SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0542- 22 ROBERT J. TRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JUMPINJAX KIDS CORP. and DIANA SMITH, Defendants-Respondents, and VAUGHNISHA SCOTT, Defendant.

_____________________________

Argued October 30, 2023

– Decided November 22, 2023 Before Judges Marczyk and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. DC- 004261

- 22. Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Respondents have not filed a brief.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0542

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PER CURIAM Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from an August 25, 2022 order dismissing his complaint against defendants JumpinJ ax Kids Corp. ("JumpinJax") and its director Diana Smith ("Smith" ). We affirm. We discern the material facts from the record, view ing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Richter v. Oaklan d Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 515 (2021). JumpinJax issued a paycheck drawn on i ts bank, Bank of America ("BOA"), to its employee, Vaughnisha Scott ("Scott" ) for $623.63. Scott presented the check for payment via electronic chec k deposit and was paid by BOA. Scott then presented the check for payment a second time to Garfield Financial Services d/b/a/ United Check Cashing ("Un ited"). United was denied payment by BOA because it was a "duplicate presentm ent. " After United was denied payment, plaintiff purchased United's intere st and was assigned its rights in the dishonored check. Plaintiff filed a complaint against JumpinJax, Smit h, and Scott in the Special Civil Part, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414 and 12A:3- 415 , seeking to recover the amount of the dishonored check, pre-jud gment interest, fees, and court costs. Plaintiff also claimed he was entitle d to collect the amount owed

on the dishonored check under the Federal Check Clear ing for the 21st Century3 A- 0542

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Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 to 5018 (2003). ("Check 21 Act"). JumpinJax and Smith answered, stating they did not owe plaintiff becaus e they previously paid the check plaintiff sought to enforce and attached a co py of their BOA statement showing the check was paid. Additionally, JumpinJax stated they did not issue a "stop payment" on the check, and they notified pl aintiff that Scott had been paid on the check. Scott did not answer pla intiff's complaint. The parties appeared before the Special Civil Part, and before the trial commenced, the judge summarized the fact s, the documents brought to court as exhibits, and the relief sought by plaintiff as fol lows:

[THE COURT:] I've reviewed the complaint and from what I can tell, this is a situation where a check had been cashed and then it was cashed again . . . . [ T]he check, [No.] 7351[,] was paid on . . . [December 7, 2022]. . . . There was duplicate presentation. An d I'm aware that defendant sent an email to [plaintiff] s tating the check was issued to . . . Scott and was paid ou t.

. . . . [F]rom what I understand, obviously this indiv idual . . . cashed the check twice . . . and [plaintiff], you're seeking to have the party that issued the check be responsible for the fact that it was cashed twice, correct? [PLAINTIFF:] Yes, Your Honor.

. . . .4 A- 0542

- 22 [PLAINTIFF:] Your Honor, . . . JumpinJax[] has the obligation . . . to prove their defense and they ha ve not set forth in their papers proofs to establish that as a matter of both federal and state law, the check in question was previously paid. The court then entered an order dismissing the case against JumpinJax and Smith. The court also granted plaintiff default ju dgment against Scott in the amount of the check, $623.63, plus costs. This app eal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argues as follows:
POINT I Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause; 12 U.S.C. 5003's requirements to prove a non-original check was paid preempts New Jersey's conflicting check drawer's records standard in Triffin v. SHS Group, 466 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021).
POINT II The trial judge committed prejudicial and reversibl e[] error[] when she summarily assumed JumpinJax . . . has a 12 U.S.C. 5003 compliant copy of the original che ck JumpinJax used to pay its dishonored check. "If, on a motion to dismiss based on [Rule 4:6 -2(e)], matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the c ourt, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by
R ule 4:46[.]" R. 4:6 -2. Where "the motion was based upon evidence, inclu ding certifications, outside of the pleadings[,]" the co urt applies the summary5 A- 0542

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judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010). "Thus, a motion to dismiss under R[ ule ] 4:6 -2(e) is effectually converted into a motion for summary judgment when the court relies on facts bey ond the pleadings." Jersey City Educ. Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 316 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 1998)

. We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, ap plying the same standard as the motion judge. Branch v. Cream-O-La nd Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). That standard requires us to "determin e whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions o n file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine i ssue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:46 -2(c)). "To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must 'dra w[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quot ing Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "The 'trial co urt's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from establish ed facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 92 (2013) ( quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,6 A- 0542

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378 (1995)). Summary judgment is properly granted "when the evidence 'is so

one -sided that one party must prevail as a matter of l aw' . . . ." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quo ting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)); see also Da vis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014). Plaintiff believes that because JumpinJax has neith er its original paid check, nor a substitute check meeting the requireme nts of 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b), it cannot prove that it paid the dishonored check p laintiff seeks to enforce. Plaintiff cites Henson v. Santander Consumer USA In c. for the proposition that in enacting a federal statute, "[the] [L]egislature says . . . what it means and means . . . what it says." 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017) (first alteration in original) (quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 ( 2005)). Plaintiff also cites the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. , art. VI, cl. 2, to support the argument that the legal legend descr ibed in 12 U.S.C. 5003(b) is required for a substitute check to be considered "c ompliant" and protect JumpinJax from liability. He asserts we held in Triffin v. Quality Urban Hous.
Partn ers "it [is] plain that critical facts must be proved and not merely assumed." 352 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (App. Div. 2002). Plainti ff argues JumpinJax did not present the original paid check as required by N.J. R.E. 1002 or a7 A- 0542

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12 U.S.C. § 5003 -compliant substitute copy, and therefore, JumpinJa x has "failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden under [N. J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b)]." Thus, he argues the matter must be remanded to determine whether JumpinJax has its original check or its compliant substitute check th at wa s used to pay the employee who cashed the check twice, causing it to be dishonored. As plaintiff acknowledges, these arguments we re answered in SHS

. However, he insists our previous decision is incorrect and must be reve rsed. In SHS, Triffin moved for reconsideration after the tr ial court held the defendant was not liable because the check was electronically deposited and paid by the defendant's bank before it was presented for paymen t a second time and dishonored. 466 N.J. Super. a t 460. Triffin argued the "previously paid" defense was not available to SHS because the check had not been endorsed when it was first electronically deposited into the codefendant 's account. Ibid. The trial judge relied on N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), which discha rges the drawer's obligation to pay if the check was accepted by a bank. Ibid. We affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was entitled to dismi ssal on its "previously paid" defense, because it had presented the court with pr oof that "clearly demonstrate[d] the check was processed and paid as a result of the electronic deposit." Id. at 470

. In SHS, even though the check offered by the defend ant8 A- 0542

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lacked an endorsement, the judge found that it, alo ng with the defendant's bank statement showing the withdrawal, was adequate evid ential support of the defense. We discern no error in our reasoning in S HS and affirm here for substantially the same reasons. Plaintiff's claim that defendants did not satisfy their ev identiary burden is without merit. Scott signed and presented the check twice for payment, which plaintiff acknowledges is true. JumpinJax is not o bligated to present the original check, nor the substitute check as described under 12 U.S.C. § 5003, as plaintiff argues. The purpose of the Check 21 Act is to "fac ilitate check truncation by authorizing substitute checks[,]" "foster innovatio n in the check collection system without mandating receipt of checks in electro nic form[,]" and "improve the overall efficiency of the Nation's payments sys tem." 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b)(1) to (3). It addresses the negotiation of instrument s within the federal banking system, not the admission of evidence at a state co urt trial. Here, the court found defendants had an immediately apparent an d recognizable defense that extinguished plaintiff's claim to the dishonored check. The court had before it the check written by Jumpin Jax, submitted by plaintiff , and JumpinJax's BOA transaction statement showing the m oney was withdrawn when it was presented the first time. This substan tial and credible evidence9 A- 0542

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supports the trial court's finding JumpinJax and Sm ith "are not the responsible part[ies]." Under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), after the check was initially cashed and paid by BOA, the liability of the drawer, Jumpi nJax, was discharged. The presence of an endorsement on the check as well as the fact it was paid out of JumpinJax's BOA account on December 7, 2020, the da y it was issued, proves Scott presented the check twice, causing it to be d ishonored. Plaintiff's argument that JumpinJax's evidence was insufficient under
N.J.R.E. 1002 is also without merit. N.J.R.E. 1003 permits the admission of duplicates "to the same extent as an original unles s a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity[,] or the circums tances make it unfair to admit the duplicate." The judge did not abuse her discre tion in considering the evidence. Ehrlich v. Sorokin, 451 N.J. Super. 119, 128 (App. Div. 2017). The substantial credible evidence before the court supports the trial judge's decision to dismiss plaintiff's claims agai nst JumpinJax and Smith. Plaintiff received default judgment against Scott f or the value of the check plus costs. Plaintiff is not without an avenue to recov er on the dishonored check he purchased. Plaintiff's remaining arguments are without suffici ent merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E).10 A- 0542

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Affirmed.