Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, YC-3, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force 

SOF Chair, Naval Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 
On the cover. Capt Kyle Walton, detachment commander, with other 

members of Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces 

Group (Airborne) on a recon of the remote Shok Valley of Afghanistan where 

they fought an almost 7-hour battle with terrorists in a remote mountainside village. Ten detachment members received the Silver Star for heroism 

during that action. Photo by Sgt David N. Gunn on 15 December 2008. 

JSOU Report 09-6

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2009

Educating Special 

Forces Junior Leaders 

for a Complex Security 

Environment

Russell D. Howard
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-36-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or 

position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency, 

October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing 

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line, 

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect 

Approaches, February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White 

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, March 2009 

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy:The Past as Present, the 

Present as Future, April 2009, Roby C. Barrett 

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May 2009, 

John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(16-19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection, 

July 2009, William G. Perry
vii

Foreword

I

n this paper, Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard argues for graduate level 

education for the junior leaders of our Special Forces (SF). By exploring the SOF future strategic environment that includes globalization, 

demographic trends, competition for resources, transnational nonstate actors, 

advanced technology, and emerging powers Brigadier General Howard 

identifies “cultural competency” as critical to the development of junior SF

officers. The need for the SF operator, at once, to effectively interact with 

indigenous peoples, interagency counterparts, and transnational, nongovernmental players suggests that a new program of graduate level study is 

needed early-on in the officer’s career.

By Howard’s analysis, such graduate programs should focus on developing one’s intellectual capacity to synthesize information concerning areas 

such as interagency relationships, language proficiency, cultural, socialpolitical anthropology, negotiation, and cross-cultural communications. So 

educated, the junior SF officer is enabled to adapt and apply his intellectual 

prowess to confront the daily challenges he will certainly face in the field. 

General Downing stated that SF officers are “the senior U.S. representative 

and implementer of U.S. foreign policy”...“out there.” Howard suggests 

that programs at Naval Post Graduate School and other traditional graduate 

programs do not educate junior SF officers because those students are typically majors (O-4s) that move on to senior positions after graduate school. 

Howard argues, earlier educational opportunities should be available to the 

junior SF O-3s—this is where additional graduate level effort is needed. 

Brigadier General Howard does not pretend to solve the operation tempo 

(OPTEMPO) problem caused by normal career development and the nearly 

continuous deployment of SF personnel to two wars. These are key reasons 

for what he identifies as equity issues or an opportunity gap, whereby conventional officers seem to have greater opportunities than SF counterparts 

to attend graduate school. To close this opportunity gap, Howard argues 

for a graduate program formula that is distant-learning intensive, has an 

emphasis on operational skills first, strategic skills last, and takes 5 years to 

complete. Such programs might extend the time window for an SF officer’s 

participation in graduate level education and as the author suggests “front 

load” education. In sum, this paper advances the concept of educating SF 
officers early in their careers so they can apply their knowledge working 

through, by, and with indigenous counterparts in the irregular warfare 

environment. Although Brigadier General Howard limited his study to 

consider SF officers, it has relevance and application to the warrant officer 

grades and other junior officers across all USSOCOM components.

Kenneth H. Poole, YC-3

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
ix

About the Author

Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard is a faculty 

associate at the Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana. He was the founding director 

of The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Prior 

to assuming the Tufts responsibilities, he was the 

Social Sciences Department chair and the founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center 

at West Point. 

His previous Army positions include chief of staff fellow at the Center 

for International Affairs, Harvard University and commander of the 1st 

Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Other recent 

assignments include assistant to the Special Representative to the Secretary 

General during United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, deputy 

chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for the 

Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. Previously, 

he was commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group 

(Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also served as the administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a special assistant to the 

commander of SOUTHCOM.

As a newly commissioned officer, he served as an “A” team commander 

in the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active component and then served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During 

this period he served as an overseas manager, American International 

Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia and China tour manager for Canadian 

Pacific Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served initially 

in Korea as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments 

included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 1st 

Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard has a B.S. in Industrial Management from San Jose State 

University and B.A. in Asian Studies from the University of Maryland. He 

also has a M.A. in International Management from the Monterey Institute 

of International Studies and MPA from Harvard University. He was an 
x

assistant professor of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy and a 

senior service college fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

Tufts University. He is a JSOU senior fellow, and his previous JSOU publication is Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New Concepts for a Changing Security 

Environment (December 2007). 
1

Educating Special Forces 

Junior Leaders for a 

Complex Security Environment

Introduction

Originally, this project was intended to review the education 

requirements and opportunities available to all Special Operations Forces (SOF) officers during a normal career path. The focus 

was to be on field-grade opportunities at service schools, civilian education 

opportunities (including graduate school), international education (such 

as opportunities for studying abroad), and service with industry. A prime 

objective was to ascertain whether the current Special Operations Officer 

Professional Education program provides the knowledge, understanding, 

and competencies to prepare officers for leadership in a future security environment characterized by continued terrorist activity, insurgency, and other 

forms of irregular warfare. 

The actual study does both less and more than its original premise. 

Instead of focusing on the entire special operations officer community 

(Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) and at all levels (O-3 through O-6), 

this study concentrates on U.S. Army Special Forces officers, particularly 

captains and majors. Certainly, a comprehensive look at special operations 

officer education is warranted and important, but well beyond the scope 

of this study and the author’s resources. Perhaps the results of this work 

will prompt others to conduct similar research for higher ranks and other 

services in the SOF community. 

While the original target research group was too large, the operational 

environment as initially defined (terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of 

irregular warfare) was much too limited. In truth, the operational environment all SOF officers will face in the coming decades will include much more 
2

JSOU Report 09-6

than irregular warfare, which greatly complicates the training and education requirements for the entire officer corps, but particularly for Special 

Forces officers. 

This study contains six parts:

a. List of assumptions that will impact Special Forces officer education 

and training

b. Best guess at what the “future international security environment” 

will look like

c. Recommendations—based on the assumptions and the “future 

operational environment”—of several knowledge-based education 

competencies—some familiar, some not

d. Survey of graduate programs teaching these competencies

e. Statistical analysis and discussion of the “gap” in graduate education 

between Army Special Forces and non-Special Forces

f. Suggestions for providing Special Forces officers with a viable, tailored, and quality master’s degree that will enhance their operational 

performance, accelerate their capability for senior-level and joint staff 

billets, and increase their opportunity for successful command in 

increasingly difficult command situations.

Assumptions

Assumptions describe the facts about circumstances believed to be true or 

beliefs that are thought to be broadly shared. These assumptions are based 

on several years of teaching the course “National Security Strategy” at the 

United States Military Academy, West Point and of researching four published books on the topic of terrorism. The author believes these assumptions to be true, and further, that a broad coalition of academics, operators, 

and policymakers also agree. These assumptions were initially briefed as 

part of a presentation at the International Special Operations Forces (ISOF) 

week in Tampa, Florida in May 2008, where they were favorably received. 

From these assumptions and the following “future international security 

environment,” the author has formulated recommendations regarding 

future education requirements. The assumptions follow:

a. The next U.S. presidential administration will have little enthusiasm 

for major conventional military operations.
3

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

b. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will be 

the “go-to” command for the full spectrum of security challenges—

from state-centric to transnational nonstate actor, from conventional 

to criminal, and everything in between. 

c. The next administration and administrations well into the 21st century will face increased terrorist, armed group, irregular warfare, and 

international criminal activity. Transnational nonstate actors will be 

the United States primary adversaries.

d. At the same time, however, the next administration could also face 

increased state-related conflict from Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and 

perhaps (though unlikely) China.

e. Interagency operations will be as important as interservice operations for SOF.

f. Ungoverned territories in failed and failing states will be frequent 

operational areas for SOF.

g. Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia, 

South Asia, and Southeast Asia—the so called arch of instability—will 

dominate the SOF agenda for the next decade.

h. International SOF forces, particularly from former Soviet Union and 

Warsaw Pact nations, will become as important (and perhaps more so) 

than traditional North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF.

The Future Strategic Environment

It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future. 

– Yogi Berra

Many attempt to predict the future; some get it right and some do not. No 

better example of this is a recent post from Harvard Business Publishing’s 

blog: “Will Your Company Predict the Future Like GM or Like Toyota?” 1

The post explains how GM failed to predict rising oil prices and continued to 

make large gas-guzzling trucks and large cars, while Toyota did the opposite. 

Because of the companies’ different predictions, Toyota has overtaken GM

as the world’s largest auto manufacturer.

Predicting the future security environment is a difficult but extremely 

important task for political leaders, defense planners, and the American 

public. Getting it right ensures comprehensive security at affordable costs. 
4

JSOU Report 09-6

Getting it wrong could be catastrophic. The truth is, predicting the future 

security environment has never been more important, nor has it been more 

difficult. The task has perhaps never been more important because the Clinton and Bush administrations’ predictions have been more analogous to 

GM’s than Toyota’s. Moreover, continued forecasting based on Cold War 

paradigms has been incorrect and counterproductive, making prediction 

more difficult because the international security environment is multifaceted, in flux, and not responsive to traditional diplomatic negotiations and/

or conventional military power. 

Numerous “predictive” studies have been initiated to help policymakers 

and planners address emerging security challenges.2 Perhaps the best predictive analysis is a yet-to-be published article by Major Paul Oh, a professor 

at the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. Entitled 

“Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” it was the 

thought piece for a conference held at West Point in June 2008.3 Major Oh 

surveyed most of the above-referenced predictive studies and other documents for his work, which is well documented, comprehensive, interesting, 

and in this author’s opinion, just about the best “future strategic analysis” 

on the street. 

Major Oh identifies the primary trends affecting the future security 

environment as “globalization, demographics, environment and competition for resources, nonstate actors and challenge to governance, advances 

in technology, and the rise of emerging powers.” 4 Each of these concepts is 

outlined in more detail below. 

Globalization

Oh refers to globalization as “the good, the bad and the ugly.” In the good, 

Oh predicts that greater market integration will benefit the world economy, 

and globalization will be the engine for greater economic growth, resulting in many in the world rising out of poverty. He notes that “the global 

economy is expected to be 80 percent larger in 2020 than in 2000,” and 

average per capita income to increase by 50 percent.5 Emerging economies 

such as India and China will continue to grow, with both examples tripling 

their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2025, and the percentage of those 

living in extreme poverty will decline.6
5

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

The bad is the economic disparity between those states that thrive in a 

globalized world and those that do not—or, as Oh states, “the benefits of 

globalization will not be global.” 7 There will be winners and losers, and the 

losers will be concentrated in areas along the “arc of instability,” a “swath 

of territory running from the Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the 

Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia.” 8 Although absolute worldwide poverty is declining, one half of the world’s 

population—roughly 3 billion people—live on 

less than $2 a day,9 and more than 300 million 

people live on less than $1 a day in sub-Saharan 

Africa.10 The resulting disparities are evident to all because of the Internet 

and other globalized communication media. 

Many believe that globalization, either separately or in conjunction with 

religious extremism, is a root cause of terrorism—the ugly in this equation. 

According to some, those who have not reaped the rewards of globalization worry that unbridled development and change can exploit workers 

and replace ancient cultures with McDonald’s and Mickey Mouse.11 They 

concur that globalization is based on the American economic system, and 

because the U.S. is the dominant world power, it has succeeded in expanding the reach of its version of globalization to more and more areas of the 

world. However, the gap between the rich and poor in most countries has 

grown wider during the last 20 years of U.S.-led globalization. As a result, 

animosities—which spawn terrorist acts against America—have grown “as 

the poor have watched American wealth and hegemony expand, while they 

themselves have received scarcely any benefit.”12 Populations perceiving 

themselves as disenfranchised will most certainly be breeding grounds for 

extremists and other criminal elements who want their fair share.13

Globalization and greater interdependence make the nation-state and 

geographic borders less important and less effective. Terrorists (particularly 

the transnational nonstate actor variety), weapons of mass destruction, 

and infectious diseases such as AIDS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 

(SARS), and Avian Flu do not recognize or respect borders. Indeed, greater 

interconnectivity and more travel options enable ugliness in many forms—

disease, terrorism, criminal cartels—to spread throughout the world at a 

frightening pace. 

The resulting disparities 

are evident to all ... 
6

JSOU Report 09-6

Demographic Trends

Demographic trends, such as population growth and decline, do not bode 

well for international stability. The world’s population will grow nearly 25 

percent between now and 2025, but most of that growth will be in the developing world. In fact, developed nations such as Japan, Russia, and many 

European states will see declining and aging populations in the next two 

decades. For example, Japan’s population will decrease by 4 million in the 

next decade, while its ratio of employment-age citizens (15 to 65) to retired 

over 65 will be only two to one by 2025.14 In contrast, population growth in 

sub-Saharan Africa (43 to 48 percent), the Middle East (38 percent), Latin 

America (24 percent), and Asia (21 percent)15 will tax already struggling 

economies and social support systems. To put this growth in perspective, 

“nine out of ten people will be living in the developing world in the next 

20 years.”16

Unlike the aging population trends in the developing world, “about 59 

percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa will be under 24 years by 

2025,” and the working-age population in the Middle East and North Africa 

“will expand by 50 and 40 percent respectively.”17 From a historical perspective, this is a disaster in the making. This bulging youth population in the 

developing world will challenge governments to provide education and 

employment opportunities, “setting up the potential for violent conflict.” 18

As a recent Economist article notes, youth “without either jobs or prospects” 

will trade “urban for rural poverty, head for the slums, bringing their anger 

and machetes with them.”19 In fact, “in the last two decades, 80 percent of 

all civil conflicts took place in countries where 60 percent or more of the 

population was under 30 years of age.” 20

Environment and Competition for Resources

Many experts believe climate change and the competition for resources

could have far-reaching security implications.21 The author takes no stand 

on the global-warming debate in this paper, but does agree with others 

that a “decline in water supplies for drinking and irrigation, a decline in 

agricultural productivity as a result of changes in rainfall, temperature and 

pest patterns, and large economic and human losses attributable to extreme 

weather events will all take their toll” on many specific geographical regions 

and will affect the global system as a whole.22 A good example is the Sahel 
7

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

region of Africa, where the desert has been encroaching southward more 

than 3 kilometers a year,23 and rainfall in the area has declined by up to 30 

percent in the last 40 years. The potential for conflict over disappearing 

pasture and evaporating water holes is huge. The southern Nuba tribe has 

warned it might restart the half-century war between North and South 

Sudan because “Arab nomads—pushed southward into their territory by 

drought—are cutting down trees to feed their camels.” 24 Interestingly, for 

those who served in Somalia, this is a common theme. There, much of the 

conflict was the result of nomadic tribes encroaching on pastoralist and 

agriculturalist tribes’ territory.25

Exacerbating environmental concerns is the ever-increasing competition 

for many resources, not just productive land. In the next several decades, 

the demand for natural resources will greatly 

increase as nations modernize and states such 

as India and China grow, prosper, and—as discussed later in this paper—attempt to achieve 

world-power status. Demand for energy and 

water will be of particular concern. For example, 

demand for energy will likely grow by more than 50 percent by 2035, with 

fossil fuels projected to meet 80 percent of this increase 26 and global consumption of natural gas to increase by 87 percent.27 China and India’s oil 

consumption has already had a major effect on global oil prices. If projections are correct—indicating China will have to increase consumption by 

150 percent and India by 100 percent by 2020 to maintain current growth—

imagine the strain on gas prices at the pump over the next decade.28

The competition for fossil fuels will intensify as the U.S., China, India, 

and other major economies vie to secure long-term energy supplies, “making 

it even more difficult for developing nations to afford minimal energy for 

their [increasing] populations.” 29 The quest for oil reserves has security 

implications as “have” nations compete for oil in the Middle East and Africa 

along the “arc of instability” and “have-not” nations face economic peril 

because of rising fuel costs. 

In addition to oil, water and food have future security and instability 

implications. In fact, two experts contend that water and resulting food 

shortages are far more serious than depleted oil reserves. Dr. Alan Dupont 

of Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National University “says water 

has overtaken oil as the world’s most critical and diminishing resource.” 30

In the next several 

decades, the demand 

for natural resources 

will greatly increase ...
8

JSOU Report 09-6

According to Dupont, one third of the world’s population does not have 

enough water today; by 2020, two thirds of the population will not have 

enough water; and within 25 years, 7 billion people could suffer from water 

scarcity.31

Dupont is not the only scholar to express concern about impending 

water shortages. “There are substitutes for oil, but there are no substitutes 

for water,” says Lester Brown, author of the book Outgrowing the Earth: 

The Food Security Challenge in an Age of Falling Water Tables and Rising 

Temperature.32 As the title implies, Brown contends that falling water tables 

and rising temperatures are making it more difficult for the world’s farmers to produce enough food for the 76 million people added to the world 

population each year.33 According to Brown, “Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security but for much of humanity, the effect 

of water shortages and rising temperatures on food security are far more 

important issues.” 34 Brown states, “for the 3 billion people who live on $2 

a day or less and who spend up to 70 percent of their income on food, even 

a modest rise in food prices can quickly become life-threatening. For them 

it is the next meal that is the overriding concern.” 35

Transnational Nonstate Actors

During the next two decades, nonstate actors, not states, will be the primary security threat to the U.S. and Western allies. Nonstate actors such as 

Al Qaeda, who owe no allegiance to a state and are not bound by national 

boundaries, are likely to continue to grow in strength and lethality.36 Small, 

empowered groups such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal cartels will 

be increasingly able to challenge states as states’ past monopoly on information and destructive power diminishes.37 This is problematic because the 

traditional forms of state interaction—diplomatic, economic, and military—

to solve differences prior to conflict are difficult to apply with a nonstate 

actor. When things get dicey, with whom do you negotiate, on whom do you 

impose sanctions, and whom do you threaten with force? And if a transnational, nonstate actor like Al Qaeda uses a weapon of mass destruction 

against a state, how does a state properly retaliate? 38

Links between nonstate actors such as terrorists and criminals, which 

capitalize on gaps in law enforcement and weak security structures, are 

increasingly becoming the norm in today’s transnational environment.39 The 

strategic alliance between terrorism and crime40—effectively described as a 
9

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

“terror-crime nexus”—takes advantage of transnational networks, allowing 

illicit actors to transcend traditional or regional spheres of influence. In 

some corners of the globe lacking strong central authority, both terrorism 

and crime become a “means of making war without declaring it.” 41 Criminal and terrorist networks thrive and support situations of “low-intensity” 

conflict, which are further exacerbated by the power vacuum that exists 

in international law enforcement. As a result, populations in areas where 

these groups are active become increasingly impoverished and subject to 

conflict, while few actually benefit from the illicit activities. The negative 

international and local effects of transnational crime and terror reveal that 

the nexus between these activities is a global threat affecting governments 

and populations at all levels.42

Advanced Technology

Advances in technology are a double-edged sword. Increased computing 

capacity combined with advances in nanotechnology, robotics, genomics, 

and biotechnology will improve the ability of governments to deal with society’s daunting medical, nutrition, environmental, transportation, and a host 

of other future concerns. However, the availability and ease of technology 

transfer allow broad access to these technologies to those who would use 

them to do great harm. Technological advances and underground trafficking by the terror-crime nexus make weapons of mass destruction (WMD—

nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological) ever easier for terrorists to 

acquire.43 Experts have begun to recognize the growing role of networks—

specifically, advanced networked organizational designs and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies among terrorist practitioners and other 

nefarious transnational, nonstate actor groups. According to several experts, 

“The growth of these networks is related to the spread of advanced information technologies that allow dispersed groups, and individuals, to conspire 

and coordinate across considerable distances.” 44

Emerging Powers

America’s superpower status could be contested in coming decades by a 

more forceful Russia (which has attacked Georgia), and emerging economic powerhouses such as India and China. Russia maintains a substantial nuclear force and a sizeable military and continues to develop modern 

weaponry. The country also has vast reserves of natural resources and is 
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JSOU Report 09-6

a leading producer and exporter of minerals, gold, timber, oil, and natural gas, with Siberia and the Russian Far East particularly rich in natural 

resources.45 However, despite the abundance of resources, Russia has serious 

problems, including a declining and aging population, troubled frontiers, 

and its remaining mineral and fossil fuel wealth located in its difficult to 

develop eastern terrain.46 More importantly, it is difficult to consider Russia 

a “superpower” when its GDP is about the size of New Jersey’s.47

India is a regional power now and could be a global power in the future. 

Many predict that India will surpass China as the world’s most populous 

country in 2030.48 India’s middle class numbers more than 200 million (four 

times the size of France’s total population), and economic growth has been 

steady.49 More importantly, India is a nuclear power that has embarked on 

an aggressive military modernization plan relying heavily on purchasing 

modern Russian submarines, tanks, and aircraft.50 Still, obstacles to India 

achieving super or even major power status remain. In an article entitled, 

“India the Superpower? Think Again,” Cait Murphy of Fortune Magazine

gives several reasons why:

a. Of the Indian children under the age of five, 47 percent are either 

malnourished or stunted. 

b. The adult literacy rate is 61 percent (behind Rwanda and barely ahead 

of Sudan). 

c. Only 10 percent of the entire Indian labor force works in the formal 

economy; of these, fewer than half are in the private sector. 

d. The enrollment of 6-to-15-year-olds in school has actually declined 

in the last year. 

e. About one fifth of the population is chronically hungry; about half 

of the world’s hungry live in India. 

f. More than a quarter of the India population lives on less than $1 a 

day. 

g. India has more people with HIV than any other country.51

Russia and India have serious internal structural problems that will inhibit 

their ability to attain world power status. India and Russia will be regional 

powers that could challenge the U.S. within their respective regions, but 

they will likely not be able to challenge the U.S. globally. 

China is a different story. A recent Pew Poll reveals that at least substantial percentages of people interviewed internationally believe China will 
11

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

replace the U.S. as the world’s superpower, and some believe China already 

has. According to the Pew Research Center:

While no country currently believes China has already overtaken 

the U.S. as the world’s dominant power, large percentages in most 

countries—and even majorities in some, including a 53 percent majority of Chinese—believe China eventually will do so in the future. Most 

of those surveyed in Germany, Spain, France, Britain, and Australia 

think China either has already replaced the U.S. or will do so in the 

future. Even in the U.S. more than one in three say China either has 

already overtaken their country (5 percent) or will eventually do so 

(31 percent), although a 54 percent majority doubts China will ever 

unseat the U.S. The Japanese (67 percent) are the most confident 

China will never replace the U.S.52

In September 1999, the author of this monograph published a paper 

entitled “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: ‘Short Arms and Slow 

Legs.’” It predicted that China’s goal of becoming a genuine power and 

regional hegemon in the new century seems quite likely, but it remains a 

distant goal to be achieved perhaps in the middle of the century.53 Today, the 

situation may be more nuanced. The paper was principally about military 

power and in that regard, and the author still believes the prediction to be 

valid. True, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Navy (PLAN), and Air Force 

(PLAA) have enjoyed double-digit budget increases every year since 1997, 

and the acquisition of modern Russian arms has advanced their capabilities 

significantly since 1999. Many of these weapons appear to have the primary 

purpose of deterring possible U.S. intervention in a Taiwan crisis, but some 

significantly expand the Chinese military’s ability to project power regionally.54 According to the paper, these include development of more accurate 

short-range and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, acquisition 

of Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny destroyers, deployment of tankers 

and air-refueling technology to extend the range of fighters, and efforts to 

improve airlift and sealift capabilities.55

Still, China has a long way to go to achieve military parity with the U.S.

For example, some reports note that Chinese military officials are now discussing building an aircraft carrier.56 Actually, this is something Chinese 

naval officers began to discuss in the late 1970s, and in 1998 they bought two 

Soviet carriers. However, neither was put to sea; instead, they were used as 
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JSOU Report 09-6

floating military-themed amusement parks. Some analysts think China 

might have a single aircraft carrier by 2015, but others, including this author, 

believe it will not have one until 2020 or later.57

Clearly, the Chinese continue to invest in a robust military modernization program. Last year the military budget rose 17.8 percent—the tenth 

straight year of double-digit increases.58 China officially says their defense 

budget is close to $60 billion; in truth, because of purchasing power parity 

and other accounting procedures, the actual figure is probably closer to 

$100 billion. Still, compared to the U.S. figure of more than $600 billion, 

the Chinese are not in the same league militarily with the United States 

and will not challenge the U.S. militarily or achieve superpower status for 

another three or four decades. 

In addition to military power, however, economic power and diplomatic 

power are measures of superpower potential, and in both, China is surging. 

Indeed, China’s large and growing economy, skillful diplomacy, and military 

restraint have enabled the nation to significantly expand its global influence, 

particularly in the developing world.59 Large-scale financial and technical 

assistance for infrastructure projects, particularly in poorer countries with 

natural resources are a form of commercial diplomacy that has been particularly effective in gaining influence and friends in the United Nations. 

Nowhere is this more true than in Africa, where China is investing huge 

sums throughout the continent. 

The main driver of China’s interest in Africa is to secure energy and 

resource assets.60 In order to hedge against rising commodity prices and 

possibly long-run supply shortages, the Chinese government encourages 

Chinese companies to secure a wide range of commodity assets by out bidding other foreign companies in securing these assets.61 The primary countries in China’s broader African engagement are the resource-rich Angola, 

Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as 

well as the more politically strategic countries of South Africa, Ethiopia, 

and Egypt.62 However, smaller African countries with comparatively little 

economic or political significance—Ghana, for example—have received 

relatively large aid and investment support from China.63

China’s commercial-diplomacy approach in Africa could be a source of 

conflict with the U.S. in the region. Countries whose political systems have 

been sharply criticized by the U.S., such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, have found 

a new ally in China, which asks few questions about political freedom or 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

human rights.64 China, which purchases most of Sudan’s oil, fielded accusations of selling the Sudanese government military equipment and training 

Sudanese pilots for missions in Darfur.65 These alleged actions violate a UN

arms embargo that “requires foreign nations to take measures to ensure they 

do not militarily assist anyone in the conflict in Darfur, in which the UN

estimates that about 300,000 people have died.”66 The terms of the embargo, 

says international lawyer Clare de Silva, “cover not only just the supply of 

weapons, military vehicles, [and] paramilitary equipment. It also covers 

training any technical assistance, so the training of pilots obviously falls 

within the scope of the embargo.” 67

China responds to such allegations by noting it is but one of several countries that sell weapons to Sudan and “is by no means the biggest exporter.”68

According to Liu Guijin, China’s Foreign Minister, China has expressed 

“grave concerns” to the Sudanese government about the violence in Darfur 

and is working to reduce tensions in Sudan’s western province.69 However, 

given the economic clout that China has in Sudan, many conclude that China 

could be much more influential in getting the Sudan to resolve the Darfur 

conflict, and China’s behavior there is indicative of a foreign policy that may 

be “confrontational” and counter to U.S. interests. 

The key concepts brought forward by Major Oh’s excellent predictive 

analysis, as well as other such documents, illustrate the importance of 

developing a comprehensive understanding of the world. Focusing on the 

concepts of globalization, demographics, environment, nonstate actors, 

technology, and the rise of emerging global powers through a multidisciplinary lens would allow Special Forces officers—or any U.S. government 

employee involved in policy formulation and implementation—to make 

more informed and nuanced decisions. 

Education Competencies

Officers assessed into Special Forces are mostly junior captains or promotable first lieutenants who have been successful in other Army branches. 

Basic entry-level training into the Special Forces branch includes the Special 

Forces Qualification Course (which provides training on small unit tactics 

in unconventional warfare environments), foreign language and cultural 

awareness training, leadership in working with indigenous forces, mission 

planning and briefing skills (namely, the ability to brief concepts to Division 
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JSOU Report 09-6

and Corps staffs), and exposure to situations that require adaptive thinking 

in complex security environments. Upon graduation from the Qualification 

Course, the expectation is that a Special Forces captain can lead a highly 

specialized team in a myriad of operations. According to Robert G. Louis, 

“Special Forces captains are required to be proficient infantry commanders 

in addition to being experts in Special Forces operations.” 70

Unlike their conventional Army counterparts—who have highly specified and controlled mission, terrain, and authority responsibilities and 

are “backed up,” supplied, and supervised by a hierarchical succession of 

headquarters—the Special Forces captain is often “out there.” In no other 

branch of the army—or any other 

service—are captains expected to 

function above the tactical level. 

Again, according to Louis, “In 

Special Forces, captains are often 

required to implement U.S. foreign 

policy with limited diplomatic or 

political guidance—and failure is not an option.” 71 Or as General Wayne 

Downing often said, “in some isolated areas Special Forces captains can 

be the senior U.S. representative and implementer of U.S. foreign policy.” 72

Indeed the most important Special Forces missions, such as unconventional 

warfare and strategic reconnaissance, require captain-led Special Forces 

Operational Detachment (SFOD) commanders to operate in failed and failing states and denied areas for extended periods of time and with little or 

no supervision. They will be out there.

The implications of being out there and the aforementioned assumptions and predictions for the new security environment suggest a need for 

educational competencies (not short-course training competencies) that 

would best be achieved in an academic environment at the graduate level, 

for several reasons. 

First, junior Special Forces officers are going to be busy—very busy—and 

like Admiral Olson said at the Special Operations Education Conference in 

June 2008, they are not going to be busy in places such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, where English is the first language.73

Second, operations in the next several decades will necessitate the ability to adapt to increasingly diverse, remote, and antagonistic cultures and 

environments.74 Special Forces captains will have to be much more than 

... the Special Forces captain is 

often “out there.” In no other 

branch of the army—or any other 

service—are captains expected to 

function above the tactical level.
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

culturally aware, which is the current requirement. They will have to achieve 

cultural competency, which is when the Special Forces officer demonstrates 

not only awareness but also cultural knowledge and sensitivity combined 

with an ability to gain trust and modify the behavior of allies, neutrals, 

or potentially divisive persons or groups to achieve a desired outcome or 

accomplish a mission.75 Special Forces captains will require sophisticated 

cross cultural communications skills. One element of the increasingly complex security environment is the exposure to a multitude of different cultures, languages, and faiths. 

Cross-cultural communications will be vital for operational success in 

many hot spots for four reasons:

a. Effective communication among allies and coalition forces from different cultural backgrounds will ensure better teamwork and mission 

focus. 

b. Effective communications with indigenous peoples—those the U.S. is 

trying to assist—will increase the likelihood for mission success. 

c. Understanding the nuances of an adversary’s internal and external 

communications (Al Qaeda’s, for example) is perhaps most important. 

Several centuries ago, Sun Tzu said it best: If you know the enemy 

and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. 

If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you 

will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, 

you will succumb in every battle.76

d. Cross-cultural communication can also refer to other agency cultures, 

including those familiar American agencies such as the CIA and 

Department of State as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). All of these agencies have 

different bureaucratic cultures and will be in the same battlespace as 

Special Forces units, often commanded by captains. 

Within these settings, there are a number of communications-related knowledge competencies that are important “kit bag” skills for a Special Forces 

captain. Negotiations, mediation, networking, and diplomacy are among 

the most important. Other beneficial skills include active listening, persuasion, building rapport, understanding nonverbal communication, how to 

communicate through interpreters, interviewing and being interviewed, 

crisis communication, and writing reports. 
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JSOU Report 09-6

The third reason Special Forces officers need graduate education is the 

growing importance of understanding anthropology—particularly cultural, 

social, and political anthropology. While it is topical to address threats and 

conflict in religious, ethnic, and political terms—individually or collectively—the truth is that much of the conflict in the developing world is quite 

simply based on land-use issues. For example, in Nigeria violence between 

Muslims and Christians certainly has religious overtones, but pressure on 

resources by the northern (Muslim) nomadic cattle herders who have moved 

through the region have taken land and power away from the southern 

(Christian) indigenous peoples. It is not just the influence of fundamentalist 

Islam and Christianity that have polarized the two groups but also—and 

perhaps more significantly—the pressure on resources.77 Somalia is another 

example. Tribal frictions that erupted in the 1990s and remain today are 

based on land-use issues. Overgrazing by nomadic tribes caused the loss of 

more and more arable land to agricultural tribes, until the only farmable 

land was in Somalia’s two shrinking river valleys. It was the encroachment 

on the river valleys by the nomadic tribes that resulted in conflict.78

Fourth, language proficiency is a cross-cultural communications enabling 

factor used for establishing and maintaining rapport with indigenous populations, interoperability with coalition partners, and truly understanding 

the intentions if not the capabilities of an adversary. This is the most difficult of the essential knowledge-based skills to learn and retain. While 

Special Forces language training is excellent, even those with an aptitude 

for learning foreign languages have difficulty attaining a professional level of 

expertise (3+) given the amount of time allotted to a Special Forces captain 

for foreign language education. Clearly, advances in Special Forces foreign 

language education during the MG Dave Baratto and MG Jim Parker years 

as commanders of the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) have done 

much to increase the SWCS’s competency of Special Forces course graduates, 

particularly in the more difficult category languages (Arabic and Chinese, 

for example).79 However, it remains a fact that most nonnative-speaking 

Special Forces soldiers—officers and noncommissioned officers—have difficulty achieving better than basic skills in a foreign language before they 

retire. This monograph will suggest traditional ways to improve on that, 

but at this point—and as a bit of aside—the author suggests three supplemental alternatives to the foreign language competency challenge—the first 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

technology-related, another the best “second” alternative, and the third a 

reverse on the present theme. 

First, there are new and emerging technologies that have instant translation capabilities. Google and other Internet browser providers have incorporated these technologies into their platforms with mixed results. Speed, 

depth, and accuracy are still problems. In many cases, speed is not instantaneous and often articles are not translated in total. Accuracy, particularly for the more difficult languages, is also a continuing problem. These 

problems will diminish as technology improves, but it will be some time 

before instant translation can compete with individual linguistic skills. 

Some emerging technology is coming out of Kuala Lumpur, developed by 

the person who invented the first E-ZPass technology. This technology will 

eventually instantly translate any language into any other language. Initially it will be in a text-to-text mode, but eventually (perhaps in less than 

6 years) it will be able to do voice to voice.80 The far-ranging implications 

of this technology will be very beneficial for any deployed Special Forces 

soldier with a laptop and two sets of headphones. With this equipment, he 

will be able to communicate instantly with anyone who does not speak or 

understand English—ultimately in any language. 

At a conference at the SWCS in 1992, General David Baratto asked the 

audience what languages the Special Forces Language School should be 

teaching in 2015. The answers were many and varied. Urdu, Pashto, Arabic, 

and Farsi were among the most frequent answers. However, seemingly less 

exotic languages like English, Chinese, Spanish, French, and Russian are no 

less important; by 2020, these languages, along with Arabic, will be either 

the first or second language for more than 70 percent of the world’s population.81 Interestingly, the demise of the Soviet Empire might have removed 

Russian from consideration by most, as most of these former states’ citizens 

prefer to study English, not Russian. However, the recent actions in Georgia suggest it might be wise to keep Russian on the list. Chinese may be 

questionable to some. Of course, the 1.5 billion people projected to live in 

China by 2020 will speak Chinese, but where else will Chinese be spoken? 

Interestingly, Chinese has become the most studied second language in 

places like Japan and South Korea. Instead of the U.S., China now attracts 

more exchange students from South Korea. Chinese-language courses are 

proliferating in Africa, as are Chinese-language television channels.82 As 
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JSOU Report 09-6

China’s economic clout continues to expand around the world, it makes 

sense that the trends in Japan and Korea will emerge elsewhere.

Finally, it might be more cost effective to take some of the time and 

money Special Forces puts into foreign language training into teaching 

“English as a Second Language” to our allies and coalition partners that do 

not speak English. Admittedly, this is radical thinking, but the potential for 

positive diplomatic rapport building (not to mention intelligence possibilities) that could result from having a cadre of civilian teachers of English 

teaching English to our allies and friends in the U.S. and in their countries 

is immeasurable. Communication is difficult—almost impossible—if individuals cannot find a common tongue in which to converse. The traditional means of learning a foreign language will continue to be important. 

However, choosing the right (high density) foreign language to learn, using 

technology to accelerate the ability to communicate by text and voice, and 

realizing that it might be easier, more cost effective, and expedient to teach 

English to some of our allies rather than attempt to learn their languages 

might be other important approaches to the communication challenge.

Fifth in the list of rationales for graduate-level SOF training is that the 

interagency process—at the consumer level—will be an important competency for Special Forces captains. By interagency process, I am not referring 

to the Washington, D.C. interagency working group competencies where 

coordination occurs (or does not occur). This is an important competency 

for higher ranks such as senior O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s who will be members 

of interagency working groups and participants in the policy-making process. This process takes place at the country-team level of interagency competency, where captains will interface with the State Department, CIA, Drug 

Enforcement Agency (DEA), U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and perhaps other agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Treasury. Not only will Special Forces team 

leaders have the opportunity to meet, brief, and coordinate at the embassy 

level, they will also meet and work with personnel from these departments 

and agencies in the field. 

Sixth, and in the same vein as the fifth, Special Forces captains should 

understand the challenges and opportunities of working with NGOs. The 

increasingly visible role of NGOs as important players in international affairs 

guarantees that Special Forces units will encounter NGOs in contested and 

threat areas in which they will both operate. NGOs are important economic 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

players that account for over 5 percent of the gross domestic product and 

over 4 percent of the employment in 36 of the most impoverished countries 

of the world. In areas where no major U.S. military operations are being 

conducted and no U.S. diplomatic presence exists, NGOs will probably be 

the best source for timely operational, logistic, economic, security, and 

political environment information. In many cases, NGOs will have been 

in the area long before any intelligence or military deployment. As such, 

NGO staff—particularly those of development, humanitarian assistance, 

and disaster relief organizations—will have a grasp of the overall situation 

“on the ground” in their particular area of expertise and operational area, 

making them excellent information (intelligence) sources and providers of 

ground truth.83

Traditionally, NGOs and military organizations have had a tempestuous 

relationship. Though the military and NGOs have a long history of working 

under harsh conditions and even in the same remote and dangerous locations, the two groups have traditionally tried to avoid collaborative efforts, 

both believing that their work was essentially incompatible. Given the likelihood that the military will be working with NGOs more frequently and far 

into the future, its operational-level leadership would benefit by learning 

to better understand how broadly its organization differs from NGOs and 

take steps needed to bridge the cultural gap that separates them in order to 

achieve common goals.84

Summary of Education Requirements

The preceding paragraphs do not cover all of the knowledge-based education 

a Special Forces captain should posses before contemplating an assignment 

out there, and others are welcome to add to the list. However, the competencies outlined will not just be useful to SOF officers—they could be missionand life-essential. At the end of the day, a Special Forces captain is going to 

be most successful if he can resolve conflict before it gets to a kinetic level. 

To succeed, he will have to be able to do more than just influence people of 

different cultures, both indigenous and bureaucratic. Often he will need to 

get them to change their behavior—and even more difficult, he will have to 

get them to do what they do not necessarily want to do. Negotiation skills, 

cross-cultural communication expertise, language proficiency, and cultural 

and anthropological aptitude are all competencies that will enable a Special 
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JSOU Report 09-6

Forces captain to lead, influence, and perhaps even survive where there is 

little or no local or outside support. 

Why does this paper advocate a graduate program when others might 

promote a less vigorous and time-consuming alternative? The answer is 

capacity-based. Clearly, you can train an officer to be able to interact, negotiate, and work with a local group such as the Bedouin in a quick, compressed, 

PowerPoint training environment—the “staff of life” at the SWCS. However, 

will that training prepare him to work with the Berber, Chawis, Rifains, 

or seven other nomadic tribes in North Africa? 85 More importantly, will 

it give him the capacity to work with the 403 other tribes in Africa? Probably not. And in fact, trying to use his Bedouin training to influence other 

tribes could be counterproductive or worse. Graduate education in cultural 

anthropology, cross-cultural communication, and negotiations would give 

him the knowledge to avoid cultural faux pas, ask the right questions, and 

interact effectively in many tribal environments. It will also give him the 

ability and flexibility to adapt quickly to different ethnic and cultural environments. Training can prepare a trainee for a specific situation and/or 

event. Graduate study is more focused on a specific area of interest and on 

acquiring specialized skills to practice at a professional level. This does not 

merely entail taking a number of courses. It requires active participation 

in the continuous discovery of new knowledge. Training is event- or skillfocused; education is for a career. 

Analysis of Select Graduate Programs

The Joint Special Operations University president, Dr. Brian Maher, articulated the requirement for “unique and tailored masters programs” in his 

presentation “The Way Forward” in the spring of 2008. He identified future 

programs being developed at the University of North Carolina, James Madison University, and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth in 

conjunction with the University of Kansas or Kansas State University.86 An 

existing option is the Special Operations/Irregular Warfare program at 

the Naval Postgraduate School. Other possible options could be distancelearning programs at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and Norwich University and a proposed combined distance learning 

and residence program at the University of Montana. Time-and-space constraints limit the number of graduate programs reviewed for this project, 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

and assuredly, other possibilities than the half dozen that are reviewed here 

exist. However, this is a good sampling of proposed and existing resident 

and distance-learning programs.87

The proposed University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill “Peace, War, 

and Defense” program mentioned in Dr. Maher’s briefing is presently an 

undergraduate, not graduate, program. In its undergraduate form, the Peace, 

War, and Defense program has a menu of more than 70 courses that include 

historical, regional, international relations, public policy, security studies, 

and terrorism titles. There is even a course entitled “War in Shakespeare’s 

Plays.” 88 The obvious shortcoming of this program is that it is not yet a 

graduate curriculum. Also, while the course offerings are robust, only one 

course—“Anthropology of War and Peace”—fits the criteria outlined in this 

monograph. Also, most of the course offerings are more theoretical than 

operational or policy-oriented.89

The James Madison University graduate program focuses on development and will prepare Civil Affairs officers for senior command and staff 

positions. The precursor to the graduate program was a 6-week program for 

Civil Affairs O-4s and O-5s first taught in September 2008. The proposed 

curriculum for the graduate course includes research methods, ethics and 

leadership, public management issues, international relations, public information and communication, communication in conflict situations (including mediation and conflict resolution and cross-cultural communication), 

and strategic planning. The program concludes with a “capstone event” that 

will challenge students to use their cumulative course knowledge to develop 

a country report, campaign plan, and business plan.90

The proposed Combined Arms Center graduate program in “Interagency 

Studies” for SOF students attending Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at 

Fort Leavenworth is in the early implementation phase. As its title implies, 

the intent of the Interagency Studies Program is to prepare special operations officers and others to understand and conceivably work in the interagency environment. The course will address interagency organizations and 

responsibilities, including embassy country teams, Congress and the legislative process, staffs and congressional delegations, the National Security 

Council, and the interagency process. Other core topics will include interagency organizations and organizational cultures, organizational behavior, 

negotiation theory and execution, legal considerations, and international 

relations. The program also includes a 3-month internship where a student 
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applies “theory to practice” in a SOF-related interagency assignment.91 This 

program would be offered in conjunction with the University of Kansas or 

Kansas State University. 

The current “flagship” special operations graduate program is the “Special 

Operations/Irregular Warfare” curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School 

in Monterey, California. The program has been in existence for several years 

and has an annual throughput of 55 SOF students from all the services in the 

grade of O-4 or O-5 (with the largest majority being Army Special Forces 

officers). The Special Operations/Irregular Warfare curriculum primarily 

focuses on international relations and security studies and is an excellent 

platform for preparing field grade officers for future command and higherlevel staff positions in the SOF community. The curriculum is designed 

to provide a course of study that focuses on the conflict spectrum “below 

general conventional war.” 92 Graduates of the program possess a detailed 

understanding of the role of SOF in U.S. foreign and defense policy as well 

as knowledge of the factors involved in planning for irregular warfare.93

Several distance-learning programs also offer master’s degrees in disciplines useful to Special Forces officers. This paper will review three. The 

premier program is the Global Master of Arts Program (GMAP) at The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University. GMAP is a unique 1-year international 

studies degree program designed for mid-to-senior-level professionals, 

combining flexible Internet-mediated study with three 2-week residency 

sessions. According to GMAP’s promotional material, the program “delivers 

a rigorous and dynamic education that is unique in form and content, by 

integrating the strength of The Fletcher School’s cross-disciplinary curriculum with today’s innovative technologies, and having a culture focused on 

teamwork and close collaboration among participants, faculty, and staff.” 94

GMAP is a combination of distance and residence learning. The residencies 

provide an intensive classroom experience and personal contact that form 

the foundation for student and student-professor interaction. The initial 

residency is held on The Fletcher School campus in Medford, Massachusetts 

and provides the first opportunity for students to meet each other and the 

GMAP faculty and administration. The mid-year residency is held outside 

the U.S. in places such as Costa Rica, Spain, Greece, Mexico, Singapore, 

the Netherlands, or Argentina. Finally, a closing residency is held at The 

Fletcher School at the end of the program to complete the theses and finalize all coursework before graduation. GMAP courses include international 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

politics, international finance, international negotiation, international trade, 

transnational social issues (human security and environmental issues), foreign policy, and international organizations. 

Norwich University’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy offers three concentrations: a) International Terrorism, b) International Conflict Management, 

and c) International Commerce. All offer strategic-level competencies useful 

to Special Forces officers. However, the International Terrorism and the 

International Conflict Management concentrations offer seminars that are 

particularly pertinent to Special Forces officers’ needs. The Norwich program’s core curriculum provides a systematic overview of the historical and 

current theories for a broad range of core topics, including international law, 

humanitarian intervention, globalization, and international economics.95

The International Terrorism concentration focuses on two major aspects 

of terrorism—state sponsored and nonstate sponsored—and also explores 

the international community’s response to the global terrorism threat.96

The International Conflict Management concentration focuses on conflict 

avoidance, conflict management, and mitigation in an increasingly conflictoriented world and is designed for civilian and military professionals who 

must apply diplomacy and conflict resolution skills to reduce the opportunities for conflict.97

The Norwich program (all three concentrations) is a 36-credit degree 

comprised of six 6-credit seminars. There are four start dates per year: 

March, June, September, or December. Each seminar is approximately 11 

weeks in length. The core curriculum is composed of three seminars focusing on the Global System, while the remaining three seminars allow individual selection of one of the three concentration areas. The three core seminars 

and the three seminars from a concentration area must be taken in the order 

they are presented, as they are strategically sequenced to build context for 

future seminars and to build on issues from past seminars. The Norwich 

program can be completed in 18 months and costs approximately $24,000. 

With the exception of a final 1-week residence phase prior to graduation, the 

Norwich program is held in a small-group, distance-learning format. 

There are few downsides to the Norwich University program. Comparatively, it is cost competitive and can be completed online. As long as 

a student has a computer and Internet access, he or she can complete the 

program. One shortfall is the lack of a “cultural and political anthropology” course. However, the cross-cultural communications and negotiations 
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course offered may suffice. Another limitation might be the lack of regional 

courses. However, students are allowed two “independent studies” which 

could be regionally focused. 

The University of Montana’s “Interdisciplinary Master’s Degree” distance-learning program is in the planning stages. Interestingly, it is a novel 

5-year program that would provide practitioner-level anthropology, communications, negotiations, interagency (country team), and regional courses 

at the beginning of the program and the more theoretical international 

relations theory, interagency process (Washington), and security studies 

courses toward the middle and the end of the program. Because Montana is 

such a large and sparsely populated state, the University of Montana’s Continuing Education Department has been offering external degree programs 

for a number of years, primarily at the doctoral and master’s degree levels. 

Originally, the school offered programs face-to-face; however, in the last 

decade significant growth has occurred in mediated or blended methods of 

learning that include traditional classroom, video conferencing, and online 

instruction, with an emphasis on the latter. These degree programs have 

been designed to meet the needs of students who cannot come to campus 

for prolonged time periods. 

According to the University of Montana concept, the proposed Interdisciplinary Master’s Degree distance-learning program would be “cost 

effective, available globally, and specially tailored for military, diplomatic, 

development, and NGO personnel.”98 The 36-credit hour degree would combine courses focusing on leadership and analysis, international relations, 

microdevelopment economics, social and cultural anthropology, national 

security, cross-cultural communications, the interagency process, terrorism, 

negotiations, and regional courses. The school will award 6 credit hours for 

previously attained foreign language proficiency, and a limited number of 

credits can be transferred into the program. An on-site resident phase at 

the University of Montana will be available but not mandatory. Anticipated 

per-student costs will be in the $15,000-to-$20,000 range, depending on the 

number of students in the program. 

Graduate Program Summary

All of the programs researched for this paper have merit and all include 

courses relevant to special operations and to various degrees, Special Forces 

officers. While it is too soon to comprehensively evaluate the resident courses 
25

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

in the design phase mentioned in the Maher briefing—including the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill “Peace, War, and Defense” program, 

James Madison University’s “Civil Affairs” program, and the Combined 

Arms Center “Interagency Studies” program—it is fairly safe to say that all 

three cater to “niche” rather than comprehensive knowledge competencies. 

The titles of the James Madison and Combined Arms Center programs 

clarify their intent and audience: Civil Affairs and interagency operations. 

The Chapel Hill program, at least if the undergraduate program design is 

followed, will emphasize historical and theoretical constructs. While all of 

these programs as envisioned are good, none provides the comprehensive 

course-set required by Special Forces officers, at least in this author’s view. 

Furthermore, residence programs will continue to prove difficult for Special 

Forces officers given the assumptions of this paper that they will be deployed 

as much as they are now, and possibly more. 

Clearly, the Naval Postgraduate School “Special Operations/Irregular 

Warfare” program is the best option for the major/lieutenant commanderlevel officer on track for higher Special Operations Command and staff 

positions. The program, under the tutelage of Dr. Gordon McCormick, has 

become an outstanding education experience. Course offerings are relevant, 

topical, and current. Furthermore, Dr. McCormick has attracted a gifted set 

of special operations savvy Ph.D. individuals such as Hy Rothstein, Gunner 

Sepp, and John Arguilla, among others. The limitations of the program are 

the throughput (50 students a year from all services) and the grade at which 

an officer matriculates (major and lieutenant commander). 

The limitations of the Fletcher School’s GMAP course for Special Forces 

officers include cost, time, curriculum, and prerequisites. First, GMAP carries a hefty price tag—$50,000 for the full program, which is more than some 

comparable residence programs at elite universities. Second, the student 

generally must complete the course with his/her cohort in 1 year (there are 

some exceptions). Third, the GMAP curriculum is strategic and intended for 

students at the major or lieutenant colonel stage of their careers and headed 

for staff positions in Washington. Also, the curriculum is lacking in the 

anthropology, intercultural communications, and regional studies courses 

required by “operators.” Finally, a prerequisite calling for a minimum of 8 

years professional experience precludes most Special Forces captains from 

matriculating.99 The program also seems to have limited appeal for Army 
26

JSOU Report 09-6

officers—only 12 have gone through the program in 5 years, and none of 

those have been SOF officers. 

The intent of this monograph is not to make recommendations about 

specific programs, but to suggest types of programs that have the most 

“cache” for the graduate requirements suggested in this work. From pedagogical, course selection, and flexibility perspectives, the existing Norwich 

University model and the planned University of Montana model seem to 

offer promise. The Norwich program can be completed in 18 months, but 

can also be extended over a longer period of time as long as the core and 

specialization modules are completed in a designated sequence. The course 

selection menu, particularly in the International Conflict Management 

concentration, is close to what this paper recommends. The independentstudy options would most likely allow students the opportunity to “make 

up the difference” under directed study. The cost of the Norwich program—

approximately $24,000—is a good value in today’s tuition market. By offering four course start times a year (March, June, September, or December) 

and an inclusive distance-learning package (the only residence phase is the 

last week before graduation), this program offers maximum flexibility to 

students who are deployed or deploying. 

The proposed University of Montana program has many of the same 

characteristics as the Norwich program (36 credits, inclusive distance 

learning, and flexible start times) but would offer even more flexibility. The 

“Interdisciplinary Master’s Degree” can be taken over a 5-year period and 

offers “practical knowledge” vice theoretical courses in the first 2 years of 

the program. During the last 3 years of the program, more theoretical and 

strategic courses will be offered. Six hours (credits) of language training 

qualify as transferable credit into the program. The cost of the Norwich 

program—$20,000 to $25,000—is competitive with other programs. And, 

as planned, the program would have an optional, summer resident phase 

for certain courses at the University of Montana. The downside at the University of Montana is that there is not a strong Africa regional program at 

the university; it is a limitation given Africa’s increased importance from 

a security perspective. 
27

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

Special Forces Officers Graduate Opportunities

Compared with Army-at-large graduate school figures, Special Forces officers do not attend in the same numbers as their non-Special Forces counterparts. See Table 1.100 At the colonel level only 6 percent of non-Special 

Forces do not have master’s degrees, whereas 15 percent of their Special 

Forces counterparts at that grade do not have an advanced degree. The most 

striking disadvantage is in the 0-3 and 0-4 grades. Only 3 percent of Special 

Forces captains have master’s degrees, while 12 percent of non-Special Forces 

Army captains have them. Of non-Special Forces Army majors, 44 percent 

have master’s degrees, while only 28 percent of Special Forces majors have 

an advanced degree. Of non-Special Forces lieutenant colonels, 80 percent 

have higher degrees, while only 69 percent of Special Forces officers in that 

grade have higher degrees.

Table 1a. Non-SF and SF Graduate Degrees

Counts (Percents) by Years of Service

Population=All ACC Non-SF Officers

Total

Fully 

Funded

Military

Graduate 

Degree

Not 

Fully 

Funded

No 

Graduate 

Degree

0-4 22,668 292 (1%) 4 (0%) 1,095 (5%) 21,277 (94%)

5-9 11,435 145 (1%) 11 (0%) 1,931 (17%) 9,348 (82%)

10-14 7,731 1,153 (15%) 293 (4%) 2,019 (26%) 4,266 (55%)

15-19 7,391 1,767 (24%) 590 (8%) 3,223 (44%) 1,811 (25%)

20+ 5,466 1,416 (26%) 700 (13%) 2,578 (47%) 772 (14%)

N/A 217 6 0 25 186 

Total 54,908 4,779 (9%) 1,598 (3%) 10,871 (20%) 37,660 (69%)

Population=SF Officers

Total

Fully 

Funded

Military

Graduate 

Degree

Not 

Fully 

Funded

No 

Graduate 

Degree

0-4 473 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 14 (3%) 459 (97%)

5-9 493 5 (1%) 1 (0%) 21 (4%) 466 (95%)

10-14 320 18 (6%) 42 (13%) 37 (12%) 223 (70%)

15-19 262 25 (10%) 76 (29%) 75 (29%) 86 (33%)

20+ 183 18 (10%) 50 (27%) 72 (39%) 43 (23%)

N/A 6 0 0 1 5

Total 1,737 66 (4%) 169 (10%) 220 (13%) 1,282 (74%)

Years 

of Service

Degree 

Type

Years 

of Service

Degree 

Type
28

JSOU Report 09-6

Table 1b. Non-SF and SF Graduate Degrees

Counts (Percents) by Grade

Population=All ACC Non-SF Officers

Total

Fully 

Funded

Military

Graduate 

Degree

Not 

Fully 

Funded

No 

Graduate 

Degree

O1 9,167 241 (3%) 1 (0%) 218 (2%) 8,707 (95%)

O2 5,738 8 (0%) 0 (0%) 248 (4%) 5,482 (96%)

O3 17,266 112 (1%) 3 (0%) 2,005 (12%) 15,146 (88%)

O4 11,530 1,525 (13%) 397 (3%) 3,150 (27%) 6,458 (56%)

O5 8,241 2,067 (25%) 654 (8%) 3,840 (47%) 1,680 (20%)

O6 2,966 826 (28%) 543 (18%) 1,410 (48%) 187 (6%)

Total 54,908 4,779 (9%) 1,598 (3%) 10,871 (20%) 37,660 (69%)

Population=SF Officers

Total

Fully 

Funded

Military

Graduate 

Degree

Not 

Fully 

Funded

No 

Graduate 

Degree

O1 0 0 0 0 0

O2 3 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%)

O3 865 1 (0%) 0 (0%) 30 (3%) 834 (96%)

O4 466 23 (5%) 56 (12%) 52 (11%) 335 (72%)

O5 305 33 (11%) 76 (25%) 101 (33%) 95 (31%)

O6 98 9 (9%) 37 (38%) 37 (38%) 15 (15%)

Total 1,737 66 (4%) 169 (10%) 220 (13%) 1,282 (74%)

Notes:

1. Data as of 30 September 2007

2. Fully funded = Graduate degree awarded as part of Advanced Civil 

Schooling (ACS) program

3. Military graduate degree = Obtained a graduate degree as part of 

attendance at a military course such as ILE or AWC

4. Not fully funded = Obtained graduate degree under tuition assistance or other non-ACS program

Funding is also an equity issue. Non-Special Forces officers have more 

than twice the number of fully funded graduate opportunities than their 

Special Forces counterparts (9 percent compared to 4 percent). Special Forces 

officers tend to earn “military graduate degrees,” presumably while attending the ILE or the War College, at more than three times the percentage as 

non-Special Forces officers (10 percent vs. 3 percent).101 Interestingly, nonSpecial Forces officers were able to self-fund graduate degree opportunities 

at a higher percentage than their Special Forces counterparts (20 percent 

to 13 percent), probably because they are “stabilized” at a given post and 

Pay

Grade

Degree 

Type

Pay

Grade

Degree 

Type
29

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

can continue to work towards degrees at on-post, off-site degree programs 

at Army Education Centers. Special Forces officers have difficulty completing degrees in these programs not just because of war-time deployment 

schedules but also because of demanding TDY deployments while back at 

home station.102

Based on these statistics and analysis, one should not draw any conclusions of nefarious Army discrimination between Special Forces and nonSpecial Forces officers graduate degree opportunities. It is most likely that 

non-Special Forces officers have more discretionary time to participate in a 

host of funded, nonfunded, and partially funded programs because of fewer 

rotations (for many but not all units) and less demanding TDY schedules.103

However, the statistics point out with some clarity that Special Forces officers 

do not have the same graduate opportunities, when it could be argued that 

they should have more, if not universal, graduate study opportunities. 

So, what to do? A Special Forces officer’s “development model” is already 

crowded (see Figure 1) and there is little, if any time for resident graduate 

schooling except in special circumstances (i.e., West Point, ROTC assignments) until he is a very senior captain through colonel-level officer. This 

Years

Grade

Professional 

Military

Education

Additional

Training

Key 

Developmental

Preferred

Developmental

Self

Development

O-1, O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6

0 10 20 30

B

O

L

C

MCCC

SFDOQC

Advanced Skill 

Courses

SFOD-A CDR

Graduate Degree

BN/GRP staff

CDR, HSC/HHC

SF Company XO

SGI

J-Staff/OSD intern

SMU

ROTC/USMA faculty and staff

S3/XO SF BN/GRP

SF CO CDR (GSC/DET)

SMU equivalent

TSOC/SOCOM Ops/Plans

USSOCOM/MACOM/

 MSC/DA joint staff

SMU

CAC/ROTC/USMA

 faculty and staff

JTF/JSOTF/TSOC staff

SO/LIC or other ACS

TOE or TDA group/ brigade-

 level command

SF-coded O-6 position

 -JSOTF/JTF staff

TOE or TDA BN-

 level command

Group DCO, XO, 

 or Plans

JSOTF/JTF staff

SF-coded O-5 position

Chief, SOTD (JRTC)

Key USASOC positions

DA/DoD/JCS staff

Joint HQ position

CGSC staff/faculty

ILE SSC

Development and Utilization Assignments

Baccalaureate

Degree

Figure 1. Special Forces Officer “Development Model” 104
30

JSOU Report 09-6

monograph recommends that graduate skills necessary for captain-level 

operational competencies be front-loaded early in a Special Forces captain’s 

career and that strategic and theoretical courses required for later command 

and staff assignments be taken during the “early major” years. Other than 

preparing the officer for a post-retirement career, a graduate degree earned at 

the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel has limited Special Forces value.

For the model described in this monograph to work, two nontraditional 

approaches must be employed. First, the time necessary to complete the 

degree must be extended from 2 to 5 years. Second, greater reliance on 

distance learning (Internet/computer-based) over residence learning must 

be emphasized. Additionally, hosting universities should consider course 

credit for language training and perhaps other knowledge-based courses 

at the Special Warfare Center and School (the follow-on to the “Regional 

Studies Course” comes to mind) to be transferable. 

Clearly, these suggestions should be reviewed with care and critiqued 

by educators and practitioners. Rather than limiting courses to the fields 

described above, a range of other topics—such as international relations, 

international economics, microeconomics, geography, development, and 

environmental policy—should be considered as possible elective or even 

core courses. Experts will differ on the finer points of the programs, and 

their opinions should be a key factor in developing options and alternatives. 

However, one topic—culture—is not negotiable. The case of the U.S. intelligence community illustrates how a lack of cultural knowledge can be a 

weakness. Currently, U.S. intelligence processes focus on political, economic, 

security, and leadership analysis. Analysts are not trained with specific skills 

in researching cultural data, nor are they assigned the task of defining the 

parameters of a foreign society’s rationality (strategic culture). While many 

in the intelligence community recognize the need to know information 

about a foreign culture, they seek it out on their own. The practice is not 

emphasized, institutionalized, or resourced. As a result—at least in the view 

of the author and of others—the intelligence community is left open to committing serious policy mistakes. According to one observer, “Understanding 

culture is essential in forecasting events, building good will on the ground, 

engaging in successful negotiations, and the entire host of other occupations 

within our foreign policy structure.”105 Those who are culturally ignorant 

do not win wars for hearts and minds.106
31

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

Concluding Remarks

The assumptions and future international security environment portions of 

this work were written before the Army’s Stability Operations Field Manual

and the Marine Corps’ Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles 

and Applications reference textbook were published. Upon review of both, 

the author is inclined to believe that his original assumptions and analysis 

of the future international security environment are on the mark. Some 

might disagree with the degree of attention paid to regional powers such as 

Russia, India, and China in this work. However, my experiences in Georgia, 

Central Asia, and Africa in recent years lead me to believe that U.S. Special Forces will increasingly confront operators, surrogates, and possibly 

forces from these emerging powers while doing this nation’s business in 

the developing world. 

The knowledge-based educational competencies suggested here are certainly subject to debate. The suggestions are based on mostly anecdotal 

data gleaned from former students returned from multiple tours in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other hot spots and on the author’s personal, much less demanding but equally lengthy operational experience in 

the developing world, both in and out of uniform. Seven missions in Africa 

in the past year have certainly influenced the opinions rendered here. 

While this analysis is intended to be a starting point for discussion, all 

suggestions are negotiable save for the culture-based courses. Again, it is 

impossible to learn the vagaries of every disparate culture a Special Forces 

officer will face in a career. However, it is possible to learn the macro fundamentals of culture so that a Special Forces operator knows which questions 

to ask and what pitfalls to avoid before engaging those from a particular 

culture. Just as in baseball, where a player has to first know the fundamentals 

before advancing to more competitive leagues, knowing the fundamentals 

of anthropology, communications, and negotiations will allow the Special 

Forces operator to quickly learn how to perform in any cultural environment. Presently, Special Forces soldiers often learn their “culture stuff” after 

some “crucible experience.”107 We can do better than that.

The survey of graduate programs in this study was limited by time and 

space. Most certainly, other programs are worthy of review, and interested 

parties are encouraged to do so. However, the programs cited here are good 

representative samples of the types of programs both currently available and 
32

JSOU Report 09-6

in the planning stages. The author is more familiar with the Fletcher School 

and proposed University of Montana programs because of past and present 

associations with both institutions. Those associations and avoidance of 

any conflict-of-interest issues are the reason that no particular university 

program is recommended in this work. Instead, this survey recommended 

a graduate school formula—distance-learning intensive; an emphasis on 

operational skills first, strategic skills last; and a completion period of 5 

years instead of the traditional 2. 

The graduate degree opportunity gap—both funded and nonfunded—

between non-Special Forces and Special Forces officers is real, and needs 

to be addressed at the command level. The gap is not nefarious, and discrimination is not the issue. Available time, deployments, other operational 

requirements, and the lack of nontraditional alternatives are the reasons 

for the gap. Hopefully some of the suggestions and alternatives highlighted 

in this work will help to reduce or possibly reverse the gap in the Special 

Forces favor. 
33

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

Endnotes

1. Andrew Winston, “Will Your Company Predict the Future Like GM or Like 

Toyota?,” Harvard Business Publishing 16 July 2008. Available at http://blogs.

harvardbusiness.org/leadinggreen/2008/07/roadkill-how-detroit-missed-th.html 

(accessed May 2009).

2. Among the most recent—compiled by the author and Major Paul Oh of the U.S. 

Military Academy—follow: 

a. Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World: Project on National Security 

Reform Preliminary Findings, Project on National Security Reform, Center 

for the Study of the Presidency, July 2008

b. Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint 

Force Through 2030, United States Joint Forces Command, December 2007

c. Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st 

Century, Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS), Woodrow Wilson 

School of Public and International Affairs, 2006

d. The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2005?, European Union 

Institute for Security Studies, 2006

e. Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, United Kingdom Ministry of 

Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 2007

f. Howard’s Formula for Conflict—“Strategic Futures,” presentations to the 

7th Special Forces Group and the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Center, Accra, 

Ghana, 2008.

3. Paul Oh, “Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” draft 

article for discussion at the U.S. Military Academy Senior Conference, June 2008. 

Presented in West Point, New York, 5-7 June 2008.

4. Ibid., p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 2. See also National Intelligence Council (NIC), Mapping the Global World

(Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 10.

6. Ibid., p. 2-3. See also European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), The 

Global Puzzle.

7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Ibid. See also DCDC, The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme, p. 3. 

9. Global Issues, Poverty Facts and Statistics, March 2004. Available at www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Facts.asp (accessed May 2009).

10. The author has made six trips to Africa in 8 months, and this is a standard figure 

used by all relief, humanitarian, and development agencies in the region. See also 

Oh, p. 3. 

11. Philippe Legrain, “Cultural Globalization Is Not Americanization,” The Chronicle 

of Higher Education, 9 May 2003. Available at: http://chronicle.com/free/v49/

i35/35b00701.htm (accessed May 2009).
34

JSOU Report 09-6

12. “Globalization and the Root Causes of Terrorism,” transcript of live online chat 

with William Christison, former CIA director, Office of Regional and Political 

Analysis. The Washington Post Online, 10 April 2001. Available at: http://discuss.

washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/nation_christison0410.htm (accessed 

May 2009).

13. Oh, p. 3.

14. Ibid., p. 4.

15. Ibid.

16. EUISS, p. 15.

17. Oh, p. 4. See also United States Joint Forces Command, JOE, p. 10.

18. Oh, p. 4.

19. Ibid. See also “Young, alive, but not very heaven,” The Economist, 2 February 2008, 

p. 54.

20. Ibid. See also United States Joint Forces Command JOE, p. 10.

21. Kate Johnston, “Climate Change: a Cause of Conflict?,” Global Politics Magazine, 

January 2008. Available at www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2008/012

008climateconflict.htm (accessed May 2009).

22. Ibid.

23. Dr. Zachariha Ousman lecture to Civil-Military Operations Course in Accra, 

Ghana, 25-29 July 2008.

24. Julian Borger, “Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate Change, 

UN Report Warns,” The Guardian, 23 June 2007. Available at www.guardian.

co.uk/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange (accessed May 2009).

25. Conversations with Michael Sheehan, Special Assistant to the Special Representative for the Secretary General at the UN, January 1994. 

26. Oh, p. 6. 

27. EUISS, p. 54. 

28. PPNS, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, p. 51. 

29. Oh, p. 7.

30. Sarina Locke, “Water, More Important than Oil,” NSW Country Hour Summary,

21 August 2003. Available at www.abc.net.au/rural/nsw/stories/s929204.htm 

(accessed May 2009).

31. Ibid.

32. David Hopkins, “Depletion of Water Resources More Serious than Oil Reserves,” 

Environmental Data Interactive Exchange, July 2005. Available at www.edie.net/

news/news_story.asp?id=9562&channel=0 (accessed May 2009).

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Oh, p. 7.

37. Ibid.
35

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

38. Russell D. Howard, “The New Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 

Understanding the New Security Environment, Russell D. Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, 

and Natasha E. Bajema, eds., Third Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2008, p. 118.

39. Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber, “The ‘New Silk Road’ of Terrorism and 

Organized Crime,” in Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency, Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed. (U.S. Naval War College, 

2008), p. 371.

40. Alison Jamieson, “Transnational Organized Crime: A European Perspective,” 

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism No. 24 (2001): 377-387, p. 380. 

41. Ibid., 378. 

42. Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, “Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Nonstate 

Actors in Central Asia,” INSS Occasional Paper 43 (2002), p. viii. 

43. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and 

Information-Age Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, pp. 134-157.

44. Ibid. 

45. “Russia: Industry,” Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2008. Available at www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Russia-INDUSTRY.html (accessed May 

2009).

46. Ibid.

47. Russia’s per capita GDP ranks 75th in the world, behind Croatia; see “Rank 

Order—GDP—Per Capita (PPP),” CIA World Fact Book, updated 6 November 2008; available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

rankorder/2004rank.html (accessed May 2009). Russia’s total GDP is 6th in 

the world, behind Germany; see “Gross Domestic Product 2007, PPP,” World 

Development Indicators Database, The World Bank, 17 October 2008; available 

at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.

pdf (accessed May 2009). 

48. “India is Now More Populous than China,” News of Future Web site. Available 

at www.newsoffuture.com/india_is_now_more_populous_than_china_future_

population.html (accessed May 2009).

49. Sanjoy Hazarika, “Powerful but Ill-Defined: Rising India Middle Class,” International Herald Tribune, 30 July 1996. Available at: www.iht.com/articles/1996/07/30/

india.t_1.php (accessed May 2009).

50. Rich Thomas, “India’s Military Modernization Surges Ahead,” Associated Content, 13 December 2007. Available at www.associatedcontent.com/article/482271/

indias_military_modernization_surges.html (accessed May 2009).

51. Cait Murphy, “India the Superpower? Think Again,” Fortune, 9 February 2007. 

Available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/08/news/international/pluggedin_

murphy_india.fortune/index.htm (accessed May 2009).

52. “53% - China the Superpower?,” Pew Research Center: The Databank, 8 August 

2008. Available at http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=575 

(accessed May 2009).
36

JSOU Report 09-6

53. Russell D. Howard, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: ‘Short Arms and 

Slow Legs,’” INSS Occasional Paper 28, September 1999, p. 38. 

54. Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy,” Strategic Forum, No. 231, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, April 2008, p. 4. 

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid. 

57. Fred Kaplan, “The China Syndrome: Why the Pentagon Overstates Beijing’s Military Capabilities,” Slate.com, 26 May 2006. Available at www.slate.com/id/2141966 

(accessed May 2009).

58. “China’s Defense Budget to Rise 17.8% in 2007,” The China Daily, 4 March 2007, 

p. 1. 

59. Frost, Przystup, and Saunders, “China’s Rising Influence in Asia,” p. 1. 

60. Martyn Davies, How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa, Center for 

Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, February 2008, p. 4. 

61. Ibid. 

62. Ibid., p. 5.

63. Ibid. The author has traveled to Ghana three times in 6 months and can vouch for 

this statement. The Chinese are everywhere in Ghana. Interestingly, the Chinese 

were looked on favorably by the Ghanaians in the early stages of China’s investment interest. However, because the Chinese are now substituting Chinese labor 

for local labor, most of the locals are beginning to doubt Chinese sincerity and 

intentions. 

64. Steven F. Jackson, “Chinese Official Development Assistance in Africa: New 

Money, Old Themes,” unpublished paper presented to the International Studies 

Association annual meeting in San Francisco, California, March 2008. 

65. Hilary Andersson, “China ‘is Fueling War in Darfur’” BBC News, 13 July 2008. 

Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm (accessed May 

2009).

66. Ibid. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Jim Yardley, “China Defends Sudan Policy and Criticizes Olympics Tie-In,” The 

New York Times, 6 March 2008. Available at www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/

world/asia/08darfur.html (accessed May 2009).

69. Ibid.

70. Robert G. Louis, “Professional Development of Special Forces Captains,” unpublished paper, Carlisle Pennsylvania, 2002, p. 3. See also Department of the Army 

Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management 

(Washington, DC: 11 December 2007), p. 175. 

71. Ibid., p. 9.
37

Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

72. Multiple conversations with the late General (Ret.) Wayne Downing at the Combating Training Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, February 2003 to 

May 2005. 

73. Comment made by Admiral Eric Olson at the Special Operations Education 

Conference, Hurlburt Field, Florida, June 2008. 

74. U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School “Leader Development Model,” 17 

August 2008. OPR: AOJK-DTD-TD. pp. 7-18.

75. Ibid.

76. There are several variations of this quote. This is the one I have used in my writings on Chinese security, foreign policy, and strategy issues. 

77. For a full explanation, see “Institutional Mechanisms Fail to Address Recurrent 

Violence and Displacement,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 29 October 2007. Available at: www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(http

Countries)/19D5FDB3E4AF4D1D802570A7004B613E?OpenDocument (accessed 

May 2009).

78. Comment attributed to Michael Sheehan. This was related to me in a tutorial the 

day I landed in Mogadishu as part of a team to support the Special Representative 

to the Secretary General in Somalia in 1993.

79. Under MG Dave Baratto, the author has had responsibility for language training 

at the Special Warfare Center when he commanded the 3rd Battalion of the 1st 

Special Warfare Training Group from 1990-1992. In September 2007, the author 

interviewed the 3rd Battalion commander about changes to the Special Forces 

Language curriculum, which is now taught in increments throughout the entire 

Special Forces Qualification Course instead of in a 6-month block at the end of 

the Q Course as it previously was. 

80. Robert Hercuse, interview and demonstration. 13 May 2008. (Was a radio show 

report in New South Wales, Australia.) 

81. This statistic was prevalent during my tenure as the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group in 1990-1992. In that position, I was 

responsible for the Special Forces Language School.

82. For example, one such Chinese-language station is channel 25, or CCTV, in Abuja, 

Nigeria.

83. Russell D. Howard, “Intelligence in Denied Areas,” Joint Special Operations Report 

7-10, December 2007, p. 25.

84. Roy Allgauer, “The U.S. Military and NGO Relationship During Post-Conflict 

Humanitarian Emergency Operations: How Can the U.S. Military Improve It?” 

unpublished paper, U.S. Naval War College, 16 May 2006, p. 1. 

85. Discussions with colleagues at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University, 14 October 2006.

86. Brian Maher (JSOU president), “The Way Forward,” Spring 2008, p. 51.

87. The author is most familiar with The Fletcher School’s existing program and 

the University of Montana’s planned program due to his background as a pro-
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JSOU Report 09-6

gram director and adjunct faculty member at The Fletcher School and his current 

position on the faculty at the University of Montana.

88. See the course description in the University of North Carolina’s Curriculum in 

Peace, War, and Defense online course catalog; available at www.unc.edu/depts/

pwad/courses.html (accessed May 2009).

89. Ibid.

90. Conversation with Dr. Kay Knickrehm, associate dean, School of Public and 

International Affairs, James Madison University, 13 August 2008 and further 

e-mail correspondence with Dr. Knickrehm on 6 October 2008.

91. J. Tennant, “Graduate program in interagency studies for SOF students attending Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and other courses at Fort Leavenworth,” 

Concept Paper, 21 April 2008.

92. Phone conversation with Dr. Hy Rothstein, 6 October 2008. See also the Naval 

Postgraduate School’s Academics Catalog Web site, available at www.nps.edu/

Academics/GeneralCatalog/414.htm#o426 (accessed May 2009).

93. Ibid.

94. Discussions with Nicki Sass, GMAP Admissions officer, 2007-2008. 

95. See the University of Norwich’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy program Web 

site, available at www.graduate.norwich.edu/diplomacy/program_overview.php 

(accessed May 2009). The author also held multiple discussions with Peter Liotta, 

director of the Pell Center at Salve Regina University and member of the Norwich 

distance-learning faculty. 

96. Ibid. 

97. Ibid.

98. Dr. Terry Weidner, director of the Mansfield Center at the University of Montana, 

in an interview on 8 September 2009.

99. See Note 95. 

100. Colonel Casey Wardynski, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, 12 June 

2008. Figures are for 2007.

101. The statistical information provided for the previous paragraph and Table 1 

were provided by Colonel Casey Wardynski, the director of the Army’s Office of 

Economic Analysis (OEMA). The data was forwarded in July 2008 and reflects 

graduate degree statistics up through 30 September 2007. 

102. Even before Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, it was difficult for Special Forces 

officers (and noncommissioned officers) to take advantage of on post-graduate 

degree programs because of demanding TDY schedules. That was the author’s 

experience while commanding the 1st Special Forces Groups.

103. This is not an inference that non-Special Forces officers do not deploy. Many of 

the author’s former non-Special Forces West Point students are working on their 

fourth combat tour. However, rotation schedules, TDY demands, and the added 

Q course requirement for Special Forces officers limit their “discretionary” time 

opportunities as compared to their non-Special Forces counterparts. 
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Howard: Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders

104. DA Pamphlet 600-3, “Officer Personnel Management,” December 2007, p. 164.

105. Jeannie L. Johnson, “Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct,” 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 31 October 2006, p. 16.

106. Ibid.

107. This is a “take-away” from a briefing given to BG David Repass, commander of 

U.S. Special Forces Command, on 3 November 2008.