Although H err era ’s notice of appea l and, conse quently , our ca ption refe r to appe llee as 1 Fr ancois A. “Gorda

n,” he identifies hi mself as Fr ancois A. “ Gordon” in his brief and in his trial cour t ple a din g s. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00115- CV
Jo se He r r e r a, App e lla nt

v. Seton Northwest Hospital an d Fr ancois A. Gor dan, M.D., Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 201ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN401539 , HO NORAB LE PATRI CK O . KEEL, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
I n th is a pp e al, we mus t de c ide wh e the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s r e qu ir e d to dis mis s a medical malpr actice suit based on the cla imant’s failure to se rv e an ex p er t report a nd curriculum vitae in compliance w ith chapter 74 of the c ivil practice and re medies code
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a ), (b) (West 2005). Be cause we c onclude that se ction 74.351(b)
man dat ed d ism iss a l of

the c la ima

nt’ s su it a

nd div e ste d th e dis tr ic t c ourt of dis c re tio n to ru le otherwise, w e af

firm the district cour

t’s order of dismissal. Se e id . § 74.351(b).
BACK GR OUND The re cord shows that J ose He rre ra sued Seton Northwest Hospital and F ranc ois A. Gordon, M.D. on May

14, 2004, alleg ing that they misdiagnose d his ruptured a pp en dix as food 1Rul e 5 g ov e rn s filing do c ume nts wi th t

he c ourt ’s c le rk , n ot serving do c ume nts to p a rt ie s. 2 Compare Tex. R. C iv. P. 5 with Tex. R. C iv. P. 21a (descr ibing methods of se rvice ). 2 poisoning. Unde r cha

pter 74, He rre ra was required to serve Dr. Gordon and the Hospital with a copy of a re po rt fr om his e xpe rt and his e xpe rt ’s curriculum vitae no later tha n September 11, 2004—the 120th day afte r filing his suit. S

ee id. § 74.351(a) . The e x pert re port provides a summary of the
e xpe rt ’s op ini on s re g ard ing the a pp lic a ble sta nd ard of c are , h owthe c la ima nt’ s p hy sic ian o r h e a lth
car e provide r fa iled to meet that standar d, and the c ausal re lationship between that failure a nd the claimant’s injury , harm, or da mag es. Id. § 74 .3 51 (r )( 6)
. Th e re c or d r e ve a ls that H e rr e ra fi le d w ith the district court a

n expert repor

t on J uly 16, 2004, in a document titled “Notice of F il i ng Ex pert Af fi davit .” He rr e ra

fi le d th e e xpe rt ’s curriculum vitae with the court on September 21, 2004, in a do c ume nt t itl e d “ F ir st A me nd e d N oti c e of F il in g E x pert Af

fi davit .” Ne ith e r o f t

he se do c ume nts contain any cer

tification that copies of

the re port and the curriculum vitae filed with the cour t were
serve d on Dr. Gor don, the Hospital, or their r espec tive counsel. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21a.

Dr. Gor don and the Hospital moved to dismiss Herre ra’ s claim under se ction 74.351, alleg ing that they

did not rece ive copies of the previously -filed e x pert re port and curriculum vitae until October 5, 2004, whe n Her rer a sent them both of the doc uments by fac simil e tra

nsmissi on. Her rer a re sponded that, under the “mailbox rule” in Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 5, the expert repor

t was “c onstructively

deli v er ed ” t o Dr. Gor don and the Hospital whe n Her rer a place d the properly addre ssed report into the control of the United States Postal Service
. See T e x. R. C i v . P
. 5. Her

rer a stated that he “wa s under the impre ssion that the curric ulum vitae ha d a lso 2 been f orwa rded pr operly

with same.” Alternatively , Her rer a arg ued that his claim should be allowe dSee Act of Ma y 5, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 14 0 , § 1 , 1 9 9 5 T ex . Gen. L aws 985, 986 3 (“a rticle 4590i”) repeale d and recodified as ame nded by Act of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.01, sec. 74.351, 2003 Te x . Gen. L aws 847, 875-77. 3 to proce ed under equitable principles beca use the failure to comply

with the require ments of sec tion 74.351 was not his fault and be cause his attorney had attempted to c omply with the statute in g ood faith. He rre ra e quated dismissal of his claim with the impositi on of “death pena lty sanctions” in the discovery context, see Tex. R. C iv. P. 215.2, and argued that it would be inappropriate for the court to impose such sanctions “a s a re sult of the inadver tent failure to deliver doc uments to [ Dr. Gor don and the Hospital] within the tim es set out in section 74.351.”

Her rer a’s f inal argument in response to the motion to d i s m i s s was that sec tion 74.351’s re strictions were unconstitutional. He urg ed that the r equire ments of sec tion 74.351 and its la c k of eq

uit y -b a se d pro vis ion s— su c h as tho se a va ila ble un de r c ha

pte r 7 4’ s p re de c e sso r, a rt ic le 4590i —constitute arbitra ry and unre asonable restric tions on his claim, viol ate the e qual protec tion 3 and due pr o ce s s gu ar an t ee s o f t h e s t at e a n d fe d er al co n s t i tu t i o n s , an d v i o l at e t h e T ex as C o n s t i tution’s open cour ts provision. After a hea ring on November

1, 2004, the district court g rante d Dr. Gor don’s and the Hospital’s motions to di smiss wit h prejudice
.

Her rer a filed a motion for new trial, rely ing on a November

30, 2004 aff

idavit from his co u n s e l’ s s e c r e ta

r y a s e v id e n c e th a t D r . G o r d o n an d th e H o s p it a l w e r e ti me ly s e r v e d with the expert’s repor

t. The secr etar

y aver red that “[o] n or about July 13, 2004, [she] draf

ted the Notice of F ili ngExpe rt

Af fi davit and [pr oc e e de d] to have same fi le d a nd ma ile d a c op y via regul ar mai l to opposing c ounsel.” He r af fid av i t d i d n ot addre ss service of the e x pert’s curriculum vitae . The4

rec ord shows that He rre ra obta ined an “ order for a setting” on his moti on fo r newtrial, but never obtained a he aringon it. Consequently , the motion for new tr ial was ove rruled by operation of law seventy -five da

y s after the cour t signe d its order of dismissal. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(c). He rr e ra br ing s tw o iss ues o n a pp e a l, a rguin g that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s dis c re tio n b y

dis mis sin g the c a se and

by fa ili ngto g ra

nt H e rr e ra ’s mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l.
DI SCU SSIO N Chapter 74 Be cause the re solution of Herre ra’ s issues depends upon h i s compliance with the statut or y re qu ir e me nts governi nghe a lthc are lia bil ity c la ims , w e be g in b y

br ie fl y re vie wi ngtho se require ments. I t is undisput ed that He rre ra’ s suit aga inst Dr. Gordon a nd the Hospital is gove rned by chapte r 74 of the c ivil practice and re medies code
. See T ex . C i v . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74 .0 01 -. 50 7 ( Wes t 20 05 & Sup p. 20 05 ). Cha pte r 7 4 r e qu ir e s c la ima

nts to p ro vid e e xpe rt

re po rt s in support of their suit, summarizi ng the expert’s opinions reg ardingthe applica ble standar d of ca

re, how the cla imant’s phy sician or he alth car e provide r fa iled to meet that s tandar d, and the c ausal relationship bet we en that failure and the c laimant’s injury , harm, or da mag es. Id. § 74.351(r) (6). Under the ver sion of section 74.351(a) applicable to this case , a claimant must serve the expert repor t with the curriculum vitae of ea ch expert listed in the repor t, w ithin 120 day s from the date that the claim was f

iled:
I n a hea lth care liability

claim, a c laimant shall, not later than the 120th da y afte r the date the c laim was filed, se rv e on each pa rty or the pa rty ’s attorne y

one or more exper t r e p o rts , w it

h a c u r r ic u lum v it a e o f

e a c h e xp e rt l is te d

in th e r e p o rt f

o r eac h ph y sic ian o r h e a lth c are pr ov ide r a g a ins t w ho m a lia bil ity c la im i s a sse rt e d. Th e dateThe most rec ent ver sion of section 74.351(a ) cha ng ed “not late r than the 120th day afte r 4 the date the c lai m was filed” to “not later than the 120th day afte r the date the original petit ion was filed.” Te x . C i v . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a ) (West Supp. 2005) (empha sis added). A s this clarification does not affe ct our discussion, we w ill refer to the curr ent ver sion of the statute. Sub se c tio n ( c ) o f s e c tio n 7 4. 35 1— wh ic h a pp lie s to re po rt s tha t the c ourt fi nd s d e fi c ie nt i n 5 substance—is inapplica

ble here
. See , e.g. , Lon gin o v . Cr os swh ite , 1 8 3 S. W. 3 d 9 1 3 , 9 1 8 n . 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na , 2 00 6, no pe t.) (n oti ngthat tr ia l c ourt c ou ld g ra nt e xten sio n of tim e to c la ima nts under se ction 74.351(c) beca use t heir report, although deficient, was timely filed). Subsection (c) state s: I f an e x pert re port has not bee n serve d within the period spec ified by Subsection 5 fo r s e rv ingthe re po rt may be e xten de d b y

wr itt e n a g re e me nt o f t

he a ff e c te d p art ie s. E ac h defe ndant phy sician or he alth car e provide r whose c onduct is impli cate d in a repor t must file and serve any objection to the sufficie ncy of the re port not later than the 21st day

afte r the date it was ser

ved, fa iling which a ll objections are w aived. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 205, § 10.01, 2003 Tex. Ge n. L aws 847, 875, amende d by Act of Ma

y 18, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 635, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 1590 (cur rent ve rsion at Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a ) (West Supp. 2005). 4

Be cause Her

rer a filed suit on May 14, 2004, his statutory deadline to se rve the repor t and curriculum vitae

— u n le s s th e p arti e s a g r e e d o th e r w is e
— w a s Se p te mb e r

11, 2004. See id. § 74.351(a)
. I f a c la im an t f a il s to s e r

v e th e r e p o rt w ith the curriculum vitae on or bef ore the statu t o ry deadline, a

nd the af fec ted phy sician or he alth car e provide r files a motion to di smiss t he claim under

section 74.351(b) , the cour t ha s no alternative but to dism iss the claim with prejudice : (b) I f, as to a de fenda

nt phy sician or he alth car e p rovider, a n expert repor

t has not been serve d within the pe riod specif ied by Subsection (a) [t he 120-da y period], the court, on the motion of the aff ecte d phy sician or he alth car e provide r, sh all , subject to S ub se c tio n ( c ), e nte r a n o rd e r t hat: 5(a) beca use elements of the repor t a re found defic ient, the court ma y gra n t one 30-day extension to the claimant in order to cure the def iciency . I f the c laimant does not rec eive notice of t he court’s ruling g ranting the ex tension until after the 12 0- da y de a dli ne ha s pas se d, the n th e 30 -d ay e xten sio n s ha ll r

un fr om t he date the plaintiff first re ceive d the notice. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(c ).
6 (1) awa rds to the af

fec ted phy sic i an o r h ealth ca re pr ovider re asonable attorney ’s fee s and costs of c ourt incurr ed by the phy sician or he alth car e provide r; and (2 ) dis mis se s th e c la im w ithre sp e c t to the ph y sic ian o r h e a lthc are pr ov ide r, wi th pr e jud ic e to t

he re fi lin g of

the c la im.
Id . § 74 .3 51 (b ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o Boothe v. D ixon , 1 8 0 S. W. 3 d 9 1 5 , 9 1 8 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Thus, our thr eshold inquiry is whether H err era

complied with section 74.351(a) by serving his ex pert’s r eport a nd curriculum vitae befor e the 120-day statutory deadline.
Service of expert re port und er c hapter 74

I n his first i s sue, He rre ra a rg ues that the district cour t abused its discretion by dismiss ing his c ase. H e urg es this Court to find that he complied with s ection 74.351(a ) by “construc tive delivery” of the expert repor t and curriculum vitae u s in g r e g u la r mail. See Te x. R. Civ. P . 5
. Alternatively , if section 74.351 does not a uthorize service by

regular mail, He rre ra sug g ests that the cour

t should have g rante d a 30-day extension to him for his g ood-fa ith attempt at service , either unde r sec tion 74.351(c) or due to “e quitable consider ations.” See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(c ). He rre ra’ s final asser tion is t hat if sec tion 74.351 preve nts him fr omRule 5 states t hat “[i] f any document is sent to the prope r cle rk by first-cla ss United States 6 mail in a n envelope or wra

pper pr operly

addre ssed and stampe d and is deposited in the mail on or b e f o r e t h e l a s td ay f

o r f i l i n g s a m e , t h e s a m e , i f

r e c e i v e d b y t h e c l e r

k n o tm o r e t h ant e nd ays t a r d i l y, shall be filed by

the c lerk a

nd be dee med filed in time. A leg ible postmark af fix ed by the United States Postal S ervic e shall be pr ima fac ie evidenc e of the date of mailing.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 5. Article 4590i stated: 7
Not later tha

n the later

of t h e 1 8 0 th day

afte r the date on which a health ca re liability claim is filed . . . t h e claimant shall, for ea ch phy sician or he alth car e provider a g ainst whom a cla im is asserted: (1) fur nis h to counsel for

eac h phy sician or he alth car e provide r o n e or more expert repor

ts, with a curr iculum vitae of e ach e x pert listed in the re port.
. . . Act o f M ay 5 , 1 9 9 5 , 7 4 th

L e g . , R. S. , c h
. 1 4 0 , § 1 , 1 9 9 5 T e x. G e n . L aw s 9 8 5 , 9 86 repeale d and recodified as amende d by Act of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.01, sec. 74.351, 2003 7 curinghis untim ely

s er v i ce of an e x pert re port and curriculum vitae , the statute must be
un c on sti tut ion a l. T he se pr op os iti on s are wi tho ut m e ri t.

Her rer a’s “ constructive d e li v e r y ” a r g u me nt is not supported by

rule of c ivil procedure 5. Under rule 5, doc uments that are prope rl y ad d resse d, stamped and de posited in the mail on or be fo re a fi lin g de a dli ne wi ll b e de e me d ti me ly fi le d, so lon g a s the c ourt ’s c le rk re c e ive s the m w ith in ten day s of t heir maili ng . See Te x. R. Civ
. P. 5. He rr e ra ’s re lia nc e on ru le 5 is mis pla c e d b e c a

us e 6 the par ties do not dispute that Her rer a’s expert repor

t and curriculum vitae wer e filed . The c rux of t h eir disput e is whethe r copie s of these f iled documents we re serve d o nth e p arti e s in

a c corda nce with section 74.351(a)
.

The distinction betwe en filing and ser ving a n expert repor

t and curriculum vitae is amplified for claims g overne d by chapte r 74 beca use article 4590i claimants we re me rely require d to “ fu rn ish ” e xpe rt

re po rt s, bu t c ha

pte r 7 4 c la ima

nts mus t “ se rv e ” the m. See , e.g. , Salazar v. 7Tex. Gen. L aws 847, 875-77 ( emphasis adde d). 8

Canales , 85 S.W .3d 859, 863-64 (Te x . App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no p et
. ) (holding that expert repor t “furnishe d ” b y

r e g ular mail satisfied statutory require ments of ar

ticle 4590i, section 13.01(d) ).

“ Se r v e ” is n o t d e f

in e d in s e c ti o n7 4
. 3 5 1 ( a )
. T h e c o d e c o n s tr u c ti o na c t p r o v ides g uidance , howeve r. I t states that “wor ds and phra ses that have acquir ed a te chnica l or particular meaning , whether

by leg islative definition or otherwise , shall be construed ac cording ly .” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(b) (West 2005). “Serve ” and “ serve d” have distinct and familiar leg al meaning s under our rules of civil pr ocedur e. See Tex. R. Civ. P . 21a. The rules of c ivil procedure g overn all actions of a civil nature in T exas c ourts unless a specific exception a pplies. Tex. R . Civ. P. 2 . We a g re e wi th o ur

sis te r c ourt ’s c on c lus ion

that, g ive n th e a

pp li cabi li ty of the ru le s o f c ivi l proce dure to he alth car e liability claims and the use of “se rve” and “se rved” i n the statute, the leg islature intended f

or cla imants to comply

with Texas Rul e of Civil Procedure 2 1 a t o fu l fi ll the require ments of section 74.351(a ). Ke nd ric k v . G ar c ia , 171 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, pet. filed); see also Quint v. Alex ander , No. 03-04-00819- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 8868, at *7 (Te x . App.—Austin, Oct. 28, 2005, pet. de nied) (me m. op.).

Th is c on str

uc tio n c omp or

ts w iththe le g isl a tur e ’s chan ge o f the wo rd “ fu rn ish ” in section 13.01(d) to “ serve ” in se ction 74.351(a)
. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2005) (allowing court to consider leg islative history

and for mer statutory

provisions in construing statute)
. We presume that the le g islature ena cted the statutory chang e with knowledg e of e x isting law. See Ack er v. Tex as W

ater Comm’n , 790 S.W .2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (“Astatute is presumed to have be e n e na c te d b y

the le g isl a tur e wi th c omp le te kn ow le dg e of the e xistin g law a

nd wi th r e fe re nc e to9

it. ” ). Th e re fo re , w e may

a lso pr e su me its awa

re ne ss of the me anin g a tta c he d to the wo rd “ se rv e ” in rule 21a
. Rule 21a authorizes four methods for service upon a party : (1) delivery in person, by ag ent, o r b y c o u r ie r - r e c e ip te d

d e li v e r y ; ( 2 ) c e rti f

ie d o r r e g is te r e d

ma il ; ( 3 ) te le p h o n ic d o c u ment tr ans fe r; or

(4 ) s uc h o the r m ann e r a s th e c ourt in i ts d isc re tio n ma

y dir e c t. T e x. R. C iv. P. 2 1a ; see also Quint , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 8868, at *7-8. The party or attorney of rec ord must c ertify to the court compliance with this rule in writing over signatur e and on the fil ed ins trument. Id
. A p a rt y who ac complishes service under r ule 21a is entit led t o a pre sumption of delivery
. Id . ( “ A c e rt if ic a te by a par ty or an attorney

of re cord, or

the re turn of the offic er, or the af fidavit of any

other pe rson showing service of a notice shall be prima f acie evidenc e of the fac t of servic e.”)
. Her rer a did not use any

of the methods authoriz ed by rule 21a to serve c opies of the expert repor

t and curriculum vitae on Dr. G o rd o n o r the Hospital bef ore the expiration of the statutory deadline. Her

rer a only contends that his ex pert’s r eport a nd curriculum vitae we re tim e ly
se nt t o o pp os ingc ouns e l by re g ula r m a il. We a

re pe rs ua de d by our s ist e r c ourt ’s ho ldi ngtha t a pa rt y who sends docume n t s t o another by regular mail—which is not authorized by rule 21a —does not comply with the 120-day service require ment in section 74.351. Kendrick , 1 71 S.W. 3d a t 70 4; see also Quint , 2 00 5 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 88 68 , a t *6 -8 (c on c lud ing that pa rt y ’s fi lin g of e xpe rt

re po rt wi th dis tr ic t c le rk

wa s n ot t anta

mou nt t o “ se rv ing ” re po rt

up on ano the r un de r se c tio n 7 4. 35 1( a ) b e c a us e it w a s n ot o ne of

ru le 21 a ’s a

uth or ize d me tho ds of

se rv ic e ); c

f. Salazar , 85 S.W .3d at 863-64 (h old ing that e xpe rt re po rt “ fu rn ish e d” by re g ula

r ma il satis fi e d statut or

y re qu ir e me nts of art icle 45 90 i, s e c tio n 1 3. 01 (d ))
. F ur the rm or e , b e c a

us e the re c or d s ho ws that th e no tic e s H e rr e ra fi le d w ithIn h i s m o t i o nf o r n e w t r i a l , H e r

r e r a i n t r o d u c e d ana f f i d a v i tf r o m h i s c o u n s e l ’ s s e c r e t a r y, 8 executed almost one month afte r the dismissal of Her rer a’s c laim, as evidenc e that Dr . Gordon a nd the Hospital wer e timely

serve d with the expert’s repor t. But the sec reta

ry did not aver that the expert repor

t was ser ved in a method a

uthorized by

rule 21a , and she doe s not mention any service of the e x pert’s curriculum vitae
. 10 the district court did not incl u d e any cer tificate of service sug g esting compliance with rule 21a, 8 H e r r e r a w a s n o te n t i t l e d

t o an y p r e s u mp t i o no f

d e l i v e r y. Be cause section 74.351(a) contemplates service to pa rties consistent with the rules of c ivi l pr oc e dure and

be c a us e He rr e ra

did no t us e any

me tho d of se rv ic e a

uth or ize d b y

ru le 21 a to deliver copies of his expert’s repor t and curriculum vitae within 120 day s of filing suit, we c onclude that Her rer a fa iled to prove c ompliance with the statutory deadline. We now consider whether any
e xce pti on e xcu se s h is n on c omp lia

nc e and pr e ve nts dis mis sa l of

his c la im. Exceptions f

or agre ed exte nsion s or deficient report Her rer a ar gu es t hat his failure to timely serve the re port from his expert and the curriculum vitae should have been e x cused be cause it was unintentional and the re sult of acc ident
or m istake. Her

rer a appe ars to allude to f ormer se ction 13.01(g ) in article 4590i. See Act of Ma y 5, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 140, § 1, se c. 13.01(g ), 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 985, 986 (“ article 4590i”). The leg islature repe aled this provision when it enacte d chapte r 74. Com pa re Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. § 74.351 with article 4590i, § 13.01(g ). A provision in secti o n 7 4
. 3 5 1 (a) does allow parties to extend the date for serving an expert repor t by written ag ree ment but the rec ord does not show that Her

rer a attempted to avail him self of this opti on. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 74.351(a)
.11 He rr e ra ’s ne xt ar g ume nt i s th a t he sh ou ld have be e n g ra nte d the 30 -d ay

e xten sio n in section 74.351(c ). That section is inapplicable beca use i t permits ext ensions for e x pert re ports that th e c o u rt f

in d s d e f ic ie n t in s u

b s ta n c e , n o t f o r r e p o rts th a t ar e f

il e d u n ti me ly
. See , e.g. , Longino v. Cro ssw hit e , 1 8 3 S.W .3d 913, 918 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). While Herr era
su g g e sts tha

t it wo uld have be e n eq

uit a ble to g ra nt him a 30 -d ay e xten sio n b e c a us e he a tte mpt e d to
serve the re port in g ood faith, there is no such exception to the proce dure se t forth in section 74.351. See Ke ndrick , 171 S.W .3d at 705.

We c on c lud e that H e rr e ra did no t e sta bli shthe a

pp lic a bil ity of any e xce pti on

to section 74.351(a) t hat would preve nt dismiss al of his claim for failure to serve an expert re port and

cu r r iculum vitae u

p o nD r . G o r d o nan d

th e H o s p it a l o no r

b e f o r e Se p te mb e r

1 1 , 2 0 0 4
. H a v ing established that Herre ra did not serve a copy of hi s expert’s repor t upon Dr. Gordon and the Hospital
a s r e qu ir e d b y

se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 a

nd that hi s f

a ilure to d o s o w a s n ot ex cus ed, we e xami ne his constitutional challeng es to the statute.
Constitutional chal lenges to sec tion 74.351

Her rer a ar g ues that sec tion 74.351 is unconstit utional, citing summarily to the due proce ss and equa l protection g uara ntees of the fede ral a

nd state constitutions, as we ll as the open courts provisions of t he Tex as C onstitut ion. See U.S. Const. amend. X I V; Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 13. He urg es t hat t he requirements of section 74.351 and its l ack of equity -base d provisions—such as tho se a va ila

ble un de r c ha

pte r 7 4’ s pr e de c e sso r, art ic le 45 90 i—c on sti tut e arb itr ary and un re a so na

ble restric tions on his claim. W hen re viewing the constitutional i t y o f a s t atut e, we beg in with aWe n ote that H e rr e ra ’s argume nt i s fl awe d be c a us e se c tio n 74 .3 51 do e s c on ta in e qu ita ble 9 provisions that would allow cer tain defe cts to be cur ed and t h e cl aim to proce ed. F or instance ,

12 presumption that it is constit utional. W alker v . Gutierrez , 111 S.W. 3d 56 , 66 ( Te x. 20 03 ); se e als o T ex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(1) ( West 2005). The wisdom or expediency of the lawis the leg islature’s pr erog ative, not ours. Te x as W or k e rs’ Com p. Com m’n v . G ar c ia , 893 S.W .2d 504, 520 (Tex. 1995). The party challeng ing a statute’s constitutionality has the burde n of provingthat the statute fails to meet c onstitut ional require ments. W alker , 111 S.W .3d at 66

. I n c ha lle ng ing the c on sti tut ion a lity of a statut e , a pa rt y may sh owthat th e statut e is unconstitutional on its fa ce or as a pplied to that party
. Ga rc ia , 8 93 S.W. 2d a t 51 8 n .1 6; se e als o City of Corpus C

hristi v. P u b l i c Ut i l

. Comm’n of Tex. , 51 S.W .3d 231, 240-41 (Te x . 2001) (Ow en, J.,
c o n c u r r i n g )
. T o s u s t a i n a f

a c i a l c h a l l e n g e , t h e p art y m u s ts h o w t h a tt h e s t a tu t e , b y i t s t e r m s , a l w a ys operates unconstitutionally
. Id. To sustain an “as applied” challeng e, the pa rty must show that the statute is unconstituti onal when a pplied to that particular

person or set of fa cts. Id. He re , H e rr e ra

did no t c ite any

a uth or ity or make any

argume nt t

hat w ou ld s up po rt

a fac ial challeng e to the constitutionality of sec tion 7 4
. 3 5 1 . He mer ely asser ts that the restrictions
se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 im

po se s o n cla im ant s are “ arb itr ary and un re a so na

ble .” B e c a

us e He rr e ra

fa ile d to demonstrate that section 74.351 alwa y s operates unconstitutionally , his c halleng e to the statute a s fac ially unconstitutional is not persua sive. He rr e r a d i d c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y o f s e c t i o n 7 4
. 3 5 1 , a s a p p l i e d t o h im,
asser ting that the c urre nt statute’s l ack of equitable provisions—previously available under se ction 13.01(g ) of a

rticle 4590i—precludes him from curing defe cts and ba rs his claim. Her

rer a urg es that 9su

bs e c tio n ( a ) p e rm its the pa rt ie s to e xten d th e date fo r s e rv ingthe e xpe rt ’s re po rt by a g re e me nt. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a ). B e c a us e He rr e ra

pr e se nte d n o a

uth or ity and fa ile d to br ie f his e qu a l pr ote c tio n a rgume nt, 10 we ne ed not addr ess it. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(h). 13 the re qu ir e me nts of

se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 c on sti tut e an a rb itr ary and un re a so na

ble re str ic tio n o n h is c la im, in v iol a tio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts to e qu a l pr ote c tio n, du e pr oc e ss, and op e n c ourt s. 10 Wit h reg ard to He rre ra’ s due proc ess cha lleng e, the supre me cou rt has held that dismiss al of a

suit due to a claimant’s failure to f ile a compliant expert re port does not violate due proce ss gua

rante es, eve n in the absenc e of notice of the re port’s noncomplianc e bef ore the motion to dismi ss. W

alker , 111 S.W .3d at 66 (apply ing former article 4590i). The c ourt rea soned that due proce ss does n o t re q uire “ prior notice that the law is serious about a clea rly stated conse quence .” Id. Her

rer a’s open co u rt s argument is simi larly misguided. Aclaimant who br ings a n op e n c ourt s chal leng e ha s th e burd e n o f s ho wi ngthat th e e xpe rt -r e po rt re qu ir e me nts a c tua lly preve nted him from pursuing his claims. M c G lo th li n v . Cu ll ington , 989 S. W. 2 d 4 4 9 , 4 5 3 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) . The open courts provision is premised upon the rationale that the le g isl a tur e ha s n o p ow e r t o ma ke a re me dy by du e c ours e of

law c on tin g e nt u

po n a n “ imp os sib le condition.” Moreno v . Sterling Drug, Inc ., 787 S.W .2d 348, 355 (Tex. 1990). Her rer a did not produce any evidenc e that the requirements of section 74.351 worke d to preve nt him from pursuing his claim. See Ma rq ue

z v . P ro v ide nc e Me m. Ho sp ., 57 S.W .3d 585, 595 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied)
. I n fac t, H err era ’s pleading s char acte rized the situation as the “re sult of the inadver tent14

failure to deliver doc uments.” Thus, He rre ra does not argue that it would have be en impossible for him to have complied with sec tion 74.351, only that he fa iled to do so. Her rer a’s situation para llels that of the claimant in T h o yakulathu v. Brennan , who had filed expert re ports but had not serve d them on other parties to the suit. No. 06-05-00070-CV, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 3308, at *15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, A pril 27, 2006, no pet. h.) ( mem. op.). Whe n B re nn an atte mpt e d to se rv e the re po rt s b y fa c sim ile , o n th e la st d ay to t ime ly se rv e the re po rt s, his facsimile mac hine malfunc tioned. Id
. at *3. The district c ourt denied a motion to di smiss under 74.351(b). Id . Reversingthe lower court’s r uli n g, o u r s i ster cour

t concluded that section 74.351

“ ne e d n ot pr ov ide e xce pti on s tha t wou ld en c omp a ss any c on c e iva ble c omp lic a tio n in

or de r t o p a ss constitutional must er.” Id. a t *1 5. Th e c ourt a lso ov e rr

ule d B re nn an’ s con te nti on that du e pr oc e ss require d section 74.351 to provide a claimant with additional extensions or a means of se eking relief from the c onsequenc es for failure t o m ee t the statutory deadline. Id . Her

rer a’s c onstitut ional challeng es ar e equa lly

unpersua sive. The district c o u rt ’s dismiss al of He rre ra’ s claim was manda tory under se ction 74 .3 51 (b ). He rr e ra

did no t est a

bli sh the a

pp lic a bil ity of any e xce pti on

to t he statut or

y pr oc e dure in 74.351(a) or demonstrate that the statute wa s unconstitutional. According ly , we ove rrule H err era ’s first issue.
Motion for new trial

I n his second issue, Herre ra asserts t hat t he dis trict court a bused its discretion by

not g ranting his moti on for new t rial. Her rer a obtained an “order f

or a se tting” on January

18, 2005, butThe c ourt, howeve r, re tained p l enary power to chang e its judgme nt until Februa ry 15, 11 2005, the 105th day

afte r it signe d the orde r of dismissal. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 3 2 9 b (e ). Herre ra’ s motion for new tria l could have be en hea rd while the c ourt reta ined plenar y power . 15 d i d n o to b t a i na

h e ar i n g o n h i s m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l , an d t h e c o u rt d i d n o t r u l e o ni t
. C o n s e qu e n t l y, it w a s o ve rr

ule d b y op e ratio n o f l aw s e ve nty -f ive da y s a ft e r the c ourt

sig ne d it s o rd e r o f d ism iss a l. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(c). We revie w t he dis trict court’s decision g ranting or deny ing a motion 11 for ne w trial for

an abuse of discre tion. Clif f v. Huggins , 724 S
. W
. 2 d 7 7 8 , 7 7 8-79 (Te x . 1987). When a motion for new tr ial is overrule d by operation of

law, as he re, the question become s whether the court abused its discr etion by allowing the motion to be overr uled. L i mestone Const r., Inc. v

. Summit Commercial Indus. Props., Inc ., 143 S.W .3d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). A court abuses its discretion when it fails to corre ctly analy ze or apply

the law. In re E.I

. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 1 36 S.W. 3d 21 8, 22 3 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Comanche Nation v. Fox , 128 S.W .3d 745, 749 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 04 , n o p e t.) . In matte rs c omm itt e d to a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, the te st i s whether the cour t acted a rbitrar ily or without ref

ere nce to guiding legal principles. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004).

I n his moti on for ne w trial, He rre ra introduc ed an aff i d av i t from his counsel’s
secr etar y , executed almost one month afte r the dismissal of Her rer a’s c lai m , as evidenc e that Dr
. Gordon a nd the Hospital wer e timely serve d with his ex pert’s r eport. Ba s ed on the re citals in the aff idavit a nd under rule 21a, Her

rer a contends that he is entitled to a pre sumption t hat “a document proper ly sent was r ece ived by

the addr essee .” See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21a.Additionally , we note that the expert’s curr iculum vitae was not filed wit h the di strict court 12 until September 21, 2004—afte r t he ex piration of the 120- day deadline. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code § 74.351(a)
. 16

Her rer a’s r eliance on this affidavit is misplace d. The secr etar y testified that “[o] n or about J uly

13, 2004, [she] draf

ted the Notice of F iling Expert Affidavit and [procee ded] to have same filed a

nd mailed a c opy

via re g ular ma i l t o o p p o s ing c ounsel.” She doe s not attest to any service of the e x pert’s curriculum vitae on Dr. Gordon and the Hospital. Nor doe s she ave r that 12 the e xpe rt re po rt wa s se rv e d b y

any of the me tho ds a

uth or ize d by ru le 21 a . H e r t e sti mony c on fi rm s the fa ct that t he documents wer e sent by regular mail only . Wit hout a demonstration of c ompliance
w i t h s e r v i c e u n d e r

r u l e 2 1 a , t h e r e i s n o p r e s u mp t i o no f d e l i v e r y. Her rer a’s introduc tion of the aff id avit for the f

irst time in his motion for new tria l sug g ests that he conside red the aff idavit “ newly -discover ed evidenc e,” justifying a new tria l. But
e v i d e n c e t h a tw a s , o r

c o u l d h a v e b e e n , d i s c o v e r e d

u s i n g r e a s o n a

b l e d i l i g e n c e i s n o tn e w l ydiscovere d. J

ac k so n v . V an W ink le , 660 S.W .2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983) (over ruled on other

g rounds); Pa tri ac c a v . F

ro st , 98 S.W .3d 303, 307 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). With the exercise of

rea sonable dili gen ce , He rrera c ould have pr esente d the af fidavit in response to the motions t o dismiss or at the N ovember 1 hear ing. H err era has not met his burden of show ing that the trial cour

t acted a rbitrar ily or unrea sonably by allowing his motion for new trial to be overr uled. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule H err era ’s sec ond issue.17 CO NC LU SION Be cause Her

rer a fa iled to serve a

copy of his expert’s repor

t upon Dr. Gordon a

nd the Ho sp ita l a s ma

nd a te d b y se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 a

nd be c a us e he did no t dem on str a te that se c tio n 7 4. 35 1 is
un c on sti tut ion a l, w e c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t cou rt wa s re qu ir e d to dismi ss H e rr e ra ’s c la ims wi th pr e ju d ic e . We f

urth e r c o n c lu d e th a t th e c o u rt d id n o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o n b y a ll o wing Herrer a’s motion for new tria l to be overr uled by operation of law. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the district court’s
or de r o f d ism iss a l.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: June 23, 2006