United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-2082

A.C., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Torrence S. 

Waithe; A.C.C., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, 

Nicolas Cahuec; A.F., a minor, by his parent and guardian ad 

litem, Aletha Forcier; R.F., a minor, by her parent and guardian 

ad litem, Aletha Forcier; I.M., a minor, by his parents and 

guardians ad litem Jessica Thigpen and Anthony Thigpen; L.M., a 

minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem Jessica Thigpen and 

Anthony Thigpen; K.N.M.R., a minor, by her parent and guardian 

ad litem, Marisol Rivera Pitre; J.R.H., a minor, by her parents 

and guardians ad litem, Moira Hinderer and Hillary Reser; M.S., 

a minor, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Mark Santow; 

M.M.S., a minor, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Amie Tay; 

M.S., a minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem, Maruth Sok 

and Lap Meas; A.W., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad 

litem, Chanda Womack; J.W., a minor, by her parent and guardian 

ad litem, Chanda Womack; N.X., a minor, by her parents and 

guardians ad litem, Youa Yang and Kao Xiong,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

DANIEL J. MCKEE,* in his official capacity as Governor of the

State of Rhode Island; NICHOLAS A. MATTIELLO, in his official

capacity as Speaker of the Rhode Island House of 

Representatives; DOMINICK J. RUGGERIO, in his official capacity

as President of the Rhode Island Senate; RHODE ISLAND STATE

BOARD OF EDUCATION; COUNCIL ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY

EDUCATION; ANGELICA INFANTE-GREEN, in her official capacity as

Commissioner of Education for the State of Rhode Island,

Defendants, Appellees.

* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Governor Daniel J. 

McKee has been substituted for former Governor Gina M. Raimondo as 

the lead defendant-appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,

Kayatta, Circuit Judge,

and Casper,** District Judge.

Michael A. Rebell, with whom Center for Educational Equity, 

Teachers College, Columbia University, Jennifer L. Wood, Rhode 

Island Center for Justice, Samuel D. Zurier, and Stephen Robinson,

and Robinson & Clapham, were on brief, for appellants.

Michael W. Field, Assistant Attorney General, with whom 

Andrea M. Shea and Keith Hoffmann, Special Assistant Attorneys

General, were on brief, for appellees Daniel J. McKee, Nicholas A. 

Mattiello, and Domenick J. Ruggerio.

Anthony F. Cottone, Chief Legal Counsel, Rhode Island 

Department of Education, for appellees Rhode Island Board of 

Education, Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, and

Angélica Infante-Green.

William T. Russell, Jr., David Elbaum, Jonathan T. Menitove, 

Nicholas L. Ingros, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP on brief

for Professors Danielle Allen and Meira Levinson, amici curiae.

Yahonnes Cleary, Erin J. Morgan, Alexander F. Atkins, Carly 

Lagrotteria, David Fu, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 

LLP on brief for National Council for the Social Studies, amicus 

curiae.

Andrew M. Troop, Jeffrey P. Metzler, and Pillsbury Winthrop 

Shaw Pittman LLP on brief for National League of Women Voters, 

League of Women Voters of Rhode Island, and American Civil 

Liberties Union of Rhode Island, amici curiae.

Robert M. Kline, Kristin A. Taylor, Carlos F. Ortiz, Michael 

W. Weaver, Dana McSherry, Annabel Rodriguez, McDermott Will & 

Emery, Jose Perez, Francisca D. Fajana, Miranda Galindo, and

LatinoJustice PRLDEF on brief for LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et al., 

amici curiae.

Gilda Daniels, Jessica Alcantara, Ky'Eisha Penn, Advancement 

Project, Janette Louard, Anthony Ashton, Victor L. Goode, National 

** Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jeremy 

Karpatkin, Raqiyyah Pippins, Florence Bryan, Danielle Pingue, Saul 

P. Morgenstern, Jonathan Green, Peter L. Schmidt, Javier Ortega, 

and Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP on brief for Advancement 

Project and NAACP, amici curiae.

Nowell D. Bamberger, Leila Mgaloblishvili, Tony J. Russo, and

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP on brief for Generation 

Citizen and Mikva Challenge, amici curiae.

Yelena Konanova, Jordan W. Garman, and Selendy & Gay PLLC on 

brief for Professor Martha Minow, amicus curiae.

Michael M. Epstein, Julie K. Waterstone, and Amicus Project 

at Southwestern Law School on brief for Samantha M. Dennis, et 

al., amici curiae.

S. Elaine McChesney, Robert E. McDonnell, Elizabeth M. 

Bresnahan, Michael A. Hacker, and Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP on 

brief for Providence Youth Student Movement, et al., amici curiae.

Jeffrey A. Simes, Allison R. Klein, and Goodwin Procter LLP

on brief for National Association for Media Literacy Education, et 

al., amici curiae.

Andrew J. Ceresney, Jillian L. Trezza, Amy C. Zimmerman, Erik 

Rubinstein, and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP on brief for The Campaign 

for the Civic Mission of Schools, et al., amici curiae.

January 11, 2022
- 4 -

Casper, District Judge. This appeal raises the question 

of whether Rhode Island's alleged failure to provide public school

students with an adequate civics education can state a claim for 

violation of the students' constitutional rights. On behalf of a 

putative class of "all students attending public K-12 schools in 

Rhode Island . . . who are not receiving a meaningful opportunity 

to obtain the degree of education that is necessary to prepare 

them to be capable voters and jurors, to exercise effectively their 

right of free speech, to participate effectively and intelligently 

in our open political system and to function productively as civic 

participants," several students ("Appellants" or "Students")

brought an action for declaratory relief against the Governor and 

various Rhode Island officials and agencies ("Rhode Island") under 

the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and 

the Republican Guarantee Clause of Art. IV, § 4 of the U.S. 

Constitution, all of which the district court dismissed.1 A.C. v. 

Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 175 (D.R.I. 2020). For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

I.

Following a district court's grant of a motion to 

1 Appellants do not appeal the district court's dismissal of 

their Sixth and Seventh Amendment, and Jury Selection and Service 

Act claims.
- 5 -

dismiss, we recite the facts as well-pleaded in the complaint. 

Zhao v. CIEE Inc., 3 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021). Appellants live 

in and attend (or will attend) public schools in Rhode Island, 

spanning preschool through twelfth grade, and allege that Rhode 

Island has failed to provide them with an education "adequate to 

prepare them to function productively as civic participants

capable of voting, serving on a jury, understanding economic, 

social and political systems sufficiently to make informed 

choices, and to participate effectively in civic activities." 

The Students point to several components of Rhode 

Island's approach to civics education that have caused the alleged 

failure. First, Rhode Island does not require any civics courses, 

although some high schools in more affluent districts offer 

elective civics courses, nor does the state mandate testing for 

civics knowledge at the high school level or report student 

performance in these subjects, unlike reading, math and science. 

Due to limited time and resources, schools thus focus on these

mandatory subjects that are tested statewide. Second, Rhode 

Island's current civics curriculum falls short. It has not 

adopted the College, Career and Civic Life ("C3") framework for 

teaching civics, which various educators and policy organizations 

have endorsed. When courses do address civics concepts, the 

content is not as comprehensive as the C3 framework would provide. 

Moreover, current courses do not promote active classroom 
- 6 -

discussion of "controversial topics" and do not teach students 

media literacy to navigate today's digital world. Third, Rhode 

Island has neglected to update civics-related materials and access 

to digital resources, and to train and hire teachers and other 

personnel, including a statewide social studies specialist, in 

civics education. Fourth, schools provide limited opportunities 

for civic experiences, like student council, student newspapers 

and field trips, and civic learning, which combines community 

service with classroom discussions. 

As to the effect of the lack of civics education, the 

Students cite national studies reporting a lack of civic knowledge, 

and a disinterest and lack of participation in civic life (e.g., 

voting and volunteering) among young Americans when compared to 

previous generations. They also point to the "civic empowerment 

gap" for many African American and Latino students and students 

from low-income families, citing demographic analysis of the 

results of civics knowledge testing done on a national sample of 

eighth graders.

II.

We review the district court's grant of Rhode Island's 

motion to dismiss de novo. Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 

79, 84 (1st Cir. 2021). 

A.

The Students appeal the district court's conclusion that 
- 7 -

an adequate civics education is not a fundamental constitutional 

right, which was fatal to their Substantive Due Process and Equal 

Protection claims.2 See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 193.

We turn first to the Supreme Court's precedent regarding 

the existence vel non of a fundamental right to education. Dating 

back at least to Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 

has characterized education as "the most important function of 

state and local governments," and as the "very foundation of good 

citizenship," which is "required in the performance of our most 

basic public responsibilities." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-

23 (1982) (noting Court's recognition of education as a vital civic 

institution for preservation of American democracy). 

Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished the relative importance 

of education and its role in society from the fundamental rights

inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment and looked to whether it 

was "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 

2 We acknowledge and thank amici curiae Professors Danielle 

Allen and Meira Levinson, National Council for the Social Studies, 

National League of Women Voters of Rhode Island, American Civil 

Liberties Union of Rhode Island, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et al., 

Advancement Project and NAACP, Generation Citizen and Mikva 

Challenge, Professor Martha Minow, Samantha M. Dennis, et al., 

Providence Youth Student Movement, et al., National Association 

for Media Literacy Education, et al., and The Campaign for the 

Civic Mission of Schools, et al., for their respective briefs in 

support of Appellants.
- 8 -

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30, 33 (citations omitted) (explaining that 

"the importance of a service performed by the State does not 

determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental"). 

Conducting that analysis in Rodriguez, where Texas children

challenged the state's increasing reliance upon local property 

taxes to fund its public schools, thus favoring wealthy districts, 

the Court held that education in general was not so guaranteed. 

Id. at 35-37. Furthermore, the Court explicitly rejected the 

petitioners' argument that "education is itself a fundamental 

personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise 

of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 

right to vote." See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36. In so doing, 

the Court recognized that the Constitution does not guarantee "the 

most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id.

at 36. Thus, in the absence of an "absolute denial of . . . an 

opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the 

enjoyment of [these] rights," the Court determined that no 

fundamental right was implicated by Texas's school-funding scheme. 

Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).

Appellants here read Rodriguez to suggest that, if 

properly alleged, we may conclude that the Constitution protects 

the specific right to a civics education that prepares them to 

participate effectively in these important aspects of public life 

(e.g., voting or other civic participation). We read the language 
- 9 -

in Rodriguez, however, to reject this proposition. See id. Since 

Rodriguez, the Court has not only reaffirmed its central holding, 

but also clarified that the decision left open only the question, 

as relevant here, of "whether a minimally adequate education is a 

fundamental right . . . ." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-

86 (1986); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 466 n.1 

(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Papasan, the Court declined 

to resolve this question directly, because it determined that the 

petitioners had failed to allege that they had been "deprived of 

a minimally adequate education." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. In 

so doing, the Court clearly suggested that such a deprivation may 

only be "possib[le]" in the case of a "radical denial of 

educational opportunity," such as where "schoolchildren . . . are 

not taught to read or write" or "receive no instruction on even 

the educational basics." Id. at 284, 286. As the Court 

explained, the petitioners' factual allegations regarding schoolfunding disparities simply failed to plead such a claim.

Here, much like the petitioners in Papasan and 

Rodriguez, the Students do not plausibly allege that they were 

"deprived of a minimally adequate education," i.e., state action 

tantamount to a "radical" or "absolute denial" of any "educational 

opportunity." See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284, 286; Rodriguez, 411 

U.S. at 37. Instead, their complaint alleges that Rhode Island's 

policies vis-à-vis civics-related curriculum is substantively 
- 10 -

inadequate to prepare them for meaningful civic engagement as 

adults, whether through insufficient course offerings and 

extracurricular activities, or that state standards do not conform 

to the C3 framework that educators and policy organizations have 

endorsed. But as we have discussed, the Court rejected a similar 

argument in Rodriguez. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36 

(rejecting the argument that a "nexus between speech and education" 

or between the "right to vote . . . [and] the educational 

foundation of the voter" creates a fundamental right to education, 

generally). And the Court has never suggested that the minimum 

"quantum of education" that could be constitutionally required 

must necessarily include instruction in certain subject matters or 

ensure certain educational outcomes (perhaps with the exception of 

an opportunity for basic literacy). See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286; 

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (declining to recognize a fundamental right 

to education but applying heightened scrutiny to a complete "denial 

of basic education" to undocumented children, noting that 

"[i]lliteracy is an enduring disability . . . [that] will handicap 

the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of 

his life"). Thus, as the district court aptly determined, the 

right to participate in a functioning democracy is "not wholly 

inaccessible without civics education." A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 
- 11 -

192-93.3 

We also take judicial notice of relevant Rhode Island 

law, which has since 2007 required at least some civics education 

in its schools, even if it is not as comprehensive as the framework 

Appellants desire, and this law was amended recently during the 

pendency of this appeal to require civics proficiency, among other 

changes. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-22-2 (2021) (requiring 

public schools to provide civics education as part of history and 

social studies curriculum, at least one student-led civics project 

during middle or high school and mandating civics proficiency

beginning in 2022-23 academic year); 200-20 R.I. Code. R. § 10-

1.2.1(F) (requiring local education agencies to develop social 

studies curriculum that includes "Civics & Government" 

coursework), § 10-2.3.1 (requiring local education agencies to 

3 The Students contend that the "central . . . issue presented 

by this case is the definition of the 'quantum of education' that 

they need to effectively exercise their constitutional rights," 

which they argue "can[not] totally omit" civics. In so doing, 

they rely upon dicta from Rodriguez and Papasan stating that the 

Court's decisions do not "foreclose the possibility 'that some 

identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected 

prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to 

speak or the right to vote].'" Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284 (quoting 

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36) (alterations in original). They 

contend that discovery and a trial are necessary to define the 

contours of this theoretical, yet-to-be-recognized minimum 

"quantum." But as we have addressed, this issue is not implicated 

by their claims, was not before the district court, and we need 

not endeavor to answer it here. We merely hold that the district 

court correctly determined that required curriculum prioritizing 

civics-based courses does not fit through the "crack" left open by 

the Court's precedent. See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 189-93.
- 12 -

adopt graduation requirements including demonstration of 

proficiency in social studies).

For these reasons, this lawsuit stands in contrast to a 

case considered recently by the Sixth Circuit, upon which the 

Students heavily rely, where a panel majority concluded that 

students in Detroit Public Schools had plausibly alleged denial of 

their fundamental right to "a basic minimum education -- meaning 

one that plausibly provides access to literacy." Gary B. v. 

Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2020), reh'g en banc 

granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020). 

Surveying legal and historical authority,4 the court determined 

that access to literacy was a fundamental right because, in part, 

it is "viewed by our society as essential for students to obtain 

even a chance at political and economic opportunity." See id. at 

649-52. 

In that lawsuit, which now remains dismissed, the 

plaintiffs specifically alleged facts describing conditions in 

4 The Students here direct us to similar historical authority, 

namely the development of public education as commonplace at the 

state level, to argue that education was deeply rooted in the 

nation's history and tradition, particularly when the Fourteenth 

Amendment was ratified. See Barry Friedman and Sara Solow, The 

Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 92 

(2013); see also Brief of Professor Martha Minow, at 10-11. We 

need not dispute this proposition but note only that none of these 

historical arguments addresses whether civics education, per se,

was deeply rooted in our nation's history, rather than public 

school education in general.
- 13 -

their schools that the students were not receiving a minimally 

adequate education: a significant shortage of qualified teachers, 

unsanitary and dangerous conditions of school facilities (for 

example, extreme heat in the summer caused students and teachers 

to vomit and faint, and contaminated, undrinkable water), and a 

lack of grade-appropriate materials (if any). Id. at 625-27, 661. 

In other words, the Gary B. plaintiffs alleged a total deprivation

of a minimally adequate education. The Gary B. plaintiffs also 

cited data that showed "a zero or near-zero percentage of subjectmatter proficiency among students at their schools," which was 

alone "not enough to state a claim, because the right to a basic 

minimum education cannot guarantee a specific educational 

outcome," but "support[ed] the inference that Plaintiffs' schools 

are woefully insufficient, especially when combined with 

qualitative descriptions of their classes' literacy shortcomings." 

Id. at 661. 

As described above, the complaint here fails to allege 

a total deprivation of a minimally adequate education (as opposed 

to specific subject-matter inclusion).5 See Papasan, 748 U.S. at 

5 Several amici also emphasize how the gap in educational 

offerings between Black and Latinx students and their White peers 

in more affluent districts negatively impacts proficiency among 

these groups of students, see Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et 

al., at 14-16 (citing statewide data in reading and math); Brief

of Advancement Project and NAACP, at 17 (citing nationwide data in

civics), but these statistics still do not suggest deprivation of 

a minimally adequate education due to Rhode Island's allegedly 
- 14 -

285-86 (declining to engage in fundamental right to education 

analysis when plaintiffs did not allege that they were "not taught 

to read or write," or that they did not receive "instruction on 

even the educational basics").

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's 

conclusion that the students have not plausibly alleged the 

deprivation of a fundamental right.6

B.

In conducting our analysis of the Students' equal 

protection claim, we first consider the appropriate level of 

scrutiny to apply. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17; Toledo v. 

Sánchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). As a preliminary matter, 

we reject the Students' argument that strict scrutiny applies, 

since we concluded above that their allegations do not implicate 

a fundamental right. Moreover, the Students, suing on behalf of 

all public school students in Rhode Island, have not asserted that 

inadequate civics curriculum.

6 We need not engage in further analysis of whether a civics 

education is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) 

(articulating two-part test for recognizing fundamental rights by 

looking to history of asserted right). First, we determined above

that Rodriguez forecloses such a conclusion. Second, we agree 

with Rhode Island that Appellants' historical evidence (and that 

of amici) focuses solely on public education in general (i.e., 

minimally adequate education), not civics curriculum. Even 

reaching such analysis, however, we adopt the district court's 

analysis under the Glucksberg framework. See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 

3d at 193-94.
- 15 -

they should be considered a suspect class. See Toledo, 454 F.3d 

at 33.

The Students next argue that Plyler entitles them to 

some heightened standard of review. In Plyler, the Court "struck 

down under heightened scrutiny the exclusion of [undocumented] 

children from a free public education offered to other resident 

children as violative of equal protection." Id. (citing Plyler, 

457 U.S. at 230).7 We are not persuaded that Plyler's heightened 

standard of review applies here. First, the Plyler Court limited 

its application of heightened review to instances where the state 

"den[ies] a discrete group of innocent children the free public 

education that it offers to other children residing within its 

borders." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33

(citing Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459) (noting that since Plyler, the 

Supreme Court has employed rational basis to assess policies "that 

burden the educational opportunities of a non-suspect class" when 

those burdens were not outright exclusions). Second, Plyler

applied heightened review to the exclusionary policy because it 

denied undocumented children a "basic education." Plyler, 457 

U.S. at 223. Here, the Students allege neither that they comprise 

a discrete group of children (e.g., undocumented children), 

7 The specific test articulated in Plyler sounds in heightened 

rational basis review, where the exclusionary policy was not 

"rational unless it further[ed] some substantial goal of the 

State." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
- 16 -

instead they represent all Rhode Island public school students, 

nor that they have been outright denied access to a basic

education.

Accordingly, as there are no suspect classifications

alleged or fundamental rights implicated, our equal protection 

review is "limited to a deferential, rational basis standard." 

D'Angelo v. New Hampshire Sup. Ct., 740 F.3d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). As the same applies to our substantive 

due process review, see Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790 

F.3d 99, 107 (1st Cir. 2015), we proceed accordingly.

C.

In reviewing state action under the "forgiving [rational 

basis] standard," the state will prevail "so long as [it]

articulates some 'reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 

provide a rational basis for the [action].'" Donahue v. City of 

Boston, 371 F.3d 7, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting FCC v. Beach 

Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)); Mulero-Carrillo, 790 

F.3d at 107 (applying same requirements at motion to dismiss 

stage). The Students argue that the district court erred when it 

dismissed their complaint under rational basis review without the 

chance to present evidence, but we have previously rejected this 

argument, for under rational basis review, "any plausible 

justification [from the state] will suffice, and effectively ends 

the analysis." Donahue, 371 F.3d at 15-16 (citations and internal 
- 17 -

quotation marks omitted); Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 

(explaining that rational basis does "not subject" action "to 

courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation 

unsupported by evidence or empirical data"); Toledo, 454 F.3d at 

33 (dismissing equal protection claim where "rational bases for 

the actions are apparent from the face of the complaint"). Rhode 

Island asserts several justifications for its actions regarding 

civics education. First, Rhode Island notes that the state has 

not denied access to civics education, but rather that its laws 

indeed require civics education in some form. Second, Rhode 

Island contends that it has an interest in allowing curricular and 

extracurricular decisions to be made at the local level. Third, 

Rhode Island explains that to the extent it has favored certain 

classes over others, like science and math, those decisions were 

made to prepare students for the workforce or to comply with 

federal law that mandates testing in these areas.

As to local control, the Students contend that Rhode 

Island has substantial authority over education and "should 

exercise this existing supervisory authority to ensure that civics 

education is a high priority for all Rhode Island's schools," and 

that additional oversight of local education policy with respect 

to civics courses is more important than allowing school districts 

to make curriculum choices. These arguments again stress 

Appellants' preferred policy outcomes but fail to negate the 
- 18 -

proffered rationality of local control over curriculum. 

Appellants do not otherwise attempt to negate Rhode Island's other 

justifications, instead focusing their arguments on the need for

heightened review, which we rejected above.

The state's asserted reasons are at least "plausible,"

which satisfies the "forgiving" rational basis inquiry. Donahue, 

371 F.3d at 15 (citations omitted). In particular, we note that 

states, and more so schools and teachers, must grapple with limited 

resources and time to educate their students, all while satisfying 

multiple demands, including mandated federal standards for testing 

and proficiency, which can affect their funding. We do not doubt 

the importance of the civics curriculum proffered by the Students 

and their amici, but we also do not doubt the importance of 

reading, science and math, both for providing a basic education 

and for preparing students to succeed in higher education and the 

workforce. 

Finally, as to the equal protection claim, we note that 

the Students have also failed to tie the difference between their 

schools and more affluent ones (that do provide elective civics 

courses and experiences) to policies implemented or enforced by 

Rhode Island to create this alleged disparity, aside from mere 

mention that one district offers some optional courses. But to 

state an equal protection claim, the Students must connect the 

alleged disparity to a specific policy or action taken by Rhode 
- 19 -

Island that caused these differences. See Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33-

34. Here, they have not.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's 

conclusion that Rhode Island's approach to civics education 

satisfies rational basis review.

D.

We briefly address whether the complaint states a claim 

for relief under the Guarantee and Privileges and Immunities

Clauses. As to the Guarantee Clause, we have noted that it "makes 

the guarantee of a republican form of government to the states; 

the bare language of the Clause does not directly confer any rights 

on individuals vis-á-vis the states." Largess v. Supreme Jud. Ct. 

for State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 224 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis 

in original). Even assuming arguendo that the Students had 

standing here, their Guarantee Clause claim fails on the merits. 

Any such claim "is restricted to real threats to a republican form 

of government." Largess, 373 F.3d at 227 (emphasis added); see

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-86 (1992) (dismissing 

state's Guarantee Clause challenge to a federal regulatory scheme 

where the threats did not "pose any realistic risk of altering the 

form or the method of functioning of [the state's] government,"

noting that even under the scheme, the state "retain[ed] the 

ability to set their legislative agendas" and "state government 

officials remain[ed] accountable to the local electorate"
- 20 -

(emphasis added)). Even reading the complaint in the light most 

favorable to Students, it is not plausibly alleged that Rhode 

Island's failure to provide civics education here is a real threat 

to its republican form of government. The Privileges and 

Immunities Clause claim also fails because the clause "protects 

only those privileges and immunities that are 'fundamental,'"

McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 226 (2013) (quoting Baldwin v. 

Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382, 388 (1978)), not 

present here, and also applies only when a state distinguishes 

among residents and nonresidents with respect to these fundamental 

interests. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (collecting cases).

III.

We conclude by echoing the district court's observations 

in dismissing this case, that the Students have called attention 

to critical issues of declining civic engagement and inadequate 

preparation for participation in civic life at a time when many 

are concerned about the future of American democracy. See A.C., 

494 F. Supp. 3d at 175-76, 181, 197. Nevertheless, the weight of 

precedent stands in the Students' way here, and they have not 

stated any viable claim for relief. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court.