a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2005 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Actions Needed 

to Improve the 

Availability of Critical 

Items during Current 

and Future Operations

GAO-05-275
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-275.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis at 

(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-275, a report to 

congressional committees 

April 2005

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Actions Needed to Improve the 

Availability of Critical Items during 

Current and Future Operations 

U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO reviewed. 

According to the 2004 National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have 

sufficient quantities of the right items at the right time. However, demand for 

the seven items exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and 

September 2004. The documented impact of these shortages varied between 

combat units. For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported 

that tire shortages reduced their operational capability, forcing them to 

abandon equipment, the 4th Infantry Division reported no similar effect. 

GAO identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to shortages of 

the reviewed items, including inaccurate Army war reserve spare parts 

requirements and ineffective distribution. Annual updates of Army war 

reserve parts requirements have not been conducted since 1999. As a result, 

the war reserves did not contain enough track shoes, batteries, and tires to 

support U.S. forces during initial operations. Effective distribution relies on 

a seamless process to promptly move supplies from the United States to a 

customer. GAO found that conflicting doctrinal responsibilities for 

distribution management, improperly packed shipments, insufficient 

transportation personnel and equipment, and inadequate information 

systems prevented the timely availability of four of the items. 

Systemic Deficiencies Contributing to Shortages of Seven GAO-Selected Items 

Item 

Inaccurate Army 

war reserve 

requirements 

Inaccurate 

supply 

forecasts 

Insufficient 

and delayed 

funding 

Delayed 

acquisition

Ineffective 

distribution 

Batteries X X X X 

Tires X X X X 

Vehicle track shoes X X X 

Body armor X X 

Meals Ready-toEat X X 

Up-armored 

HMMWVs and kits X 

Vehicle generatorsa X 

Chem-bio suits No shortage identified 

Rotor bladesa No shortage identified 

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

These are Marine-Corps-only items. 

While U.S. troops developed short-term solutions to manage item 

shortages during OIF, DOD and the services have begun to undertake 

systemic, long-term changes to fix some supply problems identified. While 

GAO did not evaluate their potential for success, the majority of the 

changes are focused on distribution, and not on the full gamut of systemic 

deficiencies GAO identified. 

GAO has identified spare parts 

supply as a long-standing 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

management problem. In 

December 2003, GAO reported on 

problems with Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) logistics support 

including shortages of spare parts 

and supplies in Iraq. This report 

expands on that effort by assessing 

(1) what supply shortages were 

experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq 

between October 2002 and 

September 2004 and what impact 

the shortages had on their 

operations, (2) what primary 

deficiencies in the supply system 

contributed to any identified supply 

shortages, and (3) what actions 

DOD has taken to improve the 

timely availability of supplies for 

current and future operations. 

To address these objectives, GAO 

judgmentally selected nine items 

based on lessons learned and 

after-action reports that 

represented possible shortages 

with operational impacts. 

What GAO Recommends

This report contains several 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of Defense directing that actions, 

such as ensuring the accuracy of 

Army war reserve requirements 

and developing and exercising 

deployable distribution 

capabilities, be taken to improve 

DOD’s system for supplying items 

to U.S. forces. DOD concurred with 

the intent of the recommendations 

and cited actions it has taken or 

will be taking. 
Page i GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 9

Supply Shortages Reduced Operational Capability and Increased 

Risk to Troops in Iraq 19

Multiple Supply Chain Deficiencies Contributed to 

Supply Shortages 24

DOD Actions to Improve Supply Availability for Current and 

Future Operations 48

Conclusions 50

Recommendations for Executive Action 51

Matter for Congressional Consideration 53

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 54

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 57

Appendix II: Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators 61

Appendix III: Armored Vehicle Track Shoes 67

Appendix IV: Interceptor Body Armor 75

Appendix V: Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits 82

Appendix VI: BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries 87

Appendix VII: Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades 96

Appendix VIII: Meals Ready-to-Eat 100

Appendix IX: Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled 

Vehicle Tires 107

Appendix X: Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 

and Add-on-Armor Kit 117

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Defense 128

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 142
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Tables Table 1: Systemic Deficiencies Contributing to Shortages of Seven 

GAO-Selected Items 5

Table 2: DOD and Joint Guidance on Distribution 16

Table 3: Systemic Deficiencies Contributing to Shortages of Seven 

Supply Items 25

Table 4: War Reserve Requirements, On-Hand Stock, and Items 

Requested Worldwide 26

Table 5: Status of On-Hand Army War Reserve Spare Parts 

Requirements as of October 2004 28

Table 6: Item and Supply Manager 57

Table 7: Organizations Interviewed during Review 58

Table 8: Forecasted and Actual Demand for Abrams and Bradley 

Track Shoes (March-May 2003) 69

Table 9: CECOM Unfunded Requirements for Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2003 93

Figures Figure 1: CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility 10

Figure 2: Total Military Personnel Deployed in CENTCOM’s Area of 

Responsibility in Support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, December 2002 

through September 2004 12

Figure 3: DOD’s Joint Distribution System 18

Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2003 Army Working Capital Fund Supply 

Management Requirements and Cumulative Obligation 

Authority Received 32

Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2003 DLA Supply Management Requirements 

and Cumulative Obligation Authority Received 35

Figure 6: Assault Amphibian Vehicle and Generator 61

Figure 7: Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generator Demand and Back 

Orders for OIF by Quarter (3rd quarter fiscal year 2001 

through 4th quarter fiscal year 2004) 63

Figure 8: Abrams Tank Track 67

Figure 9: Interceptor Body Armor 75

Figure 10: Worldwide Demand, Production Output, and Back Orders 

for Vests by Quarter (December 2001 through 

September 2004) 77

Figure 11: Worldwide Demand, Production Output, and Back Orders 

for Plates by Quarter (December 2001 through 

September 2004) 78

Figure 12: Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology 

Suit 82
Contents

Page iii GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 13: BA-5590 Lithium Battery 87

Figure 14: Worldwide Demand, Inventory Levels, and Back Orders 

for BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries by Month 

(October 2001 through August 2004) 89

Figure 15: Worldwide Forecasted Requirements, Demand, and 

Production Output for BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium 

Batteries by Month (October 2001 through 

August 2004) 92

Figure 16: Rotor Blades on CH-53E Super Stallion 96

Figure 17: UH-1N Rotor Blade Demand and Back Orders by Month 

(March 2003 through September 2004) 97

Figure 18: CH-53E Rotor Blade Demand and Back Orders by Month 

(March 2003 through September 2004) 98

Figure 19: Meal Ready-to-Eat 100

Figure 20: Forecasted Requirements, OIF Demand, Production 

Output, and Inventory for MREs (December 2002 through 

June 2003) 102

Figure 21: M-923 5-ton Truck 107

Figure 22: Worldwide Demand, Back Orders, and Inventory Level 

for the 5-ton Truck Tire by Month (February 2002 through 

September 2004) 109

Figure 23: Worldwide Demand, Back Orders, and Inventory Level 

for the HMMWV Tire by Month (February 2002 through 

September 2004) 110

Figure 24: TACOM’s Actual and Reset Requirements, Funding 

Executed and Received by Month, Fiscal Year 2003 114

Figure 25: Up-Armored HMMWV 118

Figure 26: Add-on-Armor Kit Mounted on HMMWV 119

Figure 27: Up-Armored HMMWV Requirements, Production Output, 

and Redistribution from August 2003 through 

September 2004 121

Figure 28: Add-on-Armor Requirements and Production Output, 

November 2003 through September 2004 122

Figure 29: Up-Armored HMMWV Funding, Requirements, 

Production Output by Month (August 2003 through 

September 2004) 126
Contents

Page iv GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Abbreviations

AAV Assault Amphibian Vehicle

AMC Army Materiel Command

ATLASS Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System

CECOM Communications-Electronics Command

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

HMMWV High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle

JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology

MRE Meals Ready-to-Eat

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

TACOM Tank-automotive and Armaments Command

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Page 1 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 8, 2005 Letr

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

To support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the largest deployment of U.S. 

troops since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a massive logistics effort,1

 moving more 

than 2 million short tons of cargo including equipment, spare parts, 

supplies, and other items several thousand miles to the Persian Gulf. This 

effort started in late 2001 as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)2

 began 

planning for OIF, accelerated as troops deployed in the fall of 2002 and 

major combat operations were launched on March 19, 2003, and continues 

today while U.S. and coalition forces undertake stabilization efforts in Iraq. 

From October 2002 through September 2004, DOD reported spending 

$51.7 billion for operating support, including fuel, spare parts, and facilities 

management, and $10.7 billion for transportation of personnel and supplies 

to sustain3

 U.S. forces before, during, and after major combat operations in 

1

 DOD defines “logistics” as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and 

maintenance of forces. Logistics has six functional areas: supply, maintenance, 

transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services. This report will focus 

on supply and transportation.

2

 CENTCOM is one of DOD’s five geographic combatant commands whose area of 

responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, South and Central Asia, and the 

Horn of Africa.

3

 DOD defines sustainment as the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support 

required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or 

revision of the mission or of the national objective.
Page 2 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Iraq. Despite these expenditures, there have been widespread reports of 

serious shortages of some critical items needed by U.S. troops.

DOD relies on a number of individual processes and activities, known 

collectively as supply chain management, to purchase, produce, and deliver 

products and services to the warfighter during contingency operations 

consistent with the National Military Strategy. The goal of supply chain 

management is to deliver the “right items to the right place at the right 

time” for the warfighter. To meet the initial increase in demand during a 

contingency, DOD depends on its war reserves—stocks of specifically 

designated weapon systems, equipment, spare parts,4

 and other items that 

are amassed during peacetime. The war reserves are intended to fill the gap 

until the national supply system can increase production.5

 DOD relies on 

defense working capital funds to finance the flow of supplies to the 

services. These revolving funds are financed by sales revenue rather than 

direct appropriations. Working capital funds allow the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) and the services’ logistics agencies to purchase needed 

items from suppliers. Military units then order items from the logistics 

agencies and pay for them with appropriated funds when the requested 

items—either from inventory or manufacturers—are delivered to the units. 

Supplies are shipped from the United States by air and sea through DOD’s 

joint distribution system and delivered to deployed units.

Since the 1990s, we have identified DOD’s supply chain management as a 

high-risk area because of high inventory levels and a supply system that 

was not responsive to the needs of the warfighter. In a substantial body of 

work, we have examined a range of problems, including inventory 

management and shortages of critical spare parts.6

 DOD also recognizes

4

 Spare parts are defined as repair parts and components, including kits, assemblies, and 

subassemblies (both reparable and non-reparable) required for equipment maintenance.

5

 See Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System, Chapter 6, 

Section I, Paragraph 6-1, c. (3), Army Regulation 710-1 (Apr. 15, 2003) and GAO, 

Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain, 

GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001).

6

 See GAO, Defense Inventory: The Department Needs a Focused Effort to Overcome 

Critical Spare Parts Shortages, GAO-03-707 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003) and Defense 

Inventory: Analysis of Consumption of Inventory Exceeding Current Operating 

Requirements Since September 30, 2001, GAO-04-689 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2004).
Page 3 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

supply chain management as a serious issue. In the Quadrennial Defense 

Review for 2001, DOD stated its intention to transform its logistics 

capabilities to improve the deployment process and implement new 

logistics support tools that accelerate logistics integration between the 

services and reduce logistics demand and cost. OIF is one of the first major 

tests of these new capabilities, and we have reported on the supply chain 

issues that have impeded support to the warfighter. For example, after 

visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our preliminary observations on 

the effectiveness of logistics support during OIF.7

 Among the problems we 

observed were the unavailability of spare parts, hundreds of backlogged 

shipments, and an inability to track shipments at the distribution centers.

Supplying spare parts has been a long-standing DOD management problem. 

Under the Comptroller General’s authority, we evaluated the effectiveness 

of spare parts and related logistics support being provided to deployed 

forces for OIF. Our objectives were to assess (1) what supply shortages 

were experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq and what impact the shortages had 

on operations, (2) what primary deficiencies in the supply system 

contributed to any identified supply shortages, and (3) what actions DOD 

has taken to improve the timely availability of supplies for current and 

future operations.

We developed detailed case studies of nine supply items that were reported 

to be in short supply during OIF. (These items, identified in the Results in 

Brief section, were managed by various organizations within DOD 

including the Army, the Marine Corps, and DLA.) We chose the items that 

we believed presented possible shortages with operational impacts based 

on information available in GAO and military reports, military and 

contractor lessons-learned studies, and other accounts covering the time 

period between October 2002 and September 2004. To identify the extent 

and impact of supply shortages, we visited numerous DOD logistics 

organizations to obtain data on the production, availability, and distribution 

of supply items at the national level. When supply data specifically for OIF 

were not available, we used worldwide data since OIF received supply 

priority. We also interviewed members of units that had returned from the 

theater to determine the extent and impacts of item shortages on their 

operations. We identified deficiencies that affected the availability of 

7

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics 

Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 18, 2003).
Page 4 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

two or more of the case study items. We worked with DOD logistics 

agencies, operational units, and service and geographic commands to 

evaluate the significance of these deficiencies to DOD’s overall logistics 

system. We also identified DOD’s and the services’ short-term and longterm efforts to address these shortages. We assessed the reliability of the 

data we obtained for individual items and determined they were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We performed our review from 

March 2004 through February 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology is located in appendix I.

Results in Brief U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items we reviewed. 

According to the 2004 National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have 

sufficient quantities of the right items at the right time. During OIF, DOD 

was responsible for moving millions of tons of supplies and spare parts to 

theater. However, demand for seven items we reviewed exceeded 

availability sometime between October 2002 and September 2004. These 

shortages led, in some cases, to a decline in the operational capability of 

equipment and increased risk to troops. These items included generators 

for assault amphibian vehicles, armored vehicle track shoes, Interceptor 

body armor, lithium batteries, Meals Ready-to-Eat, tires for 5-ton trucks 

and High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, and up-armored 

High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and add-on armor kits. For 

example, in August 2003 the Army’s inventory contained only 505 tires for 

5-ton trucks which fell far below the worldwide monthly demand of 

4,828 tires, most of which were needed by troops in Iraq. The remaining 

two items that we examined—chemical-biological suits and Marine Corps 

helicopter rotor blades—did not experience shortages in theater. The 

impact of supply shortages on military operations is difficult to quantify 

because it varies from one combat unit to another and is not always 

apparent in DOD’s readiness systems. For example, while units in the 3rd 

Infantry Division reported that tire shortages reduced their operational 

capability by forcing them to abandon equipment, the 4th Infantry Division 

reported that its tire shortages had no such effect. Detailed case studies, 

including the extent of shortages and their impacts, contributing factors, 

and short- and long-term solutions, for each of the nine items we studied 

are in appendixes II through X.

Five systemic supply system deficiencies primarily contributed to the 

shortages for the seven items. As discussed in the body of this report, 

studies conducted by DOD and defense contractors indicate that 
Page 5 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

these deficiencies also affected other items in the supply system. 

The five deficiencies are identified in table 1.

Table 1: Systemic Deficiencies Contributing to Shortages of Seven GAO-Selected Items

Source: GAO analysis.

• Inaccurate and inadequately funded Army war reserve 

requirements. Annual updates of the Army’s war reserve requirements 

have not been conducted since 1999. According to officials from the 

Army Materiel Command, they had not updated the war reserve 

requirements because they had not received the latest operational 

guidance from Army headquarters. However, an Army official provided 

us with copies of the guidance sent to the Army Materiel Command and 

attributed the failure to run the model to a variety of reasons, including 

problems with new databases. This guidance, based on the annually 

updated defense planning guidance, details the force structure and 

operations that the Army’s war reserve must support. Also, Army data 

showed that war reserve requirements had not been not fully funded for 

many years. This indicates that the Army has made a risk management 

decision to not fund war reserves. This decision forced war reserve 

managers to prioritize the use of available funding, and left some 

items without a war reserve to support initial operations. The Army’s 

out-of-date and inadequately funded war reserve requirements for spare 

parts negatively affected the availability of three items we reviewed 

(armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires). The 

underfunding problem continues as only $561.7 million, or 24 percent, of 

the Army’s $2,327.4 million war reserve requirements were funded as of 

October 2004. While this funding information has been reported to 

Item

Inaccurate and inadequately 

funded Army war reserve 

requirements

Inaccurate supply 

forecasts

Insufficient and 

delayed funding

Delayed 

acquisition

Ineffective 

distribution

Vehicle generators X

Track shoes X X X

Body armor X X

Batteries X X X X

Meals Ready-to-Eat X X

Tires X X X X

Up-armored High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled 

Vehicles and kits

X
Page 6 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Congress, the likely risk to operations of not fully funding the war 

reserve has not. To improve the accuracy and adequacy of Army war 

reserve requirements we recommend the Army update the data for its 

war reserve model based on the latest defense planning guidance, 

annually update war reserve requirements, and disclose to Congress the 

impact of risk management decisions to not fully fund the war reserve.

• Inaccurate supply forecasts. As indicated by regulation, the Army 

uses computer models to forecast item demand. The regulation also 

indicates that the Army’s model be able to switch to a wartime 

forecasting method; however, the model available during pre-OIF 

planning had no such capability. While DLA had a model to 

forecast contingencies, it was not effective for all items, such as 

Meals Ready-to-Eat. Therefore, Army item managers had to manually 

develop forecasts for OIF, but they did not always have sufficient or 

timely information on estimated deployment sizes or the duration of 

operations which are needed to forecasted accurate supply 

requirements. As a result, they underestimated the demand for some 

items. By contrast, Marine Corps item managers forecasted 

requirements from operational plans and equipment changes. However, 

the accuracy of these requirements has not yet been completely 

reconciled with actual usage during OIF. This is particularly important 

because, while the Marine Corps may have accurately forecasted 

requirements and predicted the types of items needed, the Marine Corps 

has not confirmed the proper quantities. DOD’s requirements processes 

were not able to accurately forecast supply requirements for four items 

we reviewed (armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, Meals 

Ready-to-Eat, and tires). To improve the accuracy of the Army’s prewar 

planning for supplies, we recommend the Army develop models that 

have the capability to accurately forecast operational requirements and 

ensure that item managers receive timely data from operational plans. 

To improve the accuracy of the Marine Corps’ wartime forecasts, we 

recommend the service complete its reconciliation of forecasted 

requirements with actual OIF consumption data and make needed 

adjustments to its requirements.

• Insufficient and delayed funding. By regulation, DOD components 

are supposed to structure their supply chain processes to provide 

flexible and prompt support during crises. During OIF, the Army 

Materiel Command asked for additional funding (known as obligation 

authority) in order to support the forecasted OIF requirements, but did 

not receive these funds in a timely manner. While data are not available 
Page 7 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

to conclusively determine why the process could not provide more 

timely and adequate funding, the Army’s multi-stage requirements 

validation process may have contributed to the delays. This lack of 

obligation authority and delays in its release impeded the availability of 

three items we reviewed (armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, 

and tires). By contrast, DLA was able to move obligation authority 

among accounts to support projected demands and did not require 

numerous validations to justify its forecasted requirements. To improve 

the sufficiency and timeliness of funding to the Army Materiel 

Command, we recommend the Army establish an expeditious supply 

requirements validation process that provides accurate information to 

support timely and sufficient funding.

• Delayed acquisition. Despite requirements that the supply system 

provide timely support during crises, specific problems delayed DOD’s 

acquisition of three important items we reviewed (Interceptor body 

armor, lithium batteries, and up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicles). The lack of key materials and long production 

lead-time continue to affect the production of body armor, and DOD has 

reported the limitation to Congress. The initial reliance on a single 

source manufacturer and long production lead-time initially delayed 

maximum production of lithium batteries. DOD’s acquisition decision 

did not maximize available capacity to produce up-armored 

High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and add-on armor kits 

nor did it give Congress visibility over the basis for its acquisition 

solution. These acquisition challenges impeded DOD’s ability to respond 

to rapidly increasing demands. To minimize acquisition delays in the 

future, we recommend the Army and Defense Logistics Agency assess 

the industrial-base’s capacity to meet updated requirements for critical 

items within the time frames required by operational plans and provide 

visibility to Congress over acquisition of critical items that emerge 

during contingencies.

• Ineffective distribution. According to DOD guidance, distribution is 

the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics 

system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” 

to support the combatant commander. We identified several times 

where the joint distribution system was not synchronized to support the 

combatant commander during OIF. Among the problems causing this 

lack of synchronization were (1) conflicting doctrine, or military 

principles, defining the authority of the geographic combatant 

commander to synchronize the distribution of supplies from the U.S. to 
Page 8 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

the theater; (2) improper packaging of air shipments from the U.S., 

which forced personnel in theater to spend extra time opening and 

sorting shipments; (3) insufficient transportation equipment and supply 

personnel in theater; and (4) the inability of logistics information 

systems to support the requisition and shipment of supplies into and 

through Iraq. As a result, DOD was not able to distribute sufficient 

quantities of four items we reviewed (assault amphibian vehicle 

generators, Interceptor body armor, Meals Ready-to-Eat, and tires). To 

improve the effectiveness of distribution we recommend that DOD 

revise current joint distribution doctrine to clarify responsibilities and 

authorities; develop and exercise, possibly through a mix of simulation 

and field training, a deployable supply receiving and theater distribution 

capability that includes trained personnel and necessary equipment; and 

establish common logistics information systems that support the timely 

requisition of and visibility over supplies.

Two of the items we reviewed did not have shortages (chemical-biological 

suits and Marine Corps helicopter rotor blades). While acquisition 

delays and ineffective distribution resulted in a perceived shortage of 

chemical-biological suits among personnel deployed to OIF, we could not 

identify situations where suits were unavailable. Similarly, while rotor 

blades were identified as a possible shortage, Marine Corps officials and 

our analysis of supply data indicated there was no actual shortage.

DOD, the services, and the defense agencies have acted to improve supply 

availability. Many short-term solutions to lessen the impact of supply 

shortages were instituted during combat operations. For example, as a 

result of the lithium battery shortage, the Joint Staff developed the “critical 

few list” to improve the availability of specific items that the services and 

geographic combatant commands report as critical to their worldwide 

operations. DOD is also beginning to make systemic, long-term changes to 

correct some of its supply problems. One of the more notable is the 

Secretary of Defense’s designation of the U.S. Transportation Command as 

being responsible for improving distribution. In addition, the Army has 

identified four areas of logistics focus for the next 2 years: connecting the 

logistician, modernizing theater distribution, improving force reception, 

and integrating the supply chain. While we did not evaluate these efforts’ 

potential for success, we observed that the majority of them focus only on 

the distribution aspects of logistics problems identified during OIF, not the 

full gamut of supply deficiencies we identified.
Page 9 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

concurred with the intent of the recommendations and cited actions it has 

taken or will be taking to eliminate the supply chain deficiencies we noted. 

While many of the actions cited, if completed, could clearly resolve some 

problems, others actions did not appear to fully address the need to 

improve the current practices. In addition, no specific timeline for action 

was provided; therefore, we modified our recommendations to require 

specific completion dates. Therefore, we have added a matter for 

congressional consideration that suggests Congress may wish to require 

DOD to disclose the risks associated with not fully funding the Army war 

reserve. The Department’s responses are in appendix XI and our evaluation 

of them appears on page 128 of this report.

Background CENTCOM, whose area of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in 

South and Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq8

began planning for OIF in late 2001 (see fig. 1). 

8

 CENTCOM is one of DOD’s five geographic combatant commands. The others are: 

U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and 

U.S. Northern Command.
Page 10 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 1: CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility

Source: GAO. 
Page 11 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Starting in mid-2002, CENTCOM began to improve the U.S. military’s 

infrastructure in Kuwait. This included an expansion of fuel and port 

facilities to support the arrival of U.S. military units. Beginning in the fall 

of 2002, CENTCOM began to deploy troops to the OIF area of operation. 

These deployments continued up to, and beyond, the start of major 

combat operations in Iraq on March 19, 2003. According to the Defense 

Manpower Data Center, the number of military personnel deployed in 

CENTCOM’s area of responsibility in support of OIF and Operation 

Enduring Freedom steadily increased from over 113,000 in December 2002 

to over 409,000 in May 2003 (see fig. 2). During major combat operations, 

over 280,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed in Iraq, Kuwait, and 

nearby Persian Gulf nations. All of the services were represented in the 

theater, but U.S. Army units formed the bulk of military personnel. After 

major combat operations were officially declared over on May 1, 2003, the 

total number of personnel in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility began to 

gradually decrease. However, U.S. and coalition forces continue to conduct 

stabilization operations in Iraq and DOD increased the number of military 

personnel in Iraq to support the elections in January 2005.
Page 12 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 2: Total Military Personnel Deployed in CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility 

in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

December 2002 through September 2004

March 19,

2003

May 1,

2003

September

2004

Number deployed

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (data); GAO (timeline).

Year

2002

Dec.

10,000

50,000

90,000

130,000

170,000

210,000

250,000

290,000

330,000

370,000

410,000

450,000

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

2003 2004

Major combat operations

Stabilization operations (occur after May 1, 2003)
Page 13 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Organizations Responsible 

for Logistics

CENTCOM’s command authority over units deployed to its area of 

responsibility allows it to direct all necessary military actions to assigned 

military forces, including units deployed in both Operation Enduring 

Freedom in Afghanistan and OIF. Command authority also provides the 

geographic combatant commander with directive authority over logistics.9

The services and other defense components, however, share the 

responsibility of supplying U.S. forces.10

The directive authority gives the combatant commander the ability to shift 

logistics resources within the theater, but logistics support outside of the 

area of responsibility is usually dependent on the services. The combatant 

commander relies on the services’ logistics components, such as the 

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), the U.S. Marine Corps Logistics 

Command, and DLA to purchase supplies and manage inventory. AMC 

has major subordinate commands that manage supply inventories, 

such as the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) and the 

Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). DLA has a role in 

packaging supplies for shipment, while the U.S. Transportation Command 

is responsible for delivering them to theater. The combatant commander 

assigns one service as the lead for logistics support, including 

transportation, in the theater.11 During OIF, the Army was the lead service 

for logistics support. 

War Reserves The military services rely heavily on their specifically designated war 

reserve stock, including weapon systems, equipment, and spare parts, to 

equip units when they first arrive in a theater of operation. The Army’s war 

reserves consist of major items including trucks and secondary items such 

as spare parts, food, clothing, medical supplies, and fuel. Spare parts have 

the largest dollar value of the Army’s secondary items. 

War reserves are protected go-to-war assets that are not to be used for 

purposes such as improving peacetime readiness or filling unit shortages. 

9

 See Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Executive Summary, p. vi, 

Joint Publication 4-0 (Apr. 6, 2000).

10 See Joint Publication 4-0, Chapter I, p. I-3-4.

11 See Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution, 

Chapter II, p. II-7, Joint Publications 4-01.4 (Aug. 22, 2000).
Page 14 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Some of these assets are located in Southwest Asia, the Pacific, Europe, 

and on special war reserve ships. War reserves are funded through direct 

congressional appropriations that are requested in the services’ annual 

budget submissions.

AMC is responsible for determining the Army’s requirements for war 

reserve spare parts.12 To do this, AMC officials use a computer model—the 

Army War Reserve Automated Process system. The model uses DOD 

planning guidance and Army information on anticipated force structure 

including a list of the end items and associated spare parts. For each end 

item or part, the model uses data on expected usage and spare parts 

consumption rates based on breakage, geography, environment, and rates 

of equipment loss due to battle damage.

The Marine Corps Logistics Command and logistics planners from Marine 

operational units are responsible for determining annually the adequacy of 

war reserve stock based on current operational plans. Once this is 

determined, planning officials confirm the availability of the supplies with 

DLA and other supporting logistics agencies that manage individual items.

Operational Requirements DOD forecasts operational requirements for spare and repair parts 

differently than it does for items that result from rapidly emerging needs. 

DOD forecasting methods for spare and repair parts vary by service. The 

Army normally uses a computer model to forecast its spare and repair parts 

requirements based on the average monthly demand over the previous 

24 months. The Marine Corps also uses models and involves operational 

and logistics planners at several levels of command to validate their 

forecasted requirements.

Operational requirements to support rapidly emerging needs, such as 

Interceptor body armor and up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), are developed outside of normal supply 

forecasting procedures. They are identified through operational needs 

statements from the theater that are validated and resourced by the Army. 

Units in theater submit operational needs statements for the items, which 

are combined by their higher headquarters into theater requirements.

12 See Army Regulation 710-1, Chapter 6, Section IV, Paragraph 6-24.
Page 15 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The Coalition Forces Land Component Command13 communicates these 

requirements to the Department of the Army, where they are validated and 

resourced by offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial 

Management and Comptroller), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Program and Analysis, and the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Logistics and eventually transmitted to the program manager.

Supply Item Funding Generally, supplies and equipment for customers—including military units 

and DOD agencies—are purchased using defense working capital funds or 

procurement funds.

Defense Working Capital Funds Of the nine items we examined, seven are purchased using defense 

working capital funds (assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) generators, 

armored vehicle track shoes, chemical-biological suits, lithium batteries, 

Marine Corps helicopter rotor blades, Meals Ready-to-Eat (MRE), and 

tires). Working capital fund managers at the logistics agencies obligate and 

spend funds to purchase supplies from manufacturers and repair items to 

build up inventories in anticipation of sales. Military units then order 

supplies from the logistics agencies. When the requisitioned supplies are 

delivered, the units pay for them with funds that are appropriated annually 

by Congress. The logistics agencies then use this revenue to pay the 

manufacturers and to cover their own operating costs.

Several funds make up the defense working capital funds, including the 

Army Working Capital Fund, the Navy Working Capital Fund (which 

finances Marine Corps managed items), and the Defense-wide Working 

Capital Fund (which finances Defense Logistics Agency-managed items). 

AMC uses the Army Working Capital Fund to purchase and maintain 

supplies.

Procurement Funds The remaining two items (Interceptor body armor and up-armored 

HMMWVs) are purchased with procurement funding because they are still 

in the process of initial issuance. Procurement funds are used to pay for 

such expenses as the purchase of weapons and weapon components, 

communication and support equipment, munitions, initial and 

replenishment spare parts, and modernization equipment. 

13 During OIF, CENTCOM’s army component, Army Central Command, was placed in overall 

command of all ground forces and renamed Coalition Forces Land Component Command.
Page 16 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Project managers for these items receive congressional appropriations to 

fund purchases of additional supplies.

Distribution Doctrine and 

Process

DOD guidance defines distribution as the operational process of 

synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the “right 

things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the combatant 

commander.14 These elements include physical, financial, information, and 

communication networks, which can be divided into two general 

categories—the actual movement of supplies (physical networks) and the 

use of information technology (financial, information, and communication 

networks) to support distribution system activities.15 Table 2 lists the 

primary DOD regulation and joint doctrine16 that guide the distribution 

process.

Table 2: DOD and Joint Guidance on Distribution

Source: GAO analysis.

14 See Joint Publication 4-01.4, Chapter I, p. I-1.

15 See Joint Publication 4-01.4, Chapter I, p. I-2-3.

16 DOD defines joint doctrine as the fundamental military principles that guide the 

employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common 

objective.

Publication number Title Date of publication

DOD Regulation 4140.1-R DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulations May 23, 2003

Joint Publication 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations April 6, 2000

Joint Publication 4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System March 19, 2003

Joint Publication 4-01.4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution August 22, 2000
Page 17 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

In its guidance, DOD identifies eight fundamental principles of theater 

distribution:

1. Centralized management: Identify one manager who is responsible for 

distribution, visibility, and control of items in the theater distribution 

system.

2. Optimize the distribution system: Give distribution managers the ability 

to maintain visibility in locations under their control and provide them 

with resources to meet changing requirements.

3. Velocity over mass: Substitute speed and accuracy for large 

investments in inventory.

4. Maximize throughput: Reduce the number of times that supplies must 

be opened and sorted.

5. Reduce customer wait time.

6. Maintain minimum essential stocks: Reduce reliance on large, costly 

stockpiles.

7. Maintain continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources: Apply the 

distribution principles to maintain an integrated and seamless 

distribution system.

8. Achieve time definite delivery: Deliver the right supplies to the 

combatant commander at the right place and time.17

Figure 3 illustrates the complexity of DOD’s joint distribution system. The 

system moves supply items from inventories, vendors, and repair facilities 

in the U.S. to deployed units in the theater. The system also returns items to 

the U.S. for repair and maintenance.

17 See Joint Publication 4-01.4, Chapter I, p. I-7 and I-8.
Page 18 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 3: DOD’s Joint Distribution System

Recent Studies of OIF 

Logistics

Several DOD components have recently commissioned assessments of 

logistics operations during OIF with the aim of identifying areas for 

improvement. One study, Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq, 

commissioned by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness) and the Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, was 

published in 2004 by the Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC). This study identified problems with DOD’s logistics support and 

contained several recommendations that were endorsed by the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) such as 

synchronizing the distribution chain from the U.S. to CENTCOM’s area of 

responsibility and resolving issues with technology.

Inventory

control point

Contract repair

Maintenance depot

National supply

management

Strategic

distribution

platforms

Other

distribution

centers and

installations

Consolidation

and

containerization

point

Air port of

embarkation

Air port of

debarkation

Vendor

Theater distribution

Sea port of

embarkation

Sea port of

debarkation

Air and sea channels

Theater inventory

Brigade Supply

Support Activity

Source: RAND.
Page 19 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Another study, commissioned by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, is an independent assessment of the Army’s logistics experience 

in OIF by the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center. This study focuses on 

how Army forces were sustained and the performance of the sustainment 

system during combat operations and initial stability and support 

operations. RAND’s report is currently under review by the Army.

Supply Shortages 

Reduced Operational 

Capability and 

Increased Risk to 

Troops in Iraq

During OIF, DOD was responsible for moving over 2 million tons of 

supplies and spare parts to theater. U.S. troops experienced shortages of 

seven of the nine items GAO selected for review. According to the 2004 

National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have sufficient quantities 

of the right items at the right time. However, demand for the seven items 

exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and September 

2004. The overall impact of these shortages on military operations is 

difficult to quantify because it varied between combat units and is not 

always apparent in DOD’s readiness systems. The remaining two items that 

we examined did not experience shortages in theater. Detailed case studies 

for the nine items are in appendixes II-X.

Shortages Occurred during 

OIF for Seven Critical Items

U.S. troops in the OIF theater did not always have sufficient quantities of 

seven items that we reviewed. For some items, the shortages occurred 

primarily during initial troop deployments and major combat operations in 

early 2003; for other items, shortages emerged during the sustainment 

period after major combat operations were declared over in May 2003. The 

overall impact is difficult to quantify because it differed between units. 

For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported that tire 

shortages affected their mission by forcing them to abandon equipment, 

the 4th Infantry Division reported that their tire shortages had no affect on 

their mission. The following describes the shortages for each of the 

seven items.

• Generators for AAVs. Marine Corps units in Iraq experienced 

shortages of generators for their AAVs during deployment and combat 

operations in early 2003. The AAV is a landing vehicle that the Marine 

Corps used as an armored personnel carrier in Iraq. Without the 

generator, which provides electric power, the AAV cannot operate. 

Although 140 generators were reported shipped from the U.S., Marine 

forces in theater reported receiving only 15. Neither we nor the Marine 

Corps could find the remaining 125 in the supply system. While the 
Page 20 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

service did not document any operational impacts specifically due 

to generator shortages, its forces had to strip parts from about 

40 nonoperational vehicles to maintain the operational capabilities of 

other vehicles.

• Track shoes for Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. As 

the conflict in Iraq continued, track shoes, essential components of 

combat vehicles such as Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 

were not available to meet increasing demands. Although sufficient 

quantities of track shoes existed to meet demand at the beginning of 

combat, by May 2003 actual demand was 5 times the forecasted 

demand primarily because of the heavy wear and tear on track shoes as 

a result of high mileage, poor road conditions, and extreme desert heat. 

Major combat units reported that significant shortages of track shoes 

negatively affected their operational capabilities. For example, the 

3rd Infantry Division reported in June 2003 that 111 (60 percent) of 

its 185 Abrams tanks were unable to perform their missions because 

of supply shortfalls that included track shoes. Furthermore, 

159 (67 percent) of the division’s 237 Bradley Fighting Vehicles were not 

mission capable for the same reason.

• Interceptor Body Armor. Demand for Interceptor body armor18

exceeded supply during OIF. The Coalition Forces Land Component 

commander decided to increase individual protection by issuing the 

armor to all troops and civilians. As a result, demand for the body armor 

surged, with quarterly demand rising from a pre-war level of about 

8,600 vests and 9,600 plates, to about 77,000 vests and 109,000 plates by 

the time the war commenced on March 2003. Back orders for plates 

peaked at 598,000 in November 2003, while back orders for vests 

reached 328,000 in December. Even though the services did not report 

that the lack of body armor impacted their missions during OIF, there 

were serious concerns. For example, combat support units in the Army 

and Marine Corps were among the last to be equipped with the armor, 

increasing the risk to personnel given the enemy’s focus on attacking 

supply routes.

18 The armor used by U.S. forces during OIF is composed of two primary components: an 

Outer Tactical Vest and two Small Arms Protective Insert plates, which, when combined, 

provide protection against both shrapnel and rifle rounds.
Page 21 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

• Lithium batteries. Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq 

experienced severe shortages of lithium batteries, particularly BA-5590s 

and BA-5390s, during major combat operations in the spring of 2003. 

These nonrechargeable batteries power some 60 critical 

communications and electronics systems, such as radios and missile 

guidance systems. Worldwide demand for these batteries surged 

from a peacetime average of below 20,000 per month prior to 

September 11, 2001, to a peak rate of over 330,000 in April 2003. As a 

result, the number of back orders rose rapidly to 900,000 by May 2003. 

According to Marine Corps officials, if the war had continued at the 

same pace into May 2003 or beyond, Marine units would have 

experienced degraded communications capability and increased risk as 

a result of battery shortages.

• MREs. U.S. forces in Iraq experienced shortages of MREs primarily 

during the deployment and major combat phases in February, March, 

and April 2003 before normal dining facilities were established. The 

peak monthly demand for MREs rose to more than 1.8 million cases, 

while inventories dropped to a level of 500,000 cases. In late April when 

other food options became available, demand fell rapidly. While certain 

Army units reported running out of MREs, available data only shows 

that they came close. According to a RAND study, some Army units 

came within an estimated 2 days or less of exhausting their on hand 

quantities.19 Similarly, according to a Center for Naval Analysis study, at 

times Marine Corps combat support units had less than 1 day of MREs 

on hand.20 As a result, both Army and Marine Corps units were at risk of 

running out of food if supply distribution was hindered.

• Tires for 5-ton trucks and HMMWVs. The rising demand for 

truck tires during and after major combat operations in Iraq nearly 

exhausted existing inventories. The demand grew as vehicles were 

driven long distances and were modified with add-on-armor. For 

example, in August 2003, the Army’s inventory contained only 505 tires 

for 5-ton trucks, which fell far below the worldwide monthly demand of 

more than 4,800 tires. As a result, back orders spiked to over 7,000 for 

19 See unpublished research report by RAND Arroyo Center on the sustainment of Army 

units in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Eric Peltz and Marc Robbins.

20 See Center for Naval Analysis, Marine Corps Operations in OIF: Volume IV—Ground 

Logistics (Sustainment & Distribution Capacity Management, Classes I & V (W)), 

CRM D0008872.A2/Final (Alexandria, Va.: January 2004), 56-59.
Page 22 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

5-ton truck tires and to over 13,000 for HMMWV tires. The shortages 

reduced the operational capabilities of these vehicles and negatively 

impacted operations in Iraq. For example, 3rd Infantry Division units 

reported that tire shortages forced them to abandon equipment, and 

Marine Corps units reported stripping and abandoning otherwise good 

vehicles because of a lack of tires.

• Up-armored HMMWVs and add-on-armor kits. Since the 

U.S. military began identifying requirements for these vehicles during 

the summer of 2003, there has been a gap between the number of 

vehicles required and the number being produced by the industrial base. 

This new requirement was based on the need to protect soldiers and 

Marines executing distribution and force protection missions. The 

up-armored HMMWV provides enhanced protection against rifle 

rounds and explosive blasts while the add-on–armor kits21 provide 

some additional protection to previously unarmored vehicles. As of 

September 2004, only 5,330 of the 8,105 required vehicles were in 

theater. The overall impact of the shortages of up-armored HMMWVs 

and add-on-armor kits is difficult to measure because units do not report 

the direct effects of using unarmored HMMWVs. However, according to 

a Center for Army Lessons Learned study, the risk of harm to both 

personnel and equipment from improvised explosive devices is greatly 

reduced when they are transported in an up-armored HMMWV.

Two Items Were Not in 

Short Supply During OIF

Two items we examined—chemical-biological suits and Marine Corps 

helicopter parts—did not experience shortages. In these cases, although 

demands were high because of wartime operations, the defense supply 

system was able to meet the needs of deployed forces. A discussion of the 

availability of the two items follows.

• Chemical-biological suits. Although there was a perception that 

sufficient quantities of the new Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology (JSLIST) chemical-biological suits were not available during 

OIF, our work did not identify any actual shortages in the theater of 

operations. Concerns about a shortage of chemical-biological suits

21 These kits, first available in November 2003, consist of armored doors, armor plates below 

the doors, an armor plate for the protection of the seat backs, and a windshield and 

windows made of ballistic glass.
Page 23 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

arose as a result of an October 2002 Congressional request that DOD 

provide suits to all military and civilian personnel located in the OIF 

theater.22 However, according to DLA, the contracting agent for 

chemical-biological suits, and our analysis,23 there were sufficient 

quantities of the suits in the inventory to meet the suit demand 

during OIF.

• Marine Corps helicopter rotor blades. Although concerns were 

raised about shortages of helicopter parts for Marine Corps helicopters, 

specifically rotor blades, we did not identify any shortages in the theater 

of operations. Marine Corps officials reported there were no rotor blade 

shortages and our analysis of supply data confirms this. In addition, 

the mission capable rates during OIF for the two helicopters we 

reviewed—the UH-1N and the CH-53E—were comparable to peacetime 

rates.

Impact of Shortages 

Was Not Always Apparent 

in DOD’s Readiness 

Reporting System

We were not always able to identify the impact of specific shortages 

because, although DOD’s supply system showed shortages of items in 

theater, DOD’s readiness reporting systems did not always show the impact 

of these shortages on unit operational capability. Such systems as the 

Global Status of Resources and Training System and Unit Status Reports 

are intended to identify the ability of units to accomplish their missions and 

the problems affecting mission performance each month. In addition, other 

reporting mechanisms, such as lessons learned reports or after-action 

reports, may also disclose the impact of shortages on operations but do 

not tie directly to readiness reporting. As a result, we used a variety of 

documents, some obtained directly from the units, to identify the impact 

of supply shortages.

For our nine items, the information reported through the various readiness 

systems, in some cases, was inconsistent with the impact cited in reports. 

For example, in July 2003, unit status reports from the 4th Infantry 

Division’s battalions showed that approximately 145 to 150 of their 

176 Bradley Fighting Vehicles were mission capable, translating to a 

22 Letter from Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International 

Relations to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, October 2, 2002.

23 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: U.S. Ability to Meet Protective Suit Inventory 

Requirements Faces Risk, GAO-04-290 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2004).
Page 24 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

mission capability rate of around 84 percent. However, a May 2004 lessons 

learned report prepared by the division indicated that the overall mission 

capability rate for its Bradleys was 32 percent during the July 2003 time 

frame and that the degraded status was due to a shortage of armored 

vehicle track shoes and other vehicle suspension items. In a June 2003 

status report, four of the 3rd Infantry Division’s five infantry battalions 

reported that 65 percent of their Bradley vehicles were mission capable. 

However a 3rd Infantry Division report for June 2003 showed that 

65 percent of the division’s Bradleys were non-mission capable because of 

supply-related reasons, which unit officials attributed almost exclusively to 

track shoe shortages. 

There were also instances of readiness information about unit status in Iraq 

not being reported. For example, in August 2003, the 4th Infantry Division’s 

five Armor battalions and one Calvary unit did not enter any mission 

capability data into the readiness reporting systems about the status of 

their 247 Abrams tanks. However, the May 2004 briefing report prepared by 

the division indicated that by July 2003, 28 percent of the division’s tanks 

were non-mission capable. The primary reason given was lack of tank 

shoes and related suspension parts.

Multiple Supply 

Chain Deficiencies 

Contributed to 

Supply Shortages

Five deficiencies contributed to shortages in the supply of seven of the 

nine items that we studied. According to DOD data and contractor studies, 

these deficiencies also affected other items in the supply system. The 

deficiencies were (1) inaccurate and inadequately funded Army war 

reserve requirements, (2) inaccurate supply forecasts, (3) insufficient 

and delayed funding, (4) delayed acquisition, and (5) ineffective 

distribution. Table 3 identifies the deficiencies that affected each of the 

seven supply items.
Page 25 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Table 3: Systemic Deficiencies Contributing to Shortages of Seven Supply Items

Source: GAO analysis.

Inaccurate and Inadequately 

Funded Army War Reserve 

Requirements for Spare 

Parts Led to Early Shortages 

during OIF

The inaccurate requirements for and poor funding of war reserves affected 

the availability of three of the supply items (armored vehicle track shoes, 

lithium batteries, and tires). Annual updates of the Army’s war reserve 

requirements for supply items have not been conducted and, as a result, the 

Army did not have an accurate estimate of the spare parts and other items 

needed for a contingency such as OIF. In addition, over the past decade, the 

Army underfunded its war reserve spare parts, which has forced managers 

to allocate money for certain items and not for others.

Army War Reserve Spare Parts 

Requirements Were Out of Date 

and Inventory Was Inadequate

Army officials told us that annual updates of its war reserve requirements 

for spare parts have not been conducted since 1999. AMC uses a computer 

model, called the Army War Reserve Automated Process, to determine its 

requirements for spare parts in the war reserve. This model is supposed to 

be run on the basis of annually updated defense planning guidance and is 

designed to support the latest war plans and Army force structure. 

According to AMC officials, the model has not been run since 1999 because 

the Department of the Army has not provided the latest guidance, which 

details the force structure and operations that the Army’s war reserve must 

support. However, an Army official provided us with copies of the Army 

guidance from 2001, 2003, and 2005 that AMC could have used to initiate 

computation of war reserve requirements. The Army official stated that

Item

Inaccurate and inadequately 

funded Army war reserve 

requirements

Inaccurate supply 

forecasts

Insufficient and 

delayed funding

Delayed 

acquisition

Ineffective 

distribution

AAV generators X

Armored vehicle track shoes X X X

Interceptor body armor X X

Lithium batteries X X X X

MREs X X

Tires for 5-ton trucks and 

HMMWVs X X X

X

Up-armored HMMWVs and 

add-on-armor kits X
Page 26 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

AMC did not run the model for a variety of reasons such as support for 

ongoing missions and problems with the implementation of a new database 

and modeling system.24

Because the requirements were out-of-date, the war reserve inventories for 

some spare parts were inadequate and could not meet initial wartime 

demands. For example, the war reserve requirement for nonrechargeable 

lithium batteries (BA-5590s) was not sufficient to support initial operations 

in OIF. The requirement for BA-5590s was set at 180,000 to support the first 

45 days of operations, but this amount was considerably lower than the 

actual demand of nearly 620,000 batteries recorded during the first 

2 months of the conflict. CECOM officials attributed this mismatch to 

inaccurate battery failure and usage rates in the 1999 model. They also said 

the model did not include all the communications systems that used 

nonrechargeable lithium batteries. 

In another example, the war reserve requirement for track shoes for 

armored vehicles was inadequate to keep pace with actual demand during 

the early months of combat. As table 4 shows, the pre-OIF war reserve 

requirement for track shoes for Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles was, respectively, 5,230 and 5,626; however, in April 2003 the 

actual worldwide demand for these tanks was four times higher. 

The situation was even worse for 5-ton truck tires.

Table 4: War Reserve Requirements, On-Hand Stock, and Items Requested Worldwide

Source: TACOM.

24 This new database, called the Logistics Modernization Program, has only been 

implemented at CECOM.

Supply item

War reserve requirement

(March 2003)

War reserve on hand

(March 2003)

Items requested worldwide

(April 2003)

Track shoe (Abrams) 5,230 5,623 23,462

Track shoe (Bradley) 5,626 5,695 20,678

5-ton truck tire 259 16 4,800
Page 27 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Since the end of major combat operations, war reserve managers have 

made manual adjustments to the requirements to reflect supply 

experiences from OIF. For example, officials told us that they have 

adjusted the Army and the Marine Corps war reserve requirement for 

BA-5590 and BA-5390 lithium batteries upward to more than 1.5 million 

batteries based on the average monthly demand of 250,000 batteries 

experienced during OIF multiplied by 6 months. Similarly, war reserve 

managers at TACOM have increased the requirements for Abrams and 

Bradley tank track shoes to 32,686 and 34,864, respectively. While these 

actions may correct a particular problem, they do not address the systemic 

inaccuracy of the Army’s war reserve requirements.

In prior reports, we have identified problems with the Army’s process for 

computing the war reserve spare parts requirements. In a 2001 report, 

we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to develop and use the best available consumption factors; improve 

the methodology used to determine requirements by considering planned 

battlefield maintenance practices; and develop industrial-base capacity on 

current, fact-based estimates for the war reserve.25 In a 2002 report, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to have the Commander of AMC change its process of calculating war 

reserve requirements. 26 While the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

concurred with these recommendations, the Army has yet to implement 

them.

Risk Management Decisions Led 

to Years of Low Army War 

Reserve Funding

The Army’s war reserve requirements for spare parts have been 

significantly underfunded for many years, indicating that the Army 

has made a risk management decision to not fully fund them. In 

November 1999, Army documents indicated that the Army had only 

$1.3 billion in parts prepositioned, or otherwise set aside for war reserves, 

to meet its stated requirement of $3.3 billion. AMC data indicate that a lack 

of funding for war reserve spare parts continues to be an issue. As table 5 

shows, as of October 2004, only about 24 percent ($561.7 million out of 

$2,327.4 million) of AMC’s total spare parts requirement is currently funded 

25 GAO, Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain, 

GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001).

26 GAO, Defense Inventory: Improved Industrial Base Assessments for Army War Reserve 

Spares Could Save Money, GAO-02-650 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2002).
Page 28 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

and on hand. Moreover, AMC data show this pattern of underfunding is 

expected to continue through fiscal year 2009.

Table 5: Status of On-Hand Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements as of October 2004

Source: Army Materiel Command.

Note: Totals do not add due to rounding.

a

The Secondary Item Control Division is responsible for items managed by agencies outside of AMC, 

such as DLA or the General Services Administration.

As a result of this low funding, war reserve managers told us that they must 

prioritize how the available funding is allocated based on their professional 

experience. For example, the war reserve manager for TACOM reported 

that he tends to spend his available funds on expensive items with long 

production lead-times, such as tank engines, because they are difficult to 

acquire on short notice. Conversely, lower cost items with shorter 

production lead-times, such as tires, do not receive funding priority. 

The Army accepts the risk of unfunded war reserve requirements in order 

to fund other priorities, such as operations and the procurement of new 

systems. Although, the Army has reported the amount of war reserve 

underfunding to Congress, the risk of not funding the war reserve is not 

clearly stated.

Dollars in millions

Major subordinate commands Requirement Value on hand Percentage filled

Aviation and Missile Command

Aviation $331.5 $56.1 16.9

Missiles 98.9 26.8 27.1

Communications-Electronics Command 344.2 81.6 23.7

Secondary Item Control Divisiona 197.0 30.2 15.3

Tank-automotive and Armaments Command

Armaments 245.4 70.7 28.8

Biological and chemical equipment 117.8 57.0 48.4

Automotive parts 992.5 239.3 24.1

Total $2,327.4 $561.7
Page 29 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Army Supply Forecasts Did 

Not Accurately Represent 

Troop Needs in OIF

The Army’s requirements process did not accurately forecast the supplies 

needed to support U.S. forces during OIF for four of the items we studied 

(armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, MREs, and tires). As 

indicated by Army regulation,27 AMC normally uses a computer model to 

forecast its spare and repair parts requirements. The model uses the 

average monthly demand over the previous 24 months to predict future 

equipment use and demand. Although the Army regulation28 indicates that 

the model should be able to switch to a wartime demand forecasting 

method, AMC officials stated the system has no wartime forecasting 

capability. As a result, the Army’s supply requirements forecasting model 

could not forecast the wartime surge in requirements during OIF. In 

contrast, DLA’s model has the capability to forecast requirements for 

contingencies, but it was not completely effective, as in the case of MREs.

Instead of using the model, the Army relied on the expert opinion of item 

managers, who manage supply items at AMC’s subordinate commands. 

Item managers, however, did not have sufficient information on estimated 

deployment sizes or duration and intensity of operations to accurately 

forecast supply requirements for OIF. According to TACOM officials, AMC 

initially directed item managers to use their expert opinion and knowledge 

to develop forecasts, without input from operational planners in 

CENTCOM. AMC officials stated that Army headquarters did not provide 

them with formal guidance on the duration of the conflict, supply 

consumption, or size of the deploying force. AMC documents show and 

their contractors confirm that AMC gathered some anecdotal information 

on force size and the duration of operations in November 2002. However, 

item managers at AMC’s subordinate commands reported they did not 

always receive adequate guidance from AMC. For example, officials at 

TACOM stated they did not receive planning guidance on operational plans 

from AMC to incorporate into their forecasts of track shoe or tire 

requirements. The forecasted monthly requirement for Abrams track 

shoes was 11,125, which was less than half of the actual requirement of 

23,462 shoes in April 2003. Forecasts for 5-ton truck tires were also 

inaccurate. Worldwide demand was forecasted at 1,497 tires during 

April 2003, less than a third of the actual demand of 4,800.

27 See Army Regulation 710-1, Chapter 4, Section I, Paragraph 4-2.

28 See Army Regulation 710-1, Chapter 4, Section I, Paragraph 4-2, a. (4) (b).
Page 30 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

In contrast, officials at CECOM reported that in the summer of 2002, 

operational planners consulted them about the number of nonrechargeable 

lithium batteries needed to support operations. Subsequently, CECOM 

officials presented these new requirements to AMC and the Joint Materiel 

Priorities and Allocation Board and received $38.2 million in additional 

obligation authority for BA-5590 and BA-5390 batteries.29 Despite these 

efforts, demand for batteries outpaced production during OIF combat 

operations.

The Marines forecast supply requirements for their initial operations based 

on operational plans30 and modeling factors that involve both operational 

and logistics planners. Modeling factors include historical supply data, 

number of personnel involved in an operation, distance of operation, and 

number of days of operation. Normally, the forecasting process includes 

many echelons of Marine Corps command. Initially, the 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force headquarters provides operational plans to the 

deploying units that determine the supply requirements for an operation. 

Once the deploying units forecast a supply requirement, it is returned to 

headquarters for review. Deploying units review the supply requirements 

again before passing them to the Marine Forces Pacific Command for final 

assessment. The Marine Corps Logistics Command, the service’s integrated 

logistics manager, sends the requirements to DLA and other supply 

providers. Supply providers then inform the Logistics Command and the 

deploying units about their ability to fill the forecasted requirements. 

According to the Marines, they used this process to forecast supply 

requirements before deploying to OIF.

After the end of major combat operations, the Marine Corps began an afteraction review process to analyze the effectiveness of their OIF supply 

forecast. As part of this analysis, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force 

assessed the correlation between supply forecasts and supply usage. This 

analysis showed that 88 percent of the types of repairable supply items 

forecasted were actually needed,31 and 62 percent of the types of 

29 The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board, sets, changes, or recommends policies 

for allocating supplies in the DOD system.

30 DOD defines operation plans as plans for the conduct of military operations in a hostile 

environment prepared by the commander of a unified or specified command in response to 

a requirement established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

31 A secondary repairable is a spare part that when broken is repaired and returned to 

inventory rather than replaced.
Page 31 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

consumable items forecasted were demanded, in the first 90 days. 

These data indicate that a significant number of unneeded items could have 

been sent to theater, placing an unnecessary burden on the distribution 

system. However, the Marine Corps has not analyzed the accuracy of 

whether the quantities forecasted equaled the quantities needed. Without 

such analysis, the Marines cannot determine if their forecasting process 

provided them with the right items in the right quantity at the right time 

during OIF.

Insufficient and Delayed 

Funding Limited the 

Availability of Supply Items 

for OIF

A lack of sufficient funding (obligation authority) within the Army’s 

working capital fund and delays with the release of funds limited the 

availability of three reviewed items (armored vehicles track shoes, 

lithium batteries, and tires). The delays may have been due to the Army’s 

multi-stage process to validate requirements. In contrast, DLA’s working 

capital fund was able to move sufficient obligation authority among 

accounts to support rapidly increasing demands.

AMC Did Not Receive Sufficient 

Obligation Authority from the 

Department of the Army to Meet 

Spare Parts Requirements 

Promptly

According to a DOD regulation,32 DOD components are supposed to 

structure their supply chain processes and systems to provide flexible and 

prompt support during crises. However, during fiscal year 2003, AMC did 

not promptly receive obligation authority to match its stated requirements. 

The Department of the Army released $2.9 billion of obligation authority 

into the Army Working Capital Fund to buy supplies in October 2002 as part 

of the fiscal year 2003 budget cycle (see fig. 4). This amount was based on 

the requirements established in the President’s Budget prepared 2 years 

earlier. By the time fiscal year 2003 began, AMC had identified a new supply 

requirement of $4.8 billion to support both peacetime operations and the 

ongoing global war on terrorism, but, the obligation authority provided in 

October 2002 did not support this revised requirement. While Army 

headquarters provided some additional funding to AMC, AMC increased its 

supply requirements again in March 2003 to $5.6 billion. However, the total 

obligation authority AMC received at that time equaled only $4.7 billion. 

AMC did not receive sufficient obligation authority to support the 

final validated requirements of nearly $6.9 billion until the end of 

fiscal year 2003, 4 months after major combat operations ended.

32 See DOD Supply Chain Material Management Regulations, Chapter 1, C1.3.2.1, 

DOD Regulation 4140.1-R (May 23, 2003).
Page 32 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2003 Army Working Capital Fund Supply Management Requirements and Cumulative Obligation 

Authority Received

Notes:

(1) Reset is a term used to define bringing a vehicle that was used during Operation Enduring 

Freedom and OIF back to a fully mission-capable (serviceable) condition. Resetting a vehicle involves 

extensive use of spare parts.

(2) Numbers are rounded to the nearest tenth of a billion dollars.

In addition to establishing requirements to support its peacetime and 

continuing global war on terrorism operations, AMC identified additional 

requirements, called reset requirements, of $1.3 billion to support the 

repair of items coming back from theater. As figure 4 shows, by the end of 

fiscal year 2003, AMC had received $6.9 billion of its total requirement 

of $8.2 billion (including reset) in obligation authority, a shortfall of 

$1.3 billion.

We could not determine exactly why sufficient funding was not provided to 

AMC more quickly, because sufficient records were not available to track 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Oct. Nov.

2002 2003

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Source: GAO analysis of AMC and Department of Army data.

Cumulative funding received

Requirements

Reset requirements

Dollars in billions

2.9 2.9 2.9

3.5 3.5

4.7 4.7 4.8

5.7

5.9

6.9 6.9
Page 33 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

when AMC and its subordinate commands requested additional funding 

from Army headquarters or the amounts requested. Similarly, Army 

headquarters could not provide information about the timing of its requests 

for additional obligation authority to the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller). However, the Army’s requirements validation 

process likely contributed to delays in the release of obligation authority 

into AMC’s Army Working Capital Fund. After AMC completes its internal 

validation process and requests additional funding above the programmed 

requirement during the year of execution, several organizations within 

Army headquarters reexamine AMC’s requirements. In the absence of 

specific direction in Army regulations, Army headquarters has developed a 

process for validating AMC’s requirements. While the Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics has the main responsibility for validating AMC’s 

functional requirements, the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Program and Analysis, and the 

Assistant Secretary of Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) 

must also review and agree on the requirements. Once these organizations 

validate the requirements, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial 

Management and Comptroller) requests obligation authority from the DOD 

Comptroller. This lengthy process may have delayed the release of funds 

and contributed to shortages of tires, track shoes, and lithium batteries.

The additional time associated with the Army’s validation process was 

exemplified by events during fiscal year 2003. AMC set its revised 

supply requirements to $4.8 billion in October 2002. However, the DOD 

Comptroller did not release the first additional obligation authority of 

$600 million until January 2003, 3 months later. Army headquarters office 

released its next increase of obligation authority of $1.1 billion in 

March 2003, for a total of $4.6 billion; nearly 6 months after AMC identified 

the initial requirement. Army officials were unable to tell us when they had 

submitted their requirements to the DOD Comptroller because they said 

they often submitted requests for additional obligation authority during the 

fiscal year informally via e-mails and telephone calls. Accordingly, detailed 

records were not kept. We were able to confirm that the time between 

the releases of obligation authority from the DOD Comptroller to the 

department of the Army did not take longer than two weeks. This indicates 

that for most of the 6 months, AMC’s request for additional obligation 

authority was somewhere in the Department of Army’s validation process.

In addition to delays in receiving funds, AMC suffered from an overall lack 

of sufficient obligation authority for its major subordinate commands that 

contributed directly to shortages of tires, track shoes, and lithium batteries 
Page 34 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

during OIF. Initial priority was to provide funding to the U.S. Army Aviation 

and Missile Command to support critical aviation systems and then to 

TACOM for tracked and tactical wheeled vehicles. Without prompt 

obligation authority, item managers could not contract for supplies in 

anticipation of customer demands. According to item managers, they 

need sufficient obligation authority in advance of customer demands in 

order to have sufficient supplies available. TACOM officials reported that 

the lack of adequate obligation authority prevented them from buying 

supplies, including tires and tank track shoes, in anticipation of demands. 

For example, in October 2002, TACOM item managers identified total 

requirements of nearly $1.4 billion, but only had authority to obligate 

approximately $900 million. By May 2003, TACOM’s requirements had 

increased to over $2.1 billion, but only $1.5 billion in obligation authority 

was available. By the end of the fiscal year, TACOM’s total requirement, 

including funds necessary to reset the force, totaled $2.7 billion, but its 

obligation authority was less than $2.4 billion. This shows that obligation 

authority for tires and tank track shoes lagged behind requirements, 

thereby preventing item managers from buying supplies in anticipation of 

demand. Similarly, CECOM reported that unfunded requirements over 

several prior years affected its purchases of lithium batteries. CECOM 

identified requirements of nearly $1.5 billion for fiscal year 2003, but 

received less than $1.1 billion in obligation authority for the year.

DLA Received Sufficient 

Obligation Authority to Meet 

Customer Supply Needs

In contrast to the Army, DLA received sufficient obligation authority from 

the DOD Comptroller to meet increasing customer supply needs during 

OIF. DLA set the requirements for its supply management business area 

at $18.1 billion and received $16.5 billion of this amount in obligation 

authority in October 2002 (see fig. 5). By February 2003, it had received 

obligation authority that kept pace with increasing requirements. As 

requirements increased during OIF, the agency was able to request and 

receive additional obligation authority to purchase supplies in anticipation 

of customer needs. By the end of the fiscal year, DLA’s supply requirements 

had reached $25.0 billion, and it had received an equal amount of obligation 

authority to meet those requirements.
Page 35 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2003 DLA Supply Management Requirements and Cumulative Obligation Authority Received

DLA officials told us they were able to obtain timely increases in obligation 

authority from the DOD Comptroller because of their requirements 

validation process. The agency conducts an ongoing review of its 

requirements throughout the year to ensure they are updated as changes in 

demand occur. Agency officials then request additional obligation authority 

directly from the DOD Comptroller. This process allowed DLA to submit 

requirements and receive increased obligation authority several times 

during fiscal year 2003. Agency officials stated that having accurate 

requirements ensures that the DOD Comptroller accepts the requirements 

without further validation. According to DLA officials, the DOD 

Comptroller was responsive to the agency’s needs, providing additional 

obligation authority within days of a request.

Oct. Nov.

2002 2003

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Source: DLA.

Cumulative funding received

Requirements

Dollars in billions

0

6

12

18

24

30

16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5

18.5 18.5

19.6

21.6 23.6

25.1 25.1 25.1
Page 36 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Delayed Acquisition Caused 

by a Variety of Challenges

The supply system faced several challenges in rapidly acquiring three of 

the items we reviewed to meet the emerging demands caused by OIF 

(Interceptor body armor, lithium batteries, and up-armored HMMWVs 

and kits). According to a DOD regulation,33 supply chain processes and 

systems, which include relationships with commercial manufacturers, 

should provide flexible and prompt support during crises. The rapid 

increase in demand for the three items was not anticipated, and as DOD’s 

supply system attempted to purchase them, its efforts were impeded 

by problems that varied by item. For example, while lithium battery 

production was limited by the capacity of a sole source supplier and long 

production lead-times, body armor manufacturers faced shortages of the 

material components of the armor.

Body Armor Production Did Not 

Support Increasing Demands

DLA data show that manufacturers of body armor could not meet the 

surge in demand for the item’s two primary components, plates and 

vests. For example, the worldwide demand for plates increased from 

9,586 in December 2002 to 108,808 in March 2003 to a peak of 478,541 in 

December 2003. A comparison of plate production rates over the same time 

period shows that only 3,888 plates were produced during December 2002, 

31,162 during March 2003, and 49,746 during December 2003. 

Increasing requirements exceeded the manufacturer’s capacity to produce 

sufficient body armor. For example, in October 2003, CENTCOM expanded 

requirements for body armor to include all U.S. personnel in its area of 

responsibility. The industrial base could not meet this new requirement 

due to a lack of construction materials and long production lead-times. 

Vest production was hindered by the limited availability of Kevlar; plate 

production was initially slowed due to a lack of a special backing for the 

plates and later by the limited availability of the primary component of the 

plates, ceramic tiles. In addition, the minimum production lead-time of 

3 months limited the manufacturers’ ability to accelerate production levels 

to meet increasing demand, especially for plates, which are more difficult 

to manufacture than vests. Due to these industrial-base limitations, body 

armor was not issued to all troops in Iraq until January 2004, 8 months after 

major combat operations were declared over.

33 See DOD Regulation 4140.1-R, Chapter 1, C1.3.2.1.
Page 37 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Lithium Battery Production 

Did Not Support Increasing 

Demands

Demand for lithium batteries exceeded inventory and production during 

OIF. As mentioned earlier in this report, the requirement for lithium 

batteries had not been assessed for the war reserve for several years. 

Worldwide demand for lithium batteries increased from 38,956 batteries 

per month in October 2001 to a peak of 330,600 in April 2003. Concurrent 

battery production was 32,000 in October 2001 and 114,772 in April 2003, 

and thus was insufficient to meet demand. CECOM expanded battery 

production from one to three manufacturers and received $38.2 million to 

increase production capacity in late 2002; the 8-fold increase in battery 

demand still outstripped production capacity. A 6-month production 

lead-time for the batteries precluded the ability of the three manufacturers 

to meet the peak demand during April 2003. The Marines reported 

being down to only a 2-day supply of batteries in CENTCOM’s area of 

responsibility in April 2003, despite OIF’s priority on worldwide supply 

shipments. By late 2003, the Army was able to acquire enough batteries so 

that its inventory exceeded back orders. 

Pace of Production of 

Up-Armored HMMWVs and Kits 

Did Not Match Maximum 

Capacity

Meeting rapidly increasing requirements for armoring HMMWVs also 

met with constraints. For example, CENTCOM stated a requirement for 

1,407 up-armored HMMWVs to support OIF in August 2003 that grew 

to 8,105 vehicles in September 2004. Manufacturers were producing 

51 up-armored HMMWVs per month in August 2003. Recognizing the 

increase in requirements in February 2004, the Army reached an agreement 

with the manufacturers to increase production to 460 vehicles per month 

by October 2004. However, the signed agreement with the manufacturer 

indicated that maximum production could have been increased to 

500 vehicles. 

Funding was not available when the requirements increased. As a result, 

Army officials stated that the up-armored HMMWV manufacturers were 

unable to operate at the maximum capacity. In order to produce vehicles 

at a consistent and high rate, the manufacturer needs to be assured of 

consistent funding at least 3 months in advance of delivery. While 

additional funding was received in fiscal year 2004, program managers 

stated they often did not know when the next funding release would occur, 

further complicating their procurement planning. As of September 2004, 

Army data shows that 5,330 of the 8,105 required up-armored HMMWVs 

were in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.

Similar issues affected the delivery of add-on-armor kits from the Army’s 

depot system even more dramatically. Kit production in the Army’s depot 

system reached its maximum rate of 3,998 kits per month in April 2004 and 
Page 38 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

would have met the requirement sooner had the Army not slowed 

production. Moreover, additional unused capacity was available for 

kit production. In February 2004, a contractor-operated Army facility 

informed Army depot managers that it could produce an additional 

800 kits per month. While item managers stated they did not use this 

contractor-operated facility due to issues with contract timing and price, 

they did not have information about the reason for reducing the level of 

production at the government-operated facilities. Army data show that kit 

production will meet CENTCOM’s September 2004 requirement for 

13,872 kits no later than March 2005.

DOD’s Response to Acquisition 

Challenge Was Inconsistent

DOD’s response to the various acquisition challenges presented by these 

items was inconsistent, lacked transparency, and did not fully exploit all 

of its capabilities to influence production. If the Army had forecasted 

an accurate requirement for the batteries, the need for additional 

manufacturers would have been recognized and production capacity could 

have been increased on time to better meet the demand. In the case of the 

other two items, the rapid increase in demand was not as predictable and 

DOD responded differently to each. DOD officials made a very aggressive 

effort to focus on and improve the availability of body armor using 

regulatory authority to increase production. DOD also provided visibility 

over the problem and courses of action to Congress. By contrast, DOD’s 

response to the need for more armor protection for HMMWVs was more 

measured and its acquisition solution was less transparent. This may have 

been why members of Congress have expressed specific concerns about 

the availability of these items and designated specific funds for them.

Ineffective Theater 

Distribution Contributed to 

Shortages of Supply Items

DOD’s inability to distribute sufficient quantities of items to troops 

adversely affected the delivery of many items. While all seven items may 

have experienced distribution problems, we found that four items (AAV 

generators, Interceptor body armor, MREs, and tires) were directly and 

negatively affected, causing troops to experience shortfalls. Distribution is 

the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics 

system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to 

support the combatant commander. This complex process involves the
Page 39 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

precise integration of doctrine,34 transport equipment, personnel, and 

information technology. Among the problems encountered during OIF were 

(1) conflicting doctrine defining the authority of the geographic combatant 

commander to synchronize the distribution of supplies from the U.S. to 

theater; (2) improper packaging of air shipments from the U.S., which 

forced personnel in theater to spend time opening and sorting shipments as 

they arrived; (3) insufficient transportation equipment and supply 

personnel in theater; and (4) the inability of logistics information systems 

to support the requisition and shipment of supplies into and through Iraq.

Conflicting Doctrine Impeded 

Effective Distribution

We found that conflicting doctrine impeded the establishment of a 

distribution system capable of delivering supplies to the warfighter 

smoothly and on time. Distribution begins with the supplier, ends with the 

warfighter, and includes all systems, both physical and informational, 

needed to move and manage supplies between the two ends. Currently, 

joint doctrine institutionalizes separate management of sections of the 

end-to-end distribution system by placing responsibility for logistics 

support outside the theater with the individual services and the 

U.S. Transportation Command.35 However, it also requires the theater 

commander to synchronize all aspects of logistics necessary to support 

the mission.36 This conflicting doctrine is contrary to DOD’s distribution 

principle of centralized management, which prescribes that one manager 

should be responsible for the end-to-end distribution of supplies. A SAIC 

study also reports that joint doctrine does not contain any specific or 

prescriptive guidance on how the combatant commander might ensure a 

seamless distribution process.37

During OIF, the CENTCOM combatant commander could not synchronize 

the distribution process to support the mission, as required by doctrine, 

with the level of control that joint doctrine suggests. Instead, the 

combatant commander had to rely on other DOD components responsible

34 DOD defines doctrine as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or 

elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative 

but requires judgment in application. 

35 See Chapter I, p. I-4, I-7, I-8, and I-10, Joint Publication 4-0.

36 See Chapter I, p. I-7, Joint Publication 4-0.

37 SAIC, Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq, Contract No. GS-10F-0091L, 

Task Order 73510 (March 2004), p78.
Page 40 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

for different functions along the distribution process to gain end-to-end 

visibility as supplies moved through the distribution system. For example, 

as we reported in December 2003,38 although CENTCOM issued a policy 

requiring the use of radio frequency identification tags on all shipments,39

to track assets shipped to and within the theater, tags were not always 

used. Officials from various DOD components reported that, while no data 

were compiled on the frequency of shipments being labeled with radio 

frequency identification tags, only about 30 percent of the pallets and 

containers coming into the theater were tagged. Officials gave various 

reasons for not following the commander’s policy, such as personnel were 

not trained to use the technology, tags were not available to place on loads 

moving through the system, and requirements to use the technology were 

not compatible with current operating systems. In addition, some Army 

officials reported that CENTCOM does not have jurisdiction over their 

process for shipping and tracking assets. Therefore, while CENTCOM 

issued guidance directing the implementation of an in-transit visibility 

system that relied on the tags, the command could not control the 

organizations outside of theater responsible for applying the tags to ensure 

their proper use.

Initial Shipments from the U.S. to 

the Theater Were Not Properly 

Packaged

DOD’s distribution principle of maximizing throughput calls for reducing 

the number of times that supplies are opened and sorted in transit so that 

distribution to warfighters is prompt. Early in OIF, inefficient packaging 

and palletizing of air shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait. In turn, 

these backlogs delayed the delivery of supplies shipped by air to units in 

Iraq, which included armored vehicle track shoes, body armor, and tires. 

Insufficient information was available to allow us to link how each 

individual item was affected by this distribution problem.

According to Army officials, shipments move most efficiently when they 

are packed and palletized40 so that they do not have to be unpacked and 

reloaded while in transit; sending such “pure” shipments to a single unit is a

38 GAO-04-305R.

39 Radio frequency identification tags are used to track shipping containers and pallets and 

their contents while in transit. The tags continuously transmit radio signals, which can be 

read using hand-held or fixed scanners.

40 DOD uses a pallet, called the 463L pallet, for air shipments. The pallet is an 88" × 108" 

aluminum flat base used to facilitate the loading and unloading of aircraft.
Page 41 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

standard peacetime procedure. During OIF, Army officials expected each 

pallet or container to contain supplies for only one unit or location. 

However, initial shipments included spare parts and supplies for several 

geographically separate units. DLA officials stated that U.S. distribution 

centers could not handle the high volume of supplies and many shipments 

were loaded with items for more than one customer or “mixed.” They also 

said that the volume of supplies arriving daily for consolidation into air 

shipments overwhelmed distribution centers in the U.S. The facilities were 

structured to handle peacetime requirements and lacked the necessary 

equipment and personnel to handle the surge capacity associated with 

wartime. Officials stated that mixed cargo was often sent to the theater 

without being sorted in order to make room for incoming supplies. 

Moreover, the lack of sorting continued because of a miscommunication 

between CENTCOM and DLA, the shipper. CENTCOM expected the 

peacetime practice of pure pallets would continue during OIF, while DLA 

officials focused on moving pallets to theater regardless of whether they 

were pure or mixed. However, at that same time RAND analysts reported 

that DLA facilities were sending pure pallets to U.S. Army units in Europe 

and Korea.

Once in theater, mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and 

re-palletized at theater distribution points, causing additional delays. 

According to staff at the Theater Distribution Center in Kuwait, some 

mixed shipments were not marked with all the intended destinations so the 

contents of the shipments had to be examined. Army officials stated that 

because mixed pallets of supplies were initially sent to theater, over 

9,000 pallets piled up at the center. By the fall of 2003, 30 percent of the 

pallets arriving at the center still had to be reconfigured in some way. The 

Army and DLA recognized the problem and worked in conjunction with 

CENTCOM to establish a “pure palleting” process at the distribution center 

in Pennsylvania. This resulted in potentially longer processing times in the 

United States in order reduce customer wait time in theater.

According to a RAND study,41 the pallets arriving in theater between 

January and August 2003 contained more than 20,000 cardboard boxes of 

small items. Over 4,300 boxes, about one in every five, were mixed and may 

have been opened and the contents sorted before being forwarded on to

41 See unpublished research report by RAND Arroyo Center on the sustainment of Army 

units in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Eric Peltz and Marc Robbins.
Page 42 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

customers, which further delayed delivery. The RAND study showed that it 

took an average of 25 to 30 days for such mixed boxes to travel from a port 

in theater, through the theater center, to the supply activity that ordered it. 

In contrast, when a box with items for only one unit was shipped, it took an 

average of 5 to 10 days to reach the customer.

Shortages of Supply Personnel 

and Transportation Equipment 

Hampered Supply Distribution

The lack of sufficient logistics resources, such as trained supply personnel 

and cargo trucks, hindered DOD’s efforts to move supplies promptly from 

ports and theater distribution centers to the units that had ordered them, as 

expected under the DOD principle of optimizing the distribution system. As 

a result, some troops experienced delays in receiving MREs and other 

supplies, thereby reducing operational capabilities and increasing risk.

According to military personnel, there was a shortage of support personnel 

in theater prior to and during the arrival of combat forces. Moreover, those 

that arrived were often untrained or not skilled in the duties they were 

asked to perform. The effects of these shortages of trained personnel were 

most evident at the Theater Distribution Center and resulted in delays in 

the processing (receipt, sorting, and forwarding) of supplies, and backlogs. 

For example, in the late February to early March 2003 time frame, the 

Center had only about 200 reserve personnel and did not reach its 

authorized staffing level of 965 supply/support personnel until May 2003. 

Moreover, when the center opened, it already had an estimated 5,000-pallet 

backlog and its commander employed ad hoc work details drawn from 

surrounding support units to help. Furthermore, organizations outside of 

the theater, such as TACOM, sent personnel to Kuwait to ensure that 

specific items, such as tires, were properly processed and sent to the 

correct customers.

Moreover, according to after-action reports, lessons learned studies, and 

discussions with military personnel, the lack of adequate ground 

transportation, especially cargo trucks, contributed significantly to 

the distribution problems. For example, an Army official with the 

377th Theater Support Command, which was responsible for logistics 

support in Kuwait, stated that when combat began his unit needed 

930 light/medium and medium trucks but had only 515 trucks on hand. 

Although his unit “managed” with what was available, he said that the 

shortage of equipment used to haul supplies into Iraq created a strain on 

materiel movement. Both the Marine Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division 

also reported that available transportation assets could not meet their 

capacity requirements. Even high-priority items, such as food did not 

always move as intended. According to a CENTCOM after-action report, 
Page 43 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

contractors responsible for moving MREs from ports to the Theater 

Distribution Center at times had only 50 of the 80 trucks needed. DLA 

officials reported that at one time 1.4 million MREs were stored at a port 

in theater, awaiting transport to customers.

One cause for the distribution resource problems was the failure of the 

force deployment planning process to properly synchronize the flow of 

combat and support forces. DOD normally uses time-phased force 

deployment data to identify and synchronize the flow of forces during an 

operation. Key elements of this process include requirements for military 

transportation companies, contractor provided services, and host nation 

logistics support. However, the process was “thrown out” in the planning 

leading up to OIF. Around November 2002, DOD started to use another 

method for deployment planning, referred to as the Request for Forces 

process.

The Request for Forces process segregated the initial deployment plan 

into over 50 separate deployment orders. DOD’s priority was for combat 

forces to move into theater first. Under this new process, logistics unit 

commanders had to justify the flow of their units and equipment into the 

theater—often with little success. According to some DOD planners, this 

approach did not adequately meet planner needs, especially the needs 

of logisticians. Each deployment order required its own transportation 

feasibility analysis, which resulted in a choppy flow of forces into the 

theater. This in turn caused imbalances in the types of personnel needed in 

the theater to handle logistics requirements. Furthermore, a RAND study 

suggests that distribution assets, particularly for components such as the 

377th Theater Support Command and the 3rd Corps Support Command, 

were either deleted from the deployment plan or shifted back in the 

deployment timeline.42 As a result, logistics personnel could not effectively 

support the increasing numbers of combat troops moving into theater.

DOD took steps to mitigate the impact of some distribution problems, but 

these did not always work. For example, according to a RAND report, 

priority was given to moving critical supplies, such as food, water, 

ammunition, and fuel. Other items, to include spare parts, were moved on a 

very limited, opportune basis. As a result, according to one after-action 

report, it took nearly 2 weeks after U.S. forces moved into Iraq for the first

42 See unpublished research report by RAND Arroyo Center on the sustainment of Army 

units in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Eric Peltz and Marc Robbins.
Page 44 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

shipment of spare parts to reach combat forces, and this delivery was 

inadequate to support an entire division engaged in combat operations. 

Moreover, the Army confirmed that after 45 days of enemy engagement, 

moving water still consumed over 60 percent of available theater 

transportation trucks. A Marine Corps after-action report43 listed repair 

parts distribution as a “near-complete failure.”

In order to move supplies to the troops, both the Army and Marines 

contracted for additional trucks. For example, the Marine Corps contracted 

for $25.6 million in services from several commercial trucking companies 

to support combat operations. It justified this action by identifying 

deficiencies in the provision of transportation support they expected from 

other components in theater. However, Army officials stated that its 

contractors did not always have sufficient trucks to move supplies as 

required because contracts did not specify a level of operational readiness 

for trucks. As a result, even if trucks were available, they were not always 

functional. In its after-action report, the 3rd Infantry Division stated that 

available transportation assets and contracted host nation support could 

not meet divisional requirements for carrying capacity.

Information Systems did not 

Support Supply Distribution

According to military doctrine, financial, communication, and information 

systems used to support supply distribution must be accessible, integrated, 

connected, and contain accurate and up-to-date information.44 In other 

words, these systems need to provide a seamless flow of all types of 

essential data from the point of production to the warfighter. However 

during OIF, the logistics systems used to order, track, and account for 

supplies were not well integrated; moreover, they could not provide the 

essential information necessary to effectively manage theater distribution.

Data Transmission Problems Hindered Supply Requisitions

Logistics information systems in use during OIF could not effectively 

transmit data, making it difficult to process and track requisitions for 

critical supplies. A number of factors limited communications between the

43 U.S. Marine Corps Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, Implications for Seabasing, October 22, 2003.

44 See Joint Publication 4-0, Chapter I, p. I-17 through I-19 and Joint Publication 4-01.4, 

Chapter I, I-8 and I-9.
Page 45 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

various logistics systems, including a lack of bandwidth in the theater to 

satisfy all systems users, systems that were incompatible with each other, 

units lacking the necessary equipment or being delayed in connecting to 

the supply system, and distances being too great for supply activities to 

effectively transmit data by radio. For example, the supply activities in the 

Army’s 3rd Infantry Division only received about 2,500 of the over 

10,000 items—including armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and 

tires—they requisitioned between August 2002 and September 2003. 

Officials at the 3rd Infantry Division attributed this issue specifically to 

communications problems between systems. Army officials also attribute 

poor communications as a major factor leading to a $1.2 billion 

discrepancy between the amount of supplies shipped to the theater and the 

amount actually acknowledged as received, which we reported on in 

December 2003.45

The Marine Corps similarly experienced communications problems 

between its information technology systems during OIF. Marine forces 

deployed with two different versions of the Marine Corps Asset Tracking 

Logistics & Supply System logistics information system, which were not 

compatible with each other. Marine Corps units in the 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force were using the Asset Tracking Logistics & Supply 

System I for frontline logistics, while the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force 

was using the Asset Tracking Logistics & Supply System II+ for theater 

support.46 Therefore, requisitions from Marine support activities at the 

front lines could not be transmitted directly to Marine logistics units in the 

rear. Instead, the Marines used other processes, such as e-mail and satellite 

phone to requisition supplies. However, this left ordering units without any 

information on the status of their requisitions. As a result, many duplicate 

orders were submitted and may have unnecessarily added more cargo to 

the already overwhelmed theater distribution system. A study by SAIC also 

noted that the lack of logistics communications was a weaknesses during 

OIF.47 The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has since provided

45 GAO-04-305R.

46 Generally, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force served as the combat force during 

the operation, while the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force provided theater-level 

supply support.

47 See SAIC, Objective Assessment of Logistics in Iraq, Contract No. GS-10F-0091L, 

Task Order 73510 (March 2004) Chapter 5.
Page 46 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

satellite communications equipment to the units operating in theater to 

help alleviate these communication difficulties. 

Available Logistics Information Systems Did Not Provide 

Adequate Visibility

Another major problem encountered during OIF was a lack of adequate 

visibility over supplies in the distribution system. While the operation order 

for OIF called for the use of radio frequency identification, tracking was 

limited primarily by a failure to place radio frequency identification tags 

on all shipments sent to the theater and a lack of fixed scanners needed to 

read radio frequency identification tags. For example, some ports, such as 

one we observed in Bahrain, had no scanners at all.

Another equally challenging problem was that scanners often failed under 

the harsh environmental conditions. According to one Army assessment, 

only 50 percent of the scanners inspected in Kuwait were operational. In 

addition to problems with the radio frequency identification technology, 

there was no suitable information system infrastructure to track and 

identify supply assets. SAIC reported that the Joint Total Asset Visibility 

system could not provide commanders with the asset visibility they 

needed, while military officials in theater told us they knew of no joint 

system that tracked supplies from the point of production to the warfighter. 

Rather, logistics personnel relied on a number of unintegrated tracking 

systems. As a result, CENTCOM and the major combat forces in the Army 

and Marine Corps could not adequately track or identify supplies moving to 

and within the theater.

The lack of in-transit visibility over supplies significantly effected 

distribution. For example, an Army official responsible for logistics 

operations at the Theater Distribution Center noted that incomplete radio 

frequency identification tags forced the center’s personnel to spend time 

opening and sorting incoming shipments. This, in turn, significantly 

increased processing time, contrary to DOD’s principle of maximizing 

throughput. As a result, according to a CENTCOM issue paper, around 

1500 Small Arms Protective Inserts plates for body armor were lost. 

Another CENTCOM report stated that 17 containers of MREs were left at a 

supply base in Iraq for over a week because no one at the base knew they 

were there. According to Marine Corps officials, they became frustrated 

with their inability to “see” supplies moving towards them and lost trust 

and confidence in the logistics system and processes. For example, the 
Page 47 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Marines could only verify the receipt of 15 out of 140 AAV generators that 

were shipped to them.

Changes to Unit Address Codes Disrupted Logistics 

Information Systems

The use of new OIF-specific address codes, known as Department of 

Defense Activity Address Codes, for ordering supplies limited the 

effectiveness of logistics information technology.48 The codes ensure that 

supplies are sent to the correct address of the ordering unit and that the 

correct unit is charged for the supplies. Because of poor linkages between 

Army logistics and financial systems, a problem of where to ship and who 

to bill surfaces unless a unit or activity deploys intact. For example, while 

some parts of the 3rd Infantry Division remained in the U.S. during OIF, the 

majority of the division deployed to Iraq. To ensure that ordered supplies 

went to the correct location of a deployed unit and that the unit was 

correctly charged, new codes specifically set up for OIF were issued to 

deploying entities. Meanwhile, the original codes remained with that 

portion of the unit that did not deploy. Approximately 10,000 new codes 

were created for OIF. This caused significant disruptions to logistics 

information systems as new data had to be manually updated in each 

system. Many problems occurred during this process, such as the issuance 

of inactive codes, use of codes already assigned to other units, and 

incorrect data being input into logistics systems. These problems were 

another factor contributing to the $1.2 billion discrepancy between 

supplies shipped and supplies received.

Furthermore, there was a delay in updating the master code schedule that 

contained all the locations associated with the new codes. This caused 

significant problems for the Theater Distribution Center. According to an 

April 10, 2003 Theater Distribution Center log entry, “Upwards of 50% of 

pallets shipped to Doha and 20-30% of pallets shipped to Arifjan are being 

returned/rejected with the reason being, ‘it doesn’t belong here.’ The 

master [codes] are not being updated when units move in or out and the 

[theater distribution center] is double and triple handling cargo.” Given that 

the center was already experiencing problems with personnel and 

48 A Department of Defense Activity Address Code is a six-position numeric code that 

uniquely identifies a unit, activity, or organization that has the authority to requisition and/or 

receive materiel. 
Page 48 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

equipment shortages; additional handling of the same supplies increased 

their difficulties.

Logistics Personnel Were Not Trained on Some of the Logistics 

Information Systems in Use

A lack of adequate training for logistics personnel also negatively impacted 

the performance of logistics information systems. For example, according 

to a 101st Airborne after-action review, loading codes and interfacing with 

data caused problems that training could have resolved. Lack of training 

also contributed to problems with asset visibility. According to a logistics 

study, units were generally not trained in the use of radio frequency 

identification devices. Marine Corps officials likewise stated that their 

personnel were untrained in the use of tracking equipment.

DOD Actions to 

Improve Supply 

Availability for Current 

and Future Operations

As a result of logistics issues that arose during OIF, DOD, the services, and 

the defense agencies have undertaken a number of actions to improve the 

availability of equipment and supplies during ongoing and future 

operations. Some are short-term actions aimed at improving immediate 

supply availability. For example, as a result of the battery shortage, the 

Joint Staff Logistics Directorate established in July 2003 a revolving 

“critical few list” of approximately 25 items that the services and various 

commands report as most critically needed worldwide. The Joint Staff 

Logistics Directorate, in conjunction with the services, determines the 

causes of the shortages and makes recommendations to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the services for corrective action and execution. 

Other actions are long-term, systemic changes that are designed to improve 

the overall effectiveness of the supply system. While we did not evaluate 

the changes’ potential for success, we observed that the majority of them 

focus on the distribution aspects of logistics problems, not the full range of 

supply deficiencies we identified. However, other GAO engagements are 

currently underway to assess some of these initiatives. (Specific short-term 

and long-term actions related to each item are noted in the appendixes.)

• Inaccurate and inadequately funded war reserve requirements.

The Army has not updated or run its war reserve model in order to 

systemically ensure the accuracy of its war reserve requirements. Due to 

its risk management decisions, it has also not funded its war reserve 

requirements. However, the Army has made manual changes to its war 

reserve inventory levels, based on the usage of certain items during OIF.
Page 49 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

• Inaccurate supply forecasts. DOD and the services have not 

undertaken systemic actions specifically aimed at improving the 

accuracy of supply forecast. However, DLA has undertaken action to 

improve its customer support through its Customer Relationship 

Management program, which could potentially improve its ability to 

forecast customer demands.

• Insufficient and delayed funding. The Army has not undertaken 

long-term actions to expedite its funding process during contingencies 

to be more responsive to customer needs. However, it has undertaken 

short-term actions to obtain additional funding for specific supply items. 

For example, AMC directed funding towards armored vehicle track 

shoes.

• Delayed acquisition. DOD has not undertaken long-term actions to 

address acquisition issues that contributed to shortages of certain case 

study items. However, DLA has undertaken other actions to improve its 

ability to leverage industrial-base capabilities. DLA seeks to improve 

industrial-base support through its collaborative planning initiatives 

with industry. For example, its Strategic Materiel Sourcing program 

establishes long-term contracts for approximately 500,000 (of a total 

4.6 million) items the agency considers critical to its customers’ needs. 

In addition, its Strategic Supplier Alliances program establishes formal 

relationships with the agency’s top 32 sole source suppliers.

• Ineffective distribution. DOD has undertaken many initiatives to 

improve its distribution system, including the Secretary of Defense’s 

designation of the U.S. Transportation Command as the Distribution 

Process Owner. According to a Secretary of Defense memorandum,49

the U.S. Transportation Command is responsible for improving the 

overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities. 

In January 2004, the command established a CENTCOM Deployment 

and Distribution Operations Center, which is responsible for directing 

airport, seaport, and land transportation operations within the OIF 

theater. DOD’s Pure Pallet initiative seeks to reduce inefficiencies in the 

distribution process and improve in-transit tracking of shipments by 

building containers and pallets with radio frequency identification tags 

that are designated to units within a specific geographic location.

49 Secretary of Defense, “Actions to Improve Logistics and Global Supply Chain 

Management,” Memorandum (Washington D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).
Page 50 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The Army and DLA have also undertaken numerous actions to improve the 

distribution system. The Army has identified four areas of focus for the 

next 2 years: (1) “Connect Army Logisticians” by using technology to 

provide logisticians and warfighters with real-time visibility over 

distribution and warfighter requirements, (2) “Modernize Theater 

Distribution” by developing a distribution-based logistics system to support 

the warfighter, (3) “Integrate the Supply Chain” by providing a system wide 

view of the supply chain through the integration of processes, information, 

and responsibilities, and (4) “Improve Force Reception” by enhancing the 

Army’s ability to deploy forces to theaters of operation by establishing an 

early port opening capability that will result in-theater expansion and 

increased theater sustainment. Furthermore, the Army has expanded its 

Rapid Fielding Initiative, which accelerates acquisition and fielding 

processes to ensure that troops deploy with high-priority items. DLA has 

also expanded its Forward Stocking Initiative by opening a fifth forward 

stock depot in Kuwait to reduce customer wait time and transportation 

costs. Moreover, AMC and DLA have formed a partnership in which they 

will explore the use of commercial systems to increase supply readiness, 

improve in-transit visibility, cut costs, and improve parts resupply to field 

locations.

Conclusions In times of war, the defense supply system needs to be as responsive and 

agile as the combat forces that depend upon it. In the Quadrennial Defense 

Review for 2001, DOD stated its intention to transform its logistics 

capabilities to improve the deployment process and implement new 

logistics support tools that accelerate logistics integration between the 

services and reduce logistics demand and cost. OIF tested this system as 

well as industry’s capability to meet rapidly increasing demands, and, in 

many instances, the system failed to respond quickly enough to meet the 

needs of modern warfare. While units in Iraq achieved success on the 

battlefield, the supply chain did not always adequately support the troops 

and combat operations. A number of problems prevented DOD from 

providing supply support to its combat forces at many points in the 

process, which reduced operational capabilities and forced combat 

commanders to accept additional risk in completing their missions. An 

inability to adequately predict the needs of warfighters at the onset of the 

war, coupled with a slow process for obtaining additional resources once 

those needs were identified, resulted in critical wartime shortages. In 

addition, even when sufficient supply inventories were available within the 

system, they were not always delivered to the combat forces when they 

needed them. All of these problems were influenced to some extent by a 
Page 51 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

lack of accurate and timely information needed to support processes 

and decisions.

Unless DOD’s logistics process improves the availability of critical supplies 

during wartime, combat forces engaged in future operations will likely be 

exposed to risks similar to those experienced in Iraq. These risks will 

continue to exist unless DOD is able to improve the availability of war 

reserve supplies at the start of operations and overcomes problems 

forecasting accurate wartime demands. Moreover, delays in the Army’s 

funding processes will continue to place U.S. troops at risk by not enabling 

AMC to swiftly meet surges in wartime demands. In addition, future 

combat operations may be adversely affected unless DOD is able to 

anticipate acquisition delays that could affect the availability of critical 

supplies and provide transparency into how it expects to mitigate 

production risks. Finally, merely increasing the availability of supplies in 

the inventory will not help combat forces in the field. Troops will continue 

to face reduced operational capabilities and unnecessary risks unless 

DOD’s supply chain can distribute the right supplies to the right places 

when warfighters need them.

While DOD took immediate steps to overcome some shortages, and is 

beginning to develop solutions to some of the problems identified 

during OIF, most systemic solutions have tended to center on resolving 

distribution problems. If supply logistics transformation is to be successful, 

DOD’s supply chain reform will need to include solutions for the full gamut 

of identified deficiencies contributing to supply shortages during OIF. An 

integrated approach to addressing all of these deficiencies will increase 

DOD’s potential to achieve responsive, consistent, and reliable support to 

warfighters, a goal envisioned in the National Military Strategy and its 

logistics concepts and necessary to support the continued dominance of 

the U.S. military.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve the effectiveness of DOD’s supply system in supporting 

deployed forces for contingencies, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions 

and specify when they will be completed:

• Improve the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and 

transparency about their adequacy by
Page 52 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

• updating the war reserve models with OIF consumption data that 

validate the type and number of items needed,

• modeling war reserve requirements at least annually to update the 

war reserve estimates based on changing operational and equipment 

requirements, and

• disclosing to Congress the impact on military operations of its risk 

management decision about the percentage of war reserves being 

funded.

• Improve the accuracy of its wartime supply requirements forecasting 

process by

• developing models that can compute operational supply 

requirements for deploying units more promptly as part of prewar 

planning and

• providing item managers with operational information in a timely 

manner so they can adjust modeled wartime requirements as 

necessary.

• Reduce the time delay in granting increased obligation authority to the 

Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands to support 

their forecasted wartime requirements by establishing an expeditious 

supply requirements validation process that provides accurate 

information to support timely and sufficient funding.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 

the Navy to improve the accuracy of the Marine Corps’ wartime supply 

requirements forecasting process by completing the reconciliation of the 

Marine Corps’ forecasted requirements with actual OIF consumption data 

to validate the number as well as types of items needed and making 

necessary adjustments to their requirements. The department should also 

specify when these actions will be completed.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army and Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to take the following 

two actions:

• minimize future acquisition delays by assessing the industrial-base 

capacity to meet updated forecasted demands for critical items within 
Page 53 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

the time frames required by operational plans as well as specify when 

this assessment will be completed and

• provide visibility to Congress and other decision makers about how the 

department plans to acquire critical items to meet demands that emerge 

during contingencies.

We also recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three 

actions and specify when they will be completed:

• revise current joint logistics doctrine to clearly state, consistent with 

policy, who has responsibility and authority for synchronizing the 

distribution of supplies from the U.S. to deployed units during 

operations,

• develop and exercise, through a mix of computer simulations and field 

training, deployable supply receiving and distribution capabilities 

including trained personnel and related equipment for implementing 

improved supply management practices, such as radio frequency 

identification tags that provide in-transit visibility of supplies, to ensure 

they are sufficient and capable of meeting the requirements in 

operational plans, and

• establish common supply information systems that ensure the DOD and 

the services can requisition supplies promptly and match incoming 

supplies with unit requisitions to facilitate expeditious and accurate 

distribution.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

To improve visibility over the adequacy of the Army’s war reserves, 

Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to 

provide it information that discloses the risks associated with not fully 

funding the Army war reserve. This report should include not just the level 

of funding for the war reserve, which is currently reported, but timely and 

accurate information on the sufficiency of the war reserve inventory and its 

impact on the Army’s ability to conduct operations.
Page 54 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the intent 

of the recommendations and cited actions it has or is taking to eliminate 

supply chain deficiencies. Some of the actions could resolve the problems 

we identified when completed. Because DOD did not specify dates for 

completing all of its actions, we modified our recommendations to require 

specific time lines for their completion. DOD is taking other actions that 

are not sufficient to fulfill our recommendations and, in several cases the 

department’s comments did not specifically address how it plans to 

improve current practices. In addition to our evaluation below, we address 

each of DOD’s comments in appendix XI where its complete response 

is reprinted.

The department cited several actions it is taking to improve the accuracy 

of war reserve requirements, support prewar planning through supply 

forecasting, minimize future acquisition delays, and improve supply 

distribution. However, it did not clearly identify time lines for fully 

implementing most of these actions. For example, initiatives to improve 

modeling and data for determining war reserves had no dates for 

implementation. In some cases, the department provided tentative 

schedules, such as with the fielding of the Army’s Logistics Modernization 

Program to improve supply forecasting, which it expects to be in full use in 

fiscal year 2007. In another instance, it provided a May 2006 deadline for 

the developing an information technology plan to improve distribution, but 

did not indicate when the plan’s recommendations will be implemented. 

Therefore, we have modified our recommendations to require that DOD 

specify when these actions will be completed.

In two instances DOD cited actions we do not consider sufficient to fulfill 

our recommendations. The department stated that its annual Industrial 

Capabilities Report to Congress, as well as the budget process and other 

forums, provide adequate information on acquisition of critical items. 

While we agree that the report provided visibility about some items, such 

as body armor, it did not identify concerns about acquiring up-armored 

HMMWVs and kits. Therefore, we do not believe current reporting forums 

provide Congress with the consistent visibility and information needed to 

make informed decisions on actions that could speed the acquisition of 

critical items. In another instance, DOD cites the establishment of the 

Deployment and Distribution Center in CENTCOM as its means of testing 

improvements to distribution capabilities. While the center may improve 

deployable logistics capability, the department did not commit to actions, 

as we recommended, that would ensure through simulation and field 
Page 55 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

training that there are sufficient trained personnel and equipment to meet 

the requirements of the operational plans—a problem in theater before and 

during the arrival of combat forces. Therefore, we continue to believe these 

recommendations have merit.

DOD did not commit to any specific action to improve transparency to 

Congress of the risks associated with inadequately funding Army war 

reserves. The department said this risk is already reported to Congress in 

the budget process and a number of other ways. As stated in this report, the 

methods cited by DOD, such as the budget documentation, do not ensure 

consistent transparency by clearly stating the operational risks of 

underfunding the Army war reserves. Therefore we believe our 

recommendation has merit and have added a matter for congressional 

consideration that suggests Congress may wish to require DOD to disclose 

the risks associated with not fully funding the Army war reserve.

While DOD agreed with the intent of three recommendations, it did not 

commit to any specific actions to address them. The recommendations 

would (1) ensure item managers are provided operational information in a 

timely manner, (2) reduce the time delay in granting increased obligation 

authority to AMC and its subordinate commands, and (3) revise joint 

doctrine to clarify responsibility and authority for synchronizing 

distribution. We believe that these recommendations have merit and have 

cited the reasons in our comments in Appendix XI.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the 

Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S. Central 

Command; the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; the Director of 

the Defense Logistics Agency; and other interested parties.
Page 56 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8365. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix XII.

William M. Solis, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 57 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To address our objectives, we employed a case study approach, selecting 

nine supply items with reported shortages as a way to assess the 

availability of supplies and spare parts during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF). We judgmentally selected the nine items because we believed they 

presented possible shortages with operational impacts based on our prior 

work on OIF logistics and other sources such as military “after-action” 

reports on OIF operations, military and contractor “lessons learned” 

studies, briefings, congressional testimonies, and interviews with 

Department of Defense (DOD) and military service officials covering the 

time period between October 2002 and September 2004. We selected the 

items to encompass a variety of supply sources and users within DOD, the 

Army, and the Marine Corps. The items we selected and the supply sources 

for each item are shown in table 6.

Table 6: Item and Supply Manager

Source: GAO.

Note: The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) became the manager of lithium batteries in October 2004.

To verify the existence of reported shortages and to determine their extent, 

we interviewed DOD logistics officials and industrial-base suppliers. We 

also collected and analyzed supply data, such as requirements, customer 

demands, inventory levels, production levels, back order quantities, and 

funding levels, for the period between September 2001 through September 

2004 for the selected items. We considered an item to be in short supply if 

the data we obtained showed that demands placed by the warfighter 

exceeded availability in the supply system. To determine the impact of 

Item Supply manager

Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) generators Defense Logistics Agency (Defense Supply Center Columbus) and Marine 

Corps Logistics Command

Armored vehicle track shoes Army Materiel Command (Tank-automotive and Armaments Command)

Interceptor body armor Defense Logistics Agency (Defense Supply Center Philadelphia)

Chemical-biological suits Defense Logistics Agency (Defense Supply Center Philadelphia)

Lithium batteries Army Materiel Command (Communications-Electronics Command)

Helicopter rotor blades Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia

Meals Ready-to-Eat (MRE) Defense Logistics Agency (Defense Supply Center Philadelphia)

Tires for 5-ton trucks and High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)

Army Materiel Command (Tank-automotive and Armaments Command)

Up-armored HMMWVs and add-on armor kits Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support, 

Warren, Mich.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 58 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

shortages for the selected items, we interviewed officials in Army and 

Marine Corps combat forces that were deployed in OIF and also reviewed 

DOD and military services’ after-action reports, lessons learned studies, 

readiness reports, and other documents. For a complete list of these 

organizations, see table 7.

Table 7: Organizations Interviewed during Review

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Arlington, Va. 

Joint Staff Directorate of Logistics, Arlington, Va. 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Va.

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii

U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

U.S. Army

 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Arlington, Va. 

 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Va.

 Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support, Warren, Mich.

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), Arlington, Va.

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Arlington, Va. 

 U.S. Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (Logistics), Fort McPherson, Ga. 

 U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. 

 U.S. Army Materiel Command

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Budget Management), Fort Belvoir, Va.

 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), Fort Belvoir, Va.

 Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.

 Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich. 

 Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise, Rock Island, Ill.

 Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Ala.

 Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, Ohio

 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.

 4th Infantry Division & III Corps, Fort Hood, Tex. 

 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 59 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Source: GAO.

To determine what deficiencies contributed to identified supply shortages, 

we interviewed officials and collected documentation from DOD’s supply 

management organizations. On the basis of case studies, we identified 

deficiencies that affected the supply of two or more of the items. We 

analyzed data from DOD logistics agencies, operational units, and service 

and geographic commands to evaluate the significance of these 

deficiencies to DOD’s overall logistics system. We also reviewed prior GAO 

reports, DOD and military services’ after-action reports, military and 

contractor lessons learned studies, DOD directives and regulations, and 

reports by DOD and external experts, including Accenture, the Center for 

Naval Analysis, the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center, the Science 

Applications International Corporation, and the U.S. Army Audit Agency. In 

addition, we analyzed supply data for each item to identify and corroborate 

deficiencies contributing to item shortages.

To determine what actions DOD has taken to improve the availability of 

supplies for current and future operations, we collected data from military 

service and joint command headquarters personnel to identify short- and 

long-term efforts to address supply shortages. However, we did not 

evaluate their potential for success. We also reviewed DOD logistics and 

U.S. Marine Corps

 Headquarters Marine Corps, Installation and Logistic Department, Arlington, Va. 

 Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii 

 Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Ga. 

 Marine Corps Aviation Supply Logistics Office, Arlington, Va.

 Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va. 

 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Ca. 

 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

 3rd Marine Air Wing, Miramar, Calif.

Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia, Pa. 

National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va.

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Logistics Agency Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Va.

Defense Supply Center Columbus, Ohio

Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, Pa.

RAND Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, Ca.

AM General Corporation, Mishawaka, Ind.

Armor Holdings, Inc. (formerly O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt), Fairfield, Ohio

(Continued From Previous Page)
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 60 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

strategic planning documents that provide guidance on improving logistics 

support for military readiness.

We assessed the reliability of the supply data we obtained by interviewing 

agency officials knowledgeable about the data and corroborated it with 

other information about supply shortages gathered from other DOD and 

military service organizations. When data specifically for Iraq were not 

available, we used worldwide data since OIF received supply priority. With 

the exception of data on track shoes, we determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In the case of track shoes, we 

determined that the data provided by the Army’s Tank-automotive and 

Armaments Command (TACOM) were not sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes and did not use it. However, we were able to identify relevant 

information from TACOM’s periodic reporting to describe the item’s supply 

status. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. In the case of lithium batteries, the Communications-Electronics 

Command (CECOM) switched database systems in July 2003. We 

determined that the data from the new system were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of showing trends and graphing, but we based our findings on 

program data prior to the system change. We also identified relevant 

information from other DOD sources to confirm reported shortages of 

lithium batteries. The limitations of data collected for armored vehicle 

track shoes and lithium batteries are included in appendixes III and VI, 

respectively. We also determined that funding data were sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes by comparing data received from multiple sources 

within DOD.

We performed our audit from March 2004 through March 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 61 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators ApendxiI

Background The Marine Corps’ AAV is a full-tracked landing vehicle designed to carry 

up to 25 people from ship to shore and is used as an armored personnel 

carrier on land. The Marine Corps used more than 550 AAVs to transport 

personnel during operations in OIF. Among the critical parts of the AAV is 

its generator, which provides needed electrical power (see fig. 6).

Figure 6: Assault Amphibian Vehicle and Generator

The supply and distribution of AAV generators is a shared responsibility. 

The Marine Corps Logistics Command manages the supply of repairable 

generators; the Defense Supply Center Columbus supplies new generators. 

During OIF, the 2nd Force Service Support Group was responsible for 

moving supply shipments from the port to Iraq, and the 1st Service Support 

Group1

 had responsibility for moving supplies once they reached Iraq. The 

3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary 

Force, was in charge of maintenance for all AAVs in theater.

1

 These support groups belong, respectively, to the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, which 

generally provided theater-level supply support for OIF, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary 

Force, which generally served as the combat force for OIF. 

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators

Page 62 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

AAV generators were not available to the warfighter at some point between 

October 2002 and September 2004. We consider generators to have been a 

shortage because 84 were ordered, but only 15 were received. The Marine 

Corps’ 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion experienced a shortage of 

generators needed to repair AAVs during and after major combat 

operations in Iraq, according to officials. Both the Marine Corps Logistic 

Command and GAO have reported that the long distances the vehicles 

traveled, combined with combat conditions, placed the equivalent of 

5 years of wear and tear on the vehicles over a 6- to 8-week period. As a 

result of this accelerated wear and tear, the vehicles’ parts—including 

generators—wore out quickly. To meet the rapid rise in demand (see fig. 7), 

the battalion submitted orders for 84 generators between January and 

June 2003. According to supply management data, the Defense Supply 

Center Columbus sent 64 new generators and the Marine Corps Logistics 

Command sent 76 repaired generators2

—a total of 140—to the theater 

during major combat operations. However, the battalion reported that it 

received only 15 generators. Officials from the 1st Force Service Support 

Group in Iraq stated they did not know why they did not receive all of the 

generators shipped from the Marine Corps Logistics Command and the 

Defense Supply Center Columbus.

2

 The Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Ga. used repairable generators obtained 

from its Foreign Military Sales program. Under this program, the U.S. government 

authorizes the sale or transfer of military equipment, including spare parts, to foreign 

countries either through government-to-government agreements or through direct sales 

from U.S. manufacturers.
Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators

Page 63 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 7: Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generator Demand and Back Orders for OIF 

by Quarter (3rd quarter fiscal year 2001 through 4th quarter fiscal year 2004)

While a 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion official stated their demand for 

generators exceeded the number received in theater, they did not report 

any decline in AAV operational readiness. The reported operational 

readiness of AAVs in the Iraqi theater remained at about 89 percent most of 

the time between February 2003 and October 2003.3

 However, in order to 

maintain this readiness rate, a 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion official 

noted that spare parts from about 40 non-operational vehicles were used to 

support combat capable vehicles.

3

 The operational readiness rate refers to the capability of equipment other than aircraft to 

perform the mission or functions for which it is organized or designed and may be used in 

general terms to express a level or degree of readiness. 

Number of generators

0

20

40

60

80

100

Source: Defense Supply Center Columbus.

OIF demand

OIF back orders

2002 2003 2004

Quarter

July Oct. Oct. Jan. Apr. July Jan. Apr. July
Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators

Page 64 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Causes of Shortages Poor asset visibility in the Marine Corps’ in-theater distribution system 

contributed to the shortage of generators needed to repair AAVs. Although 

good asset visibility is one of the main tenets of logistics supply systems,4

the Marines had difficulty maintaining visibility over the 140 generators 

shipped to the theater. Marine Corps Logistics Command and Defense 

Supply Center Columbus officials tracked generators to the theater, but 

their visibility over these shipments ended there. Once the generators 

arrived in theater, the 2nd Force Service Support Group became 

responsible for maintaining visibility of supply. However, they stated they 

did not have visibility of the generators shipped into Iraq. The 1st Force 

Service Support Group, which directly supported units fighting in Iraq, also 

indicated an inability to track requisitioned supplies. While 15 of the 

generators were received by the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, neither 

the Marine Corps’ Force Service Support Groups nor we were able to track 

the remaining 125 generators.

A contributing factor to the shortage of generators was difficulties the 

Marine Corps faced in maintaining visibility over requisitioned and 

warehoused spare parts because of incompatible and unstable software 

and other visibility systems. Before OIF began, the Marines experienced 

difficulties maintaining visibility over the generators in their in-theater 

distribution center in Kuwait. Defense Supply Center Columbus officials 

reported that generators were shipped to the theater to support 

requirements forecasted by deploying units. However, according to an 

official with the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, instead of being 

delivered to the units, generators were warehoused in the distribution 

center. One reason for the poor asset visibility at the warehouse in 

February 2003, was the failure of the warehousing software—Storage 

Retrieval, Automated, Tracking, Integrated System—to work properly. 

Moreover, the 1st Force Service Support Group used one version of the 

Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) requisitioning 

software in theater, while the 2nd Force Service Support Group used 

another version, ATLASS II+. Because the two versions could not interface, 

personnel of the 1st Force Service Support Group reported that they 

reentered requisition information manually to move data between the 

systems. Personnel at the Marine’s distribution center in Kuwait entered 

requisitions into the Supported Activity Supply System, a stand-alone 

4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution, Chapter I, 

p. I4, Joint Pub 4.01.4 (Aug. 22, 2000).
Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators

Page 65 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

inventory system. According to Marine Corps Logistics officials, neither 

system could track requisitions or parts related to them through the supply 

requisition process.

In addition, Marine Corps personnel were expected to use radio frequency 

identification5

 technology to help maintain asset visibility during supply 

distribution. According to 2nd Force Service Support Group personnel, 

Marine units in theater did not have sufficient training or equipment to read 

the tags in order to support the use of this technology.

Efforts to Improve 

Availability 

Short-term Efforts When the supply system did not respond to the demand for generators, 

Marine Corps personnel noted that units went outside the supply system, 

through e-mail and telephone communications, to locate supplies, such as 

generators, for AAVs and other equipment.

To minimize data entry errors, Marine Corps personnel developed an 

electronic process to transfer data between the ATLASS and ATLASS II+ 

software systems. According to logistics personnel, to improve visibility 

of requisitions through the system, the Marine Corps streamlined its 

requisitioning process by using ATLASS to enter requisitions into the 

Supported Activity Supply System and by eliminating the use of ATLASS II+ 

in theater.

To support greater use of radio frequency identification tags in theater, the 

Marine Corps, according to the 2nd Force Service Support Group officials, 

has provided training to personnel deploying to Iraq and increased the use 

of the technology to improve asset visibility.

5

 Radio frequency identification tags are used to track shipping containers and pallets and 

their contents while in transit. The tags continuously transmit radio signals, which can be 

read using hand-held or fixed scanners.
Appendix II

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Generators

Page 66 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Long-term Efforts According to 2nd Service Support Group officials, the Marine Corps is 

evaluating an Army information system that monitors assets moving 

through the supply system to determine if the Army’s system can be 

adapted for Marine Corps use.

The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force has developed a Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force Distribution Center initiative. The Marines stated that the 

initiative, implemented in September 2004, helps them manage the 

distribution system by bringing together the Traffic Management Office, 

deployed supply units, and transportation assets to replicate the in-theater 

supply process. The initiative will enable them to fully replicate the supply 

system, including the use of radio frequency identification tags and satellite 

transponders.
Page 67 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes ApendxiI

Background During OIF, U.S. forces relied heavily on armored vehicles such as Abrams 

tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.1

 For example, at the beginning of 

combat operations in Iraq, the 3rd Infantry Division had a fleet of 

252 Abrams tanks and 325 Bradley Fighting Vehicles drawn from Army 

prepositioned stock. Troops used Abrams tanks to lead attacks in urban 

areas with the support of infantry equipped with Bradley Fighting Vehicles. 

Army officials said that Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were 

extremely effective for operations in urban terrain. Critical components of 

both types of armored vehicles are the track that enables the vehicles to 

move, which are composed of dozens of metal shoes2

 (see fig. 8).

Figure 8: Abrams Tank Track

1

 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles are the Army’s dominant ground combat 

vehicles. Both provide mobile firepower while protecting crews from the combat 

environment.

2

 Each vehicle has a track assembly that rotates on each side. Each track assembly consists 

of a number of track shoes attached together to form an endless track. The metal track 

shoes engage the teeth of the track drive sprockets, which allows power to be transferred 

from the vehicle to the track. As the sprocket moves the track, it moves the vehicle. An 

Abrams tank has 156 track shoes; a Bradley Fighting Vehicle has 166.

Source: TACOM.
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 68 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The Army’s TACOM Track and Roadwheel Group buys the track shoes that 

are used on Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Goodyear is the 

sole source supplier of Abrams track shoes and the major producer of 

Bradley track shoes. VAREC also produces Bradley track shoes. In fiscal 

year 2003, TACOM reported spending $195.2 million to purchase track 

shoes for all tanks and vehicles. However, worldwide demand for Abrams 

and Bradley track shoes totaled $257.4 million. Of the $195.2 million, 

TACOM reportedly spent $98.6 million on Abrams track shoes and 

$52.4 million on Bradley track shoes.

We were unable to obtain reliable data on forecasted requirements, 

demands, back orders, and inventory for track shoes from TACOM’s Track 

and Roadwheel Group. The group’s officials told us that because the 

models and studies used to compute the data can produce inaccurate 

results, they could not validate the data. As a result, we were unable to 

document the extent of shortages based on these data. However, group 

officials were able to provide us with data used to inform AMC on the 

status of track shoe shortages. According to TACOM, these data are based 

on information provided by units in theater and best represent true 

demand. We corroborated this secondary data with classified data and used 

it in our analysis.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

Track shoes for the Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were not 

available to the warfighter at some time between October 2002 and 

September 2004. We consider this item to have a shortage because demand 

exceeded the amount of inventory available to meet the needs of the 

war fighters.

U.S. forces and logistics personnel reported critical shortages of track 

shoes for Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles during OIF, and 

these shortages negatively affected their mission. In undertaking their 

mission, U.S. forces subjected these tanks and vehicles to the equivalent of 

3 years of high-intensity training during major combat operations in Iraq. 

Because of the extensive mileage placed on the tanks and Bradley 

vehicles—exacerbated by bad road conditions and extreme heat—vehicle 

parts, particularly track shoes, wore out quickly.

Although TACOM was able to meet the track shoe demands of units 

preparing to deploy as well as those already deployed in OIF, it began to 

experience difficulties in providing track shoes to units in theater around 

April 2003. The demand for Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle track 
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 69 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

shoes in May 2003 was 5 times the March 2003 forecasted demand 

(see table 8). To meet the surge in demand for Abrams track shoes, 

TACOM negotiated with Goodyear to increase the production rate from 

15,000 Abrams track shoes per month (from the normal peacetime rate 

of 10,000 per month) to 17,000 per month for December 2002, then to 

20,000 per month in May 2003, and to 25,000 per month in July 2003. 

However, these increases in production still were not sufficient to meet 

OIF demands. In May 2003, for example, the actual demand for Abrams 

track shoes rose to more than 55,000.

Table 8: Forecasted and Actual Demand for Abrams and Bradley Track Shoes 

(March-May 2003)

Source: TACOM.

As a result of track shoe shortages, some Abrams tanks and Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles could not operate during the summer months in 2003. For 

example, the 4th Infantry Division reported it could not obtain sufficient 

quantities of track shoes to meet operational needs. At one point during 

post-combat operations, the division had an operational requirement for 

23,626 Abrams track shoes, of which 8,002 were shipped, but only 1,028 

were received. To support the Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the division had 

an operational requirement of 29,911 track shoes, of which 4,591 were 

shipped, but only 744 were received. As a result of its inability to obtain 

more track shoes and other suspension parts, the 4th Infantry Division 

reported its readiness rates for both types of combat vehicles deteriorated. 

For example, one of its brigades reported that 11 of its 44 Abrams tanks 

were unavailable during post combat operations because of the lack of 

track shoes.

Track shoe shortages also negatively impacted the 3rd Infantry Division. 

On June 11, 2003, the division reported that of the 185 Abrams tanks it had 

on hand, 111 (60 percent) were deemed “non-mission capable due to 

supply.” For the 237 Bradley Fighting Vehicles it had on hand, 159 

(67 percent) were deemed non-mission capable due to supply. According to 

3rd Infantry Division officials, the reason tanks and vehicles were 

Abrams track shoes Bradley track shoes

March 2003 forecasted demand 11,125 12,787

April 2003 actual demand 23,462 20,678

May 2003 actual demand 55,313 55,875
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 70 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

unavailable was because replacement track shoes were not available to 

the units. For example, between April 16-18, 2003, one divisional 

supply support activities in Kuwait had 22,074 Abrams track shoes and 

18,762 Bradley track shoes on back order.

To alleviate the impact of track shoe shortages on Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

readiness, theater commanders wanted to bring an additional 1,407 uparmored HMMWVs into theater. However, as detailed in appendix X, the 

procurement of additional up-armored HMMWVs was also problematic.

Causes of Shortages Inaccurate war reserves requirements, inaccurate forecasted requirements, 

and erratic funding affected TACOM’s ability to provide track shoes.

Inaccurate War Reserve 

Requirements

Inaccurate war reserves requirements negatively affected TACOM’s ability 

to provide track shoes to units in theater at the beginning of OIF. Governed 

by Army Regulation 710-1, war reserves are intended to provide the Army 

with interim support to sustain operations until it can be resupplied with 

materiel from the industrial base. For TACOM, the war reserve requirement 

for 3,635 Abrams track shoes and 1,800 Bradley track shoes identified in 

September 2001 was not enough to support OIF demands. Although the 

war reserve requirement increased in December 2002, the new requirement 

for 5,230 Abrams track shoes and 5,626 Bradley track shoes was still not 

enough to meet demands.

To more accurately reflect track shoe usage in OIF, TACOM officials, in 

December 2003, increased the war reserves requirements to 32,686 Abrams 

track shoes and 34,864 Bradley track shoes. TACOM officials made the 

change manually rather than using the Army War Reserve Automated 

Process,3

 which was last run in fiscal year 1999. Since then, the number and 

type of vehicles have changed, but the official process has not been 

performed again to update the requirements. TACOM officials have been 

waiting for input based on the defense planning guidance from the 

Department of the Army to initiate a new process. At the time of our 

3

 According to Army Regulation 710-1, Chapter 6, paragraphs 6-25 and 6-26, AMC is to 

compute requirement levels based on guidance from the Department of Army Headquarters 

using the Army War Reserve Automated Process system. This system is a process that 

computes requirements for repair parts and minor secondary items and several auxiliary 

processes that support the requirement process.
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 71 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

review, they were not certain when they would receive the guidance. Until 

the model is run, TACOM officials will continue to make manual changes to 

war reserves requirements.

In addition, both we and Accenture have questioned the validity of the 

Army’s war reserve requirements. In a 2001 report, we found that war 

reserve requirements could be inaccurate because the calculations were 

not updated to reflect new consumption rates; requirements determination 

methodology might not be consistent with planned battlefield maintenance 

practices; and requirements were based on internal estimates of what the 

industrial-base could provide rather than on well-defined industry data 

itself.4

 A 2003 study by Accenture concluded that part of the reason for the 

low war reserve requirements was that the forecasting process is labor 

intensive, time consuming, and suffers from inaccurate input data.5

Inaccurate Forecasted 

Requirements

In fiscal year 2003, TACOM underestimated the amount of Abrams and 

Bradley track shoes needed worldwide. Although TACOM revised its 

requirements at the end of each quarter, its estimates for Abrams and 

Bradley track shoes still fell short.

For example, in April 2003 the forecasted monthly requirement for Abrams 

track shoes was 11,125, which was less than half of the actual demand of 

23,462 shoes. The track shoe budget forecasts further illustrate the 

discrepancy between forecasted and actual requirements. Based on its 

budget-forecasting tool, TACOM forecasted it would need $46.8 million for 

Abrams track shoe purchases for fiscal year 2003. At the end of the year, 

actual demands for Abrams track shoe totaled $194.9 million—a 

416 percent increase. For Bradley track shoes, the group forecasted it 

would need $17.8 million in fiscal year 2003 to meet customer demands. 

However, actual demands totaled $62.6 million—a 351 percent increase—

by the end of the fiscal year.

4

 GAO, Army War Reserves Spare Parts Requirements are Uncertain, GAO-01-425

(Washington, D.C.: May 2001).

5

 Accenture, TACOM Track Study: Findings, Solutions & Recommendations, 

December 19, 2003.
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 72 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Even if TACOM’s revised track shoe estimates had been accurate, it would 

have been too late to meet the summer 2003 demand. In order to have 

supplies on hand when demands are received, item managers need to 

award contracts allowing for sufficient procurement lead-time.6

 TACOM 

officials explained that track shoe manufacturers need an average of 4 to 

6 months to produce and deliver track shoes once they receive a contract. 

The high demands for track shoes in the late spring and summer of 2003 

were not forecasted in October 2002, which would have been the time 

when contracts should have been awarded so that TACOM could 

adequately meet customer needs.

The failure to forecast the high demand experienced during the 

early months of OIF was partly due to the requirements forecasting model 

used and to the lack of information and guidance provided to TACOM. In its 

conclusions, the Accenture study on track shoe shortages found that the 

requirements forecasting model failed to accurately forecast future 

demands because the model uses a simple moving average based on 

24 months of historical demand7

 that does not support dynamic changes in 

item usage. This meant that large increases in demand during the last 

couple of months of the 24-month period would not result in a 

corresponding increase in the forecasted demand. In addition, TACOM 

officials stated they did not receive adequate planning guidance on 

operational plans from AMC prior to the onset of combat operations that 

they could incorporate into their forecasts for track shoes. Consequently, 

TACOM determined the requirements based on the model and on the item 

managers’ expertise and knowledge of the item, as allowed under Army 

Regulation 710-1.

Subsequent requirements throughout fiscal year 2003 also were 

understated. TACOM officials reported that although they regularly 

requested information about the track shoes’ usage and durability, which 

would have helped them better gauge actual demand, they received limited 

information and input from units in the field. As OIF continued throughout 

2003, TACOM held teleconferences with AMC Logistics Support Element 

6

 A lead-time is the interval in months between the initiation of procurement action and the 

item’s receipt into the supply system.

7

 Army Regulation 710-1 states that an active database of the past 24-month demand history 

should be used to compute future demand. However, the length of the demand base used to 

forecast requirements can vary from the standard 24 months.
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 73 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

representatives and with units in theater to obtain updated information 

about item usage.

Erratic Funding for Track 

Shoe Production

During fiscal year 2003, TACOM did not receive sufficient obligation 

authority in time to buy track shoes to meet growing demands. TACOM’s 

total funding requirements in fiscal year 2003 amounted to $257.4 million—

$194.9 million for Abrams track shoes and $62.5 million for Bradley track 

shoes. TACOM officials told us that they could not buy sufficient track 

shoes because they had received only $216 million in obligation authority 

to buy all of the items they managed. However, TACOM spent only 

$151.0 million on track shoes—$98.6 million for Abrams tanks and 

$52.4 million for Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

In addition to insufficient obligation authority, the uncertainty of the 

funding flow affected the manufacturer’s ability to produce track shoes. A 

primary producer of track shoes for TACOM, Goodyear, was in danger of 

closing down its track shoe production plant in April 2003 because of a lack 

of contracts. TACOM officials stated that they could not award contracts 

consistently because they did not know how much obligation authority 

they would receive or when the next allotment would arrive. Because of 

the acute shortage of track shoes, TACOM immediately awarded contracts 

to Goodyear whenever obligation authority became available. As a result of 

accelerated deliveries, Goodyear reported that it had a very low level of 

remaining workload and was in danger of closing down the track shoe 

production plant unless it received additional contracts.

According to TACOM officials, additional obligation authority was 

aggressively requested throughout fiscal year 2003 to support purchases of 

track shoes as well as other supply items. As an item critical to mission 

success, officials stated that track shoes usually receive more funding than 

other commodities managed by TACOM; however, releases of additional 

obligation authority were delayed in some instances. TACOM officials 

stated that when they need additional obligation authority, they request it 

from AMC, which then requests it from Army headquarters. These requests 

must be validated and justified (based on past sales) at each level before 

the Office of the Under Secretary Defense (Comptroller) approves for the 

release of additional obligation authority. TACOM officials expressed 

frustration with the process and complained that both AMC and Army 

Headquarters were not aggressively pursuing the issue and did not fully 

grasp the magnitude of impact to units in theater because of the lack of 

obligation authority provided to item managers.
Appendix III

Armored Vehicle Track Shoes

Page 74 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts To address inaccuracies in war reserve requirements, TACOM has manually 

updated its requirements levels for track shoes, rather than wait for AMC to 

implement the next Army War Reserve Automated Process.

To overcome inaccuracies in the requirements forecasting model, TACOM 

depended on item managers’ judgment and expertise to determine demand 

more accurately. Item managers worked with available information 

provided by AMC and with input from units in theater. In addition, priority 

was given to the Iraqi theater of operations and available track shoe 

production was shipped to support units in Iraq. TACOM worked with 

theater commanders to expedite and prioritize shipments of track shoes.

To address funding shortfalls, TACOM continually requested that any 

additional obligation authority be made available to buy track shoes during 

fiscal year 2003. Because track shoes were considered critical missionessential items and their shortage greatly impacted theater operations, 

officials from the Track and Roadwheel Group said that they usually 

received more funding and attention than other supply groups within 

TACOM. For example, in June 2003, the Track and Roadwheel Group 

received $64 million that was specifically meant to prevent Goodyear from 

closing down its track shoe production plant. In August 2003, TACOM 

received an additional $70 million for track shoe purchases.

To improve track shoe availability during OIF, the Army made a $5.2 million 

investment in Goodyear production facilities to meet the surge 

requirements and to sustain the viability of the track shoe supplier.8

Long-term Efforts At the time of this review, TACOM officials did not identify any long-term 

efforts to correct problems identified with war reserves, requirements, or 

funding shortfalls.

8

 According to the Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress in February 2004, 

Goodyear required an annual minimum production requirement of about 264,000 track 

shoes to meet its business case. 
Page 75 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor ApendxiIV

Background The U.S. military’s new Interceptor body armor is composed of 

two primary components: an Outer Tactical Vest and two Small Arms 

Protective Insert plates (see fig. 9). The Outer Tactical Vest consists of a 

combination of a soft fabric vest and para-aramid fiber panels that provide 

protection against shrapnel and 9 mm ammunition. The plates consist of a 

combination of ceramic tiles and polyethylene fiber 1

 that, when inserted 

into the vest, provide protection against rifle rounds up to 7.62 mm. The 

vest accepts two plates, one for the front and one for the back. Additional 

attachments can increase protection.2

The new body armor provides improved protection and weigh less than the 

older version—the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops, or “flak” 

vest—which protects only against shrapnel. The new body armor weighs 

16.4 pounds, while the older vest weighs 25.1 pounds.

Figure 9: Interceptor Body Armor

1

 The ceramic tile is composed of various ceramic composites such as boron carbide, silicon 

carbide, and aluminium oxide. The tile is backed by multiple layers of polyethylene fiber.

2

 Additional attachments include throat and groin protectors.

Source: U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center.
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 76 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The Army planned to issue the Interceptor body armor to U.S. forces over 

an 8-year period between 2000 and 2007. It began to distribute the armor to 

military personnel during Operation Enduring Freedom. On the basis of the 

armor’s effectiveness the Army decided to accelerate its fielding for OIF. 

DLA’s Defense Supply Center Philadelphia manages the Interceptor body 

armor for the Army. The Marine Corps has its own version of the body 

armor that is constructed with the same materials as the Army version. 

The Marine Corps Systems Command and the U.S. Army Robert Morris 

Acquisition Center manage it for the Marine Corps. Both services rely on 

the same manufacturers.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

Interceptor body armor was not available in sufficient quantities to 

U.S. military forces in Iraq sometime between October 2002 and 

September 2004. We consider this item to have a shortage because demand 

exceeded the production output necessary to meet the needs of the 

war fighter. While there were shortages of Interceptor body armor during 

OIF, Coalition Forces Land Component Command officials stated that 

military personnel deployed with either the vest component of the new 

body armor or the old body armor. CENTCOM officials stated that all 

personnel in Iraq had the new armor by January 2004; 8 months after 

combat operations were declared over.

The new body armor was initially intended for limited numbers of 

personnel, such as dismounted infantry, however, this changed during OIF. 

In May 2003, the Army changed the basis of issue to include every soldier in 

Iraq. Then in October 2003, CENTCOM further expanded issuance of the 

body armor to include all U.S. military and DOD civilian personnel working 

within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility including Iraq, Kuwait, and 

Afghanistan.

Demand for the vest component part of Interceptor body armor increased 

rapidly both at the beginning of OIF, when troops began combat operations, 

and again in late 2003 during stabilization operations. Worldwide quarterly 

demand for vests rose from 8,593 in December 2002 to 77,052 in 

March 2003—the onset of combat operations. The demand for vests 

continued to spike upward topping out at 210,783 in December 2003. The 

number of back orders also rapidly increased over this period of time 

(see fig. 10). By December 2003 the worldwide number of back orders 

reached 328,023 with DLA mandating that OIF requisitions receive priority. 
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 77 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

In contrast, during December 2003 the number of vests actually produced 

to meet demand was only 23,900.

Figure 10: Worldwide Demand, Production Output, and Back Orders for Vests by Quarter (December 2001 through 

September 2004)

Notes: Back order data were not available for the period between October 2002 and February 2003.

Similarly, the demand for plates increased with the onset of combat 

operations and again during stabilization operations in late 2003. The 

demand for plates increased more than ten-fold, from a quarterly demand 

of 9,586 plates in December 2002 to a quarterly demand of 108,808 plates in 

March 2003 at the beginning of OIF. As figure 11 shows, with the change in 

the basis of issue for the Interceptor body armor in October 2003, the 

demand for plates rose rapidly again, peaking at 478,541 plates in 

December 2003. In addition, during late 2003, the number of back orders 

for plates also increased rapidly. By November 2003, the number of 

worldwide back orders peaked at 597,739 plates, with DLA giving OIF 

requisitions priority. In contrast, during this month, production output 

totaled only 40,495 plates.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

Number of vests

Dec. Mar June Sept. Dec. Mar June Sept. Dec. Mar June Sept.

Source: DLA.

Demand

Production output

Back orders

2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 78 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 11: Worldwide Demand, Production Output, and Back Orders for Plates by Quarter (December 2001 through 

September 2004)

Note: Back order data were not available for the period between October 2002 and February 2003.

Military officials expressed serious concerns over the shortage of 

Interceptor body armor. Army officials stated that soldiers’ morale declined 

as units waited for the armor to reach theater. Because of the shortages, 

CENTCOM officials stated they prioritized the issue of the new body armor 

to those who were most vulnerable. In addition, there was a lack of body 

armor among support personnel, such as the Army’s 377th Theater Support 

Command, while insurgents were attacking and interdicting supply routes 

in Iraq. Because of the shortages, many individuals bought body armor 

with personal funds. The Congressional Budget Office estimated 

(1) that as many as 10,000 personnel purchased vests, (2) as many as 

20,000 purchased plates with personal funds, and (3) the total cost to 

reimburse them would be $16 million in 2005.3

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

Number of plates

Dec. Mar June Sept. Dec. Mar June Sept. Dec. Mar June Sept.

Source: DLA.

Demand

Production output

Back orders

2001 2002 2003 2004

3

 The Congressional Budget Office’s estimate for H.R. 4200, National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005, p. 16. 
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 79 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Causes of Shortages Temporary shortages of the Interceptor body armor occurred because of 

acquisition delays related to lack of key materials and distribution 

problems in theater.

Lack of Critical Materials 

Delayed Acquisition

A lack of sufficient quantities of key materials used to make vests and 

plates delayed acquisition to meet the increasing demand for Interceptor 

body armor. According to DLA officials, shortages of critical materials still 

limit worldwide production to approximately 35,000 vests and 50,000 plates 

per month. A production lead-time of three months has also limited the 

industrial-base’s capacity to accelerate its production levels to meet 

increasing demand.

DLA officials stated that the production of vests and plates was impaired by 

a limited availability of critical materials. The shortfall of vests was due to a 

lack of Kevlar, a para-aramid fiber that was in short supply. DuPont 

Chemicals is the only domestic producer of the para-aramid fiber panels 

used in the vests. However, an exception under the Defense Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement4

 allowed vest contractors to use 

Twaron5 fiber panels manufactured in the Netherlands as a replacement for 

Kevlar fiber panels. 

The shortfall in ceramic plates was due to insufficient quantities of two 

materials needed to produce them. The initial shortfall was due to the 

limited availability of SpectraShield.6

 Until April 2004, Honeywell was the 

only domestic producer of SpectraShield, and it had other competing 

commercial requirements for the material. Plate producers responded to 

the limited availability of SpectraShield by manufacturing modified plates 

that replaced SpectraShield with Kevlar and other para-aramid fiber 

materials. While these plates met ballistic protection requirements, they 

weighed a half pound more and required a service waiver for acceptance.

4

 The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Part 225 governs the acquisition 

of foreign products and services.

5

 Twaron is a para-aramid fiber that can be substituted for Kevlar. 

6

 SpectraShield is a polyethylene fiber used as a backing for the ceramic plate and is the only 

material that meets Army and Marine Corps ballistic protection and weight requirements for 

the new body armor. 
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 80 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

In April 2004, DSM Dyneema, a foreign firm that produces Dyneema, a 

SpectraShield-equivalent, opened a production facility in the U.S. and 

began to produce and sell the product. SpectraShield and Dyneema are the 

only materials that meet the services’ ballistic protection and weight 

requirements for Interceptor body armor. Due to their limited availability, 

both materials are under Defense Priorities and Allocation System control.7

Plate production was later constrained by the limited availability of 

ceramic tiles. According to DLA, current production output is subject to 

further increase as DSM Dyneema increases its Dyneema production and 

additional ceramic tiles are qualified as meeting specification 

requirements.

Accelerated Fielding 

Affected Distribution

Attempts to accelerate fielding of the new body armor met with some 

success, but also caused problems. According to an Army Office of the 

Inspector General report,8

 accelerated fielding resulted in supplying body 

armor to soldiers at a much faster pace than normal. The armor was 

distributed in some cases virtually directly from the factory to the 

warfighter. The report stated that the accelerated fielding did not allow 

time for the project manager to coordinate with units and allow them to 

establish sufficient accountability in theater, as required by Army 

regulations. However, lack of in-transit visibility, inaccurate reporting of 

on-hand quantities, lag time in recording receipt of plates, and other 

accounting errors resulted in temporary loss of visibility of between 5,000 

and 30,000 sets of plates.

7

 The Defense Priorities and Allocation System assures the timely availability of industrial 

resources to meet current national defense and emergency preparedness requirements. 

8

 Department of the Army, Office of the Inspector General, Special Inspection of the 

Processes Used to Provide Body Armor to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, December 2003-February 2004, 

April 20, 2004. 
Appendix IV

Interceptor Body Armor

Page 81 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts To meet the surging demand for plates, DOD used authority under the 

Defense Production Act9

 to allocate production of SpectraShield. More 

specifically, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Industrial Policy) used its authority under the Defense Priorities and 

Allocation System to direct Honeywell to accelerate deliveries of 

SpectraShield in support of OIF on six occasions in 2003. According to the 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics), Honeywell did this at the expense of its commercial orders. To 

increase industrial-base production capacity, DLA stated that it increased 

its number of vest suppliers from 1 to 4; plate manufacturers from 3 to 8 

(including manufacturers of overweight plates); and ceramic tile suppliers 

from 4 to 10 (including suppliers of overweight tiles).

Long-term Efforts DLA has recommended that it have management of Interceptor body armor 

requirements for all of the services. It has recommended that the services 

establish war reserve stock levels for the new body armor to mitigate 

lead-time in industrial-base production. It has also requested the authority 

to purchase and maintain an inventory of materials necessary for 

producing vests and plates as well as contract with vendors who have the 

capacity to use such stored materials during times of high demand. 

9

 The Defense Production Act is the primary legislation for ensuring that industrial 

resources and critical technology items essential for national defense are available when 

needed. 
Page 82 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix V

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits ApendxiV

Background JSLIST is a protective clothing ensemble that includes a lightweight 

chemical-biological protective suit, multi-purpose over-boots, and gloves 

(see fig. 12). When combined with a chemical protective mask, JSLIST 

provides protection from chemical and biological agents. The suit can be 

worn over a uniform and body armor. Once it is removed from the 

packages, the suit can provide protection for 45 continuous days. However, 

once exposed to an agent, it must be replaced within 24 hours. The sealed 

suit package has a shelf life of 14 years. The U.S. military began fielding 

JSLIST in November 2002. Before then, the Army relied on the Battle Dress 

Overgarment and the Marine Corps depended on the Saratoga suit.

Figure 12: Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology Suit

Although the military services manage their own inventories of JSLIST 

suits, DLA serves as the contracting agent. The largest producer is the 

National Institute for the Severely Handicapped. The primary 

subcontractor, Blücher, a German company, makes the suit’s filter fabric 

liner. A critical component of the liner is the carbon beads, which absorb 

chemical and biological agents. The carbon beads are produced for 

Blücher—through a sole source contract—by a Japanese company, Kureha.

Source: The Army's Soldier Biological and Chemical Command.
Appendix V

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits

Page 83 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Extent and Impact of 

Perceived Shortages 

during OIF

JSLIST was perceived to not be available for the warfighter between 

October 2002 and September 2004; however, we do not consider this a 

shortage because all personnel in theater were issued a JSLIST or Saratoga 

suit and the required spare by February 22, 2003. Some Army officials in 

theater, as well as National Guard officials in the U.S., indicated a shortage 

of JSLIST; however our analysis indicated no actual shortage. Despite this 

perception of a shortage, neither the Army nor Marine Corps indicated any 

impact on operational capabilities of deployed units. The Army began to 

field additional JSLIST suits to units deployed in theater in November 2002, 

in response to a congressional request.1

 By February 22, 2003, the Army’s 

Central Command reported that every Army unit had two suits for every 

soldier in theater; moreover, the theater supply base had one spare suit for 

every soldier. Similarly, the Marine Corps reported it had sufficient stock 

during OIF to issue one Saratoga suit2

 and hold two additional suits for 

each Marine.

Reasons for Perceived 

Shortages

The perception of a JSLIST shortage emerged in late 2002 and early 2003 

because of a change in requirements, poor asset visibility, and concerns 

about production capacity.

Requirements Changed in 

Fall 2002

Changes in requirements increased the demand for JSLIST. Before 

October 2002, the Army’s and Marine Corps’ requirements called for one 

chemical-biological protective suit and one backup for each soldier or 

marine in theater. To meet this requirement, the services planned to use the 

older suits (e.g., the Army’s Battle Dress Overgarment and the Marine’s 

Saratoga suit) and eventually supplemented them with the newer JSLIST. 

In October 2002, however, the House Committee on Government Reform 

requested that DOD direct the services to issue JSLIST to all U.S. forces 

stationed in the Middle East, thereby increasing the servicewide demand 

for JSLIST. According to Marine Corps officials, this request expanded the 

number of personnel who needed suits to include not only DOD military 

1

 The congressional request was prompted by our finding that DOD could not easily identify, 

track, and locate defective Battle Dress Overgarments. The Committee’s request was subject 

to available inventories and urgent deployment constraints.

2

 The Saratoga suit is considered equivalent to the JSLIST in protection against chemical and 

biological agents. Therefore, the use of the Saratoga suit by the Marine Corps was sufficient 

to meet the congressional request.
Appendix V

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits

Page 84 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

personnel but also DOD civilian contractors and members of other external 

organizations. Although Marine Corps officials state they planned to 

provide protective suits for non-military personnel before the 

congressional request, and had acquired and stocked 400 sets of Saratoga 

suits for this eventuality, they found more personnel than expected who 

needed the protective gear. Although the services were required to provide 

suits for all personnel in theater, there was no DOD policy to guide the 

procurement of these items.

Although the availability of JSLIST was sufficient, the sizes of the available 

suits were a problem for some soldiers. Initial orders for JSLIST did not 

take into account the fact that the suits would be worn over body armor 

and, thus, larger sizes were needed. According to DLA officials, units also 

did not consider that some National Guardsmen and reservists would need 

larger suits than those typically stocked to support the active-duty forces.

Lack of Asset Visibility In some cases, the poor visibility3

 over National Guard and Army Reserve 

supply inventories affected the perceived nonavailability of JSLIST. For 

example, Army officials noted that some National Guard and reserve units 

could not promptly find a sufficient number of JSLIST in their inventory to 

meet requirements. Their inventory systems did not provide visibility over 

inventory in different locations.4

 As a result, Army officials said the 

deployment of National Guard and reservist personnel was delayed until a 

sufficient number of JSLIST were located within their inventory.

3

 DOD defines visibility as the capability to provide users with timely and accurate 

information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, 

material, and supplies. 

4

 GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be Invested with 

Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability, GAO-04-615 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 27, 2004) found that asset visibility was not maintained over JSLIST suits at the unit 

level. We also found in GAO, DOD Management: Examples of Inefficient and Ineffective 

Business Processes, GAO-02-873T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002) that DOD’s visibility 

system did not provide accurate information about the quantities and location of JSLIST 

suits in its inventory.
Appendix V

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits

Page 85 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Production Concerns Although DLA reported operational unit concerns about the production of 

carbon beads, the agency was able to meet suit demand during OIF. 

Because of the single source subcontractor’s limited ability to produce 

carbon beads, the total monthly production was limited to 70,000 to 

80,000 suits. DLA officials stated this level of production was sufficient to 

meet JSLIST requirements and prior GAO analysis supports their claim.5

However, DLA officials noted they are concerned about their ability to 

meet the services’ current requirement to replace the 400,000 to 500,000 

suits issued in OIF.

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts To meet the additional requirement to supply DOD civilian contractors and 

other non-military personnel with JSLIST, Army officials noted that suits 

were shipped directly to the theater for issue. In addition, Marine Corps 

officials reported drawing on their prepositioned war reserve stocks to 

meet the additional requirement.

To meet the demand for larger sizes, the Director of DLA testified that DLA 

provided 2,000 custom-made suits for personnel outside the original size 

range.6

 Moreover, Army officials said that Federal Express was used to 

expedite the shipment of these suits.

Long-term Efforts To meet suit requirements for all personnel in theater, Army officials report 

that DLA has introduced four larger suit sizes into its inventory.

As part of an effort to improve asset visibility, the Department of the Army 

has implemented an Individual Protective Equipment Centralized 

5

 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: U.S. Ability to Meet Protective Suit Inventory 

Requirements Faces Risk, GAO-04-290 (Washington, D.C.:Apr 28, 2004).

6

 Statement by Vice Admiral Keith W. Lippert, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, 

before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Service Committee, March 30, 2004.
Appendix V

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 

Technology Suits

Page 86 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Management Initiative designed to provide units with visibility and 

shelf-life management of inventory in the United States.

To increase production capability, DLA officials stated that they worked in 

conjunction with DOD to increase the production capability of the existing 

industrial base and to develop new protective suits for future use. For 

example, DLA officials stated that Blücher is conducting research to 

develop an alternative carbon bead in order to reduce reliance on a sole 

source producer. In addition, they announced that in June 2004, the JSLIST 

Additional Source Qualification program at Quantico, Virginia, accepted 

the use of a new bead from Blücher, which will be available for future suits.
Page 87 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries ApendxiVI

Background BA-5590 and BA-5390 nonrechargeable lithium batteries1

 provide a portable 

power source for nearly 60 critical military communication and electronic 

systems, including the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, 

the Javelin missile guidance system, and the KY-57 transmission security 

device. U.S. troops depend on these systems to communicate, acquire 

targets, and gain situational awareness on the battlefield. The BA-5590 was 

developed specifically for military use more than a decade ago and, 

according to military officials, is the most widely used communications 

battery in the supply system (see fig. 13). The BA-5390 served as a 

substitute battery when shortages of BA-5590s occurred during OIF. Prior 

to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army was moving to a 

rechargeable battery at the direction of the Environmental Protection 

Agency. Funding was provided for the environmentally safe battery, not the 

disposable lithium battery. However, these disposable batteries are welladapted to fast-paced mobile operations because they do not have to be 

recharged.

Figure 13: BA-5590 Lithium Battery

Before OIF, SAFT manufactured all BA-5590 lithium batteries for the 

U.S. military. In late 2002, Ultralife Batteries started supplying BA-5390s to 

1

 These are part of the 5X90 family of lithium batteries. The BA-5590 contains lithium sulfur 

dioxide (Li/SO2) cells and has a use-life of about 24 hours. The BA-5390 contains lithium 

manganese dioxide (Li/MnO2) cells and has a use-life of about 36 hours. Both batteries have 

a shelf life of 5 years.

Source: DOD. 
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 88 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

the military and in early 2003 Eagle-Picher Technologies began delivering 

BA-5590s to augment SAFT’s output.

Before and during OIF, CECOM’s Logistics and Readiness Center bought 

and managed DOD’s family of lithium batteries. As of September 30, 2004, 

this responsibility was transferred to DLA’s Defense Supply Center 

Richmond. CECOM, however, will continue to be responsible for technical 

issues related to lithium batteries.

During the time period covered by our review, CECOM used several 

methods to derive inventory management data. Before July 2003, CECOM 

used the old Commodity Command Standard System. We consider data 

derived from this legacy system to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

In July 2003, CECOM converted to a new database, the Logistics 

Modernization Program, which encountered stabilization and data clean-up 

issues. To overcome these issues, CECOM item managers obtained 

inventory management information from the Logistics Modernization 

Program as well as manual computations. While these data are sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of showing trends and graphs, our findings rely 

primarily on data from the Commodity Command Standard System from 

the period before July 2003.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

Nonrechargeable lithium batteries, specifically BA-5590s and BA-5390s, 

were available in limited quantities to the warfighter between October 2002 

and September 2004. We consider this to be a shortage because the 

monthly demand and back orders for these batteries exceeded the monthly 

inventory that CECOM had available to supply U.S. forces in OIF.

While demand for nonrechargeable lithium batteries increased 

dramatically after September 11, 2001, it quickly outpaced the available 

supply, as U.S. troops began preparing for combat operations in Iraq. 

Demand rose from a peacetime average of below 20,000 batteries2

 per 

month before September 2001 to an average of 38,313 batteries per month 

after the United States launched the global war on terrorism and Operation 

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.3

 In January 2003, as thousands of troops 

2

 BA-5590 and BA-5390 batteries are distributed in packages of four batteries. In this report, 

we use the number of individual batteries.

3

 According to CECOM officials, demand represents worldwide demand. 
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 89 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

were deploying to the Gulf region, the number of batteries requisitioned 

surged to 140,000 and, in April 2003 during major combat operations, the 

number peaked at 330,600 (see fig. 14). When major combat operations 

were declared over in May 2003, demand began to fall. Since the fall of 

2003, the demand has leveled off to an average of about 62,000 per month.

Figure 14: Worldwide Demand, Inventory Levels, and Back Orders for BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries by Month 

(October 2001 through August 2004)

Note: Data on inventory and back orders was not available for October and November 2001.

U.S. troops encountered severe shortages of nonrechargeable lithium 

batteries because inventory levels (including on-hand and war reserve 

stocks) were low. As figure 14 shows, inventory levels remained on average 

below 15,000 batteries during 2002 and into early 2003, increasing only in 

Number of batteries

Source: CECOM.

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

Demand

Inventory

Back orders

Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec. Apr. June Aug. Aug. Feb. Apr. June Oct. Dec. Feb.

2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 90 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

May 2003 after major combat operations were declared over and demand 

began to decline. At the same time, the number of back-ordered batteries 

grew to about 250,000 in January 2003 and, by May 2003, had nearly 

quadrupled to 900,000. As demand fell and requisitions were filled, the 

number of back orders began to drop in the summer of 2003 and, by the end 

of 2003, inventory levels exceeded back orders.

Army and Marine Corps units faced critically low supplies of BA-5590s and 

BA-5390s during the spring of 2003. On March 24, 2003, a few days after 

combat operations began, the Marines reported they were down to less 

than a 2-day supply (rather than the required 30-day, on-hand safety level). 

In early April, Marine officials projected that, given existing worldwide 

inventories, production capacity, and consumption rates, they would 

experience degraded communications capacity by early May if the war 

continued at the same pace. To mitigate the shortages, the military took 

some actions, including requiring stationary units to use alternative power 

sources (e.g., rechargeable batteries) and instituting a weekly Materiel 

Priority Allocation Board4

 meeting to apportion batteries to combat units 

that needed them the most.

Causes of the 

Shortages

The critical shortages of BA-5590s and BA-5390s during OIF resulted from 

four related conditions: inadequate war reserve requirements, inaccurate 

forecasted requirements, lack of full-funding, and acquisition delays due to 

industrial-base limitations.

Inadequate War Reserve 

Requirements

The Army’s war reserve requirements for nonrechargeable lithium batteries 

were not sufficient to support initial operations. According to Army 

Regulation 710-1, the war reserve is intended to provide the Army with 

interim support to sustain operations until it can be resupplied with 

material from the industrial base. According to CECOM officials, before 

OIF, the war reserve requirement for BA-5590s was set at about

4

 The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board—which performs duties for the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—sets, changes, or recommends priorities for allocating 

supplies in the DOD system when competing requirements among DOD components cannot 

be resolved.
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 91 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

180,000 batteries to sustain the first 45 days of war.5 However, this amount 

was considerably below the actual demand of nearly 620,000 batteries 

recorded during March and April 2003. Officials stated that the low pre-war 

requirement was generated by the Army’s war reserve model,6

 which was 

last updated in 1999; moreover, this model used inaccurate battery failure 

rates and did not include all of the equipment that used nonrechargeable 

lithium batteries. Based on their experience during OIF, CECOM officials 

have increased the current Army and Marine Corps war reserve 

requirement for BA-5590s and BA-5390s to more than 1.5 million total 

batteries, an amount equal to OIF’s average monthly demand of 

250,000 batteries times 6 months of continuous combat operations. 

War reserve planners expected inventories to reach the 1.5 million mark by 

February 2005.

Inaccurate Forecasted 

Requirements

In addition to low war reserves, CECOM’s official monthly forecasted 

requirements for nonrechargeable lithium batteries were far below those 

needed to meet a wartime contingency. Forecasted requirements are 

developed primarily on the basis of actual demand data for an item from 

the preceding months7

 and are used to support funding requests to 

purchase additional supplies. In 2002, CECOM increased its monthly 

forecasted requirements from a monthly peacetime norm of 24,000 

batteries to a monthly average of 36,000 in response to the global war on 

terrorism (see fig. 15). These monthly requirements grew to nearly 60,000 

in March 2003 when combat operations began in Iraq, but this number was 

only one-fifth of the actual demand recorded that spring. Forecasted 

requirements continued to lag behind demand until mid-summer when they 

caught up. According to officials from Central Command Joint Logistics, 

the pre-OIF monthly requirement figures were low because some 

combatant commanders did not submit their requirements and estimates 

did not reflect all battery usage; as a result, officials said that calculating 

requirements was purely guesswork.

5

 BA-5390s were not part of the pre-OIF war reserve inventory because the U.S. military did 

not use them until the fall of 2002.

6

 Army War Reserve Automated Process computes requirements for secondary items, such 

as spare parts, for the war reserve.

7

 CECOM’s change in the demand base to 6 months was reflected in the April 2003 

forecasted requirements.
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 92 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 15: Worldwide Forecasted Requirements, Demand, and Production Output for BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries by 

Month (October 2001 through August 2004)

Notes: 

(1) The jump in forecasted requirements in April 2003 was the result of reducing the demand base to 

6 months to calculate requirements.

(2) According to CECOM, fluctuations in production output after July 2003 reflect changes in deliveries 

from one month to the other.

In the summer of 2002, CECOM and AMC officials developed a more 

realistic contingency requirement for nonrechargeable lithium batteries. 

Using information from the Operation Plan and other sources, they 

forecasted a need for 300,000 to 325,000 batteries per month.8

Number of batteries

Source: CECOM.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

Requirements

Demand

Production output

Oct. Dec. Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec. Apr. June Aug. Aug. Feb. Apr. June Oct. Dec. Feb.

2001 2002 2003 2004

8

 CECOM officials stated that this figure included a Marine Corps requirement.
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 93 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

As figure 15 shows, this estimate closely paralleled the actual demand of 

330,000 at the height of major combat operations in April 2003. CECOM 

officials presented this requirement to AMC and the Joint Materiel 

Priorities and Allocation Board in the fall of 2002 to bolster their request for 

$38.2 million of additional obligation authority to ramp up BA-5590 and 

BA-5390 production. They received the funding in early December 2002.

Army Decisions Did Not 

Provide Full Funding for 

Batteries

The Army’s risk-based decision not to fund full requirements for CECOM, 

particularly lithium nonrechargeable batteries, during several years prior to 

OIF compounded the shortage problem. As table 9 shows, CECOM had 

unfunded requirements ranging from $85 million to $419 million for the 

3 fiscal years up to and including OIF. In fiscal year 2003, for example, 

CECOM identified requirements for the command of nearly $1.5 billion, but 

received less than $1.1 billion in obligation authority for the year, resulting 

in an unfunded requirement of $419 million, or more than 28 percent of the 

total amount required. 

The command’s unfunded requirements specifically for BA-5590 lithium 

batteries varied from a high of $4.2 million in fiscal year 2001 to a low of 

$1.2 million in fiscal year 2002. However, the low figure for fiscal year 2002 

occurred because AMC directed CECOM to spend $11.5 million to 

specifically support its BA-5590 requirement. Our analysis shows that even 

if CECOM had been able to fund 100 percent of its BA-5590 battery 

requirement in fiscal year 2002, it would not have been able to meet the 

growing demands from the global war on terrorism. A fully funded 

requirement ($22.6 million) would have provided about 33,000 batteries per 

month, and actual demand exceeded that for most of the year.

Table 9: CECOM Unfunded Requirements for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2003

Source: CECOM and AMC data.

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

2001 2002 2003

CECOM requirements 498 568 1474.7

CECOM unfunded requirements 85 207 419

Percent unfunded 17.1% 36.4% 28.4%
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 94 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Acquisition Delays Due to 

Industrial-Base Limitations

The surge in demand for nonrechargeable lithium batteries exceeded the 

amount that the industrial base could produce, thereby delaying 

acquisition. Before OIF, CECOM had contracted with only one qualified 

producer, SAFT, to make BA-5590s. To support the global war on terrorism, 

SAFT doubled its production from 32,000 batteries per month in October 

2001 to 60,000 per month in September 2002. After receiving $38.2 million 

in additional obligation authority in December 2002, CECOM increased its 

orders for BA-5590s with SAFT and added BA-5590s to its contract with 

Eagle-Picher. It also contracted with Ultralife to make a substitute battery, 

the BA-5390. According to CECOM officials, both batteries have a 6-month 

production lead time.9

 Despite CECOM’s efforts, the long lead-time 

precluded the ability of these three producers to meet the surge in demand 

during major combat operations. Army officials stated that if they had 

received funding earlier they would have been able to mitigate the effects 

of this long lead time. As figure 15 shows, while production output 

increased to over 100,000 batteries per month in the spring of 2003, it did 

not approach 200,000 until the late summer of 2003 or reach its peak of 

250,000 until early in 2004.

A recent study identified a limited industrial base as the primary cause 

of the BA-5590 battery shortage. A March 2004 Science Applications 

International Corporation report concluded that battery shortages and lack 

of availability were an industrial-base challenge.10 The supplier was not 

able to increase production to meet the unforecasted six-fold increase 

in demand.

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts To overcome production constraints, CECOM negotiated with two other 

producers, in addition to SAFT, to manufacture BA-5590s and BA-5390s. It 

also worked with the three producers to augment battery production by 

9

 According to CECOM this relatively long lead-time includes time for testing.

10 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Objective Assessment of Logistics 

in Iraq (March 2004).
Appendix VI

BA-5590 and BA-5390 Lithium Batteries

Page 95 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

going to a 24/7 schedule. In addition to expedite shipments, CECOM had 

SAFT bypass the depot and ship batteries directly to Charleston Air Force 

Base for air shipment to the theater. According to CECOM, a capital 

investment of $5 million was made in the three producers in May 2003 to 

expand their production capacity.

DOD took a number of actions to get the limited supply of nonrechargeable 

batteries to units that needed them most. According to CENTCOM, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to send all available BA-5590s and 

BA-5390s to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility until June 2003. The Joint 

Staff also put these batteries on the “critical few list,” which focused 

attention on improving the availability of specific items the services and 

geographic combatant commands reported as critical to their worldwide 

operations. CECOM and Marine Corps officials said they shifted available 

batteries from military installations worldwide and also bought batteries on 

the commercial market. The Army, Marines, and Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command also directed troops, especially those in rear units, 

to use rechargeable batteries when possible. In addition, the Army required 

soldiers to use rechargeable batteries for garrison duty and training and to 

maximize their use during peacekeeping operations. Marine combat units 

were instructed to do everything possible to reduce nonrechargeable 

battery consumption rates. Moreover, Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command was appointed the theater’s item manager for batteries, with 

responsibility for prioritizing and releasing batteries to units.

Long-term Efforts To correct problems with war reserve requirements, CECOM officials said 

they set the current war reserve requirement for BA-5590s and BA-5390s to 

more than 1.5 million batteries to better reflect the experiences in OIF. This 

requirement was expected to be filled by February 2005.

To improve battery availability, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in January 2004, directed the transfer of 

battery inventory management from CECOM to DLA as of September 30, 

2004.

In terms of technological efforts, CECOM officials said they are developing 

newer, lighter-weight rechargeable batteries that could be powered by solar 

panels or other energy sources while troops are on the move to reduce 

dependence on disposable batteries.
Page 96 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix VII

Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades ApendxiVI

Background During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps relied on a variety of 

helicopters to support its forces during combat operations. These include 

the UH-1N Huey, a twin-engine utility helicopter used in command and 

control, re-supply, casualty evacuation, liaison, and troop transport, and the 

CH-53E Super Stallion, a triple-engine cargo helicopter used to transport 

heavy equipment and supplies. Both types of helicopters require numerous 

spare parts, including rotor blades, to maintain their operational status 

(see fig. 16). In Iraq, Marines reported that enemy fire and harsh 

environmental conditions, such as heat, sand, and unimproved airfields, 

increased the wear and tear on the rotor blades.

Figure 16: Rotor Blades on CH-53E Super Stallion

All Marine Corps helicopter spare part supplies, including rotor blades, are 

managed by the Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia.

No Supply Shortages 

Existed During 

Operation Iraqi 

Freedom

There were no shortages of rotor blades between October 2002 and 

September 2004, although there were indications of concern due to 

increased wear and tear caused by operating from unimproved airfields, 

the harsh environment, and back orders. We do not consider this a shortage 

because the supply system filled back orders within 2 months and Marine 

Corps officials from the 3rd Marine Air Wing reported no major supply 

shortages of rotor blades for the UH-1N and CH-53E helicopters during OIF. 

Source: DOD.
Appendix VII

Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades

Page 97 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The supply system was able to provide a sufficient replacement quantity of 

UH-1N and CH-53E rotor blades despite increased demands. For example, 

the Marine Corps took the forecasted 16 UH-1N helicopter rotor blades, to 

Iraq. As figure 16 shows, from March 2003 through August 2004, the 

Marines requisitioned 22 additional rotor blades to support their mission, 

and the supply system met those demands by filling orders within 2 months 

of receiving the order.

In addition, air wings from outside the theater supported the demand in 

Iraq by providing rotor blades from various air stations, ship supply, and 

Marine Aviation Logistics squadrons. As a result, the Marines were able to 

maintain a mission capable rate for the UH-1N of 75.4 percent during OIF,1

compared with a peacetime rate of 79.9 percent in 2000.2

 To date, the Naval 

Inventory Control Point Philadelphia continues to meet UH-1N rotor blade 

demands for OIF.

Figure 17: UH-1N Rotor Blade Demand and Back Orders by Month (March 2003 through September 2004)

1

 Mission capable is defined as the material condition of an aircraft indicating it can perform 

at least one and potentially all of its designated missions.

2

 The Marine Corps provided fiscal year 2000 as a representative peacetime year.

Number of UH-1N rotor blades

0

2

4

6

8

Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Nov. Sep. Oct.

Source: Naval Inventory Control Panel, Philadelphia.

UH-1N demand

UH-1N back order

2003

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep.

2004
Appendix VII

Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades

Page 98 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

The 3rd Marine Air Wing took 33 of the forecasted requirement of 64 rotor 

blades to support CH-53E helicopters in Iraq. As figure 18 shows, 

55 additional rotor blades were ordered through the supply system, with 

14 on back order from March 2003 through September 2004. The supply 

system met those demands by filling orders within 1 month of receiving the 

order. As a result, the Marines were able to maintain a mission capable rate 

for the CH-53E helicopter of 67.5 percent during combat operations, 

compared with a peacetime rate of 72.3 percent in 2000.

Figure 18: CH-53E Rotor Blade Demand and Back Orders by Month (March 2003 through September 2004)

Marine Corps officials stated that there were no shortages of rotor blades 

for UH-1N and CH-53E helicopters and our analysis of the 3rd Air Wing’s 

demand and the supply system’s ability to promptly provide rotor blades 

during OIF supports their assertion.

Number of CH-53E rotor blades

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Nov. Sep. Oct.

Source: Naval Inventory Control Panel, Philadelphia.

CH-53E demand

CH-53E back order

2003

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep.

2004
Appendix VII

Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades

Page 99 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Efforts to Maintain 

Rotor Blade Supply

Short-term Efforts Even though they were able to get enough rotor blades from the supply 

system to meet their demands, Marines took a number of actions during 

OIF to extend the life of rotor blades in theater. Marines improved the 

durability of CH-53E rotor blades and other bladed helicopter parts by 

coating them with titanium paint and a tape covering in order to protect the 

leading edge of the blade from sand erosion. In addition, as the pace of 

combat operations slowed, Marines built permanent airfields with paved 

landing areas, which decreased blade erosion during take-off and landing.

Long-term Efforts The Marine Corps and Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia attribute 

their ability to provide rotor blades to using models to determine numbers 

and timing of spare parts and upgrades to sustain helicopter operations. 

The Marine Corps and the Naval Inventory Control Point Philadelphia 

maintain a 5-year old system, the Common Rate Calculation 

System/Common Application Development System, which uses 4-year 

historical demand data for the entire aircraft community for particular 

helicopters, engineering data and worldwide environmental factors to 

produce more accurate demand projections.
Page 100 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat ApendxiVI

Background The standard military ration for the individual combatant is a prepackaged, 

self-contained ration known as a MRE (see fig. 19). A MRE consists of 

1,300 calories per bag and is designed to sustain an individual engaged in 

heavy activity, such as military training or actual military operations, when 

normal food service facilities are not available. MREs are issued in cases 

of 12 and MREs have a shelf life of 3 years when stored at 80°F.

Figure 19: Meal Ready-to-Eat

DLA’s Defense Supply Center Philadelphia manages the MRE supply for all 

services. It has supplied a total of 5.1 million MRE cases for OIF.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

MREs were not available to the warfighter at some point between 

October 2002 and September 2004. We consider this item to have a 

shortage because demand exceeded the amount available to meet the 

needs of the warfighters.

Source: DLA.
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 101 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

As figure 20 indicates, as the demand for MREs in OIF grew between 

December 2002 and March 2003, the worldwide inventory declined. A 

shortage of MREs began in February 2003 and continued into March 2003 

when monthly demand peaked at 1,810,800 cases, although only 500,000 

cases were available in the inventory. Figure 20 also shows the production 

output of MREs increased from December 2002 through April 2003. As a 

result of DLA’s actions to maintain an industrial base capable of a large 

surge in production, the industrial base was able to increase its monthly 

production of MREs.1

 Consequently, DLA never reported any back orders 

for MREs during OIF. In late April 2003, as U.S. forces transitioned from 

MREs to other food consumption options, monthly demand decreased 

significantly to 650,000 MRE cases. That month, the industrial base 

produced 1.3 million cases. From May 2003 on, a sufficient quantity of 

MREs were available in inventory to meet demand.

1

 After Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DLA established a “War Stopper” program to ensure 

sufficient wartime surge capacity for critical items. It took preemptive steps, such as 

establishing surge contracts and investing funds in equipment and facilities, to ensure that 

these items would be available in sufficient quantities during contingency operations.
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 102 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 20: Forecasted Requirements, OIF Demand, Production Output, and 

Inventory for MREs (December 2002 through June 2003)

Army and Marine Corps units did not always have all the MREs they 

needed. According to CENTCOM after-action reports, Army combat units 

were supposed to arrive in theater with a 7 to 10 day supply of MREs. 

However, CENTCOM reported that many units did not arrive with this 

quantity, thereby placing a strain on the in-theater inventory. An analysis of 

Army logistics reports by the RAND Corporation indicated that some units 

came within 2 days or less of exhausting on-hand quantities. According to 

the 2nd Force Service Support Group, Marine Corps combat units averaged 

a 6- to 8-day supply throughout the war, but there were times when some 

forces had less than 1-day on-hand supply. Marine Corps’ Combat Service 

Support Companies, which directly support combat units, also reported 

critical shortages of MREs. According to the 1st Force Service Support 

Group, direct support units were supposed to maintain a 2-day supply. 

However, according to a study by the Center for Naval Analysis, there were 

times in late March and mid-April 2003 when direct support units had less 

than a 1-day supply.

December January February March April

Source: DLA.

Forecasted requirements

OIF demand

Production output

Inventory

Cases of MREs

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

3,500,000

May June

2002 2003
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 103 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Causes of Shortages Problems with requirements planning, the release of Operations and 

Maintenance funding,2

 and distribution contributed directly to shortages of 

MREs in theater.

Requirements Not 

Accurately Forecasted

DLA’s forecasted requirements did not support MRE customer demand for 

the first month of combat operations because of rapid changes in the size 

of troop deployments. DLA’s forecasted requirement for March 2003 was 

996,556 cases of MREs; this number fell short of meeting the customer 

demand of 1,810,800 cases. The March 2003 forecasted requirement did not 

include data that anticipated initial in-theater personnel levels would be 

doubled because of a faster deployment of certain units. In a lesson-learned 

report, CENTCOM stated that the forecasted MRE requirement for the 

period of deployment was predicated on a 30-day supply for 50,000 

personnel. This forecast was quickly exceeded by the deployment of 

100,000 personnel during that 30-day period. The resulting demand placed a 

strain on existing in-theater MRE inventories. However, DLA’s model 

provided accurate planning estimates for MRE customer demand for all 

other months.

Funding Was Not Available 

When Needed

The Army experienced a delay in the release of operations and 

maintenance funding for MREs, despite DOD requirements that supply 

chain processes provide timely support during crises. Although the Army 

wanted to submit MRE requisitions to DLA in September 2002, it could not 

do so because it lacked the Operations & Maintenance funding necessary 

to purchase them. When the Army submitted the requisitions in 

December 2002, DLA shipped MREs to Kuwait. However, this 4-month 

delay in funding contributed to the shortage of MREs by delaying 

shipments of MREs into the theater.

The Marine Corps faced a similar funding problem that delayed the 

processing of ration requests for OIF. As reported in a Marine Corps 

lessons-learned report, a January 6, 2003, request for a withdrawal 

of rations from the war reserve was delayed due to lack of available 

operations and maintenance funding from Headquarters Marine Corps. The 

Marine Corps provided notification of partial funding and the Marine 

2

 The operations and maintenance budget covers the costs of purchasing supply items 

associated with carrying out military operations.
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 104 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Corps’ first request for rations was passed to DLA on January 16, 2003. 

Funding was available to provide for the remainder of the requirement and 

funded requisitions were passed to DLA on February 10, 2003, 5 days 

before the Marines’ required delivery date of February 15, 2003.

Numerous Distribution 

Problems Impeded Supply

A number of distribution problems in the logistics supply chain hampered 

MRE availability.

Inaccurate Delivery Time 

Forecasts

One problem was that actual MRE delivery times exceeded the forecasted 

delivery times. Most MREs were transported by ship from the U.S. to a 

seaport of debarkation in theater and then by ground transportation to 

combat units. CENTCOM officials estimated it would take 30 to 45 days to 

transport MREs from the United States to a warehouse in theater. However, 

they stated that the actual total time to move these rations averaged 

49 days: 31 days for transit to the theater, 3 days to gain a berth at port, 

5 days to discharge supplies, and 10 days for movement from the port to 

the theater warehouse. Officials also noted that there were times when it 

took as long as 60 days to transport MREs from the United States to 

Kuwaiti ports because multiple, rather than single, vessels were used in the 

transport process—a factor that initial delivery time estimates did not take 

into account.

Limited Materiel Handling 

Equipment and Transportation 

Assets

The lack of sufficient materiel handling equipment3 and transportation 

assets in theater up to and during combat operations caused delays in 

unloading supplies from ships and transporting them to combat units. 

Because of the lack of adequate handling equipment, logistics personnel 

could not efficiently unload the large shipments of MREs arriving at ports 

in Kuwait, resulting in a backlog of ships waiting to be unloaded. DLA 

officials stated that, at one point in time, 1.4 million MREs were sitting at a 

port in theater, waiting to be processed. In addition, there were insufficient 

transportation assets to move MREs from ports to theater distribution 

warehouses. In particular, local contractors responsible for delivering 

rations did not have sufficient trucks to make regular deliveries to theater 

distribution warehouses. In addition, there were insufficient materiel 

handling equipment and transportation assets to move MREs from storage 

3

 Materiel handling equipment refers to mechanical devices that allow supplies to be 

handled easily and economically to, through, and from production facilities, in warehouses 

and storage, and in receiving and shipping areas. 
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 105 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

locations to combat units. For example, according to one OIF after-action 

report there were times when 80 trucks were needed to move rations 

forward but only 50 were available.

Poor In-transit Visibility Poor in-transit visibility also delayed distribution of MRE shipments in 

several ways. CENTCOM officials stated that logistics personnel could not 

always rely on radio frequency identification device technology to account 

for shipments. Despite a CENTCOM requirement that radio frequency 

identification device tags be used for all shipments to theater, CENTCOM 

estimated initial use was only about 30 percent. Among other problems 

experienced were the failure to attach tags to all containers and a lack of 

sufficient tracking devices to read tags in order to identify subsistence 

items stored in containers. As a result, logistics personnel stated they had 

to manually review all packing documents to identify the contents of 

containers, thereby slowing down the distribution of supplies.

Because of poor tracking, sufficient supplies of MREs sometimes existed 

but were not visible. For example, during the MRE shortage, a DOD official 

found over 17 20-foot containers with MREs at a supply base located 

halfway to Baghdad; the MREs were there for a week because no one knew 

they were there. 

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts To reduce MRE consumption during the shortage, Army and Marine Corps 

officials stated that units switched to alternate feeding methods such as 

Unitized Group Rations. CENTCOM reported working with various carriers 

and the (Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution Command4

 to use 

sustainment packages weeks ahead of their scheduled issue dates. 

To improve the distribution of MREs, military officials formed a joint 

working group including members from DLA, the Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, CENTCOM, and U.S. Transportation Command. 

4

 This command, formerly known at the Military Traffic Management Command, provides 

global surface deployment command and control and distribution operations. 
Appendix VIII

Meals Ready-to-Eat

Page 106 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

This group communicates regularly to improve in-transit visibility over 

rations. CENTCOM officials stated that due to the lateness of ships arriving 

in theater, DLA located additional rations in other theaters that were 

shipped to OIF.

Long-term Efforts To ensure timely visibility of anticipated requirements, DLA has 

recommended that collaboration between it, the Combatant Commands, 

and the services be enhanced. To improve the timeliness of funding, DLA is 

working with the services to refine their plans for releasing funding early in 

the deployment process. To deal with distribution problems in theater, the 

Secretary of Defense in September 2003 designated the U.S. Transportation 

Command as the Distribution Process Owner. The Transportation 

Command established a Deployment and Distribution Operations Center in 

January 2004. The center is responsible for improving the distribution 

process within theater by directing airport, seaport, and land 

transportation operations.
Page 107 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires ApendxiIX

Background The U.S. Army depends on a variety of trucks and other vehicles to support 

combat operations. During OIF, it relied on the 5-ton capacity cargo truck 

to transport all types of supplies and on the HMMWV to carry troops and 

armaments, as well as to serve as an ambulance and scout vehicle. The 

5-ton truck (fig. 21) is outfitted with six radial tires and the HMMWV with 

four radial tires. The tires are specific to each type of vehicle and are not 

interchangeable.

Figure 21: M-923 5-ton Truck

The Army’s TACOM Tire Group manages the tire inventory for wheeled 

vehicles, including the 5-ton truck and the HMMWV, for U.S. forces 

worldwide. These tires are produced for the military by several 

manufacturers, including Goodyear and Michelin.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

Tires for the 5-ton truck and the HMMWV were not available to the 

warfighter at some time between October 2002 and September 2004. 

We consider this item to have a shortage because demand exceeded the 

amount of inventory available to meet the needs of the warfighters. 

U.S. forces and logistics personnel reported critical shortages of 5-ton 

truck and HMMWV tires during OIF that negatively impacted their mission. 

According to TACOM officials, the increased pace of the operations 

Source: DOD.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 108 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

resulted in high-vehicle mileage that caused significant wear and tear on 

these tires.

Prior to the onset of OIF in March 2003, TACOM had no back orders for 

5-ton truck tires and reported it was able to support demands from 

customers worldwide. However, as figure 22 shows, back orders started to 

accumulate after OIF began and, by October 2003, the number had peaked 

at 7,063 tires per month. Similarly, worldwide demand for tires rose after 

March 2003. As figure 22 indicates, this demand increased fourfold over the 

course of 1 year, climbing from a peacetime level of 1,189 tires in April 2002 

to a wartime level of 4,800 tires in April 2003. While demand remained high 

during the summer of 2003, inventory levels dropped to below 1,000 and 

were insufficient to meet customer needs. For example, in August 2003 

when demand reached 4,828 tires, TACOM recorded only 505 tires in its 

inventory worldwide.1

 According to TACOM officials, demands from OIF 

received priority and much of the available inventory supported operations 

in Iraq.

1

 Inventory as depicted in figure 22 does not include war reserve stock. As of October 2004, 

there were 2 5-ton truck tires in war reserves.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 109 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 22: Worldwide Demand, Back Orders, and Inventory Level for the 5-ton Truck Tire by Month (February 2002 through 

September 2004)

TACOM reported no back orders for HMMWV tires prior to OIF. However, 

as figure 23 shows, back orders began to increase in April 2003 and peaked 

at 13,778 tires in September 2003 as demand increased and industry took 

several months to respond. According to TACOM officials, back orders 

accumulated because of the increasing demands coming from OIF. 

Worldwide demand rose rapidly in June 2003, peaked at 16,977 tires in 

August 2003, and gradually declined during the winter months (see fig. 23). 

Over the span of 1 year, worldwide demand increased more than four-fold, 

from a peacetime rate of 3,251 tires per month in June 2002 to 15,224 tires 

per month in June 2003. While demand grew during the summer of 2003, 

inventory levels were insufficient to meet customer needs. For example, in 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

Source: TACOM.

Number of tires

Demand

Inventory 

Back orders

Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec. Apr. June Aug. Aug. Sep. Feb. Apr. June Oct. Dec. Feb.

2002 2003 2004
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 110 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

July 2003, TACOM recorded only 4,286 HMMWV tires in its inventory, but 

had demands for a total of 14,435 tires. Fluctuating demands were caused 

by the intensity of the war fight and the changing mixture of weapons 

systems employed.

Figure 23: Worldwide Demand, Back Orders, and Inventory Level for the HMMWV Tire by Month (February 2002 through 

September 2004)

Army and Marine Corps units reported that tire shortages negatively 

affected operations in Iraq.2

 Units of the 3rd Infantry Division reported that 

they could not get the required number of tires to support their mission and 

that the shortage of tires forced them to leave vehicles and supplies behind. 

In addition, TACOM reported in June 2003 that it could only provide 

64 percent of the spare parts, including tires that the 4th Infantry Division 

Source: TACOM.

Demand

Inventory 

Back orders

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

Number of tires

Feb. Apr. June Aug. Oct. Dec. Apr. June Aug. Aug. Sept. Feb. Apr. June Oct. Dec. Feb.

2002 2003 2004

2

 Units in Iraq reported shortages of tires in general, and not solely the 5-ton or the HMMWV 

radial tires.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 111 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

considered urgent. Although the 4th Infantry Division reported shortages in 

theater, it did not report any mission impact due to tire shortages. In an 

after-action report, the U.S. Marine Corps documented that cannibalization, 

stripping, and abandoning otherwise good vehicles occurred because of the 

lack of spare tires.

Causes of Shortages Problems with war reserve stocks, forecasted requirements planning, 

funding, and distribution contributed to shortages of the 5-ton and 

HMMWV radial tires during OIF.

Insufficient War Reserves 

Stock

The number of tires in war reserve stocks was not sufficient to support 

customer demands when OIF began. According to Army regulations, war 

reserve stocks are intended to meet the initial increase in demand during 

wartime and to fill the gap until the national supply system can increase 

production. In December 2002, TACOM officials managing war reserves 

established a requirement for 259 tires for 5-ton trucks. However, officials 

had only 38 tires on hand at that time, and 3 months later in March 2003, 

they had only 16 tires on hand. As of October 2004, the war reserve 

requirement for the 5-ton truck tire remained at 259 tires, but there were 

only 2 tires in the inventory. As figure 22 shows, the demand for 5-ton 

truck tires was always higher than 259 tires, starting with 978 tires in 

February 2002 and continuing throughout OIF. Therefore, the war reserve 

requirement of 259 tires was too low to support initial demands from units 

in theater.

For HMMWV radial tires, TACOM managers had a sufficient number 

of tires to meet the war reserve requirement of 1,505 tires in 

December 2002. In March 2003, managers increased the HMMWV tire war 

reserve requirement to 7,908 tires, but they failed to adequately stock tires 

in the inventory. At that time, they only had 1,483 tires on hand. As of 

October 2004, the war reserve requirement for HMMWV tires remained at 

7,908 tires, but there were only 3,764 tires in the inventory.

TACOM officials told us that they do not adequately stock tires in the war 

reserves because they lack the necessary funding. This was the result of 

risk based decisions about how to allocate DOD funds. As of October 2004, 

TACOM’s war reserve requirements for all items it manages 

(including tires) totaled $1,355.7 million. However, it has received only 

$828.9 million to support those requirements. As a result, TACOM officials 

have used a risk management approach to prioritize the funding of their 
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 112 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

requirements. For example, they gave funding priority to more expensive 

items, such as tank engines, which have long lead-times and are difficult to 

procure, rather than to less expensive items, such as tires, which can be 

produced faster. When OIF began, tires stocked in war reserves were 

inadequate to support initial customer demands because of these 

decisions.

Inaccurate Forecasted 

Requirements

TACOM’s forecasted requirements for vehicle tires underestimated the 

actual demand for tires during fiscal year 2003. For example, TACOM 

forecasted that worldwide requirements,3

 for the 5-ton truck tire would 

reach 1,497 tires per month in April 2003; however, the actual demand for 

this tire rose to 4,800 for that month, more than three times higher than the 

forecasted requirements. Similarly, TACOM forecasted that customers 

would need 5,800 HMMWV tires per month in June 2003; instead, actual 

worldwide demand for HMMWV tires grew to 15,224 per month, three 

times higher than the forecasted amount.

In June 2003, TACOM changed its requirements forecasting model for tires 

and other spare parts from a 12-month average demand base to a 30-day 

average demand base to respond to the sharp increase in actual demand. 

According to TACOM officials, the 12-month average demand base model 

did not react quickly enough to actual demands, which were at times three 

or four times higher than the monthly forecasted requirements. By 

changing the model to a 30-day average demand base, TACOM was able to 

stock up on inventory faster.

In setting forecasted requirements for tires, TACOM officials stated they 

relied heavily on past historical demand data because it received little 

guidance on the expected demand activities or operational plans from 

Army headquarters. TACOM expected an increase in demand for fiscal year 

2003 because of the growing demand from southwest Asia, especially 

Kuwait, prior to the onset of OIF. Officials from TACOM’s Tire Group told 

us they put an emphasis on past historical demand data to forecast their 

future requirements. Similarly, TACOM’s Track and Roadwheel Group 

reported that they relied on historical data, including information from 

Operation Desert Storm/Shield and operations in Bosnia, to help them 

forecast future requirements in the absence of official guidance.

3

 TACOM’s worldwide forecasted requirements included those for OIF. According to TACOM 

officials, much of the worldwide demand was driven by demand from OIF.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 113 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Insufficient and Erratic 

Funding

According to TACOM officials, the Tire Group did not receive adequate 

funding (referred to as obligation authority) from the Department of the 

Army’s working capital fund to buy additional tires to meet customers’ 

needs. Furthermore, when obligation authority became available, they did 

not receive it promptly. In fiscal year 2003, TACOM had worldwide 

demands for tires totaling $246.3 million; however, it received only 

$212 million in obligation authority, about 86 percent of its total 

requirements. By comparison, during the same fiscal year, TACOM received 

about $118.5 million worth of requisitions for all tires needed in OIF. As 

TACOM exhausted its obligation authority during fiscal year 2003, 

additional releases came in sporadically. For example, in July 2003, 

TACOM reported that it had used all of its obligation authority but still 

had $22 million worth of contracts that needed funding; by August 2003, 

however, TACOM reported that it had funds available to continue awarding 

contracts.4

 TACOM’s Tire Group complained that the ‘stop-start’ funding 

releases complicated their efforts in maintaining a consistent supply 

of tires from tire manufacturers by preventing them from providing a 

steady stream of funds in advance of production lead-time.

TACOM’s Tire Group also did not know when or how much the next release 

of obligation authority would be. In order to ensure that the industrial base 

could provide supplies promptly, TACOM needed funding at least one 

procurement lead-time (e.g., the time it takes a manufacturer to make and 

deliver the tire) in advance of the delivery date. For most tires, the 

procurement lead-time is 3 to 6 months. Therefore, in order to meet 

unexpected surges in demand, TACOM needed to have funding available 

3 to 6 months prior to the surge.

In addition to the Tire Group, TACOM as a whole was underfunded in 

fiscal year 2003. Figure 24 shows that throughout fiscal year 2003, TACOM 

was funded below its actual requirements. At the beginning of fiscal year 

2003, TACOM identified its requirements at $1,357 million; however, it was 

provided with only $885 million in obligation authority. By May 2003, 

TACOM came close to using all of its obligated authority without any 

assurance that additional funding would arrive. As a result, TACOM 

officials asked their support groups to conserve funding for the most 

critical items until additional funding arrived. However, in June 2003

4

 The primary long-term contract was with Goodyear while Michelin provided some 

additional tires.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 114 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

TACOM received additional funding, which allowed item managers to 

resume awarding contracts for supplies. For fiscal year 2003, TACOM 

identified its actual requirements at $2,726 million (including $345 million 

for reset)5

 but it received only $2,379 million in obligation authority.

Figure 24: TACOM’s Actual and Reset Requirements, Funding Executed and Received by Month, Fiscal Year 2003

5

 Reset is a term used to define bringing a vehicle that was used during Operation Enduring 

Freedom and OIF back to a fully mission-capable (serviceable) condition so that units can 

be combat-ready for other deployments. Resetting a vehicle involves extensive use of spare 

parts to bring the vehicles up to a fully mission-capable condition.

Oct. Nov.

2002 2003

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Source: GAO analysis of TACOM data.

Cumulative funding executed

Actual requirements

Reset requirements

Funding received

Dollars in millions

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 115 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Constraints in the 

Distribution Process

Distribution constraints, both in the continental U.S. and in OIF, 

contributed to customers not receiving supplies. The distribution system 

was not prepared to handle the volume of supplies ordered by customers or 

the speed with which supplies needed to be delivered.

In the summer of 2003, the Defense Distribution Center Susquehanna, 

Pennsylvania, became overwhelmed by the volume of incoming shipments 

from contractors delivering supplies for units in Iraq. Because of the 

increased volume, the center gave contractors delivery appointment times 

that were 2 to 3 weeks in the future, thereby delaying the delivery and 

processing of many items, including tires.

Once tires were in the distribution center’s warehouse, the requirement to 

build pallets to ship them to the theater caused further delays. Officials told 

us that the backlog of pallet building resulted in delays of up to 30 days or 

more before tire shipments could be released from the center. To alleviate 

this backlog, all tires shipped in and after June 2003 were diverted to the 

Defense Depot Red River, Texas, to be palletized and shipped directly to 

aerial ports of embarkations at Charleston and Dover Air Force Base.

Once tires were shipped from the U.S., TACOM lost all visibility of tire 

shipments within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. At the Port of Kuwait, 

containers could not be identified because radio frequency identification 

tags that should have been on the pallets were lost during shipment, thus 

increasing processing time. In addition, once these shipments left the port, 

receipts were not posted at the customer supply support center to verify 

delivery. Officials also stated that because of the lack of in-transit visibility, 

shipments were frequently diverted to other destinations without TACOM’s 

knowledge or authorization.

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

TACOM initiated several temporary actions and one long-term action to 

improve the availability of tires to customers in the field. However, TACOM 

officials did not identify efforts to improve funding problems experienced 

during OIF, and they told us that they are not aware of any initiatives at 

AMC headquarters or the Department of the Army that address funding 

issues.
Appendix IX

Five-Ton Truck and High-Mobility 

Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle Tires

Page 116 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Short-term Efforts To ensure that forecasted requirements better reflected actual demands, in 

June 2003, TACOM’s Tire Group changed the average demand base it used 

to calculate requirements from 12 months to 30 days. By making this 

change, the Tire Group captured demand data in real-time and allowed item 

managers to better estimate future requirements. As result, item managers 

were able to justify procuring more tires to meet future demands.

To ensure continuous production while awaiting additional obligation 

authority, officials from TACOM’s Tire Group noted persuading 

manufacturers to continue making tires. Tire manufacturers continued 

making tires while waiting for contracts and made capital investments to 

procure more tire molds, enabling them to increase production once 

contracts were awarded and obligation authority became available.

To ensure quicker distribution of tires to customers in theater, TACOM sent 

a group of supply personnel to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait to expedite the 

processing of TACOM’s shipments of tires and other spare parts. In 

response to complaints that TACOM’s tire and spare parts shipments were 

being diverted and not reaching the right customers, TACOM’s supply 

personnel also helped to look for these shipments and get them delivered.

Long-term Efforts To help solve the long-term distribution problems in theater, in 

September 2003 the Secretary of Defense designated the 

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as DOD’s Distribution 

Process Owner. TRANSCOM established a Deployment and Distribution 

Operation Center in January 2004. Under the control of CENTCOM, this 

center is responsible for improving the distribution process within theater 

by directing all airport, seaport, and land transportation operations.
Page 117 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit ApendxiX

Background The HMMWV is a highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle 

with a 4,400 pound payload. Using common components and kits, the 

HMMWV can be configured to become a troop carrier, armament carrier, 

shelter carrier, ambulance, anti-tank missile carrier, or scout vehicle. 

The initial number and type of HMMWVs in each unit is based on 

standard equipment lists. According to officials, they are the most 

numerous U.S. military vehicles in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. 

The Army reported that there were 18,656 vehicles—both armored and 

unarmored—in theater, as of July 2004.1

Up-Armored HMMWV One version of the HMMWV is a production model known as an 

Up-Armored HMMWV, also designated as the M1114 model (see fig. 25). 

This model is produced by AM General Corporation and armored by 

O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt, requirements for CENTCOM’s area of operations, 

including Iraq and Afghanistan, call for this up-armored variant. The M1114 

model of the vehicle features ballistic-resistant windows and steel-plate 

armor on the doors and underside to protect against rifle rounds and 

explosive blasts, fragmentation protection, and additional armor for the 

turret gunner on the roof to protect against artillery, as well as a powerful 

air conditioning system.

1

 The U.S. Army recognizes three levels of armor protection for HMMWVs in Iraq. Level 1 is 

the Up-armored HMMWV, level 2 is a HMMWV with an add-on-armor kit, and level 3 is fieldimprovised armor.
Appendix X

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Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 118 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 25: Up-Armored HMMWV

Add-on-Armor Kits In order to provide armor protection to existing unarmored HMMWVs in 

theater, the Army has developed an add-on-armor kit to be mounted on 

vehicles. The basic kit includes armored doors, under-door armor plates, 

seat-back armor, ballistic glass windows, and a heavy-duty air conditioning 

system. Seven Army depots and arsenals, managed by the Ground Systems 

Industrial Enterprise,2

 currently produce the kits. The Army began shipping 

the kits to Iraq by mid-November 2003 and started mass production at their 

depots in December 2003. The Army also contracted with O’Gara Hess 

Eisenhardt to produce additional armor kits to meet theater requirements. 

Source: DOD.

2

 Ground System Industrial Enterprise is a TACOM organization responsible for managing 

TACOM’s arsenals and depots.
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 119 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 26: Add-on-Armor Kit Mounted on HMMWV

Requirements for up-armored HMMWVs and add-on-armor kits are 

identified through operational needs statements directly from the theater 

that are validated and resourced by the Army. Units in theater submit the 

statements for the items, which are combined by their higher headquarters 

into bulk Coalition requirements. The Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command communicates these requirements for vehicles and kits to the 

Department of the Army, where they are validated and resourced by the 

Army’s Deputy Chiefs of Staff and eventually transmitted to the Program 

Executive Office—Combat Service and Combat Service Support Tactical 

Vehicles, who manages the procurement of both the up-armored HMMWVs 

and the add-on-armor kits.

Extent and Impact of 

Shortages

Up-armored HMMWVs and add-on-armor kits were not available to the 

warfighter at some time between October 2002 and September 2004. We 

consider this item to have a shortage because vehicles and kits were not 

available to meet the validated requirements developed by the warfighters. 

The Army has been consistently unable to meet recurring spikes in demand 

for vehicles and kits. However, the overall impact of the Army’s inability to 

deliver the vehicles and kits is difficult to measure.

Source: DOD.
Appendix X

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Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 120 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Extent of Up-Armored 

HMMWV Shortages

Since the Coalition Forces Land Component Command first began 

identifying up-armored HMMWV requirements for CENTCOM’s area of 

responsibility in the summer of 2003, there has been a gap between the 

number of vehicles required and the number of vehicles the industrial base 

is producing. By September 2004, TACOM and the Army had provided 

5,330 of the 8,105 required vehicles in theater. To meet Coalition Forces 

Land Component Command’s requirements, the Army program managers 

worked with O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt to produce an additional 2,533 new 

up-armored HMMWVs and the Department of the Army redistributed an 

additional 2,797 existing vehicles to Iraq from elsewhere in the world. 

Figure 27 shows that Coalition Forces Land Component Command 

requirements for vehicles increased faster than O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt 

was producing them, with requirements growing from 1,407 vehicles in 

August 2003 to 8,105 vehicles by September 2004. The Army worked with 

the manufacturers to increase production from 51 vehicles per month in 

August 2003 to 400 vehicles per month in September 2004. According to 

Army officials, O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt will increase production to its 

maximum capacity of 550 vehicles per month and will meet current 

requirements by March 2005.
Appendix X

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Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 121 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 27: Up-Armored HMMWV Requirements, Production Output, and Redistribution from August 2003 through 

September 2004

Extent of Add-on-Armor Kit 

Shortages

As of September 2004, the Army supplied 8,771 of the 13,872 Add-on Armor 

kits required by CENTCOM but still needed 5,101 additional kits to meet all 

requirements. The Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise depots and 

arsenals were required to produce 12,372 while O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt 

was required to produce the remaining 1,500 kits. As shown in figure 28, by 

September 2004 the validated requirement of 8,400 kits grew to 13,872. To 

meet the 8,400 requirement, program managers worked with several Army 

depots to increase production from 35 kits a month in December 2003 to 

600 kits per month by July 2004. At this production level, theater 

requirements would have been met by August 2004. However during this 

same month, Coalition Forces Land Component Command increased the 

requirement to 13,872 kits. Army officials stated that it would take 3 to 

4 months to meet this new demand and accordingly expected the 

requirement to be met by early 2005.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Aug. Oct. Nov.

2003 2004

Sep. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Requirements

Cumulative Up-Armored HMMWV redistribution

Cumulative Up-Armored HMMWV production output

Number of vehicles
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 122 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 28: Add-on-Armor Requirements and Production Output, November 2003 

through September 2004

The overall impact of up-armored vehicle and add-on-armor kit shortages is 

difficult to measure because units do not report the direct effects of using 

unarmored HMMWVs, but the reason for increasing requirements is well 

documented. Current HMMWVs are protected only by canvas tops and 

have no additional armor protection. According to the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, the harm to both personnel and equipment from 

improvised explosive devices is greatly reduced when traveling in an 

up-armored HMMWV.3

 This has generated a theater-wide concern for 

increased vehicle protection. While units have used field-improvised steel 

enclosures and other modifications to increase vehicle protection, 

up-armored vehicles and add-on-armor kits provide better protection. 

The center specifically mentions that the up-armored HMMWVs would 

improve the force protection of civil affairs teams as well as provide ideal

3

 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2004.

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Number of AOA kits

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Requirements

Cumulative production output

2003 2004
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 123 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

transport for teams of engineers operating in the constricted urban 

environments of Iraq.

Causes of Shortages There are two primary causes for the shortages of up-armored vehicles and 

add-on-armor kits. First, a decision was made to pace production rather 

than use the maximum available capacity. Second, funding allocations did 

not keep up with rapidly increasing requirements.

Production Was Not 

Paced to Match 

Maximum Capacity

DOD paced the production of armor for HMMWVs to meet initial 

CENTCOM requirements, but did not use the maximum available 

production capacity as the requirements increased dramatically after the 

onset of OIF. According to Army officials, the total Army up-armored 

HMMWV requirement prior to OIF was approximately 360 vehicles per 

year, to be produced at a rate of 30 vehicles per month. However, beginning 

in August 2003, Coalition Forces Land Component Command developed 

new requirements for additional up-armored HMMWVs based on requests 

from units in theater; the requirement increased 576 percent from 1,407 to 

8,105 vehicles by September 2004. There was also a significant increase in 

the requirement for kits. In November 2003, the initial requirement for 

Add-on Armor kits was 8,400 kits. By September 2004, the requirement had 

increased to 13,872 kits.

O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt, the sole producer of the up-armored HMMWV, 

increased production, in accordance with agreements with the Army; 

however, that rate of production has not been sufficient to meet increasing 

demands. The schedule of monthly production increases agreed to by the 

Army and O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt was based on meeting existing 

requirements established at a particular time as well as funding constraints. 

For example, the Army had requirements of 4,149 vehicles in February 2004 

to meet CENTCOM’s needs. In meeting this requirement, the Army 

redistributed over 3,000 existing up-armored HMMWVs to CENTCOM’s 

area of responsibility and agreed to have O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt to 

produce the rest of the vehicles. The Army had planned to meet the 

February 2004 requirement by July 2004 without having O’Gara-Hess 

Eisenhardt reach its maximum capacity. 

As shown in figure 27, the vehicle production rate has increased every 

month from 51 vehicles in August 2003 to 400 vehicles by September 2004, 

with a planned production of 460 vehicles per month by October 2004. 
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 124 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

However, the signed agreement with O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt indicates that 

the maximum production could have been increased to 500 vehicles per 

month in October 2004 if needed. Interviews with Army and contractor 

personnel indicated that there were other constraints on production, such 

as the availability of communication equipment.

Despite increasing requirements for the add-on-armor kits, additional 

available production capacity was not used. Prior to CENTCOM’s 

requirement for 8,400 kits in November 2003, the Army had already begun 

designing and shipping some ‘pilot’ kits in theater. When it received the 

requirements in 2003 for 8,400 kits, the Ground Systems Industrial 

Enterprise’s depots and arsenals began ordering raw materiel such as steel 

and ballistic glass and ramped up production from 35 kits per month in 

December 2003 to 3,998 kits per month in April 2004. As total production 

neared the 2003 requirement, production was slowed to 333 per month by 

September 2004. Because the kits take three to four months to produce, it 

was not until January 2004 that the depots and arsenals began shipping 

substantial quantities to theater. 

Our review of Army data and interviews with Army officials shows that 

additional capacity to produce kits was available within the Ground 

Systems Industrial Enterprise system. Managers at Ground Systems 

Industrial Enterprise indicated that seven arsenals and depots could have 

maintained the maximum level of production without affecting other 

operations at the depot, filling the kit requirement early in 2004. In addition, 

in February 2004, a contractor operated Army facility informed the Ground 

Systems Industrial Enterprise managers that it could produce another 

800 4-door kits per month. While the managers stated that they did not use 

the contract operated facility due to issues with contract timing and price, 

they did not have information on the decision to slow the pace of 

production.

DOD decision makers determined the pace at which both up-armored 

HMMWVs and kits would be produced, but did not inform Congress about 

the total available production capacity. We have not been able to determine 

what criteria were used to set the pace of production; however, in both 

cases, additional production capacity was available, particularly for the 

kits. As a result of the lack of visibility into and acceptance of decisions 

made about the rate of production, DOD received criticism about the 

availability of armored vehicles in Iraq.
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 125 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Funding for Up-Armored 

HMMWV Production Was 

Not Received in a Timely or 

Predictable Manner

While funds were available to support the planned pace of production of 

up-armored HMMWVs,4 program managers were not aware of the time 

frame for releasing funds. Although TACOM received over $1.4 billion 

between fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to produce 7,502 vehicles, it was not 

released in a timely and predictable manner. Figure 29 shows that in August 

2003, the managers received requirements for 1,407 vehicles. However, it 

had received funding to produce only 648 vehicles. By October 2003, 

program managers had a requirement to produce 3,279 vehicles, but 

received funding to produce only 1,456 vehicles. Significant differences 

continued until April 2004, when requirements reached 4,454 vehicles and 

the program managers received funding to produce 4,320 vehicles.

4

 Neither AM General nor O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt reported that the Army was not able to 

pay them for the vehicles they produced.
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 126 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Figure 29: Up-Armored HMMWV Funding, Requirements, Production Output by Month (August 2003 through September 2004)

The disbursement of funds affected program managers’ ability to plan and 

contract with O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt to produce sufficient quantities of 

up-armored HMMWVs. As shown in figure 29, requirements increased in 

June 2004 to 6,223 vehicles and again in August to 8,105 vehicles. 

However, additional funding—$572 million—was not received until 

August 25, 2004 to meet demands. As a result, Army officials stated it could 

not ask O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt to ramp up to its maximum capacity of 

550 vehicles per month because it did not have the funding at the time 

requirements increased. Furthermore, program managers explained that if 

O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt is to efficiently produce vehicles at a consistent 

and high rate, the company should be assured of consistent funding at least 

3 months in advance of delivery. The program officials stated that they did 

not know when funding would come, how many disbursements they would 

be receiving in a given fiscal year, or what amount of funding to expect, 

thus further complicating their procurement planning.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Aug. Oct. Nov.

2003 2004

Sep. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Requirements

Funded requirements

Cumulative Up-Armored HMMWVs redistribution

Cumulative Up-Armored HMMWVs production output

Number of vehicles
Appendix X

Up-Armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle and Add-on-Armor Kit

Page 127 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Efforts to Improve 

Availability

Short-term Efforts The major short-term solution to the up-armored HMMWV funding issue 

has been the receipt of additional funding from congressional increases, 

supplemental funding, and Office of Secretary of Defense additions. For 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Army received over $1.4 billion to produce 

7,502 up-armored HMMWVs to meet worldwide requirements, including 

8,105 vehicles required for CENTCOM’s area of operation, mostly from 

congressional increases and supplementals. Specifically in fiscal year 2004, 

the Army received $1.19 billion in congressional plus-ups, supplementals, 

and Office of Secretary of Defense additions above its $51.7 million 

received in the President’s Budget to produce more up-armored HMMWVs.

To meet continuing needs for force protection, Congress recommended 

$865 million in the 2005 appropriations bill to be used by the Army to armor 

additional HMMWVs and other vehicles. As part of the Rapid Response 

Force Protection Initiative, Congress intends the funds to be used to 

purchase and modify a variety of vehicles currently used in theater to 

respond rapidly to the threat of improvised explosive devices and mortar 

attacks experienced by deployed U.S. forces.

To improve the industrial capability, the Army worked with O’Gara-Hess 

Eisenhardt as well as Army depots to increase production of vehicles and 

kits. For example, program managers worked with O’Gara-Hess Eisenhardt 

to increase up-armored HMMWV production from an average of 30 vehicles 

a month to 400 vehicles a month by September 2004. The company plans to 

increase production to a maximum 550 vehicles a month to meet current 

requirements by March 2005. Army also ran 24-hour assembly lines at its 

depots and produced over 1,000 add-on-armor kits per week between 

March and April 2004 when materials were available to make the kits. 

Long-term Efforts At the time of this review, Army officials had not identified any long-term 

efforts to improve the availability of up-armored HMMWVs or 

add-on-armor kits.
Page 128 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiXI

Note: GAO’s comments 

supplementing those in 

the report’s text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 129 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Note: Page numbers in the 

draft report may differ from 

those in this report.

See comment 1.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 130 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 131 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 132 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 6.

See comment 7.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 133 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 8.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 134 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 9.

See comment 10.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 135 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

See comment 11.

See comment 12.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 136 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 137 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

GAO’s Comments The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated March 23, 2005.

1. The department cited action it is taking to improve modeling and data 

for determining war reserves that may meet our recommendation to 

update the war reserve models, once it is fully implemented. We agree 

that by developing a methodology that will capture and use OIF 

consumption data to update the model within the Army War Reserve 

Requirements Automated Process, DOD should improve the accuracy 

of the Army’s war reserve requirement. However, the department 

provided no timeline for the implementation of this effort. Therefore 

we modified our recommendation to require that DOD specify when 

this action will be completed.

2. We agree that the department’s decision to conduct annual updates of 

the Army War Reserve Requirements Process to compute new war 

reserve requirements to keep pace with Army, DOD and joint 

operational guidance should improve the accuracy of the requirements, 

as long as the updates are conducted as required.

3. DOD did not commit to any specific action to address our 

recommendation to disclose the risks associated with the percentage of 

war reserves being funded. After acknowledging a lack of adequate 

funding and the associated risk of such underfunding to the availability 

of war reserve items, DOD noted the Army was already reporting these 

risks to Congress in various forums. However, as noted in this report, 

budget documentation does not clearly state the risk of underfunding 

the war reserves; and we believe the other methods cited by DOD in its 

comments do not ensure consistent transparency to Congress of risks 

to military operations. We continue to believe our recommendation has 

merit and should be implemented. In addition, we have added a matter 

for Congressional consideration that suggests Congress may wish to 

require DOD to disclose the risks associated with not fully funding the 

Army war reserve.

4. The near and long-term actions DOD cited to improve modeling 

support for prewar planning could address our recommendation when 

completed. However, we remain concerned because their effectiveness 

will not be known until these initiatives are fully implemented years 

from now. After agreeing that the Army currently lacks a dynamic 

forecasting system, the department stated that for the near-term it has 

been implementing a new database to compute demand changes during 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 138 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

contingency operations that will work in conjunction with the current 

supply forecasting system, but did not state when the change would be 

completed. Moreover, according to DOD, the long-term solution to the 

Army’s forecasting problem is fielding of a new supply management 

system, the Logistics Modernization Program. However, the full 

implementation of this initiative is tentatively scheduled for fiscal year 

2007, but could be affected by events. Furthermore, as indicated in this 

report, there are also issues with the reliability of the data used in the 

Logistics Modernization Program that may affect its ability to properly 

forecast demands. Therefore, we continue to believe our 

recommendation has merit until these actions are fully implemented. 

We have also modified our recommendation to require that DOD 

specify when these actions will be completed.

5. The department did not commit to any specific actions to ensure item 

managers are provided operational information in a timely manner so 

they can improve the accuracy of modeled wartime forecasts. In the 

report, we noted the importance of item managers in setting 

requirements for supplies during OIF and cited concerns about failure 

to provide them operational information promptly. Furthermore, DOD 

noted that Army weapon system (item) managers made stockage 

decisions for OIF largely based on historical data that proved to be 

understated because operational tempo was as much as 12 times higher 

than normal peacetime rates. However, DOD’s response did not 

mention how it would better equip these managers to affect wartime 

forecasts if necessary. We believe that until and even after the proposed 

improvements to modeling are successfully implemented, item 

managers will remain a vital part of forecasting operational supply 

requirements. Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation 

has merit.

6. DOD’s response to our recommendation to reduce the time delay in the 

Army’s process for granting increased obligation authority to the Army 

Materiel Command noted the validation process is necessary and must 

be expeditious, but did not cite any specific actions it would be taking 

to achieve that end. We agree with the department that an appropriate 

validation process is critical to justifying additional obligation authority 

or a cash infusion, particularly in light of the size of the increases over 

budgeted amounts. Our recommendation did not ask the Army to 

sacrifice due diligence in this process. Rather, our concern is, as noted 

in this report, AMC did not receive sufficient obligation authority to 

support meet its requirements until four months after major combat 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 139 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

operations ended. As shown in this report, the cause for this delay was 

the time consuming process used by the Army to validate AMC’s 

requests, not the Office of Secretary of Defense’s process for delivering 

the funds. As we reported, without an expeditious funding approval 

process, item managers had difficulty buying supplies in a timely 

manner in the right quantity to meet war fighter needs, resulting in 

decreased operational capabilities and increased risk. Therefore, we 

continue to believe our recommendation has merit. We have also 

modified our recommendation to require that DOD specify when this 

action will be completed.

7. We agree with the department’s actions in response to our 

recommendation that the Navy improve the accuracy of the Marine 

Corps’ wartime supply forecasting process. The planned actions 

should, when completed, improve the accuracy of that process. 

However, DOD provided no clear schedule for the implementation of 

this initiative. Therefore, we have also modified our recommendation 

to require that DOD specify when this action will be completed.

8. DOD’s response to our recommendation cites Army and DLA actions to 

minimize future acquisition delays by assessing the industrial base 

capacity to meet updated forecasted demands for critical items, that 

when fully implemented, could achieve the intent of the 

recommendation. The Army Regulation 700-90, dated December 2004 

established a framework for systematically assessing the industrial 

base’s ability to support requirements. As noted in our report, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Critical Few List identifies rapidly emerging or critical 

items at the service and geographic command level and the Rapid 

Fielding Initiative accelerates acquisition of high priority items for 

troops. In combination, these and other initiatives may provide a means 

to reduce acquisition delays. In addition, DLA’s review of industry and 

continued use of War Stopper funding to invest in industrial capacity, 

should help DOD avoid some future acquisition delays. Therefore, we 

have also modified our recommendation to require that DOD specify 

when these actions will be completed.

9. DOD did not commit to any action to provide consistent visibility to 

Congress and other decision makers about how the department plans 

to acquire critical items to meet emerging demands. It stated that it 

already addresses this recommendation annually through the Industrial 

Capabilities Report Congress and other forums. While we agree that 

DOD provided visibility about some items, such as body armor in the 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 140 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

February 2004 Industrial Capabilities Report, neither the report or the 

other forums addressed the issues we identified about the acquisition 

of up-armored HMMWVs and kits. Providing clear information in 

consistent manner for critical items with rapidly emerging demands 

could have clarified the department’s acquisition challenges and 

equipped Congress to allocate funds or take other actions to increase 

the speed of acquisition.

10. In response to our recommendation to clarify responsibility and 

authority for synchronizing distribution of supplies, DOD stated it had 

appointed U.S. Transportation Command as the responsible 

organization for distribution in September 2003. However, neither the 

command nor the department have committed to revising joint doctrine 

to clarify how the command will interact with the services and 

geographic commands to accomplish this. As mentioned in our report, 

current doctrine prescribes a disjointed distribution management 

structure that does not support the timely delivery of supplies to the 

war fighter. While it is taking steps to analyze distribution processes, 

we believe DOD must also commit to making institutional changes 

through joint doctrine to ensure the geographic combatant commander 

benefits from a seamless distribution process. Therefore, we continue 

to believe our recommendation has merit. We have also modified our 

recommendation to require that DOD specify when this action will be 

completed.

11. DOD cited the establishment of the Deployment and Distribution 

Center in CENTCOM as its means of responding to our 

recommendation to develop and exercise deployable supply receiving 

and distribution capabilities. While this center may test a forward 

deployable logistics capability based on a cadre of logistics experts 

with enhanced communications capabilities, we do not see the 

department’s commitment to ensuring through simulation and field 

training that there are sufficient number trained personnel and related 

equipment to meet the requirements of operational plans. As noted in 

our report, the lack of sufficient logistics resources in theater before 

and during the arrival of combat forces hindered DOD’s efforts to move 

supplies promptly from ports to units. We believe having a preestablished deployable capability that includes sufficient and trained 

personnel, at all levels of command; communications systems; and 

necessary equipment will speed the establishment of a theater 

distribution system. Therefore, we believe additional actions are 

necessary to fully address our recommendation. We have also modified 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 141 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

our recommendation to require that DOD specify when these actions 

will be completed.

12. DOD stated that it is taking a number of actions to develop a holistic 

information technology plan to improve distribution. According to 

DOD, this plan, which is expected to be completed in May 2006, will 

recommend systems integration solutions to synchronize end-to-end 

distribution. We remain concerned that until this plan is completed and 

its recommendations fully implemented, DOD and the services will not 

be able to achieve their goal of distributing the right supplies to the 

right places when war fighters need them. Therefore we have also 

modified our recommendation to require DOD to specify when the 

plan’s recommendations will be implemented.
Page 142 GAO-05-275 Defense Logistics

Appendix XII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiXI

GAO Contacts Richard G. Payne, (757) 552-8119

John W. Lee, (202) 512-8329

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Nancy L. Benco, John C. Bumgarner, 

Michele C. Fejfar, Emily Gupta, Shvetal Khanna, Harry A. Knobler, 

Kenneth R. Knouse, Jr., Elizabeth D. Morris, Tinh T. Nguyen, Kenneth E. 

Patton, Terry L Richardson, Cary B. Russell, Rebecca Shea, Christopher W. 

Turner, John W. Vanschaik, Jason G. Venner, Gerald L. Winterlin, and 

John C. Wren made key contributions to this report.

(350492)
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