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i 

24–677 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–5] 

THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM 

AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 

STRATEGIES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 14, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

MARK MOREHOUSE, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Hoffman, Bruce, Director, Center for Security Studies and Director, Security 

Program, Georgetown University ....................................................................... 3 

Jenkins, Brian Michael, Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation .. 5 

Sheehan, Ambassador Michael A., Distinguished Chair, Combating Terrorism 

Center at West Point ........................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hoffman, Bruce ................................................................................................. 55 

Jenkins, Brian Michael .................................................................................... 89 

Sheehan, Ambassador Michael A. ................................................................... 109 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 121 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 122 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 121 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 123 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 123 

(1) 

THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM AND 

EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 14, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. Following our 

hearings on the state of the world, security environment, and the 

state of the military, today we begin to examine some of the specific security challenges facing the United States. 

This week the topic is terrorism. In conjunction with the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, there will be a 

number of classified and unclassified events this week on that 

topic. 

The United States has been explicitly at war with terrorist organizations for close to 18 years. The threat to Americans and to 

American interests has certainly changed over the course of that 

time. Today, we all have hopes the Iraqi military will continue to 

drive ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] out of Iraq, and that 

a coalition can reduce its presence and ability to operate in Syria. 

But we should be under no illusions. Squeezing ISIS out of Iraq 

and Syria will push some of them into other parts of the world, 

such as Africa and Southeast Asia. 

Al Qaeda has not gone away despite its lower profile in the news, 

and in fact, some believe that it is rebuilding its capacity for attacking the West. And while terrorists have physically spread out 

to more geographic locations, some of them have also become quite 

adept at operating online as well, challenging our intelligence collection and our counterterrorism efforts. 

We are privileged today to have three experts to whom this committee has regularly turned for perspective and guidance over the 

years. They will help us step back from the headlines of the moment to assess the status of the terrorist threat, how it is evolving, 

and what kind of capability the United States must have to defend 

our people. 

Before turning to them, I would yield to the ranking member for 

any comments he would like to make. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I largely concur on 

your opening remarks. I think you can rank the threats in different 

ways, but I have always, you know, felt that the number one threat 

was what is presented by Al Qaeda and ISIS and all of the offshoots. 

Because whatever challenges we may have with other countries 

in the world, this is the one group, Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, 

Al Shabaab, et cetera, that wakes up every morning trying to kill 

as many Westerners as is humanly possible. And the only thing 

that is stopping them is our ability to stop them. It is not a lack 

of will. 

So trying to combat that ideology and combat those specific 

groups, I still feel, is the number one security threat that we face 

in this country. And I think that the chairman outlined it fairly 

well. 

Since 9/11, we definitely had some initial success in going after 

Al Qaeda, knocking out their leadership, going after their home 

bases, and disrupting their ability to plot and carry out attacks. 

So the good news is we have done a decent job of identifying specific people and specific groups that threaten us, and then weakening them by taking out their leadership and undermining their 

ability to plan against us. 

The bad news is the ideology has spread even further, and you 

have people picking up the banner of ISIS who may have never had 

anything to do with ISIS. But nonetheless, they commit terrorist 

attacks that threaten our security here in the U.S. and amongst 

our Western allies. 

So the real big question is, how do we stop that metastasizing 

of this ideology that so threatens us? I believe that we have to continue to focus on the specific groups, the threats that they have 

made. 

I think both President Bush and President Obama prioritized 

that correctly, but how do we stop the spread of the ideology? That 

is where I feel like we have been going backwards over the course 

of the last 15 years. 

That regrettably more and more people, typically people who 

have, you know, issues of their own, not happy with their life, have 

mental instability, pick up the banner and commit attacks in the 

name of this ideology. So how we combat that, I think, is the most 

important question going forward. 

Certainly, we are also interested in the details of, as the chairman mentioned, is Al Qaeda reconstituting itself? If so, where? 

What parts of the world present the greatest challenge? 

And also, I think, very importantly, who are the partners that we 

should look to be working with or continue to be working with who 

can help us with this in those parts of the world where this threat 

emanates from? And so I look forward to your testimony. 

I thank the chairman for the opportunity, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. As I say, we appreciate 

each of the witnesses being here today. We have Professor Bruce 
3 

Hoffman, director, Center for Security Studies and director of the 

Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. 

We have Mr. Brian Michael Jenkins, senior advisor to the president at RAND Corporation. And we have Ambassador Michael 

Sheehan, who is currently distinguished chair, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 

Obviously, more extensive bios are in everybody’s information. 

Thank you all for being here. Without objection, your full written 

statements will be made part of the record, and we would be delighted to hear any overviews and oral comments you would like 

to make at this time. 

Professor Hoffman, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

SECURITY STUDIES AND DIRECTOR, SECURITY PROGRAM, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith, for the privilege of testifying before the committee this 

morning. 

While ISIS poses the most serious imminent terrorist threat 

today, Al Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding and marshalling its resources to reinvigorate its war against the United States. The result is that both groups have enmeshed the U.S. and the West in 

a debilitating war of attrition with all its deleterious consequences. 

ISIS, alas, is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. 

Some 2 years before the 2015 Paris attacks, it built an external operations capability and network in Europe that mostly escaped notice. This unit appears to function independently of the group’s 

waning military and territorial fortunes, and thereby ensures that 

ISIS will retain an effective international terrorist strike capability. 

Moreover, there is the further problem of at least some of the estimated 7,000 European foreign fighters returning home. They are 

only a fraction of the nearly 40,000 terrorists from more than 100 

countries throughout the world who have trained in Syria and Iraq. 

And unlike the comparatively narrow geographical demographics 

of prior recruits, the current foreign fighter cadre includes hitherto 

unrepresented nationalities, such as hundreds of Latin Americans, 

along with citizens from Mali, Benin, and Bangladesh, among others. 

Meanwhile, Al Qaeda’s presence in Syria should be regarded as 

just as dangerous and even more pernicious than that of ISIS. This 

is the product of Al Zawahiri’s strategy of letting ISIS take all the 

heat and absorb all the blows from the coalition arrayed against it, 

while Al Qaeda quietly rebuilds its military strength and basks in 

its paradoxical new cachet as, quote/unquote, ‘‘moderate extremists,’’ in contrast to the unconstrained ISIS. 

Anyone inclined to be taken in by this ruse would do well to heed 

the admonition of the American journalist who spent 2 years in 

Syria as a hostage of Jabhat al-Nusrah. Theo Padnos relates how, 

‘‘The Nusra Front higher-ups were inviting Westerners to the jihad 

in Syria not so much because they needed more foot soldiers—they 

didn’t—but because they want to teach the Westerners to take the 

struggle into every neighborhood and subway [station] back home.’’ 
4 

Looking to the immediate future, ISIS’ continuing setbacks and 

serial weakening arguably create the conditions where some reconciliation with Al Qaeda might yet be effected, whether voluntarily 

or through forced absorption. Regardless of how that might occur, 

any kind of reamalgamation or cooperation between the two would 

doubtless produce a significantly escalated global threat. 

A quarter of a century ago, British Prime Minister Margaret 

Thatcher described publicity as the oxygen upon which terrorism 

depended. Today, however, it is access to sanctuary and safe haven 

that sustains and nourishes terrorism. 

A depressing pattern has established itself whereby we continue 

to kill terrorist leaders while the organizations they lead nonetheless continue to seize territory. 

Indeed, according to the National Counterterrorism Center 

[NCTC], a year before the U.S. launched the current campaign to 

defeat ISIS, the group had a presence in only seven countries 

around the world. By 2015, that number had nearly doubled. 

And as recently as this past August, the NCTC reported that 

ISIS was, quote/unquote, ‘‘fully operational’’ in 18 countries. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda is also present in three times as many countries 

today as it was 8 years ago. 

Sanctuary, it should be noted, also permits more scope for terrorist research and development of various unconventional weapons, as Al Qaeda clearly demonstrated with its pre-9/11 efforts to 

acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear weapons 

in Afghanistan. 

In sum, the U.S. is facing perhaps the most perilous international security environment since the period immediately following 

the September 11, 2001, attacks, with serious threats now emanating from not one, but two terrorist movements. 

Our Salafi-jihadi enemies have locked us into an enervating war 

of attrition, the preferred strategy of terrorists from time immemorial. They hope to exhaust us and to undermine national political 

will, corrode internal popular support and demoralize us and our 

regional partners through a prolonged, generally intensifying and 

increasingly diffuse campaign of terrorism and violence. 

Indeed, the three pillars upon which our counterterrorist strategy has been based, leadership attrition, training of local forces, 

and countering violent extremism, have thus far all failed to deliver a crushing blow to either ISIS or Al Qaeda. Decisively breaking this stasis and emerging from this war of attrition must now 

therefore be among the United States’ highest counterterrorist priorities. 

The current threat environment posed by the emergence and 

spread of ISIS and the stubborn resilience and long-game approach 

of Al Qaeda makes a new strategy and new organizational and institutional behaviors necessary. 

The effectiveness of the strategy will be based on our capacity to 

think like a networked enemy in anticipation of how they may act 

in a variety of situations, aided by different resources. 

This goal requires that the United States national security structure organize itself for maximum efficiency, information sharing, 

and the ability to function quickly and effectively under new operational definitions. Thank you. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Jenkins. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR 

TO THE PRESIDENT, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JENKINS. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 

members of the committee, thank you for again inviting me to address this important subject. 

While perhaps not an existential threat to the republic, I would 

agree that jihadist terrorism is the most prominent and certainly 

the most persistent security challenge that we face. 

Terrorism has increased dramatically worldwide, although most 

recent terrorist incidents remain concentrated in the Middle East 

and adjacent regions of North Africa and West Asia. The Middle 

East is also the theater of most U.S. military engagements over the 

past three decades. 

Jihadists have established footholds throughout the region. Both 

Al Qaeda and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] have sent 

out missions to establish or acquire affiliates, often by attaching 

themselves to rebels fighting local governments. 

Now, I think it would be wrong to see this spread of jihadist flags 

as the advance of an occupying army. It is not centrally controlled. 

Loyalties remain fluid, and we will see how much attraction ISIS 

or ISIL continues to have when it faces loss of territory in Syria 

and Iraq. 

But it complicates things by turning one war into many wars. 

The spillover from these contests creates a multileveled terrorist 

threat. First, strategic strikes from abroad; second, returning foreign fighters; and third, homegrown terrorists inspired by jihadist 

ideology. 

Now, improved intelligence, greater international cooperation, 

and continuing military operations have made it more difficult, not 

impossible, to carry out large-scale operations like Al Qaeda’s 9/11 

attacks. ISIL itself clearly has global ambitions and has assisted 

some terrorist operations abroad, but it has not, at least not yet, 

attempted to replicate Al Qaeda’s campaign. 

Instead of escalating vertically, today’s jihadists have escalated 

horizontally by exploiting the internet and social media to inspire 

distant followers. Their manuals recommend soft targets and simple operations within the limited capabilities of these recruits. 

The trend is toward what we might call pure terrorism. That is, 

truly random attacks on people anywhere, often by a single individual using any available weapon. Now, the small numbers of these 

attacks suggest that it isn’t easy to remotely motivate people to action. 

The internet reaches a vast audience, but absent physical connectivity, most online would-be warriors do nothing. Still, we have to 

keep in mind that as ISIL faces defeat on the ground, it could respond with more ambitious international operations. 

Foreign fighters pose another layer of the threat, more so in Europe than the United States. The fact is here, however, that as 

ISIL is squeezed territorially in Iraq and Syria, that it won’t end 

the fighting. 
6 

It will go underground and continue the contest, but the foreign 

fighters cannot survive an underground struggle. They will scatter 

to other jihadist fronts. Some will return home, determined to continue the jihad. 

The principal threat here comes from homegrown terrorists. Fortunately, they are few despite constant exhortation from abroad. 

Since 9/11, approximately 150 individuals have been arrested or 

killed plotting or carrying out terrorist attacks here. 

The FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and police have uncovered and thwarted more than 80 percent of these plots. That is a 

remarkable record. As a result, in the past 15 years, jihadist terrorists in the United States have been able to kill fewer than 100 people. Every death is tragic, but certainly it is a far smaller number 

than we were worried about in the immediate shadow of 9/11. 

But although fortunate here, we still have to address the source 

of the problem, as Professor Hoffman has pointed out. There are 

no easy solutions here. Attacking root causes while reducing 

ungoverned spaces requires major investments and will take years. 

We could relax the rules of engagement and increase the use of 

air power, but bombing errors, we see, can create backlash. Partnering with the Russians to destroy ISIL, in my view, comes at a 

high political cost and offers very little in return operationally. 

Large-scale interventions by U.S. combat forces are best avoided, 

and any such operations must be limited in scope and time. 

Instead of sending more troops in, can we simply withdraw, leaving local belligerents to sort things out? That has a great deal of 

appeal. It would get us out of a costly mess and enable the country 

to focus on rebuilding the American economy. 

But the U.S. has achieved a measure of success on several occasions, only to see things fall apart when it turned its attention to 

other fronts. 

Still, Americans are reluctant to accept that this is an openended contest. But whether and how the United States might end 

or substantially reduce its military role remains largely unexplored 

territory. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins can be found in the Appendix on page 89.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Sheehan. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, DISTINGUISHED CHAIR, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST 

POINT 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member. It is a pleasure to testify in front of you both today. By 

the way, now that I am not in government, I will be able to speak 

a little more frankly. I want to talk a little bit about the terrorist 

threat, evaluate some of our counterterrorism measures, and then 

make a few observations about future policies. 

First, let me start off by saying there is good news and bad news 

to this story, and it is important to understand the good news. The 

good news is that, since 9/11, our Nation has been very successful 

in denying Al Qaeda, ISIS, or any of their affiliates from conducting a strategic-level attack against our homeland in 15 years. 
7 

The bad news is that over the last 6 years the number of violent 

jihadis around the world has increased dramatically. In addition, 

there are a growing number of conflict zones across the Islamic 

world, from top to bottom, from right to left, from South Asia to 

the Levant and across all of Africa. 

These conflicts have provided opportunities for the expansion of 

Al Qaeda and ISIS from their traditional strongholds and have 

exacerbated the anger of homegrown terrorists in Europe and in 

the United States. 

During the past few years, sadly, three armies that we armed 

and trained to the teeth collapsed in front of lightly armed militia 

groups, Mali in 2012, Iraq in 2014, and Yemen in 2015, providing 

our enemies with tons of equipment, ammunition, and vehicles. 

Let me expand a little bit on the bad news. I skipped over some 

of the good news, and there is lot, but it is in my written testimony. Let me focus on the bad news. 

Since the Arab Spring, the Islamic world has been beset with 

these conflicts. Currently, there are four failed states in the Islamic 

world: Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. There are at least five 

other states with major areas of ungoverned space, including the 

FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Mali. 

In addition, there are several other states with conflicts brewing 

of varying degrees of violence and ungoverned space, such as 

Southern Philippines, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and also in 

the Sinai region of Egypt. 

The roots of these conflicts are complex. Many go back decades, 

but all have been exacerbated by the Arab Spring and the involvement of radical jihadis. 

Each of these conflicts has its own unique characteristics, which 

I, again, is in my written testimony. They are all very, very different, and AQ [Al Qaeda] and ISIS adapt to each one of those to 

expand their influence and pour gasoline on the fire and extend 

their own strategic goals. 

Before recommending any new actions, let me quickly review 

what has worked for the past 15 years. It is very important to understand, a lot of what we have done has worked. It is not luck 

that we haven’t been re-attacked since 9/11. It is not luck. It is a 

lot of hard work. 

I describe it in four layers of defense, starting with sanctuary 

areas, which I will focus mostly on, because this is the Armed Services Committee. 

But the second area is the area between the sanctuaries and our 

border, where most of that action is involved with intelligence sharing. 

The third layer of defense is our border. And that is very much 

related, those watch lists, to the intelligence sharing in the second 

layer of defense. 

The fourth and final defensive area is our homeland, and that 

primarily is the work of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 

[JTTF] and organizations like NYPD [New York Police Department], that I was proud to be a part of. 

Let me talk a little bit about the sanctuaries again and what we 

have done there and what has worked. In the sanctuary areas, we 
8 

have pounded Al Qaeda’s leadership in the FATA, Yemen, and Somalia with lethal action from the skies and also from the land and 

sea. This model has now been expanded to ISIS targets in Iraq, 

Syria, and Libya. 

Some pundits call these programs ‘‘whack-a-mole,’’ inferring the 

terrorists quickly rebound from these attacks. My experience in 

studying behavior of these groups has been very different. 

In those regions where we conduct these operations, not only do 

we kill off the most experienced, talented, and dangerous terrorists, 

but those that come after are principally concerned about staying 

alive. 

And they know that it is extremely dangerous for them to talk 

on the phone, send an email, meet with more than two or three 

people, travel in a car, set up a safehouse or a small training area. 

And those that do so, have a very short life expectancy, and they 

all know it. 

And it is difficult to run an international terrorist organization 

when you are under such pressure and your primary concern is 

physical survival. 

But our most important instrument, in addition to these strikes, 

is the training, advice, and assistance of our military units in these 

regions, particularly by the U.S. Army Special Forces. 

As advisors, in most of our cases, our soldiers should not be involved with what is referred to as ‘‘actions on the objective.’’ That 

is the shooting part of it. They should be more advisors and allow 

the host country military forces take actions on the objective. 

Again, I go through more of that concept in my written remarks. 

Let me conclude by saying—with 10 points on how we need to 

ramp up our policies in order to respond to this increasing threat 

and some of the problems we have had in the last few years. 

First of all, as Mr. Jenkins said, try not to invade countries. That 

doesn’t always work out very well. But at the same time, we have 

this allergy invading countries. 

And secondly, I would say don’t allow more of these collapsed armies to happen: Mali, Yemen, and Iraq. It is not necessary. So my 

second point is if you do have to intervene, look at the French 

model in Mali where they got in, crushed the rebellion, and got out. 

They didn’t own the problem. They still have small forces there 

putting pressure on AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], but 

they have not owned Mali and they got out after they achieved 

their objective. 

Thirdly we should expand our train, advise, and assist programs 

across the danger areas that I discussed. Advisors should be able 

to move forward. But again, as I said, the actual shooting should 

go to the host country. 

Fourth, Afghanistan and Iraq are very, very important, but I 

caution about creeping troop increases in both countries. Thousands of advisors that are there in advise missions, when it becomes too big, it begins to look and smell like an occupation. And 

occupations create as many problems as they seek to solve. 

When I was a special forces advisor in El Salvador, in a compound, by the way, that was overrun three times in 7 years, there 

was never more than two or three special forces advisors per bri-
9 

gade. And for 6 months I was there by myself. Sometimes, less is 

more in this type of operation. 

Fifth, aviation is a game changer. Drones collect intelligence and 

target terrorist leadership. Attack helicopters, AC–130s, A–10s, are 

the ground pounders’ best friend in a firefight. If you want to do 

more in these combat zones, I would expand aviation. Not only U.S. 

but host countries, to the extent that you can, and keep the footprint of ground forces to a minimum. 

Troop increases should be done in tens and hundreds. I am skeptical about increases in the thousands. 

Sixth, keep your sociopolitical objectives humble and limited. 

These problems are very complex, and even if you solve them in a 

country like Tunisia, which is stable, has rule of law, some economic development, they export on a per capita basis more jihadis 

than any other Arab country. 

So even where you have solved all the political social problems 

doesn’t guarantee that you are going to eliminate the jihadis. 

Seventh, support our key allies in the regions that are in the 

front lines of this fight, particularly Egypt, Jordan, the UAE 

[United Arab Emirates], and others like Niger that are hosting our 

aircraft in Central Africa. They are not perfect partners, but they 

are our partners and need our support. 

Eight, crank up the pressure on Iran. We should no longer accept 

the Iranian transgressions against our soldiers and sailors. A swift 

and determined response should be conducted for future transgressions. Failure to do so risks escalation of these attacks from 

this rogue regime. 

Ninth, preserve our troops. Their lives are precious, and there 

are a growing number of requirements around the world. We have 

been fighting this war for the last 15 years. We are going to have 

to do it for the next 15 at least. At the same time, they are being 

asked to prepare for conflicts in Central Europe and all the way to 

East Asia. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are in a long war against a determined enemy. The key to our success is going to be sustained pressure in a targeted fashion across all the four layers that I talked 

about. If there are weaknesses in any one of those layers, we become vulnerable. 

If we keep the pressure on all four, we can prevent strategic attacks, like we have for the 15 years, and try to minimize the lone 

wolf attacks, while at the same time allowing our soldiers to prepare for the threats that loom on the horizon. Threats that you, 

Mr. Chairman, are very much aware of. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheehan can be found in 

the Appendix on page 109.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I guess I am struck by the similarities. Each of you basically see or describe the threat as having 

evolved in a similar way, spread out more geographically, more 

groups, but fewer spectacular attacks, more kind of lower level attacks. 

I guess I would like to just ask each of you, where do you see 

the threat going next? There are some people, for example, who 

argue that as ISIS gets squeezed in Iraq and Syria, the incentive 

for more spectacular attacks to show that they are still there, they 
10 

are still viable, to be an attraction for their followers will grow, and 

that they will shift, basically, to more spectacular sorts of attacks. 

I think a couple of you touched on it. There are continuing—we 

have seen the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq/Syria theater. 

There continue to be concerns that chemical, biological, or radiological weapons could be in their hands. 

So I would just like to ask each of you briefly, where do you see 

this going next in terms of the threat? How will it evolve in your 

judgment? 

Professor Hoffman. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, I think you are quite correct that as ISIS 

is continually squeezed, in order to maintain its relevance, burnish 

its credentials, it is going to have to strike. 

And I think over the past 2 or 3 years it has built up a capability 

in Europe to carry out, on the one hand, Paris-style or Istanbulstyle attacks that result in mass casualties, but also, to animate or 

motivate individuals, such as the truck driver in Nice last July. 

For me, the big question is how long Al Qaeda will wait in the 

wings? I am convinced, although this is just intuition and gut feeling, is that Al Qaeda will absorb ISIS at some point. 

That as ISIS is weakened on the battlefield, it will take on those 

fighters, whether voluntarily or some sort of a hostile takeover. Because, basically, when you compare ISIS and Al Qaeda now, Al 

Qaeda is way ahead of ISIS in terms of leadership that has largely 

remained intact and also has been dispersed throughout the world, 

but particularly to the Levant, in cohesion, in ideology, and I would 

argue, in support. 

The one advantage ISIS clearly has is this external operations 

capability, which is in part, because Zawahiri has deliberately held 

back Al Qaeda. So Al Qaeda wants that external operations capability. And as I said in my testimony, that would, I think, escalate 

this conflict onto a different level. 

And this is why Al Qaeda, I think, has been seeding Syria in particular with some of its most valued senior leadership, including 

Saif al-Adel, amongst others. 

In terms of your points about the chemical weapons, I mean, 

think of what the Tsarnaev brothers did in Boston with a pressurecooker bomb that they downloaded from the internet. Or think of 

the considerable alarm that a truck driver caused in Nice. 

Even a chemical weapon, some unconventional attack or an attack using an unconventional weapon, in a European city. And 

here I agree completely with my former boss and mentor, Brian, 

that the threat is much greater in Europe than it is in the United 

States. 

But an attack with an unconventional weapon like that, I think, 

would have profound rippling, and second- and third-order effects, 

that would catapult the fear level that these groups are able to impose, to a much higher level. 

And the fact that ISIS has already regularly used chemical weapons, that there has been evidence in the past 3 years of Al Qaeda 

similarly developing sarin nerve gas, for example, that this is a potentiality we have to consider. And the psychological repercussions 

that would follow in its wake. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jenkins. 
11 

Mr. JENKINS. I do think there will be pressure on ISIL to do 

something, particularly as it is squeezed in Iraq and Syria. That 

spectacular doesn’t have to ascend up to the level of a 9/11. 

I mean, I agree with Bruce, that, you know, if you look at the 

Paris attacks or the Nice attack, or even something that might be 

the equivalent of what we saw take place in Mumbai in 2008 or 

in Nairobi more recent than that. That is a number of shooters, 

suicide bombers, hostage situations that can basically paralyze a 

city. 

I would also not exclude—because it has been a continuing quest 

of AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], as well as a demonstrated capability of ISIL, and that is, sabotage of aircraft has 

to be included. 

Given the state of the world and the apprehension that has already been created by 9/11 and by the continuing terrorist threat, 

it doesn’t have to ascend to the level of a 9/11 to have this major 

psychological impact, which is what this is all about. 

I would also agree that the foreign fighters themselves, apart 

from central leadership, they are going to scatter. They either die 

in Syria and Iraq, or they scatter. 

Some of them went to Syria, I am convinced, initially, not to 

fight and die in Syria, but to gain the contacts and training and 

experience necessary to bring the violent jihad back home. 

So as we make progress, and even evidence of that progress in 

Syria and Iraq, could see a burst of terrorist activity elsewhere. Europe is more vulnerable to that because of the proximity and the 

physical connectivity of a number of these fighters and people who 

stayed back home. 

The thing that gave the lethality to the Paris and Brussels attacks was the fact that foreign fighters were able to come back and 

hook up with people who did not go, but who provided an underground, a logistics infrastructure, weapons, and so on that could 

make them operate at a much more lethal level. 

Finally, completely separate from all of this in terms of the future, in terms of the trajectory of this ideology, this jihadist ideology is becoming a conveyor for individual discontents. That is, for 

individuals who are unhappy with their lives, who are aggressive, 

who are suffering from issues of substance abuse, even mental illness. 

This ideology resonates with it, and we are increasingly seeing 

individuals that, you know, if you ask me, are these crazy people 

or are these terrorists, my answer is yes. And that is going to be 

just the continuing phenomenon we are going to be dealing with. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, sometimes in the U.S. we 

theorize about strategies and shifts of strategies by terrorists. I actually believe that they have never moved away from their intention to conduct massive attacks within the United States, for both 

Al Qaeda, and I think ISIS would love to do it as well. It is part 

of their DNA and what they are all about. 

The reason they haven’t done it is, quite frankly, because they 

can’t. So I believe that if they could tomorrow, they would organize 

a complex and sophisticated attack against the United States. 
12 

I remember when I was in New York City after 9/11, I used to 

give speeches around the city, and then people would ask me why 

haven’t they conducted another attack since 9/11? I said, ‘‘Frankly, 

if they could, they would tomorrow. But they can’t.’’ 

That drove people insane when I said that in 2003 and 2004, but 

it is a fact. It was the truth. A lot of people said, well, they have 

changed their strategy. They are waiting for the big one. 

The reason is they will conduct a big attack if they can tomorrow. And we have to keep pressure on them, as I said in my remarks, across all those layers, and that will prevent them from 

doing so. 

It is very difficult for them now to stroll 19 people into the U.S., 

and take flying lessons and conduct four simultaneous cellular 

planning operations and conduct an attack. That is just impossible 

for them to do now. Not only in the United States, but even in Europe, even though in Paris you had some dimensions of that. 

But again, after Paris and what happened in Brussels, you are 

seeing a lot of roll-up of those cells, and it is going to become more 

difficult for them in Europe also to conduct simultaneous, multicell 

attacks, which really become at the strategic level. 

So they have never lost the intention to do so. They would love 

to do it tomorrow, in my view, either of these organizations. I agree 

with Bruce; they are probably going to morph together. 

I wrote in 2006 that the only way, and Brian talked about 

whether they represent an existential threat to the U.S., I said 

then that the only way they could is by creating a WMD [weapon 

of mass destruction], probably an improvised WMD. 

And I do believe they still have that intention, whether it be 

chemical, biological, radiological. I would suggest, and then when 

I was in NYPD, what we tried to do about that was number one, 

always look for the cell. 

Always look for the people that want to do that. And that is an 

offensive strategy of investigations and undercovers and informants 

to try to break up that cell before they have the capability to conduct a sophisticated attack, like chemical, biological, or radiological. 

And then the second thing I would suggest is you try to protect 

the materials. When I was in New York City, we had 10 hospitals 

that had pathogens that were very dangerous. We have reduced 

that to just a few right now and improved the security around 

them. The radiological materials that you find in hospitals and engineering firms have to be protected. 

And so in my view, to prevent a WMD, an improvised WMD attack takes two lines of effort. One, go after the cells. Prevent them 

from getting any sophistication. And second, make sure you have 

got the materials protected, whether it is biological pathogens, radiological materials, or dangerous chemicals. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, before I start my 

questions, we have two new members of our committee. We are 

still waiting for the third. I apologize. They were both here at the 

start. But now, well, we only have one. 
13 

But we have Tom O’Halleran, who has joined us from Arizona. 

He has served three terms in the Arizona House of Representatives 

and one in the Arizona State Senate, former Chicago homicide 

detective, and a member of the Chicago Board of Trade and smallbusiness owner. Welcome. 

And from New York we have Thomas Suozzi, who served for 7 

years as county executive of Nassau County, New York, and four 

terms as mayor of Glen Cove, New York. Welcome to the committee. We appreciate having you aboard. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thanks. 

Mr. SMITH. The question I have, and following up a little bit on 

what Ambassador Sheehan said, I think you accurately described 

two of the things we have been most successful at. And I remember 

when people were complaining about the ‘‘whack-a-mole’’ strategy 

and thinking there are some moles that need to be whacked. 

And it also can be effective, in exactly the way that you described, as it disrupts their ability to plan and attack. I also think 

the second key thing you said was that we need to work with partners. That making it a U.S.-led operation, making it any sort of 

U.S. invasion, you know, in the Muslim world, that simply reinforces the message of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. And we need 

to do that. 

Going forward, the two things that I would like you gentlemen 

to try—well, you already addressed one. That is the issue that Mr. 

Jenkins raised. 

I don’t know what we could do about that is that basically every 

disaffected person in the world is now clinging to this ideology as 

an excuse to do the kind of thing that they probably would have 

done anyway. So trying to track down those dangerous people when 

there isn’t necessarily a direct causal link to ISIS or Al Qaeda is 

going to be a law enforcement challenge across the Western world. 

But the piece of it we haven’t really talked about is the religious 

piece. And the fact that ISIS and Al Qaeda, and this is a very controversial subject, because as I think it was General Petraeus said, 

our most important allies in combatting groups like Al Qaeda and 

ISIS are our Muslim friends. 

We need them on our side. These people are operating in their 

world. These people are hijacking their religion. They are the ones 

that are going to need to lead the fight. 

But I guess the biggest question is, well, one last ideological 

point. There are those, particularly in this current administration, 

who view Islam itself as illegitimate, that basically Islam is not a 

religion they have said. It is an ideology of subjugation. 

And if you take that approach, basically looking at all Muslims 

across the world and saying that, until you fundamentally change, 

we are going to view you all as a threat. That strikes me as a bad 

approach. 

But what I would like to ask is what Muslim allies—well, I am 

not going to like to ask. I am just going to ask it. What Muslim 

allies are there that we should work with? And how do we combat 

Al Qaeda and ISIS’ interpretation? 

I forget the gentleman who wrote the book, but some years ago, 

when the chairman and I were on the what was then the Terrorism 

Subcommittee, we had the author of a book called ‘‘The Al Qaeda 
14 

Reader’’ come testify before us and basically say, you know, bin 

Laden has got an argument about his interpretation of the religion. 

Now I don’t agree with that. There are a thousand different ways 

to interpret just about every religion out there. But what is, who 

are our best messengers for this? How do we best combat that, that 

ISIS and these folks are merely taking Islam to its logical conclusion, a view that I totally disagree with? 

But who do we look to counter it? What is the best counterargument? And how can we persuade the current White House to not 

go down that ‘‘We are at war with all Muslims’’ route, because I 

think that is quite literally a dead end. How would you wrap all 

of those religious issues together and give us a strategy? 

Whoever wants to take a crack at that is welcome. Don’t all leap 

in. 

Mr. JENKINS. We are all going to look at each other to see who 

is going to go down that path first. Look, first of all, let me address 

pieces. You raised several issues, so let me try disaggregate those 

and address a couple of them separately. 

With regard to local allies, I think we all agree here that this is 

key. This is not something that the United States can do without 

allies in the world, in the Arab world, in the Muslim world to do 

this. And these allies in almost every single case are going to be 

imperfect allies. 

And so to put this into an operational question, they are not 

going to necessarily live up to our standards of democracy, of social 

agendas, and so on. 

And while we stand for those things, we want to be careful that 

we don’t set an unreasonable bar that prevents us from working 

with locals, as imperfect as they are. 

And so that means in some sense we are going to be looking for 

a way we can work with every single Muslim state, Arab state that 

is willing to work with us on this. There are some obvious key 

ones, the Gulf States to be sure. 

Americans have, especially in recent years, a lot of trouble with 

Saudi Arabia, with the Saudis. But in fact they remain a key player, and we are going to be working with them. 

The Egyptians, again, in recent years, that has raised a number 

of problems. We are going to be working with them—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. We could go down the road of all these. 

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. I am really interested in the religious aspect of 

this—— 

Mr. JENKINS. All right. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. And how you think we should approach 

it? 

Mr. JENKINS. There, just to touch that one, I am not sure we can 

effectively persuade people to alter their views about religion. And 

I am not sure that that is necessarily a productive path. Patrolling 

ideologies or religious interpretations of the Koran or any other religious book is not something that we can easily do. 

I guess I am more in the realm of I don’t care what they believe. 

What I care about is what they do. So they can believe all of these 

things that may create certain societal problems in various soci-
15 

eties. My principal concern is operationalizing that into violent attacks. 

So just as we are in a court of law, I don’t care what the motives 

behind a murder or something else. I am concerned with the action, 

and I am going to go after this organization to ensure that these 

individuals do not have the physical capabilities to implement 

whatever is their vision for the world. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ambassador Sheehan. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Let me jump straight to one of the issues 

that is related, Congressman Smith, and that is the issue of whether we should designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. 

First of all, when I was an ambassador for counterterrorism at 

the State Department, I was in charge of the designation process 

of an FTO [foreign terrorist organization]. It is a legal process. 

After it goes from State it goes to Justice. It is a legal process and 

a complicated one and a specific one. 

Muslim Brotherhood is an ideology. And there are groups in various countries across the world. If you were to go about designating 

them, you would have to do it by organization, which is what we 

do already. 

To try to do a sweeping designation, I think, would be problematic. And before we were to do that, I would suggest that we talk 

to our key allies, like President Sisi in Egypt, and ask him what 

the implications would be to designating an ideology like that as 

a terrorist when about half of the country voted for Muslim 

Brotherhood in their elections a few years ago. I am not sure that 

would help him. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. And so what we want to do is help our 

allies. So I think that the notion of trying to broadly brush the religion of Islam as the problem is not productive. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, the fact of the matter is that 

across the Islamic world, they are plagued with about 10 or 12 violent situations, wars, conflicts. In Afghanistan it is modernity 

against a Talibanesque version, all the way to tribal issues in Africa, and different types of problems that they have. 

And on top of those, you have basically a civil war between the 

Sunni and Shia sects being waged right now, which is sort of you 

could look at it as an Arab/Persian struggle or you could look at 

it as a Sunni/Shia struggle. But either way, that struggle is exacerbating the problems across the Islamic world. 

There is not a lot we can do about that except try not to make 

it worse and probably try to stand with our partners in the Gulf, 

in Egypt, Jordan, the UAE. 

And then deal with two of the most problematic of our allies, 

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which are at the root of the problem 

in many areas, historically, both of them, and fundamental to the 

solution. So we are just going to have to work with those two countries through these issues. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hoffman, you need to be very quick. I have taken 

too much time already. 
16 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sure. Actually, even though since 1989 I have 

written about how religion has motivated and inspired and 

changed terrorism, I don’t think it is about religion anymore. I 

think it has much more to do with the very simple message that 

was articulated 60 years ago by Frantz Fanon in Algeria. 

It is about the catharsis of violence, the self-satisfaction of violence against what is seen as an oppressive, subjugative system. It 

is really South against North, the undeveloped world or the developing world against the developed world. And this is why I think 

our counter-messaging has been failing because we have been 

treating it as a theological problem and it has gone beyond it. 

That is what I think accounts for the lone wolves, as Brian and 

Mike have described, but also, too, for these 40,000 foreign fighters 

that have gravitated to the movement. 

I would agree completely with Mike that designating the Muslim 

Brotherhood would be counterproductive. This is exactly the strategy that terrorists want us to embrace. Terrorism, fundamentally, 

is a strategy of provocation where you provoke your enemy to 

undertake actions that will burnish the terrorist credentials, that 

will support their propaganda. 

In my view, firstly, we should only designate groups that are terrorists, ones that are, in fact, terrorist groups. Secondly, the Muslim Brotherhood is not a cohesive entity. There are elements of it 

that are violent. We should be tough on those individuals and sanction those individuals. 

But at the same time, there are Muslim Brotherhoods represented in the Jordanian parliament, in Tunisia, and other places. 

We should be seeking to encourage those moderates and those who 

believe in democracy in the Brotherhood to embrace it more, not 

painting them with a broad brush. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, that is a very helpful answer. And I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am very grateful that Congresswoman Elise Stefanik is going 

to be the new chair of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee. And 

so she will be taking a lead on the issues we are discussing today. 

Over the weekend, I visited the World Trade Center in New 

York. It is always going to be a tragic reminder to me of the attacks of 9/11 as the Islamic terrorists initiated the global war on 

terrorism. 

Sadly, the largest number of deaths in the war, by the terrorists, 

have been people of Islamic faith. And I agree with Mr. Hoffman 

that we must be ever vigilant to eliminate safe havens of terrorists 

wherever they are. 

I am also grateful for the line of questioning by Ranking Member 

Smith. In a recent hearing from General David Petraeus to this 

committee, he emphasized on the importance of discrediting, quote, 

‘‘the ideology of Islamic extremism.’’ 

Taking that statement in consideration, each of you, could you 

describe the importance of counter-propaganda efforts and what 

role it may play in discrediting the ideology of extremism? 

Mr. Hoffman. 
17 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think discrediting the ideology of terrorism or violence, firstly, I think you have to deprive them of their allure. And 

I think the allure isn’t so much their religion. It is that they are 

able to seize and hold territory and to exercise sovereignty over 

populations. 

I mean, ISIS has emerged very suddenly as this mercurial threat 

precisely because of its military capabilities. So I think first and 

foremost there has to be a military answer to taking down the 

state. Once that state is destroyed and once that allure is removed, 

then I think, counter-propaganda messages and counter-messaging 

can be helpful. 

Until then, though, I would emphasize less the message and 

more the technological solutions of depriving the terrorists of the 

platforms that they use to communicate those messages. I think 

that is actually, at least in the current situation, would be preferable to the counter-messaging. The counter-messaging should 

prevent the resurgence of these groups, not attempt to address 

them right now. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. JENKINS. I would agree. The counter-messaging is not the 

leading issue here. The leading issue is dealing with the actual 

threat that they pose. And that means going after the asylums. It 

means dismantling the organizations. 

In terms of counter-messaging, that is extremely, extremely difficult to do. We are trying to change people’s world views. Tough 

to do. I think our most effective counter-messaging is, in fact, not 

messaging. 

It is what we stand for, ourselves. That is, this country has always stood for certain values. These values have attracted people 

from around the world, admiration from around the world. And 

that is what we believe in. 

It is far more effective for us to project our own beliefs and to 

live by those beliefs than it is for me to try to discredit how someone else views God and their position in relationship to that God. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. 

And Ambassador. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes, Congressman, I actually believe we 

are winning the war of narratives, and we are winning by a huge 

margin. And you can see that every day as people stream out of 

the Middle East and risk mountains and seas to come to the West 

and to the U.S.A. when they could go to countries that have their 

own religious faith and language that are much closer. 

We are winning in narrative. Unfortunately, there is a small percentage of people that are attracted to this other nihilistic, violent 

narrative. And I, like my two predecessors, I think there is not a 

whole lot we are going to do about those. 

To the extent that we are involved in narratives, I believe that 

we could help our partners strengthen their alternative narrative. 

Instead of them trying to get slick talking points, or with glossy 

documents countering Koranic interpretations, I think what we— 

we could help our allies build up their narrative, what they stand 

for. 

And so if their young moderate people are willing to pick up a 

gun to fight for what they believe in, not just the jihadis that are 
18 

streaming in to pick up a gun. And I think they are going to have 

to fight it out at the grassroots level. 

And they do, Congressman, in the villages in Afghanistan or in 

Yemen where the villagers there are opposed, or in Syria opposed 

to the radical views of the Taliban or Salafist-type ideologies and 

will pick up the gun and defend themselves. 

So I think that ideologically we are not doing too bad. The fact 

of the matter is there are a number of these people that we just 

have to get them. I don’t think we are going to change their minds. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Ambassador and Mr. Jenkins, thank you both. 

And in this regard, I have had the opportunity in visiting the 

Middle East, to visit kingdoms like Bahrain, where they cite how 

grateful they are in 1895 that it was the Americans who built their 

first hospital. 

And then we are all familiar with the American University system from Sofia, Bulgaria, to Alexandria in Egypt, and, obviously, 

Beirut, that has been positive. And so I hope we keep citing that. 

Also I am really grateful when constituents express concern to 

me that people in their region want to live in the 14th century. I 

say, ‘‘No, you need to visit the countries of the Persian Gulf. They 

all look like Hilton Head on steroids.’’ And so it is much more positive. 

Mr. Hoffman, in your statement, you discussed Al Qaeda as ‘‘rebuilding and marshalling its resources to reinvigorate the war 

against the American people and American families.’’ Can you tell 

us about the long-term threat? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think Al Qaeda has never changed, and it still 

sees itself in what it conceives as an existential struggle against 

the West and against the United States in particular. 

I think that it has taken advantage of our preoccupation with 

ISIS to rebuild its strength, particularly in South Asia, where, 

again, almost completely escaped notice when they created Al 

Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent which was designed simultaneously to reinvigorate its presence in Afghanistan. 

And a year ago October, one of the largest arms dumps since 

9/11 was discovered in Afghanistan that Al Qaeda had been preparing to spread its ideology to India which is, of course, the 

world’s second largest Muslim population. And we already see its 

effectiveness in Bangladesh and in Burma. 

But I think elements like the Khorasan group are an elite forward-deployed special operations unit that is waiting for the proper 

time to take the struggle to the West and to the United States. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a reminder to the 

panel, we are now in a 5-minute rule, total, questions and answers. 

So I will try to be brief with questions and you try to be succinct 

with your answers. Appreciate that. 

Mr. Hoffman, you noted in your testimony, talking about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, that we should be looking 

out for that. What is new that is happening? 

We have been discussing this and acting on this since 2001. So 

what now in 2017 should we be thinking about that is different 
19 

than what we have been doing consistently through the DOE [Department of Energy] and the DOD [Department of Defense]? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. The threat, I think, is mostly in the realms where 

these groups can develop their own weapons or seize battlefield 

weapons and then deploy themselves. So certainly the frequency 

with which chemical weapons have been used by both sides in 

Syria, by groups like ISIS but also by the Assad government, I 

think, has loosened the restrictions or at least the moral restrictions on using these types of weapons. 

The fact that—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Does that change what we need to do within the 

DOD or DOE to operationalize a response? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, at least from my perspective, since Iraq in 

2003, there has been less and less attention paid on the terrorist 

threat using these weapons. And I think it has grown appreciably. 

So I think, first and foremost, it is to review what is in place now 

and what is being done and to be confident that it is designed to 

meet this burgeoning number of sanctuaries and safe havens which 

gives more scope for the research and development of these weapons. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Sheehan, would you agree with that assessment? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes. I would just add that it is very difficult to develop these type of weapons. Even an organization like 

an Aum Shinrikyo, which had tremendous amount of scientists, unlimited money, et cetera, you know, tried to do a chemical weapon 

attack in the subway system in Tokyo, killed seven people. They 

could have done better with two 9 millimeters; very, very difficult 

to do. 

I believe that the biggest threat, as I said in my remarks, would 

be less concern about them building a WMD overseas than I am 

about an individual within the United States that becomes radicalized, so has access to the materials. And I think that is where the 

focus should be. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Back to Mr. Hoffman. In your testimony, written testimony, on 

page 9, I think I counted five steps or five actions we ought to take. 

But one of those has to do with your suggestion that we have strict 

90-day rotations of division-size regular military in some of these 

countries. 

It is called boots on the ground. That is what we call that. And 

what I have found here in 16-plus years in Congress is that strict 

90-day rotations become unrestricted, unlimited rotations. 

So are you, in fact, advocating as part of a proposal for U.S. boots 

on the ground beyond special operations forces which you also support? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I am, sir. And actually you know, Mike Sheehan 

also talked about this in the context of the French intervention in 

Mali. I think the problem is, you know, we have tried invading 

countries, and that obviously doesn’t work. 

I would argue, for the past decade or so, we have tried the indirect approach, leadership attrition, building up post-nation forces, 

counter-messaging. It is not working. The spread of ISIS and, I 

think, the resilience of Al Qaeda has demonstrated that. 
20 

So I was trying to identify the sweet spot in the middle where, 

if our enemies, as I believe, have enmeshed us in this war of attrition or this war of exhaustion where they are trying to provoke our 

liberal societies to become more illiberal to target these groups that 

will burnish their propaganda and their recruitment, I think it is 

important to try to break that cycle, to break that war of attrition. 

And in that sense, I think, having taken down, for instance, 

Mosul sooner than 2 years would have dealt more of a blow to ISIS’ 

allure and would have probably had a greater impact on dissuading 

the 40,000-plus foreign fighters that have gravitated to the caliphate from over a hundred countries than the efforts we have undertaken thus far, which aren’t working. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Mr. Jenkins, do you have a response to boots on the ground and 

how that plays into a change in operations and tactics? 

Mr. JENKINS. You know, you have two former infantry officers 

here. And the right answer in infantry school is it depends on the 

situation and the terrain. 

Clearly, we do want to avoid large-scale commitments of U.S. 

forces on the ground. It changes the dynamics. It changes the narrative. It is unproductive and should only be done in circumstances 

where it appears there are no other options, it is the right thing 

to do. 

And but here I would agree with both Professor Hoffman and 

Ambassador Sheehan. If we are going to go in with anything larger 

than a special operations or small teams of advisors, then it has 

to be a precise mission, achievable within a limited amount of time. 

And you go in and you get out fast. Whether that is 60 days, 90 

days or 97 days, that will depend on the nature of the mission. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Sheehan, I want to go to the points that you brought 

up. You listed the 10 points that you believe that we need to continue in order to defeat, through counterterrorist mechanisms, 

these terrorist organizations’ effort. 

And it sounds like much of that are existing policies and you are 

only wanting to make sure that we intensify and maintain the 

rigor and vigor of effort in those areas. I guess you would call it 

war of full-court press. 

And I understand your vision within that is to deny the ability 

for these organizations to operate at the strategic level. And a secondary effect is to limit the number of lone wolf attacks and them 

being able to organize. 

What I noticed, though, is missing in what you lay out there is 

the endpoint at which you believe we would be able to demonstrate 

either some kind of success or some diminution of the ability for 

those groups to operate, fewer terrorist attacks. 

Give me your perspective. Is this something that we are going to 

have to continue in the way you describe it and at the intensity 

that you describe it ad infinitum? Or is it something that, at some 

point, we are going to achieve some level of success? Give me your 

perspective, too, on what the path is with this effort. 
21 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, sir, and for better articulating 

my own remarks. I appreciate that and the basketball analogy 

which I used on the full-court press. 

I never use the term defeat because I think, even if we could, it 

would require such a commitment of resources that is not commensurate with the level of the threat. We have a lot of big issues out 

here that this committee is dealing with. 

And the U.S. military, I just spent the last few weeks in the Pentagon talking to the Army about how they are trying to prepare for 

this wide range of threats from cyber to East Europe, East Asia, 

different types of irregular warfare. 

We can’t expend all our national resources on this threat. I believe that what we are doing has worked. That is why I spent time 

on that in my remarks. For the last 15 or 16 years it has been 

working. 

We shouldn’t demoralize ourselves. It is so easy to sit back and 

criticize everything. Around the world, things are falling apart. But 

here in the U.S. we have had success. 

I believe, particularly from my experience at NYPD where I studied deeply these disaffected, the investigations that we had, hundreds of them within the metropolitan area and, across the country, the FBI’s cases and knowing about the international. 

I don’t think there is any way that we are going to stop these 

jihadis from attacking us over the next 20 to 40 years. It is impossible. So the notion of defeat which somehow means we are going 

to eliminate this threat, in my view, is wishful thinking. 

So what I always talk about is preventing the strategic attack 

and minimizing the lone wolves. Over time, this nihilist ideology, 

which does have an appeal—the narrative works—but over time, it 

will wind up on the ash heap of history with the other isms of the 

20th century: authoritarianism, Naziism, communism, and others. 

But it is going to take some time, and it is going to burn out from 

within itself, with its own contradictions. And but that is going to 

take some time. As I say, this is at least a generational fight. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Ambassador Sheehan. 

Mr. Hoffman, in your testimony, you spoke about our counterterrorism actions as it relates to ISIS saying, though, that there is a 

re-emergence of Al Qaeda. And you talk about what we would need 

to do there with both air operations, ground operations, special operators on the ground, a division-level effort there on the ground 

to be able to do that. 

Give me your perspective on why you, first of all, believe that Al 

Qaeda is in this state of resurgence. And is it based on Al Qaeda’s 

fighters and their vision? Or is it based on their financial resources 

and their media networking? 

Give me your perspective about why you think Al Qaeda has reemerged and what you think their effectiveness is in that re-emergence. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, I think the first reason I would argue that 

they have re-emerged is that, I mean, they certainly have the global presence. That hasn’t contracted. They are very quietly—groups 

have gone over to ISIS but they have cultivated new partners and 

new safe havens. 
22 

Secondly, the appearance of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, that I think they have pursued a dual geographic strategy. 

On the one hand, they sent some of their most senior leaders, Saif 

al-Adel, Muhsin al-Fadhli, Haydar Kirkan. Fortunately, two of the 

three we have killed, in fact, which is certainly an important plus. 

But on the one hand, as I said earlier, to create the Khorasan 

group or to have this forward presence and, I think, to groom and 

cultivate Jabhat al-Nusrah, now Jabhat Fatah al Sham, as their 

Middle Eastern operation. 

At the same time, which to me was astonishing, in January 2014, 

while everybody was looking at developments in Syria, for example, 

Al Qaeda announced the creation of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, seeking to deepen its roots there and to use that, similarly, its presence in Pakistan as a launch pad to radicalize the region. 

So the movement of its top personnel to Syria who have not really engaged in the fighting, that have been hanging back, suggests 

to me not that they have embraced a new approach to their ideology that is peaceful coexistence to the West. In my view, I hope 

I am wrong but I don’t suspect I am, is that they are girding their 

loins for the next battle. 

They are waiting, again, precisely what concerns me the most is 

that the terrorists, in a sense, are engaging in their strategy of 

provocation. And to some extent, it is succeeding. It is causing profound divisions in societies. It is leading to nativism and populism. 

This is the best propaganda that they can seize upon. And unfortunately, we are falling into the trap. And that is why my argument is, like all adversaries, guerillas, and terrorists, they seek to 

enmesh their stronger opponents in these prolonged wars of attrition and enervation. 

We have to break that—I don’t think—it is a generational fight, 

just as Ambassador Sheehan described. But we can’t really survive 

this more than a few generations. So we have to start ending it 

now. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Got you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you very much for your testimony and 

causing us to think seriously about how to proceed. There seems 

to be a common trend of thought through all of your testimony. 

And I would like you to expand on this, and that is that our actions 

cause a counterreaction. 

And that counterreaction might be to more advance the cause of 

radical jihadism. There are some recent examples, and I don’t want 

to get too political here, one of which is the immigration ban. But 

there are others that have taken place, and particularly military 

actions. 

And I just want to be quite clear in my mind that we should— 

do I understand you to tell us that we should always be mindful 

of the reaction that our actions will cause, and that we ought to 

avoid actions that would give the ISIS or Al Qaeda a propaganda 

and recruiting and more radical attacks? 

Is that the case? And I just want to be quite clear so that we 

understand that reaction is going to happen. 
23 

So let us just start—so Mr. Sheehan and we would come on down 

from—I mean, Ambassador, if you will, we will just hear from all 

of you on this. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Look, if this is not an existential fight, 

that is, if our survival is not at stake, obviously at this moment, 

that means we get to make choices about what we do. In making 

those choices there are tradeoffs. There are benefits that might be 

achieved, but there are costs that come with those, making those 

choices. That is on our side. 

On the other side, we are dealing, as Professor Hoffman has underscored several times, we are dealing with an adversary that 

seeks to provoke us to doing counterproductive things. And even 

without that provocation, simply by our massive military power, by 

our size, we can end up doing things that will create backlashes. 

So that is the equation that we are always looking at. There are 

a lot of things we can do. One has to look at each one of those 

things and say what is this going to get me? What cost am I going 

to pay, and what risks I am taking? 

If this were existential, we don’t get to make that choice. But 

here, especially since this is a long fight, we have to be very, very 

careful about how we make those choices. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I have a feeling that I am going to get the same 

answer from the remaining two of you. 

Quickly, and then we are out of time in 2 minutes, so I guess 

I just want to make my own comment here and then I will let it 

go, is that it seems to me this is the principal point and the principal issue that we ought to be looking at as we develop policy and 

the procedures as well as funding for the various activities that are 

going forward and that we ought to be very mindful, in every step 

we take, that there will be a reaction. 

And that reaction might actually be negative to us and this cost 

benefit, I think that was about the words you were using, Mr. Jenkins. And I will let it go at that. And hopefully we will keep that 

in mind, both here within Congress as well as within the administration, and avoid those things that are going to be counterproductive. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Jenkins, you mentioned two countries in your opening paragraph. You mentioned Russia and China. And I wonder while we 

don’t share the values with those countries, or they don’t share our 

values of human rights and personal freedoms, with regard to terrorism, don’t we have a shared interest? 

Don’t they see this issue of terrorism as a threat in their country 

as well? 

Mr. JENKINS. In the broader sense, we do share an interest, more 

so probably with the Russians than with the Chinese, although the 

Chinese have tried to enlist us in their efforts against dealing with 

Muslim separatists in Western China. 

In the case of Russia, there are very real concerns about the 

threat of Muslims. I mean, in Russia, this goes back centuries in 

their history. 

Having said that, though, having a generalized sense of common 

concern, I was part of an effort in the late 1980s, a team that went 
24 

to Moscow and conducted a series of meetings to see if, at that 

time, the Soviet Union could cooperate with the United States in 

combatting terrorism. 

And getting beyond the general statements, that we agree that 

we are both concerned about this and really getting it down to 

sharing intelligence, to coordinating operations, that is difficult because here at the operational level, there are serious differences in 

how we view the world, serious differences in how we do things, 

and a significant level of mistrust. 

And it is just very, very difficult what you can achieve within 

that context. 

Mr. SCOTT. All of you, in your testimonies agree that the chaos 

in the countries in the Middle East, various countries, is what creates the ability for terrorists to not only exist but to grow and to, 

in many cases, create their own economies. 

I just wonder if, when we see an area where we know that there 

are, say, 20 to 50 members of ISIS or Al Qaeda, if we shouldn’t be 

more aggressive in taking action to eliminate them when it is 20 

or 50, before it is 200 or 500 and they have the ability to take a 

country or to take a city. 

Would you care to comment on that? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I—— 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you handle it? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I agree, Congressman. In fact, that situation happened in Yemen a couple years back. We had narrowed our 

policy in Yemen as to striking only those that had an immediate 

direct threat to U.S. safety and security, which narrowed some of 

our targets. 

But a couple months later, there were a few hundred Al Qaeda 

guys doing a dance in a village in central Yemen and later Al 

Qaeda took over cities and port cities in Yemen. And there was 

some more flexibility in going after, broadening that, the aperture 

of those strikes. 

And I would certainly believe that there are conditions wherein 

that we need to pick up military action to prevent the massing of 

Al Qaeda or ISIS forces when that happens to prevent what could 

come forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I could ask one final question? Obviously, the refugee situation that has been created with the war in Syria, a lot 

of humanitarian crimes there. It is creating a tremendous amount 

of pressure on people who do share our values and who do share 

our interests, countries like Jordan, countries like Israel. 

Is there a solution in Syria that does not include the United 

States working with the Russians? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I believe there is no solution in any country where there is conflict without an agreement with the major 

stakeholders that are willing to put people on the ground and fight 

over it unless you want to take it over and dominate every inch of 

the security equation in that country. 

And if you are short of that interest, which I believe no one has 

the interest in doing that in Syria, means you have to sit at the 

table with those that are going to have that type of power. That 

means Russia, Iran, and all the other actors that have a stake in 
25 

Syria have to be agreed with the solution or you are going to continue fighting for it. 

Mr. SCOTT. My time has expired. But I agree with you 100 percent. If you have to walk through a pit of rattlesnakes, put on your 

snake chaps and let’s get it over with. And the sooner we do it, the 

sooner some people will start to feel some relief in that part of the 

country. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses for your thoughtful testimony this morning. 

Ambassador Sheehan, I want to go to your 10-point plan and 

particularly the fifth point which is a pretty forceful statement 

that, if we are talking about using military force, as you just mentioned in the prior question, that it is a pretty strong statement 

that air power should be the, you know, the vehicle and also a pretty strong statement that we should be extremely frugal about the 

uses of ground forces. 

I am reminded of Secretary Gates’ departing statement that any 

future Secretary of Defense who recommends a large ground war 

to a President ought to have their head examined. And I was wondering if you could, again, just sort of embellish a little bit that bit 

of advice. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you. Thank you, sir. On the issue 

of air power—air power doesn’t solve everyone’s problems. It is not 

a panacea. However, since about 1944, we have dominated the airs 

of the world in most of our combat situations, although in Vietnam 

it was tricky sometimes for some of our pilots fighting against 

those air defense and jets. Generally, we have controlled the sky. 

And when you can control the sky, it gives you an enormous advantage physically, on the ground, if the condition exists when 

there is massing of the enemy. You can diminish that and then 

give your ground forces a much better chance. 

So I think that aviation gives us a technological advantage that 

can turn a situation. But never kid yourself that it is going to be 

the solution. 

So I believe that, for instance, in Afghanistan, when General 

Campbell was asking for more authority to use combat aviation 

support, the operations there, I think that was an important step 

forward in order to try to keep the Taliban at bay. Because the 

Taliban are expanding in areas. They are threatening the stability 

of that country. 

Yet I would be very, very careful about pouring too many troops 

in there. It is very expensive. It creates its own problems. And one 

way to try to push back the Taliban would be by having more liberal use of combat aviation to pound them. 

When I was in El Salvador in the early 1980s, the FMLN 

[Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] was able to have columns of several hundred people. And when they had that capability, they threatened the stability of the whole country. By the 

time we brought in helicopters by the Salvadorans—and this is the 

problem in Afghanistan. We need an Afghan aviation solution 

there. And that has been a mess for 10 years. 
26 

When they brought in the helicopters, it forced the guerrillas to 

dissipate, and they could never mass in more than a group of 10. 

And that was so debilitating to them, that it was very difficult for 

them to strategically threaten the government anymore, because of 

that ability from the air. 

It didn’t eliminate them, not in any case. That has to be done on 

the ground. But it can be used as a way to at least hold people off. 

When the AQIM was coming south and threatening Bamako, it 

was French attack helicopters that came from Burkina Faso, and 

stopped them dead in their tracks. 

It was really just two French attack helicopters. One of the pilots 

was shot and wounded and died later. Two helicopters stopped that 

entire column. And then they pushed them back across the river 

and scattered up in the north. 

And so the judicious use of air power can turn a situation. But 

again, certainly not going to answer all of your problems, but it can 

be a major force multiplier. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question this morning deals with the increased use of online 

propaganda and social media by terrorist organizations. Whether 

we are talking about formal magazines like Dabiq or Inspire, published by Al Qaeda and ISIL, which have millions of readers across 

the globe. How do we effectively counter this propaganda? 

Do you believe we have a strategy to counter this propaganda? 

What have we gotten right, and what do we need to do better? 

I will start with Mr. Hoffman. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think we have had a strategy, but it is almost 

like the Dutch boy trying to put his fingers in the dike that is burgeoning in on him. They are communicating on multiple levels. It 

is not just theological. 

It is as I described earlier, this appeal to a very classic Frantz 

Fanon wretched of the earth ideology that glorifies violence, that 

sees violence as a catharsis. 

But actually, I have to say, I don’t think Dabiq and Inspire are 

the main problems. I mean, those appeal to the peripheral, the 

hangers-on like the Tsarnaev brothers, who tragically are capable 

of killing handfuls of people. What worries me is that groups like 

ISIS in particular, Al Qaeda as well, are using the dark web. 

They are using highly secure apps like Tor, for instance, to get 

into the dark web. That is where all of their activity that is the 

most consequential, that is radicalizing individuals that best suit 

their skill sets, not just the hangers-on, the losers, the malcontents 

who are attracted to their kind of violence, but people that have 

skills in the computational sciences, that are engineers. 

It is through the dark web. And that is, I think, the dimension 

of the struggle that is really gathering momentum now. And we are 

just coming to grips with understanding the Dabiqs and Inspire, 

and they have already moved on. 

And I think this was demonstrated over the past few years 

where social apps like, you know, Twitter and that type of thing, 

you know, I am not sure about really the impact that that has. 
27 

It is more the encrypted communications from WhatsApp or Telegram that is facilitating their, both their recruitment and their terrorist operations, or at least the most consequential forms of recruitment, and the most serious types of terrorist operations. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. The issue here is not—I would agree with Professor 

Hoffman. The issue here is not the propaganda and, you know, that 

comes along with how to dismantle and clean an AK–47 in one of 

these magazines that is the problem. That is going to take place. 

In terms of much of the open web communications and social 

media communications, that has given them some advantages, but 

it has given our intelligence and law enforcement operations also 

a great deal of insights and ability to identify people and open investigations. A lot of the success we have had in uncovering plots 

has been because people have been communicating on the internet. 

From the standpoint of the most, or the greatest danger, operationally, I would agree with Professor Hoffman, it is skilled people 

communicating in a clandestine environment, and being able to do 

that, that is a great concern. And from the standpoint of crime 

other than terrorism, as well as in terrorism, that is going to be 

a future battlefield. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And Ambassador Sheehan, I am going to ask a 

follow-up to you. Given your time as Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations, what role does the Department of Defense 

play in this area of countering propaganda, and what more does 

the State Department need to be doing? And is the Global Engagement Center the most appropriate place to deal with this issue? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, Congresswoman, and congratulations on a new chairmanship. That is a great committee, by 

the way. 

Look, I have to admit, I am a skeptic on these efforts for countermessaging. We have been at this for 20 years. There have been volumes. They are stacked up in all the think tanks and universities 

around the town. It is not a new thing. We have a big effort at 

State Department, run by one of my predecessors at SO/LIC [Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict]. 

Yes, that is important, but I think the effort has to be in helping 

the host nations deal with their problems, as I mentioned before. 

Inspire is a problematic magazine, that you brought out. 

And as Mr. Jenkins said, they do assembly, disassembly. They 

encourage people to attack, and once in a while they will put a 

bomb-type instruction on there, which you can get other places on 

the internet. 

So I think that yes, we need to do this at the State Department 

and DOD and my office at SO/LIC. I had a small office that was 

also engaged in that. But I find that, I think the most important 

thing that we can do, in terms of counter-messaging, is help give 

political support to our key allies in the region. 

That, I think, is more important to help them establish some legitimacy within their countries, and try to roll back the movements 

that are festering within their country. If we could focus on helping 

them, rather than trying to come up with some snazzy talking 

points, I think our effort would be better spent. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. I yield back. 
28 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask, and anyone on the panel can answer this, what 

lessons can be drawn from the merger of ISIL and Boko Haram in 

Sub-Saharan Africa, and applied to the potential merger of ISIL 

and Al Qaeda in the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. 

And I wanted you to kind of expand on what you touched on, 

which one of you touched on a little bit earlier, about what do these 

terrorist organization mergers mean for U.S. counterterror strategy, moving forward. 

Mr. JENKINS. Let me just say briefly, I would be a little bit cautious about the use of the term merger, because we are not really 

talking about mergers here. We are talking about affiliations, 

which can take place on multiple levels. There are shared concerns, 

there is, to a certain degree, in a broader sense, a shared sense of 

ideology. 

But these on the receiving end of these, or let’s say, on the Boko 

Haram side, and the other local sides, being a part of either an Al 

Qaeda network, or an ISIL network, provides prestige. 

It elevates you among your local rivals. It may bring some modest amount of resources, so it has some advantages in terms of affiliation. It makes you more important than you are. 

On the other side, it gives the advantage of you don’t control this 

entity yet, but you may be able to influence it. It gives you a new 

base of operations. It gives you access to potential recruits down 

the road. And left alone, over time, you may be able to increase 

that degree of management and control over these things. 

But they are at all different levels. They complicate things for 

our side, but they have these narrow advantages. I still think that, 

in many of these cases, we can look at the local groups who are 

attracted to this and make progress with them, both a combination 

of pressure, and in some cases there may be some incentives and 

tempt them to peel them away from these parent organizations. 

But they are not really mergers. Each side sees a tactical advantage in these connections. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Right now I would say that the biggest danger is 

that these alliances or marriages of convenience or affiliations with 

one another are played out in ISIS’ strategy. 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has already said to would-be foreign fighters, if you can’t come to the caliphate any longer, if you can’t come 

to Syria or Iraq, go to our wilayets, go to our provinces, our 

branches. So it becomes escape valve, a sanctuary, an alternative 

venue to reengage the battle. So I think that is the first thing. 

Secondly, I think all terrorist groups are like the archetypal 

shark in the water; they have to constantly move forward to survive. And in that sense, they become opportunists. 

And smaller groups seek to hitch their stars to the fortunes of 

what they see are rising stars. And this is a constant process. And 

in that case, usually when a smaller group does affiliate or associate itself with a larger group, it brings in more recruits. 

It gives them greater access to expertise, which enhances their 

own violent capabilities, and it enables them to engage in the 

stock-in-trade of terrorists, which is even higher levels of violence, 

such as we have seen in Nigeria from Boko Haram, where even the 
29 

most egregious successes of the past are now surpassed by this new 

association, by this new support, by the new expertise and new recruits they are able to attract. 

Mr. VEASEY. In all of Sub-Saharan Africa, which of the newly 

emergent terrorist organizations do you think pose the greatest 

threat to the U.S., based on scope and influence? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I am going to give a counterintuitive answer, and 

say Al-Shabaab in Somalia. And the reason I say that is sort of the 

dominant paradigm of counterterrorism for the past decade plus 

has been that we have done a good job of hardening aviation security against terrorist threats. 

But last February, in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab operatives affiliated with Al Qaeda, exactly underscoring my point about this exchange of technology and expertise, were able to smuggle a bomb 

inside a computer laptop, and detonate it. Fortunately, it was not 

at cruising altitude, so the plane—it wasn’t an in-flight tragedy. 

But nonetheless, admittedly, the security in Mogadishu, I suspect, is not as good as at other airports. But nonetheless, I think 

that was an important incident for several reasons. 

Firstly, it showed these groups, and Al Qaeda in particular, still 

has an interest in targeting commercial aviation; secondly, that 

their ongoing efforts to effectively develop the technology to do so, 

proceeds; and thirdly, that they are willing to use affiliates or associates in far-flung places, to potentially to be their foot soldiers in 

a new campaign against commercial aviation. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. If I could add, Congressman, I agree with 

Professor Hoffman that currently, right now, Al-Shabaab would be 

the biggest threat. 

Although over the horizon I would take a very close look at the 

North African groups in Libya. And a lot of those folks are Algerians that are veterans of some brutal wars over there. These are 

some really violent and skilled terrorists. 

So I think that we have to keep a very close eye on Libya and 

the spillover from Algeria. That they are still operating in parts of 

Algeria and in south of Libya, into Niger and over to Mali, as well 

as through the region. Those are some tough geography there, and 

there are some really, some tough customers in that vicinity that 

could pose a big problem in the future. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your insights. 

Ambassador Sheehan, I appreciate your thoughts on the asymmetric advantage we have with air power, as an airman myself. 

And I agree, we have got to take advantage of where we have those 

asymmetries. 

And as we are looking at that, all of you have mentioned this is 

a long-term fight. How does that translate to your thoughts on 

force structure? This committee has pushed back pretty strongly on 

keeping the A–10 flying for its unique capabilities. It is kicking 

butt right now, over in this fight against ISIS, setting records of 

munitions expended against the enemy. 

We need fifth generation fighters. But if we are asking a fifth 

generation fighter to do all of what we need for air superiority in 
30 

places of denied access, plus all of this, on the other end of the intensity of conflict, does that make sense? 

You know, you don’t need a Ferrari to try and do what a pickup 

truck does. Maybe you need a Ferrari and a pickup truck. So what 

are your thoughts on force structure for this long-term fight? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Well, since I am no longer in government, 

I can say, if the Air Force wants to get rid of the A–10, then I think 

the Army should pick it up, in addition to the AC–130 gunship as 

well. The Army, of course, has its own aviation assets, helicopters, 

and those are fantastic. 

But I do desperately believe, as a former infantryman and special 

operator, that we need those fixed-wing assets that can hang up. 

You know, drones can fill a lot of the gaps, but there is nothing 

like a 105, or the mini-guns of an AC–130 that change the battlefield. 

Or even a C–47 with a machine gun hanging out of the door can 

change the battlefield, in a scenario, in conflicts like this, where 

you are fighting irregulars that have AKs and technicals, you 

know, Toyota trucks with machine guns in the back of it. 

So I believe that these aviation assets are a tremendous game 

changer. We should hopefully keep them within our inventory and 

also look to provide these type of assets to our partners. I think 

that the biggest failure, and I put myself in the box of failing, is 

our Afghan aviation program. It is a complete debacle. 

And we have gotten arguments here in the Congress and in 

Washington about whether we should provide Russian-made helicopters to them, or Sikorskys, and it just constipated the whole 

issue. No one is in charge of that program over there, and it is unfortunate. The Afghan air force is so far behind the army in the 

development over the last 15 years. 

And I think we need to look at that across the board, Congresswoman McSally, in terms of looking for security assistance for aviation for some of our partners, not the really expensive stuff. Old 

Hueys with M–60 machine guns hanging out of the side of them, 

C–47s with mini-guns, these are game changers. And these countries can use those type of systems. 

We might have to provide the maintenance for them, and pilot 

training, but they can fly them, and they can shoot out of the side 

of them. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks, Ambassador Sheehan. 

I want to shift focus. I am on the Homeland Security Committee, 

and one thing that we have been looking at is jihadists, this new 

phenomena of young women and girls becoming foreign fighters 

and becoming recruited to be radical. 

Their average age of the Western foreign fighters is 21, versus 

average age overall is 24. The Americans, one in six are women. 

And a very small number of them, who have traveled, get out, 

versus about 30 percent of the men are able to get out. So it is a 

very different phenomena. 

We have been taking a deep dive on this in Homeland Security. 

So they are not just victims. They are hardened jihadists recruiting 

others to come join the fight. 
31 

Do you have any perspectives on that and how we specifically 

target the narrative and the approach to stop the propaganda to 

young women and girls? Any of you? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I can take a quick shot at it. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes, sure. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I do believe there is a small percentage 

of women that have become jihadis, and that is a problem. The bigger problem is that, and I hate to sound chauvinistic here or whatever, but generally speaking, males between about 18 and 30, sex 

is on their mind. 

And one of the great recruitment vehicles of ISIS was, come to 

ISIS, we will get you a wife and a girlfriend if you pick up an AK 

and fight for us. That was a huge incentive for some of these folks. 

And if you look at Boko Haram, that disgusting nihilist organization, a lot of their most egregious acts were in kidnapping women 

and forcing them into these raping relationships that they call 

wives. 

And so the bigger problem, in my view, is the issue of sex as a 

motivator for these young jihadis to join these groups in order to 

get a wife, which they consider a wife, but we know is an absolute 

aberration. 

And I think that area needs a lot more work. It became obvious 

with Boko Haram. It was a big news issue for about a week here 

in the United States, and it has kind of drifted away. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. I am over my time. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

the witnesses for their testimony today. 

Mr. Hoffman, I really appreciate your point about one of the 

goals of terrorism being to provoke a response from the larger force 

of a larger country. 

And I think we can all think of ways in which we may have been 

provoked into expected and desired responses by terrorist organizations. Can you point out some ways in which we have confounded 

terrorist’s expectations, where we have done the thing that they 

didn’t expect and where that has been successful and how we 

might capitalize on that? 

And if you can’t, can you suggest one? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think where we have confounded terrorism expectations is especially Joint Special Operations Command, I think 

is the—I mean I don’t have the military credentials that my two 

colleagues do, but from my observations as an academician, the operation of the Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC], especially in Iraq. 

But in the year since, the way that they have closed the operational loop in terms of getting timely intelligence through interrogators that are forward deployed on the battlefield to get that to 

the operators, the innovation that they have been able to—I mean, 

JSOC is almost unique in terms of the authorities that it has, the 

ability to fire people, for example. 

So they have been on the cutting edge, I think precisely because 

they have been the most innovative and in terms of finding solu-
32 

tions and learning the lessons of the past, both what worked and 

what hadn’t worked. That to me is I think, you know, been the 

most stellar weapon we have used against terrorists, amongst 

many. But in terms of a force structure group. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thanks. 

Question for Mr. Jenkins. We had a few years ago the leader of 

one of our allied countries in the Middle East say something to the 

effect of, you know, you, the United States, shouldn’t be leading 

this fight. 

We should. Muslim majority countries, Arab countries in this 

case, and we certainly want your support and your help, but we 

need to be the ones leading on the battlefield. And of course, everyone applauded. It is exactly what we wanted to hear. It never came 

to pass in any real way. 

What are your thoughts on the potential or reality of the United 

States creating a moral hazard in the region? Our allies know we 

will always be there. And there really are no conditions that I have 

seen us effectively set on our help and our ability to intervene militarily in that region. 

Is there any way to change that calculus for our allies or their 

perception of our willingness to intervene militarily? 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, you know, your observation that many of 

these high-flown statements when we then leave them to their own 

devices they sort of dissipate. However at the same time, we have 

also had a tendency to stiff-arm some of our allies. 

I mean, they are not going to operate at our level of military. I 

don’t mean this to sound like some sort of an imperialist statement, 

but they are not going to operate necessarily at the levels of the 

U.S. Armed Forces in terms of their capabilities. 

And I think sometimes, our impatience to get the job done fast, 

our determination that we are going to do this right, has caused 

us to have our allies—in a sense, we have pushed some of them 

aside needlessly, and that hasn’t been helpful. I think there is a 

way in some cases where some of these offers have been made. 

We know if we just leave them completely alone they won’t do 

anything. So the challenge for us is can we work with them to put 

together what they have stated they are willing to do without coming in and taking over management of the store? Americans are not 

good at doing that. 

We are pretty good at taking over management. And we have got 

to learn that we have to back off. And we are going to accept something less than necessarily our standards, but it is going to be more 

than adequate. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes, and recognizing that we are in the Armed 

Services Committee room right now and appropriately talking 

about military strategy, I can’t help think about the fact that this 

is the fifth successive administration that has used military force 

in Iraq specifically and in many other areas. 

That we have an Authorization for Use of Military Force 16 

years in that we have used in six countries including most recently 

Somalia. And that we have got to do a better job of defining our 

political goals and aims. 

And perhaps just an appeal to the chairman and the ranking 

member, there is a way to meet with the Foreign Affairs Com-
33 

mittee, as well, on some of these issues to have a comprehensive 

whole-of-government conversation on this. 

So I yield back to the chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for very compelling testimony and answers to the questions. 

Mr. Hoffman, I will start with you, but I want input from the entire panel. When the Syrian conflict eventually ends, you are going 

to have all of these fighters from Hezbollah, this evil terrorist organization, return to Lebanon. 

They will have increased skills, increased experience. If there is 

nobody left to fight in Syria, what happens to all those fighters in 

Lebanon? Mr. Hoffman. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. We will probably have the third Israel-Lebanon 

war, would be I think one immediate effect. But this goes back to 

an earlier question. I think one of the most appealing reasons to 

cooperate with Russia in Syria is if it succeeds in isolating and 

marginalizing Iran more and weakening Hezbollah’s military status and forward military position in the country. 

But this is going to be an enormous problem. I would say the 

only sort of positive aspects of that, that Hezbollah fighters have 

been getting now, I think acquiring greater expertise in urban warfare on a level that they lacked in the past, is that it is controversial amongst the Lebanese Shia. 

And that increasingly it is not the elite Hezbollah forces that are 

going, but more the equivalent of conscripts, in essence, young, 

poor Shia that have no other economical alternative and that that 

is eroding some Hezbollah support. But of course Hezbollah also 

controls the government in Lebanon right now. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Right. Mr. Jenkins, your thoughts? 

Mr. JENKINS. It is Hezbollah is a problem. It is particularly a 

problem, and I agree with Professor Hoffman, for the Israelis, as 

well as for us. But it is part of a larger problem in Syria and that 

is there are lots of armed groups now in Syria. And they are not 

under the control of the central government, any central government. 

That is, there has been power shift from a central military force 

to a group of militias, some militias controlled by Iran, some of 

them controlled by the Syrian government, some of them autonomous, in addition to the various rebel formations and Sunni formations and other formations. 

As a consequence, central government authority in any future 

Syria is going to be significantly diminished, and I think we are 

looking at, realistically, a de facto partition of the country in which 

chunks of the country are going to be controlled by autonomous 

military formations, not under the control of anybody. 

I don’t think we are going to get—I know that we have to cooperate with the Russians. I don’t think we are going to get a national 

solution. I think we are in effect going to get a series of—a partitioned country and at most some local accommodations that hopefully lower the level of violence. 

But there is no government that can come in, in Damascus now 

that is going to be able to restore authority throughout the national 

territory of Syria. 
34 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Ambassador. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, this is a problem of enormous depth in the region and as Mr. Jenkins said, there are different types of groups. The ones that worry me the most though, 

are the ones that have been inspired, funded, trained, and even in 

some cases, led by the Iranian IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps] and the Quds force. 

The Iranians have systematically, deliberately have expanded 

the militia-ization of the Levant and spreading back into Lebanon 

as well, that threatens the security of the entire region. We are 

going to have big, big problems and increasing problems there over 

the years ahead unless the Iranians are directly confronted on this 

issue. 

And there is where there may be potential to work with the Russians on this. I don’t know. It is something I think that can be explored. I don’t have great confidence in it. But it is something that 

we might want to explore if they are willing to put some pressure 

on the Iranians to calm down some of these activities, which are 

inflaming the entire region. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, General. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all our 

witnesses for coming today. Professor Hoffman, you talk about the 

possibility of terrorist organizations developing and using weapons 

of mass destruction, WMDs. 

The proliferation of WMDs or materials to develop these weapons 

would be catastrophic and certainly a game changer. I believe funding of nonproliferation programs are integral to any counterterrorism strategy. 

To all our witnesses, how can we further proactively deter the 

spread of CBRNs, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons, to terrorist organizations? 

Dr. Hoffman, if we could start with you. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, first and foremost, one of the most straightforward means is to ensure that all those countries that have these 

materials undertake the proper safeguards. 

I am not entirely convinced that that is necessarily the case now 

with certain countries throughout the world in terms of safepiling 

the stockpiles, particularly of strategic nuclear material. 

Secondly, I think it is paying close attention to the remedial 

measures that are going to be necessary should any of these attacks occur in an urban center. I don’t think the likelihood is very 

high in the United States itself. 

I would put it higher in Europe, just because there have been instances, for instance in Turkey where Al Qaeda in particular has 

been operating laboratories to manufacture and produce sarin 

nerve gas for example. So while I don’t think this is necessarily an 

imminent threat, it is clearly on the minds of our adversaries. 

And I think dealing with the psychological consequences of such 

an attack, I mean, Ambassador Sheehan made the point with the 

Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo, had they set fire on the subway, 

for example, and caused smoke inhalation or had they used handguns, they would have killed far more people than the sarin did. 
35 

But nonetheless, the psychological impact of that use of an unconventional weapon back in the mid-1990s was extremely profound. And I would argue that those repercussions are going to be 

even greater now. 

And therefore, not just preventing it from happening, but being 

able to very quickly remediate any sort of incident will go a long 

way to restoring public confidence and depriving the terrorists of 

the fear and alarm that they hope to generate from using an unconventional weapon that even might have a very modest casualty 

rate. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. We are doing a number of things for obvious reasons that addresses nuclear. It is more difficult to address smaller 

scale chemical, biological, or radiological attacks and for precisely 

the reasons that Professor Hoffman has pointed out. 

And that is that it is difficult for them to scale up an attack to 

really get into casualty levels that we are looking at, at the level 

of, say, 9/11 or an order of magnitude greater than that. 

But the nature of these weapons is such that even a small-scale 

attack is going to set off the alarms and reactions that are really 

going to cause us the difficulty. 

Can we stop them from producing very tiny quantities of anthrax 

or low-quality ricin or some of these things? Very hard to do. Certainly we should try to do it. But there it is going to be a matter 

of really how fast can we respond effectively to these events that 

occur. 

With biological, fortunately, there is a way we can spend money 

and get a dual effect on this and that is, we have to look to our 

public health systems and our response systems, and say whether 

this is a man-made event or not, what is our capacity for rapid response to save lives? 

And above all to show competence in these events, rather than 

allow a small-scale event to become the one that propels the public 

into a panic. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. 

Ambassador Sheehan. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Congressman, I think I divide the problem in two areas. One is weaponized WMD, nuclear, radiological, 

biological, or chemical, or an improvised. And I think that there are 

two different approaches. 

For weaponized, which are generally done by a nation-state, you 

might want to look at the Nunn-Lugar process, where we have 

tried to safeguard former Soviet Union nuclear weapons. I think 

that was a very successful program, obviously a big and expensive 

one. 

Maybe on a smaller level we can use those types of programs to 

make sure that weaponized systems by any country that has any 

of these types of systems are controlled. My biggest fear, quite 

frankly, nuclear, is Pakistan. And we can get into that and spend 

hours wringing my hands about that fear. 

But on the improvised side, that is more difficult. There you are 

looking at I think the best way to defend against an improvised 
36 

WMD is to crush those organizations so that they are unable to develop the type of sophistication to develop these type of weapons. 

If you allow them to sit in sanctuary and give them the time in 

order to develop these things, I think they will. But if you keep 

them on the run, if you keep the pressure on them, it becomes 

very, very difficult to do that. That is why for the 15 years, they 

haven’t been able to, because of the enormous pressure on them. 

So I think the greatest fear I have is if we ever take our foot off 

the neck of some of these organizations to allow them, to give them 

the space to recruit the types of people and develop those type of 

weapons, we will be in trouble. So my answer is keep the heat on 

them. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor Hoffman and Ambassador Sheehan, I 

would like to dig a little bit deeper on your comments regarding 

the Muslim Brotherhood. And Ambassador Sheehan, I take your 

point that the group is not a monolithic organization. 

There are, for example, two factions in Jordan, one closer to 

Hamas, that I am sure the king would like to see less of, the other 

that is less difficult to deal with. But you both made the argument 

that we need to find a way of undermining the ideology. 

And this is a group whose ideology celebrates violence. It celebrates martyrdom. It has as its highest aspiration the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. The end of its credo says, ‘‘Jihad 

is our way, death in the form of Allah is our highest aspiration.’’ 

So if indeed the violent act is downstream from the ideology, how 

do we get at groups that are espousing the ideology short of designation? In other words, is there a smarter, more effective way of 

countering it that you would recommend if you are recommending 

against designation? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Again, I worry that this is, you know, precisely 

one of those moves that plays exactly into our enemies’ desires, 

that by painting with a broad brush the Muslim—I don’t disagree 

with anything that you have described about the ideology. 

But again, I think the fact that it isn’t a monolithic entity means 

that the repercussions of designating it as a terrorist group are 

going to be difficult to enforce. And I think the gains on our side 

aren’t going to be tangible, whereas for our opponents I think the 

gains will be significant. It will furnish them with greater propaganda. 

It will, I think, or I fear, have marginalized those members of the 

Muslim Brotherhoods that participate in parliamentary democracies that may have extreme views but don’t share that same embrace of violence as a means to an end, and that we will succeed 

almost in creating the Muslim Brotherhood into more of a terrorist 

group than it is now. 

I mean, admittedly it is a group that is very much in the gray 

area, but we should be focusing on the individuals who are advocating violence and not driving everyone else into their arms. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think that I have said this before in this 

testimony. I am very skeptical that American voices condemning 

the Muslim Brotherhood have much traction where it matters. And 

you wind up pissing off more people than turning away some from 
37 

joining the violent groups. I just don’t think it is a very productive 

enterprise. 

So in terms of designation, you have to define the group. And if 

you can define a group that calls itself the Muslim Brotherhood, 

and it is a defined organization that has conducted terrorist attacks 

and killed or harmed American citizens, then we have an obligation 

to designate it as FTO. But to broad-brush it, it just doesn’t work, 

first of all. 

And second of all, I don’t think it is very productive. I do believe 

that the best thing that we can do in terms of supporting counternarratives to the Muslim Brotherhood is to support the local nations that have to deal with that. They will have the better voice. 

They will understand the dynamics in their particular country and 

how to face that. 

So for President Sisi, who may perhaps—or King Abdullah that 

have these real problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, they have 

to figure out a way to deal with the political realities of their countries and try to focus on identifying the violent folks that are adherent to that and deal with them individually. 

And they have the best sense of how to deal with that. Back here 

in the U.S., our pronouncements about that I don’t think are very 

productive. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. And just a quick follow-up for Professor Hoffman, because I have a minute. So it seems like your concern would 

be that the designation would drive that sort of elements of the 

Brotherhood that are currently participating in the political process 

away from it. 

But wouldn’t our experience in Egypt suggest that the Brotherhood when allowed to fully participate in the political process only 

uses it to expand power and act in authoritarian ways against our 

interests? I would just be interested in your thoughts. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is the problem is that the Muslim Brotherhood isn’t a monolith and doesn’t have a centralized command. So 

yes, you are absolutely right in Egypt. But in Jordan, I think you 

could make another argument and that is what concerns me. 

I think groups like Hamas, that are part of the Muslim Brotherhood and that are clearly terrorist, that is what you be much more 

specific, I believe than holistic. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Am I on? I apologize. My first question I have asked 

in a full committee hearing. So this is a readiness question and 

each of you seem to agree that there might not be an end to our 

fight against terrorism. 

But rather that the United States will continue to be involved in 

an ongoing effort, perhaps generational effort, to reduce the successful, strategic feats of our continuing terrorist threat. 

If this is the case, could each of you comment on our military 

readiness from your vantage point and your experience, our sustained ability to reduce these terrorist threats. 

And I am particularly interested in your thoughts about the 

strengths and weaknesses of our personnel capabilities, both the 

strength size and the skill sets of the men and women in uniform 
38 

and also the level and engagement of U.S. and non-U.S. human assets, intelligence assets abroad. 

Mr. JENKINS. Let me comment quickly. First of all, I do think— 

we have mentioned various figures here, 20 to 40 years, two generations. It is going to be very, very long. And the end is not clear. 

And as military operations against terrorism become routinized 

then traditional concepts of victory begin to fade away. Americans 

traditionally have looked at warfare as a finite undertaking with 

a clear beginning and clear end. 

We are not going to get that. This goes on indefinitely, and upping the investment or resources doesn’t necessarily shorten the 

time horizon. But it shortens our time horizon in terms of our ability to sustain it, politically and in terms of cost. 

As a consequence we have learned that if we try to do things 

with major investments, as we have in Afghanistan and Iraq, that 

this can have a major impact on our military readiness. 

I mean we have imposed huge burdens on our military personnel. 

We have deferred decisions about acquisitions, about maintenance, 

about training. 

And as a consequence I am not the one to be able to give the precise answer to this as to how many of our brigades are really up 

to strength and combat ready to go at the moment. But I suspect 

that we have paid a heavy, heavy price in terms of our overall 

readiness to deal with other contingencies. 

So we are going to have to conceptually change our model to say 

we have to figure out a way to manage this. And I am using the 

word manage to avoid the word win or victory. That is not defined 

well. 

But to manage this for the long term in a way that we can sustain it in terms of readiness and in terms of political will and not 

exhaust ourselves, which is precisely what our opponents are trying to make us do. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I agree completely with Mr. Jenkins. I 

will just add that since we have reduced from the big efforts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, although we are increasing again, it going 

to take us years to recoup, to get those brigades combat ready 

again. But we will get there with the proper investments, and if 

we pace ourselves. 

The biggest concern is going to be in the special operations 

forces, about 70,000 of those folks out there, men and women in all 

of the services. They are going to be asked to do a lot of the heavy 

lifting in these fights. So we are going to have to—I don’t think we 

can expand much beyond that. 

And I have had a lot conversations with Admiral McRaven about 

that, and other leaders within the special operations forces community. It takes a long time to build these folks, 10 years to really 

get them ready. You can’t just create them overnight. 

So I think that we have to be careful in husbanding those resources and carefully deciding where we are going to put them because we have to spread them out. 

And I don’t think—we may be able to increase force structure a 

little bit, but I think in those areas it is very difficult. So it is a 

matter of setting priorities, and again, as Mr. Jenkins said, is designing a strategy that you can sustain for another 20 years. 
39 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Can I squeeze in a comment? We have been talking about terrorists and terrorism most of this hearing. What concerns me in terms of our military is what we are seeing with our 

adversaries is they are going beyond terrorism. We face hybrid adversaries now, whether it is ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, certainly Hezbollah. 

Where these groups have conventional capabilities they are able 

to seize territory. They are able to, even in Al Qaeda’s case, something that they didn’t want to do in the past, but they are able to 

now, provide some form of governance, however rudimentary. 

They are able to take on even the established militaries of our 

local partners. And this is a trend line that concerns me, is that 

in the future, we are not going to be talking strictly about counterterrorism or counterinsurgency or even about countering conventional warfare. 

We are going to see adversaries that are non-state entities, that 

get into this whole definitional question that Representative Gallagher raised about the Muslim Brotherhood where they become very 

difficult to define, even in this military context. 

And we are going to have to have a military, I would argue, but 

I have none of the credentials of my two colleagues, but that goes 

beyond the sort of capabilities of the smaller special forces as they 

exist today, and that have to involve a different mix of forces perhaps than we have seen in the past in a different model, and sort 

of the innovation and the different kind of thinking I talked about 

in my written testimony. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you 

for sharing your vast experience with the committee today. As a 

veteran of the war in Afghanistan, I can’t help but to start there 

and consider our mission in Afghanistan first when discussing the 

global war on terror. 

Mr. Jenkins, in your testimony, you described the military’s success that has come from working with locals, including irregular 

forces. My experience in Afghanistan gives me grim hope that we 

will find a long-term success in our Afghan partners, given the significant headwinds that prevail there. 

Whether their corruption, antiquated systems, or misplaced loyalty, it is clear that our work in Afghanistan from an advise and 

assist mission perspective is far from over. 

Ambassador, you described in your testimony the war raging between the forces of modernity and the radical Taliban in the mountainous regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

And since all three of you described the devastating terror attacks of 9/11, I would like to explore with you how to prevent the 

Af-Pak region from returning to a region where terrorists can 

move, organize, and plan devastating attacks on the West with relative ease. 

So Ambassador, in your testimony, you expressed the need to expand our train, advise, and assist programs, while also expressing 

caution about too many advisors looking like an occupying force. 

This sounds a lot to me like advocating for the status quo. 
40 

Yet last week General Nicholson testified in front of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee that we may need a few thousand more 

troops in the train, advise, and assist category. Do you agree with 

the general’s assessment in that role? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, sir. I don’t know about the 

exact numbers. I am skeptical about bigger numbers. I think the 

real question is you have to go back and define what the task is. 

If he considers his task that he has to pacify vast regions of Afghanistan, then certainly he is going to need more soldiers to do 

that. The question is, is that really what the task is? 

Is it necessary to pacify all those regions? Is it necessary to 

spend the resources, have the body bags come back up to Andrews, 

fighting over territory that might not be existential to our national 

security? 

What we really need to do in Afghanistan is make sure that we 

have enough capability there to find and kill those terrorists that 

threaten our homeland. To do that is going to require a long-term 

commitment in Afghanistan to stabilize that country. 

But in terms of pacifying the whole country, I am not sure that 

is worth the lives of more of our men and women that are dying 

and being maimed over there. And I don’t want to get emotional 

about this, but this is what we are really talking about. 

So we have to be very focused on what we are doing. And so actually, by the way, this is a separate subject. I am very skeptical 

about having field commanders come back to Washington and 

make pronouncements about troop levels. I have never met a field 

commander that didn’t want more troops. 

You don’t have, Patton didn’t come back to Washington and advocating he wanted more troops, gasoline, and bullets to move forward. Of course he did. But so did MacArthur in Asia. Those decisions are not made by the field commanders. They are made by 

people who have the broader perspective. 

Anything that he wants in Afghanistan in a zero-sum world 

which we have in the Pentagon, takes forces and funding away 

from other areas that directly threaten us in terms of terrorism 

and these other emerging threats that you have been dealing with 

in this and the other subcommittees. So there are costs and benefits that Mr. Jenkins articulated beautifully. 

So I don’t know whether General Nicholson should or should not 

get more forces. I think that we have to ask first, what are you trying to achieve here and try to keep our objectives fairly narrow so 

that we don’t exhaust ourselves. So that is my answer. 

Mr. BANKS. So with that, aside from the train, advise, and assist 

mission, how should the international community combat issues in 

the Af-Pak FATA region with a limited troop presence on the 

ground? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Well, what is ironic is that the FATA is 

the home of Al Qaeda central, which traditionally is being our biggest strategic threat. They are the ones that blew up our embassies 

in Africa, at least an African arm of that; blew up the Cole in 

Yemen, an arm of Al Qaeda central; and are the people that are 

responsible for 9/11. 

They reside in Pakistan. Some of them are floating back into Afghanistan, but it is difficult for them to operate in Afghanistan be-
41 

cause we own the terrain around Afghanistan. Not necessarily 

every mountainside, but we can reach out and touch them in Afghanistan. 

In Pakistan, in Western Pakistan, it is interesting. We haven’t 

had soldiers there in over 10 years, yet we continue to diminish 

and degrade the capability of Al Qaeda central to reach us strategically. 

I worry about this all the time, that without that presence 

there—and the Pakistani army isn’t in there very often either. 

Once in a while they come rumbling through, but that is not really 

that effective. 

They are there in those mountainous regions and we—what is interesting is we need Afghanistan almost as much as a base to attack the FATA than we need Afghanistan itself. 

Afghanistan has no strategic importance to the United States. 

However, the importance is that Al Qaeda is there and blew up the 

World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We can’t allow that to come 

back again. 

And they are in Western Pakistan, and for a variety of political 

reasons we can’t put troops on the ground there so we have had 

to come up with a solution to diminish AQ in Pakistan without one 

soldier on the ground. 

So sometimes you have to come up with solutions with no troops 

on the ground. Other times if you have the ability to send 100,000 

there it doesn’t mean you should. So it is a matter of finding the 

right solution commensurate with the threat. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I represent a district in central Florida that was significantly impacted 

by terrorism in this last June, a gunman who swore allegiance to 

ISIL walked into the Pulse Nightclub and killed and wounded over 

100 people. 

This is the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since 

September 11. It is also the deadliest instance of violence against 

the LGBTQ community in our Nation’s history. 

Unfortunately, this event serves as a tragic reminder that violence motivated by ideological extremism is an enduring threat to 

our security at home and abroad. 

We have seen that ISIL and other groups have been able to successfully recruit and inspire adherence through the internet, and 

recently I read an Associated Press investigation into CENTCOM’s 

[U.S. Central Command’s] program to counter ISIL’s online propaganda. 

The investigation found that specialists hired to work on counterpropaganda efforts had little prior experience and did not have sufficient Arabic language skills or an adequate understanding of 

Islam to be effective against ISIL’s online recruitment efforts. 

What is your assessment of our cultural and linguistic capabilities? And how do we ensure that the resources that we invest in 

efforts to counter online propaganda are effective? 

Mr. JENKINS. You know, first of all, it is striking to me that in 

a nation of 320 million people with as many immigrants that we 
42 

have that we have problems in recruiting people with appropriate 

language skills to run programs like this. 

And I cannot—I find it difficult to believe is that we don’t have 

those resources, so I think there may be bureaucratic things that 

prevent us from utilizing these people. 

In fact, if you take something, and I will trespass in Ambassador 

Sheehan’s territory, if you take something like the NYPD, the 

NYPD probably have language capabilities in Arabic that rival 

those of the Federal Government. 

That reflected the diverse population of New York, but it also reflected a determination to utilize those resources in a very, very effective way. That is one city. 

We have a lot of cities with a lot of communities where they 

speak a lot of different languages and so this is something. It is 

not a resource problem. It is how we are putting this together. 

Now, I don’t know that everyone that is in one of these programs 

has to necessarily be cleared to a top secret clearance and go 

through all of these things which we have a tendency to do. But 

I would look for myself, and I don’t know the details of this program—I read the same article—I would look for what are the bureaucratic obstacles, the organizational obstacles to getting qualified people into this as opposed to, gee, we can’t find enough Arabic 

speakers in the United States. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Mr. Jenkins is right, Congresswoman. 

The NYPD program had no security classifications for most of its 

Arabic speakers, Urdu speakers, Farsi speakers, et cetera. They 

didn’t need it. 

What they did do is they are creative enough to put those people 

operationally in a box so that they did not have access to classified 

information so that they were never a threat to the security of 

NYPD or the city or any of the FBI’s programs. 

So we were able to use the linguists that we had with NYPD to 

do all kinds of things, not only on the internet, where we were able 

to establish chat rooms far faster than the Federal Government 

was able to do after 9/11. 

Because quite frankly, the FBI and the CIA [Central Intelligence 

Agency] have a very long and in-depth process of making people 

have top secret highly classified classification qualifications in 

order for them to operate in some of these programs. 

What I have long believed that you could put those people, and 

to include undercovers and other folks, you box them off from your 

secure programs, and they are able to operate. And I think that we 

should—other jurisdictions can look to the NYPD model and duplicate those, but on a much smaller scale. 

Of course they have much smaller cities as well, but I think 

there are ways that they can get into the communities, get into the 

chat rooms, get into the internet and help find those problems. 

One other issue on Tampa, San Bernardino, Boston, and others. 

One of the things that has happened in those cases is the FBI 

when it opens up a case on an individual it will follow them for 

a long time, but after that person isn’t really active they are going 

to drop the case. 

And normally, the local jurisdiction is not notified about that unless they have an office within the JTTF. I would advocate, like 
43 

NYPD does, if a case is dropped like the two brothers in Boston, 

the local police should have picked that up. 

And they won’t conduct that operation exactly like the FBI will. 

They may go knock on the door of the house of the neighbor, but 

at least they will know that people are looking at them. And that 

might deter them from acting. 

Those are things that could be done tomorrow in other jurisdictions that I believe can be a great deterrent to some of these homegrown folks. So a little bit of creativity with the local law enforcement. 

And by the way, I have been down to Broward County talking 

to the JTF down there and some of the police forces. More can be 

done. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the 

chairman for really the entire hearing schedule we have had in this 

committee. All of the material seems to build on what we have 

learned in our prior discussions, and it seems to be drawing into 

very sharp relief the need to enhance our readiness to deal with 

these very complex challenges. 

Ambassador, you testified earlier that one of the things we could 

do to be most effective in counterterrorism is to support those who 

have more inclusive values at the local level, perhaps even at the 

tribal and community level in some of these places of concern. 

Yet in Mr. Jenkins’ testimony we seem to have the identification 

of at least five functional failed states in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, 

Iraq, and Libya, and so in these failed states, what are the effective 

tools in the toolbox that we can use to support, generate, facilitate 

some of the civic institutions that can be the most effective counterterrorism tools? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Thank you, sir. I think even in failed 

states we can work with local militia forces to fight the terrorist 

militia forces. And we are trying to do that in varying degrees in 

varying levels in places like Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. 

I think we need to—we can step up that activity because really 

it is a local fight. And I think if I can share this with you in 

Yemen, I think in Yemen we put too many resources in their traditional military structures, some of which had very dubious allegiances to the government that we supported. And that came back 

to bite us. 

If you really look at who was actually fighting AQAP in the 

mountainsides of central Yemen, it was some of these tribal groups 

that were actually first organized by the Soviet Union back in the 

1970s in the civil war there. 

But basically what they were were tribal organizations like in Afghanistan like our ALP program, the [Afghan] local police, where 

it goes back to the Vietnam models and the 1960s models about organizing local militia to defend their villages. 

And sometimes in failed states that is where you have to start 

to work, at the local level working with people that are willing to 

fight for their side and work with them as opposed to perhaps trying to stop from the top where a government is either broken or 

falling apart. 
44 

Mr. GAETZ. And Ambassador, there is increasing concern in Congress that our work with those local militias can lead to perhaps 

a lack of fidelity with them to our values and to our objectives in 

the region. What are the things that can be done to ensure that 

if we engage some of these local militia forces we, you know, our 

warfighters don’t end up fighting against our own material? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes. It is a very difficult question. The 

first time I ever trained and armed a local militia, a month later 

the guerillas came and shot a few of them and took away 40 weapons. So it is a risky proposition because—— 

Mr. GAETZ. Is it only case-by-case that we can determine where 

there is this loyalty or are there some best practices we have used 

in other parts of the world, South America—— 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. There are—— 

Mr. GAETZ [continuing]. You know, other places that we could 

use in the Middle East? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. There are plenty of best practices dating 

back decades and—but ultimately what you have to do is decentralize your decision making and allow the operators on the ground 

to make decisions about who actually they are going to spend resources on to train and assist. What are the units? 

What are the—whether it be militia or certain of the governments, which are the ones that really actually are willing to fight 

and put your resources there. There is no, I don’t think, a cookiecutter solution. I think it has to be determined at the local level. 

Mr. GAETZ. Are you confident that within our current force structure and chain of command that there is sufficient devolution on 

those questions? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. I think that we have some really smart 

folks out there working these issues. I do believe, and I alluded to 

this in my testimony, that we are fairly thin in some countries that 

are very problematic. Although we are increasing fairly dramatically in Africa the size of our forces, the 10th Special Forces Group 

over there, I think that we need to establish a more robust presence in some of these smaller countries. And I am talking again in 

dozens or 50, hundreds of people, not thousands to—and they have 

to stay there for a while, at least on repeat assignments. 

And we were talking about this in the anteroom about creating 

cadres that can develop real expertise in the region so that they 

can know the language, know the people, know what units to support. 

I am not sure our Army has the proper management systems in 

place to develop, train, deploy, and nurture those types of folks and 

their careers in those faraway places that were really at the tip of 

the spear. 

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr., is it Suozzi—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. Suozzi. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Suozzi. All right. Thank you. It will 

take me a while to get it right. Welcome the gentleman to the committee and he is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for keeping the hearing 

open. I think we are some of the last ones here, so thank you for 

sticking around for the whole time. I appreciate it very much. And 
45 

thank you to each of the speakers for a fantastic education that you 

gave us all today. 

I am going to follow up on something that Mr. Gaetz was starting to probe there, and Ambassador, you were talking about, or 

maybe it was Mr. Jenkins, you were talking about failed states and 

ungoverned areas, and, you know, not so much about the ideology, 

just this concept that Tom Friedman has used in his book recently 

of control versus chaos. 

The idea of, you know, places that are stable in the world versus 

places that are becoming chaotic because of climate change, because of civil war, because of corruption, because of incompetence. 

It is really a battle in the world of control versus chaos. 

And I want you to suggest to us where we need to prioritize 

which places that are failed or are ungoverned that we should be 

focusing on trying to get them more stabilized, and where should 

we be concerned are the next places that could become failed states 

or as you said before, you know, armies that have gone out of control because there was an army in place and now. 

So what places should we prioritize that we need to—you know, 

you talked about these small states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Where 

should we be focusing on trying to stabilize existing places that are 

unstable and where are the places that we have to worry are going 

to fall next? 

And I will ask you first, Ambassador. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Well, thank you. I ticked them off in my 

testimony there, and I think that in the failed states, the four that 

I mentioned in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, we have to put 

a high priority on activity in those four countries. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Which has the best opportunity of getting stabilized 

of those four? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Oh, I don’t think any of them have very 

good prospects at all for years. I was in Somalia in 1994, so how 

many years ago was that, and it was a mess then and it still is 

now. 

Yemen is a disaster, as is Libya. These are going to be broken 

states for a long time. And even when you do get governments that 

are stable, the countryside is going to be out of control for decades. 

So I think in those four countries we have to put a major effort. 

In Yemen you have AQAP, which has demonstrated in the past its 

ability. In Libya I am very concerned about it. Professor Hoffman 

talked about Somalia and its challenges. 

So, and Syria is obviously—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. So there is no argument you would prioritize those 

four? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Those four. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So like, for example, I was speaking to some 

Europeans the other day. They are most concerned about Libya because that is the—— 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Yes. It is close. 

Mr. SUOZZI. It’s the closest one. So should we prioritize that first 

before going to others or? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Look, right now our priority is in Afghanistan if you look at the force levels. And in Iraq of course because 

we are trying to roll ISIS out of Mosul and then eventually kick 
46 

them out of Raqqah. And then we are going to have to have pretty 

substantial forces in both of those places. 

However, I would say some of these others are just as problematic. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Any place you are worried, the next place that could 

fall that is not on the list now but the next place that could go—— 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Oh, I would—— 

Mr. SUOZZI [continuing]. If we don’t pay attention? 

Mr. SHEEHAN [continuing]. I would worry about the Central African areas like parts of Nigeria. The Nigerian state is not going to 

fall, but areas of the country that could come out of control and 

that would be very problematic. 

But I think North Africa is probably because of its proximity to 

Europe, and once you are in Europe it is easy to get to the U.S.—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. Right. 

Mr. SHEEHAN [continuing]. Is really somewhere I would focus on. 

Mr. SUOZZI. I only have a minute 4 seconds left. 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. Or Jordan, by the way, I would throw in 

there. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. You know, the patterns have been pretty stable in 

terms of the real hardcore areas. And even before we get to anticipating which ones we should be anticipating, we have a long 

enough list of ones that are on the—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. To focus on now, right. 

Mr. JENKINS [continuing]. Critical list already—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. Right, yes. 

Mr. JENKINS [continuing]. That we don’t necessarily have the resources to be ambitious, although it would be nice to anticipate all 

of these things. So I would certainly share with the focus being on 

these. 

I think the real issue is that when we pay attention to one of 

these, we have to be realistic about what we can do with our resources. And therefore are going to have to rely more on Arab allies 

that can field forces and on dealing with local militias and not necessarily taking the course that the prerequisite has to be we have 

to restore a functioning central government, which gets us into the 

nation building business—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. Right. 

Mr. JENKINS [continuing]. Before we take these measures. So we 

may end up working with local irregular forces before there is anything called a government or looks like a government. 

And we may end up leaning on some of our Arab state allies who 

have expressed a willingness to do some of these things and saying 

yes, you can put some people on the ground there more easily than 

we can. Because we don’t have enough expertise and forces and 

also we are Americans here to deal with all of these. 

So it doesn’t mean not engagement, but it means a very effective 

management. It does mean getting into the very ambitious task, as 

I think we have in Afghanistan, of, well, first we are going to have 

a big Afghan government, then we are going to have an Afghan national army, and we are saying, well, we—you know, good luck— 

that is two, three generations away. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Right. 
47 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, could I add very quickly? I will answer your questions in reverse order. For me, my biggest concern 

is Yemen because I think Yemen is going to split into two and we 

are going to have a Houthi Shia-based country influenced by Iran 

with now a significant Iranian foothold on the western part of the 

bottom of the Arabian Peninsula. 

And then we are going to have a Salafi-jihadi state, or statelet, 

on the eastern side, and that is going to, I think, have profound 

geopolitical and strategic repercussions up the Arabian Peninsula. 

And Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States must be very concerned 

about that. 

Very briefly, I think the bigger question is that the simplest answer is, you know, where are our interests most important and 

where are the best local allies to work with? And when those two 

things converge, I think that gives us an indication where the 

greatest benefit of our attention and efforts might be. 

But in one sentence, I think the biggest problem is that in some 

of these regions the World War II borders are being reshaped, 

whether we or anybody else likes it. And going in and sort of buttressing borders that have outlived their relevance is going to be 

a fool’s errand. 

So we have to think, in this upheaval that has become very localized, where we can’t put the toothpaste back in the tube or we can’t 

turn back the clock, where again between the confluence of our interests and local allies is that combination best served? 

So just for example, I am not advocating this, but with the Kurds 

in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, I mean, that is where you have something of this convergence. So it may be thinking less in stereotypical nation-state terms and more in the new constellations of 

power, local power that are going to emerge. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Last but certainly not least on this topic, the gentleman from 

Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our panel for your testimony today. It has been an interesting discussion. 

I know that we have had several questions on counter-messaging 

this morning, and I know that some of the witnesses have stated 

that we are doing okay on the narrative, for example, how we are 

dealing with refugees, but it is not going to convince people to 

change their ideology. 

So I believe it was Mr. Hoffman that indicated that we should 

do more to disable cyber capabilities. So on that topic I would like 

to explore that a little more and what can we do? What more can 

we do on the cyber front? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. It may be akin to our leadership attrition strategy 

that we use now where it doesn’t provide necessarily an ultimate 

answer or deliver the crushing blow that I talk about, but it keeps 

our adversaries sufficiently off balance and disrupts their message 

to an extent that it has just much greater difficulty reaching their 

intended audiences. 

I mean, this is an ongoing problem because of course as technology improves, what we have seen is that terrorists are able 
48 

often to seize on that technology faster than governments can adjust to it, so that is one of the challenges. 

But, I mean, in my testimony I described 40,000 fighters from 

more than 100 different countries. What common message could we 

possibly direct that is going to push back on whatever individualistic or idiosyncratic reason they have been recruited? I mean, that 

is why I think that it is important to do these things, but we can’t 

see it as an end in itself. 

And that relying on what we are really good at—we are not good 

at counter-messaging. We were during the Cold War; we had the 

United States Information Service and Information Agency to do it, 

but that is in the past. 

What we are good at now is utilizing technology. And harnessing 

technological disruption I think would be a much—in terms of cost 

effective and beneficial, would be an improvement over what we 

are doing now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Anybody else want to offer anything else? No? 

Okay. So one of you in relation to a question that Ms. Stefanik had 

with respect to—the answer was to working more closely with the 

countries in the region in the Middle East. Could you expand on 

that? In exactly what way are you suggesting we work more closely? 

Mr. Jenkins, was that you I think? 

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. I mean first of all, we can do more with regard 

to just military operations and this is not a matter of attempting 

to create, you know, the anti-jihadist equivalent of NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization] or something like that. We are not 

at that formal level. 

But we certainly can try to more effectively enlist and assist 

these local states that do have resources, and I am talking about 

both military resources as well as political and propaganda resources to make that work. 

Now, again, we have to be realistic. They are not necessarily 

going to get great report cards on every aspect of something we 

would look for in a NATO ally. 

But we are going to have to be able to do that simply because 

we are the inappropriate instrument. We are the instrument of last 

resort in these things. We cannot be the lead instrument in every 

one of these. 

Second, in terms of our expectations of these, in some cases— 

they don’t have to be good enough to match the American Armed 

Forces. They have to be good enough to deal with the Al Qaeda or 

to deal with whatever the local branches of ISIL or other jihadist 

groups. 

In some cases we may be recruiting locally for militias for the 

sole purpose of out-recruiting the other side. In other words, not 

even thinking about them as a fighting force. 

Where simply we have unemployed young men and if we don’t 

do something they will end up fighting for the other side because 

they will pay them. And in that sense it is a lot cheaper to say, 

okay, they will be in our militia, and we can have them do something useful. 

But at the very least it is far more costly and dangerous to take 

them out when they join ISIL. And ISIL is an example. Not every 
49 

fighter, not every Syrian in the ranks of ISIL is a dedicated hardcore jihadist. 

There are a lot of them that have joined this because it was there 

were no other options. So for survival, for economic survival, they 

did this. So we can look for opportunities to do that. 

In other words, we are moving away from—I think if there is one 

common message we are sending here is, one, it is a long time. We 

can’t shorten that. 

Two, we have to be careful about the kind of things we do because they can be costly and counterproductive. 

Three, this is not a war in a sense it is not like we are going 

to land on the beaches of Normandy and liberate France and cross 

the Rhine and head for Berlin. 

This is going to be much more in the realm of managing. It is 

closer to dealing with a law enforcement problem in a certain sense 

with military force than it is waging a war, although military force 

is going to be used. 

And therefore we are going to be lowering expectations, in some 

cases going for the long run, not doing counterproductive things, 

managing costs, making careful judgments. That is conceptually so 

different from the traditional way we have looked at warfare and 

military operations. 

I don’t want to use the wrong term, but that is paradigm-changing. That is a conceptual change. And our military institutions, as 

splendid as they are, that is a difficult change for them to do. And 

maybe they are not even the right instrument. 

Maybe we create a number of ad hoc things that realize, look, 

this is not what you guys do best. And we have to figure out other 

ways of getting this done. And we are going to use some military 

assets, but it is going to be a very different way of conducting operations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

I know my time has expired. You know, I would be interested in 

knowing if you could respond for the record, and in your assessment if it is a way that you can quantify it, the degree to which 

the fighters involved in this are doing it because of ideology and 

which are doing it because there were no other options? And which 

is the bigger, too; and I had some other questions that I would like 

to submit for the record. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I think that was very interesting, lots of interesting conversations. The last one was particularly interesting to me. We face a 

similar kind of situation when we look at the hybrid threat that 

Russia poses. It is not strictly tanks coming across the plains of 

northern Europe. It is much subtle. 

Do we have the right military or other instruments of national 

power to deal with that, not just the Russians, the Chinese, the 

Iranians, as you talked about Hezbollah a little while ago, and terrorism has some elements of that where just our traditional notions 

of military power may not be the right way to deal with it. 

We will have a lot more conversation about that, but a lot of that 

is the job of Congress to make the reforms sometimes that the mili-
50 

tary has a hard time doing itself. And—but to do that in a prudent 

way. 

That is why we are particularly grateful to have you-alls’ guidance in thinking about these issues and we will continue to rely on 

you in the future. 

Thank you all again for being here. The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 14, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 14, 2017 

(55) 

THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

February 14, 2017 

Professor Bruce Hoffman 

Center for Security Studies 

Georgetown University 

Washington, DC 

While ISIS1 poses the most serious, imminent terrorist threat 

today, al-Qa'ida has been quietly rebuilding and marshaling its 

resources to reinvigorate the war against the United States declared 20 

years ago by its founder and leader, Osama bin Laden.' The result is 

that both groups have enmeshed the U.S. and the West in a debilitating 

war of attrition, with all its deleterious consequences. ISIS has built 

external operations capability that will likely survive its loss of 

territory in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Meanwhile, the threat from alQa'ida persists and may become more serious as it attempts to 

capitalize on ISIS's falling star alongside the enhancement of its own 

terrorist strike capabilities. 

In order to better understand the background and dynamics of these 

developments, this testimony will discuss five key potentialities 

arising from these current threats: 

• First, the resilience of ISIS's external operations arm in a 

post-caliphate environment; 

• Second, the likely enduring threat posed by the tens of 

thousands of foreign fighters who have answered both ISIS's and alQa'ida's respective calls to battle; 

• Third, the prospect of al-Qa'ida absorbing--whether amenably or 

forcibly--ISIS's surviving cadre; 
56 

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• Fourth, the possibility of terrorist development and use of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) re-appearing as a salient threat 

consideration; and, 

• Fifth, what the new administration should do about it. 

THE RESILIENCE OF ISIS'S EXTERNAL OPERATIONS ARM IN A POST-CALIPHATE 

ENVIRONMENT 

ISIS, alas, is here to stay--at least for the foreseeable future. 

Some two years before the 2015 Paris attacks, ISIS had built an 

external operations network in Europe that mostly escaped notice. Known 

as the Amn al-Kharji or simply as "Enmi" or "Anmi" (the respective 

Turkish and Arabic rendering of the word, "Amniyat," or security 

service), this unit appears to function independently of the group's 

waning military and territorial fortunes. For instance, u.s. 

intelligence and defense officials quoted by Rukmini Callimachi in her 

revealing August 2016 New York Times article believe that ISIS has 

already sent uhundreds of operatives" into the European Union with 

"hundreds more" having been dispatched to Turkey as well. 3 If accurate, 

this investment of operational personnel ensures that ISIS will retain 

an effective international terrorist strike capability in Europe 

irrespective of its battlefield reverses in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, 

ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has already instructed potential 

foreign fighters who are unable to travel to the caliphate to instead 

emigrate to other wilayets (where ISIS branches are located). 4 This 

suggests that these other branches could develop their own external 

operations capabilities independent of the parent organization and 

present significant future threat(s)--much as al-Qa-ida's franchises 

have over the past decade in Yemen, North Africa, and South Asia, among 

other places. 

THE LIKELY ENDURING THREAT POSED BY THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN 

FIGHTERS WHO HAVE ANSWERED BOTH ISIS'S AND AL-QA'IDA'S RESPECTIVE CALLS 

TO BATTLE 

Moreover, in addition to the presumed sleeper cells that ISIS has 

seeded throughout Europe, there is the further problem of at least some 

of the estimated 7,000 European foreign fighters returning home. 5 They 

are only a fraction of the nearly 40,000 persons' from more than 100 
57 

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countries throughout the world' who have trained in Syria and Iraq. What 

this means is that in little more than four years ISIS's international 

cadre has surpassed even the most liberal estimates of the number of 

foreign fighters that the u.s. Intelligence Community believes 

journeyed to Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s in order to join 

al-Qa'ida. 8 In other words, far more foreign nationals have been trained 

by ISIS in Syria and Iraq during the past couple of years than were by 

al-Qa'ida in the dozen or so years leading up to the September 11th 2001 

attacks. 9 This recreates the same constellation of organizational 

capabilities and trained operatives that made al-Qa'ida so dangerous 

sixteen years ago. 

And, unlike the comparatively narrow geographical demographics of 

prior al-Qa'ida recruits, ISIS's foreign fighters cadre includes 

hitherto unrepresented nationalities, such as hundreds of Latin 

Americans along with citizens from Mali, Benin, and Bangladesh, among 

other atypical jihadi recruiting grounds. 10 Meanwhile, the danger from 

so-called lone wolf attacks also remains. The late ISIS commander Abu 

Muhammad al-Adnani's famous September 2014 summons to battle has 

hitherto proven far more compelling than al-Qa'ida's longstanding 

efforts similarly to animate, motivate, and inspire individuals to 

engage in violence in support of its aims. 

THE PROSPECT OF AL-QA'IDA ABSORBING--WHETHER AMENABLY OR FORCIBLY--

ISIS'S SURVIVING CADRE 

While ISIS has dominated the headlines and preoccupied the U.S. 

government's attention for the past four years, al-Qa'ida has been 

quietly rebuilding and marshaling its resources for the continuation of 

its twenty year long struggle against the u.s. Indeed, its presence in 

Syria should be regarded as just as dangerous and even more pernicious 

than that of ISIS. Evidence of the high priority that the al-Qa'ida 

senior Leadership (AQSL) attaches to Syria may be seen in the special 

messages conveyed in February and June 2012 respectively by Ayman alZawahiri and the late Abu Yahya al-Libi in support of the uprising 

against the Assad regime--calling upon Muslims in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, 

and Lebanon to do everything within their power to assist in the 

overthrow of the apostate Alawites. 
58 

- 4 -

The fact that Jabhat al-Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, regardless 

of what it calls itself, is even more capable than ISIS and a more 

dangerous long-term threat seems almost immaterial to many across the 

region who not only actively support and assist it, but actively seek 

to partner with what they perversely regard as a more moderate and 

reasonable rival to ISIS. 

This development may be seen as fitting neatly into al-Zawahiri's 

broader strategy of letting ISIS take all the heat and absorb all the 

blows from the coalition arrayed against it while al-Qa'ida quietly rebuilds its military strength and basks in its paradoxical new cachet as 

"moderate extremists" in contrast to the unconstrained ISIS. 

Anyone inclined to be taken in by this ruse would do well to heed 

the admonition of Thea Padnos (Peter Thea Curtis), the American 

journalist who spent two years in Syria as a hostage of Jabhat alNusra. Padnos relates how, "The Nusra Front higher-ups were inviting 

Westerners to the jihad in Syria not so much because they needed more 

foot soldiers--they didn't--but because they want to teach the 

Westerners to take the struggle into every neighborhood and subway back 

home. ,~l 

Finally, the importance of Syria to al-Qa'ida's plans may be seen 

in the number of AQSL personages who have re-located there. Mushin alFadhli, a bin Laden intimate who, until his death from a U.S. airstrike 

in 2015, had commanded the Khorasan Group--al-Qa'ida's elite, forwardbased operational arm in Syria. Haydar Kirkan, a Turkish national and 

longstanding, senior al-Qa'ida commander, had been sent back to his 

homeland in 2010--presumably by bin Laden himself. Kirkan's orders were 

to build an infrastructure in the region to facilitate the movement of 

key al-Qa'ida personnel hiding in Pakistan's Federally Administered 

Tribal Area in order to escape the escalation of drone strikes ordered 

by President Obama. Kirkan was recently killed as a result of a U.S. 

bombing raid in Idlib, Syria. 

And, in late 2015, al-Zawahiri dispatched Saif al-Adl, al-Qa'ida's 

most experienced and battle-hardened senior commander, to Syria in 

order to oversee the group's interests there. With this senior command 

structure in place, al-Qa'ida is thus well positioned to exploit ISIS's 
59 

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weakening military position and territorial losses and once again 

regain its pre-eminent position at the vanguard of the Salafi-Jihadi 

movement. ISIS in any event can no longer compete with al-Qa'ida in 

terms of influence, reach, manpower, and cohesion. In only one domain 

is ISIS currently stronger than its rival: the ability to mount 

spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe--and this is only because alQa'ida has decided for the time being to restrain this type of 

operation. 

Looking to the immediate future, ISIS's continuing setbacks and 

serial weakening arguably create the conditions where some 

reconciliation with al-Qa'ida might yet be effected. Efforts to reunite have in fact been continuous from both sides virtually from the 

time of ISIS's expulsion from the al-Qa'ida fold in 2014. Regardless of 

how it might occur, any kind of reconciliation between ISIS an alQa'ida or re-amalgamation or co-operation between the two groups would 

profoundly change the current conflict and result in a significantly 

escalated threat of foreign fighter terrorist operations in the West. 

THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION (WMD) RE-APPEARING AS A SALIENT THREAT CONSIDERATION 

A quarter of a century ago, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 

described publicity as the oxygen upon which terrorism depended. Today, 

however, it is access to sanctuary and safe haven that sustains and 

nourishes terrorism. A depressing pattern has established itself 

whereby we continue to kill terrorist leaders while the organizations 

they lead nonetheless continue to seize more territory. Indeed, 

according to the National Counterterrorism Center, a year before the 

u.s. launched the current campaign to defeat ISIS, the group had a 

presence in only seven countries around the world. By 2015, the same 

year that the Obama administration's latest counterterrorism strategy 

had been enunciated, that number had nearly doubled. And, as recently 

as this past August, the NCTC reported that ISIS was "fully 

operational" in eighteen countries. 12 Meanwhile, Qa'ida is also present 

in more countries today (nearly two dozen by my count) than it was in 

2001--and in three times as many as when the Obama administration took 

office in 2009. Today, foreign volunteers are fighting in Yemen, 
60 

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Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, and Mali as well as in Syria and 

Iraq, among other places. 

Sanctuary also permits more scope for terrorist research and 

development efforts to produce various weapons of destruction (WMD--

more accurately CBRN weapons: chemical, biological, radiological and 

nuclear weapons). In the case of al-Qa'ida's presence in Afghanistan 

before the September 11th 2001 attacks, these fears were more than amply 

justified. The group's interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon had 

reportedly commenced as far back as 1992--a mere four years after its 

creation. Indeed, bin Laden's continued interest in nuclear weaponry 

was also on display at the time of the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Two 

Pakistani nuclear scientists, identified as Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood 

and Abdul Majeed, spent three days that August at a secret al-Qa'ida 

facility outside Kabul. Although their discussions with bin Laden, alZawahiri, and other senior Qa'ida commanders also focused the 

development and employment of chemical and biological weapons, Mahmood-

--the former director for nuclear power at Pakistan's Atomic Energy 

Commission--claimed that bin Laden's foremost interest was in 

developing a nuclear weapon. Nor is there any reason to suspect that 

al-Qa'ida's general fascination with either nuclear or other weapons of 

mass destruction or mass disruption has ever completely abated or 

disappeared. 

Al-Qa'ida's research and development of biological warfare agents, 

for instance, were not only actively pursued but were also far more 

advanced than its nuclear ambitions. They appear to have begun in 

earnest with a memo written by al-Zawahiri on April 15, 1999 to 

Muhammad Atef, then-deputy commander of al-Qa'ida's military committee. 

Citing articles from leading scholarly publications such as Science, 

the Journal of Immunology, and the New England Journal of Medicine, as 

well as information gleaned from authoritative books such as Tomorrow's 

Weapons (1964), Peace or Pestilence (1949), and Chemical Warfare 

(1924), al-Zawahiri outlined in detail his thoughts on the priority 

that needed to be given to developing a biological weapons capability. 

At least two separate teams of al-Qa'ida operatives were subsequently 

tasked to undertake parallel R&D efforts to produce anthrax, ricin, and 
61 

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chemical warfare agents at the movement's facilities in Kandahar and 

Derunta. Bio-warfare experts believe that on the eve of the September 

11,2001 attacks, al-Qa'ida was at least two to three years away from 

producing a sufficient quantity of anthrax to use as a weapon. 

More recently, credible intelligence surfaced in 2010 that alQa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)--widely considered the 

movement's most dangerous and capable affiliate--was deeply involved in 

the development of ricin, a bio-weapon made from castor beans that the 

FBI has termed the third most toxic substance known to mankind--behind 

only plutonium and botulism. Then, in May 2013, Turkish authorities 

seized two kilos of sarin nerve gas--the same weapon used in the 1995 

attack on the Tokyo subway system--and arrested twelve men linked to 

Qa'ida's Syrian affiliate. Days later, another set of sarin-related 

arrests was made in Iraq of terrorist belonging to ISIS's immediate 

predecessor, who were reportedly respectively overseeing the production 

of sarin and mustard blistering agents in at least two different 

locations. ISIS, of course, has also repeatedly employed chemical 

weapons, including against civilians, in Syria. It is doubtful whether 

they would feel constrained from deploying these weapons elsewhere. 

WHAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DO ABOUT IT ALL 

In sum, the Trump administration is facing perhaps the most 

parlous international security environment since the period immediately 

following the September 11th 2001 attacks--with serious threats now 

emanating from not one but two terrorist movements and a previous 

counterterrorism strategy and approach that has failed. Indeed, the 

three pillars upon which that strategy was based-leadership attrition, 

training of local forces, and countering violent extremism--have thus 

failed to deliver a crushing blow to ISIS and al-Qa-ida. 13 

The U.S.-led war on terrorism has now lasted longer than our 

participation in both world wars. It has surpassed even our active 

military involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. Like the 

Viet Cong guerrillas and People's Army of Vietnam main force units, our 

Salafi-Jihadi enemies have locked us into an enervating war of 

attrition--the preferred strategy of terrorists and guerrillas from 
62 

- 8 -

time immemorial. They hope to undermine national political will, 

corrode internal popular support, and demoralize us and our regional 

partners through a prolonged, generally intensifying and increasingly 

diffuse campaign of terrorism and violence. 

In his last publicly released, videotaped statement bin Laden 

revealed precisely this strategy on the eve of the 2004 presidential 

election. "So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the 

point of bankruptcy," he declared. 

Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah ..•. This 

is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla 

warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical 

superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 

10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw 

in defeat. 14 

Decisively breaking this stasis and emerging from this war of 

attrition must therefore be among the Trump administration's highest 

priorities. Simply killing a small number of leaders in terrorist 

groups, whose ranks in any event are continually replenished, will not 

end the threats posed by ISIS and al-Qa'ida nor dislodge them from 

their bases of operation in the Levant and Iraq, North Africa, the 

Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. The slow and fractured process of 

training indigenous government security forces in those regions will 

not do so either. The inadequacy of these training activities and 

efforts to build partner capacity are evidenced by the mostly unimpeded 

escalation of terrorist activities in all those places. Whether in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, and especially in Yemen, our 

efforts to build partner capacity have all foundered. In each, Islamist 

terrorist numbers grew faster than we were able to train indigenous 

security forces effectively; terrorist control over territory and the 

creation of new sanctuaries and safe havens expanded while governmental 

sovereignty contracted; and, the terrorists' operational effectiveness 

appreciably outpaced that of their government opponents. While there 

has been some recent progress in Mali, Nigeria, Syria, and Iraq, it is 

not clear whether the past problems that undermined the performance of 

indigenous militaries have been adequately addressed and reversed. 

Accordingly, the Trump administration should conduct a complete 
63 

- 9 -

reevaluation and systemic overhaul of our training and resourcing of 

foreign partners if we are to prevent the further spread of ISIS and 

al-Qa'ida branches and counter their entrenchment across the multiple 

regions in which they have already embedded themselves. 

While continued and increased u.s. combat air support is also 

required--especially in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and in support of French 

forces in Mali--that alone is not the answer. American and allied air 

strikes in coordination with local ground forces have not brought any 

of these counterterrorist campaigns to rapid conclusion. Therefore, in 

tandem with both the continued use of air power and deployment of 

supporting American special operations forces personnel, division-size 

conventional U.S. military forces might be usefully deployed on a 

strict 90-day rotation into violence-plagued rural areas and urban 

trouble spots. They have the necessary combat experience and skill-sets 

to sequentially eliminate terrorist strength in each of these areas and 

thereby enable indigenous security forces to follow in their wake to 

stabilize and police newly liberated places. By providing more 

effective governance and core services--with sustained u.s. and 

European support--host nations could thus better prevent the recurrence 

of terrorism and return of terrorist forces. 

CONCLUSION 

The current threat environment posed by the emergence and spread 

of ISIS and the stubborn resilience and long-game approach of al-Qa'ida 

makes a new strategy and new organizational and institutional behaviors 

necessary. The non-traditional challenges to u.s. national security and 

foreign policy imperatives posed by elusive and deadly irregular 

adversaries emphasizes the need to anchor changes that will more 

effectively close the gap between detecting irregular adversarial 

activity and rapidly defeating it. The effectiveness of this strategy 

will be based on our capacity to think like a networked enemy, in 

anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by 

different resources. This goal requires that the U.S. national security 

structure organize itself for maximum efficiency, information sharing, 
64 

- 10 -

and the ability to function quickly and effectively under new 

operational definitions. 

1 The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham--also known as ISIL, the 

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; by its pejorative Arabic acronym, 

Daesh; and, simply as the Islamic State. 

2 This presentation is adopted from the author's "Terrorism 

Challenges for the Trump Administration," CTC Sentinel, vol. 9, issue 

11 (November/December 2016), at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1113.pdf. 

3 Rukmini Callimachi, "How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a 

Global Network of Killers," New York Times, August 3, 2016. See also, 

idem, "How ISIS Built the Machinery of Terror Under Europe's Gaze," New 

York Times, March 29, 2016. 

4 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, "This is what Allah and His Messenger had 

Promised us," Islamic State Fuqran Media Foundation, November 2, 2016. 

5 See John Gatt-Rutter, director of counterterrorism division, 

European External Action Service (EEAS) quoted in Martin Banks, 

"Returning foreign fighters are biggest threat to EU, Parliament 

warned," The Parliament: Politics, Policy And People Magazine, October 

12, 2016. 

6 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, "Statement 

for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 

Community," Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 February 2016, pp. 4-6; 

and, U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: 

Special Briefing by Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism," June 2, 2016. 

7 Clapper, p. 4; and, Matt Bradley, "Rift Grows in Islamic State 

Between Foreign, Local Fighters," Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2016. 

8 "Esimtates of the number of non-Afghan volunteers range from 

4,000 to 25,000, with Arab fighters making up the majority." Gina 

Bennett, 'The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,' Weekend 

Edition: United States Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and 
65 

- 11 -

Research, August 21-22, 1993, pp. 1-2, 

l1_tj;g:_L/ WW1tl~1lt:_j,c:>n__<l]fl_e_<:~rl_tj'rn()_J1\_-_(0_0It\{:J{I! a_Qde r li19Jilllj_aJ:l:Lgi n :Ecif • 

9 "U.S. intelligence estimates the total number of fighters who 

underwent instruction in Bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan from 

1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000." National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 

Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States: Authorized Version (New York & London: w.w. Norton, 

2004), p. 67. 

10 I am indebted to Professor Jytte Klausen of Brandeis University 

for her thoughts on this issue. E-mail correspondence, October 21, 

2016. See also, Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, The 

Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look At the Islamic State's 

Foreign Fighter Paper Trail (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism 

Center, April 2016), p. 9. 

11 Theo Padnos, "My Captivity,' New York Times Magazine, October 

29, 2014. 

12 William Arkin, et al., "New Counterterrorism 'Heat Map' Shows 

ISIS Branches Spreading Worldwide," NBC News, August 23, 2016, accesse 

at: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/new-counterterrorismheat-map-shows-isis-branches-spreading-worldwide-n621866. 

13 The most recent official elucidation of this approach is the 

2015 National Security Strategy document. It explains how the U.S. 

"shifted away from a model of fighting costly, large-scale ground wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the United States--particularly our 

military--bore an enormous burden. Instead, we are now pursuing a more 

sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism 

operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased 

efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization 

that drives increased threats." 

See National Security Strategy, February 2015, p. 9, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_secur 

ity_strategy.pdf 
66 

- 12 -

14 "Full transcript of bin Laden's speech," aljazeera.com, November 

1, 2004, accessed at: 

http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/ll/200849163336457223.html. 
67 

February 2017 

Georgetown University 

Security Studies Program 

Mortara Building 

3600 N Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20007 

BRUCE HOFFMAN 

EDUCATION 

brh6@georgetown.edu 

(571) 277 6659 

D.Phil., International Relations, 1986, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, England. 

B. Phil. (now M.Phil.), International Relations, 1978, New College, University of Oxford, 

England. 

A.B. (Honors), Government, History, 1976, Connecticut College, New London, 

Connecticut, U.S.A. 

CAREER 

Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California 

2016-Present- William F. Podlich Distinguished Fellow and Visiting Professor of 

Government, fall semester, 2016. 

Georgetown University, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, 

D.C. 

2010-Present- Director, Center for Security Studies, and Director, Security Studies 

Program; 2006-Present - Professor (with tenure), School of Foreign Service (on leave 

fall semester 20 16). 

RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. 

2005-2006- Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency; 1998-2006 

Director, Washington Office, and Senior International Policy Analyst, Senior Research 

Staff; 2004- Acting Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy; 2001-2004- Vice 

President for External Affairs. 

University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland 

2014-Present Professor of Terrorism Studies (part-time), School of International 

Relations; 1996-1998- Reader in International Relations; 1994-1998- Founding 

Director, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV); 1994-1998-

Chairman of the Department of International Relations; 1994-1996 -Senior Lecturer, 

Department of International Relations. 

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 

1993-1994 - Director, Strategy and Doctrine Research Program (Associate Director, 

1992-1993), Army Research Division, and Senior Social Scientist, Senior Research Staff, 
68 

International Policy Department; 1990-1992 Associate Director, International Security 

and Defense Strategy Program, National Security Research Division; and Social Scientist, 

Senior Research Staff, International Policy Department; 1986-1990- Associate Social 

Scientist, Political Science Department; 1983-1986- Assistant Social Scientist, 

Behavioral Sciences Department; and, 1981-1983- Consultant, Social Sciences 

Department. 

PUBLICATIONS 

Books 

Rollback: Reagan's Cold Warriors and America's First War on Terrorism (New York: 

Knopf, forthcoming). 

Inside Terrorism-Third Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 

August 2017). 

Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

2015; Vintage Books, 2016 & Changsha, China: Changsha Senxin, forthcoming), pp. 

640. 

• Winner, Washington Institute for Near East Studies' Gold Medal for the best 

book on Middle Eastern politics, history or society published in 2015 

• Winner, jewish Book Council, Everett Family Foundation Award for the jewish 

Book of the Year for 2015 

• StLouis Times-Dispatch "Best Books of the Year, 2015" 

• Kirkus Review"Best Books of the Year, 2015" 

• New York Times Book Review Editors' Choice" 

The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014 and 2016), co-edited, pp. 704. 

Moles, Defectors, And Deceptions: james Angleton and His Influence on US 

Counterintelligence-A Wilson Center and Georgetown University Center for Security 

Studies joint Conference (Washington, DC Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, 2014), co-edited, pp. 116. 

Terrorism And Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security EnvironmentReadings & Interpretations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012), co-edited, pp. 793. 

State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle against Global Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 

Brookings Institution, 2007), co-authored, pp. 100. 

Inside Terrorism-Second Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. 465; 

and, Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 2006, pp. 596). 

Inside Terrorism-First Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; London: 

Victor Gollancz, 1998; Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1999; Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1999; 

Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1999; Warsaw: Bertlesmann Media, 1999; Sofia, Bulgaria: Pleiada, 

1999; Tokyo: Hara-Shobo, 1999; Belgrade: Academic, 2000; Moscow: Ultra.Culture 

Publishers, 2004; Istanbul: Archaeology and Art Publications, 2004; and, Seoul: DaiHak, 

2004), pp. 288. 

The Failure of British Military Policy Within Palestine, 1939-1947 (Ram at Gan, Israel: Barllan University Press, 1983), pp. 136. 
69 

Articles in Refereed journals 

"A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars On Terrorism," Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 1 Uanuary 2015), pp. 9. 

'The Palestine Police Force and the challenges of gathering counterterrorism 

Intelligence, 1939-1947," Small Wars and Insurgencies, val. 24, no. 4 (December 2013), 

pp. 38. 

"AI Qaeda's Uncertain Future," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, val. 36, no. 8 (August 

2013), pp. 18. 

'The Rationality of Terrorism and Other Forms of Political Violence: Lessons from the 

Jewish Campaign in Palestine, 1939-1947," Small Wars and Insurgencies, val. 22, no. 2 

(May 2011), pp. 14. 

"Assessing The Terrorist Threat to America and to American Interests," Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 34, no. 2 (February 2011), co-authored, pp. 36. 

'The First Non-State Use of A Chemical Weapon in Warfare: The Tamil Tigers' Assault on 

East Kiran," Small Wars and Insurgencies, val. 20, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 14. 

"A Counter-Terrorist Grand Strategy for the Obama Administration," Terrorism and 

Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 3 Uuly 2009), pp. 18. 

'The Capability of Emergency Departments and Emergency Medical Systems In The U.S. 

To Respond To Mass Casualty Events Resulting From Terrorist Attacks," Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, val. 32, no. 1 Uanuary 2009), pp. 12. 

"Putting German Terrorism in Perspective: An American Response," Bulletin of the 

German Historical Institute, issue 43 (Fall 2008), pp. 8. 

'Terrorism in History," journal of Conflict Studies, vol. XXVII, no. 2 (Winter 2007), pp. 20. 

'The Cult of the Insurgent: It's Tactical and Strategic Implication,' Australian journal of 

International Affairs, vol. 61, no 3 (September 2007), pp. 17. 

"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, val. 28, 

no. 2 (February-March 2005), pp. 19. 

'The Changing Face of AI Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism, vol. 2 7, no. 6 (November-December 2004), pp. 11. 

'Terrorism, Signaling and Suicide Attack," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 27, no. 

4 Uuly-August 2004), pp. 39 (co-author). 

"AI Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment," Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, val. 26, no. 6 (November-December 2003), pp. 13. 

"Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism, vol. 25, no. 5 (September-October 2002), pp. 13. 

"Change and Continuity in Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 5 

(September-October 2001), pp. 11. 
70 

'Terrorism and Aviation Security," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, no. 3 

(Autumn 1998), pp. 18. 

'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents, 1996," Terrorism 

and Political Violence, vol. 10, no. 2, (Summer 1998), pp. 45 (co-author) 

"La Jonction Entre Tendaces lnternationales et lnterieures du Terrorisme et La Response 

Americaine," Strategique (Paris), vol. 66/67, nos. 2-3 (1997), pp. 22. 

"La Terror Sacree," Politique lnternationale (Paris), no. 77 (Autumn 1997), pp. 16. 

'The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism and the Threat to 

Civil Aviation," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 14. 

'Terrorism and WMD: Preliminary Hypotheses," Non-Proliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, 

(Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 9. 

"Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 1 

(Spring 1997), pp. 8. 

"The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents, 1995," Terrorism 

and Political Violence, vol. 8, no. 3, (Autumn 1996), pp. 40 (co-author). 

"Una Nueva Era del Terrorismo," Sistema: Revista de Ciencias Sociales (Madrid), nos. 

132-133 (June 1996), pp. 15. 

"Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the PostCold War Era," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 17. 

"The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents, 1994," Terrorism 

and Political Violence, vol. 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), pp. 48 (co-author). 

"Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated By A Religious Imperative," 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 13. 

'The Role of Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement in the Prevention of 

Trans-National Terrorism," Law Enforcement and Low Intensity Conflict, vol. 4, no. 1 

(Spring 1995), pp. 20. 

'The Urbanisation of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations," 

Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 6, no.1, (Spring 1995), pp. 19 (co-author). 

"Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," Terrorism and Political 

Violence, vol. 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), pp. 24 

"Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976-1980," Small Wars and 

Insurgencies val. 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1994), pp. 22 (co-author). 

"Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends and Potentialities," Terrorism and Political Violence, 

Summer 1993 vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 17. 

"Current Research on Terrorism and LIC," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. xv, no. 

2 1992, pp. 13. 
71 

''The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension," Terrorism and 

Political Violence, Fall, 1989, pp. 34. 

''The Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s," Terrorism and Political 

Violence, Spring, 1989, pp. 16. 

"Commando Warfare and Small Raiding Parties as Part of a Counterterrorist Military 

Policy," Conflict, Fall 1986, pp. 28. 

''The Plight of the Phoenix: The PLO Since Lebanon," Conflict Quarterly, Spring 1985. pp. 

13. 

Articles in Policy journals (selected) 

'Terrorism Challenges for the Trump Administration," CTC Sentinel, vol. 9, issue 11, 

November/December 2016, pp. 7, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_ Vol91ss 1113.pdf. 

"Sorry, Politicians, But Fighting Poverty Isn't Going to Defeat Terrorism," Z6calo, 1 

August 2016, http:/ /www.zocalopublicsquare.org/20 16/08/01/ sorry-politicians-butfighting-poverty-isnt-going-to-defeat-terrorism /ideas I nexus f. 

'The Coming !SIS-al Qaeda Merger," Foreign Affairs On-line," 29 March 2016, 

https: I jwww. fore ig naffairs .com I artie! e s I 2 0 16-0 3-2 9 I coming-is i s-al-qaeda-merger. 

"Return of the Jihadi," The National interest, no. 141, January /February 2016, pp. 9. 

"Low-Tech Terrorism," The National interest, no. 30, March/ April 2014 pp. 11. 

"AI Qaeda Rises in Yemen's Chaos," The National interest, no. 23, January /February 

2013, pp. 7. 

"American jihad," The National Interest, no. 107, May/June 2010, pp. 11. 

"The Age of Woman Power," The National Interest, no. 99, January/February 2009, pp. 7. 

"Cell Phones in the Hindu Kush," The National interest, no. 96, July/August 2008, pp. 9 

(co-authored). 

'The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters," Foreign 

Affairs, vol. 87, no. 3, May/June 2008, pp. 5. 

"Making The Grade: From A to F, how the U.S. measures up in its struggle against global 

extremism," The National Interest, no. 94, March/April 2008, pp. 4 (co-authored). 

"Is AI-Qaeda on the Run or on the March?" Middle East Policy, vol. xiv, no. 2, Summer 

2007, pp. 15. 

"From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency," Current History, vol. 105, 

December 2006, no. 695, pp. 7. 

"AI Qaeda and the War on Terrorism: An Update," Current History, vol. 103, no. 677, 

December 2004, pp. 5. 

"Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?" Foreign Policy (Summer 1999), pp. 14. 
72 

"Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials," Conflict Studies nos. 314/315 (London), 

Uanuary/February 1999), pp. 42. 

'The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives From Social Psychology," Psychiatric Annals, vol. 

29, no. 6 Uune 1999), pp. 337-340. 

"Old Madness, New Methods," RAND Review, vol. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 6. 

'Terrorism: Who Is Fighting Whom?" World Policy journal, vol. XVI, no. 1, (March 1997), 

pp. 6. 

"Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," Strategic Studies 

Institute Papers, U.S. Army War College, 15 July 1994, pp. 32. 

Right-Wing Terrorism in Germany, Research Report No. 13, Institute of Jewish Affairs, 

London, England, December 1986, pp. 18. 

"Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980," Orbis, Spring 1984, pp. 12. 

Chapters in Edited Books (selected) 

"Wilkinson, Paul (1937-2011)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography(Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 2015), pp. 2. 

"Who Fights?-A Comparative Demographic Depiction of Terrorists and Insurgents in the 

Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries" in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds.), The 

Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 19. 

"Assessing the State of AI Qaeda and Current and Future Terrorist Threats," in Ibrahim 

Karawan, Wayne McCormack, and Stephen E. Reynolds, Values and Violence: Intangible 

Aspects of Terrorism (Rotterdam: Springer, 2008), pp. 16. 

"CBRN Terrorism Post-9/11," in Russell Howard and James Forest (eds.), Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and Terrorism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), pp. 15. 

"AI Qaeda Then and Now," in Karen J. Greenberg (ed.), AI Qaeda Now: Understanding 

Today's Terrorists (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 6. 

"The Debate over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Weapons," in Brad Roberts (ed.), Hype or Reality? The "New Terrorism" And Mass 

Casualty Attacks (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), 

pp. 14. 

"La menace d'attentats au moyen d'armes atomiques, bacteriologiques et chimiques," in 

Arnaud Blinn, et. al., Puissances et Influences: Annuaire geopofitique et geostrateguique 

2000-2001 (Paris: Editions Mille et Une Nuits, 2000), pp. 3. 

"New Forms of Terrorism and the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological and Nuclear Weapons," in Kai Hirschmann and Peter Gerhard (eds.), 

Terrorismus als wetweites Phanomenon (Berlin: Berlin Publishers, 2000), pp. 7. 

"A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism," in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European 

Democracies Against Terrorism: Government Policies and Supranational Cooperation 

(Aidershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), pp. 26. 
73 

"Les terrorismes et Ia reponse americaine," in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), Les Strategies du 

terrorisme (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1999), pp. 21. 

'Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends and Potentialities," in Conor Gearty (ed.), Terrorism: 

International Library of Criminology, Criminal justice and Penology (Aidershot: 

Dartmouth Publishing, 1999). 

"How Terrorism is Analysed," in Alan Thomspon (ed.) Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics 

(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996), pp. 9. 

'Terrorism: Its Motives, Methods, and Immediate Results," in Eugene Sevin, et al., 

Protecting Buildings from Bomb Damage: Transfer of Blast Mitigation Technologies from 

Military to Civilian Applications (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences Press, 

September 1995), pp. 17. 

"Origins and Expressions of Religious Conflict," in Hendrick Frieman (ed.), Proceedings 

of the First International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict (Stockholm: Defence 

Research Establishment, 1995), pp. 14. 

"Command and Control of Operations Other Than War," in Hendrick Frieman (ed.), 

Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict (Stockholm: 

Defence Research Establishment, 1995), pp. 22. 

"Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe," in Edward Moxon-Browne (ed.), European Terrorism 

(New York and Toronto: G.l<. Hall, 1994), pp. 11. 

'Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends and Potentialities," in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), 

Technology and Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 17. 

"Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism," in 

Yonah Alexander (ed.), Middle Eastern Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects 

(New York and Toronto: G.l<. Hall, 1994), pp. 45. 

"Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare in the Coming Decades," in 

Lawrence Howard (ed.), Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses (New York: Praeger, 1992), 

pp. 15. 

Articles, Review Articles and Newspaper Opinion Pieces (selected) 

"How Much Really Changed About Terrorism on 9/11?" The Atlantic, 11 September 2016 

(co-authored) at: http: f_/www_. tl}eatlanJic"co_m/i nternational [arch ivef 2 016LO')fje n kin s_::-

hoffman-crenshaw-september -11-al-qaedli_ 49~-'LL 

"ISIL IS Winning," Po!tico, 10 September 2015, at: 

http:/ /www.politico.com/magazine/story /2015/09 /isil-is-winning-213136. 

"AI-Qaeda's continued core strategy and disquieting leader-led trajectory," Real 

lnstituto Elcano (Madrid), ARI 37/2013, October 9, 2013 (co-authored) at: 
74 

"Photography Changes The Face Of Terrorism," in Marvin Heiferman (ed.), Photography 

Changes Everything (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution and Aperture Foundation, 

2012), pp. 3. 

'What Osama Was Thinking at the End," Wall Street journal, 8 May 2012. 

'Tweeting fi.ir Terror," Suddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 29 March 2012. 

'Why al Qaeda Will Survive: Awlaki's death is nothing more than a glancing blow to al 

Qaeda," Daily Beast, 30 September 2011 at: 

!mp_;LL1!Yit\'V\L.!_Q~c@jlyl2_eas t. cQIJJ_,i artj_<J~s~QQllLQ'!L 3 0 I a 1=2-wl iilsi-::_s--d t:_a1b~- 11 ot hi 11 g-- mo.[~:: 

than -a-gland n g--bl ow-ai·~Gi!_eda -stronger--than -evere s t_.ht_rnl 

'The Leaderless Jihad's Leader: Why Osama Bin Laden Mattered," Foreign Affairs (online) 

13 May 2011 at: http:/ /www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67851/bruce-hoffman/theleaderless-jihads-leader. 

"American Jihad-Part II," National interest Online, 21 July 2010 at 

http: I ;www.nationalinterest.org/ Article.aspx?id = 2 3 716. 

"AI-Qaeda's New Grand Strategy," Washington Post (Sunday Outlook section), 10 january 

2010. 

"How to Win Afghanistan," National Interest Online 10 October 2009 at 

htt]:J:Uwwvv. natio na I intert:_st. o rg{Arti cit:_ .as Q)(?i<:l= 22 212. 

"Econo-Jihad," National interest Online, 13 May 2009 at 

http:Jlwwll':f:!lati()n.<J.Ii~ntf'rt:_sJ,QrgJArti~l(',al>PX£i.:J=214(:ii)._ (co-authored). 

'Terrorism's Twelve Step Program," National interest Online, 13 January 2009 at: 

http: f jwww.nationalinte rest.org f Article.aspx?id =205 92 

"Lessons from Mumbai," National Interest Online, 1 December 2008 at: 

http: 1 ;www.nationalinterest.org f Article.aspx?id = 20308 

"Innovative, ruthless, disciplined terrorism stalks us again," Sunday Times (London), 29 

November 2008. 

"AI-Qaeda Dangerous As Ever," National Interest Online, 10 September 2008 at: 

http: 1 ;www.nationalinterest.org I Article.aspx?id = 19846 

"AI Qaeda isn't dead yet," CNNPolitics.com, 10 September 2008 at: 

http: I /www.cnn.com/ 2008/ POLITICS/ 09/09 I hoffman.alqaeda/ index .htm l?iref=newssea 

rch 

"Wenn du deinen Gegner und dich selber kennst ... .': Perspektiven auf den radikalen 

lslamismus" ("If you know your opponent and yourself .... ": Perspectives on the radical 

lslamism," Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), 7 August 2008. 
75 

"Scarier Than Bin Laden," Washington Post (Sunday Outlook section), 9 September 2007. 

"We Can't Win If We Don't Know the Enemy," Washington Post (Sunday Outlook section), 

25 March 2007. 

"Remember AI Qaeda? They're baaack: Defeating Osama bin Laden's resurgent terrorist 

network requires far more than military might," Los Angeles Times, 20 February 2007. 

"What went wrong?" Washington Post Book World, 27 August 2006, p. 1. 

"Wars on Terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 295, no. 4, May 2006, p. 1. 

'The War for Muslim Minds," Washington Post Book World, 18 December 2005, p. 1. 

"Plan of attack," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 293, no. 6, July-August 2004, pp. 2. 

"Aftermath: Cleaning up after suicide bombings," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 293, no. 1, 

January-February 2004, pp. 2. 

"Saddam Is Ours. Does AI Qaeda Care?'' New York Times, 17 December 2003, p. 1. 

"In the Calculus of Fear, Terrorists Have an Edge," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion 

section, 2 November 2003, pp. 2. 

'The Wall," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 291, no. 6, july-August 2003, p. 1. 

'The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 291, no. 5, June 2003, pp. 8. 

'The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 291, no. 3, 

April 2003, pp. 2. 

"A Nasty Business: Gathering 'good intelligence' against terrorists is an inherently 

brutish enterprise, involving methods a civics class night not condone. Should we care?" 

The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 289, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 4. 

"All You Need Is Love: How the terrorists stopped terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 

288, no. 5,December2001, pp. 3. 

"One Alarm Fire," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 228, no. 5, December 2001, pp. 3. 

"A Counterterrorism Policy for Yesterday's Threat," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion 

section, 16 September 2001, pp. 2. 

'Terrorism: A Policy Behind the Times," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion section, 12 

November 2000, pp. 2. 

"America and the New Terrorism: The American Perspective," Survival, vol. 42, no. 2 

(Summer 2000), pp. 5. 

"Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?" Foreign Policy (Summer 1999), pp. 14. 

"Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials," Conflict Studies nos. 314/315 (London), 

Uanuary/February 1999), pp. 42. 
76 

"Russia: Conventional Terrorism Still Works," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion section, 

26 September 1999, pp. 2. 

'The Mind of the Terrorist: Perspectives From Social Psychology," Psychiatric Annals, vol. 

29, no. 6 Uune 1999), pp. 337-340. 

"Old Madness, New Methods," RAND Review, val. 22, no. 2 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 6. 

"Giobalisierung des Schreckens-Privatisierung der Tat," Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), 

26-2 7 September 1998. 

"The New Face of Terrorism" Shinchosha Foresight (Tokyo), no. 9, 9 September-16 

October 1998, pp. 4. 

'The New Terrorist: Mute, Unnamed, Bloodthirsty," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion 

section, 16 August 1998, pp. 2. 

"Religious Extremism," in Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, vol. 1 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 

1997), pp. 3. 

'Terrorism: Who Is Fighting Whom?" World Policy journal, vol. XVI, no. 1, (March 1997), 

pp. 6. 

"Creatures of the Cold War: the JRA," jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (February 

1997) pp. 3. 

"A New Kind of Terrorism: Silence is Deadlier," Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion 

section, 18 August 1996, pp. 2. 

"Americans Who Are Threatened By the Shadows of Terrorists Within," Shinchosha 

Foresight (Tokyo), no. 8, 8 August 1996-9 September 1996, pp. 3. 

"Mourning a lost immunity," The Sunday Times (London), 28 July 1996, p. 1. 

"How to tackle the murder and mayhem: what governments can do to fight terrorism," 

The lndependent(London), 19 April1996, p. 1. 

"Holy Terror: An Act of Divine Duty" The World Today (London), vol. 52, no. 3 (March 

1996), pp. 3. 

"The New Era of Terrorism," Shinchosha Foresight (Tokyo), no. 12, 16 December 1995-

19 January 1996, pp. 5. 

"American Right-Wing Extremism," jane's Intelligence Review, val. 7, no. 7 Uuly 1995) 

pp. 2. 

"In America, Too, Violence All the Worse for Its Religious Pretenses," International Herald 

Tribune (Paris), 27 April 1995, pp. 2. 

"Finally the Age of Religious Terrorism Has Begun: Approaching the Year 2000 the 

Danger Will Be Increased," Shinchosha Foresight (Tokyo), no. 4, 15 April-19 May 1995, 

pp. 3. 

"Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," Strategic Studies 

Institute Papers, U.S. Army War College, 15 July 1994, pp. 32. 
77 

"N.Y. Bombing Bares Vulnerability," Christian Science Monitor(Boston), 17 March 1993 

(co-author). 

"Saddam Hussein's Ultimate Fifth Column--Terrorists," Los Angeles Times Sunday 

Opinion section, 26 August 1990. 

Right-Wing Terrorism in Germany, Research Report No. 13, Institute of jewish Affairs, 

London, England, December 1986, pp. 18. 

"Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980," Orbis, Spring 1984, pp. 12. 

Congressional Testimony (selected) and Commission Reports 

'The Commission on the 9/11 Review of the FBI," U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related 

Agencies, 26 March 2014. 

"Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment," Homeland Security Project (successor to the 

"9/11 Commission"), Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, 9 September 2013 (coauthor), pp. 73. 

"Assessing Attacks On The Homeland: From Fort Hood To Boston," U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 10 july 2013. 

Report Of The Mayor's Blue Ribbon Panel On Airport Security: A report to Los Angeles 

Mayor Antionio R. Villaraigosa concerning public safety at Los Angeles International 

Airport (Los Angeles: Office of the Mayor, 2011), (co-author), pp. 162. 

"The Future of AI Qaeda," U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Trade, 2 7 May 2011. 

"Assessing the Terrorist Threat," National Security Preparedness Group (successor to the 

"9/11 Commission", Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, 10 September 2010 (coauthor), pp. 43. 

"Internet Terror Recruitment And Tradecraft: How Can We Address An Evolving Tool 

While Protecting Free Speech," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment, 26 May 2010. 

"Homeland Security Policymaking: HSC at a Crossroads and Presidential Study Directive 

1," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 

2 April 2009. 

"The Capability of Emergency Departments and Emergency Medical Systems In The U.S. 

To Respond To Mass Casualty Events Resulting From Terrorist Attacks," U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

5 May 2008. 

"Using the Web as a Weapon: The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization and 

Homegrown Terrorism," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment, 6 November 2007. 
78 

"Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist 

Threat: AI Qaeda on the Run or on the March?," U.S. House of Representatives House 

Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 

Capabilities, 14 February 2007. 

"Iraq: Democracy or Civil War?" U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International 

Relations, 11 September 2006. 

"Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground: The Terrorist Threat and the 

Counter-Terrorism Effort," U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 18 July 2006. 

"Combating AI Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat," U.S. House of Representatives 

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats 

and Capabilities, 16 February 2006. 

"Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?'' U.S. House of Representatives 

International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 

Nonproliferation, 29 September 29, 2005. 

"Lessons of 9/11," U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives Select Committees on 

Intelligence, Joint September 11, 200llnquiry, 8 October 2002: 

"Re-thinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism," U.S. House of Representatives 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland 

Security, 26 September 2001. 

"Preparing for the War on Terrorism," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 

International Relations, 21 September 2001. 

"Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and NonGovernmental Organizations," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International 

Relations, 3 April 3, 2001. 

"Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy", U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 

Affairs, and International Relations, 27 March 2001. 

Book Reviews (selected) 

Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden by Peter L. Bergen, (in The 

Atlantic MonthlY!, 2002, pp. 2. 

Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses, 

edited by Brad Roberts, (in Survival), 1998, p. 1. 

Among The Thugs, by Bill Buford, 1998 (in Terrorism and Political Violence), pp. 2. 

Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans: A U.S. Foreign Policy Perspective, by 

Gazmen Xhudo, 1997 (in jane's Intelligence Review), p. 1. 

Blood In Zion: How the jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine, by Saul Zadka, 

1997 (in Small Wars and Insurgencies), pp. 2. 
79 

The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System, by Adrian Guelke, 1996 (in 

Intelligence and National Security), pp. 2. 

Shoot The Women First, by Eileen MacDonald, 1995, (in The Oral History Review. The 

journal of The Oral History Association), pp. 4. 

Special Operations and Elite Units, 1939-1988: A Research Guide, by Roger Beaumont, 

1990 (in Conflict QuarterlY!. pp. 2. 

Multidimensional Terrorism, edited by Martin Slann and Bernard Schechterman, 1988 (in 

The American Political Science Review), pp. 1. 

Zionism and Arabism in Israel and Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 

edited by Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim, 1983 (in The journal of Imperial and 

Commonwealth Histor)IJ, pp. 2. 

RAND Corporation Reports (selectedY 

The Early History of a/ Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2011, pp. 150 

(co-author). 

The Victims of Terrorism: An Assessment of Their Influence and Crowing Role in Policy, 

Legislation, and the Private Sector(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, OP-180-

CTRMP, 2007), pp. 48 (co-author). 

The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MR2468-RC, 2005), pp. 168 (co-author). 

Preparing for Suicide Terrorism: A Primer for American Law Enforcement Agencies and 

Officers (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, TR-204-FFF, 2004), pp. 33 (coauthor). 

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 

OP-127-IPD & CMEPP, 2004), pp. 27. 

Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk 

Insurance Act (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MG-393-CTRMP, 2004), pp. 

75 (co-authored). 

Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MR-1468-

0TI, 2003), pp. 85 (co-author). 

Trends In Outside Support For Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 

Corporation, MR-1405-0TI, 2001), pp. 136 (co-author). 

Security in the Nation's Capital and the Closure of Pennsylvania Avenue: An Assessment 

(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MR-1293-FCCDC, 2001), pp. 67 (co-author) 

•N.B. RAND reports with an "MR" "TR" "OP" or "R" prefix were peer-reviewed by at least two 

referees; those reports with an "N" prefix were peer-reviewed by at least one referee. 
80 

First Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

15 December 1999, pp. 67 (co-author). 

Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, MR-989-AF, 

1999), pp. 153 (co-author). 

Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness, MR-505-

NIJ, 1995, pp. 66 (co-author). 

The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations, MR398-A, 1994, pp. 30 (co-author). 

"Operations Other Than War," in Paul Davis (ed.), New Challenges for Defense Planning: 

Rethinking How Much Is Enough (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 30 (co-author). 

"Aviation Security" in Richard Hilestad (ed.), Safety Study Schiphol: A Study of the 

External Risk and Possible Safety Concerns, MR-288-EAC/VW, 1993, pp. 12. 

Force-on-Force Attacks: Their Implications for the Defense of U.S. Nuclear Facilities, N3638-DOE, 1993 (co-author), pp. 48. 

The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1988, R-4180-RC,l992, pp. 128 

(co-author). 

Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" 

Doctrine During the 1950s, R-4015-A, 1991, pp. 41 (co-author). 

The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion, 1988 and 1989, MR-225-FF, 1993, pp. 49 

(co-author). 

A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: The 

RAND Corporation, N-3506-DOS, 1992), pp. 146 (co-author). 

Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience (Santa 

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, R-4979-A, 1991), pp. 95 (co-author). 

The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1987, R-3890-RC, September 

1990, pp. 107 (co-author). 

Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism, R3 783-USDP, March 1990, pp. 43. 

The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism for 1986, R-3890-RC, March 1990, 

pp. 105 (co-author). 

Insider Crimes: The Threat to Nuclear Facilities and Programs, R-3782-DOE, February 

1990, pp. S 3 (co-author). 

British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919-1976 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 

Corporation, R-3749-AF, October 1989), pp. 121. 

Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States, R-3618, May 

1988, pp. 71. 
81 

The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reassessment, N-2706, january 1988, pp. 16 (coauthor). 

The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension, N-2685-RC, 

November 1987, pp. 41. 

A Reassessment of Potential Adversaries to U.S. Nuclear Programs, R-3363-DOE, March 

1986, pp. 29 (co-author). 

Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Weapons Facilities, R3351-DOE, january 1986, pp. 56. 

Commando Raids, 1946-1983, N-2316-USDP, October 1985, pp. 64. 

Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983, R-3183-SL, August 1984, pp. 54 

(co-author). 

Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, N-1856-AF, March 1982, pp. 31. 

AWARDS, ACADEMIC HONORS, AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 

Provost's Extraordinary Merit Award for Excellent in Scholarship, Teaching, and Service, 

Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 

William F. Podlich Distinguished Fellowship, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, 

California, 2016. 

Harriet Buescher Lawrence '34 Prize to Connecticut College Alumni for Leadership or 

Inspiring Others for Good Through Direct Service, Connecticut College Alumni 

Association, New London, CT, june 2016. 

Presented 4th Annual Vincent Briscoe Security Sciences Lecture, Imperial College, 

London, England, November 2013. 

Presented Ist Annual Paul Wilkinson Memorial Lecture, Centre for the Study of Terrorism 

and Political Violence, St Andrews University, St Andrews, Scotland, April 2013. 

Distinguished Scholar, International Security Studies, Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 2012. 

Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 

D.C., 2010. 

Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, 2009. 

S. Rajaratnam Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of 

International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2009. 

Visiting Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia, 2007. 

Fellow and C. V. Starr Distinguished Visitor, American Academy of Berlin, Germany, 

2006. 

Honorary Degree recipient, Garfield Society, Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio, 2006. 
82 

Fellow, World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, 2003-2005. 

Santiago Grisolia Chair and Prize for Excellence in the Study of Violence, Queen Sofia 

Centre for the Study of Violence, Valencia, Spain, 1998 (first recipient of the prize and 

first holder of the chair). 

U.S. Intelligence Community Award Medallion (highest level of award presented to a 

non-government employee), 1994. 

Senior Visiting Associate Member, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1987. 

Visiting Scholar, Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies, 1987. 

National Foundation for jewish Culture Doctoral Research Fellowship, 1982. 

Memorial Foundation for jewish Culture Doctoral Scholarship, 1981. 

Conder junior Research Fellowship in Anglo-Zionist History, University of Oxford, 1980. 

Government of Israel Scholarship for Doctoral Research, 1979. 

Member, Council on Foreign Relations (New York). 

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS 

The Flora Foundation, Washington, D.C., "Primer for Law Enforcement Responses to 

Suicide Terrorism," (2003). 

TheW. Alton jones Foundation, Charlottesville, VA, "Major Enhancement to the Program 

of Work Carried Out by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence," 

(1997). 

The Airey Neave Foundation Trust, London, England, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction," (1996). 

National Institute of justice, Department of justice, Washington, D.C., "Domestic 

Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness," (1992). 

The Ford Foundation, New York, N.Y., "The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion," 

(1988). 

APPOINTMENTS and CONSULTING 

2014-2015- Commissioner (appointed by the U.S. Congress), Independent 

Commission to Review the FBI's Post-9/ 11 Response to Terrorism and Radicalization, 

Washington, D.C. 

2013-present Wilson Center Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Washington, D.C. 

2011- Member, Mayor's Blue Ribbon Panel On Airport Security at Los Angeles 

International Airport (appointed by Los Angeles Mayor Antionio R. Villaraigosa). 
83 

2011- 2014- Adviser, Palantir Technologies, Inc., Palo Alto, CA. 

2009- Present -Adviser, National September 11 Memorial & Museum, New York, NY. 

2009 Present Member, Advisory Board, FBI Intelligence Analysts Association, 

Washington, DC. 

2009- 2012 -Member, Advisory Board, Biteback Publishing (political and current 

affairs), London, England. 

2008 Present Member, Homeland Security Program (formerly National Security 

Preparedness Group), Washington, D.C. (successor to the 9 I 11 Commission and chaired 

again by Governor Thomas H. Kean and Congressman Lee H. Hamilton). 

2008- Present- Series Editor, Columbia University Press Studies in Terrorism and 

Irregular Warfare, New York, NY. 

2008- Present- Contributing Editor, The National interest, Washington, D.C. 

2008 - Present - Member, Board of Directors, jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C. 

2007- 2013- Member, Advisory Board, Home Team Academy, Ministry of Home 

Affairs, Government of Singapore, Singapore. 

2007- Present- Member, Advisory Board, "Our Voices Together: September 11 friends 

and families to help build a safer, more compassionate world," Washington, D.C. 

2007 Present Member, Advisory Board, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of 

American Scientists, Washington, D.C. 

2007- 2010 -Member, Editorial Board, Review of International Studies Uournal of the 

British International Studies Association), St Andrews, Scotland, UK. 

2007- 2009- Distinguished Fellow and Senior Advisor on International Security 

Programs, Institute of Public and International Affairs, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, 

Utah. 

2006- 2012 -Member, Advisory Committee of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism 

Program, Human Rights Watch, New York, NY. 

2006- Iraq Experts Working Group (providing analytical support to the U.S. 

Congressionally appointed Iraq Study Group), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. 

2006 2007 -Visiting Professor at the University of Sergio Arboleda, Bogota, Colombia. 

2006 - Present -Visiting Professor at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 

Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. 

2005 2013- Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

Washington, D.C. 

2005 - Present -Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
84 

2005 - 2007 Senior Fellow, National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa, 

Haifa, Israel. 

2004 Present- Senior Fellow, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, 

West Point, New York. 

2004- 2006- Scholar in Residence for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, 

Washington, D.C. 

2004 - 2005 - Adviser on Counterinsurgency, Office of Strategy, Plans and Analysis, 

Multinational Force Headquarters, Baghdad Iraq. 

2004- Adviser on Counterterrorism, Office of National Security Affairs, Coalition 

Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. 

2003 2006- Adjunct Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, 

Washington, D.C. 

January 2002 - Present -Adjunct Instructor, U.S. State Department Foreign Service 

Institute, Arlington, VA. 

2000 Present - Member, Editorial Board, Global Networks: A journal of Transnational 

Affairs (Blackwell, Ltd., Publishers). 

1999- 2002- Chairman, International Research Group on Political Violence, 

Washington, D.C. and London, England. 

1998- 2000 Executive Director, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Preparedness for 

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission), Washington, 

D.C. 

1998- Member, Panel of Experts Convened by the Argentina National Congress, 

Special Bichamber Investigation Follow-Up Commission of the Attacks Against the Israeli 

Embassy and the A.M.I.A. Building, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 

1997- Present- Editor-in-Chief (Associate Editor, 1991-1996), Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism (Taylor and Francis, Ltd., publishers). 

1994- Present- Member, Editorial Board, Terrorism and Political Violence (Frank Cass, 

Ltd., publishers). 

1994 - 2000 -- Member, Advisory Board, International Group for Research and 

Information on Security, Brussels, Belgium. 

1994 - 1998 Consultant, International Policy Department, The RAND Corporation, 

Santa Monica, California. 

1994 1996- Member, Committee on Assessing the Feasibility of Applying Military 

Blast Mitigation Technologies to Civilian Buildings, National Academy of Sciences, 

National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 

1994- Consultant, World Cup '94, The Office of the Vice President for Security, Los 

Angeles, California. 
85 

1993 Member, U.S. Department of Defense International Counterterrorism Advisory 

Board. 

1988 1990- Advisory Board, The Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences, Chicago, Illinois. 

1987- 1988- Consultant, U.S. General Accounting Office, Project Evaluation, 

Methodology and Assessment Division. 
86 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TlVES 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules ofthe U.S. 

House for the l ! 51

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Testimony 

Middle East Turmoil and the Continuing 

Terrorist Threat-Still No Easy Solutions 

Brian Michael Jenkins 

CT-462 

Testimony presented before the House Committee on Armed Services on February 14, 2017. 
90 

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91 

Middle East Turmoil and the Continuing Terrorist Threat-Still No Easy Solutions 

Testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins 1 

The RAND Corporation2 

Before the Committee on Armed Services 

United States House of Representatives 

February 14,2017 

The United States continues to face an array of armed threats to its national security: a 

revanchist Russia determined to recover its superpower status and restore its int1uence 

worldwide; an increasingly assertive China pushing its claim over the South China Sea; 

and in the Middle East, a hostile Iran and continuingjihadist terrorist threats, 

Jihadist terrorism is the most prominent and persistent threat to U.S. 

security. 

Military confrontation with Russia seems unlikely, although miscalculations remain possible, 

but Russia poses more than a military threat. Maintaining a strong North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) will, it is hoped, deter Moscow from potentially dangerous courses and 

allow the United States to play a greater role in checking the growth of Russian influence, which 

it is presently achieving through measures other than war.3 China's assertions can be best 

handled diplomatically while maintaining strong regional alliances. This was underscored by 

James Mattis, who made his first foreign trip as Secretary of Defense to South Korea and Japan, 

two countries with which the United States has bilateral defense agreements. 

The United States has managed a difficult and, at times, dangerous relationship with Iran 

since 1979. Those in Washington who may have expected the 2015 nuclear weapons deal to 

presage diplomatic rapprochement with Tehran were disappointed; that seems a long way off. At 

1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as 

representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research. 

' -The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make 

communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit~ 

nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. 

3 Brian Michael Jenkins, A Reranchist Russia Versus an Uncerta;n West: An Appreciation r~fthe Situation Since the 

2014 Ukrainian Crisis, Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, December 20 16b. As ofFebrumy 13, 

2017: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id~l7877 
92 

the same time, there appears to be little domestic and even less international support for upsetting 

the deal. Meanwhile, I believe that it is not in the interest of the United States that Iran become 

the dominant power in the region, which it seeks to do; preventing that will shape American 

actions. 

While not the most dangerous threat to the United States,jihadist or Islamist terrorism is the 

most prominent issue. Other terrorist threats to U.S. citizens and interests abroad have receded, 

although conflict with Iran or North Korea could provoke state-sponsored terrorist incidents. 

Of current threats to lJ .S. national security, jihadist terrorism is also the least amenable to any 

obvious or immediate diplomatic or military solution, although military force will remain an 

important part-but only one part-of lJ .S. counterterrorist efforts. Other counterterrorism 

activities must include programs aimed at changing the narrative and reducing the attractiveness 

of the ideology fueling the violence. And while the danger posed by jihadist terrorists would be 

quickly surpassed if there were war with any state adversary, jihadist terrorism is a threat the 

United States is going to be dealing with for the foreseeable future. That is the focus of my 

testimony today. 

Terrorism has increased dramatically worldwide, but the increase is 

misleading. 

Terrorism worldwide has increased in recent years, but we should not overestimate the 

terrorist threat to the United States. In the 15-year period from 2001 to 2015, the Global 

Tenwism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism recorded more than 85,000 incidents of terrorism worldwide, with more 

than 200,000 fatalities. That amounts to an average of more than 5,000 incidents a year, 

including almost 15,000 incidents for 2015 alone. This is a dramatic increase from the averages 

of fewer than 1,000 incidents a year in the 1970s, slightly more than 3,000 incidents a year in the 

1980s and 1990s, and about 2,500 a year between 2000 and 2009.4 I lowever, the dramatic rise in 

global terrorism is misleading. The increase in recent years reflects both better reporting of 

terrorist events in remote parts of the world and the fact that terrorism is now counted as a 

separate category of violence, even in the midst of war. Most of the recent terrorist incidents 

have occurred in war zones. 

Terrorism remains concentrated in a handful of countries. 

Between 2001 and 2015, 73 percent of all recorded tetTorist attacks and 78 percent of all 

fatalities from terrorism occurred in just ten countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Iraq, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The centers of the problem are obvious. 

Forty-six percent of the incidents, accounting for more than 50 percent of the fatalities, took 

4 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, 

College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, undated. As of February 13,2017: 

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 

2 
93 

place in just three countries-Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan-all of which were engulfed in 

intense, ongoing armed conf1icts. 5 Outside of these countries, terrorist attacks occur only 

occasionally. Although jihadist terrorists have recently carried out some spectacular attacks in 

Europe, total deaths caused by terrorists in Europe actually have declined during the decades 

since the 1970s, although there was an increase in 2015 and 2016. 

During the same two years, the United States also saw several spectacular attacks. While 

these attacks had a significant psychological impact, the total number oflJ.S. casualties caused 

by jihadist terrorists here since the attacks on September 11,2001, comes to about 100.6 Given 

its current levels in the United States, terrorism cannot be considered an existential threat. 

Rather, it is a persistent threat requiring our constant attention to ensure that it does not gain 

momentum in the United States. 

Although terrorism is increasing, the number of wars and the number of 

casualties in wars are declining. 

The increase in terrorism appears all the more dramatic because the incidence of warfare 

itself and the casualties produced by war have declined during the same period. There are fewer 

wars and fewer casualties today than there were 50 years ago, and far fewer than there were in 

the bloody first half of the 20th century.7 Terrorism looms larger, in part, because warfare has 

diminished and because terrorists have carried out more-spectacular attacks. 

Terrorist organizations have evolved into global enterprises. 

So-called international terrorism-the globalization of terrorist campaigns-is not new. 

Terrorist organizations have operated internationally for decades, sending their own operatives to 

carry out attacks abroad and creating alliances with other terrorist organizations to extend their 

reach. More recently, terrorist organizations have exploited the Internet and social media to 

inspire and instruct distant followers to carry out attacks on their behalf. 

A few groups-notably, al Qacda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-

operating from sanctuaries in ungoverned spaces, have sent out missions to establish or acquire 

affiliates. They often do so by attaching themselves to rebels fighting against local governments 

for local causes. The a!Tangement may heighten the global profile and increase the prestige of the 

5 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, undated. 

6 The author's own figures put the total at 89, not counting the perpetrators, but various counts are available. For 

example, Charles Kurzman reports a higher number of 123. but that includes the deaths of perpetrators. as well as 17 

murders attributed to the 2002 "Beltway Sniper .. and a few other incidents that! do not sec as jihadist terrorism. 

Admittedly. motives are sometimes murky. See Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Involvement with Violent 

Extremism. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. January 26, 2017. As of 

February 13. 2017: https://sites.dukc.edu/tcths/files/20 17101 I 

Kurzman Muslim-American Involvement. in_ Violent_ Extremism 2016.pdf 

7 Several studies indicate a decline in war. See, for example, Max Roser, "War and Peace;• Our World in 

Data, University of Oxford, 2016. As of February 13,2017: https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace/ 

3 
94 

local fighters and potentially gain them limited material support and assistance. For the outsiders, 

these footholds create the impression of new fronts in a vast enterprise, offer new operating 

bases, and provide potential recruits for the global effort. The footholds eventually may become 

formal affiliates of the group or "provinces" of a terrorist state, although some of them are mere 

assertions. 

Some of these alliances are strategic; others are purely tactical. And affiliations change. ISIL 

broke with a! Qaeda . .labhat al Nusra, a! Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, changed its name and 

announced that it had severed its ties with al Qaeda. 

The competition for colonies has resulted in a proliferation of al Qaeda and ISIL entities 

across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. While linked by common, or at least compatible, 

ideologies and personal oaths of allegiance, the actual connectivity varies. With a weak center, a! 

Qaeda's affiliates operate with viitual autonomy. ISIL has attempted to impose a more formal 

structure on its acquisitions, but most of these remain focused on their local struggles. The 

reduction of!SIL 's Islamic state in Iraq and Syria---its presumptive caliphate-will reduce its 

attractiveness and erode the bonds. 

These developments complicate counterterrorism. While it would be inappropriate to see the 

spread of al Qaeda or ISIL flags as the advance of an occupying anny or evidence of a centrally 

directed campaign, the terrorist colonizers over time may be able to gradually increase their 

control over their local allies. The colonies also may harbor fleeing central commanders, 

guaranteeing the survival of their effort. They cannot be ignored, but each must be addressed 

within the context of the local situation. Instead of one war, countering the enterprise becomes 

many wars. 

The organizational developments described here reflect the evolution of al Qaeda and ISIL, 

which have global, even celestial ambitions. Organizations pursuing political ends in other parts 

of the world and future terrorist organizations may not necessarily follow the jihadist trajectory. 

Inspiring attacks via the Internet pushes terrorists toward soft targets and 

"pure terrorism." 

Although the distance recruiting of homegrown terrorists does not preclude centrally directed 

terrorist operations or strategic strikes directed by afliliates, central capabilities have declined, 

and distance recruiting has become more important. Afghanistan provides a useful example. 

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan scattered al Qaeda's central command. Continued 

international pressure on the organization made central planning more difficult. Nonetheless, al 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to carry on the campaign against the United States by 

sabotaging U.S.-bound airliners and inspiring homegrown terrorists. 

ISIL has recruited tens ofthousands of foreign fighters to come to Syria and Iraq and clearly 

has global ambitions, but it has not attempted to replicate anything on the scale ofal Qaeda's 

9111 attacks. Instead, ISIL has supported operations by terrorist leaders among its foreign 

fighters. The precise relationship between these foreign organizers and ISIL's central command 

is not clear, nor is it consistent across the various attacks. Are they mere lieutenants carrying out 

orders, or are they independent entrepreneurs? 

4 
95 

lSlL is under heavy pressure and has lost territory and fighters. As it faces defeat on the 

ground, it could attempt to launch large-scale international terrorist attacks. Terrorist operations 

are intended not just to harm the enemy but also to recruit and compete for followers. ISIL and al 

Qaeda, although at war with each other, compete for the same constituents. 

ISIL has effectively used social media to reach a broader audience of potential recruits. 

However, the operational capabilities of these volunteers are not likely to match their ideological 

fervor, so !SlL, through its online publications and contact via the Internet, recommends simple 

operations that are within these volunteers' range. This means going after soft targets-that is, 

venues that are usually unprotected. 

Terrorists have traditionally concentrated their attacks on unprotected targets that still 

provided some political symbolism. The political content has faded. For today's terrorists, death, 

destruction, and notoriety seem to be the paramount goals. We now sec truly random attacks on 

people at restaurants, shopping malls, subway stations, busy streets-virtually anywhere. 

Random attacks send the message that nothing is safe. 8 Often, these are low-level attacks by a 

single individual using readily available "weapons"-guns when they can get them, but also 

knives, axes, trucks, and cars. 

Terrorism is violence calculated to create fear and alarm--and it often works. The terrorist 

organization has come to realize that even small-scale attacks can create extreme alarm and 

oblige governments to take extraordinary security measures. 

However, the small number of attacks and attackers suggest that it is not easy to remotely 

motivate people to take action. The Internet reaches a vast audience, but it also allows vicarious 

participation-fervent followers can boast and threaten online but then go on with their ordinary 

lives. Absent physical connectivity, most online, would-be warriors will do nothing. For those 

charged with security, however, ascertaining who among the radicals will cross the line into 

violence is challenging. 

The current terrorist threat remains inextricably intertwined with events in 

the Middle East. 

It is understandable that Americans see the Middle East through the lens of terrorism. Indeed, 

most of the terrorist-created crises involving the United States since the late 1960s have related 

to the Middle East and the adjacent regions of North Africa and Southwest Asia. In the 1970s, 

hijackings, incidents of airline sabotage, hostage seizures, bombings, and other attacks by 

Palestinian terrorist groups posed the greatest threat. In the 1980s, Iranian-backed groups in 

Lebanon added another dimension to the problem. Since the mid-!990s, groups inspired by al 

Qaeda and its offshoots have become the principal concern. !SlL is only the latest incarnation of 

the continuing jihadist threat. 

8 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Challenge ofProtecting Transit and Passenger Rail: How Security Works Against 

Terrorism, San Jose, Calif.: Mineta Transportation Institute. forthcoming. 

5 
96 

The Middle East also has been the predominant theater of U.S. military 

operations. 

Most of the U.S. military engagements over the past 30 years have been in the Middle East. 

in North Africa, and in western parts of Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The United States 

supported the Afghan rebels fighting against Soviet invaders in the 1980s, sent troops into 

Lebanon in 1982 and 1983, bombed Libya in 1986, deployed American naval forces and took 

military action against Iran in 1987, drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in 1991 and imposed no-fly 

zones on Iraq, deployed American forces to Somalia in 1992 and 1993, bombed Iraq in 1993 and 

Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, invaded Afghanistan in 200 I, invaded Iraq in 2003, participated 

in the bombing of Libya in 2011, initiated a bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and 

joined military efforts in Yemen in 2015. About half of these engagements were in response to 

terrorism. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen continue. In 

addition, the United States has conducted special operations and, since 2002, has carried out 

manned and unmanned air strikes and special operations to kill terrorist leaders and operatives 

throughout the region. 

The above chronology is instructive: There are few years in which the United States has not 

been directly or indirectly involved in the Middle East's conilicts. And for the past 15 years, 

American military engagement has been continuous. The high cost of these continuing military 

operations adversely affects U.S. military forces and readiness. 

Middle East turmoil will continue. 

The United States and its allies are currently dealing with terrorist spillover from ongoing 

conflicts in the Middle East, North Afi·ica, and western Asia. The turmoil in these regions seems 

likely to continue. Afghanistan has been in a state of war since the late 1970s-some would say 

throughout much of the nation's history. AI Qaeda found sanctuary in this environment and 

declared war on the West more than 20 years ago. Somalia has been a theater of conflict since 

the early 1990s. Iraq has had few years without armed hostilities since the Iran-Iraq War in the 

1980s. Yemen's civil wars reach back to the 1960s. The current conflicts in Syria and Iraq have 

exacerbated sectarian and ethnic conflicts, which will persist into the future. 

Progress is being made in reducing ISIL forces and recapturing some of the urban centers 

and towns the group held, but the reduction of JSIL-controlled territory will not end its 

campaign, nor will the end of!SlL's open control of territory end its armed struggle. Its leaders 

will likely go underground, but its foreign fighters cannot so easily survive an underground war. 

They will scatter to other jihadist fronts in the region or return home, some with intentions to 

carry on the armed struggle. 

No government in Syria will be able to restore central authority throughout its territory. Iraq 

appears on a path to remain divided. Yemen will not easily be unified. Somalia will not easily be 

subdued. The violence has increased in Afghanistan. Libya remains in a chaotic state. The 

terrorist threat made possible by this regional chaos will continue to fuel terrorist threats around 

the world. 

6 
97 

The United States faces a multilayered terrorist threat. 

Jihadist terrorists pose a multilayered threat. For the United States and its partners, improved 

intelligence, greater international cooperation, and continuing military operations have made it 

more difficult for terrorists to carry out ambitious, centrally directed strategic strikes like the 

9/11 attacks-which have been our greatest concern. Butjihadist terrorist organizations have 

demonstrated their continued detennination to attack commercial airliners on their way to the 

United States. 

As we have seen in France and Belgium, terrorist volunteers who have joined the ranks of al 

Qaeda's affiliates or ISIL may receive assistance in returning to their homelands to link up with 

local jihadists and carry out attacks. With thousands of nationals who have gone to fight in Syria 

and Iraq, Europe and even countries like Tunisia face a much greater threat from returning 

fighters than the United States does; according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

about 200 U.S. citizens have joined or tried to join jihadist fronts abroad.9 

The linallayer of the threat comprises those already in the United States who lind resonance 

and reinforcement injihadist ideology and radicalize themselves. 

Homegrown terrorists are America's principal concern; fortunately, jihadist 

ideology has gained little traction. 

The principal terrorist threat faced by the United States comes overwhelmingly from 

homegrown terrorists-citizens and residents who radicalize themselves and plot to carry out 

local attacks. Fortunately, there are relatively few of them. Despite constant exhortations from 

jihadist organizations abroad, their violent extremist ideology has gained little traction among 

Americans, in sharp contrast to the situation in Europe. 

Since 9/11, several hundred individuals have been arrested for providing material support to 

jihadist groups or attempting to join terrorist fronts abroad. In addition to these, approximately 

150 have been arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in this country. 10 The FBI and local police 

have uncovered and thwarted more than 80 percent of the jihadist terrorist plots in the United 

States since 9/11. 11 It is a remarkable record. Some of these cases have resulted from 

investigations initiated by tips from Muslim communities. 

As of this writing, only 16 jihadist terrorist plots have succeeded in launching an attack. All 

but one resulted in injuries, including seven that resulted in fatalities. In the remaining case-the 

attempted Times Square bombing-the device failed to work. In 15 years, jihadist terrorists in 

the United States have been able to kill about IOO people-and 49 of those were killed in a single 

9 Julian Hatlem, "FBI: More Than 200 Americans Have Tried to Fight for !S!S." The Hill. July 8. 2015. As of 

February 13.2017: 

http://thehi11.com/policyinationa1-security/247256-more-than-200-americans-tried-to-fight-for-isis-tbi-says 

10 Brian Michael Jenkins, Fifteen Years After 9/11: A Preliminary Balance Sheet. testimony before the Committee 

on Armed Services, United States !louse of Representatives, September 21, 2016, Addendum. January II, 2017. As 

ofF ebruary 13. 2017: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT458zl.html 

11 Jenkins, 2017. 

7 
98 

incident, the 2016 Orlando attack on a nightclub. Owing to different interpretations of motives, 

which are often murky, other analyses may add some incidents, but not many. 

The past two years have seen an increase in the number of attacks. This could be a spike, or it 

may indicate a longer-term trend. But the increase suggests that the United States, despite its 

enviable record, must maintain its vigilance and continually review its efforts to control its 

borders and know who is coming and going. 

Europe faces a different, more difficult threat than the United States does. 

Europe has suffered a much sharper increase in terrorist activity than the United States has, 

which some see as presaging a growing volume of terrorism in this country. That may be, but it 

is important to keep in mind that the situation in Europe differs significantly from that in the 

United States. 

European security services are being overwhelmed by volume. More than 5,000 volunteers 

went from Europe to Syria to serve in the ranks of the jihadist groups, mainly ISIL. About a third 

of them have since returned. Thousands more are suspected oft1ying to travel to Syria or of 

plotting terrorist attacks at home. The numbers exceed the capacity of the intelligence services 

and police to monitor. 12 This problem is being addressed, but it will take time to build the 

necessary strength and skills. Int()fmation-sharing among European services is not optimal. 

In France and Belgium, the high numbers of travelers to Syria come from subcultures that 

transcend the criminal underworld and radical underground and which are deeply embedded in 

some immigrant communities. Returning foreign fighters can hook up with radical jihadists who 

stayed home and who can provide them with hideouts, weapons, and logistics support, thereby 

increasing their lethality and ability to evade authorities. These are the personal connections that 

enable terrorists to operate at a higher level of violence. The network responsible for the deadly 

2014-2016 terrorist campaign in Belgium and France provides the best example. 13 

In contrast, the numbers of potential recruits in the United States are signilicantly lower, and 

there is no evidence here of an organized terrorist underground. Most terrorist plots have 

involved a single individual or a tiny conspiracy. While a few of the plotters may have received 

remote encouragement and guidance from contacts in al Qaeda or ISIL, there is not much 

connectivity with handlers abroad or with those involved in other terrorist plots. The current 

jihadist threat also contrasts with the situation in the United States during the 1970s, when there 

were organized terrorist groups conducting long-term bombing campaigns that lasted years. 

12 Brian Michael Jenkins and Jean-Franyois Clair, Trains. Concert Halls, Aii]Jorts. and Restaurants--All Soji 

Targets: What the Terrorist Campaign in France and Belgium Tells Us About the Future of Jihadist Terrorism in 

Europe. San Jose, Calif.: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2016. As of february 13, 2017: 

http:/ itransweb.sjsu.edu/projectl 15 32 .html 

13 The January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the authorities· response were examined in a three-part series by 

Brian Michael Jenkins and Jean-Fran9ois Clair, "Attempting to Understand the Paris Attacks," The Hill, February 

25, 2015; "Predicting the 'Dangerousness· of Potential Ten·orists," The Hill, Febmary 26, 2015; and "Different 

Countries, Different Ways of Counting," The Hill, February 27,2015. 

8 
99 

The lack of organizational continuity also keeps America's jihadists operating at a low level 

of competency. It is not that today's jihadists are less intelligent than their 1970s counterparts, 

who also started their campaigns at a low level of competency, but rather that, over time, the 

1970s terrorists had the opportunity to improve their skills by leaming from each other and the 

experience of repeated attacks. The post-9/11 attacks have been one-offs. There is no learning. 

Europe also has to deal with hundreds of thousands of political and economic refugees and 

immigrants pouring in from conflict zones and impoverished areas in Africa and the Middle 

East; Gennany registered more than l million asylum seekers in 2015. Refugees land on 

Europe's shores or cross its land borders and then authorities determine who may be eligible for 

asylum and who will be deported. In contrast, the United States is able to vet refugees before 

approving their transfer into the country. Most European countries lack the capacity to handle 

large numbers of immigrants. 

Many of those entering Europe are single, military-age males, and many of these young men 

have very limited education. They will not easily find work or easily assimilate. Instead, they 

will spend months in refugee centers. Some will drill into crime. They already are the targets of 

radical recruiters. In contrast, only a tiny fraction of the refugees entering the United States are 

young, unattached males. 

While we should not overestimate the threat these developments pose to the United States, 

what is happening in Europe does raise security concerns here. It is certainly not in America's 

interest to see Europe destabilized by terrorism. The continuing terrorist threat to the West in 

general underscores current efforts to defeat the j ihadist terrorist enterprises, pmticularly al 

Qaeda and JSIL. Until these organizations are destroyed, the jihadist terrorist threat will 

continue. 

Military force will remain a component of U.S. counterterrorist efforts 

abroad. 

Critics of American efforts often remind us that military measures alone will not defeat 

terrorism. We know that. At home, we have successfully employed law enlorcement and have 

worked through our courts. Terrorists arrested in the United State come to trial. But dealing with 

terrorists operating in conflict zones or ungoverned spaces thousands of miles away where law 

enforcement regimes do not prevail and where effective government does not exist poses 

different challenges. 

The United States has greatly improved its intelligence collection and analysis, forged new 

alliances, a11d fostered international cooperation among security services and law enforcement 

orga11izations-which, since 9/11, is unprecedented. As a result, today's terrorists face a more 

hostile operating environment, which impedes (not prevents) their ability to carry out large-scale 

terrorist operations abroad. 

The United States can rely on law enforcement only where the law rules. Where it does not, 

military operations, in cooperation with local a11d allied governments-unilateral when 

absolutely necessary-will remain a component of America's arsenal. It is an enduring task that 

could exist tor years, if not generations. 

9 
100 

There are no easy options. 

There are no easy options. None offers a clear solution. All entail risks. Here are some of the 

approaches that have been suggested and the questions they raise, above all, about defining U.S. 

national interests and objectives. 

Can attacking root causes reduce jihadist terrorism? 

One favored option is to attack the root causes driving the terrorist campaigns while reducing 

the ungoverned spaces where terrorists find sanctuary. This requires addressing chronic 

grievances, resolving ongoing conflicts, creating stability, ensuring better governance (if not 

democracy), and providing security, which, in turn, will permit social and economic 

development. These are laudable goals to be pursued even if there were no terrorists. But they 

are difficult to do, require major investments, and take years to achieve. And in just about all 

cases, the United States is at the margin of its influence. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat 

continues. 

Can the United States negotiate an end to the threat? 

Negotiations, even with those we label terrorists, should never be off the table. The United 

States, for example, was deeply involved in negotiations to end the Irish Republican Army's 

long-running terrorist campaign and has supported negotiations between the Colombian 

government and Marxist guetTillas that routinely used terrorist tactics. But negotiating an end to 

the jihadist campaign seems unrealistic. America's jihadist adversaries see this as a struggle to 

the death mandated by God. The goal is the triumph of their belief's over the unbelievers. 

The jihadists' view of war is process-oriented, not progress-oriented; that is, they derive 

benefit from mere participation in the armed struggle. God determines the outcome. Their time 

horizons are long. The war is perpetual and will continue until judgment day. They are not easily 

discouraged. 

Jihadist strategic thinking permits tactical truces if they see these as advantageous. 

Conceivably, negotiations with a more pragmatic Tali ban might be possible. Negotiations with a! 

Qaeda or ISIL are hard to envision, although some lower-level commanders may be persuaded to 

cut a deal. And not all of the groups currently allied with a! Qaeda or ISIL may share their 

partner's determination to tight to the death. 

It may be more productive to think in tenns of interim arrangements aimed merely at 

lowering the level of violence-seeking local accommodations rather than war-ending 

agreements. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that the cessation of hostilities in Syria 

sponsored by Russia, Iran, and Turkey could open the way for a more national ceasefire "based 

upon agreed zones of control" --essentially the partition of Syria with an international 

administration ofRaqqa Province, otherwise known as the Islamic State. 14 The proposal, 

1

'

1 James Dobbins, Philip Gordon, and Jeftfey Martini. A Peace Planji;r Syria III: Agreed Zones of' Control. 

Decentralization, and International Administration. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-233-RC, 2017. 

As of February 13, 2017: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectivesiPE233.html 

10 
101 

however, is predicated on the defeat of!SIL and other jihadists in Syria-they are not seen as 

participants in the discussion. Essentially, it is an agreement to unite the jihadists' enemies. 

Can the United States shorten the time line and defeat the jihadists more quickly 

through escalation? 

Escalation is possible. Suggestions include increasing the presence of U.S. service personnel 

working with the Iraqi army and irregular forces in Syria to increase their effectiveness. Without 

personnel on the ground to target and coordinate operations, airpower is largely ineffective over 

the long run. Some have also argued for relaxing the rules of engagement in order to increase the 

use of airpower. This can be done, but targets are limited, and bombing errors can lead to 

backlash and erode international support, not just of the current alliance of nations pmiicipating 

in the air campaign but for overall cooperation against terrorism. The cost may be deemed 

acceptable, but it is a cost. 

Some in Washington have argued for American combat forces to be redeployed in the region. 

That runs the risk of changing the dynamics of the contest while fueling the jihadist narrative and 

thereby assisting jihadist recruiting. Putting American boots on the ground might be popular in 

the immediate wake of a major terrorist incident in the United States, but it raises the questions 

of what exactly would they do, how would they affect the war, and what would success look like. 

Whatever initial domestic political support exists for redeployment could quickly evaporate and 

is probably not sustainable for the long run. 

Should the United States cooperate more closely with the Russians? 

Partnering with the Russians to destroy ISIL also has been mentioned as an option, but in my 

view, it comes with a high cost and offers very little in return. Russia's and Syria's siege and 

ruthless bombing campaign succeeded in driving the rebels out of their stronghold in Aleppo, but 

it appears that civilian buildings and groups, including hospitals and humanitarian aid, were 

deliberately targeted, in contravention of the rules of war, and civilian casualties reportedly were 

high. 15 Among others, the United Nations' Human Rights director called the campaign a war 

crime. 16 

However effective or satisfying it may be to pound !SIL, associating the United States with 

military operations of that type would have long-term consequences. I suspect it would cause 

deep concern in the American military. It would damage America's reputation and repel allies in 

the Arab world and beyond. [t could erode U.S counterterrorist efforts for years to come. 

15 Human Rights Watch, ''Russia/Syria: War Crimes in Month ofBombing Aleppo," December I, 2016. As of 

February 13, 2017: https:/ /www.hrw.org/news/20 16/12/0 !/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-bombing-aleppo 

16 Laura Smith-Spark, "UN Human Rights Chief Warns of War Crimes in Aleppo," CNN, October 21,2016. As of 

February 13. 2017: http:/ /www.enn.com/20 16/1 0/2l/middleeast/syria-a1eppo-un/ 

11 
102 

Should the United States be doing more with local allies? 

U.S. military successes have come from working with locals, including irregular forces. This 

was the case in Afghanistan in 2001, with the Sunni tribes in Anbar Province in 2006-2007, and 

most notably with the Kurds in the cun·ent conflict in Syria and Iraq. 

Supporting local fighters proved less successful with the Free Syrian Army and in the early 

attempts to field carefully vetted, U.S.-trained rebel formations in Syria. Those failures, which 

merit more analysis, suggest that it is not enough to train guerrillas and insert them into the 

battlefield. Their reliability and effectiveness depend on continued engagement-having 

Americans with them and direct combat support. 

The United States may be able to do more than it has done with state partners in the Middle 

East. Saudi Arabia formed an alliance of Muslim states to fight Islamic extremists. 17 The 

initiative was dismissed in Washington as unrealistic; Saudi forces are not seen to be effective in 

suppressing Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen, even though the United States participates in 

efforts on behalf of the Yemeni government. 

The United States is uncomfortable with the Saudis. Many Americans sec Saudi financial 

support for the spread ofWahhabism as a major source of jihadist radicalization worldwide and 

suspect the Saudis of duplicity in dealing with a! Qaeda and other jihadists in Syria and 

elsewhere. Others are critical of Saudi Arabia's record on human rights, rigid adherence to 

Sharia law, and not-always-precise bombing in Yemen. Some in the Barack Obama 

administration saw a close relationship with Saudi Arabia as an obstacle to what they hoped 

would be a more friendly relationship with Iran. 

These objections notwithstanding, pursuing local alliances makes sense. Politically, local 

forces are more effective than American combat units. They also have certain operational 

advantages. They do not necessarily have to be the most-advanced combat units. In some cases, 

they need only to out-recruit the jihadists-that is, offer higher pay. This will not attract the 

religious fanatics, but ISIL's ranks contain many who have joined simply in order to survive. 

Finally, we may consider the idea of an international force recruited, trained, paid, and led by 

experienced military commanders from the region and beyond. This option may work where no 

government or government forces exist. All of these ideas require further exploration. The 

objective here is to get us out of the mindset that the United States must always be--or even 

should be-on the tront line. 

Can the United States walk away? 

Should the United States avoid the costs and tribulations of further military involvement by 

withdrawing from the region, leaving local belligerents to sort things out by themselves? Doing 

so seemingly would get the United States out of a costly mess and would enable tbe country to 

focus on rebuilding the American economy, which is far more important to the country's long17 Brian Michael Jenkins, A Saudi-Led Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism: Welcome Muscle in the Fight Against 

Terrorism. Desert Mirage, or Bad Idea. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-189-RC, 2016a. As of 

February 13, 2017: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE 189.html 

12 
103 

term strategic goals. It would also enable the armed forces to rebuild to meet threats that 

endanger the republic more than errantjihadists, which law enforcement has mostly contained. 

This course of action has great appeal, but few have defined precisely what "getting out" 

means-withdrawing all American forces from Afghanistan? Ending military support for Iraq's 

forces? Halting the bombing in Syria? Ending American support for the Kurds and allied Arab 

formations? Does the United States continue drone strikes? Does the United States continue to 

support the Saudi-led tight in Yemen? Should it continue to provide training and other forms of 

military assistance to willing allies in the region? How can the state institutions-law 

enforcement, intelligence, and societal programs-be established that will underpin the 

development required for building and maintaining functional governments that provide security 

for their populations? And is it the responsibility or in the national interest of the United States to 

assume this mission? 

Withdrawal also comes with risks. In Afghanistan, the Taliban could take control over larger 

swaths of the country and ultimately defeat the government's forces if the American forces were 

completely withdrawn. The U.S. commander in Afghanistan has testified be lore the Senate that 

the situation in Afghanistan is at a stalemate and more forces are needed to break it. 18 

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Townsend, who heads the U.S.-Ied coalition against ISIL, said 

recently that ISIL's strongholds in Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria could be recaptured in the 

next six months, but he counsels that another complete U.S. withdrawal is too risky. 19 The 

United States has achieved a measure of success on several occasions-in Afghanistan, in Iraq, 

in Yemen-only to see things fall apart when it turned its attention to other fronts. 

Many in the United States would say, "That's their problem." What are the downsides of 

withdrawal to the United States? Withdrawal would be perceived as another demonstration that 

the United States is an unreliable ally. That would have strategic implications beyond the Middle 

East-in Europe and East Asia, where there are concerns about American commitment to its 

allies. A U.S. withdrawal could result in further destabilizing surrounding countries. It would 

leave ungoverned spaces not unlike those in pre-9111 Afghanistan, which allowed al Qaeda to 

flourish. It would alter political calculations in Baghdad. It would leave Iran in a commanding 

position in the region. It could prompt further and more-significant military action against the 

Kurds by Turkey. The withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq in 2011 is sometimes cited as 

a contributing factor to the rise of ISIL, although it was technically necessary under the 2008 

Status of Forces Agreement. 

Withdrawal could also cause the United States to lose any ability to shape outcomes in the 

region. Significantly, the recent Syrian ceasefire follow-up meeting in Astana with Turkey, 

Russia, Iran, and the United Nations did not include the United States. This is unexplored 

territory. 

18 Rebecca Kheel, "Top US Commander Says Tie's Short 'a Few Thousand' Troops in Afghanistan," The Hill, 

February 9, 2017. 

19 Ali Abdul-Hassan, Zeina Karam, and Robert Burns, "U.S. Commander: Mosul, Raqqa Should be Retaken !rom 

Islamic State in Six Months," New York Times. February 8, 2017. As of february 13, 2017: 

https :/ /www .nytimes.com/ aponline/20 1 7 /02/08/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq.html? _ r~O 

13 
104 

The principal reason for U.S. military involvement in these conflicts is that it is seen as 

necessary to prevent terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Has that risk sufficiently diminished, 

or is the situation worse? Would withdrawal reduce or increase the risk? Although it encourages 

homegrown terrorist attacks, ISIL thus far has not followed al Qaeda's earlier pattern of 

launching large-scale attacks on the United States, although both groups continue to call for 

attacks here. AI Qaeda's original objective was to drive the United States-the "far enemy"-Dut 

of the Middle East, although some analysts argue that the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was to 

draw the United States into the fight. How would al Qaeda now react to American withdrawal? If 

the United States were to withdraw, how would ISIL see launching attacks on the United States 

as being in its strategic interest? 

Would any administration that ordered a withdrawal be able to politically withstand a 

subsequent terrorist attack? And if one were to occur, what options would the United States 

have? 

As indicated by these questions, whether and how the United States ends--or substantially 

reduces-its military role remains unexplored tciTitory. Yet Americans must accept that this is an 

open-ended contest, with no easy off-ramps, or we must devote as much strategic thinking about 

how this war might end as we have (or have not) devoted to going in. 

14 
105 

Brian Michael Jenkins 

Senior Adviser to the RAND President 

Santa Monica Office 

Education 

M.A. in history, University of California, Los Angeles; B.A. in fine arts, University of California, 

Los Angeles 

Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation and 

author of numerous books, reports, and articles on terrorism-related topics, including Will 

Terrorists Go Nuclear? (2008, Prometheus Books). He fonnerly served as chair of the 

Political Science Department at RAND. On the occasion of the 1 0-year anniversary of 

9111, Jenkins initiated a RAND effort to take stock of America's policy reactions and give 

thoughtful consideration to future strategy. That effort is presented in The Long Shadow of 

9/11: America's Response to Terrorism (Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges, 

eds., 20 II). 

Commissioned in the infantry, Jenkins became a paratrooper and a captain in the Green 

Berets. He is a decorated combat veteran, having served in the Seventh Special Forces 

Group in the Dominican Republic and with the Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam. He 

returned to Vietnam as a member of the Long Range Planning Task Group and received 

the Department of the Army's highest award for his service. 

In 1996, President Clinton appointed Jenkins to the White House Commission on Aviation 

Safety and Security. From 1999 to 2000, he served as adviser to the National Commission 

on Terrorism and in 2000 was appointed to the U.S. Comptroller General's Advisory 

Board. He is a research associate at the Mineta Transportation Institute, where he directs 

the continuing research on protecting surface transportation against terrorist attacks. 
106 

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109 

Congressional Testimony 

House Armed Services Committee 

2118 Rayburn House Office Building 

14 February2017 

Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan 

The Evolving Threat and Effective Counter Terrorism Strategies 

Introduction 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to testifY again before you today, but as a 

civilian, not a government employee. And BTW, that gives me a bit more leeway in 

what I have to say. And it is humbling to be here with these two giants of counter 

terrorism and personal heroes of mine- both of whom I have known and worked 

with for years - before and after 9-11. 

This morning I will discuss the trends in the terrorist threat, evaluate our counter 

measures and make a few observations about future policies. 

Good News- Bad News 

Let me start by saying there is good news and bad news. 

The good news is that since 9-11, our nation has been successful in denying AQ, ISIS 

or any of their affiliates from conducting a strategic level attack against our 

homeland. 

The bad news is that over the past six years the number of violent jihadis around the 

world has increased dramatically. In addition, there are a growing number of 

conflict zones across the Islamic world-- from South Asia to the Levant and across 

all of Africa. These conflicts have provided opportunities for the expansion of AQ 

and ISIS from their traditional strong holds and have exacerbated the anger of 

homegrown terrorists in Europe and in the United States. 

During the past few years, three armies that we armed and trained collapsed in 

front of lightly armed militia groups-- in Mali in 2012, Iraq in 2014 and Yemen in 

2015- providing our enemy tons of weapons, ammunition and vehicles. 

In addition, Iran has increased its malevolent behavior in the past several years, 

training and arming violent militia groups, stoking sectarian tensions and 

exacerbating conflicts in a brazen attempt to expand their influence in the region. 

These setbacks overseas coincided with a burst of terror attacks in France and 

Belgium- as well as in Boston, San Bernardino and Tampa. 
110 

Things have improved lately-- and we need not panic- nor expend the lives of our 

troops or our national treasure needlessly. But, additional action is needed to 

respond to this troubling turn of events in the past three years. 

The Evolving Threat 

First, let me expand upon the nature of the threat. 

AQ conducted three strategic attacks from August 1998 to Sept 11 2001 --and none 

since 9-11 -- a remarkable record of success on our part -- and what can only be 

described as a massive strategic failure on the part of AQ. 

Post 9-11 Success 

There have been between 12 and 15 terrorist attacks in the USA since 9-11 -and 

about 100 deaths-- depending on how you count them. These are tragedies for the 

victims and their families- but have not had a strategic impact on our country. 

Additionally, contrary to what many pundits have predicted in the aftermath of 9-

11, Americans, from Boston to New York, from Tampa to San Bernadino- have not 

overreacted or cowered in the face of terrorist attacks - but instead they have been 

resilient and gone about living their lives without fear. 

Bad News: Deteriorating Conditions Across the Globe 

Since the Arab Spring, the Islamic world has been beset with ever-expanding 

conflicts from east to west. 

Currently, in the Islamic world there are at least four failed states: Syria, Yemen, 

Somalia and Libya. There are at least five states with major areas of ungoverned 

space including Pakistan (the FATA), Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Mali. In addition 

there are several other states with conflicts of varying degrees of violence and 

ungoverned space such as the southern Philippines, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, 

and the Sinai region of Egypt. The roots of many of these conflicts are complex and 

go back many years-- but most have been exacerbated since the Arab Spring and 

the involvement of radical jihad is. 

Each of these conflicts has its own unique characteristics- it is impossible to 

generalize about them -or underestimate the difficulty of unwinding them- but 

each of them- unfortunately-- provides space for the jihadi movements to grow 

and expand. 

Af-Pak: In the FATA and parts of Afghanistan- there is a war raging between the 

forces of modernity centered in the major cities of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the 

radical, hyper-salafist model of the Tali ban in the rural mountainous regions. 
111 

The Levant: In the Levant, the once powerful and now crumbling ISIS caliphate must 

be understood as a Sunni insurgency fighting against the Shia domination of both 

the Syrian and Iraqi governments. AQI and then ISIS mobilized this resentment and 

put a radical, apocalyptic sharia version of a caliphate on top of a largely sectarian 

movement. 

Yemen: In Yemen, a decades old civil war between the north and south has been 

reignited- unfortunately- with an increasingly sectarian dimension and Iranian 

involvement- and sadly is increasingly a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

~: In the Egyptian Sinai, resistance by Bedouin tribes to control from Cairo has 

been exploited by a! Qaeda affiliates - and although this is a relatively small group --

its terrorists attacks against civil aviation and hotels has ravaged the Egyptian 

tourist industry- and has destabilized the economy one of our most important 

allies. 

North and West Africa: In the North African Magreb, a Taureg rebellion by the 

northern desert tribes against the sub-Saharan tribes in Bamako was high jacked by 

AQIM in 2011- and thanks to the French intervention- and some important and 

timely support by the US and other allies -- we avoided another completely failed 

state. And in northwest Nigeria (and its bordering states), the nihilist Boko Haram is 

fighting a brutal war against Christianity and modern civilization. 

Tunisia: And although I hate to further provide more depressing news, even where 

there is no conflict raging- such as in Tunisia- where there is a moderate Islamic 

tradition and a fledgling democracy, rule oflaw and economic opportunity (albeit 

with un-employment numbers of youth similar to Greece and Spain)- even there--

a model of what we hope other countries can aspire - Tunisia exports, on a per 

capita basis, more jihadis to ISIS than any other Arab nation. This is extremely 

troubling, as it defies the conventional wisdom that the jihadi threat can only be 

limited with political and social modernization- apparently that does not work very 

well either in deterring a certain number of folks from radicalizing. 

The West: In Europe, and to a lesser extent the US and Canada-- there is a growing 

number of radicals that aspire to conduct violence- and much of that hatred is 

generated by social media that focuses primarily violence in the Islamic worldmuch of what is blamed on the west- rather than on any "social marginalization" in 

their adopted countries. 

Narratives and Counter Narratives 

The facts are clear; the radicallslamist-jihadi narrative has been a powerful 

motivator for thousands of young men over the past two decades. 
112 

Efforts to counter this narrative have not had lots of success over the years- many 

volumes have been written in universities and think tanks about how miserable our 

efforts have been for the past 20 years. I would offer that the problem is not 

necessarily the lack of an effective counter narrative to the jihadi violence- that 

often falls on deaf ears anyway. What is needed is a demonstrable alternative 

narrative - and more than just words or slogans - but a living model of a modern 

state that young Sunni men would be willing to fight for against the fanatical and 

murderous jihadis. And we must encourage our friends to live those models now, in 

their homelands. 

But even with the best of counter or alternative narratives -there are too many 

young men resistant to this message and will be trying to kill us for many years to 

come. There is a high likelihood that there will continue to be "one-off' attacks in 

the US and Western Europe in the years ahead- but it is NOT inevitable that they 

reconstitute strategic capability if we respond properly to the threat. 

Before recommending new actions- let me do a short review on what has worked 

for the past 15 years- as it is important first to recognize what has worked- before 

contemplating new steps. 

Four Layers of Defense: 

Since 9-11 we have bolstered our previously non-existent defenses - with what I 

describe as four overlapping layers of defense. 

It starts with our policies and programs in these ten or twelve sanctuary areas of 

conflict- those ungoverned spaces where jihadis thrive and threaten our homeland 

from afar. The second layer is from those sanctuary areas to our border and all the 

nations and oceans in between. The third layer of protection is at our border itself -

and the fourth within our homeland. 

Re: Sanctuaries: 

In the principal terrorist sanctuaries we have pounded AQ's leadership in the FAT A, 

Yemen and Somalia with lethal action from the skies-- and from the land and sea. 

This model has now been expanded to ISIS targets in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Some 

pundits call these programs "wack-a-mole"- inferring that the terrorists quickly 

rebound from these strikes. 

My experience in studying the behavior of these groups has been different. In those 

regions where we conduct these operations- not only do we kill-off the most 

experienced, talented and dangerous terrorists -but those that come after them are 

principally concerned about staying alive - and they know it is extremely dangerous 

for them to talk on a phone, send an email, meet with more than two or three 

people, travel in a car, set up a safe house or small training area. Those who do-
113 

have a very short life expectancy- and they know it. And it is hard to run an 

international terrorist organization when your primary task is physical survival. 

But our most important long-term instrument in these sanctuary countries is in 

working with the host country to assist them to control their own security 

problems. This requires work on the diplomatic front, intelligence sharing and 

perhaps most important- the training, advise and assistance missions of our 

military units- particularly the US Army Special Forces. As advisors, in most cases, 

our soldiers should not be involved in what is known as "actions on the objective" -

but leave the fighting to the host country. We should trust our "Green Berets" to use 

good judgment- but insist that they push the host country soldiers up to the front of 

the battle. We are their partners- but it is their country and their war. Unilateral 

US action should be used only for rare and special circumstances. 

Pressure on Terrorist Travel: 

Since 9-11 when 19 terrorists literally strolled into our country to attack us - we 

have established an extremely effective network of information sharing with 

virtually every intelligence service in the world, at some level, some obviously much 

more than others. Many of most important partners have also suffered attacks from 

these groups and are eager to share - actually trade-- intelligence on terrorist 

suspects. We must keep this up; expand these intelligence relationships- providing 

training and assistance as well-- even with some countries that do not share our 

values. We can work on those shortcomings --- but in the interim we need to work 

with them to us safe. CIA, DIA and several DHS agencies can play a role in this 

regard. 

Controlling the Border 

At the border- our most important effort is at our airports and is directly related to 

the watch lists created by the intelligence sharing in the second layer of defense. 

But we must also be smarter at these checkpoints- and if necessary increase 

"secondary inspections" of suspicious people - using trained intelligence 

professionals to pull suspects from airport lines --which also provides 

opportunities for intelligence collection and the development of assets. This can be 

done with respect and dignity- but must be understood as a key means of 

protecting our border. 

In regards to an expanded wall on our southern border- from my counter-narcotics 

experience that should help stem the flow of drugs- and as a Cold War Army 

veteran I was familiar with the old Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe - and I served for 

several years on the DMZ in South Korea- walls do work- as they are primarily 

used to stem immigration flows -- and certainly can only help our counter terrorism 

efforts. However, right now, I am more concerned about terrorist movements in our 

airports and just as concerned about the Canadian border than the one to the south. 
114 

Homeland Investigations and Defense 

On the domestic front, I will be brief. The FBI should be commended for keeping our 

nation safe. I know them well having worked within their JTTF structure in NYC. I 

can assure you that in my experience, I never saw FBI agents abuse the Patriot Act 

or any other authorities to do anything other than look for terrorists seeking to 

conduct violent harm to our nation. And the same was for my detectives at NYPD, 

they were aggressive --but always well within the law. They had neither the 

inclination nor time to waste on those that were not real threats to our immediate 

safety- and there were plenty of them to worry about. I firmly believe these 

investigations act as a deterrent as well and have helped keep the City safe for the 

past 15 years. 

Full Court Pressure 

It is vitally important that pressure be kept across all four of these layers -like full 

court pressure in a basketball game -please excuse my basketball analogy. 

Weakness in one area weakens the entire defense. And no one "layer" can hope to 

protect the nation by itself. It is too late to pick them up terrorists at mid courtpressure must start at the source - and be sustained all the way to the streets of our 

cities and towns. 

But the effort must be relentless- the traps of the "full court pressure" must be 

continually increased and adjusted to the evolving threat. Although we can never 

guarantee a perfect record against small one-off attacks - these efforts are essential 

for keeping our nation from a strategic attack for another 15 years. 

And it is now time to Ramp Up the Pressure 

I will conclude with ten points in summary: 

• First: On what NOT to do- try to avoid invading countries- that has not 

worked out too well for us in the past. But at the same time don't let nations 

or armies we trained fall to the enemy as occurred in Mali, Iraq and Yementhe clean up after a collapse is much more difficult. 

• Second: If we must intervene to prevent a collapse --look at the French 

model in Mali - get in and get out -leave a small footprint- turn it over to 

the UN and local government as soon as possible. Don't try to reinvent the 

country- just crush the rebellion and leave a very small footprint behind. 

• Third: Expand our "train, advise and assist" programs across the danger 

zones I discussed. Advisors should be able to move forward with their 
115 

counterparts to be effective- but actions at the objective- the actual combat 

operation- should be left to the host country solders. Occasionally, we may 

need to conduct unilateral direct action missions - but rarely and only when 

absolutely necessary. 

• Fourth: Afghanistan and Iraq are important- but I caution about creeping 

troop increases. Thousands of advisors begin to "look and smell" like an 

occupation- and that creates many of the problems that you seek to solve. 

When I was an advisor in El Salvador- on a compound over-run by guerrillas 

three times in seven years - there were never more than two or three Special 

Forces advisors per Brigade- and for six months I was by myself. 

Sometimes less is more. 

• Fifth: Aviation is a game changer; drones collect intelligence and target terror 

leadership. Attack helicopters, C-130s and A-lOs are a "ground pounders" 

best friend in a firefight. If you want to do more in tough combat zonesexpand aviation- but be careful about the footprint of ground forces. Troop 

increases should be in the tens- not thousands. 

• Sixth: Keep your socio-political objectives and spending in these countries 

humble and limited. These internal problems are very complex- and even if 

you solve them (like in Tunisia) it does not guarantee that you will solve the 

jihadi export program. American support for these international programs is 

waning- don't loose their support by over extending or overspending scarce 

resources. 

• Seventh: Support our allies in the region that are on the front lines of this 

fight, particularly Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and others like Niger that are 

hosting our aircraft in Africa. They are not perfect- but they are our friends 

and need our support- we are fighting against the same threat- this is not 

charity- it is partnership. Sometimes just some political support at a crucial 

moment is needed. 

• Eight: Crank up the pressure on Iran. No longer accept Iranian 

transgressions against our soldiers or sailors. A swift and determined 

response should be conducted for any future transgressions. Failure to do so 

risks further escalation from this rogue regime. 

• Ninth: Preserve our troops - their lives are precious - and there are a 

growing number of requirements around the world. As they continue to fight 

terrorist threat for another 15 years-- they are also being asked to prepare 

for a wide range of missions from Central Europe to East Asia. 

• Finally, we are in a long war against a determined enemy. The key to success 

is sustained pressure, in a targeted fashion across the entire "court"- with a 
116 

policy that can be sustained perhaps for decades- to prevent strategic 

attacks and minimize the lone wolf attacks ··while at the same time 

preparing for other threats that loom on the horizon- threats that with you, 

Mr. Chairman, are also very familiar. 

Thank you 

Michael A. Sheehan is a former officer in the US Army Special Forces. He has served at 

the White House on the NSC staff while on active duty. He was previously Ambassador 

at Large for Counter Terrorism at State, Deputy Commissioner for Counter Terrorism 

at NYPD and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict at Defense. He is currently the Distinguished Chair of the Combating 

Terrorism Center at his alma mater, the United States Military Academy. 
117 

Michael A. Sheehan was the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). In this capacity he served as the Secretary of Defense's principal civilian 

adviser on programs, policies, and resources for special operations. In addition, the office oversees 

Defense Department policies and programs regarding counternarcotics, humanitarian assistance, 

security force assistance programs for building partner capacity, and stability operations. Mr. Sheehan 

has over thirty-years in public service; much of it involved in counter terrorism, counter insurgency, 

peacekeeping, and law enforcement operations. 

Mr. Sheehan is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served in a 

variety of infantry and special forces assignments. In the infantry, he commanded a mechanized 

company in an armored brigade in Korea with multiple tours on the Demilitarized Zone (1983-85). As a 

special forces officer, Mr. Sheehan served in a variety of counter terrorism and counter insurgency 

capacities. He commanded an Operational Detachment -Alpha in a hostage rescue unit in Panama 

(Company C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)) and participated in numerous training 

and advisory deployments in Latin America including Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador. In 

addition, Mr. Sheehan graduated from the Colombian Commando course, Lancero. He is Airborne, 

Ranger, Special Forces, Jungle Warfare, and Jumpmaster qualified, and is a recipient of the Combat 

Infantry Badge. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Sheehan was the brigade counter insurgency advisor for the 

Fourth Brigade in Chalatenango, El Salvador, one of the most combative regions in the country. 

While on active duty, Mr. Sheehan served in the field on peacekeeping missions in Somalia (1993-94) 

and Haiti (1995). In both cases, he was Special Advisor to the head of the United Nations (U.N.) mission 

and engaged in the integration of U.N. military and civilian police programs. Mr. Sheehan served on the 

National Security Council staff for both President George H.W. Bush (1989-92) and President William 

Jefferson Clinton (1995-97). 

After retiring from the Army in 1997, Mr. Sheehan served at the State Department in the Bureau of 

International Organizations. After the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, Mr. Sheehan was 

appointed by President Clinton as Ambassador-at-Large for Counter Terrorism (1998-2000) and was 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate in 1999. During his tenure Mr. Sheehan establish bi-lateral counter 

terrorism working groups with India and Russia (both of which are still operating). From 2001 to 2003, 

Sheehan went back to peacekeeping duty as the Assistant Secretary General of Mission Support in the 

U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, where he was responsible for supporting 16 missions 

around the world and over 40,000 military and police peacekeepers. 

From 2003 to 2006, Mr. Sheehan served as the New York Police Department (NYPD) Deputy 

Commissioner for Counter Terrorism. In this position he was instrumental in reshaping the NYPD into 

what is widely regarded as one of the most effective counter terrorism organizations in the world. 

Mr. Sheehan has master degrees from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service (1988) and 

the US Army Command and Staff College (1991). In both programs his dissertations concerned irregular 

warfare theory and practice. Mr. Sheehan spoke and lectured on counter terrorism and counterinsurgency policy and was a distinguished fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and 

the Center for Law and Security at NYU. In addition, he was the on-air counter terrorism analyst for NBC 

News from 2006-11. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 14, 2017 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other engagements 

around the world have demonstrated the importance of minimizing civilian casualties to winning the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of locals and ultimately decreasing animosity 

towards the U.S. Civilian casualties aid in propaganda and recruitment efforts, as 

demonstrated by Al Qaeda’s social media use of the inadvertent death of an 8-yearold girl in the recent raid in Yemen. I believe precise and quality policies, procedures, and guidelines are essential to minimizing civilian causalities—both inside 

and outside areas of active hostilities. They are also critical to our broader strategy 

and must remain in place under the current administration. In your opinion: 

How does the loss of civilian life in operations undermine our counterterrorism 

efforts? How does it aid propaganda and recruitment efforts? 

How do we strike a balance of effective kinetic and non-kinetic activities against 

terrorists that accounts for the deleterious effects of civilian casualties? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Minimizing civilian casualties must be an absolute critical priority 

in the fight against terrorism: not because of the adverse propaganda it generates, 

but because it is morally right. Success in striking a balance between effective kinetic and non-kinetic activities will be predicated upon the best possible intelligence 

being provided to the warfighter, clearly articulated rules of engagement, and active 

and ongoing efforts in planning and operations to prevent harm coming to civilians 

to the greatest extent possible. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other engagements 

around the world have demonstrated the importance of minimizing civilian casualties to winning the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of locals and ultimately decreasing animosity 

towards the U.S. Civilian casualties aid in propaganda and recruitment efforts, as 

demonstrated by Al Qaeda’s social media use of the inadvertent death of an 8-yearold girl in the recent raid in Yemen. I believe precise and quality policies, procedures, and guidelines are essential to minimizing civilian causalities—both inside 

and outside areas of active hostilities. They are also critical to our broader strategy 

and must remain in place under the current administration. In your opinion: 

How does the loss of civilian life in operations undermine our counterterrorism 

efforts? How does it aid propaganda and recruitment efforts? 

How do we strike a balance of effective kinetic and non-kinetic activities against 

terrorists that accounts for the deleterious effects of civilian casualties? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other engagements 

around the world have demonstrated the importance of minimizing civilian casualties to winning the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of locals and ultimately decreasing animosity 

towards the U.S. Civilian casualties aid in propaganda and recruitment efforts, as 

demonstrated by Al Qaeda’s social media use of the inadvertent death of an 8-yearold girl in the recent raid in Yemen. I believe precise and quality policies, procedures, and guidelines are essential to minimizing civilian causalities—both inside 

and outside areas of active hostilities. They are also critical to our broader strategy 

and must remain in place under the current administration. In your opinion: 

How does the loss of civilian life in operations undermine our counterterrorism 

efforts? How does it aid propaganda and recruitment efforts? 

How do we strike a balance of effective kinetic and non-kinetic activities against 

terrorists that accounts for the deleterious effects of civilian casualties? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you believe we need a 21st century NSC–68 for our fight against 

radical Islam? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, absolutely. As I stated in my written testimony, the war on 

terrorism has now lasted longer than our involvement in both world wars and has 

exceeded even our melancholy intervention in Indochina. By prolonging this struggle, our enemies have enmeshed us in a war of attrition: the age-old strategy of terrorists and guerrillas everywhere that seeks to undermine confidence in our demo-
122 

cratically elected leadership, create deep fissures in our polity, polarize political 

opinion and push the liberal democratic state towards increasingly illiberal security 

measures. In order to break this stasis, a new strategy and new approach is needed 

that harnesses all of our instruments of national power in a manner that is coherent, cohesive, systematic and sustained. 

Mr. FRANKS. What happens in the coming months and years as we diminish the 

territorial holdings of ISIS in the Middle East? What will happen as we squeeze 

ISIS and take away their territory? Will there be an increase in small-scale terror 

attacks in Europe and the U.S.? How do we combat this? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. This was explained in my written testimony. In summary, ISIS 

will revert to being a terrorist organization. It will opportunistically seek to inspire, 

motivate, and animate individuals (‘‘lone wolves’’) in the U.S. and Europe to carry 

out attacks on their own; it will also attempt to activate in-place operatives, mainly 

already in Europe, to carry out opportunistic attacks; and, finally, it will likely deploy operatives from overseas on directed missions to strike at targets in Europe 

and elsewhere throughout the world. A new additional category is that of the ‘‘enabled’’ attack: where groups like ISIS provide individuals with suggestions of potential targets along with detailed targeting information—including names of person to 

be targeted, home and work addresses, e-mail addresses. ISIS’s recent publication 

of some 8,000 U.S. citizens and their addresses is a case in point. 

There is also a danger of al Qaeda absorbing whether coercively or voluntarily the 

rump of remaining ISIS fighters once their leaders are killed and their command 

structures collapse. Combatting this threat requires a systematic, simultaneous and 

unrelenting campaign waged against ISIS sanctuaries and safe havens everywhere 

(according to the National Counter-Terrorism Center, there are ISIS branches in 

some 18 counties across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia 

Mr. FRANKS. What is your definition of victory against the Islamic State? Is complete defeat plausible? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, it is plausible. Victory is when ISIS is reduced to an inconsequential number of survivors, is shorn of its territory and pretensions of governance, and when its message, appeal and ability to attract recruits no longer has the 

allure and drawing power that it once had 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you believe we need a 21st century NSC–68 for our fight against 

radical Islam? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. What happens in the coming months and years as we diminish the 

territorial holdings of ISIS in the Middle East? What will happen as we squeeze 

ISIS and take away their territory? Will there be an increase in small-scale terror 

attacks in Europe and the U.S.? How do we combat this? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. What is your definition of victory against the Islamic State? Is complete defeat plausible? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you believe we need a 21st century NSC–68 for our fight against 

radical Islam? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. What happens in the coming months and years as we diminish the 

territorial holdings of ISIS in the Middle East? What will happen as we squeeze 

ISIS and take away their territory? Will there be an increase in small-scale terror 

attacks in Europe and the U.S.? How do we combat this? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. What is your definition of victory against the Islamic State? Is complete defeat plausible? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Clausewitz said: ‘‘The political object—the original motive for the 

war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount 

of effort it requires.’’ (On War, p. 80) 

What does winning look like against this threat? What should our political, strategic, and military objectives be? How optimistic or pessimistic are you that these 

objectives are achievable? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Winning is when a terrorist group is deprived its ability to have 

strategic consequences: when its capacity for violence is diminished, when its power 

is reduced to miniscule numbers of fighters, and when its geographic operational 

locus is constrained, and when their messages fall flat, their narratives are shown 
123 

to be empty and they are no long able to recruit new fighters and attract new supporters. Winning is when terrorists lose access to sanctuary and safe haven and are 

deprived of the opportunity to re-group and re-organize: that is, when they are kept 

on the run and too preoccupied about their own security so that they cannot plan 

and plot new terrorist operations. Our objectives should be: the elimination of terrorist access to sanctuary and safe haven along the systematic weakening and dismantling of their organizational infrastructure and far-flung networks, and effective 

countering of both their message and narrative. If and when we are prepared to use 

all aspects of our national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, finance, and 

communications—in a coherent, cohesive, holistic and sustained and systematic 

way, all the above objectives will be achieved. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Clausewitz said: ‘‘The political object—the original motive for the 

war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount 

of effort it requires.’’ (On War, p. 80) 

What does winning look like against this threat? What should our political, strategic, and military objectives be? How optimistic or pessimistic are you that these 

objectives are achievable? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Clausewitz said: ‘‘The political object—the original motive for the 

war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount 

of effort it requires.’’ (On War, p. 80) 

What does winning look like against this threat? What should our political, strategic, and military objectives be? How optimistic or pessimistic are you that these 

objectives are achievable? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Jenkins, I read with great interest your commentary from last 

September, ‘‘Fifteen Years on, Where Are We in the ‘War on Terror’?’’ This point 

in particular caught my attention: ‘‘The United States’ frightened, angry, and divided society remains the country’s biggest vulnerability. Progress in degrading Al 

Qaeda’s capabilities or dismantling the Islamic State is almost completely divorced 

from popular perceptions. Rather than appeal to traditional American values . . . our 

current political system incentivizes the creation of fear.’’ Unfortunately, our society 

isn’t less frightened, angry, or divided now than it was in September. Can you 

elaborate a bit further on why you think this is the nation’s biggest vulnerability? 

What would be your advice to our political leadership for how to address this vulnerability? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Jenkins, you provided some valuable context in an interview last 

month with the Cipher Brief. After tallying 89 people who have been killed as a 

result of fatal jihadist-driven terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11, you 

asked ‘‘How many of those lives would have been saved had [Trump’s Executive 

Order] been put into effect after 9/11 and applied for the entire 15-year period? The 

answer is zero.’’ You further noted that none of the 19 attackers on 9/11 were from 

the countries named in Trump’s order. Regardless of what ends up happening in the 

courts, have you seen evidence that Trump’s Executive Order is being used as a rallying cry and recruitment tool for jihadists? Has the damage already been done, and 

is it irreparable? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. The events of September 11 led to a massive overhaul and restructuring of the Federal Government. We stood up new agencies, consolidated old ones, 

and reorganized the intelligence community . . . all with the intent of promoting better information sharing and improving our ability to connect the dots to prevent the 

next terrorist attack. Did we get it right? What more needs to be done on the organizational front? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

Dr. WENSTRUP. In February 2015, you signed a letter organized by the Center for 

the Study of the Presidency and Congress supporting the passage of a Congressional 

Authorization for the Use of Military Force directed at ISIL. The letter notes that, 

in formulating a long-term strategy for the region, ‘‘a key first step is to indicate 

U.S. political resolve and strategic aims through the passage of an authorization for 

the use of military force to combat—and ultimately destroy—ISIL and to facilitate 
124 

U.S. assistance to the Syrian opposition.’’ It goes on to say, ‘‘A bipartisan AUMF 

can serve as a valuable tool for demonstrating U.S. willingness to confront ISIL, and 

will establish a broader strategic framework for this campaign.’’ Do you still believe 

the passage of an AUMF is an important component of the U.S. effort against ISIL? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes. Only when the will of the Congress is made clear to both the 

president and the American people, will we have the resolve and the resources to 

prosecute the war on terrorism to the fullest extent in a manner that will truly assure victory. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. What constraints do the current legal authorities for the counterISIL mission—primarily the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military 

Force, in addition to the President’s Article II authority—impose on our counterterrorism operations? Do you believe these limitations are appropriate? 

Mr. JENKINS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Back in May 2013, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, you said, ‘‘At this point, we are comfortable with the AUMF as it is currently structured. Right now, it does not inhibit us from prosecuting the war against 

Al Qaeda and its affiliates. If we were to find a group or organization that was targeting the United States, first of all, we would have other authorities to deal with 

that situation.’’ Are you still comfortable with the existing authorization, or have the 

rise of ISIL, its split with Al Qaeda, and other recent developments changed your 

conclusion? 

Ambassador SHEEHAN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

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