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USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF AND 

DEA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 4, 2017 

Serial No. 115–21 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Jason Chaffetz, Utah, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matthew Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

John Sarbanes, Maryland 

JONATHAN SKLADANY, Majority Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, Senior Counsel 

CORDELL HULL, Senior Counsel 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 4, 2017 ................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. Robert Patterson, Acting Principal Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15 

Mr. Ronald B. Turk, Associate Deputy Director and Chief Operating Officer, 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tabacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 19 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 


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USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF 

AND DEA 

Tuesday, April 4, 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Issa, Jordan, Amash, Gosar, 

DesJarlais, Meadows, DeSantis, Ross, Walker, Blum, Hice, Russell, 

Hurd, Palmer, Comer, Mitchell, Cummings, Maloney, Clay, Lynch, 

Connolly, Kelly, Lawrence, Watson Coleman, Plaskett, Demings, 

Krishnamoorthi, Raskin, Welch, DeSaulnier, and Sarbanes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

We have an important hearing today, and we’re here today to 

talk about the use of confidential informants in Federal law enforcement investigations. We love and appreciate the men and 

women who literally—I mean literally—put their lives on the line 

to support and defend this country. They do a very difficult job. 

And one of the tools that we authorize and appropriate money for 

is the ability to engage with confidential informants, but they still 

need oversight of these confidential informants. Just because they 

are trying to keep it quiet and trying to do some difficult work 

doesn’t mean it goes above and beyond oversight. 

We have with us today the Department of Justice inspector general. The IG’s Office recently examined the use of confidential informants at the Drug Enforcement—at DEA, at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Representatives from both 

of those agencies are here with us today. 

Together, the DEA and ATF have more than 6,000 active informants at any given time. Over a 5-year period, the DEA and the ATF 

spent roughly $260 million engaging with informants, again, over 

a 5-year period. 

Whether they are paid or unpaid, informants are obviously very 

valuable tools to investigations. Both the DEA and the ATF told 

the IG they could not accomplish their mission without these informants. The information they provide may help keep us safe, and 

often, they have access to the information because of their own past 

involvement in the illegal activity. 


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Yet there’s an inherent risk in signing up criminals to help bring 

down other criminals. Keeping those risks in check requires significant oversight. Again, that’s what the committee is about. It is part 

of the duty—the role and duty of the United States Congress. We 

authorized it. We appropriated it. We allowed them to engage in 

it, but we also have to have some oversight. 

And there have been some ups—well, you could call them mistakes, but there have been some significant problems. 

In 2012, for instance, the ATF had an informant—an ATF informant, I should say, sexually abused a woman in a Seattle hotel 

in a room paid for by the ATF. This violent felon had already been 

in jail in 43 States. It’s pretty hard to accomplish, but this person 

had already been in jail in 43 States, and the ATF signed him up 

as an informant. Then we have this incident in the Seattle hotel. 

Six weeks ago, a court released the testimony of one confidential 

informant in Atlanta who received $212,000 from the DEA from 

2011 to 2013. She testified she wasn’t sure why she was paid. That 

was her testimony. She also testified to a sexual relationship with 

the DEA group supervisor, who allegedly convinced the subordinates to falsify reports to justify the payments. That case is currently under review by the inspector general. 

Many could look to the ATF’s deadly Phoenix field division case, 

including Operation Fast and Furious highlighted—as this highlighted a number of different problems involving confidential informants. ATF signed one Federal firearms licensee—we refer to 

that as an FFL—to act as a confidential informant and treated another one as such an informant without signing them up. In its 

wake, the ATF revised its policies regarding the use of informants, 

but the attention to Fast and Furious, Operation Fast and Furious, 

also highlighted problems with other agencies’ use of informants, 

including failing to share information about them with other agencies. Since then, most Justice Department components have followed suit to revise their policies. 

Inspector General Horowitz is in a good position to fill us in on 

the lesson he’s observed in this process. The DEA is the most recent component to update its policies, completing it in July of 2016. 

We expect to receive the new policy today. Yet even the policies are 

irrelevant if they aren’t followed. Effective informant use requires 

rigorous supervision. That includes oversight of the agents handling the informants on the front line. It also includes robust accountability for special agents who commit misconduct in this area. 

The committee, obviously, supports law enforcement and is committed to the rigorous oversight of that law enforcement, and I 

think we are all stronger and better for that. 

Again, people on the front line are in a difficult situation. We understand that and respect that, but we also have a duty and responsibility to make sure that literally the hundreds and millions 

of dollars that are spent over the course of years are also dealt 

with properly. And that’s why we’re having this hearing. 

So now let’s recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings of 

Maryland. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for calling 

this hearing. And I’d like to yield my time to Congressman Lynch, 


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the ranking member of our National Security Subcommittee. And 

he has been a true leader on this issue. 

Congressman Lynch has consistently done everything in his 

power to make sure that law enforcement is fair but, at the same 

time, that we—that they are most effective and efficient in what 

they do. And so I’m proud to join him on a bill he’s worked on over 

the years requiring agencies to report key information on their use 

of confidential informants to Congress. 

I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. LYNCH. First of all, I’d like to thank the gentleman for yielding, and thank you for his kind words and his support of this legislation. 

I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member. This is 

another issue that has been bipartisan in terms of trying to require 

accountability from our government agencies. 

We’ve been working on trying to reduce the amount of waste, 

fraud, and abuse in the use of confidential informants by our Federal law enforcement agencies for some time now. I’d also like to 

thank today’s witnesses for helping this committee with its work. 

The use of confidential informants is an essential investigatory 

tool that oftentimes provides law enforcement with valuable and 

otherwise unattainable criminal intelligence. However—and it’s a 

big however—the critical law enforcement mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the ATF and other Federal agencies 

are severely impaired in the absence of meaningful oversight over 

their confidential informant programs. 

In September of 2016, Inspector General Horowitz from the Department of Justice released an audit report on the informant program administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration, also 

known as the DEA. That report is stunning in its clarity. 

According to the report—now, get this—the DEA operated an estimated 18,000 active informants between 2010 and 2015 while 

over 9,500 of those individuals received approximately $237 million 

in payments in exchange for information, and the DEA could not 

properly track their activities or fully document their payments. 

The Inspector General’s Office also found that the DEA relies heavily on independent tipsters, known as, quote, ‘‘limited-use informants,’’ who receive little to no agency supervision and whose reliability is highly questionable, as pointed out in the examples that 

the chairman brought forward in his opening statement. These limited-use informants remain some of the DEA’s highest paid sources. 

Similarly, the New York Times recently reported that Federal 

agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, or the ATF, directed their informants to engage in sham 

transactions with a collective of tobacco farmers as, quote, ‘‘an offthe-books way to finance undercover investigations and pay informants without the usual cumbersome paperwork and close oversight,’’ close quote. 

In his ongoing review of these income-generating undercover operations, also known as churning—I could think of some worse 

words than ‘‘churning’’—the inspector general also found a serious 

lack of oversight by ATF, including one instance in which a confidential informant was permitted to keep more than $4.9 million 


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out of a $5.2 million gross profit generated from tobacco sales without even submitting adequate expense reports. That’s quite a deal. 

This past month, Inspector General Horowitz released a followup 

audit report detailing how the ATF maintained its informant 

records in hard-copy files in an antiquated automated filing system 

that prevented the agency from tracking and reporting even the 

most basic information relating to a program that included an estimated 1,855 active informants and an annual expenditure of $4.3 

million. Oversight is also lacking at the DEA when it comes to 

properly vetting informants, as the chairman pointed out, with one 

individual arrested in 43 States. I mean, you know, good luck to 

him on the remaining seven States. But if a guy has been arrested 

in 43 States, he should not be eligible as a confidential informant, 

especially one highly paid. Zero credibility. That’s disgraceful. 

In order to implement additional oversight into the selection and 

use of confidential informants by the DEA, the ATF, and other Federal law enforcement agencies, I’ve introduced H.R. 1857, the Confidential Informant Accountability Act of 2017. And I want to 

thank Ranking Member Cummings. As an original cosponsor, he’s 

been a tremendous partner on this issue. This legislation would require Federal law enforcement agencies to fully report to Congress 

on their payments to confidential informants as well as the 

amounts they have received through their work or cooperation with 

informants. The bill would also require law enforcement agencies 

to report—just report—all serious crimes committed by their confidential informants, including an accounting of the total number 

of each type and category of crime, an attestation of whether the 

crime was authorized or unauthorized, and a listing of the State in 

which each crime took place. And in the interest of safeguarding 

the integrity of the ongoing criminal investigation, the bill would 

prohibit the reporting of informant names, control numbers, or 

other personal identification that could reveal informant identities. 

This legislation has received the endorsement of the Project on 

Government Oversight, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of 

the aisle to join me in this effort. I’d also like to recognize Professor 

Alexandra Natapoff of Loyola Law School for her contributions to 

the legislation and to her continuing work in the area of confidential informant oversight. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back to the ranking member the balance of my time. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We’ll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member 

who wishes to submit a written statement. 

We’ll now recognize our panel of witnesses. We are please, once 

again, to have the Honorable Michael Horowitz, inspector general 

for the United States Department of Justice. He’s testified before 

our panel, our committee, several times. We appreciate the good 

work from him and his—all the people that work for him there at 

the Inspector General’s Office. 

We also have Mr. Robert Patterson, the Acting Principal Deputy 

Administrator for the Drug Enforcement Administration. 


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We also have Mr. Ronald Turk, Associate Deputy Director and 

Chief Operating Officer of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 

We welcome you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before 

they testify. So if you’ll please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear and affirm the testimony you are about 

to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth? 

Thank you. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in 

the affirmative. 

All of you have testified, I believe, before. And in order to allow 

time for discussion, we would appreciate it if you’d limit your oral 

testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement and any extraneous materials will be made part of the record. 

Mr. Horowitz, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cummings, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me 

to testify today. Confidential informants are an important part of 

the Department’s law enforcement operations. But as Department 

officials have acknowledged, there are substantial risks with using 

them. 

As a result, the Department has developed the Attorney General’s Guidelines on the Use of Informants. And law enforcement 

components should have in place rigorous oversight for their informant programs, including strict internal controls, clear policies 

and procedures, a tentative—a tentative program management at 

both headquarters and in the field, and substantial training. 

Over the past 2 years, my office has issued reports on ATF’s and 

DEA’s oversight of its confidential informant programs. ATF managed over 1,800 active informants as of January 2016, spending approximately $4.3 million annually on its program, while DEA managed about 18,000 informants during a recent 5-year period and 

paid about 9,000 of them approximately $237 million. 

Our audit last month of ATF’s confidential informant program 

found that it required significant improvement, especially its management of relevant confidential informant information, tracking of 

payments to confidential informants, and oversight of higher risk 

confidential informants. 

In particular, we found that ATF maintained important information in a compartmentalized way that made it difficult to assess 

whether an informant was providing information that assisted ATF 

investigations and to identify and track total payments made to an 

informant with sufficient accuracy or reliability. 

In addition, we found that ATF’s Confidential Informant Review 

Committee had not always met as scheduled, had not always reviewed and opined on all informant files provided to it for review, 

and may not have appropriately reviewed all long-term confidential 

informants. 


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We provided ATF with five recommendations to address these 

deficiencies. These include implementing a complete and reliable 

recordkeeping system, ensuring that its confidential informant 

committee is reviewing all informants as required by policy, and 

carefully monitoring foreign national CIs and appropriately coordinating with DHS regarding them. ATF agreed with all of the recommendations, and we will monitor ATF’s efforts to implement 

them. 

Our September 2016 audit of DEA’s confidential source program 

found insufficient oversight and controls related to DEA’s establishment, use, and payment of confidential sources, in particular subsources and limited-use and DEA intelligence-related sources. For 

example, we found that DEA files did not document all source activity, impacting DEA’s ability to examine a source’s reliability and 

to determine whether the source provides useful information and 

whether the information DEA agents acted upon resulted in identifying individuals involved in illegal activity or, instead, caused 

DEA to approach innocent civilians. 

And in last month’s addendum to our 2016 report, we described 

our concerns regarding DEA’s establishment, oversight, and substantial payment of confidential sources used for overseas operations and by its Intelligence Division. 

We found that DEA had not fully accounted for the national security, foreign relations, and civil liberties risks associated with 

using and paying these types of sources. 

We made seven recommendations in our September 2016 report 

and several additional recommendations in last month’s addendum 

to help DEA address these deficiencies. These include: developing 

sufficient controls and policies regarding limited-use informants 

and subsources; documenting all interactions with informants; prohibiting the use of unauthorized private correspondence; and improving training and ensuring consistent application of policies 

across DEA. 

DEA agreed with all of our recommendations, and we will continue to evaluate and assess their actions in addressing our recommendations. 

We look forward to our continued work with the Department and 

this committee to ensure that informant programs, which are unquestionably important to law enforcement, are appropriately overseen and managed. 

Thank you, and I’d be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:] 


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Statement of Michael E. Horowitz 

U.S. of Justice 

before the 

"Use of Confidential Informants at ATF DEA'' 

April 4, 2017 
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Justice 

(Department) Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) oversight of the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Confidential Informant Program 

and the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Confidential Source Program. We 

appreciate the Committee's continued interest in the Department's confidential 

informant programs. Confidential informants are an important part of the 

Department's law enforcement operations, with both ATF and DEA relying heavily 

on confidential informants to provide information related to unlawful activity and 

services that further federal criminal investigations. 

Department officials have acknowledged that there are risks involved with 

using informants because these individuals often have criminal backgrounds, and 

they often provide assistance or cooperation in exchange for cash or the prospect 

of a reduced criminal sentence rather than a desire to help law enforcement. The 

appropriate use of informants requires assessing the usefulness and credibility of 

the information and services they provide, and therefore requires significant 

oversight, attentive program management, and thorough guidance. 

To address these risks, the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use 

of Confidential Informants (AG Guidelines) provides Department-wide guidance on 

various confidential informant matters, including determining the suitability of 

individual informants and providing enhanced oversight of high-risk informants. 

Compliance with the AG Guidelines helps ensure consistent and appropriate 

informant management among all Department law enforcement agencies and helps 

to mitigate the risks involved with using confidential informants in federal 

investigations. However, despite this guidance, our 2012 review of ATF's Operation 

Fast and Furious found that, until 2011, ATF had not updated its policies on 

confidential informants to account for the requirements of the AG Guidelines and 

our July 2015 review of DEA's confidential source policies found that they differed 

in several significant respects from the AG Guidelines' requirements. 

In November 2016, I testified before this Committee and described the 

results of our July 2015 and September 2016 audits of DEA's Confidential Source 

Program. Two weeks ago, we released a public summary of a classified addendum 

to our September 2016 report that identifies specific findings related to the use of 

and payments to confidential sources by the DEA's Intelligence and Special 

Operations Divisions. Last week, we issued a report detailing our findings 

regarding ATF's Confidential Informant Program. 

ATF's Management and Oversight of Its Confidential Informant Program 

ATF managed over 1,800 active informants as of January 2016, spending 

approximately $4.3 million annually on its Confidential Informant Program in fiscal 

years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Although ATF's Confidential Informant Program is 

not as large as others in the Department, the overall risks of using informants 

remain the same. Last week's audit found that ATF's oversight of its Confidential 

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Informant Program required significant improvement, especially pertaining to ATF's 

management of relevant confidential informant information, tracking of payments 

to confidential informants, and oversight of higher-risk confidential informants. 

While we determined that ATF's confidential informant policies were 

generally aligned with the AG Guidelines, our audit also determined that ATF has 

not properly implemented practices that accomplish what is written in its policy, 

and ATF's informant policies and procedures did not provide for adequate 

management of the program. The deficiencies I will describe in more detail below 

did not allow for ATF to meet the oversight requirements established in the 

AG Guidelines, and did not allow ATF to employ the level of oversight or 

management that would have most effectively mitigated the risks involved in using 

confidential informants. 

Of particular concern, we found that information critical to the 

management of ATF's Confidential Informant Program was compartmentalized in 

three different locations: (1) the informant file, which is a hard-copy file that 

includes basic background information about the informant and administrative 

documents related to the informant; (2) one or more investigative files, which 

are hard-copy files that include details of the informant's case-related activities, 

as well as documentation of payments provided to the informant; and (3) an 

electronic database that contained only identifying information about every 

informant. Maintaining information in this way made it difficult for us, and could 

make it difficult for ATF officials, to assess whether an informant was providing 

information that assisted ATF investigations, particularly those informants who 

were involved in multiple cases. Further, the automated system that ATF used 

during our audit to manage its informant information was unsophisticated and 

unreliable, and it did not retain historical information. 

Moreover, the compartmentalized nature of ATF's informant information had 

particularly significant effects on ATF's ability to track payments to individual 

informants. The AG Guidelines require that all payments to individual informants be 

accounted for. However, during our audit we found that ATF could not efficiently 

identify and track total payments made to individual informants with sufficient 

accuracy or reliability because doing so required locating and reviewing numerous 

hard-copy documents in multiple, separate files and systems. Recognizing the 

importance of this matter, we alerted ATF management of our concerns in June 2016 

- which was prior to the conclusion of our audit -that ATF's information environment 

did not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that complete and accurate 

information was consistently available, including when such information was required 

to be made available to prosecutors for use during criminal proceedings. In 

response to our concerns, ATF concluded that it also could not completely reconcile 

some confidential informant payment records. Although we did not examine 

whether ATF provided incorrect informant payment information during any criminal 

proceedings, and we are not aware of any such instances, we consider this 

deficiency in ATF's information environment to be a significant concern. 

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We also have concerns with ATF's management and oversight for certain 

categories of higher-risk confidential informants, because we found that ATF did not 

always categorize, track, and review the use of these informants. For one particular 

category of higher-risk informants, foreign nationals, we found that while ATF can 

sponsor foreign national informants for temporary legal status when ATF believes the 

informant will provide valuable information and assistance to its investigation, ATF 

officials did not completely and accurately track information related to these foreign 

national informants. As a result, we were unable to determine the total number of 

ATF-sponsored foreign national informants. The inability to efficiently identify these 

informants is especially problematic because these informants, as with many 

informants, can have criminal histories or may be involved with criminal 

organizations, and therefore the risks associated with these informants remaining in 

the United States without legal authorization are higher than normal. This lack of 

reliable information prohibited ATF headquarters from properly managing the 

informants and from ensuring appropriate coordination with the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

We were similarly unable to obtain from ATF an accurate and complete picture 

of informants who are also Federal Firearms Licensees. While we found that ATF's 

policy provides guidance related to this informant category, we are concerned that 

ATF did not have a reliable method of querying its records to identify informants who 

may be a licensee. In our 2012 report on ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and 

Related Matters, the OIG found that ATF was receiving information and cooperation 

from a licensee regarding firearms sales to individuals who were engaged in firearms 

trafficking and illegal firearms purchases. That report revealed that ATF did not have 

controls in place to ensure that there was no conflict between its use of the 

individual in an investigative manner and its oversight of the same individual as an 

approved license holder. Although ATF officials told us that ATF does not currently 

have any licensees who are also informants, we continue to believe that this 

informant category requires increased oversight and therefore ATF should strengthen 

its recordkeeping in this area. 

In addition, we reviewed ATF's efforts to manage certain categories of 

higher-risk informants that are identified within the AG Guidelines. For example, 

the AG Guidelines require law enforcement agencies to establish a Confidential 

Informant Review Committee comprised of component and Department officials to 

approve the continued use of long-term informants, which is defined as 

six consecutive years as a confidential informant. While ATF policy states that field 

divisions are responsible for determining which, if any, confidential informants have 

been active for six consecutive years and therefore must be submitted to the ATF 

Committee for review, we found that ATF headquarters officials did not have a 

sufficient method to verify that all such informants were submitted for Committee 

review. We could not determine, and ATF could not affirm, if ATF's Committee had 

reviewed all long-term informants, as ATF did not have adequate records about 

these informants and allowed the field divisions to manage long-term informant 

information. We are concerned that this decentralized process did not provide an 

adequate level of assurance that all long-term informants requiring this enhanced 

review were identified. 

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Moreover, the Committee had not always met as scheduled, had not always 

reviewed and opined on all of the informant files provided by ATF for review, and 

had postponed decisions to a later date on numerous occasions. As a result, we 

believe that ATF's review process for these informants had not provided the 

enhanced oversight required by the AG Guidelines. 

We provided ATF with five recommendations to address the deficiencies in its 

informant program and to improve its ability to sufficiently identify, assess, and 

mitigate the risks involved with using informants. In responding to our audit, ATF 

agreed with all of the recommendations and expressed a commitment to implement 

program enhancements. We will monitor ATF's efforts to address our 

recommendations, including its implementation of the new informant database. Our 

report can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: 

https ://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a 1717 .pdf. 

Shortly after our entrance conference in October 2015, ATF informed us that 

it was in discussions to enhance its existing CI database and, in June 2016, ATF 

awarded the contract for its new database. Last fall, after our fieldwork was 

completed, ATF developed its new automated system that it believes will address 

many of the findings in our report. Because ATF has not yet fully implemented the 

system and integrated its use into ATF policy and guidance, we have not audited it. 

Based on a demonstration provided to us, we believe the system is an improvement 

over its unsophisticated legacy system and enhances ATF's information 

environment. However, the system is still in its infancy and several advancements 

are necessary to address the relevant findings in our report. 

DEA's Management and Oversight of Its Confidential Source Program 

In July 2015, the OIG issued a report that determined the DEA's confidential 

source policies were not in full compliance with the AG Guidelines and lacked 

sufficient oversight and consistency with the rules governing other DOJ law 

enforcement components. We made seven recommendations to the DEA, all of 

which are now closed as a result of DEA's issuance of new policies governing its 

Confidential Source Program and DEA's implementation of more comprehensive 

procedures and coordination with the Department. That report can be found on 

the OIG's website at the following link: 

https: 1/oig .justice.gov /reports/20 15/a 1528. pdf. 

In September 2016, we issued our next audit report that found that the DEA's 

management of its Confidential Source Program did not provide sufficient oversight 

and controls related to the DEA's establishment, use, and payment of confidential 

sources, in particular Limited Use and DEA intelligence-related sources. We made 

seven recommendations to help the DEA address deficiencies and improve various 

aspects of its Confidential Source Program. The DEA continues to evaluate and 

assess necessary actions needed to address our recommendations and remedy the 

deficiencies we found during our audit. As such, all of our recommendations remain 

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open. That report can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: 

https: //oig .justice.gov /reports/2016/a 1633.pdf. 

In March 2017, we provided the Department and Congress with a classified 

Addendum to our September 2016 report, and also issued an unclassified public 

summary, that provides additional details about the OIG's findings concerning DEA's 

establishment, use, and payment of confidential sources used in a DEA Intelligence 

Division program and by the DEA Special Operations Division for overseas 

operations. As we discuss in our public summary, we found that the DEA had not 

fully accounted for the national security, foreign relations, and civil liberties risks 

associated with using and paying certain confidential sources. We provided the DEA 

with several recommendations for the improvement of its efforts related to the use 

of these confidential sources. The DEA concurred with all of the recommendations 

and stated that it is taking necessary steps to implement the recommendations, 

which we plan to review and assess through our resolution and follow up process. 

Our unclassified public summary of that Addendum can be found on the OIG's 

website at the following link: httos:/(oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1633a.pdf. 

Informant programs are unquestionably important to law enforcement, but 

they also come with significant risks. My office will continue to be vigilant in helping 

to ensure that they are appropriately overseen within the Department of Justice. 

This concludes my prepared statement, and I will be pleased to answer any questions 

that the Committee may have. 

6 
13 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Patterson, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT PATTERSON 

Mr. PATTERSON. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf 

of the approximately 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration, thank you for the opportunity to be here again today. 

I am pleased to continue the discussion of DEA’s confidential 

source program, the enhancements made to our policies and practices as a result of both the current and past reviews and recommendations by the Office of the Inspector General and the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office. 

As you are already aware, DEA’s mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the world’s most significant drugtrafficking organizations responsible for the production and distribution of illicit drugs. To that end, we will work closely with our 

law enforcement counterparts by following the evidence wherever 

it leads. 

Central to this mission remains a worldwide confidential source 

network which uniquely positions DEA to act quickly, effectively, 

and proactively to reach beyond our borders to identify, investigate, 

indict, and incarcerate those that threaten the safety and interests 

of our country, citizens, both at home and abroad. 

For the past decade, law enforcement has increasingly seen the 

loss of investigative tools, which are critical in solving crimes that 

have already occurred as well as in the prevention of other serious 

criminal acts. As the availability of these tools has diminished, the 

use of confidential sources has only become increasingly more important. 

DEA regularly encounters sources with varying motivations. 

These range from the anonymous tipster looking to make the community safer or the individual who finds himself in a strategic position to help law enforcement all the way to those who cooperate in 

an effort to avoid or reduce the length of their incarceration. 

Sources who have participated in crimes provide tremendous value 

to investigations since they often have direct knowledge and access 

to the criminal targets in the organization. These sources can facilitate the gathering of evidence crucial to a successful prosecution. 

However, no matter the motivation or past history of the person, 

all cooperating sources utilized by law enforcement must have 

proper oversight. 

In establishing and utilizing these sources, we recognize their 

value must be constantly and carefully balanced with the inherent 

risks involved. Accordingly, any CS program must have strong 

foundation of clear policies and procedures. These items help ensure our investigative workforce has the proper guidance to operate 

within established controls and allow agents to assess and mitigate 

potential risks while still advancing their investigations. 

However, providing policies and procedures for our agents defining how they operate cannot and is not the complete extent to 

which we fulfill this responsibility. Management at all levels, both 

in the field and at headquarters, share responsibility for oversight 

through multiple levels of review and approvals, enforcement of 


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policy and procedures, and proper monitoring and auditing of CS 

utilization. 

As we discussed in November, DEA has made and continues to 

make significant improvements in the CS program. As previously 

stated, we have embraced all of OIG and GAO’s recommendations 

for our CS program, to include the most recent OIG report released 

in March of this year, and have actively worked with the appropriate parties to address the identified shortfalls. Some of these efforts go far beyond what is required under the AG guidelines, ranging from policy and procedural modifications to implementation of 

new audit controls. These actions will ensure that, moving forward, 

our continued reviews will be able to identify and correct problems 

before they become systematic. 

Additionally, we have made concerted efforts to inform and consistently message these changes to our workforce so that, in addition to improving agency policy and procedures, there is an increased understanding of the importance of the modifications to our 

program and why these are necessary. 

In conclusion, in addition to working through the recommendations, we continue to seek new ways to improve our CS program. 

The program is essential to our ability to effectively pursue investigations, and we recognize the responsibility entrusted to us to 

manage this with the greatest integrity. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you again on our program and welcome your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Patterson follows:] 


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Department of Justite 

STATEMENT OF 

ROBERT W. PATTERSON 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FOR A HEARING ENTITLED 

"USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF AND DEA" 

PRESENTED 

APRIL 4, 2017 
16 


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Statement of 

Robert W. Patterson 

Principal Deputy Administrator 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Before the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U. S. House of Representatives 

At a Hearing Entitled 

"Use of Confidential Informants at ATF and DEA" 

April4, 2017 

Chairman Chaftetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee: on behalf of the approximately 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), thank you for the opportunity to be here today to update you on DEA ·s 

confidential source program and the enhancements we have made to our policies since our 

November 30,2016 hearing resulting from several reviews and reports by the Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG). 

Our mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the world's most significant 

drug trafficking organizations responsible for the production and distribution of illegal drugs. To 

that end, we work closely with our local, state. federal, and international counterparts by 

following the evidence wherever it leads. 

Central to this mission is a world-wide confidential source (CS) network, one which 

uniquely positions DEA to act quickly, effectively, and proactively to reach beyond our borders 

to identity, investigate, and indict those that threaten the safety and interests of our country's 

citizens at home and abroad. This informant network is vital to our operations. I Iowever, DEA 

recognizes that the nature of using these sources has inherent risk, something that must be 

carefully and regularly balanced against the benefits of utilizing these individuals in furthering 

investigations. Strict oversight and adherence to sound policy and procedures are paramount to 

ensuring both the safety of our employees and the integrity of operations. 

As we discussed during the November hearing, we have updated our CS policy to fully 

comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines. and in some eases even exceed the guidelines. 

The changes to our policy address the recommendations in OIG's July 2015 report, as well as a 

similar report released by Government Accountability Office (GAO) in September 2015. Those 

reports have been fully closed out based on DEA's implementation of all recommendations. 

On September 29. 2016, the OIG issued a second report concerning the DEA's CS 

program, with a classified addendum released on March 22, 2017. This second report contained 

seven recommendations for DEA. primarily regarding increased oversight of the CS program 

from a Headquarters level to balance the Field responsibility, CS payments, and use of"Limitcd 
17 


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Usc'' sources (often relt:rred to as ''tipsters," or sources who make information available 

independently without direction from DEA). DEA agreed with all seven recommendations and 

we have provided OIG our way forward for addressing each of the recommendations. Based on 

these plans and subsequent actions. OIG considers all of the recommendations resolved. Once 

DEA has been able to fully implement actions for the recommendations and provide 

documentation to the effect. OIG may close out the repmi. 

Although DEA 's next response to OIG is not due until May 2017, I would like to take the 

opportunity to update you on several of the improvements we have implemented to address the 

recommendations. 

Regarding increased oversight of the CS program, we have implemented additional 

review and approvals to provide increased oversight for the establishment and use ofCSs. In the 

field. we are in the process of implementing formal policy requiring a second line supervisory (at 

a Senior GS-15 level) review and approval for all CSs. including Limited Use CSs, where 

previously only a first-line (GS-14 level) approval was necessary. Although DEA policy has not 

yet been updated to reflect this requirement, procedurally this change is in place. DEA's IT 

system for tracking CSs must be modified to allow for this second line supervisory requirement 

before we can update the policy to coincide with the change. We are also enhancing staffing in 

the Headquarters CS Unit to provide increased review on submissions from the field to ensure 

complete submissions with all necessary reviews and approvals conducted, and that CSs have 

been properly and consistently classified. 

Further adding to oversight of the program, DEA has implemented increased reviews of 

the CS program by DEA · s Office of Inspections (IN). Increased emphasis is being placed on the 

CS program as part of the yearly Division Inspection Program conducted by each division, the 

on-site division inspections conducted by IN, as well as an annual special review audit of the CS 

program conducted by IN. Through this increased scrutiny. we will identify issues early on, 

correct them. and assess areas that require reinforced guidance, training. or procedural 

modifications. 

The increased oversight over the CS program will also help ensure payments made to 

CSs are appropriate for the quality and amount of assistance being provided to the case. While 

approvals for smaller, more routine payments remain in the field. DEA has revised its procedures 

tor significant payments to CSs through the CS Award Program. The CS Award Program allows 

for higher payments to CSs for information and assistance in the development of an investigation 

and/or for information or assistance leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture. DEA has established 

a Headquarters CS Award Review Board comprised of Senior Executive level Special Agents. 

who will review all CS award submissions and assess the impact of the CS's contribution on the 

investigation. The Board will review each submission and determine the award amounts based 

on the established criteria, comparable cases, and prior awards. Thus, awards should be 

consistent based on similar contributions. 

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In addition to implementing changes to DEA 's CS policy and procedures in the past year, 

DEA has actively messaged the importance ofthesc modifications and compliance with new 

policy and procedures. This has been done at the leadership level to DEA 's executive staff both 

in the field and Headquarters, as well as through training for personnel at the working level. 

Since OIG's issuance of the second report, all CS Coordinators have been trained on the revised 

CS policy. 

Conclusion 

Notwithstanding DEA's own dedicated and committed workforce, our CS program is 

among the most valuable assets our agency has in infiltrating, disrupting. and dismantling violent 

drug trafficking organizations responsible for perpetuating the deadly opioid epidemic and 

violent crime in our neighborhoods, as well as transnational organized crime around the world. 

We recognize that along with such value, this program also comes with risks and we share your 

concerns that the program be managed in a way that mitigates those risks as much as possible. 

We appreciate OIG's reviews of the program and have embraced their recommendations in an 

effort to improve it. We have made significant changes in the last year as a result, and we will 

continue our efforts to implement the remaining recommendations, as well as seck additional 

ways to better the program. 

- 3 -
19 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Turk, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD B. TURK 

Mr. TURK. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and members of the committee, good morning. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today. The use of confidential informants—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Move the microphone just up a little bit. 

There you go. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. 

The use of confidential informants is very important in the Bureau’s mission. We also recognize the inherent risks that are involved with managing confidential informants. We take the matter 

seriously. We have reviewed the Office of Inspector General’s report. We have already begun taking steps to manage that program 

even better. I think, over the last several years, you will find that 

we have made significant progress. 

I’m a career special agent. I’ve worked with informants for many 

years. It’s an honor to represent the men and women of ATF today, 

and I’m happy to answer your questions regarding the subject. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Turk follows:] 


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STATEMENT OF 

RONALD B. TURK 

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

BEFORE TilE 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FOR A HEARING CONCERNlNG 

USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF AND DEA 

PRESENTED 

APRIL 4, 2017 
21 


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Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today. I 

welcome the opportunity to discuss the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of 

Inspector General's (OIG) report "ATF's Management and Oversight of 

Confidential Informants" (the OIG Audit Report). 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, ATF Special Agents, 

Investigators, and professional staff are dedicated to removing the most violent 

offenders from America's streets and making our communities safer. These violent 

offenders are often associated with gangs and other criminal organizations. To 

successfully investigate these cases, A TF must periodically enlist the cooperation 

and assistance of confidential informants. Cooperating informants often can obtain 

evidence about the activities of violent offenders, particularly those associated with 

gangs and other criminal organizations, that is not otherwise available to A TF and its 

law enforcement partners. Consequently, ATF's confidential informant program is 

an important tool in the light against violent crime, and A TF is grateful that the 

Inspector General conducted a thorough assessment of this program. 

A TF has carefully reviewed the OIG audit report, and concurs with all ofthe 

report's recommendations. I am pleased to have the opportunity today to provide 

some additional background to the Committee about ATF's confidential informant 

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program, and to describe the steps we have already taken to implement the OIG 

recommendations. 

As the OIG report indicates, before the audit was completed, ATF recognized 

and had begun addressing many of the issues raised in the report's 

recommendations. In fact, many of the report's findings do not ref1ect the current 

status of ATF's confidential infonnant program. 

ATF's administration of this program has evolved over the years. Prior to 

2012, we primarily relied on a decentralized, paper-based system, with each ATF 

field division maintaining those paper files in the field. In 2012, recognizing the 

need to modernize and centralize this process, A TF developed an interim, 

headquarters-based electronic database to track basic information regarding all 

confidential informants. This database was designed to be temporary, acting as a 

bridge while A TF developed a robust, national computerized system. As early as 

2013, ATF began evaluating system requirements and exploring cost-effective 

means of developing and implementing a new national system. 

While the OIG accurately notes that ATF did not enter a final contract with 

the system vendor until June 2016, development of that contract was the result of a 

multi-year effort. In October 2016, that multi-year effort came to fruition, and A TF 

deployed our national confidential informant management system. ATF's new 

system is robust and adaptable, and its functionality immediately addresses many of 

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the concerns the OIG raises in its recommendations. We will continue to work with 

the OIG to ensure that our new confidential informant management system adapts to 

meet any continuing concerns, and to implement updated policies and procedures for 

the system's usc by agents and managers. 

I also want to emphasize that the report reflects the results of an audit of 

ATF's administrative oversight of its confidential informant program; the report 

does not identify any deficiencies regarding the manner in which ATF manages the 

use of confidential informants in its investigations. ATF strictly adheres to 

Department of Justice guidelines governing the use of confidential informants, and, 

since 2012, we have continually strengthened our internal orders applicable to the 

usage of confidential informants to provide safeguards that exceed baseline 

Department guidelines. 

Finally, let me assure the Committee that ATF also takes very seriously the 

OIG's conclusion that its paper files and legacy database did not provide sufficient 

safeguards to assure that accurate and complete confidential informant payment 

information was consistently available to prosecutors. A TF is acutely aware of its 

obligation to provide accurate and complete information to prosecutors in the 

criminal discovery process, is fully committed to meeting that obligation in all cases, 

and is confident that our new system provides the consistency needed to ensure we 

continue to meet that obligation. 

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am proud to be here today 

representing the men and women of ATF; they work conscientiously every day to 

make America's streets safer. I assure you that A IF's executive staff will continue 

to identifY areas where we can further strengthen our effectiveness; we owe no less 

to our dedicated employees and our communities. Thank you for this opportunity. 

-4-
25 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. All right. Thank you. 

I’ll now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Horowitz, there are several components within the Department of Justice. Why are there multiple different standards and 

policies for confidential informants? Why not just one that they operate under? Why do they have individual ones? What’s the answer 

to that question? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I think in part it has to do with different 

missions, but that is a question we’ve repeatedly asked whenever 

we’ve looked at programs. We asked that question in the Fast and 

Furious review that we did. I think there are reasons why, for example, the FBI, which has a substantial counterintelligence component, would require additional and particular policies. But I think 

one of the challenges the Department faces is making sure that, 

through the Deputy Attorney General’s Office, it is making sure 

that each of the components have certain baseline procedures that 

every single one of the components—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. So have you been able to look at, for 

instance, the DEA confidential informant policy? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We have. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Patterson, we’ve asked repeatedly to 

see this policy. You have yet to give us a copy of this policy. Why 

not? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, back in November, you had asked me at the 

end of that hearing to provide you a copy. I set off on that endeavor 

throughout the month of December trying to get that or at least get 

some clarity as to the turning over of that policy. It became relatively apparent to me that I was going to need to wait for the next 

administration as people were leaving, as the outgoing administration and folks were leaving the Department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Were you told not to give it to us? 

Mr. PATTERSON. During the previous administration? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. PATTERSON. I got, quite frankly, no real answer. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Which means don’t do it? 

Mr. PATTERSON. My understanding from the Department at the 

time was that the policy would not be turned over based on Department policy. I had been doing—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. So let me go back to June 22 of 

2016. Mr. Rosenberg—who is Mr. Rosenberg? 

Mr. PATTERSON. The Administrator of DEA. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And he was before the Senate Judiciary 

Committee when Senator Grassley, who happens to be the chairman of that committee, asked if it had been completed and asked 

if the Senate Judiciary Committee could get a copy of it. Here’s 

what Mr. Rosenberg said, and I quote: ‘‘It has been finalized. It’s 

been approved by the Department. I’m more than happy to provide 

a copy to this committee and to your staff, sir,’’ end quote. 

Did they ever give a copy of the confidential informant policy to 

Senator Grassley and the Senate Judiciary Committee? 

Mr. PATTERSON. They did not. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why not? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I have spoken to the Administrator about that 

comment. You caught me off guard when you had brought that up 


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on November 30. He had said that he had intended to mean in 

camera, as a copy of the policy. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. But you understand that that’s different, 

right? We’ve had that discussion. 

Mr. PATTERSON. We have had that discussion, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. Let’s play—I actually want to play 

the video of you and I having this discussion last time you were 

here in November of last year. Let’s go ahead and put up this 

video, if you could. 

[video shown.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So, Mr. Patterson, when did you give me 

the answer to that question? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I did not, sir. My understanding is—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And you’ve testified under oath, you promised me in November as soon as you get back to your office. And 

we’re in April, and I still don’t have it, and I still don’t have an 

excuse either. 

So why are you not giving this to us? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, my understanding is that the committee 

staff was contacted yesterday by the Department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yesterday, right before a hearing. What a 

coincidence. 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, if I may say this, so I will take full responsibility that—I know the Attorney General was sworn in in February, and from February until March 11, I did not go back to ask 

this question. 

On March 11, I had the opportunity to watch another hearing, 

which prompted me to ask two questions to the Department. One 

was why Mr. Horowitz had not received our policy on mitigation for 

threats, and the second was to go back and say that we still have 

a lingering thing to address the issue of the policy and the request 

of yourself. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. So let me get this straight. The inspector general and his staff can see the confidential informant policy, but you refuse to give it to Congress. What is it you think that 

Congress doesn’t have the right to see? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, again, I work for the Department of Justice, 

and so that is—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Who specifically is telling you not to give 

this to us? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I spoke yesterday to members of the DAG’s Office. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. Let’s name some names. 

Mr. PATTERSON. I had a conversation with Armando Bonilla in 

the DAG’s Office yesterday. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And what did he tell you? 

Mr. PATTERSON. He made me aware that the committee staff had 

reached out to you and that you guys were going to work a path 

forward on this issue. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. So I’ve got to—I’m going to have to 

go another route, and I hope you understand it. Are you able to accept service of a subpoena—you personally? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I would assume so, yes. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’re not sure? I mean, your boss, right, 

the Acting Director, is testifying—actually, it’s that way—next 

door. I think what I’m going to do, if you’re not sure, I’m going to 

have someone else chair this hearing. I’m also a member of the Judiciary Committee, and I’m going to go serve him the subpoena. 

Congress has a right to have this material it, and it is unbelievable to me that you think that we shouldn’t have a copy of it. 

Now, you may be caught in the middle. You may be listening to 

others, and I’m sure, in your mind, you’re thinking, you know, ‘‘I 

don’t get to make this decision unilaterally,’’ but you are the one 

that the DEA sends before us. 

So I don’t care if it’s the Obama administration or the Trump administration; nothing has changed here. And so, in order to get the 

result that we need so we can provide the proper oversight, we’re 

going to need a copy of that policy. And I’m not buying this whole 

idea, ‘‘Oh, we give it to Congress, and it’s public.’’ We understand 

how sensitive it is. We have no intention of giving it to the public 

or releasing it. 

But I think you do value in some part oversight because you do 

give it to the inspector general. But, remarkably, you won’t give it 

the Oversight and Government Reform Committee nor will you 

give to the Senate Judiciary Committee. And my guess is you won’t 

give it to the House Judiciary Committee. And we find that wholly 

unacceptable, and so I’m forced to get into a position, which I didn’t 

want to have to be into, but we are going to issue the subpoena 

and get a copy of this material. 

My time has expired. I yield back now and recognize the ranking 

member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me say this, Mr. Patterson: I wholeheartedly 

support the chairman. 

We’re just trying to do our job. And then, when I watch that 

video just now, it just reminded me that sometimes we find ourselves going in circles because we don’t always get the cooperation 

that we should get. 

Mr. Horowitz, just last week, your office issued a report on the 

Department’s cash seizure forfeiture activities. The report found 

that the Department seizures have resulted in the forfeiture of $28 

million over the last 10 years. That’s a lot of money—$28 billion 

over the last 10 years. That includes seizures made by ATF, DEA, 

State and local law enforcement using the Federal law. Is that 

right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Using the Federal law. 

Of the 85 DEA interdiction seizures you received—you reviewed, 

79 were, quote, ‘‘initiated based on the observations and the immediate judgment of DEA agents and task force officers absent any 

preexisting intelligence of a specific drug crime,’’ end of quote. 

Does that mean that officers were making on-the-spot judgments 

about who to approach and how to proceed? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. That’s our understanding. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s not—so, I mean—what types of risk does 

that pose? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the risk is, without preexisting intelligence, 

the question is, what are the factors that are going into the assessVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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ment of whether to approach an individual or not? And this grows 

out of a report we did 2 years ago on DEA’s use of cold consent encounters and the concern that came to us about—from individuals 

who had been approached about the potential for racial profiling. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So were these the types of judgments also being 

made by State and local law enforcement officers? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, many of these task forces have deputized 

State and local officers. So they are acting as DEA agents having 

been deputized by the Department and by the DEA. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This is where I’m trying to get to: In your report, 

you stated that the DEA agent’s manual described search and seizure as, quote, ‘‘one of the most dynamic and potentially confusing 

areas of the law today,’’ end of quote. 

Based on that, how important is adequate training to ensure consistent application of the law? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It’s critical, and it is an issue we’ve consistently 

identified as a weakness. That was something in our cold consent 

encounter report that we’ve heard about. We first heard that there 

were these training programs developed, which they were, and 

then we found that a substantial number of the deputized State 

and local officers who were working these programs had never been 

trained. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So who developed the training? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It was DEA who’s developed the training programs. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Were these officers deputized officers; they were 

required to do this, but it never happened? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They were supposed to be required, but it never 

happened. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wow. 

So, Mr. Patterson, do you agree that training is important—— 

Mr. PATTERSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. —to ensure consistent application of the law? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So why aren’t these people getting trained? 

Mr. PATTERSON. So, as of March of this past year, we required 

that all individuals that work in DEA interdiction operations, to include State and local task force members, must be trained, to include both our agents and the State and local task force—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is as of the end of March you said? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I’m sorry. Not March—March of 2016, sir. I’m 

sorry. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, are you familiar with all of this, Mr. Horowitz? I mean, the fact that they apparently now—although it’s been 

on the books, I guess, that they now are saying you’ve got to do 

it? I mean, what’s the result of it? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah. We got a report from DEA in December of 

2016 updating us on that review, and we are now—we’ve followed 

up with them asking them for the material and the information to 

show that, in fact, the training is occurring as—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are going to basically say—you are going 

to look at the various people who have been deputized, the folks 

who are supposed to be trained, and see if they’ve gotten the training? Is that right? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HOROWITZ. We want the information from DEA to show that 

those individuals were in fact trained. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, you’ve seen the training? You’re satisfied 

with the training? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We’re assessing the training. I’m going to—I’ll 

talk with my folks further and be back in touch with your staff 

about that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Turk, does the ATF require its agents to receive specialized—similar specialized training? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir, we do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Horowitz, your report found that the Department did not require State and local law enforcement officers operating on task forces or participating in joint investigations to receive training on Federal asset seizure and forfeiture laws. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you believe that better training for State and 

local law enforcement could lead to a more consistent application? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It’s critical for exactly that reason and to ensure 

that folks are following the Federal laws and rules. We’re talking 

about State and local officers who have been trained in their State 

and local policies, but if they are going to be deputized, you want 

them to also understand any Federal rules that overlay what 

they’ve already learned about their State and local procedures. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that it be consistent. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so, Mr. Patterson, do you agree? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I do, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

I understand the Department accepted the inspector general’s 

recommendation to ensure that State and local task force officers 

receive the specialized training. 

Mr. Horowitz, will you keep us apprised of your progress and 

stay on top of this? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I will and be happy to update your staff on this. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. JORDAN. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

So, Mr. Patterson, let me get this straight. Mr. Horowitz does an 

investigation, issues a report and says you guys aren’t doing a very 

good job when it comes to how you handle confidential informants. 

It cites this Cromer situation where you had one of your employees 

with a totally inappropriate relationship with a couple of CIs, all 

kinds of money being paid to these individuals. I think, in the report, it talks about you did not have centralized records; the OIG 

found incomplete and inaccurate information in your system. And 

you then produced new guidelines to better deal with the poor situation that Mr. Horowitz uncovered in his investigation. Is that all 

accurate? You put together the guidelines now? Mr. Patterson? Let 

me go to Mr. Patterson. That’s accurate? You have new guidelines? 

Mr. PATTERSON. We do. 

Mr. JORDAN. All right. And once you put together the new guidelines—the chairman of this committee just talked about this— 

asked to see them, and you won’t show them to us. So why can’t 

we see them? 


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Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, again, I understand that you have not had 

the policy turned over to you. We’ve done two in camera reviews 

with staff—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Are there names of confidential informants in these 

guidelines? 

Mr. PATTERSON. There are not, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. Are there locations of where these confidential informants are at? 

Mr. PATTERSON. There are not, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. So why can’t we see it in public so we can actually 

review it? We go and see it in camera; you can’t take notes. You 

can’t take photographs; you’ve got this big document with all these 

guidelines. After the pathetic performance you’ve had dealing with 

this situation, why can’t we see it? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I think it certainly would be my position—and 

I don’t know if the Department feels the same way—that this is 

highly sensitive material. 

Mr. JORDAN. How is it sensitive when you don’t have the names 

of the informants and locations of the informants? What’s sensitive? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Because it talks about the types of informants 

and what efforts and acts they perform. 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, that’s all important information that this committee would like to know and actually be—we’re not going—like 

the chairman just said, we are not going to share that. We just 

want that information so we can review it and see if you are actually doing what Mr. Horowitz said you weren’t doing and you are 

improving the situation. 

Mr. PATTERSON. Again, sir, we’ve done multiple reviews with 

committee staff. We’d be more than happy to continue that. We’ve 

also done briefings for a whole host of folks. 

Mr. JORDAN. And I think you heard from the chairman just a few 

minutes ago: that ain’t good enough. We want the document. We 

want the guidelines so we can see what’s going on here. 

Let me ask you a couple of other questions. Do—I’ve got another 

report here from Mr. Horowitz dated 1 year ago—actually, 2 years 

ago, and it’s talking about cold consent encounters. Are you familiar with this? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I am, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And tell me what cold consent is. Well, let me ask 

it this way: Are cold consent encounters where you just walk up 

to some individual and ask if you can talk to them and search their 

belongings? 

Mr. PATTERSON. In part, yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And is the individual who is approaching some individual—in that encounter, do your folks have on a uniform, law enforcement uniform? 

Mr. PATTERSON. They do not, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. But do they show their badge? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I would assume, yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And my understanding is these things happen typically at airports. Is that correct? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I would characterize it as mass transportation 

facilities. 


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Mr. JORDAN. Yeah. And you had some complaints from a couple 

of African-American women not too long ago on this very issue. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I’m not familiar with that, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. It’s in the report. ‘‘Initiated this review after receiving complaints from two African-American women resulting from 

separate DEA-initiated cold consent encounters at an airport.’’ Is 

that right, Mr. Horowitz? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes, that’s correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. And—no. When you do these cold—Mr. Horowitz, 

when these cold consent encounters happen, is there a warrant? Is 

there any kind of judge signing off on you can go up and search 

this person’s belongings? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There is not. 

Mr. JORDAN. There is not. So think about this: You are at the 

airport where there’s all kinds of security. Individual walks up to 

you, flashes a badge, and says, ‘‘Hey, can I talk to you and search 

your luggage?’’ That’s going on right now in America, Mr. Horowitz? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That was certainly going on when we did this review. And my understanding is the—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Wow. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. —are continuing. 

Mr. JORDAN. Say it again. The what? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. My understanding is that the program has continued. 

Mr. JORDAN. They are still doing it. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s my understanding, although—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Is it still happening, Mr. Patterson? 

Mr. PATTERSON. It is, sir. We still have interdiction units. 

Mr. JORDAN. So think about this: First, Mr. Horowitz does a report on confidential informants where you’ve had all kinds of 

screw-ups, all kinds of poor recordkeeping; says this is a mess; tells 

you to put together the guidelines. You put together the guidelines, 

and then you won’t show them to the United States Congress, the 

committee of jurisdiction. You won’t show us those guidelines, and 

at the same time you won’t show us those guidelines, you’re walking up to American citizens—in this case, two African-American 

women—flashing a badge at an airport, intimidating those individuals without a warrant saying, ‘‘I want to search your belongings.’’ 

Really? And you wonder why we want the—why we want to review 

the guidelines on this confidential informant in light of that? 

I mean, that’s the concern here. So I’m glad the chairman, and 

I’m glad the ranking member supports the chairman in getting this 

information to us, at least on the confidential informants. And we 

need to do some more on this cold consent encounters that are taking place at mass transportation areas where—think about this: 

Someone comes up and flashes a badge, ‘‘Can I look at your luggage?’’ What’s that person going to do? And that’s tough, and that 

is the kinds of things you guys are doing. 

Any response, Mr. Patterson? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, I think that the cold consent, when properly 

trained, is a technique that can be used in discussing and moving 

forward with investigations. 


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Mr. JORDAN. Maybe so, but we’d also like to see the guidelines 

on another area of you guys’ activity that has real concerns. And 

I just think that the contradiction here—you’re doing this to American citizens, walking up to them, searching their belongings; at 

the same time, you won’t even show us the guidelines, which have 

no names, no locations in them, you won’t even show us the guidelines on a different program. I don’t know. I think it’s cause for 

concern. 

With that, I’d recognize Mr. Lynch, I think is next. Is that right? 

The gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Patterson, this is the part that I struggle with. So Congress 

authorizes money to the Justice Department and to the DEA so you 

folks can do your job. And we don’t just do that loosely. We have 

guidelines that are in place and requirements that you abide by the 

law. And then when we try to make sure that you’re acting in compliance with the law, you tell us we can’t—we can’t see that policy 

that you’re acting under. Do you see the problem we have here? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Again, sir, the notion that you can’t see the policy, you know, we’re displaying it to you on a format that is obviously unacceptable to the committee. 

Mr. LYNCH. No. No. No. That’s not how this works. We’re not 

playing secret squirrel with you. 

You aren’t even tracking the criminals that you’re working with. 

We just want to see the policy that you’re operating under, because 

we authorized it. We authorized it. This is due diligence on our 

part. 

So—I’m not surprised that we see these horror shows. I’m not 

surprised that we see, you know, the abuse here, the theft. I’m not 

surprised because the whole thing is—is secret. There’s no fresh air 

here. There’s no sunlight. And this is totally being operated—I 

mean, when you let somebody keep, what,$4.9 million out of a $5.2 

million sweep, I mean, there’s no accountability here, nothing that 

we see. 

There’s been no serious—I mean, we had a horrible report on 

this back in 2005. And here we are, in 2017, you won’t even let us 

see the policy and make it public. That should be a fair request. 

It just stuns me that you’ve taken this position that you don’t think 

Congress has the right to read that policy, and we haven’t been 

given a full and open opportunity to review that policy. 

Mr. PATTERSON. If I could comment, sir? 

Mr. LYNCH. Sure. Sure. 

Mr. PATTERSON. Again, I’d be more than willing, following the 

Department’s guidance, to come and I’ll spend my own time sitting 

with you while you go over the policy. 

Mr. LYNCH. Well—— 

Mr. PATTERSON. I somewhat want to push back a little bit that 

you haven’t been able to see the policy, right? So the members have 

seen it. I get that that’s not in the format that you want. 

Mr. LYNCH. Correct. 

Mr. PATTERSON. But it’s certainly been viewed and briefed to certainly staff. 

Mr. LYNCH. We represent the people, not the staff. The information, by its very nature, should be public. There’s enough stuff 


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going on here that’s horrific because it was kept sub rosa, that it 

was kept from the public. We think, in order to restore the credibility of the DEA, that we have to be honest and open with the 

American people. 

Look, you operated 18,000 confidential informants. These are basically people going out in the public and surveilling the public. 

You have one guy here that was handing over the manifest for a 

bus company. Tens of thousands of people, innocent people, on a 

list that he was handing over to you, to your operation. 

I mean, there’s no protection at all for those innocent people that 

are being swept up in that. So that’s why we want to make this 

whole process more transparent. 

Mr. Horowitz, do you see any significant improvement here, you 

know, in terms of trying to hold people accountable? We saw the 

situation with the Boston office of the FBI, when there was so 

much money sloshing around that it corrupted the Federal agents 

that were involved. And that’s what I think is happening here too. 

I think they’re protecting their own. I think they’re protecting the 

system. And it’s—it’s self-financing the operation, right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. Certainly, on the churning, it’s self-funding. 

In—with regard to the others, we have seen both ATF and DEA 

take steps to improve their programs, put in policies—put in place 

policies to address the concerns we’ve identified. And as noted, one 

of the things that we’re doing is following up on all of our most recent reports with DEA and our recent report with ATF to see how 

they’ve been implemented, but there are substantial steps that 

needed to be taken, and they have begun to take those steps, it appears, based on the reports that they’ve given us so far. 

Mr. LYNCH. Well, I’ll tell you this—in closing, this report that 

Mr. Horowitz produced puts a very dark cloud over the DEA, a 

very dark cloud, and also ATF. And that cloud remains until we 

have proof positive that we’re straightened out and flying right. 

And that’s not going to happen as long as we continue to operate 

like this. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HICE. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GOSAR. So, Mr. Patterson, let’s go back to what Mr. Jordan 

was talking about. So let’s go through a scenario. So you walk up 

to me and ask me—flash your badge and tell me you want to 

search my belongings. What are you going to do when I tell you, 

‘‘No, where is your warrant?’’ 

Mr. PATTERSON. If you don’t consent to have a search of your possessions, then it be won’t be searched. 

Mr. GOSAR. There’s not going to be a scene or anything at an airport or a mass thing like that? I mean, this is kind of a little unusual, wouldn’t you say? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, again, the—— 

Mr. GOSAR. So you’ll just walk away? 

Mr. PATTERSON. —the interdiction units are trained in how they, 

obviously, behave and question individuals. 

Mr. GOSAR. So we’ll see that in the policy manual? 


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Mr. PATTERSON. I don’t know. I think there’s already policy written on interdiction. I’m not familiar with it. I don’t have it in front 

of me today. 

Mr. GOSAR. I would probably tell you I think you’re wrong. I 

think there would be a massive scene at any place that you do 

that. So I find it despicable. 

Inspector General Horowitz, let me ask you another question. In 

the course of your review, did you have reason to believe that ATF 

had simply lost track of any foreign national confidential source? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We had real concerns over how they were tracking foreign national CIs, and we could not determine whether they 

had an ability to identify all of them. So that was our concern. 

Mr. GOSAR. It was a mess. It was a mess. 

So, Mr. Turk, let’s go to you. What is ATF doing to determine 

whether any current or former confidential informants with expired 

sponsorships are in the United States? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, in a broad sense, when you reference foreign nationals, we have roughly 13 that are registered with ATF right 

now. 

Mr. GOSAR. In the whole country? 

Mr. TURK. In the entire country. We take that program very seriously. We work very closely with HSI. Your question specifically relates to after they’ve completed service with ATF, I believe? We 

make the referrals back to Homeland Security. We present—or— 

we either present their information or their person to HSI or ICE, 

and at that point, we basically relinquish their custody to them or 

their situation to them and allow HSI to best determine where they 

go from there. 

Mr. GOSAR. So I mean, so the whole country, only 13 foreign nationals? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. We have—our entire program, I believe, has 

31 total foreign nationals registered with HSI, but 13 of them are 

acting as confidential informants. The remaining members are either witnesses that aren’t informants or they are family members 

of informants or witnesses that, for one reason or another, needed 

to remain in the United States to be with family. 

Mr. GOSAR. So, once the agents identify their usefulness and— 

do they go home? 

Mr. TURK. There’s several scenarios that could play out, sir, one 

extreme to another. And these are just hypotheticals. They could, 

in theory, go to—they could stay in the U.S. and go into the Witness Protection Program. They could also be immediately sent back 

and deported. Those decisions are made by ICE and HSI, not by 

ATF. 

Mr. GOSAR. And I guess one of the reasons I ask that is that, 

being a foreign national, most of the time, they are involved in 

criminal activity. So there’s a preponderance to reinvigorate or go 

back into that application, wouldn’t you say? 

Mr. TURK. Not necessarily, sir. We have seen foreign nationals 

that weren’t necessarily involved in criminal activity but still have 

useful information for the government to perfect criminal cases. 

Mr. GOSAR. And when you send them back to DHS, how long 

does this timetable usually take for evaluation for that foreign national? 


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Mr. TURK. I’m not exactly sure, sir. I think it would be a caseby-case basis. Some of it would probably be immediate action depending on the situation of the foreign national. Some may take 

some time. Some of these situations, the U.S. Attorney’s Office may 

request that they remain for further court-type scenarios where we 

may potentially unregister them and leave them to the care and 

advice of Homeland Security and no longer monitor them with 

ATF. 

Mr. GOSAR. And you said that you are very fixated on this. So 

is it every month, or is it every quarter that you’re evaluating 

these individuals, or is it on a day-to-day basis? 

Mr. TURK. There is a monthly update from our field divisions to 

our headquarters, sir. The ones that are of higher level concern will 

be brought to more higher attention, for example, to the front office. But there is a monthly communication from our special agents 

in charge around the country to our headquarters program office. 

Mr. GOSAR. So, Mr. Horowitz, in listening to his conversation, 

you had doubts whether they could track. Can you tell us a little 

bit about that application? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly. We found several instances where, as 

we looked through the ATF files, we found information lacking so 

that we couldn’t determine whether they had been tracked all the 

way through. We found two informants, for example, who there 

was not a consistent flow of information that they were tracked. 

We found inconsistencies or lack of information or inconsistencies 

between the national CI registry system, which ATF is required to 

include data on, and the data that ATF had and irreconcilable information between the two. And so we ultimately could not conclude or evaluate whether the information that ATF had in its 

spreadsheets and databases accurately reflected, in fact, the number of people, foreign nationals, in its system and whether it had 

sufficiently and adequately tracked these individuals, many of 

whom, as you noted, don’t have status in the United States. 

Mr. GOSAR. Right. So, Mr. Turk, one last question. So would 

you—did you not provide all the information to the OIG so they 

could make that determination? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, we were operating at the time when the Office of 

Inspector General was looking at ATF with an old—I wouldn’t even 

call it a database. If you allow me to explain briefly. We went from 

a pen-and-paper, basically, archaic system up until 2012, 2013. It 

was completely inadequate, and we recognized that at the time. We 

moved into an off-the-shelf system to start to manage our informants. Frankly, we were facing things like sequestration, and we did 

not—— 

Mr. GOSAR. No, that—that same old crap keeps coming back. 

Why haven’t you given a supplemental to the OIG? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I throw that out there only to point a positive, 

which is the database back—— 

Mr. GOSAR. It may be a positive, but why aren’t you giving it to 

the inspector general as supplemental if it was so poorly done? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, we have a new database now that’s on line that 

tracks our particular, our foreign nationals as you are asking about 

very well. Where I was going with that story was that database, 

when we built that about a year and a half ago, probably saved the 


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taxpayers about $800,000 because the delay we had from going to 

no system at all to an off-the-shelf system to the database we have 

today. So I think we are in a very good position right now to monitor that program, and I believe that the OIG has recognized we 

have that program, but they have not reviewed it. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Horowitz, your reports raises serious concerns about ATF’s 

management of high-risk confidential informants who require additional oversight due to their background, activities, and experience. 

These include senior leaders of criminal enterprises, individuals 

who have been informants for more than 6 consecutive years, foreign nationals, and informants registered as Federal firearms licensees. 

Mr. Horowitz, can you explain what special risks and challenges 

these types of informants present? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly. The long-term use of informants has 

been a concern of the Department for an extended period of time, 

and in fact, in the FBI matter involving Mr. Bulger in particular, 

that event demonstrated the risks of an informant being subsumed 

into the organization and being—and co-opting individuals that 

were their controlling agents. And so one of the things that is particularly important with the long-term informant is determining 

and assessing whether, in fact, they’re delivering value for what is 

likely to be a substantial amount of payments over a lengthy period 

of time to ensure that they should continue to be used. 

Using an FFL as a licensee we’ve identified as a concern because 

they are regulated by ATF. And so they are put a very challenging 

position if they are also being asked to be an informant for ATF. 

So the regulator on the one hand is asking to be a criminal informant on the other hand. That presents itself in various significant 

challenging ways, as we talked about extensively in Operation Fast 

and Furious report, because there was an example of that in there. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Using non-U.S. nationals presents risks because 

they are often sponsored into this country, don’t have status, and 

if you lose control of them, you’ve brought someone into the country 

who is, by definition, working with criminals, and you’ve lost control of them in the country. So I could add further examples as 

well. 

Ms. KELLY. How do we lose control of them? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the problem is if you don’t track them, if 

you don’t consistently follow them, you’ve lost touch with an individual who is not only connected to criminal enterprises, but who 

also has no status in the country. It’s hard to identify where they 

are and where they might be located. 

Ms. KELLY. Do the Attorney General’s guidelines require heightened review for high-risk confidential informants? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They do. In several different categories, including 

the ones I’ve mentioned. 

Ms. KELLY. And your recent audit said this, and I quote, ‘‘ATF’s 

practices for managing higher-risk CIs did not provide for adequate 

oversight or management of CIs. We found that ATF did not alVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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ways appropriately identify these CIs, some of whom required approval from the Confidential Informant Review Committee, which 

results in CIs not being subjected to the required suitability assessment by DOJ officials outside of ATF. Why is a review by DOJ officials outside of ATF important? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It’s important because you want to have a check 

and a balance within the operations of these programs, to make 

sure that the individual who’s handling them, and the individuals 

who are normally working them and benefiting from their work, 

aren’t the only ones deciding whether to continue to use them, and 

whether they are they are acting appropriately and consistent with 

the guidelines. 

Ms. KELLY. And turning to long-term confidential informants the 

IG’s report found flaws in ATF’s process by identify and ensuring 

review of this category of high risk informants. Is that correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Ms. KELLY. And is the problem that field divisions are not adequately identifying long-term informants for headquarters, or that 

headquarters is not identifying them for the Department, or is 

there some combination? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Actually both, I think, Congresswoman. That the 

system—there needs to be a sufficient system in place, such that, 

both at the field level and at the headquarters level, there is preferably an automated system, the FBI has one now that would trigger a tickler if there isn’t, that review within 6 years, because it 

shouldn’t be up to a paper record or a paper system. 

Ms. KELLY. And Mr. Turk, can you tell us what ATF has done 

or plans to do to address this concern? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, ma’am. And if I may, Mr. Horowitz’s comments 

were spot on. The high-risk informants and high-level informants 

are very serious to ATF. As I mentioned earlier, we do have a 

new—databases come online recently that will help us track and 

monitor those informants. We also have a commitment from the 

Department of Justice that we’ll have routine meetings with our 

Confidential Informant Review Committee at the higher levels. 

ATF numbers are relatively small. I mentioned how many foreign nationals we have already. Ma’am, you mentioned how many 

long-term informants we have. Right now we have 20, five are historic, 15 are new. So the risk is very high, our numbers are fairly 

small. 

Ms. KELLY. Well, I’m glad to hear that you’re taking steps to improve the situation, and I yield back the time I don’t have. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentlelady. I am now going to recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Horowitz, let me begin with you. And this would go both to 

DEA and ATF, what grade would you give them on the management of their confidential informants? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I think prior to our audits, I think it would 

be they would be lucky to get a gentlemen’s C, I guess I would 

frame it as, but I do think they’ve taken steps since then. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. If they would be lucky to get a gentleman’s C, 

that would be probably deserving of a D or below. At least poor, 

there’s some great reason for concern. 


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Mr. HOROWITZ. And let me say that as to the specific areas we 

looked at, we obviously did not look at every single mechanism. 

Mr. HICE. Sure, I understand that. So the reason for that poor 

grade, is it because the lack of reliability? What is the nutshell? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think it was several things that we found up 

to the 2015, 2016 reports. One is a reliable system of oversight, different as to each organization, because they do have very different 

numbers of informants and different kinds of operations. But ultimately, in both of them, it was having sufficient controls, reliable 

controls in place, for what are likely to be among their highest risk 

CI uses. 

Mr. HICE. So poor oversight, which would result in poor quality. 

I mean, if there’s not good oversight of the management of this program, there’s no way to tell the quality? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, that—your last point is the key issue for us, 

which is because of the lack of information and data and oversight, 

if we couldn’t make an assessment of whether these informants 

had provided value, how many—what kinds of cases have they delivered, or worked on for the money they had been given, what was 

their success rate? We talked about this at last year’s hearing. Are 

they batting 1,000, or are they batting less than 100 in terms of 

the information that they are passing on? 

Mr. HICE. So there’s no way to tell really. I mean, we’re taking 

a stab in the dark at the whole program here. 

Mr. Patterson, how many CIs do you have? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Currently, approximately 3,900. 

Mr. HICE. 3,900. Mr. Turk? 

Mr. TURK. Approximately 1,600, sir. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So we’ve got thousands. And we don’t have 

a clue, the quality of the job they are doing. And all of these are 

getting paid. Is that correct? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Not all, sir. 

Mr. HICE. How many of them are getting paid? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I’d have to go back and provide that number for 

you. Obviously, we have—— 

Mr. HICE. Give a stab in the dark, an estimate. 

Mr. PATTERSON. I mean, half of our informants are in the defendant category, they do not get paid for their work. Obviously, they 

are working for a different purpose. So I would say probably half, 

approximately. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. About the same for you? 

Mr. TURK. Probably a little more than that do get paid, sir. But 

if you run the basic math on average—— 

Mr. HICE. So still, either way, we have thousands that are being 

paid, and we don’t have any idea of the quality of the information 

they are providing. Mr. Horowitz, do you have any plans, or do you 

have similar views of other agencies? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We don’t have any ongoing right now. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Do you have any plans? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We haven’t put together a plan. We obviously, 

having done two of the law enforcement components, the Marshals 

Service doesn’t have many informants, and that would leave FBI, 

which we did a review, a couple of reviews several years ago. We 


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haven’t planned yet to look at the FBI, but, certainly, at some point 

in time we would. 

Mr. HICE. So when was the last time you conducted a review of 

the FBI? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It was 2005. 

Mr. HICE. 2005, so it’s been 12 years? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Mr. HICE. It has been quite a while. Is it due another one? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, we will have—these kinds of reviews take 

a couple of years. And so one of the things, having just finished the 

ATF review, we’ll consider what we do next. 

Mr. HICE. Do you believe that most departments could produce, 

if asked, a number of active confidential informants? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I’m sorry, say that again? 

Mr. HICE. If a department was asked to produce their confidential informants, could they do so? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Could they do—I do think they know who their 

informants are. The challenge for us has been is their headquarterrelated oversight sufficient to know the wide scope of their informant program? And are folks not only in the field, but at headquarters making those assessments of the value they are delivering? 

Mr. HICE. All right. So which departments would struggle the 

most with having the oversight? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I think from as we—— 

Mr. HICE. These two? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly until the last couple of years, I think 

ATF, in particular, with their compartmentalized data and information or lack of data, really, compartmentalized tracking system, 

would have a challenge. They have moved now to the computerbased system, and we will assess that, that’s within the last year. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Real quick, how long do you need before you 

have a positive understanding of the evaluation of the computer? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think it simply depends on what the level of implementation has been. Frankly, we will keep it open and look at 

it as long as we need to. The cold consent encounter report that we 

did that has been discussed, DEA was 2 years ago. That remains 

open and resolved, but we have not closed any of our recommendations yet. Until we are satisfied, we will continue to go back and 

forth with the components. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. I’m now going to recognize the 

gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Horowitz, 

your September 2016 report on DEA’s confidential source program 

raises troubling questions about whether DEA is interfering with 

American civil liberties, and right to privacy. The DEA does have 

an important job to do as we all agreed, but it must comply with 

protections provided for in our Constitution. 

Mr. Horowitz, on page 20 of your report, it describes one confidential source the DEA recruited, it states, ‘‘Between October 

2012 and January 2016, the source provided the DEA, on an almost daily basis, the entire passenger manifest for buses traveling 

to or from a specific station of their private company employer.’’ Is 

that a misprint or is that an accurate statement? 


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Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s accurate. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So I understand this, this source, a bus 

company, provided the DEA with entire passenger manifests on an 

almost daily basis for more than 3 years. Is that so? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s the information we have based on our review of the DEA’s files. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I don’t think Americans 

fully grasp the breadth of the information as collected by the DEA, 

but this raises serious questions about the privacy of many innocent individuals that—Americans that may be swept up in the appropriateness of inducing employees to violate their employer’s 

policies. 

Mr. Horowitz, do you believe that, if challenged, a court would 

uphold the authority of the DEA to vacuum up daily manifests for 

over 3 years? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, that was one of the questions in our recommendation, was to ensure that the Department, that the DEA 

worked with the Department to assess the legal risks they were 

facing by conducting this kind of operation. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Mr. Patterson, let me ask 

you a couple of questions. If this information is so important to 

DEA’s investigation over such a period of time, why didn’t the 

DEA, or why doesn’t it request this information through formal 

legal channels, such as administrative subpoenas? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Ma’am, I don’t know the specific instance on this 

one passenger list that was given. I don’t know that’s an issue that 

they wouldn’t provide, or could not provide. I don’t know. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. It is not just a list, it is a list of the passenger manifests for a period of 3 years on a daily basis. 

Mr. PATTERSON. No, I understand. And what I’m saying is in the 

specific instance, I don’t know what the purpose or what the reason 

was why they couldn’t get that list. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Do you know if DEA still possesses this 

information? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I don’t believe we would retain information for 

any purpose. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So you don’t think it is anywhere in the 

system? 

Mr. PATTERSON. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Mr. Horowitz, was this one of the pieces 

of information your office found was transmitted using personal 

communications? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I don’t know, as I sit here, whether that was specifically part of the information, but certainly we did find information being emailed to personal email accounts and texting that 

went to personal cell phones, not on government systems. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. The IG report also found the DEA paid 

this source $429,000 for the contributions to several interdiction 

cases. According to the AG guidelines, sources that receive more 

than $100,000 annually and $200,000 in a lifetime must be approved by more senior levels of leadership. 

So Mr. Horowitz, my question is, did you find any evidence that 

payments of this source had been reviewed and approved at more 

senior levels of leadership in the DEA? 


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Mr. HOROWITZ. Let me bet back to you on that. I don’t recall, as 

I sit here, whether that occurred in this particular instance. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. According to the report, this 

activity extended through January of last year. So, Mr. Patterson, 

my question is, is this source still active? Has he or she been formally reviewed by senior levels of leadership in the DEA? Is it still 

active and has he or she been evaluated? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Congresswoman, I would have to get back to you 

on the particular source. I will say that when you talk about the 

cap limits, it forces a review. We can’t pay or make any more payments until those cap limits have been reviewed at a higher level. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So then we can presume as opposed to 

assume—— 

Mr. PATTERSON. That’s correct. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. —that there was a higher level review? 

Let me ask you one question here, who determines how much 

you get paid? 

Mr. PATTERSON. So under the older system, it would be—the recommendation would come from the agents in the field with management as to how that individual would be paid—they are eligible 

up to certain amounts of awards. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. What determines how much the individual is being paid? I mean, it’s not like it’s the job market that’s 

in competition. 

Mr. PATTERSON. Again, at the time, ma’am, it was done based off 

of the direction of the field. That process, based on the OIG reviews, and, I think, important criticism has been moved into headquarters so that all payments now are reviewed out of the asset 

forfeiture by a group at DEA headquarters. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So are there standards that are applicable to how much you pay a confidential informant now? 

Mr. PATTERSON. There is so—there is a set of guidelines being 

prepared so that the payments across the country for similar work 

are commensurate with each other. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Being prepared, but has not been prepared? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I should say that there is a panel that reviews each of these payments. And as they find best practices, they 

are putting that in writing, if that makes sense, as they go through 

these processes. This was a process that was probably started, I 

don’t know, maybe about 6 months ago. But I can, again, get more 

information for you and follow up with you on that. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentlelady. The chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Mr. Horowitz, we thank you for your 

continued work. Where would we be without our Inspectors General? 

In your report where you made the five recommendations, you 

lay out the percentages of the confidential informant expenditures:$4.3 million in 2016, and it seems to have averaged that for 

the last several years. 78 percent was listed at ‘‘subsistence payVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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ments’’; 13 percent as ‘‘rewards’’; and 9 percent for ‘‘relocation.’’ Describe what subsistence might be? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. For example, rent, food, other kinds of activity 

payment for transportation, travel. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And that would be limited to $200 per day. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s my understanding. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Times 365 days, that about $73,000 a year. Not 

bad. And yet, if we look at the average salary of an ATF agent, we 

have our entry level agents which go through an awful lot of training to get there, about $34,000 a year for our entry level agents. 

Is that correct, Mr. Turk? 

Mr. TURK. I suspect it is higher than that, sir. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Perhaps with law enforcement incentive pay 

and some of that, but according to your 2016 pay scale, it is about 

$34,000. A $57,000 for mid grade, $73,000 for an agent with full 

performance level, according to your most recent pay chart. It’s almost as if crime pays. And then you look at the agents and their 

effectiveness. In fact, in recent report, ATF agents currently rank 

at the top, or near the top, of all Federal law enforcers in terms 

of arrest, prosecution, referrals and time per defendant. It’s a remarkable record, and yet, we don’t have very many of them. 2,400. 

Is that about correct? 

Mr. TURK. About 2,600, sir. Our men and women are highly effective. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSELL. So when we look at this $4.3 million, we can hire 

anywhere from 75 to 125 agents, depending upon what type of 

scale that we would have, or we can pay it out to somebody arrested in 43 States. 

I’m just curious of your opinion, and first off, I would like to 

thank you not only for your continued service in the ATF and the 

many years you’ve given, but also defending our country in your 

other capacity in the Air National Guard, and I do mean that sincerely. 

You’ve been doing nothing but serving the public and defending 

the country, both domestically and abroad. What’s going to have 

more impact, an ATF agent or some schmuck arrested in 43 

States? 

Mr. TURK. Well, sir, I would say I have several answers for that, 

but man for man, woman for woman, you won’t find any finer than 

an ATF agent to go out and fight violent crime. But if I could put 

that in context, we have 1,600 informants, on average, their pay for 

an entire year is just over $3,000. We have had one informant this 

year that has exceeded the single payment of 100,000; one, sir. 

When we talk about the national lifetime threshold of 200,000, less 

than 10. 

So our informants, by and large, are not getting paid a lot of 

money as the IG indicated. We are paying them for their time basically per day. But I wouldn’t minimize the value necessarily as an 

agent, and I’ve done this for a lot of years, of the value we get out 

of information from an informant. We work the streets a lot. We 

take a lot of pride in the type of work we do with the criminal element on the street. Our undercover agents can only do so much. 

And our local partners can only get so much information. That inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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formation we are getting from our informants is very valuable. And 

I would submit that the amount of taxpayer money, it’s very important and very high risk, it is important that we manage that 

money, but that we get a lot of value for that for criminal investigation. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I appreciate that. And I do know the value 

of using incentives. I’ve done it as a battlefield commander on a 

couple of continents, and you can get some very valuable information. But part of your informants appear, from the IG’s report, to 

be FFLs. Is that correct? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. I believe he was referencing how we manage 

our systems and how we track information. 

Mr. RUSSELL. But many in the tech spot notations according to 

the report, state that they were FFLs. What would that number 

be? 

Mr. TURK. As we speak, sir, that number is 1; historically, it’s 

generally zero. I can assure you that that one FFL that I’m aware 

of, I have personally been briefed on that. The United States Attorney’s Office and another Federal agency are involved. And I am 

confident that our oversight informant is not only meeting a significant investigation, but is also managed very properly. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I would like to take, as I close, Mr. Chairman, 

the opportunity to stress that our FFLs do an awful lot of good 

work in cooperating with the ATF. Many of the crimes that are 

solved are due to the conscientious nature of our Federal Firearms 

Licensees. And I appreciate your comments before we started the 

hearing that the systems you are trying to get in place. And I think 

we’re seeing some movement on that. But we absolutely have to 

manage these millions of dollars in both agencies with a system 

where it is not being wasted. I would rather have a DEA agent, or 

an ATF agent, who is out there putting their lives on the line and 

doing it with not only skill, but integrity, and wasting dollars that 

go like we’ve seen exposed here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Raskin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RASKIN. Very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on 

Mr. Russell’s questioning, if I could, Mr. Turk. When the confidential informants go on the payroll. How are they paid? Is that in 

cash or is it like direct deposit, or how do they make their money? 

Mr. TURK. It’s in cash, sir. 

Mr. RASKIN. And you have got a system in place to monitor that 

cash, it’s not like some cash disbursement systems we saw, I think, 

during the Iraq War where lots of money just disappeared? 

Mr. TURK. We have a lot of safeguards in place for that, sir, including witness payments. And I’m very confident that where we 

have had some shortcomings in the past with managing our CI 

data nationally in a database-type setting, I’m very confident that 

operationally, the way we actually use informants on the streets, 

the way we pay them, the way we engage with them is very appropriate and managed very well. 

Mr. RASKIN. Terrific. Do they pay taxes on the payments they get 

from the ATF? 

Mr. TURK. They should, sir. 


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Mr. RASKIN. Did you do any effort to follow up to determine that 

they actually are paying taxes on it? 

Mr. TURK. The vast majority of our informants I would say no, 

we don’t directly follow up, but I would reflect back, again, that our 

average payment—or our average nationally is $3,000 about for informant. Many informants are getting paid a lot less than that. So 

those are dollar figures where we leave that to them. 

I would also reflect that a lot of our informants, their annual income is probably not necessarily that high. 

Mr. RASKIN. Uh-huh. If you were to try to assess the principle 

value of having conventional—confidential informants, what would 

it be? Is it in the tips and information that you get that then lead 

to investigative breakthroughs, or is it in actual testimony that 

they provide in court? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. The tips and the information that we get 

from our informants in many of our cases is vital to making an effective prosecution. That being said, we work very hard to try and 

maneuver so that a CI is out of the investigation at some point. So 

we typically don’t have a lot of our informants having to testify. 

For example, we’ll introduce an undercover agent, we will move the 

CI on, we will have an undercover agent taking on that responsibility, and thus, we will have an agent testify. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. Do you take precautions to see that the confidential informant’s confidentiality is maintained? I assume some 

of these people could be in serious danger if their identity is revealed. 

Mr. TURK. We do, sir. There are a lot of steps taken to make sure 

that their physical files are properly stored and maintained. And 

to go back in time, the establishment of an initial database, one of 

the challenges we had was dealing with decades of culture where 

such files would never be put into a database, particularly for that 

safety reason. 

Mr. RASKIN. But I noted that there are some foreign national 

confidential informants. Are those people who live in the United 

States or do they live abroad? 

Mr. TURK. No, they would typically be here, sir. 

Mr. RASKIN. Okay. So—that’s all. Thank you very much for your 

testimony to all for the witnesses today. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot of questions. Let me 

start with one that’s been covered already briefly, but in 2011, ATF 

Seattle field office had this serial felon with 43 States in which he 

had committed assaults. Additionally, in that case, the CI’s handler 

had stolen approximately $19,700, right? 

Mr. TURK. I’m not sure if I’m making the connection, sir. The 

scenario you are describing by that informant, I’m not familiar 

with that criminal activity. As portrayed, it sounds awful, but I 

don’t have any details myself of that. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, he committed a crime in a room paid for 

by ATF, he was convicted and sentenced in 2012 to 10 years in 

prison. ATF also discovered the CI’s handler had stolen almost 

$20,000 from the CI’s fund. 


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Now, since that’s what we’re being told here today, that was 

2011, 2012. It’s now 5 years later. How do I know that that’s not 

happening now? Where is the accountability? For example, do you 

issue 1099s as required by law, even for a $3,000 contribution to 

confidential informants, or do you have a specific IRS waiver that 

allows you not to comply with the law? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, back to your first question. I’m not familiar with 

the details of that Seattle case. 

Mr. ISSA. So we’ll go right to the second question: Do you currently—pursuant to the Federal law that all the rest of us have to, 

if you give someone $3,000 for services, you must, in fact, issue a 

1099, do you do so? Do you, in fact, issue a series of documents 

which if received, would cause someone to say, Hey, I didn’t get 

that money, or, Yes, I did, thus giving you a quality loop for the 

question of embezzlement? 

Mr. TURK. I’m not quite sure I understand the question, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. It’s fairly simple, you give in this case $19,000 went, 

$20,000 went missing because one of your agents stole it, back in 

2011. Now the question is, earlier, the gentleman from Maryland 

asked a question that made a lot of sense. You’re giving out money 

and, I guess I’ll go to Mr. Horowitz. Do they issue 1099s? Do they 

have an audit trail where there’s a loop where the IRS knows that 

they’ve given this money and to look for it on someone’s tax filing? 

Do they, in fact, issue them so that they can verify that the money 

has been given versus pocketed by the CI’s handler? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I don’t know specifically as ATF. I can follow up 

with you, but my general understanding is that DOJ law enforcement do not issue 1099s to informants for security reasons and get 

a waiver. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, I would be interested to see the IRS waiver 

that specifically allows, and where the caps are, what the conditions are for it, because at some point, at $3,000, I think we’d look 

at it as kind of a venial sin at 19 and 20 and 100. What was the— 

whatever the figure was for the woman who was having an affair 

with a man and she doesn’t know what she was paid for. And he 

falsified the records so a quarter of a million dollars went to her. 

And they can’t find anything she did, except have an affair. So let’s 

see if we can figure out at what line you start tracking it. 

Let me go to a much greater concern even than dollars spent. As 

you know, Mr. Horowitz, you know in the Fast and Furious, the 

Obama administration willfully and deliberately broke the law and 

conspired to move guns that they knew went to Mexico and other 

criminal activities. More than 2,000 weapons were sold to straw 

people knowingly. Now, if anyone other than the Federal Government does it, that’s a crime. When the Federal Government does 

it, the question is, do they track the crimes they facilitate? Where 

would I find a list of all the criminal activities done or facilitated 

by the two gentlemen to your left? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the actions that were authorized, presumably by the individuals handling the informants, I don’t know of a 

system where they are reporting that to the Congress. 

Mr. ISSA. So for the American people—we’ll ignore the Congress 

for a moment, since we’ll still waiting on documents from Fast and 

Furious from 7 years ago, to internally, if the President of the 


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United States or the Attorney General says, I want to see the list 

of all the criminal activities that my government did on behalf of 

law enforcement, things which would be crimes if not done by the 

government, but they are still basically crimes, selling weapons, allowing illicit drugs to be consumed, et cetera, et cetera. Where 

would the Attorney General find a log in each of these two agencies 

for the criminal activities they facilitated? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I don’t believe there is a centralized database for 

either organization. Although, I would defer to them on this. I 

think you’d have to, in most instances, go file by file. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So for both of you, if your agencies through confidential informants, through sting operations, et cetera, are doing 

things which are criminal activities if done by other than the government, where is the law that says even—not central, just logs of 

other than maybe hidden in a record where somebody could interpret this crime, where is the record of authorization to commit a 

crime in order to support justice? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, if I may take that first. If I heard you right, you 

said earlier you reflected that crimes done by the gentleman to 

your left? 

Mr. ISSA. No, your—not you personally. 

Mr. TURK. —an agent 32 years. And my honor is very important 

so I wanted to make sure. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, so is Attorney General Eric Holder, but he was 

held in contempt because he, in fact, withheld information related 

to crimes. 

My question is from an organizational standpoint, if the IG 

doesn’t know, can you tell me where somebody, yourself included, 

would go to see all the things which are being authorized, which 

would otherwise be crimes, but if somebody’s—— 

Mr. HICE. The gentleman’s time has expired. If we could answer 

the question real quickly. And we need to move on. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. I can tell you just speaking from personal experience, I was brought into ATF to help post F&F. I will hold our 

people accountable wherever necessary. So if you’re asking—— 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, the only question I am asking is, is 

there a log of some sort where people can see the combination of 

U.S. attorney authorization and these agencies going forward? 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in Fast and Furious, everyone 

pointed fingers that it was nobody’s fault that nobody authorized 

2,000 guns to go to Mexico. And so the question is when something 

that is being done that would be a crime, if you did it, is done, 

where can anyone, including the Attorney General, go to see that 

record? And if it doesn’t exist, a simple ‘‘it doesn’t exist’’ would be 

fine. 

Mr. TURK. I’m not aware of any such records, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Patterson, are you aware of any such record? 

Mr. TURK. Electronically, no, sir, but we would have case files 

that would reflect traditional buys in terms of that type of information. And then, certainly, on more sensitive investigations, we have 

a sensitive activity review committee in which all that documentation is kept, but, again, it’s a manual process. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. We now recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, I want to thank you for being here. Your recent 

report revealed serious weakness in the ATF’s oversight of this confidential informant program. The report found, and I quote, ‘‘While 

ATF CI policies generally align with the Attorney General guidelines, ATF’s oversight of its CI program requires significant improvement.’’ 

Mr. Horowitz, why is the oversight of the confidential informants 

comply with the AG’s guidelines important? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, as history as shown, the failure to ensure 

compliance with strict oversight and controls can lead to not only 

unaccountable informants who have—who may think they’ve been 

authorized to engage in certain activities but have not, but it also 

can lead to improper connections, relationships between the handler, the agent who’s handling the informant and the informant. 

And so, you need to have strike rules, policies and procedures in 

place not only to address the relationship between the agent and 

the informant, but also supervision within the field office, and then 

supervision at headquarters. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I want to focus for a minute on one of the concerns raised in the audit, the ATF’s lack of efficient and effective 

recordkeeping. According to the record, and I quote, ‘‘Of particular 

concern during the audits we found that the CI information critical 

to the strategic management of the program was unsophisticated, 

automated system that hindered ATF’s ability to report information in an efficient and reliable way.’’ 

Mr. Horowitz, did that pose challenges to your investigation trying to piece it together? And, in fact, were you significantly 

alarmed that you issued a management advisory to the ATF? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It did impact us and we did issue a management 

advisory because of the concern. It was at about that time that 

ATF was in the process of putting into place an electronic database, because we were stuck, literally, looking through case files to 

try and reconcile payment data which raises concerns not only 

about controls, but as we noted, whether prosecutors had sufficient 

information to be able to comply with their discovery obligations. 

So it creates a whole series of issues. The ATF has now put in 

place its electronic system, and one of the questions, as we go forward is, is the information being entered as it should? And are the 

controls and training in place to do that first step? 

Second step is, is that data then being used in any way to assess 

the value and the continued use of those informants, because that’s 

one of the main purposes, in part, of ensuring central—— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Mr. Turk, could you please answer that question? I want to know is the system, according to your statement 

today, is it fully operational? And are those concerns been alleviated, input being put in on regular basis, and now, therefore, we 

can say collectively that its operating? 

Mr. TURK. Thank you, ma’am. Our system is probably 90 percent 

operational. Regarding that issue that you asked about for tracking 

CI payments, it’s fully operational. We are confident that we can 

track how much our informants have been paid consistently. You 


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mention that matter with the five individual informants that were 

referenced in the referral from the OIG. We took immediate steps 

to review those instances, and did not find that any of those informants had any testimony or any impact on any Federal cases. 

So, I think that’s important to note that. The 10 percent that’s left 

in that database that had I mentioned, we feel that it is not long 

ago. We are waiting for more input from our field special agents 

in charge to help us further address and fine-tune that program. 

So I’m confident that is where it needs to be. I’m confident that we 

have good oversight. But, you know, as all things, we have time 

to—room for improvement, and we are waiting to hear back from 

our field on—— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. What’s the timeline for you to hear back? 

Mr. TURK. I would say within the next 6 months, we will be adjusting that program; some will also be modifying our informant 

policy at that time. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Have you gotten the same amount of confidence 

from the—from Mr. Horowitz that your system is working? 

Mr. TURK. I believe his investigators have looked at that, but 

they have not took a deep dive, for lack of a better word. So I think 

they liked what they saw initially, and we like what we see, too, 

but there is certainly room for review. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. This is a much-needed step forward. I’m disappointed that we had an audit that revealed such an antiquated 

system. And so I’m looking forward to being 100 percent, because 

it is needed for us to be able to have full oversight. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, ma’am, thank you. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. [presiding.] The gentlelady yields. 

I recognize myself now for questions for 5 minutes. And yield 

such time as he may consume to the chairman, Mr. Chaffetz. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Turk, I’d like to start with you. On March 9th of this year, 

this committee held a hearing regarding the death of Agent Zapata. 

You were invited to come to this hearing, correct? 

Mr. TURK. I was, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why weren’t you here? 

Mr. TURK. If you will allow me to explain, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. TURK. We had about, I want to say, a day’s notice with that 

hearing. Right out of the box, we were advised by Department of 

Justice that they thought there were certain, for lack of better 

words, etiquette rules from past committees and past Department 

membership for things like 14-day rules. They talked about how 

most organizations would only send one representative, not multiple representatives, and typically, that that would be the head of 

the agency. It was completely, of my understanding in that of the 

SAC of Dallas, who also was not here, that there was communication not only with ATF, but with the Department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So who made the discussion not to be here? 

Mr. TURK. I would say that was a collective decision. Ultimately, 

we were following guidance by DOJ, and I believe that the SAC 

and I—our lack of attendance here was in good faith, that we were 

operating from guidance from above. And we—— 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, wait. The chairman of the committee 

invites you to come to the hearing, you just unilaterally decided not 

to show up? You didn’t even inform us until, I think it was less 

than 24 hours before the hearing. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, it was my understanding that communication was 

happening throughout that last—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no. Listen, we appreciate being here 

today. I appreciate what you do for this country, but attending a 

congressional hearing is not an optional activity. And I want to be 

crystal clear with you, as I did the acting administrator—the acting—your boss, that it is not an optional activity. And for you to 

let unilaterally, just kind of collectively say, well, two of our people 

aren’t going to show up. Come on, that doesn’t happen in any other 

setting, and you should be ashamed of yourself for that. 

Mr. TURK. Well, sir, I would say, and if you may please allow me, 

because you’re questioning my honor now. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yeah, I am. 

Mr. TURK. I don’t appreciate that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Because you were invited to come—— 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I was following guidance. I’m a good soldier. I was 

following orders. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Who told you not to come? 

Mr. TURK. The Department of Justice decided—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Who? I want to know a name. I don’t want 

to know the—— 

Mr. TURK. There are so many names. I could probably list off 

eight names between the agency and the Department. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Good, start. Give me one. 

Mr. TURK. So—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You’ve got eight names, name them right 

now. 

Mr. TURK. Who all that this was discussed with? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. Who told you not to come? Start naming them. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, you’re suggesting that I shouldn’t follow guidance 

from the Department of Justice? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I want to know who’s giving you that guidance? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I don’t understand how this gets to this point. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You told me there were at least eight and 

that you could name more. So give me one and then we’ll start 

with number two. 

Mr. TURK. Sure. Mr. Ramer, he’s the head of the Office of Legislative Affairs. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Keep going. 

Mr. TURK. Correct? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number two? 

Mr. TURK. There’s several individuals that work in that shop, 

correct? I believe one of them is named Jill Tyson. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Keep going. Number 3? 

Mr. TURK. I don’t recall their names. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number 3? 


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Mr. TURK. I don’t recall his name, but there is another one involved. I know that Zach Terwilliger, from the ODAG’s office, there 

was conversations with him as well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Who else. Number 4? 

Mr. TURK. This information was briefed to the deputy attorney 

general. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number 4. 

Mr. TURK. From ATF, there was discussions with Director Brandon and every one of our assistant—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number 5, name number 5. 

Mr. TURK. Joe Allen, who is our chief of staff. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Number 6? 

Mr. TURK. Right now I’m having a memory block, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You will get me 6, 7 and 8? 

Mr. TURK. I guarantee you I can get you more names than that, 

sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. When, when will you give me those names? 

Mr. TURK. I will give those names as soon as I can recall, sir. 

And I’m sure my staff can help me with that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Give me a date, give me a date when you’re 

going to give me those names. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I would never, ever give dishonor to this committee, or myself, or the agency and fail to appear if I thought for 

a minute that this would have ever happened, not for a minute. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yeah, if you didn’t think there were going 

to be any consequences. You deserve—— 

Mr. TURK. I briefed your staff, I’ve offered three times to meet 

with you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We want you to brief the Members of Congress. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I offered to meet with you personally on this matter the day after that hearing took place. I’ve met with—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no, no, no, no. We do this in the open, 

in the public so all Members of Congress—it is nice that you say 

that you are going to brief staff. 

Mr. TURK. And I am happy to answer that right now—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We want you to—hold on, hold on. We 

want you to brief Members of Congress, not behind closed doors either. You were invited here for a purpose. Now, I appreciate you 

giving me those names. 

Mr. TURK. I came here as a good, honorable person, and you admitted that you challenged my honor. I do not appreciate that. I 

operated in good faith, I had—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Operating in good faith, you didn’t show 

up. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I was told that it was an invitation, as Director 

Brandon explained. I did not know that was not optional. I would 

have happily—I would have happily gone against Department of 

Justice guidelines and been here that day. I have even discussed 

it with Inspector General Horowitz. Everyone I have ever talked to 

about this understands precisely what happened that day, yet, you 

want to get your 15 seconds of YouTube minute time to challenge 

my honor. You know that night, sir, I had to call my sister. My sisVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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ter and brother worked for ICE. It was portrayed that I failed to 

testify—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You did. 

Mr. TURK. —before a hearing. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s a fact. 

Mr. TURK. I did not fail, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That is the fact. You failed to testify. 

Mr. TURK. I was following guidance. I would never dishonor the 

memory of an ICE agent that way. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. In fact, this is what Mr. Brandon said: 

‘‘Well, the decision is theirs voluntarily. To let you know, Mr. 

Chairman, I did not order them not to be here. And no one that 

I know of from the Department ordered them not to be here.’’ Is 

it that correct or incorrect? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, it is my understanding that that was the first 

time he was ever made aware that morning. I think he got caught 

off guard, and I believe you had some words before the hearing 

started. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Is that accurate? 

Mr. TURK. It is not completely accurate, no. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So what Mr. Brandon testified to was not 

accurate? 

Mr. TURK. What he said was well, it is true to the extent, no, 

I was not ordered not to come, no one needed to order me, sir. All 

I need to be is told, I don’t need direct orders. I didn’t need your 

subpoena. If I would have known I needed to be here, I would have 

been here. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. That’s why you were invited to come testify. 

Was it your voluntary decision to do it or not do it? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. I was following guidance. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. To the members of this committee, 

it is stunning that we have to take now 6 minutes to go through 

this. 

Mr. TURK. It is stunning to me that you’re challenging my entire 

career, sir, over a thing that is quite obvious—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I didn’t challenge your entire career. I 

started off by saying we said we appreciate everything you do. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, you did. You’re challenging my honor. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, hold on. When I am asking you a question, you’re going to listen. Okay? I thanked you for your service 

to this country. You’ve done innumerable things that we can’t even 

name here, throughout a long and distinguished career. That is 

why you are in a senior position. But when you are invited to Congress, it is not an optional activity. 

Mr. TURK. You can’t separate my honor from what I do, from my 

career, my life, sir, to your scenario that you’re trying to play out. 

They are one and the same, sir, they are one and the same. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. Well, I’m not here to disparage your 

entire career based on one incident. I’m here to say that that one 

incident was a really, really bad decision. And we’re tired of people 

saying, oh well, I’ll brief staff or I will talk to you privately when 

we’re trying to do it in the open light of day. We have very valuable 


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time and lots of important things to deal with here. That’s why 

when you’re invited to Congress, you’re expected to show up. 

Now, if I have to issue subpoenas to do so, then we will do that. 

And we appreciate you being here today, but we shouldn’t have to 

go through that. I shouldn’t have to go to the U.S. Marshals to go 

deliver you a thing. And for you to suggest that as the chairman 

of the committee I’m just here to get a YouTube moment, are you’re 

kidding me? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I can assure you in the future—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. You don’t think the value we’re trying to 

do on these cases is a value to the American people? When you 

hide information, when you hide information you don’t provide it 

to the United States Congress, you’re having massive problems, 

and we can’t get the answers to the questions we have. There is 

a reason why I do have to issue subpoenas, and these two agencies, 

DEA and ATF, I love the men and women who do this, but the 

management, I have got a serious problem with. That’s why you’re 

getting a gentleman’s C from the inspector general, that is why 

we’re doing these types of hearings, is because you do need to be 

held accountable. And when you’re invited to Congress, you don’t 

sit around and have a group and say, Well, it is probably in our 

best interest not to show up. We act in the best interest of the 

American people, and you don’t respect that. That’s why you didn’t 

show. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I do respect that tremendously, I can assure you 

that in the future, regardless of what guidance I’m given from the 

Department of Justice, I will be very responsive to this committee. 

I can guarantee you that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We understand each other. 

Mr. TURK. Oh, yes, sir. I absolutely value the role of oversight. 

It’s critical, we have to be accountable to the American people, sir. 

I never intended for this to be a personal issue, this is business. 

Unfortunately it became a personal issue. I’m—I will be held accountable for ATF, I am the second in command at ATF, even 

though I’m acting, I am happy to be accountable to the agency for 

anything that happens. You all need something out of this committee, you name it, you got it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. We’ll see. I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Demings for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And this is 

a good place to start with the statement that was just made. We 

do answer to the American people, even when it is uncomfortable 

to do so. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

Mr. Turk, on February 6th of this year, The Washington Post reported on an internal ATF document, dated January 20th, with the 

title, and I quote, ‘‘Options to Reduce or Modify Firearms Regulations.’’ The paper stated, and I quote, ‘‘These general thoughts provide potential ways to reduce or modify regulations, or suggest 

changes that promote Congress and defend the Second Amendment 

without significant negative impact on ATF’s mission to fight violent crime and regulate the firearms industry.’’ 

Mr. Turk, you are listed as the author of this document. Did you, 

in fact, author this document? 


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Mr. TURK. Yes, ma’am, I did. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Why did you write these proposals? 

Mr. TURK. A lot of those proposals, ma’am, were issues that had 

been floating around for years, from the gun industry, in particular, with ATF, many of which, for different reasons, we either 

couldn’t take action on, or really weren’t in the position to openly 

discuss. And with the change in administration, it was our impression that we could expect, from either team coming in, particularly 

after the election, that we could expect a conversation about the 

regulations within the firearms industry. 

And I felt it very important to be able to assemble the ATF executive staff to talk about key issues across the gun industry, to be 

able to have potential positions for the Bureau in place, should we 

be asked by the Department or the administration. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. So they had been forwarding around for years. So 

was that a proactive action on your part, or were you asked to 

write the proposals by anyone in the transition? 

Mr. TURK. I was not asked by anyone to write those proposals, 

ma’am, that was my paper product. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. So you initiated it? 

Mr. TURK. I did. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. In paragraph 8, you wrote, and I quote, ‘‘In the 

past several years, opinions about silencers have changed across 

the United States.’’ Then you wrote, ‘‘Silencers are very rarely used 

in criminal shootings. Given the lack of criminality associated with 

silencers, it is reasonable to conclude that they should not be 

viewed as a threat to public safety necessitating NFA’s classification. So you don’t believe silencers should be regulated under the 

National Firearms Act? 

Mr. TURK. Ma’am, that paper that I wrote was intended for private conversations to elicit discussions amongst other people, key 

staff at ATF. My opinions are not really necessarily relevant. They 

certainly weren’t intended—— 

Mrs. DEMINGS. I think they are very relevant, considering you’re 

a supervisor, manager at ATF, whether private or public. As has 

already been stated, we operate in the sunshine and our opinions— 

I served 27 years in law enforcement, my opinions in private 

mattered in public. So do you believe that silencers should be regulated under—so you don’t believe that silencers should be regulated 

National Firearms Act? 

Mr. TURK. Well, ma’am, I was referencing, if I could, that public, 

private comment in relation to pending legislation. So not necessarily to what I think or don’t think. But it is long. It has been 

historical for ATF, particularly leadership, to not take stances on 

pending legislation, unless we are asked for technical expertise 

from the Members of Congress, or from the administration. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. When you stated that the opinions about silencers have changed in the United States, what did you base that 

statement on? 

Mr. TURK. Well, ma’am, over the past several years many, many 

States that once prohibited use of silencers now authorize the use. 

I believe approximately 42 States now allow for the use of silencers 

in some form. Many years ago, there were few States that allowed 

that. 


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Mrs. DEMINGS. And so I’m trying to understand, Mr. Turk, why 

you would take an active role in this particular topic as an ATF 

agent? 

Mr. TURK. Well, ma’am, on that particular topic, we have had a 

couple of different versions of proposed legislation, if you will, that 

were, again, internal for Department discussion regarding multiple 

things, like a gun trafficking statute. And we know there is pending legislation with silencers as we speak. Some of the pending legislation, you know, there could be some technical concerns with 

some of the proposals being made, so we need to have conversations with ATF to discuss that. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. In paragraph 6, you discuss the import ban on assault weapons put in place by President Bush. You wrote, and I 

quote, ‘‘Restrictions on imports are questionable public safety interest, as these rifles are already generally legally available for manufacturing ownership in the United States.’’ So you also opposed the 

import ban on assault weapons? 

Mr. TURK. No, ma’am, I don’t necessarily have a position on that 

whatsoever. I think it is something that ATF needs to discuss. We 

haven’t done a review of that topic for probably close to 20 years. 

So the firearms industry has changed, and I think it would be appropriate for us to just have that discussion. We meet routinely 

with members, if you will, from both sides of that issue, gun safety 

groups, gun industry groups. We look forward to getting input from 

them from time to time. We will do that again. And I think it’s sort 

of an open issue that we need to have a discussion on. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you. I’m out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. The gentlelady yields. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel. I 

have a couple of disjointed questions, mostly factual ones. I was curious, I saw that ATF, a number of active CIs, confidential informants, over a period from 2012 to 2015, was 1,855. And I was curious if you could give me a sense, maybe the IG’s in the position 

to do this, both with respect to ATF and DEA of what the history, 

in terms of the numbers of CIs, like, has this ramped up significantly in recent years? Is it pretty steady? And if there has been 

a ramp up, has that maybe contributed to some of the problems 

with accountability that we’ve been discussing today? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. My recollection is, although I defer to the two 

agencies, is that the number of informants within the Department 

as a whole has increased over time. The amount of payments have 

increased as a number, a broad number. I don’t have that data in 

front of me. I can get that to you; that’s my general recollection. 

But I think many of the problems here don’t necessarily—that we 

identify, don’t necessarily have do with the number of payments or 

the amount of payments, but rather the controls that were in place 

at the time we did these reviews. 

Just generally, that across the board, that these would have been 

issues whether there were hundreds of informants or 10,000. You 

need basic controls in place, basic data, basic information, to understand what kind of work they are doing? What kind of oversight 

do they have? Is it sufficient and are they providing useful information in return? 


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Mr. SARBANES. Can the agency reps answer that question about 

what the trend has been in terms of the numbers? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, consistently for the last couple of years, we 

have been traditionally been around the number 4,000 active informants. I’d have to go back, and I don’t mind going back to look 

at years before that to see if that number has picked up. I know 

that in the reviews that the OIG did, which, I think, from 2010 to 

’15, during that period, we had 18,000 informants over that span 

of time. So, I mean, if you did the basic math, it would still put 

you roughly in that same area of probably 3- to 4,000, I would be 

more than happy to go back and get those—— 

Mr. SARBANES. I appreciate that. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, with ATF, probably this past year, we came down 

a slight degree. I think over time, our numbers for how many informants we have is pretty consistent, anywhere from 1,500 to 

1,800 or so. And our payments, probably pretty consistent too, 

where we’re averaging roughly 3,000, give or take—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Question for the IG. With respect to DEA and the 

asset seizure and forfeiture, one of the conclusions of the report, I 

guess, is there is no requirement for task force officers to receive 

training on Federal seizures and forfeiture. Has that always been 

the case, or was there one time when training was in place, and 

it has sort of fallen down more recently? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I don’t know the history of it. I defer to Mr. Patterson on that. But I’d be surprised if there was training and then 

someone intentionally took it out. We’ve tended not to see that 

being the process, generally. But I—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Patterson, do you know if there was ever that 

kind of training? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, we have had numerous forms of training, 

probably for the last 20 years. I think the question here is whether 

it was mandated or not, and that training, like I said, in March of 

2016, was mandated for anybody that works interdiction cases. It 

has both interdiction-type training, as well as asset forfeiture training combined in those classes. But again, I can find out if that was 

mandated prior to that. I would agree with Mr. Horowitz, I would 

find it hard to believe that it was mandated and stopped. 

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Horowitz, you concluded that the task force 

officers at DEA made different decisions with respect to seizure of 

proceeds where they should seize all or part so forth in very similar 

situations. Giving rise to the appearance that this was arbitrary, 

can you maybe give us a little more insight into that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly. Well, part of the reason you want 

training when you’ve got deputized officers from State and local jurisdictions from around the country is, they each have different 

rules, law, States, policies. They are dealing with all sorts of different requirements when they are at the State and local level. 

Now they come federally, and there is a series of policies at the 

DEA, for example, if that’s who they are deputized and working 

with, that they are supposed to follow. And the critical nature of 

training, both with regard to making sure that it’s being done properly, consistent with policy and legally—— 

Mr. SARBANES. Was there any evidence, because I will run out 

of time—was there any evidence that there might have been some 


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distorting incentives in play that we’re leading to different treatment of these assets seizures, in some instances, versus others that 

you’re aware of? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I’m not aware of that. Our concern, of course, is 

that if you don’t have consistent operation application of the training and the rules behind it, that you end up with those kind of 

questions, precisely the ones you’re asking, Congressman. 

Mr. SARBANES. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PALMER. The gentleman yields. The chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, last week, your office issued a much-anticipated 

report on the Department’s oversight of cash, seizure and forfeiture 

activities. In recent years, a potential abuse of this tool and its 

widespread views, have attracted significant attention. Your report 

found that DEA accounted for 80 percent of the Department’s total 

cash seizures from fiscal years 2007 to 2016. That amounted to 

$4.2 billion. Is that correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CLAY. As I understand it, DEA can seize cash based on probable cause alone, and does not need to arrest or charge a person. 

In addition, DEA forfeiture frequently occurs without judicial oversight. Is that correct? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s correct. 

Mr. CLAY. Your report asks, how many seizures were connected 

to any criminal investigation? Why was that an important question 

to ask? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, one of the issues that we’ve heard consistently asked of us and that we’ve seen asked of DEA and others in 

the Department is, do the seizures and do the action, the forfeitures, help with criminal cases, with actual cases, whether it’s intelligence or directly linked to a case? And that was what we wanted 

to look at. 

Mr. CLAY. And according to your report, based on a review of a 

sample of 85 high-risk interdiction seizures, only 34 percent had 

any connection to criminal investigations. Do I have that right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That’s right. We could not determine in those 

cases or find evidence in those cases of a connection to a criminal 

case. And one of the challenges we faced is that DEA’s system for 

tracking forfeitures isn’t married to its system for tracking cases. 

And so we had to go back and look manually to make that assessment, and in many of those instances, there was no evidence apparent to us of a connection. 

Mr. CLAY. Now, that’s stunning. That means that, in this sample, 

two-thirds of seizures were not connected to criminal investigations. 

Did the Department thank you for alerting them to this important finding? And just how did they react? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the response from the Department, the 

Criminal Division, I wouldn’t characterize as thanking us; took 

issue with the data and how we went about our work. We stand 

by the methodology we used, and we stand by our findings. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you. 


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And, Mr. Patterson, what was your reaction when you got this 

report? 

Mr. PATTERSON. Sir, I got the report last week, and I read it over 

the weekend. And in this case, I think I see both sides. I think that 

OIG was very clear that they said they reviewed a judgmental 

sample of the 100 cases that posed the highest risk for concern. I 

also understand the Department’s position, which that doesn’t necessarily reflect the entire asset forfeiture community. 

To go back to one of the points that you just raised, whether it’s 

administrative, civil, or criminal, all of our seizures are reviewed 

by Department of Justice attorneys. In the administrative, obviously, there is not a legal proceeding that occurs. 

And I’d like to add one other comment, which is—and I think, 

to Mr. Horowitz’ point, and it is a difficult challenge for us—is that 

we need to be able to better capture and explain the cases, especially in the interdiction arena, that occur and how they tie in to 

other cases. That is a struggle we have. The CATS system that he 

referred to that tracks the assets is not a system that allows that, 

but that’s on DEA to be able to do a better job of explaining that. 

Although what I will say is, overall, I think probably the vast majority of our cases, one, end up either criminally or civilly and, secondly, I think you would see are very reflective of ongoing criminal 

investigations because it’s an important tool we use to deny revenue to those groups. 

Mr. CLAY. Now, you understand the public perception on this and 

the optics are real bad. I mean, are your agencies arbitrarily making these decisions, or are we like, ‘‘This artwork over here; let’s 

take this too?’’ I mean, do you see the optics can be kind of negative for reflection? 

Mr. PATTERSON. I completely understand the optics, but I also 

think that you have to truly read the report. Again, I’m not being 

critical of anybody. I think you have to understand how this was 

done. I don’t disagree with the approach that OIG took in doing it, 

but I also don’t think it represents the overall Asset Forfeiture Program. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

I would love to hear more on this—just this subject alone by this 

committee. I think it’s quite important. And I know my office takes 

in complaints as well as others on this subject matter, and so perhaps we can explore another hearing on this. 

Mr. PALMER. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Turk, what’s the F in ATF stand for? 

Mr. TURK. Firearms, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And what is your mission with respect to firearms? 

Mr. TURK. We have a dual mission, sir. We work with and regulate the industry, the gun industry, and we also enforce the Federal firearms criminal laws. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And you wrote a white paper—I’m following up 

on Mrs. Demings’ questions dated January 20th. And you’ve testiVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:19 Sep 07, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26553.TXT APRIL

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fied that no one asked you to write that paper. You just kind of 

thought time for a white paper on this subject? 

Mr. TURK. I did write the paper, sir. As I said, a lot of those 

thoughts came from others and myself that had been in the works 

for years. So I didn’t necessarily develop it in and of itself. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. A lot of those thoughts read like an NRA white 

paper. Do you represent the NRA, or do you represent the American people at ATF? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I represent ATF. And with all due respect, sir, if 

you would read—there are portions of that report that I believe— 

you could argue that there are portions of that report that—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Turk, I represent 

victims from Virginia Tech in my district. We buried six young people. And I couldn’t explain to them why an ATF agent or representative would think legalizing silencers might be a good idea or rolling back dealer oversight with respect to law enforcement, examining allowing dealers to avoid reporting requirements. That’s in 

your white paper. Considering dropping a proposed long-term sales 

records requirement that helps local law enforcement trace gun 

crimes and having further discussion on curtailing the 

antitrafficking program that requires dealers in Southeast—Western States to notify ATF of multiple sales of high-powered rifles. 

You think those are all measures to protect public safety? Is that 

your position? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, they are all just discussion points. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Discussion points? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. After everything this country has been through, 

you think it’s time to have that discussion? You cited, in response 

to Mrs. Demings, that what really spurred you was a change in administrations, correct? 

Mr. TURK. I also indicated that I believe I would have written 

the paper had the—it gone in a different direction—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Mrs. Demings comes from local law enforcement. I was the county chairman. I dealt with law enforcement in my county. Big city police departments came to you and 

said, ‘‘It’s time that we actually unshackle these requirements, 

ATF; we’d welcome this discussion,’’ like Chicago, right? Or New 

York? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I believe a lot of those issues in that paper have 

been and will continue to be discussed with law enforcement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did you discuss this white paper with the NRA? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You had no input from the NRA? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You had no outside input of any kind? 

Mr. TURK. Well, sir, over time, we’ve had outside input from 

many organizations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m talking about your white paper, January 

20th. 

Mr. TURK. Well, yes, sir. Many of the ideas in my paper came 

from other organizations’ issues over the years. None of them necessarily at that timeframe, but of course, it wasn’t just my—those 

weren’t just—— 


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Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m going to take a page out of the chairman’s 

book. Name one. What outside group? 

Mr. TURK. For example—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How many, by the way? Eight? 

Mr. TURK. I don’t know if I can give you a number, sir. I can give 

you an example, though. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. How about you give me a group that 

helped—that you talked to. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. One of the issues in the paper discussed licensing and the ability of licensees to sell only at gun shows. That 

issue was brought up through an organization that represents gun 

show—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What organization is that, Mr. Turk? 

Mr. TURK. I can’t remember the name, sir, but it’s a gun show 

organization. I can get back to you with the exact name. But they 

came to us with a written request for an answer from ATF: Can 

we, as an organization, license someone to be an FFL, a Federal 

firearms licensee, that predominantly only sells at gun shows? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, Mr. Turk, I want to give you one more 

chance. You are under oath. You’ve had no conversation or input 

from the NRA on this paper? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, they must be doing a jig over at NRA headquarters, which is in my district, having read this white paper. I 

must tell you: I would have a lot of trouble explaining your 

thoughts in this white paper to the victims I represent from Virginia Tech. 

I yield what little time I have to Mrs. Demings if she wishes to 

pursue. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. No. I just want to thank my colleague for that 

line of questioning. As well, I’m from the Orlando Police Department. I spent 27 years there. We’ve just buried one of our officers 

who was a victim of gun violence, and I’m sure you and everybody 

in the world know about the 49 victims who were shot and killed 

in a nightclub doing nothing to harm anybody but just in the 

wrong place. 

And I wonder, Mr. Turk, what would have happened had the 

shooter had a silencer on the end of his assault rifle when he entered that club? Do you believe it would have helped the shooter 

or help the victims who ran for their lives once they heard the 

sound of gunfire? 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURK. Ma’am, that was an absolute tragedy, and the men 

and woman, I can assure you, work every day within ATF to fight 

violent crime and reduce the gun violence. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. [Presiding.] I now recognize myself. 

Our committee is looking into what happened with ATF’s disciplinary process with respect to two ATF officials involved in Fast 

and Furious and also the arson investigation of former Special 

Agent Jay Dobyns in his home. For those of you that aren’t as familiar, Mr. Dobyns’ home was burned down after receiving threats 

flowing from his undercover work in infiltrating the Hells Angels, 

a matter that yielded dozens of arrests, indictments, and resulted 

in multiple prosecutions. 


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At the heart of both of these matters were two ATF special 

agents from the Phoenix field division, Special Agent in Charge 

William Newell and Assistant Special Agent in Charge George Gillett. 

In the Dobyns case, Mr. Gillett and Mr. Newell were implicated 

by ATF’s Office of Professional Responsibility for serious 

wrongdoings in investigating the arson at the agent’s home. 

Are you familiar with the Office of Professional Responsibility’s 

October 2012 report, Mr. Turk? 

Mr. TURK. Not specifically, sir. I’ve heard parts of that, but I 

don’t recall ever reading it. I’m assuming you’re referencing the 

fire, not Fast and Furious, sir? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The what? 

Mr. TURK. You’re referencing the ATF Internal Affairs investigation related to the fire, not the OIG—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. It got into a number of things. But it 

is the specific report, case No. 20120079. The Office of Professional 

Responsibility report led to a notice of proposed removal for both 

of these officials. Both were proposed for removal for their role in 

Fast and Furious as well. So it did hit on both. 

What was your position at that time? Do you recall? 

Mr. TURK. What year was that, sir? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. This was October of 2012. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. I would have been the Assistant Director for 

Field Operations, and I would have taken that position slightly earlier that year. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So you’re in charge of field operations. This 

is field operations really gone awry. Would you agree? 

Mr. TURK. I would certainly agree that there were some concerns 

with that overall investigation, but I also—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Do you recall what happened to Mr.—these 

two, Mr. Newell and Mr. Gillett? Were either of them removed? 

Mr. TURK. No, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No. They weren’t. So here’s the problem: 

You have an Office of Professional Responsibility. Here’s the report. 

It’s long. It’s thick. It’s detailed. It’s specific, and it comes to a conclusion for removal, and neither of them were removed. 

If you can’t get fired for—I mean, orchestrating Fast and Furious 

is one of the most egregious uses of law enforcement. I mean, it’s 

just a debacle from start to finish, to say the least. And people lost 

their lives as a consequence of that. And then to compound that, 

to try to wrongly frame a fellow agent for a crime—I mean, if you 

can’t get fired for that, what are you going to get—what are you 

going to get fired for? Why didn’t that happen? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, in general—I appreciate the question. I have very 

much throughout my career, when it was appropriate, held people 

accountable. In this particular instance, I was not in the position 

to review all of the records or be in a position to take action. They 

are personnel matters, and I would not be in a position to take an 

opinion one way or another because I never saw all the facts that 

were involved. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. But you are in a position now, correct? 

Mr. TURK. I would be now, correct—— 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. TURK. —but coming into this new position, I—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So would you—the committee would like 

you to produce those documents we requested regarding the discipline in the Jay Dobyns matter. Is that something you’ll provide 

this committee? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, it’s my understanding that those documents may 

have been provided in camera for review. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, but there’s a difference between in 

camera review and actually providing them to the committee. 

Will you provide to this committee the draft settlement agreement emailed to George Gillett? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I’m—I’m not—I don’t necessarily—I have not seen 

that product. I don’t know what that says. I’m under guidance—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I will take you at your word that you 

haven’t seen it. My question, though, is, will you get it and provide 

it to the committee? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, this is very similar, if I could—I understand you 

want straight talk, and I appreciate that completely. This is very 

similar to the order that was brought up earlier. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Right. Yeah. 

Mr. TURK. I’m operating under guidance from the Department of 

Justice and statutes that actually reflect on the disclosure of personnel—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Which statute says that Congress—that 

Congress can’t see something? Tell me which statute that is. 

Mr. TURK. I’m not aware of any such thing, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Oh, you just said there was a statute that 

may have prohibited this. 

Mr. TURK. I’m talking about in a public setting, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I’m not asking you to read it out loud in 

this public setting but providing—we are the recipient of highly 

classified information on a regular basis. In our little exchange a 

few minutes ago, you assured me that whatever I wanted to see, 

whatever—you would give me whatever I wanted to get. So I’m 

asking very specifically for the documents regarding the disciplinary matter of Mr.—regarding the Dobyns case, and I’m also asking for the settlement agreement that you mailed—emailed—not 

you personally but the Department, emailed to George Gillett. I 

want straight talk from you. Are you or are you not going to provide that to us? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I’ll take that back to the Department. If I’m given 

authorization by—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Who makes that decision? So you are not 

a decisionmaker. Who makes that decision? 

Mr. TURK. That decision would come from the Department of 

Justice. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I know, but—— 

Mr. TURK. I—I believe the—it could be a couple of different 

shops. It could be the Office of Legislative Affairs. It would be the 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Legislative Affairs? 

Mr. TURK. I suspect the Deputy Attorney General’s Office. 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Why does Legislative Affairs—they are 

not—the job of Legislative Affairs is not to be the road block, the 

speed bump on the way to Congress. I know that’s what they do. 

That—they—they get paid. I wish they would look in the mirror 

and self-assess what their role in life is, because Congress has 

some work to do. And, obviously, we’re having a hearing again because there’s a problem. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. Sir, I’m—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And oversight—let me give you some history. In 1814, they founded this committee. Okay? We’ve seen a few 

things on this committee. It was to oversee every expenditure on 

everything we do in Congress. It’s one of the unique things is I can 

unilaterally sign a subpoena. I shouldn’t have to do that. You 

should provide that material and not go ask some, you know, desk 

jockey, who just decides that it’s easier not to comply with the Constitution and not comply with Congress’ request. 

I want to just be crystal clear: We want all of that information. 

If you’re not going to give it to me, tell me, because I’ll just sign 

a subpoena. I don’t need to ask anybody. I don’t need to go to a 

judge. 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I personally don’t have any problem with the committee getting any of those documents that we’ve discussed. I 

haven’t seen anything—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Then get them and give them to us. 

Mr. TURK. —but I do have to follow guidance from my superiors 

as well. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. That’s this dam that we’re trying to 

undo, you know, openness, transparency. You give a lot of lip service, but then when it comes to the reality of actually getting these 

documents—we have the chairman of the Judiciary Committee in 

the Senate; you have the chairman of the Oversight Committee. 

We’re both asking for the information. And you all won’t provide 

it because there’s some, again, desk jockey sitting at DOJ making 

who knows how much money saying, ‘‘Nah, they don’t need to see 

it.’’ That’s not how America works. That’s not how Congress works. 

We’re accountable to the people of the United States of America. 

That’s the way it’s supposed to work. 

So—and don’t—you don’t need to answer this. Okay? But I want 

you and your patriotic commitment to this country to help us break 

down that wall. 

Mr. TURK. I would love—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I don’t want to get in a fight with all. You 

guys do amazing things. And the other self-assessment—it’s just 

me just giving this free advice—there’s the United States Constitution, and then there’s DOJ guidance. You’ve got to make a personal 

decision: Which is more important? And help us break down those 

walls. That goes for everybody here. This is unbelievable what gets 

hidden from Congress and what gets—we’re different in the United 

States America. We are self-critical. We do look under the rocks. 

We do go find out what’s wrong, and then we take that and make 

it better. That’s what makes this country great, but that’s not what 

happens on a daily basis at the Department of Justice. 

And it seems to be it doesn’t matter who’s in charge. There’s this 

bureaucracy that puts up this wall that says, ‘‘The American people 


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don’t need to hear that; we’ll protect them.’’ Well, the only way we 

can protect them is actually have somebody looking over the shoulder to make sure they’re telling the truth and doing things on the 

up-and-up. 

And in the case of Mr. Dobyns, it is unbelievable. You had a professional go in there with a staff and look at this report. Please familiarize yourself with it. The reason we do that is so we don’t 

make that mistake again. And that’s the spirit in which we’re trying to do our jobs. 

And you’re in a difficult spot. Okay? You are getting a lot of people telling you not to do things, and so just communicate that with 

us. We’ll blow right past it. We’ll go right to the subpoenas and—— 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I will do everything in the power that my minimal 

office has to make that happen, but it’s not my decision. I don’t disagree in general with any of these discussions—— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. —I need the names because I want to drag 

them in here, and we’re going to have quite a hearing with people 

who are making these decisions. 

Mr. TURK. I have made that recommendation that we disclose 

some of those documents already, sir, and I will continue to. I assure you that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And if there is somebody giving 

you a road block, I’m asking you to please provide those members— 

those names to Congress. And we can put you in the Witness Protection Program if you need be. Okay? We can do that. Thank you. 

We’ll now recognize Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask you something, Mr. Turk. 

I’m looking at your white paper, ‘‘Options to Reduce or Modify 

Firearm Regulations,’’ and I notice that it’s interesting that it’s 

dated on Inauguration Day. Help me with that. Why is that? 

Mr. TURK. Sir, I’ve been asked that question several times recently by members of the media. I don’t really know. I signed that 

on the 23rd on the last page. I’m not sure why that’s there on that 

day. I suspect when I came in—I’ve been working on parts of that 

document, and some of that has been cut and pasted from documents of mine in the past. I suspect I may have worked on that 

that day some, and that date may have gotten on the cover. There’s 

no significance of that to me. I recognize the significance of that 

day nationally, but I signed that on the 23rd. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I’m reading from an article in The Washington Post, dated February 6th. It says, ‘‘Senior ATF Official Proposes Loosening Gun Regulations.’’ It says: ‘‘The second highest 

ranking official at the Bureau of ATF, has written a proposal to reduce gun regulations, including examining a possible end to the 

ban on importing assault weapons into the United States.’’ 

This is your paper, right? 

Mr. TURK. It is my paper. I believe that may be a slight 

mischaracterization from the paper—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, why don’t you tell me what this is, then? 

I mean, did you—you were involved in it. Is that right? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Were you the second highest ranking official? 

Mr. TURK. I was. I still am. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. So why don’t you tell me your role in the paper, 

then, with the paper. 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. That particular issue, ATF from time to time 

is asked to make determinations, not only on individual type firearms and how they are classified, but also on broader issues for 

things like importation. On that particular issue, we haven’t looked 

at that matter for almost 20 years. So we’re getting questions, particularly from the gun industry, but also from others from time to 

time on where do we stand on these issues. 

I think it’s time for ATF to reexamine that. I don’t particularly 

have a position myself at all one way or the other, nor do I necessarily recommend a position on that matter one way or the other 

for the agency. I do think it’s time to have that conversation. I 

think it’s appropriate as things change. Some of things—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Hold it right there. Let’s put a pin on there. Hold 

on a second. 

Mr. TURK. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You say ‘‘as things change.’’ What has changed? 

Mr. TURK. The firearm—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wait. Wait. Wait. Let me just finish. In my 

neighborhood, people are still getting blown away with assault 

weapons. I live in Baltimore, in the inner city. People can get a gun 

faster than they get a cigarette. But, anyway, you go ahead. I’m 

trying to figure out what’s changed. 

Mr. TURK. I understand. I think we take the gun violence in Baltimore very seriously, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I know you do. It’s important. 

Mr. TURK. The gun industry, particularly when it relates to your 

modern sporting firearms type platforms, for example your M4s, 

your AKs, the products that can go with those over the last two 

decades has changed tremendously. So one slight variance in a 

stock or in a grip or in a—can change the classification of the firearm. And the gun industry—some manufacturers are pushing that 

right to the envelope, and they are coming to the ATF, and we’re 

constantly having to reexamine, what is this classified as? Is this 

a machine gun? Is it not a machine gun? Is it a short-barreled 

rifle? Is it not. So the dynamics for where we operate in a broad 

sense and what we thought could be imported to the United States 

20 years ago has changed significantly. 

I think people have perhaps misunderstood some of the way I 

wrote that paper. I think it’s a subject for discussion. I don’t necessarily think we should open up the floodgates for more things 

coming into this country. As a matter of fact, there may be certain 

areas where we should not do that. But I think it’s appropriate for 

us within ATF to have that conversation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Mr. TURK. Some of these matters, sir, have been—we’ve been reluctant to discuss some of these things for years in ATF. I think 

that’s not healthy. I think it’s important for our staff to be able to 

totally discuss the entire broad range of gun regulatory issues and 

get input from all communities and then present reasonable recommendations that don’t impact public safety. 


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If something is going to negatively impact public safety and we 

think it’s going to directly lead to more shootings, I can assure you 

it won’t have my name behind it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, let me tell you: I have spent a lot of time 

defending the ATF, and I think the ATF has been treated look a 

stepchild that’s not liked. And when you say that you—you know, 

the gun industry—I think that’s what you said—has some input, 

I got that. 

The question is—and this is where I really get confused. My law 

enforcement folks are telling me that folks have armor-piercing 

guns, and they’re trying to shut this stuff down. What—do you 

hear from them too? 

Mr. TURK. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so what do you hear from them? Because 

I’m wondering how much balance there is when you have someone 

like the NRA, which is extremely powerful, although its members 

believe in gun safety, reasonable gun safety, apparently the gun 

manufacturers are not necessarily in tune with the membership, 

the rank-and-file membership, of the NRA. So I’m just wondering 

how do the—my law enforcement, who I support a million percent—you know, if I’ve got people who are going out there, and 

they’re worried that there’s going to be say, for example, armorpiercing weapons, and my police chief tells me the folks in some 

of these neighborhoods in some instances have weapons more powerful than what they have. 

So what—how does ATF strike that balance at the appropriate 

moments? I mean, what do you—how does that affect you all? I get 

the impression that the gun lobby has extremely strong views and 

expresses them. And I’m just wondering, how about police officers? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir. I think there are broad opinions across the 

board. Our partnerships with our State and local partners with law 

enforcement are critical to ATF. I mean, that is our bread-and-butter mission working violent street crimes. And we would never take 

a regulatory step that would intentionally put any law enforcement 

or the public in jeopardy at all. 

We talk to law enforcement all the time, sir. We have memberships on, for example, IAC, International Association of Chiefs of 

Police committees, Major City Chiefs committees. All of our agents 

in charge and our supervisors are very much in tune with their 

local city and State police entities. We’re getting input from them 

all the time. Our public and governmental affairs folks routinely 

meet with them and hear from them as well. 

That particular issue you’re talking about, without getting too 

detailed about armor-piercing ammo, I don’t believe we would be 

in a position—I don’t believe we would support anything that 

would directly lay—I mean, for example, the law doesn’t allow for 

pistols to have armor-piercing ammo. So what’s up for discussion 

is rifle—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just used that as one example. Let me—we’re 

having to have to—we’ve been here for a while. But let me—I have 

been watching this. I’ve been in and out, but I’ve been watching it 

back there. We have video back there. We can see you in the room 

there, and I’ve watched all this. I want to go back to something 

very quickly that you and the chairman got into. 


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You know, you kept saying that the chairman was—I can’t remember the exact words you used, but basically violating your 

honor. Your honor. Am I right? 

Mr. TURK. I said that at the time. I don’t—yeah. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me tell why you I’m bringing this up. We get 

very frustrated when we cannot get information to do our jobs. And 

it’s not about your honor. It has nothing to do with your honor. As 

a matter of fact, I think you took it there, but it wasn’t—it’s not 

about that. It’s about whether we can get the information we need 

so that we can do our job. It’s simple. It’s not complicated. 

And when you get an invitation—I forget the gentleman’s name 

who appeared the last time, but he was very clear that, you know, 

he had a misunderstanding, I guess. Maybe you had a misunderstanding. But that’s not about your honor. That’s about, again, us 

trying to get the information we need so that we can do our job. 

That doesn’t mean you haven’t been a great soldier; you haven’t 

been, you know, doing a great job. You follow what I’m saying? 

Mr. TURK. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. Because sometimes I think we can take 

things so far, and it doesn’t have to go that far. As a matter of fact, 

when we take it that far, a lot of times we still don’t end up getting 

what we need because we lose sight of what we were talking about 

from the very beginning. 

And I’m hoping that you can get us whatever the chairman has 

asked for. I think he’s been very reasonable. We try hard to work 

with our witnesses. We try to have as much latitude as we possibly 

can. But at some point, we got to have what we need to do our job. 

You got me? 

Mr. TURK. Absolutely, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right now. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Just an invitation here at the end if you have any last comment. 

Otherwise, we are going to close the hearing. Anybody have something they want to share? All right. 

We want to thank you for taking time to appear today. Again, 

we appreciate the men and women who are on the front line doing 

the hard work here. 

We’d ask unanimous consent that members have 5 legislative 

days to submit questions for the record. We’d appreciate your helping to follow up with those. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

If there’s no further business, without objection, the committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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