****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andbound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v

. JEFFREY T. CONNOR (SC 19421)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued January 26—officially released May 17, 2016 Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, andAnne Mahoney and Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellant (state). Mary Boehlert, assigned counsel, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion McDONALD, J. In State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 487, 533, 973 A.2d 627 (2009), this court remanded the criminal case ofthe defendant, JeffreyT. Connor, to the trial court with direction to reconsider the defendant’s competency to represent himselfin light ofa new standard that this court adopted in the defendant’s direct appeal. Following that remand, the trial court concludedthatthe defendanthadbeen competentto representhimself, andthe defendantchallengedthatdecision before the Appellate Court as an abuse of discretion. See State v. Connor, 152 Conn. App. 780, 100 A.3d 877 (2014). The dispositive issue in the state’s certified appealiswhethertheAppellate Courtproperlyreversed thetrialcourt’sjudgmentonthe groundthattheremand hearing was procedurally flawed. The state contends that the Appellate Court raised this issue sua sponte in derogation ofBlumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 162–64, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) ( Blumberg). We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to consider the issue raised in the defendant’s appeal.
Therecordrevealsthefollowingundisputedfactsand procedural history. The defendant was charged with a number of crimes1 in connection with the abduction of his former wife. State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 486, 488. The extensive pretrial proceedings reflected repeated attempts by the trial court to ascertain the defendant’s competency both to stand trial and to discharge his court-appointed counsel and represent himself. Id., 489. The defendant’s competency had been called into doubt due to the fact that he had suffered
a debilitating stroke and exhibited signs of mental illness. Id., 490–91. The efficacy ofthese proceedings was complicated by the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the medical professionals tasked with evaluating him and his intermittent unresponsiveness in court. Id., 491–92, 497. In reliance on the opinion ofseveral medical professionals, the trial court, McMahon, J., concluded that the defendant’s refusal to cooperate was

‘‘ ‘volitional’ ’’; id., 495; and the trial court, Miano, J., thereafter concludedthat the defendantwas ‘‘malingering,’’ and found him competent to stand trial. Id., 499.
The defendant’s case proceeded to trial before Judge Espinosa,2whosimilarlyconcludedthatthe defendant’s unresponsiveness during jury selection reflected his continued ‘‘ ‘malingering.’ ’’ Id., 500–501. The defendant explained that he had previously refused to cooperate because he didnotwanthis appointed counselto represent him, and requested that he be permitted to representhimself. Id., 501. Afterdefense counselsummarized the history of the case with respect to the defendant’s competency and desire to represent himself, Judge Espinosa canvassed the defendant, asking him ques-tions about, inter alia, his educational background and his ability to recall information pertinent to his case. Id., 501–502. Judge Espinosa ultimately concluded that the defendant was ‘‘competent to represent himself. He is articulate, he’s lucid, he knows what he’s doing. He

. . . devised a calculated plan to disrupt the trial in front of Judge Miano because he wasn’t getting his way with his lawyer

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 503. Judge Espinosa therefore permitted the defendant to represent himself, but appointed his defense counselasstandbycounsel. Id. Ajuryconvicted the defendant on all but one ofthe charges against him. Id., 504.
The defendantdirectlyappealedthejudgmentofconviction to this court claiming, inter alia, that Judge Espinosa had improperly found that he was competent to represent himself. Id., 505. At the time of the defendant’s trial, our courts were bound by federal case law that had indicated that ‘‘a [criminal] defendant who has been found competent to stand trial as amatter ofstate law

. . . also is competent to waive the right to counsel. Application of a stricter competency test in the latter analysis than was used in the former would place
an unconstitutional burden inthe exercise ofthe defendant’s federal constitutional right of self-representation.’’ State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 825, 661 A.2d 539 (1995), overruled in part by State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 528n.29, 973A.2d 627 (2009). Whilethe defendant’s appeal was pending, however, the United States Supreme Court clarified that individual states may adopt standards for determining whether a defendant is competent to represent himself that are more demanding than the standard used for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008). Accordingly, although
amore stringentstandardwasnotconstitutionallymandated, this court elected to adopt such a standard in the defendant’s appeal pursuant to the exercise of our supervisoryauthority. Statev. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 528 n.28. Under this standard, when a trial court is presented with a mentally ill or mentally incapacitated defendantwho hasbeenfound competentto standtrial; id., 527; a defendant’s competency to represent himself would depend ‘‘on his ability to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel

. . . notwithstanding any mental incapacity or impairment serious enough to call that ability into question.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 530.
The court noted, however, that ‘‘[b]ecause Edwards had not been decided prior to the conclusion of the trial inthe present case, Judge Espinosahadno alternative, in light of our holding in State v. Day, supra, 233 Conn. 825, but to permit the defendant to represent himself once it was determined that he was competentto stand trial. We therefore do not know whetherJudge Espinosa would have granted the defendant’s request to represent himself if she had had the authority to deny the request in accordance with Edwards and our holding in the present case. Consequently, the case must be remanded for a determination by the court, Espinosa, J., as to whether the defendant then was competent, notwithstanding any mental disability, to conductthe trialproceedings byhimself. In makingthis determination, the trial court, which

. . . is ‘best able to make [such a] fine-tuned mental capacity [decision], tailored to the individualized circumstances ofaparticular defendant’; Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 177; should consider any and all relevant information, including, but not limited to, the extent to which the defendant’s competence to represent himselfmay have been affected by mental illness, by the stroke that he had suffered, andby anymemoryproblems that he may have experienced as a result of that stroke. The court also should evaluate the extent to which the defendant may have been feigning mental problems. Because of the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with the various evaluation teams that had been assembled to assess his competency, it is difficult to discern whether the defendant suffered from a mental illness that, alone or in combination with his stroke, may have rendered him incompetentto representhimself. Accordingly, the trial court may seek to have the defendant examined again ifit appears that such an examination would be helpful inresolvingtheissuepresentedonremand.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Statev. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 528–29. The court noted that, if the trial court elected to do an evaluation and the defendant persisted in refusing to cooperate, ‘‘the trial court would have no choice but to make a determination concerning the defendant’s competency to represent himself at the trial that is limited generally to its recollection of the proceedings and its review of the trial transcript and arguments of counsel.’’ Id., 529 n.31.
In early 2011, Judge Espinosa began the remand proceedings, but was elevated to the Appellate Court before they could be completed. See footnote 2 of this opinion. In September, 2011, Judge Schuman assumed responsibility for the remand proceedings. In January, 2012,Judge Espinosaexecutedanaffidavitbasedonher recollections of the defendant’s trial. Judge Espinosa’s affidavit stated, inter alia, that the defendant had ‘‘appeared to be engaged in every aspect’’ of his trial, had ‘‘demonstrated an understanding of the evidence presented,’’ andhad ‘‘carried outthe basic tasks needed to present his own defense in a manner similarto other self-represented’’ parties that had appeared before her. She acknowledgedthatthe defendanthadmade certain ‘‘irrelevant’’ statements, but opined that they appeared to be calculated attempts to elicit sympathy from the jury. Judge Espinosafurtherattestedthatthe defendanthad ‘‘demonstrated that he was sufficiently capable of carrying out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the assistance of counsel.’’ Judge Schuman subsequently held two hearings. At the first hearing, Judge Schuman outlined his plan to make adeterminationregardingthe defendant’s competency to represent himselfon the basis ofthe trial transcripts, Judge Espinosa’s affidavit,3 and oral argument from the parties. At the end ofthe hearing, Judge Schuman appointed counsel for the defendant because he
was unresponsive. At the second hearing, the court granted defense counsel’s request to admit the defendant’s medical records from the Department ofCorrection. At no point did anyone object to Judge Schuman conducting the proceedings or to the procedure proposed by Judge Schuman to make the competency determination.4 Judge Schuman thereafter issued a memorandum of decision inwhichhe determinedthatthe defendanthad been competent to represent himself at the time of his trial. Judge Schuman first set forth a summary of the defendant’s conduct during trial, gleaned from the trial transcripts. He then turned to the defendant’s medical recordsandexplainedwhyhehaddeclinedto givethem any weight. He noted that the medical professionals who hadformed opinions aboutthe defendant’s competency to stand trial had not observed the defendant at trial and would not be helpful in assessing the legal question of whether the defendant could adequately represent himself despite any mental impairment. Finally, he set forth Judge Espinosa’s observations, as reflectedinheraffidavit. Inhisanalysis,Judge Schuman acknowledged that the transcripts had revealed some troublingissuesregardingthe defendant’s abilityto representhimself. Nonetheless, he concludedthatthemost serious charges against the defendant were not readily defensible and noted Judge Espinosa’s opinion that
someofthe defendant’sactionsmayhavebeenattempts to gain sympathy from the jury. In conclusion, Judge Schuman noted: ‘‘Judge Espinosa has made the critical findingthatthe defendant, whilelackingtechnicalproficiency, could perform the basic tasks needed to defend himselfwithout the assistance of counsel. That finding establishes that the defendant’s performance has met the ultimate standard that applies in this context.

. . . The courtmustgive considerable deferenceto this finding because Judge Espinosa heard the trial. Reading thetranscriptisnosubstituteforthe opportunity, which onlyJudge Espinosahad, to observe whetherthe defendant had a reasonable understanding of how the trial process worked, to assess whetherhis occasional unorthodoxyrepresentedfumblingineptitude orwilfulstrategy, and to measure just how well the defendant interactedwiththejury. BasedlargelyonJudge Espinosa’s first hand assessment of the defendant’s performance, the court concludes that the defendant wascompetent to represent himself at trial.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from thejudgment, claiminginhisbrieftothatcourtthat‘‘the trial court abused its discretion when it erroneously concludedthatthe [defendant] was competentto represent himselfat trial despite his mental illness or mental incapacity.’’ Specifically, the defendantargued ‘‘thatthe evidence in this case

. . . presents a substantial basis for the [trial court] to have found that [the defendant]
was incompetent to represent himself at trial.’’ In support ofthat claim, the defendant cited the behavior and diagnoses documented in his medical records, the fact that his competency had been questioned on numerous occasions prior to trial, and his behavior at trial evidenced in the trial transcripts. In its brief, the state respondedbycontendingthatthe evidence, particularly Judge Espinosa’s affidavit, established that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant was competent to represent himself.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court ‘‘did not conduct
a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competencyofthe defendant. Indeed, theindeterminate state ofthe record precluded the court from retrospectivelydeterminingthe defendant’s competencywiththe degree of reliability that would have accompanied a competency determination contemporaneous with the defendant’s trial.’’ State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 795–96. The court further determined that, because ‘‘of the unorthodox sequence of events on remand’’ and the fact that eight years had passed since the defendant’s trial, a ‘‘procedurally adequate competency determination’’ was ‘‘no longerpossible’’ because it ‘‘would be unduly and impermissibly speculative’’; id., 810–11; and the defendant was entitled to a new trial.5 Id., 817.
Thestatethereafterfiledamotionforreconsideration
or reargument en banc, claiming that the Appellate Court had violatedBlumberg by raising sua sponte the issue ofwhetherthe defendanthadreceived ameaningful hearing. The Appellate Court denied the state’s motion.
We then granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal to this court, limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Courtproperly considerwhether the trial court’s remand hearing was procedurally flawed?’’; and (2) ‘‘If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s convictions must be vacated?’’ State v. Connor, 315 Conn. 903, 903–904, 104 A.3d 757 (2014). With respect to the first question, the state claims that the defendant never raised, and therefore waived, any claim that the remand proceedings
were procedurally flawed, and, accordingly, the Appel-late Court’s decision to resolve the appeal sua sponte
on this basis violated Blumberg

. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly decided the appeal on the basis of issues raised by the parties, but argues that, even if the Appellate Court raised the proceduralissue suasponte, doing so wasproperunder Blumberg

. We agree with the state’s argument on the first certified question, and therefore need not reach the second certified question.
Our appellate courts generally do not considerissues that were not raised by the parties. Blumberg, supra, 311 Conn. 164. This is because ‘‘oursystem is an adversarial one inwhichtheburden ordinarilyis ontheparties to frame the issues

. . . .’’ Id. There are, however, well established exceptions to this rule. In Blumberg, we surveyed our case law in which we have made such exceptions and categorized the circumstances under which reviewing courts properly may raise and decide unpreservedissues. Id., 161–64. We notedthatan appellate courthas discretionto raise anunpreservedissue if three conditionsaremet: (1) exceptionalcircumstances exist; (2) the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue; and (3) there is no unfair prejudice to the party against whom the issue is to be decided. Id., 128.
Before turning to the question ofwhether those conditions were satisfied in the present case, we must determine whether the defendant asserted a claim that the remand proceedings were procedurally flawed or whether the Appellate Court raised this issue sua sponte. Although we applythe abuse ofdiscretion standard to the question of whether the Appellate Court properlydeterminedthattheBlumbergconditionswere satisfied; id., 167–68; this threshold waiver question is subjectto plenaryreview. See Statev. Davis, 311 Conn. 468, 477, 88 A.3d 445 (2014); State v. Commins, 276 Conn. 503, 510, 886 A.2d 824 (2005), overruled on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 754, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); cf. Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 299, 94 A.3d 553 (2014) (interpretation of pleadings subject to plenary review). We concludethatthe defendantdidnotraisetheissue onwhich the appeal was decided, and, therefore, the Appellate Court raised it sua sponte.
The record reveals the following additional facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this issue. The remand hearing proceeded before Judge Schumanwithoutthe defendantorhiscounselinterposing any objections. Other than his medical records, admitted over the state’s objection, the defendant did not attempt to introduce any new documentary evidence or witness testimony. Defense counsel acknowledged that they had sought out mental health professionals to evaluate the trial transcripts, but those professionals had indicated that they would be unableto render any kind ofasignificant opinion onthatbasis. The defendant never sought to have Judge Espinosa testify, nor didhe argue that heraffidavitwas lacking in any way. Indeed, defense counsel argued before Judge Schuman ‘‘that we have before us the affidavit ofJudge Espinosa, on one hand, andthetranscripts onthe other, and in between are medical records from the Department of Correction, which I would suggest to the court

. . . would put to rest the idea

. . . whether or not [the defendant] was, at the time, suffering from any mentalillness.’’ Atthe close ofthe hearings, inresponse to the state’s reliance on Judge Espinosa’s affidavit, defense counselstated: ‘‘Isupposethesimplestthingfor the court to do here, because [the case] was remanded specifically to Judge Espinosa for a finding, is to just

. . . accept her affidavit at face value and move on.’’ Nonetheless, defense counsel noted that he disagreed with the conclusions that Judge Espinosa had drawn from the conduct displayed by the defendant. When Judge Schuman later asked how much deference he should give to the affidavit, defense counsel stated: ‘‘I

am under no illusion that you won’t give deference at all; as I said, I disagree with it. I disagree withitheartily, but she was the judge and it was returned to her for her opinion.’’ Following Judge Schuman’s decision, the defendant claimed in his brief to the Appellate Court that ‘‘the trial court abused its discretion when it erroneously concludedthatthe [defendant] was competentto represent himselfat trial despite his mental illness or mental incapacity.’’ In support of that claim, the defendant argued ‘‘that the evidence in this case

. . . presents a substantial basis for the [trial court] to have found that [the defendant] was incompetent to represent himself at trial.’’ The defendant cited the information documented in his medical records, the fact that his competency had been questioned on numerous occasions prior to trial, and his behavior at trial as evidenced by the trial transcripts. The defendant argued that the evidence in his case was comparable to that inIndiana

v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 177–78, wherein the trial courthad concludedthatthe defendantwas not competent to represent himself despite his competency to stand trial. In the present case, the defendant’s analysis of his claim made no reference to Judge Espinosa’s affidavit; he simply acknowledged its filing and conclusion inhispreliminarystatement ofthe facts andprocedural history of the case. The state’s responsive brief contendedthatthe evidence, particularlyJudge Espinosa’s affidavit, established that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant was competent to represent himself.
In its opinion, the Appellate Court initially broadly framed the issue before it as whether the trial court ‘‘improperly determined that [the defendant] was competent to represent himself

. . . .’’ State v. Connor,supra, 152 Conn. App. 795. The Appellate Court then noted that, although such determinations ordinarily would be made at a time substantially contemporaneous with a mentally ill or incapacitated defendant’s request for self-representation, that did not happen in the present case. The Appellate Court noted that retrospective (or nunc pro tunc)6 competency determinations are generally disfavored and only permissible when they are the product of a meaningful hearing. Id., 801. The Appellate Court further explained: ‘‘In the present case, by way of remanding the matter to the trial court with direction to render a nunc pro tunc competency determination, our Supreme Court implicitlydeterminedthatitwaspermissible forthetrial court to rendersuch adetermination atthattime. The implied permissibilityofthenuncprotunccompetencydetermination, however, waspredicatedonthe assumptionthat Judge Espinosa would conduct the remand proceedings, as was plainly set forth in our Supreme Court’s mandate to the trial court.

. . . Judge Espinosa, however, did not conduct the remand proceedings.

. . . Our Supreme Court’s mandate to the trial court did not account for such a contingency and, consequently, in order to resolve the defendant’s claim on appeal that the competency determination was improper, we must examine the basis of and grounds ofJudge Schuman’s determinationthatthe defendantwas competentto represent himself

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.) Id., 802–804.
The court noted that, although this court had assumed that Judge Espinosa’s determination would require the exercise of discretion, Judge Schuman did not, under the circumstances, make the discretionary determination that this court had sought from Judge Espinosa. Id., 803 n.21. The court reasoned that ‘‘[b]ecausethejudges ofour Superior Court do nothave
a collective consciousness, Judge Schuman’s conclusion as to what Judge Espinosa would have done in a circumstance that she never contemplated would not have been an exercise of discretion, but a legal fiction.’’7 Id.
In considering whether Judge Schuman had conducteda‘‘meaningful,’’ andthereforepermissible, retrospective competency hearing, the Appellate Court defined ameaningful hearing as one in which ‘‘the state of the record, together with such additional evidence
as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s condition at the time of the original

. . . proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 804. TheAppellate Court explained that the ‘‘primary object’’ ofits inquiry into whetherthe defendant had received a meaningful hearing was ‘‘to determine whether the quantity and quality of the evidence would have permitted the court on remand to reliably reconstruct the defendant’s competency at the time of trial.’’ Id., 805.The Appellate Court then proceeded to analyze whether the remand hearing had been meaningful by applying a four factor test often used by federal courts to determine whether a nunc pro tunc hearing to determine a defendant’s competency to stand trial is meaningful. Id., 804–805. Specifically, the Appellate Court considered: (1) the amount of time that had elapsed betweenthedefendant’strialandthecompetencydetermination; (2) the availability of medical evidence that
was contemporaneous with the trial; (3) statements by the defendant in the trial record; and (4) the availability of individuals who were in a position to interact with the defendant before and during trial. Id. Applying this test, the court first noted that the competency determination occurred approximately six years after trial. Id., 805. The court then effectively determined that the defendant’s medical records were not reliable evidence
as to his competencyto represent himselfbecause they
were from a time period preceding his trial, they included many illegible entries, and they contained other entries using medical terminology that could not be understood without the aid ofexpert testimony.8 Id., 805–806. The court next determined that the defendant’s statements at trial were ‘‘ofminimal utility without aproper understanding of [the defendant’s] mental state at that time,’’ which it concluded could not have been accurately assessed given the state ofthe contemporaneous medical evidence that was available to the court. Id., 806–807. Insofar as some of the defendant’s statements seemed to indicate that he may have been competent to represent himself, the Appellate Court reasoned that those statements could have been the product ofmental illness. Id., 807. Finally, theAppellate Court determined that, although Judge Espinosa had observed the defendant during the relevant time, her ‘‘live testimony would have been necessary insofar as her affidavit set forth what we can characterize only
as conclusory statements regarding the defendant’s ability to represent himself during trial

. . . .’’ Id. The court noted that Judge Espinosa’s affidavit had been made without knowledge of the defendant’s subsequently admitted medical records and that her ultimate opinion conflictedwithherstatements attrialregarding the defendant’s competency.9 Id., 808–809. In balancing these factors, the Appellate Court ultimately concluded that the trial court had not conducted a meaningful hearing. Id., 809–10.
From our review of this record, it is apparent that, although the Appellate Court’s initial framing of the issue—whether the trial court ‘‘improperly determined that [the defendant] was competent to represent himself’’—was consistent with the parties’ dispute at its broadest level; id., 795; its decision was based on an issue that was not raised by the parties. The defendant challenged the substantive basis of Judge Schuman’s decision, claiming that certain evidence proved that hewas not competent to represent himself. By contrast, the Appellate Court decided whether, in light of the fact that Judge Espinosa had not presided over the remand proceedings, any other trier of fact could have made adeterminationregardingthe defendant’s competency given the substantial amount of time that had passed and the state ofthe record. The Appellate Court effectively concluded that, although this court had approved the making of a competency determination
on the basis of a review of the trial transcripts, oral argument ofthe parties, and Judge Espinosa’s personal observations, those same considerations constituted an inadequate basis to afford the defendant a meaningful competency hearing.
The defendant never questioned Judge Schuman’s ability to make a competency determination, whether because a significant amount oftime had elapsed since the defendant’strial orbecauseJudge Schumanhadnot presided over that trial. The defendant never claimed, eitherbefore the Appellate Court orthe trial court, that the evidence was insufficient or unreliable such that Judge Schumancouldnotmake adeterminationregarding his competency. Indeed, the defendant conceded that Judge Schuman properly could afford substantial deferencetoJudge Espinosa’sconclusionsinheraffidavit, arguing onlythat the court should find the evidence contained in the defendant’s medical records a more compelling basis to reach a contrary conclusion. The defendant did not, nor could he claim, that Judge Schuman improperly precluded him from introducing evidence relevant to his competency. Therefore, any such claims would have been waived by the defendant.
In other words, the parties focused exclusively on whether the trial court properly determined that the defendant was competent to represent himself on the basis of the evidence properly before it, whereas the Appellate Courtanalyzed as athresholdmatterwhether the circumstances and evidence allowed the trial court to make any competency determination at all.10 Although the Appellate Court considered the evidence that the parties cited, it did so through the lens of whether the evidence provided the defendant with a meaningful hearing, not whether the trial court made
a proper determination on the basis of that evidence. Indeed, the Appellate Court weighed this evidence againstthepassage oftime, aconsiderationthatneither party raised at any stage of the proceedings. We therefore are compelledto concludethattheAppellate Court decidedthe appeal onthe basis ofan issue that it raised
sua sponte.
In light of this conclusion, we turn to the question ofwhetherthe requirements forraising an unpreserved issue sua sponte were satisfied. As previously noted,
we review the Appellate Court’s decision as to this matter for an abuse ofdiscretion. Blumberg, supra, 311Conn. 167–68. Although the state contends that none of the Blumberg requirements was satisfied, we focus
on two of them: (1) whether the parties were given an opportunity to be heard on the issue; and (2) whether there was unfairprejudice to the state, thepartyagainst whom the issue was decided. Id., 128.
With respect to the opportunity to be heard, the record reveals the following relevant facts. Priorto oral argument, the Appellate Court did not order the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question of whether the defendant had been given a meaningful hearing. The Appellate Court did not issue an order directing the parties to be prepared to discuss that issue at oral argument. The issue arose for the first time during the state’s rebuttal argument through questions by the Appellate Court panel. The panel questioned the state, for example, on whetherthere had been any discussion ofmaking Judge Espinosa available for cross-examination and whether there had been any objection to the
manner in which her affidavit was received. The Appellate Court thereafter did not instruct the parties to file supplemental briefs concerning these issues.
The court in Blumberg specifically phrased the requirement that a party be heard on an issue as ‘‘an opportunity

. . . to be heard by way ofsupplemental briefing

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 161–62; see also id., 157 n.26 (citing ‘‘the requirement that parties must be given an opportunity to brief an issue that the reviewing court has raised sua sponte’’). Our case law also has establishedthatif‘‘theAppellate Court decides to address an issue not previously raised or briefed, it may do so only after requesting supplemental briefs from the parties or allowing argument regarding that issue.’’ Statev. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 715, 924A.2d 809 (2007), overruled inpart on othergrounds byBlumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc

. v. Brown & Brown ofConnecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 162 n.34, 84 A.3d 840 (2014).
Consistent with this jurisprudence, this court, on occasion, has issued orders instructing parties to be prepared to discuss certain issues at oral argument without ordering supplementalbriefing onthose issues. See, e.g., Gould v. Freedom ofInformation Commission, 314 Conn. 802, 808 n.9, 104 A.3d 727 (2014) (whether plaintiff was aggrieved); Lexington Ins. Co.

v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., 311 Conn. 29, 35 n.6, 84 A.3d 1167 (2014) (whether jurisdiction existed for cross appeal); Broadnax v. New Haven, 284 Conn. 237, 240 n.4, 932 A.2d 1063 (2007) (whether final judgment existed); Board of Education v. Nonnewaug Teachers’Assn., 273 Conn. 28, 31, 866 A.2d 1252 (2005) (impact of recently issued decision). Principally, this court has used this procedure when a jurisdictional
concern comes to this court’s attention afterthe parties have filed their briefs, which is a matter that the courtis required to address even if not raised by the parties. Blumberg, supra, 311 Conn. 128. Thus, it is clear that, at a minimum, the parties must be provided sufficient notice that the court intends to consider an issue. It is implicit that an opportunity to be heard must be a meaningful opportunity, in order to satisfy concerns offundamental fairness. See id., 156 n.24 (‘‘[f]undamental fairness dictates that aparty must be afforded the opportunity to address an unpreserved claim on appeal’’). The parties must be allowed time to reviewthe record with that issue in mind, to conduct research, and to prepare a response. A meaningful opportunity is not provided when a party is asked a question about a different claim, not previously raised, forthe firsttime at oral argument. Moreover, the Appellate Court’s questions in the present case did not make clear that it intended to decide whether a retrospective competency proceeding was permissible and that it would make such a determination under atest that had notbeenraisedinthebriefsofeitherparty. Accordingly, the Appellate Court failed to provide the state with an opportunity to be heard on the dispositive issue.
If the absence of such an opportunity was the only
concern in the present case, we could remand the case totheAppellate Courtto affordthepartiesthatopportunity. See, e.g., Haynes v. Middletown, 306 Conn. 471, 475, 50 A.3d 880 (2012). The state also contends, however, that it was unfairly prejudiced by the fact that this issue was never raised before the trial court. The state argues that it would have proceeded differently had the defendant objected to the procedure used by Judge Schuman. Specifically, the state contends, if the defendant had objected to having anyjudge other than Judge Espinosa conduct the remand proceedings, it would not have objected to Judge Espinosa11 conducting the proceedings or would have actively sought to have her do so.12
Unfairprejudice maybe found ‘‘when aparty demonstratesthatitwouldhavepresentedadditional evidence
or that it otherwise would have proceeded differently if the claim had been raised at trial.

. . . Moreover, because it may be difficult for a party to prove definitively that it would have proceeded in a different manner and, as a result, would suffer unfairprejudice ifthe reviewingcourtwereto considertheunpreservedissue,
once that party makes a colorable claim of such prejudice, the burden shifts to the other party to establish that the first party will not be prejudiced by the reviewing court’s consideration ofthe issue.’’ (Citations omitted.) Blumberg, supra, 311 Conn. 156–57.
In the present case, the state has made a colorable claim that it was unfairly prejudiced. Had the state known that it should have sought to have Judge Espinosa preside over the remand proceedings, it therebycouldhave alleviatedtheAppellate Court’s con-cerns regarding the substance of her affidavit. General Statutes § 51-197c (f) provides amechanism that would have allowed Judge Espinosa to preside over the remand proceedings notwithstanding her elevation to the Appellate Court. Section 51-197c (f) allows Appellate Court judges to preside over trial court matters withthe permission ofthe ChiefJustice ofthe Supreme Court when ‘‘the public business may require it.’’13
The defendant has failed to advance any argument
as to whythe state could not have soughtto have Judge Espinosa preside over the proceedings or why such
an attempt would have been futile. The defendant has accordingly failed to meet his burden to overcome the presumption that the state was unfairly prejudiced. We conclude, therefore, that the Appellate Court abused its discretion by deciding the appeal on the basis of an unpreservedissuebecausetherequirementsarticulated in Blumberg were not met.
Thejudgment ofthe Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to considerthe claim raisedbythe defendant inhis appeal to that court.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The charges included kidnapping in the first degree, robbery in the third degree, robbery involving an occupied motor vehicle, larceny in the third degree, and stalking in the first degree. See State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 486, 503.

2 On March 16, 2011, Judge Espinosa was sworn in as a judge of the Appellate Court. On March 6, 2013, she was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Because this appeal involves matters that occurred beforeJustice Espinosa’s appointmentto the Supreme Court, andforclarity,

we refer to Justice Espinosa as Judge Espinosa in this opinion.

3 The timing and process wherebyJudge Espinosa’s affidavit was actually entered as a court exhibit is not clear from the record.

4 Although the defendant’s brief to this court argues to the contrary, at oral argument he conceded that no objection had been made to Judge Schuman presiding over the proceedings.

5 Judge Bear issued a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which he primarily took issue with the majority’s conclusion that Judge Espinosa could not conduct another remand proceeding because she had made herself a material witness and, therefore, the proper remedy was
a new trial. State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 817, 827–29.

6 Nunc pro tunc means ‘‘now for then’’ and is used, inter alia, to refer to competency determinations made after the time at which the underlying proceeding took place, in the present case, the defendant’s criminal trial. Statev. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 799–800; see alsoBlack’sLawDictionary (10th Ed. 2014).

7 Thisfactrebukesthe defendant’s claimthattheAppellate Courtreviewed Judge Schuman’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard.

8 The Appellate Court nevertheless faulted the trial court for refusing to give weight to the defendant’s medical records. State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 793 n.11.

9 The Appellate Court noted: ‘‘[I]nsofar as [Judge Espinosa’s] affidavit indicated that she believed the defendant was capable of carrying out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without counsel, the trial transcript offers a conflicting statement: ‘[If] you represent yourself, you’re not going to walk out of here free, I can tell you that. Because you are not capable, you think you are, you think you know what you’re doing, but you’re not.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 808–809. Contrary to the Appellate Court, we believe that the latter statement, read in proper context, indicates that Judge Espinosa was warning the defendant that he lacked the skills to successfully represent himself. See State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 529–30 (‘‘We emphasize that the issueto be decided on remand is not whether the defendant lacked the technical legal skill or knowledge to conduct the trial proceedings effectively without counsel. Indeed, it appears quite clear that he did lack such skill or knowledge. That fact, however, has no bearing on whether he was competent to represent himself for purposes of Edwards

. Rather, the determination of his competence or lack thereof must be predicated solely on his ability to ‘carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel’

. . . notwithstanding any mental incapacity or impairment serious enough to call that ability into question.’’ [Citation omitted.]).

10 We acknowledge that the Appellate Court varyingly framed the issue before it, making it difficult to characterize with precision the ultimate issue

on which it based its decision. For example, it initially framed the issue as whetherthe hearing was meaningful, but later characterized the trial court’s

error as having ‘‘fail[ed] to resolve the doubt as to the defendant’s competency.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 814. The parties agreed, however, that the trial court had resolved that doubt, but took different positions as to whether the court’s resolution was the correct one. Thus, irrespective of how it framed the issue, the Appellate Court decided that some procedural flaw rendered the judgment improper. The Appellate Court did not simply decide the substantive issue raised by thepartiesunderplenaryreview, ratherthantheabuseofdiscretionstandard sought by the parties.

11 Thejustices ofthe Supreme Court and thejudges ofthe Appellate Court

are also judges of the Superior Court. General Statutes §§ 51-198 (a), 51- 197c (a), and 51-165 (6).

12 The state also claims in its reply briefthat, had it known that there was
a concern about the availability of individuals ‘‘who were in a position to interact with the defendant before and during trial’’; State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 805; it would have presented testimony from other persons who had had such interactions, and it also would have joined in a request ofthe defendantto havethe remandhearinglitigatedbeforeJudge Espinosa. Although it is debatable whether this argument is sufficiently distinct from the prejudice argument in the state’s main brief and thus should not be considered; see State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331, 341 n.8, 963 A.2d 42 (2009) (‘‘[i]t is a well established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); we need not resolve this question because the state’s principal prejudice argument is sufficient.

13 The Appellate Court panel disagreed whether Judge Espinosa could preside over the proceedings ifit reversed thejudgment rendered by Judge Schuman because Judge Espinosa had filed an affidavit, thereby potentially making herself a material witness. Compare State v. Connor, supra, 152 Conn. App. 812 n.26, with id., 828–29 ( Bear, J., concurring and dissenting);

see also Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a) (5) (C) (judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where judge ‘‘was a material witness concerning the matter’’). The defendant does not argue thatJudge Espinosa could not have presided over the proceedings for this reason. Indeed, had the defendant timely raised any ofthe concerns expressed by the Appellate Court before Judge Schuman, these concerns arguably could have been resolved before Judge Espinosa’s affidavit was admitted as a court exhibit. See footnote 3 of this opinion.