UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 99-4396

ERIC PEARSON LEE, a/k/a Eric

Ingram,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-98-282)

Submitted: December 14, 1999

Decided: January 6, 2000

Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

James D. Williams, Jr., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Angela H. Miller, Assistant

United States Attorney, Kirsten Lee Dunton, Third-Year Law Student, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Eric Pearson Lee pled guilty to distributing 69.9 grams of cocaine

base (crack), see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994), and was sentenced to the

mandatory minimum term of 240 months imprisonment. He appeals

his sentence, arguing that the district court erred (1) in permitting the

government to amend its first information filed under 21 U.S.C. § 851

(1994), and (2) in finding that he was not eligible for a sentence

within the guideline range under the safety valve provision, see U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2 (1998). He also raises an

equal protection challenge to the statutory penalties for crack and

cocaine offenses. We affirm.

Before Lee entered his guilty plea, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, informing Lee that it would seek

an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) based on his prior New

York felony drug conviction. The information stated that Lee had

been convicted on May 5, 1993, of a violation of New York Statute

PL 220.16, a Class B felony, under Criminal Docket Number 1990-89

in the Superior Court of Kings County, New York. At the guilty plea

hearing in November 1998, Lee maintained that the information was

incorrect. Before sentencing, the government filed an amended information alleging a conviction in the same court with the same docket

number, but stating that Lee had been convicted on September 11,

1989, to a violation of New York Statute PL 220.09, a Class C felony,

for which he was sentenced on October 16, 1989.

Lee did not file a response to either information. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 851(c)(1) (defendant who denies allegation of prior conviction shall

file written response to § 851 information). However, at the first sentencing hearing in March 1999, Lee objected to enhancement for the

offense listed in the amended information, claiming that he had not

been given proper notice of it. The government maintained that the

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same offense was described in both the original and the amended

information, and that the amended information merely corrected clerical errors obtained from a computer printout. The district court

decided that Lee had received adequate notice of the prior conviction,

that the changes in the amended information were clerical corrections

which were permissible under § 851(a)(1), and that the offense was

a felony because Lee was exposed to a statutory maximum sentence

of fifteen years, even though he received a suspended sentence of

thirty days with five years probation.

Upon Lee's request that he be sentenced within the guideline range

under the safety valve provisions of USSG § 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3553(f) (West Supp. 1999), the district court continued sentencing

to permit the government to determine whether Lee had truthfully

provided all information concerning the offense. See USSG

§ 5C1.2(5). When sentencing resumed the following month, the probation officer had obtained more information from New York about

Lee's 1989 arrest for robbery, which had previously been listed in the

presentence report under "Other Arrests." The probation officer

learned that Lee had pled guilty to attempted second degree robbery

and had been sentenced to five years probation. The revised presentence report included one additional criminal history point for this

sentence, which made Lee ineligible for a sentence under the safety

valve provision. See USSG § 5C1.2(1). Although Lee maintained that

revision of the presentence report should not be permitted because the

district court had already made its findings concerning the offense

level and criminal history category, defense counsel stated that he had

had enough time to address the new criminal history issue and did not

ask for a continuance. The district court adopted the recommended

findings in the presentence report and sentenced Lee to 240 months

imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence.

Lee contends on appeal that the district court erred in allowing the

government to amend the original § 851 information. Section 851

provides that an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction may

not be imposed unless the government has filed and served on the

defendant, before his trial or guilty plea, an information "stating in

writing the previous conviction to be relied upon." 21 U.S.C.

§ 851(a)(1). Clerical errors in the information may be corrected

before sentencing. Id. The purpose of the requirement is to provide

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the defendant with "reasonable notice of the government's intent to

rely on a particular conviction and a meaningful opportunity to be

heard." United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th

Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d 416, 418-19

(7th Cir. 1992)).

Lee first argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his 1989 New York drug conviction was a felony

for federal sentencing purposes. The term "felony drug offense" is

defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(44) (West 1999) as "an offense that is

punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of

the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or

restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant

or stimulant substances." Lee's offense was classified as a felony

under New York law, and his conviction exposed him to a possible

maximum sentence of fifteen years. However, the state judge sentenced Lee to thirty days imprisonment and five years probation under

a provision which permitted a definite sentence of less than one year

of imprisonment due "to the nature and circumstances of the crime

and to the history and character of the defendant." N.Y. Penal Law

§ 70.00(4). Lee thus contends that the potential penalty for his particular offense did not exceed one year.

We resolved a similar question in United States v. Jones, ___ F.3d

___, 1999 WL 1020528 (4th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999), holding in that case

that the offense statutory maximum sentence, not the individual sentence applicable to the defendant, determined whether a prior offense

was punishable by a term exceeding one year. See Jones, 1999 WL

1020528, at *2. Under Jones, the district court in this case properly

looked to the fifteen-year offense statutory maximum and determined

that Lee's 1989 offense was a felony.

Next, Lee claims that the government failed to provide adequate

notice of the conviction it intended to rely on to enhance his sentence

because the changes in the amended information were more than clerical. We are unconvinced. The original information correctly identified the court and the docket number of Lee's prior conviction, which

left no doubt about which conviction the government intended to rely

upon for the enhancement, despite the incorrect date and statute subsection. See United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1997)

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(incorrect date was clerical error), and United States v. Campbell, 980

F.2d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1992) (incorrect citation of statute subsection

was clerical mistake). Because we find that the errors in the original

information were clerical, not substantive, the amended information

was also timely.

We find no merit in Lee's claim that the district court erred in permitting the probation officer to submit a revised presentence report

awarding him an additional criminal history point after the court had

made findings at the March 1999 sentencing hearing. Although Lee

suggests that there was a violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 3552(d) (1994),

which requires disclosure of the presentence report at least ten days

prior to sentencing, no violation of the statute occurred because the

presentence report was first disclosed in February 1999, more than a

month before the March sentencing hearing. Moreover, Rule

32(b)(6)(B) permits the probation officer to conduct further investigation and revise the presentence report "as appropriate." Consequently,

the district court did not err in permitting the probation officer to

revise the presentence report before the final sentencing hearing or in

considering the newly-discovered sentence to deny Lee the safety

valve reduction.

Finally, Lee argues that the statutory sentencing scheme for crack

and cocaine offenses violates the Equal Protection Clause. Because he

did raise this issue in the district court, the plain error standard of

review applies. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35

(1993). Lee contends, first, that two people with similar criminal histories cannot be sentenced differently because one distributed crack

and the other distributed the same amount of cocaine powder. Second,

he maintains that the adverse impact of the crack sentencing scheme

on black defendants violates equal protection. This court has more

than once rejected equal protection challenges to the penalty structure

for crack and cocaine offenses. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d

849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing cases). Therefore, the district court

did not plainly err in failing to find a violation of equal protection.

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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