FILED

March 17, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DECEMBER SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9802-CC-00079

)

Appellant, )

)

) ANDERSON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JAMES B. SCOTT, JR.

ROY L. HOWARD, ) JUDGE

)

Appellee. ) (Direct Appeal - Motor Vehicle 

) Habitual Offender)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

CHRISTOPHER VAN RIPER JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Stuart & Van Riper Attorney General and Reporter

300 Market Street, Suite 200

Clinton, TN 37716 ELLEN H. POLLACK

Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243

JAMES N. RAMSEY

District Attorney General

JAN HICKS

Assistant District Attorney

Room 127, Anderson Co. Courthouse

Clinton, TN 37716

OPINION FILED ________________________

REVERSED AND REMANDED

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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OPINION

On May 2, 1997, the State filed a petition in the Anderson County Criminal

Court in which it sought to have Appellee Roy L. Howard declared a motor

vehicle habitual offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-10-

601, et seq. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on November 7,

1997, and the court subsequently denied the petition by an order dated February

11, 1998. The State challenges the trial court’s denial of its petition. After a

review of the record, we must reverse the judgm ent of the trial court.

FACTS

On January 1 and January 8, 1996, Appellee was cited for driving on a

suspended license. On January 9, 1996, Appellee pled guilty to both of these

offenses. Appellee was also cited for driving on a suspended license on August

25, 1996, and he pled guilty to that offense on November 26, 1996. 

On May 2, 1997, the State filed its petition to have Appellee declared a

motor vehicle habitual offender. On October 10, 1997, while the petition was still

pending before the trial court, the Tennessee Department of Safety apparently

accepted monetary fees from Appellee and reinstated his driving privileges. 

On November 7, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s

petition. The trial court denied the petition by an order dated February 11, 1998.

Although the trial court’s order contains no findings and no explanation of why the
1Appellee conten ds that the trial court erre d when it determ ined that it did n ot have ju risdiction to

consider his motion. We conclude that the trial court was correct. The jurisdiction of this Court attaches

upon the filing of a notice of appe al and, thus , the trial court los es jurisdic tion. See State v. Pendergrass,

937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). Therefore, “[a]s a general rule, the trial court may not hear motions

filed subsequently to the filing of the notice of appeal.” State v. Tony Craig Woods, No. 01C01-9606-CR00238, 1997 WL 602865, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 30, 1997). In addition, the findings that

Appellee asked the trial court to mak e, such as an ex press f inding that th e Dep artme nt of Safe ty

reinstated Appellee’s driving privileges after Appellee paid a fee, would have had no impact on the

decision in this case.

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petition was denied, the transcript of the hearing indicates that the trial court

denied the petition because the Department of Safety had reinstated Appellee’s

driving privileges after he paid a fee. 

The State filed a notice of appeal on February 23, 1998. On March 10,

1998, Appellee filed a motion in which he asked the trial court to amend the

judgment and make additional findings of fact. On April 3, 1998, the trial court

denied Appellee’s motion after it concluded that because the State had already

filed notice of appeal, the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the judgment or

make additional findings of fact.1

ANALYSIS

The State contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed the State’s

petition merely because the Department of Safety accepted fees from Appellee

and reinstated his driving privileges. We agree.

Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603, a motor vehicle

habitual offender is:

Any person who, during a three-year period, is convicted in a Tennessee

court or courts of three (3) or more of the following offenses; any person

who, during a five-year period, is convicted in a Tennessee court or courts

of three (3) or more of the following offenses; or any person who, during
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a ten-year period, is convicted in a Tennessee court or courts of five (5) or

more of the following offenses; provided, that if the five- or ten-year period

is used, one (1) of such offenses occurred after July 1, 1991:

. . . .

(x) A violation of § 55-50-504, relative to driving on canceled,

suspended, or revoked license . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(A) (1998). In addition, section 55-10-613

provides that “if the court finds that [the] defendant is an habitual offender, the

court shall make an order directing that such person shall not operate a motor

vehicle on the highways of this state and that such person shall surrender to the

court all licenses to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state.”

Tenn. Crim. App. § 55-10-613(a) (1998). The period during which a motor

vehicle habitual offender is prohibited from obtaining another driver’s license

must be at least three years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-615 (1998).

It is evident that under section 55-10-603, the sole criteria to be used by

a trial court in determining whether a defendant is a motor vehicle habitual

offender is whether or not the defendant has been convicted of the required

number of specified offenses during the prescribed time period. The actions of

the Department of Safety are completely irrelevant to this determination. See

State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (“A statute giving

a judge the right to prohibit certain individuals from driving motor vehicles for

certain periods is not related to nor dependent upon sections giving the

Department of Safety the power to grant, revoke, or suspend licenses.”).

Appellee contends that because the Department of Safety accepted money

from him and reinstated his driving privileges, the State should be estopped from

seeking revocation of his license under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act.
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“Generally speaking, the doctrine of estoppel is not favored under our law.”

Sexton v. Sevier County, 948 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations

omitted). In fact, “very exceptional circumstances are required to invoke the

doctrine against the State and its governm ental subdivisions.” Id. (citations

omitted). Further, “[e]stoppel is appropriate against government agencies only

when the agency induced the party to give up property or a right in exchange for

a promise.” Elizabethton Hous. & Dev. Agency, Inc. v. Price, 844 S.W.2d 614,

618 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). There is no proof in the record that

the State induced Appellee to do anything. There is absolutely no proof in the

record that the Department of Safety ever promised Appellee that if he paid a fee,

his driving privileges would be permanently restored. Further, Appellee did not

give any money to the Department of Safety until after he knew that the State had

filed the petition to have him declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. Under

these circumstances, the doctrine of estoppel has no application to this case.

Appellee also contends that this Court should dismiss this case because

the issue of declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender became moot

after the Department of Safety restored his driving privileges. The concept of

mootness deals with the circum stances that render a case no longer justiciable.

McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). A moot case

is one that has lost its character as a present, live controversy. Id. A case will

generally be considered moot if it no longer serves as a means to provide relief

to the prevailing party. Id. As previously stated, the actions of the Department

of Safety are completely irrelevant to the question of whether Appellee should be

declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. Thus, it is obvious that this case
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involves a live controversy that can serve as a means to provide relief to the

State. In short, this case is not moot. 

In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the

State’s petition merely because the Department of Safety accepted money from

Appellee and reinstated his driving privileges. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court and we remand this case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

___________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR. JUDGE