Filed 05 / 16 / 23 Aresh v . Marin

- Morales CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.11 15.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ZAAL ARESH, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
MONICA MARIN

- MORALES et al.,

Defendants ; DANIEL WILLIAMS, Respondent. G060579 , G060827
(Super. Ct. No. 30

- 2020

- 01153341)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, James Crandall, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded. Appellant’s request for judicial notice d enied

.

Jonathan Lee Borsuk for Plaintiff and Appellant.2 Daniel J. Williams, in pro. per., for Respondent.

* * * Zaal Aresh appeals from an order vacating the judgment he obtained to enforce his attorney fee lien and to collect the fees and costs he earned in two cases from
the settlement funds recovered in those cases. His current dispute is not with his former clients, 1 however ; it is with respondent Daniel J. Williams, the attorney who took over
the clients ’ representation after Aresh ’ s services were terminated . Aresh had initial ly
included Williams as a defendant in his lawsuit, along with all the other potential
claimants to the settlement funds recovered in the cases, with the intent that all interested parties could participate in resolving their claims to those funds in a single action. But
Williams demurr ed, arguin g Aresh was required to establish the validity, value , and enforceability of his own attorney fee lien s in an action against just his former clients before he could state any cause of action involving a third party.

Aresh then dismiss ed Williams and the other third parties as defendants in
the case and litigat ed his fee claim s against only his former clients. Following a trial, t he

court determined Aresh was entitled to recover his earned fees and costs from the
settlement amounts pursu ant to his liens . However, over Aresh ’ s objection, the court also purported to de termine the amount of fees and costs Williams was entitled to be paid
from the settlement funds in the two cases , a nd ordered that the remain der of the two settlement funds be dispersed to the clients. The court entered a judgment incorporat ing
all of those issues.

Aresh filed a notice of appeal as to the judgment. Williams thereafter moved to vacate the judgment, correctly arguing the court could not ad judicate the
amount of fees and costs he was entitled to receive in a case in which he was not a party.
But Williams did not s top there. He argued the court was required to vacate th e entire

1 Defendants Monica Marin

- Morales, Akin Arikan, Glafira Cruz Sumano, Beatriz Marin

- Morales, and David Marin Romero (former clients).3

j udgmen t

— not just the provisions a ddressing his fees and costs

— because if t he court allowed the remaining provisions of the judgment to stand, it would d i spos e of all the
settlement funds other than those awarded to Williams , and thus would implicitly preclud e him from recover ing a greater share of the settlement funds than had been
awarded in his absence. The trial court agreed and vacated the entire judgment. We disagree and therefore reverse in part

.

Where t h e trial court err ed was in failing to distinguish between the provisions of the judgment aw arding fees and costs to Aresh , and th ose awarding the remaining portion of the settlement funds to Aresh’s former c lients

. Only the latter
cannot be severed from the properly vacated provisions adjudicating Williams ’ s rights.

As Williams himself initially argued, Aresh ’ s fee claims and the validity of
his lien s against the settlement funds are contractual matter s to be determined between
Aresh and the former clients , who are the parties to his fee agreements and , as a result,
h is liens

. W illiams was not require d to be

— and objected to becoming

— a party to litigation addressing Aresh ’ s fee claim s

. The court had jurisdiction to adjudicate those
claims wi thout Williams ’ s participation ; that judgment is therefore valid

. The fact that Williams, as subsequent counsel, has his own fee claim against th e same clients , does not require reversal of Aresh’s part of the judgment

.

By contrast, the judgment ’ s provisions ordering that all remaining funds be paid to the former clien ts implicitly adjudicat e s the lien claims of any third parties (such as Williams) who also claim a right to share in those settlement funds. T he court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity and value of Williams ’ s lien claim ; it also lacked jurisdiction to determin e the amount of remaining settlement funds to be paid to the
former clients. Thus, the invalidity of the judgment provisions awarding fees to Williams
could not be severed from the pro visions awarding specific amoun ts to the former clients. As a result, w e reverse the order vacating the judgment and remand the case to the trial
court with directions to enter a new order vacating only the provisions purporting to4

adjudicate (1) Williams ’ s rights to the settlement fun ds and (2) Aresh’s former clients ’
entitlement to be paid specific amounts of the settlement funds. The provisions adjudicating Aresh ’ s rights to specific portions of the settlement funds remain intact. 2

FACTS
Aresh initiated litigation to obtain recovery of the attorney fees and costs he earned while representing Marin

- Morales in an employment case

. Aresh also represent ed
Marin

- Morales and four other individual defendants , Akin Arikan, Glafira Cruz Sumano,
David Mar in Moreno, and Beatriz Marin Morales , in a personal injury case (collectively, former clients)

. Aresh alleged that the former clients had granted him a contractual lien against any recover y in both case s , to ensure payment of his attorney fees and costs out of
any such funds . Aresh ’ s services were terminated by his former clients in both cases
after he had done substantial work on them, and shortly before the matters were settle d

. Wi lliams took over the employment case , while he and a third a ttorney took over the personal injury case.

Aresh alleged that after both cases had been resolved, he filed notice of his
lien s , but his former clients refused to pay him any share of the settlement funds as his
fees. He alleged the former client s and Williams claimed he had no valid lien against the
settlement fund s in either the employment case or the personal injury case and also that there were conflicting demands by various parties a gainst both settlements.

Aresh ’ s lawsuit alleged causes of action for breach of contract and quantum
meruit , and for interpleader and declaratory relief a gainst all defendants , including (1) the
individual former clients, (2) Williams, (3) the third attorney and law firm who s ucceeded

2 Aresh has also asked us to take judicial notice of a stipulation he entered into with his former clients, reflecting the clients ’ non

- opposition to the provisi ons of the judgment favoring Aresh. We deny the request. The stipulation was entered into after the court issued the order vacating the judgment which is at issue in this appeal ; the stipulation is therefore irrelevant to our analysis

.5

Aresh and Williams as counsel in the personal injury case , and (4) various professional s who provide d service in connection with each case

. The c laim for declaratory relief alleges that the former clients and Williams (but not the third attorney) dispute the

“ validity, priority, and amount ” of his attorney lien s, and seeks a declaration that his lien
is “ valid and perfected, first

- priority

. . . [ and ] in the amount of the value of the services ”
he rendered. Williams demurred, citing Mo jt a hedi v. Vargas ( 2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
974 ( Mojtahedi ) , for the proposition that a discharged attorney could not sue to enforce his fee lien against a successor attorney holding settlement funds unless he first established the validity and value of the lien in an action against the client. He argued that the discharged attorney must first bring an action “ only against the client with who m the complaining attorney had a contract for attorney services. ” He also argued Aresh

“ does not have standing for declaratory r elief as to subsequent counsel Williams, because Aresh has not established the validity and amount of his purported liens in an independent and separate legal action against his former clients, and such standing will not occur until conclusion (i.e., judgm ent ) of the present legal action against his former
clients. ” (Initial capitalization and bold omitted.)

The trial court tentatively agreed that the demurrer should be sustained and
took the matter under submission after oral argument. 3 The court also ordered b oth

3 W e believe Mojtahedi is distinguishable from this case. In Mojtahedi , the initial attorney attempted to enforce his fee lien against the subsequent attorney without involving the clients. H e argued it was improper for an attorney to draw t he clients into what he viewed as a dispute that i s solely between attorneys over the ir division of a contingent fee. ( Mojtahedi, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.) T he appellate court disagreed, pointing out the attorney ’ s lien was a matter of contract between the attorney and client s and the fees w ould be paid out of settlement funds otherwise belonging to the client s

. Consequently , the attorney must establish “ his entitlement to a particular portion of the settlement proceeds ” as against the client before enforcing that entitlement a gainst a third party holder of the funds. ( Id . at p. 978.) In contrast to Mojtahedi , Aresh did6

Aresh and Williams to detail the amount of fees and costs in clud ed in the settlement
funds and how each expected those fees and costs to be apportioned

. The former clients submitted their own proposal as wel l, w hich amounted to a request that Aresh and
Williams agree on how to divide the contingency fee amounts between themselves, with
the remainder of the settlement funds immediately disbursed to the former clients.

Six weeks later, apparently before the cour t formally ruled on the demurrer,
Aresh filed a request for dismissal, without prejudice , as to every named defendant except for the former clients. The matter proceeded to a trial between Aresh and his
former clients. Williams declined to participate as a party, but he appeared as a witness.

At the conclusion of the trial, th e court announced a tentative decision stating that the con tingency fee in the underlying employment case was $65,000 ( 40 percent of the client ’ s recovery ), and that 65 percent of that amount was to be paid to
Aresh , while 35 percent was to be paid to Williams ; costs in the amount of $3,590.33 and $193.65, were payable respectively

. The court ruled the “ remaining $93,716.02 ” of t he settlement funds was to be paid to the client. For the underlying personal injury case, the court tentatively decided that the attorney fees were 25 percent of one client ’ s recovery and 33 .33 percent of the other clients ’ recoveries, and Aresh was entitled to be paid
90 percent of those amoun ts, while Williams was entitled to be paid 10 percent; costs were waived by the parties

. Again, the court stated , “ the remaining fun ds (minus the contingency fees) are to be paid from the trust account to the [clients] forthwith. ” The
court ordered counsel for the former clients to prepare a proposed judgment.

The proposed judgment prepared by the former clients ’ counsel included
prov isions specif

ying the fee and cost amount s to be paid to each Aresh and Williams
with respect to each case, as well as provisions identifying the remain ing amount of

includ e his former clients in his lawsuit , thus giving them the opportunity to be heard that
was improperly denied to the clients in that case. T he issue of simultaneous litigation
was never raised in Mojtahedi

.7

settlement funds that each client was entitled to be paid , and specifying how the check to each was to be made out

— including that “ [n]either Zaal Aresh nor Daniel Williams shall be payees on said payment

. . . . ”

Aresh objected to the provisions of the proposed judgment that

“ affirmatively . . . remit or release fund s to [the former clients] and nonparty Daniel
Williams , ” pointing out the court could not award relief “ for or against a person who is not a party to the proceeding ” and a defendant “ cannot obtain relief unless it files a

cross

- com p laint against the plaintiff because affir mative relief cannot be claimed in the

answer. ” The court signed the judgment , as proposed, on June 1, 2021

. Within a
month , Williams filed a motion to vacate the judgment, arguing it was void because it purported to adjudicate his fee claim in the unde rlying cases when he was not a party. On October 28, 2021, t he court vacated the judgment in its entirety. The court acknowledged it was without fundamental jurisdiction to adjudicate Williams ’ s fee claim , as he was not a party to the action following hi s dismissal. T he court also agreed with Williams ’ s contention that the invalid portion of the judgment adjudicating his fees could not be
severed from the remaining provisions because those other provisions had award ed the
remain ing settlement funds to either Aresh or the former clients, and thus the continuing validity of those provisions would effectively limit Williams ’ s own potential share of the
settlement funds to the amounts that had been improperly adjudicated in his absence.

Aresh timely filed an appeal as to the underlying judgment and the postjudgment order to vacate.

DISCUSSION
1. Where the Parties Agree It is undisputed that the judgment provisions specify ing the amounts of fees earned by Williams in the two underlying cases are void. As explained by our Supreme8

Court in People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2002) 33 Cal.4th 653, 66 0 , a judgment is voi d , as opposed to merely voidable, when t he court l acks fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties ; i.e., it has “‘ an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties

. ’” Here, the court lacked jurisdiction over Willi ams because he had been dismissed as a party prior to the trial

. “ When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and ‘ thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time. ’” ( I

bi d

. ) The parties also agree tha t if the void provisions of the judgment cannot be severed from the otherwise valid remainder, the judgment must be vacated in its entirety. (See Miller v. Superior Court (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 779, 785 [ “ a judgment or order of court, invalid in part, will not be totally rejected if the invalid part is severable and it does
not vitiate the remainder ” ].)

F inally, the parties agree that the provisions of the judgment specifying the amounts of settlement funds to be paid to the clients are not severable from the void provisions purporting to adjudicate Williams ’ s fee claims. We agree as well. U ntil
Williams has had an opportunity to prove the amount s he contends he is entitled to for his
fee s , or the former clients agree , the court cannot determine the remaining amounts of the
settlement funds to be disbursed to the former clients

. 4
2. Where the Parties Disagree
T he parties disagree about whether the provisions of the judgment adjudicating the fees Aresh is entitled to recover are severable from the void provisions

.

4 It is unclear whether Williams has taken any steps to establish t he validity and value of his own contractual attorney f ee lien s against the former clients ’ settlement funds , as he insisted Aresh was obligated to do

. If one or more of the clients dispute the validity of Williams ’ s lien, his entitlement to fees , or the amount he is entitled to , that dispute must be resolved in an a ction between Williams and the former client s

.9

We conclude t hey are , and thus that the court erred by declaring the entire judgment to be
void.
As discussed , ante i n Mojtahedi , the court held the enforcement of an attorney ’ s lien claim is a matter of contract between the attorney and client, and thus it
must be resolved as between those contracting parties. ( Mojtahedi, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 8 [ “ plaintiff provided the services to the clients, not to
defendant ” ] ; s ee Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp . (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172 [An attorney ’ s lien is created by a fee contract between an attorney and client with either an express provision granting the lien or language stating the attorney will be paid for services rendered from the judgment itself].) Until that was accomplished , the attorney

- plaintiff in Mojtahedi could not compel a third party holder of the funds

— who
in that case was the attorney who had succeeded him in representing the clients

— to satisfy the lien from th e funds recovered on the clients ’ behalf

. That rule applies here.

But William s further suggest s the judgment provisions favoring Aresh must be vacated because the trial court f ailed to make the findings required by Mojtahedi. For example, h e con tends the “ court ’ s first required task was to determine whether Aresh has
valid liens against each client ’ s settlement. The underlying judgment does not contain any language regarding the validity of Aresh ’ s liens , which means there is no legal basis for any monetary am ount awarded to Aresh from the clients ’ settlements. ” He also
cl aims the judgment failed to “ determine the quantum meruit value . . . of Aresh ’ s purported liens. ”

We are not persuaded for two reasons

. First, t here is no requirement that a judgment include detailed findings. (Code Civ. Proc. , § 632. ) It is presumed the court (or jury) will make sufficient factual findings to support a judgment ; the burden is on the party challenging the judgment to demonstrate the opposite. ( In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal. 3d. 1130, 1133 .) Williams has not done so

.10 S econd, the provisions of this judgment necessarily imply the findings that
Williams claims are m issing. By ordering Aresh ’ s fees to be paid from the settlement funds, the court has necessarily found that his liens against th ose funds are valid and
enforceable

. And by assigning a particular dollar amount to the fees Aresh is entitled to recover, the court ha s necessarily determin ed the fair value of the services he rendered. Consequently, a s to Aresh, this judgment does what Moj tahedi require s : it determined the existence, amount , and enforceability of Aresh’s liens in an action between h im and his
former clients

. ( Mojtahedi, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 977.)

We reject Williams ’ s contention that the litigation he insisted must take place between Aresh and his former clients alone

— without involving Williams

— is just the first step in determin in g the amount Aresh is entitled to be paid on his lien s

. T here is no second step in which the attorneys are required to li tigate a division of the contingent
fee s between themselves. 5 Each attorney has a separate contractual relationship with the client, and a separate claim for his o wn fees based upon his work and the terms of the agreement negotiated. While litigating the two attorney ’ s claims together might be more efficient, and would avoid the possibility of inconsistent results, there is no requirement
that they be combined into a single action.

Nor does Williams have grounds to complain that the enforc ement of
Aresh ’ s liens, before resolution of his own, has somehow prejudiced him. Aresh ’ s liens are entitled to priority over Williams ’ s liens because they were established first. ( Civ. Code, § 2897 [ “ [o]ther things being equal, different liens upon the same property have

5 Williams ’ s contention that the “ percentage split of attorneys ’ fees between a discharged attorney and subsequent attorney is a matter to be determined after the discharged attorney brings a separate action against the former clients to determine the lien ’ s validity , value , and enforceability ” appears to be based on a misreading of Mo jtahedi

. That case requires only that the first attorney establish the validity an d the amount of the lien claim as against the clients before he can compel the second attorney to pay that amount out of the settlement funds.11

priority according to the time of their creation ” ] ; Brown v. Superior Court (2004)116 Cal.App.4th 320, 328 ; Pangborn Plumbing Corp. v. Carruthers and Skiffington (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1039, 10 49 [ “ The general rule, all things being equal, is that liens have priority among themselves according to the date of their creation ” ].)

Finally, Williams argues the court properly vacate d the portion of the judgment establishing the value of Aresh ’ s fees because it had erred in analyzing the

am ount of fees Aresh was entitled to recover

. Specifically, Williams claims “ the trial
court realized the errors and acknowledged that the specific monetary amounts awarded
to Aresh could not be severed from the rest of the judgment, because the trial court specifically based those numbers upon a proportional split with Williams ’ contingency attorney ’ s fees, using Williams ’ higher contingency rates, and without any evidence of the work done by attorney Williams. ” We disagree

.

The amount of fees awarded t o Aresh may or may not be the product of factual or legal error , b ut as a non

- party to the judgment, Williams lacked standing to

move to vacate it on that ground. (Code Civ. Proc. , § 663 [ allowing a court “ upon motion of the party aggrieved ” to set aside a judgment on the ground of “ [i]ncorrect or

erro neous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts ” ].)
B ecause Williams is not bound by the judgment, he is not aggrieved by it. I f Aresh’s
former clients be lieved the court erred in rendering the judgment in Aresh’s favor, they had the right to file their own motion to vacate or to appeal the judgment. Our record suggests t hey elected to do neither.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court erred to the extent it vacated the provisions of t he judgment establish ing Ar e sh ’ s entitlement to recover fees
from the settlement funds obtained on behalf of his former clients. Williams remains free to pursue his own lien claims in a separate action or negotiation with the clients.12 DISPOSITION The order vacating the judgment in its entirety is reversed , and the case is
remand ed to the trial court with directions t hat it enter a new order vacati ng only the provisions purporting to adjudicate (1) Williams ’ s rights to the settlement funds and (2) the former clients ’ entitlement to be paid specific amounts of the settlement funds. The provisions adjudicating Aresh ’ s rights to specific portions of t he settlement funds are
affirmed

. Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.