JSOU Report 09-4 The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy Barrett
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force 

SOF Chair, Naval Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow
On the cover. Following the theme past as present—present as future, the 

cover depicts the unstable balance between prosperity and conflict in the 

Arabian Gulf. The flag of the Gulf Cooperation Council is imposed over 

the six flags of the Arab Gulf states (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi 

Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and Kuwait). These are followed by images of a 

burning oil field in Kuwait, 2001, and the modern skyline of Doha, Qatar. 

The photographs rest on three flags that represent historical context of the 

Gulf Security System of the past 250 years: the British East India Company, 

the British Union Jack, and the United States. 

Photo Credits. Burning oil field photo from AFP Photos, used by permission 

of Newscom. Doha skyline photo courtesy of Wikipedia Creative Commons 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ on 12 March 2009). 

JSOU Report 09-4

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2009

The Arabian Gulf

and Security Policy

The Past as Present,

the Present as Future

Roby C. Barrett
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-32-6
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise, December 2006, 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community, January 2007, 

Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Nortern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency, 

October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing 

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line, 

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect 

Approaches, February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White 
vii

Foreword

I

n his first monograph for JSOU Press, Roby Barrett researched and 

wrote this paper on security perspectives on the Gulf region of the 

Middle East from the Arab perspective. In other words, how do the 

Arab’s view security issues in their region. Are they similar to or divergent 

from the United States view? And most importantly, how will these views 

affect the long-term relationship between the United States and its regional 

partners. 

Unless the world’s economy is weaned from heavy reliance on petrochemicals, a highly unlikely possibility in the short- to medium-term timeframe, the Gulf region will remain a critical source of energy resources for 

the world economy. Access to these supplies will remain a critical, perhaps 

vital, security concern for the world’s industrial economies. In a best-case 

scenario, the regional countries will establish an effective security regime 

to defuse regional competitions and prevent interstate conflict, as well as 

minimize the effectiveness of nonstate actors who might threaten regional 

trade. Unfortunately, if the past 30 years is any indicator of the future, the 

scenario is unlikely to be achieved and instability and tension will remain 

in some areas of the region. 

This less-than-ideal perspective leads a security professional with even 

a passing interest in the region to ponder the regional countries’ security 

strategy and capabilities, as well as the role of external security or military 

forces. How much external influence or presence is required or optimum? 

How will these forces interact with regional players? There is no single 

answer to these questions, and Roby Barrett’s monograph is an attempt to 

framework the issues and perspectives. Although not specifically drafted 

as a paper for a SOF-only audience, any U.S. involvement within the region 

will have a SOF role or “flavor,” especially if nonstate violent extremist or 

terror networks continue to operate within the region. 

The monograph is also a new initiative for JSOU’s Strategic Studies 

Department. This monograph is the first to focus on a regional-cultural 

topic. JSOU Press anticipates publishing additional papers on other Middle 

Eastern or South Asian topics this year, as well as topics from other regions 

in future years. Hopefully this paper will inform the reader about issues of 
viii

importance and enhance an understanding of a region of critical importance 

to the United States and its allies. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
ix

About the Author

Dr. Roby Barrett is an associate fellow 

with the JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department. He has over 30 years 

of government, business, and academic experience in the Middle East and Africa. Dr. 

Barrett is the president of a consulting firm, 

specializing in technology applications and 

systems for national defense and security. 

He has extensive experience in policy and 

operational and technical integration related 

nuclear issues, police and security systems, 

command and control, and weapons and 

system acquisition. His research focuses on 

strategic and operational security issues in the 

Persian/Arabian Gulf including Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. A former 

Foreign Service officer in the Middle East, he has a strong background in 

the cultural and political dynamics of the region. 

As a founding member of the National History Center within the 

American Historical Association, Dr. Barrett specializes in analyzing 

contemporary political, economic, and security issues and future trends 

within the context of the broader historical paradigm. He is a scholar with 

the Public Policy Center at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. 

Dr. Barrett also serves as a Senior Fellow with Air Force Special Operations 

Command focusing on Gulf affairs, Iraq, and U.S. foreign policy. He has 

participated in numerous groups and conferences including Congressional 

Policy Forums at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, 

the Global Strategy Group Middle East in Kuwait and as a guest speaker at 

the Bahrain Security Forum and Exposition, invited by the Bahrain Ministry 

of Interior and the Royal United Services Institute of the British Ministry 

of Defence. He is a senior advisor to the Board of Directors of the Bilateral 

Arab-U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 

Dr. Barrett was an Eisenhower-Roberts Fellow of the Eisenhower Institute in Washington D.C., a Rotary International Fellow at the Russian and 

East European Institute at the University of Munich, and a Scottish Rite 
x

Research Fellow at Oxford University. He holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern 

and South Asian History from the University of Texas-Austin. He also has 

an M.A. in Russian History and Political Science from Baylor University in 

addition to a B.A. in History and an M.A. in Political Science from Texas 

A&M University-Commerce. He is an alumnus of the Foreign Service 

Institute’s intensive 2-year Arab language and Middle East Area Studies 

program, the Counterterrorism Tactics Course and the Special Operations 

course. He served in North Africa, the Levant, and Arabian Peninsula with 

extensive assignments across the region. 

Dr. Barrett is the author of The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: 

U.S. Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (Palgrave Macmillan, 

2007) and articles on intervention in Iraq 1958-1959, the Arab League, and 

digital research techniques. His commentary has also appeared in the U.S., 

Latin American, European, and Middle East Press including VOA and BBC 

Arabic Service as well other media outlets. 
1

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

The Past as Present, the Present as Future

On 9 June 2008, Henry Kissinger spoke about the need for a Middle 

East policy that was thought out “in detail” with “no vague ideas” 

at its core. He stated that there must be a “clear broad strategy so 

that we understand our strategic objectives.” The former Secretary of State 

made it clear that the U.S. had to deal with the region as it is, not as we 

want it to be—a reference to poorly conceived ideas about democracy and 

political transformation.1 Given recent history, consistent policy development and a comprehensive strategy has been difficult because U.S. policy 

has consistently attempted to ignore the historical fundamentals. This study 

evaluates the policies of the Arab Gulf states, their contextual historical 

origins, and their thrust over the next decade. It is not a regurgitation of 
2

JSOU Report 09-4

U.S. foreign policy. The foundational premise is that the present and future 

must be understood within the context of the collective and individual 

historical paradigms of the Arab states of the region. The present cannot be 

understood nor the future predicted without a fundamental, detailed grasp 

of the past. The past establishes the paradigm for the present and that defines 

context for the possible developments for the future. This study is a history 

lesson defining the present and projecting into the future. Secondarily, this 

effort provides a reference guide to the historical formation of the individual states of the Gulf. It is an informational aid that provides a concise 

but detailed explanation of the historical relationships and interactions, 

knowledge of which is consistently considered by Arab Gulf officials to be 

essential to understanding the region. 

The historical political, cultural, and social construct dictates the constraints, opportunities, and risks inherent in any given geopolitical situation. Likewise, policy formulation and implementation occur within the 

same strategic context. When this context is misunderstood or ignored 

the consequences can be severe, as Iraq from 2003 to 2007 demonstrated. 

Without a firm grasp of the past, accurate policy planning and prognosticating about the future becomes virtually impossible. Important in any 

geopolitical environment, this in-depth understanding is essential in the 

Middle East. In the Arabian Gulf, centuries-old disputes and rivalries are 

today’s and tomorrow’s headlines. Gulf Arab government officials and military officers see this lack of in-depth insight into the historical paradigm 

as something that detracts from the overall effectiveness of U.S. officials.2

Understanding regional historical modalities provides critical parameters 

for assessing policy risks—even those that lie outside the historical norm. 

It creates something akin to an x/y axis around which to evaluate tactical 

situations and understand complex issues.3 The following is the 250-year 

perspective that defines the security environment of the Arabian Gulf. 

Introduction

The purpose of this study is as much pedagogical as informational. It is 

not a briefing paper. It is designed to present the region from a different, 

broader historical perspective and to provoke a different conceptual way 

of thinking about the Arab Gulf. It is an attempt to place the reader in a 

position to view the present and the future through Arab eyes. Optimally, 
3

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

it will provide a framework around 

which to organize information that 

comes to senior officers through 

intelligence estimates, status briefings, and short-range status reports. 

The study is designed to provide a 

shortcut to an understanding of the 

historical paradigm of the Gulf and 

an intellectual backdrop for evaluating plans and policy. Ideally, it will 

also serve as a catalyst for acquiring 

a deeper understanding of the drivers behind the policy positions and 

initiatives in the Arab Gulf states. 

It would be difficult to identify an 

area of the world in which this view 

of the relationship between the strategic paradigm and tactical decision-making were more intimately 

related than the Arabian Gulf. The 

basic underlying problem in the U.S. government is that enormous amounts 

of information are complicated by a lack of in-depth framework for structuring knowledge. This knowledge can only be acquired by viewing the 

region through a more holistic historical social, cultural, and political prism. 

For the purposes of this study, the modern Gulf emerged in the mid-18th 

century. In the 19th century, under Pax Britannia, a comprehensive Gulf 

Security System (GSS) developed. This GSS remains the salient feature of 

Gulf security today. 

This paper explores how the Gulf states have pursued their own security 

requirements within the framework of the British, now American, dominated GSS. Great powers established general rules, but within that framework, the states of the Arab Gulf pursued and are pursuing their own tribal 

and dynastic interests. The study also attempts to penetrate the screen created by conflicts in the Gulf and illuminate its unifying role as a highway for 

commercial, cultural, and political intercourse. Conflicts notwithstanding, 

the regional states have more in common with each other than with outside 

forces. Even today with elevated frictions, there is considerable cross-gulf 

The Arabian Gulf. This Moderate 

Resolution Imaging Spectro-radiometer (MODIS) image from 31 January

2003 is from The Visible Earth

(visibleearth.nasa.gov), a catalog 

of NASA images and animations. 
4

JSOU Report 09-4

commerce and dialogue. The region is far more complicated than simple 

confrontation between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Finally, on a practical 

utilitarian level, the study will provide a compressed quick reference guide 

to historical and dynastic development.

The complexity of the region provides multiple examples of western 

assumptions based on tactical realities gone awry. These policy setbacks 

are more often than not the result of a failure to maintain a region-based 

historical perspective at a given point in time. Two major events in the last 

50 years provide illustration: the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958 and the collapse 

of the Iranian Pahlavi regime in 1979. Both were tactical surprises and yet, 

strategically, long-predicted. In both cases, the United States and Britain 

invested enormous political capital on regional anomalies and, at the same 

time, pressured these states to pursue policies that served to exacerbate 

their instability. In Baghdad 1958, the U.S. and the British lacked insight 

into the intentions of mid-level army officers allowing an obscure brigade 

commander, Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim, to utterly destroy the Hashemite 

regime in a single day. In the Shah’s case, a failure to understand the likely 

outcome of pressures to liberalize or democratize the regime and to evaluate 

realistically whether “democracy” and “liberalization” was in fact a good 

idea paralyzed an already unstable regime. In addition, the U.S. succeeded 

in a strategy with Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices, undermining the Iranian 

economy and the Shah’s development plans.4 It left an unstable, insecure 

monarch unable to deal with another episode of civil unrest that became a 

revolution. No one in Washington understood the internal class and social 

dynamic afflicting relationships within the Iraqi army nor did they grasp the 

latent potential of civil and clerical unrest unleashed on the Shah. While the 

ultimate responsibility for collapse lay with both regimes, U.S. and British 

pressure on both regimes to pursue given policies played a significant role 

in undermining them. 

These “intelligence failures” were in reality “failures of intelligence”; each 

resulted from the inability to grasp the broader historical context in which 

the regimes were attempting to survive. In the case of Iraq and Iran, the 

instability of broader historical political, social, and cultural context merely 

awaited the right catalyst for implosion. Viewed in this light, the “good idea” 

of 2003 held that the United States would, for a modest investment, rid the 

world of a dictator with weapons of mass destruction. This morphed into 
5

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

the creation of a functioning democracy that would spread across the entire 

Middle East. Five years later in Iraq, the human and financial costs, and the 

damage to the U.S. economy and long-term interests illustrate the dangers 

of proceeding with 

little or no understanding of the real 

historical, social, and 

cultural context. If 

a policy idea is truly 

good, then without 

incurring significant risk, it cannot be taken with little or no regard for the 

deeper historical paradigm.

In practical terms, the goal is to construct a more comprehensive 

approach in thinking about the Arab Gulf. First, the study redefines the 

states of the Arab Gulf into two elements.

a. The Gulf emirates comprise the first element—Oman, the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Each has its own unique 

historical narrative tied to the British GSS of the 19th century. Security 

systems predated British arrival in the Gulf including the Sassanian, 

Safavid, Portuguese, Ottoman, and other imperial systems, but none 

were as comprehensive as that of the British. Today’s GSS essentially 

reflects the 19th century efforts of the British to secure their lines of 

communication and the trade between India and Britain. 

b. The nation states of the 20th century constitute the second element. 

Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran represent an entirely different dynamic. 

These three states function as regional powers with which smaller 

states alternate between wanting good relations or from which they 

seek protection. The interests of the large states often diverge from 

the perceived self-interests of the Gulf emirates. With this in mind, 

this study classifies and examines Saudi Arabia separately from the 

emirates. Brief summaries of Iraq and Yemen are also included; neither 

currently functions as a traditional state. The paper focuses on Arab 

perspectives on Iran and only tangentially Iranian policy. 

Five years later in Iraq, the human and financial 

costs, and the damage to the U.S. economy 

and long-term interests illustrate the dangers of 

proceeding with little or no understanding of 

the real historical, social, and cultural context. 
6

JSOU Report 09-4

The Gulf Security System and the Gulf Cooperation Council

The first challenge is to provide a more precise definition of the Gulf Security 

System in terms of its historical and geopolitical context. The 200-year-old 

GSS is not to be confused with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The 

GCC represents a 1980s tactical adjustment to the instability in the Gulf. The 

revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime aggravated by Gulf Arab support 

for Saddam Hussein and Iraq resulted in active policies to destabilize the 

Arab states of the Gulf. The GCC represented the effort of those states to 

present a united front to Iran; while the GCC has served as a forum to solve 

problems between the Arab Gulf states and at least partially evolved toward 

commercial cooperation, its primary function is to coordinate diplomatic 

and security policy vis-à-vis Iran. The problems persist and so does the 

GCC, but it is a tactical response within the context of the historical GSS

context. 

Therefore, what is the Gulf Security System? For the purposes of this 

overview, the year 1501 provides a good preface for explaining the GSS. 

In the early 16th century, Shah Ismail of Persia embraced Twelver Shi’ism 

transforming the Safavid state from predominately Sunni to Shi’a.5 In 

Mesopotamia, now Iraq, Safavid Shi’a Persia battled the Sunni Ottoman 

Empire for dominance. Lasting victory for the Ottomans came in the mid17th century and established the geopolitical, cultural, and social system, 

“a 350-year-old applecart,” that dominated Mesopotamia until it was upset 

in April 2003 by the destruction of Sunni-dominated Iraq. In the early 16th 

century, the decline of Safavid power and the arrival of the Portuguese 

altered the security situation. Prior to the Europeans, the tribal confederations of the Gulf depended on either the Ottomans or the Safavids for 

survival and protection. The Europeans had technological advantages in 

sea power and trade that overnight made them a power, if not the power in 

the Gulf. In alliance with the Portuguese, some tribal groupings asserted 

an unprecedented level of independence from the two empires. Alfonso 

De Albuquerque, the Portuguese commander in the Indian Ocean, viewed 

the Straits of Hormuz as a strategic passage and quickly took positions 

on both sides of the waterway.6 Assisting one political or tribal grouping 

against another became the standard strategy of European intervention. As 

Christopher Bayly pointed out in examining the decline of the three great 

Muslim empires—the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mogul—in the 18th 
7

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

century, emergence of regional centers of power to challenge the existing 

empires in the Muslim world coincided with the arrival of the Europeans. 

The various indigenous rulers also learned to use these great-power rivalries to advantage. It was this dynamic that accelerated the total collapse of 

the Mogul and Safavid empires and undermined the Ottomans.7

Local rulers invited the intervention of western powers in order to gain 

their assistance in furthering dynastic goals. The European powers shifted 

their support among the local rulers and groupings to attain commercial 

dominance. In the early 17th century, the British East India Company allied 

with the Safavids, and other local tribes drove the Portuguese from the Gulf 

and Oman. In 1602, the Shi’a Safavids with assistance from the British East 

India Company occupied and held Bahrain until 1782. For political and 

tribal groups in the Gulf, their views of British intervention were a matter of 

perspective. Groups that came to power as partners and allies of the British 

tended not to reflect the attitude of grievance about imperial intervention. 

Most of those political groupings still dominate the Gulf today. The Seven 

Years’ War (1756–1763) was the key event that permanently altered the geopolitical importance of the Gulf, imperial British security requirements, 

and eventually created the modern GSS.

8

Meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council leaders on 20 May 2008 to 

celebrate the 75th anniversary of Saudi oil company Aramco. Photo 

by Balkis Press/Abacapress.com used by permisson of Newscom. 
8

JSOU Report 09-4

Why? Three enormous prizes were at stake in this struggle: the wealth 

of the Spanish empire in the Americas, the ultimate disposition of North 

America, and finally the trade of India and Asia. After a truly global struggle, the Treaty of Paris 1763 effectively removed the French from North 

America and India, handing both to the British. The disposition of India 

would be the determining factor in the history of the Arabian Gulf. The 

importance of India to the British crown cannot be overstated. It provided 

the wealth that gave Britain the highest standard of living in the world 

through the 19th and early 20th centuries. It gave security in the Arab Gulf 

global economic implications and provided a new expanded definition for 

“The Gulf.” 9 The Gulf became any geographic area west of India that the 

British East India Company, the British Secretary of State for India, or the 

British Viceroy in India defined as important or critical to the defense of 

British India and its trade.

In the 19th century, this British obsession with India’s security resulted 

in the creation of the modern GSS. In the 20th century, the discovery of oil, 

the shift from coal to oil by the Royal Navy, and the birth of a hydro-carbonfired world ensured that this obsession would continue into the 21st. The 

motivations for the British-created GSS have evolved, but the fundamentals 

have remained remarkably unchanged. In the 1970s, after the British withdrawal East of Suez, the United States inherited the GSS and has since led 

western efforts to ensure that the system created by the British and the Gulf 

emirates continues. Gulf security, originally based on the ability to control 

the water, now extends to the water and the air. The continued independence of the Gulf emirates under friendly regimes is an overriding national 

security issue for the United States. Historically, the emirates provide the 

Great Powers with military bases that translate into the geopolitical leverage to project power and influence from Tehran to Baghdad to Riyadh. The 

survival and prosperity of the Gulf emirates and the fortunes of the various 

ruling groups have depended on the maintenance of this symbiotic relationship for over two centuries. 

Conversely, given the overwhelming importance of the Gulf to the West, 

a clear strategic understanding of what is at stake is critical. From an Arab 

point of view, the U.S. needs to avoid the pitfalls of well-intentioned but 

misguided attempts to convert the Gulf states into clones of western societies. They are allies and the GSS has worked because of shared mutual 

interests, not because of a shared political, cultural, and social heritage. The 
9

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

first priority for the United States is to protect its own interests by assisting 

pro-western rulers in the Gulf to protect theirs—not as some would have it 

by spreading liberal (in its 19th century definition, not the vague common 

20th century usage) western-style 

democracy. Western-style democracy 

in some parts of the world is simply 

not conducive to stability or for that 

matter good governance. This does 

not mean that the Arab Gulf states do 

not have representative forms of government where the competing interests 

of various groups are taken into account; instead, it points to the fact that 

western attempts to transplant its political system to the Middle East have in 

almost every case failed and created enormous difficulties in the process. In 

fact, in the post-World War II Middle East as a rule, monarchies have been 

both more stable and more benign in their rule than republics. Republics 

have been dominated by military officers, security apparatus officials, or 

religious ideologues. For naïve ideologues supporting western-style democracy, whether right-wing neoconservative or center-left activists, it might 

be suggested that they review the last 50 years and the records of various 

republics in the region—Iraq, Syria, and Iran. No matter how authoritarian, 

no monarchy comes close to the corruption, malevolent repression or plain 

body-count of these republics. The issues will become clearer as the historical context is explored. The Gulf states have replicated certain patterns of 

behavior time and again for political survival in an unstable region, and 

none of those replications reflect liberal, western political democracy. 

First, to understand the context for the Gulf security system and how the 

various pieces fit together, it is necessary to examine the Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) and its relationship to the GSS. They are two separate entities. One is an organization, the focus of U.S. and, to a degree, Saudi hopes 

for regional collective security; and the other is the functioning historical 

system that has provided stability and security in the Arabian Gulf. This 

organization vs. system is often misunderstood. As one observer stated, 

“Without a doubt, the creation of the GCC represented a momentous step 

toward unity on the Arabian Peninsula.” Periodically, the U.S. has wasted 

considerable diplomatic energy on this misleading conceptualization and 

“experts” on the region from various think-tanks have wasted even more. 

Simply put, it is not a “momentous step toward unity.” 10 Sheikh Sultan bin 

Western-style democracy in 

some parts of the world is simply 

not conducive to stability or for 

that matter good governance. 
10

JSOU Report 09-4

Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan hit the mark when he stated, “Undeniably, the 

member states held on to their cherished policies and only supported the 

GCC when it suited them, but on major foreign policy questions the GCC

states agreed to preserve the alliance at all costs.” 11

Encouraged by the United States in the aftermath of the collapse of 

Iran, the GCC serves useful purposes, but one of those purposes has not 

been collective military cooperation. Some Western political analysts, in 

explaining the origins of the GCC, have talked about Iran’s pre-1979 role 

as the principal pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf, “the stronger of 

America’s two pillars in the Gulf” and Saudi Arabia’s current role as a weak 

substitute.12 Obviously, this judgment is fundamentally flawed. Apparently, 

Iran was not “the stronger of the two pillars.” Iran collapsed and, despite 

enormous pressure, Saudi Arabia did not. In any Cold War scenario, Iran 

and its armed forces were little more than a trip-wire that would have hardly 

delayed a concerted Soviet attack. Given the historical context, was it even 

a realistic expectation to see the GCC as a collective security organization 

in the conventional sense? The obvious answer is no. 

So a series of questions arise: Have the collective security ambitions for 

the GCC been realistic? If not, is the GCC useful? How does it contribute to 

the security of the Arabian Gulf? There are several debates about the original 

conception and intent of the GCC. Two provide good points of reference for 

discussing the GCC within the overall GSS construct. The first model was a 

hub-and-spoke concept with the United States serving as the common hub. 

In contrast, the historical security construct developed by the British and 

taken over by the Americans is more of a shield. In its earliest conception, 

the U.S. foreign policy community had hopes that the GCC would transform 

itself into a collective security system for the Arab Gulf. Now almost 30 

years later, elements of the community have accepted that in some distant 

future that may happen, but not anytime soon. Others still have hopes that 

it may develop into some kind of European Union-like arrangement. Even 

the concept of a loose EU-type arrangement has been severely complicated 

by the current global economic crisis. 

The other model is attributed to the U.S. military and more specifically to 

a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) conception of three progressive tiers. 

The goal was to achieve the first tier, a situation in which the Gulf states were 

capable of defending their own territory and thus potentially constituting a 

deterrent to Iraq and Iran. As the first Gulf War demonstrated, that is not 
11

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

the case. The second tier concept was one in which the GCC states created 

a collective security arrangement. This approach was to include Egyptian, 

Syrian, and even Pakistani troops integrated into a joint command with 

Gulf forces and a regional command-and-control structure run by the U.S.

The Damascus Declaration of 1991 outlined this non-Gulf participation.13

The idea that the Gulf states, much less Saudi Arabia, would welcome the 

stationing of large numbers of Egyptian and Syrian troops in the Gulf is 

highly unlikely. U.S. planners may not know who the Mamluks were, but 

Gulf Arab leaders do. 

The Arabs have an excellent grasp of their own history and dynastic 

issues. For three centuries, it was Egyptian and Syrian troops wearing the 

uniform of the Ottoman Empire against which the emirates of the Gulf 

and Saudi Arabia struggled to maintain their independence. Only a halfcentury ago, Egypt united with Syria in the United Arab Republic (UAR) 

and threatened to destroy the “feudal states” of the Arab Gulf. Egyptian 

troops did participate with Arab League forces in Kuwait in 1961 and again 

in Saudi Arabia in 1991; however, in both instances they were a part of a 

larger force with British or American troops participating as well. Saudi 

Arabia had a brigade of rented Pakistani troops stationed there as a security 

force during the 1970s and into the 1980s, but that was a temporary bilateral 

agreement. It is almost inconceivable that the Gulf states would agree to a 

system that integrated Egyptian and Syrian forces into a permanent Gulf 

security arrangement. Washington may not know who the Mamluks were 

(slave soldiers who took over Egypt in the 12th century), but the Saudis and 

Emiratis do. At one point, the GCC developed a modest joint security force, 

Peninsula Shield. It was based in northern Saudi Arabia in the aftermath 

of the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, but this was disbanded. 

There are ongoing discussions about the creation of a skeleton command 

structure that would in times of crisis have each of the Gulf states contribute 

combat units, but nothing along the lines of a standing, integrated force for 

collective security is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. 

From this concept, another more comprehensive idea for collective security integration emerged. Some security analysts in the West argued that 

the logical next step was for the Gulf states to integrate their forces into a 

cohesive military command structure. To the frustration of these experts, 

this concept has not materialized. Military analyst Anthony Cordesman 

complained, “The main threat that the GCC states now face is not Iran, 
12

JSOU Report 09-4

Yemen, or terrorism, but their own forces, an obsession with buying different 

and better ‘glitter factor’ weapons than their neighbors, and an unwillingness to come to grips with the details of creating effective joint forces.” 14 This 

frustration over the refusal of the Arab Gulf states to integrate their militaries reveals a failure to understand political and dynastic considerations that 

trump cooperation and integration. This U.S. obsession with integration and 

cooperation flies in the face of the historical security paradigm of the Gulf, 

as a discussion of the individual emirates will clarify this issue further.

The third tier approach is successful precisely because it fits well in the 

traditional GSS context. This approach consists of bilateral relationships and 

agreements for building U.S. military facilities, prepositioning equipment, 

and providing access.15 It may not be what the large states of the Gulf or 

what some in the U.S. think they want to see, but the emirates are comfortable with it and it works. The idea of the Arab Gulf states integrating their 

militaries into a cohesive command is only slightly less palatable than the 

idea of Egypt and Syria based in the Gulf. As one senior Gulf military officer 

put it, “The GCC is useful and we participate in it, but in any given situation, 

our interests may not necessarily be those of the GCC.” 16 Historical experience has taught the Gulf Emirates that their next door neighbor does not 

necessarily have their best interests at heart. Collective security is an alien 

concept that occurs only in very unusual circumstances and is most likely 

orchestrated by an outside power—the Dhofar rebellion in Oman of 1970s 

and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 fit this description. The emirates’ 

historical experience in dealing with the larger states in the region does not 

encourage trust. 

The preferred model for Gulf security is a bilateral relationship with 

an outside power. Protection derived from inside the region is far more 

unreliable and potentially fatal to dynastic perpetuation. Viewed within 

the context, the current preferences and modalities of behavior are not only 

understandable, but they also make perfect sense. The current system has 

provided security and protected the independence of the Gulf emirates in 

a very volatile environment for 250 years. Why change it based on a tactical 

need? And, above all, why change it because someone outside the region 

including the U.S. thinks it is a good idea? Bad advice from well-meaning 

friends is still bad advice. 

Short of military integration, the GCC structure provides other security benefits that are more suitable and more useful to the Arab Gulf 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

environment. In the critical area of internal and border security, the process that sets GCC citizens apart from other nationalities encourages more 

sophisticated systems for tracking that human element in the security equation. Information sharing on security issues within the Arab Gulf contributes to an improved security environment. This sharing has also led 

to another interesting development. The UAE, Qatar, and Oman now have 

closely coupled immigration and border security systems and an increased 

level of intelligence sharing and cooperation. Sharing also exists among the 

other states under the GCC umbrella but a much higher degree of integration between the emirates of the southern Gulf seems to be emerging. Saudi 

Arabia and Bahrain, with their tightly coupled security challenges, also 

appear to be achieving a significantly increased level of coordination and 

information sharing. Subversion and terrorism are the real dangers, and the 

GCC structure can provide the structure for enhancing police cooperation 

and intelligence sharing that will prove highly beneficial. The GCC also 

offers a mechanism for coordinating another critical element—petroleum 

security and policy.17 The focus for increasing coordination under the GCC

should be related to coordination and information sharing among regional 

security forces and organizations. In fact, involvement of the military establishments in the security mission in the individual emirates could very well 

be a back door to greater cooperation in the military sphere. 

In addition, the GCC has negotiated a Unified Economic Agreement that 

has not been fully implemented.18 The ability to conclude and implement this 

agreement would appear to be a simpler, and frankly more productive, task 

than trying to integrate military establishments. The difficulties in economic 

integration, now complicated by the global recession, further underscore 

that broader GCC cooperation and integration in nonsecurity-related fields 

lay most likely in an undefined distant future. In fact, petroleum policy 

makes the GCC a superpower capable of leaving Iranian and Iraqi, and 

for that matter the Russian and Venezuelan, national economies in tatters 

and placing a very high price on political and military adventurism. Low 

oil prices are problematic for the Gulf Arab states, but they are disastrous 

for larger states addicted to budgetary oil subsidies. It is this security and 

petroleum cooperation that likely offers the best route for increased Gulf 

Arab policy cooperation and integration as opposed to integration of military establishments. 
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JSOU Report 09-4

The Gulf Security System and the Emirates

The basic element to any understanding of Arab perspectives on Gulf security is the individual emirate. Under the British GSS, the emirates of the Gulf 

achieved a level of security that had eluded them. They achieved this not 

through an alliance among themselves or through the auspices of one of the 

larger states in the region, but rather through a bilateral relationship with 

the British Empire. The British provided a shield behind which the states of 

the Gulf developed. Now without most of the more onerous imperial trappings, the United States functions in that same role. The following consists 

of a brief case-by-case study of the unique historical development of the 

emirates and illustrates how that development determines current and influences future policy. The leadership of the emirates employed a combination 

of three strategies—representation, regulation, and repression—to maintain 

control. Each applies the strategies differently with one general exception; 

“Political liberalization is always a top-down affair, a calculated reaction by 

the ruler to secure support.” 19 It also provides some useful insight into how 

the United States might adapt its policies and advice so that U.S. interests are 

served by going with the flow rather than swimming against the historical 

current. Perhaps we can do a better job of anticipating where the states of 

the Arab Gulf are headed and tailoring our efforts to more realistic policy 

goals. 

Kuwait

While all of the emirates are geopolitically strategic in the current security 

framework, Kuwait arguably occupies the most strategic location in the 

Gulf. Kuwait is the cork in Iraq’s strategic security bottle. Kuwait severely 

limits Iraq’s access to the sea and can serve as a springboard for applying 

military and political pressure on any regime in Baghdad. Its oil production can also serve as leverage on Iraqi petroleum income by ratcheting 

up production and driving down prices. Iraq continues to be significantly 

indebted to Kuwait as a result of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Every Iraqi 

regime since 1920 has at one point or another made an issue of Iraq’s claim 

to Kuwait. Kuwait also serves as a geopolitical leverage point against Iran, 

and in the last century it was a target of Saudi Ikhwan raids and a commercial embargo. Given this reality, the historical context in which Kuwait has 

survived and almost perished becomes very important because it strongly 
15

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

influences by example Arab Gulf views of their own vulnerabilities in this 

volatile region.

The Historical Context. The establishment of the ruling dynasties in 

Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar stems from the migration of the Utub tribes, 

part of the “great Anaizah tribal confederation” that also includes the Saudi 

royal family. In 1756, the Al-Sabah clan defeated the Banu Khalid, the tribe 

dominating what is now Kuwait, and established themselves as rulers in 

the area under Sheikh Sabah bin Jabar. From this same migration would 

spring the al-Khalifa clan’s rule in Bahrain.20 This same period of foment in 

Arabia produced the first Saudi Dynasty under Muhammad ibn Saud who, 

in 1744, offered protection to Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab wedded the 

Saudi dynasty to Wahhabi Islam. All of these events coincided with the 

global war fought between the Europeans between 1754 and 1763 for control 

of global trade.21

Threats ebbed and flowed into the 19th century as Kuwait and the Sabahs 

increasingly turned to security arrangements with the Ottomans. In the 

1890s, separate Russian and German initiatives to build a railroad to the Gulf 

provoked British hand-wringing. This provided the new ruler of Kuwait, 

Mubarak bin Sabah—also known as Mubarak the Great—an opportunity 

to find a new powerful sponsor. In 1899, the British pressured Istanbul to 

recognize Kuwait as a separate entity under British protection. In 1913, the 

British once again pressured the Ottomans to recognize the Sabah as the 

independent governors of Kuwait. In 1914, Kuwait declared itself an independent sheikdom with British support. The Sabah would rule Kuwait but the 

British would conduct Kuwaiti foreign policy, oversee defense, and approve 

all major commercial arrangements. In the post-1918 world, it solved the 

Sabah search for security including protection from the Saudi Ikhwan. 

Because of British oil discoveries and exploration in Iraq and Iran, stability in Kuwait became increasingly important. In 1921, unrest led Sheikh 

Ahmad al-Jabar to approve election of Majlis, a National Legislative Council, 

and then to ignore the agreement.22 In 1936, the general strike in Palestine 

against British support for Zionism spawned pan-Arab policies in Iraq 

and statements by King Ghazi about the historical connection between 

Iraq and Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis sent their children to Iraq for education. 

Understanding this, the British political agent cautioned Sheikh Ahmad 

to avoid the politics of Palestine and to ignore Iraqi pan-Arab entreaties.23 
16

JSOU Report 09-4

Angered, the Kuwaiti opposition gave money to the Palestinians anyway 

and, in 1938, forced the Sheikh Ahmad to establish a Majlis. On paper, the 

Majlis greatly reduced the power of the ruler. The Amir used the resentment 

among the Bedouin, the poorer classes, and the Shi’a to dissolve it. Three 

outside events also reinforced Sabah power and reduced the pressure on the 

Sabah: the British “White Paper” on Palestine that recommended an end to 

Zionist emigration, the death of radical nationalist, expansionist-minded 

King Ghazi in Iraq, and the outbreak of World War II.24 

Post-war al-Sabah stability and control flowed literally from the wellhead. In 1938, the British discovered oil. Shipments began in 1946 and revenues grew rapidly, providing the Sabah with financial stability.25 Kuwait 

also became economically strategic to the British. In the early 1950s, the 

rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser and his campaign against “feudal regimes” 

exposed Kuwait to radical Arab nationalism. Under propaganda attack from 

Nasser and pressured by Iraq to enter into a defense arrangement against 

Nasser, sovereignty issues reemerged. Successive Iraqi governments made 

it clear that they viewed Kuwait as part of Iraq. Within days of Kuwait 

achieving independence in 1961, Iraq—now under President Abd-al-Karim 

al-Qasim—revived the Ottoman claim to declare Kuwait a historical part of 

Iraq and moved troops to the border.26 Sheikh Abdullah al-Sabah immediately requested and received British military support under the new treaty 

of friendship. The episode had four repercussions for the Sabah: first, the 

general population rallied around the Amir creating a political consensus that made the promulgation of a constitution possible in 1962; second, 

the antagonism between Iraq and Egypt brought formal recognition from 

Nasser and membership in the Arab League; third, the incident reinforced 

the need for outside security guarantees; and finally, it demonstrated western willingness to defend its interests in the Gulf.27

In 1973, the oil embargo stemming from the October War and the rise in 

oil prices made the Kuwaitis fabulously wealthy. Kuwaiti oil was nationalized in 1975. Then in 1977, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad became Amir. The Iranian 

revolution and Iran-Iraq war posed immediate threats to Kuwait. In 1981, 

elections for a new Majlis found politics divided along sectarian lines as 

Shi’a-Sunni differences heightened. Then, in 1982, the Suq al-Manakh, a 

private stock market, collapsed implicating members of the royal family 

in corruption. The crash of oil prices further complicated matters affecting 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

all aspects of the economy. As 

the 1980s progressed, growing political unrest manifested 

itself in bombings of U.S. and 

French interests, attempts to 

assassinate the Amir, the bombing of restaurants, and attacks 

on oil installations. Because of 

political disputes, the Amir dissolved the assembly, suspended 

the constitution, and clamped 

down on the press.28 The tanker 

war in the Gulf threatened 

Kuwait’s oil lifeline and the 

U.S. re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers providing them with U.S.

Navy escorts. When the IranIraq conflict ended, it appeared 

that the region in general and 

Kuwait in particular would get 

a long-deserved respite from 

tension and conflict. 

It was in this context that 

the Iraqi invasion occurred. 

Following the Iraqi invasion, the Amir promised political liberalization and 

unsuccessfully attempted to placate the opposition with various half measures that failed. Kuwait became an issue in the U.S. election of 1992. Under 

pressure, the Amir called elections in 1992 and a Majlis dominated by the 

opposition came into power. The resulting turmoil appeared to foreshadow 

the dissolution of the Assembly but court rulings against the Majlis averted 

a confrontation, and the election of 1996 brought pro-government deputies 

back to power. In 2003, based on their experience in 1990, the Sabah agreed 

to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some have speculated that fear of a 

perceived internal “Salafist threat” was the driving factor. This is unlikely 

given that the Salafist opposition in Kuwait with a few exceptions reflects a 

conservative religious tradition, not a radical jihadist agenda. Quite simply 

Modern Kuwait. In this November 2007 

photo of the Kuwait Towers, a Chili’s 

restaurant can be seen in the lower left. 

Used by permission of Newscom. 
18

JSOU Report 09-4

Kuwait still feared Iraq, and U.S. assurances were enough to persuade them 

that Saddam and Iraq had to be dealt with once and for all. 

The Kuwaiti government’s support for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq ultimately led to “unprecedented levels of resentment” across Kuwaiti society. 

This was further aggravated by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite Kuwaiti 

disillusionment with Yasir Arafat and Palestinian support for Saddam 

Hussein in 1990, Kuwaitis none the less simmered over the U.S.-perceived 

carte blanche to Israel in dealing with the Palestinians. Young Kuwaiti volunteers headed for Iraq to fight the Americans. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad 

and Suleiman Abu Ghayth, both Kuwaitis, were already senior leaders in Al 

Qaeda. The invasion also complicated internal security; “Since the beginning of the military buildup in autumn 2002, Kuwait’s involvement with 

the U.S. military presence in Iraq has been the primary driver of insurgent 

activity originating with Kuwait.” In 2005, Kuwait experienced its own 

version of September 11. Security discovered cells in Kuwait planning to 

attack U.S. and foreign targets.29 The surrounding regional chaos clearly 

demonstrated the potential to spread to Kuwait.

Then, Sheikh Jabir died in January 2006; the Crown Prince, Sheikh 

Sa’ad Abdullah al-Sabah, suffered from debilitating dementia. The National 

Assembly intervened and vetoed an attempt to have Sa’ad rule in name only. 

Following the two-week crisis, Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah, the brother of Sheikh 

Jabir, became the Amir. This violated precedence because the Amir’s position rotated between the Jabir and Salim branches of the family, now two 

Jabirs ruled in succession creating a potential rift in the ruling family that 

may be an issue in the future. According to one U.S. official, these factors 

combined created a “case of pessimism” about the future.30

The Future in Context. The optimism of the 1970s morphed into the anxieties created by the Suq al-Manakh economic crisis, Iran-Iraq war, and 

tanker war in the 1980s and collapsed in 1990 when Kuwaiti generosity 

to the Palestinians, the Jordanians, the Yemenis, and most important to 

Saddam Hussein bought from their point of view nothing but treachery. 

1990 demonstrated conclusively the need for a strong ally. The U.S. invasion 

of Iraq created a hotbed of Islamic resentment toward the Sabah. It intensified the social and political divisions between the settled Bedouins and the 

largely pro-government urban population. It intensified political religious 

identity. It complicated serious internal security problems. It destroyed the 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

Sunni buffer that Saddam’s Iraq provided against Iran while increasing the 

influence of Iran, and it shook Kuwaiti faith in Washington’s judgment. As 

one senior military official put it, “How could the United States have been 

so ignorant of the nature of Iraq and its role as a counterbalance to Iran?” 

Now the Kuwaitis find themselves tied to an ally whose judgment they do 

not trust. In addition, the population is increasingly hostile to the government’s relationship with the U.S.31 The Kuwaitis believe that the coming 

U.S. drawdown will bring Iranian and Shi’a dominance to Iraq and a scenario more destabilizing than post-1991 Saddam. Looking for leverage, the 

Kuwaitis are refusing to forgive Iraq’s pre-1990 debts. The Foreign Minister 

Sheikh Mohammad al-Salim al-Sabah stated, “Iraq’s debt to Kuwait is an old 

debt... It has to be paid or Iraq has to pay its interest. These are the rights 

of the Kuwaiti people.” 32

Given this situation, undertaking fundamental reforms in educational, 

infrastructure, health care, and other areas would likely put more pressure 

on the government. During the next 3 years, the Kuwaiti government will 

likely avoid moves that might exacerbate the domestic, political, and security situation. In short, the government may address specific problems but 

eschew any new comprehensive initiatives. There will be a second corollary 

to this domestic approach—namely, that the advice from allies who do not 

live in region needs sharper scrutiny.

Kuwaiti officials have made it very clear that they view the prospects of 

another war in the Gulf as an unmitigated disaster. A nuclear armed Iran 

is preferable to the consequences of another war. In a recent interview, the 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammad al-Salim al-Sabah urged 

Iran to “resolve tensions” with the West over the nuclear issue and categorically stated that Kuwait would not allow the U.S. to launch an attack against 

Iran from its soil. He restated Kuwait’s position that Iran had a right to 

nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.33 The Kuwaitis clearly prefer a 

nonmilitary approach to the challenge posed by Iran, but they are decidedly 

leery of any U.S.-Iranian rapprochement at their expense. The policies of the 

second Bush in the region are viewed as almost total failures; this has left 

the Obama administration with the difficult task of engaging Iran without 

further eroding official Kuwait’s already shaken faith in U.S. judgment. The 

short-term view is fundamentally conflicted. Kuwaitis, including most in 

the government, fundamentally oppose military action against Iran but 

strongly support a hard-line policy against any Iranian nuclear weapons 
20

JSOU Report 09-4

program. For this reason, the Kuwaitis by-and-large see the development by 

Iran of a nuclear weapons capability as inevitable. Whether this capability 

will include actual assembly and test of a weapon is the only real topic of 

speculation and debate. 

As for the opposition in Kuwait, if the post-withdrawal situation in Iraq 

improves, it will be good for Kuwait. Sporadic domestic unrest may occur, 

but it is difficult to foresee a strategic threat to the Sabah. The Kuwaitis face 

a period of muddling through. The educational and health-care systems 

will continue to limp along and the periodic brownouts will continue as 

comprehensive infrastructure improvement plans lag. Despite problems, 

the relationship with the U.S. continues to be the best current source of 

strategic security. Financially, the Kuwaitis will seek to further diversify 

their sovereign wealth holdings. U.S. protectionist paranoia and risks associated with the recent financial crash make these investments less attractive. 

Diversification will take new forms. As a hedge against the next catastrophe, 

Kuwait is actively looking at alternatives for storing oil in Asia, Vietnam, 

and China, should the Iranians block the straits of Hormuz.34 A U.S. official 

agreed that right now if the Kuwaitis could move their oil they would.35

In the next 5 to 10 years, there is an argument to be made for radical 

political change, but it is an argument in a vacuum that does not reflect the 

historical cycle of events in Kuwait. For 250 years, the Sabah have overcome 

significant obstacles to survival and mastered the political give and take of 

statecraft. Western officials may be frustrated with what they view as political stagnation and failure to address much needed institution reforms, but 

quite frankly, their knowledge of the inner workings of the royal family and 

the government is limited. In any event as Sir Charles Johnston pointed out 

in the 1950s, “The Americans should not allow any infantile anti-Monarchist 

prejudices to blind them to this fact. Monarchy is a very ancient and tenacious principle in the Arab world.” 36 In fact, monarchies have been far more 

politically stable than republics in the region. 

Kuwait has been through a particularly traumatic quarter century—the 

Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war with it attendant “tanker war,” the 

Iraqi invasion, and now the U.S. invasion of Iraq with its unintended fallout 

of domestic terrorism and increased influence for Iran. Given this situation, 

the Amir knows his country better than outsiders and is unlikely to undertake major reforms or transformations. He may well believe that Kuwaiti 
21

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

tolerance for social, political, and economic shocks is at its limit. Lack of 

action now on pressing domestic issues most likely reflects an unwillingness 

to run the risk, making a complex, highly 

charged domestic environment even more 

volatile. The recurring theme from Kuwaiti 

officials is that despite the dangers of the 

region and the threats posed by Iraq and 

Iran, a period of extended stability is needed far more than any attempt to 

“solve” the various issues plaguing the region. In other words, the region 

as a whole and Kuwait in particular needs a respite. 

This interpretation fits well within the historical paradigm for rule in 

Kuwait. Kuwait’s survival has been linked to the ability of the Sabah to find 

an internal political and an external security equilibrium and maintain 

it within acceptable limits. This approach has paid off even in the most 

extreme of crises. By letting the current situation in Iraq play itself out and 

using the U.S. security shield to guarantee their rule, the Sabah may have a 

much better vantage point from which to move forward in the near future. 

At the same time, they are balancing this wait-and-see policy with clear 

opposition to another war in the Gulf. These policies should allow Kuwait 

to transition to a new generation of al-Sabah leaders who, in a more stable 

environment, can push for comprehensive institutional and infrastructure 

investment. The Kuwaitis have the resources to regain their place as a model 

for the region. Politically, lightning could strike, but it is difficult to discern 

the process through which al-Sabah rule might collapse. Historically, the 

ruling family has done a good job of reinventing itself, and they have also 

been lucky. Cold analysis from foreign officials argues that there is really 

no group that could provide the leadership required and that no significant political group is pushing for an end to al-Sabah rule. Recent events 

further underscore both the importance and the prerogatives of the Sabah 

rulers. Frustrated with parliamentary “irresponsibility,” the Amir dissolved 

the Majlis (Parliament) on 18 March calling for new elections. There are 

indications that if the next Majlis is not more “responsible,” it too may be 

dissolved with an extended hiatus, perhaps as much as 2 years, before the 

next election is called. This is a clear reminder that the Sabah family and its 

allies are the guarantors of Kuwaiti political stability and not the fractious 

political groupings. 

In other words, the region 

as a whole and Kuwait in 

particular needs a respite. 
22

JSOU Report 09-4

Given that the Sabah will likely be in charge of Kuwait in 10 years, perhaps the more important question is what will their policies look like? It is 

conceivable that Kuwait might modify its relationship with the U.S. given 

the missteps of the past. During the 1970s, relations between the U.S. and 

Kuwait were severely strained because Washington’s uncritical support for 

Israel. Prior to 1990, Kuwait had a very large Palestinian population and at 

that time, it was a political problem for the Sabah. The Palestinians were 

ejected for supporting Saddam, but the issue of Israel remains. From the 

street to the palace, Kuwaitis believe that the U.S. misunderstood or misrepresented the situation in Iraq dragging them into a poorly thought out, 

incompetent effort to “democratize” the region. If U.S. actions continue 

to create problems, the Kuwaitis will examine other security options. The 

Russians have made a huge investment in Dubai and the French are building a military base in Abu Dhabi.37 The next decade will see Chinese power 

expand. The Kuwaitis will be living in a Gulf in which Iran has nuclear 

weapons and Iraq’s instability continues. Kuwait may seek additional security guarantees. 

Sovereign wealth is another security issue. Kuwait will focus more on 

Asia. The perceived opportunity is greater and there is less political resistance. Barriers to recycling of petro-dollars in the U.S. will lead to more U.S.

wealth finding its way into Asian coffers. If past relationships with the U.S.

recede, the new generation with their Harvard MBAs will look elsewhere 

for the secure economic investments that Kuwait views as essential. In an 

area where every emirate occupies important strategic territory, Kuwait is 

the key to the northern Gulf. The more sophisticated policies would be to 

maintain the U.S. shield, expand the number of outside security alliances, 

and diversify economic investment strategies.

Bahrain

The physical location of Bahrain makes it key to control of the central Gulf, 

but its significance extends well beyond just geography. Bahrain’s complex 

demographics make its internal and external security policies critically 

important to the Arab Gulf and potentially to stability in the oil-rich eastern 

provinces of Saudi Arabia. The revived Iranian claim to the island Kingdom 

serves as a warning to others about the fickle nature of regional relations—

old disputes are rarely forgotten. In addition, Bahrain is the first emirate 

of the Gulf to face the challenge of transitioning to a post-oil economy. For 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

Bahrain, the historical paradigm determines the current and future security 

policies to a greater degree than perhaps any other Arab Gulf state.

The Historical Context. Like Kuwait, the origins of Al-Khalifa rule in 

Bahrain lie in the Utub migrations of the mid-18th century. In addition, 

Bahrain has played a significant role in Islamic history from the 7th century. During the 10th century, the Bahraini Qarmati Shi’a dominated the 

Arabian pilgrimage routes, threatened the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, 

and sacked Mecca during the Hajj. The regime was so radical that even its 

titular overlords, the Fatamid dynasty in Cairo, repudiated their activities. 

In the early 16th century Bahraini Shi’a missionaries converted the Safavid 

Persian Shah Ismail to Twelver Shi’a Islam. After a Portuguese interlude, the 

Safavids ruled Bahrain for two centuries until the mid-18th century.38

In 1766 an Utub clan, the Khalifa, left Kuwait and migrated to Qatar. 

Then in 1783, with al-Sabah assistance, the al-Khalifa supported by Najdi 

tribes and Hawala Arabs from Persia displaced crumbling Safavid rule in 

Bahrain.39 With their political center in Bahrain, the Khalifa ruled Bahrain 

and Qatar into the 19th century. The triumph of the Khalifa coincided with 

the British victory in the Seven Years’ War. The situation was tailor-made 

for the preferred method of British imperial expansion—namely, indirect 

rule and influence. It was beneficial for the new regimes because the British 

conditionally supported their quest for security and survival, in effect creating the political structure of the modern Arabian Gulf. 

To protect its trade routes with India, the British East India Company 

imposed control over the Gulf in 1820. The General Treaty of 1820, sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Peace, actually focused on the Qawasim 

and the emirates of the so-called “Pirate Coast,” but to avoid maritime tolls 

the Khalifa requested to be admitted to the treaty. This limited al-Khalifa 

activities but provided a security guarantee for the regime.40 Subsequent 

treaties served to increase British involvement. In 1867, the Khalifa, still 

occupying western Qatar, and Abu Dhabi moved to eliminate al-Thani 

control in eastern Qatar. The Thani had emerged as the leading tribal clan 

in eastern Qatar and a rival both to the Khalifa and the Bani Yas in Abu 

Dhabi. British intervention recognized the Thani and ultimately the independence Qatar.41 In 1892 the Khalifa signed an agreement with the British 

specifying that Bahrain would not enter into any agreement with a foreign 

power without British consent and in return London confirmed al-Khalifa 
24

JSOU Report 09-4

rule. By 1923 British concerns about Persian claims to Bahrain brought 

internal political friction to a head. The British wanted a compromise that 

would simplify their policy situation in the Gulf, particularly in reference to 

their interests in Iranian oil. Part of this effort was to pressure the Bahraini 

ruler, Sheikh Isa bin Ali, into reforms and greater political integration of 

the Bahraini Shi’a. Sheikh Isa resisted. The British replaced him with his 

son, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa (1923–1942), and introduced a series of reforms. 

When Bahraini Sunnis formed the Bahrain National Council and protested, 

the British simply arrested and exiled them to India.42 Sir Charles Dalrymple 

Belgrave became the permanent resident and over the next 30 years he 

graduated from “advisor” to “secretary” to the ruler.43

In addition to physical protection of the emirate, the British facilitated 

the development of a sophisticated civil service and infrastructure, making 

Bahrain the first modern state in the Gulf. The first discovery of oil on the 

Arab side of the Gulf in 1930 further enhanced Bahrain’s position. In 1938 

the Arab revolt in Palestine brought unrest in Bahrain as it had in Kuwait. 

Britain suppressed the revolt but was forced to create a national labor committee to placate workers and introduced other reforms in education, the 

media, and the bureaucracy.44 In the 1950s the Suez Crisis and Nasser’s 

pan-Arab propaganda on Sawt al‐Arab radio brought riots and unrest. Like 

other rulers in the Gulf, the Khalifa were trapped between the British and 

the Bahraini Arab nationalism. In the end, the British suppressed the political groups and forced the opposition underground.45 In 1957 the members 

of the Committee for National Unity were arrested and exiled to St. Helena 

Island. The British declared a state of emergency that lasted for a decade.46

In 1968 the British Labour government announced the withdrawal of British 

Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Sheikh 

Khaled bin Ahmad al-Khalifa upon his 

return from Tehran 27 February 2009. 

Bahrain and Iran said they will maintain good relations. The week before, 

Bahrain strongly protested after a 

member of Iran’s Expediency Council 

was reported to have said the Kingdom

used to be Iran’s 14th province. AFP

photo, used by permission of Newscom. 
25

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

forces east of Suez by 1971. The announcement shocked the Khalifa and its 

supporters. The Shah of Iran immediately laid claim to Bahrain on the basis 

of the Safavid occupation two centuries before, increasing its insecurity. 

Immediately after the announcement, it appeared that Bahrain, Qatar, 

and the seven Trucial States, of which Abu Dhabi and Dubai were the most 

prominent, would federate, but agreements could not be reached between 

Bahrain and Qatar.47 Bahrain became an independent state. Sheikh Isa bin 

Salman al-Khalifa (1961–1999) wanted political life to be “an expression of 

royal benevolence.” A Constitutional Assembly composed of two political groupings, the People’s Bloc, viewed as leftists, and the Religious Bloc, 

largely rural Shi’a, emerged. The Assembly met twice between 1973 and 

1975. It opposed the security bill that allowed 3 years imprisonment without 

charge, sought an end to absolute al-Khalifa control, and opposed the Jufair 

Agreement granting the U.S. Navy port facilities. In 1975 the Amir dissolved 

the Assembly; the Iranian revolution, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, 

and an Iranian-backed coup attempt in 1981 effectively ended discussions 

of reinstating the Assembly.48

The attempted coup and revived Iranian claims to Bahrain confirmed the 

course of politics and governance for almost two decades. The subsequent 

investigation revealed the existence of the Islamic Front for the Liberation 

of Bahrain and resulted in the arrest of 73 people including Bahrainis, 

Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Omanis. Shaken by the discovery, Bahrain immediately turned to Saudi Arabia and signed a mutual defense pact.49 To bolster 

Bahrain, the Saudis helped establish Bahrain’s banking industry, shared 

some offshore oil fields, and used the Bahraini oil refinery. Saudi Arabia 

generated a Bahraini economic base that allowed the Sunni and Shi’a lower 

classes to move into a middle class existence. This development has left 

Bahrain much more vulnerable to normal economic cycles and associated 

unrest. The attempted coup also institutionalized a very strong security 

service and tight control over people and groupings that had any potential 

as an opposition.50

In 1999 Amir Sheikh Isa bin Salman died, and domestic security policy 

began to change. Several factors influenced this shift. During the first Gulf 

war, western politicians and media were far less interested in Bahrain’s 

security issues than in naïve views about democracy. In response, Sheikh 

Isa formed a Consultative Council in late 1992. In 1994 a declining economy 
26

JSOU Report 09-4

brought confrontations and repression of opposition Shi’a groups. Not 

comprehending the security or geopolitical implications, outside elements 

increased calls for liberalization.51 The new ruler, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, 

and Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa initiated a series 

of reforms under a National Charter. Political prisoners including Sheikh 

Abdul-Amir Al-Jamri, a Shi’a opposition leader, were freed and a bicameral national assembly was created. Bahrain became a kingdom. The king 

retained much of his power; he appoints the upper house which approves 

the laws put forward by the lower house. While Islamic groups, including 

the Al-Wifaq Islamic Society, demand further reforms, that appears most 

unlikely. 

The Future in Context. The official Bahraini government view is highly 

pragmatic. With the obligatory preamble that the U.S. is a close and trusted 

ally, officials then point to fluctuating U.S. policy. As one official put it, “in 

the 1990s, we were being pushed to liberalize and in 1999 we did. Then 9/11 

happened and we were being told that we needed to clamp down to assist 

in the ‘Global War on Terror.’” In their view, Bahrain will pursue its own 

security interests. The Khalifa view the new National Assembly as a major 

concession and an experiment in democracy, but the fractious delegates’ 

propensity to follow narrow sectarian interests is viewed as being indicative 

of chronic political irresponsibility. Without a curb on the lower house of 

the Assembly, the rulers believe that anarchy would result.52 The Bahraini 

bicameral approach has even sparked some discussion in Kuwait about the 

possibility of adopting a similar arrangement versus the unicameral system.53

Also unspoken is the sure knowledge that the lower house would repeat the 

performance of the 1973–1975 Assembly—a political nonstarter. 

What are the options in the next 3 to 5 years? Some non-Bahraini officials have suggested that opening up parts of the bureaucracy and even the 

security services and military to the Shi’a might reduce tensions.54 While 

suggestions about the bureaucracy and business might well help, it is highly 

unlikely that the Khalifa will consider putting weapons in the hands of 

any group that might turn on the ruling regime. It could happen at a very 

low level but even that is doubtful given the continuing fear of subversion. 

Currently no weapons are in the hands of any individual of any group, 

political or sectarian, that might be considered potentially disloyal to the 
27

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

regime. This proscription shows every sign of continuing. The ruling elite 

have no intention of committing political suicide. They also have a fairly 

strong argument that the instability that would result from their relinquishing power would create a political and economic crisis beside which the 

problems of the current situation would pale in comparison. 

In the near term, the Bahraini government may experiment with additional controlled reforms. Given the fiasco of Palestinian and Iraqi democracy, the U.S. has toned down its enthusiasm; nevertheless the Bahrainis are 

watching for another change of mind. In addition, Bahraini officials believe 

that what “some friends” want is often mutually exclusive. They want allies, 

military facilities, security cooperation, and political support against Iran 

and its nuclear program, but they want “democracy” without even understanding the historical context of what that would mean for U.S. interests 

and Bahrain.55 The Khalifa are looking for ways to mute pressure from the 

United States without increasing security problems. In this regard, Huda 

Nonoo, a Bahraini woman of Jewish-Iraqi heritage, became ambassador to 

the U.S. and “a symbolic figure of reform politics in Bahrain.” 56 Substituting 

symbols for risky liberalization is a shrewd approach.

With regard to Iran, al-Khalifa detests the Iranian regime and the idea of 

Tehran with nuclear weapons. In February 2009, senior officials in Tehran 

once again made public statements about Iran’s historical claims to Bahrain. 

It provoked a firestorm of Arab indignation and a surprisingly quick official 

retreat by Tehran.57 The Iranians also sent their Minister of the Interior 

Sadeq Mahsouli to a regional security conference in Bahrain to deny that 

Iran had any designs on the island Kingdom.58 Nevertheless, as one official 

put it, the Iranians have the ability to display the “worst traits of arrogance 

to hide a deep insecurity.” The Bahrainis, at the official level, believe that 

much of Iran’s posturing is about respect. The Iranians are attempting to 

assure the Bahrainis that the situation with the U.S. is really not as dangerous as it appears.59 They view Iraq as a major victory for Iran and for Iran’s 

broader Shi’a aspirations. The installation of what they see as a pro-Iranian 

government in Baghdad is just one issue. U.S. efforts have failed in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah has emerged as the most powerful political force. Syria is dominated by a minority Shi’a group. “For states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 

this is a very threatening environment caused by U.S. policy.” They assert 

that Iran causes unrest without overtly doing anything. Their propaganda 
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JSOU Report 09-4

attacks and successes embolden other Shi’a groups undermining the stability of the region. These factors make substantial political reform high risk 

and it will not happen.60

In the 5-to-10-year environment, it is unlikely that the position of the 

Khalifa and its supporters will change. Their goal will be to continue to 

exercise ultimate authority over the political process and levers of power 

in Bahrain. The viability of al-Khalifa rule in Bahrain is a key security 

issue for Saudi Arabia given the sectarian composition of the eastern provinces. Riyadh will go to great lengths to assure their survival, including 

increased economic and defense support. Bahrain will also maintain close 

ties with the United States for strategic security. Now despite concerns, the 

Bahrainis absolutely oppose military action against Iran. Bahrain will continue to attempt escaping what one senior official referred to as the rentier

petroleum-based economy—namely, an economy artificially propped up 

either directly or indirectly by oil. To some degree the economic approach 

may have shielded Bahrain from some of the effects of the global recession, 

but as the economic crisis deepens, it is difficult to see how the spreading downturn cannot help but affect the island Kingdom. Bahrain and the 

Khalifa have mastered this centuries-old balancing act and used it to maintain their independence. Their geopolitical position is so strategic for U.S.

and for Saudi interests that it is almost inconceivable that either would not 

do whatever is necessary to support the current political order in Bahrain. 

While there is always cause for concern, the Khalifa believe this, and they 

are in all probability right. 

Qatar

With the smallest population of all the emirates, Qatar has emerged as a real 

force in Gulf politics. This transformation is all the more remarkable given 

Foreign Office pessimism about Doha’s ability to survive in a post-British 

world. Qatar has not only survived but developed a regional and foreign 

policy that some consider the most creative in the region. With its long-term 

security interests and dynastic survival foremost in mind, al-Thani policies 

fostered relations and security agreements that balance the potential threats 

in the region and provide a strategic relationship that likely assures Qatar’s 

security well into the future. This unique approach flows directly from the 

historical experience of the state and al-Thani dynasty. 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

The Historical Context. When the Khalifa migrated to Zubarah on the 

west coast of Qatar, its development as a trading and pearling center provoked an attack from Safavid-dominated Bahrain in the 1760s. With alSabah support, the Khalifa occupied Bahrain and moved their seat of rule 

there. Gradually during the 19th century, another rival political center began 

to emerge in eastern Qatar. The al-Thani clan consolidated influence and 

control, and in 1867 the Khalifa allied with the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi to 

attack the east coast of Qatar.61 As previously noted, the British intervened 

and recognized Muhammad bin Thani as the representative of the eastern 

Qatari community. The Treaty of 1868 ended the conflict and Qatar emerged 

as a separate entity.62 In 1871 Muhammad al-Thani’s son, Qasim, accepted 

Ottoman troops in return for recognition of him as governor of Qatar. In 

1893 the al-Thani ejected Ottoman troops from Qatar.63 As a hedge against 

the Ottoman’s, Amir Qasim paid tribute to Ibn Saud and embraced Wahhabi 

Islam.64 In 1913 al-Thani obtained a security guarantee from the British 

against the Saudi Ikhwan when the Anglo-Turkish Convention on the Gulf 

ended Istanbul’s claims to Qatar and recognized British interests there. In 

1916 Percy Cox, the ubiquitous British political agent in the Gulf, signed 

an agreement with Abdullah bin Qasim Al-Thani.65 The al-Thani received 

protection in return for British control of foreign relations, defense policy, 

and significant commercial agreements.66

Qatar Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Plant. Photo courtesy of 

Emerson Process Management. 
30

JSOU Report 09-4

Al-Thani rule in Qatar was difficult in 1930s due to the collapse of the 

pearling industry and the Great Depression. Since there was no clear succession in Qatar, several branches of the family refused to recognize the 

Amir and a chaotic, even lawless, period ensued. In 1935 payment from the 

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and formal British protection finally solidified 

Amir Abdullah’s rule.67 The British discovered oil in 1940. In 1949 unrest 

caused Amir Abdullah, in his 80s, to abdicate in favor of Sheikh Ali bin 

Abdullah (1949–1960). The British resident presided over the transition. In 

1960 Sheikh Ali abdicated in favor of his son Ahmad bin Ali, and at the 

same time his cousin Khalifah bin Hamad was officially recognized as the 

heir apparent. Developments in Qatar tended to follow the same pattern as 

those in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait—namely, consolidation of 

al-Thani power, the emergence of a welfare state, and development of a large, 

complex bureaucracy to oversee the functions of government.68

Here again, the British decision to withdraw east of Suez confronted 

Qatar with a critical decision. Qatar proposed that the nine states of the 

lower Gulf—the Trucial States, Qatar, and Bahrain—unite, but lingering 

friction between Bahrain and Qatar became a stumbling block. Bahrain’s 

decision to go it alone caused Qatar to move toward independence as well. 

The Qatari constitution of 1971 required that the ruler be al-Thani. It established a Council of Ministers to advise the Amir and a special Consultative 

Council that never materialized. The Amir appointed an Advisory Council 

that reflected the various Qatari constituencies. 

In 1971 it became apparent that Sheikh Ahmad could not run the country; the al-Thani replaced him with Sheikh Khalifah. In the mid-1980s 

Sheikh Khalifah handed over much of the governing responsibility to his 

son, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifah al-Thani, who in turn unseated his father 

in June 1995.69 In 1996 scores of arrests were made to head off a coup to put 

Sheikh Khalifa back on the throne. In 2002 another attempted coup by 

mid-level army officers was quashed.70 There was considerable speculation 

about the source of the coup, and some suggested that Saudi Arabia backed 

or encouraged it because they feared liberalization under Sheikh Hamad.71

Most U.S. officials discount Saudi involvement, saying that Riyadh may have 

had a preference but direct or indirect involvement was “most unlikely.” 72 In 

2004 Amir Hamad stated that for Qatar, “reform” was the path to “modernity.” The reforms included the election of Municipal Councils in 1999, an 
31

Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

increased role for the Consultative Council first set up in 1960, and finally 

the election of two thirds of the Consultative Assembly in 2007.73

Whatever the truth about outside involvement in the coup attempts, 

al-Thani historical concerns about Saudi Arabia have resulted in an interesting foreign policy that shows every sign of continuing. First, when the 

Khobar Towers attack brought a rethinking in Riyadh and Washington 

of the deployment of U.S. military in the Kingdom, Qatar quickly offered 

to serve as the replacement for Saudi Arabia and built to specification an 

alternate command post for CENTCOM. In 1992 Qatar signed a bilateral 

Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. and in 1995 agreed to the 

propositioning of heavy military equipment for a mechanized brigade. It 

has also conducted joint exercises with the U.S. and French in the Gulf.74

Frictions emerge from time to time, as in the case of resent Palestinian 

meetings held in Qatar, but the strategic interests of the U.S. and Qatar are 

so closely aligned that it is difficult to imagine that strategic issues will not 

supersede any tactical problems.

The Future in Context. In many ways, Qatar needs the long-term bilateral 

security relationship with the U.S. as much as any state in the region. At the 

same time, Qatar has pursued a policy of cooperation with Iran. Both share 

gas and offshore oil fields in the Gulf and have good relations. Qatar sees 

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as an unfortunate problem but officials do 

not seem to be overly concerned even in the event that Iran acquires them. 

There is far more concern about another war in the Gulf that they see as 

catastrophic for the region. As one senior Qatari official put it, “We have 

to live in the region. Maybe the United States will still be here and maybe 

not, so we have to think about 40 years from now.” Qatar obviously sees 

the CENTCOM installation as a hedge against any potential threats from 

Iran or Saudi pressure. 

As one UAE official commented, Qatar was pursuing its own set of policies vis-à-vis Iran partially as a hedge against Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom 

and Qatar have finally agreed upon a delineated border after decades of 

claims and counterclaims. Despite good relations with both Tehran and 

Riyadh, Doha recognizes that the best chance of Qatar maintaining its independence and freedom of action is the U.S. security guarantee.75 As former 

U.S. Ambassador Chase Untermeyer explained it, “Because Qatar maintained good relations with Iran, HAMAS, Hezbollah, and Syria many viewed 
32

JSOU Report 09-4

it as unfriendly, but to the contrary, events have demonstrated that Qatar’s 

policies constitute an informed strategic approach to a volatile region. From 

a security point of view, Qatar is a key U.S. ally in the region.” 76

There is also the issue of the succession. Given the history of succession 

problems, U.S. officials have raised concerns about how the selection of a 

ruler in the future might affect Qatar. Privately, officials believe that any 

outside meddling would be in the form of moral, as opposed to materiel, 

support for one group or another, but they are concerned about a family 

struggle that might change al-Thani policies.77 No matter how future political power might shift, it is difficult to see why Qatar’s balancing act in foreign policy would change. There are less than 200,000 Qataris, and they are 

sitting on enormous petroleum wealth. The only way to lose this wealth is 

to be subsumed into a larger state; therefore, the aim of any Qatari government will be the same—to maintain its independence and it wealth. The 

only way to assure that this will happen is to continue the balancing act 

and keep open multiple options for support, but the surest way to maintain 

independence is with the current bilateral security assurances.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is the only successful experiment in political unification in the 

Arab Gulf. While the seven emirates of the Trucial Coast existed under 

essentially the same administration, there were considerable differences 

between them. These differences continue to be muted by mutual selfinterest in a sometimes uneasy political compact between the two largest 

states, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The context in which the UAE developed 

and continues to exist is more complicated than that of the other states of 

the Gulf; it is a union of distinct individual emirates within a community 

of independent emirates. An understanding of the behavioral modalities 

between the emirates within the UAE is critical for a real understanding of 

its current and future security policies and challenges.

The Historical Context. The UAE is a federation of emirates that adds an 

additional level of complexity to analyzing security issues within its historical context. As with the other states of the region, this study begins in the 

mid-18th century. Prior to the arrival of the British, the seaborne emirates 

of Sharjah and Ras al-Kaimah, led by separate branches of the Qawasim 

tribe, dominated the southern coast of the Gulf. Various land-based tribes, 

including the Bani Yas in Abu Dhabi, were poorer with less political clout. 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

The Qawasim were basically seafaring and focused on trade, pearling, fishing, and a livelihood as corsairs. The fractured power structure in the Gulf 

created an environment ideally suited for entrepreneurs with “scores of 

ships, sailing principally from Ras al-Khaimah (and Sharjah) and manned 

by thousands of ferocious fighters who ravaged commerce of the Gulf and 

the northern Indian Ocean.” 78 Then in the mid-18th century, the British—

worried about its trade with India—made freelancing in the Arabian Gulf 

and the Indian Ocean unacceptable. At the same time, Bani Yas led by the 

Nahyan clan expanded its control of Abu Dhabi. In 1761 potable water was 

discovered on Abu Dhabi Island, and the leading sheikhs established it as 

the center for political rule on the Gulf. 

In the early 19th century the Royal Navy neutralized the threat that the 

naval power of the Qawasim posed to Indian trade. In 1819 the British created the Trucial Coast or Trucial States, placing British agents in each of the 

emirates. This new arrangement reduced the influence and power of Sharjah 

and Ras al-Khaimah and increased the influence of Abu Dhabi. In the mid1800s, Sheikh Zayid bin Khalifa (1855–1909), also known as Zayid the Great, 

created a ruling framework that would form the foundation for the modern 

political structure.79 In effect, British influence and control in the southern Gulf developed along lines that were complimentary to Abu Dhabi’s 

emergence as an independent emirate largely without imperial versus local 

frictions. In 1853 the British negotiated the Perpetual Maritime Peace with 

the emirates and changed the official designation from the “Pirate Coast” 

to the “Trucial Coast.” In reaction to potential European encroachment, the 

British concluded the Exclusive Treaty of 1892. What ensued was a dozen 

years of thrust and counterthrust as the British aggressively protected their 

interests against the European interlopers. For Dubai the 1892 agreement 

was particularly onerous because it inhibited their commercial expansion 

and ended their lucrative gun-running into Pashtun areas of India with 

other European powers.80 When Zayid the Great died, Khalifa, the eldest 

of seven sons, declined the position of Amir. Sheikh Tahnun bin Zayid 

succeeded his father but died of natural causes within 3 years. The next 

three rulers, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayid (1912–1922), his successor Sheikh 

Sultan bin Zayid (1922–1926), and Sheikh Saqr bin Zayid were assassinated 

in disputes over commercial differences, family subsidies, and blood feuds. 

At this point Sheikh Khalifa engineered the appointment of his nephew 

Shakhbut (1926–1966).81
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JSOU Report 09-4

Shakhbut’s rule brought four decades of political stability to Abu Dhabi, 

and his stature even allowed him periodically to challenge the British. In 

1937 he called British demands for Abu Dhabi to sign an oil concession with 

a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company hawa or hot air and stonewalled London for 2 years because the Americans paid higher royalties.82

He insisted on Abu Dhabi’s ownership of Buraimi Oasis in the face of a 

Saudi claim and reaped the benefits of the British-led confrontation of the 

Trucial Scout and Omani troops with Saudi irregulars in the 1950s.83 In an 

environment where British support brought London’s meddling, the Sheikh 

doggedly maneuvered between maintaining their backing and establishing 

his independence. The discovery of oil in 1958 would ultimately be the old 

Sheikh’s political undoing. Fearing the demise of Abu Dhabi’s traditional 

culture, Shakhbut refused to use the new oil wealth to modernize the state. 

In 1966 with British support, a family gathering replaced Shakhbut as Amir 

with his younger brother, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan. Sheikh Zayid had been 

the governor of the Buraimi area and brought with him considerable experience in administration and in negotiating with tribal groups. These skills 

would place him in good stead when the British announced their intention 

to withdraw from east of Suez in 1971.84 

As discussed earlier, friction between Bahrain and Qatar effectively 

thwarted unification of the nine southern emirates. Abu Dhabi and Dubai 

now faced the challenge of unifying the Trucial Coast. The challenges were 

A day at the beach in Abu Dhabi, 29 January 2007. AFP Photo used by permission of Newscom. 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

not inconsequential. The Maktoum clan of Dubai under the leadership 

of Sheikh Maktoum bin Butti seceded from the Abu Dhabi branch of the 

Bani Yas in 1833. By 1852 and bin Butti’s death, the Maktoum had managed to carve out an independent sheikhdom based on Dubai as a citystate. Although Dubai had been independent for 60 years, it was the rule 

of Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar (1894–1906) that set Dubai on a course to 

prominence—albeit one significantly different from that of his cousins in 

Abu Dhabi. During the 19th century, the Qawasim clan of the emirate of 

Sharjah, Dubai’s immediate neighbor, had administered the Persian port of 

Lingah. In 1887, for political reasons, the Persian Qajjar government replaced 

the Qawasim administration with Persian officials. Due to Qajjar incompetence and corruption, business in Lingah and the port went into decline. In 

1902 the Persian Qajjar imposed prohibitive high customs duties on imports 

and exports in an effort to increase government revenues. Recognizing an 

opportunity, Maktoum bin Hashar encouraged the Persian merchants of 

Lingah to move across the Gulf to Dubai. As a result, Dubai became the 

cosmopolitan commercial center and entrepot of the southern Gulf and 

the main base of operations for the British military in the region.85 In 1958 

Sheikh Said bin Maktoum (1912–1958) died, and his son Sheikh Rashid bin 

Said (1958–1990) became Amir. Rashid’s mother, Sheikha Hussa bint Murr 

or Umm Rashid—a formidable business woman and astute politician in her 

own right—had groomed Sheikh Rashid well to lead the emirate. Sheikh 

Rashid organized and ran Dubai’s government like a business with a council 

that served as a virtual board of directors. He included major business leaders as well as key government officials and members of the Maktoum. 

The British withdrawal particularly shocked Dubai. Alignment with 

more conservative Abu Dhabi was a necessity but, at the time, not particularly appealing. Territorial disputes and differences occurred between the 

tribal-based culture of Abu Dhabi and the urban, town-based culture of 

Dubai.86 Because of oil, population, and physical size, it was apparent that 

conservative Abu Dhabi would be the most influential emirate. In contrast, 

Dubai had close ties with Iran and a cosmopolitan, more liberal, commercial culture. To allay concerns, Sheikh Zayid went to Dubai and settled the 

territorial disputes. Nevertheless, Sheikh Rashid pressed for a loose federal 

arrangement as opposed to the strongly centralized administration supported by Abu Dhabi. A political standoff endured until 1979 when popular demonstrations, Saudi pressure, and Kuwaiti facilitation resulted in an 
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JSOU Report 09-4

agreement in which Amir Rashid became the prime minister of the UAE

and Amir Zayid became president.87

In the UAE government the Nahyan and the Maktoum clans serve 

together at the most senior levels of the security and defense establishments. 

Still differences between Abu Dhabi and Dubai persist. The other emirates—

Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, and Fujairah—are to 

one degree or another dependent on their share of Abu Dhabi’s petroleum 

wealth for support. Sharjah has established itself as a center of educational 

excellence and with some modest oil and gas discoveries has its own source 

of wealth. Sharjah’s dispute with Iran over the status of Abu Musa Island 

in the Gulf is a major irritant for UAE relations with Tehran while Dubai 

provides the largest transshipment point for Iranian goods in the Gulf. The 

union is a work in progress, but the accomplishment of the UAE in terms of 

federal governance and integration of diverse political, economic, and even 

cultural interests is remarkable. It is against the backdrop of this framework 

of UAE, regional and global politics, and economics that future security 

policy must be evaluated. 

Looking forward to the next 5 years, internal security, defense alliances, 

petroleum development and technology, sovereign wealth issues, trade and 

commerce, and development of a post petroleum-based economy are all 

critical security-related policy issues. Internal security is an increasingly 

important issue including demographic security. There are roughly one 

million UAE citizens and between four and five million foreign nationals. 

Of those foreign nationals, most are foreign guest workers. The police chief 

of Dubai, Lt. General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, in 2008 addressed this very 

issue. Because of inflation, real wages have declined causing unrest. While 

nothing unmanageable occurred, there is growing concern.88 In addition, 

the UAE has a very long coast facing the Arabian Gulf. The emirates have a 

long history of sanctioned and unsanctioned trade—smuggling—throughout the Gulf. Iran occupied islands belonging to Sharjah and consistently 

in the event of hostilities with the U.S. threatens those states with close 

relations to the U.S. While the UAE has bolstered its maritime patrolling, 

more security measures are critical. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nahyan 

confirmed this stating, “A completely integrated security system in place 

to keep pace with developments is the foundation of our country’s security 

and stability.” 89
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

There are additional internal security issues. The U.S. provides great 

training, technology, and support for internal security organizations. 

Nevertheless, the question arises: in the event of an internal emergency how 

useful is the U.S.? The U.S. track record of internal intervention on behalf of 

friendly regimes is spotty. Unlike the 19th century British, the U.S. is reluctant to intervene internally. The UAE may look to additional relationships 

as further support to the regime. In part, this explains the recent announcement that the French will build a military base in Abu Dhabi.90 The UAE

government appears to recognize the utility of French ground-force presence 

and the historical willingness of Paris to support its friends against internal 

turmoil. French analysts are quick to argue, “The GCC states need the help 

of trusted allies [France] in order to set up mechanisms for collective security.” 91 Whether this is a sustained idea that will come to fruition remains 

to be seen, but the UAE is very interested in entertaining the option. 

The Future in Context. The UAE choice of U.S. hardware for its strategic 

needs is shrewd. Capabilities and technologies aside, the UAE has placed 

itself squarely in the mainstream of development and support of the largest, 

most advanced military in the world. The relationship and the presence of 

U.S. military personnel virtually guarantee that an attack on the UAE by an 

adversary like Iran would generate a devastating, potentially regime-ending 

response in retaliation. The relationship also falls within the comfortable 

historical paradigm—namely, a great power security guarantee. It allows 

the UAE to choose on a case-by-case basis independent policies or regional 

cooperation. In describing the preference for a U.S. security guarantee, one 

senior former U.S. official stated, “The emirates are not comfortable with a 

security guarantee under the wing a GCC dominated by Saudi Arabia—they 

prefer the security under an American wing.” 92

With regard to Iran, a nuclear-armed Iran would be a serious security 

issue, and the UAE wants to prevent it. However, dealing with that eventuality is more palatable than another war in the Gulf. Recently in Dubai, 

Abdul Rahman al-Attiyah, General Secretary of the GCC, called for Iran 

to arbitrate the dispute over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb 

islands in the Gulf. At the same time he “rejected the military option” visà-vis Iran’s nuclear program.93 Attiyah stated that the GCC fully support 

the UAE in the dispute over Abu Musa calling the Iranian move, “a striking 

violation and illegitimate procedure on an inseparable part of a sovereign 
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nation.” 94 The Iranian response was blunt; “they basically warned the GCC

to stay out of Iranian affairs and defended their stance on Abu Musa.” 95

Another senior UAE official stated that Iran’s refusal to negotiate or submit 

the matter to international arbitration was a matter of “respect or the lack 

thereof exhibited by Iran for international law and the sovereignty of a 

neighboring state.” 96 Much of this anxiety over another war in the Gulf 

results from what UAE officials view as the negative consequences of Iraq. 

They do not want to pay for another miscalculation. They are also unhappy 

with what U.S. officials in the region admit privately was “enormous pressure” on the UAE to open an embassy in Baghdad.97 They feel that they are 

being pressured to legitimize an Iranian-backed Iraqi regime. 

In the Gulf, security and economics are intertwined. The UAE survives 

on a “rentier oil economy”—stability flows directly from the profits of the 

petroleum industry and on the “sovereign wealth funds” created. To date, 

Abu Dhabi has channeled these funds into western investments. That is 

beginning to change. Recently, political hysteria in the U.S. prevented 

Dubai’s purchase of a company managing U.S. ports. This paranoia, coupled 

with the U.S. mismanagement in the financial sector, makes U.S. investment 

increasingly unattractive. As a result, sovereign wealth funds are evaluating 

friendlier environments particularly in Asia.98 In addition, the emirates are 

trying to develop a viable economic infrastructure independent of oil. By 

most measures, Dubai is leading the way focusing on establishing a global 

banking and commercial center. It is investing heavily in ship repair, aircraft 

maintenance and repair, and air and sea transportation facilities. 

Anticipating an eventual end of petroleum resources, the UAE has also 

decided to pursue a nuclear energy program. Nuclear energy for power 

generation and desalinization is also 

viewed as a means of extending oil and 

gas reserves. UAE analysis indicates a 

shortfall in electrical power beginning 

in the next 5 years. They make a persuasive argument that the UAE must go 

to a power program that relies equally on natural gas, renewable sources, 

and nuclear if growth and petroleum exports are to be maintained.99 The 

program also serves another political purpose. The UAE wants to make 

its program the “model, transparent” civilian nuclear program for the 

region. It is thinly veiled to show the UAE’s respect for international law, 

Nuclear energy for power 

generation and desalinization 

is also viewed as a means of 

extending oil and gas reserves. 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

the environment, and political maturity in direct contrast to what they view 

as the bellicose insecurity currently exhibited by Iran.100

Dubai’s approach has raised concerns. With the largest Iranian ex-patriot 

community in the Arab world, its trade with Iran has been described as 

“massive.” Many feel that requests to crackdown on dual use technology 

for Iran are ignored. Abu Dhabi has expressed its concerns in this regard, 

although there is speculation that Abu Dhabi’s concern is moderated by 

a desire to see Dubai’s economy flourish independent of UAE subsidies.101

Dubai’s wide-open financial industry is attractive to legitimate and criminal 

organizations. Lack of oversight has attracted Al Qaeda and large Russian 

investments from questionable sources. Dubai is also rumored to be a center 

for ex-patriot Somalis funding and coordinating the pirating trade along the 

African coast.102 A Middle East specialist described Dubai as “the region’s 

premiere free port. For many years the emirate has also attracted the attention of both criminal and terrorist international organizations, many of 

which have exploited Dubai’s geographic location, laissez-faire attitudes, 

and impressive infrastructure to set up various smuggling, gunrunning, 

human-trafficking, money-laundering, and terror-funding operations.” 103

Increased oversight has implications for this freewheeling environment. 

On a related issue, the Dubai real estate and stock markets are overheated. 

Corruption allegations including a Minister of State and falling real estate 

prices will likely reduce profits. Some speculate that Amir Muhammad bin 

Rashid al-Maktoum will need to take advantage of his good relations with 

Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nahyan for additional financial 

support.104 While any losses will be covered by oil revenues, the strategic 

economic goals could suffer long-term damage to the confidence that has 

been driving growth.105 The global economic crisis may actually contribute 

to further UAE political integration. Dubai’s quid pro quo for an economic 

bailout by Abu Dhabi may well be closer cooperation and integration with 

Abu Dhabi and federation. The Economist speculated that Dubai would 

have to end its “independent foreign policy” vis-à-vis Iran and “lose its 

ambitions to become the Monaco of the Gulf.”106 As a result, the economic 

crisis could prove to be a boost to long-term political stability and cohesion 

in the UAE. 

Sharjah, smaller and more dependent on federal subsidies than Dubai, is 

attempting to emerge as an educational center for excellence. Abu Dhabi is 

focused on building a center of educational excellence that includes Johns 
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JSOU Report 09-4

Hopkins, the Sorbonne, New York University (NYU), and Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT). Dubai has plans to create “a world-class” 

center for knowledge.107 Strategic think tanks have also emerged; the 

Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and the Gulf Research 

Council are developing solid reputations. The education initiatives also 

have some interesting social implications. Increasing numbers of women in 

higher eduction are opening up new opportunities. In a striking example, 

three women just graduated from Khalifa Aviation College with pilots wings 

and will fly in the UAE Air Force. Given the shortage of qualified male pilots, 

the UAE has taken a bold step by bringing women into the military into 

roles that were the exclusive domain of males.108

In the 10-year time frame, Saad al-Barrak, CEO of Kuwaiti-based Zain 

mobile telephone, stated the region purchased “the hardware of modernization” but not the “software”—that is, “transparent legal systems, regulatory 

environments, and free elections.” 109 The relationship between free elections 

and stability can be debated but certainly transparent regulatory and legal 

systems are central. The UAE will continue to expand its commercial and 

banking efforts, diversify its investment portfolios, and be more creative 

with sovereign wealth. In this regard, financial and commercial ties with 

China and Southeast Asia will become more of the norm. In addition, food 

security will emerge as another issue. Inflation in basic commodities will 

increasingly drive investment in offshore agricultural output to support the 

UAE economy. Asia and Africa have the greatest potential in this regard. 

Dubai is betting that through Emirates Air it can become the air bridge 

between Europe and Asia, a hub of communications and transport. Finally, 

in energy, U.S. and western firms will face increasing pressure from Asian 

competitors. The emirates are evaluating oil and gas facilities in China and 

Southeast Asia where environmental and labor laws create attractive conditions for cooperation. Security concerns in the Gulf have intensified pipeline 

construction, linking the UAE directly to the Arabian Sea.110

Projecting 10 years out, Henry Azzam, chief of Deutsche Bank’s Middle 

East operations pointed out, “We’re becoming the epicenter of the global 

economy, [but] political and military problems could destabilize the whole 

region.” 111 Barring some unforeseeable radical shift, the UAE understands 

that its external security lies in powerful protection from a state outside 

the region. The UAE will continue to rely on the U.S. security guarantees. Nevertheless, should U.S. policy further shake UAE confidence in 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

Washington’s judgment, they will seek additional security guarantees. With 

regard to internal security, additional security relationships should well 

have a priority. The overall historical security paradigm for the UAE will 

not change in the next 10 years. The question is how security concerns will 

be satisfied. The Anglo-American system of the last 200 years is preferable; 

however, if doubts and uncertainties arise, the UAE would be remiss in not 

examining additional options. Now with the advent of competent centers 

for strategic studies, it is hard to imagine that these evaluations will not 

become an ongoing process.

Oman

Oman has a legitimate claim to being the historical cornerstone of the GSS. 

The predominately Ibadi or Kharajite state, historically separated from the 

Arab Gulf by geography and a unique cultural and sectarian identity, is 

critically important to control access to the Gulf. Cultural and sectarian 

differences with the other emirates create a unique set of parameters for 

Oman’s interaction in the region. The ability of Oman and the Al Bu Said 

dynasty to not only survive but also unite Muscat and the Oman Imamate 

into a state whose alliance with the West is more important today and for 

the foreseeable future than it has ever been. By what path did Oman arrive 

at this juncture and what might the future hold?

The Historical Context. The rulers of Muscat and Oman have played a 

powerful regional and global role in trade and sea power. In the 8th century, 

the Omani interior came under the control of the smallest Islamic religious 

grouping known as the Kharajites or Ibadis. In the mid-8th century, Oman 

fell under Abbasid rule from Baghdad. During this prolonged struggle 

against the Abbasids, the Ibadi Imam became a spiritual and a temporal 

leader.112 Late in the 10th century, the Imamate took control with its seat of 

power at Nizwa Oasis.113 It collapsed in the 12th century only to reemerge in 

the 15th century.114 The Portuguese arrived to dominate the Omani coast in 

1507.115 In 1650 the Ya’ariba dynasty supplanted the Portuguese and extended 

Omani power and influence in Africa, Persia, and the Arabian Gulf. 

In the mid-18th century, civil war and collapse of the Imamate brought 

a realignment of Omani tribes into the Hinawi and Ghafiri tribal groupings. The Hinawi of the southeast were strict conservative Ibadis, while 

the Ghafiris of the northwest were somewhat “more receptive to outside 
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JSOU Report 09-4

influences.” 116 These two groups continue as the basic tribal alignments 

today. A new dynasty, the Al Bu Said, to which Sultan Qaboos belongs, 

focused on building Omani sea power and commerce. During the late 

17th century, Oman’s naval power in the Indian Ocean was second only to 

the English. By the mid-19th century, Ras al-Khaimah’s naval power, the 

influence of Saudi Arabia, and family quarrels sent Muscat into decline. 

British support blunted these threats, but as Al Bu Said power declined, the 

Imamate reemerged and threatened the state. In 1913 British Indian troops 

intervened to prevent an Al Bu Said collapse, and in 1920 the British negotiated the Treaty of Sib that effectively gave control of Muscat and the coastal 

areas to the Sultan and control of the interior to the Imamate.117

In the 1950s a series of events led to the collapse of the Imamate. In 1955, 

in a dispute over the Buraimi Oasis, British-led Trucial and Oman Scouts 

drove Saudi forces from the area. The British believed that the Saudi claim 

had been “fathered by ARAMCO to enlarge its concession area.” 118 In 1937 

Said bin Taymur (1932–1970) signed an agreement with the Iraqi Petroleum 

Group, granting a concession that was clearly within the boundaries of the 

Imamate.119 Then in the late 1950s, Petroleum Development Oman created 

the Muscat and Oman Field Force and eliminated the Imamate.120

Imam Ghalib and his followers found refuge in Saudi Arabia and 

raided the Sultanate. The Saudis also helped organize the Oman Liberation 

Movement with hopes of annexing western Oman and regaining Buraimi 

Oasis. The final act in this drama occurred in January 1959 when British 

Special Air Service (SAS) units captured the last Imamate stronghold of 

Jabal al-Akhdar, removing the threat.121

During the next decade, Sultan Said ignored development and modernization and did little to systematically counter Saudi and Egyptian subversion. In the late 1960s the British withdrawal from Aden complicated the 

situation. The rise of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) 

with Soviet, Chinese, and Iraqi support transformed the Dhofari rebellion 

in Oman into the Marxist-dominated movement, the Peoples’ Front for the 

Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The crisis actually benefited the Al Bu Said because the Communist role brought a shift in Saudi 

policy. Second, the Oman military, populace, and the British decided that 

a change in leadership was necessary.122 In July 1970 these forces coalesced 

to remove Sultan Said bin Taymur and replace him with his son, Sultan 

Qaboos. At the same time, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman changed its 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

name to the Sultanate of Oman. The immediate focus of the new Sultanate 

was the insurgency. With support from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and the 

British, Qaboos used a combination of development funding and military 

force to pacify Dhofar. By 1976 the revolt had effectively ended.123

As in the other Arab Gulf states, the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq 

war brought Omani security policy in line with the U.S. This relationship 

now includes military facilities, prepositioning of supplies, joint exercises, 

and military hardware. Exerting its independence, Muscat refused to break 

relations with Egypt over Camp David, normalized relations with the PDRY, 

and established relations with the Soviet Union and China. In addition, 

Oman maintained good relations with Iran and criticized Iraq during the 

Iran-Iraq war.124 At the same time, Muscat settled its historical territorial 

disputes with Saudi Arabia.125 Within the GCC community, a southern tier 

community of Oman, Qatar, and UAE has emerged with cooperation on a 

series of issues including customs and border control that link the Sultanate 

even more tightly to the southern emirates. 

The Future in Context. Iran is the most important near-term issue. Oman 

has chosen to deal with it through dialogue. There are regular meetings 

between Omani and Iranian senior officials and military officers as well 

as naval port visits. Oman pursues a policy of “constructive engagement,” 

a belief that will “prove to be a more practical method” than attempts to 

isolate the Tehran regime. For Oman, Iran is a major concern. They blame 

Iran for a 1994 plot against Qaboos and for supporting religious extremists.126 Oman sees Iran as a threat that may well have to be confronted 

with force but only as a last resort. Sultan Qaboos argued, “if the [Iranian] 

government can bring itself to take a different approach to the West, one 

that produces benefits, then the third faction (whose views are unknown) 

might support pragmatism. But there is no easy solution. Time will tell.” 127

Increasing bellicosity from Tehran has made Oman even more important to 

the Gulf emirates, reviving pipeline projects from the UAE across Oman to 

the Indian Ocean.128 Gas pipelines run from Qatar via Abu Dhabi to Sohar 

on the Omani coast. Other internal UAE routes are under consideration.129

The Abu Dhabi-Oman route appears more secure.

The Omani-Yemeni border is another security issue. The Republic of 

Yemen has limited control in tribal areas. The addition of the former PDRY

complicated the problem. The “Yemenis” of the Hadramut have more in 
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JSOU Report 09-4

common with the Omanis of Dhofar than with the government in Sanaa. 

The growing inability of Yemeni government in Sanaa to control the 

Hadramutis could pose a potential security threat to Oman. The area is a 

known breeding ground for violent, radical Islamic elements. In addition, 

given the history of issues between the Dhofaris and the government in 

Muscat, aspirations for local autonomy or even independence in eastern 

Yemen could conceivably spread into western Oman. Good relations with 

Yemen are helpful, but cannot replace aggressive border security. 

The two greatest stability issues for Oman’s future are declining petroleum resources and the leadership succession. Politically, succession is the 

key issue. Sultan Qaboos appears to be in good health but has no heirs.130

The Sultan knows that succession problems have brought revivals of the 

Imamate, outside political intervention, and division to Oman. To prevent 

this cycle from recurring, Sultan Qaboos promulgated the Basic Law in 

October 1996 after he was almost killed in a traffic accident. Article 5 states, 

“The system of government is a hereditary Sultanate in which succession 

passes to a male descendant of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan.” The claimant must be an adult, born of legitimate Muslim parents and “of sound 

mind.” Article 6 states that when the position of Sultan becomes vacant the 

Ruling Family Council will within 3 days pick a new Sultan. If the Council 

The Shangri-La Barr Al Jissah Hotel and Spa Resort, near Muscat, 

Oman, June 2007. Used by permission of Newscom. 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

cannot agree, “the Defense Council shall confirm the appointment of the 

person designated by the Sultan in his letter to the Family Council.” The 

Defense Council was created shortly after the Basic Law and is composed of 

eight senior officials and military officers appointed by the Sultan to oversee 

the defense of Oman.131 Sultan Qaboos explained that he had written down 

two names in descending order and placed them in two separate envelopes 

to be opened in the event that the Family Council could not come to agreement.132 While the wishes of the Sultan initially will be honored, there are 

no guarantees. The competence of the Omani government and security 

services will likely maintain stability. However, Sultan Qaboos’ shoes will 

be very difficult to fill. Outside meddling and internal issues could emerge 

well after the initial event. 

The second long-term issue is the dwindling oil reserves. Estimates of 

Oman’s reserves were modest to begin with and in 2004 these estimates 

were revised downward by 40 percent. Oman’s gas is largely mixed with 

the oil and will likely also be revised downward. Without major new discoveries, Oman will deplete its petroleum resources in less than 15 years. 

Despite attempts to boost other economic areas, oil continues to account 

for 40 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This potential drop in 

oil production is occurring in the face of a precipitous rise in population. 

Since only 10 percent of the private sector jobs are occupied by Omanis, the 

government will face increased pressure for additional government outlays in 

an environment where the prospect of funding is rapidly nearing an end. “It 

appears that the sultanate will face a serious economic crisis in the next 10 to 

15 years, or even sooner if oil prices plummet.” 133 The timing of these serious 

economic problems could very well coincide with the succession issues. 

Undoubtedly Oman will press forward over the next 10 years with programs aimed at creating a non-rentier oil economy. In recognition of these 

challenges, there will be an increased focus on security and defense issues. 

The Basic Law not withstanding, senior officers in the security services 

and military will position themselves as the power behind the throne no 

matter who rules as Sultan. In this regard, there will be an increasing effort 

to maintain alliances that guarantee the security of the Sultanate. Current 

policies likely foreshadow the strategy to come—namely, defense links with 

the United States and its western allies, expanding economic ties with the 

oil rich states of the Gulf, an increasing security role vis-à-vis Hormuz, and 

an alternate petroleum export path to the open sea. 
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Finally, the Omanis will maintain a dialogue with the Iranians just in 

case. Like the other Gulf states, Oman views U.S. policy of late as erratic 

and counterproductive. While pursuing an external security policy that 

places the Sultanate under the umbrella of the U.S., Oman will increasingly 

focus its resources on internal security. Given the potential for economic 

and succession problems, subversion, and even a resurgent Imamate, the 

government will no doubt conclude that the real potential for instability is 

internal. It is no doubt clear to the Sultan that the Al Bu Said dynasty should 

not count on direct U.S. assistance in an internal power struggle. With this 

in mind, there will be increasing focus on upgrading internal security to 

include border and coastal security and internal intelligence operations. If 

the potential for economic and succession problems is never realized, no 

harm will have been done; however, if it happens, increasing vigilance over 

the next 10 years will provide an extra edge in the struggle to survive.

The Future and the Large Arab States of the Gulf

Although interests often intersect, Saudi Arabia—as the largest cohesive 

Arab state in the Gulf—arrives at that intersection from a position based 

on an outlook that fundamentally differs from that of the Arab emirates. 

Perhaps the differences are blurred by a lack of historical understanding, 

Saudi Arabia and the Arab emirates emerged simultaneously from very 

different traditions. Defined by population, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen 

meet the large regional Arab state criteria. Of these, only Saudi Arabia is 

a conventional functioning state. As a result, Saudi Arabia will be the primary focus of this section followed by more cursory examinations of future 

security issues for Iraq and Yemen. 

Saudi Arabia

In describing Saudi Arabia’s frustration in attempting to take a leadership 

role in the Middle East, the Economist cited mistrust stemming from it 

being a “bastion of arch-conservative Sunnism.” The article argued that “the 

tiny Gulf state of Qatar” has had better luck negotiating between political 

groups in Lebanon than Riyadh. It stated that the Iraqis mistrusted Riyadh 

because its “forebears, 200 years ago, led ferocious Sunni raids on the Shi’a 

holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.” In addition, the Economist stated that 

Iraqi Sunnis believe that “the Saudi-influenced version of Sunnism espoused 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

by Al Qaeda” had wreaked havoc on its community over the last 5 years. 

While pessimistic about the Saudi role within the Arab world, the article 

added that outside the Arab World, the Kingdom may well be in a unique 

position to initiate if not broker a compromise between warring factions 

in Afghanistan because of its fundamentalist credentials.134 What does this 

analysis mean and how is it linked to the historical context of Gulf security? 

While one might argue that these issues are overstated, this evaluation of 

Saudi Arabia underscores the Kingdom’s separate and distinct place in the 

historical and contemporary geopolitical structure of the Arabian Gulf. 

The tendency to lump Saudi Arabia with the Arab emirates is not only an 

historical error but also represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the 

current political paradigm in the region. Saudi Arabia is not like the Gulf 

emirates, but rather it has all the attributes of a large state including the 

historical ambition to lead the Arab Gulf. The interests of Saudi Arabia and 

the other states of the Arab Gulf intersect, but their strategic interests are 

substantially different. To understand, these distinctions one must examine the historical development of the Saudi state. Saudi Arabia’s historical 

experience occurs in three phases, often referred to as the three Saudi states. 

Expansionist policies buttressed by a distinct ideology drove each, and the 

regional ambitions of all three states were checked by an outside power 

whose interests it threatened. The remarkable attribute is that the third state 

that transformed itself into modern Saudi Arabia has produced leaders at 

each critical historical juncture, which has enabled the Kingdom successfully to transform itself to meet revolutionary challenges under very difficult 

circumstances since its founding by Abd-al-Aziz ibn Saud at the turn of the 

last century. It is from within this historical context that one must seek an 

understanding of modern Saudi Arabia and a window on its future. 

The Historical Context. The First Saudi State (1744–1818) established 

the dynastic, political, and ideological model. In 1744 Muhammad bin 

Saud (d. 1765) linked his political fortunes to the ideological fortunes 

of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792). In 1727 Muhammad 

bin Saud became ruler of a small village, Dir’iyyah, in the Najd Desert. 

Simultaneously, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab—an aspiring religious 

scholar whose father was a judge in the Najd—pursued a religious education in Medina, Basra, and Hasa. Abd-al-Wahhab returned the Najd with 

a new interpretation of Islam.135 Simply put, he had rediscovered Ahmad 
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ibn Hanbal’s traditionalist teachings of the 9th century and revived the 

Hanbali School of Islamic thought in the form of Wahhabi Islam. Ibn 

Abd-al-Wahhab’s teachings focused on the absolute oneness of God, the 

strict adherence to the Koran, and the Sunna for religious and temporal 

guidance.136 In 1744, in return for strict adherence to Wahhabi interpretation, the Saudis received ideological and financial support in the form of 

the zakat or Muslim tithe. Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab received protection. The 

Saudi-Wahhabi alliance transcended issues of tribal affiliation and wealth. 

“Preaching and raids progressed simultaneously,” allowing the Saudi leadership rapidly to dominate the region.137 In the early 19th century, Saudi 

raiders took Karbala, the Shi’a holy city, threatened Damascus, and captured 

Mecca and Medina. Irritated, the Ottoman Empire asked its viceroy in 

Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to eliminate the Saudi threat. In 1818 Muhammad 

Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, invaded the Najd, captured al-Dir’iyyah, and 

sent Abdullah ibn Saud, the Saudi ruler, to Istanbul where he was beheaded 

ending the first Saudi state.138

From its inception, the exceptionalist ideology and expansionist goals of 

Saudi Arabia resembled the empires of the region more than the emirates. 

Only when it overreached was its expansion stopped and ultimately the state 

destroyed. This was a valuable lesson learned. In 1824, as the Turks withdrew 

from the Najd, Turki ibn Abdullah, son of the beheaded ruler of the first 

Saudi state, reestablished Saudi rule. In 1837 Faisal bin Turki refused to pay 

the annual tribute to the Egyptians, was removed, and sent to Cairo. His son 

Abdullah replaced him. What ensued was a half century of internal family 

strife in which various factions sought aid from outsiders to defeat their 

family rivals. In 1887 Muhammad ibn Rashid, the leader of a rival tribal clan, 

intervened on behalf one of the claimants, occupying Riyadh; eventually, in 

1891, Rashid defeated the Saudis and their allies forcing the Saudi claimant, 

Abd-al-Rahman ibn Abdullah, to seek refuge in Kuwait. The instability of 

the second Saudi state taught yet another valuable lesson about internal 

competition and the dangers of rival claims to the throne.139

In 1902 the third Saudi state reemerged when Abd-al-Aziz ibn Saud 

launched a campaign from Kuwait with the backing of the Sabah of Kuwait 

to recapture Riyadh from the Rashids, now aligned with the Ottomans. The 

Sabahs were safe behind their 1899 British treaty and wanted to undermine 

potential Ottoman and Rashid commercial competition.140 When World War 
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I broke out, the British needed an ally in eastern Arabia, and in December 

1915 an Anglo-Saudi Treaty granted Ibn Saud a subsidy, weapons, and support. It also stipulated that other agreements required British approval and 

prohibited raiding against Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the Trucial States, and 

Oman.141 When Ibn Saud made his move against Sharif Hussein in the Hijaz, 

the British did not intervene despite promises of support for the Hashemites. 

Mecca fell to Saudi forces in December 1924 and Jidda in January 1925. The 

British now made it clear that Trans-Jordan and Iraq was off limits to Saudi 

raiding. In November 1925 Ibn Saud agreed to these conditions. 

The agreement angered many of the Ikhwan, or Muslim brothers—the 

most ardent followers of Abd-al-Wahhab—who saw it as a repudiation of 

the Wahhabi mandate for jihad and a curb on their nomadic lives. It was 

also accompanied by a decree from Ibn Saud that abolished tribal lands 

and claimed them for the state. In 1927 the British recognized Ibn Saud as 

the ruler of the Najd, Hijaz, and Asir and in turn provided him Royal Air 

Force (RAF) support as required against his rivals; Saud recognized British 

interests in the Gulf.142 Tribal unrest not withstanding, in compromising 

with the British Ibn Saud demonstrated that he understood the error of 

the first Saudi state—namely, overreaching in the face of power that was 

capable of destroying the Kingdom. In the post-1932 period he showed that 

he understood the problem with the second Saudi state. Ibn Saud moved to 

marginalize the other branches of the Saudi family to make certain that any 

heir to the Saudi throne would be one of his direct descendants. He made it 

clear that he expected to be succeeded by Saud ibn Abd-al-Aziz, his senior 

son with Faisal ibn Abd-al-Aziz as the next in line. 

Twenty years after its formation, the Saudi state faced the succession 

crisis that Ibn Saud had anticipated. He died in 1953 and the crown passed to 

Saud ibn Abd-al-Aziz ibn Saud (1953–1964), the senior son. In Egypt, Gamal 

Abdul Nasser called for an end to “feudal regimes” and pan-Arab unification was wildly popular even in conservative Saudi Arabia. Saud was simply 

incapable of formulating a political or economic strategy for the Kingdom. 

Nasser was more popular in Saudi Arabia than was King Saud. Nasser was 

openly described by many in the West and particularly the U.S. as “the 

wave of the future.” As Sir Charles Johnston, British ambassador to Jordan, 

pointed out, “The Americans should not allow any infantile anti-Monarchist prejudices to blind them to this fact. Monarchy is a very ancient and 
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tenacious principle, in the Arab world. It would be naïve to think that, after 

living with it for millennia, the Arab world is suddenly going to drop it.”143

The attitude Johnston described continues in varied forms even today—that 

is, the preoccupation with democratizing the region much to the irritation 

of the Saudi government. From their vantage point, neither their role as 

an ally nor their considerable accomplishments in surviving in a volatile, 

unstable region are adequately understood or appreciated. 

Between 1958 and 1963 the royal family found a formula of reform and 

political restructuring that allowed the state to survive and thrive. King 

Saud and his supporters struggled for control against Crown Prince Faisal 

ibn Abd-al-Aziz—who was supported most prominently by the seven full 

brothers (known as the Sudayri Seven)—and created the modern Saudi 

state. The surviving Sudayri brothers, now in their late 70s, still control 

the key ministries of aviation and defense and interior. In 1973 King Faisal 

initiated an oil embargo in reaction to U.S. support for Israel that flexed the 

Kingdom’s economic muscle.144 The state that many believed was on the 

verge of collapse only a few years before had metamorphosed into a global 

economic power. For 50 years, the modern state constructed by Faisal has 

provided a political core around which the sons of Ibn Saud have exercised 

global, political, and economic power. As one senior Saudi prince put it 

when asked about the ability of the Kingdom to survive current crises, “In 

the fifties, they said we were finished and that Nasser was the wave of the 

future—where is Nasserism now and where are we?” 145

Saudi Arabia views itself as the leader of the Arab Gulf, particularly 

following the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the formation of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council in 1980. Prior to the collapse of the Shah, U.S. policy 

had an ambiguous tenor. Iran and Saudi Arabia were viewed as key components of the so-called U.S. “pillar policy, but Washington viewed Iran as 

the potential military power in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia as the economic 

component.” 146 In 1979 the Carter Doctrine committed the U.S. to defend 

the Gulf states against outside aggression and subversion. Both Riyadh and 

Washington saw the GCC as a vehicle for regional collective security with 

Saudi Arabia as the senior partner. More recently the Bush Administration 

pushed this view of collective Gulf security. This goal has not been realized 

for numerous reasons but foremost because it does not align with the historical Gulf security paradigm. 
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The Future in Context. During the next 5 years, the GCC issue and the role 

of the U.S. in the Gulf may contribute to increased Saudi disenchantment. 

There is an increasing feeling that “the United States is no longer a reliable 

ally.” 147 More accurately, official Saudi Arabia’s faith in U.S. policy judgment 

has been shaken to its core. The outcome of the first Gulf war, the Saudi view 

that criticism for 911 was unfair, resentment over “irresponsible” pressure for 

political liberalization, and the carte blanche given to Israel to subjugate the 

Palestinians contributed to the view that U.S. judgment was fundamentally 

flawed. Then from Riyadh’s point of view, the 2003 invasion of Iraq created 

a potential security disaster. The removal of a Sunni-dominated government 

with no plan or forethought and the rise of what many Saudis viewed as “the 

Iranian government in Baghdad” shocked Riyadh.148 Public expressions of 

concern about Iranian influence in Baghdad have moderated somewhat, 

but privately there is little abatement. Having created a “disaster” for the 

interests of the Kingdom and the Gulf emirates, the problems associated 

with Iraq brought calls in the U.S. for the withdrawal of U.S. troops leaving 

Iraq under the control of a pro-Iranian and anti-Saudi government and 

political chaos on its doorstep. From a Saudi point of view, the best outcome 

given the current situation would be a unified Iraq with a staunchly Arab 

nationalist government.149 From Riyadh’s point of view, this would also 

include the caveat that any unified Iraqi state would not threaten its Arab 

neighbors. This represents the optimum state of affairs with regard to Iraq; 

given the current state of affairs, at least in the foreseeable future, it is a 

highly unlikely outcome. As a result, Riyadh is undoubtedly evaluating its 

alternatives in the more likely event that Iraq faces more instability and a 

political future in which Iran will work assiduously for increased influence 

and leverage. 

For good measure, the Bush administration chose to ignore Saudi, 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and even Israeli advice to delay 

elections in the Palestinian territories, and Hamas won. To compound the 

problem, the U.S. has then looked the other way while Israel attempts to 

crush Hamas and in the process kills hundreds of Palestinian civilians, 

further radicalizing an already inflamed Middle East. Riyadh also viewed 

Washington’s policies as partially responsible for Hezbollah’s success in 

Lebanon. U.S. miscues were extending Iran’s influence and Shi’a clout 

from Iran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. The level of apprehension 
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is further illustrated by Saudi concerns at some level that U.S. plans for a 

rapprochement with Iran might be intended to replace Saudi Arabia as the 

U.S. primary ally in the Gulf.150 As unimaginable as this may seem in any 

foreseeable future, it illustrates the degree of mistrust that has crept into 

the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as a result of the events 

of the last 8 years.

Added to these issues, U.S. policy in the Arabian Gulf thwarted the Saudi 

vision of the GCC. The U.S. bilateral relationships around the Gulf encouraged the policy independence of the emirates. Since Saudi Arabia would 

clearly be the dominant partner in GCC collective security, Riyadh viewed 

this as a critical policy goal both from the standpoint of Gulf security and 

because it fit the Kingdom’s image of its role in the region. If indeed that 

was the desired policy goal of the United States, then rather than expanding 

its bilateral ties in the region, Washington needed to be pulling back and 

pressing the emirates to fully embrace the GCC as the collective security 

arrangement. The current situation in which the U.S. embraced the idea of 

collective security through the GCC but continued to expand its bilateral 

relations with the emirates encouraging bilateral security arrangements 

fundamentally conflicted. One of two things was occurring. Either the U.S.

was being duplicitous in its approach to Gulf security and the Saudi role in 

King Abdullah bin Abdul al-Saud meets with Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates at the king’s hunting lodge in Saudi Arabia, 17 

January 2007. DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby. 
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it, or Washington was simply unaware. Riyadh does not want to see an end, 

by any stretch of the imagination, to U.S. involvement in the Gulf; however, 

it would prefer to see U.S. policy first aligned with that of the Kingdom and 

then pursued in the region. No matter what the reason, the U.S. 21st century 

policy mirrored that of the British in the early 20th century by providing 

a shield behind which the Gulf emirates maintain their independence and 

offering an alternative to Saudi leadership of the Arab Gulf. 

Looking forward no matter what the problems, U.S. security guarantees are more critical than ever to Saudi Arabia given the Iranian gains in 

Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear program. The Kingdom 

will pursue bilateral agreements that tie the U.S. to the Saudi defense and 

pressure Washington to maintain pressure on Iran. Recently, the U.S. and 

Saudi Arabia concluded a security agreement that commits Washington to 

provide security for Saudi oil infrastructure. It seems to guarantee that an 

attack on the Kingdom’s source of wealth will result in a counterstrike by 

the U.S. More important is the implication that an attack on Saudi facilities is tantamount to an attack on the United States. Behind such a shield, 

the Saudis can develop their border security efforts utilizing an aggressive 

in-depth approach. Through payments to Sunni tribal and political elements in Iraq, Saudi security services may attempt to create a de facto Iraqi 

Sunni buffer against Shi’a expansion. The possibility that pro-Saudi and 

pro-Iranian proxies will clash in Iraq could produce direct retaliation and 

lead to a direct confrontation with obvious implications for the U.S. 

With regard to the Gulf states, the Kingdom will press for collective 

security agreements and close Arab coordination under the GCC umbrella. 

Because of the last 8 years, the Saudis are justifiably concerned that the 

Obama administration, or any U.S. administration for that matter, has the 

capability to make significant misjudgments that compound Arab Gulf 

security problems. Such misjudgments could come in the form of pushing 

for internal political liberalization or a new U.S. relationship with Iran that 

sacrificed the security interests and stability of the Arab Gulf states. The 

issue of liberalization potentially poses a twin threat to the Kingdom. The 

U.S. might actually influence one or more of the emirates to take actions 

that ultimately undermine its leadership. In particular, problems in Bahrain 

with its large Shi’a population and history of Iranian claims have direct 

implications for the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia and their own large 

Shi’a population, and some U.S. officials and members of Congress have 
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demonstrated a real lack of understanding of the implications of this issue. 

Kuwait is another example of what the Saudis view as the U.S. propensity 

to lead the emirates astray. The Saudi view is that they opposed the invasion of Iraq as did Turkey and that bilateral U.S. pressure on Kuwait drew 

it into a strategically problematic and tactically ill-conceived adventure 

that created significant problems for the emirate. A more Saudi-integrated 

GCC would provide support for resisting U.S. pressure and bad advice. In 

effect, U.S. bilateral relations with the smaller Gulf states encouraged and 

supported their ability to pursue independent policies with which the Saudis 

disagree. 

Despite criticism of Iran and its policies, Qatar, Dubai, and Oman maintain reasonable-to-good relations with Iran. In addition, liberalization in the 

Gulf emirates has put significant pressure on the Saudi government to follow 

suit. In this regard, the free-wheeling al-Jazira news operating from Qatar 

has become a real aggravation for Saudi Arabia. The government in Riyadh 

believes that, given the expansion of Iranian influence, the Arab Gulf states 

need to speak with a single voice. That voice could be any individual from 

any of the Gulf states as long as the policy positions agree with those held 

in Riyadh. Some have compared Qatar’s independent attitudes and policies 

to those of Kuwait during the 1970s and early 1980s and speculate that the 

realities of the region will ultimately bring policy shifts that will be more 

in line with those shared by the other states of the Gulf. In addition, Saudi 

Arabia and all of the Arab Gulf states will be monitoring very closely the 

new U.S. opening to Iran to ensure their interests are not sacrificed by either 

a misstep or a conscious decision by Washington. 

The issue of internal security is intrinsically related to Gulf security. 

There is a tendency in the region to understate or hide internal problems. 

Saudi authorities underestimated the depth and breadth of the internal 

radical movement and its potential for causing political, economic, and 

social instability while undermining Saudi influence and relationships 

abroad. Wanting to avoid mistakes of the past, Saudi Arabia is upgrading 

border security, port security, petroleum infrastructure security, security 

training, and internal security operations. The Saudi government is being 

very innovative in its approach to terrorism by utilizing a PRAC strategy 

(Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare). Within the Ministry of Interior 

(MOI), the PRAC reports through Prince Muhammad ibn Nayef, the son of 

the Minister of Interior Prince Nayef ibn Abd-al-Aziz. The campaign targets 
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the “ideological infrastructure that supports and breeds violent Islamic 

extremists.” 151 Saudi officials claim an “80 to 90 percent success rate” with 

only a few dozen being rearrested for security-related offensives.152 As with 

any rehabilitation program, there has been some recidivism, but the focus 

and support of the most senior levels of government has made a real difference not only in the successful prosecution of both coercive and persuasive approaches but also in the creativity being applied to a very complex 

problem. 

Succession represents the greatest potential threat to the Saudi monarchy. 

The sons of Abd-al-Aziz have reached their 70s and 80s. At some point in 

the near future the crown will pass to a grandson. Sheer numbers and ambitions make this a most complicated problem. In late 2007, King Abdullah 

addressed the issue directly. On 8 October, he added bylaws to the 25-article 

“Allegiance Law of Succession.” In a majlis that included every surviving son 

and many of the grandsons of Ibn Saud, he named an Allegiance Council. 

It has 35 members represented by each of the surviving sons of Ibn Saud or 

if deceased, by a grandson chosen by that branch of the family. There were 

16 sons and 19 grandsons. The King named Mish’al ibn Abd-al-Aziz, the 

former Deputy Defense Minister and Governor of Mecca, as the chairman 

of this commission empowered to select future kings.153 Although the bylaws 

left certain questions unanswered, Abdullah’s declaration was a significant 

step forward in transparency. It also admonished all “to work for the unity 

of the ruling family.” How it will play out remains to be seen. Clearly, King 

Abdullah understands the risks and wants to rationalize the process.154 In 

more than 100 years, one succession threatened the Saudi dynasty. The critical struggle between Saud and Faisal established a structure around which 

new monarchs have been chosen for over half a century. King Abdullah is 

now attempting to address the next 50 years. 

In the future, security and stability require a nonpetroleum-based economy. With a growing focus on the use of sovereign wealth to invest for the 

long-term, moves are underway to offshore agricultural production as a 

hedge against commodity inflation and numerous other projects to move 

the Kingdom to a self-sustaining economy. Progress has been spotty, and 

it remains to be seen how this will work out. The Saudi leadership knows 

that long-sought population growth has created dangerous under- and 

unemployment among the young and a transformation of the economy 

will be critical. The second issue is reform. Political, economic, and social 
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challenges have created escalating calls for reform. King Abdullah supports 

change and may even support Talal ibn Abd-al-Aziz’s recent call for the 

creation of political parties. In the coming years, there will be attempts to 

find the balance between reform and the preservation of the Saudi state. 

King Abdullah and his successors, like Ibn Saud and Faisal before them, 

must find the middle passage between tradition, stagnation, and liberalization run amok without threatening the stability of the state.155 Historically, 

the Saudi tradition of statecraft and family consensus has demonstrated 

the ability to innovate without compromising Saudi rule. Ibn Saud radically altered the relationship between the Ikhwan, the mutawwa—that is, 

enforcers of religious law and himself. Faisal instituted reforms that at the 

time were considered radical, including a complete overhaul of the financial 

system with accountability levied on the King and education for women. The 

monarchy will experiment, albeit conservatively, on reforms and accountability in an effort to find equilibrium. Finding this equilibrium allowed 

Ibn Saud to create the state; it allowed Faisal to construct a modern state, 

and finding it will allow the next generation of Saudi rulers to address the 

challenges of the 21st century. 

When taken in context, all of these initiatives are interlinked. Combined 

they constitute the Gordian Knot of Saudi Arabia’s future. There is broad 

concern about the “fragility” of the Saudi state.156 In point of fact, the monarchy has proved itself to be far more adaptive than anyone gives them 

credit for being. The lesson of the late 1950s and early 1960s is an excellent 

case-on-point. In 1963 Sir Charles Johnston, during a period of extreme 

instability, commented on U.S. concerns about Saudi “fragility”:

The Saudi regime is unstable at all times and could blow up tomorrow. But Faisal is after all not a fool and is capable of judging his 

own interest. ...The State Department are [sic] assuming a heavy 

responsibility in claiming to understand Faisal’s interests...better 

than [he]. The American theory that an Arab Republic has something 

inherently more stable about it than an Arab monarchy seems to me 

to be more derived from ideology than fact.157

As things turned out, Faisal was far more capable of judging his interests than other leaders in the region like Nasser. Through his reforms and 

policies, Faisal created a state in which, no matter what the problems, there 

is no apparent political alternative to the Saud family.158 Sir Charles was 
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right and would no doubt have the same view of King Abdullah and rightly 

so. The Kingdom has certainly proven more stable than Republican Iraq. 

Stability over the last three decades in Syria and Egypt may rival that of the 

Kingdom but only after the installation of the Assad dynasty in Damascus 

and what may be a Mubarak one in Cairo. No republic can boast of a century 

of relatively stable rule and more than 250 years of either political power 

or influence in the region. Could lightning strike? Perhaps, but it is highly 

unlikely. Nevertheless, official U.S. concern and speculation will no doubt 

continue. One thing is certain, given the current U.S. track record in the 

region: it will be a long time before Saudi Arabia follows any advice from 

Washington with which they do not already agree.

The Dysfunctional States

Two other Arab states, or perhaps would-be states, have an impact on 

the future of the Gulf. Yemen and Iraq are too unstable to have influence 

through conventional policy on the Gulf states, but their very instability has 

a clear effect on states in the region. A cursory examination of their potential 

paths and impact on the stability of the region is useful.

Yemen

Instability in Yemen caused by tribal and political factionalism and a lack 

of government control has been a chronic condition since the inception 

of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. The compromises necessary to end 

the civil war, 1962–1970, simply do not lend themselves to strong central 

government. As a result, control from the center ebbs and flows. In the 

mid-1990s, attempts to imbue the current government with the trappings 

of a centralized functioning modern state were largely wishful thinking. 

This is a misunderstanding; a united Yemeni state did not emerge from the 

triumph of Ali Abdullah Salih’s northern government. There is now a crisislike atmosphere with U.S. officials worrying about Yemen “becoming a failed 

state.” In a conventional sense, Yemen has always been a failed state, but not 

necessarily a failed society. Yemen is a coalition of armed tribal and clan 

interest groups that coalesce around a government dominated by a tribal 

and clan grouping. The degree to which the central government has authority is largely determined by co-opting tribal and clan elements to support 

a given policy. All this is complicated by the fastest population growth in 
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the world, limited economic opportunity, limited petroleum resources and 

an ever-dwindling supply of water. Yemen, as a source of instability on the 

Arabian Peninsula, a breeding ground for militant Islamists, and a difficult 

foreign policy challenge, is nothing new. 

In the 5-to-10 year time frame, Salih could pass from the political scene. 

An officer in the army or perhaps the security services will emerge as the 

new leader. The degree to which this person and those supporting him 

will be able to control Yemen will depend on their success in balancing 

the competing factions and co-opting the potential opposition. Violence 

in Yemen on the part of disaffected groups is the norm, not the exception. The key to survival is the balancing act, and Ali Abdullah Salih has 

exceeded beyond all expectations. The policy of any Yemeni government 

for the foreseeable future will be to maintain the imperfect equilibrium in 

which it can survive.

The Saudis understand Yemen and have buffered themselves by maintaining influence with the tribes in the northern border regions and with 

various officials in Sanaa. Saudi Arabia is justified in its concern about 

destabilizing activities that could spill over into the Kingdom. Riyadh has 

steadfastly refused to allow Yemen membership in the GCC. The Saudis view 

Yemen membership as a potential destabilizing influence that might damage 

the current public face of consensus that the GCC is often able to project. 

Opposition by the more conservative Gulf Arab states to Yemen’s membership is further assured by Iranian calls for Yemen’s inclusion in the “Gulf 

community and the GCC.”159 The Iranians are transparently attempting to 

use Yemen membership in the GCC as a wedge issue in undermining GCC

solidarity in opposition to Iranian policies in the region, and this virtually 

assures Yemen’s continued status as an “observer” in GCC affairs. 

This situation likely means that Yemen will have to go it alone over the 

next 10 years as it has over the last 30, but there are risks. A post-Taliban 

Afghanistan-like breakdown would produce additional safe havens for terrorists. These safe havens could destabilize areas in both Saudi Arabia and 

Oman. The Saudi-Yemeni border is ill-defined with a significant flow of 

largely unregulated cross-border activity. The Omani-Yemen border was 

finally demarcated in the mid-1990s but as one author pointed out, “No 

border settlement in the Gulf ever seems to be final,” and there is a continuing risk that Yemen may make claims to Omani territory.160 At the current 

time, Yemen is a center for jihadist activity, but they have limited ability to 
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export it outside the borders of the country. A total disintegration might 

change that dynamic. 

This is possible but unlikely. Existing political and tribal arrangements 

have worked to some degree for 30 years. The likely scenario would be a 

period of instability followed by the establishment of an equilibrium that 

would have its ups and downs just as the government of Ali Abdullah 

Salih has had. Policymakers tend to forget that when Salih took power, two 

presidents in rapid succession had been assassinated; the Soviet Union was 

backing the PDRY with advisors and weapons, and the PDRY was in turn 

backing the National Democratic Front (NDF). The Yemeni power structure 

cannot be understood in a conventional western sense. Any Yemeni solution 

will be inherently unstable and contain the potential for terrorist mischief. 

Also, when the thought of intervention or “fixing Yemen” appears, think 

about the Egyptian investment of 1962 to 1968 and expunge the thought 

immediately.

Iraq

Undoubtedly the ultimate outcome in Iraq will have important consequences 

for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and perhaps even Bahrain. The emirates of the 

southern Gulf will likely be less affected. If the current U.S. policies vis-à-vis 

Iraq are successful, a Shi’a-dominated government will be able to control 

the entire country. In a perfect world, this control would be democratic with 

the sectarian groups sharing the oil wealth, economic prosperity, political 

participation, and physical security; however, Iraq is not a perfect world. 

If the current Iraqi government manages to extend its control over the 

entire country and maintain that posture after a U.S. withdrawal, the Sunni 

who have not already fled will find their current position, as second-class 

citizens, worsen. If the threat of U.S. intervention to maintain a strategic 

status quo is removed, Iranian influence will grow during this period in 

which the Shi’a attempt to exert control over the Sunni. It is unlikely that 

the Iraqi government—no matter how much progress they believe that they 

have made—can do the job alone; thus it is only logical that the additional 

support would come from Iran whose influence already permeates the Green 

Zone. Recent cooperation between the Maliki government and Sunni groups 

represents the tactical “divide-and-conquer” approach to Iraqi politics as 

opposed to any real strategic realignment. It is this struggle that the Iraqi 

government faces for the next 5 years or perhaps longer. If the U.S. continues 
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a sizable presence in Iraq in terms of military training and support, then 

Iraqi nationalists and the various groups—that is, Sunni, Kurd, and secular 

Shi’ia that oppose Iranian influence—may well emerge as a political force 

capable of blunting the long-term Iranian goals of maintaining its influence 

in Baghdad and creating a weak, client state in Iraq.

Despite recent electoral trends, the process of trying to control the country will intensify sectarian issues and worsen resistance of Iraqi Sunnis. 

While the Shi’a-dominated Baghdad government will no doubt resent at one 

level or another the interference and influence of Iran in its internal affairs, 

it will tolerate it because aggravations with Iran will be relatively minor 

when viewed in the context of the hostility from Sunni political elements 

within Iraq and from their backers in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. 

These frictions could escalate into threats and counterthreats and resurrect old territorial claims and jealousies. Although Arab, Iraq’s tactical ally 

would likely be Iran simply because of the fear and hostility that a rearmed 

Iraq with a well-equipped army and a subjugated Sunni population would 

incur from the Arab Gulf states. The new Iraq would be no happier about 

Kuwait’s ability to bottle up its ports or unwillingness to forgive Iraqi debts 

than Saddam Hussein. Over the longer term, the emergence of a strong, 

centralized Iraq would also resurrect a strategic threat to Iran as well. An 

independent nationalist government in Baghdad, even though Shi’ia, would 

ultimately present a threat to Iran too. While all the states of region call 

for a strong, stable Iraq, there is more than a little reason to question their 

sincerity. It is simply a matter of national interest—a strong Iraq has always 

emerged as a threat to its neighbors. 

The other more appealing scenario from a Gulf point of view is that 

the current policy fails. The Iraqi government is unable to secure its territory. Iraq devolves into a series of Shi’a fiefdoms while the Sunnis are able, 

with support from the Arab Gulf states, to establish their own area like 

Kurdistan. This de facto partition could be the beginning of a highly federated Iraq. In this scenario, Iraq as a state will not have real policies that 

extend beyond its borders. The Sunni areas will find themselves increasingly 

aligned with Jordan and the Gulf Arab states. While not the ideal from a 

Gulf Arab point of view, it is far better than the emergence of a unified Shi’a 

Iraqi state either strongly influenced by Tehran or one that emerges a strong 

threat to its neighbors in the region. 
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Conclusion

The Arab perspective on Gulf security over the next 5 to 10 years in the 

context of the historical narrative of state and dynastic development provides a series of useful insights. These, by necessity, are generalizations, 

but the perspective offers 250 years of practice, experience, and example. It 

allows the analyst to transcend exceptionalist myopia in which events that 

defy historical norms and are misidentified as permanent policy fixtures 

of the region; the GCC is an example. Each state in the region has its own 

individual narrative that occurs within the overall structure of the wider 

historical paradigm. How can this GSS environment be summarized in a 

manner that is useful to policymakers? 

First, the emirates of the Arab Gulf are the central essential element in 

the historical GSS. The large states are obviously important, but they are 

fundamentally different because of size, potential influence, and national 

ambitions. The emirates have been the fundamental building bloc for security in the Arab Gulf. This system has been based on bilateral relationships 

with first the British and now the U.S., and it has provided dynastic security and a stable environment for economic development. As a result, it is 

the approach to security preferred by the emirates. In addition, there is an 

almost visceral reluctance to seek a primary security alignment with one of 

the large powers in the Gulf. This reluctance is in part rational and in part 

based on suspicions arguably transmitted by the historical threat posed by 

their larger neighbors. In this area, any progress toward a truly integrated 

defense structure between the emirates will be slow at best. The governments 

simply want to maintain their own militaries while paying lip service to a 

real GCC common force. The U.S. is the preferred shield against external 

threats with secondary relationships with the other western powers.

The same historical insecurity drives security preferences related to economic considerations. Despite extensive investments in the local economy, 

a strong undercurrent exists that argues for diversification of risk. Whether 

it is risk driven by regional, political, and military instability or risk driven 

by fears that economic growth cannot be sustained in a non-rentier, postpetroleum environment is immaterial. Diversification through sovereign 

wealth funds and other investment structures is aimed at sustaining prosperity in the face of catastrophic drops in the price of oil or eventually when 
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the oil-based economy is no longer viable. All the Gulf emirates are investing 

in infrastructure improvements that will diversify their economies. Dubai 

and Qatar are perhaps the most prominent but it remains to be seen if 

they can truly transform themselves into freestanding economies no longer 

dependent on oil. This is a question that has yet to be answered. All of the 

investment and infrastructure improvements are paid for by oil revenues, 

and it is a challenge to make the transition; nevertheless that is the goal.

Petroleum infrastructure security is increasingly important. Securing 

pipelines, refineries, offshore platforms, and related infrastructure requires 

a significant build-up in border, maritime, and internal security capabilities. 

To be sure, there are other potential internal security issues, but protecting the petroleum base tips the scales toward expenditures to support ever 

more sophisticated police and security forces and systems. This area will 

be an ongoing focus with ever-increasing resources applied and a greater 

likelihood for increased cooperation through the GCC. The mutual benefits 

from joint maritime, border, and police operations and coordination are 

potentially so significant that the security systems and efforts will become 

much more integrated.

For the foreseeable future, the insistence of the emirates on the bilateral 

approach to strategic security with the United States will continue to be, at 

times, a frustration to Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has made real strides in 

settling long-standing differences with the various Gulf states. The recent 

border demarcation agreement with Qatar is a case in point. However, the 

fact remains that the smaller emirates prefer their strategic security be guaranteed by a friendly great power from outside the region. All of the ruling 

families in the emirates survived because their interests and those of the 

British Empire more or less coincided. From the point of view of the emirates themselves, British colonialism was not an issue. It was a relationship 

that, while contentious at times, allowed them to maintain their independence and ultimately enjoy largess of their petroleum resources. The decades 

after the British withdrawal brought a chain of events that reinforced their 

historical inclinations about security, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq 

war, the “tanker war” in the Gulf, the invasion of Kuwait, and finally the 

invasion of Iraq. The lesson that the emirates fell back on was the historical lesson of dynastic survival—namely, that the best security for the state 

and the ruling family did not come from the region itself but rather from 

an outside power with shared interests. For this reason, real integration of 
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military and defense organizations under the GCC will simply not happen, 

and this will be a frustration for Saudi Arabia. 

For Saudi Arabia, the lone large cohesive Arab state in the Gulf, the 

future promises to be somewhat similar but perhaps with greater frustrations. For the Kingdom, the issue is not just survival. The Saudis have real 

large-state aspirations. They see themselves as the leaders of the Gulf Arabs, 

and in that vein, the dominant state in the GCC. The GCC is a natural 

institution for cooperation on economic, diplomatic, and most of all integrated defense and security issues. Riyadh views a bilateral relationship 

with the United States as crucial but it wants the overall relationship with 

the Gulf states to be focused in more of a collective fashion through the 

GCC and the Kingdom. There is deep concern that Washington may make 

another mistake and further cripple the security and defense postures of 

the Sunni Arab Gulf states as it did with the invasion of Iraq. There is growing frustration with the ability of the Gulf emirates to pursue independent 

policies with some degree of impunity because of their bilateral security 

arrangements with the U.S. These policies are viewed as inconsistent with a 

more cohesive defense policy for the Gulf. Despite these concerns, the most 

important security issues for the Kingdom over the next 5 to 10 years will be 

internal—the nonpetroleum economy, unemployment, institutional reform, 

infrastructure security, border security, and most important succession. 

King Abdullah’s government is moving to address these issues, and time 

will test how effective the measures will be. 

The issue of a Palestinian state and unqualified U.S. support under the 

Bush administration for any policy that Israel labeled antiterrorist undermined U.S. credibility not only on the Arab street but among officials as 

well. Bush policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue have become an increasingly sensitive collective security issue for all of the Gulf states. It severely 

complicates both the internal security situation and the external credibility 

of the Gulf Arabs. The policies of the Bush administration with regard to 

Palestine were first a shock and then a severe disappointment to the Arab 

leadership in the region. Most Arab leadership had assumed that George 

W. Bush would follow the policies of his father, George H. W. Bush, in at 

least attempting to give the appearance of even-handedness with regard to 

the Palestinians. In fact, from an Arab perspective, Bush-administration 

policies appear to have been dictated by Israel and its U.S. supporters. For 

example, Gulf Arab officials often cite the demand that Palestinians adhere 
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to the letter of agreements with Israel while turning a blind eye not just to 

the refusal of Israel to remove settlements on the West Bank but also to the 

active expansion of those settlements. Leaving whatever moral and Muslim 

solidarity issues aside, U.S. policy has thoroughly embarrassed and further 

frayed the confidence of the Arab Gulf in U.S. judgment and friendship. It 

has handed the enemies of the pro-western, moderate Gulf leaders the gift 

of a critical “wedge issue” with which to further undermine their security, 

stability, and credibility. Here again, in the view of the Gulf Arab leaders the 

principal beneficiaries have been Iran and radical Arab political groups. 

In particular, it has allowed Iran to expand its influence with heretofore 

purely Arab movements and expand the influence of power of its surrogates in the Arab world. There is pervasive concern around the Arab Gulf 

that U.S. policy in Iraq and with regard to Palestine has allowed Iran to 

consolidate its leadership in the Shi’a communities of the region and to 

make threatened inroads among Sunni groups.161 The underlying frustration 

expressed almost unanimously by Gulf Arab officials at what they perceive 

as the lack of understanding and a disregard for the political reality in 

which they live could very well lead to less cooperation with the U.S. and 

a potentially more independent political course. Decreased cooperation or 

increased policy separation carries with it significant geopolitical security 

risks for all involved. An immediate concern over the next 2 to 3 years 

will be U.S. policy toward Iran. While a great deal of support exists for the 

political change in Washington represented by the Obama administration, 

there is concern, resulting in large part by the policy mistakes of the Bush 

administration, that Obama may pursue conciliatory policies with Iran that 

encourage Iranian adventurism and undermine U.S. Arab allies in the Gulf. 

All of the Gulf Arab states want to see close consultation with the U.S. and 

transparency on any new U.S. policy initiatives with Iran. The message is 

clearly talk if you like but do not give away anything significant because the 

Iranians have no incentive to compromise on anything of substance.162

The Arab Gulf has functioned within a very consistent paradigm over the 

last two centuries. It is this historical context that is the single most important determining factor when looking at future policy. The emirates prefer 

the protection of a great power through bilateral defense arrangements. Each 

has its own set of priorities and peculiarities; for sound historical reasons, 

they have learned to see the large states of the region as potential threats 

to their independence and dynastic ambitions. Historically, the guarantees 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

of one generation are quickly forgotten in the next. It would be impossible 

to list all the examples, but Iran’s foregoing a claim to Bahrain in the early 

1970s only to revive it later in the decade is a glaring example. The Kuwaitis 

do not trust Iraqi guarantees nor do the Qataris entirely trust Saudi ones. 

The only constant has been the guarantee of an outside power.

This situation will not change if the current GSS is maintained. The 

current situation has arguably lasted 250 years, and there is no reason for 

it to change. The threat posed by Iran in one sense probably assures willing participation of the Gulf emirates in the GSS. Of the large Arab states, 

Saudi Arabian frustrations will ebb and flow over the next decade. They will 

seek to exert more influence in the relationship with the United States as it 

pertains to the Gulf, but frustrations notwithstanding, security policy will 

reflect a continued desire for strong bilateral guarantees and a preeminent 

leadership role among the Arab Gulf states. A major shift, or the perception 

of a major shift, in the posture of the United States in the Arab Gulf might 

create critical uncertainties, but only extreme uncertainty about U.S. intentions would lead to a major reformulation of the Gulf security paradigm. 

In such an unlikely event, any number of factors might come into play. 

Saudi Arabia would attempt to expand its influence as would Iran. While 

the emirates might accept temporary protection from a large state within 

the region, they would actively seek external guarantees from new outside 

partners. The lessons of the last two centuries have been learned too well 

and the system has been highly beneficial to dynastic fortunes of the ruling 

elites of the Arabian Gulf. 

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Endnotes

1. Fareed Zakaria, “Interview with Henry Kissinger,” GPS CNN International, 9 

June 2008.

2. What often is accepted as historical background with the U.S. government is a 

perspective on the last 30 to 50 years in the region. In reality, this is only a tactical 

point of reference since most of the ongoing controversies, despite being couched 

in 21st century terms, originate from a much deeper historical perspective. It is a 

byproduct of an international relations approach to understanding a region with 

its tendency to be light on in-depth political, cultural, and social knowledge.

3. The tactical situation can telescope from the next 5 to 10 years in the Persian 

Gulf to the 25 years of Muhammad Reza Shah’s post-coup rule in Iran (1953-

1979)—a foreign regime totally outside the historical norm—or it can be the 

80-year-old British-created anomaly of Iraq that the U.S. destroyed in 8 weeks. 

Because a policy or situation is outside the norm does not mean that for reasons 

of national interests it should not be pursued or supported; rather it means that 

it should be understood, and the risks understood from an understanding of the 

historical context. That the Shah’s regime collapsed like a house of cards or that 

Iraq disintegrated as a unified state is of no surprise at all to those who understand the historical context. Neither does it mean that supporting the Shah for 25 

years was a bad idea. It does, however, mean that viewing the Shah as essential to 

U.S. security and interests in the Gulf was placing a lot of eggs in a very unstable 

basket. 

4. Andrew Scott Cooper, “Showdown at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal That Helped Sink 

the Shah of Iran,” Middle East Journal 62 (Fall 2008): 567.

5. The Safavid Empire was founded by Shah Ismail in the early 16th century. At that 

time, Persia—now Iran—was principally Sunni. Convinced by missionaries from 

Bahrain of the validity of the Twelver Shi’a interpretation of Islam, Shah Ismail 

converted and then mandated the Twelver form of Shi’ism as the state religion. 

The term Twelver Shi’ism refers to those who believe that twelve Imams followed 

the death of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, and that the last Imam occulted 

and will return at the end of time. There are two other major forms of Shi’ism, 

sevener, also called Ismaili and fiver, the most prominent group being the Zaydis 

of Yemen, who believe that the occultation occurred with the seventh and fifth 

Imams respectively. Today the dominant Shi’a group is the Twelvers. From the 

time of the Safavids, Persia or Iran has been predominantly Twelver. For a concise explanation, see John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 1999), 44-49.

6. Malcolm C. Peck, Historical Dictionary of the Gulf Arab States (Toronto: The 

Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008), 233. (Hereinafter cited as Peck, Gulf Arab States.)

7. Christopher A. Bayly, Imperial Meridians: The British Empire and the World 17801830 (London: Longman Limited, 1994), 35-74. 
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8. The first shots of the conflict were actually fired in 1754 in the backwoods of 

Pennsylvania by a Virginia colonel named George Washington. It became a global 

conflict in 1756.

9. James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the 

British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 

1-5. 

10. Jospeh A. Kechichian, “Unity on the Arabian Peninsula,” in Iran, Iraq, and the 

Arab Gulf States, ed. John A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 281.

11. Sultan bin Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan, “The UAE Vision for Gulf Security,” in 

Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States, ed. John A. Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 

2001), 386.

12. Michael Knights, Troubled Waters: Future of U.S. Military Assistance in the Persian 

Gulf (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 

8-9.

13. Ibid., 9.

14. Anthony Cordesman, “Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net 

Assessment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article 

(Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 8 September 2008), 3; available from www.csis.org/

component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4863/type,1/ (accessed 9 March 

2009). 

15. Knights, Troubled Waters, 9.

16. An opinion voiced by military officers from the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait in July 

and August 2008.

17. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Can Conservative Arab Gulf Monarchies Endure a Fourth 

War in the Persian Gulf?” Middle East Journal 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007): 298.

18. J. E. Peterson, Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia (Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 

Inc., 2003), 61.

19. F. Gregory Gause III and Jill Crystal, “The Arab Gulf: Will Autocracy Define 

the Social Contract in 2015?” in The Middle East in 2015, ed. Judith Yaphe 

(Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, 2002), 190.

20. Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia 1750-1800 (Beirut: 

Khayats), 27.

21. It should be pointed out that the Seven Years’ War formally began in 1756, but 

the shooting actually started with George Washington’s initial foray against the 

French at Fort Duquesne at present day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1754.

22. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 170.

23. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States (London: Ithaca 

Press, 1998), 37. (Hereinafter cited as Zahlan, Modern Gulf States.)

24. Ibid., 39.

25. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Persian Gulf States – Country Studies (Washington, D.C.: 

Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1998), 58-59.
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

26. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: The Westview Press, 2003), 

110-111. 

27. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 48.

28. Ibid., 54.

29. Knights, Troubled Waters, 39.

30. Interview with knowledgeable official familiar with the historical working of the 

succession process in Kuwait. 

31. Comments of a senior Kuwaiti military officer on the dangers of a U.S. 

withdrawal.

32. “Iran nuclear dispute hurting neighbours: Kuwait,” The Peninsula, 10 August 

2008, 4.

33. Ibid.

34. “Kuwait Eyes Oil Storage Abroad – Iran Could Easily Shut Hormuz,” Arab Times, 

5 August 2008, 1, 8. Available from www.arabtimesonline.com/client/pagesdetails.asp?nid=20530&ccid=11 (accessed 9 March 2009).

35. Discussion with a U.S. official familiar with Kuwaiti attitudes on petroleum 

security.

36. “British Embassy Amman (Johnston) to Hadow (Foreign Office), 30 October 

1958,” Public Records Office, FO371/134021.

37. “France’s defence review – Let’s get real,” Economist, 21 June 2008, 63. Also available from www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11580198 

(accessed 9 March 2009).

38. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 37. It should be noted that this struggle for control in the 

southern Gulf paralleled another more protracted struggle that pitted the Shi’a 

Safavid Empire against the Sunni Ottoman Empire in what we now call Iraq. The 

struggle for Mesopotamia lasted from roughly the rise of the Safavid dynasty 

between 1500 and 1510 and the emergence of Shah Ismail I (1500-1524) until 

the mid-17th century when the Ottomans emerged as the winners. The Safavids 

developed from a mystical religious Sufi order founded by Sheikh Safi al-Din 

(1252-1334). The Safavids transformed Persia or Iran from a predominantly Sunni 

to an officially Shi’a state. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Sunni in one 

configuration or another constituted the ruling group in Mesopotamia, was the 

Sunni minority—“the 350-year-old applecart” that the U.S. overturned in 2003. 

For a more detailed but concise explanation, see John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford 

History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 363-371.

39. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 61.

40. Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj, 91, 101-102.

41. Habibur Rahman, The Emergence of Qata, The Turbulent Years 1627-1916 (London: 

Kegan Paul, 2005), 76-77. 

42. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 65.

43. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 38.

44. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 67. 
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45. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 39.

46. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 71.

47. Ibid., 72.

48. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 39

49. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 1988), 379.

50. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 77.

51. Ibid., 79.

52. Senior Bahraini official knowledgeable about political and reform issues.

53. Senior Kuwaiti political analyst. 

54. Senior U.S. official knowledgeable about Bahraini security issues.

55. Senior Bahraini official knowledgeable about political and reform issues.

56. Sarah Strickler, “des Konigs Enstandte,” Vanity Fair, German Edition, 5 June 

2008, 16.

57. “Shias in the Gulf - Grumbling and rumbling,” The Economist, 28 February 2009, 

51-52.

58. Speech by the Iranian Minister of the Interior Sadeq Mahsouli at the Bahrain 

Security Conference and Exposition, 24 February 2009, Manama, Bahrain. Prior 

to speaking, Mahsouli and Iran were taken to task in a blistering speech by the 

Qatari General Secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council Sheikh Abdul Rahman 

Bin Hamad Al Attiyah. 

59. Senior Bahraini official knowledgeable about political and reform issues. This is 

most interesting because as earlier pointed out, it has been a message that Iranians 

have been putting out in several quarters. It is very much an undercurrent in the 

diplomatic communities of several Gulf Arab states. It appears that Tehran is 

pushing that story line in several different places simultaneously. There is some 

logic to this being a very good line for the Iranians to take in the Gulf. They do 

not want to become more isolated in their own back yard. The Iranians want to 

get some separation between the Gulf emirates and Washington; thus, exploiting 

Arab unhappiness and in some cases outright disillusionment with U.S. policy 

in Iraq and the fact that no one in the Gulf wants to see another conflict, the 

Iranians are using the attraction of conspiracy-theory politics in the region to 

create a sense of caution vis-à-vis Iran. In short, if the U.S. were making a deal, 

a Gulf Arab state would not want to be too vociferous in supporting the current 

confrontation policy only to have Washington pull the rug from under them with 

some secret arrangement. 

60. Senior Bahraini official knowledgeable about Iran issues.

61. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 239.

62. Rahman, Emergence of Qatar, 82.

63. Ibid., 240.

64. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 101.

65. Rahman, Emergence of Qatar, 226.
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66. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 240.

67. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 102.

68. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 240.

69. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 104.

70. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 241.

71. Knights, Troubled Waters, 224

72. Senior U.S. official knowledgeable about Gulf emirate affairs.

73. Knights, Troubled Waters, 224.

74. Anthony Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (Boulder: The Westview 

Press, 1997), 227.

75. Senior Qatari official with detailed knowledge of defense policy.

76. Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, “Qatar’s role in the Arabian Gulf” (presentation, 

Bilateral U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce—Opportunities in Qatar), Houston, 

Texas, 24 October 2008.

77. Senior U.S. official knowledgeable about Gulf emirate affairs.

78. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 249.

79. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 198.

80. Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (New 

York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1978), 23-39.

81. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 109.

82. Ibid.

83. Major Clarence Mann, Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikdom (Beirut: Khayats, 

1964), 52.

84. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 111.

85. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 194.

86. Ibid., 113.

87. Ibid., 115.

88. Senior U.S. official familiar with the structure of the internal security apparatus 

in the UAE.

89. “Khalifa committed to boosting performance of security forces,” Gulfnews.

com (17 September 2008); available from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/09/17/10245673.html (accessed 9 March 2009).

90. “Let’s get real,” Economist, 63.

91. Charles Saint-Prot, “EU-GCC Relations: The French Perspective,” France and the 

Arabian Gulf (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 

2007), 78.

92. Senior U.S. diplomat with extensive experience in Gulf policy.

93. Jumana Al Tamimi, “Iran must solve islands issue,” Gulfnews.com (9 September 

2008); available from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/09/09/10243695.

html (accessed 9 March 2009). See also Simon Henerson, “The Persian Gulf’s 

‘Occupied Territory’: The Three-Island Dispute,” Policy Watch (No. 1402, 
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8 September 2008, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1-2 and 

Thomas R. Mattair, “Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Arab/Persian Gulf: GCC 

Perceptions,” Middle East Policy (Summer 2007), 133-140.

94. Karen Attwood, “Iran told to remove Abu Musa buildings,” The National, 17 

August 2008, 4.

95. Sami Moubayed, “Tehran feels an Arab sting,” Asia Times (12 September 2008), 

2; available from www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JI12Ak04.html (accessed 

9 March 2009).

96. UAE official intimately familiar with UAE foreign and economic policy goals, 

November 2008.

97. Senior U.S. official familiar with the structure of the internal security apparatus 

in the UAE.

98. Jeffery E. Garten, “Keep Your Rich Rivals Close,” Newsweek, 18-25 August 2008, 

45.

99. Ambassador Yousef Al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the United States, and 

Ambassador Hamad Al-Kaabi, UAE permanent representative to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, speech at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Washington, D.C. on 14 January 2009.

100. Senior UAE official intimately familiar with UAE foreign and economic policy 

goals, November 2008.

101. “Abu Dhabi, Dubai at odds over lifestyle, Tehran ties,” Kuwait Times, 18 

August 2008, 1, 14. Available from www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.

php?newsid=NzY4MzIxMDg0 (accessed 9 March 2009).

102. “The world’s most utterly failed state,” Economist, 4 October 2008, 49. Also 

available from www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displayStory.

cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12342212 (accessed 9 March 2009).

103. Christopher Davidson, “Dubai: The Security Dimension of the Region’s Premier 

Free Port,” Middle East Policy (Summer 2008, 15, 2; International Module), 143.

104. “Dubai: Not-so-hot property,” The Economist, 11 October 2008, 67. Also available from www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_

id=12381473 (accessed 9 March 2009).

105. “Qatar valuations scare off investors as Oman soars,” Kuwait Times, 8 

August 2008, 21. Also available from www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.

php?newsid=MTYyNjQ2Njcz (accessed 9 March 2009).

106. “Dubai’s bail-out—The Outstretched palm,” The Economist, 28 February 2009, 

78.

107. Zvika Krieger, “Build It and They Will Learn,” Newsweek, 18-25 August 2008, 

49.

108. “Like a bird leaving its nest,” The National, 17 August 2008, 3. Available from 

www.thenational.ae/article/20080816/PAGETHREE/391640358 (accessed 9 March 

2009).

109. Scott MacLeod, “The Gulf: Giddy Heights,” Time International Edition, 9 June 

2008, 49.
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

110. “Oman set to get Qatar gas through Dolphin pipeline,” Gulfnews.com (17 June 

2008); available from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/17/10221551.

html (accessed 9 March 2009). 

111. MacLeod, “The Gulf: Giddy Heights,” Time, 49.

112. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 

1968), 5-7.

113. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 125.

114. Kelley, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 9. While the Kharajites were and are more 

theologically akin to the Sunni, historically the Kharajites were the allies of the 

Caliph Ali and the party of Ali, the Shi’a, in their opposition to Qurayshi and 

Umayyad rule. It was a Kharajite ally of Ali that killed him because he was willing to negotiate with the Umayyad. It should also be noted that Oman maintains 

perhaps the best relations with Iran of any of the Gulf states. 

115. Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1977), 343.

116. Ibid.

117. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 215. Ras al-Kaimah and Sharjah are two of the seven 

emirates that comprise the United Arab Emirates or Trucial States. They were 

dominated by the Qawasim tribal grouping, and their power was sea-based. It 

was Qawasim activities in the Gulf and Indian Ocean that provoked the British 

to extend their control in the Arabian Gulf in the early 19th century. 

118. Phillips, Oman, 175.

119. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, 123.

120. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 216.

121. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 130.

122. Peck, Gulf Arab States, 217.

123. Ibid., 218.

124. Zahlan, Modern Gulf States, 132.

125. Cordesman, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE, 132.

126. Ibid., 130.

127. Judith Miller, “Creating Modern Oman,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1997), 14. 

The reference to the “third faction” or pragmatists is undoubtedly a reference to 

those allied with Rafsanjani who opposed confrontational politics and prefer to 

build Iran into the economic power of the Gulf with an economy that functions 

independently of oil subsidies and good relations with the West, Russia, and 

China. 

128. “Oman set to get Qatar gas through Dolphin pipeline,” Gulfnews.com (17 June 

2008). 

129. Duraid Al Baik, “East-west channel being planned for UAE oil exports,” Gulfnews.

com (23 September 2008); available from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/09/23/10247125.html (accessed 9 March 2009).

130. Metz, ed., Persian Gulf States, 306.
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131. Sultan Qaboos, Basic Law, 1996. The source was Articles 5 and 6 of the Basic 

Law with a commentary on the Defense Council and succession by a senior 

U.S. Government official with a detailed knowledge of the succession issue in 

Oman.

132. Miller, “Creating Modern Oman,” 17.

133. Mark N. Katz, “Assessing the Political Stability of Oman,” Middle East Review of 

International Affairs 8, No. 3 (September 2004), 3.

134. “Saudi Arabia: Can it make peace in the wider region?” The Economist, 11 October 

2008, 65. Also available from www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12380962 (accessed 9 March 2008). 

135. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2002), 17.

136. John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of Islam (Oxford: The Oxford University 

Press, 1999), 114.

137. Al-Raheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 19.

138. J. E. Peterson, Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia, 7.

139. Al-Rahseed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 26.

140. Ibid., 41.

141. Ibid., 43.

142. Ibid., 46.

143. “Letter from British Embassy Amman (Johnston) to FO (Hadow), 30 October 

1958,” PRO, FO371/134021. Johnston believed that British Embassy in Washington 

and the Foreign Office were too affected by U.S. pessimism regarding traditional 

regimes and tended to overlook Washington’s infatuation with Nasser. 

144. Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, 161.

145. Prince Sultan ibn Abd-al-Aziz ibn Saud, Minister of Defense and Aviation, 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (interview, BBC, September 2006).

146. Pillar policy is a term used to describe the specific U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 

East that emerged during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Particularly 

during the Johnson administration, the Vietnam War and the British decision 

to withdraw East of Suez brought a reassessment of U.S. commitments. It was 

determined between 1962 and 1968 that the U.S. would focus on supporting key 

allies in the region as opposed to pursuing a broad policy of engagement there. 

The key allies were Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—the odd quartet.

147. Senior Arab Gulf official knowledgeable about U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations and 

security affairs.

148. Ibid.

149. Former senior official in Iraqi government knowledgeable about attitudes at the 

senior level within the Iraqi government. 

150. Senior Arab Gulf official knowledgeable about U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations and 

security affairs. Questions about the intent of the U.S. to replace Saudi Arabia 

with Iran as the principle U.S. ally in the region could very well be the result of 
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Barrett: The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy

another Iranian disinformation effort in the Gulf. Officials in Washington may 

view the entire question as nonsense, but given the levels of concern about U.S. 

policy, the propensity for conspiracy theories to flourish in the Gulf and the pre1979 history of U.S.-Iranian relations gives the Arab states pause for thought. It 

does not have to be true to have an impact.

151. Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, 

Rehabilitation, and Aftercare,” Carnegie Papers (Washington, D.C.: Middle East 

Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 97, September 2008), 

3-6. Available from www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=v

iew&id=22155&prog=zgp&proj=zme (accessed 9 March 2009).

152. Ibid., 21.

153. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Affirming the Saudi Will to Power: Domestic Challenges 

to King Abdullah,” Policy Brief (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute – Web 

Publication, No. 16, June 2008), 2. Available from www.mideasti.org/policy-brief/

affirming-saudi-will-power-domestic-challenges-king-%E2%80%98abdullah 

(accessed 9 March 2009).

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid., p. 8.

156. Senior U.S. military officer involved in contingency planning for Saudi Arabia.

157. “Telegram from Governor of Aden, Sir Charles Johnston, to CO, Secretary of State 

for the Colonies,” 15 February 1963, PRO CO1055/3, 1-3.

158. Senior U.S. Diplomat highly knowledgeable about Saudi Arabian affairs. 

159. Speech by the Iranian Minister of the Interior Sadeq Mahsouli at the Bahrain 

Security Conference and Exposition, 24 February 2009, Manama, Bahrain.

160. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, 131.

161. During the course of a month-long trip to the region in February and March 

2009 senior Arabs officials in the region time and again reiterated this theme of 

expanding Iranian influence fueled by Iraq and the Palestinian issue. 

162. In over a score of meetings with senior Gulf Arab politicians, government officials, and analysts during February and March 2009, this concern about U.S. 

rapprochement with Iran was a recurring theme. Most believe that real progress 

or compromise on the Iranian’s part is unlikely and that discussions with the 

U.S. will merely be used by the Iranians to increase their influence and political 

leverage in the Gulf.