SANDIA REPORT

SAND2013-0150

Unlimited Release

Printed January 2013

Areas for US-India Civilian Nuclear 

Cooperation to Prevent/Mitigate 

Radiological Events

Gopalan Balachandran

Consulting Analyst, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses

New Delhi, India

Geoffrey E. Forden

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM

Prepared by

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, 

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SAND2013-0150

Unlimited Release

Printed January 2013

Areas for US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation 

to Prevent/Mitigate Radiological Events

Gopalan Balachandran1, Geoffrey E. Forden

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-MS1373

Abstract

Over the decades, India and the United States have had very little formal 

collaboration on nuclear issues. Partly this was because neither country needed 

collaboration to make progress in the nuclear field. But it was also due, in part, to the 

concerns both countries had about the other’s intentions. Now that the U.S.-India 

Deal on nuclear collaboration has been signed and the Hyde Act passed in the United 

States, it is possible to recognize that both countries can benefit from such nuclear 

collaboration, especially if it starts with issues important to both countries that do not 

touch on strategic systems. Fortunately, there are many noncontroversial areas for 

collaboration. This study, funded by the U.S. State Department, has identified a 

number of areas in the prevention of and response to radiological incidents where 

such collaboration could take place. 

 

1

Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
4
5
6

CONTENTS

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................ 8

1.1 The Current Study............................................................................................................... 8

1.2 Indian Priorities................................................................................................................... 9

2. Areas for Future Collaboration ................................................................................................. 11

2.1 Preventing Radiological Emergencies.............................................................................. 11

2.1.1 Control of Nuclear Material across Borders........................................................ 11

2.1.2 Security Measures Beyond the Boundaries of Nuclear Facilities....................... 11

2.1.3 Cooperation on Seismic Evaluation of Reactor Siting........................................ 12

2.1.4 Cooperation on Developing Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental 

Impact Statements ........................................................................................................ 12

2.2 Responding to Radiological Emergencies........................................................................ 12

2.2.1 Developing Guiding Principles for Evacuation Plans......................................... 12

2.2.2 Establishing a Nation-wide Network of Hospitals for Handling Radiation Injuries

13

2.2.3 Developing Procedures for Transmitting Information to Off-Site Stakeholders 13

2.2.4 Mobile Monitoring Systems................................................................................ 14

2.2.5 Develop Training Plans for Responding to Radiological Incidents.................... 14

3. Conclusions.............................................................................................................................. 15

4. References................................................................................................................................ 16

Appendix: Author Biographies..................................................................................................... 18

Distribution ................................................................................................................................... 19

TABLES

Table 1. The Schools within the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership......................... 15
7

NOMENCLATURE

AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (India)

DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India)

DOE Department of Energy (United States)

DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization (India)

GCNEP Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (India)

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority (India)

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (United States)

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Agency (United States)

SNL Sandia National Laboratories (United States)
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1. INTRODUCTION

There was very little active bilateral contact between Indian and US nuclear scientists from 1974, 

when India tested its Peaceful Nuclear Device, and 2008 when the US and India signed the socalled 123 Agreement.1 A 123 Agreement is a bilateral agreement between the US and another 

country and is required by the United States Atomic Energy Act of 19542as a prerequisite for 

any nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Even now, there is no overriding 

compulsion for any joint collaborative research in the nuclear field. The nuclear science 

programs in both countries are self-sufficient in fulfilling their respective national goals and 

needs. However, there are a number of factors encouraging such cooperation.

First, both countries are aware of, and concerned about, the developments in the international 

nuclear environment that may have very serious negative consequences for the global use of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and national security. Cooperation would also strengthen 

India-US political and strategic efforts to manage the changing global international environment 

in a peaceful manner. It would also nurture the growing bilateral cooperation in other strategic 

areas such as defense. Finally, such cooperation would increase political awareness at all 

levels—governmental, commercial, and the general public—in both countries about the need to 

deepen and improve bilateral relations.

While these factors encouraging nuclear cooperation are real and important, there are also 

significant aspects that make it difficult. Foremost among those are the residual doubts and 

apprehensions, harbored in both countries, about the intentions of the other that inhibit greater 

collaboration between the two countries. For instance, the Hyde act3, which sets out the US 

policy on nuclear cooperation with India, was originally viewed by many in India as placing too 

many restrictions on India’s nuclear program.4 Only after an open letter was sent to Parliament 

by a group of former military chiefs, bureaucrats, and scientists supporting the deal did it win 

approval in India.5 In addition to this initial distrust, there is a lack of awareness in each country 

about the opportunities such cooperation can create without any adverse consequences on either 

country’s national security goals.

In addition to such policy considerations, which tend to make cooperation difficult, there are 

several practical difficulties that have inhibited such interactions. Foremost among those has 

been the perceived lack of attention and thought among governmental offices and nongovernmental circles—Think Tanks—such cooperation deserves. There has also been a lack of 

well-developed institutions where such collaborative research could be carried out. Fortunately, 

the creation of India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) now provides an 

appropriate center for such collaboration.

1.1 The Current Study

This study is focused on the prevention and mitigation of radiological incidents. These areas of 

study are noncontroversial in both countries since they concentrate on the management of 

emergencies; they will avoid any lingering suspicions the countries may have about cooperation 

that come closer to strategic systems. It also fills a noticeable void: the perceived lack of
9

substantial interaction between agencies in the two countries that are concerned with emergency 

and consequence management.

Radiological incidents have been the subject of vital and increased concern, both globally and 

within India, after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.6 This concern has been amplified by 

the planned acceleration of civil nuclear energy in India. The World Nuclear Association

estimates that the power produced by nuclear plants in India will more than double in the next 

four years as those plants that are already under construction come on line by 2016 to more than 

9.6 Gigawatts (electric).7 The same report estimates that another 45 Gigawatts (electric)—more 

than ten times the current nuclear capacity in India—will be brought on line if all the planned or 

proposed nuclear power plants are built. 

This increase in nuclear power has been accompanied by an increased public awareness of the 

off-site consequences of nuclear incidents. Fukushima was much more alarming to the general 

public than the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in 1986 because so much of it was 

witnessed live on TV.

The objective of this study is to identify areas of possible cooperation that have a high priority in 

India, identify places and institutions where the cooperation could take place, and recommend 

strategies to enable such cooperation.

1.2 Indian Priorities

The National Disaster Management Authority, NDMA, is the cabinet level Indian organization 

that has been tasked with the management of nuclear and radiological emergencies. It has 

identified a number of areas where further development is required as a high priority.8They

point out that rescue and relief measures will be highly demanding in terms of the availability of 

adequately trained personnel and advanced instruments and equipment. The nature of relief 

measures for radiological incidents—involving possibilities all the way from nuclear power plant 

accidents to orphaned radiological sources to terrorist attacks—differs in many ways from those 

needed in natural disasters like fire, floods, and earthquakes. In a nuclear emergency, the first 

responders and others who follow to carry out relief work are likely to be exposed to both high 

doses of direct radiation and contamination that can lead to delayed exposure. These unique 

aspects of radiological events not only affect the lives and health of the first emergency workers 

to respond, but their potential to carry out relief work.

There is also much work to be done training all the agencies involved in the management of 

radiological emergencies. Senior public administrators, like district or state-level officials, who 

would manage such emergencies, need to have an action plan worked out ahead of time and they 

need to practice it just as much as first responders need to practice their procedures for dealing 

with these unique events. 

Also needed as a high priority is a mobile monitoring system available to law and order 

authorities which would warn them of any significant or abnormal rise in the background 

radiation level in the public domain. This mobile monitoring system is in addition to providing a 

large number of personal protective gear including personal radiation detection and monitoring 
10

instruments. Presently, any such protective gear is confined to the Department of Atomic Energy 

(DAE) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) establishments. Even 

there, the total numbers of such devices will probably not suffice for responders off the site of 

nuclear power plants. This lack, and the lack of trained responders, could severely hamper the 

nation’s ability to effectively handle any nuclear emergency scenario.
11

2. AREAS FOR FUTURE COLLABORATION

Under the terms of reference for this study, we confined our areas of interest to those joint 

projects that might either help prevent radiological events from occurring or responses that 

would mitigate the effects of radiological incidents. We have identified general areas for future 

collaboration but, again, we want to emphasize that the next step for all of these areas of 

cooperation would be another study to look at a specific area to plan that cooperation in detail.

2.1 Preventing Radiological Emergencies 

India, like all countries, places maximum emphasis on preventing nuclear and radiological 

emergencies. As a consequence, India has instilled a culture of nuclear safety and security and 

follows the best safety and security practices in its nuclear facilities and institutions that use 

radioisotopes. There are, nevertheless, two types of emergencies that are of great interest: 

possible malfunctions in the nuclear fuel cycle and detonation of a radiological dispersal device.9 

There are a number of areas of prevention where collaboration between India and the US would 

be of great interest. This section lists a few of those.

2.1.1 Control of Nuclear Material across Borders

As with other countries, India is increasingly worried about terrorism of all kinds including 

nuclear terrorism. It views with concern the security measures its nuclear neighbor, Pakistan, is 

taking with both its nuclear weapons and its nuclear material.10 Collaboration leading to an 

improved ability to detect nuclear material crossing its border may be of interest to India.

2.1.2 Security Measures Beyond the Boundaries of Nuclear Facilities

For the time being, it would be best if U.S. involvement in nuclear security cooperation was 

limited to issues outside the boundaries of India’s nuclear facilities. However, there is plenty of 

room for cooperation between the two countries in security measures involving radiological 

materials outside the boundaries of these sites. A few of the possible areas for cooperation are 

listed below.

2.1.2.1 Security of Radiological Materials at Hospitals, Universities, Industries, etc.

India would be interested in cooperating on security measures at sites outside of its dedicated 

nuclear facilities. Examples include hospitals, universities, and various industries that use 

radioisotopes. The U.S. NNSA has started a program to improve security of nuclear material at 

hospitals around the United States.

11

 As a first step in this process, NNSA provides hospitals 

with an assessment of their nuclear material and then installs security upgrades—remote 

monitoring systems, biometric access controls, and security cameras—as needed. India would 

like to study this program and understand the principles behind and guidelines for those 

assessments.

2.1.2.2 Recovering Orphan Sources.

India, like most countries, has been using encapsulated radioactive sources for a variety of 

medical, educational, and industrial purposes for years. Of these, a small fraction are so-called 

orphan sources; sources that possess sufficient radiological hazard to warrant regulatory control 

but are not so controlled because they have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, or transferred 

without appropriate measures having been taken. For instance, a high reactivity Cs137 source 
12

was imported into India in the 1950s, while regulatory control in the country was still in its initial 

stages. 12 As a consequence, the source was not placed under regulatory surveillance until a 

member of the corporation that owned the source discovered it. Without proper regulatory 

control, this source could have made it out into the community and caused substantial harm. 

Fortunately, this particular source was discovered and put into the regulatory system before it 

could escape into society. India would be interested in engaging with the U.S. on developing 

procedures for the recovery of such sources.

2.1.2.3 Cooperative Development of the Principles of Nuclear Transportation Security

India has plans to dramatically increase its use of nuclear power in the years ahead.19 This will 

inevitably result in a huge increase in the transportation of nuclear fuel, both fresh and irradiated. 

The U.S. has years of experience in the safe and secure transportation of these kinds of materials 

and India may be interested in collaborating with the United States on designing safe and secure 

transportation containers and understanding the guiding principles for secure transportation.

2.1.3 Cooperation on Seismic Evaluation of Reactor Siting

India is a relatively active seismic region of the Earth with almost 54% of the land vulnerable to 

earthquakes.13 Fortunately, most of the power reactors that have already been built are in 

relatively quiet zones either inland—and hence safe from tsunamis—or on the West coast of 

India. As India’s fleet of nuclear power plants increases in the years ahead, that might not 

always be possible. India may be interested in joint research on evaluating reactor sites for 

seismic and tsunami suitability.

2.1.4 Cooperation on Developing Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental 

Impact Statements

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission publishes detailed guidelines on how to write 

environmental impact statements for reactors inside the United States.14 However, the U.S. 

guidelines are very US-centric and geared to responding to U.S. laws. India may be interested in 

understanding more about the basic principles of writing such environmental impact statements 

so that they can be written explicitly for the Indian experience.

2.2 Responding to Radiological Emergencies

No matter how much work is spent trying to prevent radiological emergencies most experts agree 

that they will eventually occur. Because of this, it is important to plan for their response, as well 

as their prevention. This section discusses some of the areas of joint cooperation that India and 

the United States might undertake to build up responses in both countries to radiological events.

2.2.1 Developing Guiding Principles for Evacuation Plans

Evacuation, and its complement, sheltering, are the principal protective actions that might be 

taken by the authorities to protect the public during the early phase of a radiological emergency 

originating in a nuclear power plant. Evacuation is the removal of the populous to avoid or 

reduce high-level, short-term exposure from the emitted plume. Planning for it, however, must 

take into account a number of different scenarios and the availability of transportation. These 

factors can differ considerably between the United States and India, for instance, in the US, there 

is a higher probability of ice storms in the vicinity of power plants and Indian authorities have to 

worry more about the effects of monsoons. India will need to develop its own parameters to use 
13

in making such plans. However, India may be interested in collaborating with the United States 

to develop guidelines for its own evacuation plans.

2.2.2 Establishing a Nation-wide Network of Hospitals for Handling Radiation Injuries

Radiation injures are, fortunately, not frequent events, which causes most hospitals to be 

unfamiliar with their treatment. However, a number of specialties usually associated with other 

forms of care can contribute to the care of irradiated patients. For example, cancer treatment and 

its specialties such as those associated with the care of patients needing bone marrow transplants. 

Most patients, however, even those with severe doses from a radiological incident will most 

likely not need bone marrow transplants. But the supportive care associated with such 

procedures can greatly aid the expected casualties.

15

 For that reason, hospitals local to the 

radiological incident—which most likely do not have such specialized expertise—can benefit 

considerably from the hospitals that do. These network hospitals can help triage the patients and 

determine which need more specialized supportive care and who should be moved to the network 

hospitals. However, setting up such a network requires considerable planning based on both the 

specialized medical knowledge and the results of numerous studies of large-scale simulations of 

radiological events. India would be interested in both collaborating with the United States on 

those studies and utilizing the information from past studies to develop such networks.

2.2.3 Developing Procedures for Transmitting Information to Off-Site Stakeholders

India has developed the federal-level mechanisms for dealing with large scale radiological 

incidents but there is considerable work to be done at the state and local levels. Of particular 

interest is how a nuclear facility communicates the occurrence and status of a radiological 

emergency to the local stakeholders: the populous as well as state and local officials. 

2.2.3.1 Communicating with the Population

Communicating with the population in the region of the radiological emergency should be done 

by means that are available to the vast majority of the public and appropriate for their proximity 

to the site of the radiological emergency. Furthermore, the public must be made aware of what 

the appropriate response is to an issued warning and where they can learn more information 

about what actions to take. This necessitates continual communication with and education of the 

public. India may be interested in collaborating with the United States on developing the 

guidelines for establishing these channels of communication and education.

2.2.3.2 Communicating with State and Local Level Officials

Communication involves both technology and procedures and both need to be developed. State 

and local officials are in charge of the initial agencies responsible for protecting the public from 

the offsite consequences of a radiological incident. They are responsible for ordering such 

preventative measures as evacuations. However, these officials can only make their decisions 

based on information released by the nuclear facility so it is important that strong lines of 

communication be established as well as educating these officials so that they can develop 

written procedures for dealing with these emergencies. Cooperation between the U.S. and India 

on developing the guidelines for formulating these procedures—which must depend on the 

specific circumstances for each locale—as well as the systems for assured communication may

be welcome.
14

2.2.4 Mobile Monitoring Systems

India recognizes the need for mobile monitoring systems for determining the levels of radiation 

around the site of the radiological emergency. India could either purchase such systems or 

license their production.

2.2.5 Develop Training Plans for Responding to Radiological Incidents

One of the most important factors in ensuring successful response to emergencies is a 

comprehensive training program that involves realistic exercises. Not only do such realistic 

exercises provide individual training, but, if the results are properly evaluated, they also improve 

the whole emergency management system.

16 India may wish to cooperate on planning training 

exercises for radiological incidents and, as preparation for that, send observers to a U.S. field 

exercise for a radiological incident.
15

3. CONCLUSIONS

In this report, we have outlined a number of new initiatives for potential cooperation between 

India and the United States. More joint preparatory work needs to be done on just about all of 

these initiatives before the actual development can take place. We recommend that follow-on 

studies be done between Indian and US scientists and policy makers to work out the details. 

However, once a work plan has been created, the joint development work will need to find a 

venue. We recommend that joint development work taking place in India utilize the Schools 

associated with the Global Centre for nuclear Energy Partnership being set up outside of New 

Delhi.

In September 2010, the central government approved the establishment of the Global Centre for 

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP).17 The proposed center will provide facilities related to 

advanced education, research, and training in the fields shown in Table 1. The mission of the 

School of Radiological Safety Studies is “to carry out research and development in radiation 

monitoring including development of detectors and systems, to develop decision support systems 

for nuclear emergency management, to conduct radiation transport, shielding, dispersion 

modeling and impact assessment studies, to impart training to and certification of personnel in 

radiation protection principles and safety practices, and to maintain and update radiation 

protection standards.”

Table 1. The Schools within the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership18

1) School of Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems Studies

2) School of Nuclear Security Studies

3) School of Radiological Safety Studies

4) School of Nuclear Material Characterization Studies

5) School for Studies on Applications of Radioisotopes

This Centre can provide the needed institutions, facilities, and personnel in India for many of the 

areas for joint research and cooperation outlined in this report. In particular, the School of 

Radiological Safety Studies’ mandate aligns very well with many of the initiatives developed 

here. Others might well find a home in the School of Nuclear Security Studies. 
16

4. REFERENCES

1. The Times of India, “India, US sign landmark 123 Agreement,” October 11, 2008; 

available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-10-

11/india/27905286_1_indian-nuclear-market-sign-landmark-civil-nuclear-field, last 

accessed 11/6/2012

2. The United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, available at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1320ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr1320ih.pdf, last 

accessed 11/6/2012

3. United States and India Nuclear Cooperation (Public Law 109-401-Dec. 18, 2006), 

available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ401/pdf/PLAW109publ401.pdf, last accessed 11/6/2012

4. Praful Bidwai, “POLITICS: India Split Over US Nuke Deal,” Inter Press Service News 

Agency, available online at http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/12/politics-india-split-over-usnuke-deal/, last accessed 11/6/2012

5. The Indian Express, “The Question is Can We Get a Better N-Deal? No”, available 

online at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-the-question-is-can-we-get-a-better-ndeal-

-no-/239308/0, last accessed 11/6/2012

6. Matthias Wiliams, Reuters, “Fukushima fallout seeps into India’s nuclear push”, 

available online at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/india-nuclear-kudankulamfukushima-idINDEE88H0FL20120919, last accessed 11/6/2012

7. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India,” available online at 

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html, last accessed 11/6/2012.

8. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), “National Disaster Management 

Guidelines—Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies” (February 2009), 

available online at 

http://nidm.gov.in/PDF/guidelines/nuclear_radiological_emergencies.pdf. Last accessed 

11/6/2012.

9. Ibid., p. xv.

10. Parul Chandra, The Asian Age, “India worried about Pakistan’s nuclear programme, 

terrorism,” March 25, 2012, available online at http://www.asianage.com/india/indiaworried-about-pakistan-s-nuclear-programme-terrorism-961

11. GAO, “Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of Radiological Sources at U.S. 

Medical Facilities,” (GAO-12-925), September 2012, available online at 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647931.pdf, last accessed 11/8/2012

12. The IAEA, Strengthening control over radioactive sources in authorized use and 

regaining control over orphan sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1388, February 2004, p. 25
17

13. Dr. B. B. Jain, “Housing Census Data and Disaster Mitigation Aspects in India,” 

presented at the United Nations Workshop on Census Cartography and Management for 

ESCAP, 15-19 October 2007, Bangkok, Thailand.

14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear 

Power Stations, NUREG-0099, Regulatory Guide 4.2, revision 2 (1976), available online 

at http://www.orau.org/ptp/PTP%20Library/library/Nrc/Reguide/04-002.pdf, last 

accessed 11/12/2012.

15. Radiation Injury Treatment Network, Radiation Injury Treatment Network (RITN): 

Concept of Operations. (February 2012), available online at 

http://www.ritn.net/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147483905, last accessed 

11/12/2012.

16. National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA, “Unite 1: Introduction to Exercise Design,” 

available online at http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is139Unit1.doc, last 

accessed 11/15/2012

17. The Hindu, “Haryana to have global centre for nuclear energy,” available online at 

http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/04/stories/2010120451550400.htm, last accessed 

11/6/2012

18. GCNEP List of Schools, Department of Atomic Energy, available online at 

http://www.gcnep.gov.in/schools.html#3, last accessed 11/6/2012

19. The Indian Department of Atomic Energy, “Meeting Demand Projection,” available on 

line at http://dae.nic.in/?q=node/129, last accessed 1/8/2013
18

APPENDIX: AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. Gopalan Balachandran

Dr. Balachandran is a consulting fellow at India’s Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis 

(IDSA) where he works on projects related to Indian defense spending and civil nuclear power 

programs. He has advanced degrees in economics, computer science, electrical engineering, and 

applied physics from universities in India, England, and the United States. Previous to working 

at IDSA, Dr. Balachandran worked in a number of capacities ranging from correspondent (at The 

Hindu) and editor (at the Business Standard, New Delhi) to director for a United Nations 

development program. He has done a number of studies for various agencies of the Indian 

government.

Dr. Geoffrey E. Forden

Dr. Geoffrey Forden is a physicist by training but has been working on issues related to arms 

control, international security, and nonproliferation for the last 15 years. He joined Sandia in

September of 2010, where he has worked on a number of projects furthering the nonproliferation 

goals of the Departments of State and Energy in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. 

His work on South Asia while at Sandia has involved extensive interactions with both Indians 

and Pakistanis separately and together. Before coming to Sandia, he spent ten years as a 

principle research scientist at MIT. While there, he concentrated on understanding how 

developing nations acquired the world’s most dangerous weapons. He took a year off from MIT 

to work as United Nation’s Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission’s 

(UNMOVIC) first Chief of Multidiscipline Analysis and Assessment. UNMOVIC was the UN’s 

weapon inspection agency for Iraq.
19

DISTRIBUTION 

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No. 1 Development Enclave

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India

10 MS1373 Geoffrey Forden 6821

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