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FREDERICK CORNELIUS v. LINDA ARNOLD,

TAX ASSESSOR TOWN OF FARMINGTON

(AC 38011)

Keller, Mullins and Norcott, Js.

Argued February 11—officially released October 4, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, Hon. Arnold W. Aronson, judge trial referee.)

Frederick Cornelius, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Duncan J. Forsyth, with whom were KellyC. McKeon

and, on the brief, Michael C. Collins, for the appellee

(defendant).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Frederick

Cornelius, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Linda Arnold, the tax

assessor of the town of Farmington. On appeal, the

plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) his action for relief from wrongful

assessment was untimely because he commenced the

action beyond the one year time limitation set forth in

General Statutes § 12-119,1 and (2) he failed to establish

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a continuing course of conduct tolled that time limitation. We

disagree with both claims and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history inform

our review. On January 29, 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action by service of a summons and two

count complaint on the defendant. In count one of the

amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged the following.

On October 1, 2011, he was the owner of a parcel of

real property located at 1509 Farmington Avenue in

Farmington (property).2 On that date, the defendant

valued the property at $238,714 and assessed the property at a value of $167,100. The assessment, on which

the tax laid on the property was computed, ‘‘was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at

except by disregarding duties of the assessor established under . . . General Statutes §§ 12-62 and/or

12-55.’’3

The defendant pleaded the time limitation set forth

in § 12-119 as a special defense, alleging that the plaintiff

had not commenced the action within one year of the

October 1, 2011 assessment he challenged. The defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment on the

basis of the special defense. The plaintiff objected,

arguing that his action was timely pursuant to § 12-119

as properly read or, in the alternative, that a continuing

course of conduct had tolled the limitations period.4

By memorandum of decision, the trial court rendered

summary judgment as to count one. See footnote 2 of

this opinion. The court concluded that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s

failure to bring the appeal, as alleged in count one,

within the one year period starting with October 1, 2011,

supports the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.’’5 The court further concluded that the plaintiff

failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

defendant had engaged in an illegal course of conduct

that would have tolled the limitations period in § 12-

119. This appeal followed. Additional facts will follow

as necessary.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for two principal reasons. First, he claims that his commencement of the

action on January 29, 2013, was timely because the
October 1, 2011 date of the allegedly illegal assessment

of the property was not the ‘‘date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation,’’ on

which the one yearlimitations period in § 12-119 begins.

Second, he claims that whether a continuing course of

conduct tolled the limitations period was a genuine

issue of material fact that precluded summary

judgment.

‘‘Summary judgment may be granted where the

[claim] [is] barred by the statute of limitations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset

Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 310, 94 A.3d 553

(2014). ‘‘The question of whether a claim is barred by

the statute of limitations is a question of law over which

we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn.

App. 638, 661, 127 A.3d 257 (2015).

‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the

trial court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . [T]he scope of

our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the

[defendant’s] motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . .

‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summary judgment

based on a statute of limitations special defense, a

defendant typically meets its initial burden of showing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by demonstrating that the action had commenced outside of

the statutory limitation period. . . . When the plaintiff

asserts that the limitations period has been tolled by

an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, the

burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish a

disputed issue of material fact in avoidance of the statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, supra,

312 Conn. 309–10.

I

The plaintiff first claims that summary judgment was

improper because he commenced his action within the

one year limitation period in § 12-119, as that statute

properly is read. He argues that the ‘‘date as of which

the property is last evaluated for purposes of taxation’’

within the meaning of § 12-119 is the date on which

the assessment is ‘‘finalized’’ because ‘‘the evaluation

process is ongoing.’’ Because the date of finalization

will vary according to the circumstances of a given

case, he argues, the statute is ambiguous and must be

read in his favor. He also contends that the limitations

period is directory rather than mandatory or subject to
a balancing of the equities, and that an action pursuant

to § 12-119 does not exclude the pursuit of other equitable remedies not subject to the time limitation. We are

not persuaded.

‘‘The legislature, in creating the municipal taxation

scheme, placed precise statutes of limitations over most

substantive taxpayer claims.’’ National CSS, Inc. v.

Stamford, 195 Conn. 587, 594, 489 A.2d 1034 (1985)

(citing, among other statutes, § 12-119). ‘‘It is well settled that, if the owner of the [property] at the [time] of

the [assessment] in question . . . want[s] to challenge

the [assessment], [he is] required to follow the appropriate statutory procedures, either by (1) timely appealing from the [assessment] to the city’s board of

assessment appeals pursuant to General Statutes §§ 12-

111 and 12-112, and from there by timely appealing to

the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a,

or (2) timely bringing a direct action pursuant to . . .

§ 12-119. [A] taxpayer who has failed to utilize the available statutory remedies [may not] assert . . . that the

tax has not been properly assessed. . . . The rationale

forthis rule is the need on the part of the government for

fiscal certainty. A municipality, like any governmental

entity, needs to know with reasonable certainty what

its tax base is for each fiscal year, so that it responsibly

can prepare a budget for that year. . . . Public policy

requires, therefore, that taxes that have not been challenged timely cannot be the subject of perpetual litigation, at any time,to suit the convenience ofthe taxpayer.

. . . A taxpayer who has not sought redress in an appropriate manner is foreclosed from continuing litigation

outside [those] statutes.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury

v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 12–15, 730 A.2d

1128 (1999).

A

The plaintiff first argues that the reference in § 12-

119 to the ‘‘date as of which the property was last

evaluated for purposes of taxation’’ is ambiguous

because, under the circumstances of a given case, that

date may be either (1) January 31 following the October

1 assessment date, in the event that the assessor conducts an interim assessment of the property; see General Statutes § 12-55 (b); (2) May 1 following the

assessment date, in the event that the assessment is

appealed to the board of assessment appeals; see General Statutes § 12-111; or (3) August 1 following the

assessment date, the date on which taxes become due,

because ‘‘[p]ayment finalizes the [assessment] process

. . . .’’ He argues that we must resolve this ambiguity

in his favor and conclude that he timely commenced

the present action. We disagree.

‘‘[I]f there is no ambiguity in the language of [a] statute, it does not become ambiguous merely because

the parties contend for different meanings.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hardt v. Watertown, 95

Conn. App. 52, 57, 895 A.2d 846 (2006), aff’d, 281 Conn.

600, 917 A.2d 26 (2007). ‘‘When construing a statute,

[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied

to the facts of [the] case, including the question of

whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013).

Section 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is

claimed that . . . a tax laid on property was computed

on an assessment which, under all the circumstances,

was manifestly excessive and could not have been

arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the

statutes for determining the valuation of such property,

the owner thereof . . . may . . . make application for

relief to the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the judicial district

in which such town or city is situated. Such application

may be made within one year from the date as of which

the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation . . . .’’

In seeking to determine the meaning of the phrase

‘‘the date as of which the property was last evaluated

for purposes of taxation’’; General Statutes § 12-119; as

applied to the facts of this case, ‘‘we do not write on

a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial

interpretations of the language and the purpose of the

statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford

v. Jacobelli, 317 Conn. 863, 871, 120 A.3d 500 (2015).

Our appellate courts uniformly have held that ‘‘the date

as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes

of taxation’’ refers to the assessment date.6 As our

Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘property [is] assessed for

purposes of taxation on October 1 of each year. The

claim that . . . property ha[s] been wrongfully or

excessively assessed [may be] appealed . . . by direct

action to the court within one year from the date when

the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation

pursuant to § 12-119.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Norwich v.

Lebanon, 193 Conn. 342, 346–48, 477 A.2d 115 (1984);

see also Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 122 n.10, 617

A.2d 433 (1992) (‘‘[o]ur decision today . . . requires

that a declaratory judgment action that is predicated

on the substantive rights of § 12-119 be brought within

one year of the date of assessment’’).

Likewise, in Grace N’ Vessels of Christ Ministries,
Inc. v. Danbury, 53 Conn. App. 866, 870, 733 A.2d 283

(1999), this court stated that ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] application to the trial court challenged, inter alia, the October

1, 1992, and October 1, 1993 assessments [of the property]. Because [the plaintiff] filed the application7 on

August 3, 1995, more than one year from either of those

dates and, therefore, beyond the time limitation permitted in § 12-119, the trial court correctly determined that

its claims . . . are time barred.’’ (Footnote added.)

Accordingly, under the foregoing authorities, the

plaintiff had one year from the assessment date of October 1, 2011, to commence his action. He failed to do

so. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the

plaintiff’s challenge to the 2011 assessment of his property, which he commenced on January 29, 2013, fell

outside the one year limitation on bringing an action

pursuant to § 12-119.

The plaintiff relies on the cases of Interlude, Inc. v.

Skurat, 253 Conn. 531, 754 A.2d 153 (2000), and Wiele

v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 119 Conn. App. 544,

988 A.2d 889 (2010), forthe proposition that the application of a one year time limit to a claim of an illegal

assessment is improper. These cases, however, are factually distinguishable from the present case.

In Interlude, Inc., the court concluded that § 12-119

was entirely inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim of an

illegal assessment because the plaintiff did not own the

subject property on the date of assessment. Interlude,

Inc. v. Skurat, supra, 253 Conn. 539. Because § 12-119

did not apply, the court left for another day the question

of what statute of limitations would apply under those

circumstances. Id., 540 n.12. Here, by contrast, there

is no dispute as to the plaintiff’s ownership of the property on October 1, 2011, the date of the challenged

assessment. In Interlude, Inc., the court’s conclusion

that § 12-119 was entirely inapplicable defeats the plaintiff’s reliance on that case to argue that our Supreme

Court ‘‘has . . . expressed significant reservations

regarding the proper application of any statute of limitations when a claim for an illegal assessment is brought

under § 12-119.’’ (Emphasis altered.) Indeed, the court

in Interlude,Inc., noted that ‘‘the entire range of municipal taxing statutes . . . make[s] clear that the assessment date is the foundation of municipal taxing power.

Thus, it is necessary to consider the date of assessment

as the appropriate date . . . for purposes of valuation

of taxable property . . . . General Statutes § 12-119.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Interlude, Inc., v. Skurat, supra,

538–39.

In Wiele, this court declined to apply the limitations

period in § 12-119 to bar a claim of an illegal assessment

because the plaintiff in that case, who had moved out

of state, lacked notice of the assessment until many

years after the assessment had been conducted. Wiele
v. Board of Assessment Appeals, supra, 119 Conn. App.

547, 554–55. Under such circumstances, this court

remanded the case to the trial court with direction to

determine whether the lack of notice would support an

argument that the limitations period should be equitably

tolled. Id., 555. Here, there is no claim that the plaintiff

lacked notice of the 2011 assessment he now challenges. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s attempt to argue

that the limitations period should be tolled in this case;

see part II of this opinion; there was no reason here,

as there was in Wiele, for the court to decline to apply

the limitations period.

Pursuant to our appellate courts’ uniform understanding of ‘‘the date as of which the property was last

evaluated’’ to refer to the assessment date, the time

limitation set forth in § 12-119, as applied to the facts

of the present case, required the plaintiff to commence

the present action within one year of the October 1,

2011 assessment that he alleged was illegal. This he did

not do.

The plaintiff nevertheless argues that the legislature’s

choice of this broadly worded phrase requires us to

conclude that it intended to provide a more temporally

expansive understanding of the evaluation process that

may encompass January 31, May 1, or August 1 as the

date of evaluation. We disagree. As to the first of these

proposed dates, we acknowledge that § 12-55, which

mandates the publication of the taxable grand list on

or before January 31, allows the assessor to ‘‘increase

or decrease the valuation of any property’’ prior to

taking the required oath upon the grand list; General

Statutes § 12-55 (b); and, as a result, ‘‘an assessor has

the authority under § 12-55 to conduct an interim

assessment of property . . . .’’ Kasica v. Columbia,

supra, 309 Conn. 97. Nevertheless, we interpret the relevant statutory language as applied to the facts of the

present case; id., 93 (‘‘we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language

as applied to the facts of [the] case’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]); and, here, there was absolutely no

evidence before the trial court that any such interim

assessment occurred. Indeed, the plaintiff expressly

alleges in the application for relief that it was the October 1, 2011 assessment that was illegal.

As to the latter two dates, neither reasonably can be

interpreted as constituting the ‘‘date as of which the

property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-119. The plaintiff argues

that ‘‘[i]f the valuation of a property can be changed

under § 12-111 until May 1 of the following year due to

a decision of the board of assessment appeals, then

clearly, the [property] is still being ‘evaluated’ in April.’’

We cannot reasonably interpret the statutory scheme,

however, to contemplate that the evaluation process is

still ongoing after an appeal has been taken to the board
of assessment appeals pursuant to § 12-111.8

The plaintiff also argues that payment of taxes by

the due date of August 1 ‘‘finalizes the process’’ of

evaluation. In support of this argument, he relies on a

Supreme Court case discussing a prior version of § 12-

119, which could be ‘‘invoked up to the expiration of

one year, not from the making of the assessment but

from the time when the tax became due . . . .’’ Cohn

v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 702–703, 37 A.2d 237 (1944).

As we have noted, however, the numerous appellate

decisions to have considered the present version of the

statute uniformly have interpreted its time limitation

to commence on the date of assessment. See Wilson v.

Kelley, supra, 224 Conn. 122 n.10; Norwich v. Lebanon,

supra, 193 Conn. 346–48; Grace N’ Vessels of Christ

Ministries, Inc. v. Danbury, supra, 53 Conn. App. 870;

see also Crystal Lake Clean Water Preservation Assn.

v. Ellington, 53 Conn. App. 142, 151, 728 A.2d 1145,

cert. denied, 250 Conn. 920, 738 A.2d 654 (1999); Farmington v. Dowling, 26 Conn. App. 545, 552, 602 A.2d

1047 (1992), appeal dismissed, 224 Conn. 592, 619 A.2d

852 (1993) (certification improvidently granted). For

the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s alternative interpretations of the relevant language are either factually

inapplicable or legally incorrect.

Because the plain meaning of ‘‘the date as of which

the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation’’ provided the plaintiff with one year from the October 1, 2011 assessment in which to commence the

present action pursuant to § 12-119, there is no ambiguity to resolve in the plaintiff’s favor. ‘‘Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, we are confined

to the intention expressed in the actual words used and

we will not search out any further intention of the

legislature not expressed in the statute. . . . In the

absence of ambiguity it is unnecessary to resort to principles of statutory construction such as the resolution of

ambiguity in favor of the taxpayer.’’ (Citation omitted.)

Harris Data Communications, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183

Conn. 194, 198, 438 A.2d 1178 (1981); see Stratford v.

Jacobelli, supra, 317 Conn. 874–75 (declining to apply

canon of statutory construction resolving ambiguity in

favor of taxpayer where taxpayer failed to advance

other reasonable interpretation of statute in question).

B

In the alternative, the plaintiff contends that the one

year limitation on bringing an action pursuant to § 12-

119 is ‘‘clearly directory,’’ subject to a balancing of the

equities that must be resolved in his favor, or that the

relief provided by § 12-119 is ‘‘cumulative and not exclusive of equitable remedies’’ not subject to the statute’s

one year time limitation. We are not persuaded.

First, the plaintiff argues that the time limitation in

§ 12-119 is directory, not mandatory, because it pro-
vides that an application for relief ‘‘may’’ be brought

within a year of the date as of which the property

was last evaluated for taxation purposes. We decline

to consider this argument because it is inadequately

briefed. The plaintiff notes that the statute employs

the word may, which ‘‘ ‘ordinarily does not connote a

command,’ ’’ as our Supreme Court noted in Lostritto

v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269

Conn. 10, 20, 848 A.2d 418 (2004); nevertheless, he fails

to examine the context in which the word may is

employed, proceeding instead to a conclusory assertion

that § 12-119 must, therefore, be permissive. ‘‘Although

we are solicitous of the rights of self-represented litigants . . . this court is not required to review claims

that are inadequately briefed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Midland Funding, LLC

v. Mitchell-James, 163 Conn. App. 648, 649 n.1, 137 A.3d

1 (2016). In any event, we note that the commencement

of an application for relief from an illegal assessment

beyond the one year limitations period in § 12-119, as

long as it is specially pleaded, as the defendant has

done here, provides a basis for a court to deny the relief

provided for in the statute. See L. G. DeFelice & Son,

Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167 Conn. 509, 510–11, 513, 356

A.2d 144 (1975).

Second, the plaintiff argues that the one year limitation is subject to a balancing of equities that tips in his

favor. We disagree. It is not a court’s role to balance

the equities to determine whether to apply a statute of

limitations in a given case, for, in determining whether

to impose a time limitation on a particulartype of action,

our legislature already has balanced the relevant equities and determined the point in time at which they

weigh in favor of finality. ‘‘The purposes of statutes of

limitation[s] include finality, repose and avoidance of

stale claims and stale evidence. . . . These statutes

represent a legislative judgment about the balance of

equities in a situation involving a tardy assertion of

otherwise valid rights: [t]he theory is that even if one

has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on

notice to defend within the period of limitation and that

the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to

prevail over the right to prosecute them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Iacurci v. Sax, 313 Conn. 786,

806–807, 99 A.3d 1145 (2014); see also Danbury v. Dana

Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 15 (time limitations

on taxpayer challenges recognize municipal interest in

fiscal certainty).

Third, the plaintiff argues that the remedy provided

by § 12-119 is ‘‘cumulative and not exclusive of equitable

remedies, and a party may elect to proceed under either

or both.’’ On the contrary, ‘‘as [§ 12-119] was clearly

intended to take the place of the remedy in equity based

on an overvaluation of the property and as all the relief

can be obtained under it which could be afforded by

equity, it precludes a resort to equity generally in such
a case as the one before us.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 706, 513

A.2d 77 (1986); see also Crystal Lake Clean Water Preservation Assn. v. Ellington, supra, 53 Conn. App. 150

(‘‘a taxpayer may not [additionally seek a common law

remedy] in an attempt to circumvent the time restraints

of § 12-119 if it would undermine the purpose of the

statute’’).

II

The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly

concluded that he failed to raise a genuine issue of

fact as to whether the defendant’s continuing course

of conduct tolled the one year limitations period in

§ 12-119. He argues that he created a genuine issue of

material fact by submitting evidence that, although the

parties ‘‘engaged in a continuing course of conduct to

establish a proper valuation forthe property,’’ the defendant did not provide a response to his request to revise

the 2011 assessment that ‘‘at any time may have remedied the conflict and removed the need for a lawsuit

. . . .’’ We disagree.

As previously noted, a plaintiff may avoid summary

judgment on statute of limitations grounds by creating

an issue of fact as to whether an equitable exception

to the statute applies. Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance

Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 310 (‘‘burden normally shifts

to the plaintiff to establish a disputed issue of material

fact’’ regarding equitable exception to statute of limitations); Wiele v. Board of Assessment Appeals, supra, 119

Conn. App. 551 (‘‘the limitation in § 12-119 is procedural

and personal rather than jurisdictional and, therefore,

susceptible to equitable doctrines’’). ‘‘In certain circumstances . . . we have recognized the applicability of

the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll a statute of limitations. . . . [W]hen the wrong sued upon

consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute

does not begin to run until that course of conduct is

completed.’’9

(Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co.,

LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 311.

‘‘[I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuing

course of conduct that may toll the statute of limitations

there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that

remained in existence after commission of the original

wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed

for bringing an action for such a wrong.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brusby v. Metropolitan District,

supra, 160 Conn. App. 662. ‘‘The continuing course of

conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff

has discovered the harm . . . .’’ Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff did not and, indeed,

could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as

to the applicability of this doctrine because the very
course of conduct on which he sought to rely demonstrates that he already had discovered the harm upon

which he sued—namely, the allegedly illegal 2011

assessment of the property. Before the trial court, the

plaintiff argued that ‘‘[o]n October 26, 2011, [he] initiated an informal effort to have the assessment

reduced,’’ which ‘‘continued periodically [until] December 5, 2012 . . . when the effort became more formalized. The plaintiff’s request to revise the assessment to

reflect the nonexistence of the structure created a duty

on the part of the defendant to . . . at least respond to

the plaintiff’s legitimate concern. The defendant never

responded to the plaintiff’s request.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Consequently, he argued, ‘‘[t]he equitable doctrine

of continuing course of conduct tolled the inception of

any applicable statute of limitations until at least January 13, 2013 . . . which was the last occurring conduct

outside of this action.’’ The evidence by which the plaintiff attempted to demonstrate a continuing course of

conduct indicated that in October, 2011, he had sought

to reduce the assessment by notifying the defendant of

the removal of a house from the property several

months prior, and that the parties had met on January

10, 2013, to discuss the assessment of the property.10

The evidence presented to the trial court in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

demonstrates, in sum, that after initially challenging the

2011 assessment on October 26 of that year, the plaintiff

waited more than one year before attempting again

to challenge the assessment, in December, 2012. See

footnote 10 of this opinion. This evidence, which

unequivocally indicates the plaintiff’s awareness of and

disagreement with the 2011 assessment, utterly fails to

implicate the continuing course of conduct doctrine.

Here, the plaintiff clearly had discovered the harm

upon which he sued; he simply waited too long to do

so. As we previously have noted in this opinion, there

were two avenues by which the plaintiff could have

challenged the validity of the 2011 assessment of the

property: he could have filed a timely appeal to the

board of assessment appeals, and, from there, a timely

appealto the SuperiorCourt; see General Statutes §§ 12-

111 and 12-117a; or he could have filed a timely appeal

pursuant to § 12-119 directly to the Superior Court. See

Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn.

12–15. He elected to engage in periodic ‘‘informal’’

efforts to have the assessment reduced instead of commencing the present action under § 12-119. He offers

no authority for the assertion that these efforts created

a duty on the part of the defendant to engage in negotiations regarding the assessment, and, indeed, the defendant was under no such duty. The plaintiff’s attempts

to negotiate a lower assessment were not a substitute

for timely resorting to the existing procedure for challenging the assessment’s legality. ‘‘[A] taxpayer who has

failed to utilize the available statutory remedies [may
not] assert . . . that the tax has not been properly

assessed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 14–15.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed

. . . that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which,

under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have

been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for

determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof . . . prior

to the payment of such tax, may, in addition to the other remedies provided

by law, make application for relief to the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the judicial

district in which such town or city is situated. Such application may be

made within one year from the date as of which the property was last

evaluated for purposes of taxation and shall be served and returned in the

same manner as is required in the case of a summons in a civil action, and

the pendency of such application shall not suspend action upon the tax

against the applicant. In all such actions, the Superior Court shall have

power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form

as to justice and equity appertains, and costs may be taxed at the discretion

of the court. If such assessment is reduced by said court, the applicant

shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes in

accordance with the judgment of said court.’’

Thus, ‘‘[i]n a tax appeal taken pursuant to § 12-119, the plaintiff must

prove that the assessment was (a) manifestly excessive and (b) . . . could

not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes

for determining the valuation of the property. . . . [The plaintiff] must [set

forth] allegations beyond the mere claim that the assessor overvalued the

property. . . . The focus of § 12-119 is whether the assessment is illegal.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 308 Conn. 87, 105, 61

A.3d 461 (2013).

2

In count two, the plaintiff appealed, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-

117a, from the action of the Farmington Board of Assessment Appeals

reducing the October 1, 2012 assessment of the property to $70,630. Because

count two remained pending in the trial court, the plaintiff’s initial appeal

to this court was dismissed for lack of a final judgment. Before filing the

present appeal, the plaintiff withdrew count two, rendering the trial court’s

judgment final. See Annecharico v. Patterson, 38 Conn. App. 338, 339–40, 660

A.2d 880 (1995). Accordingly, only count one is at issue in the present appeal.

3 General Statutes § 12-62 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Commencing

October 1, 2006, each town shall implement a revaluation not later than the

first day of October that follows, by five years, the October first assessment

date on which the town’s previous revaluation became effective . . . . The

town shall use assessments derived from each such revaluation for the

purpose of levying property taxes for the assessment year in which such

revaluation is effective and for each assessment year that follows until the

ensuing revaluation becomes effective.

‘‘(2) When conducting a revaluation, an assessor shall use generally

accepted mass appraisal methods . . . . Prior to the completion of each

revaluation, the assessor shall conduct a field review. Except in a town that

has a single assessor, the members of the board of assessors shall approve,

by majority vote, all valuations established for a revaluation. . . .’’

General Statutes § 12-55 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) On or before the

thirty-first day of January of each year, except as otherwise specifically

provided by law, the assessors or board of assessors shall publish the grand

list fortheirrespective towns. Each such grand list shall contain the assessed

values of all property in the town . . . for the assessment year commencing

on the October first immediately preceding. The assessor or board of assessors shall lodge the grand list for public inspection, in the office of the

assessor on or before said thirty-first day of January, or on or before the

day otherwise specifically provided by law for the completion of such grand

list. . . .

‘‘(b) . . . The assessor or board of assessors may increase or decrease

the valuation of any property as reflected in the last-preceding grand list,

or the valuation as stated in any personal property declaration or report

received pursuant to this chapter. . . .’’

4 The plaintiff appended three exhibits to his objection: (1) a residential
property card for the property bearing a handwritten note that ‘‘10/26/11

owner came in [and] said house was torn down a few months ago. No

permits were taken out as of 1/31/12. Building Dept. will not write a letter’’;

(2) a December 5, 2012 letter from the plaintiff to the defendant requesting

‘‘all information regarding the 2007 property revaluation’’; and (3) a January

16, 2013 letter from the plaintiff to the defendant purporting to memorialize

a January 10, 2013 meeting between the parties.

5 The court incorrectly identified February 4, 2013, the date on which the

plaintiff filed the complaint in the Superior Court, as the date of the action’s

commencement. An application for relief from wrongful assessment is not

commenced until it is ‘‘served and returned in the same manner as is required

in the case of a summons in a civil action . . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-

119; see General Statutes § 52-45a (civil action commenced by legal process);

cf. Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 565, 573–74,

119 A.3d 1229 (construing identical language in General Statutes § 12-117a,

which provides that tax appeal ‘‘shall be . . . served and returned in the

same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil action,’’ to

require service of process for commencement of tax appeal), cert. granted,

319 Conn. 928, 125 A.3d 203 (2015). Because we conclude that the limitations

period in § 12-119 expired before January 29, 2013, the date on which process

was served, any error was not material to the court’s determination that

the plaintiff’s action was untimely.

6 General Statutes § 12-62a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Each municipality . . . shall establish a uniform assessment date of October first.

‘‘(b) Each such municipality shall assess all property for purposes of the

local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy per cent of present true and

actual value, as determined under section 12-63. . . .’’

7 See footnote 5 of this opinion.

8

Indeed, to appeal to the board of assessment appeals pursuant to § 12-

111, a person already must be aggrieved by an act of the assessor, including,

for example, the valuation of his property for taxation purposes. Section

12-111 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person . . . claiming to be

aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may appeal therefrom

to the board of assessment appeals. . . . Such board may equalize and

adjust the grand list of such town and may increase or decrease the assessment of any taxable property or interest therein . . . .’’

9 Our appellate courts previously have not considered whetherthe continuing course of conduct doctrine may toll the limitations period in § 12-119.

The plaintiff relies on Wiele to argue that the doctrine may provide an

exception to the limitations period in § 12-119. In Wiele, this court suggested,

but did not decide, that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to toll the

limitations period in § 12-119 where the property owner did not have notice

of the challenged assessment. See Wiele v. Board of Assessment Appeals,

supra, 119 Conn. App. 553, 555. In the present case, because we conclude

that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, we need

not address the continuing course of conduct doctrine’s applicability to the

limitations period in § 12-119.

10 The January 16, 2013 letter from the plaintiff to the defendant purporting

to memorialize the meeting reads in relevant part that ‘‘the following are

the salient points as I understood them:

‘‘1. Although you profess a personal willingness to address the issues of

the assessment forthis property, you indicated that you are unable to address

them because no relief is available because the issues are not a result of

any ‘mistake’ but rather are the result of ‘judgment.’ . . .

‘‘4. You indicated that the information you provided to me in your e-mail

on December 6, 2012, in response to my request forinformation of December

5, 2012, contains all the information and correspondence available and ‘there

is nothing else than what has already been provided.’

‘‘If this is not an accurate representation of our conversation, or if there

is any relevant information that I have not included, please advise any

necessary corrections or additions at your earliest opportunity.

‘‘Sincerely,

‘‘[The plaintiff].’’