[Cite as State v. Edmonds, 2018-Ohio-2832.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 17-CA-53 

 : 

BRANDON G. EDMONDS : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 16 CR 00095 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 16, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

WILLIAM C. HAYES PETER GALYARDT 

LICKING COUNTY PROSECUTOR ASST. STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 

 250 East Broad St., Suite 1400 

PAULA M. SAWYERS Columbus, OH 43215 

20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor 

Newark, OH 43055 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 2 

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Brandon G. Edmonds appeals his conviction and 

sentence on June 19, 2017 by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} On February 12, 2016, Defendant-Appellant Brandon G. Edmonds and codefendants went to the home of H.O. located in Newark, Ohio. Edmonds knocked on the 

door and when H.O. opened the door, Edmonds and the co-defendants rushed in. 

Edmonds brandished a gun at H.O. and other occupants of the house in an effort to steal 

drugs or money. A struggle ensued between H.O. and Edmonds, during which Edmonds 

fired his gun numerous times. H.O. was shot in the knee, causing serious physical harm. 

Edmonds and the co-defendants fled the home. 

{¶3} A warrant was issued for Edmonds’s arrest on February 16, 2016. He was 

arrested on March 11, 2016. 

{¶4} On March 24, 2016, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted Edmonds on 

the following offenses: 

Count 1: Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first-degree in violation of R.C. 

2911.11(A)(1) and/or (2)(B); 

Count 2: Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first-degree in violation of 

R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and/or (3)(C); 

Count 3: Felonious Assault, a felony of the second-degree in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and/or (2)(D)(1)(a); 

Count 4: Having Weapons While Under Disability, a felony of the thirddegree in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3)(B); and 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 3 

Firearm Specifications as to Counts 1, 2, and 3, in violation of R.C. 

2941.145(A). 

{¶5} Edmonds entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. Prior to trial, Edmonds 

waived his right to a jury trial on Count 4 and elected to have that count tried to the court. 

The matter proceeded to trial on June 12 through June 15, 2017. 

{¶6} During the trial, Detective Art Minton with the Newark Police Department 

testified. On direct examination, Det. Minton testified to the following: 

Q. * * * At some point in time did you read or did you advise Mr. Edmonds 

of his Miranda? 

A. We did. 

Q. Did you ask him questions after that? 

A. I did. 

Q. And what – what questions did you remember asking him? 

A. Well the first thing I remember asking him was something to the effect of 

do – do you remember the incident on Dickerson Street involving Cole, 

James, and Marcus? 

Q. And what was his response? 

A. And his response was, “Pretty much.” And then he added, “But I don’t 

know or I don’t remember a James.” 

Q. Okay. Did he say anything else about the case? 

A. Well, he – he kept – he was trying to interview me really to find out what 

– what I knew or what I had been told. And I wouldn’t give him any of that 

information other than what the charges were against him were on the 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 4 

warrant. And then he at some point asked us what kind of deal he would 

get if he talked about that and he asked us at some point about a lawyer 

and if he’s --- 

MS. MENASHE: Objection, Your Honor. 

(T. 705-706). 

{¶7} Counsel for Edmonds objected to Det. Minton’s testimony on the basis of a 

Doyle violation and requested a mistrial. (T. 706). The trial court excused the jury and the 

parties argued their positions. Counsel argued the State improperly elicited testimony that 

Edmonds invoked his right to counsel in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 

S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). (T. 708-709). Counsel argued: 

So the clear implication of this is he asked for a lawyer and noth – and then 

he asked for – and I think where we were headed was, what Mr. Edmonds 

really said on the tape was if – if I get a lawyer can I come back and talk to 

you then. And obviously there’s no evidence that he came back and talked 

to them then, so it’s because the lawyer – in fact Detective Minton actually 

says to him, well they’re not going to let you talk during – during the 

interview. * * * but clearly the – the inference to the jury now is that’s it, he 

asked for a lawyer, they stop because he invoked his right to counsel * * *. 

(T. 711-712). 

{¶8} The State responded: 

Your Honor, the statement would not be sufficient for a suppression motion. 

The statement was, “If I got a lawyer, could I come back and talk to you 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 5 

then?” The response was, “Your lawyer is not going to want you to talk to 

us. * * * It was not a clear invocation of the right to counsel. 

(T. 712). 

{¶9} The trial court inquired: 

Yeah, but – but what’s any of that – okay, even if it’s not a clear invocation 

of his right to counsel, what’s the probative value of anything he says up 

until that point? I don’t * * * know what we’re even talking about that. I don’t 

know why the jury is even hearing about this portion of the interview if he’s 

not going to make some statement eventually that triggers the right to 

counsel. I mean that’s the problem. What – what other purpose did we hear 

that testimony for if it wasn’t the suggestion that he lawyered up? 

(T. 713). The State responded that the testimony was to show that Edmonds wanted to 

know what the co-defendants told Det. Minton. Edmonds wanted to know what they said 

so he knew what to say. (T. 714). The trial court stayed ruling on the oral motion for 

mistrial until he had reviewed Det. Minton’s testimony, heard the recording of Det. 

Minton’s interview of Edmonds, and conducted research on the issue. (T. 715). 

{¶10} After the trial court reviewed the trial materials and heard further arguments 

from the parties, the trial court overruled the motion for mistrial. The judge stated: 

The question is whether there is a Doyle violation. The jury heard Detective 

Minton say that I Mirandized him, he was aware of his rights, we talked, and 

at some point he mentioned something about a lawyer – and I’m 

paraphrasing. That is not a Doyle violation, in my view. It’s improper, it’s 

prejudicial. I will – I will sustain the objection and issue a instruction if the 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 6 

Defense wants one. * * * Doyle has to do with confronting a Defendant while 

he’s testifying with the fact that he remained silent after being advised of his 

Miranda warnings. He didn’t remain silent here but that – that’s really beside 

the point. The jury’s only heard that he’s asked about a lawyer; that’s all 

they heard. 

(T. 729-730). 

{¶11} Edmonds was ultimately convicted on all counts. The trial court sentenced 

Edmonds to an aggregate sentence of eleven years. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶12} Edmonds raises one Assignment of Error: 

{¶13} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED DUE 

PROCESS WHEN IT DENIED BRANDON EDMONDS’S MISTRIAL REQUEST. FIFTH, 

SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; 

ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION. TR. 705-706, 711, 713, 719-

720, 726, 729-730.” 

ANALYSIS 

{¶14} In his sole Assignment of Error, Edmonds argues the trial court erred by 

denying his motion for a mistrial after Det. Minton testified in the State’s case-in-chief that 

Edmonds asked about a lawyer. We disagree. 

{¶15} “Mistrials need to be declared only when the ends of justice so require and 

a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1 

(1991). The standard of review for evaluating a trial court's decision to grant or deny 

a mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 7 

(1984). In reviewing a claim that a mistrial should have been granted, the Ohio Supreme 

Court has noted “[t]his court has instead adopted an approach which grants great 

deference to the trial court's discretion in this area, in recognition of the fact that the trial 

judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his courtroom warrants 

the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Shaffer, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2003-CA-0108, 2004-

Ohio-3717, ¶ 18 quoting [State v.] Widner [(1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 429 N.E.2d 

1065]. See, also, Wade v. Hunter (1949), 336 U.S. 684, 687, 69 S.Ct. 834, 836, 93 L.Ed. 

974. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment. It implies 

that the trial court ruled arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶16} The right to remain silent is conferred by the United States and the Ohio 

Constitutions. The privilege against self-incrimination “is fulfilled only when the person is 

guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 

exercise of his own will.’ ” State v. Graber, 95 N.E.3d 631, 641 (5th Dist.2003) quoting 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, quoting Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 

U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. The United States Supreme Court in Miranda 

v. Arizona, supra detailed the well-known procedural safeguards, including the right to an 

attorney, to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. “A suspect’s right to an 

attorney during questioning * * * is derivative of his right to remain silent.” State v. Leach, 

102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2D 335, ¶ 13 quoting Wainwright v. 

Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 298-299, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., 

concurring). In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), 

the United States Supreme Court held that use of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 8 

silence for impeachment purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 16. 

In Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 298-299, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 

(1986), the United States Supreme Court held the use of a defendant’s post-arrest, postMiranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt violated due process. The State may not 

use a defendant’s silence to lead the jury to the conclusion that innocent people speak to 

the police to clear up misunderstandings, while guilty people consult with their attorneys. 

State v. Abraham, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26258, 2012-Ohio-4248, ¶ 42 citing State v. 

Leach at ¶ 32. 

{¶17} Det. Minton testified that after Edmonds was advised of his Miranda rights, 

Edmonds answered some of his questions. The State asked Det. Minton if Edmonds said 

anything about the case. The detective responded that he felt Edmonds was trying to 

interview him to see what he knew or had been told by the co-defendants. He next stated 

that Edmonds asked about a lawyer. The trial court ruled there was no Doyle violation 

when Det. Minton testified Edmonds asked about a lawyer during post-arrest, postMiranda questioning. 

{¶18} In State v. Abraham, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26258, 2012-Ohio-4248, the 

Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed a decision to find no Doyle violation in a scenario 

where a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was referred to in the State’s casein-chief. The detective in Abraham testified that during questioning, the defendant stated 

he did not know if he needed to talk to an attorney or he may want to talk to an attorney. 

Id. at ¶ 43. The State stopped the line of questioning and no more references were made 

regarding the defendant’s attorney. 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 9 

{¶19} The Ninth District found no Doyle violation as to the detective’s reference to 

the defendant’s question about an attorney. The court differentiated its case from State 

v. Leach, supra, wherein the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a Doyle violation 

occurred when the State remarked on the defendant’s silence during opening statement, 

repeatedly asked about his silence during direct examination, and introduced the Miranda

rights form he later signed into evidence. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court was asked to 

decide whether a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive 

evidence of guilt in the State’s case-in-chief and whether a defendant’s post-arrest, postMiranda assertion of his right to counsel may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in 

the State’s case-in-chief. Id. at ¶ 1. The Court held the State violated the defendant’s 

privilege against self-incrimination both pre-arrest, pre-Miranda and post-arrest, postMiranda by using it against him during the trial, subverting the policies behind the Fifth 

Amendment. Id. 

{¶20} The Ninth District found the testimony in Abraham to be distinct from Leach

because the State in Abraham never affirmatively sought to use the defendant’s silence 

as evidence. Abraham at ¶ 45. The detective’s reference was “brief and isolated,” the 

reference was vague, and there was no evidence the State sought to elicit the response 

the detective gave. Id. citing State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 

162. 

{¶21} In this case, we find that while the defendant’s silence in Abraham was prearrest and pre-Miranda, the facts are similar to the present case where the issue was 

raised post-arrest and post-Miranda. First, there is no evidence in this case that the State 

sought to elicit the detective’s response. The State asked the detective, “Did he say 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 10 

anything else about the case?” The detective responded to the question explaining he felt 

Edmonds wanted to know what the detective knew about the case and at the end of his 

explanation, he stated Edmonds asked about a lawyer. The statement was vague in that 

the detective stated Edmonds asked “about a lawyer,” not “for a lawyer” or “for his lawyer.” 

In Leach, the defendant stated “he wished to consult an attorney.” Leach, supra at ¶ 16. 

Second, Det. Minton’s statement was brief and isolated. There was no further reference 

during the State’s case-in-chief about Edmonds’s attorney. 

{¶22} Third, there is no evidence the State affirmatively sought to use Edmonds’s 

question about a lawyer as substantive evidence of Edmonds’s guilt; nor did the State 

use the evidence for impeachment purposes. The Ninth District stated, “[t]he thrust of 

Leach and its progeny is that the State may not use a defendant’s unwillingness to talk to 

the police to infer his guilt.” Abraham at ¶ 45 citing Powell, supra at ¶ 155-156. Det. 

Minton’s testimony does not show Edmonds invoked his right to remain silent or was 

unwilling to talk to the police. Det. Minton made no comment on Edmonds’s silence. 

{¶23} In this case, we find no abuse of discretion when the trial court did not find 

the State elicited a Doyle violation necessitating a mistrial. A mistrial is required when the 

ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible. Det. Minton’s reference to 

Edmonds’s question about an attorney did not rise to that level. 

{¶24} Edmonds’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled. 

 
Licking County, Case No. 17-CA-53 11 

CONCLUSION 

{¶25} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Delaney, J., 

Gwin, P.J. and 

E. Wise, J., concur.