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THE BALKANS:

THREATS TO PEACE AND STABILITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2017

Serial No. 115–47

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 4

Gordon N. Bardos, Ph.D., president, South East European Research and 

Consulting ............................................................................................................. 30

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi, founding president, Albanian American 

Civic League (former Member of Congress) ....................................................... 46

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., academic director of conflict management, School of 

Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ........................... 55

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee: Prepared statement .............................................................. 7

Gordon N. Bardos, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 33

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi: Prepared statement .................................. 49

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 57

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 76

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 77

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: 

Report from the Humanitarian Law Center dated March 1, 2017 .................. 78

Letter from the National Federation of Croatian Americans ........................... 80

Statement of the National Federation of Croatian Americans Cultural 

Foundation ........................................................................................................ 82

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi: 

‘‘The Macedonian Crisis—A failure of EU conflict management?,’’ by the 

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) .................................................. 85

‘‘Crisis brewing in Macedonia,’’ by Roland Gjoni and Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi ................................................................................................................ 88

Interview of Albanian Security Guard on Violence in Macedonian Parliament .............................................................................................................. 91

Photos supplied for the hearing .......................................................................... 96

Internet link for ‘‘Albania’s Prosecutor’s Office, Judicial Reform, & the Role 

of US Ambassador Donald Lu in Tirana’’ submitted for the record by 

the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats, and ‘‘The Explusion of the Albanians’’ submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi ............................................ 99

Questions for the record submitted to Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee and Daniel Serwer, 

Ph.D., by: 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher ..................................................................... 100

The Honorable Francis Rooney, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida ................................................................................................. 101

The Honorable Lee M. Zeldin, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 102

(1)

THE BALKANS:

THREATS TO PEACE AND STABILITY 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order this hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. Today’s 

topic is, The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability. 

After the ranking member and I each take our 5 minutes to 

make opening remarks, each member present will have the opportunity to make an opening statement for themselves. We will, then, 

proceed with our first of two panels. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record. 

Building peaceful, democratic, and stable states in the Balkans 

has been an issue that has been close to me for many years. As 

I know, it has also been close to several of our friends here. Especially I hope that the ranking member might stop in, Mr. Engel, 

who has also been involved in the Balkans for such a long time. 

I am pleased to be holding this hearing and thankful that we 

have an official from the State Department to take part in the 

hearing. As we are now at the start of a new Congress and the 

start of a new administration, this is an ideal time for us to reflect 

on the situation in the region and to recommit ourselves to playing 

a positive role in that part of the world. 

While the Western Balkan nations have achieved some major 

steps forward over these last two decades, including the independence of Kosovo, much remains to be done. Issues of governance, political development, corruption, judicial independence, media freedom, economic security, xenophobia, and reconciliation between 

democratic players in that region. 

Today witnesses will get into specific details of the challenges 

and opportunities that exist in the region. But several points to appear very clear to me. 

First, while European integration provides a framework or goal 

for the Balkan nations, that has proven to be an insufficient motive 

to inspire or compel political decisionmakers in the Balkans to do 

the right thing in far too many cases. Leadership from the United 

2

States remains absolutely essential. Obviously, Brussels can’t hack 

it on their own. 

Second, we should remain committed to our shared values and 

hold the governments of the region accountable to the standards 

they profess. Perhaps we have been too tolerant of democratic 

backsliding and authoritarian politicians dressed up as democrats. 

Third, at a time when foreign assistance and development aid accounts are set for reduction, they will be reduced, we need to 

rethink our points of influence and how we engage in that region. 

As an example, I will remind the panel that I have put forward a 

plan for a mutual land swap or, what would be more likely, a border change between Serbia and Kosovo as part of a process of normalizing relations. 

If the Serb community in northern Kosovo wishes to be governed 

by Belgrade, they have every right and we should acknowledge it. 

This is the same principle that led us to support Albanian Kosovars 

in their desire for self-determination. Border adjustments are not 

just a magic bullet, but forcing populations to live in outdated borders or borders that are imposed upon them is a poor use of limited 

diplomatic resources. 

To help the subcommittee work through current issues and find 

creative solutions, we have an excellent panel of experts today. 

But, first, we will be hearing testimony from the State Department, 

and certain activities of the State Department and USAID in the 

region have been subject to some controversy with allegations of 

impropriety being lodged, especially those allegations that are actually presented by several United States Senators. We look forward 

to the answers on those topics that have been brought up. 

So, Ranking Member Meeks, I will yield to you for your opening 

statement, and anyone else after that who would like to have a 

short opening statement. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

to provide us with a timely update on the Western Balkans region. 

With the EU understandably consumed by domestic politics, we 

must not forget the importance and delicate state of progress in the 

Balkans. It is an opportunity to examine the tough issues and the 

potential for advancement for a region that is struggling to move 

beyond its history, outside influence, and difficult social and economic factors. 

I am especially pleased to have Mr. Yee from the administration 

with us today. As I have stressed throughout my tenure on the Foreign Affairs Committee, the work that our diplomats do in the field 

to advance American interests under difficult circumstances is undervalued. And I would like to take this opportunity to thank you 

for your service and let you know that there is bipartisan concern. 

Thank you collectively for what you have done, but there is bipartisan concern about the administration’s planned budget cuts to the 

State Department. 

I am not saying because I am worried about your job, Mr. Yee. 

We think your job is okay. But I am saying this today because I 

am worried about America’s place in the world and what a 

rudderless Balkan region would mean. 

3

The administration has not given our diplomats the tools or the 

human resources to do the daily diplomatic work in the Balkans. 

Without the appointees needed to direct the ship, the aforementioned vacuum will grow. 

Into this space comes the Kremlin which exploits the troubles on 

the ground. Young political actors and fragile institutions are pressured by corruption, a dismayed population, and other temptation. 

In some cases, it is the Slavic culture ties which the Kremlin plays. 

Economically speaking, easy money talks. Corrupt Russian money 

has brought up critical infrastructure, flooded the airways with this 

information, and hung a cloud over democracy and transparency. 

‘‘We are all corrupt,’’ the Kremlin narrative goes, and the West is 

made out not to be any different. 

History has proven that democracy requires hard work, attention, and investment from leadership. In Ukraine, for example, 

groundwork has been laid for reform, but with President 

Poroshenko at the top, who is reluctant to divest from his business, 

the work is easily undermined. 

Unfortunately for us, as of late, here in the United States we 

have a leader who attacks the press, threatens our independent judicial system, which undermines our democracies, demands loyalty 

to him over country, and who refuses to have transparency with 

reference to his economics. It is immensely more difficult to encourage reforms when our very institutions are threatened here in the 

United States. 

Today European politicians are growing skeptical toward enlargement. America, one can argue, is turning inwards. And with 

respect to the Balkans and this autopilot approach, it is damaging. 

It is up to Congress to support healthy democratic, economic, and 

peaceful progress on the ground. 

The United States has invested billions of dollars and many lives 

in order to ensure peace and prosperity in the region. I hope that 

in today’s hearing we can examine the broader U.S. interest in the 

region, integration into western institutions. Croatia, and soon 

Montenegro, provide proof that the European Peace Project is alive 

and still very attractive in the region. Macedonia, we learned of encouraging news, as a government may soon be formed that will 

work to protect the rights of all minorities. 

Nevertheless, there are pockets of trouble on a microscale that 

are bubbling to the surface. Government boycotts in Albania, 

Kremlin-supported coup and assassination attempts in Montenegro, and worries by ethnic groups are just a few of the current 

events that threaten to derail peace in the region. 

Governments there, as well as important civil society actors and 

members of the press, should know that we are concerned with the 

state of affairs after this hearing. We look forward to following up 

on what is discussed at this hearing. 

The Kremlin’s work to destabilize the situation is not going unnoticed, but I fear if we willfully ignore or are welcomed by some, 

there will be dangerous consequences for the region as well as the 

United States of America. 

So, I look forward to hearing and having a constructive discussion where we can explore what Congress can offer and do to help, 

because the Balkans are very important in the global world order 

4

and to the United States of America. We cannot—we cannot—take 

our eyes off the prize of working with and in the Balkans. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Congressman Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Meeks, for holding this hearing today. And thank you 

to our witnesses for being with us today. 

I just returned this past week from a very useful and informative 

Judiciary Committee trip to the Balkans where we visited Bosnia, 

Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo. What really struck me at the 

time was the central importance to each of these countries that the 

U.S. continue to support their democracies and their deep gratitude 

for America’s strong presence in the region, and the danger of any 

retreat from our participation or engagement in the region, as Congressman Meeks just outlined. 

But there remain serious challenges to good governance, to judicial reform, to serious economic development, and to efforts to ream 

out corruption. And I was reminded during the trip of the famous 

words of Winston Churchill who once said, ‘‘The Balkans produce 

more history than they can consume.’’

But what was very clear to me was that, after many years of war 

and turmoil and change, the Balkans have found a fragile peace. 

And I strongly believe it is in the best national security interest of 

the United States to continue to support reform, development, reconciliation, and maintaining the peace in the Balkans, and that 

this is not a time for us to retreat in any way, but to continue to 

understand the importance of this region, the importance of our 

partnership with our allies in this region, and the danger of creating space for others with less virtuous objectives. 

And so, I very much look forward to our hearing today, and I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt 

Yee. He was appointed to his current post in the Bureau of Europe 

and Eurasia in September 2013. He is a career Foreign Service Officer and previously stationed in Montenegro, Greece, and, most recently, as the Deputy Chief of mission in Croatia. 

In the past, he served as Director for European Affairs on the 

National Security Council, and before that, he worked at NATO 

headquarters as Deputy Director of the private office to the Secretary General. 

So, Mr. Secretary, if you could give us 5 minutes’ worth of your 

thoughts and, then, we will give you some questions in return. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HOYT BRIAN YEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the situation in the 

Western Balkans. Over the years, Congress, and in particular this 

subcommittee, have played an important role in working with the 

countries of the region and in shaping an environment that advances U.S. interests, and we welcome very much this partnership. 

5

Mr. Chairman, although the Balkans no longer dominate international headlines as they once did, the region still faces enormous 

challenges that, left unaddressed, pose a threat to U.S. interests in 

Europe. Ethnic tensions throughout the Balkans are once again on 

the rise. 

The recent violence in Macedonia underscores the severity of its 

political problems. As progress in the Serbia-Kosovo dialog stalls, 

stability in the Balkans will remain vulnerable. And without needed structural reform, Bosnia is at risk of becoming a failed state. 

Across the region, nationalism is growing and domestic political 

rhetoric is increasingly divisive. From teargas in Kosovo’s Parliament to challenges from the Republic Srpska, to the authority of 

Bosnia’s Constitutional Court, nationalist politicians are openly 

testing democratic norms and institutions. 

Compounding the trouble, lackluster economic growth has failed 

to deliver the standards to which people in the Western Balkans 

have aspired. In no small part, this is due to significant public corruption and endemic weaknesses in the rule of law. Even more 

alarming, a small number of those who do not or cannot leave are 

increasingly vulnerable to the twisted message of violent extremism, ISIS and other violent groups are finding success in recruiting fighters and supporters from the Balkans. 

Finally, Russia is increasingly working to undermine progress in 

the Balkans. From a bold attempt to undermine the government in 

Podgorica, to more subtle support for secessionist rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia seeks to thwart advancement toward 

NATO and EU membership wherever it can. 

Since the end of the wars in the 1990s, we and our European allies have incentivized the necessary political and economic reforms 

and reconciliation with neighbors by linking these actions to eventual membership in the European Union and NATO. Those linkages have been powerful and effective, but there is reason to be 

concerned that they are losing their drawing power, as the prospects for further expansion appear to dim. 

It is clear that we cannot take for granted stability and democracy in the Balkans. The risk of renewed conflict is on the rise and 

the forces against democracy are growing. Left unattended, the 

problems of the region will fester and generate conflicts that will 

almost inevitably draw us in. However, with active engagement, we 

can keep this region on the Euro-Atlantic path and manage the 

challenges without a disproportionate expenditure of resources. 

Recent history has repeatedly shown us there is no substitute for 

active U.S. leadership in the Balkans and strong partnership with 

the European Union. Our work in the Balkans helps make Americans safer as the countries of the region have partnered with us 

more effectively to fight terrorism and extremism and are becoming 

net contributors to international peace and stability operations 

rather than the subjects of them. 

On April 21, the United States ratified the accession protocol for 

Montenegro to join NATO. Montenegro’s entry into NATO on June 

5th will be the result of years of reforms completed with assistance 

from the United States and other partners. Montenegro’s experience provides a clear example that structural reform strengthens 

a country’s economy and democracy, allowing it to become a better 

6

and stronger security partner and, ultimately, a force for regional 

stability. 

When it comes to tracking and disrupting terrorist activity, we 

continue to have strong, willing partners throughout the Balkans, 

and they need our support. Excellent regional cooperation with 

Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo broke up an attempted terrorist 

attack against an Albania-Israel football match in Shkoder last November. 

These countries in the Balkans can help us, however, only if they 

are politically stable and the region is peaceful. We continue to 

work toward that end, but more needs to be done. 

We have also developed a multifaceted approach to push back 

against Russian malign influence. Our focus on anti-corruption and 

rule-of-law reforms in the region forms the backbone of our strategy. 

Increased government transparency and accountability counters 

Russia’s efforts to exploit corrupt practices to make countries more 

vulnerable to Russian pressure. We are supporting independent 

media and investigative journalists through small grants and training, and we are sending American experts to the region to speak 

with opinion leaders. 

In order to reduce vulnerabilities, we are promoting energy security, including through diversification. We are also using our military assistance programs to counteract Russian malign influence 

by fortifying the human capital of militaries of the region and presenting options that allow countries to move away from overdependence on Russian military equipment. 

Mr. Chairman, looking ahead, we have much work to do, but also 

much to build on. I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify before this committee. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yee follows:]

7


25456a-1.eps

Testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoyt Yee 

U.S. Department of State 

before the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

May 17,2017 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me to discuss the current situation in the Western Balkans. I plan to address both the 

significant outstanding challenges to peace and security in the region as well as our 

achievements. Over the years, Congress and this Subcommittee have played an important role in 

working with the countries of the region and shaping an environment that advances U.S. 

interests. We welcome this partnership. 

Challenges 

Mr. Chairman, although the Balkans no longer dominate international headlines as they once did, 

the region still faces enormous challenges that, left unaddressed, pose a threat to U.S. interests in 

Europe. Ethnic tensions throughout the Balkans are once again on the rise. The recent violence 

in Macedonia underscores the severity of its political problems. As progress in the SerbiaKosovo Dialogue stalls, stability in the Balkans will remain vulnerable .. And without needed 

structural reform, Bosnia is at risk of becoming a failed state. A lack of opportunity, due to 

corruption and disenfranchisement, drives young people to seek better economic opportunities 

abroad; in the past two years alone, over 80,000 people have left Bosnia to seek opportunities 

elsewhere. In an effort to gain popular support without tackling the real challenges facing their 

country, Bosnian politicians of all ethnicities revert to nationalistic rhetoric, testing the 

boundaries of the Dayton Peace Accords. The political dysfunction is so great, in fact, that 

Bosnia was unable to complete the simple IMF prior actions necessary to receive a tranche of 

money worth €75 million. 

As Senator McCain recently wrote, "We ignore this region at our own peril." 

Across the region, nationalism is growing, and domestic political rhetoric is increasingly 

divisive. From tear gas in Kosovo's Parliament to Mil orad Dodik's challenge to the authority of 

Bosnia's Constitutional Court, nationalist politicians are increasingly open in their testing of 

democratic norms and institutions. 

Compounding the trouble, lackluster economic growth has failed to deliver the living standards 

to which people in the Western Balkans have aspired. In no small part, this is due to significant 
8


25456a-2.eps

public corruption and endemic weaknesses in the rule oflaw. Slow growth and massive youth 

unemployment, in tum, are destroying young people's faith in the future of their countries and 

leading them to emigrate elsewhere. 

Even more alarming, a small number of those who do not or cannot leave are increasingly 

vulnerable to the twisted message of violent extremism. ISIS and other violent groups are 

finding success in recruiting fighters and supporters from the Balkans, often using slick 

recruiting efforts in local languages and on social media. As converts to extremism return home 

from the battlefield or are radicalized in place, Balkan governments worry that they will see a 

surge in violence, intolerance, and extremism in the region- and perhaps see it exported north 

and west. 

Finally, Russia is increasingly working to undermine progress in the Balkans. From a bold 

attempt to undennine the government in Podgorica, to more subtle support for secessionist 

rhetoric in Bosnia and opposition to Kosovo's integration into the family of nations, Russia seeks 

to thwart advancement towards NATO and EU membership wherever it can. Moscow uses 

propaganda and fake news to sow distrust and confusion and undermine the position of proWestern political leaders. Russia's dominance of the natural gas market in the Balkans leaves 

the region vulnerable to exploitation. Without alternate energy sources and a more diversified 

energy infrastructure, Russia will continue to hold this powerful lever. 

Since the end of the wars in the 1990s, we and our European allies have incentivized the 

necessary political and economic reforms and reconciliation with neighbors by linking these 

actions to eventual membership in the European Union and NATO. Those linkages have been 

powerful and effective, but there is reason to be concerned that they are losing their drawing 

power as the prospects for turther expansion appear to dim. 

It is clear that we cannot take for granted stability and democracy in the Balkans. The risk of 

renewed conflict is on the rise and the forces against democracy are growing. Left unattended, 

the problems of the region will fester and generate conflicts that will almost inevitably draw us 

in. However, with active engagement, we can keep this region on the Euro-Atlantic path and 

manage the challenges without a disproportionate expenditure of resources. 

Recent history has repeatedly shown us that there is no substitute for active U.S. leadership in the 

Balkans and strong partnership with the European Union. In the immediate aftermath of the 

wars of the I 990s, our investment enabled the new states of the Western Balkans to establish 

themselves as peaceful democratic states committed to a European future. This transition helped 

make Americans safer as the countries of the region, with a shared commitment to European 

integration, have partnered with us more effectively to fight terrorism and extremism, and to be 

net contributors to international peace and stability operations rather than subjects of them. 

2 
9


25456a-3.eps

On April21, the United States ratified the accession protocol for Montenegro to join NATO. 

Montenegro's entry into NATO will be the result of years of refonns, completed with assistance 

from the United States. Secretary Tillerson stated that Montenegro's entry into NATO is 

"strongly in the interests of the United States," and the White House included actions to support 

Montenegro's accession to NATO as one of the notable accomplishments of President Trump's 

first I 00 days. Montenegro's experience provides a clear example that structural refonn 

strengthens a country's economy and democracy, allowing it to become a better and stronger 

security partner and ultimately a force for regional stability. Its accession will demonstrate that 

the door to NATO remains open for those countries that desire membership and can meet the 

standards of the world's premier alliance. 

Continuing on the subject of security, when it comes to tracking and disrupting terrorist activity, 

we continue to have strong, willing partners throughout the Balkans- and they need our support. 

Excellent regional cooperation with Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo broke up an attempted 

terrorist attack against an Albania-Israel football match in Shkoder last November, leading to the 

arrest of 23 suspects across three countries. Kosovo is improving its capacity to manage and 

rehabilitate returned foreign terrorist fighters and CT offenders, curb the radicalization of general 

population inmates, and reduce the risk of extremist recidivism. And it is worth noting that all 

countries in the Western Balkans have adopted strong anti-terrorism legislation, and all are 

contributors to the Defeat-ISIS coalition. These countries can only help us if they are politically 

stable and the region is peaceful. We continue to work towards that end, but more needs to be 

done. 

Additionally, we have developed a multi-faceted approach to push back against the Russian 

malign influence. Our focus on anti-corruption and rule of law reforms in the region forms the 

backbone of our strategy. Increased government transparency and accountability counters 

Russia's efforts to export corrupt practices that make countries more vulnerable to Russian 

pressure. To combat Russia's wide-spread propaganda machine, we are amplifying our 

messages, correcting false statements, and engaging decision makers. We are also supporting 

independent media and investigative journalists through small grants and training, and are 

sending American experts to the region to speak with opinion leaders. In order to reduce 

vulnerabilities, we are promoting energy security and diversity projects and policies. Currently, 

the western Balkans are entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas. By supporting projects 

such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the Krk Island Liquid Natural Gas terminal, and the 

Bulgaria-Serbia Interconnector, we will enable Balkan countries to import gas from multiple 

sources, cutting off a powerful source of Russian leverage. 

We are also using our military assistance programs to counteract Russian malign influence by 

fortifying the human capital of militaries of the region and presenting options that allow 

countries to move away from over-dependence on Russian military equipment. Through the 

International Military and Education Training (IMET) program we are equipping the next 

generation of military leaders in the region with the skills they need not only to succeed, but also 

3 
10


25456a-4.eps

to uphold democratic ideals and withstand outside pressure that might countermand their chain 

of command. Our military cooperation programs give the militaries of the region the opportunity 

to break away from their dependence on Russia and use U.S. military equipment, weakening one 

of the traditional levers of Russian power. 

US. diplomacy has strongly supported the EU-led Serbia-Kosovo Dialot,>ue. The process 

remains indispensable to regional stability and it is in the national interests of both Serbia and 

Kosovo to resolve their open issues through normalization of relations that will advance their 

countries on their respective European paths. 

In Albania, with our support, the parliament last July passed constitutional amendments on 

judicial refonn intended to dramatically strengthen the rule oflaw and deal with deeply rooted 

corruption. As a direct result of these reform efforts, on November 9, the European Commission 

recommended the opening of EU accession negotiations with Albania, contingent upon the full 

implementation of key judicial reform laws. 

In Macedonia, at the invitation of the four largest political parties in the country, the United 

States, together with the EU, helped forge an agreement to create conditions to hold credible 

parliamentary elections last December. After a significant delay, the new parliamentary majority 

elected a Speaker of Parliament. This is an important step towards government formation and 

we will work with the new Speaker to support democracy and to help Macedonia move forward 

on its European path. We have called on Macedonian authorities to fully and promptly 

investigate the attacks on MPs that took place following the Speaker's election and to bring those 

who are responsible to justice. 

Tn Bosnia, redundant, overlapping and competing political institutions and processes are deeply 

dysfunctional, and we are working with leaders there and with our European partners to 

encourage much-needed political reforms before the 2018 election. These reforms, when 

implemented, will create a more stable and functional Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 

meantime, we will continue working with partners to address the symptoms of dysfunction, such 

as rampant corruption, organized crime, and extremism. We will increasingly hold leaders 

accountable for actions that harm US. interests. Our intervention with OFAC sanctions against 

RS President Dodik sent a clear and effective message that we will not watch idly while 

politicians endanger the stability of the country and region through ethno-nationalistic 

secessionist activities that undermine the Dayton Peace Accords. 

And finally, in Croatia, we continue to work with the government to develop new energy 

facilities to contribute to energy diversity and security for the Balkans and for Europe more 

broadly. 

4 
11


25456a-5.eps

Conclusion 

While there have been some real successes, the challenges to U.S. interests are serious and 

growing. The region as a whole is economically weak and politically unstable. Without our and 

European assistance and our focused attention on necessary reforms, there is a real risk of rising 

tensions sparking contlict. We can reduce this risk by maintaining our commitment to the 

Balkans. This means supporting strong anti-corruption programs to strengthen rule of law so 

that citizens can hold leaders responsible for their actions. Tt means standing alongside these 

countries as they fight against terrorism and extremism. We will also need to support 

governments' efforts to meet the requirements for joining the EU and NATO. Qualifying for 

membership in these institutions requires extensive structural reforms that create the building 

blocks for strong and stable societies. Finally, to help these states build resilience against 

Russia's campaign, we need to continue our work to support energy diversity and security in the 

Balkans. 

Our engagement, working in parallel with our European allies, can help overcome these 

challenges and create conditions conducive to a strong, stable and prosperous Balkan peninsula. 

Stability in the Balkans makes the world safer for Americans by creating reliable partners in 

counter-terrorism and regional security. Prosperity in the Balkans supports American trade and 

investment and contributes-- albeit modestly-- to job creation back home. There are of course 

other regions in the world that require our time, attention, and resources. lt is in our interests 

however to make the necessary effort to help the Balkans evolve from a net consumer to a net 

producer of security and prosperity. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee. 

5 
12

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. I have a few 

questions for you and, then, we will let Mr. Meeks proceed as well. 

Let me just ask, right now, how would you rate the peace? The 

basic issues that brought us into the Balkans into the first place 

with Kosovo and Serbia. Is that a peace that is holding? What are 

you expecting from that? Are you optimistic or are you pessimistic, 

or what is your take on that peace? 

Mr. YEE. Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic about the prospects for 

reconciliation and peace, peaceful relations between Serbia and 

Kosovo. Since 2013, these two countries have been working to normalize their relations through a process facilitated by the European Union with strong U.S. support. And while the progress has 

been slow and at times painful, we believe it is headed in the right 

direction. There have been a number of agreements reached by 

both governments which a few years ago, back before 2013, many 

of us would have thought to be, if not impossible, extremely difficult. 

So, there is agreement now on an agenda of items that were concluded or reached agreement in August 2015. They are now in the 

process of implementing such agreements as the relations between 

the Kosovo-Serb population with the rest of the country, and the 

elimination of parallel institutions. So, there is no longer a Serb set 

of institutions and a Kosovo Government set of institutions. There 

will be only one set. 

That is not to say that it will be easy to implement these agreements or that the relations will be always smooth. I am certain 

there will still be more areas of disagreement and a lot of hard 

work going forward, but the important element that makes me optimistic is that the European Union and the United States Government remain committed to helping these countries, along with 

other partners, to implement what they have already agreed and 

to go further to find a long-lasting solution. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, you mentioned about the European 

Union and the role it plays, but the European Union seems to be, 

from a distance, seems to be actually not in a situation where its 

power and influence is actually increasing. It looks like from a distance that it is even disintegrating back home. What is your prediction in terms of the European Union’s weakening and how that 

will impact on the Balkans? 

Mr. YEE. Mr. Chairman, I would agree that the incentive of EU 

membership, the drawing power of the prospect for many countries 

in the Western Balkan to join the European Union has weakened 

in recent years, for many of the reasons you mentioned. 

However, what is important for both Kosovo and Serbia is that, 

as they make progress on the reforms that they are being asked 

to make in order to become more compatible with EU standards, 

as they make progress, they are given positive feedback from the 

EU and from us. And it is still the case for Kosovo, in particular, 

but also for Serbia, that if Kosovo will take the steps necessary, it 

will gain further—rewards is too strong a word, but reinforcement 

from the EU that they are on the right path. 

The example I would use, Mr. Chairman, is on the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro that Kosovo signed several 

years ago, which now needs to be ratified by its Assembly. The EuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Aug 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\051717\25456 SHIRL
13

ropean Union has assured Kosovo that, if the Assembly of Kosovo 

adopts this agreement, ratifies the agreement, the people of Kosovo 

will, then, get what every other citizen of Europe has, which is 

visa-free travel. And that is an important step forward. That is still 

a real possibility. 

So far, it has not been the European Union withdrawing that 

possibility. It has been Kosovo not willing, not able to take that 

step. As long as these incentives are still valid, still exist, we and 

the European Union can still help them make these reforms. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, it would be a positive influence. One of 

the things that we have heard, and we have this letter from several 

United States Senators, is that George Soros, who many of us believe holds beliefs that are contrary to what our country, what 

America is all about, anyway, that he has actually been very involved in the Balkans and, also, very involved in the Balkans in 

cooperation with various American programs. What programs has 

we been working with George Soros on? And is that a good thing? 

Mr. YEE. Mr. Chairman, first, as a general statement, I want to 

say that recent stories, accusations about the Open Society Institute and Mr. Soros himself playing an outsized role in the Balkans 

are greatly exaggerated. And what I want to make clear to this 

subcommittee, this committee, is that the efforts by the United 

States Government, by the European Union, are their own. In 

other words, we are not under the influence of any one person, any 

one institution, not Mr. Soros or anyone else. 

Rather, it is the other way around; that individuals and NGOs 

and other organizations are supporting what the European Union 

and the United States Government have been promoting in terms 

of advancing the types of reforms, whether it is rule of law, fighting 

corruption, strengthening free media, strengthening an independent judiciary, strengthening civil society. All these efforts are 

efforts that are led primarily by the international community, by 

the EU and U.S. 

Where we have seen support from Open Society over the years, 

many years in the Balkans, has been particularly in the area of 

strengthening civil society, of citizens and citizen-led groups to become contributors to stability, contributors to the reforms that we 

believe also are important. 

So, there has been some cooperation. There has been both from 

the EU and there has been from the United States some support 

to Open Society over the years in promotion of certain projects, but 

at a much smaller level than many people would be led to believe 

by some of the narrative that is circulating now about this disproportionate influence by Mr. Soros. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, you are confirming for us that, indeed, 

there has been cooperation with George Soros’ projects, but they 

have been exaggerated in terms of the influence that Mr. Soros’ organizations have had? 

Mr. YEE. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Meeks, you may proceed. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Secretary, again, welcome. 

Now let me ask—and I think you touched on this in your remarks—that the Kremlin exploits weaknesses in the region. We 

14

know that when we have ethnic tensions and economic malaise and 

high unemployment, lack of transparency, lack of a free press, and 

even a stalled progress toward the EU, that that leaves a lot of 

space for the Kremlin to act. 

So, my question to you is, what do you think are the Kremlin’s 

goal in the region, in your humble opinion? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for that question. It 

would be difficult to predict or to read the mind of Vladimir Putin, 

but I can say that it seems to us that the efforts most recently in 

the Balkans by Russia tend to be aimed at increasing the influence 

of Russia, tend to be to discourage the countries of the Western 

Balkans from advancing toward the West, Western institutions, 

whether it’s the European Union or NATO. It tends to be as much 

as possible to create greater dependency of these countries on Russia as opposed to on the West. 

So, there does not, in my view, appear to be a kind of grand 

strategy; rather, an opportunistic approach at how to weaken certain governments that may be favorably disposed toward the West, 

to help governments become, if possible, more dependent or more 

friendly toward Russia. And, of course, there is a commercial motivation behind a lot of what Russia does as well. For example, in 

the energy area, to increase the dependence of Europe, including 

the Balkans, on Russian sources of hydrocarbons. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Well, let me ask the opposite question, 

too. We have a new administration here in the United States. So, 

what would you say in our engagement, what is new in the United 

States engagement? Is it something new? Is it the same as in the 

past administration? Are there any differences or any changes in 

our goals? That is why I am delighted to have you here, because 

we are trying to figure that out. Unless we have individuals like 

yourself, we don’t have anyone to ask. So, I am trying to figure out 

what are our goals or the administration’s goals and whether they 

have changed? Are they different? If they are different from the 

prior administration, what are they? And please give me an answer 

to that. 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, for that question. U.S. policy in 

the Balkans, for good reason I believe, has been consistent over the 

last several administrations, going back at least two decades, 

where I believe all of the administrations, the United States administrations, have focused on protecting and advancing U.S. interests in the Balkans, a very volatile area, an area where there has 

been considerable instability. 

Our interests are supported by the sorts of efforts that you mentioned, sir, in your opening statement, as well as the chairman, 

that it is very important for the United States that the region be 

peaceful, it be secure, it be stable; that elements, sources of instability, whether it is corruption or malign influence from Russia, are 

dealt with firmly and swiftly. We believe that continues to be the 

interest of the United States, to continue helping the region advance toward integration with the rest of Europe, to stronger institutions, to closer partnerships with the United States, helping us 

in areas such as fighting terrorism, dealing effectively with mass 

migration flows, and, also, reinforcing operations or exercises by 

NATO. 

15

So, I think the consistency in our policy is based on the consistency of American interests in——

Mr. MEEKS. Because I am, you know, concerned because our 

President has said different things about NATO—once it was irrelevant; maybe it is relevant again—different things about the EU. 

And when I have talked to some of our allies, they are confused 

also. That is why I am concerned. 

Our President has said he knows more than any of our State Department, our intelligence folks, or anything of that nature, and 

that he was going to review and change everything because, even 

though two or three past administrations, Democratic and Republican, he says they all are wrong; that no one is smarter than he. 

And so, I want to be sure that we are staying on the same path 

and there has not been any indication or any order to change the 

direction, because I think the region is interested in wanting to be 

secure as to what the United States is doing because too many 

places folks don’t know. And you are telling us that you are going 

to stay the course. 

All right. I think we are going to do another round, right? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you would like. 

Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Secretary Yee. 

I want to just follow up on Mr. Meeks’ last set of questions. Have 

you had discussions with Secretary Tillerson directly about the administration’s strategy toward the Balkans? And can you share 

with us, if you have, how our thinking about the Balkans relates 

to our strategy in the larger region? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, sir, for that question. I have not discussed 

directly with Secretary Tillerson our strategy in the Balkans. However, I can assure you that much of what I have described in my 

testimony has been thoroughly circulated and vetted, reviewed by 

the senior levels of the State Department. And we have, of course, 

kept Secretary Tillerson informed of our activities, of our plans, 

and particularly since the Secretary has participated in meetings 

with NATO allies, that he had to decide whether to sign or not to 

sign the Protocols of Accession of Montenegro for NATO membership, and also to advise the President, that he is well aware of the 

importance of the region. I believe as we have more time, we will 

be able to——

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. I understand that. I just wanted to be sure 

that there was—it would be helpful to know if the Secretary of 

State has actually discussed directly with you kind of the administration’s strategy about this area and the region. I take it the answer is no. 

The same thing, I just want to follow up on Mr. Rohrabacher’s 

question. The reference to the Soros Foundation was actually made 

on our trip as well. Of course, it turns out it is a very modest participation, and it is through a competitive grant process. 

I want to just ask you whether or not there is any difference in 

your mind in the work that is supported by the Soros Foundation 

and the National Endowment for Democracy or the International 

Republican Institute, those agencies that are doing work on governance, judicial reform, rule of law, strengthening civil society. Is 

there any difference? 

16

Mr. YEE. Is there any difference? Sorry, sir. Is there any difference between the approach before in the last administration——

Mr. CICILLINE. So, the work that is being done by the Soros 

Foundation in those areas, aren’t those the same kinds of things 

that are happening with the National Endowment for Democracy 

and the Republican Institute? 

Mr. YEE. Yes. Yes, thank you for that question. Yes, absolutely. 

The type of work that we support, the U.S. Government supports 

or the European Union is supporting through implementing partners which are selected according to open and transparent criteria, 

includes a wide range of organizations, including those that you 

mentioned, sir. 

The Soros Institute, Open Society Institute, actually makes up a 

very small percentage of the assistance programs that are supported by the U.S. Government and also by the European Union, 

as far as I know. The types of criteria that the nongovernmental 

organizations, including the Open Society, need to meet are consistent across the board throughout the Balkans. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Also, would you just tell us a little bit about what your assessment is? There have been proposals of very substantial cuts to foreign assistance to the Balkans and how that might impact the 

U.S.-Balkan relationships, and what are the both short-term and 

long-term national security interests of the United States, if the 

level of cuts that have been proposed by this administration, what 

the impact would be? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you for the question, sir. The State Department 

is confident that it will be able to carry out the foreign policy priorities set by this administration within the budget blueprint that 

has been put forward by the administration. 

Mr. CICILLINE. With a 37-percent cut in foreign assistance? 

Mr. YEE. We will, as always, sir, make the absolute best——

Mr. CICILLINE. Well, I guess the question isn’t whether you make 

the best. Will it have an adverse impact on the work we are doing 

in the region, the partnerships that we are building with these governments to promote transparency, rule of law, judicial reform, 

good governance, and to combat the growth of extremism? Because 

if it is not having any impact on it, we maybe shouldn’t spend any 

money there. I mean, that is clearly not the case. So, are you saying that a proposed reduction of 37 percent will not have an adverse impact on the work we are doing and the long-term national 

security interest of the United States? 

Mr. YEE. Well, sir, I will make two points on that. First, of 

course, there is an impact. If we spend less or we spend more, 

there is an impact, because our implementation of programs based 

on U.S. assistance we do believe has an impact. So, there will be. 

But the question on whether——

Mr. CICILLINE. And it will be a negative impact? When there is 

a nearly 40-percent cut, that would not advance the national security interest of the United States, in your opinion? 

Mr. YEE. Well, sir, I would say we would have to see what the 

impact is going to be, based on our prioritization and our focus that 

will be a necessity after we receive the budget from the Congress. 

17

Mr. CICILLINE. But you are not suggesting we are going to have 

greater influence and be a better partner in the region if we spend 

40-percent less resources devoted to the work? 

Mr. YEE. Well, sir, I would make this point: That U.S. leadership 

and the impact of American diplomacy is, of course, reliant in great 

part on our assistance, but it is by no means the only means in 

which we have an influence on the region. Much of what we are 

doing today in places like Macedonia and Albania is not dependent 

on the amount of dollars that we put into our programs. So, again, 

we, of course, consider these programs to be very helpful. 

What is important is that these countries, the populations, the 

citizens, the parties understand that the U.S. is committed, is willing to demonstrate the leadership necessary in order to help them 

solve problems, some of which, of course, do require resources, but 

some require leadership and a willingness to stand up to authoritarian leaders, corrupt leaders, organized crime, narcotics traffickers. Many of these efforts depend on U.S. leadership. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And resources? 

Mr. YEE. And resources. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. But I just want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, 

by welcoming Ambassador Faber who is here, who I had the pleasure of meeting in Albania, and I want to welcome her to the hearing room. 

And I will yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. At the request of Mr. Meeks, we will have a 

second round. 

Let me just ask right off the bat here, what you are describing 

is, of course, that the United States is deeply involved. When you 

have a democratic election in countries like this, does that mean 

that we are trying to superimpose what we believe would be the 

best government in a democratic process? Are we telling people 

that their democratic process is important, but here is what you 

should be doing because that is our opinion? Isn’t that what these 

Soros operations are all about? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. We are 

absolutely not imposing our will or our preferences for one party 

or one policy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we are interfering, are we not? 

Mr. YEE. I would not——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You wouldn’t say that giving money that goes 

into helping one party organize this group of people or that group 

of people, even though it is not on election day, that that is not 

interfering with them? 

Mr. YEE. I would say it is not, sir. It is not going, all the assistance does not go to one party or one group of citizens. It is distributed in a way that is nonpartisan, that is supportive of civil society 

or other sectors of society. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if nonpartisan is an idea that one party 

believes in a set of ideas and it just happens to be that we are helping those ideas, promoting those concepts through whatever nonprofits that we have there, then that isn’t considered helping the 

party that is advocating exactly those things and hurting the party 

that is advocating in another direction? That seems to be interference. 

18

In Macedonia, we have some pictures up here, and I will find out 

exactly what they are about. But a majority was elected in Macedonia, and the reports that we have are that our Ambassador actually encouraged a situation in which the Macedonian Government, rather than having it the majority, the party that won the 

majority take over, we have been encouraging obstructionism and 

some kind of coalitions to try to make sure that the party that won 

didn’t actually take power. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. YEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. No, it is not 

an accurate description. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. YEE. Actually, quite the opposite took place. Let me begin 

with the first part, just to make clear on interference. There is no 

question that the United States is assertive in defending U.S. interests we believe should be accepted by countries that want to be 

partners with us. And this is important to mention, that Macedonia 

wants to join NATO. Macedonia wants to join the European Union, 

and Albania also wants to join the European Union. 

We, as partners, are trying to help them meet the standards necessary to achieve that goal. So, when, for example, we advocate for 

rule of law, when we advocate for judicial independence, when we 

advocate for human rights, it is not always popular to the government in power. But we believe, as partners and as potential allies, 

it is important to make clear and to help them implement reforms 

that will advance what we believe is a shared interest. But, if the 

government does not want to support rule of law, does not want to 

support human rights, it is their sovereign right to do so. It is still 

our obligation to make clear what our priorities are. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As long as the government is representative 

of an election process, they are the real government, whoever. 

Mr. YEE. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We believe the majority of people will decide 

who is the government. And if we are there undermining that, for 

whatever reason, we want the government to go the opposite direction, we are interfering with people’s right to choose their government. 

And we have Mr. Meeks who is very concerned about any influence the Russians might have. Okay. They have their national interests; we have our national interests. But perhaps it is better for 

us. I mean, the result that I see in Macedonia. I used some not totally accurate words when someone asked me about it that got 

quoted all over the world. But they don’t have, and I shouldn’t have 

said a country, they don’t have a government. And they don’t have 

a government because there has been people there from the outside, I believe, who are convincing people not to either respect the 

majority or, No. 2, not to make the compromises that are necessary 

for democratic government to work. 

And if we are down there watching out for our interests, and we 

have decided that that is tied to social goals that may or may not 

be what the people there believe in, we are interfering with that 

system to the point that it is totally broken down. And you don’t 

have—correct me if I am wrong—the government right now, they 

still do not have a functioning government in Macedonia. Am I 

wrong? 

19

Mr. YEE. There is an interim government, sir, to answer your 

question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. An interim government, right? 

Mr. YEE. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. YEE. But, to answer your question, in Macedonia the elections did result in a situation in which no one party had a majority. 

And therefore, it was incumbent among the parties to form a coalition that would have the majority of seats in Parliament, so the 

government could be formed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Was it a majority of the vote or a majority 

of the people elected in the Parliament? 

Mr. YEE. It was proportionally. So, it was essentially the same; 

that the party——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, no party won a majority? 

Mr. YEE. No party won a majority. However, there was a coalition of members of Parliament that did represent a majority that 

is supposed to receive under normal European democratic norms a 

mandate from the President of the country to form a government. 

And up until today, up until today, the President has been withholding that mandate from the majority. And we have been advocating very strongly, sir, for the President to observe the constitution, observe European democratic norms, along with their European partners. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So, we have been suggesting that the 

President send that letter and make that recognition? Is that it? 

Mr. YEE. That he allow the formation of a government, not one 

party or the other, but to give the mandate to the majority. This 

is the basic democratic principle. And today he did that. So, we 

have advanced beyond the next step out of this crisis. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It seems to me that this has been going on 

for a while now, and it is only a little country. And we do have, 

as you say, a lot of influence in that part of the world. Quite frankly, I think that we have screwed it up, and I will leave it with that. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. I will just say, you know, we always talk about the 

United States being a leader and try to protect and make sure that 

there are human rights. So, we are not trying to force a government to do something, but I think that if we see human right violations are wrong, we should challenge the countries on their human 

rights. When we see there is not freedom of the press, we should 

challenge the government on whether or not there is freedom of the 

press. When we see that there is corruption, we should challenge 

the government on those corrupt issues, and not just look away and 

say that is the will of the people. Because, clearly, when you have 

certain leaders, the will of the people is not heard because of the 

will of the leader and they prevent the people when you suppress 

freedom of the press, when you suppress humanitarian rights, 

when you use certain tactics. And I think that that is still a very 

good role for the United States of America to play. 

The fact of the matter is we talk about Russian influence. You 

know, I want to challenge them. I think that the President of the 

United States, when he had the Foreign Minister in the White 

House, as opposed to talking about secrets that we had, he should 

20

have been questioning Russia on human rights, on freedom of the 

press, on various things. And we shouldn’t want to be like them. 

I think that we set the standard, and we should be the ones that 

are moving forward in that regard. 

A couple of quick questions. You said in your testimony that of 

secession rhetoric in Bosnia, you said it was being leveraged by the 

Kremlin. How so? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, for that question. In BosniaHerzegovina, particularly in the Republic Srpska, there is a strong 

interest and efforts by Russia to maintain and increase its influence with the Government of the Republic Srpska, both through financial means and also political means. 

Where we have seen the malign influence in Russia, in particular, has been in encouraging, words of encouragement, what we 

are aware of in public at least, and we can only imagine in private, 

encouragement by the Russian Federation of the secessionist plans 

and movement by certain politicians to break away from BosniaHerzegovina, which would be in violation of the Dayton Accords, 

which we believe would be tremendously destabilizing and would 

undo many years of hard work in stabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina 

and bringing it toward the European Union and, if it decides, to 

NATO as well. 

So, our efforts in the Republic Srpska and Bosnia in general are 

to strengthen institutions, which will make it more difficult for 

Russia or other external factors who wish to maintain a malign influence, including by strengthening rule of law, by strengthening 

the free media, and strengthening the judiciary, independence of 

the judiciary, so they are not able——

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask another question. And I don’t know, 

maybe they are doing good things. Maybe they are checking human 

rights, et cetera. But, back in 2012, the Russians and the Serbian 

Government established the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center, I think it was in Nis. And that was founded in order to provide 

humanitarian emergency response in Serbia and other Balkan 

states. 

How do you assess that arrangement and the activities that are 

going or working with the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center 

in Serbia? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you for that question, Mr. Meeks. We believe it 

is very important to be vigilant in general about all Russian moves 

in the region, since we have seen recent moves by Russia which are 

undermining the interests of the countries in the Western Balkans 

and, also, of the United States, we believe, most recently and most 

dramatically, in Montenegro, where the Russian Government attempted to undermine the elections and the government itself in 

Montenegro. 

It is very important to be vigilant. I think we have some questions about why Russia is trying to set up a ‘‘humanitarian center’’ 

in Nis and why it is seeking special status for this facility. We 

don’t believe the intentions are pure. And so, we are advising Serbia to ask the hard questions, to ask Serbia why it needs this facility and why it needs to have a special status, and what it is going 

to do that it can’t already do from Belgrade or from existing facilities. 

21

Mr. MEEKS. Let me make one last question. Well, actually, it is 

a statement, but you might want to answer it. It is piggybacking 

off of Mr. Cicilline. Because you spent much of your testimony on 

incentives driving countries in the region toward better behavior. 

But now, if we have these severe budget cuts, aren’t you going to 

gut the very incentives which could help countries move forward? 

Because a lot of the incentives, you know, it takes personnel. Personnel cost money as well as other things. And you won’t be able 

to maintain with a 40-percent cut personnel as well as other areas. 

And so, therefore, a lot of the incentives that we have been giving 

out, with a 40-percent budget cut, where even a general said that, 

if you cut the State Department, we are going to just spend the 

same money in bullets, but isn’t that contrary? Wouldn’t we be losing out on those incentives to move forward? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. There is no doubt, 

as Mr. Cicilline also made clear, that the resources that are used 

in providing assistance to countries of the Western Balkans is important and has had a positive impact. And whether we spend 

more or less, there will be an impact. 

The point I want to make in terms of the incentives for the region is that the assistance, in terms of the financial assistance in 

particular, is not the most important driver. The most important 

drivers are the types of reforms these countries need to make. It 

is the help, political help especially, these countries need to make 

these reforms. 

So, for example, a lot of the countries in the region actually are 

led by people who do not want to see the country join the European 

Union or to move forward, because they are invested in the status 

quo, invested in systems that allow them to exploit state-run enterprises, to maintain control over all the instruments of power in 

their countries. 

So, it is somewhat of a paradoxical situation in which we are trying to convince the governments, which tell us that they want to 

join the European Union, that they need to make substantial 

changes in their political system, in the way of doing business. And 

these, of course, do—these processes, these reforms are assisted by 

our programs. But the most vital element is the political will necessary by the leaders in these countries to move forward to make 

these changes. 

Mr. MEEKS. I am out of time. I just want to thank you again for 

your service. I always think that those who work for the State Department are underappreciated. I think that the budget proposal to 

the State Department shows that underappreciation. And I know 

you have got to stand there and take the grate here, but it has not 

gone unnoticed about the service that the men and women of the 

State Department do on an everyday basis. When we travel and we 

go see what is happening on the ground, and we see how you serve 

our country, you know, I salute every person that is in the military, 

but I also salute every person that is in the State Department because I see members of the State Department putting their lives 

on the line. 

And just as we need to increase, and they are looking at ways 

to increase the defense budget to some degree, we need to make 

sure that we do the same thing with our State Department, at the 

22

very least maintain it, because your job and your work is something that is of tremendous service to the United States of America, and I thank you for it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

And now, Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin just to respond a little bit to the chairman’s suggestion that our foreign policy should be indifferent to values, that 

there is something wrong with supporting an effort in a country 

where there is a particular party that is supporting one set of ideas 

versus another. 

Because if you imagine that there were one political party that 

was supporting free press, judicial integrity, good governments, the 

respect for human rights, free and fair elections, and there was another entity that was supporting repression of human rights, judicial corruption, corruption in the election system, violation of 

human rights, our foreign policy ought to reflect our values as a 

country. We are not indifferent to those things. We have to a conclusion as a country that we will promote peace and stability 

around the world and the long-term national security interest of 

the United States by encouraging things like respect for human 

rights, honest elections, good governance, judicial integrity, free 

press. 

And the notion that we sort of should be indifferent to that 

would mean we wouldn’t have any foreign policy that reflected our 

values as a country. And so, I think in the Balkans it is particularly important to reject the notion that it doesn’t matter which of 

those values are being reflected, because it does matter. 

And I think on the issue of Macedonia, I heard from our Ambassador directly about the efforts to encourage the constitutional application of the mandate and the forming of a government. I am delighted that happened today. 

But that is exactly the role the United States should play: Respect for rule of law, respect for fair elections, and to support the 

governments and the countries that are doing that work. So, I 

think it is important to push back on this notion of indifference in 

our foreign policy. I think it is exactly, sadly, what we have heard 

from the Secretary of State a little bit, and I think it is a very dangerous direction. So, I am happy to hear that you understand the 

importance of that. 

One thing that we heard from everyone that we met with in the 

Balkans was how important EU accession and NATO membership 

was. And I just want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, about how 

you think those objectives play in the kind of long-term national security interests of the United States, the deep interest in all of the 

Balkan countries to be part of the EU and to be part of NATO. 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline, for those remarks and also 

the question. Fortunately, the Western Balkans still believe very 

strongly in American leadership; still believe very strongly in the 

importance and value of joining the European Union and joining 

NATO. 

The facts speak for themselves, that countries that are in NATO, 

in the European Union, are more prosperous. They are more stable. 

23

They have better futures for their young people. And so, it continues to be a draw. 

And as Chairman Rohrabacher mentioned, as the prospect for 

joining those institutions weakens, the motivating force we have in 

part weakens. So, we need to continue, I think, to keep these processes moving forward, both so we can encourage the European 

Union to continue the European Project, but also to keep NATO’s 

open door open. That has been tremendously important in helping 

Montenegro, Albania, and Croatia motivate themselves and their 

populations to take some difficult reform steps. 

And if I could just make one short comment on the issue of values, the Secretary of State, Vice President Pence, and Secretary 

Mattis have all made clear to their staffs that values do matter; 

that human dignity, respect for human rights, for justice, rule of 

law, and democracy are all the important ingredients that bind us 

and Europe together. So, I think there is high-level support, although it may not have been articulated directly with respect to 

the Balkans. I believe that our leadership has made clear that the 

values do matter and that we should be fighting for them. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And my last question, Mr. Secretary, is, if the 

United States were to pull back in a significant way from our engagement in the Balkans, do you believe that we would see a greater likelihood of this spread of extremism and a rise in terrorism 

and, if so, in which countries do you think the risk is greatest? 

Mr. YEE. I believe it is—thank you for the question, sir—I believe 

it is a risk if the West turns its back, or appears to be turning its 

back, on the Western Balkans. They will, the countries of the Western Balkans will look for other options. They will look to either 

Russia or China or other powers that are providing alternatives to 

the first option, which is the West for most of these countries. 

So, I think it is absolutely crucial that we continue to help them 

make the reforms needed, including the areas you mentioned of 

fighting extremism, of providing jobs for young people who otherwise will turn to less appropriate uses of their time and energies. 

If we don’t do this, then I think we can fear that things will deteriorate, not only with respect to violence and extremism and terrorism, but with regards to the economy, which, if not improved, 

will lead to mass migration outside of the region into Europe, but 

also to the United States. And if brain drain increases in that region, the problems of these countries will only get worse. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask to associate myself with the 

remarks of Mr. Meeks with respect to our men and women in the 

Foreign Service. I am always in awe of the tremendous service of 

the men and women who serve our country all over the world, 

sometimes in very dangerous places. And this was no exception on 

my trip to the Balkans. We have extraordinary professionals that 

have dedicated their lives to representing our country and the interests of the United States, and they do it with tremendous dedication and make us all very proud, and that includes you. So, 

thank you for your service. And we will do all we can to protect 

resources for the important work that you do. 

With that, I yield back. 

24

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to now welcome the ranking 

member of the full committee, Mr. Engel, who has had decades’ 

long interest in this region. I know because we came in together 

and we are both very active since day one, and a man who I deeply 

respect. And I am very happy that he stopped in and joined us at 

this hearing today. 

You are recognized, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for those kind words. We have worked together for a long, long 

time. 

Before I begin, I want to acknowledge the Ambassador of Albania 

to the United States, my friend Floreta Faber. She is here. I want 

to recognize her and thank her for coming. 

Of course, I want to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoyt 

Yee who works so hard and so long. Hoyt, it is always good to see 

you, and I am grateful for working so closely with you through the 

years. And thank you for your service. I agree with Mr. Cicilline 

about how we are in awe of people in the Foreign Service that work 

so hard on what I consider a shoestring and do such wonderful 

work. 

So, if we take away a message, one message, from today’s hearing, it is that our work in the Balkans is not over. The project that 

began in the 1990s with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia still 

requires active engagement by the United States and by our allies 

in Europe. 

First, the good news: There has been real progress in the Balkans. Two countries, Slovenia and Croatia, have joined the EU. 

Three, Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania, have entered NATO, and a 

fourth, Montenegro, is on the way. That is good. 

Since the brutal wars of the 1990s, peace and democracy have, 

indeed, been the norm in the region, but all is not well. The democracies established with each country’s independence are now fraying on the edges. Press freedoms are narrowing in Serbia. Macedonia has not yet been able to form a government, although today 

I hear there is real progress. And Albania’s opposition Democratic 

Party is refusing to take part in next month’s parliamentary vote. 

Kosovo’s elections next month, spurred by a parliamentary no-confidence motion, seem relatively normal in comparison. But Kosovo’s 

troubles remain right around the corner, as Serbia remains unwilling to normalize relations and recognize its neighbor, Kosovo. 

On top of the regional concerns, Vladimir Putin has added Balkan countries to the list of targets with his contention and undermining confidence in democracy. The Kremlin attempted a coup in 

Montenegro which, fortunately, failed. It is selling advanced weapons to Serbia, including MiG-29s and T-72 tanks. And it is getting 

involved in Macedonia’s domestic politics, aiming to prevent the 

resolution to the governing crisis in Skopje. 

So, Hoyt, I am glad you are here to help us understand what is 

going on and what the United States is doing to get the region 

moving forward again. 

I would like to make a few points. First, President Trump’s State 

Department and foreign assistance budgets will devastate America’s ability to promote our interests and protect our security. This 

is as true in the Balkans as it is anywhere else. Since the wars of 

25

the 1990s, we have invested billions in the Balkans, and we have 

made progress. It would be foolhardy at best to squander that investment simply to further an ideological drive to make deep cuts 

throughout the government. 

Secondly, I was taken aback at the initial United States opposition to Kosovo’s plans to form an army. If our recognition of Kosovo 

as a sovereign and independent democracy means anything, it 

means we must stand by Pristina when it pursues policies well 

within the bounds of what is accepted for any other normal country. And saying Kosovo’s development of a military should take 

place gradually just doesn’t cut it anymore. Kosovo is in its tenth 

year of independence. We are past gradual; we are now approaching glacial. Rather, let’s help the Kosovars consult with their domestic constituencies, their neighbors, and the international community, so that can formally establish their nonthreatening defensive force. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, our work is not done in the Balkans, 

as you well know. We need to keep the region on the path toward 

democracy and the rule of law. We need to continue to integrate 

the countries in the North American community, and we need to 

ensure that Europe’s soft underbelly does not become a low-hanging fruit ripe for Putin’s picking. 

This means that the United States must step up our engagement 

in the region and support each nation as it continues its path forward. Anything less will risk bringing further instability and difficulties back to a region that deserves a real chance of freedom 

and prosperity. 

So, I guess I will just ask you to comment on anything I said or 

might say. And I also want to ask you about the name of Macedonia with Greece, so problems there. Have there been any 

changes of authority in terms of the name for Macedonia? 

Mr. YEE. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for your statement 

and your questions. I agree largely with everything you have said, 

sir, with one possible clarification I wanted to make about Kosovo 

and its military. We do, in fact, support Kosovo’s aspirations to create an army. We have agreed with Kosovo since 2011 on a strategy, 

the security sector strategy review that includes a number of steps 

that Kosovo will undertake before it transforms its security force 

into an army. That strategy includes having onboard all the parties 

in the country and the government also, including the minority 

Serbs. 

The Kosovars have agreed that, for reasons of stability, it would 

be much better to have all of the different peoples in the country 

supportive of this step before it happens. So, what we are asking 

for is for Kosovo to follow the strategy that we have laid out and 

agreed together, that Kosovo honors its commitments to its partners because, after all, Kosovo, while it is a sovereign country, also 

has the presence of a NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, which 

expects Kosovo to meet its commitments. 

So, in other words, if Kosovo is going to take any step that will 

possibly affect the conditions for the NATO-led peacekeeping force 

or for security in general, these steps need to be coordinated in advance. And when we did make clear to the Kosovars that we 

thought they needed to return the strategy was when it appeared 

26

a couple of months ago that Kosovo was going to proceed with the 

formation of an army outside of the framework of the agreement 

that it had agreed with us and with other NATO partners. 

So, we do support formation of an army, but it should be in accordance with the strategy that we have already agreed with them, 

and it should be done in a way that does not upset the security situation, which might lead to a weakening of support from NATO allies for the Kosovo security force, the KFOR, the peacekeeping force 

led by NATO. 

And, in general, on Russia, I just want to add again what I mentioned earlier, sir; that we believe it is very important to stand up 

to Russian malign influence and we are engaged in many different 

efforts to strengthen the ability of all the countries in the Western 

Balkans to resist illegal or ill-intended efforts by Russia to increase 

its influence, including in Kosovo, including in Albania, in places 

which have traditionally been, more or less, thought to be immune 

from this kind of influence. And now, we are beginning to see 

where it could, in fact, be coming into play. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge me, I would like to ask 

one more question, and say that I am deeply concerned with the 

lack of justice for murders and crimes committed by the Government of Serbia during and after the Kosovo war. There have been 

no charges brought against anyone for the murders of the three 

American citizens, the Bytyqi brothers, despite widespread understanding of who was behind them. 

On January 31st of this year, the respected Humanitarian Law 

Center of Belgrade released a dossier called ‘‘The Cover-up of Evidence of Crimes During the War in Kosovo: The Concealment of 

Bodies Operation.’’ This report described mass graves in Serbia 

containing the bodies of 941 Kosovo Albanians, mainly civilians 

killed outside combat situations in Kosovo during 1999. 

According to the report, ‘‘The evidence corroborated the decision 

to conceal evidence of crimes committed was planned as early as 

March 1999 at the highest level of the Serbian Government.’’ And 

on top of this, Belgrade has not brought to justice those responsible 

for attacking and setting fire to the U.S. Embassy in 2008. I want 

to know when Belgrade will face facts and bring to justice the people, including high officials in its government, who are behind 

these very serious crimes. The murder and mass burial of almost 

1,000 incident civilians is a crime against humanity, but the perpetrators have since gone unpunished. 

At the same time, the European Union has looked the other way 

and has been willing to proceed with Serbia’s accession process. 

This has to stop and stop now. Until Serbia brings those who have 

committed these crimes to justice, the EU should not move ahead 

with Belgrade’s accession and the United States should think twice 

before advancing our relations with Serbia. 

I also think that Serbia should stop throwing roadblocks in 

Kosovo’s way and Kosovo’s attempt to join the European Union. If 

both of them are to join the European Union—and I have no objection to that ultimately—then I think that each should help the 

other join the Union, not resist and make it almost impossible by 

throwing up roadblocks. 

27

So, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask unanimous consent to put 

in the record HLC’s one-page summary of the dossier I just mentioned. 

And I thank you for your indulgence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, and thank you very much for 

your years of services on this issue and your focus all of these 

years. And I don’t think it is due to the fact that you have massive 

numbers of Serbian or Kosovar residents in your district. I have got 

to feel it is just from your heart and representing a truly principled 

position, which I may disagree with certain things about. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, we have disagreed on a number of things, Mr. 

Chairman, through the years, but I think mostly we have agreed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me just note that my positions 

were mentioned in several testimonies. And as a matter of courtesy, I will yield myself some time to respond. 

First of all, and again, I would hope, and what my disagreement 

with Eliot is, that we close the books on that war and Serbia starts 

cooperating with Kosovo. And bringing up who killed who 35 years 

ago or 30 years ago is going to harmful to bringing about that cooperation. So, I would recommend both sides just drop it, close the 

book, realize bad things were done, and try to form a better relationship. 

In terms of our influence, let me note that several times what we 

have heard here today is how we must be concerned about Russia’s, 

we have to stand up to Russia’s trying to increase its influence. 

What is that all about? I mean, this is Russia phobiaism, Russia 

phobia. They are no longer the Soviet Union. They are a major 

power. They have every right to try to expand their influence by 

influencing people in various parts of the world, as we do, and we 

are all over the map in these things, and we have our military all 

over the world trying to do that through the military even. 

And, yes, Russia has every right to try to become an influential 

force, especially on countries that border Russia. What is going on? 

I mean, we went up to the Baltics, and after hearing the words 

‘‘Russian military aggression’’ in the Baltics over and over and over 

again for a year, I went up there and we had a hearing. And there 

was no Russian military aggression in the Baltics. I mean, not once 

have their troops gone into one of these countries. 

And, yes, we actually put more troops on their borders than they 

actually put inside their own country next to these countries. So, 

again, I think this idea that we are now treating Russia the same 

way we did during the Soviet Union is harmful to peace and undermines our ability to get things done and promote peace in the 

world. 

One last thing about this whole thing about Macedonia and 

Soros and these other things. Here is where we disagree. No, if a 

country decides they have political parties based on their social 

norms, whether it is—yes, they have a right to have a political 

party and say, ‘‘No, we are not going to,’’ and I’m not stepping on, 

trying to attack anybody here or anything. Just we have a right to 

determine what we consider to be acceptable in our national parade. Okay? 

And I know we have had problems with that. What I see is that 

you have Christian groups in these countries. Soros and his gang 

28

don’t like the Christian groups. They don’t like family groups, people who have more traditional, conservative principles. And I am 

not saying those principles are right. I am just saying the people 

of these various countries have the right to do that without interference from us, without us shipping in money to try to help them 

organize politically to get the guys who are on the other side of 

those social norms. 

And finally, let me just say that, when we are talking about what 

really is the motive going on here, who is seeking influence about 

what, Mr. Secretary or Deputy Secretary, what we are going to call 

you today, my read of this is that what we have here is the same 

sort of thing that we have seen with the EU elsewhere, like what 

they did in Ukraine. It is a power grab by suggesting any country 

who wants to get into the EU has to do this, has to jump through 

hoops. 

The attempt at control isn’t Russia. The attempt at control is 

that we are backing up the EU’s demand for control in this part 

of the world. And that is what their goal is. And unfortunately for 

these folks, I would say that the EU is not proving to be as viable 

as it presents itself. I think the EU is going down, and instead, it 

is using its leverage based on us to try to get these new governments down in the Balkans, to get them to toe the line, the line 

that they create for that European market as they see it. 

This is German bankers, basically, telling the Balkans what to 

do. And I am sorry, I see that far differently than the Russians—

as far more of a detriment to freedom than I do that the Russians 

are trying to gain influence on this or that legislature or this or 

that leader in that part of the world. 

However, I will, as a courtesy, give you 1 minute to refute it. And 

then, we are going to our next one. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I just was going to ask unanimous consent that 

Secretary Yee may have an opportunity to respond, so that it is 

clear to anyone who is watching that what you have just articulated is not the policy of the United States. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You’ve got it. You’ve got it. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CICILLINE. So, maybe Secretary Yee could clarify that. 

I think it is important. I have traveled with the chairman, and 

we have had this lively discussion before. But I think, since we 

have an administration official here, responding to the administration’s view of that would be useful. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, I learned this about Macedonia, 

too. You don’t want anyone to determine that they think you are 

talking for the United States Government. I am not even talking 

for our new President. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Well, nor originally the members present today. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. YEE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline, too. 

Very briefly, I just want to say I agree with the chairman that 

sovereign countries should have the right to decide. And this is perhaps where we disagree, sir; that it is an assessment of the United 

States Government that countries like Macedonia and Albania and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other members of the Western Balkans, 

29

want to join the European Union, want to join the West. They want 

to join NATO. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. YEE. In order to do that, there are certain standards they 

need to meet: Rule of law, respect for human rights, respect for a 

free media, freedom of the speech. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How about economic policies? They also demand? 

Mr. YEE. Also, economic, certain economic standards. 

So, what we are doing is helping them to achieve their goal. We 

are not telling them that they must join NATO or they must join 

the European Union, but they must meet certain standards if they 

do want to advance. 

Russia is fundamentally against what these countries are trying 

to do. That is the difference. We are trying to help these countries 

join the West. Russia is trying to hold them back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate you coming here. 

And let me just note that we will be having a codel to the Balkans this summer. And we are all invited to go, and we hope 

maybe even to see you there, or at least get a briefing before we 

go. And we are going. 

So, we are watching this situation very closely. And it seems to 

me that what we had for so long, over the years all we have heard 

is, ‘‘the Baltics,’’ ‘‘the Baltics,’’ again, the military aggression in the 

Baltics. And we didn’t hear anything about the Balkans. And the 

Baltics, as we find out, in terms of Russia, it is a locked door. They 

are not going through the Baltics. But the Balkans seem to be a 

broken door. And whichever way people are going to go in and out 

right now, it will be determined by what we do as a nation and 

what we can do to help those people there have a more efficient, 

effective, and free government. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

We will now call on the second panel. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The hearing is called to order. 

We are grateful that we have a fine panel of witnesses. I would 

ask the witnesses, if they could, to provide 5 minutes’ worth of oral 

testimony. Anything you want to put in the record will be put into 

the record. But 5 minutes, and that will give our panel, our committee members here, a chance to go into a dialog about the points 

that you have made in your 5-minute remarks. 

So, first, I will introduce all of them, and they will start with Mr. 

Bardos after that. 

Gordon Bardos is president of the South-east European Research 

and Consulting. It is a political risk analysis firm specializing in 

Southeastern Europe. He previously served as director for the Association for the Study of Nationalities and as a linguist for NATOled stabilization forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Joseph DioGuardi, no? I should know that after all our years. I 

have been mispronouncing it every time I have seen him for the 

last 30 years. A former Member of Congress, a member of this committee, and while in office and later as a prominent AlbanianAmerican leader, he has worked tirelessly to focus the attention of 

30

the American Government on the Balkans. He is responsible for 

helping bring about the first congressional hearing on Kosovo in 

1987. Today he is president of the Albanian American Civic 

League. 

And finally, Mr. Daniel Serwer, who is an academic director of 

conflict management at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a scholar in the Middle East Institute. 

Previously, he was a minister/counselor at the Department of 

State, serving as U.S. Special Envoy and Coordinator for the Bosnian Federation. 

So, we have some people who have got experience on the ground 

and a great deal of knowledge to share. And we appreciate you 

joining us. 

Dr. Bardos, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF GORDON N. BARDOS, PH.D., PRESIDENT, 

SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND CONSULTING 

Mr. BARDOS. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to share some thoughts with you on the 

current situation in Southeastern Europe. I will focus my remarks 

on four issues: The current crisis of Balkan democracies, the dangers inherent in opening a Balkan front in the new Cold War, the 

need to improve the economies of the Balkan states, and the challenge of confronting Islamist terrorist groups in Southeastern Europe. 

Just in the 2 weeks since this hearing was scheduled, two Balkan Governments have essentially fallen. And overall, as one European diplomat has noted, two states in the Western Balkans are 

on the verge of disintegration and three are in deep political crisis. 

International democracy monitoring organizations such as Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy 

Index, all agree that democratization in the region has either 

stalled or backslided over the past 10 years. 

I was going to do a glance around the region, but I think Secretary Yee already did that. So, there is no need for that. I will concentrate on something else. 

In the midst of all of these troubles, most people’s attention is 

focused on what Russia is doing in the Balkans. I want to argue 

that this obsession with Russia and the Balkans is as misguided 

and potentially as detrimental as the discussion about WMDs in 

Iraq was, because turning the Balkans into another front in the 

new Cold War will sacrifice democracy in the region for yet another 

generation. 

By almost any measure, military, diplomatic, and economic, the 

U.S. and the EU have achieved dominant positions in Southeastern 

Europe. To give just two examples, and more provided in my written testimony, every country in Southeastern Europe is currently 

a member of NATO or a member of the Partnership for Peace Program. Russia currently has formalized military alliances with none 

of the countries in the region. 

In 2015, Serbia conducted two military exercises with Russia. In 

the same year, Serbia conducted 22 military exercises with NATO. 

To sum up my argument, I would use a sports analogy. In the 

game with the Russians in the Balkans we are leading by 78 to 13. 

31

Some people think we need to keep on running up the score. I 

would argue that it would be better for us to call this game and 

start preparing for the challenges posed by next week’s opponent. 

Viewed in this context, the challenge presented by next week’s 

opponent is going to be stabilizing and strengthening the Balkans’ 

failing democratic institutions and resuscitating the region’s stagnant economies. To put the economic situation in the Balkans in 

some perspective, the states in the region have gone through an 

economic depression that has lasted far longer and cut far deeper 

than anything the United States experienced in the 1920s. 

In 2015, Serbia’s GDP was still 25 percent below what it was in 

1989. According to the World Bank, Bosnia currently has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world. And, of course, the 

Greek debt crisis is still far from over. Unfortunately, promoting 

the Balkans’ democratic and economic development will be impossible if the region becomes yet another front in the new Cold War. 

Finally, we need to address a serious problem in the region that 

I believe is getting insufficient attention, the growth and spread of 

Islamist extremist movements. Thanks in part to the work of 

Saudi, Qatari, Iranian, and other groups, a militant form of Islam 

has been steadily encroaching on the region’s traditionally more 

mild traditions. Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo are estimated to have 

produced more jihad volunteers per capita than any other countries 

in Europe. The importance of the Balkans in the international 

jihadi movement is also evident from the frequency with which a 

Balkan connection can be made to almost every terrorist incident 

in Europe. 

The Balkans also play an important role in the European terrorist threat matrix as a source of armaments. Thanks to the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s and Albania’s near meltdown in 1997-1998, 

jihadis can obtain practically whatever weapons they might want 

in Southeastern Europe’s black market arms bazaars. What should 

be of particular concern is the degree to which Balkan militant 

islamists can or have established ties with Southeastern Europe’s 

flourishing organized crime networks, which are amply skilled in 

human trafficking and drug and weapons smuggling. 

Indeed, given the current state of the Balkans, it would not be 

difficult to put together all of the elements needed to make everyone’s nightmare scenario, terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, 

come true. At least three times over the past 5 years the FBI has 

helped to thwart efforts to sell nuclear and radioactive material in 

Moldova. We have been lucky so far, but the combination of weapons-grade uranium on the black market and apoplectic terror 

groups with known ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons should be 

a loud wakeup call to everyone concerned. 

To deal with all these problems, we need to make several adjustments to our policy toward the region. First, we need to align our 

political ambitions and political projects more closely to the region’s 

political culture and political tradition. Far too often over the past 

20 years, we have been engaged in political and social experimentation that simply will not work in the Balkan environment. 

Second, we need to start entertaining the possibility that the stability-versus-democracy tradeoff might be a false dichotomy. A 

strong argument could be made that leaders and groups that beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Aug 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\051717\25456 SHIRL
32

lieve they enjoy Washington’s favor or believe they know how to 

manipulate American policymakers will increasingly press their advantages against both domestic and foreign opponents, resulting in 

less democracy internally and more aggressive policies externally. 

Third, we need to spend less of our diplomatic time and energy 

on micromanaging states and more on organizing a coordinated 

and coherent approach to the region by major powers such as Turkey, Russia, and, of course, the EU. Whether we care to admit it 

in the current political atmosphere, each of these actors will be 

needed in promoting stability and peace in the Balkans over the 

coming years. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to share some 

thoughts with you on the situation in the Balkans, with you and 

the committee. I have discussed all of these matters in more detail 

in my written testimony, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bardos follows:]

33


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Gordon N. Bardos, Ph.D. 

Southeast European Research & Consulting, LLC 

House Committee on Foreign Atfairs 

Mayl7,2017 

The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability 

Mr. Chainnan and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to share some thoughts with you 

on the current situation in southeastern Europe. I will focus my remarks on four issues-the current crisis 

of Balkan democracies; the dangers inherent in opening a Balkan front in the New Cold War: the need to 

improve the economies of the Balkan states; and the challenge of confronting Tslamist terrorist groups in 

southeastem Europe. 

A Region in Turmoil-The Weimar Era in Balkan Democracy 

At this point it is fair to say that most Balkan countries are in a phase similar to the Weimar years in 

Gcm1any in the 1920s and 30s, insofar as we arc dealing with a collection of countries with weak 

democmtic institutions, depressed economics, and high levels of popular dissatisfaction. 

The evidence that progress on building democratic institutions and advancing political rights and civil 

liberties in the region either came to a halt or regressed over the past decade is substantial. The Economist 

Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2016, for instance, shows that of the nine countries in southeastern 

Europe (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania 

and Serbia), only one (Bulgaria) showed any improvement, one (Albania) showed no improvement, and 

the remaining seven all regressed in terms of their democmtic development. 1 Other democracy 

monitoring organizations, such as Freedom House and the Bcrtclsman Transformation Index have 

similarly shown significant democratic backsliding in the Balkans since 2008. 

As one European diplomat with significant Balkan experience, the Slovak foreign minister Miroslav 

Lajcak, recently summed up the situation in southeastern Europe, two states in the Western Balkans are 

on the verge of disintegration and three are in deep political crisis 2 A glance around the region fully bears 

out this point. 

In Bosnia & Herzegovina, just a few days ago the chainnan of the Council of Minister-s 

admitted that there is no longer a governing majority in parliament, the divided city ofMostar has 

been unable to hold elections since 2010, Bosnian authorities have been unable or unwilling to 

implement the European Court of Human Rights Sejdic-Finci decision since 2009, and some 80 

decisions of the Bosnian Constitutional Court have not been implemented, as was most notably in 

evidence by last year's refusal ofRS officials to cancel a referendum on their entity's holiday 

1 See Democracy index 2016: Revenge of the "deplorables (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017), 5. 

~See ElvirBucalo, "EU okrenula leda zapadnom Balkanu," Voice of,~merica, 6 March 2017, at 

http:/ /1N'7{\'/. glascnne1ike net/a/eu-okrenula -ledia-zapadnom-bulkanu/3 7 518-f 9. hnnl 
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ordered by that institution. One oftbe country's two entities. the Federation ofBiH. exists in 

name only, and Bosnian Croats are increasingly raising demands to establish their own entity. 

Given the fact that 2018 will be an election year in Bosnia there is little chance that there will be 

any significant political breakthroughs there for the foreseeable future. 

For the past two years Macedonia has been undergoing a deep legitimacy crisis, triggered by 

revelations that the govcnunent had been illegally wiretapping up to 20,000 individuals in the 

country. New parliamentary elections held in December 2016 were inconclusive. with the current 

president being unwilling to give a mandate to form a new govcmmcnt to the leader of the largest 

opposition party. One recent analysis noted tbat Macedonia ·'docs not have a govcmmcnt. it docs 

not have a parliament_ it does not have mayors, nor municipal goven1ments. but above all-it 

does not have a way out rofthis crisisl-'"3 Since 1994---i.e., during the Clinton Administration--no 

progress has been made on resolving the Macedonian name dispute between Athens and Skopje, 

which has blocked Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. 

In Kosovo, in just the past week the government has fallen, and a prominent joumalist, Arbana 

Xharra, was the victim of a '·savage beating., in front of her apartment. In 2016 sessions ofthe 

Kosovo parliament were frequently disrupted by protesters throwing tear-gas canisters in tbe 

assembly. the five-year old EU-sponsorcd Kosovo-Serbia normalization talks have essentially 

collapsed. the Kosovo parliament is unable to pass a border demarcation agreement supported by 

the U.S. and the EU, and Kosovo remains unrecognized by five EU states. two members ofthc 

U.N. Security Council, and other major powers such as Brazil, India. Israel, Nigeria. and South 

Africa 

Montenegro's democratic evolution (or lack thereof) is evident in the fact that the same political 

party has been in power since 1945, and the same individual has been either president or prime 

minister for most of the past quarter century. In 20 15, an international anti-cormption NGO 

named Milo Djukanovic ''Person of the Year in Organized Crime."' As the award announcement 

noted. '·Nobody outside ofPutin has run a state that relies so heavily on corruption, organized 

crime and dirty politics. It is truly and thoroughly rotten to tbe core."" 

Serbia· s democratic backsliding is evident across a number of dimensions. Serbia last month held 

probably its most questionable presidential elections since tl1e fall of Miloscvic. According to one 

analysis. current Serbian prime minister Alcksandar VuCic · s presidential bid received 58 percent 

of election programming time_ and if one included reporting on his activities as prime minister_ he 

received 92 percent of Serbian national TV's political programming. 5 Indeed, one of Serbia's 

most prominent and respected journalist has said that in many ways there vvas more freedom of 

the press under Milosevic than there is now,6 and civil society activists report increasing levels of 

lntlmldatlon. Pollee lntlmldatlon of opponents \Vas another aspect of the elections: for instance, 

former Serbian foreign minister Vuk Jeremic was summoned for a police interrogation within 

twenty-four hours of his return to Serbia to begin his electoral campai~,>n. and his wife (earlier one 

3 Sec Tomas Braj. "Bc1. it.la~:a u Makcdoniji," TJeuische Welle. I 0 March 2017, at http://w\n\ .dn.com/sr/bc;,-i;l<valt:JBakt&.loniji/a-3 7879 t?l2 

'

1 See .. 2015 Man of the Year in Orgmrized Crime: Milo DjukcmoviC, .. Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting 

Project. at ill!Jll'.C'-ill~j]£;]]2Jill?Llli~!.!!\l!llli~i!L!;m2i. 5 See Srdan 
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of the country's most popular newscaster) was slandered by one of Vucic-s surrogates and 

accused of being the leader of Serbia-s narco-mafia_ 

Even states in the region which arc both members ofthc EU and NATO arc wobbly. In Croatia in 2016, 

one govenunent collapsed within nine months of taking office_ and just a few weeks ago the country 

narrowly avoided having yet another govcmmcnt collapse. In the first few months of 2017 Romania 

experienced its largest public demonstrations since the fall of Ceaucescu_ Greece is still in crisis debt 

crisis h<1s yet to be resolved, which thre<1tens not only Greece but the fimnci<1l st<1bility of the EU itself In 

sum_ by any measure southeastern Europe ls in deep crisis. 

The Danger of creating a Balkan Front in the New Cold War 

In this environment, the region's fragile democratic politics cannot afford any additional stresses and 

strains_ Yet that is precisely what risks happening if the Balkans become another front in the new Cold 

War between Moscow and \Vashington_ In his recent book Robert Legvold has described the numerous 

"opportunity costs'" of the deterioration of relations between Russia and the \Vest 7 To add to his list_ the 

opportunity cost of pursuing Cold War in the Balkans could well be sacrificing the democratization of 

southeasten1 Europe for yet another generation. 

To make this point more clearly, I would like to suggest a comparison with a mistake the U.S. foreign 

policy cstablislnncnt made some 15 years ago when it came to Iraq_ In 2002-2003, American policy was 

not responding to \Vhat Saddam Hussein "s regime \Yas real(v doing, or to its real capabilities. It vvas 

responding to highlv-questionable allegations, assumptions and rumors about the existence of\VMD's in 

Iraq and Hussein-s supposed ties to AI Qaeda. Just as happened back then_ we are exaggerating and 

overinflating some issues at the expense of focusing on what is really happening_ As regards the current 

situation in southe<!Stem Europe, I would argue th<1t U.S. policy is not responding to how influenti<1l 

Russia real/y is in the region. We are responding and reacting to superficial analysis and dubious 

joumalism being produced in the current unhealthy media and political environment that has engulfed 

Washington and other western capitals. 

Thus, a flood of ominous news stories has begun to detail Moscow "s growing influence in the Balkans, 

alleged signs of which can be seen in the visit of<1 Coss<1ck folklore troop to Bosni<1 (supposedly 

analogous to the "little green men'" that took over Crimea), 8 a Russian motorcycle gang visiting 

Podgorica,' and the graffiti on a kitschy Russian-built train car scheduled to travel from Belgrade to 

Mitrovica. 

Yet as anv detailed analysis reveals, the EU and NATO-the main instrument of U.S. power in Europehave achieved dominant positions in the Balkans. 

Sec Lcgvolcl Relurn 10 Cold War (Malden, MA: Polity Press. 2016)_ 53-54. 8 See Christo Grozev ... The Kremlin's Balkan Gambit: Part 1.--4 Mmch 2017, at 

1tttps ://•,;t.,".V\V .beHingcat.com/ne~;vs/uk -and-e1rrope/20 17 /(13 /()..Jfkrcmlins-bm.kan-gmnbit -part/ 9 See Andrew' Higgins, "Finger Pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro," The -Ve~t· rork Time,<,', 26 

November 2017. 
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Militarily_ Russia has had little influence in southeastern Europe over the past two decades_ Putin 

withdrew Russian peacekeeping forces fi-om Bosnia and Kosovo back in 2003_ and in December 2014 

Putin cancelled what was supposed to be the grand instrument of Russian geo-strategic and geo-economic 

power in the Balkans, the South Stream Pipeline Project. 

By way of comparison, over this time frame NATO has essentially locked up southeastern Europe. Since 

2004 Albania_ Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia have joined NATO, Macedonia is a 

candidate country. and Bosnia and Serbia are members ofNATO"s Partnership for Peace Program. The 

latter two have also concluded Status-of-Forces Agreements (SOFA) with NATO which give alliance 

personnel immunity from prosecution on their tenitory. Russia currently has no fonnalized military 

alliances 'vith any of the countries in southeastem Europe. Indeed. as The F.conomist sarcastically noted, 

when Moscow threatened to cancel joint military projects with Montenegro if the latter joined NATO, 

'1hc Montcncgrins were baft1cd, because there arc none."''" What is widely cited as a Russian spy base 

near the Serbian city ofNis reportedly has a full-time staff of five Russian nationals: by way of 

comparison_ the largest U.S. military base built since the Vietnam War is just across the border in 

Kosovo. Moreover, the Russians inNis have not been given the same status provided for by Serbia-s 

SOFA with NAT011 

While Serbia's recent purchase of MTG-29 fighter jets from Moscow made headlines, this again misses 

the more important overall point; as defense analyst John Cappello has noted, Serbia's '·relations with the 

Euro-Atlantic alliance have never been stronger ... the vast majority of its international defense 

cooperation is with NATO and the West."' 12 For example, in2015 Serbia held two joint military exercises 

with Russia: in the same year Serbia carried out twenty-two military exercises with NATO-" On a recent 

visit to Belgrade in April2017, Senator John McCain himself claimed that the U.S. is Serbia's most 

important defense partner, with the two countries engaging in 90 joint activities a year 1 " 

Diplomatically_ the U.S. and the EU also enjoy a dominant position. The official foreign policy goal of 

every country in the Westem Balkans is to join the European Union, not to join the Eurasian Economic 

Union. In keeping with this. most states in the region have aligned their foreign policies with those of 

Washington and Brussels. Even Serbia, which has refused to join the sanctions regime against Moscow, 

has also refused to recognize Russia"s annexation of Crimea. 

10 ·•Jn the Balkans, NATO has outmuscled Russia," The Fconomist, 11 December 2015 at 

Dusan Stojanovic, "Inside Russian "spy base· in the Balkans:· .L'isociated Press (Dateline Nis, Serbia), 6 

October 2016, at http:/ !bigstorv .ap.ondmtic]e/03 f70(J(~-fec5b48bbb 1 c2f5Gbdea92 5 5e/inside-russian-spy-base-balklit'i 1

: See Cappello. "Russianlnfornmtion Operations in the Westen1 Balkans," Rea/CiearDefense.cum, 2 Februal)' 

2017_ at 

Figures according to Sergey Bclous, .. How long will Belgrade seesaw between NATO and Russia?". Oriemal 

Rel'!e\r, 2J April 20 It\ at brtrr//orient.81revie...-v .QrgL.?O l6/04/!3/hmv-Jong_-,-rin-be1g,rade-ser.sa}y-bcny~l-mlt.Q.-andSee '·VuCiC i Mekejn o regionalnom mim, saradrYi T 7.ajedniCkim akci_jama,'' Politika (Belgmde), 10 April2017, at 

http:/hx\VV'f.politika.rs/scck:lauak/3780g9/Vm:ic-i-:Mekejn-o-re1,.rionaJnom-minl-saraduji-i-zajednickim-akciiama 
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25456b-5.eps

Where diplomatic differences exist_ it is more constructive and healthier for the overall U.S.-Russia 

relationship for us to reCQb>nize that there can be legitimate differences of opinion on some problems 

rather than trivializing a serious problem intemational issue and dismissing eve0,thing as ·"Russian 

meddling." The Kosmo issue is a prime example. Moscow's refusal to recognize Kosovo is frequently 

ascribed to a desire to cause problems for the West in the Balkans.'' But the reality is much more serious 

and complex. Georgia and Ukraine, for instance, similarly refuse to recognize Kosovo, and it is difficult 

to sec why they would be following Russia· s lead on this. Moreover, five EU members, as well as Brazil, 

China, lndia,lndoncsia_ Mexico, Nigeria, and other states representing 60-70% ofthc world's population 

also refuse to recognize Kosovo. Clearly_ any serious understanding of global politics has to recognize 

that divisions within the international conununity over Kosovo·s unilateral declaration of independence 

arc not caused by "Russian obstructionism": rather, they arc dri,cn by the very considerable implications 

the Kosovo case has for any multiethnic state facing an actual or potential secessionist movement. 

Other diplomatic moves by Moscow that are allegedly intended to destabilize the Balkans have been seen 

in Russia· s rhetorical support for the Bosnian Serbs' plan to hold a referendum on the _judiciary," 

although most Americans would also take issue with a legal system in which three foreigners sat on the 

Supreme Court, an lslan1ist party controlled the attomcy-gcncral' s ofticc, and legal practices such as the 

retroactive application of laws were in effect. Similarly, a recent ,)'tra(/Or analysis decried Moscow·"s 

support tor the Bosnian Serbs' decision to hold a referendum over a holiday, 17 yet it missed the most 

important development in months-that it \\as precisely in Mosco-w on March 2nd of this year, after 

meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, that Bosnian Serb president Dodik walked back 

earlier plans to hold an independence referendum. Indeed_ the most important point to be made is that (at 

least as far as this author knows) since 1995 Russian officials have consistently and unequivocally voiced 

their support from Bosnia's territorial integrity. 

Economically. Russia also has a weak position in the Balkans. Neighbors_ EU com1tries and Turkey easily 

account for 70-80 percent ofthc Wcstcm Balkan countries' foreign trade (and China is increasingly 

becoming an important trading and investment partner as well)_ As a recent Financial Times editorial 

noted_ "As a source of trade, aid and investment, the EU dwarfs Russia. For all the Russian cultural links, 

migration flows from the Balkans are almost entirely to the rest ofEurope."18 The one exception here 

comes in terms of the region's energy dependence, with Russian gas and other energy products providing 

well over half of each country's supply. Russia has made some high-profile economic acquisitions in the 

region, such as buying Serbia's Na(ina Industrija Srbije, oil refineries in Bosnia, Montenegro's largest 

industrial concern, etc., but the experience of the past few years has shown that these economic 

investments only have a limited capacity to sway political and strategic priorities in any major way. 

Consider tbc tollowing: Russian indi,iduals and businesses account for 22 percent of the tourist arrivals 

in Montenegro, Russians own almost one third of all businesses in Montenegro, 40 percent of the 

1

' Sec Bernd Riegert. "EU looks to contain Russian innucncc in the Balkans_'' TJeulsche Welle. I 0 March 2017. at 

James Lyon, --Is War About to Break Out in the Balkans?" Foreign l'o/i~v, 26 October 2015. at 

In tp:/ /forcignpo liC\' .cnm/20 ! 5/ l 0/26/v,,m-brcn k -out -ba lkn no;;;-bo:-nin-rcpub lika -smskil-dm· ton/ 

~ See .. Russia Stirs the Hornet's Nest:· ,)'traffhr.com_ 2S March 2017, at l!!.!vs·J/\V'\Y\Y.strrrtfOr com/analvsis/mssiJ..:: 

See '·Europe and the US face a challenge in the Balkans.-- The Financial Times, 10 March 2017, at 

https://>:\"'.V\V.fLconlfcontent/ce3bd71.-J.-058a-lle7-:.~ceO-lce02efOdef9. 
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country-s real estate_ and Russia has provided one third of the foreign direct investment in Montenegro. 10 

Yet despite this significant Russian economic position in and control of Montenegro's economy, it \Vas 

still unable to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. 

It has also been claimed that Moscow's increasingly malign influence in the Balkans has been the fact 

that many Balkan media outlets have bcgm1 numing stories by Russian media outlets such as RT and 

Sputnik," yet Balkan media also routinely run articles by Age nee France Pre sse, AI Jazeera, the BBC_ 

Deutsche Welle <Ind Voice 'if A merzca and Radio Free Furopc. 

In sum_ viewed from the milimry. diplomatic and economic perspectives, Russia can hardly be seen as 

posing a dangerous threat to Western interests in the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, the in±lated and 

overblown accounts of ''Russian meddling., in the Balkans arc having very significant-and 

detrimental-policy consequences. In what has become knovvn as the '"'st.:Lbility versus democracy 

tmdcoff" u_s_ and European support for democratic institutions and the rule oflaw arc being consistently 

sacrificed for the sake of legitimizing authoritarian leaders who have leamed that by simply expressing a 

few platitudes about democracy and human rights, and by declaring themselves to be opponents of 

Russian advances in the Balkans, Washington will give them a free pass to crack do\\11 on the political 

opposition, independent media, engage in large-scale corruption, etc. As one scholar has aptly described 

this process, 

A new generation of autocrats has been taking over the region_ sometimes with the direct 

complicity of overzealous American policymakcrs and distracted EU officials ___ Both U.S. and 

EU policymakers have been willing to tum a blind eye to comrption, which plagues the region-s 

govennnents_ and have either downplayed or ignored the creeping rise of autocratic mlers _ 

fwhol are well-coached in telling Westem diplomats what they want to hear. while blatantly 

undermining democratic principles and the nde of law at home U.S. and EU policymakers 

need to ask themselves if oligarchs, autocrats and kleptocrats, who happen to be pro-Westem, are 

any better than Putin-or helpful for the West's long-term interests in the region." 

Evidence ofthis dynamic is frequently on display_ T11e most well-known at this point is the claim of an 

alleged Russian plot to overthrow the Montenegrin govemment in October 2016. Yet any serious 

examination suggests that the alleged plot is either a complete boa'\., or at most an amateurish exercise by 

a group more akin to the y<Ihoo militimnen who occupied the M<1lheur Nation<!! Wildlife Refuge in 2016 

than a serious covert operation. 

If we do not get wise to this gmnc and continue to view southcastcm Europe as yet another front in the 

New Cold War, and our ovcrarching goal remains ''keeping Putin out ofthc Balkm1s." we may well be 

sacrificing Balkm1 democracy m1d regional stability for mwther generation_ Leaders and groups that 

Jaroslmv WiSnie'\vskL '·Russia has a years long plot to influence Balkan politics. The U.S. can leam a lot from it.'' 

W'i'slum!.ton Post. 19 20 16. at 
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believe they enjoy Washington's favor-or believe they know how to manipulate American 

policy1nakers-will increasingly press their advantages against both domestic and foreign opponents, 

resulting in less democracy intemally and more aggressive policies extemally22 Meanwhile, leaders and 

groups that do not enjoy Washington's favor will increasingly feel the need to turn to Russia (or in the 

not-too-distant futnre China) for some modicum of support. The result will be a self-fulfilling logic in 

which the Balkan states are impelled into more and more hostile, divided camps. Taken to the most 

dangerous extreme, this could result in the kinds of proxv wars we arc witnessing in Syria and Ukraine. 

Consequently, a far more pn1dent and beneficial strategy_ as Thomas Graham has recently argued 

regarding the overall European context would be to bring Russia on board in developing what has 

widespread acceptance as a new, legitimate political and security order in southeastem Europe in the postpost-Cold War era. In other words, we should be striving to make Russia part of the solution in the 

Balkans rather than insisting that it is the source of the problem. With regard to the stability versus 

democracy tradeoff, as Graham has also argued, the Russian challenge in Europe and throughout the 

Balkans will be best met by addressing the internal problems countries have with their democratic 

institutions and economies 21 

Balkan security specialist Dimitar Bechev has arb'lJed along the same lines. In Bechev's proposed strategy 

of''calling Russia's bluff' in the Balkans, he notes that, 

EU members have tumed a blind eye to the less appetizing aspects of Balkan politics if there 

is trouble brewing in the Balkans_ it has more to do with the perverse effects ofthe "stability" 

provided by incumbent governments than with the risk of all-out conflict. Combined with the 

weakening pull of the EU and the United States- relative disengagement, democratic decay and 

insufficient economic growth add up to a general state of stagnation ... [The Westl should take a 

look at what has gone wrong in the domestic politics of post-Yugoslav states and apply pressure 

on leaders to take seriously the rule of law, media freedom, and independent civil society2 " 

Reviving Balkan Economies 

One of the most important reasons to avert tuming the Balkans into another front in the New Cold War is 

to avoid the political instability that will inevitably drive away the foreign investment needed to revive the 

Balkan economies. Indeed, stabilizing southeastem Europe will be impossible tmless we are able to 

reverse the horrible economic decline these countries have confronted since the 1990s, when the 

destruction of war, the international sanctions regime which effected the entire region, and the difficulties 

2 For an example of this as it pertains to Kosovo, see Enver Hoxhaj. ·'Kosovo Feels Russia's Heavy Hand, via 

Serbia ... lhe New Yor!t l'imes. 13 April2017, at Ul~R-~JZ11\! \_\' J.Wlhn~~,c;Qn_l!2_Q_1_(/Q_f/J}/9JlilJiQll0-iO:'jQ~~9o::f~cl_~-JJt~h1'?-:_ 

hc<:WY-hand-via-scrbia.html? r"-0. For a Montenegrin sec Dusan Stojanovic, "Montenegrin leader: Russia 

wants to destroy the EU," The Associated Press (dateline I~ March 20 17_ at 

E. Graham, .. Toward a Ne\v Equilibrium in U.S.-Russian Relations:· The lv"atwnal Jntere:••t. 

Februarv 20 17_ at http:JinatiOnalinterestorglfeaturettmvard-ne\v-equilibrin:m-us-mssian-relations-192g l 

'"See DimitarBechev, --The West Needs to Call Russia's Bluff in the Balkans," 23 Febnmry 2017, at 

http://'\'t/\\'\l/ .atl;mticcomldL org/b logs/llk:raineakrt/the-\vest -needs-to-call-russia-s-bluii-in-the-balkan.'>. 
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inherent in the transition to a n1arket economy caused most of the countries in southeasten1 Europe to go 

into an economic decline which lasted far longer and has been deeper than anything Americans 

experienced during the Great Depression in the 1920-sand 1930s_ 

To make matters worse_ many of the \Vestem Balkan countries had barely begun to recover from the 

decline of the 1990s when the global economic crisis of2008-2009 and the Greek debt crisis sent them 

reeling again. The migrant crisis of2015-2016 provided yet another shock to the region; indeed, in 

December 2015 Angela Merkel even claimed that war could break out in the Balkans if Europe did not 

handle the migrant crisis properly:~ 5 

A few examples of the bleak state of the Balkan economies provide a disturbing picture ofthe scale of the 

problem. In 2015_ Serbia's GDP was still25% below what it had been in 1989_" Bosnia & Herzegovina 

reportedly has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world-over 67 percent in20!6_27 Kosovo is 

similarly reported to have a youth Lmemploymcnt rate of over 60 percent, and in JUSt two months 

(December 2015-January 2016)_ some 50,000 people fled Kosovo 28 All of the states in southeastem 

Europe are literally bleeding medical doctors, engineers, and other professionals, as these groups-the 

very spark plugs any society needs to promote economic gro"ih-emigrate for better employment and 

financial opportunities. 

Clearly, maintaining political stability in southeastem Europe will be impossible without stabilizing and 

improving the region-s dire economic situation. Unfortunately, doing so will require an international 

commitment to reviving the Balkan economics even greater than was provided in the 1990s. By 2003_ 

Bosnia had received more financial assist:'lnce per capita than vvas allocated to any country in Europe 

under the Marshall Plan,''' and as of2006_ NATO countries had devoted 50 times more money to Kosovo 

per capita than to their efforts in Afghanistan 30 

The scale of the economic challenge we face in the Balkans is therefore clearly immense. But it will 

nevertheless be cheaper than the economic costs we would face if the region again devolved into 

violence. 

5 Adam \VithnalJ, ·'Refugee influx could spark ·militnry conflicf in Balkans. Angela Merkel \varns;· The 

independent (UK). 3 November 2015. at http://'\Y\"\\'/.illdependent co.llk/ne,vs/"\vorld/europe/refm~ee-in:flnx-could­

~]s._-nlllilaD: -conl1ici -in-ba1kans-angcla-rm;rkcl-\"'ains-a6 71 0521.lltrnl#1m.llcrv 6 According to Milojko ArsiC, "Long-term consequences of the collapse of the Serbian economy during the 1990s: 

the dynamics of potential GDP in the period between 1989 and 201s:· Quarterlv Monitor H (Janruny-March 2016). 

at: http://pescanik.net/wp-content/uploads/20 16/11/spot~4.pdf 

~., See the statistics on world youth unemployment rates compiled by the 'Vorld Banl.;:. available at: 

http:/ /data. worldbank.org/indicator/SL. U EM.152~ .ZS 

" All information according to Harriet Alexander. "'Exodus from Kosovo: Why Thousands Have Left the Balkans:· 

The (London), 21 2015, at 
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25456b-9.eps

Confronting the Islamist Extremist Threat in the Balkans 

Finally, one of the most serious threats confronting the Balkans (and, indeed, Europe as a whole) is 

the grm:v1h and spread of indigenous Islamist militant movements. 

The importance of the Balkans in the intemationaljihadi movement is e;ident from the frequency with 

which a Balkan cmmection can be made to almost every terrorist incident in Europe. Consider, for 

inst<mce, the following: Anis Amri_ the perpetrator of the December 2016 Berlin Christmas Market 

massacre. had been a roommate ofBoban Simeonovic, a Serbian-Gennan extremist 'vell-knmvn in 

Gennany 's jihadist circles. Among the individuals who have transited through or set up shop in 

southeastern Europe have been Abdelilah Himich, the suspected ISIS mastermind of the November 2015 

P<Iris <Ind the M<Irch 2016 Bmssels <1tt<1cks 31 The man who took credit for the Janu<Iry 2015 ('harlie 

Hebda attacks, Nasser bin Ali Ansi, was a veteran of the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s and subsequently 

became a leader of AI Qaeda in tl1e Arabian Peninsula. Mourad Hamyd (a brother-in-law of Charlie 

Hebda attacker Cherif Kouachi), was arrested on the Turkish-Bulgarian border after making his way 

through the Balkans from Paris, apparently on his way to the Islamic State. The ringleader of the later 

November 2015 Paris atrocities, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, directed preparatory work for the attacks ±rom 

Athens_ and Salal1 Abdeslam, Ahmad al Muhammad (an alias) and one other suicide-bomber used the 

migrant's Balkan route to get to France_ Atatlirk Airport attack mastennind Akhmad Chatayev had been 

arrested in Bulgaria in 20 II, and Ansbach suicide-bomber Mohammed Dalecl had lived in Bulgaria in 

20 13_ Mirsad Bektasevi6, a Serbian-Swedish terrorist in,-olved in a 2005 plot to launch suicide-bombing 

att.:tcks against western embassies in Saraje\-0, \vas arrested in Greece en route to the Islamic St.:tte in 

January 2016. 32 

Indigenous Balkan e"-tremists have been plotting attacks of their own_ and developing their own ISISrecruiting networks_ h1 December 2015, Italian and Kosovo police discovered a group of four Kosovars 

(some with reported links to Syria) plmming to kill Pope Frm1cis." In November 2016_ 19 individuals 

vvcrc arrested in Kosovo after the discovery of a plot to carry out a series of'·s:ynchronizcd terrorist 

attacks'' in Albania and Kosoyo_ tied to coincide with a World Cup qualifYing match played in Elbasan, 

Albm1ia. in which the Isr<Ieli m1d Albanian national Iemus were to play_ There were indications that in 

addition to attacking the Israeli national team. the conspirators \Yere also planning on attacking a number 

11 See Sebastian Rotella, --u_s_ Identifies ISIS Plmmer in Attacks on Europe:- ProPub/ica, 22 November 2016 

GJtms:/J-f\~CQ.Qublica.org!()nicle/us-id~J_ttifies-isi.2,:-.lliFJnner-in-atracks-on-europe). 

12 For more infonnation on these individuals and their activities. see. for instance. Mariya Cheresheva, '"Bulgaria to 

Send Terror Suspect to France." JJalkanlnsighl. 17 August 2016 (http:!/vt \\ V\.balkaninsiglu.com/cn/aruck!bu1gminto-c:\1mditc--chatlic-hcbdo-P.t_t1l_ckct~.:-.r£1DtiYc-to-fr~£:flS-lf-20! Oj: Chris Morris. ""Paris attacker's escape from 

Athens_" BBC Selt's_ 8 December 2015, (http/lwww_hbc.com/ncws/world-enrope-350~58~9)~ "20 15 Paris Terror 

Attacks Fast Facts."' CN_N.cmn. 13 April2016 (ltHn:~L\11:.' \~_,_C_I_!Jl"(,:Qll1/2JlL)/J 2J_(_)_8/~HIQQ~/29_l;;_-p_aJj_~-.1~IT.Q.I-~th1s;:l~s.­

fnst-fnclst);Mmiya Chcresheva. "Fraud Left Ansbach Bomber Homeless in Bulgaria;· TJalkanJnsight_ 27 July 20 16_ 

lhttv: I /\V\Y\V .lJ;Jlkanin1iig}_1t. co nL1e n/article!fmud-left -ansbach-bombc r -homeless-in-lmlgarig_-0'7-?.J-2 0 lQ);Mariya 

Cheresheva, "Bulgaria Istanbul Terrorist Mastermind," Ba/kanlnsight. I July 2016 

See Steve Robson, "-Jihadist plot to kill Pope Frm1cis thwarted as police arrest four Kosovans with links to Italy_" 

The }.Jirror (UK), 3 December 2015 at lmJL.:_{/'y'nY.mjiTQ.LC..9.nk/ne"-rsllvorld-nelP3Li!hadi:.1.:!2.l9J::kill.:QQ[le-fmD95..: 

69~7979 
42


25456b-10.eps

of Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries across Kosovo 34 In January 2017, 800 Austrian police 

launched raids in Vienna and Graz against a Balkan-based Islamist network linked to Ebu Tejma, an 

extremist cleric from the Sandzak involYed in the recruitment of over 150 ISIS Yolunteers.35 In March 

20 17, !tal ian police arrested three indiYiduals from Kosovo plotting to blow up the Rialto Bridge in 

Venice. One of the individuals had been to Syria, and the group had studied ISIS instructional Yideos 

intended to train people in bombmaking techniques and how to stab people-" 

Apart from being the natural gateway and thoroughfare for jihadis intent on attacking Europe, the 

Balkans have also become a significant source ofmanpovver for the Islamic State and/or the AI Nusra 

Front. Official estimates suggest that approximately 1000 indiYiduals from the Balkans have joined the 

Syrian and Iraqi jihads,37 and it is widely belieYed that Albania, Bosnia and KosoYo haYe provided more 

jihad volunteers per capita than any other countries in Europe.l' Sewral dozen individuals from 

Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and other Balkan states haye also become jihad yolunteers. 19 

Comparing these numbers with extremist mobilization in the EU reveals the worrying leYels to which 

militant Islamism has grown in southeastem Europe. The Soufan Group. for instance, has estimated that 

western European (i.e .. EU countries) with a total population of some 510 million people. have proYided 

some 5000+ jihad volunteers 40 By way of comparison, the western Balkan states (i.e., Albania, Bosnia & 

Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro. and Serbia) with a combined population of some 20 

million, have provided some 1000, which suggests that western Balkan countries are generating four-to 

±ive-times more jihad volunteers per capita than EU states. 

Analysts across the region. however. suggest that the real number of Balkan jihad Yolunteers could be 

significantly higher than official figures. Some estimates claim that Kosovo alone may have provided as 

'"See "Kosovo Arrests 19 ISIS-Linked Suspects Plarnring Attack on Israeli Soccer Team" The Jerusalem Post, 17 

See Eleanor Rose, "Austria Cracks Jihadist Network Linked to Balkans,'· Balkanlnsight. 26 January 2017. at 

brtp:/''\Y'i-Y'\V .halkaninsightconven/m1ide/seY~ntl-balkan-iihadJ sis-detained -in-large-scale-tenor -raids-0 l-26-20 17-1 36 Sec Elisabcta Povolcdo. "3 Arc Held on Suspicion of Piotto Bomb Rialto Bridge in Venice," The .\!m York 

T1mes. 30 March 2017. at .h:r.tni://inn·'J nvtil~.:Sf£!..!JlLlQJ7/01/10/vmrld/e_ll!:Q.m';/rialto-bJjdP:e-ve~lli:.l2: 

unests.html" r=O. accessed on 31 March 2017 at !O:OOam EST: Nick Squires. "Italian police brealutp alleged 

jilmdist cell tlmt plarmcd to attack Venice's Rialto Bridge.'' 1he lidegraph (UK). 30 March 2017. at 

bn.p:/J,,vmY.:..~~-h.co.nk/neyrs/20 J 7/0~/30/itali3n-poliG~.:hr.Ellis.:ill.!§ged-jihadist-crll_:lli!Jl1lled-;lttag_~-',..enl~~ 

" Adrian Shtmri claims ""more than 1000'. indiYiduals from the Balkans have gone to Syria and lrdq; see Shtmri, 

""Dynamics of Radicalization and ViolentE,1remism in Kosovo:· United S'tate.•1 Institute (~{Peace S'pecial Report 

397 (December 2016), 2. Vlado Azinovic estimates 950 indiYiduals from the Balkans have joined the jihads in Syria 

and Iraq. Snijczarm Pavic. "STRUCNJAK ZA TERORlZAM U RAZGOYORU ZA JUTARNJI OTKRlVA 'U Siriji 

i Tmku bori se i scst Hrvata. 7\lljudi iz Bosnc i Herccgovinc vee je tamo poginulo','' .Tutarnji list (Zagreb). 27 

December 20 1 G (http://'i.\\Y'\V jutamji.hr/Yij estilsvij et/stnicn]ak -za-terorizam-n-razgovo:m-zc1-jmarnji -Dtkriva -u-siriiii:-.it~hu:-_bQrl::-~~:-l.-:~-~i.-lJI~ ~llil~ 7_0_-UuQ_i_-j_?~QSll~-i~b_t;_tcygm~h1~_-:_\:_ey_-Jc-_tQlJ1Q:PPBlnulgl_5fJ727:YJ 38 Sec the estimates by Thomas Hcgghammcr as cited by Frank Gardner. "Europe Could Feel the Backlash from 

Jihadist Conflicts," BBC' News <..hllp:/l\n·vtY.hbc.co.uk/ne\YSi\YOild-middle_:east-2-ll_li,l_?i.[). See also the info graphic 

entitled "foreign Fighters in lmq and Syria .. '' Radio Free HuropeRadio Liberry .. 29 Jcmuary 2015. at 

ht tp:/ln \Y\\ . rfcr! .org/contcn! info gmphics/info gr;1 phlcs/265R-I-9-J.O. ht ml 39 Predrag TomoviC, "VehabUe na Balkmm sn izmanipulisane.-- Radw ,\7ohodna HFropa. 1 June 2013 

(http:i/Yi'">V'I.Y slobod.Im.eYropa.org/coutent/vehabije-na-ba1kmu-izmanipuJ.isane/25003930.ht:ml). 40 Jloreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment qfthe Plow (?fForetgn Fighter.<;,· into ,\~vria and Iraq (The Soufan 

Group. December 2015). 
43


25456b-11.eps

many as 1000 ISIS recrnits"1 and Albanian security specialist Ilir Kulla has suggested that the number of 

jihad volunteers fi-om the region could be '·in the thousands'' if one includes individuals fi-om the Balkan 

diaspora"' Aida Skompan, a Montenegrin joumalist tracking the Tslamist extremist movement in her 

country, believes the number of Montenegrin jihad volunteers is significantly higher than the estimate of 

thirty or so individuals usually used." 

Unfortm1ately, these munbers are only the tip of the extremist iceberg in southeastem Europe. As 

security specialist Adri<1n Shtuni h<1s noted. the B<1lbn jih<1d volunteers going off to Syri<1 <1nd Iraq 

constitute ··merely· a fraction of an extensive net\vork ofhke-minded milit:1nts. supporters, and enablers 

who not only openly share the same ideology. but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and 

recmitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks.""4 

Although hmd data on the actual size of the Balkan militant Islamist movement is difficult to come 

by, one indicator of the pool of individuals psychologically and politically predisposed to ISIS· message 

and activities can be seen in the results of the Pew Resemch Center's 2012 survey of Muslim public 

opinion around the world-"5 Although in general the Balkan Muslim populations can be seen as the most 

moderate and tolerant Muslim societies in the world. nevertheless a cluster of questions within the survey 

provided disturbing evidence of the progress of radicalization within the Balkans. Thus, in response to 

questions on the desimbility of imposing sh<1ri<1 law. on support for suicide bombing <1nd other fonllS of 

violence, on support for public whippings and cutting off the hands of alleged thieves, on stoning accused 

adulterers to death. on imposing the death penalty for apostasv, and on the moral acceptability of 

polygamy ----- some 400,000 people across Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo expressed their support for all of 

these things.ln the Sandzak, a May 2016 survey found that twenty percent of those interviewed believe 

that the use of violence is legitimate to defend one· s religion, eleven percent believe it is acceptable to go 

to a foreign com1try to wage war, and over 35% claimed that there were individuals or groups in their mea 

who express extremist positions 46 Such numbers suggest that some five- to ten-percent of the Balkans' 

Muslim populations have become mdicalizcd. Although not all of these people should be considered 

active threats. they do, to paraphrase Mao Zedong, provide the proverbial sea terrorists swim in. 

The Balkans also play an important role in the European terrorist threat matrix as a source of 

mmaments. Thanks to the Yugoslav wms ofthc 1990s and Albania's ncar-meltdown in 1997-9S.jihadis 

'

11 David Phillips. "lslamisminKosovo,''1he WorldPosl. 21 Dcccmbcr2015 

QJ1illj/www.huffingtonQQ.s1 CQm!cbvj!i:!::Jlhl!Jills/isl"mism-in-kosovo b R8:"5128.html). 42 Kamil Arli. "Albarrian E,;pert: Turkey Waypoint for Balkan Jihadists." Today 's Zaman. 19 July 20 I~ 

(http:/h.vY{\V todJYS7.J_m<Jq"'"~-vm/interviy\vs a!~m.1i.!l.!l:~Yrt -hlrkey :111!YPOint-for-h-1)kan-j ihadists 3_21-1. 77 .h!DJJ). 41 See Aida Skompan's comments as cited by Petar KomneniC, ··crnogorske vlasti najavile reak:ciju nak:on vijesti 

RSE o odlasku na st.rana mtiSta," Radio S'lobodna Hvropa, 18 September 2014 

W1m1bvvvw.slobodmcvropa.omicomcllJ/dobro:.-oljci-iz-c.mc-gorc-u-i&rii.tl-l!:nJm.:.!:lfl2t:r..9l@Y!1ill_:!13koJH;ijc~tirst'i26592-IGG html); Dejan Penmicic. "ANB drii na oku diihadiste iz Cme Gore." Vijesti. 20 September 201~ 

04W:ibx_w~-L~ti~5ll,m_t;/y_ti~~lii~H!b_"::dr:tl:ua~pJtt-_d{,_i_b~disJ~--i.?_-_!;fHf;_:gQ£~_-79(~(~:4(l): Samir KajoSeviC. "U ISIL otiSlo tri 

pula vise dr/.avljana Cmc Gore." Vijesli. (no dnte given. but appears to be September 20 I~) 

(http://\:tlDV_t,.ijesti.me~hl!fu-isi1-otislo-tri-puta-Yi~~.drz;ill.l.LaruJ-crne-l!ore-8-J.3389); Dusica Tomovic, 

"Monteneh'fO to Keep Tmck of ISIS Threat." Balkanlnsighr. 21 July 2015 

(hltn://1\-\V\\' .balkrminslghccom/cn/artidc/mon!cncgro-on-guard-aftcr-isis-thrc;.llo;o). 4

-1- Shtuni, .. Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo,'· p. 2. 

" See l'he World's Muslims: Religion, Politics & Society (Washinh'lon. DC: Pew Research Center. 20 13). 46 See the smvey conducted by P~f Dr. Vladimir TliC, .. \,'tal'r)l'i .Hladih u Sandiaku: Koliko Su Af!adi Otvoreni 

Prema Js/amskom Ekstremizmu (Beogmd: Helsinski Odbor za Ljudskn Prdva u Srbiji. May 2016). 
44


25456b-12.eps

can obtain practically vvhatever \Veapons they might \Vant in southeasten1 Europe-s black market anns 

bazaars. A rocket launcher and ammunition used in the C'harlie Hebdo attack in January 2015 were 

manufactured in the Balkans. and guns used in the attack on the Bataclan Theater in November 2015 were 

AK-47s produced by Zastava of Serbia. Guns and ammunition used in the March 2016 Brussels attacks 

have also been traced to the former Yugoslavia, and Balkan arms smugglers have in some of these cases 

been implicated in helping the terrorists obtain their weapons"7 In July 2016, an Albanian couple was 

arrested on suspicion of providing weapons to Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlcl, the ''ISIS soldier" who killed 

84 people in a truck attack along Nice's seaside promenade." l11ere is also cause for concem due to the 

fact that the hundreds offoreignjihadis who remained in Bosnia a±lcr the war V\ere never forced to give 

up their weapons.4

'J Balkan vveapons and an1n1unition go in the other direction as ·well. Annament 

Research Services (ARES) has ±ound that 17% of the anmumition used by ISIS in parts of Iraq come 

from the Balkans 50 

What should be of particular concern to western intelligence and security organizations, as security 

analyst Ebi Spal1iu has warned. is the degree to which Balkan militant lslan1ists can (or have) established 

ties with southeastern Europe· s ±1ourishing organized crime networks, which are amply skilled in human 

trafficking, and drugs and weapons smuggling51 Indeed, given the current state of the Balkans it would 

not be difficult to put together all of the elements needed to make everyone-s nightmare scenariolslamist terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons-come true. At least three times over the past five years, the 

FBI has helped to thwart efforts to sell nuclear and radioactive material in Moldova. 52 We have been 

lucky so far, but the combin<Ition ofwe<Ipons-gmde umnium on the bbck m<Irket. org<Inized crime groups 

skilled in smuggling, weak_ unprotected borders, and terror groups with known ambitions to acquire 

nuclear weapons should be a loud wake-up call to every·one concerned. 

Conclusions 

4

' ·'Serbia makes its biggest arms haul inl6 years," BBC Nell's. 16 November 2016 

(littp://www.bbc.corninews/world-europe-379~88<!5). Lindita Arapi, "The Balkan route to Westem Europe for 

Yugoslavia guns.'' TJeutsche Welle. 5 November 20 15JL!llg•Ji!:cll!cUl~~'l[!!L£!!1ll!£:!1!l!bill,~illU'-:llt:l\~~,P:t9Jilllr£.:: 

f~l[::Il.!£OS1~DJ:W1Sia-l_fi3_9_6MQ): Adrian Schutnni. 

Recmitment". JVFR ll"eekend }."dition Saturda.J', 28 May 2016 (http:!/\nv"\v.upr.org/20 l6/05/28./479X24670/theba!Lmrs-an::9Jlcr:-ovcrl2_okcd-hoibed-for-isis-n;£!lli!llJCnt): Gordon N. Bardos. "Clmlic Hebda• The Balkan 

Connection:· World Affilirs, ~ Febmarv 2015 (http)/,ww.worldaffairsjournal.orglblog/gordon-n-bardos/charliehebdo-balkan-collllection). 

48Susannah Cullinane and Margot Haddad, "2 arrested in connection "\vith Nice attack," CV-V.com, 17 July 2016 

(http:i /v•t'i\''" .c:nn. com/2 0 l !)/07 I l 7 /europe/fmnce-attack -on-nice-arrests/). 

'

19 Ljudnrila Cvctkovic, !vlarija Anmulovic, and Vlado Adnovic, "Rcakcijc na lmpScnjc vchabija u Novom Pazaru," 

Rodin Slohodno l'vropa, 19 March 2007 Uilll2JiJimY.>].Ql2£>gmcwona.o]g/;]L(i9R8_68.html). 

"·'The Balkan am1s trade• Ask not from whom the AK-47s flow.-- The Economist, 16 April201G 

Ebi Spahi.u, '":rvfilitant Islamists, Organized Crime, and the Balkan Diaspord in Europe,"' Jamestmrn Foundation 

'l'erroris1n .!.Honitor 13 (2 December 2015) (https://imnestm'Hton:iprogrmn/nrilit.tnt-islamists-organi.zed-crlme-andthc-bnlkan-diaspora-iiJ-curopc:'). 

52 Kathv Gilsinan, "Why Moldova Might Be the Scariest Place on Earth." The Atlanttc. 8 October 2015 

(ltttp://\Y\V\V.theatlautic.conu'intenmtional/nrcliivc/20 l5/l0/moldova-nuclear-\veapons-isis/4-09.f56/)~ Evan Perez, 

Michael Martinez and Cosmin Stan, -·FBI helped thwart nuclear smuggling plot in Moldova:· L'7v7vT.com, S October 

2015 (lrt1pJiwww.cnn.cmn/?015-'l0/07ipolitics/!bi-heiped-thwart-nuclear-smug:gling-plot-in-moldoYai). 
45


25456b-13.eps

Mr. Chainnan and n1embers of the committee, thank you once again for inviting me to share son1e 

thoughts with you on the current situation in southeastern Europe. I apologize for providing such a bleak 

assessment but empirical and political reality is such as it is. Nevertheless, there are steps the U.S. can 

take to try to stabilize the situation. 

First. we need to take every step possible to maintain political and strategic stability. This requires us to 

work with major pmvers such as Russia and Turkey, alongside EU and NATO cmmtries, to exert pressure 

on all regional actors to act responsibly. and to foster a security environment in which local politics can 

play out peacefully. U.S. diplomatic time and energy in this situation is best senred by engaging other 

major po\vers into legitimizing and enforcing a new political and security order in the Balkans. The 

history and experience of the past two decades has shown that attempts to micro-manage the political 

affairs of individual countries are ineffective, and frequently counter-productive. Far too often, our 

political projects and political ambitions in the region have not aligned with the reality of the region's 

political culture and traditions. 

Above all. we must strive to avoid turning southeastern Europe into another front in the New Cold War. 

In the current political and media climate, this will not be easy. Yet I would draw on one historical 

example to show the necessity of this even in the lowest points of the relationship between the United 

States and Russia. In the early 1980s, even in the midst of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 

imposition of martial law in Poland, one ofthe great American statesmen of the 20'h century, W. Averell 

Harriman, was urging President Reagan to continue to pursue nuclear arms control agreements with the 

Soviets because the stakes for all of humanity in the U.S.-Soviet relationship were simply too high. In this 

spirit, we need a balm1ced, infonned. m1d dispassionate m1alysis of what is really happening in 

southeastern Europe. As Harriman himself put it, "To base policy on ignorance and illusion is very 

dm1gcrous. Policy should be based on knowledge and understm1ding.'' 

Second, apart from maintaining political stability. the U.S. must lead an effort to revive the Balkan 

economies. Absent an improvement in southeastern Europe's dire economic situation, it will be 

impossible to sustain political stability in the region. 

Third. we need to shut down the threat posed by the spread ofTslamist terror networks in the region. 

Inattention to this problem has given these groups the operational space m1d time needed for them to 

grow, and to use the region as a recmiting ground and launching platfonn for attacks around the world. 

Individuals involved in the attack on the USS Cole, the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid Train bombings of 2004, 

the Istanbul attacks of 2003, and countless other attacks had all operated in the Balkans in the 1990s. If 

we had been paying attention and taken action back then. there is a good likelihood that AI Qaeda would 

never have become the global threat it eventually turned out to be. 
46

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

Joe? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI, 

FOUNDING PRESIDENT, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC 

LEAGUE (FORMER MEMBER OF CONGRESS) 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We were here 2 years ago. You had a wonderful hearing, and it 

was mainly on Kosovo and Macedonia. 

And you can see the photo all the way to the—it is being blocked 

by the fellow from Voice of—excuse me. The chair, could you move, 

please? 

There is Mr. Ziadin Sela with you 2 years ago being greeted after 

the hearing up there, surrounding by his family and friends from 

where he was the mayor of Struga. He was announcing that he was 

now going to embark on an impossible task of reforming, politically 

reforming, the state of Macedonia. 

Two years later it was Ziadin Sela and his party that was able 

to meet the qualifications of the mandate. And under the constitution, as bad as that constitution was, and other European law naturally, he had to be given by President Ivanov the right to form 

a government after the ruling party, under the strongman Mr. 

Gruevski, was not able to. 

So, you were right in your comments before. He was able to get 

a coalition of parliamentarians, Slav and Albanian, to be a majority 

and form the government. 

When he was supposed to form the government on September 

27th, look at the result. There he is in a hospital bed. Right below 

you will see his face bloody. He is being pulled out by a thug. 

And just to show you how big these Slav thugs that were hired 

by Mr. Gruevski, take a look at this right here, the guy with the 

beard. He is one of them. 

That was the beginning of the melee. What happened on the 

27th was Gruevski’s attempt to be sure that there would be no reforms, that there would be no new government, because he knows 

how high his crimes are and he is afraid to be prosecuted and put 

in jail. So, he must keep control. 

So, what you heard today is like we heard from Mr. Milosevic so 

many times when we were able to get hearings here. The day of 

the hearing they released prisoners. They did this; they did that. 

So, just today, because our Civic League has advertised this, has 

told the world that this hearing was going to be really important 

for Macedonia—and in this room I daresay that 90 percent of the 

participants are ethnic Albanians from Macedonia whose families 

are still there suffering. They came one from Alaska, many from 

Chicago, two from Iowa. They are here because they wanted to 

show you their concern, just the way the Kosovars did many times 

when we had those hearings. 

But look at this. Now he is being pulled out here. Look at the 

blood on his face. He was given up for dead. Now the only reason 

he is in that hospital bed is that there was a security guard, the 

only Albanian hired by the Macedonian Government, to show you 

the economic discrimination in this country. That Albanian security 

guard realized that he was not dead; he was still breathing. They 

47

walked away from him. He took him and put him in a room, hid 

him until the place cleared out. Then, he was delivered by an ambulance or an armored car to the hospital. 

Ziadin couldn’t come here. He wanted to be here, but I was naive 

in thinking he could. He has had so many concussions. If you look 

at the picture, you are not just seeing dry blood; you are seeing 

pummeling, constant fists to the face and to the head. They were 

there to kill him. 

They advertised this weeks and weeks in advance, that this man 

was an enemy of the state. It reminds me of what Milosevic called 

me, an enemy of the state. They called him an enemy of the people. 

This is a signal to UDBA or the security forces to eliminate that 

person, and that is what they tried to do on September the 27th. 

They went 21⁄2 hours. They put the uniformed police outside. 

They only came in after 21⁄2 hours when they thought they had 

beat up everybody and killed Ziadin, only to find out that he was 

put in the hospital, resuscitated. 

His doctor, Arben Taravari—Arben, stand up for just a minute—

is right here. He flew in. He is a neurosurgeon. He had operations, 

but for 1 day he said, ‘‘I have to come here and at least take 

Ziadin’s place and let people know that this man is going to come 

back to reform the government.’’

So, what do you make of today? This is not going to continue. 

Whatever Ivanov did, it is not going to last. It is too dangerous for 

Gruevski to have a new government. 

You have to remember, Mr. Chairman, 20,000 audiotapes were 

made public by the Slav opposition of Mr. Gruevski, Mr. Zaev, 

whose party now—I think it is LSDM—is in coalition with the 

party of Ziadin Sela. 

He is not going to allow that coalition to go forward because he 

knows everything has been publicized. The only answer to 

Gruevski to those wiretaps was, ‘‘Where did they come from, some 

foreign thing?’’ He won’t deny them. 

And you can’t believe what some of these wiretaps say. And also, 

I mean, what they say are things like, ‘‘Those Albanians that we 

set up in this Monster case.’’ And you know what? They have long 

jail sentences. They couldn’t adequately defend themselves. They 

were set up. They were not even guilty, but now they are in long 

prison sentences. 

You have Knova when they set up this phony operation and 

called it the Albanians from Kosova coming into military action. 

They were actually hired by Slavs to do that for an excuse to go 

further in their opposition or their repression of the Albanian people. 

Where did this all start? You said that the country of Yugoslavia 

disappeared, disintegrated in 1991-1992. Somehow the Government 

of Macedonia slipped in with no opposition as an independent state 

in 1992 with an old-type constitution under the former Yugoslavia. 

And when they formed the state, it clearly says this is a state for 

Macedonian Slavs. They don’t mention Albanians. They don’t mention Bulgarians. And by the way, there is no majority in this state. 

One-third Bulgarian, one-third Albanian, and one-third Macedonian Slav. That is the kind of state it is. 

48

But the Albanians have practically no rights whatsoever. Five 

percent or less of the Serbs in northern Kosovo have much greater 

rights, including language rights, than probably 40 percent of the 

country or let’s say at least 35 percent of the country in Macedonia. 

So, what is here for Albanians? 

We should have had a solution to this 16 years ago to stop the 

violent conflict between the Albanians in Macedonia and the Slavs. 

We guaranteed with Europe something called the Oher/Ohrid 

Agreement. Sixteen years have passed by and things have only gotten worse because Gruevski, like a racketeer, the way he is, he coopted the junior Albanian Party that came into office, and nothing 

has been done. 

So, one of the recommendations I am going to make to you is 

that we have to go forward with the State Department, the U.S. 

taking a much more active role in a framework to implement the 

rights of the Ohrid Agreement. We must get that constitution 

changed so that it codifies the fact that you have at least two major 

ethnic groups in this state that need equal rights, because there is 

nothing like equal rights. 

You talk about the economic discrimination and the political corruption against the Albanian people. It is monstrous, and just economic discrimination. Many jobs are given out in the government. 

If you have 33 percent and they were supposed to get up to 25 or 

30 percent on the Albanian side, they haven’t put 10; it is around 

7 percent, no jobs. The unemployment rate must be just like what 

is going on in Bosnia right now, the highest in Europe. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Joe, you have——

Mr. DIOGUARDI. May I put on the record—I have just summarized by comments. I want to read my full testimony on the record 

in writing. 

I would like to, then, put the interview by the person who saved 

Ziadin Sela, the Albanian security guard. I had it translated from 

Albanian to English. 

I want to put in some of the photos you haven’t seen, because 

when he was here 2 years ago he also met with Senator McCain. 

And hopefully, that will be done by the doctor before he goes back. 

And I want to put on the record this statement that I put on the 

record in 1991 when Chairman Pell was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in 1998 when Senator Biden 

was. It is the expulsion of the Albanians by Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. 

This paper is the modus operandi of the Slavs and the Serbs. They 

wanted to get rid of all Albanians. I have quoted it in my testimony. I want to put the entire document on the record, so you can 

see they are not going to give up on this. 

And two articles, sir, one from Mr. Foray, one of the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Joe, without objection, all that will be put 

into the record. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you did twice as much as everybody else. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DioGuardi follows:]

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Statement of Hon. Joseph J. DioGuardi 

President, Albanian American Civic League 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

"The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability" 

May 17,2017 

The e~•ents surrounding the brutal attack on Ziadin Sela as the leaderfor political reform in 

Macedonia 

On April 27, 2017, Tal at Xhaferi was elected as the Speaker of the Parliament of Macedonia. 

Those who supported the election of the new Speaker, the first Albanian to be elected to this 

position, were brutally attacked by deputies of the VMRO-DPMNE ruling party and their paid 

thugs and paramilitaries in an attempt to strike fear and terror in the minds and hearts of those 

bent on reforrning the corrupt Macedonian government headed by Prime Minister Nikola 

Gruevski, who has led the government like a criminal enterprise for the past fifteen years. He 

has totally controlled every part of the Macedonian government, including the courts, through 

bribes, patronage, and mafia-like zeal and tactics. 

For months, in advance of the horrific attack on April 27, Ziadin Seta, the Mayor of Struga 

and the head of The Movement for Reforms of the Democratic Party of Albanians, LR-PDSH 

(who was in coalition with Zoran Zaev, the head of the ethnic Macedonia LSDM Party and in 

opposition to the VMRO-LPMNE) was the target of an extensive propaganda campaign marking 

him as "an enemy of the people," who should be eliminated. The result was a truly shocking and 

brutal attack on Seta, in particular, by masked special police forces, who were allowed by the 

Macedonian government uniforrned police to attack the Members of Parliament for more than 

two hours without any intervention by police who were present on the scene. Ziadin Sela was 
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-2-

repeatedly hit in the head, knocked unconscious, and was presumed dead by the attackers, when 

he was pulled out of the melee with severe wounds by colleagues who then resuscitated him with 

medical help. (This can be clearly seen in the bloody photos of Sela on April 27 that l have 

enlarged for this hearing.) Mr. Chairman, using such terrible planned violence to instill fear and 

trembling to achieve political goals should quality the VMRO-DPMNE party for listing as a 

terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, as has been done for other political groups 

promoting terror. 

The VMRO-DPMNE party led by Nikola Gruesvsky represents a violent anti-Albanian 

movement in Macedonia. 

The VMRO-DPMNE led by Nikola Gruevsky is clearly a violent anti-Albanian political 

party, which has many convicted criminals as members, including Members of Parliament who 

were convicted of serious crimes, such as Jovan Tarculovski who in 2005 was sentenced by the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war crimes against one hundred 

Albanians during the armed conflict of2001 between ethnic Albanians and the security forces of 

the Macedonian government. Tarculovski is now a member of parliament for the VMRO. 

The current political crisis and economic chaos in Macedonia has very negatively affected the 

daily life of the large Albanian population, which is already subject to extremely high 

unemployment, especially among the youth. Tt is obvious that economic discrimination against 

Albanians is being used as an institutionalized instrument of ethnic cleansing of Albanians, much 

like the late Serbian dictator and indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic used in Kosova from 

1989 to 1999, until the United States led NATO to bomb Serbia and brought Milosevic to justice 
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in the Hague International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia. Milosevic was charged 

with "crimes against humanity"-crimes that are now being repeated by virulent Slavic racism 

-oand chauvinism under Nikola Gruevski's direction today. 

Looking at the deteriorating economic and political environment in Macedonia 

during the last fifteen years after the "Ohrid/Oher Agreement" was signed to settle the serious 

military conflict between the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, it becomes clear that the 

roots of the current conflict are primarily political, not ethnic. The current crisis is a struggle for 

power and financial resources by VMRO-DPMNE and Nikola Gruevsky, who refuse to 

peacefully transfer power to the Zaev/LSDM-Ied coalition, who were trying to form a new 

government on April 27 under a mandate legally allowed to them after putting together a 

majority coalition of MPs in accordance with the Constitution of Macedonia. The VMRO 

party's real concern is the fear of criminal charges that its leadership, including Prime Minister 

Gruevsky and the head of his Secret Services, will probably face once they are out of power. 

The potential of Russian involvement in Macedonia 

This raises a real possibility of Russian involvement in Macedonia since Gruevsky will 

welcome any Russian support to tum an internal political crisis into an interethnic conflict with 

regional implications since Macedonia is bordered by Albania and by Kosova, Greece, and 

Serbia. And, there is a real danger that Russia will use the vulnerable position of Gruevsky and 

VMRO to push for a full-scale ethnic conflict in order to strengthen its role in the Balkans. This 

possibility should be enough of an incentive for the United States and the European Union to 

respond to the chaotic events of April 27 as quickly as possible. Serbia has already signaled that 

it is preparing for the worst in Macedonia and will intervene to protect its national security. In 
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such a scenario, Russia can exploit interethnic hostilities to expand its regional influence by 

offering support to Macedonia and even to Serbia. 

-4-

The Oher/Ohrid Agreement is compromised by Skopje 2014 

VMRO's anti-Albanian rhetoric and ethnic exclusivity for ethnic Macedonians was made 

very clear in the creation by the Macedonian government of the Skopje 2014 pageant and 

construction of museums, government buildings, and monuments of historical figures from the 

region, while completely expunging Albanian identity from all literature, architecture, and 

symbols. VMRO-DPMNE did this, even though Albanians were the largest group or majority in 

Skopje from the 1800s until 1992, until many immigrated to Tirana, the capital city of Albania, 

after the fall of communism in Albania. Skopje 2014 is the most serious violation of the 

Oher/Ohrid Agreement, and it was made possible through the subordination to VMRO-DPMNE 

of its Albanian coalition partner, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), led by Ali Ahmeti, 

along with the silence and complacency of the United States and the European Union. 

The root.~ of Albanian racism in Macedonia can be found in the Former Yugoslavia 

On March 7, 1937 an internal domestic policy memorandum was presented in Belgrade by 

Dr. Vaso Cubrilovic, the mentor of brutal Interior Minister Aleksandar Rankovic and war 

criminal Slobodan Milosevic. The memorandum, entitled "The Expulsion of the Albanians, 

made ethnic cleansing and even genocide an "allowable" strategy to fulfill "the mass removal of 

the Albanians from their triangle" [Kosova, Macedonia, and Montenegro] as "the only effective 

course for us." 

On page 5, of the 19-page memorandum, which I am submitting for the Record, Cubrilovic 

states that, "The Albanians cannot be repulsed by means of gradual colonization alone; .. the 
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only way and the only means to cope with them is the brute force of an organized state, in which 

we have always been superior to them." And on page 7, "the mode of removal" is spelled out as 

-5-

follows "The mass removal of the Albanians .. is the only effective course for us .. to bring 

about the relocation of a whole population.. The first prerequisite is the creation of a suitable 

psychosis.. Therefore ... we must win over their clergy and men of influence, through money or 

threats to support the relocation of the Albanians ... , [and] agitators to advance this removal must 

be found.. Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus .. so as to make staying 

intolerable for the Albanians.. We should distribute weapons to our colonists.. There 

remains one more means, which Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, 

that is, by secretly burning down Albanian villages and city quarters [emphasis mine]. 

As someone who has been actively following the events leading to the disintegration of the 

Former Yugoslavia since 1986, as a US Congressman. and since 1989 as an advocate for 

Albanian human, political, and civil rights in the Balkans, it is clearer than ever to me since the 

events of April 27, 2017, that Nikola Gruevsky is following the racist, chauvinistic path of now 

deceased indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, which, if not stopped, will only lead to more 

interethnic tension and political violence in Macedonia, with dire legal consequences for all who, 

like Gruevsky, follow Milosevic's disastrous road that ultimately led to his death in a prison cell 

in The Hague and his worst fear, the independence ofKosova. 

Recommendations 

1) The United States cannot wait any longer for the European Union to resolve the political 

crisis in Macedonia, for the reasons given in this testimony, and must take a leading role 

now before Macedonia devolves into chaos and the political, financial, and humanitarian 
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cost of cleaning up the mess of a regional conflict becomes too much for the United 

States to bear. 

-6-

2) An immediate step to take should be the active commitment of the United States to the 

full implementation of the now fifteen-year-old "Oher/Ohrid Agreement" to ensure equal 

rights for the Albanian people of Macedonia. To accomplish this, the US Congress 

should establish an Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) Implementation Council. The 

lack of such a mechanism is one of the reasons that the VMRO-DPMNE was able to 

control the leadership of DUI, the junior Albanian partner in their coalition. 

3) The United States should call for codification of ethnic equality between Albanians and 

Macedonians in the Constitution because the current Constitution (1991) contains 

outdated post-Yugoslav provision that perpetrate a second-class, discriminatory status for 

Albanians in the Macedonia. 

4) The shocking April 27, 2017, attack on the Macedonia parliament by special police 

forces was enabled by uniformed police forces, who allowed it to go on for almost three 

hours without intervention. As a result of this and the refusal of President Ivanov to hand 

over the mandate to the proposed coalition of the SDSM, led by Zoran Zaev, with the 

ethnic Albanian parties (resulting in 67 MPs out of a total of 120) to form a new 

government, the United States and the European Union should immediately call for 

sanctions against Macedonia. 
55

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Serwer? 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., ACADEMIC DIRECTOR 

OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks. With 

permission, I would like to submit a written statement for the 

record and use a few minutes for just three key points. 

First, the countries of the region made remarkable progress in 

the 10 years or so after the NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995. 

But in the last 10 years, these past 10 years, the U.S. effort to pass 

the baton of leadership to the European Union has allowed slippage in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia. There are now 

risks of instability that could trigger a regionwide convulsion. That 

would reflect badly on America’s global leadership role, unravel 

three peace agreements, and cost us far more than conflict prevention. 

Second, those who say ethnic partition through rearrangement of 

borders would be a viable solution are playing with matches near 

a powder keg. Moves in that direction would lead to violence, including ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and even genocide. 

It happened in the 1990s and it could happen again. Mono-ethnic 

states cannot be achieved without a massive and expensive peacekeeping deployment. Ethnic partition would not only be violent, it 

would also generate a new flood of refugees and creation of Islamic 

mini-states in parts of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia proper. 

This was the main reason we refused to move borders in the 

1990s. Americans should be even more concerned about it today. 

The Islamic state and al-Qaeda have had more success recruiting 

in the Balkans than many of us thought possible, given the proWestern and pro-American attitudes of most Muslims in the region. 

Reducing Balkan Muslims to rump mono-ethnic states would 

radicalize many more. 

Damage would not be limited to the Balkans. Russia would welcome ethnic partition because it would validate Moscow’s destructive irredentist behavior in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 

Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbass, as well as give Moscow a 

stronger foothold in the region. It would also leave a geographic 

gap in NATO and the EU that we have long hoped would be filled 

with friends and allies. 

My third point is this: I see no serious alternative in the Balkans 

to the political and economic reforms required for each of the countries of the region to be eligible for NATO and EU membership. All 

want to join the EU, which, unfortunately, will not be able to begin 

admitting them until 2020 at the earliest. That leaves NATO membership as the vital carrot for reform except in Serbia. We need to 

do more to enable Balkan countries that want to do so to join the 

alliance, as Montenegro is doing right now. 

Let me summarize what this really means. In Macedonia it 

means Europe and the U.S. need to tell Greece it will be invited 

to join NATO once it reestablishes transparent and accountable 

democratic governance. 

56

In Kosovo it means ensuring Pristina develops an army designed 

for international peacekeeping that poses no threats to Serbs. For 

that, Serbia will need to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial 

integrity by allowing U.N. membership. 

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO members should tell Republic 

Srpska secession will gain no Western recognition or aid for it or 

any country it joins, including from the IMF and the World Bank. 

These and other suggestions in my written testimony would put 

the region back on track and prevent the peace agreements of the 

1990s and 2001 from unraveling. So, too, would ensuring that Balkan countries have access to energy supplies from countries other 

than Russia: Natural gas from Azerbaijan, LNG from the U.S., or 

eventually Mediterranean gas from Cyprus or Israel. 

Mr. Chairman, I have just outlined a substantial list of diplomatic tasks. If the administration commits to them, implementation might require an American Special Envoy. But a policy should 

come first, one based on maintaining current borders, preventing 

ethnic partition, and pushing hard for NATO and EU membership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

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Preventing the Unraveling of the Balkans Peace Agreements 

Testimony 

By 

Daniel Serwer 

Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies 

Hearing on The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability 

House International Relations Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe, Asia and Emerging Threats 

May 17, 2017 
58


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Introduction 

Recent news from the Balkans is alarming: demonstrator-initiated violence inside the Macedon ian 

parliament, an attempted coup in Montenegro, harsh words between Serbia and Kosovo, a declared 

intention to hold an independence referendum in Bosnia's Republika Srpska. Fears of renewed violence 

are in the air. Is the Balkans returning to the now dimly recalled but brutal wars of the 1990s? 

2 

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the Balkans region suffered the violent breakup of former 

Yugoslavia, including wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In 1995, the United States led a 

NATO air intervention against Bosnian Serb forces and subsequent diplomatic negotiations at Dayton, 

Ohio that ended the more than three-year Bosnian war. After unsuccessful negotiations concerning 

Kosovo, NATO intervened again, this time against Serbia in 1999. In Macedonia, U.S. troops joined a 

successful UN preventive deployment in the early 1990s, and the U.S. and EU in tandem conducted, with 

NATO backing, a successful diplomatic negotiation to end an Albanian uprising in 2001. 

This was the unipolar moment: Russia was weak, Europe operating on its own had failed, NATO was 

looking for its future role, the U.S. was strong and committed to defend what it regarded as universal 

human rights violated all too blatantly with ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 

even genocide in the Balkans. 

A decade or more of substantial progress in the Yugoslav successor states followed each of these 

interventions, due in part to explicit international community guidance and ample support. The EU in 

2003 pledged "unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries" and 

has backed the promise with major funding and extensive technical assistance. Slovenia entered the 

EU in 2004, Croatia in 2011. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are candidate countries 

currently negotiating membership, which will not occur before 2020 and perhaps not before 2025. 

Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania are NATO members. Montenegro soon will be. 

The West-ward march of the Balkans has however now stalled, especially in Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, 

and Kosovo. Bosnia finds itself handicapped with a power-sharing constitution Americans wrote to end 

its war; it now prevents functional and efficient governance, while the leader of its "Serb entity" 

(Republika Srpska) is threatening an independence referendum that would infuriate the country's 

majority Bosniak Muslim population. Macedonia is suffering a profound years-long political crisis that 

has revealed gross abuses of power and aggravated interethnic tensions. Serbia is drifting away from its 

EU ambition towards Moscow's political and military orbit. Kosovo, still living under a regime of limited 

sovereignty, has both internal problems with its Serb population as well as issues with Belgrade. 

Kosovo's youthful population is proving vulnerable to extremist recruitment and pan-Albanian appeals 

inconsistent with the bargain Pristina made with the West at independence: it would not be able to join 

any other country. 

External factors have greatly aggravated these problems. The United States has sought over the past 

decade to lower its commitments in the Balkans and pass the baton to Europe, which has greater 

interests in the Balkans and far stronger leverage to encourage political and economic reform in the 

region. But Brussels is distracted. The long recession in Europe following the global financial crisis of 

2008, the Greek financial crisis that ensued, the flood of Middle Eastern migrants into Europe through 

the Balkans beginning in 2015, and the Brexit referendum in 2016 have soured EU attitudes on 

enlargement. EU credibility has diminished dramatically} as has its leverage over Balkan politicians who 
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see imminent threats to their hold on power from the reforms required for membership but no nearterm prospect of joining the EU. 

At the same time, Russia has greatly increased 11hybrid warfare11 efforts in the region, seeking to disrupt 

progress towards NATO and the EU. Moscow is especially active among more ethnically nationalist 

Orthodox Christians in Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Montenegro. It has established a logistics facility 

in Serbia in the guise of humanitarian center, it sponsored a coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016, it 

finances anti-NATO and anti-EU politicians and protests throughout the Balkans, it has armed and 

trained nationalist paramilitaries, and it has greatly increased its Russia Today and Sputnik propaganda 

efforts throughout the region. The results are palpable: interethnic tension has increased, especially in 

Macedonia and Bosnia, and Serbia is drifting away from its European ambitions. Russia could seek to 

repeat its successes in creating puppet secessionist regimes in Crimea and Don bas in Bosnia's Republika 

Srpska, northern Kosovo, or even northern Montenegro. 

The wars in the Middle East are also likely to affect the situation in the Balkans, where Islamic State and 

other recruitment of radicalized Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo has yielded small absolute numbers but 

relatively large percentages when compared with their Muslim populations, which otherwise are 

markedly pro-Western and specifically pro-American due to the 1990s interventions. Some Balkan 

extremists are now returning to the region, acting as charismatic magnets and propagators of extremist 

ideology that threatens the region's democratic evolution. 

The Contingencies 

3 

Large scale, long-duration conflict of the kind the Balkans experienced in the 1990s is no longer likely, 

because none of the Balkan countries has sufficiently malign leadership, political support, or (except for 

Serbia) military capabilities to sustain such efforts. Instability and shorter1 more decisive military clashes1 

possibly using Russian trained and equipped paramilitary forces at least nominally not under state 

control, are more likely. The consequences could include ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, 

challenges to existing state institutions1 border changes1 and further Muslim radicalization. 

The main concern for the U.S. in the Balkans would be unraveling of the American-induced peace 

settlements in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. All of them were based on the proposition that internal 

boundaries might be upgraded to international borders but no borders would be moved to 

accommodate ethnic differences. The five republics that seceded from former Yugoslavia have the same 

international borders as they had when they were part of the Yugoslav Federation. Only Serbia has a 

different border, because of Kosovo's independence, which left the existing boundary between the 

autonomous province and Serbia proper in place but upgraded it to an international border. This border 

principle led to the formation of fragile states that were all expected with peace to transition to fullfledged democracy providing Western-style protection and rule of law to ethnic groups that happened 

to be numerical minorities. 

While the sequence of events is unpredictable, events in any one of these still fragile states would likely 

precipitate problems in the other two. The region is interconnected: if Republika Srpska tries to leave 

Bosnia, Serbs in northern Kosovo will try to leave Kosovo and Albanians in southern Serbia will try to 

leave Serbia. If Macedonia is partitioned1 its Albanians will want union with at least Kosovo if not also 

Albania and the Albanian-majority municipalities of southern Serbia, which would trigger partition of 
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Kosovo and of Bosnia. Moving borders to accommodate ethnic differences would thus open "Pandora's 

box," leading inevitably to ethnic cleansing aimed at moving everyone to the "right" side of the border. 

4 

In Bosnia, Republika Srpska's president has promised an independence referendum in 2018. While 

international recognition is unlikely, withdrawal of Serb participation in Bosnian state institutions would 

paralyze them, as they are based on ethnic power-sharing that requires not only numerical majorities 

for decisions, but separate concurrence of ethnic caucuses. An independence referendum could 

precipitate a Bosniak military move to seize the northeastern town of Brcko, which links the two "wings" 

of Republika Srpska and is vital to its survival. Serbia would then have to decide whether and how to 

intervene (as it did in the 1990s with only a thin veneer of deniability) to sustain Republika Srpska. 

Albanian rioting against Serbs in Kosovo, much like what occurred in 2004, could precipitate Serbian 

military intervention to protect the Serb-majority municipalities of the north, perhaps even with NATO 

concurrence. Serb provocations-like the train with nationalist slogans painted on it that tried to enter 

Kosovo earlier this year-could trigger an Albanian effort to seize northern Kosovo. The likelihood of 

these contingencies will greatly increase once NATO, which will not stay forever, decides to leave. 

In Macedonia, Albanian or Kosovar paramilitaries like those who rebelled in 2001 (and appeared 

suddenly again in 2015) might seek union with Kosovo or Albania, generating pressure to repress the 

rebellion or to allow Macedonian paramilitary forces to respond. Skopje is the center of gravity for both 

Albanians and Macedonians, as it is the largest city in the country for both ethnic groups. Rioting or 

paramilitary clashes there could generate pressure for broader military responses. 

While Montenegro, soon to be a NATO member, may seem out of danger, Russian efforts to destabilize 

the new Alliance member will continue. Moscow has backed Serbs concentrated in northern 

Montenegro who were loyal to Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, resisted Montenegro's 

independence, and opposed NATO membership. Moscow is also courting Bosniak politicians in 

Montenegro, encouraging their contacts with the Chechnan leadership. 

None of these contingencies could be readily contained to one or even two countries without a massive 

commitment of international troops and resources. Prevention is the only viable option. 

Warning indicators 

Balkan politics is already flashing warning of possible future violent instability. Nationalist leadership is 

dominant in most of the region. Hate speech is common in Balkans media. Even if most people are 

primarily concerned with jobs and the economy, extremist Serbs, Albanians, and Macedonians make no 

secret of their loathing for each other and their willingness to return to violence, sometimes organizing 

militias or hate groups for the purpose. Some display intentionally provocative symbols and parade 

ostentatiously. Even a recent claim that Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Bosnian are dialects of the 

same language (a common view in the past) roused passionate nationalist objections. Anti-nationalists 

and human rights advocates are subjected to denunciation, harassment, petty violence, and worse. 

In Bosnia, the president of Republika Srpska speaks openly of secession, while prominent Croats 

advocate a "third entity" that would revive the wartime para-state of Herzeg-Bosna, which aimed at 

eventual union with Croatia. Macedonia's political crisis is due in part to an Albanian political platform 

written in Tirana under the tutelage of the Prime Minister of Albania. It would require Albanian to be 

spoken throughout Macedonia, which is a practical and political impossibility. In Montenegro, the 
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Russian-sponsored coup attempt was the tip of the iceberg. Moscow is expending substantial resources 

supporting anti-NATO and anti-EU politicians there and elsewhere throughout the region. In Serbia, the 

President-elect who helped unveil the Montenegrin coup attempt and ran as a pro-EU candidate is 

hedging his bets by maintaining Belgrade's strong links to Moscow. In addition to the existing Russian 

facility near Nis, Moscow wants a training center in the northern province of Vojvodina. Relations 

between Serbia and Croatia are strained, with Belgrade buying more weapons from Russia to try to 

match Zagreb's enhanced NATO-compatible capabilities. 

Additional warning indicators could include: 

Scheduling of an independence referendum in Republika Srpska 

More parading or exercises by armed paramilitaries of any ethnic group in any Balkan country 

Strengthening of pan-Albanian sentiment in Albania, Kosovo, or Macedonia 

Belgrade expanding cooperation with Russia 

Russian meddling in Balkan elections, especially in Montenegro and Macedonia 

Continued failure of Macedonia to form a new government 

Worsening of relations between Serbia and Croatia 

Implications for U.S. interests 

The Balkans are not a primary area of U.S. interests in the 2010s, but unraveling of the peace 

agreements there would nevertheless have a serious impact on U.S. interests, reflecting badly on its 

past achievements as well as its current global leadership role, and causing real harm to its interests in 

Europe and the Middle East. 

The big losers in the Balkans would likely be Muslims, who already generate a disproportionate number 

of foreign fighters in the Middle East. Partition of Bosnia would create one or more non-viable Islamic 

republics, likely under Turkish or Iranian patronage. Already in the 1990s the U.S. was concerned about 

the possibility that such rump Islamic states would provide platforms for international terrorists. 

Concern should be much greater today. Partition of Kosovo would likely further radicalize some of its 

notably young, growing, and increasingly religious Albanian population, which is mostly Muslim, even if 

many Kosovars are no more than mildly observant. 

5 

Transnational organized crime already has a substantial foothold in the Balkans, where drugs, people, 

money, and weapons flow without any barriers among criminals of different ethnic groups. The states of 

the region have begun to implement serious law enforcement measures, as they all need to do to 

qualify for upgrades in their relationships with the EU. Instability in the region would dramatically 

reduce the restraints on organized crime and unleash a wave of trafficking that would be a major 

challenge to existing state structures as well as neighboring European allies of the U.S. Kleptocratic 

politicians throughout the Balkans would be enriched. 

Russia is making major inroads in the Balkans, including through arms sales to Serbia. Instability in the 

Balkans would enable Russia to widen its foothold further among Christians, especially the Serb 

Orthodox, in the region. Moscow's influence would grow in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 

Republika Srpska, while America's stock throughout the region would decline sharply. NATO, which still 

has troops in Kosovo and is regarded as a guarantor of Bosnia's territorial integrity (even though the 

troops there now are under EU command) would be exposed as a paper tiger. Moscow, which already 
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cites Kosovo's independence as a precedent for its behavior in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, would 

treat any future partitions in the Balkans as post-facto validation justifying Russian irredentism in 

Crimea, Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. 

6 

In addition to the NATO members in the Balkans, the U.S. has close and productive military relationships 

with Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, which cooperate respectively with the Ohio, Iowa and Vermont 

National Guard contingents. The Macedonian army has fought under U.S. command in Afghanistan. 

Kosovo has no army yet but its lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is mostly U.S. and British 

trained. The Iowa National Guard will help with the process of upgrading the KSF to an effective, NATOeligible army. The Ohio National Guard connection is a major contribution to U.S. efforts to overcome 

past conflict with Serbia. 

The United States still has more than 600 troops in the Balkans (mainly Kosovo) as well as U.S. citizens 

who are likely to number in the thousands, including aid workers as well as dual nationals. Any 

instability could put both civilians and troops at risk. Violence in the Balkans also has the potential to 

spread to Croatia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria, which are all NATO members, in addition to causing 

refugee flows into the EU and eventually into the U.S., where there are already substantial communities 

of Balkan origins, especially in New York, Ohio, Missouri and elsewhere. Congress, which played a strong 

role in encouraging the U.S. interventions in the 1990s, would likely be concerned with any serious 

widespread instability in the Balkans. 

Preventive options 

Primary responsibility for preventing the worst in the Balkans belongs to the EU, which has stronger 

carrots and sticks as well as more immediate geopolitical, economic, and cultural interests in the 

Balkans. The Europeans have launched a Bosnian initiative aimed at political and economic (not 

constitutional) reform, but the conditionality on which its implementation depends has been erratic. 

Brussels has also sponsored a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo that has yielded concrete results and 

initially a much-improved atmosphere between their capitals, but there too implementation has lagged 

and major problems, especially Serbia's block on Kosovo joining the UN, remain. The U.S. has given 

ample support to the EU in its so far unsuccessful efforts to resolve Macedonia's ongoing political crisis, 

which has left the country without an effective government for two years. 

None of these EU efforts has proven sufficient to compensate for the declining lure of EU membership. 

The EU has already given away many of its carrots: all the non-member states in the Balkans have 

Stabilization and Association Agreements that provide market access and ample funding, most have visa 

waiver programs, and several have EU candidate status. NATO membership, which in the past has 

proven a stepping stone towards EU membership, is currently blocked for Bosnia (by its internal 

politicst Kosovo (because it has no army yetL Macedonia (by Greece, which claims Macedonia1s name 

and wants Skopje to give it up), and Serbia (which has not opted to aim for NATO membership). 

Future options include: 

Accelerate NATO and EU membership. Washington and Brussels could either remove obstacles to faster 

progress in EU and NATO accession or find other ways of increasing their impact on Balkan behavior. 

Montenegro's impending NATO accession is an important signal to the region that the door is not 

slammed shut, and NATO should continue to use its Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plans 
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to good effect. The U.S. could give more resources and visibility to its National Guard cooperation with 

Balkan states. The EU may want to create a new category of "associate" membership or something 

similar that brings Balkan candidate countries further inside the Union's decision-making process, 

without however the votes associated with full membership. 

Develop and use better carrots and sticks. While the EU has exhausted many of its carrots, the U.S. has 

not. It could consider bilateral free trade agreements with Balkan countries as a reward for meeting 

NATO and EU requirements. Or Washington could encourage the non-EU Balkans countries to form a 

free trade area among themselves, which could then negotiate a free trade agreement with the U.S. 

7 

The U.S. Treasury has "designated" some Balkan individuals, blocking their access to the U.S. financial 

system and preventing them from traveling to the U.S. because of the obstacles they pose to peace, 

security, and democracy in the Balkans. While this may have little immediate practical impact, the 

symbolism is important and has seriously affected the political calculations of at least some of those so 

designated. The EU has not consistently followed suit. It is vital that the U.S. and Europe act jointly in the 

Balkans against recalcitrant Balkan political leaders and their cronies. It would be particularly useful to 

prevent those who finance them, often with the proceeds of corrupt behavior, from accessing the 

European banking system. 

Beef up OSCE activities. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe still maintains a 

substantial pro-democracy network in Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia. 

This network is vital to the free and fair conduct of elections. Its resources could be increased to ensure 

that it delivers the other democratization assistance that these countries require, particularly in the 

media space. 

Improve relations among Balkan ethnic groups. In the more than 20 years since the end of the Bosnian 

war, little has been accomplished in improving people-to-people relations among ethnic groups in the 

Balkans. Transitional justice has focused on the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

former Yugoslavia, which has been slow and unconvincing in its pursuit of criminal justice despite more 

than 100 convictions. The Balkans could establish an official, region-wide truth and reconciliation effort 

like that proposed by the Commission for Recom, a regional nongovernmental organization that has 

documented war crimes and other violations of human rights. 

Enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts. In several Balkan countries there are distinct issues that might be 

resolved through enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts, which could require appointment of a special envoy 

responsible for mediating and resolving key hot spots in cooperation with the EU, in particular in 

Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. 

In Macedonia, the "name" controversy with Greece has caused a marked increase in ethnic tension 

between Albanians and Macedonians. U.S. pressure on both Greece and Macedonia to allow Macedonia 

into NATO as "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (as provided for in a 1995 Interim 

Agreement validated by the International Court of Justice in 2011) or as the Republic of Macedonia (its 

constitutional name) would require presidential-level engagement. Another possibility is to end the UN 

mediation effort, which has lasted more than 20 years and become unproductive, thus encouraging 

Athens and Skopje to deal directly with other on the issue. 
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8 

In Bosnia, the U.S. needs to encourage the EU to be much stricter in requiring implementation of 

political and economic reforms. Washington could also encourage the Europeans to move their troopsnow scattered in militarily insignificant numbers throughout Bosnia-to Brcko, signaling to both Serbs 

and Bosniaks that this center of gravity will not be allowed to fall to either. As Republika Srpska has let 

its plans for an independence referendum in 2018 be known, the U.S. and EU could prepare and 

publicize a vigorous planned response, including non-recognition and ineligibility of independent 

Republika Srpska, or any country it joins, for EU membership or loans from the International Monetary 

Fund or the World Bank. 

In Kosovo, formation of the army required for NATO membership is stalled due to Serb opposition, 

which stems in part from Belgrade's concern about how the army might be used. The U.S. could help to 

resolve this quandary by urging Belgrade to accept Kosovo UN membership, in return for an army 

designed not for territorial defense but rather for deployment on international missions. Serbia has 

preferred to put off the question of acceptance of Kosovo's sovereignty until just before EU accession, 

but that is a mistake since all the bargaining power then will be on the EU's side, not Serbia's. The U.S. 

could consider threatening NATO withdrawal from Kosovo unless Belgrade permits Kosovo UN 

membership and both Belgrade and Pristina fully implement all their agreements. 

In addition to these country-specific issues, enhanced U.S. diplomacy could focus on ensuring that the 

Balkans, parts of which are highly dependent on Russian natural gas imports, has alternative sources: 

Azeri, U.S. liquefied natural gas, or eventually Eastern Mediterranean gas from Cyprus or Israel. 

Counter Russian troublemaking. The U.S. could use its influence with NATO members to block or hinder 

Russian air and ground access to the Balkans, especially to its "humanitarian" base in Serbia if that is 

used for nefarious purposes. It could also use a portion of democratization resources Congress is likely 

to make available to beef up U.S. broadcasting and social media efforts in the Balkans to offer a more 

positive image of the U.S., EU, and NATO. 

Seek Russian cooperation in the Balkans. U.S./Russian relations are at a nadir. Cooperation in Syria or 

Ukraine seems unlikely, as Washington's and Moscow's interests there diverge sharply. The U.S. could 

seek to make the Balkans an experiment in cooperation with Russia, promising no further NATO 

expansion there if Moscow will stop its hybrid warfare efforts to destabilize the region and allow the 

states of the region to accede to the EU. 

Arrange for ethno-territoriaf partition of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The U.S. and EU could 

conclude that state-building in the Balkans within existing borders is impossible and embark instead on 

an effort to negotiate ethno-territorial partition of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, with the right of the 

resulting states to join neighboring states. This would require heavy diplomatic lifting on the part of the 

U.S. and likely also a deployment of thousands of U.S. and European troops to minimize the likelihood of 

associated violence. They would likely need to stay for that purpose for many more years, if not 

decades. 

Mitigating options 

The U.S. should be prepared 
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to sponsor with Russia and EU members a UN Security Council resolution condemning any 

outbreak of large-scale violence in the Balkans and naming/shaming parties that have 

contributed to it. 

to convene an emergency meeting of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia, the body 

that oversees the Dayton agreements, and 

9 

to redeploy some or all U.S. troops in Kosovo, and NATO troops from neighboring countries, to 

the north, to Brcko, to Skopje or any other location of instability to assist in reestablishing a safe 

and secure environment as well as warning off any perpetrators. 

Recommendations 

There is no viable alternative to Euroatlantic integration for the Balkans. The U.S. needs to act urgently 

to preserve peace and stability in the region, relying on the EU as the vital partner in the effort. Together 

they should 

Develop a new set of carrots and sticks for Balkans countries, including bilateral free trade 

agreements with the U.S., accelerated EU membership, and more effective European 

procedures for blocking indiviudals from traveling in the EU or utilizing its financial system. 

Jointly designate Balkan leaders who threaten democracy, peace and security. 

Try to develop with Russia an understanding that will reduce Moscow's meddling. 

Enunciate publicly a planned joint response to Republika Srpska's independence referendum. 

Establish a region-wide truth and reconciliation effort that would seek a common understanding 

of what happened during the conflicts of the 1990s as well as compensation for victims. 

Enhance OSCE democratization resources and activities. 

Consider redeployment of U.S. and EU troops to maximize their deterrent effect. 

The U.S. should also appoint a special envoy for the Balkans who would seek to resolve, in close 

consultation with the Europeans, country-specific issues: 

In Bosnia, constitutional reform aimed at creating functional and effective governments at all 

levels, including a state (central) government capable of negotiating and fulfilling the 

requirements for NATO and EU membership. 

In Serbia, an end to the Russian veto on Kosovo UN membership. 

In Kosovo, creation of an army that poses no threat to anyone inside the country and is capable 

of substantial contributions to international, including UN and NATO, missions. 

In Macedonia, transparent and accountable governance as a prelude to NATO membership for 

The FYROM at the next NATO summit. 

For the region1 natural gas and other energy networks that are economically viable and 

minimize dependence on Russia. 

The special envoy would also seek to ensure high-level U.S. Government visits to all the Balkan 

countries, several of which have been neglected in recent years. 

In addition, the U.S. needs to beef up its efforts to counter Russian hybrid warfare in the Balkans. This 

should entail a major commitment to Balkans media1 including television1 which would make it harder 

for Moscow to spread its propaganda, as well as willingness to block overflights into the Balkans by 

Russian aircraft. National Guard cooperation with Balkan countries should get increased resources and 
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10 

visibility. Only by showing determination will Washington get from Moscow the type of cooperation that 

could be helpful: Moscow's willingness to drop its veto on Kosovo UN membership as well as an end to 

Russian meddling in Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Promising no expansion of NATO 

would be a mistake, as it would signal weakness and seriously disappoint Kosovo and Macedonia, 

radicalizing Albanians and Macedonians in counter-productive ways. 

The fraying Balkans should not be allowed to unravel. The costs of preventing a reversion to violence in 

the region will be minimal compared to the costs of even minor instability, never mind a rearrangement 

of borders and state structures, which would require major U.S. diplomatic and military efforts. The U.S. 

should expect the EU to foot most of the bill for prevention, but renewed warfare could vastly raise the 

costs to the U.S. The time to act is now. 
67

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think you get the Golden Cup for being 

right on time. Okay. [Laughter.] 

I will start the questions and, then, we will move from there to 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Bardos, you have used for the first time the words that I 

know would eventually emerge, the words ‘‘the new Cold War.’’ I 

don’t know who wants it, but somebody wants war with Russia. 

And it is more than just a fear of Russia; somebody wants there 

to be a new Cold War. 

I have spent a considerable part of my life trying to defeat the 

Soviet Union, both in the White House and in the field against Soviet troops, et cetera. And I started, anyway, when I was a teenager. 

But the bottom line is that we don’t want a Cold War; the American people don’t want a Cold War. Yet, we have an unrelenting 

hostility that says that we have to watch out for even Russia’s influence on a region. I see no reason why Russia shouldn’t be able 

to sell energy to any country that it wants to or any country. I 

don’t see that as a hostile act to the United States. 

Let me just note, if we are going to solve this, we have got to 

move forward in a positive way rather than looking at this as some 

kind of we are going to do this, so just screw the Russians. That 

is not going to bring about a better world. 

But we know something needs to be done in the Balkans because 

it is not working. And just like you said, Doctor, when the EU took 

over, basically, some of the major leadership from the United 

States, things started going haywire. And it has continued to go 

haywire for the last 10 years. 

So, with that, why not make a different kind of approach. I think 

what is motivating us is there are some very powerful, monied interests in Europe that want to see the Balkans toeing the line that 

they dictate. 

What about encouraging these countries to form a new Southern 

European Economic Union together? They can’t call it Yugoslavia, 

but they can call it whatever else they want to call it. The bottom 

line is that, if you had open-borders type of free trade by these 

countries, it would be a tremendous benefit to them. So, instead of 

us pushing to try to get them to do whatever the German banks 

tell them to do in order to get into the EU, maybe we should be 

telling them, ‘‘Why don’t you start working together and opening 

up trade between each other and tearing down these boundaries, 

economic boundaries?’’ What do you think about that? Please, 1 

minute, we will start with Bardos. Start with Joe in the middle 

and, then, go to the right. Go ahead. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Okay. It is not going to work, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me tell you why. You have got such political corruption now in 

Albania, in Macedonia, in Kosovo, in Serbia. The rich are getting 

richer, and the poor are getting poorer. The people are not being 

served by these governments. 

I don’t know what is going to happen after the elections in 

Kosovo and in Albania. Nobody agrees on anything, apparently. I 

think that it is time for the U.S. to realize that, by abandoning the 

Balkans to the European Union, we have failed. The Ohrid AgreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Aug 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\051717\25456 SHIRL
68

ment was guaranteed by the U.S. and by the European Union. It 

did nothing. It is worse now than it was before. 

So, how could we look at normal ways of thinking to create an 

economy in Southeast Europe? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Got it, Joe, but now tell us your 30-second 

answer of your plan. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. The plan—and I hate to see these cuts for the 

State Department; it doesn’t make any sense—we need to be much 

more engaged than we are. We are fooling ourselves if——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What are we pushing for? 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. For instance, get Ohrid back on. It was signed 

off, but let’s have an ‘‘implementation framework’’ that we are monitoring very closely. Not saying, well, let the European Union do it 

and we will figure out what goes on later. 

So, we have got to take baby steps. This is not going to be solved 

very fast. The racism that exists from the Slavs to the Albanians 

is so great because of the paper I just mentioned: ‘‘We have got to 

get rid of the Albanians at all costs.’’ Basically, that is what this 

paper says. 

And that is one of the reasons why Milosevic went to The Hague, 

because we brought him to The Hague and made sure that paper 

was put on the record, so that they knew Albanians could never coexist in Serbia and in Kosovo with this kind of thinking. And now, 

Gruevski is doing it in Macedonia. 

So, I don’t know what the answer is. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let’s go to the doctor who may 

know the answer. 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, I won’t claim to know the answer. 

What I will tell you is that it is worth a look. I think we have not 

maximized the economic advantages of peace after——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And cooperation. 

Mr. SERWER [continuing]. After 1995 and 2001. 

These countries do have good access to European markets 

through their stabilization and association agreements. I think 

they have quite a bit of access to each other’s markets as well. But 

that is a proposition that would have to be studied in some depth 

and with some care. And I, frankly, haven’t seen such a study. 

Maybe, Gordon, you know. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Dr. Bardos? 

Mr. BARDOS. Well, it is a very commonsensical and logical idea. 

As a matter of fact, the current Serbian Prime Minister, soon to be 

President, Vucic, proposed something like that a few weeks ago, a 

kind of Balkan common market. 

The problem with it, I think a lot of the problem with it right 

now is political. Emotions are still too raw among the different peoples in the region. Some people think that Serbia will wind up 

dominating such an arrangement and they don’t want to see that 

happening. Some people think it might be like a recreation of the 

old Yugoslavia, and they don’t want that, to see that happening. 

I think there is something in place—and, unfortunately, I am not 

an economist, so I don’t know this in great detail—there is something called CEFTA, the Central European Free Trade Association 

69

or Agreements. I can’t remember all the specifics of it. Something 

like that does exist. 

I think a good step in this direction, though, would be to start 

promoting what might be politically possible, and to start promoting as many bilateral free trade agreements as possible, start 

opening up the markets that way. 

So, maybe, obviously, it might not work between Serbian and 

Kosovo now or between Kosovo and Macedonia, but if you could see 

something, you could see trade freeing up considerably between 

Serbia and Bosnia, for instance, or between Croatia and Bosnia, 

and permutations like that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We know something has to happen. The bottom line is that you have people suffering there economically. You 

have young people who have no hope of jobs. 

Mr. BARDOS. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have got people who are—when people 

lose hope, they turn to extremism. And the last thing we need, 

whether they are Christian extremists or whether they are Muslim 

extremists, we do not need them turning to their religion and becoming extremists and, then, joining in with others to commit acts 

of violence. And that is a real not only possibility; it has already 

been in your testimony. You mentioned that that is being seen now 

for not the first time, but it we are easing into a situation where 

that didn’t exist, and now it is becoming a part of the reality of the 

Balkans. 

So, we need to get moving. We need to be engaged. And I will 

have a very short closing statement, but Mr. Meeks has the floor 

now. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again. 

Interesting dialog. Let me just pick up where some are talking 

about. I know I will start with Dr. Serwer. In March 2017, this 

year, the leaders of Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia met. They all got together to, I guess, reignite 

this regional cooperation and reaffirm their shared interests in 

eventually joining the EU, if possible, and putting forward a plan 

for the Western Balkans. And I think they have planned another 

meeting sometime this year. I think it is July. 

So, my question to you is, do we, the United States of America, 

should we have an interest in these meetings, in these meetings 

continuing? Are these meetings a positive step that may lead to 

something or toward mutual cooperation? And if you think it is, 

how do you think the United States should support such meetings? 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Meeks, I am under the impression that the 

United States has given ample support to these kinds of regional 

arrangements which exist among the Defense Ministers, among the 

Interior Ministers, and also for regional, economic and infrastructure cooperation. There is, however, very little progress on regional 

infrastructure. The EU has promised a lot of money, but hasn’t 

really started the digging yet. 

I am under the impression that we have provided a lot of diplomatic support to those efforts. We don’t have the kind of bilateral 

assistance money that helps much in this game. We, frankly, have 

been out of the infrastructure game for the most part. We need to 

70

see the World Bank, in particular, and the European Union pick 

up the bills for roads, for railroads, and for airports in the region. 

I think it would have been better to have asked Mr. Yee, but I 

think he would say, ‘‘Look, we have been fully supportive of all the 

regional cooperative arrangements.’’ And they are quite successful, 

I must say. These guys meet all the time. 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Bardos, you mentioned that the new Serbian 

President talked about having a Western Balkans custom union or 

something of that nature. You mentioned that. Is that a good idea? 

Was that something that would help some of the economic instability in the region? Is that a step in the right direction? And what 

influence do you think that the new President of Serbia will have 

in the region? 

Mr. BARDOS. It is a very good. It is, as I said, very 

commonsensical, very logical, if it would reduce tariff barriers, 

make transporting goods easier, moving labor or capital, and so 

forth. It could be a spurt to economic development and activity in 

the region, and so forth. 

But, again, the problem right now at this point is political. I 

think there is too much—as I said, the emotions are too raw right 

now. People are still very leery about anything that looks like recreating Yugoslavia. And there is also the fear that this might be, 

the Europeans might be offering this in place of European Union 

membership. So, that is what a lot of people in the region are 

afraid of, too; that, okay, the Europeans have given up on taking 

the Western Balkans into the EU. So, this is kind of our consolation prize. So, you are getting a little kind of political and emotional pushback because of that as well. But it is a very good idea. 

Mr. MEEKS. Do you agree? 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. When you mentioned Radovan Karadzic, you are 

talking about the people that were wounded by Slobodan Milosevic. 

The biggest racist you are ever going to find, what he did, he got 

convicted. Well, he died in a prison cell because he didn’t take his 

heart medicine, but he was about to get convicted for war crimes 

and genocide against the Albanian people. 

What did Radovan Karadzic say recently? They signaled that 

they will definitely come in to support Gruevski, the guy that did 

this. And what they want is in an ethno-ethnic name; they want 

an excuse. They want to see the Albanians out so badly that they 

want to see an ethno-ethnic. Even though it is a political conflict 

and an economic problem, they want it to be ethno-ethnic because 

that would throw Russia in, and then, Russia would probably support, obviously, the Serbs. And it would be, again, a war against 

the Albanians. So, we have got to be very careful here. 

Mr. MEEKS. My last question. I see I am just about out of time, 

and I know we have got votes getting ready to come up. 

My other concern is Bosnia and its current troubles with its ethnic minority population, of course, and the corruption and its relatively weak central government. How can we encourage others in 

the region, the regional actors to better cooperate and to support 

an independent Bosnia? I think that is real important. Is there 

something that we can do, is there a role that we can play to help 

make that happen? Dr. Serwer? 

71

Mr. SERWER. Yes, in short, we should be encouraging Belgrade 

to do what it has any number of times said it would do, which is 

to be supportive of a sovereign and integral Bosnia. But much more 

is needed because we have in Republic Srpska somebody who has 

promised an independence referendum, who clearly is in violation 

of the Dayton Accords. We have designated him under our Treasury regulations. And we need to do more to ensure that he is not 

a dominant political force in Bosnia, if Bosnia is going to stay in 

one piece. 

The way to do that in my view is to talk with the Europeans. 

I mean, the Europeans have to be worrying. When we designate 

somebody using the Treasury’s powers, the Europeans, more often 

than not, do not follow suit. They use those tools much more sparingly than we do, and that has to do with politics inside the EU. 

We need to be getting them to follow suit. I think preventing Mr. 

Dodik himself and some of his people from traveling in and using 

the financial system of the European Union would be a very serious sanction. 

So, I think Serbia is ready in many ways to do the right things, 

but it is Europe that hasn’t done as much of the right things as 

I would like to see. 

Frankly, Bosnia is a problem because of the constitution that we 

wrote for the country and that they wanted for the country. It is 

very hard to change that constitution, but I have no doubt but that 

we will be having problems with Bosnia until it at least has a 

clause in its constitution that says the central government has the 

authority, all the authority it needs, to negotiate and implement 

the rules of the European Union. That would be my simple solution 

in Bosnia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, and I want to thank all of you for your 

testimony. I am simply out of time here, and I know that we have 

votes coming up and the chairman wants to do his closing remarks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Remarks. There you are. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I wanted to make a comment on that. Can I? 

Just one quick comment, please? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, yes, sure, Joe. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. You can’t trust Serbia. Mr. Dodik is taking his 

orders from Belgrade. Serbia wants at some point not only to have 

influence in Srpska, but to make it part of Serbia, the same thing 

that is going on in northern Kosovo. 

And listen, Serbia still has not recognized Kosovo. They want to 

become part of the European Union. Part of that was good neighborliness. What good neighbors are Serbs to Kosovo and Albanians? 

They have gotten worse, not better. So, you have got to watch out 

for Serbia. They are the bad man in the neighborhood, and you are 

not going to get them to change anything because the issue is not 

‘‘Greater Albania’’; it is ‘‘Greater Serbia.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that was an interesting last bit of testimony: Watch out for Serbia. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Yes. Am I right? [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well——

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Ask the Albanians. [Applause.] 

72

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My theory is watch out for bad guys. Listen, 

there are good people in every one of those ethnic groups that you 

are talking about. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are good people——

Mr. DIOGUARDI. You’re right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are good people who are Serbs and 

there are good people who are Albanians. There are good Muslims. 

There are good Christians. And what we have to try to do, if there 

is going to be peace, is try to seek out the good people in all those 

communities and say it is about time we get moving. We have stagnated enough. We have 20 years of going nowhere because we are 

only concerned about the bad guys over there and there are all the 

bad guys. 

The fact is that there are bad guys, as I say, in all of these countries, but there are good guys. And the good guys I think are capable of working together if the United States provides leadership. 

And we have to provide leadership with people knowing that we 

care about things like that. When you have people being beaten up, 

we care about that. And we have to be forceful and let people on 

the other side know that is unacceptable. And we also have to have 

some creative approaches. 

Let me just say that this idea, I don’t know, every time I have 

gone down to the Balkans, they seem to have the same concept: 

Let’s get a part, we have got to get a part of the EU, and we have 

got to be part of NATO. Well, this is like, ‘‘I’ve really got to get to 

the Titanic before it sails.’’ And, in fact, the Titanic has already 

sailed. ‘‘I’ll pay you to put me on the Titanic. Get me a rowboat or 

get me a motorboat and get me on that ship.’’

The EU is the past and it is not working. If we can come up with 

some positive solutions and have some energy and some excitement 

about really economic coalitions that work—let’s look back when 

things were really bad. And I can tell you, there were really bad 

guys in Germany in World War II, and we came along with the 

Marshall Plan. I have read about the Marshall Plan. Probably 

some of you, probably the doctor knows a lot more than me. 

But the Marshall Plan, what did it do? What was the most important thing it did? It made sure that all of these inhibitors to 

trade between their countries, the European countries that had 

been at war with each other, they got rid of those impediments, 

and they encouraged people to economically cooperate. So, that is 

what made the European situation better in the first place. 

None of that has been tried in the Balkans. I will tell you, Joe, 

if a lot of Serbs are bad, there were a lot of Germans that were 

bad at that time, and we made sure that we integrated them into 

a situation. And now, of course, they are calling the shots on the 

World Bank and a lot of other places. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Mr. Chairman, you made a very good point. The 

people are good; it is the governments that are bad. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. All right. 

Mr. DIOGUARDI. How do you deal with these corrupt governments? That is the problem. 

73

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it is up to us to make sure that we are 

encouraging the good people, and I don’t know, we do respect democracy. We do respect who gets elected and the rules of the game. 

Let me just say this committee paid a lot of attention to the Baltics. And as I say, as we got in the Baltics, I did not find the Russian military aggression everybody was talking about. 

And we have spent a lot of time in this committee going over 

Turkey, and Turkey has turned out to be the disaster that we 

thought it might be. 

And this subcommittee has held numerous hearings with numerous ideas going into this. I can assure you that now we are going 

to be focusing on the Balkans to try to come up with ways that we 

can actually work with people there, the good people there in all 

of these countries, try to find some cooperation, some areas of cooperation, and make it happen. 

So, with that said, you can count on us, this is just the second 

of a hearing series. We are going and there will be a codel, a major 

codel, just to the Balkans probably in August. We will visit these 

areas, and we would really be happy for any advice that any of you 

could give us as to who we would meet with there. 

So, with that said, I want to thank the witnesses and thank Mr. 

Meeks. We had a good one again. 

Mr. MEEKS. A good one again. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And this committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

May 10.2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfirlly requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to 

be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats in Room 2200 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http:/h,\'\V\Y ForeiJ.-rn;\ ffairs.housc.f!.ov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. May 17, 2017 

2:00p.m. 

T11e Balkans: 11lfeats to Peace and Stability 

Panel I 

Mr. Hoyt Brian Y ee 

Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

US_ Department of State 

Panel II 

Gordon N _ Bardos, Ph.D. 

President 

South East European Research and Consulting 

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi 

Founding President 

Albanian American Civic League 

(Former Member of Congress) 

Daniel Sen.ver, Ph.D. 

Academic Director of Conflict Management 

School of Advanced International Studies 

Jolms Hopkins Uni vcrsity 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ E_ur_op'--"_',_E_m_.,,_si_"'-"-"-" E_''_"_e'_'~~'_·u_g_r:_ru_·ea_t_s ---~HEARING 

Day Wedne.,day Date. ___ ~ftf.~~~v~1~7~,~2~01~7 __ Room __ 2~2~0'--0'--R==~~~~bl~ll~'''--'~ 

Starting Time 2:00pm Ending Time 4:16pm 

Recesses I____Q_J (~_to ___j (~_to ___j L_to ~-)(~_to~-) L_to ~-) L_to ~-) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Rep. Rohmbaclter 

Check all oftilejollowing tlwt app(v: 

Open Session CZJ Executive ~sell) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Reconl!lli...{taped) I:ZJ 

Stenographic Record i...{J 

Rep. Meeks, Rep. Cicil/ine, Rep. Duncan, Rep. Sensenbrenner 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRRSRNT: (Marlnvilh an* ifihey are no! members offzrll committee.) 

Rep. Engel 

HRARING WITNRSSES: Same as meeting notice attached'/ Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include lille, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record.) 

Attached 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ____ _ 

or 

TIME AD.JOURNED __ 4_:_1_6,_p_m __ 
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locations remain unmarked, without any sign to indicate that hundreds of bodies of men, women 

and children who had been killed in numerous mass crimes in Kosovo were buried in Serbia. The 

Humanitarian Law Center has launched an initiative to establish a memorial site at the Batajnica 

mass grave site. At the time of the publication of this Dossier, the online petition in support of 

the initiative has been signed by several hundred people. 

No one has ever been held accountable before courts in Serbia for the large-scale operation of 

concealment of bodies ofKosovo Albanian victims in mass graves. 
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critical to emphasize that the current electoral law still provides unequal opportunities of political 

choice to the different constituent peoples of BiH, and, in this instance, is specifically targeted 

against the interests of the Croat community in clear violation of the DPA. The election of Zeljko 

Komisc in 2006 and 2010, for example, was in direct violation of the DPA since he relied solely on 

the support of the Bosniak community within the Federation. Such an outcome is simply not 

legitimate unless one were to degrade the rights guaranteed to all three constitutive peoples of BiH 

as stipulated by the DPA 

The EU's top foreign policy chief, Frederica Mogherini, at a meeting on April 6, 2017, 

acknowledged the need and the importance to implement changes to the BiH electoral laws. Croatian 

Foreign Minister Davor lvo Stier at the same meeting distributed a non-paper that highlighted these 

electoral law changes and the significance of the "dual track approach" of potential EU and 

NATO membership to help steer necessary reforms along and within BiH. 

Of course, a new ··re-federalization" only within the Federation (without altering the DPA) that 

allowed Croats one or two "super-cantons" would solve the electoral law issue and resolve the issues 

raised by the Seydic-Finci decision of the European Court of Human Rights. In the Federation of 

BiH, one of the two DPA-designated entities within Bosnia, Croat parties still discuss and 

are advocates of this "federalization" of BiH that could be actualized without further ethnic 

divisions. This may also be the ideal time to consider a few Croat majority cantons in a federal union 

which has been long promoted by several prominent Croatians 

ln closing, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to deal with one political crisis after another. With no 

end in sight, BiH has assumed the character of a traditional frozen state. With unemployment rates 

ofT the charts, Bosnia continues to perpetuate its bloated, dysfunctional federal government There is 

clearly a need for greater and more focused political engagement on the part of both the European 

Union and the US with its NATO members. We all know the ultimate objective is to provide 

the political impetus to all the constituent peoples and all citizens to embrace the more functional 

European and Euro-Atlantic path to political and economic stability. There must be much greater 

vigilance and focused cooperation between the EU, the US, and the NATO member states to better 

ensure the functionality, stability, and the opportunity for BiH to fulfill all its responsibilities. And 

that is to become a full participating member of all Euro-Atlantic multilateral institutions. This goal 

must include a guarantee of institutional equality for Bosnian Croats, starting with the 2018 electoral 

law reforms and within the Mostar area electoral unit 

Thank you for this opportunity to present the NFCA's review of a complex but important matter 

facing BiH and the other new nation-states of the Western Balkans. I copy of my letter to the High 

Representative is attached for inclusion in the hearing record. If we may provide additional 

information to the Subcommittee on these important issues, please contact our Washington Public 

Affairs Director Joe Foley on (301) 294-0937. 

Sincerely, 

Steven J. Rukavina, President 

National Federation of Croatian Americans 
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National Federation of Croatian Americans Cultural Foundation 

PO Box 78152, Washington DC 20013 

The Croats of BiH need reaffirmed empowerment and enhanced co-decision capacities in 

Federation BiH. We believe that if certain electoral law changes do not happen and the Croats 

remain excluded from meaningful participation and fair decision-making in shared institutions 

on the Federal level, then instability in the country will only increase. While no demand is 

currently being made for the establishment of a third Croat-majority federal entity, we wish you 

to keep in mind that such an option is one which is a legitimate one. This may be the ideal time 

to consider a few Croat majority cantons in a federal union that has long been advocated by 

several prominent BH Croats. 

There are five specitlc examples in President Covic's letter that clearly state and expose the tlaws 

within the constitutional framework ofBiH and the Federation ofBiH: 

I. The illegitimate means in which Bosniaks and other non-Croats can elect the Croatdesignated Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (even in a scenario 

where all Croats voted to support one candidate, an entirely unlikely prospect). 

2. Institutional amendments to the Constitution of the Federation of BiH and BiH 

election law that deprive or diminish the rights of Croats guaranteed and safeguarded 

within the House of People, Government and other key institutions and bodies within the 

Federation of BiH. It is unacceptable that the Constitution of BiH can be changed 

without the consent of BH Croat political representatives, as is the growing disregard for 

the principles of parity and consensus in higher administrative and political levels. 

3. Newly dictated amendments that solidify power with Bosniak representatives at 

the expense of Croats, placing Croats in an inferior position and allowing Bosniaks 

within the Federation ofBiH to make decisions without the input and participation ofBH 

Croats. 

4. An increasing list of institutional changes that directly harm and affect the 

equal distribution of taxes, including appointments to the Public Broadcasting System, 

ministries and within areas of several canton-related sovereignty, all of which 

clearly favor Bosniak political representatives. 

5. The inability of Croats to fully exercise their cultural and linguistic autonomy within 

BiH, given that they have been intentionally deprived of the right to have a radio station 

and TV channel in the Croatian language focused on the specific needs of Croats in BiH. 

Such rights are accessible to national minorities within many EU countries, while they 

have been denied to a constituent people of BiH. 
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National Federation of Croatian Americans Cultural Foundation 

PO Box 78152, Washington DC 20013 

The path to a more secure, stable and consolidated BiH as a successful nation-state is the 

empowerment of Croats and seriously dealing with their grievances It is our hope that the PIC 

Steering Board will re-affirm and establish the necessary power-sharing principles that embody 

and guarantee the equality of constituent peoples as set forth in the DPA and the Washington 

Agreement. 

We firmly believe this is necessary for the vitality of constitutionalism and the rule of law in 

BiH, as well as to ensure that BiH retains a European perspective and the means for constructive 

participation in the largest union of states and peoples. BH Croats (who are also citizens of the 

EU) and their political leadership have displayed a great level of maturity and have proven that 

they are firmly dedicated to lead the rest of the country toward such a future. 

Lastly, we look to the United States and the PIC to step up and fulfill their responsibilities to reestablish the institutional freedom and equality of BH Croats so that they can maximize their 

ambitions for their country. These necessary goals must be accomplished so that BiH can become 

a full participating member of all Euro-Atlantic institutions, a goal which will benefit all peoples 

and citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Sincerely, 

Steven Rukavina, President 

National Federation of Croatian Americans 

Cultural Foundation 

sjrukavina@gmail.com 
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aspirations for the ethnic Albanian community (which according to the 2002 census represents some 25% of the 

Macedonian population of 2 million). 

The 'eader of the VMRO-DPMNE, fearful of losing power, claimed that the proposals put forward by the ethnic 

Albanian parties would result in "federalisation" and eventually the break-up of Macedonia as a unified country, even 

though such a concept was not part of the proposals and despite the fact that he himself had raised no objections 

whe r these proposals were raised in his negotiations with the DUI. 

With all the parties concerned having made clear that the preservation of the unity and identity of Macedonia was an 

objective that united the entire country, it became clear that Gruevski's strategy was to wave the red flag of interethnic tensions in order to discredit the proposed coalition. In so doing, he called on the citizens to take to the 

streets to "defend the country", and accused his political opponents of treason. Many of those who stormed the 

Parliament on April 27th are known to be friends, supporters and even family members of the ruling party. 

Further violence cannot be excluded as the country awaits the response from the President to the formal 

notification sent to him of the election of the new Speaker. According to the constitution, he has 10 days from the 

date of notification within which to hand over the mandate to form a government to whichever party or coalition 

commands a majority in Parliament The new majority then has 20 days to agree on a new cabinet which is then put 

to a vote in the Parliament. Mr Gruevski has already announced that his party does not recognise the new Speaker 

as duly elected. A boycott of Parliament by his party, which would surely exacerbate the tens'rons, cannot be 

excluded. 

The origins of this most recent crisis can be traced to the revelation in January 2015 of a vast wiretapping 

operation providing evidence of alleged corruption by government ministers and senior officials from the ruling 

party. This was followed in early May of that year by an outbreak of violence in the northern city of Kurnanovo, which 

resulted in the death of eight police officers and 12 others, in a security operation that has yet to be properly 

inveslgated. A succession of mediation efforts in June 2015 and again in July of 2016, led by Commissioner 

Johannes Hahn together with a delegation from the European Parliament (composed of the current and previous 

Rapporteurs for Macedonia plus a member of the EPP, of which the VMRO-DPMNE is a member), resulted in a 

number of agreements, signed by all four main political parties. They provided inter alia for the appointment of a 

Special Prosecutor to investigate the wiretapping scandal, electoral reforms to be followed by early elections and 

the implementation of a list of reforms contained in a report adopted by a senior expert group mandated by the 

Commission to investigate the wiretapping scandal and related rule of law issues. 

Despite these agreements, the ruling party did everything possible to delay implementation of the reforms and to 

h'rnder the work of the Special Prosecutor. These delays provoked renewed inter-party tensions. As if this wasn't 

enough, the President issued in April2016 a blanket pardon to the 56 senior government and ruling party officials, 

including the fomner Prime Minister himself, who had been placed under investigation by the Special Prosecutor. 

The objective was clear: to deliver a mortal blow to the work of the Special Prosecutor. 

Recent experience in Macedonia has shown that the lack of any enforcement mechanism deployed by the EU to 

ensure a serious follow-up of all the commitments contained in these successive mediated agreements is a major 

factor in their ineffectiveness. In the same vein, the messages coming from the EU have not always been 

consistent. At times, the EU has given the impression that its highest priority was stability, particularly during the 

refugee crisis, and that rule of law issues would eventually sort themselves out. This was particularly the case with 

Commissioner Hahn's statement following his visit in January 2016, which seemed to prioritise a strong and stable 

government to better address the flow of refugees coming across the Western Balkans, with Macedonia being a 

major entry point. This, despite the fact that the country was still in the throes of the political crisis resulting from the 

wiretapping revelations. 

When the President of the Council Donald Tusk visited on April 4th of this year, the main focus of his remarks 

following his meeting with President Ivanov was the importance of Macedonia's cooperation with migration and 
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border controls. His reference to the political crisis was limited to calling on the President to "find a solution based 

on cemocratic principles, decency and common sense". He did not repeat or make any reference to the statement 

mace by HR Federica Mogherini durin9 her visit on March 2nd, when she directly called on President Ivanov to 

reverse his decision and, even quoting the Constitution, to "entrust the mandate to a candidate belonging to the 

part·r which has the majority in the Assembly". This message was fortunately repeated by Hahn during his own visit 

on 1\\arch 21st. 

All of this has given the impression of a weak and uncoordinated EU conflict-resolution machinery. It has 

contibuted to an increased sense of impunity by the ruling party, which continues to ignore all the 

reccmmendations for reforms set out in the succe'ssive Commission's country reports, and in the senior expert 

groLp report mentioned above. It continues to deploy its vast propaganda machinery abroad using its membership 

of tre EPP to justify its behaviour and legitimacy in the Macedonian political environment. 

The stance of the European Peoples Party is also beyond comprehension. It continues to protect a party whose 

leadsr and senior officials are under investigation for serious criminal offences. Botll the Austrian and Hungarian 

ForEign Ministers have gone even further, and attended election rallies of the ruling party prior to the December 

elec:ions. The EPP continues to defend the indefensible, even after the violence of April 27th. 

If the EU is really serious about its role in conflict resolution, it needs to back its words with action. A periodic visit 

by a Commissioner or MEP delegation with no effective follow-up will serve little purpose. The EU should deploy 

all the instruments it has at its disposal, including a threat of sanctions, if the mediated agreements are not 

implemented. Failure of the EU to resolve this ongoing crisis will send the worst possible message to the region 

where other 'Balkan strongmen' are watching closely. 

Erwan Fouere is Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. He served in a dual capacity as EU Special 

Representative and Head of Delegation in the EU External Service in Macedonia from 2005 to 2011. 

CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. As an 

institution, CEPS takes no official position on questions of EU policy. The views expressed are attributable only to 

the author and not to any institution with which he is associated. 

Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) © CEPS 2017 

Erwan Fouere 

Associate Senior Research Fellow 

Europe in the World 

Contact CEPS 

Centre for European Policy Studies 

1 Place du Congres, 1000 Brussels 

Tel: +32 (0)2 229 39 11 

Fax: +32 (0)2 706 56 26 

Email: info@ceps.eu 
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The thne~year deadline for implementation was not however met and reforms have often been slow, half~hearted and 

marred by continuous setbacks. The use of Albanian in state institutions is still neglected in practice, while display of 

Albania 1 national symbols has been found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Central government continues 

to discrhlinate against majority~Albanian municipalities in budget allocation and grant distribution, often using Jack of 

funds o·legal technicalities as an excuse. Meanwhile, Albanian representation in the judiciary, as well as in senior 

position~ in defence, security and special police units, remains minimal, allegedly due to lack of "capable", 

professonally-qualified candidates. 

Drow Aing in distrust 

The VM~O~Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, the ethnic-Macedon ian party led by the prime minister, 

Nikola Gruevski, and the Democratic Union for Integration, the ethnic-Albanian junior partner in the ruling coalition led 

by the former paramilitary leader, Ali Ahmeti, dominate the country's political life. Both have played the nationalist card 

as the quickest way to secure the allegiance of members of their respective communities and consolidate their political 

support at the expense of their rivals. The VMRO~DPME and DU! have won every local and state-vvide election in their 

respective camps for the past ten years. 

The two parties squelch the opposition in both communities, pocket funds for themselves, suppress independent 

media a1d operate a corrupt judicial system. Both whip up nationalist rhetoric at home, while maintaining the fayade of 

democracy abroad by holding elections and using language that will appeal to western officials and media. Instead of 

using th3 Ohrid agreement to develop a multiethnic society in Macedonia, the VMRO~DPME and DUI have been busy 

creating a binational oligarchy that is hard to dismantle: they have turned the agreement into an instrument for seizing 

state resources and expanding their patronage networks. 

On the ethnic-Macedonian side, frustration with Greece for blocking entry to NATO and EU membership talks {Greece 

insists that recognising the name "Macedonia" would enable the country to exercise territorial claims over its northern 

province of that name) has made elites insecure. But the name issue may not be the primary source of their malaise: 

fearful of Albanian disloyalty, ethnic~Macedonian politicians appear to believe that reneging on a commitment to a 

multiethnic society and inventing a national identity devoid of Albanians and other minorities is the better path. 

The VMRO-DPMNE leadership may be content to share the spoils of power \Nith Albanian parties but it excludes any 

Albanian and non-Macedonian heritage from official identity. This goal is obvious in the controversial "Skopje 2014", 

an exclusively Macedonian~nationalist project led by Gruevski, which has turned the city into the kitsch capita! of the 

world-littered with monuments purportedly inspired by ethnic~Macedonian glorious antiquity. This is a national 

strategy destined for failure. 

Most ethnic Albanians feel unrepresented and the largely unemployed youth may become an easy target for political 

and religious 6xtremists attempting to fill the leadership vacuum in Macedonia. Growing disillusionment with the failure 

of Albanian political parties to represent the community, coupled with the painfully slow implementation of Ohrid, is 

pushing some disenchanted Albanians toward radical options. While it is not yet clear how extensive is the 

encroachment of radical Islam into Albanian communities, it is gaining a foothold. 

As never before, Macedonian politics are dysfunctional, exacerbated by unprecedented struggles within each of the 

communities. The largest Macedonian opposition party, the LSDM, has boycotted parliament since April and disagrees 

\Nith the VMRO-DPME on virtually every important issue the country is facing. On the Albanian side, DUI and the DPA, 

!ed by Menduh Thaci, are also locked in unprincipled confrontation. Failing to represent a new vision for Albanians in 

Macedonia, they have alienated their constituents from identification \Nith a state which continues to treat them as 

second~class citizens. This is stymieing any serious, unified effort to address the important issues concerning the 

rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and to shape a vision for their future. 

The West shares some of the blame for Macedonia's 13~year failure. Even though the democratic backsliding and 

nationalist tensions have been widely documented by local and international NGOs, Brussels and Washington seem 
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to have hrgotten that the Ohrid agreement was an internationally guaranteed peace plan to transform Macedonia into 

a functior,al state in the 21st century. It is fast becoming an illiberal democracy on the verge of falling apart. 

The EU a1d the US must move quickly beyond the rhetoric of preserving stability, at the expense of consolidating 

democraty and interethnic equality. As guarantors of Ohrid, they must renew their commitment to its full 

implemertation. The EU in particular must link Macedonia's prospect of membership to genuine improvements in the 

rule of Jav, an effective fight against government corruption and an end to the concentration of power in a few hands. 

About the authors: 

Roland Gjoni is a researcher on ethnic conflict and nationalism. 

Shirley Cioyes DioGuardi a foreign policy 1 t · · · · 

affairs adviser to the Alb;nian American C~~: l!a~~:.c•ahsmg m the Balkan conflict, is the Balkan 
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Submission for the Record 

Submitted by: Joe DioGuardi 

Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

May 17, 2017 · 

Interview of Albanian Security Guard on Violence in Macedonian Parliament 

ORIGINAL IN ALBANIAN (TRANSLATION IN ENGLISH BELOW) 

Original full video location of the primetime TV Show "200" transmitted on national TV Alsat-M: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01 fC90hDr3Y 

Clip of the witness interview from the original video above: 

https://drive.google.com/open?id=OBzX7W6g kM70b2RWOFo5YUJPS28 

Nazim ("200" TV show host) : Dhe jemi riklhyer ne studio per te vazhduar me program in edhe 

nje here te ftuar jane Arben Taravari, sekretar i pergjithshem i Levizjes per Reform a, Ljupcho 

Nikollovski depute! dhe Natasha Stojanovska kolege gazetare. Por dote vijojme program in me 

intervisten e paralajmeruar. Me ate qe mund te thuhet se eshte njeriu qe ndoshta shpetoj Ziadin 

Selen. Emri i tij eshte Abdylfetah Alimi, punonjes i sigurise ne Parlamentin e Maqedonise. 

lntervisten e realizoj kolege Fatlume Dervishi. Propozoj te ndjekim materialin. 

(Video filion. Degjohen thirrje: "Ajde kurvi! Ajde!" Hajde kurva! Hajde!) 

Fatlume: E Enjtja e kobshme e dhunes ne Kuvend nxori me lendime me serioze kreun e 

LRPDSH-se Ziadin Sela. Punonejsi i sigurimit te Kuvendit, Abdylfeta Alimi nga Orizarja e 

Kumanoves ne nje intervisle per TV Alsat tregon momentet e tmerrit qe kaluan bashke me 

Ziadin Selen ne kohen kur ai e shpetoj nga duarte dhunuesve te cilet mbi te ishin duke ushtruar 

dhune brutale. 

Abdylfetah: Ka qene moment shume i rende. Moment horror. Me ka flu nje kolege thole "Feta, 

eja see kane mbyt Selen!". Aty para kesaj kohe kam qene disa minuta i alivanos, mirepo fuqia 

e Zotit, me ka ndihmu Zoti, me ka dhene fuqi e kam vrapuar poshte se kam qene ne katin e 

pare. Aty kur kam shku te Klubi i Deputeteve e kam pa zotin Sela aty te shtrim te pergjakun 

edhe une kam mendu se eshte i vdeket. Ed he aty kam ra permbi trupin e zotit Sela e ne ato 

momente kam pa se eshte tu marre frymarrje. I kam venu doren e kam pa qe ka puis. Dy 

huligane kane qene aty u kam thane "Largonu se eshte i vdeket!" Ala kane mendu se eshte kry 

puna. Masandej vendosa Ia nxjerri per dritare te mbrendshme te klubit qe jane aty, nga ane e 

mbrendshme. Se jane disa shkalle aty sigurisht qe i dini, te aluminit. Me shu me mund, ishte i 

palevizshem. E mora keshtu ne shpine e kembet i shkojshin zhag. Ne zbraztiren e parlamentit 

poshte ka pas shume njerez atje. Kur hypa shkallet nail dikush bertet atje se nuk eshte kry puna 

me Selen. Ne ato momente une zotni Seles i kam fol ne gjuhen maqedone te jem me i sigurt 

mos kerkoje dicka prej meje dhe mos na degjojne se jena tu fol Shqip. Eshte moment shume ... 

per mua eshte me shekuj mete tregu qysh kena mberri deri te dhoma 334. Faklikisht te zyrja. 

Kemi hy te zyra 334 ne gjendje shume te rande ka qene. E kam shtri ne dysheme dhe me ka 

pyle "Kush je? Me kend jem?" Atehere i kam tregu se jam Fetai i sigurimit te Parlamentit. I erdhi 

nje shprese shume e mad he, shume e forte. Me tha: "Feta, jam ne Bese Iande!" Ne ate moment 

i !hash, iu drejtova: "Ziadin, nese me vrasin rna ban hallall!". 
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Fatlume: Abdylfetahu dhe Sela per disa ore me rradhe kane qendruar vetem. Nderkohe ne salle 

eshte paraqitur vetem moira medicinale e Kuvendit per t'i dhene infuzion. Per ala ka qene e 

frikshme per te mas i besojne me askujt per te treguar vendendodhjen. 

Abdylfetah: Ed he filluan masanej telefonat. Njerzit te vijne te na ndihmojne. lnteresoheshin 

familja. Familja e z.Ziadin. Familja ime. Shake. Dashamire. Mirepo u pat humb besimi. U pat 

humb besimi edhe nuk kisha guxim ti tregoj askujt se ku jam. Mirepo nje rast me ka ndihmu 

shu me lash e kuptoj. Dikuj i kam qit nje lajm se (Sela) eshte i kidnapu. 

Fatlume: Kujt ja the kete? 

Abdylfetah: I kam thane nje njeriu te sigurte qe te shperndahet kjo. Qe te mas e kerkoje me. Ajo 

mund te kete qene tri ore, kater ore, nuk e di. Nuke di mo cka ka ndodh jashte asaj zyre. Zyres 

334. Ajo ka qene ... Dera e zyres ka qene jeta a vdekje per neve aty. Ne zyre ka pas edhe 

shume momente interesante. Ne nje moment, kisha pas cigare me vete. Ed he e kam kall nje 

cigare. Kryetarin e kisha ketu nder tavoline. Jeta interesante dikur i !hash: "Zijadin, a po don 

cigare?" me tha "A ki cigare?" edhe ja dhash. Sikur ja jep gjysen e bates. Me ka ndihmu per 

disa momente qe nuke kam leju z.Sela me tregu se ku jena. Ne nje moment aty ku e shihni i 

!hash: "Nese me degjon une cka te !hom, 99% dalim te gjalle prej ketu." Edhe e ka ba ate. 

Kontakt qe i kam fillu ti besoj ka qene Zylfi Adili. Masandej mu ka lajmeru qe punon ne pune te 

brendshme, njefar Xheki. Sigurisht ai do dale me emer e mbiemer. Non-stop mu kane lajmeru 

keta edhe shume te !jere. Mirepo besimin qe kam kriju, e kam kriju te keta instiktivisht. Zylfi Adili 

me ka tregu se ku gjindet. Ku gjindet me disa shake mirepo ka qene e pamundshme ai te hy 

aty. Se aty mu dashten do djem police me qene. Keto i kam besu ketij djalit Xhekit. I kam thane 

"Mi cho kater deri me pese djem police. Tregoj se ku jam. Nese jane ne gjendje gjithcka me bo!" 

Mbas disa oreve ia kam dhan numrin e dhomes dhe i kane marre ala djem me nje mjek shqiptar 

ka qene edhe nje mater medicinale maqedone. Kane ardhe edhe i kane dhone ndihmen e para 

ata. Kane ardhe edhe masandej kur kane dale prej aty kam pa se Parlamenti eshte ne dore te 

policise. Ne kena zdryp poshte kryetarin per me e nxjerre jashte. Paraprakisht ia kam pas vesh 

nje bluze kryetarit me kapele. 

Fatlume: As prezenca e policise per Abdylfetahun nuk ka qene bindese se z.Sela eshte ne duar 

te sigurta. 

Abdylfetah: Kur jena ba gati per me e transferu prej Parlamenti deshim dalim nga ana e "vinar" 

qe i thomi aty. Mirepo kishte pas protestues e imi kthy e kena shtri prape ne 'hodnik' (koridor). 

Ne ate moment ka qene edhe ky Vladimir Gjorcevin e kam pa. Edhe i them "Me cka do ta 

choni?" se e bonem per me shku prej bodrumi aty ne garazhe. Me tha "Me ambulante". Thash 

"Me ambulante nuk e lejoj, vetem me autoblinde nese bini atehere!". Nuk ish a i sigurte me 

ambulante. "Nese bini", !hash, "autoblinde, poe lejoj te dale. Nese jo, qetu dote jes". Edhe e 

zbatoj ate urdher. Edhe ata djem kane qene non-stop me mu. Ed he mjeku. Mund te kisha harru 

shu me sen de pa i !hone se ajo eshte histori me veti, ato 3-4 ore jane sa 3-4 shekuj. Ne cdo dy 

min uta me ka thirr emnin tem. "Feta, a je ketu?". Nuk i besojke ma askujt. Edhe ne spital nuk i 

besojke kerkujt derisa ka ardhe Krenar Lloga. Atij ja kam lane ne dare. Tha "Fela, mas u largo. 

Make dhane Besen." 

Fatlume: Pasojat e asaj nate Abdylfetahu i kujton akoma. Pam jete tmerrit qe perjeloj edhe me 

lej vazhdojne ta shqetesojne. 
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Abdylfetah: Dote thole realisht po ju tregoj se ka 4 nate nuk kam fjet Keto kater nate sigurisht 

qe kam vetem 2 ore gjume. Edhepse nuk du ta kujtoj. Edhepse nuk du ta kujtoj ... cdo here kur i 

mbylli syte, te shkallet me rrin mendja. Ed he sot me duket se jam tuj hyp per shkallet Shu me e 

rand e. Shu me e rande ... pak kush ka ne gjendje eshte shu me e rande. Shu me pak gjendje me 

pas eshte shu me e rande. Kete pune e ken a bo ne menyre pikesepari nga ana morale e kam 

bo. Eshte ajo edhe ajo mund te thone edhe Kombetare nuke di une ato. Po ka ardhe edhe 

puna profesionale nga vete deshira e jone. 

Abdulfetah Alimi, an Albanian security guard in the Macedonian Parliament, saved the life 

of Ziadina Sela. Below is an interview with him (translated into English) conducted on 

May 5, 2017, on "200,"a national TV program on the Alsat-M channel in Macedonia 

Nazim: And we are back in studio to continue the program. One more time with me here are 

Arben Taravari, General Secretary of 'Levizja per Reforma' (Movement for Reforms, full political 

party name Levizja per Reforma Partia Demokratike Shqiptare), Ljupcho Nikollovski MP and 

Natasha Stojanovska colleague journalist. We will continue with the interview that we 

mentioned. We can now say that this may be the person who saved the life of Ziadin Sela. His 

name is Abdulfetah Alimi, security employee of the Parliament of Macedonia. The interviewer is 

my colleague Fatlume Dervishi. Let's see the material. 

(Video starts. We can see several people carying the bloodied unconscious body of Ziadin Sela 

and hear: "Ajde kurvi! Ajde!" "Let's go whores! Let's go!") 

Fatlume Uournalist comment): That fatal Thursday of the violence in the Parliament the most 

hurt was the leader of LR-PDSH Ziadin Sela. Security worker of the Parliament, Abdylfeta Alimi 

from Orizari of Kumanovo in one interview for TV Alsat explains the moments of horror that he 

has experienced with Ziadin Sela at the time when he saves Sela from the hands of the thugs 

that were brutally beating him. 

Abdylfetah (witness): It has been very difficult moment. Moment of horror. I was invited from 

one of my colleagues who said to me: "Feta, come because they have killed Sela!". Just before 

this I was unconscious and weak, but the force of God, God helped me, gave me strength and I 

ran downstairs because it was on the first floor. I went to the Club of Representatives and I saw 

Mr.Sela lying all bloodied and I thought he was dead. I leaned over his body and I noticed that 

he was still breathing. I touched his hand and noticed he still had pulse. Two thugs were 

watching over me and I told them: "Leave. He is dead!" They thought that they were done. After 

that I decided to get him (Sela) through the internal windows of the Club, which are on the 

inside. There are some stairs there as you know, the ones from aluminium. With a lot of effort, 

because he was unconscious and not moving. I carried him like this over my back and his feet 

were dragging. In the open space of Parliament there were a lot of people. When I climbed the 

stairs I heard someone yelling to the others that Sela was not done. During these moments I 

was talking to Mr.Sela only in Macedon ian so that I can be a bit safer if he asks something from 

me and they hear us talk in Albanian. It was a moment. .. for me it was like centuries how I 

arrived to room 334. That was an office. Went inside office 334 and he was in very bad shape. 

laid him on the floor and he asked me: 'Who are you? Who arn I with?" That's when I told him 

that I am Feta (short for his name Abdylfetah) from security of Parliament Big hope arrived to 

him, very strong hope. He said to me: "Feta, I am in your Besa!" (Besa, Albanian trust). At that 

moment I told him: "Ziadin, please forgive me if they kill me!" 
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Fatlume Qournalist comments): Abdylfetah and Sela for several hours were alone. In the 

meantime the nurse of the Parliament went in to give Sela an infusion. He (Abdylfelah) was still 

aftraid and not trusting anybody to give away their hidden location. 

Abdylfelah (witness continues): And then the phone calls started. People wanted to come to 

help. Families were asking. Mr.Ziadin family. My family. Friends. Well-thinking people. But, the 

trust was lost. The trust was lost and I was afraid to tell anybody where am I. But now I 

understand that one moment helped me a lot. I told someone to say outside that (Sela) was 

kidnaped. 

Fatlume Uournalist asking): Who did you tell that? 

Abdylfelah (witness responds): I told that to a trustworthy person to spread that around. So that 

they stop looking for him. This could have been three hours, four hours, I don't know. I didn't 

know what was going on outside that office. Office 334. That office was ... The door of that office 

was death or life for us. Inside the office we also had interesting moments. At one moment, I 

noticed I had cigarettes with me. And I smoked one. I had the Leader (Sela is the leader of LRPDSH) like this under the table. Life is interesting. I asked him: "Zijadin, do you want a 

cigarette?" he asked me "Do you have cigarettes?" so I gave him one. It was as if I gave him 

half the world. He also helped by not telling for a while where are we. At one point I told him: "If 

you listen to me, 99% we will get out alive." And he did it. The contacts I started trusting first 

was Zylfi Adili (he is in coalition Alliance for Albanians with Ziadin Sela, later confirms this in 

another TV show). Then I got a call from a guy we call Xheki ('Jackie', nickname of a worker at 

police who later confirms this). For sure he will come out with first name and last name about 

this. They were calling me non-stop and many others. But this trust that I created with these 

two, it was instincts. Zylfi Adili told me where he was. He told me where he was with several of 

his friends but it was impossible for them to get inside. So I needed them to send me some 

policemen. This is what I entrusted this guy Xheki/Jackie to do. I told him "Send me four or five 

policemen. I will tell you where I am. They need to be ready to do everything!" After hours I gave 

him the number of the office and these guys with an Albanian doctor were there and a 

Macedon ian nurse. They arrived there and they provided first aid (to Sela). They arrived and 

then when we left from there I noticed that the Parliament was under the police control. We 

brought the leader (Sela) downstairs so that we can take him outside. Before that I dressed a 

hoodie on him. 

Fatlume {journalist comment): The presence of police was still not enough for Abdylfetah that 

Sela is safe. 

Abdylfetah (witness): When we got ready to transfer him from the Parliament we wanted to get 

out from the side "vinar'' as we call it. But we noticed on that side there were still protesters 

outside so we went back in the hallway. With me at that point was and Vladimir Gjorcev (VMRO 

MP) who I saw. So I asked him: "How are you going to transport him?" because we started 

talking to get him through the basement garage. He said to me "With ambulance". I told him 

"With ambulance I am not going to let him, only with armored vehicle!" I wasn't feeling safe with 

ambulance. "If you bring", I said, "armored vehicle, I willie! him get outside. If not, we are 

staying here!". He listened to me. All those guys stayed with me non-stop. The doctor too. I may 

have forgotten many things because this is long history, those 3-4 hours feel like 3-4 centuries 

to me. Every two minutes he (Sela) was calling my name. "Feta, are you here?". He didn't trust 

anybody else. In the hospital he didn't trust anybody until Krenar Lloga arrived. I left Sela to him. 

He (Sela) said: "Don't leave. You gave me your Besa". 
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Fatlume Uournalist comment): Abdylfetah is still reliving the consequences from that night. He is 

still recalling those sights of horror and they still bother him. 

Abdylfetah (witness): I am telling you that I have not slept for 4 nights. These 4 nights I may 

have like 2 hours sleep. Even though I don't want to remember. Even though I don't want to 

remember. .. each time I close my eyes, I think about those stairs. I feel like I am climbing those 

stairs. Very difficult. Very difficult ... only few could understand, very difficult. Only few could 

understand how difficult. Very difficult. We did this thing first of all for moral reasons I did it. This 

could be also as they call it Patriotic, I don't know. It was both the professional obligation but 

from our own desire (to save/help him). 
96

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI, 

FOUNDING PRESIDENT, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE (FORMER MEMBER OF

CONGRESS)


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Note: ‘‘Albania’s Prosecutor’s Office, Judicial Reform, & the Role of US Ambassador 

Donald Lu in Tirana,’’ submitted for the record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats and ‘‘The Explusion of 

the Albanians,’’ submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi, 

founding president, Albanian American Civic League (former Member of Congress), 

are not reprinted here but may be accessed on the Internet with the following link:

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=105978

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Question for the Record 

To: Assistant Deputy Secretary Yee 

From: Rep. Dana Rohrabacher 

Jn re.1ponse to FF&FT Subcommittee Hearing entitled "The Rakans: Threats to Peace and 

Stability" on May 17, 2017 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Yee, one of the topics of last week's hearing was economic 

development We know that throughout the world, in post-conflict regions, a vibrant economy 

mitigates a return to conflict. In your recent discussions with PM Markovic you discussed the 

importance of foreign investment T know you know of the Stratex Group as an American 

investor working in Montenegro, for example. How can the US government work with the 

Montenegrin and other governments in the region to foster private sector economic 

development~ 
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Congressman Francis Rooney 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

"The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability" 

Wednesday, May 10, 2017 

Questions for the Record 

For Mr. Hoyt Vee: 

Letters regarding activities by the US Embassy and USAID mission in Skopje have 

been insufficiently answered by the State Department regarding funding to the 

Open Society Foundation- Macedonia which supported the SDSM. 

• Is the Embassy and Ambassador engaged in the activities described by the 

letter and how can those be stopped? 

• Does the State Department have any role in settling a Macedonian 

parliamentary dispute? 

• Is recognizing the election of Tal at Xhaferi- an ethnic Albanian- by the US 

Ambassador not effectively a ruling by the US in favor of the SDSM and DUI 

coalition? 

For Dr. Daniel Serwer: 

In an article you authored regarding the current situation you said, "I blame the 

Macedonians." 

• Considering Zoran Zaev's blackmail offormer Prime Minister Nikola 

Gruevski's government, would you say that Mr. Zaev is also partly 

responsible for the current situation? 
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05/17/2017 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee 

hearing titled "The Balkans: Threats to Peace and Stability". 

Question for the Record (QFR) submitted by Congressman Lee Zeldin (NY -01 ): 

For Deputy Assistant Secretary VeeThe Bytyqi case, which is the murder of three American citizens who were executed and dumped 

into a mass grave by Serbian special forces in 1999, is still unresolved. Serbian Prime Minister 

and President-elect Aleksandar Vucic promised former Vice President Biden, former Secretary 

of State Kerry, Members of this Committee, the surviving family members, and the American 

public, that he would personally see that these horrific murders would be resolved. Unfortunately 

nothing has happened. Additionally, a war crimes prosecution system was put into place by the 

Serbian government in 2003, and has been provided with substantial training and assistance by 

the U.S. government, yet has not produced effective results. 

My questions are- What has the State Department done to date to sanction the behavior 

regarding the Serbian government's handling of the Bytyqi case~ What leverage could the State 

Department use on Prime Minister Vucic and other Serbian officials to bring the Bytyqi case to 

closure~ Could the U.S. government honorably support Serbia's advancement in its European 

Union accession process without it taking credible actions to resolve the Bytyqi murders~