Docket No. 92116–Agenda 7–May 2002.

In re J.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,  								v. J.W., Appellant).

Opinion filed February 21, 2003.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent, J.W., a 12-year-old boy, was adjudicated

delinquent following his admission to two counts of aggravated

criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–14(b)(i) (West 1998)), and

was sentenced to a term of five years’ probation. Among the

conditions of his probation, J.W. was ordered to register as a sex

offender. In addition, J.W. was prohibited from residing in or going

to the Village of South Elgin, Illinois, the community where J.W.

lived and where the aggravated criminal sexual assaults took place.

	J.W. appealed two of the conditions of his probation

contending that: (1) requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a

sex offender is unconstitutional; and (2) prohibiting J.W. from

residing in or visiting South Elgin as a condition of probation is

overly broad and void. The appellate court affirmed the trial

court’s order. Nos. 2–00–0360, 2–00–0432 cons. (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court granted J.W.’s

petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also granted

the motion of the Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern University

Law School and the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the

University of Chicago Law School for leave to file a brief as

amicus curiae.

BACKGROUND

	The State filed its petition for adjudication on November 10,

1999, alleging that J.W. had committed aggravated criminal sexual

assaults against two seven-year-old boys, R.We. and J.P. On

February 14, 2000, J.W. pled guilty to two counts of aggravated

criminal sexual assault in exchange for the State’s agreement to

withdraw two other counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.

There was no agreement among the parties as to sentencing.

Consequently, a sentencing hearing was held in February 2000.

	At J.W.’s sentencing hearing, Dr. Kevin Breen, a psychiatrist,

testified that he met with J.W. and his parents one time in

December 1999, for approximately one hour, to determine whether

J.W. was a danger to anyone else. Dr. Breen’s report of this

examination was entered into evidence. The report indicated that

J.W. had admitted to five episodes where he convinced R.We. and

J.P. to have oral-genital contact with one another and with him.

J.W. denied that the boys were physically coerced, but admitted he

used verbal coercion. J.W.’s parents revealed to Dr. Breen that

J.W. also had exposed himself on one occasion to a five-year-old

boy. J.W. denied having been physically, sexually or emotionally

abused, but admitted that he had seen his father’s sexually explicit

magazines.

	Dr. Breen concluded in his report that J.W. was minimizing his

sexual encounters with young boys, noting that J.W. had not

mentioned the incident with the five-year-old boy. According to the

report, Dr. Breen’s diagnosis of J.W. was paraphilia, not otherwise

specified. Paraphilia is where a person engages in sexual activity or

sexual acts that are not sanctioned by society. The diagnosis would

have been pedophilia with a sexual attraction to males, except that

J.W. was not 16 years old, as required by the standard criteria.

	Dr. Breen testified at J.W.’s sentencing hearing that he was

not aware of any incidents of anal sex or anal penetration between

J.W. and his victims, nor was he aware of allegations that J.W. had

introduced a dog into his sexual acts. Dr. Breen’s

recommendations for the treatment of J.W. included medication,

cognitive behavioral therapy, and residential treatment. Dr. Breen

recommended residential treatment given the frequency of relapse

among individuals with sexual disorders. Dr. Breen testified that,

given the frequency of relapse, J.W. would present a risk to the

community if he was not placed in residential treatment.

	David Berg, an investigator with the Child Advocacy Center

of the Kane County State’s Attorney’s office, testified at the

sentencing hearing that he investigated the case concerning J.W.

Berg became involved in the case after the family of R.We. made

a police report alleging that J.W. had put his mouth on R.We.’s

penis and had R.We. put his mouth on J.W.’s penis. These

incidents took place under the deck of a neighbor’s house and in J.W.’s home. R.We. said the sexual contact occurred between 5

and 10 times. R.We. did not tell anyone about the incidents

because he feared retribution from J.W.

	Berg also interviewed the other victim, J.P. J.P. lived next

door to J.W. J.P. told Berg that J.W. had put his mouth on J.P.’s

penis and that J.W. had put his penis in J.P.’s mouth. J.W. also

touched the penises of both victims.

	In addition to the two victims, a five-year-old boy saw J.W.

expose himself, and R.We.’s six-year-old sister witnessed an

incident of oral sex between J.W. and R.We.

	Berg initially spoke with J.P.’s stepmother on November 5,

1999. In a follow-up conversation several days later, J.P.’s

stepmother told Berg that J.P. had forgotten to tell him something,

and indicated that J.W. had placed his penis in J.P.’s anus.

Subsequently, both J.P. and R.We. told Berg there were several

occasions where J.W. placed his penis in their anuses. J.P. told

Berg that he did not tell anyone about these incidents because J.W.

told him not to tell.

	Berg testified that approximately one week prior to the

sentencing hearing, he again met with R.We., who told Berg that

J.W. had his dog lick the penises of both boys. J.W. also told the

two victims to try to penetrate the dog’s anus with their penises,

but they were unable to do so. The boys did observe J.W. penetrate

the dog’s anus. The incidents with the dog took place in J.W.’s

home. In addition, both boys related that J.W. had directed them

to penetrate one another, but they were unable to do so. These

events took place under the deck of the neighbor’s home and at

J.W.’s home.

	Therese Wrona, a therapist, testified that she had been

involved in the treatment of sexually abusive juveniles for 10 years.

Wrona first saw J.W. on December 7, 1999, and in January 2000

began seeing him at least once a week. Wrona testified that J.W.

was a danger to the community “to a certain degree.” Wrona

recommended probation for J.W., stating that “the longer the legal

system hangs on to individuals such as [J.W.], the better.” In

addition, Wrona recommended a course of treatment specialized

for individuals that have problems with sexual aggression. Wrona also stated that J.W. required 24-hour monitoring and supervision

by a person that understood the nature and seriousness of J.W.’s

problem. J.W.’s school should be informed concerning J.W.’s

history of sexually aggressive behavior so that the school could

monitor J.W. and protect other students. Wrona further said that

J.W. should not be around younger children, or even children his

own age, unless an adult who is aware of J.W.’s problems is

present. Wrona’s opinion was that J.W. should be allowed to

remain in the community and should not be placed in residential

treatment. With regard to the protection of the community, Wrona

believed that J.W. could return to his home in South Elgin,

although given the publicity concerning the case, Wrona believed

it might not be in J.W.’s best interest to return to his home.

	Wrona testified that J.W. “groomed” his victims, meaning that

he approached the victims to assess his likelihood of committing

the sexual abuse. J.W. sought out his victims and selected his

victims based upon their youth and their trust in him. Wrona said

that J.W. initially did not feel any guilt, but she believed J.W. was

beginning to appreciate the seriousness of his acts.

	J.W.’s parents testified at the sentencing hearing and indicated

their willingness to engage in intensive supervision and monitoring

of J.W. if he was allowed to return home. J.W.’s parents also

indicated that if J.W. was allowed to return home, they intended to

sell their home in South Elgin and move to a different

neighborhood.

	J.W.’s aunt, Monica Grant, testified on behalf of J.W. that she

resides with her husband in Elgin, Illinois. Grant stated that she and

her husband were willing to let J.W. live with them and would take

responsibility for his supervision.

	At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, J.W. made a

statement on his own behalf apologizing to the victims. The trial

court then noted that, because J.W. was under the age of 13, he

could not be committed to the juvenile division of the Department

of Corrections. See 705 ILCS 405/5–750(3) (West 2000). The trial

court also noted that, even though the State had recommended

residential treatment for J.W., the State had not determined

whether there was a treatment center willing and/or able to take

J.W. Accordingly, the trial court placed J.W. on five years’ probation and directed the probation officer to determine whether

placement was available for J.W. J.W. was to be placed in

residential treatment if such placement was available. If placement

was not available, J.W. was prohibited from going back to South

Elgin and was ordered to reside with his aunt, Monica Grant, until

his parents moved out of South Elgin. J.W. also was ordered to

register as a sex offender and to comply with AIDS/HIV testing

pursuant to section 5–710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705

ILCS 405/5–710 (West 2000)).

	On March 1, 2000, the parties returned to court and informed

the trial court that residential treatment had been found for J.W.

Accordingly, an order was entered placing J.W. at the treatment

center. Thereafter, in anticipation of J.W.’s imminent release from

the treatment center, the trial court entered an order on August 22,

2000, providing that J.W. was to reside with Monica Grant upon

release, and would be allowed to reside with his parents once they

moved out of South Elgin.

	J.W. then appealed the conditions of his probation requiring

him to register as a sex offender and prohibiting him from entering

or residing in South Elgin. The appellate court stated that J.W. was

required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life

because he was considered a sexual predator under the Sex

Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The appellate court then rejected J.W.’s claim that imposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-old

offender violates substantive due process. The appellate court also

held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

prohibited J.W. from entering or residing in South Elgin, noting

that J.W.’s parents had concurred in the restriction. In this court,

J.W. again challenges the conditions of his probation requiring him

to register as a sex offender and banishing him from the Village of

South Elgin.

ISSUES

	As a preliminary matter, we must address the State’s claim

that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because

J.W. did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)),

provides, in pertinent part:

			“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of

guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days

of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial

court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the

sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being

challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and

vacate the judgment.” 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

	Recently, this court held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile

proceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001). This court left open, however, the issue of whether a juvenile’s failure to file a

post-admission motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) serves as a

jurisdictional bar to an appeal. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 322. The State contends that this question must be answered in the affirmative,

maintaining that, if Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile proceedings, its

jurisdictional component also must apply to juvenile proceedings.

	With regard to this case, the State notes that J.W. entered

admissions to the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse for which

he was adjudicated delinquent, and that an admission in juvenile

court is the equivalent of a guilty plea. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 316 (2001). J.W., however, did not file a motion to withdraw

his admissions or to reconsider his sentence prior to filing his

appeal. Because J.W. did not comply with Rule 604(d) prior to

filing his appeal, the State contends that this court has no

jurisdiction over J.W.’s appeal.

	In response, J.W. states that, even if the filing of a motion

pursuant to Rule 604(d) is a prerequisite to taking a delinquency

appeal, Rule 604(d) does not bar his appeal because he is not

seeking to challenge his plea or to reconsider his term of probation.

Rather, he is contesting the constitutionality of two of the

conditions of probation imposed by the trial court, namely, the

condition that he register as a sex offender for the rest of his life

and the condition barring him from entering the Village of South

Elgin. J.W. claims that because these conditions are

unconstitutional, they are void. J.W. maintains that a void sentence

may be attacked at any time, even following a guilty plea and in the

absence of a motion to vacate that plea.

	We need not decide here the issue left open in In re A.G. We agree with J.W. that his challenge is to the constitutionality of two

of the conditions of his probation, not to the imposition of

probation itself. J.W. is not challenging his plea or his sentence of

probation. Consequently, Rule 604(d) does not bar J.W.’s appeal.

	The State then argues that, even if this court has jurisdiction

over this appeal, J.W. has waived any challenge to the conditions

of probation because he did not raise these issues in the trial court.

J.W., however, maintains that a constitutional challenge to a statute

may be made at any time.

	J.W. is correct that, in general, a constitutional challenge to a

criminal statute can be raised at any time. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1989). Accordingly, J.W. has not waived his

constitutional challenges to the Registration Act even though he

first raised those challenges in the appellate court.

	J.W. first argues that the trial court’s order requiring him to

register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life violates

substantive due process and the proscription against double

jeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation

of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S.

Const., amend. VIII).

	It is well settled that statutes are presumed constitutional and

that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the

burden of establishing its invalidity. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000). This court reviews de novo the constitutionality of a statute. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).

	At the outset, we must address the appellate court’s finding

that J.W. shall register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural

life. In ordering J.W. to register as a sex offender, the trial court

did not specify the duration of registration. The appellate court

found that, given the nature of the charges for which J.W. was

adjudicated delinquent, J.W. is a “sexual predator” as defined by

the Registration Act, so that the duration of registration is for the

rest of J.W.’s natural life.

	In construing a statute, this court must ascertain and give

effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting that statute. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). To determine the intention of the

legislature, we first examine the language of the statute, which is

the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear

and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the statute as written

without reading into the statute exceptions, limitations or

conditions that the legislature did not express. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211-12. In addition, a statute must be read as a whole, and no

word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered

meaningless. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111.

	With the foregoing principles in mind, we must examine the

definitions of “sexual predator” and “juvenile sex offender” as set

forth in the Registration Act. Section 2 contains the definitions for

purposes of that Act. Section 2(A) defines a “sex offender.” 730

ILCS 150/2(A) (West 2000). Effective July 1, 1999, the

Registration Act was amended to add, inter alia, the definition of a “juvenile sex offender.” Section 2(A–5) of the Registration Act

now provides that:

			“ ‘Juvenile sex offender’ means any person who is

adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of the

commission of or attempt to commit a violation set forth

in item (B), (C), or (C–5) of this Section or a violation of

any substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreign

country law. For purposes of this Section, ‘convicted’

shall have the same meaning as ‘adjudicated.’ ” 730 ILCS

150/2 (A–5) (West 2000).

J.W. falls within the definition of a juvenile sex offender because he

was adjudicated delinquent as the result of the commission of a

violation of item (B) of section 2, namely, aggravated criminal

sexual assault. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2000).1

	Also included within the definitions in section 2 is the more

specific category of sexual predators. A “sexual predator” includes:

			“any person who, after the effective date of this

amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly is:

				(1) Convicted of a violation of any of the following

Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 and the

conviction occurred after the effective date of this

amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly:

* * *

					12–14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault)[.]”

730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1) (West 2000).

	Reading section 2(A–5) together with section 2(E) so that no

word or paragraph is rendered meaningless, we conclude that J.W.

clearly qualifies as a sexual predator under the Registration Act.

Section 2 (A–5) provides that “convicted” has the same meaning

as “adjudicated,” for purposes of section 2. Section 2 defines a

sexual predator as a person who has been “convicted” of

aggravated criminal sexual assault. This statutory language is clear

and unambiguous, so we give effect to the statute as written. J.W.

has been adjudicated delinquent, or “convicted,” as the result of the

commission of aggravated criminal sexual assault. J.W. therefore

falls within the definition of a sexual predator.

	Section 3 of the Registration Act provides that sex offenders

and sexual predators have a duty to register as required by the

Department of State Police. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). With

regard to the duration of registration, section 7 of the Registration

Act provides, in pertinent part:

		“A sexually violent person or sexual predator shall register

for the period of his or her natural life after conviction or

adjudication if not confined to a penal institution, hospital,

or other institution or facility, and if confined, for the

period of his or her natural life after parole, discharge, or

release from any such facility. Any other person who is

required to register under this Article shall be required to

register for a period of 10 years after conviction or

adjudication ***.” 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2000).

	Generally, then, a juvenile sex offender would fall within the

portion of section 7 that requires registration for a period of 10

years after adjudication. However, with regard to juvenile sex

offenders who also are considered sexual predators, the duration

of registration is for natural life. Consequently, we find that the

appellate court correctly determined that J.W. is a sexual predator

so that the duration of J.W.’s registration is for the rest of his

natural life.

	In so holding, we note that J.W. has submitted as additional

authority a recent decision of the appellate court finding that

juvenile sex offenders are not required to register under the

Registration Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497, 500 (2001). The Nicholas K. court based its finding on the fact that section 3 of the Registration Act, concerning the duty to register,

does not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders. Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.

	The additional authority submitted by J.W. does not change

our holding in this case. Although section 3 of the Registration Act

does not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders, section 3 does

provide that sex offenders and sexual predators shall register. 730

ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). Without addressing whether J.W. would

be required to register in any event because he is a sexual predator,

we note that a juvenile sex offender is a sex offender, albeit a specific category of sex offender. Juvenile sex offenders therefore

are included within the larger category of sex offenders required to

register.2

	This conclusion is supported by the legislative debates

concerning House Bill 2721, which added the definition of juvenile

sex offender to the Registration Act. Specifically, Representative

Klingler explained to the House of Representatives that the bill

“requires juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent to register.”

91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143

(statements of Representative Klingler). Likewise, Senator Klem

explained to the Senate that the bill by adding the definition of

juvenile sex offender as well as other definitions “imposes

registration requirements of those persons.” 91st Ill. Gen. Assem.,

Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 52 (statements of Senator

Klem).

	The conclusion that juvenile sex offenders are required to

register is further supported by examining the Registration Act in

conjunction with the corresponding Sex Offender and Child

Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730

ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2000)). The Notification Law provides that the Department of State Police is to establish and

maintain a sex offender database of those persons registered as sex

offenders under the Registration Act. 730 ILCS 152/115 (West

2000). The Notification Law expressly includes juvenile sex

offenders. See 730 ILCS 152/105, 120(e) (West 2000).

	Clearly, then, juvenile sex offenders do fall within the purview

of section 3 of the Registration Act and are required to register.

Accordingly, the appellate court properly concluded that J.W. is

required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life.

	We next address J.W.’s claim that an order requiring him to

register as a sexual offender for the rest of his natural life violates

substantive due process. When confronted with a claim that a

statute violates the due process guarantees of the United States and

Illinois Constitutions, courts first must determine the nature of the

right purportedly infringed upon by the statute. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 302 (2001). Where the statute does not affect a

fundamental constitutional right, the test for determining whether

the statute complies with substantive due process is the rational

basis test. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000). To satisfy this test, a statute need only bear a rational relationship to the purpose

the legislature sought to accomplish in enacting the statute. People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989). Pursuant to this test, a statute will be upheld if it “bhears a reasonable relationship to a public

interest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable

method of accomplishing the desired objective.” People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).

	J.W. does not argue, nor do we find, that the statute at issue

affects a fundamental right. Accordingly, we analyze the statute at

issue using the rational basis test. In People v. Adams, we noted that an earlier version of the Registration Act was passed “in

response to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses against

children” and was designed to aid law enforcement agencies by

requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement

authorities. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 386. The intent of the legislature in enacting the Registration Act was “to create an additional

method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of

sexual assault and sexual abuse.” Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 387.

	In response to an adult defendant’s claim that the Registration

Act violated his right to substantive due process, we held that the

public interest to be served by the Registration Act was the

assistance of law enforcement in the protection of children. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 390. We further held that the Registration Act served

that purpose by providing officers ready access to information on

known child sex offenders. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 390. We concluded that there was nothing unreasonable in the statute’s

method of serving its purpose given the direct relationship between

the registration of sex offenders and the protection of children.

Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391. Accordingly, the statute satisfied the requirements of substantive due process. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391.

	Subsequently, we upheld a constitutional challenge to the

Notification Law. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 430 (2000). In Malchow, we held that the purpose of the Notification Law, like the Registration Act, was the protection of the public

from sex offenders. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 420.

	In the context of a 12-year-old sex offender, the public interest

to be served by the Registration Act remains unchanged. The

public interest is to assist law enforcement in the protection of the

public from juvenile sex offenders. The Registration Act as applied

to a 12-year-old child serves that public interest by providing police officers ready access to information on known juvenile sex

offenders.

	J.W. acknowledges that the public interest the Registration

Act is intended to serve is the protection of the public from sex

offenders. J.W. argues, however, that in contrast to an adult

offender or even a juvenile that could be charged and tried as an

adult, requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex offender for

the rest of his life is not a reasonable method of accomplishing the

objective of protecting the public. J.W. observes that juveniles

traditionally have been viewed as less culpable than adults and as

more amenable to rehabilitation and treatment. J.W. argues that

imposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-old child

is at odds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act

(705 ILCS 405/1–1 et seq. (West 2000)).

	J.W. maintains that it is not reasonable to hold a child that has

been treated in the juvenile court system, and could only be treated

in the juvenile court system, to an adult standard of reporting and

registration for the rest of his life. J.W. observes that among the

purposes and policies of the Juvenile Court Act are the protection

and the rehabilitation of minors. J.W. also cites In re Nicholas K., which in finding that juvenile sex offenders are not required to

register, concluded that requiring a delinquent juvenile to register

as a sex offender is inconsistent with the purposes of the Juvenile

Court Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500. The Nicholas K. court observed that the overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to promote the minor’s best interest and to

correct, not punish. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500-01.

	It is true that one of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act is

the rehabilitation of the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/5–101(1)(c)

(West 2000). However, effective January 1, 1999, the purpose and

policy section of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to provide,

in pertinent part:

			“It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a

juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem

of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect the

community, impose accountability for violations of law

and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live

responsibly and productively. To effectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares the following to be important

purposes of this Article:

				(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.

				(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly

accountable for his or her acts.” 705 ILCS

405/5–101(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 2000).

	This court has recognized that the amendments to the purpose

and policy section of the Juvenile Court Act represent a

fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include

the overriding concerns of protecting the public and of holding

juveniles accountable for violations of the law. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001). Indeed, confronted with a similar issue, the

Supreme Court of Delaware recognized:

			“[A]lthough we are aware that the juvenile justice

system places emphasis on the best interests of the child,

sex offenders of any age present unique problems. The

General Assembly enacted the Sex Offender Registration

Statute in an effort to protect society from both the adult

and the youthful sex offender.” Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1079 (Del. 2001).

	Given the shift in the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court

Act to include the protection of the public from juvenile crime and

holding juveniles accountable, as well as the serious problems

presented by juvenile sex offenders, we find no merit to J.W.’s

claim that requiring him to register as a sex offender for life is at

odds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act.

	Nonetheless, in support of his claim that the registration of a

12-year-old sex offender is not reasonable, J.W. also contends that

there are other less offensive but equally effective means of

protecting the public from juvenile sex offenders. For example,

J.W. notes that even though he could not be subject to

incarceration for more than 30 days due to his age (see 705 ILCS

405/5–710(1)(b) (West 2000)), his probationary period must be at

least five years (see 705 ILCS 405/5–715(1) (West 2000)). In

addition, J.W. observes that a trial court may impose conditions of

probation, including that: the minor obtain therapy and treatment;

the minor’s contact with his or her victims and other children be limited or prohibited; the minor be subject to a period of home

confinement; and the minor’s parents be subject to monitoring or

supervisory conditions. See 705 ILCS 405/5–715(2), 5--–110 (West

2000).

	 J.W. concedes that the considerations at issue might be

different if the registration was for a limited period of time, if

dissemination of the information was limited in scope, or if the

minor could be and was treated as an adult for purposes of criminal

prosecution. In advancing this argument, J.W. reads the

Notification Law as allowing the public unlimited access to

information concerning juvenile sex offenders, including access via

the Internet. J.W. maintains that requiring a 12-year-old child to

register for the rest of his life as a sex offender and allowing the

general public unfettered access to identifying information about

that child is not a reasonable means of accomplishing the

legislature’s goal of protecting the public and is offensive to this

country’s fundamental precepts of justice.

	We first observe that contrary to J.W.’s claim that the

Notification Law gives the general public “immediate, unlimited,

and permanent access to identifying information about him,” the

Notification Law actually strictly limits the availability of

information with regard to juvenile sex offenders. Specifically, the

Notification Law provides:

			“The Department of State Police and any law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction may, in the

Department’s or agency’s discretion, provide the

information specified in subsection (b) [i.e., offender’s name, address, date of birth, offense], with respect to a

juvenile sex offender, to any person when that person’s

safety may be compromised for some reason related to the

juvenile sex offender.” 730 ILCS 152/120(e) (West 2000).

	Consequently, information concerning a juvenile sex offender

may be disseminated to a member of the public only if that person’s

safety might be compromised for some reason and only in the appropriate agency’s or department’s discretion.3 Information concerning juvenile sex offenders is not available over the Internet.

We find, therefore, that the extremely limited dissemination of

information concerning juvenile sex offenders supports a finding

that the registration of juvenile sex offenders is a reasonable means

of protecting the public.

	In addition, although J.W. suggests alternate means of

accomplishing the legislature’s objective in this case, it is well

settled that the rational basis test does not require that the statute

be the best means of accomplishing the legislature’s objectives.

People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). It is best left to the legislature and not the courts to determine

whether a statute is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve

the desired result. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d at 124. If there is any conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the statute will

be upheld. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d at 124.

	With the foregoing principles in mind, we must reject J.W.’s

claim that the statute at issue violates substantive due process.

Clearly there is a rational relationship between the registration of

juvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from such

offenders. Requiring the registration of juvenile sex offenders, even

where the offender is only 12 years old and the duration of

registration is for life, is reasonable in light of the strict limits

placed upon access to that information. Whether there are better

means to achieve this result, such as limiting the duration of

registration for all juvenile sex offenders including juvenile sexual

predators, is a matter better left to the legislature.

	As a final matter, we note that the amici assert that the lifetime registration and the notification requirements violate procedural due process under the Illinois and United States Constitutions.

J.W., however, has not raised a procedural due process claim and

in fact expressly stated that he was not challenging the Registration

Act and the Notification Law on procedural due process grounds. Amici also claim that enforcement of the registration and notification requirements violate state and federal constitutionally

protected privacy interests. Neither the State nor J.W., however,

has raised a privacy issue in his brief to this court.

	An amicus curiae is not a party to an action but rather is a “friend” of the court. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 234 (1991). Consequently, the sole function of an amicus is to advise or make suggestions to the court. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234. An amicus takes the case as he finds it, with the issues as framed by the parties.

P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234. This court need not pass on grounds of invalidity solely urged by an amicus. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234; accord Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 281 (1996). Consequently, we decline to address the procedural due process

and privacy issues raised by the amici.

	J.W. next contends that requiring a 12-year-old child to

register as a sex offender and allowing the public access to

information concerning juvenile sex offenders violates the eighth

amendment and the proscription against double jeopardy. The

State argues that J.W. has waived this issue, noting that J.W. did

not raise this issue in the trial court or the appellate court, nor did

he raise this issue in his petition for leave to appeal to this court.

	The State is correct that J.W. did not raise these constitutional

challenges in the trial court or the appellate court or in his petition

for leave to appeal.   As noted, however, a constitutional challenge

to a criminal statute can be raised at any time.   Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d at 454.   Accordingly, we find that waiver does not bar consideration

of these issues.

	J.W. concedes that this court has held that the Registration

Act and the Notification Law are not punitive and therefore do not

violate the eighth amendment. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (2000). J.W. distinguishes Malchow, however, on the ground that the defendant in Malchow was an adult, and on the ground that the version of the Notification Law at issue in Malchow provided for limited dissemination of the information in question, while the current version of the Notification Law provides that

anyone can access information on registered sex offenders at any

time, including through the Internet.

	We first address the claim that the Notification Law

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it allows for

unlimited dissemination of information concerning juvenile sex

offenders. Both J.W. and the amici read the amendments to the Notification Law as providing for dissemination of information

concerning juvenile sex offenders to anyone with access to the

Internet. J.W. and amici argue that providing such information over the Internet without restriction clearly is punitive when the

sex offender is a 12-year-old boy.

	As discussed above, however, J.W. and amici are reading the Notification Law incorrectly. The Notification Law specifically

addresses juvenile sex offenders and provides that information

concerning juvenile sex offenders is not available on the Internet

and public access to information concerning juvenile sex offenders

is limited to those whose safety might be compromised for some

reason related to the juvenile sex offender. See 730 ILCS

152/120(e) (West 2000). In fact, the debates concerning House Bill

2721 reflect the limited dissemination of information concerning

juvenile sex offenders. House Bill 2721 amended the Notification

Law as well as the Registration Act to include juvenile sex

offenders. In discussing the registration of juvenile sex offenders,

Representative Klingler observed that “Notification, however, is

limited to schools and when public safety is at risk then the

juveniles would not be on the Internet.” 91st Ill. Gen. Assem.,

House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143 (statements of

Representative Klingler).

	Public information concerning juvenile sex offenders thus is

much more restricted than information concerning adult sex

offenders. Given that the dissemination of information concerning

juvenile sex offenders is even narrower than the dissemination of

information at issue in Malchow, we disagree with J.W. that Malchow is distinguishable and is not binding precedent.

	With regard to the fact that the defendant in Malchow was an adult, J.W. analogizes the lifetime registration requirement in this

case to the imposition of the death penalty and observes that the imposition of the death penalty on a child under the age of 16

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

	We find no merit to this argument. There is no question that

the death penalty is a punishment. In Malchow and Adams, however, this court rejected claims that the Registration Act and

the Notification Law constitute punishment. We are not persuaded

that requiring a juvenile sex offender to register and allowing very

limited public access to notification concerning the juvenile’s status

as a sex offender compels a different result. See In re Ayres, 239 Mich. App. 8, 608 N.W.2d 132 (1999) (given strict statutory

safeguards protecting confidentiality of juvenile sex offenders,

registration act as applied to juveniles neither punishes juvenile nor

offends premise that a reformed adult should not have to carry

stigma of youthful offense). We therefore reject J.W.’s claim that

the Registration Act and Notification Law as applied to juvenile

sex offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

	As the State observes, J.W.’s argument that requiring him to

register as a sex offender violates the proscription against double

jeopardy is based on his claim that the registration requirement

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because we hold that the

registration requirement does not constitute punishment, J.W.’s

double jeopardy argument likewise must fail. See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 426 (given holding that Registration Act and Notification

Law are not punitive, defendant’s claim that those statutes violate

double jeopardy also must fail).

	J.W.’s final argument is that the trial court’s condition that he

not reside in or enter South Elgin during the term of his probation

is overly broad, unreasonable, and violates J.W.’s constitutional

rights. J.W. claims that banishing a 12-year-old child from the

entire town in which he and his family resided is not reasonably

related to the goals of rehabilitating the minor or protecting the

public. J.W. concedes that the Juvenile Court Act allows the trial

court to impose, as a condition of a minor’s probation, the

requirement that the minor refrain from entering a specific

geographic area (see 705 ILCS 405/5–715(2)(r) (West 2000)), but

argues that the condition here which provides for no circumstances

under which J.W. can be present in South Elgin is too broad.

	Section 5--–715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:

			“(2) The court may as a condition of probation or of

conditional discharge require that the minor:

* * *

				(r) refrain from entering into a designated geographic

area except upon terms as the court finds appropriate. The terms may include consideration of the purpose of

the entry, the time of day, other persons accompanying

the minor, and advance approval by a probation officer,

if the minor has been placed on probation, or advance

approval by the court, if the minor has been placed on

conditional discharge.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS

405/5--–715(2)(r) (West 2000).

	Thus, the Juvenile Court Act allows a court to impose, as a

condition of probation, certain restrictions on a minor’s ability to

be present within a designated geographical area if the court

includes terms whereby the probationer can enter the restricted

area for legitimate purposes.   The order in the case at bar, however,

goes further--–it prohibits J.W. from residing in his own home in the

community where he had been living with his family.   Moreover, the

order banishes J.W. from the Village of South Elgin without

providing any terms or exceptions to its application.   Accordingly, 

J.W. is prohibited, as a condition of probation, from entering South

Elgin for any purpose.   Consequently, the condition of probation

imposed on J.W. in the case at bar is not one which is explicitly

provided for by statute.

	Although the banishment condition of probation is not

expressly provided for by statute, it may, nonetheless, be a

constitutionally valid condition of probation. It has been recognized

that courts have broad discretion to impose probation conditions,

whether expressly allowed by statute or not, to achieve the goals

of fostering rehabilitation and protecting the public. See People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d 575, 581 (1992). Of course, the wide latitude given to courts in

setting conditions of probation is not boundless. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 580.   The court’s discretion is limited by constitutional

safeguards and must be exercised in a reasonable manner.   Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581.   “The constitutional safeguards, which

circumscribe a trial court’s exercise of its discretion to impose conditions, are the basic constitutional rights of the probationer.” 

Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581-82.

	 In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456, 460 (1989), it was recognized that probation conditions which impose geographic

restrictions on travel implicate liberty interests.   Reference was

made in Pickens to People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 621- 22, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386-87 (1983), wherein the court held:

		“ ‘A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree

of privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution

[citations].’ [Citation.]

			 A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate as

well as interstate travel. ([Citation.)] Many other

fundamental rights such as free speech, free assembly and

free association are often tied in with the right to travel.

([Citation.)] The right to acquire, own, enjoy and dispose of

property is also a basic fundamental right guaranteed by

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. ([Citation.)]”

	Although the condition of probation imposed on J.W. in the

case at bar--–barring J.W. from residing in or going to South

Elgin--–implicates his constitutional rights, a condition of probation

which 

 impinges on fundamental constitutional rights is not

automatically deemed invalid. Even fundamental constitutional

rights are not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the

public interest. City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 460 (1997) (personal liberties are not absolute and only governmental

actions which intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily or in an

utterly unreasonable manner violate the due process clause);

People v. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582; People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Thus, when deciding the propriety of   a

condition of probation imposed in a particular case, whether

explicitly statutory or not, the overriding concern is

reasonableness.   In re M.P., 297 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1998); People v. Ferrell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79 (1995).   To be reasonable, a condition of probation must not be overly broad

when viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to that

end.   In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 843 (1998).   In other words, “ ‘[w]here a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious

constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the

extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compelling

state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is an

unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental

constitutional rights.'’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 146, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (1979), quoting

People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 488 P.2d 630, 635, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1971). 

	When assessing the reasonableness of a condition of probation

it is appropriate to consider whether the restriction is related to the

nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the probationer.  

Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 378;   Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 460.   Other considerations are: (1) whether the condition of probation

reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose of the legislation,

(2) whether the value to the public in imposing this condition of

probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to the probationer’s

constitutional rights, and (3) whether there are any alternative

means that are less subversive to the probationer’s constitutional

rights, but still comport with the purposes of conferring the benefit

of probation. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582; In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840,at 843 (1998). 

	In the case at bar, the requirement that J.W. not reside in

South Elgin is severe.   At the time the condition was imposed, the

family residence was located in South Elgin and the restriction

prevented J.W. from living with his parents until they sold the

home and moved to another community.   In a California case,

People v. Beach, a banishment order which required an elderly woman to vacate the home she had owned and lived in for 24 years

was held invalid. Beach,  147 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387.   The court found that the banishment served no valid

purpose, stating:

				“[T]he value to the public does not manifestly outweigh

any impairment of appellant’s constitutional rights of

freedom of travel, speech, association, assembly and to the

possession and enjoyment of her property. Simply causing

appellant to move from one geographical area to another

is of minimal value to the public when compared with the infringement of appellant’s basic constitutional rights.”  

Beach, 147 Call. App. 3d at 623, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 

	The Beach court, when considering whether the banishment order would promote the probationer’s rehabilitation, found that

the condition might cause more damage due to the psychological

stress that would be associated with such a move. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387.   Further, the Beach court held that there were less subversive means that the court could

utilize to accomplish its goals.

	The situation in Beach is distinguishable from the case at bar.   Here, despite the harshness of the residency restriction, it is a

reasonable condition of probation. Clearly, this condition is related

to the offenses. The victims of the sexual assaults for which J.W.

was adjudicated delinquent were children living in J.W.’s

neighborhood. Further, due to the nature of the offenses and the

hostile public sentiment they engendered, removing J.W. from the

location where the offenses took place would be in his best interest

and a benefit not only to his rehabilitation, but to the rehabilitation

of his victims. In addition, the harshness of the residency restriction

in the case at bar is tempered to a large degree by the fact that

J.W.’s family expressed a willingness to move out of the

community.   From the record it appears that the court’s order that

J.W. not reside in South Elgin was not so much a restriction

imposed by the court as it was an affirmation of the parent’s

expressed intent to leave the community.   For all of these reasons,

barring J.W. from residing in South Elgin is a constitutionally valid

condition of probation and not unreasonable.

	At the same time, however, banishing J.W. from entering

South Elgin for any purpose is a condition of probation which is not narrowly drawn and, thus, an unconstitutionally overbroad

restriction on J.W.’s exercise of his fundamental rights.  

	As noted earlier, a condition of probation is constitutionally

valid if it is reasonable.   However, a restriction on a probationer’s

travel into a specified geographic area is reasonable and not

unconstitutionally overbroad only if (1) there is a valid purpose for

the restriction, and (2) there is a means by which the probationer

may obtain exemption from the restriction for legitimate purposes. 

 In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456 (1989), our appellate court held:

			“A court may, as a   condition of probation or other

sentence short of incarceration, bar a defendant from

certain areas if the penalty is reasonably related to the

offense, provided that, if the defendant has a legitimate and compelling reason to go to theat area or place, he may

apply to a specified authority for specific permission, as

here to the probation officer.

  			We find the proviso to the condition imposed,

permitting the defendant to obtain specific written

permission from her probation officer to enter the

restricted area if she had a legitimate reason to go there,

removes the taint of banishment from the restriction and

substitutes in its stead supervised guidance for permissive

entry to the area.” (Emphasis in original.) Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 461-62.

	In the present case, banishing J.W. from going to South Elgin

was a condition imposed in an attempt to minimize the possibility

of J.W.’s contact with his victims.   While this serves as a valid

purpose for the restriction, the limitation imposed in the case at bar

is too broad because it fails to make any provision for J.W. to enter

the area for legitimate purposes.

	Section 5--–24715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act authorizes the

court, as a condition of probation, to require a juvenile to “refrain

from entering into a designated geographic area except upon terms as the court finds appropriate.”  (Emphasis added.) This language of the statute mirrors the constitutional requirement that the

condition of probation be narrowly drawn.   For this reason, the trial

court, by failing to strictly conform the condition of probation to

the requirements of the statute, imposed an overly broad and

unconstitutional condition of probation.   We therefore vacate the

portion of the trial court’s order of probation imposing the

banishment condition as written, and remand the cause so that the

court may consider whether the geographic travel restriction is still

warranted and, if so, what appropriate terms for entering the

geographic area should be applied.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,

affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County, is

affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, and 

vacated in part,;

 andcause remanded.

	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:

	In the case at bar, this court upholds the constitutionality of

the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS

150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), which requires 12-year-old J.W., who was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of aggravated criminal

sexual assault, to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.

Although I believe this ruling to be legally correct, I write

separately to express my concern over the harshness of this lifetime

reporting requirement.

	J.W. contends that imposing a lifetime registration requirement

on juveniles, especially juveniles under the age of 13, violates

substantive due process and the proscription against double

jeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation

of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.

	While I agree with the court that the registration requirements

mandated by the plain language of the Registration Act are

constitutionally valid, I recognize a certain tension between a

lifetime reporting requirement and the philosophical underpinnings

of our juvenile justice system.

	According to the provisions of our Juvenile Court Act, a

minor under the age of 13 can never be prosecuted under the

criminal laws of this State, nor can a minor under the age of 13 be

the subject of an extended juvenile prosecution. 705 ILCS 405/5–130, 5–805, 5–810 (West 2000). In my view, these

provisions reflect a legislative understanding that children under the

age of 13, no matter how serious the offense charged, “simply are

too immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult.” In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 325, 777 A.2d 891, 904 (2001). Children under the age of 13 have a diminished capacity to form

criminal intent. It seems incongruous, then, to make no distinction

in the treatment of juveniles under the age of 13 for purposes of the

Registration Act.

	I observe that, while all 50 states have adopted sex offender

registration and community notification laws, often referred to as

Megan’s Laws (see State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 292, 738 A.2d 595, 601-02 (1999) (providing historical explanation of

Megan’s Laws and their adoption throughout the country)), the

implementation of these laws, particularly with respect to juveniles,

varies greatly from state to state. Some states do not expressly

include juveniles in their law (see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §775.21 (West 2000)), while others include only those juveniles who have

been tried and convicted as adults (see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4121(a)(4)(b) (Supp. 2000)). In some instances, although

registration requirements are made applicable to juveniles, the

burden has been ameliorated by various means: by making a jury

trial a condition precedent to juvenile registration, allowing the

juvenile court the discretion to waive the registration requirement,

providing that the duty to register will terminate at a certain age or

by allowing the juvenile to petition for termination of the

registration duty upon a clear showing that the juvenile has not

reoffended and that registration is no longer necessary to protect

the public.

	I recognize that the laws in other jurisdictions which limit

registration and notification requirements with respect to juveniles

are the result of policy determinations made by the governing

bodies of those states. I further recognize that the authority to

determine appropriate public policy for this state is vested in our

legislature and not with this court. Thus, barring a constitutional

violation, this court is constrained to uphold the registration and

notification laws of this state as written.

	In the case at bar, this court holds that the requirements of the

Registration Act apply equally to adults and juveniles and that our

constitutional safeguards do not prevent the Registration Act’s

lifetime registration provisions from being applied to minors of all

ages. While I am compelled to agree with this determination, I,

nevertheless, invite the legislature to reconsider the wisdom of

imposing such a burden on juveniles, particularly juveniles under

the age of 13. The public safety concerns which animate the

registration and notification laws should be harmonized with our

traditional understanding of the need to protect and rehabilitate the

young citizens of this state.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

	I concur in the majority’s holding that the condition of

probation barring J.W. from going to South Elgin fails to conform

strictly to the requirements of the statute and is an overly broad

and unconstitutional condition of probation. Although I agree with

the majority that adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are

required to register as sex offenders, I respectfully dissent in part

because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Illinois

Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1

et seq. (West 2000)) as requiring J.W. to register as a sexual predator for the rest of his life. Moreover, I believe that an

interpretation requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual

predator for the rest of his natural life offends principles of

substantive due process. Finally, I dissent because of the majority’s

unnecessary factual description of the sexual conduct between J.W.

and the minor victims.

	The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determine

and give effect to the legislature’s intent, while presuming the

legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust

results. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19 (2001). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids of

construction. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it is

proper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter

and to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947).

	The parties disagree on the interpretation of the Registration

Act as applied to juvenile sex offenders and acknowledge that the

Registration Act is subject to differing reasonable interpretations.

A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by

reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Here, the Registration Act is clearly subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation and is thus ambiguous. See B.C., 176 Ill. 2d at 543 (a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable

interpretation). Accordingly, we must employ aids of statutory

construction to determine legislative intent, while avoiding absurd,

inconvenient, or unjust results. See D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418-19.

	The legislature created two categories of sex offenders.

Section 2(A) of the Registration Act defines a “sex offender” and

section 2(E) defines a “sexual predator.” Section 2(A–5) defines

“juvenile sex offender.” An adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex

offender is a specific type of sex offender. In fact, the recent

amendments to the Registration Act deleting the “juvenile sex

offender” definition section 2(A–5) and adding a subsection (5) to

section 2(A) supports the inference that the legislature intended

adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders to be a specific

category of sex offender. See Pub. Act 92–828, eff. August 22,

2002 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, 4, 5, 5–5, 6, 7, 8–5, 10 (West

2000)).

	Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that J.W. falls within

the definition of a “sex offender” because he was adjudicated a

juvenile delinquent as a result of committing aggravated criminal

sexual assault, an offense specified in section 2(B) of the

Registration Act. I disagree, however, with the majority that a

juvenile sex offender can be classified as a “sexual predator.”

	A reading of section 2(A–5) of the Registration Act and

section 105 of the Sex Offender and Child Murder Community

Notification Law (Notification Law), together with section 2(E) of

the Registration Act, makes it clear that a “juvenile sex offender”

cannot be classified as a sexual predator. Both sections 2(A–5) of

the Registration Act and 105 of the Notification Law specifically

define a “juvenile sex offender” as one who commits any of the

offenses specified in items “(B), (C), or (C–5)” of the Registration

Act, and neither definition makes any reference to item (E) of the

Registration Act that would result in the classification as a

“juvenile sexual predator.”

	Section 2(E), on the other hand, specifically defines a “sexual

predator” as one who is convicted of any of the offenses specified

in items (1), (2), or (5) of section 2(E), or certified as a sexually

dangerous person, or found to be a sexually violent person. 730

ILCS 150/2(E)(1), (E)(2), (E)(3), (E)(4), (E)(5) (West 2000).

Section 2(E) contains no reference to section 2(A–5) or any

indication that a “juvenile sex offender” may also be classified as a

“sexual predator.” In fact, there are absolutely no references to

juveniles as “sexual predators” in either the Registration Act or the

Notification Law.

	Moreover, although the term “convicted” is given the same

meaning as “adjudicated” for purposes of section 2(A), section

2(E) contains no similar pronouncement. Based upon section

2(E)’s silence on adjudications, the legislature must have intended

that the term “sexual predator” apply only to persons who have

actually been “convicted” in adult court of a specified offense.

	Any other interpretation leads to unjust and absurd results. For

instance, the majority’s interpretation would subject so called

“juvenile sexual predators” of any age to such reporting

requirements, while a sex offender or a sexual predator who is

convicted of first degree murder of a child must be at least 17 years

of age to be subject to lifetime reporting requirements. See 730

ILCS 150/2(C–5), (E)(2) (West 2000). The legislature surely did

not intend consequences so inconsistent with reason, logic, and

common sense.

	Equally important, the State never has contended that and,

indeed, it concedes in its brief that J.W. should not be required to register as a “sexual predator” and that his registration is limited to

a period of 10 years. The State itself expresses concerns over the

propriety of requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex

offender for the rest of his life, remarking that,

		“As a sex offender, the registration of the minor is limited

to 10 years. A 10-year requirement *** strikes a fair

balance between Respondent’s desire for a limited

registration time and the People’s concerns for protecting

the public.”

The State further acknowledges in its brief that the trial court

ordered J.W. to register as a “sex offender,” not as a “sexual

predator.” The State also acknowledges that the appellate court

mistakenly determined, sua sponte, that J.W. must register as a “sexual predator.”

	J.W. was not convicted as an adult in a criminal court and

cannot be treated as an adult in every aspect of sex offender

registration and community notification. Juveniles convicted as

adults are classified as either “sex offenders” or “sexual predators” based upon their specific convictions. Such convictions are

founded on determinations of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

subject to the protections of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments

to our federal constitution. However, under the majority’s

statutory interpretation, a juvenile who was not treated as an adult

in criminal court but was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent sex

offender in juvenile court cannot have the advantage of such

protections. While some registration requirements such as the

10-year limitation may be justified, a juvenile delinquent sex

offender can only be classified as a “sex offender” and cannot be

classified as a “sexual predator.”

	This statutory interpretation is consistent with current practice

and the official guides that are widely disseminated by the Illinois

State Police. See A Guide to Sex Offender Registration in Illinois, Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies, at 6, 31, 33

(October 1, 2002) (“Adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders

are required to register effective July 1, 1999. Adjudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders are not predators” (emphasis added) and “[a]djudicated juvenile delinquent sex offenders cannot be classified as sexual predators (emphasis in original)”); see also A Guide to Sex Offender and Child Murder Community Notification

Law in Illinois, Prepared for: Illinois Criminal Justice Agencies (October 1, 2002).

	This interpretation of the statute is also consistent with the fact

that juveniles who engage in sexually inappropriate behavior do not

necessarily pose a long-term risk of re-offending. “In many

instances, sexually improper behavior by such young children

[under age 14] is more a reflection of inadequate adult supervision,

immaturity, inappropriate media exposure, or a prior history of

emotional abuse than it is of irremediable sexually predatory

inclinations.” In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 340, 777 A.2d 891, 913-14 (2001). Accordingly, I believe that while the trial

court properly ordered J.W. to register as a juvenile sex offender,

this registration requirement is limited to 10 years from the date of

adjudication.

	I agree with the majority that information concerning J.W.

cannot be disseminated to the public, placed on the Internet, or

made available to the public except when public safety is

threatened. The majority does not make clear, however, that for

purposes of community notification, the adjudicated juvenile

delinquent sex offender should continue to be treated as a juvenile,

even though he or she reaches the age of 18.

	I further disagree with the majority’s analysis that subjecting

a 12-year-old child to lifetime registration requirements as a

“sexual predator” comports with principles of substantive due

process. To comply with substantive due process, a statute must

bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and

the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing

the desired objective. People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).

	In Adams, this court found that the State has an interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and that the

Registration Act bears a reasonable relationship to that interest.

Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391. However, in Adams, this court only reviewed the registration requirements in the adult context. The

majority fails to acknowledge that adjudicated juvenile delinquent

sex offenders do not enjoy the same panoply of rights and

safeguards as adults and juveniles prosecuted as adults in criminal court. Requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sexual predator

for the rest of his life is an unreasonable means of furthering the

State’s interest. The majority misses this obvious conclusion and,

unfortunately, ignores the State’s concession of that point.

	Although this court has recognized that recent amendments to

the Juvenile Court Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings that

are “similar” to adult criminal proceedings (In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317-19 (2001)), there remain fundamental differences

between the juvenile and criminal justice systems that militate

against holding a 12-year-old child to an adult standard of

registration and reporting for the rest of his life. Children have

lesser levels of maturity and, because of their corresponding

inability to control their behavior or to comprehend fully the

consequences of their actions, their criminal acts are generally

considered less culpable than those of an adult, and they are seen

as more amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 718-19, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (plurality op.). In fact, the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)  distinguishes between juveniles over and under

the age of 13. Under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, a

juvenile court judge may enter an order permitting a minor 13 years

of age or older to be prosecuted under the criminal laws of the

state if the judge finds “that it is not in the best interests of the

public to proceed under this Act.” 705 ILCS 405/5–805(3)(a)

(West 2000). There is no similar provision for the transfer of

minors under the age of 13. “It is clear that the purpose of a

transfer proceeding is to balance the best interests of a juvenile

offender, particularly as the offender’s interests relate to his

potential for rehabilitation, against society’s legitimate interest in

being protected from criminal victimization perpetrated by minors.”

People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 424-25 (2001). The transfer provisions of the Juvenile Court Act reflect a clear legislative

determination that a child under the age of 13 is simply too

immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult, no matter how

serious the offense.

	It is indisputable that J.W. could not have been prosecuted as

an adult for his conduct. To treat him as an adult by requiring him

to comply with lifetime registration requirements cannot seriously be considered a “reasonable” means of furthering the state’s

interest. I can conceive of no legitimate rationale for subjecting a

juvenile delinquent under the age of 13 to lifetime registration

requirements. Accordingly, I believe that subjecting juvenile

delinquents to a lifetime registration requirement violates principles

of substantive due process as it is an unreasonable method of

accomplishing the state’s desired objective, and is therefore

unconstitutional as applied to juvenile delinquents. See Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 390 (to comply with substantive due process, a statute

must bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be

served, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of

accomplishing the desired objective).

	This court now puts juveniles, regardless of age, on equal

footing with their adult counterparts without affording them equal

constitutional rights and protections. After today’s decision,

children under the age of 12 who are adjudicated of certain sex

offenses will be forever labeled as “sexual predators” and subjected

to lifetime registration requirements.

	Finally, I am troubled by the majority’s detailed description of

the sexual conduct between J.W. and his victims, including

identifying the minor victims by initials. This court should be

especially sensitive to protecting the identity of the juveniles and

respecting the privacy of the juvenile victims. It is apparent from

the record that many people in the community of South Elgin

already know the identity of J.W. and his involvement in sexual

conduct with other juveniles, but these people may not have known

the identity of the victims or the exact nature of the sexual conduct.

Given that J.W. pled guilty, such specific and graphic details are

unnecessary to the disposition of this case and are, in my opinion,

inappropriate.

	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.