2021 UT 33 

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BROOKELYN GILLMAN, CINDY MAUGHAN, CHANCELOR MAUGHAN,

AND JOHN MAUGHAN, 

Appellants, 

v. 

GARY WALKER GILLMAN AND LANCE FINN GILLMAN, 

Appellees.

No. 20190404 

Heard November 9, 2020 

Filed July 22, 2021 

On Interlocutory Appeal 

Fourth District, Spanish Fork 

The Honorable Jared Eldridge 

No. 180300090 

Attorneys: 

James K. Tracy, James C. Dunkelberger, and Hyrum J. Bosserman, 

Salt Lake City, for appellants 

Michael F. Skolnick, Jeremy R. Speckhals, and Calvin C. Curtis, 

Salt Lake City, for appellees 

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE 

HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined. 

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court: 

INTRODUCTION 

¶1 The defendants in this case missed the deadline to file an 

answer. The court clerk entered their default and the plaintiffs 

moved for default judgment. The defendants quickly opposed the 

motion and requested that the default certificate be set aside 

under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). The district court 

granted the defendants’ request, concluding they had shown 

“good cause” under the rule. The plaintiffs then filed this 
GILLMAN V. GILLMAN

Opinion of the Court

2 

interlocutory appeal, arguing the district court abused its 

discretion in setting aside the default certificate. 

¶2 We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶3 Decedents Glade and Betty Gillman left behind trusts for 

the benefit of their children: appellees Gary Walker Gillman and 

Lance Finn Gillman (collectively, the uncles), along with two other 

siblings who are deceased. The deceased siblings’ share was to 

pass to their children: appellants Brookelyn Gillman, Cindy 

Maughan, Chancelor Maughan, and John Maughan (collectively, 

the cousins), along with two additional non-party cousins. After 

becoming concerned with their uncles’ handling of the trusts, the 

cousins sued Gary Gillman for alleged mismanagement of the 

trusts and both uncles for unjust enrichment. The cousins also 

sought an accounting of trust funds and a declaratory judgment 

establishing their rights under the trusts. 

¶4 The cousins filed their complaint in May 2018. The uncles 

timely moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary 

judgment on each claim. The cousins opposed the motion to 

dismiss and moved the court to convert the motion to one for 

summary judgment under rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. They also requested that the summary judgment 

disposition be delayed so the parties could conduct discovery. 

¶5 On October 10, 2018, the district court heard argument on 

the matter and orally granted the motion to convert. The court 

deferred ruling on the summary judgment motion and ordered a 

period of discovery. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered 

the cousins to prepare an order memorializing its decision. Over a 

month later, on November 16, 2018, the cousins’ counsel sent the 

uncles’ counsel, Calvin Curtis (Curtis), a proposed order. 

¶6 Two weeks later, Curtis emailed the cousins’ counsel, 

informing them he had been away for the Thanksgiving holiday 

and would look at the order and respond the following Monday. 

But he did not follow up. Just over five weeks later, on January 8, 

2019, the cousins’ counsel emailed Curtis again to inform him 

they would file the order on January 11 if Curtis did not respond. 

Counsel also wrote that they anticipated the uncles’ answer 

would be due by the end of January. 

¶7 On January 10, Curtis responded that the order was 

“fine,” that the uncles consented to entry, and that he would “be 

back in touch shortly on the remainder” of the email. The cousins’ 
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Opinion of the Court 

3 

counsel filed the order and the court entered it on January 16, 

2019. The order specified that the uncles’ answer was due within 

fourteen days of the entry of the order, which was January 30. 

¶8 On February 1, two days after the answer deadline, 

Curtis emailed the cousins’ counsel and informed them that the 

uncles were going to engage separate litigation counsel and Curtis 

expected to “have word on that within a couple days.” A week 

later, on February 8, the cousins’ counsel emailed Curtis and 

asked if he would be filing an answer. Curtis did not immediately 

respond. 

¶9 On February 14, the cousins filed a proposed order 

entering the uncles’ default. It was entered the next day. Four 

days later, Curtis emailed the cousins’ counsel and informed them 

that the uncles had engaged separate litigation counsel, who 

would be in touch about the answer and proposed litigation 

schedule. The cousins’ counsel did not respond. Instead, on 

February 20, they filed a motion for default judgment. 

¶10 Five days later, the uncles filed a motion opposing 

default judgment, which included a footnote requesting “that the 

Court set aside [the] default certificate.”1 It included an affidavit 

from Curtis, which stated that: (1) on or about February 1, he 

advised the cousins’ counsel that he would “be engaging separate 

litigation counsel”; (2) he had interacted with litigation counsel 

and their firm on other matters but first contacted them about the 

instant case on January 31, 2019; (3) he had “experience in 

litigating trust and estate matters,” but had reduced his litigation 

practice, and because the previous motion hearing had been 

“focused . . . on procedural rules,” the advisability of hiring 

separate counsel was “reinforced in [his] mind”; (4) between 

January 31 and February 19, he communicated with litigation 

counsel about the mechanics of their involvement in the matter 

but never discussed a due date for the answer; and (5) both 

parties had previously sought and received extensions in the case, 

__________________________________________________________ 

1 See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2692 (4th ed. 2021) (noting that 

“federal courts often view opposition to a motion for the entry of 

a default judgment as a motion to set aside the default 

[certificate], whether or not a formal motion under Rule 55(c) has 

been made”). 
GILLMAN V. GILLMAN

Opinion of the Court

4 

but Curtis had never requested an extension for the answer, nor 

did he “envision or foresee the possibility of entry of default 

based on a three week delay” in filing the answer. 

¶11 Also included as an exhibit to the opposition was the 

uncles’ proposed answer, in which they asserted the following 

defenses: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted; (2) expiration of the statute of limitations on one or more 

claims; (3) waiver, release, and estoppel; and (4) unclean hands. 

¶12 The district court denied the cousins’ motion for default 

judgment and granted the uncles’ request to set aside the default 

certificate. In its written order, the court noted that the case was “a 

close call.” To determine whether the uncles had shown “good 

cause” to set aside the default certificate under rule 55(c), the 

court considered factors that have been outlined by the court of 

appeals in Pierucci v. U.S. Bank, NA, 2015 UT App 80, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 

837, and Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ¶ 16, 244 P.3d 391. 

Specifically, the court analyzed “whether the default was willful, 

whether defendant alleges meritorious defenses, whether 

defendant acted expeditiously to set aside the default certificate, 

any prejudice to plaintiff and the existence of a public interest in 

the outcome.” 

¶13 First, the court found that, while Curtis “could have been 

more diligent,” it was “not convinced that [his] omissions r[ose] to 

the level of willfulness.” Next, the court recognized that the uncles 

had asserted meritorious defenses and had acted expeditiously to 

set aside the default certificate and oppose the motion for default 

judgment. The court rejected the cousins’ contention that they 

would be prejudiced if the default certificate were set aside. And 

it found that the public interest weighed in favor of deciding the 

case on the merits because “Utah courts disfavor default 

judgments.” 

¶14 The cousins sought this interlocutory appeal of the 

court’s decision. We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code 

section 78A-3-102(3)(j). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶15 We review a district court’s decision to set aside a default 

certificate for an abuse of discretion. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 

¶ 9, 11 P.3d 277. While the “court has broad discretion in deciding 

whether to set aside a default [certificate],” a “decision premised 

on flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 
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Opinion of the Court 

5 

 ANALYSIS 

¶16 The cousins contend that the district court abused its 

discretion in setting aside the entry of default in this case. Their 

primary argument is that to show “good cause” to set aside a 

default certificate under rule 55(c), the moving party must 

establish as a threshold matter that some event, exigency, or other 

cause beyond the party’s own inaction caused the default. They 

argue that if the defaulting party cannot proffer some reasonable 

justification for the default along these lines, the party has 

necessarily not shown “good cause.” And they assert that because 

the uncles did not offer any explanation for their late filing other 

than their counsel’s inaction, the uncles did not demonstrate good 

cause as a matter of law, and the district court should not have 

proceeded to consider whether other equitable factors—such as 

the ones identified by the court of appeals in Roth and Pierucci—

weighed in favor of setting aside the default. 

¶17 As we will explain, this is an incorrect reading of rule 

55(c). 

I. THE RULE 55(C) “GOOD CAUSE” STANDARD 

¶18 When a party fails “to plead or otherwise defend as 

provided by” our rules of civil procedure, the opposing party may 

request that the clerk of court enter default—sometimes called a 

default certificate—against the defaulting party. UTAH R. CIV. P.

55(a). This is “an interlocutory step” taken before the opposing 

party moves for default judgment under rule 55(b). 10A CHARLES 

ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 2692 (4th ed. 2021).2 Obtaining an entry of default is 

not an onerous task. “[A]ll that must be shown . . . is that the 

__________________________________________________________ 

2 “In construing our [rules of civil procedure], we freely refer 

to authorities which have interpreted the federal rule[s]” where 

the state and federal rules are “nearly identical.” See Gold 

Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 

1990). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) (“The court may set aside an 

entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a final default 

judgment under Rule 60(b).”), with UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c) (“For 

good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, 

if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it 

aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).”). 
GILLMAN V. GILLMAN

Opinion of the Court

6 

defendant has failed to answer . . . in a timely fashion.” Skanchy v. 

Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). 

¶19 Once a default certificate is entered, the defaulting party 

may move for it to be set aside under rule 55(c). A district court 

may grant such a request “[f]or good cause shown.” UTAH R. CIV.

P. 55(c). 

¶20 “Good cause” is not defined by our rules of civil 

procedure. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good cause” as a 

“legally sufficient reason”—“often the burden placed on a litigant 

. . . to show why a request should be granted or an action 

excused.” Good Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 

Accordingly, rule 55(c) requires only that a movant make a 

showing that is sufficient to persuade the district court that the 

default should be set aside. Nowhere does the rule require the 

movant to show that the default was caused by an event, 

exigency, or other external cause. 

¶21 The cousins essentially read rule 55(c) to require the 

moving party to show good cause for the default. But that is not 

what the rule says. It provides: “For good cause shown the court 

may set aside an entry of default.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c). And as 

discussed above, good cause is the burden placed on the movant 

to show why a request should be granted. Thus, in this context, 

the movant must show why there is good cause to set aside the 

default—not why there is good cause for the default. Of course, a 

party might argue that a default certificate should be set aside 

because the late filing was caused by events beyond the party’s 

control. Indeed, a party could proffer any fact or factor that is 

relevant to determining whether there is good cause to set aside a 

default. But the cousins’ reading of rule 55(c) inserts particular 

requirements that are simply not found in the text of the rule. See

Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 21, 428 P.3d 1096 

(“We will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not 

already there.” (citation omitted)). 

¶22 The cousins also argue that their reading of the rule is 

supported by our appellate case law. They assert that “Utah 

appellate courts have consistently required some event, exigency, 

or other cause to justify setting aside default or default judgment.” 

This may be an accurate observation of the factual circumstances 

that are often involved in such appeals. But the cousins have not 

cited any case involving rule 55(c) in which we or the court of 

appeals have held that “good cause” encompasses the mandatory 

threshold showing they urge. 
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Opinion of the Court 

7 

¶23 Further, the cousins rely heavily on case law interpreting 

the “excusable neglect” standard found in rule 60(b)(1). In those 

cases, we have held that “excusable neglect requires some 

evidence of diligence in order to justify relief.” Jones v. 

Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 20, 214 P.3d 859; see also Sewell v. 

Xpress Lube, 2013 UT 61, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 1080 (“To qualify for relief 

under rule 60(b)(1), a party must show he has used due diligence. 

Due diligence is established where the ‘failure to act was the 

result of . . . the neglect one would expect from a reasonably 

prudent person under similar circumstances.’” (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted)). 

¶24 The cousins assert that our analysis of the excusable 

neglect standard applies equally here because the standard for 

setting aside a default certificate under rule 55(c) is the same as 

the standard for vacating a default judgment under rule 60(b). But 

that is incorrect. 

¶25 While a default certificate may be set aside for “good 

cause shown,” UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c), a court is given discretion to 

vacate a default judgment only upon a showing of, among other 

things, “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” id.

60(b)(1). And “the vacation of a default judgment is subject to the 

explicit provisions of Rule 60(b), which places additional 

restraints upon the court’s discretion.” 10A WRIGHT & MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2692; see UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(c) 

(establishing a filing deadline applicable to a motion under rule 

60(b)(1)). Thus, the standard to set aside a default certificate is 

lower than the standard necessary to set aside a default judgment. 

See 10A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2696 

(“Any of the reasons sufficient to justify the vacation of a default 

judgment under Rule 60(b) normally will justify relief from a 

default entry and in various situations a default entry may be set 

aside for reasons that would not be enough to open a default 

judgment.”). 

¶26 “Th[e] distinction [between relief from a default 

certificate and a default judgment] reflects the different 

consequences of the two events and the different procedures that 

bring them about.” Id. § 2692. A default certificate is but a step on 

the way to a default judgment. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 55; Skanchy, 952 

P.2d at 1076; Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ¶¶ 15, 17, 244 P.3d 

391. In contrast, a default judgment generally ends the litigation 

and requires a more onerous showing. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2) 

(providing, for example, that a court may hold a hearing to 
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Opinion of the Court

8 

establish damages or “the truth of any averment, . . . or to make 

an investigation of any other matter” before entering a default 

judgment). Thus, a party seeking relief from a default judgment 

bears a higher burden than a party seeking only to set aside a 

default certificate. 

¶27 The federal courts interpret their rules similarly. See, e.g., 

Let’s Go Aero, Inc. v. Cequent Performance Prods., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 

1363, 1371 (D. Colo. 2015) (“The good cause required for setting 

aside an entry of default ‘poses a lesser standard for the 

defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be shown 

for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).’” (citation 

omitted)); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. AMerik Supplies, Inc., 588 F. 

Supp. 2d 1349, 1352 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (“The ‘excusable neglect’ 

standard . . . is more rigorous than the ‘good cause’ standard.” 

(citation omitted)). 

¶28 This is not to say that cases involving rule 60(b)(1) are 

irrelevant to the rule 55(c) analysis. While the standards vary, we 

note that oftentimes the reasons for relief from either type of 

default will be similar. See 10A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2694, 2696. So, rule 60(b)(1) cases may 

shed light on circumstances and factors that will often be relevant 

to a rule 55(c) analysis. However, these cases have not grafted 

additional requirements onto rule 55(c).3

¶29 Accordingly, we reject the cousins’ argument that the 

good cause standard requires a movant to make an initial 

showing that the default was caused by some event, exigency, or 

other external cause before considering any other relevant factors. 

¶30 Because we have not previously had occasion to interpret 

rule 55(c), we take this opportunity to identify some guiding 

__________________________________________________________ 

3 This case has highlighted an inconsistency in our rules of civil 

procedure. Rule 6(b)(1)(B) requires that a party show excusable 

neglect if moving the court to extend a deadline after that 

deadline has expired. But if that same party fails to move the 

court for an extension, has a default entered against them, and 

then moves to have that default certificate set aside, the party 

need only show good cause. Compare UTAH R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B), 

with id. 55(c). We direct our rules committee to review this 

incongruity and to determine whether it is necessary to provide 

further guidance as to the interplay between the two rules. 
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Opinion of the Court 

9 

principles to assist district courts in analyzing whether to set aside 

a default certificate. Vacatur of a default is an equitable remedy 

that necessarily requires the district court to exercise its discretion 

and consider the facts unique to each case. “By their nature, 

equitable inquiries are designed to be flexible, taking into account 

all relevant factors in light of the particular circumstances.” Jones, 

2009 UT 39, ¶ 17. In other words, the movant can assert, and the 

court may consider, any fact relevant to the decision to set aside a 

default because “the question is always whether the particular 

relief sought is justified under principles of fundamental fairness 

in light of the particular facts.” Id.

¶31 With that in mind, any doubts should be resolved in 

favor of setting aside a default certificate and allowing the case to 

proceed on the merits. See, e.g., Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 

1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) (noting that courts should exercise 

discretion “in furtherance of justice and should incline towards 

granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may 

have a hearing”). The policy that “courts should be liberal in 

granting relief against default judgments so that cases may be 

tried on the merits” is equally applicable to default certificates. See 

Erickson v. Schenkers Int’l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 

(Utah 1994). So, underlying any inquiry into whether a default 

certificate should be set aside is the principle that defaults 

generally are disfavored and cases should be tried on the merits 

where possible. 

¶32 But we recognize the competing need for judicial 

efficiency and adherence to deadlines. “In exercising discretion 

under Rule 55(c), the court will be very cognizant of the 

competing policies and values that are relevant to entering 

defaults and setting them aside. Both the default entry and 

judgment play an important role in the maintenance of an orderly, 

efficient judicial system.” 10A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2693 (footnote omitted). If parties were 

able to miss deadlines without recourse, it would delay the 

litigation process and place unnecessary strain on the judicial 

system. Thus, the entry of default can be “a useful remedy to a 

good faith litigant who is confronted by an obstructionist 

adversary” and “a means of encouraging an unwilling or 

uncooperative party to honor the rules established for . . . 

litigation.” Id.

¶33 These competing policies illustrate why the district court 

is granted wide discretion in its rule 55(c) determination: the court 
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Opinion of the Court

10 

is in the best position to know whether the conduct of a defaulting 

party is such that the need to enforce deadlines in a particular case 

outweighs the general policy that cases should be adjudicated on 

the merits. 

¶34 Our court of appeals has identified several factors that 

could be relevant to this determination in a given case: “whether 

the default was willful, whether the defendant alleges a 

meritorious defense, whether the defendant acted expeditiously to 

correct the default, whether setting the default aside would 

prejudice the plaintiff, and the extent, if any, to which the public 

interest is implicated.” Roth, 2010 UT App 332, ¶ 16; see also 

Pierucci v. U.S. Bank, NA, 2015 UT App 80, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 837. These 

factors have also appeared frequently in federal case law applying 

rule 55(c). See, e.g., In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 369 (5th Cir. 2008); 

Let’s Go Aero, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1371; Peoples v. Fisher, 299 F.R.D. 56, 

59 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Insituform Techs., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. 

¶35 We agree that these considerations could be relevant in 

an appropriate case. However, we make clear that these factors do 

not form a “test” that must be applied in all circumstances. 

Rather, we reiterate that “[e]quitable inquiries defy distillation 

into any formal legal test; instead, the question is always whether 

the particular relief sought is justified under principles of 

fundamental fairness in light of the particular facts.” See Jones, 

2009 UT 39, ¶ 17. We caution that not every principle will weigh 

equally or be relevant in a particular case. And the factors 

identified are not an exhaustive list. A district court can consider 

anything that is relevant to determining whether the default 

certificate should be set aside. But because the factors identified in 

Roth may often be relevant to a rule 55(c) inquiry, we briefly 

discuss each one and offer related considerations that could be 

relevant in individual cases. 

¶36 First, a court could consider whether the defaulting 

party’s failure to answer was willful. “A willful default is an 

‘intentional failure’ to respond to litigation.” In re OCA, Inc., 551 

F.3d at 370 n.32 (citation omitted). “Mere negligence or 

carelessness is insufficient to support a finding of willfulness. 

Willfulness requires egregious conduct that is not satisfactorily 

explained,” such as “when a defendant ignores a complaint 

without action and fails to offer an explanation for its failure to 

respond to a motion or pleading,” Peoples, 299 F.R.D. at 59 

(citations omitted), or “cho[oses] to play games,” Lacy v. Sitel 

Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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Opinion of the Court 

11 

¶37 Likewise, a court could consider more generally the 

defaulting party’s conduct throughout the litigation—assuming 

some litigation has taken place, as it has here. For example, if a 

party has been actively engaged or otherwise diligent in the case 

and the default appears to be an anomaly, that would weigh in 

favor of vacating the entry of default. But if the party has been 

repeatedly dilatory or otherwise noncooperative, the court may 

decide default is warranted and decline to set it aside. See 10A 

WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2693 (“The 

default procedure offers a useful remedy to a good faith litigant 

who is confronted by an obstructionist adversary.”). 

¶38 Next, a court could consider whether the defaulting party 

acted promptly to cure the default. There is no hard-and-fast rule 

to determine what constitutes prompt action in every case. Courts 

should look at the response to the default in relation to the overall 

context of the litigation. 

¶39 Further, a court could consider whether the nondefaulting party would be unduly prejudiced if the default 

certificate were vacated. Some courts have held that delay by itself 

is insufficient to show prejudice. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 

10 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that “delay standing 

alone does not establish prejudice”). These courts require a 

showing that the delay will “result in the loss of evidence, create 

increased difficulties of discovery, or provide greater opportunity 

for fraud and collusion.” Peoples, 299 F.R.D. at 61 (citation 

omitted). 

¶40 But although we agree that delay can be especially 

pernicious when it leads to loss of evidence or witnesses, or 

otherwise influences litigation, we decline to categorically 

disqualify delay itself as a sufficient basis for a finding of 

prejudice. Instead, we leave to the district court’s discretion 

whether delay in a particular case has become sufficiently 

egregious to constitute prejudice on its own. And it is appropriate 

for the court to consider whether, if any harm was done to the 

non-defaulting party, the harm can be remedied with a sanction 

less drastic than default. See Jones, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 22 n.15 (“The 

district court’s equitable discretion extends to fashioning the 

remedy as well as granting it. In other words, a district court may, 

as part of exercising its equitable discretion, in appropriate cases, 

condition the relief from judgment on the moving party’s 

payment of attorney fees incurred by the nonmoving party as a 
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Opinion of the Court

12 

result of the moving party’s neglect or satisfaction of any other 

equitable condition.”). 

¶41 Additionally, it could be relevant whether the defaulting 

party has a meritorious defense. This is a low bar. “A defense is 

meritorious if it is good at law so as to give the factfinder some 

determination to make.” Am. All. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 

F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). This does not mean 

the court must consider whether the defendant will ultimately 

succeed on the merits. A meritorious defense is merely an 

indication of the defendant’s ability and desire to litigate the case 

on the merits. Conversely, “if the defendant fails to present a 

meritorious defense sufficient to support a finding on the merits 

for the defaulting party,” the court may exercise its discretion not 

to allow the case to proceed. Lacy, 227 F.3d at 293. In such an 

instance, setting aside the default would be futile. Our policy 

favoring adjudication on the merits would be overcome because 

there would be no real legal issues to adjudicate. 

¶42 We again emphasize that district courts have wide 

discretion in determining whether a party has shown good cause. 

The considerations we have discussed here are by no means a 

complete list, and they may not be relevant in every case. Courts 

should take the unique circumstances of each case into 

consideration and determine “whether the particular relief sought 

is justified under principles of fundamental fairness in light of the 

particular facts.” See Jones, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 17. 

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULE 55(C) ORDER 

¶43 To prevail on appeal, the cousins must demonstrate that 

the district court abused its discretion in vacating the default 

certificate. “Though broad, the court’s discretion is not unlimited. 

As a threshold matter, a court’s ruling must be ‘based on adequate 

findings of fact’ and ‘on the law.’” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 9, 

11 P.3d 277 (citation omitted). In light of the principles and 

considerations we identify today and the district court’s findings, 

the cousins have not carried their burden. 

¶44 We find no error of law in the district court’s ruling. In 

analyzing whether to set aside the default certificate, the district 

court considered the factors previously identified by the court of 

appeals, specifically: “whether the default was willful, whether 

the defendant alleges a meritorious defense, whether the 

defendant acted expeditiously to correct the default, whether 

setting the default aside would prejudice the plaintiff, and the 

extent, if any, to which the public interest is implicated.” See Roth 
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Opinion of the Court 

13 

v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ¶ 16, 244 P.3d 391; see also Pierucci v. 

U.S. Bank, NA, 2015 UT App 80, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 837. As we have 

discussed, a court is not required to apply these factors. But where 

they are relevant, it is certainly not legal error to do so. A court 

may consider any relevant factor. 

¶45 And the court’s decision was supported by adequate 

findings. The district court determined that the uncles’ default 

was not willful. It recognized that the answer the uncles filed as 

an exhibit alleged four defenses, all of which it categorized as 

“meritorious.” The court found that the uncles acted 

expeditiously in moving to set aside the default and oppose the 

motion for default judgment. The court determined setting aside 

the default certificate would not prejudice the cousins. And it 

awarded the cousins attorney fees to compensate for the cost 

incurred in moving for the default certificate and default 

judgment. Finally, the court recognized that although the case was 

a “close call,” the public interest weighed in favor of adjudicating 

the case on the merits. 

¶46 The cousins argue that the case before us is like Jones v. 

Layton/Okland, in which we affirmed a district court’s refusal to 

vacate a default judgment because the defaulting party failed to 

show “even a minimum level of diligence” prior to default 

entering. 2009 UT 39, ¶ 29, 214 P.3d 859. In Jones we noted that in 

the realm of a rule 60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment, 

“excusable neglect requires some evidence of diligence in order to 

justify relief.” Id. ¶ 20. Upon examination of the record, we found 

it to be “utterly devoid of any diligence by Jones that would 

justify his neglect.” Id. ¶ 28. So we were able to affirm that district 

court’s decision because there was “simply no basis in the record 

for us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 

refusing to set aside” the default judgment in that case. Id. ¶ 30. 

¶47 We disagree with the cousins’ comparison. The uncles’ 

conduct is not akin to the defendant’s behavior in Jones, which 

was “utterly devoid” of diligence.4 The record shows that the 

__________________________________________________________ 

4 It is important to remember that the standard of review in 

Jones and in this case is abuse of discretion. So any comparison of 

facts across cases should be done with care. When reviewing for 

an abuse of discretion, we are not determining whether the 

district court was correct or objectively right. Rather, we are 

looking at the case through a lens of deference and determining 

(continued . . .) 
GILLMAN V. GILLMAN

Opinion of the Court

14 

uncles were actively involved in the case—they filed a timely 

motion to dismiss, participated in oral argument, and 

communicated with opposing counsel. And when Curtis 

determined he was out of his element, he sought to engage 

litigation counsel and informed the cousins’ counsel of this fact. 

When the default certificate was entered, the uncles responded 

within days. It is arguable that a court could find this level of 

diligence sufficient to warrant vacation of a default judgment, not 

to mention a default certificate. “Even where a course of events 

does not make it strictly impossible for a party to meet its legal 

obligations, the party’s choice to attend to another matter, or even 

its simple failure to attend to its legal obligation, may be 

sufficiently diligent and responsible, in light of the attendant 

circumstances, to justify excusing it from the full consequences of 

its neglect.” Id. ¶ 22. So while the court in Jones was within its 

discretion to deny relief from a default judgment under the 

circumstances before it, so too is the court here within its 

discretion to grant relief from a default certificate in light of the 

facts here. 

¶48 Further, we note that the delay caused by the uncles’ 

failure to respond was not substantial in the context of the 

litigation—considering the extensions the parties had given each 

other and the time it took for the cousins to file their proposed 

order. Indeed, the cousins’ briefing to this court acknowledges 

that “[t]he parties, through counsel, communicated for months 

leading up to the deadline to answer.” 

¶49 The district court determined these circumstances 

constituted good cause to set aside the default. And it did not 

abuse its discretion in doing so.5

 

whether the district court’s ruling was within the bounds of its 

wide discretion. 

5 This does not mean that we condone Curtis’s handling of this 

facet of the litigation. He should have either timely filed the 

uncles’ answer or requested an extension while he assisted the 

uncles in obtaining litigation counsel. That said, we note that our 

Standards of Professionalism and Civility state that, “Lawyers 

shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other 

counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients’ legitimate 

rights could be adversely affected.” UTAH STANDARDS OF 

PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY 16. We do not intend this as a 

(continued . . .) 
Cite as: 2021 UT 33 

Opinion of the Court 

15 

CONCLUSION 

¶50 In determining whether there is good cause to set aside a 

default certificate under rule 55(c), a district court should weigh 

any relevant facts and circumstances of the case before it and 

decide whether it would be fundamentally fair to grant the 

requested equitable relief. Adjudication on the merits is preferred, 

and courts should err on the side of granting rule 55(c) motions 

where it is appropriate. We conclude the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding there was good cause to set aside 

the default certificate here. We affirm. 

 

criticism of the cousins’ counsel in this case. But in general, when 

counsel knows the identity of opposing counsel, they should 

notify opposing counsel explicitly that they intend to move for 

entry of default before doing so “unless their clients’ legitimate 

rights could be adversely affected.” Id.