- 887 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Antonio D. Ratumaimuri, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 11, 2018. No. S-17-187.

1. Convicted Sex Offender: Proof. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4011(1) 

(Reissue 2016), the State must prove that the defendant (1) is required 

to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-4001 et seq. (Reissue 2016), and (2) violated a section of the act.

2. Convicted Sex Offender. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) 

(Reissue 2016), a trial court must determine whether a defendant who 

has committed one of the offenses listed therein is subject to the Sex 

Offender Registration Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 et seq. (Reissue 

2016), during the proceedings on the underlying conviction and 

sentence.

3. Judgments: Words and Phrases. A judgment is an adjudication of 

all the matters that are essential to support it, and every proposition 

assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and 

on which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the 

ultimate question which is finally resolved.

4. Criminal Law: Judgments: Sentences: Appeal and Error. In a 

criminal case, the judgment from which the appellant may appeal is 

the sentence.

5. Convicted Sex Offender: Appeal and Error. Whether a defendant is 

subject to the Sex Offender Registration Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 

et seq. (Reissue 2016), based on a guilty plea or conviction for an 

offense that is not inherently sexual must be reviewed on direct appeal 

from the underlying conviction and sentence.

6. Judgments: Collateral Attack. When a judgment is attacked in a 

way other than by proceeding in the original action to have it vacated, 

reversed, or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its 

enforcement, the attack is a collateral attack.

7. ____: ____. A judgment that is not void, even if erroneous, cannot be 

collaterally attacked.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/03/2018 12:09 AM CDT
- 888 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

8. Convicted Sex Offender: Collateral Attack: Appeal and Error. A 

challenge to a determination that the Sex Offender Registration Act, 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 et seq. (Reissue 2016), applies to a defendant 

for a listed offense that is not inherently sexual outside of a direct appeal 

from the underlying conviction and sentence is an impermissible collateral attack.

9. Courts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Upon further review from 

a judgment of the Nebraska Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme 

Court will not reverse a judgment which it deems to be correct simply because its reasoning differs from that employed by the Court 

of Appeals.

Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, Pirtle, 

Riedmann, and Arterburn, Judges, on appeal thereto from the 

District Court for Lancaster County, Susan I. Strong, Judge. 

Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.

Joseph D. Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, and 

Nathan J. Sohriakoff for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Joe Meyer for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke, 

JJ., and Derr and Urbom, District Judges.

Funke, J.

The Lancaster County District Court convicted Antonio Y. 

Ratumaimuri of violating the registration requirements of the 

Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).1 Before the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals, Ratumaimuri assigned as error that there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he 

argued the State had failed to prove he was subject to SORA’s 

requirements, because it failed to present evidence that—during the proceedings for a previous conviction and sentence—

the county court for Lancaster County had made a factual finding pursuant to § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B).

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 et seq. (Reissue 2016).
- 889 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

The Court of Appeals affirmed Ratumaimuri’s conviction 

on the sufficiency of the evidence. However, rather than relying on the determination in the previous proceedings—that 

Ratumaimuri was subject to SORA—alone, the Court of Appeals 

concluded that determination was valid because it was based on 

an implied factual finding pursuant to § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B).

On further review, we hold that (1) a determination that 

a defendant is subject to SORA must be reviewed on direct 

appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence and (2) 

such a determination is not subject to an impermissible collateral attack in subsequent proceedings. Accordingly, the Court 

of Appeals erred in analyzing whether the determination in 

the previous proceedings was valid. While our reasoning differs from that employed by the Court of Appeals, our ultimate 

conclusion on the judgment is the same. Therefore, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In November 2015, a police officer found Ratumaimuri 

sleeping in a parking garage in Lincoln, Nebraska. The officer 

determined Ratumaimuri was a registered sex offender but had 

not updated his address since July 2015, when he was incarcerated. Ratumaimuri admitted he had been transient since he was 

released from prison, in September 2015, and was in violation of his SORA requirements because he had not registered 

with the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Department. The officer 

arrested Ratumaimuri for violating SORA by failing to update 

his address or status.

The offense that subjected Ratumaimuri to SORA’s requirements was a 2014 conviction for third degree assault. The 

State had amended the charge from third degree sexual assault 

in exchange for Ratumaimuri’s agreeing to plead no contest. 

The State informed Ratumaimuri, however, that the county 

court could still determine he was subject to SORA, under 

the plea bargain. At the plea hearing, the county court ruled 

that Ratumaimuri was subject to SORA’s requirements and 

that he had committed a “sexual offense.” Ratumaimuri was 

provided with a “Notification of Registration Responsibilities 
- 890 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

Under [SORA]” form, which stated: “Your conviction or 

guilty plea has caused you to be subject to [SORA].” At the 

sentencing hearing, the county court questioned Ratumaimuri 

about whether he had read and signed the notification form 

and whether he understood his responsibilities as a sex 

offender. Ratumaimuri did not appeal from that conviction 

or sentence.

In the current proceedings, Ratumaimuri was charged with 

violating SORA’s registration requirements, under § 29-4011(1). 

The State offered into evidence the record from his third degree 

assault conviction, which contained the determination that he 

was subject to SORA. After a stipulated bench trial, the district 

court found Ratumaimuri guilty and sentenced him to 12 to 18 

months’ imprisonment. Ratumaimuri filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, Ratumaimuri assigned the district court erred in 

convicting him, because there was not sufficient evidence to 

prove his guilt. He argued the State failed to prove his previous conviction subjected him to SORA’s requirements, because 

there was no factual finding under § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) that 

the crime involved either “sexual penetration” or “sexual contact.” The State argued Ratumaimuri’s appeal itself was an 

impermissible collateral attack on his previous conviction 

and sentence.

The Court of Appeals determined that Ratumaimuri’s 

appeal, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, was not 

a collateral attack and affirmed Ratumaimuri’s conviction, 

because the evidence was sufficient to prove Ratumaimuri 

was subject to SORA.2 In reaching its conclusion on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court of Appeals analyzed the 

determination of SORA’s application to Ratumaimuri in the 

prior proceedings and concluded it was valid because the 

county court had made an implied finding of fact pursuant to 

§ 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B).3

2 State v. Ratumaimuri, No. A-17-187, 2017 WL 5713404 (Neb. App. Nov. 

28, 2017) (selected for posting to court website).

3 Id.
- 891 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

Both Ratumaimuri and the State petitioned for further 

review. We denied Ratumaimuri’s petition, which assigned 

error to the Court of Appeals’ holding that sufficient evidence 

supported his conviction. We granted the State’s petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The State assigns, restated, that the Court of Appeals erred 

in concluding Ratumaimuri’s appeal was not an impermissible 

collateral attack on a previous judgment.

ANALYSIS

[1] Section 29-4011(1) provides: “Any person required to 

register under [SORA] who violates the act is guilty of a Class 

IIIA felony.” Accordingly, for a conviction under § 29-4011(1), 

the State is required to prove that the defendant (1) is required 

to register under SORA and (2) violated a section of SORA. 

Ratumaimuri did not argue on appeal that he did not violate a 

section of SORA, so only the sufficiency of evidence regarding whether he was required to register under SORA was 

at issue.

In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, the relevant question for an appellate court is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.4

The Court of Appeals determined that the record from 

Ratumaimuri’s third degree assault conviction provided sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Since we denied 

Ratumaimuri’s petition for further review regarding this 

issue, we do not reconsider the Court of Appeals’ holding that Ratumaimuri’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

The State contends that Ratumaimuri’s appeal as a whole 

was an impermissible attack on a prior conviction. However, 

4 State v. Wofford, 298 Neb. 412, 904 N.W.2d 649 (2017).
- 892 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

since the appeal raised only one assignment of error, that 

being the sufficiency of the evidence, the appeal was proper. 

Nonetheless, Ratumaimuri specifically argued that the record 

from the prior proceeding was insufficient to subject him to 

SORA. As a result, we must consider whether this argument 

constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a previous 

judgment and whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing 

the merits of this argument.

Generally, SORA requires individuals that plead guilty to 

or are convicted of certain enumerated offenses, also known 

as automatically registerable offenses, to register with the 

county sheriff in the counties where they reside, work, and 

attend school.5 SORA requirements may also apply to individuals that plead guilty to or are convicted of offenses that are 

not inherently sexual, but which are listed in subsections (I) 

through (VII), (IX), and (X) of § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(A). Third 

degree assault is one of the listed offenses that is not inherently sexual.6

Section 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) sets out the requirements to 

bring an offense that is not inherently sexual within SORA, 

stating that “[i]n order for [SORA] to apply to the [listed not 

inherently sexual offenses], a court shall have found that evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact, as those terms 

are defined in section 28-318, was present in the record . . . .”

In State v. Norman (Norman I),7 on direct appeal, and State 

v. Norman (Norman II),8 on appeal after remand, we considered a trial court’s § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) determination for an 

underlying conviction of third degree assault. Both appeals 

assigned error to the district court’s determination that the 

defendant was subject to SORA’s requirements for his third 

degree assault conviction. In Norman I, we reversed the court’s 

5 See § 29-4001 et seq.

6 § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(A)(VI).

7 State v. Norman, 282 Neb. 990, 808 N.W.2d 48 (2012).

8 State v. Norman, 285 Neb. 72, 824 N.W.2d 739 (2013).
- 893 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

determination that SORA was applicable, because the court 

made the requisite finding solely on the State’s factual basis 

for the plea and not the evidence on the record, which denied 

the defendant procedural due process. In Norman II, we determined the burden for proving that the offense included “sexual 

penetration” or “sexual contact,” under § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B), 

was by clear and convincing evidence, and we held that there 

was sufficient evidence to support the court’s factual finding of 

“sexual contact.”

[2] As evidenced by these opinions, the trial court must 

determine whether a defendant, who has committed a listed 

offense that is not inherently sexual, is subject to SORA during 

the proceedings on the underlying conviction and sentence.9

This is also supported by § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B)’s requirement 

that the determination be based on the evidence in the record, 

because the court on the underlying conviction is in the best 

position to consider the facts present in the case before it.

[3-5] This court has recognized that a judgment is an adjudication of all the matters that are essential to support it, and 

every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up 

to the final conclusion and on which such conclusion is based 

is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is 

finally resolved.10 In a criminal case, the judgment from which 

the appellant may appeal is the sentence.11 Thus, we hold that 

whether a defendant is subject to SORA based on a guilty plea 

or conviction for an offense that is not inherently sexual must 

be reviewed on direct appeal from the underlying conviction 

and sentence.12

[6-8] When a judgment is attacked in a way other than by 

proceeding in the original action to have it vacated, reversed, 

or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its 

9 See, also, State v. Boche, 294 Neb. 912, 885 N.W.2d 523 (2016).

10 State v. Keen, 272 Neb. 123, 718 N.W.2d 494 (2006).

11 Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017).

12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016).
- 894 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

enforcement, the attack is a collateral attack.13 A judgment that 

is not void, even if erroneous, cannot be collaterally attacked.14

Therefore, we further hold that a challenge to a determination that SORA applies to a defendant for a listed offense that 

is not inherently sexual outside of a direct appeal from the 

underlying conviction and sentence is an impermissible collateral attack.

As a result, in the instant matter, we conclude Ratumaimuri’s 

argument that the determination in the previous proceedings 

was invalid constituted an impermissible collateral attack 

on the judgment of his previous conviction and sentence. 

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the merits 

of Ratumaimuri’s argument and not relying solely on the prior 

determination that Ratumaimuri was subject to SORA.

We note that these holdings do not conflict with our earlier 

opinion in State v. Torres.

15 At the time we decided Torres, 

SORA applied only to the automatically registerable offenses 

now listed in § 29-4003(1)(a).16 SORA provides that its requirements apply to these automatically registerable offenses without any determination during the proceedings on the underlying conviction.17 After our decision in Torres, the Legislature 

amended SORA to add the offenses that are not inherently sexual and the requisite findings of sexual penetration or sexual 

contact.18 Our opinions in Norman I and Norman II addressed 

these new considerations.

Further, Torres is distinguishable from Ratumaimuri’s matter 

and our opinions in Norman I and Norman II as it concerned 

Reyes Torres’ standing to challenge his conviction and sentence by attacking the constitutionality of SORA. Torres was 

13 Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, ante p. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018).

14 Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 888 N.W.2d 514 (2016).

15 State v. Torres, 254 Neb. 91, 574 N.W.2d 153 (1998).

16 See § 29-4003 (Cum. Supp. 1996).

17 See § 29-4003(1)(a) (Reissue 2016).

18 2009 Neb. Laws, L.B. 285.
- 895 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

299 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. RATUMAIMURI

Cite as 299 Neb. 887

convicted of third degree sexual assault, which automatically 

made him subject to SORA. During the sentencing, Torres was 

advised of the requirement, but the district court’s sentencing 

order did not address SORA’s requirements. Further, Torres did 

not argue to the sentencing court that SORA was unconstitutional. On appeal, however, Torres argued that his sentence was 

excessive because SORA potentially increased his sentence for 

failing to register under it.

Our decision in Torres first addressed the fact that Torres 

did not raise the constitutional challenge before the sentencing court. We noted that an appellate court will not consider a 

constitutional question unless the question has been properly 

presented to the trial court for disposition. We then noted 

the proposition of law that “defendants are prohibited from 

attempting to circumvent or avoid conviction under a particular 

statute by asserting a constitutional challenge to another, collateral statute which is irrelevant to the prosecution.”19 As a 

result, we determined that the underlying conviction could not 

be attacked based upon the constitutionality of SORA.

[9] While our reasoning differs from that employed by the 

Court of Appeals, our ultimate conclusion on the judgment 

is the same. Upon further review from a judgment of the 

Nebraska Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court will 

not reverse a judgment which it deems to be correct simply 

because its reasoning differs from that employed by the Court 

of Appeals.20

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Nebraska Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Affirmed.

19 Torres, supra note 15, 254 Neb. at 94, 574 N.W.2d at 155.

20 In re Estate of Clinger, 292 Neb. 237, 872 N.W.2d 37 (2015).