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97–448 PDF 2004

THE NATION’S FLU SHOT SHORTAGE: WHERE ARE

WE TODAY AND HOW PREPARED ARE WE FOR

TOMORROW?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 2004

Serial No. 108–246

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on November 17, 2004 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Gerberding, Dr. Julie L., Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy

and Infectious Diseases; and Dr. Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration ....................................................... 137

Pien, Howard, president, chief executive officer, and chairman of the

board, Chiron Corp.; Kathleen Coelingh, senior director, regulatory and

scientific affairs, MedImmune, Inc.; Dr. Robert Stroube, Virginia State

health commissioner, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials; and Dr. Jerome Klein, professor of pediatrics, Boston University

School of Medicine ........................................................................................ 245

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burgess, Hon. Michael C., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Texas, prepared statement of .................................................................. 404

Coelingh, Kathleen, senior director, regulatory and scientific affairs,

MedImmune, Inc., prepared statement of ................................................... 266

Crawford, Dr. Lester M., Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 192

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 392

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 5

Fauci, Dr. Anthony S., Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, prepared statement of ........................................................ 170

Gerberding, Dr. Julie L., Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, prepared statement of .................................................................... 140

Klein, Dr. Jerome, professor of pediatrics, Boston University School of

Medicine, prepared statement of ................................................................. 287

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 396

Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 308

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 390

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, article dated October 23–24, 2004 ................................................. 221

Owens, Hon. Major R., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 309

Pien, Howard, president, chief executive officer, and chairman of the

board, Chiron Corp., prepared statement of ............................................... 248

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 306

Stroube, Dr. Robert, Virginia State health commissioner, Association of

State and Territorial Health Officials, prepared statement of ................. 278

Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 387

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 398

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California:

Memo dated November 17, 2004 .............................................................. 10

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 130

(1)

THE NATION’S FLU SHOT SHORTAGE: WHERE

ARE WE TODAY AND HOW PREPARED ARE

WE FOR TOMORROW?

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Davis, Shays, Mica, Duncan, Deal,

Murphy, Waxman, Lantos, Owens, Towns, Sanders, Maloney,

Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Van Hollen,

Ruppersberger, Norton, Cooper, and McCollum.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director, David Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Keith Ausbrook, chief

counsel; Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior policy counsel;

Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and investigations;

Anne Marie Turner, counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/parliamentarian; Robert White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; Susie Schulte, professional staff member;

Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah Dorsie, deputy clerk; Allyson

Blandford, office manager; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information

officer; Phil Barnett, minority staff director; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications director/senior policy advisor; Anna Laitin, minority communications and policy assistant; Sarah Despres and Naomi Seller,

minority counsels; Richard Butcher and Josh Sharfstein, minority

professional staff members; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and

Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. A quorum being present,

the Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I want

to welcome everybody to today’s oversight hearing regarding this

year’s U.S. influenza vaccine supply.

As most are now aware, on October 5, 2004, the Medicines and

Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, United Kingdom’s version

of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, suspended Chiron

Corp.’s manufacturer’s license for a period of 3 months. Chiron

planned on delivering 46 to 48 million doses of flu vaccine, almost

half of the U.S. supply.

This committee’s investigation into the issues surrounding the

flu vaccine shortage began at a flu pandemic hearing in February

of this year. The committee informed U.S. health officials of its conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cern that Chiron did not have a manufacturing plant located within the United States. So should a flu pandemic occur, it was theorized that the U.K. could nationalize Chiron’s vaccine supply, resulting in the loss of half of our national supply.

At an emergency hearing on October 8, 2004, the committee discussed contributing factors to the flu vaccine shortage, how the

government and vaccine manufacturers were responding to and

managing the crisis, and what steps would be taken to prepare for

next year’s flu season.

As a result of testimony at these two hearings, Ranking Member

Henry Waxman and I sent a letter to the FDA requesting documents that would indicate whether FDA knew about the problems

at the Chiron facility and whether FDA responded adequately.

As part of this committee’s investigation, I led a congressional

delegation to London last week to meet with top-ranking officials

from the MHRA and Chiron. The committee also conducted an extensive meeting with FDA officials in Washington to discuss FDA

documents and the committee’s findings from meetings held in

London. These meetings were extremely productive, provided the

committee with a timeline of events leading up to October 5, 2004

the standard protocols used by MHRA and FDA, and the steps all

parties involved are taking to prevent future vaccine shortages.

The FDA documents and investigative meetings held by the committee confirmed several key facts. First and foremost, FDA was

unaware prior to October 5, 2004 that MHRA would suspend

Chiron’s manufacturing license.

On October 25, 2004, Chiron contacted the FDA to alert the

agency there may be a delay in its vaccine shipment, as contamination was located in some lots of Chiron’s flu vaccine. All documents

and meetings confirm that FDA followed routine protocol in responding to Chiron’s initial contact with FDA and continued to follow protocol with each step the agency took after October 25th.

Chiron also notified FDA that it had conducted an internal failure investigation to discover how the contamination occurred. It is

standard protocol for FDA to have a manufacturer’s failure investigative report in hand when conducting an inspection. The FDA

uses that report in determining cause and the report serves as a

roadmap for the inspection. Chiron informed FDA that it would receive the internal report the week of October 4, 2004. FDA has informed the committee that it believed this was a reasonable timeframe. During this time, FDA was in constant communication with

officials from Chiron and immediately alerted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention about the delay in Chiron’s shipment.

Unfortunately, the internal report was not provided to FDA until

after Chiron’s license suspension. The MHRA, however, was provided with Chiron’s findings on September 24, 2004. As a result,

MHRA concluded its final investigative visit to Chiron on September 30, 2004. The FDA has since reviewed the report and instructed committee staff that had the agency received the draft report sooner, the Chiron facility would have been reinspected,

whether or not MHRA suspended Chiron’s manufacturing license.

FDA, MHRA, and Chiron all agree that Chiron’s license suspension resulted from systematic problems within Chiron’s Liverpool

facility, based on a lack of manufacturing oversight and execution.

3

In addition, all parties agree that prior inspections conducted by

both FDA and MHRA at the Chiron facility did not foreshadow the

license suspension. While some issues at the facility continued from

2003 until September 2004, Chiron’s license suspension wasn’t

based on contamination in flu vaccine lots or other issues that were

addressed in previous inspections. It would be inappropriate to

imply that problems at the Chiron facility in 2003 recurred in 2004

and contributed to the closure of the facility.

Questions have been asked as to why FDA was kept in the dark

regarding Chiron’s license suspension until October 5th. Pursuant

to the U.K.’s Medicines Act, MHRA is prohibited from sharing commercial information without the consent of the manufacturer involved. FDA, MHRA, and Chiron all informed committee staff that

it is widely accepted and understood that the two agencies do not

discuss their own actions with regard to companies over which they

each have jurisdiction. In addition, it would be standard procedure

for Chiron not to discuss this interaction with FDA or MHRA with

the other agency. Since October 5th, Chiron has permitted FDA

and MHRA to communicate on all issues.

This investigation has been conducted in a bipartisan manner.

Politics has no place in the public health arena. I hope that this

spirit of cooperation isn’t threatened today by those who choose to

ignore standard FDA protocol, accepted by vaccine manufacturers

worldwide, and place the sole blame for the flu vaccine shortage on

a single agency, rather than taking an objective look at all of the

facts presented during the committee’s investigation. If protocols

need to be tweaked, however, then let us talk about tweaking

them.

After all, should FDA be held accountable for decisions made by

Chiron without its knowledge or for actions taken by MHRA that

were legally protected by the law of the U.K.? If the committee

spends too much time placing blame and pointing fingers, we will

be unable to look to the future to ensure that the United States has

an adequate flu vaccine supply. Let’s let experience be our teacher.

My main goals in this investigation are to understand the lessons

learned from the events leading up to and occurring since October

5, 2004, and, most importantly, to work vigilantly with U.S. health

officials and private industry to ensure that a similar situation

does not occur in the future.

Based on my findings with the FDA, MHRA, and Chiron, I am

optimistic that Chiron will be able to produce vaccine for next

year’s flu season. The license suspension didn’t prohibit Chiron

from procuring its startup materials for next year. As of today,

Chiron has contracted and paid for its egg supply for the 2005–

2006 flu season. MHRA is extremely pleased with the remediation

plan that Chiron has submitted, and a followup inspection will be

conducted in late December to evaluate Chiron’s progress.

It is important to recognize there is a need to expand the current

number of FDA approved flu vaccine manufacturers and to bring

those manufacturers into the U.S. markets. We are going to work

on legislation designed to provide incentives to flu vaccine manufacturers in hopes that we can stimulate the vaccine market domestically.

4

Since our October 8, 2004 hearing, both Aventis Pasteur and

MedImmune have been able to produce additional doses of flu vaccine. FDA has also identified and negotiated for approximately 5

million doses of flu vaccine from foreign manufacturers. Additionally, the Nation has a supply of enough antiviral medicines to treat

about 40 million people. These antiviral drugs can be used to prevent or treat the flu if symptoms are identified early.

Our witnesses today will discuss how U.S. health officials are

procuring and adequately distributing the flu vaccine to the highrisk population and preparing for next year’s flu season, and what

incentives can be provided to manufacturers to ensure a stable annual flu vaccine supply.

In addition, I am pleased that Howard Pien, the president of

Chiron Corp., is present to speak publicly for the first time since

October 5, 2004. I know we are anxious to hear his testimony as

to Chiron’s remediation plan and how Chiron is moving forward in

preparation for next year’s flu season.

We have an excellent roster of witnesses, and I would like to

thank all of them for appearing before the committee, and look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. I would now like to yield to Mr. Waxman

for an opening statement.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Chairman Davis, for holding this hearing on the flu vaccine shortage. You and I share the goal of establishing a healthy vaccine supply in the United States, and effective

government oversight is an important part of this process.

This year’s flu vaccine crisis raises three important oversight

questions.

The first question is how the United States came to depend on

just two companies for the flu vaccine. The Institute of Medicine,

the Government Accountability Office, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee have all issued reports exposing the weakness of

our national vaccine infrastructure, and we can’t afford to ignore

their recommendations any longer. And they have been making

recommendations since the year 2001.

The second question is why the vaccine shortage led to such confusion and chaos. In a series of reports over the last 4 years, GAO

repeatedly warned that the United States does not have a plan to

ensure that the highest risk people are immunized in the event of

a shortage. The seniors who have been standing in lines for hours

trying to get a flu vaccine know that GAO was right.

And the third question is the primary subject of today’s hearing:

Did FDA do its job to protect the U.S. vaccine supply?

Since the vaccine shortage began, senior administration officials,

including Acting FDA Commissioner Lester Crawford, have been

reassuring the public that the FDA made no mistakes and did everything possible to protect the vaccine supply.

Today we will evaluate those claims.

On October 13th, Chairman Davis and I asked FDA to provide

copies of documents relating to its oversight of the Chiron vaccine

plant in Liverpool, England. This is the plant that British regulators shut down on October 5, causing the United States to lose

approximately half of its supply of the flu vaccine.

We have now received and reviewed over 1,000 pages of documents. We have also met with FDA officials, and the chairman

traveled to England with majority and minority staff to interview

British and Chiron officials.

The documents show that FDA failed to provide effective oversight. Expert scientists at FDA knew about serious problems at the

Liverpool facility in June 2003, but there was not sufficient leadership at the agency to ensure that they were fixed.

My staff prepared a background memorandum for this hearing

that describes the documents and their significance in detail, and

I ask that this memorandum and the redacted versions of documents cited in the memorandum be made part of the hearing

record.

Chairman DAVIS. No objection. Let me just add that I think that

all records in the binders before the Members, majority and minority, ought to be made part of the record, and if there is no objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. The Chiron plant in Liverpool was not an ordinary

FDA-regulated facility. It is a facility with a history of contamination problems that makes half the supply of the U.S. flu vaccine.

The plant should have received the highest priority from the Food

and Drug Administration.

Yet the agency ignored glaring problems at the facility and

missed repeated opportunities to correct them.

Mr. Chairman, you said you don’t want us to point fingers and

look at the past, let us look at the future. You even, I thought, said

you don’t want partisanship invoked in our hearings. I don’t know

what is partisan about criticizing what has led to, in my view, the

situation we are facing today. If you don’t learn from the past, you

are not going to correct these problems for the future.

I have been in Congress for 30 years. Throughout this period,

oversight of FDA has been one of my highest priorities. I drafted

many of the major laws that the agency implements, including the

Orphan Drug Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Nutrition Labeling

and Education Act, the Safe Medical Devices Act, the user-fee law

that accelerated drug approvals, and the Food Quality Protection

Act. That is why I have become so concerned about how the agency

has performed in recent years.

What we are witnessing is the dismantling of FDA’s enforcement

and oversight capabilities. In area after area, the agency is failing

to enforce the public health laws that Congress enacted. Enforcement actions for misleading drug advertisements have dropped 70

percent since 2001. Enforcement actions at vaccine plants and

other manufacturers of biologic drugs have dropped over 80 percent. Key food labeling laws are being ignored.

And there is no better example of what is wrong at the FDA than

its failures at the Chiron vaccine facility.

The story told in the FDA documents begin in June 2003, when

a team of FDA inspectors visited the Liverpool facility and found

20 serious problems at the plant, including bacterial contamination

and poor sanitary practices. The FDA experts who conducted the

inspection recommended the agency take official enforcement action against the company. Yet this recommendation was rejected.

FDA downgraded its response and asked the company to make only

voluntary reforms.

FDA’s justification for failing to cite the facility is that the agency thought conditions were improving. But conditions weren’t improving, they were deteriorating. Over the next 16 months, as production at the facility increased, the problems found in June 2003

mushroomed. Yet during this entire period, the FDA never once revisited the plant to see if Chiron was correcting its problems and

making safe vaccines. Incredibly, FDA remained passive even after

October 25, 2004, when Chiron disclosed that millions of doses of

vaccine were contaminated by a potentially lethal form of bacteria.

A responsible regulator would have inspected the plant, demanded to review its production records, and convened high-level

meetings of the agency’s top experts. That is exactly what the British regulators did. A senior British health official summed up their

philosophy as ‘‘seeing is believing.’’

By contrast, FDA conducted oversight by conference call, trusting

a stream of false assurances by Chiron that the plant had no seriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ous problems. FDA conducted no inspection; it reviewed no plant

records; and it was caught completely by surprise when British regulators shut down the plant on October 5.

FDA’s laxity has had a heavy cost. If FDA had ensured that the

problems identified in June 2003 were fixed, this year’s flu crisis

might never have happened. And if FDA had responded aggressively to the contamination problems in August, our public health

system would have had critical extra weeks to prepare for the

shortage and to avoid the chaos that ensued in October.

It is essential for FDA to learn from its mistakes. But, so far, the

administration has been unwilling even to admit them. In recent

weeks, the President, the HHS Secretary, the Acting FDA Commissioner have all reassured the public that FDA did everything right.

The Acting Commissioner has even indicated he would do it all

over again, the same way.

And I might point out that all those assurances, given all before

the election, might be viewed as partisan, because there at least we

were facing election. We don’t have an election now; the election is

over. So if we are critical of something that is going on through

oversight, that shouldn’t be attacked as partisan.

After the flu crisis broke, Dr. Crawford told the public that the

June 2003 inspection had ‘‘no relevancy’’ to the problems found in

2004. He said that FDA monitored the actions of Chiron and assured that the violations found in 2003 were corrected. And he said

that the United States and British regulators had acted ‘‘in synchrony.’’

Well, none of these statements are true. In this administration,

inconvenient facts are simply ignored. This is a dangerous way to

govern and is particularly hazardous for the public health.

I expect the chairman may disagree with me today about the interpretation of some of the FDA documents. That is his right. But

even as we disagree over specifics, I want to commend the chairman for his approach to this hearing. He has asked for the right

documents, he has worked with us to ensure that we can release

redacted copies so that Members and the public can judge their significance for themselves. That is exactly the right way to approach

this important hearing. And I hope, after we have had a chance to

hear the testimony and ask the tough questions, that we will feel

better informed about what happened to make sure that it doesn’t

happen again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

I know a lot of Members would like to make opening statements,

but if we go through this, we will never get to our panel; and our

conference is still going on. So what I would ask is we will give

Members a week to submit written statements for the record and,

of course, on the questions they can make statements and use their

time to do that.

We are going to move to our first panel of witnesses. Dr. Julie

Gerberding, the Director of the CDC; Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; and

Dr. Lester Crawford, the Acting Commissioner of the Food and

Drug Administration. They are going to discuss efforts being taken

at the Federal level to manage the flu vaccine crisis. They will also

describe their efforts to coordinate distribution with State and local

authorities, and what steps are being taken in preparation for next

year’s flu season.

It is our policy to swear all witnesses in. You have all been here

before, so if you would please rise and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Gerberding, we will start with you. As you know, we have

a light here. Your entire statement is in the record, and I can tell

you that our staff and Mr. Waxman’s staff have been through the

written testimony. We would like you, if you could, to try to limit

your testimony to 5 minutes. You have a light in front of you.

When the light turns orange, 4 minutes are up; when it is red, 5

minutes are up. And when it is red, if you could move to completion as quickly as possible. I don’t want to cut you off if you think

there is something you need to say, because this is televised and

people are watching, but we are conscious that we have a lot of

questions and giving ample time to amplify at that point.

Dr. Gerberding, thank you for being with us. Please go ahead.

STATEMENTS OF DR. JULIE L. GERBERDING, DIRECTOR, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; DR. ANTHONY S. FAUCI, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES; AND DR. LESTER M.

CRAWFORD, ACTING COMMISSIONER, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

Dr. GERBERDING. Thank you. And I thank you and the staff of

the committee for their incredible interaction and professionalism

in helping us prepare and be responsive to this hearing.

CDC is in a situation where we are faced with two big goals. One

is to do our part to ensure that we do have a modern vaccine available to everyone who needs it that is safe, effective, affordable, and

accessible, and is produced in a domestic manufacturing process

that is reliable and robust. We have a second urgent goal, and that

is to assure that the vaccine we do have this year gets to the people

who need it the most as quickly as possible.

And I would just like to start by thanking some very important

health protection heroes who have been doing their part. First and

foremost, I thank the people who have been patiently waiting in

lines and persistently trying to find vaccine. I am sorry that they

138

are in this situation. We are doing everything we can to distribute

the available vaccine that is out.

I also thank the people who have stepped aside to let those who

need the vaccine get it. I am incredibly appreciative of Aventis,

who has collaborated with CDC’s allocation plan. Aventis, Chiron

and the distributors who have made proprietary information available to health officials so that we can do a good job of targeting the

vaccine.

Most importantly, I thank the true heroes of this whole process,

which are the State and local health officials who have been working around the clock to assess the needs, assess the flu situation

in their jurisdictions, and make hard decisions about where to allocate vaccine at the local level.

On the next graphic I have a picture of the current flu situation

as of the end of a week ago. The current situation is good news:

the season is not off to a fast start. We have local flu activity or

sporadic flu activity in many States; we still have some States with

no flu activity.

But as we pointed out in the next graphic, flu is very unpredictable. The peak months of flu activity is very unpredictable. February is the most common peak, but it can be earlier or later than

that. We also know that demand for flu vaccine is unpredictable.

We have seen, this year, a great increase in demand. Certainly we

have learned that the supply is unpredictable. The current influenza activity suggests that situation is getting us where we have

a little more time to get vaccine out, but we are not resting until

we have every dose allocated.

On the next graphic I have just put an organizational chart of

the CDC operation. We have activated our Emergency Operation

Center to handle the logistics of the flu season this year. It involves

several hundred people across CDC and public health agencies who

are working on various tasks. First and foremost among them is allocating vaccine. CDC is using about 20 times more dollars for flu

this year than we did in 2002, so we are doing everything we can

to utilize those dollars and achieve the best possible flu preparedness that we can.

In August, when we learned of the shortage, we purchased vaccine for the stockpile in addition to those doses that we had purchased earlier in the year. We also increased our supply of

antiviral medication for the stockpile. And more recently, after the

loss of the vaccine was noted in October, we have increased by 5

million treatment courses antivirals for the stockpile. We have also,

in August, initiated a survey to assess States’ preparedness and

contingency planning for reprioritization and reallocation of vaccine, and took a number of steps within the agency to have some

contingency for worst-case scenario. However we were operating on

the premise that the most likely scenario is that ultimately we

would end up with an unprecedented supply of vaccine.

On the next graphic I just have given a very few snapshots of

the kind of traditional flu tracking we do at CDC. This involves

people across our health agencies. We do laboratory typing, Statebased typing, mortality tracing of both adults and pediatric populations.

139

But on the next graphic I have demonstrated some of the new

innovations that we are utilizing this year that never have been

used before to track flu. Chief among them is an ongoing household

survey where we can assess people’s vaccine status on an ongoing

basis. In the first week of November, through the household survey, we were able to determine that our targeting efforts are working. Only 4 percent of low-priority patients have been vaccinated

this year, and for those that need it most, including the seniors

over age 65, we have more than 26 percent vaccine coverage, which

is about where we would be at the midpoint of the flu season.

The last graphic really illustrates the most important component

of all, and that is that flu is a preventable illness. Vaccine is the

most important component of prevention, but there are other steps

that we have to focus on this year as well, including prevention of

person-to-person transmission, respiratory hygiene, hand hygiene,

and, of course, antivirals. For people who cannot get the flu vaccine

but need it, it is very important that they seek medical attention

at the earliest onset of flu, because antiviral drugs can treat flu

and prevent serious complications. We want to make sure that

word gets out widely. And, of course, we are also preparing for a

worse flu season than usual through other interventions at the

community and institutional level if we need them as we go down

the road.

There are a number of things ongoing across the agency, and we

really appreciate the support of Congress in helping us get there.

We know we need to do more. We know that we have requested

$100 million in the 2005 budget to modernize our vaccine strategy,

and we look forward to working with you in the committee and others on how we can do this expeditiously and successfully. Thank

you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gerberding follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Before we get to Dr. Fauci, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Dr. Fauci, before we hear from you, I want to express my feelings, and I think the feelings of the members of this

committee, about the loss, and sudden loss, of a leader in infectious

diseases, your Deputy, Dr. John La Montagne.

Members may not have known him personally, but he was a person from whom we all benefited. He worked on issues such as flu

vaccination, biodefense research, malaria, and tuberculosis. He was

held in the highest esteem by all of his colleagues. He had an exemplary public service record. I know it is a loss to you, and I think

to the country, that he has suddenly passed away, and I wanted

to extend my condolences.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I concur with that.

Dr. FAUCI. Thank you very much, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Chairman,

and members of the committee. We really appreciate the recognition that you have given to John La Montagne. It is a fact that

John was one of the leaders in influenza vaccine research and, in

fact, when he first came to the National Institutes of Health almost

30 years ago, he was the first influenza program officer in our research enterprise. So I think he would be particularly interested in

this hearing were he here today, and thank you for your recognition.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take my time allotted

to me now to talk to you a bit about the research approach toward

tackling and meeting the challenge of influenza, both the immediate challenge and the long-range challenge, including that of pandemic flu.

As shown on this first poster, the NIH influenza research is one

of the components of the Department of Health and Human Services’ comprehensive program involving surveillance, regulation, and

research to not only understand the influenza virus and the disease’s cause, but also to help us partner better with industry in

order to overcome some of the challenges that we have been meeting over these past several months.

The research endeavor is comprised of both basic research; research capacity; a bit of surveillance, which, as you know, is fundamentally what the CDC does; but the end point is to develop vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics.

This particular slide showing the influenza funding I think is

very telling, because it shows the effort that has been put in under

the leadership of Secretary Thompson at the Department in expanding our capabilities. As you can see, in 2001 our research endeavor was about $20 million, and the President’s budget for 2005

is approximately $66 million, a clear, rather impressive increase in

resources.

Some of the scientific issues that were tackled are of importance

to the discussions that are taking place here today. Many of you

have heard of the terminology ‘‘reverse genetics.’’ I will try to simplify that for you.

This was a technique that was developed by NIH grantees, and

what this technique does, it takes some of the uncertainty out of

finding and isolating the seed virus to grow for a vaccine. And

when you get a virus like isolated this year, the H5N1 from Asia,

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and you want to grow that to develop a pilot lot, you generally put

a vaccine that is well adapted to growing in eggs, which is the

main medium of growing, together with the vaccine in question,

hoping that they will naturally reshuffle their genes so that you

have the component of the virus in question within the framework

of a virus that you know from year after year grows well.

Reverse genetics circumvents that; it allows you to actually pick

out the genes and deliberately put them together to form a hybrid

type of a virus that we call a reassortment, a molecular version of

the reassortment, where you deliberately do it yourself. That is

how we isolated and got the H5N1 that we are now preparing for

a vaccine in the event of a pandemic flu.

The next slide shows the two major research endeavors that are

ongoing now to tackle the question of how we can have alternatives

to egg-based vaccine, and that is the development of cell culture

vaccine production and recombinant DNA technology. Hopefully we

will get a chance to discuss this during the question period.

Another important component of tackling influenza is what we

do with therapies, therapies that are for the actual treatment of influenza as well as those that can be used for prophylaxis or prevention. There are four drugs that are available today against different

targets. Three of them are used for prevention and all of them can

be used for treatment.

We need a more robust pipeline to be able to have in our armamentarium other drugs in the event of the development of resistance to these drugs by the influenza virus. And we know from experience that whenever you treat a microbe over a period of time,

sooner or later there will be resistance. But we do have drugs, as

was mentioned by Dr. Gerberding, such as Tamiflu and

Rimantadine in our strategic national stockpile, with in fact many

more doses now being prepared for that stockpile.

And finally let me just mention a word of how we use the research enterprise to approach the pandemic flu threat that is an

ever-looming threat. We know that this is occurring in Asia right

now. H5N1 is a virus that has already infected 44 people and killed

32. The good news is that it has not yet learned to effectively transmit from person to person; there is only one documented case.

But if we use history to tell us what microbes can do, sooner or

later either this virus or a related virus might learn that. So there

are some research issues that need to be addressed that will help

us to be able to meet that challenge.

They are listed here. One is to isolate that virus, which we, in

collaboration with the CDC and the WHO, last year did, and we

did it by the reverse genetics technique that I introduced you to

just a moment or two ago. We are developing pilot lots of the H5N1

and other bird flus. By pilot lots we mean small amounts, 8,000 to

10,000, that can be used in clinical trials, as shown on the third

bullet.

Those clinical trials will begin anywhere from January up to and

including March or April; and this has been in association with the

purchase by the Department of 2 million doses of H5N1 from

Aventis-Pasteur to be able to have in our stockpile, should we need

it. And, finally, the continual screening and development of new

therapeutics.

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So, in summary, as part of the broad comprehensive approach of

the Department, the NIH research endeavor will hopefully continue

to contribute productively to the challenge that we will inevitably

meet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fauci follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Crawford, thank you for being with us.

Mr. CRAWFORD. On August 25, 2004, Chiron informed FDA that

the company had discovered bacterial contamination in eight lots

of final vaccine product for this year’s flu supply, and advised that

they were already investigating the problem to determine the root

cause of the contamination. At the same time, they proceeded to

quarantine all of the vaccine lots while they retested the product.

In September 2004, FDA, CDC, and Chiron scheduled weekly

conference calls to discuss the status of the firm’s investigation.

During these calls, they advised FDA that they had identified the

cause of the contamination, that it was confined to specific vaccine

lots. During their investigation, Chiron informed FDA that the results of the retesting were negative. They planned to submit a final

investigative report to FDA during the week of October 4th.

It is important to recall that on September 28th Chiron’s chief

executive officer advised the Senate Special Committee on Aging,

‘‘As of September 27th, it remains Chiron’s expectation that between 46 million and 48 million Fluvirin doses will be delivered to

the U.S. market beginning in early October.’’

On the morning of October 5, 2004, the British regulatory organization, MHRA, announced a 3-month suspension of Chiron’s license

to manufacturer influenza vaccine. FDA had no prior knowledge of

that intention, to suspend the firm’s license. The chief executive of

MHRA indicated that they did not have the legal authority to notify FDA before the October 5th suspension.

Upon learning of the suspension, FDA contacted both Chiron and

the MHRA. Chiron indicated to FDA that it believed it had satisfactorily addressed MHRA’s inspectional findings. However, the

British expressed serious concerns about Chiron’s vaccine stocks

and the company’s ability to assure the safety of the vaccine. FDA

immediately dispatched a senior team of scientists to the U.K. to

meet with company officials and MHRA, and to inspect Chiron’s

Liverpool manufacturing facility.

On October 15, 2004, after completing its inspection, FDA determined that it could not adequately assure that Chiron’s vaccine

met our safety standards. As a result, Chiron will not supply any

influenza vaccine to the U.S. market for the 2004–2005 flu season.

In coordination with others at the Department of Health and

Human Services, we have been actively exploring all viable options

to secure additional dosage of flu vaccine to provide more Americans protection against the flu. Through these efforts, we have

been able to increase the available supply of licensed flu vaccines

for the U.S. population to 61 million doses for this flu season. We

have also been contacting manufacturers worldwide in an effort to

identify increased supplies of antiviral medications that will provide further protection and treatment for Americans during this flu

season.

Next year, Aventis-Pasteur believes they have the capability of

producing the same or more doses of the influenza vaccine. In addition, MedImmune has indicated that it has the capability to

produce 10 million doses of FluMist for the 2005–2006 season and

as much as 40 million doses by 2007.

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In partnership with the MHRA, we will continue to work with

Chiron in an effort to bring them back online for next year’s flu

vaccine production. We are also encouraging foreign licensed manufacturers to apply for U.S. licensure, and we will work to help them

achieve this goal.

Looking further ahead, we must develop more efficient ways to

produce flu vaccine so that we have the flexibility to deal with

shortages or unexpected problems. The Department has requested

$100 million for fiscal year 2005 to shift vaccine development to

new cell culture technologies, as well as to provide for year-round

availability of eggs for egg-based vaccine. We urge Congress to fully

fund the $100 million requested, and we are encouraged by the

positive response from Congress on this important request.

To help manufacturers overcome challenges such as the vaccine

development problems that Chiron is experiencing, FDA has been

investing its energy and resources in important initiative such as

the Current Good Manufacturing Practices for the 21st century initiative, or the GMP initiative. Under that initiative, FDA is working with industry to encourage the use of advanced technologies, as

well as quality systems and risk-based approaches, that build quality into the manufacturing process and avoid the problems such as

those Chiron experienced.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crawford follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Waxman and I have agreed to begin the questioning. We will

take 15 minutes and then Mr. Waxman will get 15 minutes on his

side, and then we will go down and allow individuals to get their

5 minutes, should they desire to do so.

Dr. Crawford, let me start the questioning. FDA provided the

committee with the Form 483s from the June 2003 and the October

2004 inspections of Chiron’s Liverpool facility. This is an important

point because a lot of has been made about a duty, perhaps, of the

FDA to have gone back and continued to inspect that plant prior

to October 2004.

Could you explain the differences between these two forms and

why, even though some similarities exist between faults that were

found in the June 2003 inspection and October 2004 inspection,

that Chiron’s license suspension in October 2004 was not foreshadowed by the June 2003 inspection?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, the two events were unrelated. In 2003 we

inspected the plant and were involved with it, and we did issue

Form 483, which cites some corrections that must and should be

made; and the plant responded affirmatively. We were able to

interact with them in a productive way; and the proof of that was

that the 2003 vaccine production was completed on schedule and

none of it was condemned, as was the case in 2004.

So they are two entirely separate situations. The 2004 situation

was quite different.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. When the team biologics returned to the

United States after its June 2003 inspection of Chiron’s Liverpool

facility, it initially recommended that official action be taken

against the facility. FDA ultimately decided that voluntary action

should be taken. Can you explain to us the protocol FDA follows

in deciding actions after routine inspections of manufacturing facilities?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. The inspectors that actually do the evaluation onsite come back and make a recommendation as to what kind

of action FDA should take, if any, and then team biologics actually

has a decisionmaking process so that all of the members of the

team are able to evaluate the severity of the situation and also

what progress is being made. By that time, they did have the response from the company to the 483, and based on that, and also

based on the fact that vaccine production process last year did

come to full and successful completion, the action was changed

from mandatory to voluntary.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. FDA’s routine protocol, as I understand it,

is to inspect foreign manufacturers once every 2 years?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The last routine inspection of Chiron’s

Liverpool facility, then, was June 2003. FDA informed the committee it accepted Chiron’s response plan to correct the issues that

were raised in June 2003 and, therefore, the file was closed on September 3, 2003, is that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If these steps were following standard

FDA protocol, would there be a reason for FDA to go back to

Chiron’s Liverpool facilities prior to the 2-years time to reinspect?

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Mr. CRAWFORD. No, we don’t do that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So you were following protocol.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me just ask you this. In retrospect,

now that we have seen what happened, is there anything in inspection in that time period that might have shown that we should

have gone back? I know it wasn’t within protocol.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No. Within the number of years that we have

been doing this, for decades, this has been our standard protocol.

It is modified somewhat from time to time in order to deal with the

good manufacturing practices, as practices within the industry

change, but the sequence of events has been unchanged over recent

years and has been very effective. This is the first time we have

had contamination in final lots of vaccine at that plant, and that

was a different kind of thing. But we would not have changed the

protocol leading up that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You believe that the causes of the contamination in the vaccine in October 2004 were unrelated to the

initial reports that we got back in June 2003 and potential contaminations at that point?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. The flu vaccine composition is changed each

year based on the expected strain, so this was an entirely different

production.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now, let me step ahead a little bit and try

to understand that everyone’s goal this year, MHRA, Chiron’s, the

FDA, is to get Chiron up and running so that they can produce flu

vaccine next year. They have gone ahead and ordered the eggs; the

invested financially in being able to go ahead next year and get the

doses up and the supply ready for the United States.

But if Chiron isn’t up and operating, if something goes wrong, if

the changes that they are making within their planned operation

somehow do not pass muster and we still have contamination, can

you tell the committee what is our Plan B?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, at that point it will be early enough for us

to seek alternative production facilities, but also alternative

sources of vaccine from other countries and elsewhere. So that will

be a signal to both the British and to us that we need to work with

their version of the Centers for Disease Control and our version of

our own CDC in order to work together to secure an adequate vaccine supply from other sources, if in fact they are not going to be

able to provide it.

As you recall, we testified in 2002 that the vaccine industry was

extremely fragile; we would be down to a very few suppliers, and

we needed to work on that. When you find out too late in the production season, it is too late to seek alternative sources because

they can’t get up and running fast enough. It will be earlier than

that this year.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You also have foreign license manufacturers. In fact, Chiron has other plants, do they not, where they manufacture vaccine?

Mr. CRAWFORD. They do.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Are we in the process of going out to other

manufacturers that are currently providing dosage for Europe and

for other parts of the free world, and have met criteria in other

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countries, to get those licenses as well, so that, should this occur

again, we have other sources of supply?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. I have personally talked to every chief executive officer manufacturing flu vaccine anywhere in the world, even

those that have elected not to come to the U.S. market, and have

encouraged them to do that and also have encouraged them of the

commitment of FDA to work with them in that process, because we

need more competition, if you will, within the flu vaccine industry.

I have also talked to the manufacturers of substances like FluMist

and also the antiviral drugs, and have assured them also of our

commitment. Some of them, the antiviral drug manufacturers, also

have chosen to not enter the U.S. market. I have encouraged them

to rethink that, and we are having a continuing series of calls on

a virtually daily basis in order to see what their thinking is and

also to work with them.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It is true that worldwide there is a shortage of flu doses? It is just that in the more affluent parts of the

world we tend to be able to go out and buy it and usually have

ready supply? Is that a fair comment?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. Dr. Gerberding would be better able to talk

about that, but we consume more than our share of the flu vaccine

that is produced worldwide. That is as it should be; we have a very

aggressive public health program thanks to CDC, and we are moving forward, I think, to vaccinate an even larger percentage of our

population. But the number of companies that are actually manufacturing are down really to about three or four.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Gerberding, is that an accurate statement?

Dr. GERBERDING. That is accurate. I don’t have the global production figures this year—we can get them for the committee—but

in most years it is less than the total of 300 million doses globally.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. What is the annual death toll from

influenza around the world? We know it averaged about 36,000 in

the United States in an annual basis. What would it be worldwide,

any idea?

Dr. GERBERDING. We don’t have accurate estimates globally because there really is no system for surveillance for flu deaths on

an international basis.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. In many countries.

Dr. GERBERDING. We are working on that, but I can’t answer the

question.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Let me go back to you, Dr. Crawford. What are Chiron’s obligations to FDA in order to get their license back to produce Fluvirin

vaccines for next year’s flu season, and how are you working with

Chiron and the MHRA to develop and implement the remediation

plan, and how confident are you that we are going to be successful?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thanks to an agreement that has been reached

between the MHRA, FDA, and Chiron, we are now able to share

information and also to work together in helping to get the vaccine

production facilities——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And that is the first time we have had

that, correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is, yes.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. In fact, without that, under British law,

they couldn’t share this with you.

Mr. CRAWFORD. They could not and did not share information.

We are now working hand-in-glove to get that particular plant up

and functioning, and a decision will be made on that by January

5. Now, it is important to note that since the facility is in the

United Kingdom, the license will come from the British Government.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Correct. And we have talked about the

Plan B, that at that time you still have time to look worldwide into

other areas.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask you another thing. We have

some jurisdictions, State of Illinois, city of New York, that are talking about importing vaccines from countries that are not FDA certified.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What are we doing about that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Some Governors and mayors have come to FDA

and have offered to go and try to find vaccine that is still unused

in wholesale distribution channels, and they have found, starting

with the Governor of Illinois and then the last one to enter the situation was the mayor of New York City, they have come up with

up to 750,000 extra doses. And what we are doing now is we had

to first collect the lot numbers on those doses in order to be sure

that they were legitimate, that they came from the plant where

they were supposed to have come from. The second this is now we

are developing what is called a pedigree, and that is to be sure that

we know where all this vaccine has traveled throughout the world

and whether or not the cold chain, as it is called, that is, refrigeration, has been in place sufficiently and adequately to make sure

that the vaccine is still viable and can be used.

We are down to that point now, and we are also meeting with

that CEO on a regular basis as they help us to get the data we

need in order to bring the vaccine in. Now, it is not approved in

the United States, so we will have to do some special procedures

in order to bring it in, but we are not at that point yet, but we are

making progress.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I would just emphasize, from my perspective, for next year and the years after, we just need to get more

providers out there. And if we can’t get them to produce it here,

we have to go worldwide to just get them certified, where they can

do that.

Also the FluMist, are we looking at testing that to see if that can

have a wider applicability than it has?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, as I mentioned, they are going up to 10

million doses, and as you also know, it is now used for people that

are in healthy physical condition between the ages of 5 and 49. The

company has released information that they are interested in perhaps expanding that perhaps to some further ages, and I can assure you, although we can’t reveal the procedures and what is

going on in terms of the data that has been submitted to us and

the relevant applications, we will do everything we can to work

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with them or anyone else who wants to expand a flu vaccine product in the U.S. market.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Dr. Gerberding, let me ask you. Getting parochial, Virginia,

Maryland, and D.C., this whole region, we are all heavily dependent on Chiron to supply our vaccines for the public sector. How has

the CDC worked with Aventis to redistribute the portion of the

Aventis flu zone doses to States that contracted solely with Chiron?

Dr. GERBERDING. On October 5th, 33 million doses of Aventis

vaccine had already been distributed, but there were a projected 25

million doses left to be allocated. The first phase of allocation was

targeted to people who need the vaccine the most. So looking at the

Aventis purchasers, as well as the public sector purchases, we did

everything we could to ensure that we got all the doses out to the

Vaccine for Children Program, doses going to nursing home and to

other high-priority obvious areas where there were most likely to

be people who needed it.

Once that plan was developed and implemented, then the remaining 12 million or so doses needed to be allocated, and in this

step the State health officials stepped in and said we will work

with CDC and Aventis to target those doses of vaccine to the places

in our communities that need vaccine the most. Thus the States

have really done an assessment of where it is needed, how it is

needed, and we have made sure it has gotten there.

In this process of working with the States to allocate the vaccine,

we have made available to them, for the first time ever, proprietary

information on a secure Web base that tells them now just how

many doses, but exactly to whom Aventis shipped the doses. The

Chiron distributes have been providing that information now as

well. Therefore the doses are going, at the direction of the State

health officials, to the people in those jurisdictions who need them

the most.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask. If you go back to October, it

looked like we had about 50 million doses nationally available, is

that about right?

Dr. GERBERDING. In October we had already used 33 million of

the——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I am talking about total doses available.

With Chiron not being able to produce it, we were going to be

around 50 million doses. Is that right?

Dr. GERBERDING. A total of 61 million doses total this year, including 3 million doses of the FluMist.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But part of that is because we have

stepped up efforts since October, isn’t that correct?

Dr. GERBERDING. Right. Exactly.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I am just saying it was about——

Dr. GERBERDING. Aventis had a higher than expected yield, and

they were also able to get a few million more doses out of the production line.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So we are up to 61? Will that go any higher, do you think, looking at some of the foreign distribution?

Dr. Crawford, do you know?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. We were at 75 million doses last year.

What do we expect to be at the end of the flu season? How many

doses can we reasonably expect to have on the street, available to

the public? Anybody want to take a stab at that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. We have made contacts with a variety of

companies, and we are in final negotiations with three of them that

are in other countries, and it is possible that we will have an additional 5 or 6 million doses cleared for shipment to the United

States by the first of the year. The exact figure we don’t know at

this point because we are continuing to negotiate, but we have sent

inspectors to those plants and they have filed their findings. And

I expect to have on the first plant, which is actually the largest

one, a recommendation by the end of this week, and then I can

make a determination as to whether or not it meets U.S. standards

and can be brought in under special circumstances.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You would agree, though, we need more

suppliers to avert this kind of thing in the future? Does everybody

agree with that?

Dr. GERBERDING. Absolutely.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And that means the FDA is going to have

to be proactive in going out and getting some of these other areas

licensed, is a fair assumption?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It does. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Gerberding, let me just conclude.

What lessons from our response to this year’s flu vaccine shortage

are really relevant to bioterrorism preparedness?

Dr. GERBERDING. Well, the systems that we have been using to

track and allocate flu this year are the same systems that we

would use for a pandemic or for a terrorism event. I think it has

been a challenging exercise. We have been asking a lot of our public health system in this regard, but the laboratory network, the

communication network, the emergency operations network, and

really the countermeasure allocation system that we have executed

are all critical components of any emerging threat, including terrorism.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And they are working pretty well under

these circumstances?

Dr. GERBERDING. Well, so far we have been very pleased with the

steps that have been taken and the success that we have had, but,

again, it is early in the season and we have a long way to go before

we are through with this.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Waxman, you have 15 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Crawford, I want to start my questions with you. In 1999 the

Food and Drug Administration inspectors went to a Liverpool plant

and they identified manufacturing problems—this was before

Chiron purchased it—and the inspectors responded to these problems by issuing a warning letter. And as I understand the significance of a warning letter, it is an official enforcement action. If the

manufacturer doesn’t correct the problems or remedy the violations, FDA can initiate legal action against them. So it is a serious

matter. And, in addition, once there is a warning letter, it genVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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erally ensures that another inspection will be conducted to make

sure the problems have in fact been fixed. So that is what happened in 1999.

In June 2003 FDA inspectors went out again. There were four inspectors, as I understand it, to look at this Chiron plant in Liverpool. And they found bacterial contamination, in some cases 1,000

times higher than expected. They found unsanitary practices. They

found the plant was not doing an adequate job investigating and

correcting these problems. The June 2003 inspection team recommended, as I understand it, unanimously that there be an official action, as there was in 1999. Instead of a warning letter being

sent, which would be official actions, the recommendation was

‘‘downgraded to a request for voluntary action by the company,’’ a

request that carries no legal weight and that did not lead to a

prompt followup inspection.

What I am concerned about is why did FDA downgrade its response and ask for only a voluntary action?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is because of the progress that the plant was

making. We issued what is called a 483, which is a statement of

what we think should be corrected. We stayed in touch with the

plant as they moved toward the end of that production cycle. Two

things happened: they responded very well, they corrected the

problems; and then the vaccine production in that plant for that

year, which was ready for our evaluation a few weeks later, turned

out to be OK. The 2003 production was not contaminated. So they

had in fact completed what we wanted them to do and there was

no need to have mandatory or a warning letter.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, there was no need, but there could have

been, and that would have enforced another inspection. In fact, did

FDA go back to the plant to inspect whether conditions in the plant

were actually improving as you thought they were or you hoped

they were? Did you schedule another inspection, as FDA would

likely have done if you had taken an official enforcement action?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, two things happened, as I mentioned.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, could you answer yes or no on that question?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Pardon me?

Mr. WAXMAN. Could you answer yes or no?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Would you restate the question?

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you didn’t send an official letter, which

would require followup inspection; and you thought things were improving. And I want to know did FDA go back to the plant and inspect whether the conditions in the plant were actually improving,

as you hoped they were, and did you schedule another inspection,

as FDA would have done had you issued an official letter?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, it is not possible to answer that yes or no

because we did go back in August 2004. If that is the question, the

answer is yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the answer wouldn’t be yes, because under

an official letter you would have gone back earlier than that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. But they corrected the problems.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, how do you know they corrected the problems?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Because we got the vaccine produced and it was

OK.

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Mr. WAXMAN. That was the final product.

Mr. CRAWFORD. In 2003.

Mr. WAXMAN. But in the 2003 inspection your people said that

there were unsanitary conditions there, that there is a high bacterial contamination. Maybe it wasn’t in the final product that you

saw, but it certainly became the reason why the British shut down

the plant in 2004, isn’t that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, that is not correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. It is not correct? OK, we will get to that in a

minute.

I think it was a mistake for you not to have gone back earlier

than 2004. If you had issued an official letter, you would have had

to have gone back earlier. And the reason it was a mistake is conditions weren’t getting better, as you thought they were; they were

deteriorating. But because you weren’t there in the plant until

2004, when we already had a problem that was much worse, you

had no idea how bad things actually were. Unfortunately, what

happened at the Chiron plant I think is emblematic of larger problems at your agency, but let me get to that in a minute as well.

FDA inspected the flu vaccine supply in June 2003. The report

of the inspectors found serious problems in 20 areas of vaccine

manufacturing and distributing. You stated that FDA’s oversight in

2003 had no relevancy for 2004. I want to ask you first about the

finding of high bio burden, meaning high levels of bacteria in the

vaccine production process. In 2003 FDA found evidence of bio burden more than 1,000 times higher than expected, even after they

had this filtration system to stop it. FDA also found that on repeated occasions the vaccine pools had been contaminated with potentially lethal bacterial called serratia; and FDA even found contamination in the vaccine after sterile filtration, which is supposed

to eliminate any potential for bacterial growth.

Now, is it not true that if these findings of high bio burden, how

you can say they had no relevancy, the problem that led to the closure of the plant in 2004?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, as you mentioned earlier, in 1999 we had

this same sort of problem with the bio burden. As you know, every

vaccine production lot starts off with a bio burden, and production

is in large place decontaminating it so that it goes back to a sterile

situation. After 1999 we had a perfectly fine production in 2000;

after the findings of 2003, that vaccine turned out to be OK. There

was no linkage between it and what happened in 2004.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, in the documents that we finally got from

you—and it took a while to get it—this was the inspection in 2004.

They talked about this high bio burden in the lots and they said

‘‘not corrected from previous inspections in 2003, in that similar occurrences noted during this inspection.’’ So when they went back

in 2004, the FDA inspectors found the same problems they found

in 2003, a high level of bacteria that can contaminate the supply.

And I think this is a key point. In 2003 FDA found problems at

the company investigating sterility failure, and it was the failure

at the plant to investigate and correct the 2004 contamination that

led to the shutdown.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, that is not correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. What led to the——

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Mr. CRAWFORD. Bio burden is present in every production lot of

flu vaccine; it starts with a bio burden and then the point is that

the bio burden has to be reduced and eliminated.

Mr. WAXMAN. They had problems with the bio burden; it was

1,000 times more than it was supposed to have been. Is that right?

Mr. CRAWFORD. What year are you talking about?

Mr. WAXMAN. 2003.

Mr. CRAWFORD. They had problems, but they were able to decontaminate it, so the vaccine actually went on the market.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, your inspectors went back in 2004, and they

said the problem had not been corrected for the bio burden. When

you finally went back on October 15, 2004, you found a high bio

burden that hadn’t been adequately investigated. And this inspection expressly stated it wasn’t corrected from the previous inspection in 2003. When you read these documents, it is clear that the

bio burden problems and Chiron’s failure to be able to identify and

correct them were a significant factor behind the closure of the facility. They existed in 2003, they weren’t corrected; they got worse

in 2004. As I mentioned, the FDA inspectors, in 2003, found evidence of contamination in the vaccine, even after sterile filtration

that is supposed to remove all bacteria, ‘‘a potential source of contamination was identified in the aseptic connections between the

tanks of the vaccine and the formulation area.’’

So in June 2003 FDA found that the company had failed to address these problems with these connectors, and this year Chiron

investigated its most recent contamination problems and the company found a major weakness and possible cause of the contamination in the aseptic connections. FDA scientists wrote, ‘‘The contamination most likely occurred during the multiple number of aseptic

connections in the formulation stage.’’

So let me ask you this question. Aseptic connections were identified as a potential source of contamination in 2003. They weren’t

fixed. They then were identified by both Chiron and FDA officials

as a likely source of contamination in 2004. Doesn’t that make the

2003 inspection and FDA’s failure to followup to make sure the

problems were fixed relevant to the problems in 2004?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No. The bio burden comes in with the eggs, the

chicken eggs that the virus is grown in, and it is discreet to that

particular year. The bio burden of 2003 is long gone. So you bring

in a new bio burden with the new chicken eggs, and what you have

to do is reduce that load through various means.

Mr. WAXMAN. Your staff met with our staff this week, and when

they met, your senior FDA officials conceded that a number of findings in 2003 were relevant to the 2004 problems. These included

problems not only with the bio burden and the aseptic connections,

but also with the basic sanitary practices in the facility. In essence,

what they told us is that the problems identified in 2003 didn’t get

better, as FDA hoped they would; instead, as production volumes

increased in 2004, the problems at the plant expanded, ultimately

leading to the shut down of the facility.

I would submit that this was a serious cost of the FDA failure

to be more vigilant. If the agency had taken official enforcement action, as the FDA inspectors asked for, as they recommended, the

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cine crisis might have been averted. And if FDA would be more

honest about what happened and the mistakes that were made, the

public would have greater confidence that the agency will correct

its mistakes and can be trusted in the future.

Dr. Crawford, I know you want to say this is different, but essentially what we have is a plant that has had troubled sanitary conditions in its production, and those troubled sanitary conditions

eventually led to the contamination of the vaccine supply. That is

what caused the shutdown by the British. That is what your FDA

people saw when they finally got out there. I would submit to you

that now that we have these documents, it is not good enough to

say, well, things were getting better. They weren’t getting better;

the problems hadn’t been corrected; the production was being increased. And with the increase in production and the facilities not

having their sanitary problems corrected, we ended up with a

breakdown.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, I had to condemn, as you know, the production for this year based on the fact that the bio burden could

not be reduced this year; and that didn’t happen in 2003. It was

one of the toughest decisions I ever had to make, but we could not

allow that vaccine into the United States. We had to take that particular step, and we are working now with the British to see what

can be done for the next flu season.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you say it was a very tough decision for you

to make, but in fact it wasn’t you that made it, it was the British

who shut down the facility and prohibited Chiron from selling any

vaccine.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, we already had between 6 and 7 million

doses in the United States. We sent a team over to do an inspection

of the plant, and then I had to make the decision. That is the sequence of events.

Mr. WAXMAN. That was after the British action or before the

British action?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That was when the British notified that they

were suspending the license. We already had the vaccine here in

the United States.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the point is clear: the British suspended the

license because these problems were contaminating the vaccine

supply. You had some of the supply here; you decided you can’t use

that supply. The British had already shut down the plant.

You said that there was no relevancy to the June 2003 inspection

to later problems. I just dispute that statement. You said that the

FDA assured that Chiron took all steps to resolve the problems

from 2003. But FDA had not done any reinspection of the facility,

and your own inspectors found this to be untrue in October of this

year, finding that a key issue involving contamination was not corrected since the previous inspection.

All of these statements that I think were made by you and others

in the administration that were not accurate had the effect of reassuring Americans, before the election, about the Bush administration’s role in the flu vaccine shortage. Prior to the election, FDA

withheld documents from this committee that revealed the truth.

FDA ostensibly said that there was a reason to not send us the documents at the time we requested, because the individuals who

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were to produce the documents were too busy trying to find more

vaccine. But when we look at the fax cover sheets now with these

documents, they were sent to you by individuals on October 18th,

2 days prior to our deadline, just as I had been informed by an

FDA employee.

So what I am picking up here is a pattern of misleading statements, and maybe even political calculations, that I think reflect

poorly on the administration, but I think they do an enormous

amount of damage to the credibility of the FDA.

I did want to get into the other enforcement actions that have

not been followed through by FDA. We have seen just dramatic decreases in enforcing the law. I know you consider this a routine

procedure, but this is not a routine procedure when you are talking

about half the vaccine supply of the United States.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Can I respond to some of this?

Mr. WAXMAN. Please.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Every statement I made was accurate. As you

know, the chairman granted us an extension of time so we could

produce the documents that were requested all together, and not

just dribble them in. So we complied with the chairman’s timing.

Mr. WAXMAN. I just want to ask this one last question, because

my time has expired. How could you say there was no relevance

for the inspection in 2003, when your inspection in 2004 had specifically noted on it by the inspectors that the previous problems

had not been corrected from 2003, which have to do with contamination of the facility?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The problems were corrected, because the vaccine production was good and could be used. They use the same

terms, and that may be where the confusion is coming in.

Mr. WAXMAN. Your inspectors said that wasn’t true, though.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Because if something happened like in 1999——

Mr. WAXMAN. So you think the problem was——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Crawford, I want to give you an opportunity, if you want, to

finish that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, I was just saying they used the same terms

of art to describe inspections, you know, maybe over a 20 year period. That doesn’t mean that whatever it is, like the bio burden

doesn’t occur from year to year——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me ask. You could have taken

the 1999 inspection and said that had a problem with 2004 as well,

couldn’t you, under the same logic?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN. Would the gentleman yield just on that point?

We are not talking about something years before, we are talking

about 1 year earlier they told you there was a problem. You said

it didn’t show up, so it was corrected, but it didn’t appear to be corrected according to your own inspectors.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think he just explained it.

Mr. WAXMAN. If it hadn’t been corrected, I think that’s a

problem——

Mr. CRAWFORD. I have already answered that. They were corrected.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think he explained it, and I don’t think

we are going to reach a closure on this.

Mr. Mica, you are recognized for 5 minutes, and then we will go,

Mr. Waxman, to you.

Mr. MICA. Dr. Crawford, don’t you realize how many times you

deny the accusation, that it is still thrown at you? Dr. Crawford,

this little exhibit here, warning letters for biological manufacturing

violations have dropped sharply since the fall of 2001. Actually, it

goes back to 2000. Are vaccines considered part of biological manufacturing?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, they are.

Mr. MICA. And hasn’t there been a significant drop in actual

manufacturers of vaccine?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. We are down to only——

Mr. MICA. So if we have fewer people producing the vaccines,

then we would have fewer people to go after.

This is a great example of trying to now blame the bureaucrats,

as I have said, and FDA. Now, FDA, you don’t know it, but you

are the fall guy. I have sat on this panel now for 12 years, and I

have been through vaccine hearings over that period of time, and

first the folks on the other side, they blame the drug manufacturers; these are bad people and they were producing bad stuff, and

they were charging too much for it. So then the next routine was

it is not just the drug manufacturers, it is those bad insurance

companies, because the cost went up dramatically. And I think I

cited at the last hearing one vial someone held up and said this

only costs $1 or $2, the actual vaccine itself, but the insurance

costs $20 or $30, if you could get it.

Now we have no manufacturers in the United States, I guess except for nasal vaccines. We have no insurers, so it is your turn to

be the fall guy, and it is your fault. Don’t you understand that?

Now, you just heard that if you had gotten there a little bit earlier

or sent a warning a little bit earlier, there wouldn’t be any shortage. Is that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I did hear that.

Mr. MICA. Well, first we go on the premise that you weren’t there

in time, which you have said you acted in an appropriate manner.

But somehow even if you had acted a few weeks earlier, would we

have a flu vaccine shortage today?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It wouldn’t have had any effect, because it started just in January.

Mr. MICA. And you have made that point. But the root problem

and cause, and a lot of folks in Congress don’t want to admit it,

are, first of all, liability. It is kind of interesting that you had trouble getting to Liverpool to look at a manufacturer.

I submit for the record this article from the International Herald

Tribune that shows France, Germany, and Switzerland, for example, followed the so-called British rule, where the losing party pays

the cost of winner’s lawyer, and it goes on to describe how difficult

it is in the countries where they are manufacturing flu vaccine,

where you have to fly over and try to find out what they are doing,

how much easier it is to produce that and how much more difficult

it is to sue and have lawsuits, which have driven manufacturing

out of the United States.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Would the gentleman ask that article be

put in the record?

Mr. MICA. Oh, yes. I am sorry.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, the article will be entered into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. So, one, we need liability and tort reform. Until we get

that, folks, you are not going to have health care cost reduced. It

is interesting. Pick up the papers today and see how, in a couple

of the papers, how many more doctors are closing down their operations, how many health care providers are going out of business

or relocating their activities. And that will continue until you get

some tort and liability reform in medicine.

Regulatory reform, and it now takes some 8 months, and you

have described the process.

Let me go back first. The accusation is maybe we haven’t spent

enough money, because you have to always spend a lot of money.

NIH, that is Dr. Fauci. In 2001, on research, we had a 10 percent

increase from 2001 to 2002. I am not very good at math, but that

is what it looks like. Even before all this came out, I don’t want

to say we doubled, we went from 22.8 to 57.4, which I would say

is about 160 percent increase in research. So that goes out the window.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Does the gentleman have a question? His

time has expired.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, you are recognized.

Mr. MICA. Well, I have a number of points and a number of questions. I am willing to stay for a second round, but I am trying to

get at the root problem and identify liability, regulatory reform,

and I have a host of questions about the States buying this, about

guaranteed purchases by the government that have driven up

costs. And I will get to those when I have adequate time. Thank

you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Waxman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, my colleague, Mr. Mica, didn’t get

to his questions because he was making absolutely incorrect statements about a lot of different things. He used the opportunity to

say we have all, on this side of the isle, accused the manufacturers

of being bad people. We have never said that. He is saying it is terrible we are accusing the FDA bureaucrats of maybe not doing the

right thing. He doesn’t believe that. He thinks it is malpractice or

liability issues that has caused the problem we face today.

Well, I would submit that it was not the liability laws that

caused the contamination of vaccine in Liverpool. It was the fact

that they had unsanitary conditions there. And the inspectors from

Britain found that out to be the case, and eventually our own FDA

came to conclude that was the case. And I don’t consider Dr.

Crawford or the FDA to be bad people, but my criticism is that the

FDA didn’t do enough to stay on top of this issue. They knew from

previous inspections in the year before, 2003, that there were problems at that plant, and they never went back for another inspection, until after the British closed the plant down.

I disagree with Dr. Crawford’s statement that it was irrelevant

that they found that there was contamination in 2003. He said

there was contamination in 2003, but that wasn’t the problem in

2004. His inspectors said that was the problem in 2004 because it

hadn’t been corrected in 2003. Well, if you take Dr. Crawford’s

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statement, it would have to be they corrected it and then they went

back into a contaminated state. That doesn’t follow.

Now, let me just address the liability issue, because that is really

a red herring. The gentleman speaks with a great deal of ignorance, because in the liability area vaccines were a problem; manufacturers weren’t making any vaccines for fear of liability. And I

authored, and the Congress passed, the vaccine compensation system. It has been very successful by providing a fund to compensate

those people who are injured from a vaccination. It has been very

successful in keeping people from going to the courts.

The flu vaccine is part of that vaccination system. None of the

drug companies, none of the advisory committees to the FDA have

come in and said we ought to change the immunization problem,

liability for immunization, because it is not a problem in this case.

I will leave to another time to discuss the problems of medical malpractice, which I do think is a serious problem causing higher

prices in the practice of medicine.

I just think it is important, especially if this is on C–SPAN—I

don’t know if it is or not, but following his statements made with

such abandon and such ignorance, I think somebody should correct

the record.

I do want to take advantage of the fact that I have my 5 minutes, and I thank my colleagues for indulging me to do this. But

FDA has, I think, undergone a very serious change in direction in

the way they have been responding to a number of the problems

not just in this area, but this area is emblematic of it.

Well, we have a chart over there, it is the ‘‘Warning Letters for

Biological Manufacturing Violations.’’ They have dropped sharply

since the fall of 2001. You can see in 1997 there were 17; in 1998,

19; and then after 2001 there was 1, 2, and 1. A big drop. We have

seen the warning letters to manufacturers who are making false

and misleading statements in their advertising. They have dropped

dramatically. I would submit that FDA is just not enforcing the

law. I was concerned that they just didn’t even enforce the food labeling laws, which I also had a part in authoring.

Dr. Crawford, why do you think that is happening at FDA? Why

is there a precipitous drop of enforcement actions?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, there are not as many people to regulate,

not as many companies, as was stated earlier. But we have not

lessened our profile in terms of evaluating these companies. But

there is variability. If you take it back a long period of time, you

will see that some years it is up, some years it is down.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we see a dramatic——

Mr. CRAWFORD. But if we still had 20 manufacturers, it would

be up higher.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I am not talking about just vaccines. But

even for the false and misleading statement by all pharmaceutical

companies in their advertising, an 80 percent drop in any kind of

enforcement actions to be sure the public is not mislead.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, we do have fewer drugs that are on the

market that have prescription status and are still in patent, also,

so that would account for it. But we have not lessened our attention to this kind of activity.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

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The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Deal, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Gerberding, thank you for being here. We appreciate the fact

that you and the CDC in my State of Georgia are doing such a good

job.

I would like to ask you just briefly you have outlined what you

have done in this rather critical situation of a shortage of the flu

vaccine in terms of trying to make sure that what is available is

delivered to the most critical places. What role, if any, would the

CDC play in a normal situation? Do you participate in those decisions in the absence of a shortage?

Dr. GERBERDING. Unlike childhood vaccines, the flu vaccine market is almost entirely in the private sector, so CDC only purchases

a very small amount of the vaccine. Therefore, we have only a limited capacity to target or direct our supply to the appropriate individuals. In the last 5 years of vaccine production, every year vaccine doses have gone unused. So, in general, the private sector distribution has targeted to the people who are willing to take vaccine. This year, of course, we are expecting the profile to be very

different.

What we do is work with our expert advisory committee, the

ACIP, to make the recommendations, the science-based recommendations about who will benefit from vaccine and how they

should be vaccinated and when they should be vaccinated; and

then the adult immunization mechanisms in the health care delivery system and in the public sector at the State and local level kick

in to actually administer it.

This is one of the things that we are looking at, is opportunities

to improve our typical coverage of this vaccine, which has never

been ideal. We would like to have a higher demand for flu vaccine

and we would like to assure that everybody who needs a dose gets

it.

Mr. DEAL. You mentioned something about the fact that it is

fragile. What is the shelf life of the injectable vaccine? I assume it

can’t be frozen and preserved in that fashion. What is the shelf life

for a vaccine?

Dr. GERBERDING. With this particular vaccine, the shelf life, assuming that the cold storage is maintained properly, is not very

relevant because the virus changes every year. So the shelf life is

longer than a year, but it doesn’t help us very much because we

need to make a brand new vaccine every single year; and that is

part of the challenge that this particular infectious disease presents to us. That is part of why Dr. Fauci’s comments about the

need for modernizing the vaccine is so very critical. Imagine if we

didn’t have to get a flu shot every year. We would be in a very different situation than we are right now.

Mr. DEAL. There are obviously disagreements and opinions as to

why we have so few manufacturers. Am I correct that one of the

earlier statements, that there is no domestic U.S. manufacturer of

an injectable vaccine for the flu? Is that correct, there is no American domestic producer?

226

Dr. GERBERDING. Aventis is producing vaccine in America, but

their headquarters are in France. So the actual manufacturing does

occur in the United States for the product that we are using.

Mr. DEAL. How long have we been in a situation of having only

two major suppliers? How many years has that situation existed?

Dr. GERBERDING. Ten years ago we had five suppliers, and there

has been a gradual attrition over that period of time until just the

two injectable suppliers this year.

Mr. DEAL. You know, you would think normally the old adage of

supply and demand would work in this environment. Obviously,

the normal forces are not at work here. And I would assume that

there are some truths to the allegations that the issues of liability

play a factor in the fact that we have so few manufacturers available.

Is it simply not a profitable business? And perhaps the second

panel is more appropriate, perhaps, to ask that, and we will try to

ask it there. But from your perspective, is it the lack of profitability

that is limiting the supply?

Dr. GERBERDING. We have a few big problems. One is that we

don’t have a guaranteed market for the vaccine, and we have unpredictable demand. The second is the manufacturers need a fair

price for the product that they are manufacturing; they need to

have a business case. The third issue is that making this vaccine

is risky, as Chiron discovered this year. This is a very difficult

manufacturing process; you start out with a bio burden, and by the

end you are supposed to end up with a product that is sterile

enough for use, and it is fraught with opportunities for things to

go wrong. While liability has played a role, this is the first year

that we have recommended flu vaccine for children, which makes

it eligible for the vaccine injury compensation program. In past

years, because we hadn’t recommended it for children, it was not

on the list for liability protection. And even that doesn’t completely

remove all of the concerns about liability, it only covers the things

that are in the table.

So it is a complicated set of problems, and the bottom line is the

manufacturers need to know that they can make a strong business

case for producing this vaccine.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you.

Mr. Van Hollen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding another hearing on this important issue. I want to thank

all the witnesses as well.

My first question is obviously this year we have to make the best

of the situation that we have before us, and we have to relocate the

existing vaccine to those people who are most vulnerable. My question is what is the administration’s plan, if any, to prevent this

kind of shortage from happening next year and into the future?

That is one question.

The second set of questions relates to the issues that Dr. Fauci

mentioned, with respect to the avian flu and the pandemic, which

is something obviously we need to be preparing ourselves for not

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tions there are, No. 1, to what extent do we have cooperation from

many of the Asian countries, where this flu is originating, that allows us to detect it early enough to prevent it from spiraling out

of control, to the point where we can’t isolate it and it becomes a

pandemic? And what recommendations, if any, do you have to

make sure that we have an early warning system in place, on the

ground? I know a number of people at CDC have been working on

this and have been frustrated by their lack, for example, of cooperation from the Chinese. So that is one set of issues, the early

detection.

The second set of issues relate to a vaccine, and whether or not

we are moving ahead as quickly as possible in coming up with a

vaccine; whether mutations in the avian influenza would defeat the

work that we are doing; and even assuming that we are on the

right track with respect to manufacturing a vaccine, what are we

doing in terms of the production capability, because we haven’t prepared adequately to have a supply of flu vaccine where we know

we have certain strains of flu, and at what time would we be prepared from the vaccine production point of view to confront an

avian influenza pandemic?

I know that is a lot of questions, but these are obviously big

issues.

Dr. GERBERDING. I will start, and then we will start the baton

down the table.

In terms of the scenario planning, worst case scenario planning

for next year, our Team B is working on this from a CDC perspective, and the Secretary has also called a special task force at the

Department to really dig in to what can we do now and what can

we do soon to obviate this situation.

One major thing is to work with the existing manufacturers to

see what can be done to support the largest possible production.

And Dr. Crawford has already mentioned that Aventis and

MedImmune are looking at ways that they can increase their production next year. Getting Chiron back online is clearly a high priority for everyone. We may have vaccine available from international manufacturers on an IND, an investigational drug status,

and that can allow us to get more doses in, and we are working

out the mechanisms for that as we speak. And also we will certainly focus on prioritization early in the season and make sure

that we get the targeting when the first dose of vaccine is available, not waiting until more than half of it has been distributed,

as we did this year.

So there are some short-term things we can do, but we really

look forward to working with the administration and with Congress

to figure out if there are additional incentives to help expand the

market and get the production up to where we need it to be.

Dr. FAUCI. Let me just extend that, Mr. Van Hollen, and talk

about what we are actually doing right now in preparation for pandemic flu; and I alluded to it in my opening statement, but let me

just summarize it briefly for you.

We know now that there are a couple of circulating avian influenza viruses. The one that is causing us the most concern is H5N1.

Another is H9N2, H7N7, a few others over the years. But let us

just focus, for the purpose of an example, on H5N1. What we are

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doing now is we are assuming—and it may not be correct, but the

assumption I think is an appropriate thing to do, because it will

set into motion the machinery that will prepare us if we have to

switch in midstream. So we are assuming that the H5N1 is something that we need to worry about, so we are developing two things

in parallel. The first are pilot lots. We have isolated it by that

rapid method of reverse genetics, and we are in the process of making pilot lots in small amounts, 8,000 to 10,000, from two companies; and we are doing that in order to put them into the clinical

trial to determine things: one, is it safe, because we have not vaccinated people with H5N1; we assume it will be because the methodologies essentially stay the same; and, second, how much do you

need to inject to get an adequate immune response, is it going to

be one dose, two doses, or more?

In parallel, in the assumption that we will have an H5N1 problem, we have contracted with Aventis-Pasteur to get us 2 million

commercial lot doses; and that is critically important because the

process that gets you the 8,000 to 10,000 doses is not something

that you can scale up to 10, 20, 30, 40 million, but the 2 million

of the commercial lot doses will set the process in motion that if

indeed we do need to scale up, it is much easier to scale up.

Now, on the scenario that perhaps the virus will change so much

that the vaccine that we are making is not specifically going to target that virus that now is spreading efficiently human-to-human,

the very process of scaling up with an avian virus vaccine is going

to put us in good stead to go and meet that challenge.

So we are already doing it now.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Your mic is not on.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. The issue of international cooperation. I know

it was a big question and a lot to cover.

Mr. SHAYS. If there could be a quick answer, I would be happy

to entertain it, but not a long one.

Dr. GERBERDING. I can give you a quick answer.

We have a system called the global detection network, and we

are investing in laboratories around the world and scaling up our

ability to get those isolates and get them to CDC for sequencing

and onto the seed vaccine development process. We are also sequencing all strains that are coming in.

Mr. SHAYS. Technically, I am next in line, but I notice we have

a number of colleagues in the democratic side of the isle, so I will

defer my questions and go to you, Ms. Norton. I think you are next.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.

Two questions. One has to do with the kinds of issues local jurisdictions are going through now to think of what they can do now.

I asked the District of Columbia Department of Public Health to

use its authority to issue its own regulations in an effort to avoid

panic and because, as you know, most of the vaccine is in private

hands and does not go to public health authorities. They did so. As

you know, every State in the United States—this would also be the

case in most cities—has the authority, that you apparently don’t

have, to proceed on its own to avoid a public health crisis. I want

to know if you have asked public health authorities to use their

own local authority to issue such regulations as they deem suitable,

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to advise them that would be an appropriate thing to do in light

of what you know about our supply and the delays that are already

being experienced by local jurisdictions getting whatever supply is

available.

Have you asked those who do have authority to use their authority? For example, a private physician who has regular patients may

well be under some very special pressure to give the vaccine to people who are not in high-priority groups. It would be much easier

for that physician to say regulations indicate I can’t do it then to

say that the CDC, who has no authority over me, said I can’t do

it. So I want to know, since you didn’t have the authority, since you

left us all out here, whether you have at least asked local public

health authorities who do have the authority to use their authority.

Dr. GERBERDING. We have indeed recognized the statutory authority of the State health officers, as well as the local health officials, to make decisions to protect the health of people in their jurisdiction, and that is exactly why we have been able to provide

them with the detailed information about their high-risk populations and the vaccines that are there.

Ms. NORTON. I am sorry, I didn’t get the answer to my question.

Has the CDC specifically advised local authorities that it might be

beneficial—not saying that you should do it, but that it might be

beneficial—for them to use their own local authority to handle this

public health crisis?

Dr. GERBERDING. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Would you indicate to me whether that has been

in a written directive? Could I get a copy of it? How was that advice given? What have you advised them to do specifically?

Dr. GERBERDING. The State health officials have worked with

CDC to develop the criteria for vaccine allocation; they are receiving the——

Ms. NORTON. See, you are not answering my question, and I have

another question.

Dr. GERBERDING. I am sorry.

Ms. NORTON. I know you have been working with them to develop the criteria. I have asked you something else; it has to do

with their legal authority to issue their own regulations so that

people know that you are not supposed to give these doses outside

of the priority groups. Now, I am not talking about developing and

whatever, I am saying very directly have you said you have authority? We are not sure what you would want to do with that authority, but when you have a public health crisis, you should at least

consider using that authority if you think that authority would

help alleviate the crisis. I have given you the kind of circumstance

I am talking about, and I am asking a direct question and I want

a yes or no answer.

Dr. GERBERDING. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Or if not a no—and if a yes answer, then my followup question was what did you say? Give me a copy of it. I don’t

know that my authority has received anything; at least they have

not reported any such thing to me.

Dr. GERBERDING. We would be happy to provide you that information.

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Ms. NORTON. Well, what did you say? I am asking you a question

here.

Dr. GERBERDING. We said we encourage you to exercise your statutory authority to make decisions about vaccine allocation for your

district. And we have also provided them with information from

our public health law program, which gives them the legal guidance from the statutes that are applicable to them.

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is certainly at variance with what I was

told. Therefore, I am asking, by the end of the day, would you provide me with a copy of that? We were told that you all did not consider it appropriate to do so. And I am very pleased if you have

reconsidered.

Dr. GERBERDING. We consider it appropriate for them to use

their authorities as they see fit.

Ms. NORTON. Well, obviously as they see fit. I am not asking you

to demand what you can’t demand. I would like to have a copy before the end of the day so I can make sure my own public health

authority knows that has been your recommendation.

Mr. SHAYS. Time has expired and we need to move.

Between Mrs. Maloney and Mr. Sanders, have you worked out

who goes next?

Mr. SANDERS. She won.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mrs. Maloney, you are next.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.

First of all, I would like to thank the witnesses for your testimony.

Just to underscore how critical this challenge is, two flu outbreaks in New York City alone have led to the death of four people

and 13 hospitalizations in the past few weeks. Our mayor—and I

congratulate him for this action—has reached out to purchase,

along with New Mexico and Illinois, 200,000 doses of flu vaccine

from European suppliers. And while this is not enough to cover everyone in New York City, it would cover our high-risk residents

and it would supply roughly 570,000 doses of vaccine.

I wrote a letter, along with other members of the New York delegation, in a bipartisan way, to Commissioner Crawford, asking

FDA to expedite the process for the review for these doses, and I

really want to know where that is. We need to get this vaccine. We

have wholesalers that are available in Europe that will sell to us.

How soon can we get it approved?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We are going through a process which involves,

first of all, getting the lot numbers of the vaccine, which the Governors and the mayor have kindly provided. The company that

manufactures the vaccine has authenticated those lot numbers,

they are in fact legitimate production from their facilities. And

what we are now doing is getting what is called the pedigree, and

that is where the vaccine has been, where it has been shipped to

and whether or not it has been kept refrigerated. We should have

all that information in the next few days and we should be able to

make a determination of whether or not it is suitable very shortly

after that. I can’t give you a specific date, but we have up to

750,000 doses nationwide that we are dealing with, including the

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200,000 for New York City, and we should be able to do all of them

at the same time.

Mrs. MALONEY. I would like to ask CDC what the justification

is that you have for not buying the many doses of vaccine that is

available from wholesalers in Europe right now? That vaccine is

available, unlike the vaccine from manufacturers which may not be

available until January, which may be too late for many high-risk

patients.

Dr. GERBERDING. I think the answer is the same as the answer

that Dr. Crawford provided. We can’t purchase vaccine until it has

been verified that it meets the importation criteria and has been

handled in a way. The vaccine in question has already left the

manufacturer, so it is out in the wholesale arena, and we are not

allowed to purchase that until we know that it has been properly

stored and maintained, and that its safety can be guaranteed.

Mrs. MALONEY. So you are reviewing wholesale production and

sale at this point, CDC?

Dr. GERBERDING. We are working with FDA to do everything we

can to get international vaccine sources into this country safely and

quickly.

Mrs. MALONEY. I would like to go back to the timing of the review. The Wall Street Journal this week quoted John Taylor, FDA’s

Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, and he said that in

2003 FDA’s Liverpool inspection showed systemic quality control

issues at the Chiron facility. And yet, even though FDA knew that

they had these problems, you never returned to the plant to verify

that things had been rectified and that the vaccine would meet

minimum safety standards, and you relied on Chiron’s assurances

that they had corrected it. And even after Chiron announced on

August 27th that it had identified contamination in some of the flu

vaccine, you still did not schedule an inspection.

So my question is if FDA had responded quickly to the August

27th announcement, could we have avoided the severity of the

problem, if you had gone in there early and worked with them and

corrected it, instead of waiting? And then, second, if you had alerted Aventis, the second company that is verified to produce the vaccine, of the problem, could FDA have redirected their vaccine to the

high-risk individuals? By the time the announcement came to

Aventis that we had a challenge and that there was a shortage,

they had already shipped almost 60 percent of the vaccine; but it

had not been shipped before August 27th.

So, in short, I think that the American people deserve more from

FDA in their management in a proactive way of making sure that

the vaccine was there and checking on it in advance. But from this

timetable that we have, you didn’t even go for an inspection, you

didn’t followup, you didn’t alert Aventis. And then there comes another question: Why do we only have two companies with this vaccine? I shudder to think if it had been small pox vaccine and we

had a breakout of some terrible disease.

Chairman TOM DAVIS [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Dr. Crawford.

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Mr. CRAWFORD. Actually, we don’t control how many companies

want to enter the U.S. market. There is not much we can do about

that. We wish we had the 20 manufacturers we formerly did.

We did followup on what we found in 2003, and, actually, the

vaccine for that year, which was the subject of that inspection,

turned out to be OK, and it was used. Then a new batch of vaccine

was prepared for this year, during this year. It was too late in August for them to start over again, because it takes from roughly

January or February until it finally comes offline for it to be produced. But we have, once we got the information, gone to other

manufacturers, and we have been able to find millions of more

doses, and we are still looking with the cooperation of Governors

in States and elsewhere to complete as large a quantity of vaccine

as we possibly can.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK, Mr. Sanders, you are recognized for

5 minutes.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, the issue

that I want to pursue is a very simple one, and that is the Federal

Government and numerous States, including the State of Vermont—Dr. Crawford, you and I chatted about this very briefly, and

I discussed it with Secretary Thompson as well very briefly.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. The Feds and the States have identified over 5

million flu vaccine doses that are available in Canada and in Europe. And we are not talking about obviously fly by-night companies, we are talking about Aventis, we are talking about Glaxo, we

are talking about ID Biomedical in Canada. And to the best of my

knowledge, these flu vaccines have already been used and distributed in Europe and in Canada, like a new product.

My question is, given the crisis that we face—Mrs. Maloney mentioned that people in New York are already dying; the fear is that

there could be a serious outbreak of flu—why does it take so long?

I mean, you have reputable companies in countries which are well

regulated, Europe and Canada. You have a product which has already been distributed to the people in those countries. Why, last

month, did you not send a host of inspectors there to make the

check of the plan, of the dosages, and get them out to the people?

Dr. Crawford.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It won’t take very much longer. The process is

basically threefold. These vaccines, although used in other countries, are not approved for use in the United States, so we have to

speed up that process. The way we do it is we contacted these three

manufacturers, got their production records, and also what is called

their master file of how they produce the vaccine.

Mr. SANDERS. That is the first day. What did you do on the second day?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The second thing is we sent inspectors, and they

have now all completed their inspection of these facilities. They will

file their reports with me. The first one——

Mr. SANDERS. I don’t mean to be rude. We don’t have a lot of

time. I understand all that. That is legitimate. That is 2 days’

worth of work. Why has it taken it a month?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, it is about a month worth of work.

Mr. SANDERS. Why?

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Mr. CRAWFORD. Because you have to get these master files. First

you have to get the cooperation.

Mr. SANDERS. Yeah, we have things like email; you have planes

to get you over there.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, no, no. Let me explain. You have to get the

cooperation of the company; they have first got to decide that they

want to give it to us. That took a lot of stuff.

Mr. SANDERS. We have talked in Vermont to some of these companies; they want to sell their product. You are not giving me a

good—briefly, why does it take——

Mr. CRAWFORD. And then, finally, we have to give them approval

to bring it in under what is called an investigational new drug application.

Mr. SANDERS. All right, I will give you 3 days. This does not take

a month. You have people in my State who are very concerned. All

over this country they are concerned.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I can assure you we will get it as quickly as we

possibly can.

Mr. SANDERS. But you see, I want to raise a question, and tell

me that maybe I am being overly concerned here. Some of us, including the majority in the House, believe in prescription drug reimportation. We think that it is insane that Americans have to pay

two, three, five times more for the same product that our friends

in Canada and Europe do. If we had prescription drug re-importation, those products would be in this country a month ago. I hope

very much that, given the administration’s opposition to re-importation, you are not making this more difficult than it should be.

Could you comment on that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. If the question is are we making it more difficult

than it should be, the answer is no.

Mr. SANDERS. But you still haven’t given me a reason why, with

all of the resources at the FDA’s command, why we have not approved those medicines and why we have not distributed them.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, I told you we are doing it as quickly as we

can, and that it is a matter of days away before we make a determination about these particular products.

Mr. SANDERS. Then how long does it take you to make a determination?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, it depends on what the data is we get, how

we evaluate it, whether or not we can——

Mr. SANDERS. All right, explain to the people who are watching

this. You have a product that has been widely distributed in Europe and Canada; you are inspecting these facilities of major drug

companies, above-board, reputable. How long is the determination

going to take and why is there so much question?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is variable. It is normally about a month’s

time before we reach an evaluation, because we have to get all the

records, we have to visit the plant, we have to make a determination. We have to be sure that the vaccine brought in won’t injure

the American people.

Mr. SANDERS. Well, of course.

Mr. CRAWFORD. By law, it has to be done on an investigational

new drug application, and that is the way it is.

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Mr. SANDERS. How long is this determination process going to

take?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is just about over.

Mr. SANDERS. So you think you can make a decision within a

week?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I wouldn’t be held to a week, but I think it could

be quicker than that in one case.

Mr. SANDERS. All right, now, my question is—and I know you

and I chatted about this——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. SANDERS. Thirty seconds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If he can state his question quickly.

Mr. SANDERS. Thirty seconds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. State the question.

Mr. SANDERS. All right.

Are you going to allow States and cities to go forward or are

these European and Canadian drugs going to come into the United

States and you guys will distribute it?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We have been working with the States. Some of

them want to bring them in directly, and they already have made

contacts and so forth, so we will work with them on an individual

case-by-case basis.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If I could just followup. I think you testified earlier you believe that some of these drugs from foreign manufacturers are going to be certified and be able to come in the country.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Some of these vaccines, yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Vaccines, right. Thank you very much.

Who is next over here? Mr. Tierney, have you asked questions

yet? I think you were here. Would you like 5 minutes? We still

have a couple questioners here.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Crawford, let me ask you a set of questions here about

Chiron’s plant in Liverpool, England. It was subject to an inspection both by the FDA and by the British counterpart, the MHRA.

Now, you have repeatedly stated that both agencies responded to

the August 2004 reports of contamination in a similar fashion. I

think at the committee’s October 8th hearing you said that both

FDA and the MHRA performed inspections that were about the

same thing. In a later press conference with Secretary Thompson,

you stated, ‘‘We would have, 5 hours later, made the same conclusions as the British; we were in synchrony with them.’’

So I want to just ask about some of the differences between the

British and the U.S. approach to that August Chiron announcement of contamination. When the initial contamination was reported, it was the United States, and not the U.K., that immediately lost several million doses. It was the United States, and not

the U.K., that was depending on Chiron for about half of its vaccine supply. Yet, it was the British, who had, I think, much less

at stake with this vaccine facility than the United States, that sent

an inspection team to the facility within a few weeks of the August

25 announcement, and the British who also sent a second inspection team to the plant at the end of September. Why didn’t our

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FDA respond forcefully to the August contamination by sending inspectors to the plant, as did the British?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We had inspectors in the plant on August 25,

and——

Mr. TIERNEY. But if I could just interrupt for a minute. You had

somebody there by coincidence, who was inspecting an entirely separate and discreet issue?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. They were getting up a different line. But

they were there and they were alerted by Chiron. They went over

some records and made some recommendations. Subsequent to

that, we, along with the CDC arranged for a series of calls, at least

once a week, to find out how they were doing with their bio burden

in that plant. Things appeared to be going well up until the final

reports, which came to the British and also came to us in virtually

the same amount of time. They scheduled an inspection, as did we.

Mr. TIERNEY. But your inspectors over there did not do the same

kind of thorough inspection that the British team did when it went

in.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I can’t speak for the British.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, you can speak for yours, and you know that

they did a more thorough examination. Your person did a somewhat cursory look at some records, but didn’t actually have a fullblown inspection that you ordinarily would have had in response

to this type of an emergency.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, we would have come to the same conclusion based on our lot release program; we would not have allowed

the product into circulation. And I made that decision following an

inspection that took place onsite.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me look at another point of difference on this.

The British received a draft of the Chiron inspection sometime in

mid-September, before even their second inspection. Yet, on the

other hand, we never received the report until the British actually

shut down the facility, sometime in October. How do you explain

that the British got that inspection report so much more quickly

than the FDA did?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We were getting a weekly update from the company, and we were scheduled for the final report on October 5. The

Chiron facility was under instruction from the U.S. Government to

quarantine the product, which they did, so none of it could be released, starting on August 25. So I believe we had control. In fact,

we did have control, because none of it got out.

Mr. TIERNEY. But there was a serious gap, and the British

seemed to be on top of this thing. They are getting a report before

their second inspection; we get it weeks later. I mean, it would

seem to me like they were a lot more aggressive, even though they

had less at stake than we did, and I am wondering why it was.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, we got a report every week, but the final

report was scheduled for October 5 for both governments, because

that was the end of the run. You can’t get a final report until they

finish.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, is it fair to say, though, that the FDA was

caught a little flat-footed about the British closing of that plant,

that the FDA didn’t even know it was going to happen until after

the fact?

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Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, by law, they could not communicate with

us, and we did not know that they were going to do that on October

5, no, that is correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. The law that you are mentioning is a British law,

right?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is.

Mr. TIERNEY. But that can be waived. We know that because it

was waived after the fact.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, the British issued a press statement about

3 days after the October 5 determination, in which they said they

were constrained by their law from communicating to us or the

other 98 countries.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it could be waived, and it was waived after the

fact.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, now we are able to work together because

of the company’s willingness to share it.

Mr. TIERNEY. So my question, I guess, is this. It is a very important source of supply for us.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. We had a lot at stake. Why would we rely simply

on the company’s analysis or report of facts, or whatever? Why

hadn’t we asked for a waiver from the company, which tells us now

that they would have certainly cooperated? Why didn’t we ask for

information from more than one source as this thing was developing? Why not say to the company ahead of time we need a waiver;

we want to not only find out from you what is going on, we want

to talk to our British counterparts and we want to have our own

inspections, we want to stay on top of this thing because we have

so much at stake?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We were getting all the information we were

asking for; there was no need to do that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time, Mr. Cummings, you have 5 minutes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really

appreciate it.

Let me just ask you this. I just want to make sure we are clear.

Did FDA make any mistakes?

Mr. CRAWFORD. FDA is not perfect. We followed our situation

here as we traditionally do, and at the end of the time we got the

final report on schedule, October 5. We sent an inspection team

over, and then we had to make the determination that this vaccine

was not usable; therefore, it never got the U.S. population.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are saying that made——

Mr. CRAWFORD. So, therefore, it was a success.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Excuse me. Are you telling

us that FDA made no mistakes?

Mr. CRAWFORD. In this vaccine thing?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No. It never got on the market.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I can’t hear you.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It never got on the market.

Mr. CUMMINGS. FDA rejected the recommendations of the inspectors and decided not to pursue official enforcement action against

Chiron in June 2003. As a result, the problems at the facility were

237

not public, and told investors that the inspection showed the plant

was really ‘‘in very good shape.’’ Was that a mistake?

Mr. CRAWFORD. On the 2003 vaccine production, we asked them

to make some corrections; they did. That vaccine was fine.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are saying you didn’t make a mistake

there.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, because the vaccine was fine.

Mr. CUMMINGS. FDA failed to reinspect the facility to find out if

any of the problems were corrected or the company’s plan was

being implemented as proposed. Yes or no, was that a mistake?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We reinspected by taking information from them

all along, so, no, we did not violate our procedures.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So again you didn’t make a mistake.

FDA declined to meet with Chiron after it requested a meeting

‘‘as soon as possible’’ to discuss plans to respond to the June 2003

inspection. This meeting could have helped the company understand the severity of the problems. Was that a mistake?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We met with Chiron.

Mr. CUMMINGS. FDA delayed sending a copy of the full inspection report to Chiron by 9 months, from September 2003 to June

2004. By the time the report arrived, the time to implement some

of the recommendations mentioned had already passed. You didn’t

make a mistake again?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That was a mistake.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Upon hearing of the actual contamination of vaccine this summer, FDA neither conducted a prompt inspection nor

reviewed the company’s records. As a result, FDA was caught completely by surprise by the British enforcement action. Was that a

mistake?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We did review the company’s records.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So no mistake there?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, we have a major problem here. We

have people in my district who cannot get these flu vaccines that

are begging for them; seniors, many of them standing in long lines.

But FDA made no mistake. The reason why I asked you these

questions is that we cannot deal with a problem unless we accept

the fact that we have one, that we made mistakes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. We are working to get more vaccine.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So FDA made no mistakes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Look——

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes or no?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The vaccine was contaminated in the final fill.

There was no way to know that until October 5, when the final report came through. You can’t do that until it gets finished. We

didn’t make a mistake because we condemned the vaccine; it did

not go into U.S. circulation. That was not a mistake. I would do

it again.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are saying to the people of the United

States, as they watch you on C–SPAN, that you all made no mistakes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. As I said, we condemned the vaccine——

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes or no?

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Mr. CRAWFORD [continuing]. And it did not get here. We make

mistakes, but we followed the procedures——

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, I am talking about with regard to this.

Mr. CRAWFORD [continuing]. And we took the right action.

Mr. CUMMINGS. No mistakes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. The vaccine didn’t get into circulation.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Fine. Apparently, you don’t want to answer my

question. I asked you a question. I said did you make any mistakes. Did FDA make any mistakes with regard to this?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I already——

Mr. CUMMINGS. Sir, let me tell you something. I have to go back

to my district and I have to explain to them why we have a Federal

agency that, to me, made some mistakes, but refuses to admit it.

At least just say no.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I already told you we made a mistake.

Mr. CUMMINGS. No.

Mr. CRAWFORD. We made a mistake. I can tell you no.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You did? What were the mistakes that you made,

so that we can correct them?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We didn’t get the report back to them on time

in 2003; we were late by a few months, and our procedures call for

it to get there in time. We have corrected that procedure, but that

was a mistake.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you one last question. During the

campaign season I noticed one interesting thing that happened.

Every time this flu vaccine came up in my district, my opponent

jumped up and said that there are not more companies producing

it because they are afraid of liability. I heard that over and over

again. And then I read in the Washington Post that one of the

main reasons why they didn’t produce it is because it has a short

life span, and they were afraid of spoilage and losing money.

Is that true? Which one is true?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I don’t know why they don’t enter the U.S. market. I don’t know about liability; I think that could be a factor. But

they have to remake the vaccine every year, and I am sure that

is a factor.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you are saying you don’t know why they

don’t enter the U.S. market?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you.

Mr. CUMMINGS. He said no. I just want to make sure that is on

the record. He doesn’t know why they don’t enter the U.S. market.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. And I

don’t think it is productive for Members to be screaming at witnesses that are here on their own volition. We all have questions

of this.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now I am going to take my 5 minutes.

The FDA basically followed your standard practices in waiting

for the failure investigation report, right?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Before proceeding to inspect the Chiron.

And Chiron never did produce the report to you until after its license was suspended by the MHRA on October 4th.

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Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The FDA and MHRA have both told the

committee that Chiron had no reason to expect its license would be

suspended until it completed its failure investigation report that

was provided in draft to MHRA on September 24th.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Once Chiron’s license was suspended, on

October 4th, U.S. access to the report and investigation by U.S. authorities was a moot point, although further inspection confirmed

the judgment of MHRA, is that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The problems at Chiron are not longstanding ones that FDA should have recognized long ago; Chiron’s

license was suspended for systematic problems in the facility, such

as lack of oversight and execution, but not the specific contamination or other issues addressed in 2003, as you have stated, and as

we have gone through and I think the reports are clear, is that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, that is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The FDA didn’t reject the initial recommendation of the team biologics to refer official action on the

June 2003 issues?

Mr CRAWFORD. No, we did not.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And further discussions resulted in full

agreement by all of those involved that voluntary action was appropriate, isn’t that correct?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Was there any dissension in that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No. The team biologics has a very good peer review of the process, and then they reach a consensus.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And there is no evidence that anyone involved in the process disagreed with the final decision, is there?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, there is not.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. I appreciate it.

Mr. Mica, did you want to ask.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, I am in my 5 minutes. Mr. Shays

will get 5 minutes.

Mr. MICA. You know, you have been hammered. You still haven’t

understood this, because you are the bad guy, and we have to prove

you bad.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I am beginning to get the picture, though.

Mr. MICA. OK. But this 2003 mistake that you admitted to, in

not responding in time, now the batch of vaccine, when was that

produced that proved to be bad, was that in 2003?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That was with reference to the 2003 vaccine,

which proved to be good, actually.

Mr. MICA. OK. So the 2003 mistake that you admitted to had

nothing to do with the batch in 2004.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Nothing, absolutely nothing.

Mr. MICA. OK. Well, but see, you are bad, and you have to pay,

because we don’t have the drug companies around; we have less

people. Pretty soon you are not going to have anybody to send

warnings to. What the hell are you guys going to do over there?

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Mr. CRAWFORD. It will be a lonely time for us.

Mr. MICA. But it is kind of sad that it has evolved to this.

I think Mr. Van Hollen had a very good point, though. He is gone

now, but we do have lots of seniors that want that. We should be

manufacturing this in the United States. And Mr. Waxman is

right. Even though he attacked me personally, I have to say he is

right. We don’t have a liability problem now because we have just

about run out of people to sue. So he is right on one account. But

you have to adjust liability.

Dr. Gerberding, she went down all of the problems: you have a

short shelf life; you don’t have a guaranteed market, so people

don’t produce it; you have regulations that impede the production

in the United States; you have a guaranteed purchase program of

childhood vaccines that actually pays less than I think the cost,

and that has also inhibited the manufacturing in the United

States. So it is a host of these issues. And until Congress addresses

these issues and changes some of the law regulations that we have

in place, in fact, we won’t be producing these vaccines in the

United States.

Just a quick question, doctor. Wouldn’t it be a lot easier for you

to keep tabs on these manufacturers if they were in the United

States, rather than far-flung around the globe?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It certainly would be easier to get to them. We

don’t have any overseas locations at FDA, we have to dispatch our

teams of inspectors from here.

Mr. MICA. OK.

And guaranteed purchases, Dr. Gerberding, that is also something that needs to be addressed?

Dr. GERBERDING. I don’t have the right formula for a solution,

but everything is on the table right now, and in order to guarantee

a market, that would be one strategy that we could look at to ensure the manufacturers that their vaccine would be purchased.

Mr. MICA. And the government now buys 60 percent of the pediatric vaccines. Is that still the case? That is the information that

I have.

Dr. GERBERDING. I believe that is correct, but I can get you the

exact percentage.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK, we are just about up. Thank you.

Let me just add. We had an old saying when I used to practice

law, that if you have the facts, you pound the facts; if you have the

law, you pound the law; and if you have neither, you pound the

table. I think in this it is pretty clear from the record that you have

set out earlier today that you followed the appropriate procedures,

you followed the appropriate protocols. We may need to tweak

those protocols a little bit. I mean, we need to make sure what happened this year should never happen again.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Absolutely.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I think we need to have that dialog

of how best to prevent it. It seems to me that the most basic thing

we can do is make sure there are more suppliers. As Mr. Sanders

and others have pointed out, there are foreign suppliers who

haven’t asked for U.S. recognition, but we need to get them into

our markets and have you out there inspecting them. And if we do

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that, at least we have some guarantee of alternate sources of supply. There are other issues we need to look at, but we will talk

about that.

Mr. Shays has 5 minutes a little later, and we will talk about

that.

Ms. Watson has not had her 5 minutes yet. Diane has been patiently waiting over there.

Ms. Watson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

And thank you, doctor, for being willing to sit on the hot seat.

We are not going to talk about that or good guys. I just would hope

that you would clarify some things for us. So I am going to raise

two issues, and then you can just address them together.

The first thing, I understand that Chiron is based in my own

State of California, yet we manufacture in the United Kingdom for

the U.S. market, and I am wondering why we could not start building a plant in California, why Chiron could not. That ought to be

something that we ought to be talking to them about. And Aventis,

I understand, is a French firm, but they manufacture in Pennsylvania.

So is it possible to produce the supplies that we are going to

need? And I will imagine our need will be greater in 2005 in California and Pennsylvania. You can answer that after I finish with

my next comment.

The next comment is that I understand in June 2003, after the

inspection, the company asked to meet with the FDA. Is it true or

not that the FDA refused to meet with Chiron to discuss its problems? So can you clarify what is going on? It is essential, if they

are one of two producers for the U.S. market, that we be communicating with each other.

So can you clarify those issues for me, please?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. We did meet with them. I have actually met

with them myself, so that is not correct.

Ms. WATSON. Can you give me a time?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We can supply that for the record, yes.

Ms. WATSON. Has it been after 2003?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. And with respect to the fact that there are

no vaccine production facilities owned by American firms in the

United States, I believe Chiron is going to testify on the next panel,

and you may wish to ask them. I think what guides them to seek

facilities elsewhere is because the facility is available. In other

words, I believe in mid-2003 Chiron actually acquired this plant

from another company, and they didn’t even own it until that

point. The facility that is in Pennsylvania I also believe was previously owned by another corporation. So I think even though a

French company manufactures there is because the plant was

present.

Now, what do we do about getting plants built in the United

States? That is beyond my authority or expertise, but I would think

what we are doing will help some, and that is we are engaging the

CEOs of all the companies in the world that produce flu vaccine,

and we are telling them that FDA has a commitment to help them

get up-line and get moving to either enter the U.S. market or to

build a facility in the United States. We will help them with whatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ever we can do. We can’t force them to do that, though, and that

is why I responded as I did to the last questioner.

Ms. WATSON. I think that as the Federal Drug Administration,

and with the threat of maybe a biological war, a threat of biological

vaccines coming in that are very toxic, I would think that the FDA

would want to suggest that we have legislation requiring that we

develop our own plants under the regulations that you already

have. I see the need as being tremendous, with the threat that is

facing the United States and the rest of the world from the terrorists. We need to be ready. I would think that would be a readiness

plan that would be recommended from the FDA. We should never

find ourselves in this position again.

And as Elijah Cummings said, people are coming into my office

in the center of Los Angeles in tears, and they are rushing around

to see if they can find a place to get their flu shots. And I am telling them don’t get one, it probably will give you the flu, because

they do inject some of the, as I understand, the microbes.

But please, please, as FDA, don’t wait for us as the legislators

to do it; you need to come with a strong recommendation and we

need to get the building of the plants and the distribution of these

needed vaccines right here in the United States.

Thank you, Dr. Crawford.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you.

Dr. GERBERDING. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one thing?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, Dr. Gerberding. Sure.

Dr. GERBERDING. I would just like to emphasize that the

injectable flu vaccine does not contain live virus that causes the flu;

there is no risk of getting the flu from the vaccine. The nasal vaccine does contain a weak flu virus, so there is a theoretical risk of

getting flu from that product, but not the injectable vaccine.

Ms. WATSON. Let me just respond by saying regardless, I think

they ought to be manufactured here, the nasal or the injectable. We

ought not to depend on other nations for our tremendous need.

Dr. GERBERDING. I absolutely agree with you on that. Thank you.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Shays, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

It is a wild circumstance. We have an American company whose

product made in England and we have a French company whose

product is made in Pennsylvania. And what I am interested to

know, Dr. Crawford, is if you had realized even 5 months earlier

that we had a problem, there would have been no solution, or

would we have been able to go out and request vaccines from other

places and been able to deal with this problem?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The eggs, which are chicken eggs, are

actually——

Mr. SHAYS. I need a short answer.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It started too early, so we couldn’t have done

anything about it.

Mr. SHAYS. So it speaks to a much bigger issue.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. I just want to align myself with Mr. Davis and also

Mr. Mica. This is a huge problem, but the fault does not rest at

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your doorstep; it rests right here in Congress, working with the

three of you.

I would like to ask Dr. Gerberding, on October 25, 2004, the CDC

introduced a secure electronic system to display influenza vaccine

dosage distribution information called the Flu Vaccine Finder. This

dataset is only available to State health officials. Has the Flu Vaccine Finder proven to be an effective tool for States to identify and

reallocate available vaccines?

Dr. GERBERDING. The Flu Vaccine Finder is an unprecedented

way for States to see the proprietary information about vaccine delivery in their jurisdiction. I believe they are finding it to be extremely helpful. The feedback we have received so far has been enthusiastic and with great relief. They can finally get their hands

on the information about distribution planning that they need. We

are working to make that same kind of information available to

people at the local health department level as well; that just takes

longer because there are several thousand of them.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I ask you the next question, I want to say that

the imminent biological threat facing the United States I think is

pandemic influenza, as a mutated viral form has caught the world

unaware in the past, and it will do so in the future. SARs was a

huge opportunity for us to see how we would deal with this issue.

It was involuntary and it was life-threatening, and it was extraordinarily serious. I think it points out persistent weaknesses in public health surveillance and vaccine production surge capacity to

meet emerging threats, and I would like to know if you agree.

Dr. GERBERDING. I agree. But I also think that the investments

we have made and the lessons we learned from SARs have been

very helpful to us in dealing with this current flu season situation,

and we are learning lessons from this situation that will help us

be even more prepared for a pandemic flu. In fact, that is part of

our mission right now, is to look at the distribution process, to look

at our detection capabilities, look at our surge and make sure that

we are learning from that so that if we see pandemic flu emerge,

we can be better prepared.

Mr. SHAYS. So what I want to ask the three of you is I am asking

do we need a new mechanism, new incentives to guarantee to that

adequate numbers of safe and effective flu vaccines are produced

and delivered annually? Just in this more particular case I guess

the answer is yes. And then with the very short period of time remaining, tell me what that is.

Dr. FAUCI. One of the things from a research standpoint, very

briefly, is to provide the advanced technologies to allow the companies to be able to get a head start, since we obviously have to partner with them to get the vaccine developed and out in an emergency situation. I mentioned a couple of them in my presentation.

And that is one of the ways we can do it, by providing the technology through the science. That is one of several ways.

Mr. SHAYS. And provide economic incentives that they are willing

to do that.

Dr. FAUCI. Oh, absolutely. And that gets to the point that you

were making There are four or five issues that we need to do. It

is a risky business; it is not a high profit business. We have to not

only provide the technologies that I mentioned, but some of the

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things that Dr. Gerberding early on mentioned and Mr. Mica questioned, something like guaranteed purchases, cutting down some of

the red tape which we call regulatory relief. And liability fits in

there. It may not be the biggest one, but it is one of several things

we can do.

Mr. SHAYS. I agree.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Well, let me say to this panel thank you. Dr. Crawford, that is

it. We don’t have any more questions. I know you are sorry to hear

that. You have accorded yourself well. All of you have. And we appreciate very much your time and your expertise on this. You are

no strangers to this committee. We look forward to working with

you in the future as we consider these issues. Thank you very

much.

The committee will take about a 3-minute recess as we get ready

for our next panel.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. We are moving to our next

panel.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing. Invited to join us

on our second panel are two vaccine manufacturers to discuss vaccine production capacities to respond to the shortage crisis in ways

to ensure a stable annual flu vaccine supply. Dr. Howard Pien, who

is the president and chief executive officer and chairman of the

board of Chiron, will be providing testimony. We also have Kathleen Coelingh of MedImmune, which manufacturers the nasal

spray vaccine, FluMist, which was referred to earlier. And Dr. Robert Stroube, who is the Virginia State health commissioner, also

joins us. He is here on behalf of the Association for State and Territorial Health Officials to provide an assessment of State and local

public health departments’ ability to respond adequately to the vaccine shortage. And last but not least, Dr. Jerome Klein is here from

the Boston University School of Medicine. He will be providing a

more academic perspective into issues surrounding the annual influenza vaccine.

It is our policy that we swear everybody in before you testify, so

if you would rise with me and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Let the record show everybody is here on their own volition. We

appreciate very much your being with us today. I think you know

the rules; your entire testimony is in the record. You have 5 minutes to say whatever you want. I think you know when the lights

come up.

Dr. Pien, we will start with you. And I know this has been an

interesting 6 months or so for you, but we appreciate your working

with us, working with our committee staff here and in London, and

we are pleased to have you here. Thank you.

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STATEMENTS OF HOWARD PIEN, PRESIDENT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, CHIRON

CORP.; KATHLEEN COELINGH, SENIOR DIRECTOR, REGULATORY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, MEDIMMUNE, INC.; DR.

ROBERT STROUBE, VIRGINIA STATE HEALTH COMMISSIONER, ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL

HEALTH OFFICIALS; AND DR. JEROME KLEIN, PROFESSOR

OF PEDIATRICS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

Mr. PIEN. Thank you, Chairman Davis and members of this committee. I welcome the opportunity to appear at this hearing.

In light of Chiron’s strong tradition of commitment to global public health, our vaccine division’s inability to provide influenza vaccine to the United States for this season has been a painful experience from which we are all learning a great deal. As we have said

on numerous occasions in the past, we profoundly regret that we

have been unable to supply influenza vaccine for this season. And

we appreciate the opportunity to engage in these very important

discussions.

I respectfully suggest that the lessons learned from this year’s

experience provide an excellent opportunity to reflect on the critically important policy initiatives that the 109th Congress should

consider to ensure a reliable and stable influenza vaccine supply

for the United States in the future.

I will focus my remarks on three key messages: what we are

doing, what is our prospect, and what are the policy considerations

that have emerged from this experience.

First, Chiron Vaccines is proceeding expeditiously in implementing internal changes and devoting resources to enable it to regain

its U.K. vaccines manufacturing license and to address the concerns raised by the FDA. In the past several weeks, Chiron Vaccines has developed a plan to implement a series of fundamental

personnel changes that will restructure the management of our

Liverpool operations. These personnel changes will leverage the

strength of Chiron’s existing global management team and will be

supplemented by new management to help take us forward in managing the Liverpool facility. These changes will maximize our ability to enhance our prospect to meet the challenge of returning to

influenza vaccine manufacturing for the 2005–2006 season.

We have assembled a world-class international team of 70 internal and external individuals with expertise in quality control, quality assurance, manufacturing, and regulatory standards to conceptualize and implement a remediation plan. We have retained external consultants who have substantial experience with the United

States and the U.K. regulatory standards. Most importantly, upon

the approval of the implementation plan by our board of directors,

this team will be empowered to make changes that will restore the

confidence of our regulators, both here and in the United Kingdom.

Also, effective November 3rd, I reorganized Chiron’s senior management team to allow me to focus more attention on overseeing

the Vaccines Division’s remediation activities at Liverpool. To that

end, I have appointed an interim chief operating officer of Chiron

in Jack Goldstein, previously our president of the Blood Testing DiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00253 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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vision. Starting November 4th, Jack began overseeing our operations other than those related to Fluvirin remediation.

To my second point. By devoting these resources to the remediation of our Liverpool facility, we expect to meet and exceed the required responses to the MHRA and the FDA observations raised in

their respective inspections.

Chiron Vaccines acquired the Liverpool facility in July 2003. Although both the regulatory community and ourselves recognized it

was a somewhat older facility, we promptly committed to replacing

the influenza vaccine production plant with a state-of-the-art adjacent facility estimated to cost $100 million, which is under construction. We also proceeded to address a number of the concerns

identified by the FDA in its June 2003 inspection conducted when

Liverpool was under previous ownership. At present, in coordination with both the MHRA and the FDA, we are close to finalizing

a detailed remediation plan for our Liverpool facility. The plan covers a range of enhancements to our manufacturing processes, quality systems, and structure for management oversight. Subject to

the concurrence of both regulatory authorities and approval by our

board of directors, we will implement this plan expeditiously, with

the hope and the aim of supplying influenza vaccine next season.

Our ability to regain our U.K. influenza vaccine manufacturing

license in time to participate in vaccine production next year is

mission-critical for Chiron Vaccines. This plan addresses quality

systems in a holistic manner and is proposed with the aim of exceeding the specific regulatory observations made last month by

the MHRA and the FDA. The plan covers personnel, processes,

equipment, systems, and infrastructure. The organizational

changes will enable us to entrench a culture of quality where employee performance is correlated clear and quantitated performance

metrics.

To successfully achieve its remediation objectives and to be able

to provide influenza vaccine next year, extraordinarily close coordination between the MHRA and the FDA will be needed. In the

meetings that we have held with these regulatory authorities since

October 5th, we are heartened by the encouragement we have received. Having said that, it is important to add two cautionary

notes. In light of the broad and ambitious scope of our remediation

plan, there can be no conclusive assurance that we will be able to

meet expectations of the MHRA and the FDA by March 2005,

which will be the start of full-scale manufacturing season. Moreover, because the regulators’ GNP standards are ever-rising, we

cannot say definitively whether we will be able to meet them in future years.

To my third and final point. This year’s experience provided lessons that can enable us to strengthen our national public policies

with regard to interpandemic and pandemic influenza. We know we

must address short-term and long-term policy objectives that assure a stable supply of influenza vaccine that drive uptake for vaccine and that establish manufacturing capacity within the United

States. In the so-called normal influenza season, a stable vaccine

supply for the U.S. market is dependent on diversifying the manufacturing base, which is in turn driven by an environment conducive to multiple manufacturers. This environment should have the

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following characteristics: (1) sufficient demand to enhance production capacity; (2) pricing and reimbursement that justify investments in maintaining and expanding existing production capacity;

(3) a regulatory pathway that fosters innovation in new technologies; and (4) mechanisms to reasonably protect vaccine manufacturers from liability claims.

Marketing of influenza vaccine is dependent upon an effective

public and private partnership that improves vaccination rates by

raising awareness, dispelling myth, and extending the immunization season. In the long-term in order to effectively address our

public health needs in the event of a global influenza pandemic, a

strong public-private partnership is paramount, particularly to

prioritize and allocate influenza vaccine in the event of a supply

challenge. The essential ingredients for meeting this challenge are

evident: information-sharing, partnership, frequent communication,

and hard work. The public health system is coping with the challenges, and I believe will emerge stronger from this experience,

with a clearer focus on strengthening our influenza immunization

infrastructure and creating a sustainable influenza market. The

men and women of the public health service have demonstrated incredible leadership in addressing public distress and in getting vaccine to those who need it most in the current supply shortage.

With that as a backdrop, to increase manufacturing capacity in

the United States, the government should begin now to invite additional manufacturers into the U.S. market and to provide appropriate financial incentives and clear regulatory guidance. Experience teaches us, as you said, Mr. Chairman, that establishing this

capacity likely will take several years. However, events occurring

with regard to the avian flu in the pacific realm indicate that the

pandemic clock is already ticking; thus, we cannot afford any delay.

I ask, respectfully, that my written testimony be also included as

part of the record, and I am prepared to answer any questions.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, the entire testimony of

all of you will be a part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pien follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Coelingh, thank you for being with us.

Ms. COELINGH. Good afternoon. My name is Dr. Kathleen

Coelingh, and I am the senior director of regulatory and scientific

affairs and MedImmune, a Maryland-based vaccine company that

manufactures the innovative intranasal influenza vaccine, FluMist.

Approved by the FDA last year for healthy persons 5 to 49 years

of age, FluMist is the first advancement in influenza prevention in

50 years.

We are at a critical juncture in defining what the influenza vaccine market will look like in the future and how U.S.-based vaccine

manufacturers will meet the needs of this country going forward.

What will be the incentives for companies to build U.S.-based manufacturing facilities? How will our government drive vaccine acceptance, utilization, and demand, since it is demand that ultimately

determines the supply of vaccine manufactured? And what will be

the incentive for continued innovation?

MedImmune recommends that this committee support and encourage two key longer term solutions in the realm of policy

changes and incentives for innovation. The first recommendation is

to move toward adoption of a universal recommendation for influenza vaccine for all Americans. The current recommendations,

which are based on age groups and an ever-expanding list of underlying chronic medical conditions are both complicated for the health

care provider to follow and are confusing to the public. We believe

that a universal recommendation will stabilize demand for vaccine,

thereby leading to increased vaccine supply and ultimately to substantially lowering the current morbidity and mortality due to influenza.

As an interim step, MedImmune recommends required vaccination of school-aged children, who have a very high influenza attack

rate and spread influenza to younger siblings, their parents, and

their grandparents. Thus, vaccination of school children would directly benefit not only the children themselves, but may also have

the potential to greatly reduce the impact of influenza in our communities. This concept of protecting an entire community by vaccinating the school-aged children has already been demonstrated in

Japan and in studies in the United States. In conjunction with this

interim step, money must be appropriated to expand the education

of the public and the medical community about the seriousness of

influenza and the value of influenza prevention.

The second solution that MedImmune recommends to ensure continued influenza vaccine supply is to provide tax incentives for scientific innovation and for construction of U.S.-based facilities.

MedImmune is a primary innovator in the area of molecular techniques, termed ‘‘reverse genetics.’’ The use of reverse genetics is

vital to producing seeds for an H5N1 pandemic vaccine, as we

heard from Dr. Fauci earlier. MedImmune owns multiple patents

in this area and has granted free access to its reverse genetics intellectual property not only to governmental organizations, but also

to other companies who are developing pandemic influenza vaccines. MedImmune is currently collaborating with the National Institutes of Health to produce intranasal pandemic vaccines and to

test them in clinical trials.

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MedImmune also has core expertise in the innovative area of cell

culture manufacturing. The main advantages of manufacturing

using cell culture are elimination of our dependence upon egg supplies and more consistent and rapid production, which will be critical in the event that the egg supply is decimated by the emergence

of a pandemic virus. The transition from egg-based to cell-based

manufacturing will require considerable investment in the construction of new facilities and potentially additional clinical studies. Tax incentives to subsidize the cost of such innovations are

necessary to guarantee a more stable vaccine supply on a yearly

basis and when the pandemic comes.

The government also needs to incentivize manufacturers to build

manufacturing facilities within the United States. There is an increased risk that, with offshore manufacturing, companies will face

political decisions that may prevent vaccine products from entering

the United States, particularly in the event of a catastrophic pandemic. Tax incentives for U.S.-based manufacturing facilities would

encourage manufacturers to build more facilities in the United

States.

To address what MedImmune has done during the current vaccine shortage, since October 5th, we have worked diligently with

the appropriate authorities to, first, blend and fill our excess bulk

vaccine to produce an additional 2 million doses of FluMist, bringing our total production for this year to 3 million doses; second, we

have supplied the Department of Defense with up to 400,000 doses,

the CDC with 125,000 doses, and we have supplied hospitals with

over 60,000 free doses of FluMist this year; third, we have supplied

the FDA with new storage data for FluMist, which they have

promptly reviewed and approved, allowing the additional 2 million

doses of FluMist to be stored in a household freezer without the requirement for the special freezer box; and, finally, we have worked

closely with the CDC and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices to clarify that FluMist is an option for all healthy

people 5 to 49 years of age who want to consider protecting themselves from influenza this season.

Shifting gears a bit and looking forward to next season, you must

understand that the influenza vaccine manufacturing campaign for

the 2005–2006 season is starting right now. We are already preparing the new vaccine seeds that we anticipate will be in the next

year’s vaccine, and we are making decisions about how many doses

of vaccine we will manufacture, including deciding how many

chicken eggs to order. Thus, the amount of FluMist that will be

available next season will soon be fixed.

With some additional regulatory cooperation, MedImmune has

the capacity to produce between 8 to 10 million doses for next season. These regulatory actions include: FDA approval allowing for

the production of larger lot sizes and filtration; acceptance by the

FDA of our application to permanently eliminate the requirement

for the FluMist storage box; and, finally, FDA acceptance of recently sumitted data that supports the expansion of the FluMist indication to include the 30 million healthy Americans who are 50 to

64 years old, a group that is not eligible for the injectable flu shot

this season, and may not be eligible again next season, should we

experience a continuing shortage.

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In summary, MedImmune is clearly at a crossroads in determining not only how much FluMist will be available next season, but

also whether our investments and innovation will be recouped in

this market. Our level of production for next season depends on the

occurrence of several immediate regulatory actions. But whether

MedImmune expands its production and whether companies continue their efforts to develop influenza vaccines depends in large

part upon the government’s commitment to encouraging innovation

and driving demand. Requiring childhood influenza vaccination as

an interim step toward a universal recommendation and legislating

tax incentives for both scientific innovation and U.S.-based manufacturing will go a long way to ensuring an adequate supply of influenza vaccine in the near future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Coelingh follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you for your testimony.

We will hear now from Dr. Robert Stroube, Virginia State health

commissioner with the Association of State and Territorial Health

Officials.

Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

Dr. STROUBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the House Government

Reform Committee, my name is Robert Stroube. I am the health

commissioner in Virginia. I am honored to be testifying before you

today, and I would like to thank you for convening this hearing on

this really crucial problem that we are facing.

The ongoing flu vaccine shortage continues to present many challenges for Virginia, as well as the other States. State and local

health departments have been working nonstop since October 5th

to address this issue.

As of today, Virginia Health Department has received a total of

159,565 doses of flu vaccine, which we have distributed to our local

health departments and our long-term care facilities for administration to people at high-risk of complications from the flu. In addition, the Health Department has received 84,480 doses of flu vaccine intended for high-risk children who are eligible for the Vaccines for Children program. According to recent information from

CDC, we are expecting another shipment of about 150,000 doses,

which we will allocate to long-term care facilities, hospitals, and

other health care facilities with unmet vaccine needs.

The Health Department is now providing the flu vaccine to many

more people and providers than we would during a typical flu season. You might say that the Health Department is now the broker

in the management of the flu vaccine to help ensure that the vaccine goes where it is most needed.

We applaud the reallocation efforts of CDC and of Aventis, and

we are grateful for the timely receipt of the vaccine that we have.

We firmly believe that as the public health agency for Virginia, it

is our responsibility to guide allocation distribution of vaccine to

those who are most in need.

However, we do want the committee to be aware of the immense

workload this situation has placed on local and State Health Department personnel. During the first week of November, the State

Health Department distributed more than 77,000 doses of vaccine

to our 35 local health districts on a population-based formula. Each

health district developed a flu vaccine distribution plan based on

the needs of the high-risk persons in that community. In developing those plans, all the health districts had to make difficult decisions on how to distribute the limited amount of vaccine. In some

areas they opened up phone lines and began taking appointments

on first call-first served basis; some distributed the vaccine to

health care providers in the community; some pre-identified highrisk individuals who were unable to get the vaccine in the private

sector.

In Chesterfield County, just outside of Richmond, the health department there held a ‘‘drive through’’ flu clinic this past weekend

so that high-risk people wouldn’t have to stand in line out in the

cold. That one clinic required 120 staff members to manage all of

the logistics. The health director there estimates this ongoing issue

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has required more than 600 hours of work from senior-level managers, supervisors, and other personnel. The health department’s

time devoted to this ongoing flu shortage supply issues means time

away from other important public health practices.

Another example is our ongoing distribution of 82,000 doses of

vaccine to long-term care facilities in Virginia who did not receive

flu vaccine. In order to accurately determine which facilities still

needed vaccine, all of our 35 health districts surveyed each facility

in their community. The health department usually does not provide flu vaccine directly to long-term care facilities. Most of these

facilities ordered vaccine this year through a distributor or directly

from the manufacturer, and most ordered through Chiron Vaccines.

In our Immunization Program, we typically only need one fulltime person working on the flu vaccine program. This year we have

four staff persons working continuously managing the issue at the

State level. In addition, the issue has required the involvement of

all our senior-level management, our public information personnel,

and some of our emergency preparedness personnel, which manage

State level planning, logistics communication and coordination. We

owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to our hardworking and

dedicated public health employees who are spending hours planning and executing flu vaccine clinics or answering phone calls

from our worried elderly and our other high-risk citizens. I would

like to take this opportunity to personally thank each and every

person for their service to our citizens.

At the beginning of the shortage, one of our biggest difficulties

was determining how much flu vaccine was available in the private

sector. We would like to thank CDC and Aventis for their efforts

to make this information about vaccine distribution in the private

sector available to us through our secure Web-based data base.

This information has helped us to identify geographic gaps in vaccine supply and focus our distribution efforts to providers in those

areas. This system is constantly being upgraded, and just this

morning, before I left to come here, we found out that they have

now upgraded it, so we will be ordering our vaccine directly and

sending it through reallocation out over this data base.

Even with all the flu vaccine now coming to Virginia, we do not

expect that we will have enough vaccine for every high-risk individual in Virginia this year. To help alleviate the situation, we continue to provide the public with useful tips for preventing the

spread of flu in the absence of vaccine, such as frequent hand

washing and staying home from work when sick. In addition, we

have been encouraging the use of pneumococcal vaccine among the

elderly and individuals with chronic medical conditions. This widely available vaccine can help prevent pneumonia, which in many

cases is a secondary complication of flu.

We would like to thank CDC and the Department of Health and

Human Services for all the work they have done to help manage

the situation and secure flu vaccine for the State health departments. We believe that everyone involved at the Federal, State,

and local level has done an outstanding job addressing the problem.

But I cannot stress enough how important it is for Congress to

take steps now to prevent this flu vaccine shortage from occurring

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again. This situation has required an enormous amount of time

and effort to manage, and has had a major fiscal and human resource impact on other important public health activities.

Efforts must commence now at the national level to ensure a stable flu vaccine supply. As many of us have stated in previous testimony, the present system of vaccine production distribution is incapable of effectively and efficiently responding to the current demand for the flu vaccine. It is imperative that Congress take steps

now to support the development of a more reliable and flexible vaccine production and distribution process. In addition, efforts need

to be made now to guarantee an ample supply of flu vaccine from

multiple manufacturers.

Given the estimated 36,000 people that die each year in the

United States from the complications of flu and the threat of a flu

pandemic, I believe addressing the flu vaccine production and distribution problem has to be of the highest priority for Congress.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stroube follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Klein, thanks for being with us.

Dr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am Jerome

Klein, a pediatrician, a professor for pediatrics at Boston University, and a member of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee.

A robust domestic vaccine capability is a necessity not only for

old threats such as influenza, but for new and virulent microorganisms spread by natural means or by bioterrorist activity. The current shortage of influenza vaccine underlines the vulnerability of

the supply of all recommended vaccines in the United States, and

I would like to touch on four areas that have already been discussed in part in the prior discussions: first, the loss of vaccine

manufacturing capability in the United States; second, the issue of

stockpiling; three, Food and Drug Administration regulatory practices; and, fourth, the liability concern.

First, the loss of manufacturing capability. Vaccine manufacturing is complex, involves uncertainties that do not exist in pharmaceutical drug manufacturing. There is no question that additional

influenza vaccine manufacturers this year, if available, would have

diminished the effect of loss of the Chiron product. Companies

leave the marketplace when a product no longer provides a reasonable return on investment. Appropriate incentives must exist that

encourage companies to enter and remain in the vaccine business.

What is needed now is a sustained effort to provide concrete proposals that will have a durable effect. A multi-disciplinary group to

include all stakeholders should be convened to evaluate and propose appropriate incentives for manufacturers to ensure supply of

existing vaccines and stimulate development of new vaccines, and

that is the encouragement of domestic vaccine producers, not seeking vaccine overseas.

Second, the issue of strengthening vaccine stockpiles. A program

to stockpile vaccines has been available since the 1980’s. The principle is simple: government purchase of vaccine provides a repository that can be called on if there is an emergent need. Subsequent

to the 2002 workshop held by National Vaccine Advisory Committee, there was additional funding that was provided to expand the

stockpile program. However, no new vaccine has been added because of a Securities and Exchange Commission accounting regulation that bars vaccine manufacturers from claiming sales to the

stockpile program as revenue until they come out of the stockpile.

This impediment to a universally approved response to enhance

vaccine supply should be remedied as soon as possible, because a

new influenza vaccine is prepared each year and the stockpile concept is not applicable. A redundancy of supply has been suggested.

The government purchase program would be expanded so that additional vaccine beyond that required for patients at risk would be

instituted. Since influenza immunization would be a value for

healthy children and adults, the additional vaccine would not be

wasted.

Three, streamlining the regulatory activity of the Food and Drug

Administration. The current good manufacturing practices need to

be dynamic, with changes to maintain or improve facilities to current standards, but allow sufficient flexibility to ensure continued

vaccine production. In addition, a review of current GMP and regulation should be instituted to consider whether the complexity of

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manufacturer of vaccines and biologics warrants a separate and

different mode of regulation than that used for drugs, which is the

practice currently.

Finally, the liability issue, which, as I understand it has little

role in the current concern about the contamination issue at the

Chiron facility. But there is renewed concern about litigation associated with the manufacture and administration of vaccines. The

National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was established in 1986 to compensate quickly and appropriately individuals who suffered serious injuries associated with the administration of an FDA-approved vaccine. The program removed the threat

of liability from the manufacturer, as well as those who administer

vaccines, and successfully stabilize the market. The VICP should

be maintained and strengthened to include additional vaccines.

When those additional vaccines are added, additional staff will be

needed. So the VICP program needs to be supported. Strengthening

the VICP would benefit manufacturers, providers, consumers, and

further safeguard the Nation’s vaccine supply.

The development of safe and effective vaccines during the past

50 years, since the introduction of the polio vaccine, has been one

of the great success stories of American medicine. However, there

is concern, as has been discussed today, that future contributions

of the vaccine industry may be jeopardized by lack of attention to

basic issues. Solutions are not easy to come by in a sustained effort. The collaboration of all stakeholders and political will will be

required.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you, and thank all of you for

your testimony.

Let me just, if I could, recognize we have with us today in the

back of the room Cub Scouts Pack 1134, Den 7, from the Chain

Bridge District. And we are happy to welcome you here today to

today’s hearing. This is on the flu vaccines in the United States

and the shortage we are having.

Let me just start with one question before I recognize Mr. Mica;

and this goes really to Mr. Pien. Could you tell us what happened

at Chiron’s Liverpool facility that ultimately led to the October 5,

2004 license suspension?

Mr. PIEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chiron, as I testified, acquired this

facility in July 2003, and the acquisition actually was conditioned

upon a successful satisfactory inspection that took place in June

2003. And after we made the acquisition, of course, we continued

the investment program, so about another $50 million got into this

current facility. Since then, in addition, we recognized that, as the

standards of quality will be rising, that we need to build a new facility; and, therefore, we made the commitment of spending $100

million, as I testified, to build an adjacent facility, of which roughly

$30 million have now been spent.

We had a terrific 2003 season, as Commissioner Crawford had

indicated; we had a 40 percent increase into the U.S. market from

that facility over 2002. We had a 30 percent total output increase,

some of which of course, went to parts outside of the United States.

We found that the facility was viable. We had tremendous confidence in the ability for that facility to continue to produce products. And, of course, you will recall last year at this time we were

sitting here thinking about the regionally severe and earlier flu

season. So there is indeed a demand in the United States. So that

takes us into 2004.

In July 2004 our quality assurance programs identified two consequential batches which failed our standards, and they turned out

to be sterility problems. We then formed a team to identify the root

cause. In late August I was advised that we would likely be delaying the shipment of Fluvirin relative to our previous release forecast. We immediately informed both regulatory agencies, MHRA

and the FDA, of the expected delay and our adjusted forecast of

supply. This, incidentally, led to a press release in August. Since

then we have been in regular consultation with both agencies to

update them on the progress of our confirmatory testing program,

and has brought us now to September 27th.

On September 27th our internal testing program concluded favorably. We expected, therefore, to be able to supply between 46

and 48 million doses to the United States. We initiated a process

of reporting the outcome of our confirmative testing program to the

regulatory agencies, starting with the MHRA. The MHRA came to

visit our Liverpool facility on September 28th to both evaluate our

confirmative testing findings and to start what turned out to be a

3-day inspection. When the inspection was completed on September

30th, we received a one-page list of observations and we responded

to those observations 4 days later, over the weekend; and that took

us to October 4th.

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On October 5th the MHRA advised us of their decision to temporarily suspend our Liverpool plant license. And as a consequence

of that decision, our products that were produced, that were tested,

that were retested could not be and were not released to the marketplace.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Klein, thank you for your very succinct and direct recommendations as to what we need to do to get flu vaccine and vaccine manufacturing in the United States. You covered incentives,

which were also mentioned by the producer of the FluMist. You

talked about stockpiling a bit. You talked about two things that I

got into; I didn’t have a lot of time: regulatory reform and liability

reform.

The other thing, Mr. Chairman, that I think he brought up, as

well, was a meeting of stakeholders. These hearings are nice and

they make nice fare; tomorrow it will be a great headline to bash

the FDA, but it doesn’t get flu vaccine or other vaccines that are

essential on the market. But a stakeholders meeting would be very

good, where we had people who actually manufacture and produce

this, maybe with some of the FDA folks. I think, Mr. Chairman,

that would be an excellent recommendation. And, actually, the Virginia health representative said that Congress needs to take steps,

and we do need to take steps. We are already into another season.

But you pointed out something, too. I am a fairly ignorant Member of Congress, as has been pointed out here, but you did highlight one area that I am not that familiar with, and that is the difference between regulation of a pharmaceutical and a vaccine. And

maybe it is time, as you pointed out in your testimony, that we reexamine the regulatory regime we have. And that may be out of

the purview of our committee’s jurisdiction, but it is one of the

things that we haven’t looked at, and you might want to address

it. You probably share my ignorance in thinking that liability or

the threat of liability, if we could remove that, would also enhance

manufacturing, but I guess we are both probably at the school and

lacking in knowledge.

But I think you hit the nail on the head, doctor. It is too bad you

are the last witness, but I think everything you pointed out succinctly, again, directly identifies the problem and where we need to

go. So I thank you for that.

How would you compose a stakeholder conference or meeting?

And I think we should do that sooner rather than later, but give

us your idea so we could do something positive. And Congress must

act, as Dr. Stroube has pointed out.

Dr. KLEIN. Well, I think your remarks are very appropriate in

the sense that you would like to see action, and you would like to

have knowledgeable people involved; and that would include not

only manufacturers, but purchasers, consumers, legislators, or legislative staff that would convene a session that would have contrary proposals as the goal. Then to bring those proposals to this

committee or any other body for review and potential action. But

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tiously as possible. And I think in a way the flu crisis that we have

now is an opportunity to light a fire, because what is coming could

be much worse.

Mr. MICA. And Mr. Pien talked about the pending pandemic.

Dr. KLEIN. The pandemic flu problem is inevitable. It is not a

question of whether——

Mr. MICA. It is when.

Dr. KLEIN [continuing]. Is it a question of when.

Mr. MICA. Again, you have to excuse my ignorance; I am not very

knowledgeable about some of the regulatory process. But, again,

the point that you raised about treating vaccines differently from

pharmaceuticals—and, again, I am not an attorney like some of

these folks up here, I am just sort of a leftover businessman. But

the question I would have is, from a technical standpoint, does

FDA have the authority to make those changes in that regulatory

distinction, or is that something that would require a change in the

law?

Dr. KLEIN. I am not sure, but I think FDA——

Mr. MICA. Oh, another ignorant guy. I am sorry.

Dr. KLEIN. But I think they do have the regulatory authority to

modify——

Mr. MICA. But I think that is an important question, too, that

we should look at and maybe we need to address.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. KLEIN. I think they can modify their inspection.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Waxman, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pien, when FDA inspected the Liverpool facility in June

2003, the agency found 20 serious areas of concern. We now know

that the inspectors believed that official enforcement action such as

a public warning letter was justified. Had a warning letter been

issued, the agency would have detailed the changes necessary to fix

the problems identified. But a warning letter was never sent; the

inspectors’ recommendation was downgraded. As a result, Chiron

never received from FDA a specific list of changes needed to fix the

problems at the June 2003 inspection.

That raises the question of whether Chiron, which was in the

process of taking over the Liverpool facility, really understood what

was needed to resolve these concerns. On June 27, 2003, Chiron

wrote to FDA asking for a meeting ‘‘as soon as possible’’ to discuss

the company’s response to the June 2003 inspection. Would this

meeting have been an opportunity for the company to learn more

about what steps were needed to correct the problems at the facility?

Mr. PIEN. Mr. Waxman, as I testified before, the inspection took

place in June 2003, and the Liverpool facility was then not owned

by Chiron, it was known by an English company called PowderJect.

Our board of directors conditioned the acquisition of the Liverpool

facility on what was reported to us to be, by the people in Liverpool, a satisfactory FDA inspection. I think that most of the correspondence that arose from that inspection still had the Evans letterhead on it, which was the name of the previous owner relative

to the Liverpool facility.

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Since then, my understanding is that there had been discussions

between our people in Liverpool and the FDA relating to the observations that they made in 2003, prior to our taking them over. And

as I testified before, Chiron made a very, very conscious decision

that, indeed, we want to remediate against any past observations

of deficiencies, and that was the reason that we followed through

with the remediation program that went into that facility of $15

million that was spent in addition to the new facility that I talked

about.

Mr. WAXMAN. You also, on the same basis, I assume, asked for

the meeting with the FDA, so you could find out what they knew

about the plant that you needed to correct.

Mr. PIEN. What I understand, Mr. Waxman, is that those conversations did take place. The regulatory contact were based in

Liverpool, and those conversations did eventually take place.

Mr. WAXMAN. FDA told us that they never followed up with you.

So you have a different view of what happened, that FDA did followup about the June 2003 inspection?

Mr. PIEN. Mr. Waxman, what I understand, what I am told is

that around September or October there was a telephone contact

for our people to understand how best to proceed with the observations that were made in the June FDA inspection in 2003.

Mr. WAXMAN. A year later, in June 2004, Chiron wrote FDA

again asking for a full copy of the final inspection report. While

this report does not contain formal recommendations for action, it

does contain a number of specific details, including some recommendations that are not included in initial lists of agency observations. Now, according to the FDA staff, this full inspection report

should have been delivered to the company in September 2003. But

because of confusion within the agency, it was sent 9 months later.

I heard that Dr. Crawford even accepted, in response to a question

from Mr. Cummings, that this was a mistake.

Can you explain the difference in the point of vaccine manufacturing cycle between September 2003 and June 2004?

Mr. PIEN. I have not seen that document, so I am not sure. I

should probably study that document such that I can provide an intelligent answer.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, if you get a chance to do that, we would welcome your comments for the record.

Mr. PIEN. We shall.

Mr. WAXMAN. Would having the full inspection report 9 months

earlier have helped the company understand the FDA’s June 2003

inspection better?

Mr. PIEN. Congressman, as I testified just now, I understand

there to have been a contact between our Liverpool-based people

who were charged with the fulfillment of the remediation against

the 2003 inspections, and my understanding is that contact did

take place.

Mr. WAXMAN. The documents we released today show that FDA’s

regulatory approach from June 2003 to October 2004 was to rely

on company representations rather than conduct its own inspections to make sure the problems were being corrected. For example,

after you announced a problem with contamination in August 2004,

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tober. But this approach did not work. From the end of August

until the British shut the facility, you were telling FDA and the

public that the contaminated vaccine was limited in amount and

you had every expectation that the rest of the vaccine was on track

for this year.

The problem with the FDA approach is when what you said

turned out to be wrong, things were not OK, both British and FDA

inspectors found systemic problems, including failures to address

high bio burdens, problems addressing connection between tanks

and sanitary practices that were found on previous inspections. So

FDA was taken by surprise when the British came in and found

out these problems.

It seems obvious to me if we had known earlier, we could have

planned for the shortage. But, if you know, why did the company

provide FDA with information and projections that turned out to

be wrong; was it deliberate, or would it be fair to say the company

was not aware of the severity of the problems and was optimistic

any problems could be overcome?

Mr. PIEN. Congressman Waxman, as I know you know this, the

making of the flu vaccine is a terribly complicated thing; it is a new

product every year, it is actually one product made up of three

components every year. And you start, therefore, with a very large

number of eggs, you put these seeds of viruses into the eggs and

you make it grow, and then you harvest it. And the process is complex, and that is the reason that you would have, as a manufacture, these series of procedures for testing and retesting.

In July 2004, as I testified before, our quality assurance program

identified two batches of products that had sterility issues, and

when that occurred, we thought that the scope of the problem did

not appear to threaten any supply expectations that we had at the

time, and we began to test and do these programs and investigate

what caused it, the so-called root cause diagnosis and determination. And as you would expect in making flu vaccines in the way

that I have just described—by the way, at the peak of the production season, one can be talking about 400,000, 500,000 eggs. So

what you alluded to is the bio burden issue—I think Commissioner

Crawford has already testified—happens. The trick is to make sure

that you have a robust process that, therefore, the end product

does not have any of this bio burden.

Therefore, we expected some failures in these internal testing

programs, and that is why we were performing these confirmative

tests.

Mr. WAXMAN. You thought they were isolated failures.

Mr. PIEN. We did.

Mr. WAXMAN. But you didn’t think they were systemic problems,

which, of course, the FDA report seemed to indicate.

Mr. PIEN. We understand that. And as I testified before, this

came to us as a surprise. When it came on October 5th, when the

MHRA had, as previously agreed, come to take a look at our

confirmative testing results, they said they would come; they came.

The day after we finished the testing program they came and

looked at our results and did a 3-day inspection. At the end of the

3-day inspection we were given one sheet of paper showing us some

of the observations, which we responded to within 4 days; and the

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day after that the MHRA concluded that there are issues with respect to the systems and processes of the entire plant.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, my concern—and I see my time is up—is

that you were taken by surprise, the Food and Drug Administration was taken by surprise, and yet there had been an evaluation

done in 2003 that showed systemic problems. And I don’t think

that the Food and Drug Administration followed through. They

should have been more on the case. You were taking over the company, and they should have been working with you together to

make sure that these problems were dealt with. But when you had

an increase in production and systemic problems, it just led to

what now looks an inevitable, in retrospect, breakdown in the system.

Mr. PIEN. Mr. Waxman, if I may point out the obvious. We are

in a regulated industry. So if you are asking me to criticize our regulators, that simply isn’t something that I can do, will do, or shall

do. Look, we have a plant. We have a set of procedures.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me interrupt you. I am not asking you to criticize the regulators. I will do that job, because I think they deserve

criticism. But I think it would be interesting to know if you had

their observations early enough, whether you could have done

something about the problem. And I would submit that it just

makes sense that if you are not told there is a problem, you may

or you may not catch it. But FDA’s job should have been to be on

the case to make sure these problems were dealt with.

Mr. PIEN. Mr. Waxman, if I may. Here is our situation now. We

lost our license for this 90-day period. We are trying to get it back.

Now, we are going to do everything we can, that we can define.

Once we define those things that we can, we will do those things

subject to our assessment that we can actually do them. And I

think what is extremely encouraging is that both the MHRA and

the FDA have looked at this issue and this situation and this experience, and the two agencies, as I testified before, are working extraordinarily closely. So to the extent that your observations should

inspire some lessons for all of us going forward, I think that inspiration has already been achieved.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I thank you for that. That certainly is what

we want, in the future, to have the problems corrected. I just want

to make sure that people understand the mistakes that were made

in the past so that they are never repeated again, and that we have

a regulator that is doing a good job of regulating, because the purpose of it is to protect the public.

Mr. PIEN. We concur.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Let me say to my friend, Mr. Waxman, in my opinion, after listening to everything today, there is no question that had the FDA

gone in early or the MHRA gone in earlier and alerted them, we

might have been able to avert this. But that was not part of their

protocols at the time. I think they followed the protocols, as I understand it. It doesn’t mean they couldn’t have done more, or in the

future shouldn’t. And I think maybe one of the lessons coming out

of this, particularly for foreign vaccine manufacturers, we need to

be more vigilant and have more rigid protocols.

Mr. WAXMAN. If you would just yield to me.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure.

Mr. WAXMAN. Their protocols call for what they did, but they also

call for an enforcement letter if it is more serious. And I would submit that this is not Rogaine, a product which I didn’t use in time.

But this is a product that is essential to the health of millions of

Americans to avert the flu and the consequences for those who are

at risk. And there should have been a higher priority and concern

over the flu supply than to treat it in the same routine way they

might treat Rogaine and other drugs that don’t have the consequences of failure in this case.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, that is certainly a propecious comment. But I think FDA and Chiron have basically said to the committee that the inspection didn’t show systematic problems in 2003.

Is that correct?

Mr. PIEN. That is our understanding from the people who experienced the inspection.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And we may have a difference of interpretation here, but——

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we will let the documents that we put out

today speak for themselves.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Exactly. And it may be an

interpretation——

Mr. WAXMAN. Because the FDA inspectors thought otherwise.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But I think the testimony is pretty clear

that after they went back, as they do, and examined these, the

biogenics, and they came back and talked about it, they decided it

wasn’t. But I think the documents will speak for themselves. We

need to move forward. And I think, Mr. Waxman, one thing you

have contributed very positively today is the fact that we need to

be more vigilant in these areas. And whatever the protocols were,

they need to be tweaked at this point, as we move forward. We cannot allow this to happen again. And had we had earlier inspections,

not only would Chiron maybe saved a boatload of money, but we

might have had more vaccine available to people this year.

Let me just ask a few more questions, if I can. I haven’t had my

5 minutes yet.

Mr. Tierney, go ahead. Then I will wrap up. Go ahead.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t think I am going to take a full 5 minutes,

Mr. Chairman, and I thought you had your 5 before.

Let us segue into looking forward a little bit.

Dr. Coelingh, am I saying that correctly?

Ms. COELINGH. It is Coelingh.

Mr. TIERNEY. Coelingh. I am sorry. You talked about what we

might do in terms of going forward to make sure that we have

enough vaccine on the market. This, so far, has been an industry

that has been market-driven, as opposed to government-driven or

having government intervene other than the regulatory process.

You talked about seeking tax incentives. Well, that obviously would

take it outside the free market aspect. You talk about government

stimulating demand. That would take it outside the free market aspect on that. So if industry can’t survive or can’t expand in a free

market environment, and if you are going to ask taxpayers then to

sort of use their tax dollars to invest in the industry, either by tax

incentives or by mandatory public purchases, what do you think

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the industry would offer back to those taxpayers or investors as

compensation or as a dividend for that? Would they offer up a

share of the profits; would they talk about price controls and a

guaranteed supply; would they talk about tighter safety regulations; would they talk about contributions, as Dr. Klein talked

about, in terms of a VIP type of situation in case there is an error

or injury to somebody? Would they talk about all of those or some

combination?

Ms. COELINGH. Well, one thing that this industry—I think that

is really misunderstood about how the vaccine, especially the flu industry vaccine operates, is that it really is different from a lot of

other things where you say a free market system.

Mr. TIERNEY. You operate for a profit, right?

Ms. COELINGH. Correct. But what drives this market is the recommendations of public health authorities. That is the major driving force in deciding who gets vaccinated and who does not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I just back up for a second? I think what

drives it is individuals that either subscribe to get the vaccine or

they don’t, and their decision may be driven by some comments or

decisions that the government makes, right?

Ms. COELINGH. Correct. It is primarily the Advisory Committee

on Immunization Practices. They put out a list of who should and

who should not get vaccine every year. And the American Academy

of Pediatrics and the American Association of Family Practitioners

also follow in step with those recommendations.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that terribly different than companies that sell

things for lowering your cholesterol, where the FDA and other advisory groups put out a word saying that you ought to take these

medications to lower your cholesterol?

Ms. COELINGH. The main difference is when you are ill and you

need to get a drug to change that situation, it is a lot different

than—most of us are walking around perfectly healthy, there is

nothing wrong with us except influenza will be coming. So there is

an additional——

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I am just carrying forward my example. Most

people walking around with high cholesterol are feeling great and

not thinking there is anything imminent there either.

Ms. COELINGH. True. But those medicines are prescribed for a

condition; whereas, we are in the area of preventive medicine. So

there is a higher hurdle to get people to value influenza prevention

and——

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, other industries would advertise.

Ms. COELINGH. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you?

Ms. COELINGH. Last year was our launch season, 2003, and during our launch season we did.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t mean to tag it all on your company; I am

talking about the industry. So I want to remove that from anything

person on that.

Ms. COELINGH. Yes, there is some advertising. But primarily

what happens is the guidance from the CDC and their advisory

committees tell doctors who gets vaccine and when they get them.

Mr. TIERNEY. But the industry could advertise, as other industries do, if they want to drive a market, right?

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Ms. COELINGH. Correct. Absolutely. But how vaccines are used is

not usually driven by direct-to-consumer advertising.

Mr. TIERNEY. I understand there is some difference on that. But

if you chose, in a free market environment, to advertise to drive

your market, then that would be one way to do it. You are saying

that your industry thinks it better to either have taxpayer incentives of some sort or public purchases. So my question that we

haven’t answered yet, and I would like to get to, is what would the

industry offer back?

Ms. COELINGH. What the industry offers back is new and improved vaccines that really will change how medicine is practiced

in the United States. We haven’t had great changes in our vaccine

industry——

Mr. TIERNEY. Couldn’t we get that just by having NIH do the research?

Ms. COELINGH. By having, I am sorry?

Mr. TIERNEY. NIH or some other entity do the research.

Ms. COELINGH. Well, you know, NIH does a great job at doing

research, but they don’t make vaccines.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, we could either give them the authority to or

establish somebody that does, right?

Ms. COELINGH. Well, that comes at a price as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. But I guess what you are telling me is the industry

doesn’t feel it would owe anything back to the taxpayers if the taxpayers became their investors.

Ms. COELINGH. I am not saying that we necessarily feel that the

government has to purchase strategic reserves or purchase unused

vaccine. We would much rather make vaccine and have it used

than stockpiled and maybe never used.

Mr. TIERNEY. But the two things that you did recommend, one

was tax incentives, which would be a taxpayer incentive; the other

was public purchases for school children or whatever.

Ms. COELINGH. It is a universal recommendation for children.

Mr. TIERNEY. So, again, why are you putting that burden on the

government for an industry that usually are talking all about the

free market? Why not advertise and take it upon yourselves to use

your investment and your stakeholders’ investments to do that?

Ms. COELINGH. Well, first of all, we have invested alot in this

product, and, second, if the U.S. Government invests in this product, what they get is they get to not have this kind of situation

happening again.

Mr. TIERNEY. But there are a number of ways to skin that cat,

right?

Ms. COELINGH. And you get to not have to face the pandemic

without having a vaccine as well. So I think those are things that

are hard to appreciate because you don’t worry about them until

they happen, and that is the whole problem with prevention.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess I don’t want to drive too fine a point on

this, but let me just drive a real fine point.

Ms. COELINGH. OK.

Mr. TIERNEY. If we make you fabulously wealthy because you

have all of these new customers or whatever, or you get tax breaks,

why would a taxpayer not expect something back? Apparently you

are not going to answer, and that is fine, but that would be the

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question I would have, and I would think a lot of taxpayers have.

If you are going to go out there and make a profit from the taxpayers’ investment one way or the other, then why wouldn’t they

get some guarantees back that would be of value to them.

But thank you for your colloquy.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

It would probably be cheaper to do it through tax incentives than

direct purchase, but that is an economic argument that we could

get into.

Let me ask each of you a few questions. Let me start, Dr.

Coelingh, with you.

MedImmune right now is looking for universality, is that correct,

in terms of being able to market it to everyone and getting those

protections?

Ms. COELINGH. Correct. We think that is a good solution to stabilize the market.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Oh, it would be a wonderful solution. You

heard the FDA Acting Director today talk about how they were

working toward that. Are we getting satisfaction working toward

that? Is there anything we can do to try to move that along?

Ms. COELINGH. Well, the Advisory Committee on Immunization

Practices started talking about moving toward a universal recommendation a couple of years ago, and I think there is a lot of

support amongst the scientific community and the medical community and the public health community. I think there is a desire to

want to do that because we appreciate what could be accomplished

by those means. However, I think it comes down to it is going to

have to be supported by a lot of education for people to understand,

No. 1, why is influenza a problem, because often it is thought of

as just a minor cold. We don’t realize that 36,000 people die in the

United States every year from complications due to influenza and

another 200,000 are hospitalized every year. Look at the cost of

that to our society. So I think we need to educate people so that

they understand how important it is to protect our citizens.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You also, in your particular product, are

trying to make sure that this would immunize older patients and

younger patients. There is no evidence that it doesn’t, it is just that

the burden of proof is on you to show that it does, is that correct?

Ms. COELINGH. We are trying to expand our indication down

lower, below the age of 5.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And higher.

Ms. COELINGH. And higher. So we have recently submitted new

analyses of data that we have to show that the product is effective

in adults from 50 to 64 years of age, and the FDA should be reviewing that soon.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Where is your plant?

Ms. COELINGH. Well, our manufacturing is done in three stages.

The first stage is manufacturing of the seed viruses, which Mr.

Pien has referred to; and we do that in northern California, in the

Bay Area. So the seeds are made there. Then those are shipped to

Liverpool and our bulk manufacturing is done there. And then the

bulks are shipped to our Philadelphia plant and they are blended

and filled into the nasal sprayers.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. These are global viruses, then, as they

move through. Well, thank you very much. We appreciate everything that you are doing.

Mr. Pien, let me ask, the suspension of your license hasn’t prevented you from procuring the materials necessary to move forward

next year. You are planning as if you are going to go full boat, correct?

Mr. PIEN. What we are doing is we are defining all of the details

of the implementation to achieve remediation, and it is going to

take stages, and the first stage is to get the MHRA to come back

into our plant, probably in December, to look at whether or not

they are going to be able to allow the 3-month suspension of license

to expire.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But you have the eggs lined up and everything as if you are ready to go, right?

Mr. PIEN. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And, in fact, if you don’t get licensed, you

are stuck with a lot of eggs. You will be in the chicken business,

won’t you?

Mr. PIEN. Well, we will be in a different business than vaccines,

yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So we appreciate that is a considerable

risk for your coming, just moving ahead in a case like that.

Mr. PIEN. We recognize that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I think we appreciate and I think it

shows the can-do attitude here as we move forward, but I just

wanted to point that out. You feel encouraged in your work is that

fair to say, with MHRA and the FDA, to ensure that you will be

able to manufacture for next year?

Mr. PIEN. We feel encouraged in the approach that I have outlined in my testimony has received considerable positive and constructive feedback from both the MHRA and the FDA.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The issues that were identified that led to

the suspension of the license were not facility issues, were they?

Weren’t there more management issues, human factors issues?

Mr. PIEN. Chairman Davis, that is largely correct. The MHRA

did make some recommendations as to whether or not this machine

should be here and that machine should be there, and also made

some observations about our quality control system and testing

program. All of those things are in the scope of our remediation

plan proposal.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And let me just say for the record we met

with the FDA and we met with the MHRA, and everybody working

together on this felt pretty good about where we are going, but, as

you said, there are no guarantees in this business.

Mr. PIEN. No guarantees, first of all, but absolutely. And I think

everybody has heard Mr. Waxman’s suggestions about learning

from our mistakes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I have heard a lot of them here too.

Dr. Stroube, how is Virginia doing at this point? Is the CDC

making sure we are getting enough to take care of our vulnerable

population?

Dr. STROUBE. We are getting our fair share; they are allocating

it by population. And with this new data base and today triggering

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the ordering thing, ordering part of it, we will be able to do the

best we can with the limited vaccine that is available.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. How is the vaccine dosage distribution information on the Flu Vaccine Finder working? It is only available

to State health officials. Is that working satisfactory, from your

perspective?

Dr. STROUBE. Yes. It is getting better. Like I said, they upgraded

it this morning before I left, and I played with it some, where you

can go in and actually now we can approve the ordering of vaccine

and direct where it goes to on that system through the distribution

and through Aventis.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You notice some other States have gone

out and gone to other foreign manufacturers that are not licensed

by FDA, but FDA, we heard today, is looking at trying to give them

some certification so that they can bring it in. Has Virginia given

any thought to doing that?

Dr. STROUBE. We have talked it over, but we have not done that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You think you can get an adequate supply

for the vulnerable population without doing that?

Dr. STROUBE. Well, we were worried about the timeliness since

we were working with what we have to get it out, because we were

really worried. We have had some cases in nursing homes already,

so we went ahead and used some of the vaccine that we already

had gotten for the public health side and just diverted it right

away to the nursing homes to try to get them protected. So we

have been working with what we had, and with the expectation a

foreign vaccine does get approved, it will be put through the CDC

system, as I understand it, the same way, and we should get a

share of the 5 million that FDA is working on.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. Klein, current flu vaccine recommendations cover people

under the age of 2 and over 50 to include people who have underlying medical conditions and put them at high risk. Do you think the

current flu vaccine recommendations are adequate, or should they

be expanded to recommend it for all Americans?

Dr. KLEIN. I think the group is at risk, those that have been targeted and those that had the highest hospitalization rates, the

most morbidity, and the elderly, the mortality, but I think it is a

matter of cost-benefit for employers who have employees who may

have to miss work. Certainly we make it a matter of importance

that all health personnel be immunized so not only do they stay on

the job during an outbreak, but they don’t pass on the virus to

their patients. And I think the same arguments could be made in

almost every venue, that the importance in preventing disease, in

this case respiratory disease, does have a cost-benefit and would be

beneficial to all ages.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So an ounce of prevention is worth a

pound of cure.

Dr. KLEIN. It will be exam times; college students should be protected.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Would a universal flu vaccine recommendation also help ensure a stable flu vaccine supply?

Dr. KLEIN. I think so, in the sense that one of the goals, I think,

of any program that addresses these issues should be to engage adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00310 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ditional manufacturers, particularly domestic manufacturers, and if

they have guaranteed market with some price structure that

makes it profitable, I think they will return to the market and

make that vaccine available. And then there will be flexibility, so

that if there is a problem with one manufacturer, it will influence

modestly the vaccine supply.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You all have heard everybody’s testimony

today, the first panel with the FDA and the CDC and everyone

else. Are we missing anything here? Is there anything else we

ought to be doing that hasn’t been discussed or recommended?

Dr. KLEIN. No, but I hope the various authorities, bodies of importance, direct long-term measures, not just to put out this fire,

but to consider that this probably will occur in the future; that vaccine shortages have taken place in the past, the current one is important, and they will take place in the future unless we build in

some new safeguards against that. But that will take a lot of

perseverence and continued interest.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

I would ask unanimous consent that the three statements previously submitted to the committee be entered into the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Waxman, do you have any followup questions?

Mr. WAXMAN. I do, Mr. Chairman. It is interesting to take note

of the fact that we have a crisis right now; we have an inadequate

supply for the flu season for the vaccinations. Yesterday a committee of the Senate held a hearing; today this committee is holding

a hearing; tomorrow there will be another committee in Congress

holding a hearing, it is a subcommittee over in the Energy and

Commerce Committee. Obviously, Congress cares a lot about this

issue, appropriately so. We want to learn from our mistakes.

But I want to ask you, Dr. Klein. You are one of the leading experts in childhood infections and you served on the National Vaccine Advisory Committee. We are acting as if this has never been

an issue, that suddenly we have a whole issue of vaccine supply

and we never imagined we would have such an issue before us.

Didn’t the Advisory Committee present a report in October 2002?

Dr. KLEIN. It did, and many of the issues that I addressed are

those that have been partially addressed, such as there was additional funding made available for vaccine stockpile. But because of

the SEC regulation, that hasn’t been implemented. But the others,

because they are complex and they require perseverence, have been

managed in a stop gap measure. And we need to reinstitute a more

durable set of advisory groups that will be able to address and propose specific recommendations that can alleviate the long-term

problems.

Mr. WAXMAN. So before October 2002, your Advisory Committee

was looking at the issue of how to give the right incentives for

manufacturers to want to invest in producing vaccine, to make sure

that they would have a sufficient supply, that the unsold batches

wouldn’t be a disincentive for them, for example. So the recommendations were made to set up a committee to look at and give

further thoughts to it, is that what happened in October 2002?

Dr. KLEIN. Well, actually, the workshop was in February 2002,

and as a result of that there was an IOM report of financing vacVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00311 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cines that was issued, but it in itself wasn’t complete or wasn’t sufficiently complete, and was somewhat controversial. So you need

continuing activity to maintain until proposals that are satisfactory

can be given to this committee and others.

Mr. WAXMAN. So the Vaccine Advisory Committee proposed a

multi-disciplinary committee to be operating on an ongoing basis to

address these issues of vaccine supply.

Dr. KLEIN. That is correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, what happened to that recommendation, was

it adopted?

Dr. KLEIN. The recommendation for the ongoing——

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes.

Dr. KLEIN. The IOM report was issued in the latter part of 2003.

In June 2004 there was an NVAC meeting that was specifically

held to continue that dialog, and we are interested now in progressing further so that something can be done. But the Vaccine Advisory Committee is just that, it is advisory to the National Immunization Program and the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human

Services.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we need the advice from the experts, and we

had an advisory committee who gave us recommendations; we had

the Institute of Medicine give us recommendations. But from what

I can tell, none of these recommendations have been followed up

on, especially in this area, where everybody is now for giving incentives for production of vaccine so we won’t lose supply and face the

problem we are facing now. Even Secretary Thompson seems to be

talking about the importance of financial incentives.

The point I want to make is we shouldn’t wait for a crisis. We

have advisory committees. In fact, your testimony here today is

helpful, but it is advisory to us in many ways to have Congress act.

And if Congress only holds a hearing while there is attention paid

to the issue, and if the Secretary of Health and Human Services

only pays a high priority to this issue when there is a crisis, and

when there is no crisis it is pushed aside, it is inevitable we are

going to come back and repeat the same mistakes over and over

again.

Let me just ask you parenthetically, because you know this issue

very well. Is liability a strong disincentive for the manufacturing

of flu vaccine?

Dr. KLEIN. No, it is not.

Mr. WAXMAN. It is not? Why not?

Dr. KLEIN. The flu vaccine, for the most part, has been a very

safe product; it is made in eggs, so anybody with an egg allergy

would be excluded from getting the vaccine. And there have been

minor problems in the past. There was one experience with swine

flu, where there was a neurologic disability that followed. And

there are a couple of minor issues that occurred. But the reason for

this current shortage is not liability, it is associated with a problem

that Chiron experienced. That there are ingenious ways of getting

around the current legislation and the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is a given, and that is why that program needs to be

reviewed constantly and assured that it remains as strong as it has

been in helping the administration of vaccine, those who adminVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:47 Jan 22, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00312 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97448.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ister vaccines, as well as the manufacturers, be clear of liability for

approved vaccines.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I think you are absolutely right on that, and

I hope we will get to—not on this committee, but on the committee

that has jurisdiction, although this committee did come up with

some recommendations on the Vaccine Compensation Program.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and

thank all the witnesses for their testimony. I hope we can learn

from this experience that we are facing now to do things better and

to learn from our mistakes, and hope that we don’t make the same

mistakes again, and the ones we do won’t have the catastrophic

consequences that we seem to be facing with so many at-risk people having flu vaccine completely unavailable to them.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me thank this panel not just for

testifying here today and sharing your views, but what you are

doing outside of this hearing room, trying to get more vaccines to

people in need. Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays, Hon. Tom

Lantos, Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Carolyn

Maloney, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon.

Diane E. Watson, and Hon. Michael C. Burgess, and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

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