United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1900

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:14-cv-00248, Judge Claire R. Kelly.

______________________ 

Decided: July 6, 2016

______________________ 

JOHN MICHAEL PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

RUSSELL ANDREW SEMMEL. 

STEPHEN CARL TOSINI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, PATRICIA M.

MCCARTHY. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, CLEVENGER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
2 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal concerns certain entries of merchandise 

imported by Appellant Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. 

(“Hutchison”) and subsequent actions taken on those 

entries by the United States Department of Commerce 

(“Commerce”) and the United States Department of 

Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection 

(“Customs”). The United States Court of International 

Trade (“CIT”) dismissed Hutchison’s Complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, holding that because 

Hutchison could have pursued a remedy under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a) (2012), it could not invoke jurisdiction pursuant 

to § 1581(i)(4). See Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. 

United States, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2015). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2007, Hutchison imported wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic of China (“China”). The 

merchandise was exported by Orient International Holding Shanghai Foreign Trade Co., Ltd. (“Orient International”).

Commerce subsequently conducted an administrative 

review of an antidumping duty order on wooden bedroom 

furniture from China that examined Orient International’s exports.1 In the review’s final results, Commerce 

 

1 “Commerce imposes duties on imported merchandise that is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United 

States at less than fair value . . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v. 

United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Sales at 

less than fair value are those sales for which the normal 

value (the price a producer charges in its home market) 

exceeds the export price (the price of the product in the 

United States) or constructed export price.” Id. (internal 
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

assigned an antidumping duty margin of 216.01% to 

Orient International’s exports. Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 

41,374, 41,380 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 17, 2009) (“Final 

Results”).

Orient International initiated an action in the CIT 

challenging various aspects of the Final Results. The CIT 

enjoined Commerce from instructing Customs to liquidate 

the subject entries2 and directed “that the entries subject 

to this injunction shall be liquidated in accordance with 

the final court decision in this action, including all appeals, as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e).” J.A. 19.

On February 5, 2013, the CIT sustained Commerce’s 

remand redetermination pertaining to the Final Results, 

including its selection of a new rate of 83.55%. Lifestyle 

Enter., Inc. v. United States, 896 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1299 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2013). Orient International did not ap-

 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “At the conclusion 

of a[n] . . . antidumping duty investigation, assuming the 

requisite findings are made [by Commerce and the United 

States International Trade Commission], Commerce may 

issue orders imposing duties on imports of goods covered 

by the investigation.” Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 

755 F.3d 912, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Upon request, Commerce may conduct an administrative review of an antidumping duty order to determine the dumping margin for 

entries of subject merchandise made during a twelve 

month period. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2012).

2 At the conclusion of an administrative review, 

Commerce issues instructions to Customs that reflect the 

amount of dumping duties to be assessed when Customs 

liquidates the subject entries. 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(6)

(2015); see also 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (“Liquidation means the 

final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries 

for consumption or drawback entries.”).
4 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

peal the CIT’s decision. On June 13, 2013, the CIT ordered that “all entries exported by [Orient International]

. . . be liquidated without delay in accordance with this 

[c]ourt’s February 5, 2013 [F]inal [J]udgment.” J.A. 1045. 

Commerce then issued instructions to Customs to liquidate Orient International’s exports of subject merchandise 

at Commerce’s redetermined rate of 83.55%. J.A. 39. In 

September 2013, Customs liquidated the entries at this 

rate.

Hutchison then filed a protest with Customs pursuant 

to 19 U.S.C. § 1514,3 J.A. 1027, asserting that its entries 

were outside the scope of the antidumping duty order, 

J.A. 1030. Customs denied the protest. J.A. 1027.

In October 2014, Hutchison sought review of the liquidation of its entries before the CIT, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4). J.A. 1002. Specifically, 

Count I of Hutchison’s Complaint asserted that the subject entries should not have been liquidated at the rate 

provided in Commerce’s instructions (i.e., 83.55%), but 

rather should have been deemed liquidated at the rate at 

which they entered (i.e., 7.24%) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(d). J.A. 1004, 1014–15. Section 1504(d) provides 

that “[w]hen a suspension required by statute or court 

order is removed, [Customs] shall liquidate the entry . . . 

within [six] months after receiving notice of the removal 

from [Commerce], other agency, or a court with jurisdiction over the entry,” and that if the entry is not liquidated within six months, the entry “shall be treated as 

having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted by the importer of record” 

 

3 A party may protest “any clerical error, mistake of 

fact, or other inadvertence . . . adverse to the importer[] in 

any entry, liquidation, or reliquidation” made by Customs 

in certain decisions. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (listing protestable decisions).
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

at the time of entry (“deemed liquidation”). 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(d). Hutchison included no other count in its Complaint. 

In its Prayer for Relief, however, Hutchison argued 

that Commerce’s liquidation instructions were arbitrary 

and capricious because they misidentified “the date on 

which suspension of liquidation was lifted.” J.A. 1015. 

Commerce’s instructions provided that notice of removal 

of the suspension occurred on June 13, 2013, the date that 

the CIT amended the injunction governing Orient International’s exports. J.A. 37–38. Hutchison claimed that 

the suspension of the liquidation under the CIT’s injunction expired when the CIT entered Final Judgment on 

February 5, 2013. J.A. 1013. Accordingly, Hutchison 

sought a declaratory judgment that its entries were 

deemed liquidated by operation of law in August 2013, 

approximately six months after the CIT’s February 5, 

2013 Final Judgment. J.A. 1002, 1015–16 (referencing 19 

U.S.C. § 1504(d)).

The CIT dismissed Hutchison’s Complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. The CIT found that the “true 

nature of [Hutchison’s] claim involves a protestable 

[Customs] decision regarding liquidation and/or deemed 

liquidation.” Hutchison, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1378. The CIT 

held that “a decision by [Customs] as to liquidation is a 

protestable decision,” which Hutchison could have appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) if its protest was 

denied, “regardless of whether the [February 5, 2013 

Final Judgment] constituted a final court decision or 

whether [that Final Judgment] constituted notice to 

[Customs] starting the six month period in § 1504(d).” Id. 

Because Hutchison could have protested any allegedly 

erroneous liquidation and appealed any denial of such a 

protest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), the CIT applied 

the “well-settled [rule] that a party may not invoke jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1581(i) when jurisdiction 

under another subsection of § 1581 . . . could have been 
6 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

available.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Accordingly, the CIT found jurisdiction lacking. 

Id. at 1381.

Hutchison appeals the CIT’s dismissal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review the CIT’s “decision to grant the Government’s motion to dismiss [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction] de novo as a question of law.” Juice Farms, Inc. v. 

United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “[T]he 

party invoking [the CIT’s] jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing it.” Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 

472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, we “must 

accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and must 

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant.” 

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1281, 

1284 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

II. The CIT Properly Held that it Lacked Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Over Hutchison’s Complaint

Chapter 95 of Title 28 of the United States Code contains Congress’s jurisdictional grant to the CIT. The first 

section, § 1581, is titled “Civil actions against the United 

States and agencies and officers thereof” and consists of 

subsections (a) through (j). 28 U.S.C. § 1581. “Each 

[§] 1581 subsection delineates particular laws over which 

the [CIT] may assert jurisdiction.” Nat’l Corn Growers 

Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The 

sole issue in this appeal is whether the CIT correctly 

applied its own jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1581. 

The CIT held that Hutchison could have sought judicial review pursuant to § 1581(a) and therefore could not 

invoke the CIT’s jurisdiction under § 1581(i)(4). 
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 7

Hutchison, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1379. Section 1581(a) provides the CIT with “exclusive jurisdiction [over] any civil 

action commenced to contest the denial of a protest” by 

Customs. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Protestable decisions 

include “the liquidation . . . of an entry . . . pursuant to . . . 

[19 U.S.C. § 1504].” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5). Section 

1581(i) provides the CIT with residual jurisdiction over 

civil actions that arise from import transactions. See 

Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign–Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 

1581, 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In particular, subsection (i) 

provides the CIT with

exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or 

its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for– 

(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;

(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the 

importation of merchandise for reasons other 

than the raising of revenue;

(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise 

for reasons other than the protection of the 

public health or safety; or

(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs 

(1)–(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)–

(h) of this section.

28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). “[T]o prevent circumvention of the 

administrative processes crafted by Congress [in other 

subsections of § 1581],” we have held that “jurisdiction 

under subsection 1581(i) may not be invoked if jurisdiction under another subsection of section 1581 is or could 

have been available, unless the other subsection is shown 

to be manifestly inadequate.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
8 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

United States, 544 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

We look to the “true nature of the action” in determining whether the CIT properly found jurisdiction lacking. 

Id. at 1293 (citation omitted). The true nature of a particular action will depend upon the attendant facts asserted in the pleadings. See Norsk, 472 F.3d at 1355; 

Williams v. Sec’y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557–58 (Fed. Cir.

1986) (explaining that “the substance of the pleadings 

define a suit”). Determining the true nature of an action 

under § 1581 requires us to discern the particular agency 

action that is the source of the alleged harm so that we 

may identify which subsection of § 1581 provides the 

appropriate vehicle for judicial review. See Nat’l Corn 

Growers Ass’n, 840 F.2d at 1555.

A. The True Nature of Hutchison’s Complaint Concerns a 

Protestable Customs Decision

Hutchison argues that “[t]he CIT erred in dismissing 

[its claim] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under 28 

U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) because the CIT erred in determining 

the true nature of its action. Hutchison’s Br. 19. 

Hutchison asserts that, in holding that its “sole avenue 

for raising its claim was to protest [Customs]’s allegedly 

untimely liquidation of its entries, and to bring suit under 

[the CIT’s] 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) ‘protest’ jurisdiction,” the 

CIT “overlook[ed] the fact that the decision which 

Hutchison challenges” was made by Commerce as opposed 

to Customs. Id. According to Hutchison, “[a] protest 

against the assessment of antidumping duties [under 28 

U.S.C. § 1581(a)] can only be brought . . . where the error 

results from a decision by [Customs], and not in those 

cases where [Customs] is merely carrying out its ministerial tasks of enforcing and applying Commerce decisions 

and instructions.” Id. (citations omitted). We disagree.

The true nature of Hutchison’s action is a challenge to 

Customs’s September 2013 liquidation of its entries. 
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

What Hutchison ultimately seeks is the liquidation of its 

entries at the rate its merchandise entered (i.e., 7.24%) 

because, according to Hutchison, the entries should have 

been deemed liquidated in August 2013, one month before 

Customs actually liquidated the entries at the 83.55% 

rate provided in Commerce’s instructions. J.A. 1002, 

1014–15. A deemed liquidation is a protestable event that 

falls squarely within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). See 

Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 

1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (An importer challenging liquidation 

can “invoke[] the jurisdiction of the [CIT] under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a) if, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5),” which 

cross-references the deemed liquidation provision of 19 

U.S.C. § 1504, the importer “timely protest[s] the liquidations.”); see also Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 

1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“While we agree that Customs’[s] role in making antidumping decisions, i.e., in 

calculating antidumping duties, is generally ministerial, 

Customs here made a decision regarding liquidation,” 

which may be protested under § 1514(a). (footnote omitted)).

Hutchison’s contention that the true nature of its action focuses on Commerce’s instructions belies the terms 

of its Complaint. Hutchison included only one count in its 

Complaint, and that count speaks only to deemed liquidation, an action committed solely to Customs. 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1500(c)–(d), 1504(d). Had Hutchison intended its 

action to concern Commerce’s liquidation instructions, we 

suspect it would have included an additional count with 

the relevant allegations and legal authority.

Our decision in Fujitsu confirms that the true nature 

of Hutchison’s appeal concerns Customs’s liquidation of 

its entries. In Fujitsu, the appellant argued that “Customs had improperly failed to liquidate the entries within 

six months of having received notice that the injunction 

against liquidation had been removed.” 283 F.3d at 1367 

(emphasis added). The appellant in Fujitsu did not allege 
10 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

a Commerce error. See id. We held that the appellant 

could not invoke the CIT’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(i)(4) because the appellant could have pursued a 

remedy under § 1581(a). See id. at 1376. 

Hutchison’s Complaint attempts to distinguish its appeal from Fujitsu by emphasizing the facts related to 

Commerce’s June 25, 2013 instructions to Customs. J.A. 

1013–15. Indeed, Hutchison attempts to attribute a 

Customs decision (i.e., whether to treat certain entries as 

deemed liquidated) to Commerce. See J.A. 1013–15; see 

also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1500(c)–(d), 1504(d) (providing Customs 

with the authority to deem entries liquidated). Although 

the facts in the instant appeal and Fujitsu are different, 

Hutchison’s recasting of the liquidation of its entries as a 

Commerce error obscures the true nature of its action. 

See Hartford Fire, 544 F.3d at 1293.

Accordingly, we agree with the CIT that Hutchison “is 

challenging a decision by [Customs] as to the appropriate 

time for liquidation,” that this “decision would have been 

protestable under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5),” and any denial 

of the protest would have been reviewable under 28 

U.S.C. § 1581(a).4 Hutchison, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1380.

 

4 Even if we regarded the true nature of 

Hutchison’s appeal to concern Commerce’s liquidation 

instructions, such that the CIT possessed jurisdiction 

under § 1581(i)(4), Hutchison fails to assert a claim for 

which relief could be granted because it has not based its 

claim for relief on a plausible legal theory. See, e.g., Fifth 

Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471–72 

(2014) (explaining that allegations in a complaint must 

rest on a plausible legal theory to survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim). Hutchison argues 

that Customs should have determined the deemed liquidation date by using the CIT’s February 5, 2013 Final 
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 11

B. Hutchison’s Remedy Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) Was 

Not Manifestly Inadequate

“[J]urisdiction under subsection 1581(i) may not be 

invoked if jurisdiction under another subsection of section 

1581 is or could have been available, unless the other 

subsection is shown to be manifestly inadequate.” Hartford Fire, 544 F.3d at 1292 (citation omitted). “To be 

manifestly inadequate, the protest must be an exercise in 

futility”—i.e., “incapable of producing any result.” Id. at 

1294 (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation 

omitted). Although Hutchison alleges it “mistakenly 

filed” a protest that Customs denied, Hutchison’s Br. 21 

n.9, it nonetheless contends that any challenge to Customs’s liquidation of its entries would have been “manifestly [inadequate because its claim] could not have been 

raised by protest and [therefore] by an action brought 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a),” id. at 21 (footnote omitted). 

Specifically, Hutchison asserts that “a protest cannot be 

filed with [Customs] to challenge a decision by another 

federal agency, [such as Commerce,] in circumstances 

 

Judgment as the starting point. Hutchison’s Br. 30. 

However, that argument ignores Fujitsu, which held that 

a final judgment does not take effect immediately, but 

only after the time for further appeal expires, or the 

mandate in any appeal therefrom issues and the time to 

file a petition for certiorari expires. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 283 

F.3d at 1379. Thus, because the relief sought in 

Hutchison’s Complaint rests on a faulty legal premise, its 

Complaint fails to state a claim for relief that the CIT 

could grant. To the extent Hutchison asks us to reconsider Fujitsu, see Hutchison’s Br. 31, we may not, see Deckers 

Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(explaining that only the en banc court or the Supreme 

Court has the authority to overrule prior precedential 

panel decisions).
12 HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES

where [Customs’s] role in relation to that decision is 

ministerial.” Id. 

We have held that an importer “seeking to use [a 

deemed liquidation] claim as a sword in a refund action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)” may not invoke jurisdiction

under § 1581(i)(4) if the importer “could have timely 

protested Customs’[s] purported liquidations under 19 

U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5).” Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1375–76 (emphasis added). Indeed, when Customs makes a decision 

to liquidate, that decision is “[m]ore than passive or 

ministerial” and “constitute[s] a ‘decision’ within the 

context of section 1514(a).” Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1324. The 

record demonstrates that Hutchison not only could have 

filed a protest, but that it in fact did so after Customs 

liquidated its entries. J.A. 1027. Hutchison’s incorrect 

“belief that it had no remedy under subsection 1581(a) 

[does] not make that remedy inadequate,” and in any 

event is belied by the actions Hutchison took prior to 

filing suit. Hartford Fire, 544 F.3d at 1294. 

A party filing a protest is required to “set forth distinctly and specifically . . . the nature of each objection 

and the reasons therefor.” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1)(C). In 

its protest, Hutchison asserted that its entries were 

outside the scope of the antidumping duty order.5 J.A. 

1030. It did not allege that the entries were or should 

have been deemed liquidated pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1504(d), as it does in its Complaint. While Hutchison 

could have raised its deemed liquidation argument at any 

time before Customs denied its protest, see 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1514(c)(1), its failure to do so means the CIT was unable 

 

5 In this respect, Hutchison’s protest sought relief 

from the wrong Federal agency. Commerce, not Customs, 

determines whether a particular product falls within the 

scope of an antidumping duty order. See 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(a).
HUTCHISON QUALITY FURNITURE, INC. v. UNITED STATES 13

to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to § 1581(a). See Fujitsu, 

283 F.3d at 1371–73 (holding that the CIT may not invoke 

§ 1581(a) jurisdiction over new grounds for relief that a 

party does not raise in its protest to Customs). With that 

avenue closed, Hutchison likely regarded § 1581(i)(4) as 

its only option for judicial review. However, a party’s 

failure to timely raise an argument to Customs in a

protest does not change the fact that jurisdiction under 

section 1581(a) could have been available if the argument 

had been timely raised. See id. at 1376; Juice Farms, 68 

F.3d at 1346. Therefore, the CIT properly dismissed the 

case for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Hutchison’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the 

decision of the United States Court of International Trade 

is

AFFIRMED