In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-1394 

W. STEPHEN LUSH, II, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 3:20-cv-50421 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED MARCH 10, 2022∗ — DECIDED MARCH 29, 2022 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, SCUDDER, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Stephen Lush II brought claims in 

federal court after unsuccessfully pursuing many of those 

∗We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because 

the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and 

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 

34(a)(2)(C) 
2 No. 21-1394 

same claims in Illinois state court. When the district court 

informed him that his complaint failed to state claims, faced 

jurisdictional barriers, and may indeed warrant sanctions, 

Lush agreed to a voluntary dismissal. But he then appealed, 

wishing to challenge prior rulings the district court made 

denying his requests for the recruitment of counsel and to seal 

everything filed in the case. What Lush fails to recognize is 

that his voluntary dismissal—his walking away from the case 

he brought—leaves us with no appellate jurisdiction to 

consider these interlocutory rulings. This outcome reflects the 

harsh reality that can accompany an uninformed decision 

made by someone doing his best to represent himself but

without the legal training to do so effectively. We have no 

choice but to dismiss the appeal. 

I 

Lush started at the Northern Illinois University College of 

Law in 2003. Poor academic performance, perhaps owing to 

mental-health struggles, resulted in the University dismissing 

Lush after his first year. Lush responded with litigation, suing 

the University in state court to recover his tuition and other 

alleged damages, and to purge his academic transcript. He 

also sought injunctive relief to prescribe the way the University handles matters relating to the mental health of its students. 

The state court litigation did not go well for Lush. The first 

of Lush’s lawsuits ended with an Illinois court entering judgment for the defendants. In time Lush brought additional lawsuits advancing similar claims, and those other cases ended 

the same way. 
No. 21-1394 3

In 2020 Lush turned again to federal court. He sued the 

University’s Board of Trustees, individual trustees, and the 

State of Illinois, alleging a range of violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and provisions of other federal 

laws, civil and criminal. Lush accompanied his complaint 

with a request for the recruitment of counsel. For its part, the 

Board moved to dismiss the complaint as not only untimely, 

but also barred by principles of claim preclusion based on the 

prior cases Lush brought in state and federal court. Lush responded by filing an amended complaint which, in turn, 

prompted the district court to deny the Board’s motion to dismiss as moot. 

Fulfilling the screening obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), the district court entered an order observing that 

the claims in the amended complaint were precluded by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, in any event, untimely given 

that Lush brought the federal action some 16 years after the 

events in question. So, too, did the district court observe that 

Lush’s allegations fell short of stating any claim for relief. The 

district court then ordered Lush to show cause why the 

amended complaint should not be dismissed, while alternatively giving him the option of voluntarily dismissing the action to avoid potential sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11. 

Lush’s initial response was to renew his request for counsel, which the district court denied. From there Lush responded by agreeing to voluntarily dismiss his amended 

complaint and asking the district court to seal the entire case. 

The district court denied the request to seal and dismissed the 

case. The dismissal was “with prejudice,” undoubtedly reflecting the district court’s view that Lush’s renewed effort to 
4 No. 21-1394 

relitigate his claims faced multiple insurmountable barriers 

that rendered futile any wish Lush may have had to further 

litigate. 

This appeal followed, with Lush limiting his challenge to 

the district court’s denials of his motions to appoint counsel 

and to seal the case file. 

II

Lush’s appeal is a prime example of a pro se litigant struggling to navigate the judicial system. To our eye, Lush seems 

intent on taking another shot at litigation—assisted by recruited counsel—without understanding that too many legal 

barriers stand in the way of any attempt to renew his prior 

claims. 

His prior efforts to litigate in Illinois state court ended in 

adverse judgments against him. As the district court observed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine almost surely prevents 

those judgments from being collaterally challenged or set 

aside through subsequent federal court litigation. See District 

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 

(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). Nor 

is it clear that Lush appreciates other barriers that would 

stand immediately behind clearing the Rooker-Feldman hurdle 

including, for example, showing that his claims were timely 

and not barred by principles of claim preclusion. See Daza v. 

State, 2 F.4th 681, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that a 

prior judgment on the merits precludes a subsequent action 

advancing the same claims and ones that could have been 

brought in the first action). 

Even more, though, Lush took an affirmative step in the 

district court that precludes any appeal of the two 
No. 21-1394 5

interlocutory rulings he presses in his brief. He agreed to a 

voluntary dismissal of his lawsuit, thereby dropping and 

walking away from his case in the district court. And once he 

received that dismissal and saw that the district court entered 

it “with prejudice,” he took no step under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60 or otherwise to challenge the court’s order. 

Lush’s voluntary dismissal had a jurisdictional consequence: the voluntary dismissal did not result in an adverse 

final judgment from which Lush may appeal the interlocutory 

rulings he now wishes to challenge. See Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 436 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing other cases reaching the same conclusion and explaining that “it makes no difference whether the dismissal under Rule 41(a) was with or 

without prejudice” because “when the district court granted 

[the plaintiff’s] motion for voluntary dismissal, [he] received 

the precise relief he requested” and thus “may not appeal”); 

see also 8 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 

§ 41.40[11][b] n.129 (3d ed. 2021) (collecting cases likewise 

concluding that the voluntary dismissal of a civil action precludes an appeal); accord Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 

1702, 1707 (2017) (employing similar reasoning and holding 

in the class action context that voluntary dismissals are not 

appealable as a way of challenging an adverse interlocutory 

ruling on one or another aspect of Rule 23’s class certification 

requirements). 

Because Lush received the precise relief he requested—

dismissal—he cannot now challenge the district court’s nondispositive interlocutory rulings denying his requests for 

counsel and to seal all case filings. See Palka, 662 F.3d at 436. 

Today’s outcome may be difficult for Lush to accept, as he 

may have been of a mind that a voluntary dismissal would 
6 No. 21-1394 

permit future litigation, including on appeal—not preclude it. 

That view was uninformed, though, and almost surely reflects 

the reality and limitations of his proceeding without the benefit of a lawyer able to explain to him that jurisdictional and 

other barriers identified by the district court preclude any further effort to litigate (indeed, relitigate) his claims. Lush had 

no legal right to counsel, though, and every day district courts 

face the consequential task of deciding what circumstances 

warrant the appointment of counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 

F.3d 647, 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). It is clear that the 

district court denied Lush’s request for counsel because of the 

futility of allowing another federal pleading on the matters 

alleged in this most recent complaint. 

We therefore DISMISS Lush’s appeal for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction.