HURRICANE SANDY

REBUILDING

STRATEGY

August 2013

Stronger Communities, A Resilient Region

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Task Force
HURRICANE SANDY

REBUILDING

STRATEGY

Stronger Communities, A Resilient Region

Presented to the President of the United States

August 2013

Front and Back Cover (Background Photo) Credits:

(Front Cover) Hurricane Sandy Approach - NOAA/NASA

(Back Cover) Hurricane Sandy Approach - NOAA/NASA

Cover (4-Photo Banner) Credits - Left to Right:

Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey - FEMA/ Rosanna Arias

Liberty Island, New York - FEMA/Kenneth Wilsey

Seaside Heights, New Jersey - FEMA/Sharon Karr

Seaside Park, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Letter from the Chair

LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Last October, Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast with incredible power and 

fury, wreaking havoc in communities across the region. Entire neighborhoods 

were flooded. Families lost their homes. Businesses were destroyed. 

Infrastructure was torn apart. After all the damage was done, it was clear that 

the region faced a long, hard road back. That is why President Obama pledged 

to work with local partners every step of the way to help affected communities 

rebuild and recover. 

In recent years, the Federal Government has made great strides in preparing 

for and responding to natural disasters. In the case of Sandy, we had vast 

resources in place before the storm struck, allowing us to quickly organize a massive, multi-agency, 

multi-state, coordinated response. To ensure a full recovery, the President joined with State and local 

leaders to fight for a $50 billion relief package. The Task Force and the entire Obama Administration has 

worked tirelessly to ensure that these funds are getting to those who need them most – and quickly. 

As a result, through these disaster relief funds and existing government programs, as of July 2013, the 

Administration has helped more than 270,000 people and thousands of businesses. And when the 

summer vacation season kicked off on Memorial Day weekend, thousands of Americans saw that more 

than 150 beaches in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut had reopened, and the many boardwalks 

and storefronts that line them were restored. 

This work is helping entire communities move beyond this painful time in their lives. But as they do so, 

it is important not just to rebuild but to better prepare the region for the existing and future threats 

exacerbated by climate change. President Obama’s Climate Action Plan clearly states that “climate 

change is no longer a distant threat – we are already feeling its impacts across the country.” In recent 

years, we have seen intense storms hit our neighborhoods with increasing frequency. More than ever, 

it is critical that when we build for the future, we do so in a way that makes communities more resilient 

to emerging challenges such as rising sea levels, extreme heat, and more frequent and intense storms.

The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force that President Obama asked me to chair has made this 

work a priority. Launched last February, we are working hand-in-hand with communities to help them 

rebuild smarter and better by providing the best data about the risks they face, setting clear resilience 

standards to help protect against those risks, and bringing a wide range of stakeholders together to 

foster innovative ideas and ensure a comprehensive regional approach to rebuilding. 

This work will help protect communities in the region when future disasters take place. It will also make 

a positive impact on budgets. Last year alone, there were 11 different weather and climate disaster 

events across the Unites States with estimated losses exceeding $1 billion each. We know that every 

dollar we spend today on hazard mitigation saves us at least $4 in avoided costs if a disaster strikes 

again. By building more resilient regions, we can save billions in taxpayer dollars. 
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Letter from the Chair

Clearly, the Task Force’s work strengthens our communities while at the same time benefitting the 

bottom line. As a result, our efforts are setting an example that others can learn from and follow. In 

fact, our innovative resilience strategies are already serving as models for communities across the 

country. For example, in April, then Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and I announced that all 

Federally-funded rebuilding projects in the Sandy-affected region must account for future risks posed 

by rising sea levels. The President’s Climate Action Plan formalizes this effort and directs Federal 

agencies to make sure that any new project funded with taxpayer dollars addresses future flood risks. 

The benefits of resilient rebuilding to a neighborhood hit by Sandy can and should be replicated by 

communities across the Nation.

Local governments and community leaders are the frontlines of disaster recovery, and it is the 

job of the Federal Government to have their back by supporting their efforts, providing guidance 

when necessary, and delivering resources to help them fulfill their needs. To be successful, we need 

everyone involved. We must use all the great ideas coming from academic institutions, businesses, and 

community leaders, including the talent and perspectives from vulnerable communities. By uniting 

these ideas with opportunity, we can help to turn them into action.

That is why the Task Force has worked to usher in a new era of unprecedented collaboration through 

initiatives like our Rebuild by Design competition, which we launched in June 2013 to promote 

resilience in the Sandy-affected region by attracting world-class talent to develop innovative projects 

that will protect and enhance our communities. Everybody has a part to play in building a stronger 

region, and we will continue to foster and encourage new ideas and learn from our recovery partners 

across the country and the globe. 

The Task Force is developing 21st century solutions to the 21st century challenges facing our Nation. 

We are firmly committed to building a stronger and healthier region and country – and we have 

come a long way. We’re encouraging the adoption of microgrid technologies to update our energy 

systems so that they are more resilient, harnessing technological innovation throughout our rebuilding 

solutions, and ensuring that our decisions are guided by current science and best available data, while 

anticipating future risks. 

Still, we know there is more work to do so that we are prepared to handle the next storm, whether it 

is next year or next decade, whether in New York, along the Gulf Coast, or any of the towns and cities 

across America. This Rebuilding Strategy details the work we have done, and will need to do, to meet 

this challenge. And I am confident that the Federal Government, working in close partnership with 

State and local actors, will indeed build a stronger Northeast region and a stronger America.

Shaun Donovan

Chair, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force

Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
5

Table of Contents Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Table of Contents

LETTER FROM THE CHAIR ................................................................................................................... 3

HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE..................................................................................... 7

TASK FORCE ADVISORY GROUP ........................................................................................................... 9

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 10

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................... 13

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 17

BACKGROUND ON THE REGION, THE STORM, AND THE RECOVERY ................................................... 19

Sandy’s Reach................................................................................................................................ 19

A National Response...................................................................................................................... 30

Recovery Progress......................................................................................................................... 30

Facing a Growing Threat ............................................................................................................... 33

Science and Technology Supporting Resilience............................................................................. 34

A Regional Approach to Resilience................................................................................................ 36

Definitions..................................................................................................................................... 37

LONG-TERM PLAN FOR REBUILDING................................................................................................... 39

PROMOTING RESILIENT REBUILDING THROUGH INNOVATIVE IDEAS AND 

A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT AND FUTURE RISK ............................................... 41

ENSURING A REGIONALLY COORDINATED, 

RESILIENT APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT........................................................... 49

RESTORING AND STRENGTHENING HOMES AND 

PROVIDING FAMILIES WITH SAFE, AFFORDABLE HOUSING OPTIONS ........................................... 85

SUPPORTING SMALL BUSINESSES AND REVITALIZING LOCAL ECONOMIES................................... 99

ADDRESSING INSURANCE CHALLENGES, UNDERSTANDING, AND AFFORDABILITY....................... 119

BUILDING STATE AND LOCAL CAPACITY TO PLAN FOR AND 

IMPLEMENT LONG-TERM RECOVERY AND REBUILDING ............................................................... 129

IMPROVING DATA SHARING BETWEEN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.......................... 143
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Table of Contents Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

DATA SHARING AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE PMO......................................................................... 153

BEYOND THE TASK FORCE: DRIVING IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING PROGRESS .................... 161

APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................ 163

Executive Order -- Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force................................. 163

Definitions..................................................................................................................................... 169

Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................................... 172

Agency Accomplishments.............................................................................................................. 177

Addressing Future Risks................................................................................................................. 185

The Importance of Outreach and Community Engagement.......................................................... 199

Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Staff and Agency Designees............................................ 203
7

Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

HURRICANE SANDY 

REBUILDING TASK FORCE

Task Force Chair

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development - Shaun Donovan, Secretary 

Task Force Members

U.S. Department of the Treasury – Jacob Lew, Secretary

U.S. Department of the Interior – Sally Jewell, Secretary

U.S. Department of Agriculture – Tom Vilsack, Secretary

U.S. Department of Commerce – Penny Pritzker, Secretary

U.S. Department of Labor – Thomas Perez, Secretary

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary

U.S. Department of Transportation – Anthony Foxx, Secretary

U.S. Department of Energy – Ernest Moniz, Secretary

U.S. Department of Education – Arne Duncan, Secretary

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs – Eric Shinseki, Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Janet Napolitano, Secretary 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency – Regina McCarthy, Administrator

Small Business Administration – Karen Mills, Administrator 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers – Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)

White House Office of Management and Budget – Sylvia Burwell, Director 

White House National Security Staff – Lisa Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

and Counterterrorism

White House Domestic Policy Counci - Cecilia Muñoz, Director

National Economic Council – Gene Sperling, Director

White House Council on Environmental Quality – Nancy Sutley, Chair

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy - John Holdren, Director

White House Council of Economic Advisors – Jason Furman, Chair 

White House Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs – Valerie Jarrett, Senior 

Advisor to the President

White House Office of Cabinet Affairs – Danielle Gray, Assistant to the President and Cabinet Secretary

Task Force Executive Director

Laurel Blatchford
8

Task Force Advisory Group Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

TASK FORCE ADVISORY GROUP

The Task Force Advisory Group was composed of State, local, and Tribal elected leaders from the most 

severely impacted cities and towns in the region. 

New York

Andrew Cuomo, New York Governor

Steven Bellone, Suffolk County Executive; Michael Bloomberg, New York City Mayor; Ruben Diaz Jr., 

Bronx Borough President; Scott Mandel, Long Beach City Council President; Edward P. Mangano, Nassau 

County Executive; Marty Markowitz, Brooklyn Borough President; Helen M. Marshall, Queens Borough 

President; James Molinaro, Staten Island Borough President; Kate Murray, Hempstead Supervisor; 

Christine Quinn, New York City Council Speaker; James Ruzicka, Mayor of Island Park; Richard Schaffer, 

Babylon Supervisor; Scott Stringer, Manhattan Borough President

New Jersey

Chris Christie, New Jersey Governor

Stephen C. Acropolis, Mayor of Brick Township; William Akers, Mayor of Seaside Heights; Thomas A. 

Arnone, Monmouth County Freeholder Director; Cory Booker, Mayor of Newark; Kathleen A. Donovan, 

Bergen County Executive; Steve Fulop, Mayor of Jersey City, and former Mayor Jeremiah Healy; 

Thomas F. Kelaher, Mayor of Toms River Township; John P. Kelly, Ocean County Freeholder Director; 

Walter G. LaCicero, Mayor of Lavallette; Lorenzo T. Langford, Mayor of Atlantic City; Dennis Levinson, 

Atlantic County Executive; Dina Long, Mayor of Sea Bright; Kennedy O’Brien, Mayor of Sayreville; 

Mauro Raguseo, Mayor of Little Ferry; Paul Smith, Mayor of Union Beach; Gerald Thornton, Cape May 

Freeholder Director; Dennis Vaccaro, Mayor of Moonachie; Dawn Zimmer, Mayor of Hoboken.

Connecticut

Dan Malloy, Connecticut Governor

Maryland

Martin O’Malley, Maryland Governor
9

Task Force Advisory Group Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Rhode Island

Lincoln Chafee, Rhode Island Governor

Shinnecock Indian Nation

Daniel Collins, Shinnecock Trustee Chairman
10

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Acknowledgments

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Task Force’s work was informed greatly by the contributions of so many dedicated professionals 

across the Federal Government who are constantly working to improve how we recover from disasters, 

and by the leaders on the State and local level who are committed to rebuilding their communities to 

be stronger, more resilient, and better prepared to face the effects of a changing climate. To everyone 

involved in the development of this Rebuilding Strategy, Thank you. 

The Task Force further extends its gratitude to the following specific contributors: 

The Task Force members, led by Secretary Donovan and composed of the heads of the executive 

departments, agencies, and offices as designated by the President, committed their leadership, 

guidance, time, and the resources of their agencies and offices, to help develop the recommendations 

that will help to build not just a better, stronger region, but a more resilient Nation. 

From the moment the Task Force was stood up, the staff work necessary to begin to address the 

challenges both on the ground and within the government has been all-consuming; the broad 

engagement and dedication of the Task Force staff was unyielding and selfless, and demonstrated the 

best of public service. 

Federal agency designees to the Task Force gave their full commitment to working with the staff and 

collaborating with their partners across the government to help develop this Rebuilding Strategy, 

dedicating their time and passion to the task of recovery, all on top of their already full work 

responsibilities. 

The Executive Office of the President provided the coordination, leadership, and resourcefulness to 

help ensure that the Task Force met its charge. 

The Task Force Advisory Group helped provide a direct line of communication between those affected 

by the storm and the Task Force, and their input was critical to ensuring that the Task Force’s work 

reflected the needs and concerns of the communities working to recover. The Task Force members and 

staff extend our deepest gratitude for their service. 

Our partners in Congress, both those who represent the storm-impacted States and those who are 

National leaders on the issues of recovery and resilience, were instrumental in supporting the Task 

Force and helping to guide the Rebuilding Strategy. 

The Task Force was in near constant contact with a wide range of stakeholders from residents, nonprofits, think tanks, academia and the private sector. These groups offered not only their opinions and 

expertise, but their support.
11

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Acknowledgments

The many professionals within the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency focused on disaster recovery helped to facilitate the day to day 

operations of the Task Force; their efforts were critical to our ability to readily launch, complete the 

work, and wind down in the span of just a few months. 
Liberty Island, New York - FEMA/ Kenneth Wilsey
13

Executive Summary Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 29, 2012 multiple weather systems – including Hurricane Sandy1 – collided over the most 

densely populated region in the nation, with devastating and tragic results. At least 159 people in the 

United States were killed as either a direct or indirect result of Sandy.2

More than 650,000 homes were damaged or destroyed and hundreds of thousands of businesses were 

damaged or forced to close at least temporarily.3 The power of nature was set loose on our nation’s 

largest city and some of our smallest coastal towns, with results that would have previously seemed 

unimaginable. Lives were lost, millions of homes were upended, families were made homeless in a 

single night, and entire communities were in shock at the scale of the loss. 

The government’s response began before the storm hit and by the day it made landfall more than 

1,500 personnel from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were on the ground along 

the East Coast.4 Federal, State, and local emergency responders rescued and provided basic services to 

individuals, assessed damage, and began guiding families and businesses to the assistance available to 

help them get back on their feet. As of July 2013, FEMA and the Small Business Administration (SBA) 

had helped more than 270,000 individuals or households and 3,900 businesses to get back on their feet 

through $3.8 billion in SBA recovery loans and FEMA individual assistance.

Rebuilding Challenges and the Creation of the 

Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force

In recognition of the size and magnitude of the storm and the rebuilding challenges facing the region, 

President Obama signed an Executive Order on December 7, 2012 creating the Hurricane Sandy 

Rebuilding Task Force and designating the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun 

Donovan, as Chair. The Federal Government’s experience from previous disasters taught that it was vital 

to have a team focused exclusively on long-term rebuilding immediately after the storm hit; working 

in tandem with the elements of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), the Task Force was 

established to ensure the recovery benefitted from cabinet-level focus and coordination. The President 

charged the Task Force with identifying and working to remove obstacles to resilient rebuilding while 

taking into account existing and future risks and promoting the long-term sustainability of communities 

and ecosystems in the Sandy-affected region. 

1	 After striking the Caribbean as a Category 3 Hurricane, Sandy weakened over the Atlantic Ocean. Though the storm

weakened in power, it grew massively in size. Sandy sustained Hurricane-force wind in the Atlantic as a Category 1

hurricane before making landfall in Brigantine, N.J. as a post-tropical cyclone. For the purpose of clarity, this Strategy

will refer to the storm as “Hurricane Sandy” or simply “Sandy.” For more information, see: National Hurricane Center,

“Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.

2	 National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013,

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.

3	 Ibid.

4	 FEMA, “Hurricane Sandy: Timeline,” accessed 7/22/2013, http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline.
14

Executive Summary Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

In January 2013, Congress passed and the President signed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 

(Sandy Supplemental), which provided about $50 billion in funding to support rebuilding in the region.

This Rebuilding Strategy establishes guidelines for the investment of the Federal funds made available 

for recovery and sets the region on the path to being built back smarter and stronger with several 

outcomes in mind: 

• Aligning this funding with local rebuilding visions.

• Cutting red tape and getting assistance to families, businesses, and communities efficiently and 

effectively, with maximum accountability.

• Coordinating the efforts of the Federal, State, and local governments and ensuring a regionwide approach to rebuilding.

• Ensuring the region is rebuilt in a way that makes it more resilient – that is, better able to withstand future storms and other risks posed by a changing climate. 

Resilience involves enabling the region to respond effectively to a major storm, recover quickly from 

it, and adapt to changing conditions, while also taking measures to reduce the risk of significant 

damage in a future storm. Sustainability involves ensuring the long-term viability of the people and 

economy of the region and its natural ecosystems, which requires consideration of the risks posed 

by a changing climate, the practicality of maintaining a long-term presence in the most vulnerable 

areas, and the need to protect and restore the natural ecosystems. The Rebuilding Strategy includes 

69 recommendations, many of which have already been adopted. They are divided into several policy 

priorities that were identified with the help of input from the Task Force’s public engagement with 

local leaders and community groups. Many of the recommendations are directly linked to Sandy 

Supplemental funding. The Rebuilding Strategy also includes additional policy recommendations that 

will have a significant impact on how the region rebuilds, but that are not directly linked to Sandy 

Supplemental spending. Finally, in recognition of the increased risk the region and the nation face from 

extreme weather events, the Rebuilding Strategy includes recommendations that, if implemented, will 

improve our ability to withstand and recover effectively from future flood-related disasters. The Task 

Force recommendations include: 

• Promoting Resilient Rebuilding, Based on Current and Future Risk, Through Innovative Ideas by: 

◦ Giving governments and residents the best available data and information on current and 

future risks to facilitate good decision making for recovery and planning – for example, by 

creating and making widely-available a Sea Level Rise projection tool.

◦ Leveraging the Rebuild by Design competition to deliver innovative, resilient rebuilding ideas 

to the Sandy-impacted region.

◦ Prioritizing the engagement of vulnerable populations on issues of risk and resilience.
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Executive Summary Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

• Ensuring a Regionally Coordinated, Resilient Approach to Infrastructure Investment by: 

◦ Helping communities work together to be better prepared at a lower cost for the risks associated with a changing climate. 

◦ Making the electrical grid smarter and more flexible, and protecting the liquid fuel supply 

chain to better prepare them for future storms and other threats.

◦ Helping to develop a resilient power strategy for telephone and internet communication 

systems and equipment, so that our ability to communicate when it’s most necessary is less 

vulnerable to disaster. 

◦ Providing a forum to coordinate and discuss large-scale, regional infrastructure projects and 

map the connections and interdependencies between them, saving money and getting better results for all levels of government.

◦ Establishing guidelines to ensure those projects are situated and built to withstand the impacts of existing risks and future climate change, in the region, and across the country.

◦ Assisting States and localities to optimize Sandy recovery infrastructure funding and leverage 

non-federal resources to help build critical infrastructure assets that are resilient to current 

and future risks. 

• Providing Families Safe, Affordable Housing Options and Protecting Homeowners by: 

◦ Helping disaster victims to be able to stay in their homes by allowing homeowners to quickly 

make emergency repairs. 

◦ Preventing responsible homeowners from being forced out of their homes due to shortterm financial hardship while recovering from disaster by creating nationally-consistent 

mortgage policies.

◦ Making housing units – both individual and multi-family – more sustainable and resilient 

through smart recovery steps including elevating above flood risk and increased energy efficiency.

◦ Communicating to State and local governments, residents, and workers consistent guidance 

on how to remediate indoor environmental pollutants such as mold. 

• Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies by: 

◦ Making it easier for small businesses to access Federal contracts for Hurricane Sandy rebuilding.

◦ Creating specialized skills training programs to support Sandy rebuilding including training 

opportunities for low income individuals and other vulnerable populations. 
16

Executive Summary Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

◦ Developing a one-stop shop online for everything related to small businesses and recovery.

◦ Improving the process for accessing critical disaster recovery loans and other resources; and 

increasing SBA’s unsecured disaster loan limits and expediting the disbursement of small 

dollar loans. 

• Addressing Insurance Challenges, Understanding, and Accessibility by: 

◦ Working with Congress on the affordability challenges posed by reforms to the National 

Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) so that responsible homeowners aren’t priced out of their 

homes.

◦ Encouraging homeowners and other policy-holders to take steps to mitigate future risks, 

such as elevating their homes and businesses above flood levels, which will not only protect 

against the next storm but also make their flood insurance premiums more affordable.

◦ Streamlining payouts to homeowners and other policy-holders in the wake of a disaster.

• Building Local Governments’ Capacity to Plan for Long-Term Rebuilding and Prepare for Future 

Disasters by: 

◦ Supporting regional planning efforts underway in New York and New Jersey to create and 

implement locally-created and federally funded strategies for rebuilding and strengthening 

their communities against future extreme weather.

◦ Funding Local Disaster Recovery Manager positions in communities in the Sandy-impacted 

region and taking additional steps to prepare for future disasters.

These innovative strategies, along with the additional recommendations detailed in the report, can help 

the Sandy-affected region rebuild and serve as a model for every community in the country that faces 

greater risk from extreme weather. 

President Obama’s Climate Action Plan laid out a series of responsible and common sense steps to 

reduce carbon pollution and prepare communities for the impacts of a changing climate that are 

already being felt across the nation. That plan was informed by lessons from the Sandy recovery 

process, as well as several of the policies and principles developed by the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding 

Task Force. 

To date, the response to and recovery from this storm has been a testament to the unique spirit, 

strength, and will of the American people. 

The recovery also highlights fundamental American virtues: we do not leave any communities to pick 

up the pieces by themselves, we harness American ingenuity, and we give all communities the tools 

they need to make sure that when we rebuild, we build back stronger and smarter.
17

Introduction Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey and New York on October 29, 2012. The results were 

tragic and devastating. The office towers of Lower Manhattan were left powerless and dark. Miles 

of rail lines were twisted and torn apart. Beach towns from New Jersey to Rhode Island were buried 

beneath mountains of debris. Millions of lives were upended. Most tragically, more than one hundred 

people lost their lives. 

During the storm and in the days following, the President directed his Cabinet to lean forward, cut 

red tape, and get resources to survivors as well as state and local governments. At the peak of the 

response, the Federal Government mobilized more than 17,000 volunteers in the affected areas,5 and 

more than $200 million in Federal services and resources were provided to address immediate recovery 

needs.6

The President recognized that, in addition to the immediate aid response, it was vital to have a Cabinetlevel team focused on long-term rebuilding, working closely with the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and the organizations put in place by the National Disaster Recovery Framework 

(NDRF) (see sidebar on page 32) to remove obstacles to resilient rebuilding and promote the long-term 

sustainability of communities and ecosystems. 

In response to the crisis, and because of the scope of the impact and the need for the highest level of 

coordination for recovery, President Obama created the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (the 

Task Force) in December of 2012, and designated the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD), Shaun Donovan, as Chair. The additional members were the heads of twenty-three executive 

department agencies and offices. 

The President, along with the support of State and local leaders, fought for much-needed Federal funds 

to aid the victims of the storm and provide needed resources for a successful recovery. Their efforts led 

to the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (Sandy Supplemental), which was passed by Congress 

and signed into law in January 2013, providing about $50 billion in funding to support rebuilding. Thus 

far, these dollars have provided support to hundreds of thousands of people and businesses in the 

affected region. Looking ahead, the Task Force’s principal goal, which is set forth in this Rebuilding 

Strategy, has been to establish guidelines for the investment of the Federal funds made available 

for recovery and set the region on the path to building back smarter and stronger as part of a more 

resilient Nation.

The Task Force quickly established offices in New York, New Jersey, and Washington D.C., to facilitate 

engagement with State and local officials and other stakeholders. Additionally, the Task Force created 

an Advisory Group which included local elected leaders from the five states hardest hit by Sandy – 

5	 FEMA, “Superstorm Sandy Update – Nov. 10, 2012,” 10/11/2012, http://www.fema.gov/

employee-news-and-announcements/superstorm-sandy-update-nov-10-2012.

6	 FEMA, “Hurricane Sandy: Timeline,” 12/07/2012, http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline.
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Introduction Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island – to inform the Task Force’s operation 

and help guide the Rebuilding Strategy.

Task Force members assigned staff with a wide range of talent, skills, and experience from their 

agencies to develop a viable Rebuilding Strategy. The Task Force organized many multi-disciplinary 

teams (e.g., engineers, financial analysts, grant managers, urban planners, data system specialists, etc.) 

to study the critical inter-relationships of complicated states, communities, and systems. These teams 

built on, and incorporated contributions from, existing Federal, State, and local efforts to develop the 

Rebuilding Strategy.

The Rebuilding Strategy includes 69 recommendations, across several policy areas, that are designed to 

align funding with local rebuilding priorities, eliminate barriers to recovery while ensuring effectiveness 

and accountability, coordinate across levels of government, facilitate a region-wide approach to 

rebuilding, and promote resilient rebuilding so that the region will be better able to withstand the 

impacts of existing risks and future climate change. 

The Rebuilding Strategy is in alignment with President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, released in June 

2013. Both the strategy and the Climate Action Plan are designed to strengthen communities against 

future extreme weather and other climate impacts. For example, building on the implementation of 

the government-wide Flood Risk Reduction Standard initiated by the Task Force in the Sandy-affected 

region (discussed in more detail on page 44), the President’s Climate Action Plan calls for agencies to 

update flood risk reduction standards for all federally funded projects nationwide. Further, the work 

of the Task Force emphasized the importance of incorporating and addressing the region’s emerging 

risks resulting from rising sea levels into recovery planning, requiring region-wide, government-wide 

coordination.

These recommendations are the result of a community-based, locally driven process. They reflect 

months of outreach to State and local elected officials; tribal officials; non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs); non-profit organizations; representatives from the private sector; academics, think tanks 

and other science and policy experts; and other community organizations, particularly those serving 

vulnerable populations. Indeed a key function of the Task Force was to bring all of these players to the 

table to ensure their efforts are coordinated, that particular attention is paid to already disadvantaged 

and struggling communities, and that they are helping each other as they help themselves. 

The Rebuilding Strategy is designed to be used by all of these actors, all of whose efforts will be critical 

to the successful rebuilding of the region and strengthening of the Nation.
19

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

BACKGROUND ON THE REGION, 

THE STORM, AND THE RECOVERY

Sandy’s Reach

Hurricane Sandy affected twenty-four states across the northeastern and mid-Atlantic United States.7 

The Federal Government made major disaster declarations in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, 

Rhode Island, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 

Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the District of Columbia.8 Much of the destruction inflicted by Hurricane Sandy 

centered in the densely populated coastal areas of New Jersey and the New York metropolitan area.9

New Jersey and the New York Metropolitan Area

New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the nation and predominantly urban or suburban. 

The areas that sustained the most damage were the small- to medium-sized suburban beach 

communities along New Jersey’s 137 miles of Atlantic Ocean coastline, with populations that swell 

during the summer tourism months; an additional 104 miles of shore along the Delaware Bay that 

consist of more rural and economically challenged towns; and the northern urban and suburban 

areas, such as Hoboken, Jersey City, Newark, Moonachie, and Little Ferry.10 New Jersey’s shoreline is 

intensely developed and includes year-round residents, several urban centers including Atlantic City, 

and a significant number of seasonal residences and facilities related to the multi-billion dollar per year 

tourism industry.11

With a total population of about 19 million, the New York metropolitan area is the largest metropolitan 

area in the U.S. and one of the largest in the world.12 New York’s recognized metropolitan area includes 

the five boroughs of New York City, Long Island, Southeastern New York State, Northern New Jersey, 

and Southwestern Connecticut. The region includes some of the wealthiest suburbs and poorest urban 

centers in the nation. 

7	 NOAA, “Service Assessment, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy,” 05/2013, http://

www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.

8	 FEMA, “Disaster Declarations for 2012,” accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year/2012; FEMA,

“Disaster Declarations for 2013,” accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year/2013.

9	 NOAA, “Service Assessment, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy,” 05/2013, http://

www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.

10	 U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, “Coastal Sensitivity to

Sea-Level Rise: A Focus on the Mid-Atlantic Region,” Table 2: Shoreline Length by Major Water Body and

	 Likelihood of Shore Protection (miles), 01/2009, http://risingsea.net/ERL/New_Jersey_shoreline_length.pdf.

11	 New Jersey Division of Travel and Tourism, “2012 Tourism Economic Impact Study,” 2012,

http://www.visitnj.org/new-jersey-tourism-research-and-information

12	 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population and Housing Occupancy Status: 2010 - United States -- Metropolitan Statistical Area;

and for Puerto Rico: 2010 Census National Summary File of Redistricting Data,” http://www.factfinder2.census.gov/

faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_NSRD_GCTPL2.US24PR&prodType=table.
20

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

The New York metropolitan area is the largest economic engine in the nation, contributing 9.5 percent 

of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).13 At its center is the country’s largest city, New York City, 

comprised of five boroughs, all of which sustained damage from the storm. Sandy wreaked havoc on 

the City and its expansive 520-mile shoreline.14 To the east of the City is Long Island, the largest island 

in the contiguous United States. The 118-mile15 island is composed of two counties, Nassau and Suffolk, 

which have a combined population of over 2.8 million people,16 more populous than 16 states.17

As a center for many industries, including finance, international trade, biotechnology, media and 

entertainment, and tourism, New Jersey and the New York metropolitan area comprise one of the 

most important economic regions in the world. A diverse array of industries and businesses of all sizes 

create the regional economy. Sandy-affected counties are home to many prolific small businesses, and 

these Sandy-affected counties normally generate 90 percent of New Jersey’s gross state product (GSP) 

and 70 percent of New York’s GSP.18 Additionally, in New York and New Jersey, small businesses are 

disproportionately located in coastal towns, and 77 percent of the States’ small businesses are located 

in counties where Hurricane Sandy caused damage.19 This density of commercial activity increases the 

regional economy’s vulnerability to storms.

Commercial activity is highly dependent on the region’s infrastructure. Even before Hurricane Sandy, 

significant infrastructure in the region was in need of repair due to chronic underfunding. According to 

a 2013 study by the American Society of Civil Engineers, many of New York State’s bridges, the majority 

of its roads, and its wastewater and drinking water infrastructure are badly in need of investment and 

repair.20 New Jersey faces similar conditions.21

The region’s relatively expensive and unusually low-inventory housing market raised different 

challenges than those experienced in disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina, Ike, and Rita. Affordable, 

temporary housing units close to Sandy-affected neighborhoods were in short supply. This forced 

Federal, State, and local authorities to employ an array of policy tools to provide displaced individuals 

with places to stay.

Sandy also followed a protracted foreclosure crisis that affected much of the region and threatened 

to destabilize the market by causing mortgagors struggling to recover from the storm to fall behind on 

their payments. Owners who were able to weather the economic downturn and remain current on 

their mortgages were suddenly faced with the three-fold burden of not only making monthly payments, 

13	 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Economic Growth Continues Across Metropolitan Areas In 2011,” 02/22/2013,

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_metro/gdp_metro_newsrelease.htm.

14	 New York City Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New

York,” 06/11/2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.

15	 About Long Island, 2013, http://www.longisland.com/long-island.html.

16	 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36059.html; U.S.

Census Bureau, 2012, http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36103.html.

17	 U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract: State Rankings, 2012, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/rankings.html.

18	 U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns, accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/.

19	 Task Force analysis of data from U.S. Census Bureau Patterns, Moody’s (2012),

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, FEMA, ESRI, 05/22/2013.

20	 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card on America’s Infrastructure,” 2013, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/states/.

21	 Ibid.
21

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

but also paying for repairs to their damaged homes and for temporary places to stay while repairs were 

being completed. 

Finally, despite the vulnerability of the region to coastal and other flooding, the penetration of flood 

insurance in the region is extremely low. A February 2013 report on the National Flood Insurance 

Program (NFIP) estimated 15 to 25 percent of properties in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA)22

 in the Northeast were insured for flood losses.23 Specifically, just before Sandy hit, only 38,785 

residential and business policies were insured in New York City out of more than 300,000 housing units 

and 23,400 businesses damaged by Hurricane Sandy’s storm surge and inundation.24 According to a 

May 2013 New York Federal Reserve Bank survey of small businesses across New Jersey, New York, 

and Southern Connecticut, only eight percent of respondents whose firms suffered damage had flood 

insurance.25

The Storm and Its Impact

Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Brigantine, NJ at approximately 7:30 pm on October 29, 2012.26

After barreling across the shores of Jamaica and Cuba, the storm transitioned back and forth between 

hurricane and tropical storm strength over the Atlantic before merging with a winter storm and 

crashing into the East Coast. Its strong winds, historic storm surges, heavy rain, and snowfall resulted 

in overwhelming destruction up and down the East Coast with effects felt as far west as Wisconsin.27At 

nearly the same time, communities in West Virginia and northwestern Maryland faced blizzard 

conditions that dumped as much as three feet of snow on some areas.28

Hurricane Sandy is the second costliest hurricane in the nation’s history.29 According to the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Hurricane Center, Sandy was the largest 

storm of its kind to hit the East Coast.30 The size and strength of the storm affected a variety of sectors 

throughout the region.

22	 According to FEMA, flood hazard areas identified on the Flood Insurance Rate Map are identified as a Special

Flood Hazard Area (SFHAs). SFHA are defined as the area that will be inundated by the flood event having a

1-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. National Flood Insurance Program, “Flood

Zones,” 05/15/2012, http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-2/flood-zones.

23	 Congressional Research Service, “The National Flood Insurance Program: Status and Remaining

Issues for Congress,” 02/06/2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf.

24	 New York City Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York”, 06/11/2013

http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/final_report/Ch4_Buildings_FINAL_singles.pdf.

25	 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Small Business Credit Survey, 2013,” 05/2013, http://

www.newyorkfed.org/smallbusiness/2013/pdf/full-report.pdf.

26	 National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013,

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.

27	 NOAA, “Service Assessment, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy,” 05/2013, http://

www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.

28	 Ibid.

29	 According to NOAA, the 2013 Consumer Price Index (CPI) cost adjusted value of Hurricane Sandy was $65.7 billion.

The costliest storm was Hurricane Katrina, with a 2013 CPI cost adjusted value of $148.8 billion, and the third costliest

Hurricane was Hurricane Andrew, with a 2013 CPI cost adjusted value of $44.8 billion. Source: NOAA, “BillionDollar Weather/Climate Disasters,” accessed 08/06/2013, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.

30	 NOAA, “Service Assessment, Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy,” 05/2013, http://

www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Sandy13.pdf.
22

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Hurricane Sandy by the Numbers

$65 BILLION in damages and economic loss

200,000 Small business closures due to damage or power outages

2 million Working days lost

$58 million In damages to the recreational fishing sector

100 million Gallons of raw sewage released in Hewlett Bay 2 days after Sandy

70 National Parks impacted

At least 159 FATALITIES caused by Hurricane Sandy

72 U.S. fatalities directly caused by the storm

87 U.S. fatalities caused by circumstances indirectly associated with the storm

8.5 MILLION customers left without power

48,000 Number of trees removed or trimmed to restore power in New Jersey

$1 billion Estimated cost of power and gas line repairs in New Jersey

650,000 HOMES damaged or destroyed

6,477 Storm survivors in shelters at the peak of the disaster

43% Portion of those registered for FEMA assistance that were renters

64% Portion of renter registrants from NYC that were low-income

67% Portion of renter registrants from NJ that were low-income

Portion of workers who commute using public transportation in the Tri-state area: 30.5 PERCENT

8 Flooded tunnels

42 minutes Average commute time in Brooklyn before Sandy

86 minutes Average commute time in Brooklyn after Sandy

25 PERCENT of cell sites out of service in 10 STATES

6 Number of NYC hospitals closed because of the storm

26 Number of NYC residential care facilities closed because of the storm

10 Number of NYC hospitals that stayed open despite flooding or power outages

8% Portion of all N.Y.C. hospital beds that were unavailable after Sandy

2 Number of NJ hospitals evacuated because of the storm

12 Number of NJ residential care facilities closed because of the storm
23

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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25 PERCENT of cell sites out of service in 10 STATES

1,408 Number of reported patients evacuated

100% Portion of all open NJ hospitals that utilized their emergency generators for any given time

Hurricane Sandy’s size at landfall: 1.8 MILLION SQUARE MILES

3 Peak storm Category in Caribbean

14 feet Peak height of storm surge in New York City

32.3 feet Peak wave height recorded off the coast of Monmouth County, NJ

26 feet Previous wave height record in that location, set during Hurricane Irene

36 inches Maximum snowfall recorded (Richwood, WV and Wolf Laurel My., NC)

12.83 inches Maximum rainfall recorded (Bellevue, MD)

65 knots Maximum sustained wind speed recorded (Great Gull Island, NY)

83 knots Maximum wind gust recorded (Eaton’s Neck, NY)

Disasters or emergencies declared in 13 STATES

CT DC DE MA MD NH 

NJ NY PA RI VA WV States with emergency declarations

CT DC DE MA MD NH 

NJ NY OH PA RI VA WV States with Major Disaster Declarations

Sources:

National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013

National Climatic Data Center, “Billion-Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters,” 2013

The Hartford 2013 Small Business Pulse: Storm Sandy, 2013

Climate Central, “Sewage Overflows from Hurricane Sandy,” April 2013

National Park Service, “Status of National Parks Affected by Hurricane Sandy,” 12/05/2012

New York University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, 

“Sandy’s Effects on Housing in New York City,” March 2013

Enterprise Community Partners, Inc., “FEMA Assistance Analysis,” March 2013

Federal Transit Authority, Hearing on Recovering from Superstorm Sandy: Rebuilding our Infrastructure, 12/20/2012

Rudin Center for Transportation NYU Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, 

“Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy,” 11/2012 

David Turetsky, Chief, Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks NENA 

2013 Conference & Expo Charlotte, NC, 06/18/2013

New York City Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York,” 06/11/2013

U.S. Census Bureau, “Commuting in the United States: 2009, American Community Survey Reports,” 09/2011. 

HHS analysis of State and industry data 

NASA, “NASA Satellites Capture Hurricane Sandy’s Massive Size,” 10/30/2013

FEMA, “6 Months Report: Superstorm sandy from Pre-Disaster to Recovery,” 04/25/2013

FEMA, “Disaster Declarations for 2012”

FEMA, “Disaster Declarations for 2013”
24

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Infrastructure

The damage from Hurricane Sandy to physical infrastructure in New York, New Jersey, and other 

impacted states is measured in tens of billions of dollars.31 Separate from physical damage, EQECAT, a 

catastrophe risk modeling company, estimates the region lost between $30 billion and $50 billion in 

economic activity due to extensive power outages, liquid fuel shortages, and near-total shutdown of 

the region’s transportation system.32 

Energy

Following Hurricane Sandy, power outages impacted approximately 8.5 million customers, including 

businesses and services, affecting millions more people.33 34 Additionally, breaks in natural gas lines 

caused fires in some locations, resulting in the destruction of many residences.35 Access to gasoline 

and diesel fuel in New York City and northern New Jersey was severely impaired following Sandy. This 

was largely caused by flooding damage to major terminals and docks in the Arthur Kill area of New 

Jersey. These fuel shortages delayed first responders and other response and recovery officials. As a 

result, portable generators sat unused and lines at fueling stations were long and problematic while 

consumers struggled to identify which gas stations had power and were operational. 

Communications

The storm disrupted telecommunications and data access to millions of people and hundreds of 

thousands of businesses, paralyzing the greater New York Metropolitan economy. At the peak of the 

storm, tracking by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revealed that approximately 25 

percent of cell sites across all or part of 10 states and Washington, D.C. were out of service.36

Green Infrastructure

Storm surge associated with Hurricane Sandy caused dune and beach erosion, island breaching, and 

transport and deposition of sediment inland (i.e., overwash) in coastal communities from New England 

to Florida. Coastal flooding also caused significant erosion to existing natural infrastructure, inundation 

of wetland habitats, removal of or erosion to coastal dunes, destruction of coastal lakes, and new inlet 

creation. 

31	 NOAA, “Billion-Dollar U.S. Weather/Climate Disasters 1980-2012,” accessed

07/11/2013, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.pdf.

32	 EQECAT, “Post-Landfall Loss Estimates - Hurricane Sandy,” 11/01/2012, http://www.eqecat.com/

catwatch/post-landfall-loss-estimates-superstorm-sandy-released-2012-11-01/.

33	 Department of Energy “Comparing the Impacts of Northeast Hurricanes on Energy Infrastructure,” 04/2013, http://

www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/Northeast%20Storm%20Comparison_FINAL_041513c.pdf.

34	 National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013,

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.

35	 National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013,

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.

36 David Turetsky, Chief, Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications

Commission, Remarks NENA 2013 Conference & Expo Charlotte, NC 06/18/2013, http://www.

transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db0621/DOC-321744A1.pdf.
25

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Transportation

Hurricane Sandy was the worst disaster for public transit systems (e.g., bus, subway, commuter rail) in 

the nation’s history. On October 30, 2012, the morning after the storm made landfall, more than half of 

the nation’s daily transit riders were without service.37 New York City’s subway system was shut down 

on October 28, in advance of the storm, and remained closed through November 1.38 During that time, 

the City experienced traffic gridlock, and those who were able to get to work experienced commutes of 

up to several hours.39 Seawater breached many critical infrastructure systems, flowing into the Hugh L. 

Carey (Brooklyn-Battery) Tunnel, flooding eight of the New York City Subway tunnels, and damaging a 

variety of other transportation systems in the region.40

Average commute times by home region and mode of 

transportation. Pre Sandy compared against November 1-2, 201241

37	 Peter M. Rogoff, FTA Administrator, Testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Subcommittee

on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, 12/20/2012, http://www.fta.dot.gov/newsroom/12908_14967.html.

38	 MTA,10/28/2012, http://www.mta.info/Alert_hurricaneSandy.htm.

39	 Rudin Center for Transportation NYU Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, “Transportation During and After

Hurricane Sandy,” 11/2012, http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/sandytransportation.pdf.

40	 Federal Transit Administration, “Superstorm Sandy Public Transit Projects – Review of Cost Estimates,” 01/31/2013.

41 Rudin Center for Transportation NYU Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, “Transportation During and After

Hurricane Sandy,” 11/2012, http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/sandytransportation.pdf.
26

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Due to the flooding of a major electrical substation in Kearny, NJ and Amtrak’s tunnels connecting 

New York and New Jersey under the Hudson River, passenger train service was suspended for nearly 

a week in parts of the Northeast Corridor and full service was not restored until three weeks later on 

November 16.42 The 100-year-old tunnels provide the only direct intercity and freight rail access from 

New Jersey to Manhattan.43

42	 Amtrak, “Hurricane Sandy,” 11/29/2012, http://www.commerce.senate.gov/

public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c449a06d-c1d6-41be-8326-8e625faeb211.

43	 Ibid.
27

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Stormwater Management and Drinking Water and Wastewater Treatment Systems

Floodwaters, massive storm runoff, wind damage, and loss of electricity combined to cause wastewater 

treatment plants up and down the mid-Atlantic coast to fail.44 These failures sent billions of gallons of 

raw and partially treated sewage into the region’s waterways, impacting public health, aquatic habitats, 

and resources.45

The threat of contaminated flood waters entering groundwater aquifers, pipes, and wells that supply 

drinking water to much of the region also caused concern for public health. Many drinking water 

utilities experienced power loss, which disrupted their ability to provide safe water. Public health 

authorities in New York and New Jersey had to issue dozens of “boil water” advisories for customers 

from Nassau to Ulster counties in New York and from Atlantic to Sussex counties in New Jersey.46 The 

advisories were eventually lifted after the water showed no contamination and there were no ill effects 

as a result of the threats. 

Public Medical Facilities and Schools

New York City-area hospitals and medical facilities, including the New York City Health and Hospitals 

Corporation facilities, were severely impacted by Hurricane Sandy; Bellevue Medical Center and Coney 

Island Hospitals, for example, were all flooded and eventually shut down due to the storm. In many 

places, there was extensive damage to mechanical, electrical, research, and medical equipment, much 

of which was located on lower floors or below grade to allow easier servicing and delivery of large 

equipment.47

In New Jersey, many health care facilities were severely impacted by Hurricane Sandy, including 

hospitals, Emergency Medical Service providers, Federally Qualified Health Centers, local health 

departments, vital statistics offices, home healthcare agencies, rehabilitation hospitals, dialysis centers, 

and long-term care facilities. Hospitals alone reported an initial estimated $68 million in damages; 48

Hudson County was hit hardest and closed some of its hospitals.49

In New Jersey, Hurricane Sandy disrupted schools, forcing many to close for more than a week 

following the storm. Schools took different approaches for temporary solutions immediately after the 

storm. These approaches included remaining closed until they were fully operational and temporarily 

providing instruction to students at alternate sites. In the case of Lincoln Park, schools opened for half 

44 Climate Central, “Sewage Overflows From Hurricane Sandy,” 04/2013, http://www.climatecentral.org/pdfs/Sewage.pdf.

45 Ibid.

46 State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, ”Christie Administration Advises Residents To

Be Alert For Local Boil Water Advisories,” 10/31/2012, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/newsrel/2012/12_0132.

htm; New York State Department of Health, “Drinking Water Advisories Following Hurricane Sandy,”

12/2012, http://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/water/drinking/boilwater/sandy/.

47	 New York City Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient

New York,” 06/11/2013,http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.

48	 Information provided by FEMA.

49 NJ Spotlight, “NJ Hospital Officials Begin Planning, Building for the Next Sandy,” 02/21/2013, http://www.

njspotlight.com/stories/13/02/20/hospital-officials-begin-planning-building-for-the-next-sandy/.
28

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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a day a week after the storm – without electricity, working boilers, or lunch service.50 A total of 13 

schools across Bergen, Cape May, Hudson, Monmouth, and Ocean counties closed for longer periods of 

time primarily due to structural or utility damage.51 Likewise, several school districts in the Rockaways 

and Nassau County (East Rockaways Union Free School Districts, Island Park Schools, Long Beach City 

Schools), as well as the New York City Department of Education/School Construction Authority, were 

damaged, with repairs in the State expected to be approximately $340 million.52

Housing

Hurricane Sandy left its trace on hundreds of thousands of homes in communities across New 

York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. As a result, workers could not return to their jobs, children 

were separated from their schools, elderly and disabled residents were unable to receive 

essential care, vulnerable populations experienced environmental and public health challenges, 

and neighbors were torn from their communities and deprived of their support networks. 

Small Business

Hurricane Sandy devastated small businesses throughout the affected region. Flooding damaged 

inventories, machinery, and other structures; high winds and falling trees caused structural damage; 

and failure of power, water, telecommunications, and fuel infrastructure shut businesses down for days, 

if not weeks. Some small businesses still remain closed today and may never reopen. Supply chains, 

including small business suppliers,53 were disrupted as well. Some sectors were disproportionately 

impacted, according to findings in a Department of Commerce study, particularly the travel and tourism 

industry in New Jersey. The report projects a measurable decline in tourism demand in 2013 that will 

have ripple effects throughout the state and across other industries.54 Additionally, the recreational 

and commercial fishing industry, comprised largely of small businesses, depends heavily on coastal 

infrastructure and healthy coastal habitats and ecosystems, all of which were severely impacted by 

Hurricane Sandy.55

50	 The Star-Ledger, “Hurricane Sandy aftermath: Some NJ schools reopen with no heat, no lunch,” 11/06/2012,

http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/11/hurricane_sandy_aftermath_some.html.

51 Information provided by FEMA.

52	 Office of the Governor of New York, “New York State Hurricane Sandy recovery needs summary,”

11/26/2012, http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/documents/sandyimpactsummary.pdf.

53	 NJMEP Ongoing Post Sandy Outreach, Data on Calls Made November 2-16, 2012.

54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Economist, draft report “Economic Impact of Super Storm Sandy”, 08/2013

55 NOAA Fisheries, “Regional Impact Evaluation: An Initial Assessment of the Economic Impacts of Sandy on New

Jersey and New York Commercial and Recreational Fishing Sectors,” 03/2013, http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/

Assets/economics/documents/sandy/Final_Report_Sandy_Regional_Impact_Evaluation_MSA.pdf.
29

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Insurance

Private insurance companies will pay an estimated $18.8 billion to their policyholders in claims related 

to Sandy, compared to $48.7 billion in claims related to Hurricane Katrina and $25.6 billion related to 

Hurricane Andrew in 1992.56 In addition, as of April 30, 2013, NFIP, administered by FEMA, had paid 

$6.7 billion in claims related to Sandy compared to $16.2 billion related to Katrina and $169 million 

related to Andrew.57

Sandy Claims Paid by Type58

Homeowner & 

Residential Property Claims (#) Value ($)

New York 501,447 $2.1 billion

New Jersey 328,946 $1.56 billion

Auto

New York 109,833 $1.5 billion

New Jersey 54,642 $530 million

Residential Flood (NFIP)

New York 54,894 $3.2 billion

New Jersey 70,787 $3.1 billion

Rest of the region 11,428 $270 million

Commercial Flood (NFIP)

1,933 $241 million

3075 $315 million

792 $43 million

Commercial property

New York 30,817 $1.33 billion

56 Insurance Information Institute, “Over 90 Percent of the New Jersey and New York Sandy Insurance Claims Have Been Settled;

Likely to Be Third Largest Storm Ever for U.S. Insurers,” 4/19/2013, http://www.iii.org/press_releases/over-90-percent-of-the-newjersey-and-new-york-sandy-insurance-claims-have-been-settled-likely-to-be-third-largest-hurricane-ever-for-us-insurers.html.

57	 Figures expressed in 2012 dollars. Source: FEMA, “Significant Flood Events as of April 30, 2013,” updated 06/24/2013,

http://www.fema.gov/policy-claim-statistics-flood-insurance/policy-claim-statistics-flood-insurance/policy-claim-13-9.

58	 New York Department of Financial Services, as of 06/14/2013; New Jersey Department

of Banking and Insurance, as of 6/18/2013; FEMA, as of 06/25/2013.
30

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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Homeowner & 

Residential Property Claims (#) Value ($)

New Jersey 39,870 $1.2 billion

A National Response

On October 26, three days before Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New York and New Jersey, State, 

Federal, and non-governmental organizations were working in the region to anticipate the storm’s 

impact and prepare an effective disaster response. That day, the President held the first of 15 Sandyrelated conferences and briefings, convening with representatives from FEMA, NOAA’s National 

Hurricane Center, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss ongoing preparations 

for the storm. The day before the storm made landfall, the President approved emergency declarations 

under the Robert T. Stafford Act (Stafford Act) for New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, 

Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia, making Federal support available to save lives, protect 

property, and enhance public health and safety. Also, before Sandy’s landfall, 1,500 FEMA personnel 

were deployed along the East Coast to support preparedness and response operations.59

Through the storm and in the days following, the President directed his Cabinet to lean forward, cut 

red tape, and get resources to the survivors and State and local governments. Additional emergency 

declarations were approved in Delaware, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia, while 

major disaster declarations were issued in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. At the peak of the 

response, the Federal Government mobilized more than 17,000 volunteers in the affected areas60 and 

provided more than $200 million in Federal services and resources to address immediate recovery 

needs.61 Within four weeks of the disaster, 450,000 applicants registered for assistance from FEMA and 

more than 4,700 applicants received shelter.62

Recovery Progress

In total, the Sandy Supplemental appropriated about $50 billion in new budget authority for recovery 

efforts related to Hurricane Sandy and other major disasters in Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 and 2013. 

Congress provided an additional $9.7 billion in new borrowing authority to NFIP. Of that funding, 

approximately $18 billion is planned for expenditure on infrastructure systems, $1 billion for economic 

programs, $1 billion for natural and cultural resources, $800 million for Federal asset restoration, $750 

million for health and social services, $300 million for program support and research, and $28 million 

59	 FEMA, “Hurricane Sandy: Timeline,” 12/07/2012, http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline.

60	 FEMA, “Superstorm Sandy Update – Nov. 10, 2012,” 10/11/2012, http://www.fema.gov/

employee-news-and-announcements/superstorm-sandy-update-nov-10-2012.

61	 FEMA, “Hurricane Sandy: Timeline,” 12/07/2012, http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline.

62	 FEMA, “Sandy Update – Nov. 21, 2012”, 11/21/2012, https://www.fema.gov/

employee-news-and-announcements/sandy-update-nov-21-2012.
31

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

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for oversight.63 Just more than $26 billion includes flexible funding programs at DHS for FEMA and at 

HUD for the Community Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program, which will 

be deployed to address diverse, regional, unmet needs.

By July 1, 2013, 17 Federal agencies had announced more than $22 billion in funds to help the region 

affected by Hurricane Sandy rebuild. As of June 30, 2013, $9.18 billion had been obligated, representing 

19.13 percent of total funding appropriated for the recovery. Of the $9.18 billion obligated by Federal 

agencies, more than $4 billion has been outlayed. 

The three departments with the largest portion of recovery funds are HUD, the Department 

of Transportation (DOT), and DHS, with $15.2 billion, $12.4 billion, and $11.5 billion in funding 

authority, respectively. DHS has outlayed $3.9 billion, approximately 34 percent of the agency’s total 

appropriation, for Sandy recovery, amounting to the largest proportion of funds outlayed by any 

agency.

The largest portion of HUD’s allocation is for the CDBG-DR program, a critical post-disaster funding 

source that provides grantees the discretion to address unmet housing, infrastructure, economic 

development, and other needs after other Federal, State, local, and Tribal resources have been 

exhausted. 

Overall, Federal agencies have outlayed $2.93 billion in New York, $1.06 billion in New Jersey, and 

approximately $360 million across other states as of June 30, 2013.64 The Federal Government has 

effectively partnered with states to make substantial progress in the recovery effort following Hurricane 

Sandy. In addition to the accomplishments achieved in partnership with the Task Force, which are 

described throughout this Rebuilding Strategy, selected projects and recovery activities initiated by Task 

Force member agencies are included in Appendix IV.

While significant progress has been made in helping residents, business owners, and communities get 

back on their feet, there is still far more work to do. As this Rebuilding Strategy emphasizes, decision 

makers must work to ensure this funding is spent in a way that not only rebuilds the communities 

impacted by Hurricane Sandy but also makes them stronger and more resilient to future storms.

63	 These values are based on agencies classifying programs into one primary category that describes the

intended use of funds. These are not direct line items from the Sandy Supplemental, but rather show

the different types of program themes that have been funded explicitly and implicitly.

64	 This data is not based on 100 percent of all obligated and outlayed funds and includes data that was submitted to

the PMO by agencies. This data does account for approximately 90 per cent of obligated and outlayed funds.
32

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

A New Preparedness Directive and a New Recovery Framework

Hurricane Sandy marked the first full implementation of the NDRF in a large-scale disaster. The NDRF is one 

of the five integrated national frameworks required by Presidential Policy Directive-8: National Preparedness 

(PPD-8) and stemmed from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. This directive, issued by 

President Obama on March 30, 2011, is focused on “strengthening the security and resilience of the United 

States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the 

Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”65

The NDRF lays out pre- and post-disaster planning activities for disaster recovery, provides an interagency 

coordination structure, and defines roles and responsibilities for all who contribute to the disaster recovery. 

The NDRF defines disaster recovery as:

“Those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, 

including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate interim and longterm housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic 

development; and restoring natural and cultural resources.”66

Creation of the NDRF was driven by the recognition that planning for long-term recovery must begin even 

as response activities are underway and must incorporate a wide array of stakeholders, including all levels 

of government, the private and non-profit sectors, emergency management and community development 

professionals, and disaster recovery practitioners. Recovery activities are divided into six areas (defined as 

Recovery Support Functions (RSFs)67 to facilitate the identification, coordination, and delivery of Federal 

assistance needed to supplement recovery resources and efforts by State, local, and Tribal governments as 

well as private and non-profit sectors.

As a result, planning for long-term recovery from Sandy began at almost the same time as the response. We 

know from past disasters that planning for long-term rebuilding must begin even as response and initial, 

short-term recovery activities are underway. 

This new framework for coordinating Federal assistance for recovery directed an influx of recovery-specific 

Federal personnel into the Sandy-affected region. The implementation of the NDRF meant that community 

recovery would be enhanced by instituting Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (FDRCs) and activating 

RSFs which focused on identifying recovery challenges, improving information sharing, leveraging existing 

resources, and providing technical assistance through Joint Field Offices (JFOs) in the region.

The NDRF has significantly advanced the Federal Government’s approach to disaster recovery in the United 

States. With the direction in the President’s Climate Action Plan, recovery efforts will consider risks posed by 

sea level rise and climate change, resulting in a more resilient nation. 

65	 Presidential Policy Directive 8, http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

66	 National Disaster Recovery Framework, 09/2011, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf.

67	 FEMA, “Recovery Support Functions,” accessed 07/19/2013, http://www.fema.gov/recovery-support-functions.
33

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Facing a Growing Threat 

Sandy and other recent disasters underscore the nation’s vulnerability to extreme weather events 

under current climate conditions. Last year alone, there were 11 different weather and climate disaster 

events with estimated losses exceeding $1 billion each across the United States. Taken together, these 

11 events resulted in more than $110 billion in estimated damages.68 While scientific evidence does 

not yet tell us definitively whether storms like Sandy are growing more common, evidence indicates 

climate change is already altering environmental conditions in a way that suggests there may be 

changes in the frequency, intensity, duration, and timing of future extreme meteorological events, 

which may lead to unprecedented extreme weather events.69

Specifically, sea level rise due to ocean warming and ice melting will increase the risk of more severe 

inundation for any given coastal storm. Global sea level rise has been increasing over recent decades 

and is expected to continue beyond the end of this century, impacting millions of Americans living in 

coastal areas. These projections of increased risk cannot be overlooked in the development of hazard 

mitigation and recovery plans for the future (see Appendix V for more detailed discussion of sources of 

future risk), given that rebuilding after severe storms and other weather events costs taxpayers billions 

of dollars a year.

Countless examples from the Gulf Coast, the Jersey Shore, and other storm-struck areas demonstrate 

how non-structural hazard mitigation measures make communities more resilient to extreme weather 

events. Coastal homes that were elevated or had stronger roofs and beach communities with natural 

buffers or zoning, such as setbacks for the most vulnerable areas, fared better than their neighbors 

without similar hazard mitigation.70

No single solution or set of actions can anticipate every threat, but decision makers at all levels must 

recognize that climate change and the resulting increase in risks from extreme weather have eliminated 

the option of simply building back to outdated standards and expecting better outcomes after the next 

extreme event. There is clear evidence at the national level that investments made to mitigate risk 

have achieved significant benefits. For instance, the Multihazard Mitigation Council estimated that, on 

average, for every dollar invested by FEMA in hazard mitigation, the country receives at least $4 dollars 

in benefits.71

68	 Values represent the 2013 Consumer Price Index (CPI) cost adjusted value. NOAA, “Billion-Dollar U.S. Weather/

Climate Disasters 1980-2012,” accessed 07/11/2013, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.pdf.

69	 IPCC, 2012: Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change

Adaptation [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner,

S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1-19.

70	 Buro Happold, “Sandy Success Stories,” 06/2013, http://www.sandysuccessstories.org.

71	 Multihazard Mitigation Council, “Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings

from Mitigation Activities,” 2005, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nibs.org/resource/resmgr/MMC/hms_vol1.pdf.
34

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Whether homeowners are reinforcing their foundation or city planners are rerouting roads away 

from flood-prone areas, hazard mitigation measures can take on many forms. As noted earlier, the 

President’s Climate Action Plan highlights the need for communities to prepare for the risks of climate 

change and outlines a series of steps the Federal Government will undertake to help communities 

understand and mitigate those risks. The President’s plan directs agencies to remove barriers to local 

climate-resilient investments and create a centralized “toolkit” with information needed by state, local, 

and private sector leaders.

For communities to protect themselves from future risks, it is also necessary for them to have access 

to the most up-to-date, scientifically-sound information about the risks. The President’s Climate Action 

Plan calls on the Federal Government to provide such information to communities and the Task Force 

focused on this direction in the Sandy-affected region. 

Since FEMA had not updated flood maps of New Jersey and New York City in more than 25 years,72

 it was difficult for local planners to effectively understand and address current and future risks posed 

by climate change, urbanization, and other factors. Consequently, FEMA issued updated Advisory 

Base Flood Elevation (ABFE) maps in the immediate aftermath of the storm, and the Administration 

released a sea level rise tool designed to provide communities in the Sandy-affected region with timely 

information on how various scenarios of sea level rise would be expected to impact them.73

Science and Technology Supporting Resilience

Science is at the heart of invention and the drive to improve our lives. Throughout U.S. history, science 

and technology have facilitated major economic and cultural shifts. These impacts are ever-present and 

are increasingly driving decisions in all aspects of our technology-based society. Science and technology 

can provide key capabilities for the response and rebuilding process, and scientific processes can help 

to inform our investments to rebuild more resilient communities. Overall, science needs to be an 

integrated part of post-disaster response and recovery efforts. 

Investing in Better Science and Technology for Better Informed Decisions

Although good science is necessary for supporting good decision making, it is not always sufficient. 

Science acts as evidence does in a court case; sometimes it needs to be explained or translated 

for particular applications the same way legal strategies are translated by lawyers to help others 

understand. New scientific knowledge, applied appropriately, can dramatically reduce risks U.S. citizens 

face and provide major economic opportunities. As a nation we have made significant investments in 

science for this reason, and it is incumbent upon us to use science and technology to help communities 

and leaders make sound decisions about our future investments.

72	 FEMA, “Changes in the Flood Insurance Program: Preliminary Considerations for

Rebuilding,” http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/fpmfemacfip.pdf.

73	 U.S. Global Change Research Program, “Sea Level Rise Tool for Sandy Recovery,” http://www.

globalchange.gov/what-we-do/assessment/coastal-resilience-resources.
35

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Recent trends and scientific evidence about how the atmosphere and oceans will respond to a warmer 

climate indicate an increasing likelihood of severe coastal storms; consequently, the costs to respond to 

extreme events of this type are expected to escalate. In order to reduce recurring costs and disruption 

to lives and communities resulting from dynamic environmental changes, we should wisely apply the 

lessons learned in this rebuilding process towards disaster risk reduction strategies. 

Although current scientific knowledge does not generally provide a single, clear answer to complicated 

questions involved with rebuilding, evidence-based information, risk-based analysis, and robust costbenefit analyses can help us to invest more wisely in future hazard mitigation. To improve community 

resilience, decision makers and scientists must take into consideration new paradigms, understanding 

complexities and interdependencies in natural and human systems, facilitating the training of scientists 

and decision makers on how to turn data into actionable information, and incorporating technological 

solutions and future research and development to meet resilience needs. Addressing these priority 

areas will also help us prepare for disaster responses that best meet community needs and capabilities. 

The Importance of Science in Rebuilding Efforts 

The goals and processes of rebuilding require decision makers to routinely make complex decisions 

under uncertain and rapidly changing conditions, including responding to immediate needs while 

anticipating future risk. Effective response, recovery, restoration, and rebuilding in the aftermath of 

Hurricane Sandy required significant scientific input. As storms grow stronger and more frequent, 

more lives and economic investments are put at risk. At the same time, science and technology 

are uncovering new ways to reduce risks. In a region as unique and diverse as the one affected by 

Hurricane Sandy, scientific study helps us understand interdependencies, identify weak links and 

methods to strengthen them, and devise systems approaches to increase resilience. Likewise, better 

use of available scientific information and models can lead to better decision making in advance of the 

next major event.

Scientific Data Sharing for Disaster Resilience

Federal agencies collected and disseminated vast quantities of scientific data that aided Hurricane 

Sandy preparation, response, and recovery. Interagency data sharing has been central to this 

process. Before the storm, the National Hurricane Center worked with FEMA to deliver Geographical 

Information System (GIS)-ready storm surge depth grids and forecasts. After the storm, FEMA, state, 

and local emergency managers used storm surge data and aerial imagery to guide evacuations, monitor 

local conditions, assess damages, and allocate response resources. Multi-agency coordination of poststorm data collection on hurricane-induced coastal changes ensured cost-effective coverage of the 

entire Sandy-affected region. NOAA collected data on changes to the New York Harbor, which enabled 

marine traffic to restart more quickly. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is using U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) LiDAR data to assess alternatives for rebuilding projects on Fire Island. All these data will 

improve forecasting models and vulnerability assessments, allowing us to be better prepared for future 

storm events.
36

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Hurricane Sandy Science Coordination Working Group

Many of the agencies participating in the Task Force are engaged in scientific activities aimed at 

expanding knowledge of the Sandy-affected region and determining what steps can be taken to ensure 

that our coastal communities are more resilient to future risks. In order to best utilize the varied 

and extensive expertise of the Task Force member agencies, the White House Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP) established and chaired a Science Coordinating Group to work with the 

Task Force to provide support in policy development, facilitate interagency collaboration, and ensure 

the quality of information presented. The working group was formed drawing upon the existing 

scientific coordination bodies, including the National Science and Technology Council74 and its various 

interagency subcommittees. Through the Science Coordination Group, the Task Force was able to 

capitalize on existing expertise to ensure the best available science was used to inform its policy 

recommendations.

DOI Strategic Sciences Group

Former Secretary Salazar established the Department of Interior (DOI) Strategic Sciences Group (SSG) 

by Secretarial Order in 2012 to provide science-based assessments and interdisciplinary scenarios of 

environmental crises affecting Departmental resources. Based on an approach developed during the 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the SSG rapidly assembles teams of scientists and provides the scenario 

results to Departmental leadership to support decision-making. The Secretary deployed the SSG to 

develop scenarios of Hurricane Sandy’s environmental, economic, and social impacts and potential 

interventions to improve resilience of the region in the face of future storms. The SSG briefed Task 

Force representatives, DOI leadership, White House staff, and officials in the affected region. The 

scenarios developed by the SSG are now the basis of criteria for selecting over $300 million in projects 

for Hurricane Sandy mitigation, $100 million of which will fund an external competition. A full technical 

report is in preparation.

A Regional Approach to Resilience

Natural disasters do not respect State or local boundaries, thus rebuilding plans cannot be bound by 

jurisdictional lines. The scope of the damage from Hurricane Sandy escalated challenges associated 

with recovery. As communities began to recover, it was clear that, historically, too little consideration 

was given to inherent interdependencies – whether between multiple states, neighboring counties, 

or seaside towns. A series of uncoordinated hazard mitigation measures may yield unintended 

consequences and could ultimately decrease resilience in the long-term. Major rebuilding decisions 

made by community leaders should not be considered in isolation. Similarly, communities must be 

74	 The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) within the Office of Science and Technology Policy was established by Executive

Order on November 23, 1993. This Cabinet-level Council within the executive branch coordinates science and technology policy

across the diverse entities that make up the Federal research and development enterprise. The work of the NSTC is organized under

five primary committees: Environment, Natural Resources and Sustainability (CENRS); Homeland and National Security; Science,

Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) Education; Science; and Technology. Each of these committees oversees subcommittees

and working groups focused on different aspects of science and technology and working to coordinate across the Federal government.
37

Background On The Region, The Storm, And The Recovery Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

aware of vulnerabilities associated with common resources. If a major power plant for Community A 

is located in Community B and disaster strikes the latter, both communities will be forced to recognize 

their interdependencies and ideally work together to limit future impacts. 

In order to make efficient investments that mitigate risk effectively and increase the resilience of a 

region, capital planning decisions must address shared local and regional goals, take into account 

interdependencies between human and natural systems, and result from a collaborative process. New 

protective technologies to mitigate regional risk must be incorporated into existing systems, such as 

technology that protects mass transit systems from flooding or resilient electric grid developments that 

counter the cascading effects of power surges during a disaster.

Definitions

More detail on the Task Force’s definitions is located in Appendix II

Sustainability: Sustainability is the creation and maintenance of conditions under which humans and 

nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of 

present and future generations. Sustainability involves providing for the long-term viability of the 

people and economy of the region and its natural ecosystems, which requires consideration of the 

risks posed by a changing climate, the practicality of maintaining a long-term presence in the most 

vulnerable areas, and the need to protect and restore the natural ecosystems.

Resilience: The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 

rapidly from disruptions.

Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Risk assessment is evaluating and prioritizing known risks and 

their effects; risk management is making a decision and setting policy based on that knowledge.

Hazard Mitigation: An effort using non-structural measures to reduce loss of life and property by 

lessening the impact of a major storm.

Vulnerable Populations: Groups of people especially at risk to impacts of a major storm due to their 

location or because they are overburdened and lack resources or have less access to services.
Beach Haven, New Jersey - FEMA/ Sharon Karr

New York, New York - FEMA/Kenneth WilseyHoboken, New Jersey - FEMA/ Sharon Karr

Long Beach, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
39

Long-Term Plan For Rebuilding Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

LONG-TERM PLAN FOR REBUILDING

President Obama directed the Task Force to establish “a long-term rebuilding plan that includes input 

from State, local, and Tribal officials and is supported by Federal agencies, which is informed by an 

assessment of current vulnerabilities to extreme weather events and seeks to mitigate future risks.” 

The rebuilding plan will help drive regional coordination and make communities more resilient to future 

storms. 

The plan will guide Sandy Supplemental spending and help align Federal, State and local policies 

to achieve several goals that are important to the long-term rebuilding of the region, in the most 

economically efficient ways possible. Those goals are: 

• Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

• Ensuring a Regionally Coordinated, Resilient Approach to Infrastructure Investment 

• Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

• Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

• Addressing Insurance Challenges, Understanding, and Affordability

• Building State and Local Capacity to Plan for and Implement Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding 

• Improving Data Sharing Between Federal, State, and Local Officials
Rumson, New Jersey - FEMA/Patsy Lynch
41

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding

Through Innovative Ideas and

a Thorough Understanding

of Current and Future Risk

It is increasingly important to take advantage of the latest data and technology to measure and 

manage risk. Flood risk maps need to incorporate what scientists know about the pace and impact of 

climate change on sea level and other environmental factors. At the same time, the demographics of 

at-risk communities—which change quickly and dramatically due to rapid urbanization and shifting 

work patterns—must be understood. In the Sandy region and across the country, communities once 

thought to be safe from risk are now beginning to recognize they face greater vulnerability to extreme 

weather and other natural disasters than previously imagined. Further, disadvantaged communities 

must account for higher risks due to their proximity to other environmental and health challenges.

It is vital that science-based tools and the best available data are used to better anticipate community 

vulnerabilities for future disasters and to adopt measures that will reduce future human, economic, and 

environmental costs. 

Both science and technology are critical to an effective recovery. Investments now will last for decades, 

meaning current construction must be completed to standards that anticipate future conditions 

and risks. Technology can help mitigate future risks, for example, by protecting mass transit systems 

from the effects of flooding. Similarly, “islanding” sections of an electric grid may counter the 

cascading effects of a power surge during a disaster. Mapping software can help planners understand 

the complexities of regional interdependencies and turn scientific data into timely and actionable 

information.

Only with an accurate understanding of current and future risk and vulnerability can the effectiveness 

of hazard mitigation efforts be judged. This critical information ensures not only that good investment 

decisions are made, but also that insurance systems reflect reality and encourage responsible behavior 

and resilience. 

A robust recovery must use good data and good science to support good decision making. Utilizing 

such information will ensure that decisions are well-informed and incorporate goals that are both 

clearly defined and realistic. Evidence-based information, risk-based analysis, and robust cost-benefit 

analyses could help governments, businesses, and homeowners better invest in measures that increase 

resilience on the national, regional, and local levels.
42

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

Coastal Vulnerability, Storm Surge, and Flooding 

Hurricane Sandy reminded us how vulnerable our coastal communities are to flooding and erosion. 

While many communities that lacked flood risk reduction measures suffered during the storm, the Task 

Force saw examples of hazard mitigation efforts that helped protect communities from excessive harm. 

To encourage these kinds of successful hazard mitigation efforts, the Task Force pursued two specific 

initiatives to enhance the quality of information used to assess risk: the first is focused on determining 

current risk, and the second is designed to help decision makers assess future risks.

In particular, the Task Force focused on helping communities make informed decisions to mitigate 

future disaster risk by helping those in the region carrying out rebuilding efforts understand and 

appreciate both current and future risk.

Incorporating Projections of Current and Future Risk

Challenge and Goal

Even a moderate amount of sea level rise will increase the flooding that coastal storm events cause. 

Recent research on the Atlantic coast demonstrates that the probability of coastal erosion increases 

with higher rates of sea level rise.75 Flood risk, however, varies in different circumstances and depends 

on factors such as the design life of particular investments, the size of the planning area, and the 

willingness of the community to accept a higher or lower probability of impacts. 

When determining the level of acceptable risk-tolerance, decision makers must assess the potential 

for catastrophic loss of life, damage to infrastructure, interruption to local economy, and threats to 

ecosystem functions. In addition, these decision makers must consider issues of perceived fairness and 

the voluntary nature of risks. Finally, the decision makers must take into account human vulnerability 

and the adaptive capacity of a system or community to respond successfully to a coastal flooding 

event, including adjustments to behavior, resources, and technologies. Considerations of risk vary 

considerably among and within coastal communities. While this remains an active area of research and 

public debate, it is nonetheless important to consider when discussing resilient recovery and planning.

The Task Force has worked to ensure that the decisions being made with regard to coastal planning, 

management, and risk assessment in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy include in-depth analysis 

of both current and future conditions, especially related to future sea level. These actions will help 

identify and evaluate resilient rebuilding options that will mitigate the risks extreme weather poses.

75	 Matthew J.P. Cooper, Michael D. Beevers, and Michael Oppenheimer, “Future Sea Level Rise and the New Jersey Coast: Assessing

Potential Impacts and Opportunities,” 11/2005, http://www.princeton.edu/step/people/faculty/michael-oppenheimer/

recent-publications/Future-Sea-Level-Rise-and-the-New-Jersey-Coast-Assessing-Potential-Impacts-and-Opportunities.pdf.
43

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

1. RECOMMENDATION: Facilitate the incorporation of future risk assessment, such as 

sea level rise, into rebuilding efforts with the development of a sea level rise tool.

Recognizing the need to better publicize existing datasets and the development of regionalized 

climate-related decision support tools, the Federal Government introduced a suite of future 

flood risk tools to ensure that decision makers can minimize risk to the greatest degree 

possible.76 FEMA, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the U.S. Global 

Change Research Program (USGCRP), NOAA, and USACE came together to combine various 

datasets and sources of expertise to produce tools accessible to local decision makers. These 

tools include an interactive web-based map and a sea level rise calculator with localized data. 

The mapping tool combines peer-reviewed global sea level rise scenarios with existing FEMA 

maps to project where 100-year floodplain boundaries are expected to be in the future. The sea 

level rise calculator allows the user to project future 100-year flood elevations resulting from 

relative (i.e. regional) sea level rise. These tools will help local planners, floodplain managers, 

engineers, and others identify risks and safeguard long-term investments in the region. 

President Obama announced in his Climate Action Plan that such sea level rise tools are part 

of a broader climate resilience toolkit that Federal agencies are developing. Adopting these 

tools will provide recovery planners with knowledge to better inform rebuilding efforts in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. These tools and related products that Federal agencies are 

developing with State and local partners will help coastal communities, both inside and outside 

the Sandy-affected region, incorporate more comprehensive flood risk information into their 

decision making. 

Owner

Leads: NOAA, USACE, FEMA, CEQ, USGCRP

Supporting Agencies: DOI

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

76	 U.S. Global Change Research Program, “Sea Level Rise Tool For Sandy Recovery,” http://www.

globalchange.gov/what-we-do/assessment/coastal-resilience-resources.
44

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

2. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a minimum flood risk reduction standard for major 

Federal investment that takes into account data on current and future flood risk.

On April 4, 2013, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan joined then DOT Secretary Ray LaHood to 

announce a minimum flood risk reduction standard that protects investments in Sandy-affected 

communities. This minimum flood risk standard addresses the increased flood risk that results 

from rising sea levels, more intense storms, increased urbanization in floodplains, and other 

factors. This standard, which is in line with standards that many State and local jurisdictions 

have adopted, requires all major rebuilding projects that rely on Sandy-related Federal funding 

to be elevated or otherwise flood-proofed according to the best available FEMA guidance plus 

one additional foot of freeboard. Where State or local building codes or standards already 

require minimum elevations, the higher of the competing minimums apply. 

Additionally, per Executive Order 13514: “Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and 

Economic Performance,” Federal departments and agencies are currently required to consider 

and address how climate change affects their missions, programs, and operations. Executive 

Order 13514 led to the development of Federal Climate Change Adaptation plans for each 

agency. In addition, on June 25, 2013, President Obama’s Climate Action Plan directed agencies 

to expand the application of this flood standard nationwide and update their flood-risk 

reduction standards for Federally-funded projects to reflect a consistent approach that accounts 

for sea level rise and other factors affecting flood risk.

Owner

Lead: Task Force

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently applicable to projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region. Through the 

implementation of the President’s Climate Action Plan, NSS will coordinate a policy effort to 

update flood risk reduction standards for Federally-funded projects beyond the Sandy-affected 

region.

Promoting Resilience through Innovation

On June 20, 2013, the Task Force launched Rebuild by Design, a multi-stage, regional design 

competition aimed at promoting resilience through innovation for the Sandy-affected region. The 

goal of the competition is two-fold: promote innovation by developing regionally-scalable yet locallycontextual solutions that increase resilience in the region, and implement selected proposals with both 

public and private funding dedicated to this effort.
45

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

Challenge and Goal

The process of recovering from Hurricane Sandy has already produced valuable knowledge that will 

help the region rebuild in a way that makes the region more resilient in future storms; however, much 

more can be done to enhance understanding of the region and its interdependencies, as well as the 

ways in which investments can be targeted to best mitigate risk.

In the past, Federal agencies, in partnership with the private sector and philanthropies, have 

successfully used incentive prizes and challenges as tools to spur innovation and solve tough problems.

 Incentive prizes establish ambitious goals and bring a variety of approaches and perspectives to bear 

on a problem.77 Since its launch in 2010, http://www.challenge.gov, an online platform for Federal 

Government-sponsored competitions, has featured more than 250 prize competitions offered by over 

50 Federal departments and agencies. The figures below depict the added benefits of offering prizes.78

77	 OSTP, “Implementation of Federal Prize Authority: Progress Report,”03/2012, http://www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/competes_report_on_prizes_final.pdf.

78	 McKinsey & Company, “And the Winner Is...” Capturing the promise of philanthropic prizes, 2009
46

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

The Task Force is building upon these past successes to harness the innovation of 

interdisciplinary teams, foster regionalism and resilience, build the capacity of local 

communities to plan for the next storm, and attract long-term sustainable economic 

development in the Sandy-affected region.

3. RECOMMENDATION: Create a design competition to develop innovative resilient design 

solutions that address the Sandy-affected region’s most pressing vulnerabilities.

The Task Force launched Rebuild by Design to promote resilience for the Sandy-affected region. 

With a region-wide focus, this competition will help provide solutions to problems that are too 

large or too complex for individual towns to solve themselves. Design solutions are expected 

to range in scope and in scale, from large-scale urban and multi-functional green infrastructure 

to small-scale distributed flood protection measures and resilient residential structures, 

for example. The competition process will also lead to increased understanding of regional 

interdependencies, thus fostering coordination and resilience at both the local and national 

levels. Competition participants will develop projects in consultation with existing and potential 

future CDBG-DR grantees to address recovery needs in the region. Winning designs may be 

supported by CDBG-DR funds. To the extent practicable, additional supplemental funding from 

relevant Federal programs will also be leveraged to support winning designs. Philanthropic 

organizations, including The Rockefeller Foundation, are supporting the design competition 

process and contributing to the prize pool. 
47

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Promoting Resilient Rebuilding through Innovative Ideas and 

a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk

The Rebuild by Design competition process is structured in four stages: 

1) Request for qualifications and selection of five to ten teams (June – July 2013).

2) Analysis of the region through a participatory collaborative process and identification of 

design opportunities (August – October 2013).

3) Development of site-specific design solutions in collaboration with State/local 

government partners and other stakeholders (November 2013 – February 2014).

4) Design development of winning solutions and implementation of winning design 

solutions (March 2014 – TBD).

The competition will bring world-class expertise to multiple levels of government across 

the Sandy-affected region by engaging a diverse set of experts: engineers, architects, urban 

designers, community builders, artists, and ecologists are just some of the many professionals 

that could comprise the interdisciplinary teams, which will create innovative proposals for 

resilient rebuilding. 

A jury will judge the designs at a date to be determined in 2014. 

HUD will, in collaboration with philanthropic organizations, evaluate the Rebuild by Design 

competition process using the process of this competition as an inspiration, and research the 

possibilities of applying ‘regional resilience by design’ in other regions across the nation.

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Competition currently underway to identify projects to be funded 

by the Sandy Supplemental. Similar competitions could be utilized for future disaster recovery 

efforts in the region and nationwide.
Hoboken, New Jersey - FEMA/Sharon Karr

Bernardsville, New Jersey - FEMA/ Sharon Karr New York, New York - FEMA/ Jocelyn Augustino

Holgate, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
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Ensuring a Regionally Coordinated, Resilient 

Approach to Infrastructure Investment

Ensuring a Regionally

Coordinated, Resilient Approach

to Infrastructure Investment

The damage from Hurricane Sandy to physical infrastructure in New York, New Jersey, and other 

impacted states is measured in the tens of billions of dollars, but the impact of that damage on the 

people of the region goes well beyond the financial cost. For example, the failure of hospitals and 

health facilities due to disasters carries a high cost in terms of both lives and economic resources. 

Infrastructure systems are more than just physical assets; they create the framework that allows 

people to be safe and comfortable in their homes, the movement of goods and people, individuals to 

communicate with one another, and for society and communities to function. 

The two overarching infrastructure-related goals of the Task Force were to ensure all Federal actions, 

policies, and resources work together to foster a quick and effective recovery from Hurricane Sandy 

and to encourage investment in systems and assets that ensures the region is better prepared to both 

withstand and recover from future disasters. This chapter describes the Task Force’s recommendations 

and policy initiatives across the entire spectrum of infrastructure types as well as in specific segments 

of the infrastructure area.

Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines 

Challenge and Goal

Many of the agencies involved in the unified Sandy recovery effort have done extensive work studying 

the effects of climate change on structures, administered pilot programs to analyze adaptation efforts, 

and revised building practices to incorporate modern standards; however, early meetings of the Task 

Force revealed that Federal agencies lacked a consistent approach to building resilience. There was also 

a lack of common understanding and language observed at the State and local levels. Executive Order 

13632 charged the Task Force with identifying and working “to remove obstacles to resilient rebuilding 

in a manner that addresses existing and future risks and vulnerabilities and promotes the long-term 

sustainability of communities and ecosystems.”79 The Task Force concluded that agencies involved in 

the Sandy recovery effort should develop and adopt clear and consistent standards to guide resilient 

rebuilding. To that end, the Task Force created and led an interagency working group that developed 

a set of shared Federal resilience guidelines to govern Sandy-related infrastructure investment. To the 

extent feasible and allowable by law and regulation, these guidelines will apply to all infrastructure 

construction, including projects performed by Federal agencies and their contractors, as well as by 

State and local entities utilizing Federal funding.

79	 Executive Order 13632, 12/07/2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200936/pdf/DCPD-201200936.pdf.
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This work resulted in the Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines (Guidelines). The Guidelines will lead 

to decisions that better protect communities and ensure wise investment of scarce public resources 

by setting criteria for investment and by helping align projects with national policy goals. The seven 

guidelines below represent the shared understanding of the Federal agencies involved in Sandy 

rebuilding and are being applied to Sandy recovery, as described in the policy initiatives in this chapter. 

• Comprehensive Analysis: 

Use comprehensive, forward-looking, and science-based analysis when selecting, prioritizing, 

implementing, and maintaining infrastructure investments. When making investment decisions, the 

Federal Government should consider a broad range of information and best available data including 

projected future risks from climate change and other sources, anticipated impacts, and costs and 

benefits of alternative investment strategies (e.g., gray and green infrastructure options). Project 

design and selection processes will, to the extent allowable and appropriate, include an assessment 

of the following criteria: 

• Public health and safety impacts (e.g., injury, illness, loss of life, impacts to hospitals and healthcare facilities, and psychological impacts). 

• Direct and indirect economic impacts (e.g., the financial and opportunity cost of losing infrastructure functions and services following a disaster).

• Social impacts (e.g., community, regional, and governance impacts).

• Environmental impacts (e.g., sustainability considerations, impacts to natural and restored ecosystems, externalities, and environmental justice issues). 

• Cascading impacts and interdependencies within and across communities and infrastructure 

sectors.

• Changes to climate and development patterns that could affect the project or surrounding communities.

• Inherent risk and uncertainty (in the analyses performed and due to future conditions).

• Monetization of the impacts – both the costs and the benefits – of alternative investment strategies.

The assessments should, wherever possible, include both quantitative and qualitative measures. 

These assessments must also be timely, so as to not delay the recovery of the region.
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• Transparent and Inclusive Decision Processes: 

Select projects using transparent, consistent, and inclusive processes. Apply a multi-criteria decision 

analysis – including a cost-benefit analysis – or other structured evaluation in Federal infrastructure 

funding selection and administration processes. Wherever practical and feasible, provide 

information broadly with clear, non-technical explanations of issues and proposed solutions. Share 

decision criteria, evaluation processes, and findings with all project stakeholders and interested 

parties to ensure transparency and inclusion. Include measures that will advance the engagement 

of vulnerable and overburdened populations. 

• Regional Resilience: 

Work collaboratively with partners across all levels of governance (i.e., Federal, State, regional, 

local, Tribal, territorial) and the private sector to promote a regional and cross-jurisdictional 

approach to resilience in which neighboring communities and states come together to: identify 

interdependencies among and across geography and infrastructure systems; compound individual 

investments towards shared goals; foster leadership; build capacity; and share information and best 

practices on infrastructure resilience. 

A more detailed discussion of this approach as applied in the Sandy recovery is found in the 

Regional Infrastructure Resilience Coordination discussion in the next section. 

• Long-Term Efficacy and Fiscal Sustainability: 

For all infrastructure programs, agencies should require a plan to monitor and evaluate the efficacy 

and sustainability of the implemented project, taking particular account of changing environmental 

conditions such as sea level rise or changing development patterns using risk management tools 

(see Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Appendix II) as well as changing funding sources. 

Periodic evaluation of effectiveness and fiscal sustainability is essential to ensure that the Federal, 

State, and local agencies involved in funding infrastructure projects continue to be able to provide 

funding as needed, as well as to reflect any future changes in the Federal role in funding. In 

addition, periodic evaluation also allows improvements to existing infrastructure based on new, 

enhanced scientific understanding of risk or the development of more resilient technological 

solutions. Fiscal sustainability is important, for example, to ensure that funding both for operations 

(when required) and for maintaining the asset to a state of good repair is programmed and available 

to the entity operating the asset.
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• Environmentally Sustainable and Innovative Solutions: 

Ensure that Federal infrastructure investments align with the commitment expressed in the 

President’s Climate Action Plan and achieve operational resilience while also supporting Federal 

goals to promote innovation, sustainability, reduced environmental and public health impacts, and 

opportunities to leverage natural systems. Federal partners should collaborate to enhance their 

ability to adequately capture the entire value of green infrastructure and environmental factors 

when selecting infrastructure investments, including the compounding value of linked or proximate 

projects. 

• Targeted Financial Incentives: 

Implement meaningful financial incentives and/or funding requirements to promote the 

incorporation of resilience and risk mitigation into infrastructure projects. Consistent with the 

President’s Climate Action Plan, this should include removing barriers to using Federal funding/

programs to support climate-resilient investments, and encouraging and supporting the integration 

of climate-related risks into project design through agency grants, technical assistance, and other 

programs. 

• Adherence to Resilience Performance Standards: 

Collaborate with State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, as well as private stakeholders, 

to facilitate the development of resilience performance standards for infrastructure and use these 

performance standards when selecting infrastructure investments. Performance standards might 

include criteria for how strong of a storm systems should be able to withstand and how long 

different types of customers (e.g., hospitals, transit systems, gas stations) can be without power.

4. RECOMMENDATION: Apply Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines to all 

Federal infrastructure investments and projects for Sandy recovery.

The Task Force and the interagency infrastructure working group have already made substantial 

progress in implementing many of the Guidelines in the ongoing Sandy recovery efforts. 

The regional coordination workshops, described in the Regional Infrastructure Resilience 

Coordination section, brought together key officials from multiple states and localities. In 

addition, on June 20, 2013, the Task Force announced the Rebuild by Design competition, 

discussed in detail the previous chapter. Rebuild by Design attracted world-class talent to 

promote development of innovative projects that promote resilience as part of Sandy recovery. 

While much progress has been made, ongoing efforts are required to fully implement the 

Guidelines for Sandy-related recovery efforts, such as the next allocation of HUD, DOT, and DOI 

funding. The Recovery Support Framework Leadership Group (RSFLG) and Mitigation 
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Approach to Infrastructure Investment

Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG) will oversee this effort, which will be conducted as part 

of the regional coordination effort discussed in the next section and done in coordination with 

the implementation of the President’s Climate Action Plan. 

Owner

Leads: RSFLG and MitFLG

Supporting Agencies: HUD, FEMA, DOT, USACE, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), DOI,

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NOAA,

General Services Administration (GSA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will, to the extent allowable by law and regulation, be applicable to future disaster recovery 

efforts in the region.

5. RECOMMENDATION: Consider applying the Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines nationally

The Task Force recommends that DHS’ National Protection and Programs Directorate, under 

the policy leadership of the White House National Security Staff (NSS), support an interagency 

process to assess the value and feasibility of expanding the use of the Guidelines beyond the 

Sandy recovery efforts. These Guidelines represent the agreed upon consensus of Federal 

stakeholders regarding the goals and core elements of a successful Federal infrastructure 

resilience policy in the Sandy recovery. The Guidelines are consistent with executive guidance 

on resilience, including the goals outlined in the President’s Climate Action Plan for supporting 

climate-resilient investments, the strategic imperatives in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21) 

corresponding to the development of a national strategy for critical infrastructure resilience, 

and the goal to strengthen security and resilience through national preparedness, as articulated 

in PPD-8. As such, adherence to the Guidelines may be beneficial beyond the Sandy recovery 

for both Federal agencies and potentially infrastructure owners and operators in building the 

next generation of resilient infrastructure. This effort should be coordinated with the efforts 

underway to implement the similar provisions of the President’s Climate Action Plan and 

PPD-21. 

Owner

Lead: NSS and DHS

Supporting: CEQ, OMB, NIST, DOT, HUD, FEMA, DOE
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Status

Recommendation in process: This recommendation has been referred to the White House-led 

Interagency Policy Committee responsible for infrastructure resilience policy. 

Regional Infrastructure Resilience Coordination

Challenge and Goal

A regional focus is important to making infrastructure investment decisions and building with resilience, 

given the regional impact of large disasters and the interconnectedness of local economies. Decisions 

about infrastructure in the New York – New Jersey metropolitan area impact tens of millions of people 

in multiple states as well as the largest local government in the country. Were these infrastructure 

systems to fail, there would be a cascading effect on both the region and the nation as a whole, as 

more wealth is created in this area than in any other metropolitan area in the United States.80 Research 

also suggests that decision makers need more comprehensive discussion and coordination of the 

interrelated effects of the systems to effectively plan for future disasters.81 These investment and 

building decisions should be coordinated and planned ahead of the disaster, not made ad hoc during 

the crisis. 

Examples from Sandy that illustrate the need for regional coordination of resilience investments were 

seen in many instances. The storm’s impact on fuel terminals in New Jersey and on pipelines caused a 

severe problem of fuel availability in New York City. A hospital is only functional when access routes to 

the facility are open and when availability of water, power, and telecommunications allow continuity of 

operations and the ability to absorb the additional demand for medical care. Similarly, removing sand 

from one location in the region to rebuild beaches in another location could weaken coastal protection 

in the source location, and/or impact local fisheries and tourism. Addressing such vulnerabilities will 

require the cooperation of New Jersey, New York City, and New York State, as well as private sector 

owners and operators.

The overall goal of adopting a regional approach is to promote better decision making, create more 

efficient and effective projects, and to avoid unintended impacts. For State and local stakeholders, 

the benefits include the ability to design more effective projects with knowledge of other linked 

investments, as well as the identification of opportunity projects – those ideas that were not previously 

proposed because they did not become apparent until other projects were considered. From the 

Federal perspective, this process lowers the risk of unplanned redundancies or gaps in resilience and 

spreads the Federal investment over the largest area in a coordinated, efficient, and equitable manner. 

These efforts are also aligned with the call for coordination in the NDRF, the National Mitigation 

80	 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area: Advance Statistics for 2011 and Revised

Statistics for 2001–2010, 03/2013, http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/03%20March/0313_gdp-by-metro_area.pdf.

81	 Rural Policy Research Institute – Rural Futures Lab & the University of Missouri, “Regional Resilience Research and Policy

Brief,” 02/2012; Community and Regional Resilience Institute, “How Geographic Scale Matters in Seeking Community

Resilience,” 2009; Cutter, S. L. (ed.), “American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters,” 2001.
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Approach to Infrastructure Investment

Framework, the National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan, and the President’s Climate Action Plan. 

The failure to coordinate an investment of this magnitude can result not only in wasted tax dollars, but 

also in increased vulnerability to the region and the nation as a whole. 

6. RECOMMENDATION: Federal, State, and local agencies should continue 

to coordinate Sandy recovery infrastructure resilience projects.

The Task Force worked to ensure that both the natural and built infrastructure decisions for 

Sandy recovery consider other projects, assets, and dependencies across both the geographic 

region and the different types of infrastructure systems. The Task Force initiated this regional 

coordination effort by hosting a workshop to identify the dependencies between initially 

proposed infrastructure projects in the region and to discuss how to ensure awareness of these 

dependencies in the project development, design, and review process. This workshop, held on 

July 11, 2013, convened a group of technical experts from the Federal, State, and local agencies 

that are sponsoring or funding major infrastructure projects in New York and New Jersey. A 

broad sampling of proposed and potential (i.e., under study or not yet formally proposed) 

projects were mapped on a GIS and discussed in terms of scope, purpose, and interaction with 

other existing or planned projects. The Task Force collected these data and incorporated them 

into the GIS. The maps included projects that may be considered under grant funding from 

agencies such as DOT, FEMA, EPA, and HUD as well as projects to be directly contracted by 

agencies such as USACE and the National Park Service (NPS). 

Following this workshop and through the rest of 2013, project sponsors, funding agencies, 

and reviewing agencies will meet in smaller groups to discuss the projects. These discussions 

will focus on how the projects impact or benefit other projects or systems, the opportunities 

identified for new or revised projects, and how to incorporate new technology and new 

approaches (e.g., nature-based systems) into projects. An example of this is a working group 

facilitated by the Task Force on flood protection issues related to “Hospital Row” on the east 

side of Manhattan. This effort is bringing together New York City, New York State, FEMA, 

USACE, the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and HUD. 

Additionally, a small working group is looking at issues related to the resilience of the liquid 

fuels supply chain in New York and New Jersey. When beneficial, additional, larger workshops 

or meetings will be held to discuss specific projects or broader issues, and funding may be 

provided to assist in mapping and planning. The scope of the coordination will also be expanded 

to include projects in Connecticut as well as other States, if determined to impact projects in 

other parts of the region. 

Owner

Coordinating Agency: HUD

Supporting Agencies: DHS, USACE, DOT, EPA, DOE, USDA, DOI, U.S. Department of Commerce

(DOC), U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), GSA, HHS, VA
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Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

7. RECOMMENDATION: Institutionalize regional approaches to resilience 

planning in the NDRF and the National Mitigation Framework.

The NDRF and the National Mitigation Framework have broad mandates to support regional 

cooperation and coordination. One example of these mandates implemented is the regional 

cooperation supporting recovery from the 2012 drought. The Task Force recommends that 

RSFLG and MitFLG consider how to best incorporate regional infrastructure resilience into their 

respective frameworks.

Owner

Leads: RSFLG and MitFLG

Status

Recommended in process: Recommended for implementation in future projects funded by the 

Sandy Supplemental and applicable to resilient rebuilding following disasters nationwide.

Federal Review and Permitting

Federal review and permitting responsibilities are authorized and assigned by Congress to multiple 

Federal agencies. These agencies seek to ensure that a project’s potential impacts on safety, 

security, the environment, public health, and community resources are considered and that adverse 

effects are avoided, minimized, and mitigated throughout the project planning process. These 

responsibilities also include efforts to ensure that low-income and minority communities do not bear 

a disproportionate share of the impacts of any given project and that recipients of Federal funds 

comply with nondiscrimination laws, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 which prohibit 

discrimination, both intentional and unintentional based on race, color, national origin (including 

limited English proficiency), age, sex, and disability in any program or activity receiving federal 

assistance.83 These efforts also align with the President’s Climate Action Plan and Executive Order 

82	 The Civil Rights Act of1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/

USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42-chap21-subchapV-sec2000d.pdf

83	 Such efforts are undertaken in conformance with Executive Order 12898 and the Federal Interagency Working Group on

Environmental Justice Memorandum of Understanding (2011). Source: EPA, “Memorandum Of Understanding On

	 Environmental Justice And Executive Order 12898,” http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/

resources/publications/interagency/ej-mou-2011-08.pdf.
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12898 to identify innovative ways to help the most vulnerable communities prepare for and recover 

from the impacts of climate change.

Federal review and permitting is especially important for complex infrastructure projects. The President 

made development and repair of the nation’s infrastructure a top priority of his Administration. 

Executive Order 13604, signed in March 2012, charged the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

and CEQ with managing a government-wide effort to increase the efficiency of the permitting and 

review process for complex infrastructure projects, while driving better outcomes for communities and 

the environment.84 A steering committee established to lead this effort focused on 50 infrastructure 

projects of national or regional significance,85 including three in the region that Hurricane Sandy 

eventually hit: the Tappan Zee Bridge, the Bayonne Bridge, and the deepening of the New York Harbor. 

Deliberate coordination among senior Federal agency leadership early in the review process for these 

50 projects, as well as the engagement and dedication of staff teams throughout each agency, resulted 

in time savings estimates ranging from several months to several years, depending upon the project’s 

scale, complexity, and stage of Federal review.86

Challenge and Goal

Federal, State, and local officials expressed concern about potential delays of Sandy rebuilding 

projects caused by permitting and review activities. An estimated $20 billion of the nearly $50 billion 

allocated in the Sandy Supplemental for the region’s recovery will be used on infrastructure projects.87 

Additionally, funds for housing as well as natural and cultural resources could total in the billions of 

dollars. All of the resulting projects are likely to require some form of Federal review or permitting. 

There are approximately 40 different permit and review processes among the Federal agencies, and the 

time required to ensure that projects comply with existing laws and regulations can range anywhere 

from two weeks to four years.88 

It is clear that these required safeguards, addressed in the review process, are both necessary and 

worthwhile. They exist to ensure that approved projects do not jeopardize the Federal government’s 

ability to fulfill Federal trust responsibilities, and to avoid, minimize, and mitigate any detrimental 

impacts when necessary to surrounding communities and the environment. However, when permits 

related to disaster recovery are not prioritized for review and those reviews are not effectively 

coordinated among the Federal agencies, project timelines can be delayed considerably, resulting in 

increased costs. The review process for potential Sandy recovery projects are also inherently complex, 

given their broad scope and the vast natural and cultural resources they can potentially impact. Given 

84	 Executive Order 13604, 03/22/2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200202/pdf/DCPD-201200202.pdf.

85	 The White House, “Report To The President: Rebuilding America’s Infrastructure: Cutting Timelines and Improving

Outcomes for Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects,” 05/2013, http://www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/report-to-the-president-rebuilding-americas-infrastructure.pdf.

86	 The White House, “Report To The President: Rebuilding America’s Infrastructure: Cutting Timelines and Improving

Outcomes for Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects,” 05/2013, http://www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/report-to-the-president-rebuilding-americas-infrastructure.pdf.

87	 Estimates based on data reported by agencies funded in the supplemental

appropriation, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force analysis.

88	 Based on an analysis compiled by the Infrastructure Steering Committee
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this complexity and the number of stakeholders involved in review, when not prioritized or effectively 

coordinated, these projects may be the most hindered by any such delays.89

Experiences from previous disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, further illustrate concerns about the 

efficacy of Federal review and permitting systems. One post-Katrina report highlighted the fact that 

“quick action could not occur” because “agencies followed procedures that required extensive, timeconsuming processes.” The report explained that the slow recovery of important infrastructure, like 

hospitals, might be a factor in slowing the return of displaced residents.90

As a result of these challenges, Congress included two provisions in the Sandy Supplemental to address 

this issue. First, the Sandy Supplemental directed the President to establish an expedited and unified 

interagency review process for disasters by July 29, 2014. A steering group, composed of FEMA, DHS, 

the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) and CEQ, is guiding this effort. A unified Federal 

review can enhance the ability of the Federal environmental and historic preservation review process 

to inform and expedite disaster recovery decisions for grant applicants and other potential beneficiaries 

of disaster assistance, enhance consistency in the review process across Federal agencies, and assist 

agencies in better leveraging their resources and tools. Secondly, Congress included a provision that 

allows HUD and its grantees to adopt environmental reviews performed by FEMA or any Federal agency 

when the HUD grantee is providing additional assistance to actions performed under specific sections 

of the Stafford Act.91

The Task Force also sought to ensure that the Federal review and permitting processes for Sandy 

recovery and hazard mitigation projects are well-coordinated and prioritized, so that they can be 

delivered as efficiently and effectively as possible.

8. RECOMMENDATION: Establish a Sandy Regional Infrastructure Permitting and Review 

Team that leverages the Executive Order 13604 framework for Sandy projects.

The Task Force has been able to build upon the foundational success of the work of the Steering 

Committee, which Executive Order 13604 established.92 The Task Force believes that the best 

practices and tools already developed through that effort will ensure that the most complex 

Sandy projects are delivered as efficiently as possible. Best practices will be applied to: those 

89	 The White House, “Report To The President: Rebuilding America’s Infrastructure: Cutting Timelines and Improving

Outcomes for Federal Permitting and Review of Infrastructure Projects,” 05/2013, http://www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/report-to-the-president-rebuilding-americas-infrastructure.pdf.

90	 GAO, “Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery,” 03/08/2006,

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-442T; Executive Office of the President, “The Federal Response to Hurricane

Katrina: Lessons Learned,” 02/23/2006, http://www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf.

91	 Specifically, sections 402, 403, 404, 406, 407, or 502 of the Stafford Act. The Sandy Supplemental stated, “Provided

further, That, notwithstanding the preceding proviso, recipients of funds provided under this heading that use

such funds to supplement Federal assistance provided under section 402,403, 404,406, 407, or 502 of the Robert T.

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) may adopt, without review or public

comment, any environmental review, approval, or permit performed by a Federal agency, and such adoption shall

satisfy the responsibilities of the recipient with respect to such environmental review, approval or permit.” Disaster

Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ2/html/PLAW-113publ2.htm.

92	 Executive Order 13604, 03/22/2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200202/pdf/DCPD-201200202.pdf.
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Sandy-funded infrastructure projects that involve multiple Federal, State, local or Tribal permits 

or reviews; those involving a multi-step, complex Federal review process, which require 

heightened project management and transparency; or projects that are otherwise particularly 

costly. 

Another component of the infrastructure initiative driven by Executive Order 13604 was the 

establishment of regional teams to ensure that Federal and State permitting officials have an 

open channel of communication about projects once projects are selected. To build on this 

effort, the Task Force worked with OMB, CEQ, and Task Force partner agencies to develop 

a parallel Sandy Regional Infrastructure Team, which is responsible for facilitating early and 

ongoing coordination, prompt identification and resolution of issues, and alignment of Federal 

and state processes where appropriate. The regional team, which would provide regular reports 

to the Infrastructure Steering Committee, includes appropriate points of contact from OMB, 

CEQ, and agency headquarters, as well as senior representatives from the Federal agencies with 

responsibility for the permitting and review of Sandy projects, and relevant State permitting and 

review agencies. The first meetings of the agencies engaged in developing the regional team 

charter and protocols are scheduled for August and September 2013. The continued efforts of 

this interagency team, led by HUD, will ensure that, as the region rebuilds, the permitting and 

review of complex infrastructure projects are coordinated and delivered as quickly as possible.

Owner 

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and could be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

9. RECOMMENDATION: Leverage the Executive Order 13604 framework to 

identify opportunities to expedite and improve other types of review processes 

through programmatic agreement or consultation where appropriate.

Beyond the long-term, OMB-, and CEQ-led efforts on infrastructure permitting and the 

interagency unified Federal review effort, agencies also identified two State-focused solutions 

in Sandy recovery that will immediately inform the work of improving and expediting the 

permitting and review processes. These can and should be replicated in other contexts.

First, to expedite the review of housing recovery projects in New Jersey, FEMA and HUD 

recognized that one Federal review would be sufficient for both agencies. This coordinated 

effort will avoid the delay that sequential and redundant reviews of housing projects could 

otherwise cause. The agencies are pursuing similar approaches with the State of New York and 

New York City.
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Second was FEMA’s work on historic preservation agreements in New Jersey. Based on an 

innovative programmatic agreement that FEMA and ACHP developed in the 1990s, FEMA 

worked with the New Jersey State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), New Jersey State 

Office of Emergency Management, ACHP, and four Tribes to develop an agreement that would 

meet State-specific needs, agency review requirements, and promote historic preservation 

awareness.93 This agreement satisfied historic preservation compliance responsibilities by 

significantly accelerating the timeframe for FEMA consultation with SHPO, exempting smallscale projects from further review, and establishing treatment measures to resolve adverse 

effects to historic properties. Additionally, HUD, FEMA, and ACHP developed an addendum to 

the FEMA agreement that allows the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs to use the 

same terms and process to satisfy their compliance responsibilities for projects that only use 

CDBG-DR funds. FEMA also executed a counterpart historic preservation agreement for Sandyrelated undertakings with the State of New York. Meanwhile, HUD grantees will leverage FEMA’s 

agreement to satisfy their compliance responsibilities.

The Task Force recommends that additional agencies engage with ACHP to identify 

opportunities for these types of prototype agreements. Similarly, legally required environmental 

review processes can also be improved and completed in a more consistent and timely manner, 

through the use of programmatic consultations.

The negotiation process required of agencies, ACHP, and relevant SHPOs and Tribal Historic 

Preservation Officers can be lengthy and complex; however, potential efficiencies in the 

rebuilding effort warrant that agencies should pursue these agreements for as many programs 

and states as possible before disaster strikes. The Infrastructure Steering Committee has 

identified programmatic agreements as a best practice with the potential for expanded use 

for historic preservation requirements as well as other statutorily required environmental 

reviews. Additionally, the interagency group developing a Unified Review process for future 

disaster recovery efforts will also examine this issue. In the interim, the Task Force recommends 

that agencies begin to work with ACHP to determine which programs or undertakings could 

potentially be covered, as well as work to develop and implement the relevant program 

agreements. These agreements are expected to expedite the review and permitting process, so 

as to quickly and effectively rebuild the Sandy-impacted region.

Owner 

Lead: The Infrastructure Steering Committee established by Executive Order 13604

Status 

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and could be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

93	 ACHP, “Program Alternatives – 36 CFR § 800.14,” last updated 05/09/2013, http://www.achp.gov/progalt/.
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10. RECOMMENDATION: Disaster recovery efforts should account for the temporary 

staffing needs of Federal agencies and State and local governments who 

conduct reviews and permitting of Federal disaster recovery projects.

Recovery efforts should be structured to account for the need to ensure that all agencies have 

the capacity to effectively and expeditiously manage the process of administration, review, and 

permitting to complete projects without unnecessary delay. Decisions for all programs should 

account for the temporary increase in review and permitting activities required at Federal, 

State, and local levels. 

Federal project and permitting agencies and recipients should plan for the temporary increase 

in review and permitting activities required post-disaster to ensure that disaster-impacted 

communities can rebuild efficiently and without unnecessary delays.

Owner 

Lead: OMB, CEQ

Status 

Recommendation in process: Recommended for implementation to enhance recovery efforts in 

future storms in the region and applicable to rebuilding following disasters nationwide.

Infrastructure Finance

Challenge and Goal

The damaging impact of Hurricane Sandy exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s infrastructure to 

weather-related risk. In order to effectively address this risk it is not enough to bring existing assets 

to the pre-storm state: these long-lived assets must be rebuilt sustainably and resiliently in a way 

that reflects consideration of future risk. In order to rebuild damaged infrastructure and address 

vulnerabilities to future disasters, more than $20 billion is currently being targeted at infrastructure 

projects, and more funding will be made available as State and local officials finalize plans for FEMA and 

HUD programs, such as the hazard mitigation portion of Public Assistance and CDBG-DR.94 The size and 

scope of the disaster, as well as the need to build back resiliently across many types of infrastructure 

systems in several jurisdictions, increased the need for ongoing Federal technical assistance to States 

and localities to help ensure that Federal infrastructure investments are optimized. Even with the 

significant investment from the Federal Government for rebuilding in the Sandy-affected region, State 

governments do not have sufficient staff or financial resources to ensure all critical infrastructure assets 

94	 These data reflect $18 billion in funds appropriated specifically for infrastructure and over $2 billion in

CDBG-DR and Public Assistance funds allocated to infrastructure projects as of June 28, 2013.
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can be rebuilt in a way that is resilient to both current and future risks. One way in which the States are 

looking at addressing this issue is by bringing private capital funding and financing into these projects. 

11. RECOMMENDATION: Provide technical assistance to States and localities to help 

optimize Sandy recovery infrastructure funding, share best practices, leverage 

resources, advance sustainability, and meet the needs of vulnerable communities.

The alignment of Federal funding and increased leverage of non-Federal funds for infrastructure 

projects are important to the success of disaster recovery in the Sandy-affected region. To 

optimize the use of the various Federal funding programs to support infrastructure resilience 

projects, a grantee must be able to align and sequence the funds across different agency 

programs that support different modes of infrastructure as well as, potentially, across multiple 

jurisdictions. The Task Force worked with Federal agencies to ensure that State and local 

jurisdictions have a clear understanding of program eligibility requirements to align use of 

Federal funds to maximize resilience and other key infrastructure investment criteria described 

in the Guidelines. 

The Task Force worked to help States understand the opportunities provided by leveraging 

resources, which may be used in future contexts to address need beyond assets that Sandy 

damaged. Leverage in this context refers to increasing the pool of available non-Federal funding 

to support additional Sandy recovery infrastructure projects today by: requiring impacted 

States and localities to match a percentage of Federal funding with State and local funding; use 

by States of loan repayment streams or a portion of Federal capitalization grants as collateral 

in order to borrow money from private, tax-exempt bond markets; or use by States of Federal 

grants to serve as an incentive, through use of a loan loss reserve or other credit-enhancement 

instrument, to attract other forms of private investment to support infrastructure projects. 

These actions can help States and localities increase resilience and the number of projects that 

can be funded, and thereby speed and enhance the recovery. 

A number of existing Federal funding programs that help States and localities leverage Federal 

funding to expand the pool of capital available for infrastructure projects offer valuable lessons 

of how Federal financing programs can leverage resources, inform planning, and fund crucially 

needed infrastructure. For example, EPA’s State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs provide grants 

to States to capitalize State loan funds, which States use to provide loans to communities to 

support infrastructure projects that protect water quality or provide safe drinking water.95 In 

many States, including New York and New Jersey, State SRF program funds are used as collateral 

to issue tax-exempt bonds, the proceeds of which are subsequently lent at low interest rates 

to localities to support the development of wastewater and drinking water infrastructure.96

95	 EPA’s Environmental Finance Advisory Board has examined SRF programs across the country, and concluded that

“state programs that have leveraged their SRF funds have provided greater assistance as a percentage of their

capitalization grants than those that have not leveraged.” Source: EPA Environmental Finance Advisory Board, “Report

on the Relative Benefits of Direct and Leveraged Loans in State Revolving Loan Fund (SRF) Programs,” 08/2008.

96	 New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation, http://www.nysefc.org/Default.aspx?tabid=114; New Jersey Environmental

Infrastructure Fund, “Frequently Asked Questions,” updated 07/07/2010, http://www.njeit.org/faqs.htm#general1.
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Both DOT’s Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) and SRF programs 

provide technical assistance to States in evaluating the costs and benefits of using these 

programs to leverage private dollars for investment in infrastructure;97 yet, these programs are 

sector-specific and therefore not optimally positioned to analyze and support infrastructure 

resilience improvements across sectors in the context of disaster response.

A multi-sector Federal infrastructure financing entity could complement and build on these 

programs’ successes and enhance the ability of States and localities to coordinate planning 

and leverage resources for disaster recovery as well as more generally. President Obama, in his 

FY2014 Budget, requested that Congress create such an institution in the form of a National 

Infrastructure Bank. Under the President’s proposal, the National Infrastructure Bank would 

be able to leverage private and public capital to support infrastructure projects of national and 

regional significance across a broad range of infrastructure sectors, including transportation, 

water, and energy.98 The National Infrastructure Bank proposal has been included in the 

President’s last four annual budget requests to Congress and has received bipartisan support, 

but has not yet been enacted by Congress.99 

While the Task Force believes a National Infrastructure Bank is a more effective and efficient 

method of supporting State efforts to leverage non-Federal funds to address the funding gap 

for more resilient infrastructure investment, until Congress acts on the President’s proposal, 

supporting States directly on State-based, multi-sector infrastructure programs is a valuable 

and appropriate role for the Federal Government. Thus, in the absence of being able to rely on 

a national entity to help optimize Federal investments in resilient infrastructure through the 

Sandy Supplemental, the Task Force worked with both New York and New Jersey to ensure that 

Federal funds were available to support the development or expansion of State programs that 

can leverage non-Federal funds for infrastructure projects in Sandy-affected areas. 

• In New York, for example, the Task Force worked with HUD and the State to ensure 

that an initial allocation of $20 million in CDBG-DR funding is available to support the 

creation of a State infrastructure fund. The Task Force also worked to ensure that the 

framework for this fund incorporates the criteria outlined in the Infrastructure Resilience 

Guidelines. New York State is structuring this fund to facilitate the alignment of public 

spending at the Federal, State, and local government level and to leverage public funds 

to attract additional private funding for Sandy-affected infrastructure projects across 

multiple infrastructure sectors, including water, transportation, and energy. If successful, 

the fund may present one possible model for other jurisdictions that are seeking 

effective strategies for aligning and leveraging Federal funding to support disaster 

recovery. 

97	 Federal Highway Administration, “MAP-21 – Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century,” 09/25/2012, http://

www.fhwa.dot.gov/map21/qandas/qap3.cfm; EPA, “Drinking Water State Revolving Fund Program Operations

Manual,” 10/2006, http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/dwsrf/pdfs/manual_dwsrf_programoperationalmanual.pdf.

98	 The White House, “Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Overview,” accessed 07/24/2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/overview.

99	 The White House, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/budget.pdf; 

The President’s Budgets for Fiscal Years 2010-2014; S. 652: “Building and Upgrading Infrastructure for Long-Term”, 112th Congress.
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• The Task Force has also worked with HUD, DOE, and the States of New York and New 

Jersey to ensure that $30 million CDBG-DR funding is available to support financing 

targeted at improving the resilience of energy infrastructure in Sandy-affected areas. 

More specifically, New York is pursing the establishment of a “Green Bank” Resilience 

Retrofit program, and New Jersey is considering an energy finance program. The 

programs in New York and New Jersey are exploring the financing of energy resilienceoriented activities that target important infrastructure facilities, including, but not 

limited to, smart grid technologies as well as distributed and resilient energy generation 

assets, such as Combined Heat and Power (CHP), microgrids, solar, fuel cells, and 

energy storage. These efforts would allow both States to evaluate a loan loss reserve in 

stimulating private investment in necessary energy infrastructure improvements and 

repair in Sandy-affected areas. 

Owner

Leads: HUD, DOT, DOE, EPA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

Energy Infrastructure 

Challenge and Goal

Extensive power outages during Sandy affected millions of residents and resulted in substantial 

economic loss to communities.100 Despite the size and power of Hurricane Sandy, this was not 

inevitable: resilient energy solutions could have helped limit power outages. In addition, improvements 

in and hardening of, the liquid fuel supply chain would have prevented some of the most visible 

impacts of the storm. 

One of the biggest problems with the liquid petroleum (i.e., gasoline and diesel fuel), supply chain 

after Hurricane Sandy was flooding damage to major terminals and docks in the Arthur Kill area of New 

Jersey, as described earlier. 

As shortages accumulated, consumers struggled to find gas stations that were functional. The lack of 

shared priorities among different groups of critical officials and service providers led to shortages and 

a general lack of information and coordination. Immediately after the storm, the White House Office 

100	 National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy,” 02/12/2013,

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.
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of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), FEMA, and DOE worked together to use technology to help 

inform the public which gas stations were open and had fuel and power from a backup generator. In 

spite of these efforts, many people struggled to get accurate and timely information about available 

fuel sources.

To prevent shortages in future disasters, the Task Force worked to ensure that critical infrastructure 

such as hospitals, transportation systems, drinking water and wastewater treatment plants, and public 

facilities, as well as industrial economic engines such as refineries, office buildings, data centers, and 

manufacturing facilities, become more energy resilient as a result of investments made by the Federal 

government during the Sandy recovery. Additionally, the Task Force encourages the alignment of 

investments in the Nation’s energy infrastructure with the goal of improved resilience and the national 

policy initiatives regarding climate change, transparency, and innovative technology deployment. 

Most energy infrastructure is privately owned and operated, which means that resilience investment 

will come about only through close cooperation between the Federal and State governments and the 

private sector.

12. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that Sandy recovery energy investments are resilient.

The Task Force and DOE provided technical assistance to New York and New Jersey to help them 

evaluate and develop pilot projects, financial mechanisms, and policy and market development 

tools and to generally promote cost effective investments in resilient energy generation and 

storage using Sandy recovery funds. The Task Force and DOE are also helping the states explore 

ways to use fees paid by utility customers and other revenue streams to help finance energy 

resilience for infrastructure. The region, assisted by the Federal Government, will launch 

programs later this year using public-private partnerships to lower project costs and increase 

the value of energy resilient infrastructure. Through these and other measures, New York and 

New Jersey have embraced the opportunity to provide national leadership in energy resilience. 

Specifically, in New Jersey, DOE and the Task Force worked in partnership with the State to 

review critical facilities and energy infrastructure and to develop a State-wide solution for 

resilient energy infrastructure. The State is considering an energy finance program and exploring 

how facilities funded by the program could serve as primary hubs for microgrids, distributed 

generation, smart grid technologies, and energy storage. The analysis began with a mapping 

of all relevant systems and needs in the State for a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 

requirements for a resilient state-wide system. This effort will complement previous efforts 

performed under DOE grants for energy assurance plans. DOE and the State also reviewed 

various deployment models designed to lower the cost of capital financing and leverage private 

sector expertise and capital through public-private partnership. This review also included 

exploration of financing structures such as loan loss reserves, revolving loan funds, and other 

credit enhancement mechanisms that are designed to magnify the impact of scarce public 

dollars. With assistance from DOE, the State is also exploring ways to create markets that value 

energy reliability. These innovative structures have the potential to unlock value from resilience 

beyond what is reaped in the event of a disaster.
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In Bergen County, N.J., the public utility authority used a biogas-powered CHP system to keep its 

sewage treatment facilities working during and after the storm.101

In New York, the Task Force, HUD, and DOE 

are providing funding and technical assistance 

to support the planning and implementation 

of resilient energy communities using 

microgrid and other distributed generation 

and storage technologies through the Green 

Bank Resilience Retrofit program. Connecticut 

is also pursuing projects with microgrids and 

CHP systems through a solicitation process 

that was started in the State prior to Sandy. In 

response to requests from stakeholders and 

Members of Congress, the Task Force worked 

with HUD, DOE, and EPA to develop guidance 

relating to the use of disaster funding in 

the Sandy Supplemental to support CHP

technologies. Lessons learned from Hurricane 

Sandy will be considered to ensure that our 

power systems across the country are more 

resilient to disaster.

This summer, the Task Force along with DOE, 

New York Governor’s Office, New Jersey

Governor’s Office of Recovery and Rebuilding, 

and Connecticut Governor’s Office, are 

participating in a discussion of innovative finance, policy, and market development approaches 

to energy resilience. All of these issues are aligned with the goal of “building stronger and safer 

communities and infrastructure” as set forth in the President’s Climate Action Plan.

Owner

Leads: DOE, HUD, FEMA, EPA

101	 Ibid.

102	 Stony Brook University, “In the Aftermath of Superstorm Sandy: A Message from President

Stanley,” http://www.stonybrook.edu/sb/sandy/index.shtml; ICF International, “Combined Heat

and Power: Enabling Resilient Energy Infrastructure for Critical Facilities,” 03/2013,

103	 DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “CHP: Enabling Resilient Energy Infrastructure,” 04/03/2013, http://

www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/distributedenergy/pdfs/chp_enabling_resilient_energy_infrastructure.pdf.

104	 American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, “How CHP Stepped Up When the Power Went Out During Hurricane

Sandy,” 12/06/2012, http://www.aceee.org/blog/2012/12/how-chp-stepped-when-power-went-out-d.

105	 ICF International, “Combined Heat and Power: Enabling Resilient Energy Infrastructure for Critical Facilities,”

03/2013, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/distributedenergy/pdfs/chp_critical_facilities.pdf.

Successful Implementation 

of CHP Systems during and 

after Hurricane Sandy

CHP is an efficient and clean approach to 

generating electric power and useful thermal 

energy from a single fuel source -- eliminating 

the need for a separate on-site boiler or 

furnace and purchased electricity. College 

campuses such as Princeton University, Stony 

Brook University, New York University, and the 

College of New Jersey, used CHP to keep the 

lights (and the heat) on both during the storm 

and in the days and weeks that followed.102 

South Oaks Hospital on Long Island and 

Connecticut’s Danbury Hospital used CHP 

to keep medical facilities online when the 

local electrical grids failed.103 104 Commercial 

buildings and even residential communities like 

Co-op City in Bronx County, N.Y. showed the 

enormous resilience of CHP during Sandy.105
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Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will, to the extent allowable by law and regulation, be applicable to future disaster recovery 

efforts in the region as well as future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

13. RECOMMENDATION: Mitigate future impacts to the liquid fuels supply 

chain like those experienced during the Sandy recovery.

The Task Force, in partnership with DOE, worked with State and local officials in New York and 

New Jersey as well as with other Federal agencies and industry partners to find ways to improve 

the resilience of the fuel supply chain during and following disasters in the region. All aspects of 

the supply chain were considered and the outcome of those discussions was a consensus that 

disruptions to the supply chain are caused by a number of separate, but often related issues. 

The issues raised in these discussions included: 

• Physical impacts to key distribution facilities and infrastructure (e.g., marine terminals, 

refinery, pipelines, storage facilities).

• Electric power outages at retail filling stations and important transportation-related 

infrastructure (e.g., pipelines, refineries, marine terminals, storage facilities).

• Public awareness of which retail locations were open and had fuel available.

Additionally, local safety rules for backup generators, including limiting the amount of fuel 

storage (e.g., a 72-hour supply), and requiring larger volumes of fuel for backup generators to be 

stored in basement locations, impaired energy resilience or created additional unsafe situations 

following Sandy.106 For example, Bellevue Hospital Center moved their generators from the first 

floor to a safer location on the 13th floor prior to Sandy; but because the fuel was still stored at 

ground level and the pumps which supplied the fuel to the generators were submerged, hospital 

staff created a human chain to move the fuel by hand up 13 floors to keep life-safety power 

operating and their patients safe for another two days. New York City and other jurisdictions are 

reviewing these requirements to determine if new rules can be developed to maintain safety 

while increasing resilience. Lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy will be considered to ensure 

that our fuel delivery systems across the country are more resilient to disaster.

Owner

Leads: DOE, FEMA, HUD

106	 2008 New York City Mechanical Code, with January 1-December 31, 2011 Supplement, Section MC 1305.11.1.3.
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Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will, to the extent allowable by law and regulation, be applicable to future disaster recovery 

efforts in the region as well as future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

14. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage Federal and State cooperation 

to improve electric grid policies and standards.

States should work with DOE and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers to develop 

a new approach for electric grid operations. The new approach would define policies and 

technical requirements for how to incorporate smart grid technology, microgrids, building 

controls, and distributed generation, including CHP, with two-way flow networks into the 

grid. This approach would ensure that problems can be isolated, surviving generation can be 

optimally dispatched (with priority to essential services), and that degradation can be graceful 

and not catastrophic. This approach would allow building controls to provide a minimal 

level of service such as basic lights and refrigeration during emergencies. States should also 

review DOE’s new report, “U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme 

Weather,”107 which assesses vulnerabilities that would be helpful in developing a new approach 

for electric grid operations. Improvements need to include addressing damage to power 

generation and medium to long-term alternatives to power sources if critical power generation 

facilities are damaged or destroyed.

Owner

Lead: DOE

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and could be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

15. RECOMMENDATION: Mobilize the private sector and non-profit community to develop 

innovative solutions that support and integrate whole community efforts for disaster relief.

OSTP and FEMA, with the support of DOE and other Federal agencies, will convene an all-day 

brainstorm with whole community partners, such as technologists, entrepreneurs, designers, 

philanthropists and local and state officials at the White House to develop innovative solutions 

to support how disaster survivors respond to and recover from disasters. These solutions will 

empower disaster survivors and enhance the ability of first responders as well as Federal, 

State, and local officials to conduct response and recovery activities. All efforts will support and 

107	 DOE, “U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather,” 07/2013, http://energy.

gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities%20Report.pdf.
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integrate whole community efforts to better prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover 

from disasters.

Owner

Lead: OSTP and FEMA, in coordination with DOE, and other Federal agencies

Status

Recommendation adopted: Brainstorm currently scheduled for the end of August.

16. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a resilient power strategy for wireless and 

data communications infrastructure and consumer equipment.

DOE and the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, part of DOC), 

should work with FCC to promote a programmatic approach to ensure that cellular towers 

(antennas), data centers, and other critical communications infrastructure are able to 

function regardless of the status of the electrical grid. In addition, encouraging stored power 

(i.e., batteries) for consumer level broadband equipment, through funding or other means, 

will improve impacted individuals’ ability to seek information, help with recovery needs, 

communicate with family members, and even work from home when transportation or business 

facilities are significantly compromised.

Owner

Leads: DOE and NTIA

Status

Recommendation in process: Under consideration for implementation for future recovery 

efforts.

Transportation Infrastructure

Challenge and Goal

Sandy caused damages directly (from the wind and water) and indirectly (loss of power) to the region’s 

transportation infrastructure. More than half of the nation’s total daily trips on public transportation 

systems occur within the Sandy-affected region. The day after the storm, nearly all of the region’s 

systems were shut down due to flooding, wind damage, or loss of power, further complicating the 

rebuilding effort. 
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Adding to the difficulty of restoring transit in the region was the fact that the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA), the Federal agency responsible for supporting the recovery of transit, was 

unfunded for this purpose and had no rules and regulations in place to allocate funding once Congress 

made an appropriation. In 2012, Congress authorized, but did not immediately fund an emergency 

relief program for public transit.108 In addition, DOT was working diligently to implement several 

provisions in the law that had short implementation deadlines. The transit emergency relief program 

authorized in the law was not one of the programs with a statutory implementation deadline, so it was 

prioritized behind the programs Congress required in the statue to be implemented quickly. The Federal 

Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Transportation Emergency Relief program, covering roadways, 

bridges, and tunnels, had successfully been used prior to Hurricane Sandy, but was also in need of 

funding to be able to respond to immediate needs after the storm. Ultimately, Congress appropriated 

over $12 billion to the two programs in the Sandy Supplemental.

On March 29, 2013, FTA issued an interim final rule to direct the transit emergency relief program to 

ensure that Sandy funds were quickly but appropriately allocated to repair projects in the region. This 

regulation sets forth the general program requirements for funds expended under the program. Due to 

some structural differences between the highway and transit programs at DOT, the highway emergency 

relief program rules are different. The transit rules are more reflective of the overall policy goals of 

rebuilding more resiliently and ensuring that all investments align with national policy goals such as 

flood risk management and climate change adaptation. The Task Force’s goal is to align both programs 

with current national policy goals and lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts.

17. RECOMMENDATION: Expedite flow of Sandy transportation funding to needed repairs.

The Task Force and DOT worked closely with State transportation agencies and transit operators 

in the region to ensure that DOT efforts were coordinated with other agency efforts and aligned 

with national policy goals being developed by the Task Force. 

Soon after the establishment of the Task Force in December 2012, Secretary Donovan, DOT 

Deputy Secretary Porcari, and FTA Administrator Peter Rogoff met with the heads of the major 

transit agencies in the region to make clear that once funding was appropriated by Congress, 

DOT would make it quickly available, but with tight reporting requirements and controls. With 

an assessor on the ground in the days immediately after the storm’s impact, FTA worked closely 

with the large affected transit agencies to determine the extent of the damage, estimate the 

costs of needed repairs, and ensure that the design for the repair work improved the resilience 

of the systems against future storms. 

Coordination between the FHWA and the States was initiated immediately after the storm, even 

before funding was available. 

In addition, FEMA is funding, under its Public Assistance program, repairs to airports, port and 

harbor facilities, and other publicly owned transportation systems not covered by the FTA or 

108	 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), P.L. 112-141.
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FHWA emergency relief programs. Most of these assets were owned by the Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey, which worked closely with FEMA to assess damages and estimate 

repair costs. To ensure FEMA and FTA did not provide duplication of funding to State and local 

transportation agencies, FEMA and the FTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding on March 

25, 2013, clearly stating what types of projects would be funded by each agency.109

Other transportation systems, such as the intercity rail lines operated by Amtrak, and Federal 

assets at airports such as air traffic control towers and navigation systems, were funded or 

repaired by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) or the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), respectively. In a unique partnership with NPS, the piers and docks on Liberty Island, 

which allow ferry access to the Statue of Liberty, were repaired by the Eastern Federal Lands 

division of FHWA. 

As a result of its internal efforts to address the speed of recovery and the need for accuracy and 

accountability, FTA allocated $2 billion within the first 60 days of the authorization’s enactment, 

and FHWA was able to release close to $500 million in emergency relief funds by March 2013. 

Real projects are now complete or currently underway, including restoration to Ocean Parkway, 

work to repair New Jersey Transit’s Hoboken Terminal, efforts to reopen Route 154 in Old 

Saybrook, Connecticut and restoring tunnel lighting, track replacement, power cables, signals 

and communications equipment for the Greenpoint Tube in New York City.

Owner

Lead: DOT

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

as well as future disasters in the Sandy-affected region.

18. RECOMMENDATION: Align Sandy transportation funding 

expenditures with national policy goals.

The Federal Flood Risk Reduction Standard announced by the Task Force (best available flood 

hazard data plus one foot of freeboard) applies to the rebuilding of structures that were 

substantially damaged and will be repaired or rebuilt with Federal funding. For example, DOT 

has adopted the flood risk reduction standard for all Sandy-related transportation repairs and 

resilience projects. FTA has included the Standard in its interim final rule for its emergency relief 

program. 

109	 Federal Transit Administration and FEMA, “Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Department of

Transportation Federal Transit Administration and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency

Management Agency,” 03/03/2013, http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_FEMA_MOA.pdf.
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The second allocation of public transportation emergency relief funds in response to Sandy 

that included $5.7 billion in funds for four of the area’s most affected transit agencies, of which 

$1.3 billion will be used for locally prioritized projects to make transit systems more resilient 

to future disasters. FTA will also develop a competitive process for additional Sandy funding 

to identify and support larger, stand-alone resilience projects in the impacted region. The new 

resilience grants will be based in part on the successful Transportation Investment Generating 

Economic Recovery (TIGER) program, which was developed under the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act, 2009 (ARRA) to generate economic growth and environmental benefits for 

an entire region. FTA is taking the TIGER model and incorporating the Infrastructure Resilience 

Guidelines and other resilience components, including the goals of the President’s Climate 

Action Plan, to develop a specific program for the Sandy-affected region. The overall goal of the 

new program is to ensure the region’s public transit systems can continue to serve their critical 

function in the face of future disasters and the impacts of climate change.

Owner

Lead: DOT

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

Green Infrastructure

Challenge and Goal

For the purposes of this Rebuilding Strategy, green infrastructure is defined as the integration of 

natural systems and processes, or engineered systems that mimic natural systems and processes, into 

investments in resilient infrastructure.110 Green infrastructure takes advantage of the services and 

natural defenses provided by land and water systems such as wetlands, natural areas, vegetated sand 

dunes, and forests, while contributing to the health and quality of life of America’s communities. 

At the scale of a neighborhood or community, green infrastructure may refer to stormwater 

management systems that mimic nature by soaking up and storing water or to the patchwork of 

natural areas that provides habitat, flood protection, cleaner air, and cleaner water to communities 

(noting that some jurisdictions are experimenting with implementing green infrastructure stormwater 

management systems on a citywide or watershed basis). On a larger scale, there are a variety of ways 

in which humans are trying to prevent the flooding of coastal environments by implementing green 

infrastructure.

110	 Some agencies and organizations have used the term “green infrastructure” more narrowly to define natural systems for

stormwater management; however, the Task Force’s Strategy Report is using the more expansive definition provided here.
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Communities at increasing risk from coastal storms can use green infrastructure approaches that 

restore degraded or lost natural systems (e.g., wetlands and sand dunes ecosystems) and other 

shoreline areas to enhance storm protection and reap the many benefits that are provided by these 

systems. There is also quantitative evidence supporting the importance of protecting intact systems 

where they exist because these systems may provide some wave attenuation capability, particularly 

in low-energy storm surges.111 Protecting, retaining, and enhancing these natural defenses should be 

considered as part of any coastal resilience strategy.

The Task Force worked to ensure that Sandy Supplemental funding for infrastructure is used to 

integrate these types of nature-based approaches, where appropriate and beneficial, into designs for 

recovery and hazard mitigation projects across the region. And that it was done in alignment with both 

the Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines and the President’s Climate Action Plan.

Successes in Hazard Mitigation through Green 

Infrastructure during Hurricane Sandy

Green infrastructure includes natural and/or restored features (e.g., wetlands or sand dune 

ecosystems), that incorporate the natural processes (e.g., flood protection, water filtration) that are 

recognized as integral to community, economic, and environmental resilience. These approaches have 

proven successful in other regions, and it appears they reduced flood damage where applied in the 

region impacted by Sandy.

During Sandy, an example of effective hazard mitigation through green infrastructure was demonstrated 

at the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge in North Carolina. As part of a climate change adaptation 

project, oyster reefs were installed several years ago parallel to the Pamlico Sound shoreline near Point 

Peter Road and the canal that ends at the Sound. The oyster reefs absorbed some of the energy of 

storm-generated waves and decreased the amount of erosion at the end of Point Peter Road and along 

the shoreline adjacent to the road. The water control structure installed in the canal next to the road as 

part of this project likely slowed erosion by adapting the flow of storm flood waters from a channelized 

system to a sheet flow system which emulated natural processes.

19. RECOMMENDATION: Consider green infrastructure options 

in all Sandy infrastructure investments.

To ensure that Federal infrastructure investments are resilient while also supporting Federal 

goals to promote innovation, environmental sustainability, resilience, and climate adaptation, 

the Task Force developed a set of Guidelines for Federal infrastructure investment in Sandy 

recovery. Environmentally sustainable approaches will include consideration and integration 

111	 ESA PWA, Analysis Of The Costs And Benefits Of Using Tidal Marsh Restoration As A Sea Level Rise Adaptation Strategy In

San Francisco Bay,” 02/22/2013, http://www.bay.org/assets/FINAL%20D211228_00%20Cost%20and%20Benefits%20of%20

Marshes%20022213.pdf; Shepard CC, Crain CM, Beck MW, “The Protective Role of Coastal Marshes: A Systematic Review

and Meta-analysis,” 11/23/2011, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0027374.
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of the following ecosystem services, including valuation where feasible and appropriate: (1) 

provision of habitat (coastal, inter-coastal, inland); (2) landscape conservation for the tourism, 

recreation, and aesthetic values on which economies depend; (3) watershed protection for 

clean drinking water and improved flood management; (4) threatened and endangered species 

conservation and restoration; and (5) other associated ecosystem services from which people 

derive benefits (e.g., aquaculture and recreational and commercial fishing). The Guidelines, 

discussed in more detail at the beginning of this chapter, are being applied by Federal agencies 

to grants, loans, Federal construction, and all other Federal infrastructure funding mechanisms 

supporting recovery in the Sandy-impacted region. Rather than just rebuilding damaged 

infrastructure to its pre-disaster standard, these Guidelines and other proposals within the 

Rebuilding Strategy, encourage construction of sustainable and resilient infrastructure built to 

better withstand future disasters. 

Federal agencies funding and building infrastructure projects are leading the implementation 

of this recommendation in coordination with other Federal agencies with capabilities in natural 

science and State and local partners. 

Owner

Leads: Agencies funding and building infrastructure projects (DOT, HUD, USACE, DOI, EPA, DHS,

GSA, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), HHS, VA)

Supporting Agencies: CEQ, OSTP, NOAA, USDA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region as well as future disaster 

recovery efforts nationwide.

20. RECOMMENDATION: Improve the understanding and decision-making tools for 

green infrastructure through projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental.

The Task Force worked with Federal agencies to ensure that Sandy-affected States and local 

communities that are interested in pursuing green infrastructure solutions have access 

to Federal tools that can assist them in evaluating whether green infrastructure can be a 

beneficial component of their recovery strategy. Agencies such as EPA, USACE, NOAA, and DOI 

provide a range of tools to State and local partners, including modeling capabilities, decision 

support tools, case studies, and best management practices. The Task Force also worked with 

agencies and the private sector to leverage Federal funding programs, green infrastructure set 

asides, and other resources to mobilize private financing for natural infrastructure solutions. 

Continued progress will require a focus on developing and improving techniques and tools 

for measuring and predicting the effectiveness of natural infrastructure approaches, and on 

innovative uses of Federal and local funds to attract more private investments. The following 
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examples are a sampling of how agency Sandy recovery efforts are providing valuable sciencebased information on how best to integrate natural systems in creating resilient infrastructure, 

communities, and economies.

NOAA is advancing the integration of green infrastructure into Sandy recovery and resilience 

efforts by providing financial support, information, tools, and services for coastal communities. 

With Sandy supplemental funding, NOAA will be releasing Coastal Resilient Networks (known 

as CRest) grants to provide funding for advancing recovery efforts, with priorities that target 

resilient communities and coastlines, including promotion of natural shoreline restoration 

efforts. 

NOAA, in partnership with USACE and other Federal agencies, is also supporting an economic 

assessment to analyze the relative levels of inundation protection and related benefits 

associated with shoreline rebuilding and restoration alternatives in the Sandy-affected region. 

This analysis will provide information on benefits and cost-effectiveness of different alternatives 

to inform recovery and resilience efforts. NOAA will also be revising and updating Environmental 

Sensitivity Index maps in areas affected by Sandy, which will provide important reference 

material for green infrastructure planning.112 Finally, Sandy funding will support restoration 

and repair of a range of sensors and monitoring infrastructure damaged by the storm to inform 

modeling and predictive capabilities relative to sea level rise and flood surge. These efforts and 

related information, tools, and training will support assessments and implementation of natural 

systems to reduce impacts of storms and provide information and guidance on integrating 

natural (e.g., living shorelines and wetlands restoration) and nature-based (e.g., sand dune 

ecosystem creation) approaches to increase resilience of coastal ecosystems and communities. 

As a part of its responsibilities for managing national parks and refuges along the nation’s 

coasts, DOI is researching and monitoring the effectiveness of green infrastructure in their 

role in promoting coastal resilience. Within DOI, several agencies are using Sandy recovery 

funding or working in Sandy-affected areas to further the science and understanding of green 

infrastructure.

• USGS initiated efforts to provide communities with updated (post-storm) mapping of 

land and water features as well as real time data on stormwater levels to support model 

predictions of the surge of high water levels during storms and the impacts they have on 

coastal bays and estuaries.

• The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has initiated projects involving data collection 

and resource identification, environmental assessment, environmental monitoring, and 

stakeholder support and outreach to be responsive to the need for sand resources for 

112	 Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) Atlases are a collection of maps that provide a concise summary of coastal resources

that are at risk in the event of an oil or chemical spill. There are three distinct components to the maps and data: biological

resources (such as birds and shellfish beds), sensitive shorelines (such as marshes and tidal flats), and human-use resources

(such as public beaches and parks). Source: NOAA, ESI Maps, http://www.response.restoration.noaa.gov/esi.
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projects in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 

Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida.

• NPS is currently assessing the role of the coastal barriers in providing protection to shore 

communities and monitoring how quickly beaches and dunes recover from the erosional 

impacts of Sandy. In partnership with USGS, they are also monitoring the biological 

and physical response of a breach in the federal wilderness on Fire Island in New York. 

A large body of scientific data and information published over the past 50 years show 

that the influx of large amounts of sediment and water from the ocean into the bays, 

which result from breaching, are essential for the long-term maintenance of the barrier 

island and back-bay systems and their biologically diverse habitats and ecosystems.113 

Protecting these barrier island processes is an essential element in maintaining longterm resilience to the barrier and long-term protection to mainland communities.

• At the John H. Chafee National Wildlife Refuge in Rhode Island, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service is working with The Nature Conservancy to repair extensive shoreline erosion 

by using natural materials and “living shoreline” techniques, making this important salt 

marsh better able to withstand future storm impacts.

Several agencies are also collaborating to promote and study green infrastructure options. 

EPA and the USGS are partnering on a targeted pilot initiative to support the Task Force using 

an ecosystem services analytic framework. The pilot will build on recent scholarship seeking 

to quantify how retained natural ecosystems and habitats can serve to increase resilience by 

protecting coastal communities and ecosystems from flooding and storm damage, and will 

evaluate tradeoffs between retaining natural systems and enabling development.114

USACE has undertaken and is presently undertaking several actions to implement this 

recommendation in partnership with other stakeholders. The Sandy Supplemental requires 

a Comprehensive Study of the flood risks of vulnerable coastal populations in areas that 

were affected by Hurricane Sandy. Tools are also being developed to identify opportunities 

to coordinate navigation dredging and regional sediment management programs to promote 

a robust coastal landscape that provides a full range of economic, environmental, and risk 

reduction services.

Dredging actions undertaken as a part of the Sandy Supplemental are currently utilizing 

nature-based approaches which support the development of nature-based features through 

113	 Leatherman, S.P., “Migration of Assateague Island, Maryland, by inlet and overwash processes,” 1979; Donnelly, J.P.,

J. Butler, S. Roll, M. Wengren, and T. Webb III., “A backbarrier overwash record of intense storms from Brigantine,

New Jersey,” 2004; Roman, C.T., J.A. Peck, J.R. Allen, J.W. King, and P.G. Appleby, “Accretion of a New England (USA)

salt marsh in response to inlet migration, storms, and sea-level rise,” 1997; Fisher, J.J., and E.J. Simpson., “Washover

and tidal sedimentation rates s environmental factors in development of a transgressive barrier shoreline” In:

Leatherman, S.P. (ed.), “Barrier Islands: From the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico,” 1979.

114	 Costanza, Robert, Octavio Perez-Maqueo, M. Luisa Martinez, Paul Sutton, Sharolyn J. Anderson, and Kenneth Mulder, “The Value of

Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane Protection,” Ambio, 2008; USGS, “Meeting the science needs of the Nation in the wake of Hurricane

Sandy—A U.S. Geological Survey science plan for support of restoration and recovery,” http://www.pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1390/.
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the beneficial use of dredged material (i.e., consistent with USACE’s Engineering With Nature 

research). Coordination with State and local authorities on these projects in New Jersey and 

Rhode Island are providing opportunities for innovations in dredging operations that will 

nourish eroded beaches and near-shore habitats, construct wetlands, and restore island 

habitats that were damaged during Sandy.

Owner

Leads: DOI, NOAA, USACE, EPA, USDA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

21. RECOMMENDATION: Create opportunities for innovations in green infrastructure 

technology and design using Sandy funding, particularly in vulnerable communities.

The Sandy Supplemental included $570 million in funding for capitalization grants to EPA 

SRF programs ($475 million for wastewater treatment and $95 million for drinking water), 

which primarily provides localities with low-interest financing to support renovations and 

improvements designed to enhance resilience and to mitigate against flood risk in the Sandyaffected region. In recent months, EPA has worked closely with New York and New Jersey to 

develop guidelines, issued May 2013, on eligible uses of the these funds, which include both 

green infrastructure stormwater management systems, such as permeable pavement and 

green roofs, and natural storm surge prevention systems, such as sand dune ecosystems, tidal 

wetlands, and natural berms or levees, as well as supporting efforts in vulnerable communities.

To help build coastal resilience, DOI is launching a $100 million competitive grant program 

using funding provided for Sandy recovery to foster partnerships and promote resilient natural 

systems while enhancing green spaces and wildlife habitat in needed areas along the Sandy 

landscape. An additional $242 million from the Sandy Supplemental will be allocated to support 

projects for coastal restoration and resilience at DOI assets, including national parks, refuges, 

and Tribal lands across the region. Through the lessons learned by implementing these projects 

and monitoring their future success at enhancing resilience and protecting communities, DOI 

intends to build knowledge to better prepare the Federal Government and local communities as 

they prepare for future storms.

One more innovative way the Task Force is creating opportunities for green infrastructure is 

the regional design competition, Rebuild by Design, described in more detail on page 47. While 

green alternatives are encouraged in all focus areas, the ecological and water body network 

focus area of the competition specifically requests concepts that address the interdependencies 

between the natural and built environments. 
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Owner

Leads: DOI, EPA, HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental.

22. RECOMMENDATION: Develop a consistent approach to valuing the benefits of 

green approaches to infrastructure development and develop tools, data, and 

best practices to advance the broad integration of green infrastructure.

Research suggests that green as well as gray infrastructure, and the integration of the two, can 

reduce the risk of fatalities and property loss in vulnerable coastal communities and provide 

significant additional measurable benefits.115 However, more work is needed to develop 

short- and long-term benefit-cost analysis and science-based decision criteria for reducing 

the risk of flooding through these systems. CEQ should convene relevant parties from across 

government to develop a consistent, science-based approach for evaluating the value and 

performance of nature-based defenses for coastal protection, stormwater management, 

building design, and environmental compliance mitigation requirements, and to develop a 

clearinghouse of tools, data, and best practices for integrating green infrastructure and Low 

Impact Development in urban coastal areas into all applicable Federal investments. This work 

should make use of several ongoing efforts such as: the USACE Comprehensive Study; DOI’s 

competitive grant program for coastal habitat restoration; EPA’s existing body of research and 

experience with stormwater-related green infrastructure; the Infrastructure Systems Rebuilding 

Principles developed by NOAA and USACE to promote a unified strategy for activities in coastal 

restoration; work to implement the President’s Climate Action Plan; and various existing 

research efforts underway or funded by agencies such as USACE, NOAA, DOI, USDA, and EPA. 

This effort should focus on developing, and making publicly available, a set of tools and data 

to assist States and local communities in understanding and replicating best practices across 

regions, and in evaluating the full value of green investments, including the positive external 

effects on addressing climate change and other threats, and investigating market-based 

approaches to ecosystem services to capture the full value of green infrastructure investments. 

This effort should include engagement of coastal and community decision makers to help 

identify information needs and evaluate methodologies. 

In addition to efforts to provide tools, information, and best practices for valuing and deploying 

green infrastructure and natural defenses, agencies should examine how to improve and better 

leverage incentives for green infrastructure deployment, and work to remove unnecessary 

barriers. 

115	 Arkema, K.K., et. al., “Coastal habitats shield people and property from sea-level rise and storms,”

07/14/2013, http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate1944.html.
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Owner

Lead: CEQ

Supporting Agencies: OSTP, EPA, NOAA, DOI, USACE, USDA

Status

Recommendation in process: Recommended for implementation for future projects funded by 

the Sandy Supplemental and coordinated with implementation of the President’s Climate Action 

Plan.

Water Infrastructure 

Challenge and Goal

Water is one of the most basic and essential resources on the planet. The management of water 

requires a broad range of systems and facilities to ensure that we have enough where we need it 

and not too much where we do not want it. Whether it involves flood risk reduction, stormwater or 

wastewater management, or ensuring clean and available drinking water, the resilience of complex 

water infrastructure is critical to the health of individuals and the viability of communities. One 

common theme impacting the development of water infrastructure is the emphasis on maintaining 

the delicate ecological balance required to preserve this crucial natural resource. As was discussed in 

the previous section on green infrastructure, using natural systems or building infrastructure which 

mimics nature is an important way to maintain this balance. The integration of gray and green types 

of infrastructure is important in managing water because it furthers the national policy goals of 

environmental sustainability, working to mitigate the impacts of climate change, and adaptation to the 

impacts of rising sea levels and more intense storms. 

Hurricane Sandy overwhelmed, compromised, and in some cases destroyed much of the region’s water 

infrastructure. Beaches were washed onto roads, houses, rivers, and even across barrier islands. Flood 

walls were breached and overtopped and stormwater systems were inundated. The flooding and loss 

of power caused wastewater and drinking water systems to fail, impacting hundreds of thousands of 

people and causing untold ecological damages to waterways and sensitive habitats. 

The Task Force worked to ensure that water infrastructure repaired, built, or improved as part of the 

Sandy recovery addresses the national policy goals of resilience, sustainability, and climate change 

adaptation.
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23. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure Sandy recovery water infrastructure 

investments are timely, resilient, sustainable, and effective.

In the area of stormwater management, EPA has been leading efforts to incorporate natural 

systems into infrastructure for many years. EPA’s programs provide technical assistance and 

training, modeling tools, research, partnership opportunities, and further encourage the use of 

green systems to manage wet weather through the permitting and regulatory processes under 

the Clean Water Act. These projects promote resilience and eco-system benefits, and they have 

been proven to reduce flooding risk from stormwater. EPA has been providing this support to 

the State and local agencies throughout the Sandy recovery process.

The repair of wastewater and drinking water facilities damaged by Sandy is being addressed, in 

large part, by FEMA under the Public Assistance program. FEMA will spend more than a billion 

dollars on repairs to these facilities and improvements to ensure they are prepared for threats 

posed by future sea level rise and other impacts of climate change. FEMA’s programs can fund 

resilience mitigation as part of a repair project or separately as part of the Hazard Mitigation 

Grant Program (HMGP). HMGP funds are prioritized by the States and the total amount of 

funding is based on a percentage of funds approved to repair damage within the State. DOE 

and the Task Force provided New York and New Jersey technical assistance to identify critical 

projects and develop strategies to help them maximize the impact of HMGP funding.

Using Sandy Supplemental funding provided to the New York and New Jersey SRFs, EPA and the 

States will work to ensure impacted drinking water and wastewater systems are more resilient. 

The States develop project plans and submit their plans to EPA for review and for public 

comment. EPA allows, and strongly encourages, the use of green infrastructure as part of these 

project plans, but ultimately the States are responsible for project selection. New York and New 

Jersey are also considering financing programs that leverage CDBG-DR funding to attract private 

capital to support resilient energy investments to protect the water infrastructure. DOE and EPA 

have been providing technical assistance to help the States evaluate the energy and water nexus 

and explore public-private partnerships to make these water facilities more energy efficient and 

resilient.116

The Sandy Supplemental also authorized and appropriated funds for USACE to undertake a 

Comprehensive Study of the flood risks of vulnerable coastal populations in areas that were 

affected by Hurricane Sandy within the boundaries of the North Atlantic Division of USACE. The 

Sandy Supplemental further requires the “evaluation of the performance of existing projects 

constructed by USACE and impacted by Hurricane Sandy for the purposes of determining their 

effectiveness and making recommendations for improvements thereto.”

The Comprehensive Study will be a broad, conceptual, examination of the best ideas and 

approaches to reducing the vulnerability to major storms over time in a way that is sustainable 

over the long-term both for the natural coastal ecosystem and for communities given expected 

116	 Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ2/html/PLAW-113publ2.htm.
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changes in sea level rise, extreme weather events, and other impacts of climate change. The 

study will include economic analyses and will also investigate how more emphasis on naturally 

occurring features and processes might contribute to a reduction in the flood and coastal storm 

risks. The study will also evaluate the performance of green infrastructure, such as ecosystems, 

during Hurricane Sandy and investigate the potential for risk reduction measures for back-bay 

communities. The Comprehensive Study will be aligned with the President’s Climate Action 

Plan, the Infrastructure Resilience Guidelines, and the Infrastructure Systems Rebuilding 

Principles jointly developed with NOAA. USACE will proceed collaboratively in partnership with 

Federal, State, tribal, and local officials, with participation and input from the public, academia, 

NGOs, and the private sector.

Owner

Leads: USACE, EPA, NOAA, HUD, DOI, FEMA, DOE

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.

24. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure Sandy recovery water infrastructure 

projects are coordinated with other infrastructure investments.

Much of the extensive damage to infrastructure across the region was caused by flooding 

from storm surge and from the loss of electrical power, which also resulted from flooding. As 

described above, the Task Force has initiated a process to ensure that infrastructure resilience 

projects are considered in the context of other projects in the region, which may have some 

dependencies or linkages across geography or type of infrastructure. The regional coordination 

effort is described at the beginning of this chapter. EPA, FEMA, DOI, HUD, and USACE are the 

main agencies funding water projects and will be responsible for participating in the regional 

coordination efforts along with DOE who will provide best practices and technical assistance 

capabilities for energy resilience projects to protect water infrastructure from vulnerabilities in 

the grid. 

Owner

Leads: HUD, EPA

Supporting Agencies: USACE, EPA, NOAA, DOI, FEMA, DOE

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.
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Building Codes

Challenge and Goal

Using disaster-resistant local building codes is the most effective method to ensure new and rebuilt 

structures are designed and constructed to a more resilient standard. The adoption and enforcement 

of building codes happens at both the State and municipal levels; but, a consortium of experts, 

practitioners, and stakeholders from both the public and private sector—under the auspices of the nonprofit International Code Council (ICC)—develop the consensus model codes. The ICC is an association 

whose mission includes developing model codes and standards used to ensure the safety, sustainability, 

and consistency of buildings and other engineered structures. The membership of the ICC includes 

approximately 50,000 Federal, State, and local code enforcement and fire officials, as well as architects, 

engineers, and other construction professionals and manufacturers. The ICC publishes the International 

Codes (I-Codes), which all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted.117

 Additionally, the I-Codes are referenced in construction guidelines of some corporations and are used 

by many Federal agencies. One of the I-Codes used for commercial construction is the International 

Building Code (IBC). The I-Codes are published on a three-year cycle, with the most current version of 

the IBC being the 2012 version (published in April 2012). The International Residential Code (IRC) is a 

stand-alone code that covers regulations for one- and two-family dwellings and townhouses.

While the IBC and IRC have been adopted in the States most impacted by Sandy, the most current 

version of the model building codes (2012) have only been adopted in Rhode Island and Maryland: New 

Jersey has adopted the 2009 version, New York the 2006 version, and Connecticut the 2003 version. 

Both New York and New Jersey, however, are currently in the process of adopting the current editions 

of the codes.

25. RECOMMENDATION: States and localities should adopt and enforce 

the most current version of the IBC and the IRC.

Use of the most current code ensures that buildings and other structures incorporate the 

latest science, advances in technology, and lessons learned. These codes help ensure that 

more resilient structures are built and that communities are better protected from all types of 

hazards and disasters. The codes are models and should be reviewed to ensure all local issues 

and geographic vulnerabilities are addressed in the final code that the jurisdiction adopts. In 

most cases, States and municipalities add specific requirements or increase the standards, but 

in some cases they have removed or weakened key provisions of the model codes. State and 

localities should be careful when considering changes to the model codes during the adoption 

process to ensure that they do not compromise the level of resilience and safety that these 

standards afford. 

117	 Federal agencies do not formally “adopt” the I-Codes, but do use them as guides for design and construction of

Federal facilities. In general, Federal facilities are designed to conform with or exceed local building codes.
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In some States, a complex regulatory review process delays the adoption of the most current 

codes. As noted above, the review process is important to ensure local issues and requirements 

are included in the adopted code, but it is also important to adopt the new versions of the 

codes as quickly as possible to provide the most current science and thinking on resilience into 

all new and rebuilt structures. Finally, much like the advisory base flood elevation mapping 

that FEMA released, the current version of the model codes can be adopted by private sector 

owners when building or improving structures, as a way to ensure their building provides the 

highest level of safety, resilience, and sustainability even if the local codes do not yet require 

some of these standards. Building to these standards not only will reduce risk, but also could, in 

turn, lead to lower insurance rates and maintenance costs. 

Owner

Lead: MitFLG as a coordinating entity

Status

Recommendation in process: Recommended for implementation for future projects funded by 

the Sandy Supplemental and applicable to resilient rebuilding following disasters nationwide. 

This recommendation has been referred to the MitFLG for coordination.
Port Monmouth, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
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Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Restoring and Strengthening

Homes and Providing Families with

Safe, Affordable Housing Options

From the public housing projects in Queens and Brooklyn that remained for days without light and 

heat to the beach front towns along the Jersey shore where surging tides plowed houses from their 

foundations and left them buried in sand, the storm upended tens of thousands of lives across the New 

York and New Jersey region. Sandy rendered individual homes and entire neighborhoods uninhabitable 

and, in some cases, unrecognizable.

Because the region has a high population density, relatively expensive housing market, and low housing 

inventory, responding to the housing needs of affected residents raised challenges different from those 

faced in disasters such as Katrina, Ike, and Rita. Affordable, temporary housing units in close proximity 

to storm-affected neighborhoods were in short supply, which forced Federal, State and local authorities 

to employ an array of policy tools to provide displaced individuals with a place to stay. Some of these 

tools had been used in past disasters, but many were significantly adapted or developed in real time to 

respond to Sandy.

Shelter-in-Place Initiatives

Challenge and Goal

In the immediate aftermath of the storm, agencies charged with response and recovery faced the 

daunting task of finding short-term housing for tens of thousands of people with damaged homes. 

Quickly rehabilitating salvageable homes became an essential response activity, especially given the 

high cost and scarcity of temporary housing in the Sandy-affected areas. FEMA assistance allowed those 

without alternatives to temporarily relocate to hotels, but few expected these programs to sufficiently 

cover every eligible household.

26. RECOMMENDATION: For future disasters that affect high-density and high cost areas, 

shelter-in-place programs like New York City’s Rapid Repair and FEMA’s Sheltering and 

Temporary Essential Power (STEP) programs should be implemented to reduce the number 

of people displaced from their homes that would otherwise require short-term housing. 

Evaluate the effectiveness of STEP and compare outcomes to other forms of temporary 

emergency sheltering implemented in response to Sandy. In addition, evaluate the New 

York, New Jersey, and New York City implementation of sheltering in place programs.
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In New York City, thousands of households were able to take advantage of the City’s newly 

developed Rapid Repair program. This program funded temporary emergency repairs, which 

permitted homeowners to quickly restore their dwellings to a level of habitability. This allowed 

temporary units to be available for those who needed them and prevented families from 

having to relocate.118 Rapid Repair is an adaptation of FEMA’s STEP program. STEP is a new pilot 

program that provides homeowners with a maximum of $10,000 per unit to complete necessary 

and essential repairs to their primary residences, including the restoration of power, heat, and 

hot water, as well as temporary exterior repairs.119 New York City worked with FEMA to adapt 

STEP so that the program would be compatible with the City’s particular needs, including the 

City’s specific permitting requirements. 

In New Jersey, the State requested implementation of the existing shelter in place options, 

Blue Roof and Rapid Temporary Repair, immediately after the disaster. FEMA later made STEP 

available in Atlantic, Cape May, Middlesex, Monmouth, and Ocean Counties; however, the 

program was only used in the town of Sea Bright, with very mixed results.120

Programs like STEP and NYC Rapid Repairs reduced the need for emergency shelter.121 The Task 

Force recommends that FEMA study STEP and NYC Rapid Repairs to evaluate their success, 

determine whether and to what extent such programs should be eligible and/or improved 

for future disasters, and, as appropriate, strengthen and scale the program to ensure that it is 

replicable in diverse communities nationwide.

Owner

Lead: FEMA

Status 

Recommendation in process: FEMA has already begun a review and analysis of its shelter in 

place programs. This review will include examining the potential of expanding the STEP program 

nationwide. 

118	 The Rapid Repair program restored service to 11,744 buildings containing 20,257 residential units and 54,000 individuals.

Source: City of New York, “Mayor Bloomberg Announces First-Of-Its-Kind NYC Rapid Repairs Program Completes

Work On More Than 20,000 Homes Damaged By Hurricane Sandy,” 03/22/2013, http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/

nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_

name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2013a%2Fpr109-13.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.

119	 DHS Office of Inspector General, “FEMA’s Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program,”

12/2012, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-15_Dec12.pdf.

120	 Red Bank Green, 03/2013, http://www.redbankgreen.com/2013/03/sea-bright-drops-unworkable-fema-fix.html.

121	 New York City Mayors office, http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2013a/pr109-13.html.
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Community Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery

Challenge and Goal

As State and local governments in the hardest hit areas of the region confronted the enormity of 

the task ahead of them, they depended on the Federal government to fund numerous projects, 

including costly rehabilitation programs for damaged homes and the elevation of houses that sat in 

the floodplain. To provide State and local governments with the funding and flexibility they needed 

to finance unmet recovery needs, Congress appropriated over $15 billion for the CDBG-DR program 

to fund recovery from Sandy and other eligible disasters. Allocating these CDBG-DR funds quickly and 

effectively was the responsibility of HUD, as was providing appropriate standards and guidance for 

grantees.

27. RECOMMENDATION: HUD should expedite future allocations from the remaining CDBGDR funds for Sandy recovery and other eligible disasters, as well as other allocations 

(if appropriated) for future disasters. HUD should continue to provide consistent and 

appropriate standards for the use of CDBG-DR funding. In addition, HUD should encourage 

grantees to use toolkits and other existing resources to expedite program implementation.

The Task Force worked with HUD to expedite 

CDBG-DR allocations and to ensure that 

appropriate standards guided the use of 

these funds. Under the CDBG-DR program, 

funds are allocated to affected State and local 

government grantees based on objective 

determinations of need. Eligible recipients 

(potential grantees) then submit action 

plans, which detail how the eligible recipients 

would use funds and how they would meet 

the objectives of the CDBG-DR program. 

These objectives focus on assisting lowand moderate-income (LMI) populations, 

providing affordable and workforce housing, 

promoting sustainable and resilient 

rebuilding, and assisting those who are most 

vulnerable to disasters. 

After Sandy, HUD made its first CDBG-DR 

allocation in record time— just eight days 

from when Congress appropriated funds—

which allowed money to flow as quickly as 

possible to grantees once their action plans were submitted and approved. New York State’s 

Green Building Standards

To encourage sustainable building practices 

in the storm-affected region, HUD is 

requiring CDBG-DR grantees to adopt green 

building standards for replacement and new 

construction of residential housing. Although 

even prior to Sandy there was significant 

interest in these types of standards in the 

region, some state and local jurisdictions 

either had not previously applied any energy 

efficiency standards or had applied inconsistent 

standards. Through the CDBG-DR Notice, HUD 

provided a menu of standards that could be 

applied uniformly across each jurisdiction. 

These standards not only promote greater 

energy efficiency, but also improve longterm affordability by reducing utility costs. 

This marks the first time that a CDBG-DR 

allocation has included such standards.
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

plan dedicated $838 million for housing programs,122 New Jersey’s provided $1.16 billion,123 and 

New York City’s allocated $648 million.124 In all three instances, plans focused on the rebuilding 

or rehabilitation of single family and multifamily buildings, while also including resilience and 

mitigation measures. All three action plans also addressed vulnerable populations, including the 

elderly and the disabled, and made funding available for mold remediation. 

HUD Programs in a Box 

When responding to Sandy, all three of the primary grantees of disaster recovery funds (New 

York, New Jersey, and New York City) developed a significant number of CDBG-DR funded 

programs on their own. For example, these grantees established buyout programs, set up 

housing counseling services, and performed rehabilitation work in their jurisdictions. Not all 

CDBG-DR grantees have the capability or the institutional knowledge to develop these kinds of 

programs quickly after a disaster. For this reason, HUD developed tool kits, or “Programs in a 

Box,” that grantees can readily utilize to speed program implementation. Grantees that receive 

future CDBG-DR allocations can use these toolkits for Sandy or future disasters. Sandy-affected 

grantees have already used these toolkits to establish housing counseling for residents that 

are experiencing financial hardship while repairing their homes. The housing counseling toolkit 

is most efficiently used when grantees use existing housing counselor networks (e.g., HUDapproved counselors).

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Applies to grantees in the Sandy-affected region and will be 

applicable to future allocations of CDBG-DR in the region.

122	 New York State Homes and Community Renewal, Office of Community Renewal, “State Of New York Action Plan For Community

Development Block Grant Program Disaster Recovery,” 04/2013, http://www.nyshcr.org/Publications/CDBGActionPlan.pdf.

123	 New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, “Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action Plan,”

approved 04/29/2013, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/announcements/pdf/CDBG-DisasterRecoveryActionPlan.pdf.

124	 City of New York, “Community Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery Partial Action

Plan A,” http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/downloads/pdf/cdbg-dr_full.pdf.
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

CDBG-DR Funding for Public and Assisted Housing: 

Challenge and Goal

A significant number of vulnerable residents found themselves in the storm’s path, including substantial 

low-income,125 elderly, and disabled populations, each of whom required special consideration from 

responders and policy makers. Many of these residents were either unable or unwilling to evacuate, 

and the special assistance that these residents required often took a long time to arrive. In particular, 

a significant concentration of New York City’s public housing projects were located in mandatory 

evacuation zones, but for various reasons, many residents remained in their homes during the storm. 

As a result, many public housing residents became stranded without power and heat, in some cases 

for weeks. While cities developed and instituted evacuation plans, these plans failed to prepare for 

the eventuality that many people would not or could not evacuate. Stories of people using their gas 

stoves to stay warm and of elderly people unable to descend from high-rise apartments due to nonworking elevators were common. In many of the multifamily housing projects throughout the region, 

generators, emergency boilers, and pumps would have prevented widespread hardship. Although 

public housing authorities might be expected to provide these kinds of emergency services, private 

landlords rarely have these kinds of capabilities. Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) and assisted housing 

managers used insurance money, funds from reserve accounts, and disbursements from FEMA’s Public 

Assistance program to make some of their repairs and to restore units. Unfortunately, prior to Sandy, 

Federal funding was insufficient to obtain emergency resources that would have protected residents 

left behind after the storm.

The Task Force sought to ensure that public housing agencies and other assisted multifamily housing 

received funding for hazard mitigation as well as for rebuilding. This approach helps protect residents 

from facing the same problems in future disasters.

28. RECOMMENDATION: Require grantees to use CDBG-DR funding to support public 

and HUD-assisted multi-family housing, as well as subsidized and tax creditassisted affordable housing with recovery and risk mitigation efforts.

Unlike prior disaster recovery efforts, the CDBG-DR Notice governing Sandy recovery funds 

included a model provision to focus the attention of grantees on HUD-assisted housing (public 

housing and multifamily) and their residents, a population that has not usually been a focus of 

CDBG spending. HUD Notice 78 FR 14329 (March 5, 2013) required grantees to identify how 

they will address the rehabilitation, mitigation, and new construction needs of each impacted 

PHA, as well as the multifamily assisted housing within their jurisdictions. 

125	 A significant number of low-income households were impacted by the storm. Reports released in March 2013 by New York

University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy and by Enterprise Community Partners, Inc. indicate that 43% of those

who registered for FEMA assistance were renters. Of all renter registrants, 64% in New York City and 67% in New Jersey are low

income and less likely to have insurance. Sources: The Furman Center and the Moelis Institute for Affordable Housing Policy, “Sandy’s

Effects on Housing in New York City,” 03/2013, http://www.furmancenter.org/files/publications/SandysEffectsOnHousingInNYC.

pdf; Enterprise, “Measuring the Response to Hurricane Sandy,” http://www.practitionerresources.org/showdoc.html?id=67899.
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

The State of New Jersey set aside $179.5 million from the first tranche of CDBG-DR funding 

to create new affordable housing units, as well as to restore damaged public housing, HUDassisted multifamily developments, and other subsidized and tax-credit assisted housing. In 

addition, the State of New York provided $10 million to assist public housing units, and126 New 

York City committed $120 million to design and construct improvements to public housing. The 

first phase of the City’s plan includes the installation of permanent generators at 100 of the 

New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA) most vulnerable buildings that were affected by the 

storm. Mitigation measures should address environmental exposures, including indoor, on-site, 

and off-site exposures. 

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Grantees are now using CDBG-DR funds provided in the Sandy 

Supplemental to assist public and HUD-assisted housing. It is HUD’s intent to implement this 

requirement for CDBG-DR use in future disasters. 

Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Federal Housing 

Finance Agency (FHFA) Mortgage Policy Alignment

Challenge and Goal

Sandy came on the heels of a protracted foreclosure crisis that affected much of the region and 

threatened to destabilize the housing market by causing mortgagors struggling to recover from the 

storm to fall behind on their payments.127 Owners who had been able to weather the economic 

downturn and remain current on their mortgages were suddenly faced with the three-fold burden of 

paying for their existing mortgage, financing repairs to their damaged homes, and renting a temporary 

place to live while those repairs were being completed. Beyond identifying shelter for displaced 

individuals, the Federal Government sought to stabilize housing markets by preventing foreclosures. 

126	 New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, “Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action Plan,”

approved 04/29/2013, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/announcements/pdf/CDBG-DisasterRecoveryActionPlan.pdf.

127	 In October 2012 before Hurricane Sandy, single-family homeowner foreclosure filings in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut were

on the rise. Realty Trac Inc. reported an increase in default, auction, and repossession filings of 140% in New Jersey, 123% in New York

and 41% in Connecticut from a year before. In a February 2013 National Foreclosure Report, CoreLogic reports that in January 2013,

New Jersey (at 7.2%) ranked second and New York (at 5.1%) third in the country behind Florida with the highest foreclosure inventory

as a percentage of all mortgaged homes. The national average in January 2013 was 2.9%. In the March 2013 CoreLogic report,

New Jersey (at 7.3%) and New York (at 5.0%) continue to rank second and third in the nation behind Florida. Sources: RealtyTrac,

11/13/2013, http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/october-2012-us-foreclosure-market-report-7474; 

CoreLogic, 02/28/2013, http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic-reports-61,000-completed-foreclosures-in-january.aspx; 

CoreLogic, 04/30/2013, http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic-reports-55,000-completed-foreclosures-in-march.aspx.
91

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

While Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) had issued foreclosure moratoria in prior disasters, 

policies differed between the FHFA (which oversees the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 

Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)) and FHA (which is part of 

HUD). Previously, announcements were not coordinated and eligibility requirements varied among the 

different GSEs.

The Task Force sought to promote consistent standards to help homeowners recovering from disasters 

stay current on their Federally-backed mortgages.

29. RECOMMENDATION: Align the foreclosure prevention policies of FHA and 

FHFA – including policies on moratoria, forbearance, and refinancing.

In the aftermath of the storm, FHA and FHFA introduced consistent and coordinated policies 

to institute a moratorium on foreclosures of government-backed loans in disaster-affected 

areas. The alignment of these policies helped to minimize confusion for homeowners and 

mortgage servicers, and it prevents mortgage servicers from introducing arbitrary policies. 

The moratorium initially lasted through January 2013 and was later extended through April 

2013. This marked the first time that FHA and FHFA had aligned their post-disaster moratorium 

policies. In addition, these two agencies also issued amended eviction policies to protect 

tenants. 

FHA and FHFA offered those with Federally-backed mortgages a forbearance period of up to 

twelve months, the ability to modify their mortgages, and, in many cases, the opportunity 

to obtain streamlined mortgage refinancing through FHA’s Streamline Refinance program. A 

forbearance period alone would have left borrowers owing a large lump sum to their lenders 

after twelve months, something most people could not afford after shouldering the cost 

of repairs and temporary housing. By working with lenders to offer modifications and the 

Streamline Refinance program, FHA and FHFA allowed homeowners to amortize the amount 

owed from the forbearance period and pay it off over several years. Many homeowners who 

refinanced using the Streamline Refinance program actually lowered their monthly payments 

by taking advantage of historically low interest rates. Typically, the savings from the reduced 

rate was more than enough to make up for arrears accrued following the disaster. Homeowners 

were eligible for the Streamline Refinance program as long as they were current on their 

mortgages when the storm hit and if the refinancing would not increase their payments. 

Registration was simplified by limiting the documentation requirement. 

The Task Force played a central role in bringing FHFA and FHA together to align their policies 

with one another. This coordinated initiative will benefit not only those in Sandy-affected 

areas but also those eligible homeowners recovering from Hurricanes Irene and Lee. More 

significantly, perhaps, these policies have the potential to help an untold number of borrowers 

affected by future disasters who would otherwise find themselves unable to support their 

mortgages while attempting to recover. These policies give responsible homeowners the 

breathing room needed to remain in their homes after a disaster strikes.
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for eligible homeowners with Federally-backed 

mortgages in the Sandy-affected region and applicable to future disaster recovery efforts as 

appropriate.

Model Affordable Housing Programs

Challenge and Goal

Due to the high cost of housing in the region and the limited supply of affordable units, State and local 

governments have struggled to maintain the local supply of affordable housing through the rebuilding 

process. Although Federal sources, such as CDBG-DR, provide recipients with funding that can be used 

to repair and rebuild lost or damaged affordable housing stock, State and local governments must often 

work with the non-profit and private sectors to form partnerships that leverage Federal funds.

30. RECOMMENDATION: HUD should explore ways to assist State and local governments to 

develop model affordable housing programs that leverage funding from the public, private, 

and philanthropic sectors for affordable housing development and preservation in Sandyaffected areas, as well as in other regions that could potentially be affected by future disasters.

The development of model affordable housing programs allows local recipients of Federal 

funds to increase their investment in neighborhoods recovering from the storm. For multifamily 

housing, one potential model to reduce the cost of development is a partnership that provides 

a secondary risk market through a securitization mechanism that allows state or local housing 

entities to make more loans. 

Another model for distressed single-family loans is a partnership of the Federal Government, 

the State, and a local Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI), which is a non-profit 

lending institution certified by the Community Development Financial Institution Fund of the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). This model leverages private capital with State and 

Federal funds to purchase federally-distressed, single-family mortgages in the counties that 

were significantly impacted by Hurricane Sandy. This structure would allow a CDFI to work with 

HUD and the State to purchase pools of mortgage notes from FHA and then work with low- and 

moderate-income homeowners to help them retain their homes. It also creates opportunities to 

remediate vacant properties. 
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Both the single and multifamily models are community centered and create strong partnerships 

with regional organizations that specialize in financing projects to meet community needs. 

In addition, these partnerships encourage more resilient building practices and promote 

sustainable environmental and land use planning. 

To ensure that Sandy-affected communities do not suffer a net loss of affordable or accessible 

housing after the storm, the Task Force has worked in both New York and New Jersey to develop 

programs that harness the power of the Federal, private, and non-profit sectors. By partnering 

with the Federal Government, States and local governments can finance development at lower 

interest rates, making development more feasible and increasing the number of units available 

to low- and moderate-income families. Governments can also partner with private entities to 

ensure that low- and moderate-income homeowners are able to remain in their homes.

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation underway, pending further action: Recommended implementation for future 

projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental and would be applicable to resilient rebuilding 

following disasters in the region. The risk sharing model proposal is currently under review by 

HUD and Treasury, and the single-family asset sale model proposal is currently under review by 

HUD. 

Model Certification Programs for Disaster 

Resilience (FORTIFIED/Resilience STAR) 

Challenge and Goal

For the past several years, builders seeking to improve energy efficiency and to develop sustainably 

have relied on certification programs and model codes such as ENERGY STAR and the U.S. Green 

Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program. The implementation 

of green building measures saves homeowners money over the useful life of a building by lowering 

utility costs, in addition to minimizing harm to the environment. However, no certification program 

has achieved comparable success for the promotion of resilience and hazard mitigation against 

natural disasters. While some localities incorporate resilience into their building ordinances, many of 

the States at the greatest risk of catastrophic events have the least stringent codes. Minimum model 

building codes adopted by most States and municipalities address common safety concerns; yet, these 

minimum model building codes do not provide the necessary protections to help homes withstand 

catastrophic events.
94

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

The Task Force encouraged and promoted pilot programs that require buildings to incorporate 

resilience and hazard mitigation measures to determine whether these measures effectively protect 

structures from catastrophic events.

31. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage and promote the Insurance Institute for Business and 

Home Safety (IBHS) FORTIFIED home programs/ Resilience STAR development standards.

The IBHS, a non-profit research affiliate of the insurance industry, developed FORTIFIED, 

which provides practical, meaningful, hazard-focused solutions for new and existing structures 

throughout the United States. For example, FORTIFIED for Safer Living is a “code-plus” new 

construction program that helps homeowners and home builders create stronger, safer houses 

from the ground up. The program’s standards, design guides, and third-party validation 

process are designed to reliably increase a home’s resistance to the natural hazards that 

threaten the area where the house is located. These standards exceed the minimum lifesafety requirements of local building codes. The IBHS FORTIFIED Home Hurricane program 

focuses on retrofitting existing homes to improve their hurricane resistance. This program also 

uses third-party validation and can be applied to new construction. In some states, including 

Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina, insurance incentives are mandated for homes built or 

retrofitted to FORTIFIED standards. In addition, the States of Louisiana and South Carolina may 

provide residual market premium credits for FORTIFIED for Safer Living homes. 

After the FORTIFIED program was well-received by policymakers and insurers working on Statelevel recovery and rebuilding in the Sandy-affected region, the Task Force worked to bring 

FORTIFIED to a development in New Jersey as part of another pilot project that will begin in 

September. 

DHS has also developed Resilience STAR, its own voluntary designation for homes designed 

and constructed to be resilient to natural disasters. An initial pilot will take place in a high-risk 

community, such as coastal Alabama, in partnership with FORTIFIED. An additional Resilience 

STAR pilot may be introduced in New York in the coming months as well.

As rebuilding proceeds in the Sandy-affected region, the wide spread use of these voluntary 

standards would promote building practices that reduce human suffering, property loss, 

and recovery time by incentivizing stakeholders to incorporate resilience into design and 

construction. These standards would not only make building occupants safer, but also may 

lower insurance rates. Costs to homeowners are marginal128 and because this is a voluntary, 

consumer-driven program, there is no additional expense to government.

128	 Munich Re estimates that applying the standard adds a few thousand dollars in construction costs per home but this cost is

likely to be exceeded by expected savings on insurance premiums and deductibles, which in the Alabama pilot ranged between

25-50% Sources: Munich Re, “Interview: Carl Hedde Head of Risk Accumulation,” http://www.munichreamerica.com/ind_cat_

mngmnt_hedde_ibhs.shtml; Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety, “Disaster Safety Review: 20 Years After Hurricane

Andrew Are We building Stronger?” 2012, http://www.disastersafety.org/wp-content/uploads/DSR-andrew-08-20121.pdf.
95

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Owner

Leads: DHS for Resilience STAR and Treasury/Federal Insurance Office (FIO) for IBHS FORTIFIED

Status

Recommendation in process: Currently implemented for Sandy recovery projects and will be 

applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region as well as future disaster recovery 

efforts nationwide.

CDFI Toolkits

Challenge and Goal

State and local governments work with limited resources as they rebuild but they are often able to 

work with non-profits and private sector partners to leverage available funding. However, many State 

and local governments lack the capacity to identify opportunities and work with potential partners. 

The Task Force seeks to help State and local grantees develop the capacity to leverage Federal disaster 

assistance.

32. RECOMMENDATION: Help identify opportunities for State and local housing 

programs to leverage funds and create public-private partnerships.

To help maximize Federal investment in State and local housing programs, the Task Force 

has been working with grantees to help them identify opportunities to leverage funds and 

develop public-private partnerships that attract financing for rebuilding activities. To encourage 

these partnerships, the Task Force, through HUD’s Office of International and Philanthropic 

Innovation (OIPI), collaborated with the Opportunity Finance Network (OFN), one of the largest 

associations of CDFIs. Together, OIPI and OFN created the first ever master list of CDFIs for 

State and local governments looking to lend and leverage CDBG-DR funds with private and 

philanthropic funders. This master list, or “index,” contains a comprehensive list of proven 

lenders that provide technical assistance and training and that already engage in housing, small 

business, or other types of community lending. The list identifies the type of lending each 

CDFI offers and whether the CDFI participates in a state small business program supported by 

Treasury’s State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI). As State and local units of government 

work with homeowners, renters, and small business owners to leverage CDBG-DR funding, 

the list will help quickly identify lenders and available financial resources that can assist in the 

rehabilitation and new construction of homes, rental buildings, and small businesses, as well as 

with risk mitigation activities.
96

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Mold Remediation and 

Other Indoor Pollutants

Challenge and Goal

One of the most common and intractable problems 

for many residents in the aftermath of the storm 

has been the persistence of mold. Mold is common 

after flooding and requires particular expertise to 

remediate, which can be costly for homeowners.

The Task Force is working to develop guidance and 

to encourage the use of best practices for home 

and rental owners seeking to remove mold after a 

disaster.

Historic Preservation 

Funds and Tax Incentives

A significant percentage of the affected 

infrastructure, including housing, is listed 

on or eligible for the National Register of 

Historic Places. $50 million was appropriated 

by Congress from the Historic Preservation 

Fund to be allocated to tribal, state and local 

preservation grants to public and private 

owners of historic properties damaged by 

the storm, following the example of the 

successful Hurricane Katrina initiatives. 

The Historic Preservation Fund is available 

to homeowners as well as commercial 

property owners. The repairs must follow 

the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for 

Rehabilitation. In addition, the tax credits for 

historic preservation projects are available at 

the normal percentage of 20% for certified 

rehabilitation costs for commercial historic 

properties. The program is administered 

by the National Park Service and the IRS
97

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

33. RECOMMENDATION: FEMA, EPA, HUD, and HHS should issue consolidated guidance 

on remediation of indoor air pollutants (e.g. mold, lead, radon, and asbestos) that can 

pose health hazards for workers and residents in the Sandy-affected region. In addition, 

these agencies should recommend or establish region and housing stock specific 

toolkits related to indoor air pollutants for States and localities responding to disasters. 

Tribal, State, and local governments should include the remediation of these indoor 

environmental pollutants in their rebuilding construction/rehabilitation programs.

Although mold removal is not regulated like lead paint or asbestos abatement, several agencies, 

including EPA, HHS and its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National 

Institutes of Health (NIH), National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), DOL, 

and HUD each issued comprehensive guidance on remediation techniques for homeowners. In 

addition, HUD’s Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard Control (OHHLHC) has detailed staff 

to the JFOs in New York and New Jersey to provide information directly to the public about how 

to address mold, asbestos, and lead-based paint damage.

Owner

Lead: HUD

Status

Recommendation in process: Currently being implemented in the Sandy-affected region and will 

be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region as well as future disaster recovery 

efforts nationwide.

Convene Housing Partners to Integrate Plans and 

Facilitate Statutory, Regulatory, and Policy Changes 

to Improve the Delivery of Immediate, Interim, and 

Long-Term Housing in the Event of a Disaster

Challenge and Goal

One of the most important and time-sensitive concerns for an individual or family recovering from a 

disaster is locating housing (temporary, interim, or long-term). For residents displaced for an extended 

period of time, the government often steps in and provides rental assistance. Over the last several 

major disasters, Federal agencies have used a variety of programs to provide housing, but many 

of these programs have raised challenges and concerns for both the Federal Government and for 

recipients. These challenges often stem from restrictive statutory provisions that limit the Federal 

Government’s ability to respond to specific disaster scenarios, due to restrictions on how agencies, 

such as FEMA, can allocate responsibility to State and local governments. 
98

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy

Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing 

Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options

The dense population and urban landscape of New York and New Jersey presented a unique housing 

challenge following Hurricane Sandy. Additionally, low vacancy rates limited the supply of housing that 

was available for displaced families, leading to high costs of the limited housing supply. The traditional 

housing alternatives and policies used in previous disasters were not feasible given these unique 

characteristics of the Sandy-affected region.

The housing challenges that arose after Hurricane Sandy revealed the need for flexible solutions that 

allow the Federal government to address the housing needs that arise from any particular disaster and 

enable agencies to adapt their policies to specific situations. The housing challenges in the aftermath of 

Sandy also raise the question of whether State governments should be given the opportunity to receive 

funding, given that the States may be better positioned to develop appropriate housing solutions. 

The Task Force aims to ensure better coordination between Federal housing partners and to develop 

improved housing solutions, which give the Federal Government and States the flexibility to adapt to 

meet the specific needs that arise in a particular disaster.

34. RECOMMENDATION: Bring together the Housing RSF and Emergency Support 

Function six partner agencies to review and integrate existing housing plans, as well as 

existing statutes, regulations, and policies for potential changes (statutory, regulatory 

or policy) to improve the delivery of housing solutions for future disasters.

Owner

Leads: HUD and FEMA

Status

Recommendation underway, pending further action: The Task Force will work with HUD and 

FEMA to convene the partner agencies and establish goals and milestones.
99

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

Supporting Small Businesses and

Revitalizing Local Economies

Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to disasters because they often have small profit margins 

and cannot sustain extended business interruption. They also typically lack adaptive business 

management models, tend to be underinsured, and, often, depend on generating revenues from 

customers and clients who have also been impacted by the disaster. Disasters amplify existing economic 

issues and launch long-term recovery trajectories for small businesses and entrepreneurs.129

The Task Force also recognizes the role small businesses play in recovery and rebuilding after a disaster. 

Small businesses, such as grocery stores, pharmacies, and gasoline stations, provide services in their 

communities. Furthermore, small business contractors may contribute to economic recovery by taking 

on government contracts for rebuilding and long-term resilience and hiring a local workforce to do the 

work. 

There are more than 28 million small businesses in the United States. These firms create two of every 

three net new jobs and employ half of America’s workforce.130 Small businesses also increase equity 

and inclusion by providing opportunity to vulnerable populations. Of small businesses nationwide, 

nearly one-third (7.8 million) are owned by women and nearly one-fourth (6.1 million) are owned by 

minorities.131 More than 60 percent of workers with a disability are employed by small businesses, 

and more than 60 percent of workers with less than a high school education are employed by small 

businesses.132

For these reasons, small businesses have been a major focus of recovery and rebuilding efforts from 

the Federal to the local levels since the moment Hurricane Sandy passed.

Local Coordination and Communication of Information

Challenge and Goal

After a disaster, small businesses need immediate, direct, and consistent communication about 

resources available to them. There are a number of organizations and entities at the local level that 

provide this communication. These entities should be well coordinated with the Federal agencies that 

can provide financial and other assistance.

129	 FEMA, “Protecting Your Businesses,” updated 03/01/2013, http://www.fema.gov/protecting-your-businesses.

130	 SBA Office of Advocacy, 2013, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/WEB_11_Advo_Brochure.pdf.

131	 SBA Office of Advocacy, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 09/2012, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf.

132	 61.6% of workers with a disability are employed by a firm with fewer than 500 employees, and 62.7% of workers with a

high school education or less are employed by a firm with fewer than 500 employees. Source: SBA Research and Statistics,

“The Small Business Economy 2012,” Appendix A, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Appendix_A_2012.xls.
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

In the aftermath of Sandy, the Task Force heard from frustrated small business owners that there 

were dramatic differences in the amount and quality of information provided by local and Federal 

government officials regarding financial and technical assistance, power outages, school and road 

closures, and other pieces of information. For some, this inconsistency created confusion and delayed 

recovery.

While Federal agencies post information about their 

own disaster recovery programs, they often do not 

reference resources provided by other agencies. As a 

result, small business owners must spend countless 

hours navigating numerous websites to find crucial 

information. Additionally, vulnerable populations and 

typically underserved communities do not always 

have ready access to needed information. 

The following recommendations were developed 

with the goal of improving and institutionalizing local 

coordination, including the Economic RSF, as well as 

enhancing communication of information related to 

Hurricane Sandy recovery.

35. RECOMMENDATION: Build a Disaster 

Preparedness and Operations Team (DPOT) 

focused on planning to help SBA district 

offices, including those in the Hurricane 

Sandy region, ensure clear and consistent 

guidance on how to access both local 

and Federal aid following a disaster.

SBA will further refine its existing coordination with local resource partners and economic 

agencies by building a DPOT to advise each of its 68 District Offices, including those in the 

Sandy-affected region. Prior to a disaster, SBA District Offices already work closely with their 

resource partners -- including Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), Women’s Business 

Centers (WBCs), and the SCORE Association -- and with local community officials and small 

businesses to develop working relationships and ensure clear and consistent guidance on how 

to access local and Federal aid following a disaster. SBA will further support these individual 

District Office led efforts with a headquarters based DPOT which will include disaster assistance 

marketing and outreach teams as well as appropriate representatives from SBA Headquarters. 

DPOT teams will support the District Offices in pre-disaster training and networking. They 

will also provide “reach-back” and deployable support to speed comprehensive small 

business economic recovery following a disaster. These additional coordination efforts will be 

incorporated into SBA’s existing Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan. These new 

EDA

DOC’s Economic Development Administration 

(EDA), as Coordinating Agency for the 

Economic RSF, integrated the technical 

assistance resources of the Federal 

government with those initiatives of the States 

to reduce duplication of effort and promote 

more effective information sharing between 

all levels of government and the private sector. 

Efforts included train-the-trainer Access to 

Capital workshops, a tourism recovery peer-topeer forum, and collaborative efforts between 

Federal and State governments with the 

private sector to enhance risk management.
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teambuilding efforts will help develop more effective small business support networks and will 

be structured to include vulnerable populations. 

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be 

implemented for future projects funded 

by the Sandy Supplemental and will be 

applicable to future disaster recovery efforts 

in the region as well as future disaster 

recovery efforts nationwide.

36. RECOMMENDATION: Institute a “No 

Wrong Door” approach to federal 

information sharing after disasters by 

building on existing information platforms 

and cross-referencing Hurricane Sandy 

disaster recovery resources. Furthermore, 

measures should be taken to ensure 

that information about economic 

recovery from Hurricane Sandy is 

accessible to vulnerable populations.

A user-friendly tool that can allow users 

to specify their needs and effectively 

search and access all applicable program

information, potentially including nonfederal 

resources, is needed. Platforms like Business 

USA, DisasterAssistance.gov, the National 

Disaster Recovery Program Database, and 

Max.gov are intended to share disaster 

recovery information from multiple sources. 

However, the sites are not all well linked 

and businesses, communities, and individuals may have to look at multiple sites to find the 

information and applications they need. 

133	 SBA, “Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs),” accessed 07/24/2013, http://

www.sba.gov/content/small-business-development-centers-sbdcs.

134	 SBA, “Women’s Business Centers,” accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.sba.gov/local-assistance/wbc.

135	 SCORE, “About SCORE,” accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.score.org/about-score.

SBDCs

Small Business Development Centers 

(SBDCs) provide a vast array of technical 

assistance to small businesses and aspiring 

entrepreneurs through professional 

business advisors. Services provided by 

SBDCs help small businesses thrive. They 

include the development of business 

plans, manufacturing assistance, financial 

packaging and lending assistance, and 

procurement and contracting aid.133

Women’s Business Centers (WBCs) represent 

a national network of nearly 100 educational 

centers designed to assist women in starting 

and growing small businesses.134 Through 

the management and technical assistance 

provided by WBCs, entrepreneurs (especially 

women who are economically or socially 

disadvantaged) are offered comprehensive 

training and counseling on a variety of 

topics, in many languages, to help them 

start and grow their own businesses.

The SCORE Association is a non-profit 

association comprised of 12,000 volunteer 

business counselors throughout the U.S. 

and its territories.135 SCORE members are 

trained to serve as counselors, advisors, 

and mentors to aspiring entrepreneurs 

and business owners. These services are 

offered at no fee as a community service. 
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As an outgrowth of both the Sandy recovery efforts and the Administration’s response to the 

2012 Drought, the RSFLG is reviewing multiple databases that have been created with the 

objective of easing the search for specific federal and non-federal resources. In most instances, 

data presented still require significant drill down to find applicable information for specific 

issues. Additionally, linking the tool directly to primary sources so that data automatically 

update would ensure quick access to current data.

Business USA

On October 28, 2011, the President issued a challenge to government agencies to, in the best 

interest of serving America’s business community, think beyond their organizational boundaries 

and start thinking and acting more like the businesses they serve. He directed the creation of 

Business USA, a centralized, one-stop platform to make it easier than ever for businesses to 

access services to help them grow and hire. Federal agencies and local governments can provide 

information and forms that can be linked to the existing “Seek Disaster Assistance” tool (http://

business.usa.gov/disaster-assistance) on Business USA. In addition, Business USA provides call 

center, email, and chat features so any inquiries can be funneled to the appropriate agency or 

local authority.

Business USA (http://www.business.usa.gov) implements a “No Wrong Door” approach for 

small businesses and exporters by using technology to quickly connect businesses to the 

services and information relevant to them, regardless of where the information is located. 

The following agencies have pledged their commitment to making this site a one-stop shop for 

everything related to business in the Federal government: USDADOC, DOL, Treasury, VA, EPA, 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Export-Import Bank of the United States, GSA, 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation, SBA, Trade and Development Agency, the White 

House, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).136

Owner

Lead: RSFLG

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region as well as 

future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

136	 Business USA, accessed 07/22/2013, http://www.business.usa.gov/about-us.
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37. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage HUD CDBG-DR grantees to address the needs of a broad range 

of affected small businesses, including through the provision of grant funds to community 

organizations that work closely with businesses whose needs might otherwise be unmet.

Community-based and economic development organizations are on the front lines when 

disaster hits. These organizations have close relationships with local businesses and knowledge 

of their communities’ needs and assets. They also have networks of stakeholders that grantees 

can and should leverage to share information about available assistance. While these important 

organizations may have provided informal assistance after Sandy, they tend to be underresourced in spite of the considerable value they have to add in short- and long-term rebuilding. 

HUD will issue guidance to encourage grantees consistent with this recommendation.

Owner

Leads: HUD and Grantees

Status

Recommendation adopted: Recommended for implementation for future projects funded by 

the Sandy Supplemental and would be applicable to resilient rebuilding following disasters in 

the region as well as resilient rebuilding following disasters nationwide.

Access to Technical Assistance

Challenge and Goal

Through its community engagement process, the Task Force learned that technical assistance in the 

form of business counseling was inconsistent or not easily accessible. Small business owners cited 

specific services needed in the short-term, such as completing loan applications, business planning, 

legal counseling, and assistance with landlord-tenant issues. In addition, businesses have asked for 

help with business continuity and risk management, marketing, and strategies to build resilience and 

mitigate losses from future disasters. 

SBA sought and received ad hoc authority to expand recovery-related technical assistance efforts led 

by its network of resource partners at SBDCs, WBCs, and SCORE. The Sandy Supplemental made $19 

million available for this purpose. The Task Force recognizes the need to increase the availability of 

technical assistance to help small businesses recover from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to fund small 

business incubators and accelerators that can provide start up and entrepreneurial assistance to new 

businesses and ensure economic growth and resilience.
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38. RECOMMENDATION: Remove statutory barriers for SBA programs that provide additional 

technical assistance to small businesses before, during, and after a disaster.

Currently, there are limits on SBA’s ability to provide technical assistance before and after 

disasters. The Task Force recommends taking the following steps to modify legislation that 

would benefit the Sandy-impacted region, as well as future disaster areas:

• Authorize permanent no-year authority and no-match funding, through a separate 

line item, for future SBA appropriations of disaster grants for SBDCs, WBCs, and SCORE 

serving a disaster area.

• Waive territorial limitations for SBDCs, WBCs, and SCORE in providing technical 

assistance after a disaster.

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation underway, pending further action: These activities are being implemented for 

the Sandy disaster area through funds and authority provided for these purposes in the Sandy 

Supplemental; permanent authority would require legislative action and would be applicable to 

recovery and resilient rebuilding following future disasters nationwide.

39. RECOMMENDATION: Provide SBA statutory authority to fund incubators and accelerators.

By providing SBA grant authority and no-match funding for incubators and accelerators, SBA 

would be able to work collaboratively with its resource partners to aid entrepreneurs, startups, and small businesses (including vulnerable populations) after a disaster by providing them 

mentorship, resources, and training. These companies will in turn contribute to economic 

growth and resilience in disaster-impacted regions. 

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation submitted: Would be applicable to resilient rebuilding following disasters in 

the region and to resilient rebuilding following disasters nationwide.
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

Access to Capital for Small Businesses

Challenge and Goal

After a disaster, while revenues are depressed, small 

businesses urgently need capital to offset disrupted 

cash flows, replace inventory, manage repairs, and 

retain employees. In the months and sometimes 

years following a disaster, small businesses that may 

be adapting their business model to a post-disaster, 

or rebuilding, economy need long-term working 

capital that will give them the flexibility they need to 

adapt. While grant and low-interest loan programs 

were made available by CDFIs within two months of 

the storm, these programs were few and far between 

and had limited funding. SBA loans filled much of the 

gap in needed loan financing. In addition, there are 

currently CDBG-DR funded grant and loan programs 

underway in the Hurricane Sandy region.

The Task Force found numerous challenges faced 

by small business owners trying to access financial 

assistance from Federal and local sources. Specific 

challenges to accessing SBA’s Disaster Loans 

included: a perception of excessive “red tape,”

leading to fewer applications submitted; mixed 

communication by governments and other entities, 

leading to discouragement from applying for

SBA loans; confusion surrounding “duplication of 

benefits” rules; delays in the application process and 

rigorous application requirements; a limited array 

of loan products; and challenges specific to “micro” 

businesses owned and run by vulnerable populations 

that may not be engaged with more traditional

associations and networks and may have limited 

abilities to complete the application process.

137	 SBA Disaster Loan Application data, 2011-2012.

138	 SBA Disaster Loan Approval data, 2013.

139	 Ibid.

140	 Ibid.

141	 Ibid.

SBA’s Disaster Loan Program

SBA’s Disaster Loan Program was, and is, 

the most consistent avenue of recovery for 

businesses after a disaster. Following the 

2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, 

and Wilma), SBA experienced significant 

challenges meeting the demand for its disaster 

home and business loans. Since then, SBA 

has completely rebuilt its disaster operation, 

upgraded technology, reformed processes, 

and leveraged personnel to create a system 

far better able to handle major disasters 

and serve survivors. This is evidenced in 

the early recovery work from Sandy:

SBA’s Disaster Electronic Loan Application 

(ELA) resulted in 55 percent of all Sandy 

disaster loan applications being in electronic 

form; this is up from 36 percent submitted via 

ELA in FY2012 and 27 percent in FY2011.137

Average times between loan application 

submission and approval fell from 61 

business days in FY2006 to 15 business days 

in FY2012 (inclusive of all SBA declared 

disasters in 2012).138 This fiscal year, the 

average SBA response time has been 27 

business days for the over 108,700 disaster 

loan applications for all recently declared 

disasters.139 However, the average application 

processing time for businesses in Hurricane 

Sandy has been 42 days, suggesting that 

further improvements can be made to 

manage large catastrophic events.140

The average approval rate for SBA disaster 

loans for Hurricane Sandy as of July 2013 was 

53 percent (home 55 percent, business 41 

percent); as of July 2013, SBA had approved 

36,137 loans totaling $2.4 billion, with 

32,194 home loans for $1.94 billion and 

3,943 business loans for $448.3 million.141
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

The Task Force recognizes the importance of enhancing access to capital for small businesses impacted 

by Hurricane Sandy.

40. RECOMMENDATION: Institute new and innovative process 

improvements to SBA’s Disaster Loan program.

Several steps can be taken to continue to make processing and approval times more efficient 

including: 

• Developing a process of separate application tracks for business and home disaster 

loans. 

• Establishing a process to expedite approval of disaster loan applications that meet 

minimum credit score and other specified eligibility requirements. 

• Establishing a new training module for reserve disaster loan officers based on efficiencies 

and improvements identified in an analysis of the Hurricane Sandy response.

After a disaster, homeowners normally apply for loans faster than small businesses. Typically, 

small business owners first assess the economic damage to their businesses caused by 

disrupted supply chains, displaced consumers, structural damage, inventory loss, and a range 

of other complex factors. As a result, small businesses apply for disaster loans much later than 

homeowners and, if they are handled in the same processing tracks, usually face delays due to 

the large number of home loan applications filed ahead of them. SBA will address this problem 

by creating a separate track for small businesses, with the potential to improve processing times 

for both small business and home loans. 

Expediting the approval of certain SBA disaster loan applications will make processing more 

efficient and, by determining which applications can be processed quickly and deploying staff 

accordingly, SBA can then dedicate more staff to potentially more time-consuming applications.

The establishment of a new training module builds upon continuous procedural improvements 

to the disaster loan program made by SBA since Hurricane Katrina and ensures that a trained 

reserve staff is in place for the next disaster. 

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts in the region. 

This will also be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

41. RECOMMENDATION: Modify regulations to adopt an “alternative size standard” for 

small businesses for SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster Loans similar to the standard 

for SBA business loan programs, to enable more businesses to qualify for loans.

Currently, to qualify for SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loans, a business is determined to be 

small based on either its revenues or number of employees. By offering an alternative size 

standard based on the same standards used for SBA’s 7(a)/504 loan guarantees, more small 

businesses in need of capital after a disaster that do not have traditional sources of financing 

available to them could qualify for disaster loans.

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts in the region 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

42. RECOMMENDATION: Increase SBA’s unsecured disaster loan limits 

and expedite the disbursement of small dollar loans.

Currently, SBA’s limits on unsecured disaster loans, which do not require collateral, are $14,000 

for physical damage and $5,000 for economic injury.142 If the limits were raised to $25,000 

for both physical and economic injury, more small businesses that may be impacted by 

future disasters would be provided with much-needed small dollar loans following a disaster. 

Additionally, to speed up the disbursement time of funds, SBA plans to create separate queues 

for unsecured and secured loans. 

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation underway, pending further action: To be implemented for future disaster 

recovery efforts nationwide. This recommendation will require both statutory and regulatory 

changes.

142	 SBA Disaster Loan Terms.
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43. RECOMMENDATION: Defer loan payments due to SBA from Microloan 

Intermediaries, when appropriate as determined by SBA Administrator, if a 

certain percent of the Intermediary’s portfolio is made up of loans to microborrowers in major disaster areas, including the Hurricane Sandy region.

SBA provides funds to specially designated intermediary lenders, which are non-profit 

community-based organizations with experience in lending as well as management and 

technical assistance. These intermediaries administer SBA’s Microloan program for eligible 

borrowers. SBA’s Microloan program provides loans up to $50,000 to help small businesses 

and certain non-profit childcare centers start up and expand. The average microloan is about 

$13,000.143 By deferring loan payments due to SBA when their borrowers are clearly having 

difficulty making payments, microloan intermediaries have more flexibility to defer small 

business microloans.

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts in the region 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

44. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage HUD CDBG-DR grantees and private sources to fund 

additional CDFI outreach and support to small businesses in vulnerable communities.

Treasury has encouraged and facilitated steps by grantees and other funders to support CDFIs. 

CDFIs have the ability to leverage significant private resources to support small businesses and 

reach vulnerable populations. The Task Force has also collaborated with HUD to create a CDFI 

index containing information about CDFIs that are active in the Sandy-affected region. The index 

is explained in the Housing chapter of this report on page 95. 

Owner

Lead: Treasury, in coordination with HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: Recommended for implementation for future projects funded by 

the Sandy Supplemental and would be applicable to resilient rebuilding following disasters in 

the region as well as resilient rebuilding following disasters nationwide.

143	 SBA Microloan Program Data
109

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45. RECOMMENDATION: Raise awareness that Treasury’s SSBCI Program can 

be used for disaster recovery, including Hurricane Sandy recovery.

SSBCI provides States significant flexibility 

to build on successful models for State small 

business programs, including collateral 

support programs, Capital Access Programs, 

loan participation programs, and loan 

guarantee programs. In addition, many State 

and local governments have experience 

setting up temporary disaster assistance 

programs for small businesses immediately 

following a crisis. SSBCI allows States the

flexibility to leverage SSBCI funding to help 

small businesses impacted by disasters 

rebuild their business stronger than before. 

To support the work of the Task Force,

Treasury used the annual conference of SSBCI state program managers held June 3-4, 2013 at 

the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank to promote the program’s flexibility to provide capital to small 

businesses that are still recovering from Hurricane Sandy or last summer’s historic drought. 

Owner

Lead: Treasury in coordination with the States

Status

Recommendation adopted: Implementation underway for future disaster recovery efforts in the 

region and future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Rebuilding Contracts

Challenge and Goal

After a disaster, there are a number of contracting opportunities at the Federal, State, and local 

levels. These types of contracts are often well-suited for small businesses to perform; however, small 

businesses need access to these opportunities, as well as the skills and knowledge of how to compete 

and win the contracts. Following Sandy, key concerns that the small business community expressed 

144	 Treasury, “State Small Business Credit Initiative,” updated 3/19/2013, http://www.

treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/ssbci.aspx.

145	 Ibid.

SSBCI

The SSBCI was funded with $1.5 billion 

from the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 

to support State and local programs that 

provide lending to small businesses and small 

manufacturers that are creditworthy but are 

not getting the loans they need to expand 

and create jobs.144 SSBCI is expected to help 

spur up to $15 billion in lending to small 

businesses, or a 10:1 leverage ratio on each 

federal dollar, by December 31, 2016.145
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Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

to the Task Force about contracting included: difficulty finding information about available rebuilding 

contracts; a possible shortage of local contractors for certain work or with FEMA certification; difficulty 

for minority-owned small businesses to compete with better-capitalized businesses for contracts; 

a struggle to find opportunities related to long-term rebuilding; and difficulty determining which 

resources would be available to help small businesses maximize long-term rebuilding opportunities. 

SBA Administrator Karen Mills and OMB’s Office of 

Federal Procurement Policy Administrator Joe Jordan 

currently convene the White House Small Business 

Procurement Group on a quarterly basis to hold the 

24 top-procuring Federal agencies accountable to 

meeting their small business contracting goals and to 

ensure best practices are disseminated throughout 

the government. At the June 26, 2013 meeting, 

which Task Force Executive Director Laurel Blatchford 

attended, Administrator Mills and Administrator 

Jordan asked agencies to maximize utilization of 

small businesses in Sandy-related disaster contracts. 

Presently, the statutory goal for prime contracts to 

small businesses is set at 23 percent. (There is no 

specific goal set for disaster recovery contracts.) 

As of July 2013, 27.1 percent of Sandy-related 

prime contract146 dollars obligated in the Federal 

Procurement Database System went to small 

business, exhibiting a strong Federal commitment to 

small business contracting.147 Of note, 13.6 percent of 

Sandy-related prime contract dollars obligated in the 

Federal Procurement Database System went to local 

New York and New Jersey businesses of all sizes.148

Several recommendations are designed to continue 

making progress on increasing small business149

contracting for Hurricane Sandy rebuilding and longterm resilience with an emphasis on utilizing local 

business capacity. By involving local businesses in recovery efforts, communities can keep revenues 

local, create local jobs, and help minority and disadvantaged businesses recover.

146 A prime contract is a contract that is awarded directly by the Federal government to a business. It is distinct from a

subcontract, which is a contract in which a business performs part or all of the obligations of another’s contract.

147	 Task Force analysis of Federal Procurement Data System data, 08/01/2013, https://www.fpds.gov/.

148	 Ibid.

149	 SBA, “Goaling Program,” accessed 07/24/2013, http://www.sba.gov/about-sba-services/2636.

The SBA Act

The Small Business Act stipulates that all small 

businesses have the maximum practicable 

opportunity to provide goods and services 

to the Federal Government. Congress, in 

furtherance of that policy, enacted various 

small business goals for Federal procurement. 

SBA is responsible for the management and 

oversight of the small business procurement 

process across the Federal Government. SBA 

works with Federal agencies to negotiate 

small business prime and subcontracting 

goals to ensure that small businesses have the 

maximum practicable opportunity to provide 

goods and services to the Federal Government. 

Furthermore, the goal negotiation seeks 

to ensure that the Federal Government 

meets the 23 percent statutory goal to small 

businesses, 5 percent to women-owned small 

businesses, 5 percent to small disadvantaged 

businesses, 3 percent to service disabled 

veteran-owned small businesses, and 3 

percent to certified Historically Underutilized 

Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses.149
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46. RECOMMENDATION: Create opportunities and tools to increase access for small 

businesses to rebuild their businesses and participate in Hurricane Sandy rebuilding.

SBA has or is implementing multiple activities supporting this recommendation:

• On August 7, 2013, SBA and other Task Force agencies collaborated on the Hurricane 

Sandy Small Business Recovery and Matchmaking Summit in Newark, N.J. The event 

educated more than 400 affected small businesses about local and Federal resources 

and connecting them with government and global corporate buyers. Modeled after SBA’s 

American Supplier Initiative, this event was designed to increase the number of small 

businesses in the corporate and Federal supply chains, equip small businesses with the 

tools to be effective suppliers, and build lasting relationships between small businesses 

and government and global corporate buyers. 

• Responding to the need to ensure that small businesses have a one-stop source 

to identify not only Federal contracting opportunities related to Hurricane Sandy 

but also State and local contracting opportunities, SBA expanded its existing Sandy 

website (http://www.sba.gov/Sandy) to include contracting opportunities for small 

businesses at the Federal, State, and local levels. This effort centralizes and improves the 

communication of information about contracts; thus, addressing a concern that small 

businesses in the Sandy-affected region expressed to the Task Force.

• The Task Force and SBA identified the need for increased training for contracting officers 

on special regulations that apply to disaster response-related contracts (e.g., set-asides 

that can be used for local and small businesses). SBA will develop an online webinar 

series to provide this training, which will be available on an ongoing basis on SBA’s 

“Government Contracting Classroom” (http://www.sba.gov/gcclassroom).

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Implementation underway or completed for disaster recovery 

efforts in the region. The contracting officer training will also benefit future disaster recovery 

efforts nationwide.
112

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47. RECOMMENDATION: Make statutory changes to existing SBA initiatives to make it easier 

for small and local businesses to access Federal contracts for Hurricane Sandy rebuilding.

The changes below would directly impact small and local contractors’ ability to receive 

Hurricane Sandy rebuilding contracts in years to come and impact future recoveries from 

disasters: 

• Provide authority to SBA to reinstate as a Disaster Historically Underutilized Business 

Zone (HUBZone) for five years any HUBZone whose HUBZone designation expired in the 

preceding five years and is in a county with a Presidential Declared Disaster. This would 

give local firms based in those areas the ability to become HUBZone certified and obtain 

preference in Federal contracting dollars, helping to stimulate local economies.

• Upon the request of a certified 8(a) firm in a major declared disaster area, SBA will 

suspend the firm’s participation in the nine-year 8(a) Business Development program 

for a one-year period while the firm recovers from the disaster to ensure the firm is able 

to take full advantage of the program, rather than being impacted by lack of capacity or 

contracting opportunities due to disaster-induced disruptions. During this suspension, 

the firm would not be eligible for 8(a) Business Development Program benefits, including 

set-asides; however, the firm would not “lose time” in the nine-year program due to the 

extenuating circumstances that the disaster created.

HUBZone and the 8(a) Business Development Program are two key programs SBA implemented 

to help small, disadvantaged businesses compete in the marketplace and gain preferential 

access to Federal procurement opportunities.

Owner

Lead: SBA

Status

Recommendation underway, pending further action: Recommended for implementation of 

future projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster 

recovery efforts in the region and nationwide. 

Workforce Training and Employment Opportunities

Challenge and Goal

The short-term workforce impacts of Hurricane Sandy were due to myriad challenges, including: 

disruptions of public transportation and road closures; electricity outages; gas leaks; limited childcare; 
113

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

and damages to personal residences. Many of the businesses that escaped physical damage from high 

winds or flooding sustained economic damage, such as business interruption or changes in clientele, 

and were unable to keep employees working. According to analysis from the Department of Commerce 

(DOC), changes in unemployment claims, payroll employment, and industrial production suggest that 

economic activity in the New York-New Jersey area almost fully resumed within a couple of months 

after the storm. Potential economic gains are likely to be realized over the next several years, according 

to DOC’s analysis, if repair and construction needs, as presented by the states, are met.150

In order to meet those repair and construction 

needs, local governments will need to ramp up 

retraining and other workforce development 

programs necessary to help workers adapt to new 

trades. In addition, local workforce development 

institutions, both public and private, will need to 

adjust to prepare the local workforce for significant 

new opportunities that will come with large-scale 

infrastructure and resilience projects. Ideally, these 

organizations will be able to provide, in a relatively 

short amount of time, retraining opportunities to 

allow otherwise unemployed or underemployed 

residents gain access to the rebuilding boom.

And although falling unemployment numbers show 

progress,151 they may not reflect underemployment 

and other disproportionate impacts in certain 

communities and industries. In Sandy’s aftermath, those that were unemployed prior to the storm are 

having a difficult time finding employment, and individuals unemployed as a result of the storm might 

not have the skills needed to obtain employment in the recovery economy. In some cases, there is 

a readily available and qualified out-of-state population to do recovery-related work. In other cases, 

vulnerable populations fear being excluded from skills building and job placement opportunities, and 

significant barriers exist for low-skilled, limited English proficiency, minority, and disabled workers in 

learning about job opportunities and hiring processes. 

Recommendations are designed to enhance job options and opportunities for local residents to 

participate in Hurricane Sandy rebuilding.

150	 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Economist, draft report “Economic Impact of Super Storm Sandy

151 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployment rates in New Jersey, New York State, and New York

City decreased by 0.9, 1.0, and 0.7 percentage points between September 2012 and June 2013, respectively. In

comparison, national unemployment fell 0.2 percentage points in the same period. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics,

“Unemployment Rates for States,” 06/2013, http://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm; New York State Department

of Labor, “Labor Statistics for the New York City Region,” 06/2013, http://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/nyc/.

DOL’s Registered 

Apprenticeship Program

Through DOL’s Registered Apprenticeship 

program there are opportunities for local 

residents to help rebuild communities and 

receive on the job learning experiences. 

Pairing dislocated workers with Registered 

Apprenticeship sponsors/employers provides a 

benefit to both the worker and the employer: 

the worker will receive paid training, and the 

employer will receive a staff resource that 

could result in a permanent staff resource 

once the training period is completed. 
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

48. RECOMMENDATION: Promote best practices of local workforce agencies that are integrating 

disaster recovery and long-term Hurricane Sandy rebuilding into their ongoing efforts.

An example of a best practice is the Recovery Talent Network in New Jersey, established by the 

New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (LWD) and led by Ocean County 

College. The Recovery Talent Network will assess the overall workforce needs of Hurricane 

Sandy impacted employers in New Jersey and will work with educational institutions, workforce 

development organizations, and other stakeholders to develop new programs to connect 

unemployed individuals with employment opportunities. 

DOL’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) regularly shares best practices with other 

States, including New Jersey’s Talent Network efforts. ETA’s regional office also will share best 

practices relating to Hurricane Sandy rebuilding with other States, including New York, at ETA’s 

State Administrators’ meeting, scheduled for August 5-6, 2013 and Business Services virtual 

meeting, scheduled for August 13-15, 2013.

LWD developed the concept of Talent Networks in 2010, starting with six networks built around 

six Garden State industry clusters that employ more than half of the workers in New Jersey and 

pay more than two-thirds of the wages earned in the State. Talent Networks enlist employers 

to identify the skills employers need in new employees to further the growth and operations of 

their businesses. In turn, the Talent Networks work closely with State workforce development 

agencies, educational institutions, and career and technical education schools to develop those 

skills in the workforce, improving employment possibilities and fueling the State’s economic 

growth. 

Owner

Leads: DOL, in coordination with the States

Status

Recommendation adopted: Implementation underway for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region and will be 

applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.
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49. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage HUD CDBG-DR grantees, in complying with Section 

3 regulations, to maximize efforts to create specialized skills training programs in 

the areas needed most for Sandy rebuilding, ranging from mold remediation and 

construction to ecosystem and habitat restoration, green infrastructure, and coastal 

engineering. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that these training programs 

include low-income individuals and other vulnerable populations and create local 

Hurricane Sandy recovery jobs that pay wages and benefits at industry standards.

Section 3 is a provision of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. The purpose 

of Section 3 is to ensure that employment and other economic opportunities generated by 

certain HUD financial assistance are directed—to the greatest extent feasible and in a manner 

consistent with existing Federal, State, and local laws and regulations—to low- and very lowincome persons, particularly those who are recipients of HUD assistance for housing, and to 

business concerns that provide economic opportunities to low- and very low-income persons. 

The Task Force recognizes that providing job training, employment, and contract opportunities 

to low- or very-low income residents in connection with projects and activities in their 

neighborhoods is a key strategy for revitalizing communities. For example, these opportunities 

could be publicized widely at public housing facilities to increase participation of its residents, 

especially where there are HUD-funded projects at those facilities.

Owner

Lead: HUD, in coordination with grantees

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region and will be 

applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

50. RECOMMENDATION: Pursuant to Executive Order 13502, executive agencies 

should be encouraged to consider Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) on 

large-scale construction projects in the Hurricane Sandy region in order 

to promote economy and efficiency in federal procurement.

President Obama’s Executive Order 13502 encourages federal agencies to consider requiring 

the use of PLAs to promote the efficient and expeditious completion of federal construction 

projects. PLAs can provide structure and stability that may help agencies manage the 

challenges, posed by large-scale construction contracts, to efficient and timely procurement. 

PLAs can help ensure large scale federal construction projects are completed on time and on 

budget by:
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Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

• Providing a mechanism for coordinating wages, hours, work rules, and other terms of 

employment across the project.

• Creating structure and stability 

through the use of broad provisions 

for grievance and arbitration of 

any disputes that may arise on site, 

including procedures for resolving 

disputes among the construction 

crafts.

• Prohibiting work stoppages, 

slowdowns, or strikes for the duration 

of a project and obligating senior 

union management to use their best 

efforts to prevent any threats of 

disruption of work that might arise.

• Ensuring expeditious access to a welltrained, assured supply of skilled labor, 

even in remote areas where skilled 

labor would have otherwise been 

extremely difficult to find in a timely 

fashion.

The Sandy-affected region has traditionally 

utilized PLAs as an effective way to complete 

complex construction projects, taking 

advantage of a highly skilled permanent 

workforce and experienced contractors. In 

carrying out large-scale construction projects 

for Sandy rebuilding, federal agencies are reminded of their responsibilities under Executive 

Order 13502. To further support the goal of Executive Order 13502 in the region, and to ensure 

those impacted by Hurricane Sandy benefit from local federal construction projects, the Task 

Force also recommends encouraging the use of registered apprenticeship programs, developing 

community partnerships, and promoting the hiring of local workers. 

Owner

Coordinating Agency: DOL

Supporting Agencies: Agencies funding and building infrastructure projects (DOT, HUD, USACE,

DOI, EPA, DHS, and GSA)

Project Labor Agreements

On February 6, 2009, President Obama issued 

Executive Order 13502: Use of PLAs for Federal 

Construction Projects under the Federal 

Property and Administrative Services Act [40 

U.S.C. 101 et seq.] Pursuant to this order is 

the promotion of efficient procurement and 

completion of large scale Federal construction 

projects ($25 million and more) in an 

economical, efficient, and timely manner. 

Under the Executive Order, a PLA is defined as 

a pre-hire collective bargaining agreement with 

one or more labor organizations [as defined in 

29 U.S.C. 152 (5)]. Labor organizations in the 

construction industry maintain a permanent 

workforce that can predict labor costs 

while bidding on contracts. Further, these 

labor organizations are adept in managing 

multiple teams of construction craft workers 

at a single location. PLAs greatly reduce 

labor disputes -- with guarantees against 

strikes, lockouts, and similar job disruptions 

-- and uncertain craft work assignments. 
117

Long Beach, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Strategy Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region.
Long Beach Island, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
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Rebuilding Strategy Addressing Insurance Challenges, Understanding, and Affordability

Addressing Insurance Challenges, 

Understanding, and Affordability

When risks are known and disasters are imminent, individuals can take immediate precautions like 

boarding up windows when the forecast predicts high winds, seeking shelter during tornadoes, and 

clearing basements of valuables in the face of floods. Businesses can likewise prepare for disruption 

and, in some cases, plan to operate remotely. For risks less imminent and more difficult to predict, 

insurance can be an important line of defense against economic loss. In the absence of insurance, the 

cost of repairing damaged property is usually borne by the property/business owner or the Federal 

government through federal assistance and often has negative social consequences—disrupting lives 

and livelihoods.152

There are two approaches to reducing the cost of recovery from future disasters. The first is to mitigate 

and reduce risk by moving out of harm’s way or hardening properties to better withstand flood or other 

hazards. The second is to insure property and transfer the risk. The Task Force is proposing initiatives to 

encourage investment in both hazard mitigation and insurance. For these approaches to be effective, 

individuals need to understand their risks, take steps to reduce risk, and invest in applicable insurance 

products that will adequately transfer their risk in the case of a disaster. 

Disbursement Delays

Challenge and Goal

After Sandy, an enormous number of insurance claims were filed in the region. Specifically, in New York 

and New Jersey—as of June 2013, 830,000 homeowner, 165,000 auto, and 126,000 residential flood 

insurance claims had been filed. An additional 71,000 commercial property claims and 5,000 flood 

claims were also filed by businesses.153 Given this incredible volume of claims, it is not surprising that 

many home and business owners were frustrated by the adjustment and inconsistent disbursement 

processes. Policy holders with mortgages faced a particular set of frustrations. For this group, insurance 

claim checks were sometimes issued jointly to the property owner and the property owner’s mortgage 

provider. In certain cases, the claim proceeds were made available to the property owner immediately. 

In other cases, funds were held by banks and released in increments as repairs were completed. The 

amount of funds that can be released, as well as the manner in which they can be released, is generally 

established pursuant to regulations set by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA. 

152	 Congressional Research Service, “The National Flood Insurance Program: Status and Remaining

Issues for Congress”, 02/06/2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf

153	 New York numbers from DFS as of June 14, 2013; New Jersey numbers from DBI and

Insurance as of June 18, 2013; NFIP numbers from FEMA as of June 25, 2013.
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In the case of Sandy, the most common consumer complaint concerned banks and mortgage providers 

not processing insurance proceed checks in a timely manner. For example, in March 2013, four months 

after Hurricane Sandy, some banks were holding back 44 percent of Sandy insurance claims (compared 

to the industry average of 17 percent) amounting to 1,109 checks totaling nearly $41 million.154 While 

banks often play an important role in ensuring appropriate use of disbursements for rehabilitation 

activities and may help property owners navigate the rebuilding process, the delays have been a source 

of great frustration in the region.

The Task Force’s goal was to unify disbursement regulations, reduce confusion, and expedite the 

release of funds. 

51. RECOMMENDATION: Establish Unified Insurance Disbursement Process.

One reason for the delayed disbursement of insurance funds described above is that Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, and a multitude of private sector lenders had different policies for 

approving the release of insurance claim funds. To address this issue, the Task Force established 

a working group of lenders to review and propose unified policies and processes that could be 

adopted by the lenders and financial institutions. The policies are being worked on for future 

disasters and will be presented to FHFA and FHA for review and approval.

Owner

Leads: Task Force, FHFA, FHA, Lenders

Status

Recommendation adopted: Implementation underway for revised disbursement process for 

current Sandy recovery efforts that will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the 

region as well as future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Consumer Confusion

Challenge and Goal

After Sandy, as after most other large hurricanes, many homeowners were surprised to learn what was 

and was not covered under their insurance policies. In particular, property owners were surprised to 

learn that their homeowners’ policies did not cover floods. This was especially true for those property 

owners who did not live in FEMA-designated flood zones. Misunderstandings were compounded by 

confusion over whether damage was caused by flooding (covered only by flood insurance) or by wind 

and rain (covered by some, but not all, homeowners’ policies).155

154 Office of the Governor of New York, “Governor Cuomo Announces DFS Investigation Identifies Banks with Worst

Sandy Aid Statistics”, 03/19/2013, https://www.governor.ny.gov/press/03192013cuomo_dfs_worst_sandy_aid

155 Congressional Research Service, “The National Flood Insurance Program: Status and Remaining

Issues for Congress”, 02/06/2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf
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Businesses, likewise, were confused about what was covered and not covered by their commercial 

insurance policies. According to a survey conducted by the New York Federal Reserve Bank, only eight 

percent of small businesses that incurred damage related to Sandy had flood insurance.156

Another source of confusion and surprise for property owners affected by Sandy was that many had 

no previous knowledge they were at risk of flooding. As described earlier in the Rebuilding Strategy 

document, many flood maps for the region were out of date and greatly underrepresented the 

geographic areas at risk of flooding. FEMA identifies one percent probability flood event on its maps; 

flooding that exceeds the one percent event can and does happen. This can be catastrophic when 

property owners outside mapped flood zones are unaware of their risk and lack adequate insurance to 

protect their financial interests.

As a result, the Task Force has worked to highlight best practice consumer communication regarding 

property owners’ risks, insurance coverage, and insurance policies, and has also worked to promote 

general disaster preparedness.

52. RECOMMENDATION: Support efforts to reduce consumer confusion regarding 

risk and insurance coverage while working to increase hazard preparedness.

To improve understanding of risks, FEMA has a process to keep flood maps updated. Map 

changes may have an impact on flood insurance rates. In March of 2009, Congress approved 

the Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) tool to update flood maps. Among 

the major objectives of Risk MAP is to ensure that 80 percent of the nation’s flood hazards are 

current (meaning the flood hazard data is either new, recently updated, or deemed still valid). 

FEMA is required by law to review maps every five years to ensure individuals have up-to-date 

information about their flood risk. 

To increase take up of flood insurance by individuals and businesses, the Task Force 

recommends leveraging the lessons learned from NFIP’s FloodSmart marketing campaign in the 

2004-2010 timeframe in ongoing outreach efforts. These include: 

• Communicating both probabilities and consequences, including actionable information 

specific to the individual.

• Incorporating decision aids specific to the location and individual (e.g., the FloodSmart 

flood risk assessment tool for specific addresses) that provide premium and insurance 

agent information.

• Communicating sources and pathways of flooding.

• Encouraging individuals to assess the consequences of not carrying insurance on their 

individual financial situation.

156 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “2013 Small Business Borrowers Poll: Superstorm Sandy

Insurance”, 05/2013, http://www.newyorkfed.org/smallbusiness/2013
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• Leveraging windows, such as after flood events or when map revisions occur, when 

affected individuals are focused on insurance and flood risk and may be receptive to 

change.

• Utilizing “consumer-speak” to deliver an effective message that is relevant to 

consumers.157 

As a result of the FloodSmart outreach campaign, there was an increase in number of people 

renewing their policies and, therefore, more flood insurance coverage in force in the 2003-2006 

timeframe, highlighting the campaign’s contribution to flood risk communication.158

The Task Force also sought to encourage individuals to prepare themselves for relevant hazards 

and supports FEMA’s efforts in this area. Despite multiple campaigns and awareness efforts, 

a large percentage of Americans have not performed preparedness actions to increase their 

personal safety nor, as previously mentioned, do they understand their risk and insurance 

coverage, or lack thereof, should they be hit by a disaster or emergency. Effective campaigns 

encourage behavioral change by linking strategies with community-based action. 

To this end, FEMA’s Individual and Community Preparedness Division (ICPD) will launch 

America’s PrepareAthon!, a nationwide, community-based campaign for action to increase 

emergency preparedness and community resilience and build understanding of risk and 

insurance. Though not yet officially launched, shortly after Hurricane Sandy, America’s 

PrepareAthon!, in partnership with the Ready Campaign, the Ad Council, Al Roker and the Today 

Show, launched a public service announcement designed to inform citizens about preparing 

their homes for safety.159

Once launched, twice yearly, in the spring and fall, America’s PrepareAthon! will highlight a 

“national day of action,” on which millions of citizens can participate through drills, group 

discussions, and exercises to practice for local hazards. The Task Force strongly encourages 

using these days to also emphasize the value of insurance and educate potential consumers 

on available insurance products and hazard mitigation measures. The campaign is actionable, 

measurable, and informed by the latest scientific research to help increase the number 

of citizens who understand the hazards most likely to occur in their community; know the 

corresponding protective actions, hazard mitigation measures, and community plans; practice 

a real-time behavior to increase their preparedness; and contribute to increase community 

preparedness planning. 

157	 Vrem, M.J. “Communicating Risk - Ten Key Learnings from the FloodSmart Campaign,” Gilbert F. White National Flood Policy

Forum 2010 Assembly, 2010 http://www.asfpmfoundation.org/pdf_ppt/2010_GFW_Forum_Background_Reading.pdf

158	 Society for Risk Analysis, “Policy Tenure Under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)”, 2011,

http://cedm.epp.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/Erwann%20et%20al%20on%20flood%20insurance.pdf

159 Lynda F. Williams, ICPD, Campaign Manager, America’s PrepareAthon!
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Owner

Leads: FEMA and Federal Insurance Office within the Department of the Treasury

Status

Recommendation adopted: Will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide. 

The soft launch of America’s PrepareAthon! is scheduled for September 5, 2013.

53. RECOMMENDATION: Improve National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policyholder 

awareness of factors that affect flood risk and insurance rating decisions.

Currently, policyholders have little access to NFIP resources or data that would provide detailed 

information on their property’s vulnerability to flood hazards. Compounding the issue, the 

program lacks structure-specific elevation data for more than 1.5 million160 structures in the 

floodplain that receive subsidized rates or non-elevation based rates, and the program is 

therefore incapable of calculating or communicating structure-specific risk for those policies.161

This information is not available because these homes were constructed and a policy was issued 

before the community’s flood insurance rate maps were issued.

As a result, many policyholders are largely unaware of the various factors that influence their 

assessed flood risk and corresponding insurance premiums. These policyholders are at a 

disadvantage in terms of taking steps to manage their existing risk. The factors that have the 

greatest influence on the program’s current rating process are elevation and environmental 

conditions that affect the NFIP’s designation of flood zones.162

To best address this challenge, the Task Force recommends that the NFIP provides structurespecific information and hazard mitigation suggestions for Sandy-impacted customers’ annual 

premium bills. This will serve as a mechanism by which the program can stimulate individual 

demand for hazard mitigation measures and more effective hazard mitigation and floodplain 

management at the community level.

Owner

Lead: FEMA

160	 FEMA

161 “Buildings constructed after December 31, 1974, or after the publication of a flood insurance rate map (FIRM), are charged an

actuarial premium that reflects the property’s risk of flooding. Subsidized rates, on the other hand, are determined by a statutory

mandate that requires rates to be affordable so individuals are encouraged to participate. Owners of properties built prior to the

issuance of a community’s flood hazard map or January 1, 1974 (Pre-Firm structures), usually pay subsidized rates and are exempted

from the NFIP’s floodplain management standards. Even properties that are remapped into higher-risk areas pay the subsidized

rates ─ a situation that exacerbates the financial challenges facing the NFIP.” Congressional Research Service, “The National Flood

Insurance Program: Status and Remaining Issues for Congress,” 02/06/2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf.

162	 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Flood Insurance Program – Frequently Asked Questions” 25/01/2013

http://www.fema.gov/region-vi/national-flood-insurance-program-reform-frequently-asked-questions.
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Status

Recommendation adopted: FEMA has begun to implement for some policies. Will be applicable 

to those impacted by Sandy and policy holders nationwide.

Actuarially Sound Rates

Challenge and Goal

In the summer before Hurricane Sandy, 

Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood 

Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW12), 

reauthorizing the program through 2017 

with significant reforms. Congress acted 

to make the NFIP rates more risk-based, 

reducing existing subsidies. As of March 

2013, the NFIP owed the Treasury $24 

billion, in part, due to the large losses 

from Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012.163

Key provisions of the legislation require 

the NFIP to phase out subsidized and 

grandfathered rates so that policy 

premiums reflect true actuarial risk. One 

of the benefits of moving to actuarially 

sound rates is that property owners will 

have better information about the risks 

at hand and therefore will have better 

clarity on the potential payoffs of hazard mitigation and insurance. The reforms will mean premium 

rate increases for some, but not all, policyholders over time. The NFIP has already begun to implement 

the phase-out of some subsidies. Residents and business owners in the Sandy-affected region have 

expressed concern and uncertainty about how the changes will affect the cost of insuring their 

properties.

As the NFIP transitions toward full risk rates, there will be significant increases in premiums for some 

subsidized and grandfathered policies. Individuals whose properties are at risk of flooding may lack 

the resources to make prudent risk management and mitigation decisions, including those to relocate, 

mitigate, or purchase adequate insurance. BW12 authorized studies by FEMA, the National Academy 

of Sciences, and the Federal Insurance Office within the Department of the Treasury, to analyze: 

“methods to encourage/maintain participation in the NFIP, methods to educate consumers about the 

163	 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “National Flood Insurance Program Report”, 2013,

http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/national_flood_insurance/why_did_study.

Ocean Gate, N.J., Jan. 30, 2013 -- The home on pilings, in 

the background, survived Hurricane Sandy with relatively 

little damage, while its neighbor (foreground) was not as 

fortunate. Photo by Liz Roll/FEMA
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NFIP and flood risk, and methods for establishing an affordability framework for the NFIP... including 

the implications of affordability programs for the NFIP and the Federal budget.” However, the study 

will not be done in the timeframe originally scoped in the law. Specifically, due to a dearth of data on 

structure-specific risks and policy holders’ incomes, merely scoping the study is now expected to take 

18-24 months. 

Changes due to BW12 have and will continue to take effect. Specifically, as of January 1, 2013, policies 

on pre-FIRM subsidized second homes began to see price increases of up to 25 percent. Pre-FIRM 

subsidized businesses and repetitive loss properties will likely see increases beginning October 1, 2013. 

These rates will continue to increase by 25 percent per year until they reach their full actuarial rates. 

Also, beginning October 1, 2013, new pre-FIRM policies, lapsed pre-FIRM policies, and policies on 

pre-FIRM homes sold to new owners since July 6, 2012 will be immediately charged full actuarial rates. 

Beginning late 2014, those areas where a FIRM has been revised or updated on or after July 6, 2012, 

including both those recently mapped into the expanded flood plains and those whose rates do not 

reflect their property specific full-risk rate, will be phased into property-specific full risk rates over five 

years.

Many property owners do not clearly understand their flood risk and/or the ultimate cost of flood 

insurance (due to uncertainty about possible affordability measures being authorized). Property owners 

face hard choices in determining whether to remain in their properties.

Therefore, when considering a path toward recovery for the region, affordable insurance may be a 

limiting factor given the number of people living in the newly drawn flood plain and their ability to 

pay the projected higher rates. For New York City, the updated flood maps show almost double the 

number of residents living at risk: 398,000 people today as opposed to 218,000 based on the 1983 

maps. The number of buildings in the floodplain has likewise almost doubled to 67,700 buildings today 

from 35,500 in 1983. Based on climate change estimates, this number is expected to grow to 88,700 

buildings by the 2020s and 114,000 buildings by the 2050s for New York City.164

Owners of properties in the floodplain are at high risk of sustaining flood damage over the life of their 

mortgages. To provide financial protection against the risk of flooding, structures with federally backed 

mortgages are required to buy flood insurance. However, for those experiencing the phase-in of actual 

risk rates, or for those newly added to the NFIP-designated Special Hazard Flood Area or floodplain, the 

cost of flood insurance or significant increases to flood insurance policies may be an expense that they 

did not plan for when they bought their home or business. In addition, the cost of flood insurance may 

decrease the value of properties in floodplains as prospective buyers will factor flood insurance into the 

price of a flood-prone property. 

Property owners in the floodplain who incurred damage during Sandy and accepted Federal monies 

(e.g., from FEMA, SBA, or HUD) will be required to purchase and maintain flood insurance. Those 

164 Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York”, 06/11/2013 http://

www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/final_report/Ch_2_ClimateAnalysis_FINAL_singles.pdf.
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who are new policy holders may be required to pay actuarially sound rates immediately, rather than 

benefitting from subsidy phase-outs provided by the law for existing policy holders.

Based on initial analysis completed by the Task Force, the 100-year flood plain areas (including coastal 

V zones)165 hold about 5.6 percent of the US population, of which 41.4% are Low to Median Income 

(LMI).166 This emphasizes the importance of evaluating the affordability issue, per the requirements 

of the law. Property owners, be they owners of small businesses, homeowners, or landlords, may not 

be able to maintain the status quo if the cost of insuring their properties becomes overwhelming. 

Affordable housing units may become unaffordable. 

To this point, New Jersey’s CDBG-DR Action Plan reflects concerns that rising premiums will drive 

homeowners out of shore communities. For this reason, the State is providing a one-time payment 

of $10,000 to as many as 18,000 homeowners who can use it for any purpose, including payment of 

premiums if homeowners commit to stay in the community for a period of three years.167

54. RECOMMENDATION: Encourage increased hazard mitigation activities 

including elevation in order to protect property against future losses.

The National Institute for Building Safety’s Multihazard Mitigation Council has estimated that 

for every dollar invested in hazard mitigation, a savings of four dollars is achieved.168 Disaster 

survivors currently have access to post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds in coordination 

with their state and local hazard mitigation plans to assist in taking protective mitigation actions 

against future events. Disaster survivors may also utilize CDBG-DR programs for elevating and 

for buy-outs to get people out of harm’s way. In addition to elevating the structure, existing 

guidance from FEMA suggests property owners use good construction standards to mitigate risk 

including:

• Raising utilities or other mechanical devices above expected flood level.

• Wet floodproofing in a basement or in areas above and below ABFE.

• Using water resistant paints or other materials.

• Dry floodproofing non-residential structures by strengthening walls, sealing openings, or 

using waterproof compounds or plastic sheeting on walls to keep water out.169

165 V-zones are coastal areas with a 1percent or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard associated with storm waves. These

areas have a 26 percent chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. https://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/

info?storeId=10001&catalogId=10001&langId=-1&content=floodZones&title=FEMA%2520Flood%2520Zone%2520Designations.

166 For this analysis, PD&R defines “LMI” is determined as people in households that are

80% or less of the HUD determined Area Median Income (AMI)

167	 New Jersey Department of Community Affairs Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action

Plan. 01/29/2013. http://www.nj.gov/dca/announcements/pdf/CDBG-DisasterRecoveryActionPlan.pdf.

168	 Multihazard Mitigation Council, “Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves”, 2005, http://c.

ymcdn.com/sites/www.nibs.org/resource/resmgr/MMC/hms_vol1.pdf

169 FEMA, “Mitigation Ideas: A Resource for Reducing Risk to Natural Hazards”,

02/2013, http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=6938.
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 As an example program, New York City is proposing to encourage existing structures in the 

floodplain to adopt flood resilience measures through an incentive program and targeted 

building requirements. Specifically, the program consists of two elements:

• A $1.2 billion incentive program, subject to available funding, will offer grants or, where 

appropriate, loans to building owners to help fund a percentage of the eligible costs of 

completing all or some of the recommended resilience measures; and

• A requirement for large buildings (i.e., those with 7 or more stories that are more than 

300,000 square feet in size) to undertake flood protection measures by 2030.170

The Task Force supports and advocates for this use of CDBG funding.

Owner 

Lead: FEMA

Status 

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental 

and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts in the region/will be applicable to 

future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

55. RECOMMENDATION: Continue to assess actuarial soundness of decreasing 

premiums based on mitigation activities other than elevation.

The NFIP currently assesses a structure’s general characteristics to determine actuarial rates 

by setting premiums that vary based on a number of factors, including the structure’s flood 

zone, elevation, number of floors, construction, and occupancy, among other characteristics. 

As a result of BW12, many structures with basements that currently receive subsidies or 

grandfathered discounts will move to full-risk rates. Hurricane Sandy highlighted the fact that 

many urbanized areas have high concentrations of older row homes or brownstones, with 

basements, that are not easily elevated. Due to concern that full-risk premiums for these 

structures could make flood insurance premiums unaffordable, stakeholders affected by Sandy 

requested that FEMA consider partial mitigation credits to reduce premiums. In recognition of 

the anticipated premium increases and in consideration of the specific concerns from those in 

the impacted area, FEMA reevaluated the credit available under existing authorities to nonsubsidized, undiscounted, basement rates to ensure adequate credit is given when electrical 

and mechanical equipment is elevated at or above the base flood elevation. These activities will 

significantly reduce the total claim payment, and will therefore result in rate reductions that 

reward homeowners for good mitigation practices. 

170	 Special Initiative for Resilient Rebuilding, “PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York”, 06/11/2013 http://

www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads/pdf/final_report/Ch_2_ClimateAnalysis_FINAL_singles.pdf.
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The Task Force recommends FEMA work with New York City to communicate the benefits of 

mitigation activities other than elevation that would reduce risk and premiums. 

Owner 

Lead: FEMA and NYC Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability

Status 

Recommendation adopted: Revisions to the NFIP rate manual are underway.

56. RECOMMENDATION: Analyze affordability challenges of flood insurance and the 

impact on economically distressed households facing premium increases.

As the NFIP transitions toward full risk rates, as discussed above, there will be significant 

increases in premiums for some currently subsidized and grandfathered structures. Individuals 

whose properties are at risk of flooding may lack the resources to make prudent risk 

management and hazard mitigation decisions, including the decision to relocate, mitigate, or 

purchase adequate insurance. 

The Administration highlighted this concern in its Statement of Administration Policy to the 

Senate NFIP reauthorization bill.171 As previously mentioned, FEMA is charged by BW12 to 

complete a study with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to analyze the following: 

methods to encourage/maintain participation in the NFIP, methods to educate consumers about 

the NFIP and flood risk, and methods for establishing an affordability framework for the NFIP... 

including the implications of affordability programs for the NFIP and the Federal budget.

Accordingly, the Task Force agrees with the importance of studying and exploring affordability. 

Because there will be property owners who cannot bear the cost of flood insurance, more must 

be done to address the affordability issue. The Administration is committed to working with 

Congress on additional reforms to help economically distressed homeowners that strengthen 

the NFIP and are consistent with the President’s Budget.

Owner

Leads: FEMA, HUD, and FIO

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts nationwide. 

FEMA is working with the National Academy of Sciences to initiate the affordability study.

171	 The White House, “Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1940–Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2011,”

06/25/2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1940s_20120625.pdf.
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Building State and Local Capacity to Plan for and 

Implement Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding

Building State and Local Capacity

to Plan for and Implement LongTerm Recovery and Rebuilding

The scope and scale of Hurricane Sandy challenged the uneven capacities of State and local 

governments, which also faced differences in needs and readiness for disaster recovery. Many of the 

municipalities that experienced severe river flooding and the coastal towns along the New Jersey Shore 

and on Long Island are without full time planners, city managers, grants managers, engineers, and 

architects, and thus do not have the in-house capabilities to lead comprehensive, long-term recovery 

planning efforts on their own. 

The NDRF includes the Community Planning and Capacity Building Recovery Support Function (CPCB 

RSF), coordinated by FEMA, to help communities address this challenge and coordinate the resources 

and expertise of supporting organizations to build local capacities and support local and regional 

planning efforts. The FDRCs for each state are responsible for managing and directing the RSFs in their 

respective states. At the national level, the RSFLG provides guidance and coordination for consistency 

among RSFs.

Planning for recovery from a catastrophic event like Sandy is a massive challenge for even the best 

prepared communities and it should not be postponed until the immediate response is complete. 

Recovery planning and decision-making take place under severe time constraints and deal with 

the rebuilding of multiple systems simultaneously. This effort involves stakeholders who have been 

traumatized and triggers funding sources not normally available. Successful recovery under such 

difficult circumstances depends on two critical factors: capacity building and planning. 

Sandy revealed the necessity of improving hazard mitigation efforts to alter how vulnerable coastal 

areas of the densely populated northeast are occupied. Long-standing land use patterns have placed 

people, property, and infrastructure in locations that have significant risk of flooding and storm surge 

and that will become more vulnerable as sea level continues to rise. Municipalities need to build 

the capacity and expertise to take the steps necessary to reduce that risk. Hazard mitigation and 

risk reduction must be a primary goal of recovery efforts in the region even if fragmented land use 

authority and governance make this a difficult proposition. 

• Capacity Building – Disaster recovery reveals the importance of having capabilities and capacity in the right place at the right time. This means ensuring that personnel have the appropriate skills and tools related to urban design and recovery planning, community and economic 

development, mapping and data analysis, stakeholder and civic engagement (including populations with limited English proficiency), environmental contamination assessment and response, 

engineering, land use planning, and building code expertise specific to disaster recovery and 
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• resilient rebuilding. In addition, all stakeholders must have an understanding of available Federal, State, and local disaster assistance programs and resources and the ability to manage largescale grants. 

• Not all of the capacity to recover must be housed in local government agencies. Partnerships 

among various levels of government and with the private sector, academia, NGOs and philanthropic organizations should be available to address the full range of capacity needs. In addition 

to skilled personnel, it is necessary to develop disaster recovery tools, best practices for more 

resilient reconstruction, approaches to system upgrades that enhance the ability to withstand 

future impacts, coordinated management to ensure leveraging of multiple funding sources, and 

technical assistance for local recovery planning and capacity building. Additionally, prior to a 

disaster occurring, it is important to have baseline benchmarks and metrics of community and 

environmental health so that impacts from the disaster can be accurately identified.

• Recovery Planning – Effective recovery planning engages the community in order to reflect local values and address the needs of vulnerable populations. Local leaders should have funding 

and technical resources available to allow them to present citizens with plans reflective of the 

best available lessons and techniques from other jurisdictions and recovery efforts. State and 

Federal governments serve as partners in that effort, smoothing access to recovery funds that 

enable planning, community engagement, and the building of community capacity. Federal 

agencies serve to help State and local governments facilitate cross-sector partnerships, address 

the needs of low-income, minority, limited English proficient, and other vulnerable populations, 

and ensure that issues of regional and intergovernmental significance are adequately addressed 

in local planning processes. Effective recovery planning ensures that all populations, particularly 

disadvantaged populations, are meaningfully engaged in an open and inclusive citizen participation process.

Task Force community outreach efforts focused on understanding on-the-ground capacity and 

community planning challenges associated with recovery, assessing unmet needs, and removing 

obstacles to rebuilding in a manner that addresses existing and future risks and vulnerabilities. State 

and local challenges related to capacity centered on three main areas:

1. Support and resources for local recovery planning and management, including tools.

2. Enhancing the regional coordination necessary to adequately address 

large-scale, integrated solutions across jurisdictions.

3. Support and resources for building the capacity of and coordination among 

philanthropic and non-profit partners working on recovery. 

The Task Force worked on the following initiatives in response to challenges identified on the ground 

and developed recommendations for actions that should be taken going forward.
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Building Local Capacity

Challenge and Goal

Given the stresses on municipal budgets post-Sandy, most local governments lack the funding to fill 

the Local Disaster Recovery Manager (LDRM) positions that are strongly recommended by the NDRF. 

The primary role of these positions is to coordinate and manage the overall long-term recovery and 

redevelopment of a community, which includes the local administration and leveraging of multiple 

Federally-funded projects and programs. 

Meeting requirements for staffing is a constant challenge in a post-disaster environment. Federal and 

State funding for LDRMs is currently an activity that is recommended within the NDRF and the role is 

key to ensuring that Federal funds for recovery are properly used. This problem is not unique to Sandy, 

but repeats itself after every major disaster in this Nation and presents what is perhaps the greatest 

barrier to successful recovery operations. Methods to fund these positions must be found, and Federal 

interagency coordination to confront this challenge represents a pressing need.

57. RECOMMENDATION: Work with States and local jurisdictions to consider funding 

strategies and raise awareness about the need to fill LDRM positions.

As part of the Sandy recovery, HUD should encourage States and local government grantees 

to dedicate adequate CDBG-DR funding to address capacity deficiencies and respond to the 

need for long-term recovery coordination at the local level. In previous disasters, supplemental 

funding from the EDA was used to help fill LDRM positions, however EDA did not receive any 

funding within the Sandy Supplemental. The Task Force and CPCB RSF teams worked with 

local philanthropies to fill some of these positions in New Jersey, but the lack of commitments 

and dedicated resources to fund them over multiple years is inhibiting the ability of local 

municipalities to lead and implement their own recovery. 

Federal agencies can help local governments meet this need by providing guidance and 

technical assistance to help them understand how they can flexibly use and leverage 

program administration funds to partially support these positions, which have a direct tie to 

implementing projects under different disaster assistance program(s). 

Owner

Lead: CPCB RSFs (FDRCs with FEMA as RSF coordinating agency)

Status

Recommendation adopted: Funding for capacity building and coordinated local administration 

currently available under various Federal programs (disaster-related and non-disaster-related). 

The CPCB RSF is active in New Jersey and New York providing technical assistance to support 

States and local jurisdictions as they develop funding strategies for LDRMs.
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Plan EJ 2014

In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, environmental justice (EJ) organizations raised concerns about 

adverse health effects resulting from exposures (i.e. Indoor, on-site, and off-site) to environmental 

contaminants, particularly in industrial waterfront communities, that were caused or exacerbated 

by storm events. They also encouraged local and regional scale solutions that align climate 

adaptation and disaster planning as part of an inclusive planning process and ensure that the 

recovery process and cross-boundary planning answers the needs of all communities, especially 

those that are vulnerable to future storms.172

The Administration recognizes that, in addition to helping communities rebuild in ways that make 

them more resilient, it is important to recognize that some communities - particularly low income 

communities and communities of color - are disproportionately impacted by pollution and other 

environmental factors. EPA has laid the cornerstones for fully implementing its environmental 

justice (EJ) mission - that is, ensuring environmental protection for all Americans, regardless of 

race, color, national origin, income or education - in Plan EJ 2014. Its goals are to: 

• Protect the environment and health in communities that are disproportionately impacted 

by pollution.

• Empower communities to take action to improve their health and environment.

• Establish partnerships with local, State, Tribal, and Federal governments and organizations 

to achieve healthy and sustainable communities. 

Through Plan EJ 2014, the EPA developed a comprehensive suite of basic tools and guidance to 

integrate EJ in all its programs, policies, and activities. In addition to Plan EJ 2014, more than 

one dozen federal agencies have released new or updated environmental justice strategies and 

annual implementation progress reports over the past four years. Further, communities across the 

country are integrating environmental justice and equitable development approaches to design 

healthy, sustainable, inclusive, and resilient neighborhoods. The Rebuilding Strategy reflects this 

Administration’s commitment to addressing longstanding environmental and health challenges 

exacerbated by storm events and protecting all Americans from pollution where they live, learn, 

and play. 

These strategies can help vulnerable and overburdened communities access and use tools and 

create new opportunities to address long-standing environmental and health challenges (such as 

indoor and outdoor air pollutants, bacteria, parasites and other contaminants) that can reduce the 

risk of acute and chronic illness as well as death. 

172	 Sandy Regional Assembly, “Sandy Regional Assembly Recovery Agenda,” 04/2013, http://dl.dropboxusercontent.

com/u/4969505/NYC-EJA/SandyRegionalAssemblyRecoveryAgenda_WEB_033013.pdf.
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Build Regional Partnerships 

Challenge and Goal

Of New Jersey’s 565 municipalities, 136 took the brunt of the impact of Sandy, with 37 suffering 

extensive damage and 99 experiencing moderate damage.173 In New York State, Long Island, which has 

15 cities and towns that are further divided into 73 incorporated villages,174 was also particularly hard 

hit. With many home rule entities and independent local governments in both States, local government 

structures are not conducive to facilitating the cross-jurisdictional collaboration that is needed for a 

more efficient and effective recovery. 

The Task Force worked closely with the CPCB RSF, the FDRC in each State, and a consortium of nonprofit and philanthropic organizations to promote regional partnerships in the areas most impacted 

by Hurricane Sandy. The goal of this collaboration was to foster the development of local and regional 

solutions that integrate climate change adaptation and risk reduction as part of an inclusive recovery 

planning process. Solutions focus on coordinated planning and prioritization of long-term recovery 

activities as well as the coordinated implementation of those activities.

58. RECOMMENDATION: Support the New York Rising Community Reconstruction Program.

The New York Rising Community Reconstruction Program (NYRCR) brings communities 

together to facilitate a more collaborative planning process. The CPCB RSF supported the 

State by providing 88 community profiles (which included GIS maps, demographics, and 

inundation levels), conducting needs assessments, and gathering data on technical assistance 

requirements. The Task Force worked closely with New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to define 

the guidelines for the NYRCR program, identify best practices from other communities, and set 

aside $25 million of the State’s first CDBG-DR allocation to support NYRCR planning activities.175

The forthcoming CDBG-DR allocation to the Sandy-affected region may serve to supplement and 

build on these initial planning efforts as well as to help implement the proposed community 

recovery projects.

Within this program, each New York Rising Community (a state-determined grouping of 

localities) will have a planning committee drawn from the community that will assess the 

community’s vulnerabilities to future natural disasters and needs for economic development, 

identify where funds should be used to repair or reconstruct critical facilities and essential 

public assets damaged or destroyed by the storm, and identify projects that will increase 

resilience while also protecting vulnerable populations and promoting sound economic 

173	 New Jersey State Office of Emergency Management and FEMA, Comprehensive Damage Assessment, 5/8/2013.

174	 New York State Local Government, “Local Government in Long Island” http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Long_Island_Local_Govt.pdf.

175	 The New York State CDBG-DR Action Plan provides that “New York State will establish the Community Reconstruction Zone

(NYRCR) planning grants. The State anticipates allocating approximately $25 million from this first allocation to provide

planning grants to targeted communities selected by a NYRCR planning committee. Later allocations will be used to implement

successful NYRCR plans.” Source: New York State Office of Community Renewal, “State Of New York Action Plan For Community

Development Block Grant Program Disaster Recovery,” 04/2013, http://www.nyshcr.org/Publications/CDBGActionPlan.pdf.
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development.176 Governor Cuomo officially launched the program with Secretary Donovan 

on July 18, 2013.177 The State released guidelines for NYRCR plans, including requirements for 

community engagement and hazard mitigation against future storms. The NYRCR program has 

established a cadre of consultants with a variety of capacities and expertise, which have been 

paired with each community. Successful completion of a NYRCR plan qualifies the community to 

receive access to additional recovery grants. The State estimates grants to eligible NYRCR plans 

will range from $3 million to $25 million, which the State anticipates using future CDBG-DR 

allocations to fund.178

As part of the NYRCR program, the State has also engaged the Long Island Regional Economic 

Development Council to resolve issues of regional significance and assess the collective impact 

of individual NYRCR plans on Long Island. The Task Force expects that this process will lead 

to community-driven plans that, due to regional coordination, will more effectively leverage 

Federal dollars. The hope is that the NYRCR program will enable the region to take advantage 

of planning expertise otherwise unavailable to an individual town or city and therefore push 

standard thinking towards truly actionable and innovative solutions that make the region more 

resilient. The solutions will look not only at infrastructure, but also at issues related to economic 

development, housing, and health and social services.

The CPCB RSF should regularly track updates on the progress of the New York planning program 

and work with the FDRCs, as appropriate, to ensure that resources are being provided to 

support recovery planning and implementation activities. Additionally, Federal agencies with 

local and/or regional planning resources and requirements should be directed to support and 

align planning activities that they fund or undertake in the impacted region. This may include 

NOAA, USACE, DOT, HUD, EPA, EDA, USDA, FEMA and others.

Owner

Lead: HUD and CPCB RSF (FDRC with FEMA as RSF coordinating agency)

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for projects funded by the Sandy Supplemental.

176	 New York State Guidance for Community Reconstruction Zone Plans, accessed 07/23/2013,

http://www.nysandyhelp.ny.gov/community-reconstruction-program.

177	 State of New York, “Governor Cuomo Designates 102 New York Rising Communities Eligible to Receive More Than $750

Million for Storm Reconstruction,” 07/18/2013, http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/07182013-ny-rising-communities%20.

178	 Ibid.
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59. RECOMMENDATION: Support New Jersey planning efforts, including pilots for New 

Jersey Local Resilience Partnerships, and encourage Federal agencies, the State of 

New Jersey, non-profits, and philanthropic organizations to provide both financial and 

technical support for the formation and operation of the Local Resilience Partnerships.

Given its many small towns – as well as the “Home Rule” relationship between these towns, 

the counties, and the State of New Jersey – New Jersey has a real need for robust planning 

efforts in order to ensure that its communities rebuild effectively. The State has incorporated 

planning into its rebuilding work thus far. For example, individual towns or regional groups 

within Partnerships in the State’s nine most impacted counties are eligible to apply for grants 

for consulting services on long-term planning issues through the CDBG-DR-funded and Stateadministered $5 million Post-Sandy Planning Assistance Grant program.179 These grants range 

from $5,000 to $50,000 with a maximum of $310,000 per municipality.180 Eligible activities 

include developing a strategic recovery plan, preparing community design standards specific 

to flood hazard areas, and analyzing local land use practices. In addition, communities are 

encouraged to combine their funds to pursue regional projects and solutions. New Jersey 

anticipates that more than 70 communities will participate in the program.

New Jersey is also coordinating a planning grant program of over $2.5 million under FEMA’s 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), which will provide eligible counties with grants to 

develop multi-jurisdictional hazard mitigation plans. These grants will allow municipalities 

or Partnerships of municipalities to collaborate with county government to develop regional 

resilience plans that will help New Jersey mitigate the threat of future hazards.

To provide local communities with the best available data to inform planning decisions, New 

Jersey has also partnered with six universities181 to devise flood mitigation strategies for 

particularly flood-prone communities located near the Hudson River, Hackensack River, Arthur 

Kill, Barnegat Bay and Delaware Bay, in addition to collaborating with the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers on its comprehensive study. The university studies focus on repetitive flooding 

regions beyond what is already being addressed by current or planned U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers projects.

To support these and other longer-term planning efforts, the Task Force worked together with 

local and Federal partners to develop a new model called the New Jersey Local Resilience 

Partnerships. This effort is designed to support cross-jurisdictional collaboration in several 

regions that have common problems and together encompass flood-prone municipalities in 

New Jersey. It was developed through the Task Force’s engagement with a number of nongovernmental partners --Sustainable Jersey (a public-private partnership that coordinates 

179	 “Christie Administration Announces Post-Sandy Planning Assistance Grant Program,” http://

www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/552013/approved/20130618e.html.

180	 For more information, please see http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/pdf/Post%20

Sandy%20Planning%20Assistance%20Grant%20Program%20Guidelines.pdf.

181	 Rutgers University, Stevens Institute of Technology, New Jersey Institute of Technology,

Stockton College, Monmouth University and Montclair State University.
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resources and policy to support local governments pursuing sustainability), New Jersey Future (a 

non-profit planning advocacy organization), and the New Jersey Recovery Fund (a philanthropic 

collaborative run by the Community Foundation of New Jersey and Geraldine R. Dodge 

Foundation with numerous supporting foundations). 

The New Jersey Local Resilience Partnerships (“the Partnerships”) are voluntary associations 

of small groups of adjacent communities that share common geography, flood risks, recovery 

challenges, and other characteristics. They serve the dual purposes of improving Sandy recovery 

and promoting greater cooperation among towns. The Partnerships have a bottom-up structure 

in which towns retain local control over land-use decisions. They will enable communities to 

expand their capacity to recover by bringing recovery planning and implementation capabilities 

to member towns on both a local and regional basis, expanding access to information and 

resources, and encouraging neighboring municipalities to pool resources and share services. 

Shared services may include joint engineering projects and cross-jurisdictional approaches to 

hazard mitigation. By sharing information and working together, the municipalities will be able 

to cooperate in securing – rather than competing with one another for – limited resources. The 

work of these Partnerships will foster stronger and more sustainable recovery outcomes and 

numerous benefits that will last far beyond recovery. 

As part of their structure, the Local Resilience Partnerships will identify “Affiliate Members” that 

can provide technical assistance, training, and other support. Affiliate Members could include 

Federal, State, and county government agencies, as well as universities and non-profits with 

important expertise. The resources and ability of Affiliate Members to provide access to other 

opportunities will also enable Local Resilience Partnerships to participate in existing recovery 

efforts such as the development of county hazard mitigation plans. Technical assistance will 

help local decision-makers better participate in major recovery coordination issues such as the 

regional coordination of infrastructure resilience investments. 

In support of these Partnerships, the New Jersey Recovery Fund is providing $1.5 million in 

seed funding for one year to support a Resource Center at Rutgers University as well as Disaster 

Recovery Managers and Resilience Coordinators to assist local governments with recovery 

and resilience planning. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is committing to fund Disaster 

Recovery Impact Assessments, which will help communities develop improved recovery 

strategies and better long-term risk adaptation measures.182 USDA Rural Development has 

agreed to support Partnership efforts focused on regional rural economies as their funding 

and legal authorities allow. USACE will also support Partnership efforts focused on vulnerable 

coastal communities where funding and authority is available. FEMA, through the CPCB RSF, will 

support the Partnerships by working with key leadership to build capacity to convene, organize, 

and manage the effort. FEMA will initially assist in coordinating members, information-sharing, 

and Partnership activities, and facilitate relationships with other Federal, State, non-profit, 

and philanthropic support organizations until the effort is successfully launched. In addition, 

182	 These assessments will draw on a framework for Health Impact Assessments (HIAs) created by the National Research Council and

supported by The Health Impact Project, a collaboration of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts.
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FEMA will continue to provide technical assistance, planning capabilities, and support for the 

implementation of recovery activities that are within the scope of the CPCB RSF. 

The network of regional Resilience 

Coordinators and LDRMs coordinated by 

Sustainable Jersey and New Jersey Future 

respectively will also help to organize and 

convene the pilot Partnerships, assist in 

coordinating members and Partnership 

activities, and provide technical assistance, 

planning capabilities, and support for the 

implementation of recovery activities. Many 

communities have already expressed the 

desire to participate in such Partnerships and 

three pilots are ready to be operationalized. 

These Partnerships will create a vehicle 

for participating municipalities to work on 

matters of recovery and resilience in an 

efficient and cost-effective manner that 

fosters stronger, more sustainable outcomes. 

The CPCB RSF should regularly track updates 

on the progress of the New Jersey planning 

program and work with the FDRCs, as 

appropriate, to ensure that resources are 

being provided to support recovery planning 

and implementation activities. Additionally, 

Federal agencies with local and/or regional 

planning resources and requirements should 

be directed to support and align planning 

activities that they fund or undertake in the 

impacted region. This may include NOAA, 

USACE, DOT, HUD, EPA, EDA, USDA, FEMA and 

others.

Owner 

Leads: HUD and CPCB RSF (FDRC with FEMA

as RSF coordinating agency), Sustainable

Jersey, and New Jersey Future

Land Acquisitions

Another powerful tool for reducing risk 

of future losses in areas that are prone 

to repetitive flooding is land acquisitions. 

Voluntary land acquisitions by both 

governments and nonprofits serve a number of 

purposes: removing populations and structures 

from vulnerable areas, and providing land that 

can be dedicated to natural flood mitigation 

measures, public space or natural areas, or to 

building engineered flood control structures. 

Coordinated and targeted efforts to acquire 

at-risk properties from willing sellers are an 

important part of an effective overall risk 

mitigation strategy. Various mechanisms for 

land acquisitions include federal, state, and 

local open space funding, buyouts of flooded 

properties, deed restrictions, and easements. 

The Federal government should consider 

including the responsibility to coordinate the 

various Federal land acquisition mechanisms 

within the recovery responsibilities assigned 

in the NDRF. This will help avoid risk, develop 

resilient land use patterns, and encourage 

green infrastructure in vulnerable floodplains. 

Some examples of existing land acquisition 

mechanisms that could be utilized include: 

pre-and post-mitigation FEMA funding, 

CDBG-DR, NOAA’s Coastal and Estuarine Land 

Conservation Program (CELCP), and DOI’s Land 

and Water Conservation Fund, especially when 

coupled with state, county, and local open 

space funding. Both New Jersey and New York 

have implemented buy-out programs that 

address vulnerable flood-prone properties 

in certain areas, although the current levels 

of funding for these programs are less 

than the identified needs for buy-outs.
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Status

Recommendation adopted: Implementation underway for current and future Sandy recovery 

efforts. The CPCB RSF, New Jersey Future, and Sustainable Jersey are working with communities 

to help coordinate and facilitate the formation of Local Resilience Partnerships.

60. RECOMMENDATION: Package the variety of existing Federal resources and tools related 

to disaster recovery and create new ones specific to community planning and capacity 

building in order to establish a coordinated suite of assistance that enhances and 

streamlines access to the recovery expertise needed by impacted communities.

Responding to recovery needs in the aftermath of Sandy requires that local practitioners acquire 

new skill sets and enhanced knowledge about disaster recovery best practices and model 

approaches. The NDRF places great emphasis on the need for better capacity building measures 

for State and local governments, community-based organizations, and local actors engaged in 

challenging recovery operations. This includes a focus on the tools and training needed to help 

impacted communities improve their disaster recovery plans, processes, protocols, project 

management, and program administration. One of the six principles of the CPCB RSF states, 

“local community recovery planning and recovery capacity are essential for organizing, leading, 

and most importantly, sustaining long-term recovery activity.”183 However, it is often difficult 

for State and local partners to find or efficiently deploy disaster recovery tools, training, case 

studies, best practices, funding sources, and technical assistance.

In order to meet this need, the CPCB RSF within the RSFLG will need to engage the appropriate 

agencies and partners to leverage their capabilities to support local recovery planning and 

management.

The Task Force recommends that targeted disaster recovery capacity building efforts be 

piloted in the New York/New Jersey/Connecticut region that would respond to urgent needs 

for practical expertise and that would dovetail with the planning activities in the NYRCRs and 

New Jersey Local Resilience Partnerships. These efforts would offer training sessions and 

workshops, one-on-one technical assistance, and ongoing peer learning opportunities to 

enhance the capabilities of LDRMs, civil servants, planners, and program administrators in the 

region. The Task Force also recommends that FDRCs and the CPCB RSF’s in New York and New 

Jersey work with the States, other RSFs, academia, and non-governmental partners to develop 

a Sandy-specific online portal offering: tools, best practices, and links to funding opportunities; 

a coordinated calendar of training and technical assistance offerings in the region; blogs and 

discussion boards; updates on regional activities; and a forum for requesting assistance from 

technical experts. Efforts to establish a portal are already underway in New York and should 

continue to be supported.

183	 FEMA, “Community Planning and Capacity Building Recovery Support Function,” 09/2011, http://

www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/community_planning_cpacity_building_rsf.pdf.
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The CPCB RSFs should be tasked with the development of this resource while the RSFLG should 

develop a strategy for interagency support and disseminate the results. Existing training and 

technical assistance funds from Federal agencies should be better coordinated to serve as 

a unified national disaster recovery capacity building network. In addition, future disaster 

appropriations should include explicit authority and funding for technical assistance. 

Owner

Lead: CPCB RSFs (FDRCs with FEMA as RSF coordinating agency)/RSFLG

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Facilitate Opportunities for Community and NonProfit Engagement in Capacity Building and Actively 

Engage Philanthropy to Fill Capacity Gaps 

Challenge and Goal

The NDRF notes that existing highly networked individuals and organizations, both inside and outside 

government, are key building blocks for sustained recovery efforts. In the aftermath of a disaster, 

these existing networks should be tapped; resulting in a single, shared strategy for rebuilding that 

is facilitated by dialogue among local and regional stakeholders. While the Task Force helped to 

facilitate engagement between the States, foundations, and community-based organizations, much 

more is needed to ensure that these partnerships are successful. Ideally, where formal associations 

among philanthropic entities (e.g., funder collaboratives) do not exist, entities would be established 

and staffed by the foundations to regularly engage with State and local governments, support broad 

stakeholder engagement, and allow strong and capable local organizations to actively participate in 

long-term recovery.

Highly capable non-profit organizations and technical assistance providers in the New York and New 

Jersey region have the ability to meet unique needs and fill resource gaps that public-sector funding 

cannot address. As such, it is critical that non-profits are connected to and engaged with State and local 

government to maximize recovery impacts through partnership. 

There is a need to enhance the working relationships between non-profits and State/local government 

to the benefit of the survivors they serve. As a key partner in recovery, it is important for State and local 

governments to dedicate resources in such a way that not only maximizes the impact they can have but 

that also builds the capacity of local non-profits. This investment in the capacity of non-profits yields a 
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Building State and Local Capacity to Plan for and 

Implement Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding

return on investment that is experienced by the community for years since these organizations become 

more capable of addressing a variety of continuing needs. Non-profits may be eligible subgrantees of 

States and local governments receiving CDBG-DR funds. CDBG-DR grantees are encouraged to consider 

this source of funding when looking to partner with non-profit organizations and leverage public and 

private funds. 

Philanthropies generally do not consider disaster part of their normal funding priorities and, if they 

provide funding for these emergency events, are, historically, much more apt to fund response-oriented 

activities. This is because the need is clear, the media helps shine a light on areas where assistance 

is needed, and efforts during these periods bring in donations and produce good will. It is easy and 

intuitive for philanthropy and non-profits to undertake immediate relief activities, but as the response 

phase ebbs and recovery begins, many foundations have become interested in longer-term rebuilding 

processes. They want to know:

• What is the role of government and are they duplicating efforts? 

• How much, if any, funding should be provided? And for what activities?

• Which local non-profits have the “know-how” to take on these tasks? 

• Are there any proven models to invest in? If not, or if there are only a limited number, how can 

philanthropy work with government officials and non-profit leaders to identify the best ad-hoc 

initiatives to support? 

• What is the best use of limited funds for response and/or for longer term recovery?

The Task Force recognizes the vital role of philanthropy to spur innovation in the field of disaster 

recovery and to support non-profits as they provide services in coordination and collaboration with 

government.

61. RECOMMENDATION: Facilitate and expand opportunities for philanthropic and nonprofit engagement in recovery, including opportunities for organizations that work with 

vulnerable populations. The CPCB RSFs in New York and New Jersey should actively 

support funder collaboratives that provide grants to nonprofits working in coordination 

with government. This should include encouragement of sub-grants to NGOs that would 

assist in accomplishing the Federal outreach requirements, including those specific to 

vulnerable populations to ensure they are included in the recovery planning process.

The CPCB RSFs should continue to support geographically based funder collaboratives, 

encourage foundations to support LDRMs and the multi-jurisdictional partnerships in New York 

and New Jersey, and help identify specific non-profit resources that can assist government in 

capacity building efforts.
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For future disasters, the CPCB RSFs and RSFLG should develop and disseminate guidance and 

sample public-private partnerships for state and local governments to leverage Federal funding 

and engage non-profit and community-based organizations in local capacity building and 

community planning efforts.

Owner

Lead: CPCB RSFs (FDRCs with FEMA as RSF coordinating agency) and RSFLG

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future projects funded by the Sandy 

Supplemental and will be applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.
Forest Hills, New York - FEMA/ Andrea Booher
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Improving Data Sharing Between 

Federal, State, and Local Officials

The use of data facilitates decision-making that is well-informed and leads to goals that are both clearly 

defined and realistically achievable. In post-disaster situations, data collection and application are 

especially important for on-the-ground recovery efforts, as well as for long-term policy formulation and 

program management. 

Data and information are extremely valuable to Federal, Tribal, State, and local governments, as well 

as to private citizens, businesses, non-profits, and other community groups. Data and information are 

used to:

• Help local governments identify and design the most effective programs to meet the needs of 

communities.

• Help governments problem solve and streamline processes that more quickly deliver better 

services.

• Help governments control costs.

• Inform members of the public about the return on their investment paid through taxes.

• Inform members of the public about the availability of funding for their communities.

• Allow local planners and technology experts to design locally-focused applications.

• Allow the public to hold government accountable.

As a point of clarification for readers, the Task Force’s examination of data sharing in this section 

is primarily confined to process-related issues at the three major recovery agencies: FEMA, HUD, 

and SBA. Obviously, “data sharing” is a term that can be interpreted very broadly, encompassing 

everything from what data Federal agencies collect to how information is passed along to victims in 

the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The Task Force, however, has limited its inquiry to a specific set 

of issues that have hindered the recovery efforts of FEMA, HUD, and SBA in response to Sandy and to 

other disasters in the past. The term “agencies,” as used in this section, refers only to FEMA, SBA, and 

HUD. Nevertheless, several of the recommendations directed at these three agencies may be relevant 

for other agencies as well. The Task Force encourages other parts of the Federal family to consider 

adopting the recommendations in this section, where appropriate, and to reach out to FEMA, HUD, and 

SBA where coordination is necessary.
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Lack of Access to Data by Non-Governmental Third Parties

Challenge and Goals

While shared data can be employed to facilitate and inform Federal and State responses to disasters, 

it can also be used to validate and provide context for decisions government officials make. Agencies 

and States have an interest in employing data not only to design their policies, but also to explain their 

policies to the public. 

Non-profits working in the Sandy-affected region informed the Task Force that they would greatly 

benefit from having access to government data, which would help them respond more effectively and 

evaluate government actions. For example, community groups in New York and New Jersey told the 

Task Force that government data about individual needs assessments would allow them to formulate 

comments in response to State Action Plans by giving them a better sense of which unmet needs 

required attention. 

In addition to using publicly available information to evaluate government programs, non-governmental 

entities (e.g. NGOs, academic partners, and private sector firms) can use additional data to supplement 

government efforts and make their efforts more effective. For example, HHS, recognizing the 

importance of tracking the health outcomes of individual program participants, has made grant funds 

available for researchers to analyze the impact of HHS programs on storm-affected communities. As 

they draft their proposals, grant applicants have asked for access to government data to help them 

determine whether their research designs are effective. Some of these applicants have pointed to 

existing government access portals available to potential grantees, such as http://www.healthdata.gov, 

as resources that provide researchers with a better understanding of the populations they intend to 

investigate. HHS also recently conducted an exercise in New Orleans with the local health department. 

Using data from HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), officials identified individuals 

who had electrically powered medical equipment and where these individuals lived. The CMS teams 

then visited these individuals to confirm the accuracy of the data and to learn more about their 

emergency preparedness plans. HHS learned that the data are accurate and hopes that this forms the 

basis for building nationwide capability.

Given that the Obama Administration has committed itself to making information resources accessible, 

discoverable, and usable by the public to promote transparency and accountability, both through 

its Open Government Initiative184 and its recently announced Open Data Policy,185 the proactive 

release of aggregated data in the aftermath of disasters would further an important objective of the 

President. Although information must be shared in a manner that complies with applicable laws and 

policies and protects personal privacy, it may be possible to make aggregated data available that are 

184	 “Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies to put information about their

operations and decisions online and readily available to the public.” Source: The White House, “Memorandum

for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies – Transparency and Open Government,” 01/21/2009,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-12.pdf.

185	 The White House, “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Open Data Policy – Managing

Information as an Asset,” 05/09/2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf.
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sufficiently scrubbed of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) but still present a useful and accurate 

picture of the post-disaster landscape. Having a publicly accessible portal available in the aftermath of 

Sandy would have helped partners outside of government contribute more effectively to the Federal 

response.

62. RECOMMENDATION: Agencies should make aggregated, PII-scrubbed data about 

disaster-affected populations available to the public using a central website similar 

to http://www.data.gov. Specifically, FEMA, HUD, and SBA should coordinate to 

create a new website or adapt an existing one (such as FEMA’s openFEMA site) for 

data posting during disasters. In addition, FEMA, HUD, and SBA should create a 

process for digesting raw data into an aggregated form that the public can view.

There is a growing expectation that government will make data available whenever appropriate 

rather than waiting for third party requests. In the Freedom of Information Act context, 

agencies are now posting documents proactively to promote transparency and eliminate 

unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles for document requestors. Similarly, groups from outside of 

the government that are seeking data in the wake of a disaster should not have to approach 

agencies to make requests when data can be posted online as a matter of course. Privacy 

concerns can often be addressed by masking PII through aggregation, so that data only pertain 

to large groups of individuals whose identities cannot be deduced.

To make publicly available data sets as accessible and user friendly as possible, they should 

ideally be posted on a central website that includes information from all major disaster data 

collecting agencies, including FEMA, HUD, and SBA.186 As discussed above, http://www.

healthdata.gov is a useful example of a publicly available data website that is comprehensive, 

secure, and easy to navigate. OpenFEMA could potentially serve this role since it already 

contains some publicly available data.

While not all data can be posted, aggregated summaries that provide context to third parties 

about the scope and extent of a disaster can prove invaluable, both to groups working with 

government (such as the HHS grant applicants described above) and to outside groups that 

may employ data in ways that Federal or State officials have not envisioned. In the immediate 

aftermath of Sandy, volunteer organizations that developed and employed information 

technology to direct recovery assistance to storm victims played a particularly important 

role in storm-affected communities. Providing these groups with access to the most current 

government data would have helped these groups carry out their activities even more 

effectively. By embracing an “open data” philosophy, the Federal Government will not only 

promote transparency and accountability, but also leverage non-governmental resources that 

can contribute to disaster recovery efforts. 

186	 As with all information releases, agencies should abide by applicable Fair Information Practice Principles.
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Owner

Leads: FEMA, HUD, SBA

Status

Recommendation in process: Recommended for future disaster recovery efforts in the region 

and applicable to future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Data Sharing Between Federal Agencies 

and State and Local Governments

The ability of agencies and States to disseminate and receive data quickly and efficiently in the 

aftermath of a disaster is an essential component of a transparent and effective recovery. Whether 

agencies are sharing information with one another about assistance disbursed to individuals to 

avoid duplication of benefits or are passing information to States to help them administer their 

own programs, the successful exchange of data is often the difference between a productive, timely 

response and one that is slow and reliant on incomplete information. Failure to transmit data efficiently 

and effectively can lead to delays that prevent individuals and small businesses from receiving urgently 

needed assistance. 

In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the Task Force examined the data sharing processes of the three major 

Federal disaster response agencies -- FEMA, HUD, and SBA -- and identified several impediments that 

cause delays and inefficiencies when Federal agencies share information with one another and with 

State and local governments. The Task Force offers recommendations for how agencies can use data 

to ensure that recovery efforts are transparent and appropriately tailored to the communities that 

agencies are serving.

Typical Data Sharing Arrangements

Although disasters pose unique challenges to agencies providing and requesting data, much of the 

work required of agencies follows a familiar pattern. FEMA is typically the first on the ground, collecting 

individual registrant data immediately after a disaster. Included in this registration process is an 

individual income screen, which establishes who in an affected area is eligible for different types of 

assistance. In addition to using this information for its own programs, FEMA sends these data to SBA 

to determine whether individuals are eligible for disaster loan assistance. In addition, HUD and FEMA 

exchange data about local housing needs. HUD initially identifies residents who received housing 

assistance before the storm so that FEMA can assess the need for its emergency housing programs. 

Then, once the short-term response has ended and long-term housing programs go into effect, FEMA 

sends HUD information about who has received emergency housing assistance and income eligibility 

data to inform HUD’s programs and avoid duplication of benefits. Finally, as States begin to develop 

their CDBG-DR Action Plans, both SBA and FEMA make data available to State grantees so States can 
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determine who qualifies for grant assistance using CDBG-DR funds. In addition, HUD will request loan 

data from SBA and FEMA to help formulate policy and determine allocations for CDBG-DR grants before 

making funds available to States. 

Identify Dedicated Points of Contact for Data Sharing Requests 

in Agencies and Within State and Local Governments

Challenge and Goals

Both States and agencies raised concerns that they did not have dedicated points of contact with whom 

to negotiate the exchange of data after Sandy. Agencies, including SBA and FEMA, wanted a central 

point of contact with the State governments in New York and New Jersey who would be responsible for 

passing data on to municipalities. Similarly, New Jersey wanted a dedicated official at FEMA who could 

answer questions about the State’s data requests and help the State become familiar with the data 

available. The lack of a “go-to authority” to make and receive requests and to provide assistance meant 

that States and agencies lost time as they tried coordinating with one another.

63. RECOMMENDATION: Each agency and each State should identify a “data steward” who 

serves as a point of contact for data requests. This contact should not only be available after 

disasters, but also serve as an informational resource in advance of disasters. FEMA, HUD, and 

SBA should each designate an individual within their agencies that is permanently available 

to receive data sharing requests and related questions from States, local governments, 

and non-governmental entities. Each agency should then distribute the name and contact 

information of that individual to all 50 States. In the event of a disaster, agencies should send 

affected States a reminder that the data steward is available to assist them and that each 

State is responsible for identifying a central point of contact within the governor’s office or 

within the primary disaster response agency to coordinate requests with Federal agencies.

One of the keys to improving the current data sharing process is to keep lines of communication 

open before, during, and after a disaster strikes. To that end, the Task Force recommends that 

FEMA, SBA, and HUD each identify a dedicated “data steward” who is available to answer 

questions from States and other agencies and that can provide data expertise before and during 

a disaster. This is in keeping with the NDRF, which states that before disaster strikes, each RSF 

should identify and leverage “programs that assist communities to prepare, collect and analyze 

relevant existing and future data necessary to plan and manage complex disaster recovery.”187

In advance of a disaster, Federal data stewards would introduce potential State recipients to the 

request process and serve as reference librarians for each agency’s data collection. In addition 

to familiarizing State officials with available data, data stewards would help States identify 

which data would be most helpful, the format in which the data should be delivered, and 

187	 National Disaster Recovery Framework, 09/2011, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf.
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the limitations of the data (privacy requirements, aggregation, data latency, etc.). States, not 

knowing what information they will need, often make overly broad requests that result in an 

unmanageable volume of data being delivered to them by Federal agencies. This is also true for 

local and Tribal governments, non-profits, and community organizations that often make their 

own data requests. By helping to “curate” their agencies’ data, the Federal data stewards would 

help States make better use of the information the States receive. Besides working with States 

on their requests, the Federal data stewards would also make sample data sharing agreements 

available to State officials before a disaster strikes so that recipients have an opportunity to do 

advanced troubleshooting, which can cut down on protracted negotiations over data sharing 

agreement language when disasters do occur. 

The Federal data stewards should work in close coordination with agency officials, including the 

senior agency official for privacy and the Chief Information Officer (or an equivalent official). 

Similarly, States should identify a single point of contact to make requests, and that contact 

should then take responsibility for passing data on to other entities within the State, including 

other State agencies and local governments.

Owner

Leads: FEMA, HUD, SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently adopted by HUD for Sandy recovery efforts and to be 

implemented by FEMA and SBA for future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

Create Data Menus to Ensure that Data 

Requestors Have Complete Information

Challenge and Goals

Inexperience is a tremendous handicap to State and local governments seeking data after a disaster. 

Simply put, State personnel generally do not know what information to ask for and where to find it. 

Even States with experience responding to disasters may not be aware of all of the data potentially 

available from various Federal agencies. 

Following Sandy, New Jersey officials, who were requesting information from FEMA for the first time, 

asked for a summary sheet; unfortunately, no such summary existed, which resulted in delays.

By contrast, New York City had FEMA staff embedded in the Mayor’s Office of Housing Recovery 

Operations. Having a close point of contact familiar with both the City’s goals and with FEMA’s 
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procedures and data sets made the City’s process of completing a data sharing agreement much more 

efficient. Unfortunately, most States and localities cannot count on having someone with in-depth 

knowledge of an agency available to provide guidance.

64. RECOMMENDATION: Each agency should catalogue its disaster data in a “menu” that 

describes the data that it may share with States and local governments. Specifically, 

each agency’s data steward (see recommendation 63) should create a document 

containing a list of all data sets that are typically requested during a disaster. Each data 

item description should include the fields in the data set and the units of measurement, 

as well as a brief description of how the data can be used by States responding to a 

disaster and describe the limitations of the data (privacy requirements, aggregation, data 

latency, etc.). This document should be distributed to disaster agencies in each State.

A data menu containing the categories of data that an agency can share with State and local 

governments would be an invaluable resource for States and local governments seeking sources 

of Federal data in the wake of a disaster. The menu should include the names and fields in each 

data set, the level at which data are collected (zip code, municipality, census tract, etc.), and 

the ways it can be employed by States and local governments during disaster recovery. SBA has 

developed a version of this that it began distributing in the spring of 2013 that describes the 

loan data it has available, how the data are broken down by field, and the unit of measurement 

for each field. FEMA has also started working on a similar document.

The data menu should be assembled in advance of a disaster and describe potential applications 

for each item listed. In addition, the data menu should include a description of how the data 

were originally collected so recipients understand how to interpret them. The data steward (see 

recommendation 63) would be charged with maintaining the data menu to ensure it is regularly 

updated. Ideally, each State would have access to menus from all of the major disaster response 

and recovery agencies so that it has a complete picture of the data available from the Federal 

Government. 

Owner

Leads: FEMA, HUD, SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently adopted by SBA for Sandy recovery efforts and to be 

implemented by FEMA and HUD for future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.
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Create a Uniform Request Process and Uniform Data Sharing 

Agreement Template Common across Federal Agencies

Challenge and Goals

States attempting to obtain data from multiple Federal sources quickly learn that request processes 

vary from agency to agency. When talking with the entities that shared and received data in the 

aftermath of Sandy, the Task Force learned that recipients seek a dependable, uniform request process 

so recipients can eliminate the guesswork needed to comply with each agency’s requirements. This 

includes the way requests are submitted, how to clarify requests, and how to draw up data sharing 

agreements. After Sandy, New Jersey experienced significant delays obtaining data from FEMA because 

State officials did not understand how to comply with the agency’s specific data request submission 

guidelines. The State, which hoped to use information from FEMA to design its own response programs 

as part of its Action Plan, made several unsuccessful data requests to the agency. FEMA informed the 

State that its request submissions were required to provide more detail about the data sought and 

the proposed use of the data. Frustrated State officials reported that they struggled to find “the magic 

words” to unlock FEMA’s data so that they could put it to use. Until they did, New Jersey could not 

complete its Action Plan. 

Similar delays result when States have to negotiate widely varying data sharing agreements with FEMA, 

SBA, and HUD. Many of the agreement terms and conditions relate to safeguarding information to 

ensure compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and require some flexibility depending on the applicant 

and the intended use of the data. However, there are common elements in each agreement that could 

be standardized in advance by all three agencies, which would save States time and prevent negotiation 

delays due to disagreements over language. Prolonged negotiations between lawyers over agreement 

terms are often cited as one of the most time consuming aspects of the data sharing process.

65. RECOMMENDATION: FEMA, HUD, and SBA should adopt a common data sharing 

agreement template so that data requestors do not have to familiarize themselves with 

three separate forms. Attorneys and privacy officials from these agencies should meet to 

compare their current data sharing agreement formats and identify common boilerplate 

language that can serve as the basis for an interagency template. Once drafted, this 

template should then be distributed by each agency’s data sharing steward to the States.

The adoption of a common template by the three primary disaster response agencies would 

make the data request process easier to understand for recipients and could eventually lay the 

groundwork for an interagency data hub (see recommendation 66). Agencies should distribute 

this template, along with guidance about how to complete it, before disasters occur, so that 

State points of contact are familiar with the template prior to a disaster. It should be noted, 

however, that although a template will streamline the process, all data agreements will have to 

undergo review and clearance from agency counsel and privacy officials before data containing 

PII can be released.
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Owner

Leads: FEMA, HUD, SBA

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

66. RECOMMENDATION: Work towards a multi-agency integrated data repository, or “data hub,” 

shared and operated by FEMA and HUD, that, to the extent permitted by law and Federal 

policy, allows those agencies to access and store one another’s data and pass these data 

along to States in the event of a Federally declared disaster. FEMA and HUD should provide 

technical support and personnel resources to further this tool’s development in preparation 

for the next disaster. In addition, agency attorneys and privacy officials should discuss what 

steps will be necessary to begin preparing the legal framework for a multi-agency data portal.

FEMA and HUD are already discussing how to set up an online portal that will allow both 

agencies to transmit information to one another instantaneously during a disaster. Each agency 

would have standing agreements in place to access and store one another’s disaster-relevant 

data. Although this would require each agency to meet a number of legal requirements – 

including the publication of System of Records Notices (SORNs)188 – it would eliminate the time 

consuming process of establishing interagency data sharing agreements each time a disaster 

strikes. This repository could potentially be incorporated into an existing portal/tool, such as the 

National Disaster Recovery Program Database, http://www.data.gov, http://www.max.gov or a 

new portal established by FEMA. 

Owner

Leads: FEMA and HUD

Supporting Agency: DOI

Status

Recommendation in process: Recommended for implementation for future disaster recovery 

efforts nationwide.

188	 Generally speaking, System of Record Notices (SORNs) are a Federal Register notice required by the Privacy

Act that documents containing the rules for collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data sets

containing PII. Please see the Privacy Act and OMB guidance for a more detailed description of SORNs.
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Agency Efforts to Comply with the Privacy Act 

The Privacy Act, a Federal law regulating Federal agencies’ collection, maintenance, use, and 

dissemination of certain records containing PII, places considerable restrictions on agencies’ ability 

to share information. In general, absent consent from the person whose data are being shared, data 

in records covered by the Privacy Act may only be shared if the disclosure falls into one of twelve 

exceptions in subsection (b) of the statute. One of those exceptions is a disclosure for an official 

“routine use.” Routine uses are defined in the Privacy Act as the use of a record for “a purpose which is 

compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.”189 Routine uses must be described in a SORN 

and should be interpreted narrowly. 

67. RECOMMENDATION: To help make Federal data available to States, agencies should 

review “routine use” language in relevant SORNs to determine whether any changes 

are warranted that could provide greater flexibility to share information for planning 

purposes, to share information across State agencies and with local governments 

and to broaden categories of records to cover data from other sources. FEMA’s Office 

of Chief Counsel has offered to make attorneys available to provide guidance.

The requirements of the Privacy Act are important to help the Federal Government protect 

privacy; however, because the routine use exception in the Privacy Act is narrow, agencies may 

not be able to use the exception to share Federal data with States in response to a disaster. 

Federal agencies should review the routine use language in relevant SORNs to determine 

whether changes are warranted and appropriate in disaster settings. If agencies are able to draft 

routine uses in a way that allows for disclosure in response to a disaster, it could help reduce 

the long delays that States have encountered in obtaining access to important data. Specifically, 

agencies can work with their privacy officers and attorneys to consider routine use language 

that makes it possible for State agencies to use information for program planning and design 

purposes. 

An additional concern that the States raised was that they were unable to pass on data to 

subrecipients, such as local governments or other State agencies. Even in cases when States 

were permitted to receive data, the States were not allowed to provide the data to any other 

entity within the State. Instead, the States had to renegotiate agreements, which contributed to 

additional delays.

Owner

Lead: FEMA and HUD

Status

Recommendation adopted: To be implemented for future disaster recovery efforts nationwide.

189	 Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a (a)(7), effective 01/07/2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE2010-title5/USCODE-2010-title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552a/content-detail.html.
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Data Sharing and

Accountability: the PMO

The Program Management Office (PMO) provides a concrete example of the ways in which open 

and transparent data sharing practices between agencies can encourage smarter and more effective 

decision making in recovery and rebuilding efforts. The size, complexity, and urgency of the funding 

for Hurricane Sandy recovery made it clear -- even before the Sandy Supplemental was enacted -- that 

the Task Force needed a central coordinating office that would work closely with agencies, OMB, and 

the oversight community, such as the agency Inspectors General and the Recovery Accountability and 

Transparency Board (RATB). PMO was also established to leverage lessons learned from Hurricane 

Katrina as well as best practices from ARRA. 

Challenge and Goals

The Sandy Supplemental provided about $50 billion in relief funding for communities affected by 

Hurricane Sandy and other disasters in 2011, 2012, and 2013.190 The funds were appropriated to 19 

different federal agencies to be administered through more than 60 different programs. To meet the 

challenge of monitoring these many programs, the Task Force established PMO to serve as a central 

source for information about the progress and performance of Sandy Supplemental funding. PMO 

centrally collects and shares data across agencies.

68. RECOMMENDATION: Continue functions of PMO to track the progress 

of the Sandy Supplemental funding and performance.

The Task Force created PMO in January 2013 to serve as the data-driven cross-agency 

management organization within the Task Force, coordinating with OMB and the oversight 

community.

PMO’s mission was to support the Task Force and partner agencies by promoting efficiencies 

and information sharing across agencies in order to speed assistance to and maximize the 

impact of relief funds for Sandy-affected communities, families, and individuals, while also 

promoting the transparent and responsible use of federal resources. Since its inception, PMO 

has worked to fulfill this mission by focusing its efforts on four primary areas: 

1) Transparency: PMO worked to develop public facing financial and performance updates, 

as well as machine-readable data sets for public consumption in order to keep taxpayers 

informed about the progress of recovery. These are expected to be published by October 

1, 2013.

190	 Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ2/html/PLAW-113publ2.htm.
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2) Cross Agency Coordination: PMO served as the Task Force’s office responsible for 

coordinating matters related to budget execution and performance management across 

the 19 federal agencies funded by the Sandy Supplemental. 

3) Data: In recognition of the lessons learned from both Hurricane Katrina and ARRA about 

the importance of accountability, PMO focused on data. PMO collected and analyzed 

agency financial and performance data to understand the progress of recovery on the 

ground. 

4) Oversight Support: PMO played a support role to RATB and, by extension, to agency 

Inspectors General (IGs), by providing data and information, as well as by convening 

agency stakeholders, in support of the oversight community. These functions are 

also particularly important in light of the lessons from Katrina that demonstrate that 

accountability and transparency are critical elements of a successful recovery. 

While each of these functions is routinely addressed within every agency—as well as within 

state entities, which are, in some cases, charged with program implementation—PMO has 

worked to bring together agency experts in these areas to ensure that Task Force and agency 

efforts are aligned. Especially given the breadth of the funding and affected agencies—each 

with their own set of governing statutes, regulations, and data systems—the PMO roles 

described above served to ensure regular and open communication across agencies and 

oversight organizations, as well as allowed the development of a single, consistent, source of 

information about the progress of spending and performance across the agencies. Activities and 

stakeholders supporting each of these functions are described in the sections below. 

Promoting Transparency 

The tracking and coordination provided through PMO has primarily served the needs of 

government leadership and staff within agencies, the oversight community, the Executive Office 

of the President (EOP), and the Task Force. These organizations are charged with overseeing 

and managing program implementation, and keeping track of progress to date is an important 

component of their roles. The data that PMO collects serve many purposes: the data are critical 

to internal management and can also be useful to the public, helping demonstrate the nature of 

taxpayers’ investment (e.g., what programs were funded, and at what levels) and the return in 

terms of long-term recovery for Sandy-impacted families and communities.

One key lesson from ARRA is that there is a tremendous amount of public interest in 

understanding where the funds are going and what they are buying. To expand on those 

lessons, after building the underlying reporting mechanisms and establishing day-to-day 

operations, PMO turned its attention to developing a way in which non-sensitive data and 

information could be shared with the public. In coordination with Task Force agencies, as well 

as with OMB and the White House, PMO began to design both narrative and graphic updates 

on progress for the public, which will be published to a public website. Following the lead of 
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the http://www.data.gov efforts, PMO also worked to develop granular information, such as 

funds and performance by state, in machine-readable formats that the public can download and 

analyze.191 PMO expects these data to be published by October 1, 2013.

Cross Agency Coordination

PMO worked with a broad range of stakeholders and established a PMO working group 

which provided critically important feedback and information. This working group met on a 

weekly basis and consisted of representatives from each of the 19 agencies that the Sandy 

Supplemental funded. The weekly conversations were the principal drivers of PMO’s work and 

allowed PMO to move quickly to develop reporting processes with maximal agency input and 

also provided a constructive forum for interagency problem solving and information sharing.

Each week, PMO presented proposals for data collection and analysis and facilitated a 

discussion around the implications of these proposals. In this way, PMO was able to quickly 

meet its data collection goals while fully leveraging the wisdom and experience of the group. 

By taking a consensus-based approach, PMO was able to collect the necessary data while also 

ensuring that PMO’s processes were relevant and workable for the affected agencies. PMO staff 

also provided extensive technical assistance to help partner agencies navigate PMO’s reporting 

processes. This assistance has been a critical component for ensuring consistency across 

agencies, and the need for this kind of agency-specific technical assistance will continue into the 

future.

Through PMO, agencies were able to work together to identify and address common program 

implementation and budget execution concerns. A good example of this was the development 

of a waiver policy proposal to provide much-needed flexibility for the permissible duration of 

rebuilding projects. Finally, agencies productively used PMO to share information about their 

agency’s activities or funding opportunities that could have an impact on another agency. For 

example, EPA shared its revised Title VI term and condition, as well as its updated guidance 

regarding SRF and Superfund grants, so other members of the PMO working group could 

see possible ways of highlighting the need to comply with non-discrimination laws while 

also providing guidance to recipients about limited English proficiency issues and public 

participation. The very existence of this Sandy Supplemental-focused forum enabled simple and 

efficient cross-agency information sharing which might otherwise have taken longer or not have 

occurred at all.

191 Machine readable data are that which is structured to allow for automated processes; this

enables data that are readily retrieved, downloaded, organized, and searchable.
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Focusing on the Data

Another primary PMO strategy for advancing its mission was to focus on the data. In particular, 

lessons learned from Katrina illustrated the importance of accountability in the disaster context, 

and in keeping with the administration’s focus on data-driven policy formulation, a focus on 

the data was perhaps the most critical component of the PMO strategy, as it supported and 

enhanced each of the others.192 Again, while each agency has their own internal process for 

monitoring and reporting relevant data, by providing a comprehensive view of the data across 

the broad range of programs funded in the Sandy Supplemental, PMO became the primary 

source of information about interagency progress to date. This centralized effort obviated the 

need for ad hoc inquiries of more than 60 programs. 

192	 This updated the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), revising the existing performance

framework to increase the use of performance information driving program decision-making. This includes

agencies producing more relevant and frequent data to inform agency decisions and operations. Source: GPRA

Modernization Act of 2010, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ352/pdf/PLAW-111publ352.pdf.
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The primary datasets the Task Force focused on were the financial metrics that detailed the 

progress of spending and preliminary performance metrics to illustrate what the significant 

federal investment has and will produce.193 Since the process of providing Federal aid to 

communities begins with shifting money from federal agencies to State and local recipients, 

PMO began by tracking financial metrics. Typically, once Federal dollars reach the State and local 

level, funds are distributed by recipients and the work on the ground commences.194 This work 

was captured though PMO’s performance reporting process, which measured progress in terms 

of three main metrics: the people, businesses, and projects served by these funds. Through 

a monthly report, PMO provides aggregated agency data on the numbers of people served, 

businesses assisted, and projects planned, started, and completed. 

By providing ongoing technical assistance to agencies, and by leveraging very simple technology, 

PMO was able to effectively compile and manage dynamic agency data while designing and 

deploying standardized products. These products present a great deal of information to a broad 

audience. In line with the principles of data-driven policies that the government is increasingly 

implementing, these simple datasets were provided to a range of stakeholders with varying 

needs and are intended to enhance the recovery effort. Furthermore, by regularly informing 

agency staff, leadership, and the oversight community about the status, recipients, and results 

of the supplemental funding, the Task Force is enabling more informed, consistent policy–

making, which should lead to better outcomes on the ground.195

Supporting the Oversight Community

Lessons learned from Katrina underscore the importance of the oversight function. Nearly 

eight years after the storm, multiple agency IGs found that funds moved too slowly and were 

not adequately managed.196 In a more extreme example, a 2007 GAO report assessing the 

Hurricane Katrina recovery process noted that there was a lack of proper oversight on contracts 

in several housing programs. GAO concluded that this lack of oversight may have resulted in 

millions of dollars in fraudulent charges to FEMA, illustrating the need for appropriate levels of 

oversight in post-disaster scenarios.197 In the Sandy Supplemental, Congress responded to this 

193	 Note that PMO has focused on program administrative and financial data, and not on issues surrounding duplication

of benefits. These issues are included in the Data Sharing Policy section of this document beginning on page 116

194 Each agency has its own processes and funding sequence, but this is a typical sequence

for grants and contracts which are not funded on a reimbursable basis.

195 Center for American Progress, “The CitiStat Model: How Data-Driven Government Can Increase Efficiency & Effectiveness,”

04/2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/04/pdf/citistat_report.pdf.

196 HUD Office of Inspector General, Audit Report 2013-FW-0001, 03/28/2013, http://www.hudoig.gov/Audit_Reports/2013-FW-0001.

pdf; HUD Office of Inspector General, Memorandum 2013-IE-0803, 03/29/2013, http://www.hudoig.gov/Audit_Reports/2013-

IE-0803.pdf; EPA Office of Inspector General, “Lessons Learned: EPA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 9/14/2006, http://www.epa.

gov/oig/reports/2006/20060914-2006-P-00033.pdf; DHS Office of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster

management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 03/2006, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06-32_Mar06.pdf; 

DHS Office of Inspector General, “Management Advisory Report: Recoupment of Improper Disaster Assistance Payments,” 12/2010,

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-21_Dec10.pdf; GAO, “Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief Continued Findings

of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse,” 03/2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07300.pdf; GAO, “Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past

Disasters Offer Insights for Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events, 07/2009, http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293529.pdf.

197	 GAO, “Hurricane Katrina: Ineffective FEMA Oversight of Housing Maintenance Contracts in Mississippi Resulted in

Millions of Dollars of Waste and Potential Fraud,” 11/2007, http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/269550.pdf.
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inherent difficulty in meeting the dual objectives of getting money out quickly while maintaining 

appropriate controls, and as such gave RATB the authority to take on an extended oversight 

role over Sandy projects. Established by ARRA, RATB had broad transparency and accountability 

missions over the stimulus funding, and the Sandy Supplemental extended RATB’s accountability 

mission to also apply to Sandy Supplemental funding. The vigilant oversight that RATB applied 

proved to be extraordinarily effective for ARRA funding: only 987 potential cases of fraud 

were identified (0.04% of the total awards) and DOJ filed charges for less than $3 million (or 

.0001%) in ARRA funding not related to taxes.198As the primary convener of agencies funded 

in the Supplemental, PMO was well suited to support this work by facilitating conversation, 

communicating agency concerns, and, most importantly, by compiling and providing agency 

data to OMB, RATB, and relevant agency IGs. 

Another mechanism the Sandy Supplemental included to help ensure this significant investment 

was adequately managed and documented was the requirement that agencies develop 

enhanced Internal Control Plans (ICPs) to identify incremental risks associated with Sandy 

recovery programs.199 PMO worked to ensure that agencies understood this requirement and 

assisted with the development and delivery of the plans to OMB. In these plans, agencies 

identified risks associated with Sandy Supplemental funding, as well as the specific hazard 

mitigation strategies they would use to address each risk. For example, HUD’s ICP laid out a 

series of additional steps taken to oversee the funds, including increased grantee monitoring 

and additional reporting requirements, while EPA’s ICP detailed proactive IG engagement before 

the funds were awarded and how specific additional information would be used by both EPA 

and the States. The plans are a foundational source of information for oversight and provide 

important information about steps agencies are taking internally to prevent waste, fraud, and 

abuse.

In addition to working closely with the agencies and OMB, PMO also worked with RATB to 

define roles, data needs, and to share information. In a series of conversations since the passage 

of the Sandy Supplemental, PMO, OMB, and RATB have worked to identify their respective 

responsibilities and how to support them. PMO shared data and information with RATB to 

support their work towards preventing and identifying waste, fraud, and abuse. This proactive 

approach to oversight—enabled by sharing data and information about recipients of federal 

funds, the progress of spending, and program performance—serves government’s collective 

objectives: to see disaster funds spent responsibly so storm-affected families, businesses, and 

communities recover and rebuild quickly and without waste.

198	 The White House, “A New Way of Doing Business: How The Recovery Act Is Leading The Way To 21st Century

Government,” 02/2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/new_way_of_doing_business.pdf.

199 OMB Circular A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, establishes the requirement for all agencies to establish

ICPs “to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of Federal program funds.” The Disaster Relief Act required agencies to expand

existing internal controls to address specific risks associated with Sandy-recovery related funding. Source: The White House,

“Memorandum for the heads of Executive Departments and Agencies -- Accountability for Funds Provided by the Disaster Relief

Appropriations Act, 03/12/2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-07.pdf.
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Owner

Lead: Sandy Recovery Tracking Team

Status

Recommendation adopted: Currently available for the Sandy Supplemental and replicable for 

future supplemental appropriations.

69. RECOMMENDATION: Document the functions and processes used by 

the Task Force recovery in a “PMO toolkit,” which could be quickly 

deployed in the event of future supplemental funding.

For any large supplemental appropriation in the future, whether in response to a disaster or 

otherwise, good government requires that a comprehensive view of the funding be available. 

Quickly establishing PMO was critical to creating that picture during the Sandy recovery. Given 

this experience, the Task Force will, over the course of the wind-down period, create a toolkit 

that identifies the processes, stakeholders, and considerations required to quickly establish a 

similar interagency tracking function for large-scale and complex funding situations.

Owner 

Lead: Task Force

Status

Recommendation adopted: In development, for use in future supplemental appropriations
National Disaster Recovery Board meeting - the White House/ Official White House Photo
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Beyond the Task Force: Driving Implementation 

and Monitoring Progress

BEYOND THE TASK FORCE: 

DRIVING IMPLEMENTATION AND 

MONITORING PROGRESS

The President established the Task Force to ensure that the highest levels of government were engaged 

on the rebuilding and recovery efforts. As part of their work on the Task Force, the constituent Federal 

agencies have made important and detailed commitments to the region’s recovery. Though the Task 

Force will wind down its operations over the sixty days following the submission of this Rebuilding 

Strategy to the President, the recovery will continue for years. In order to build on the extraordinary 

partnership forged among agencies over the last nine months, there must be a plan for implementing 

the recommendations and monitoring the progress of the recovery. To that end, the Task Force has 

developed a framework to maintain a similar degree of Cabinet-level engagement over the longterm. This includes both the implementation and monitoring of: the progress of the Task Force policy 

recommendations; the Sandy Supplemental funding; and performance metrics as contemplated in EO 

13632.

Implementation

While many of the recommendations that the Task Force suggests have already been adopted and 

implemented, there are a significant number that will require additional work by the agencies well 

into the future. To ensure that these efforts continue to be driven to completion, the Task Force has 

developed a framework for implementation that the agencies will use moving forward, including 

implementation plans with major milestones for each recommendation and regular checkpoints for 

interagency coordination.

Furthermore, on a quarterly basis, the agency principals will convene in a forum, co-chaired by the 

Secretaries of DHS and HUD, and attended by the relevant agency regional administrators (or other 

agency leadership as appropriate), to provide the cabinet-level engagement required to see that these 

recommendations are fully implemented. These regular meetings will be used to highlight successes 

and escalate challenges across all of the recommendations and policy areas relevant to the recovery 

and to rebuilding the region. All relevant Sandy stakeholders at the EOP and agencies will also be 

engaged in these meetings. 
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Beyond the Task Force: Driving Implementation 

and Monitoring Progress

Monitoring Progress

The complementary function to implementation is accountability, which occurs through monitoring. 

To this point, the Executive Order requires that the Task Force’s Rebuilding Strategy include a “plan for 

monitoring progress.” Thus, this Rebuilding Strategy identifies a plan that calls for two components of 

monitoring, to be owned by a Sandy Recovery tracking team. The Sandy Recovery tracking team will 

continue the work of the PMO, monitoring Sandy Supplemental funding and the cumulative outputs 

and outcomes in the storm-impacted communities, and will also set up a process to monitor the 

progress of the recommendations. 

Continued Coordination

The two components of the Task Force’s succession plan -- implementation and monitoring -- are 

intended to ensure agency accountability for the commitments that have been made to improve the 

outcomes for Sandy-affected communities and to ensure that the administration is working to mitigate 

against future risk as effectively as possible. This model of active and engaged senior leadership -- 

combined with consistent data collection, analysis, and dissemination -- will serve these goals well. The 

model also serves to facilitate the Executive Order’s charge to identify “specific outcomes, goals, and 

actions . . . that could support the affected region’s rebuilding.” 

These coordinated efforts, led through the interagency forums described above, and supported by 

regular data and analysis, will serve to both effectively implement and rigorously monitor the recovery 

effort, thus ensuring that the Sandy Supplemental funds are put to work quickly, responsibly, and 

transparently, and that the recommendations identified by the Task Force, agency partners, and local 

stakeholders are expediently implemented. This will guarantee a full recovery and a more secure future 

for the region.
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APPENDICES

I Executive Order -- Establishing 

the Hurricane Sandy 

Rebuilding Task Force

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13632, December 7, 2012

- - - - - - - 

ESTABLISHING THE HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of 

America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, resulting in major flooding, 

extensive structural damage, and significant loss of life. A dangerous nor’easter followed 9 days later 

causing additional damage and undermining the recovery effort. As a result of these events, thousands 

of individuals were displaced and millions lost power, some for an extended period of time. Over 1,600 

stores were closed, and fuel distribution was severely disrupted, further complicating the recovery 

effort. New York and New Jersey -- two of the Nation’s most populous States -- were especially hard hit 

by these storms.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the Department of Homeland Security is 

leading the recovery efforts to assist the affected region. A disaster of Hurricane Sandy’s magnitude 

merits a comprehensive and collaborative approach to the long-term rebuilding plans for this critical 

region and its infrastructure. Rebuilding efforts must address economic conditions and the region’s 

aged infrastructure -- including its public housing, transportation systems, and utilities -- and identify 

the requirements and resources necessary to bring these systems to a more resilient condition given 

both current and future risks.

This order establishes the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (Task Force) to provide the 

coordination that is necessary to support these rebuilding objectives. In collaboration with the 

leadership provided through the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), the Task Force will 

identify opportunities for achieving rebuilding success, consistent with the NDRF’s commitment 

to support economic vitality, enhance public health and safety, protect and enhance natural and 

manmade infrastructure, and ensure appropriate accountability. The Task Force will work to ensure 

that the Federal Government continues to provide appropriate resources to support affected State, 

local, and tribal communities to improve the region’s resilience, health, and prosperity by building for 

the future
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Sec. 2. Establishment of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. There is established the 

Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, which shall be chaired by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development (Chair).

a. In addition to the Chair, the Task Force shall consist of the head of each of the following executive departments, agencies, and offices, or their designated representatives

i. the Department of the Treasury;

ii. the Department of the Interior;

iii. the Department of Agriculture;

iv. the Department of Commerce;

v. the Department of Labor;

vi. the Department of Health and Human Services;

vii. the Department of Transportation;

viii. the Department of Energy;

ix. the Department of Education;

x. the Department of Veterans Affairs;

xi. the Department of Homeland Security;

xii. the Environmental Protection Agency;

xiii. the Small Business Administration;

xiv. the Army Corps of Engineers;

xv. the Office of Management and Budget;

xvi. the National Security Staff;

xvii. the Domestic Policy Council;

xviii. the National Economic Council;

xix. the Council on Environmental Quality;

xx. the Office of Science and Technology Policy;

xxi. the Council of Economic Advisers;

xxii. the White House Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs;

xxiii. the White House Office of Cabinet Affairs; and

xxiv. such other agencies and offices as the President may designate.
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b. The Chair shall regularly convene and preside at meetings of the Task Force and determine its 

agenda as the Task Force exercises the functions set forth in section 3 of this order. The Chair’s 

duties shall also include:

i. communicating and engaging with States, tribes, local governments, Members of Congress, other stakeholders and interested parties, and the public on matters pertaining to 

rebuilding in the affected region;

ii. coordinating the efforts of executive departments, agencies, and offices related to the 

functions of the Task Force; and

iii. specifying the form and subject matter of regular reports to be submitted concurrently to 

the Domestic Policy Council, the National Security Staff, and the Chair.

Sec. 3. Functions of the Task Force. Consistent with the principles of the NDRF, including individual and 

family empowerment, leadership and local primacy, partnership and inclusiveness, public information, 

unity of effort, timeliness and flexibility, resilience and sustainability, and psychological and emotional 

recovery, the Task Force shall:

a. work closely with FEMA in the coordination of rebuilding efforts with the various intergovernmental activities taken in conjunction with the NDRF;

b. (b) describe the potentially relevant authorities and resources of each member of the Task 

Force;

c. identify and work to remove obstacles to resilient rebuilding in a manner that addresses existing 

and future risks and vulnerabilities and promotes the long-term sustainability of communities 

and ecosystems;

d. coordinate with entities in the affected region in efforts to:

i. ensure the prompt and orderly transition of affected individuals and families into safe and 

sanitary long-term housing;

ii. plan for the rebuilding of critical infrastructure damaged by Hurricane Sandy in a manner 

that accounts for current vulnerabilities to extreme weather events and increases community and regional resilience in responding to future impacts;

iii. support the strengthening of the economy; and

iv. understand current vulnerabilities and future risks from extreme weather events, and 

identify resources and authorities that can contribute to strengthening community and 

regional resilience as critical infrastructure is rebuilt and ecosystem functions are restored;

e. prior to the termination of the Task Force, present to the President a Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (Strategy) as provided in section 5 of this order;
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f. engage local stakeholders, communities, the public, Members of Congress, and other officials 

throughout the areas affected by Hurricane Sandy to ensure that all parties have an opportunity 

to share their needs and viewpoints to inform the work of the Task Force, including the development of the Strategy; and

g. communicate with affected tribes in a manner consistent with Executive Order 13175 of November 6, 2000, regarding the consultation and coordination with Indian tribal governments.

Sec. 4. Task Force Advisory Group. The Chair shall, at his discretion, establish an Advisory Group to 

advise the Task Force and invite individuals to participate in it. Participants shall be elected State, local, 

and tribal officials and may include Governors, Mayors, County Executives, tribal elected officials, 

and other elected officials from the affected region as the Chair deems appropriate. Members of the 

Advisory Group, acting in their official capacity, may designate employees with authority to act on their 

behalf. The Advisory Group shall generally advise the Task Force as requested by the Chair, and shall 

provide input on each element of the Strategy described in section 5 of this order.

Sec. 5. Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy.

a. Within 180 days of the first convening of its members, the Task Force shall prepare a Strategy 

that includes:

i. a summary of Task Force activities;

ii. a long-term rebuilding plan that includes input from State, local, and tribal officials and is 

supported by Federal agencies, which is informed by an assessment of current vulnerabilities to extreme weather events and seeks to mitigate future risks;

iii. specific outcomes, goals, and actions by Federal, State, local, and tribal governments 

and the private sector, such as the establishment of permanent entities, as well as any 

proposed legislative, regulatory, or other actions that could support the affected region’s 

rebuilding; and

iv. a plan for monitoring progress.

b. The executive departments, agencies, and offices listed in section 2(a) of this order shall, as appropriate and to the extent permitted by law, align their relevant programs and authorities with 

the Strategy.

Sec. 6. Administration.

a. The Task Force shall have a staff, headed by an Executive Director, which shall provide support 

for the functions of the Task Force.

b. The Executive Director shall be selected by the Chair and shall supervise, direct, and be accountable for the administration and support of the Task Force.
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c. At the request of the Chair, other executive departments and agencies shall serve in an advisory 

role to the Task Force on issues within their expertise.

d. The Task Force may establish technical working groups of Task Force members, their representatives, and invited Advisory Group members and elected officials, or their designated employees, 

as necessary to provide advice in support of their function.

e. The Task Force shall terminate 60 days after the completion of the Strategy described in section 

5 of this order, after which FEMA and the lead agencies for the Recovery Support Functions, as 

described in the NDRF, shall continue the Federal rebuilding coordinating roles described in section 3 of this order to the extent consistent with the NDRF.

Sec. 7. General Provisions.

a. For purposes of this order, “affected tribe” means any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, 

or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe pursuant to the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 479a), located or with 

interests in the affected area.

b. To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development shall provide the Task Force with such administrative services, facilities, staff, equipment, mobile communications, and other support services as may be 

necessary for the Task Force to carry out its functions, using funds provided from the Disaster 

Relief Fund by agreement with FEMA and any other available and appropriate funding.

c. Members of the Task Force, Advisory Group, and any technical working groups shall serve without any additional compensation for their work on the Task Force, Advisory Group, or technical 

working group.

d. Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

i. the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof, or 

the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or

ii. the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

e. This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, and subject to the availability of 

appropriations.

f. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, 

agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December 7, 2012.
Beach Haven, New Jersey - FEMA/Sharon Karr
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II Definitions

Sustainability 

Sustainability is the creation and maintenance of conditions under which humans and nature can 

exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and 

future generations. Sustainability involves providing for the long-term viability of the people and 

economy of the region and its natural ecosystems, which requires consideration of the risks posed by 

a changing climate, the practicality of maintaining a long-term presence in the most vulnerable areas, 

and the need to protect and restore the natural ecosystems. The specific definition of sustainability 

will vary when shifting the scale of a sustainability assessment between individuals, neighborhoods, 

communities, cities, and regions. Individuals, communities, or regions will need to state what they 

want to sustain, why they value that, how long they intend to sustain it, and what costs (social, 

ecological, and economic) they are willing to accept in order to sustain what they value. As individuals 

and societies evolve, their specific definition of sustainability, based on how they answer these four 

questions, will evolve as well.

The Task Force also recognizes elements and challenges of implementing sustainability. To maintain 

resilience in the face of a constantly shifting set of needs and values, sustainability efforts will need 

to utilize an integrated approach to problem-solving that optimizes the desired social, economic, and 

environmental effects of an action while minimizing known negative effects, as well as adapting to 

unknown and unintended effects as they surface.200

Resilience

For individuals and communities, resilience means the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to 

changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions. Disruptions can 

include deliberate attacks, accidents, potential threats, and naturally occurring incidents. Discussions 

of resilience will vary depending on the focus of the effort and stakeholders involved (e.g., individuals, 

communities, regions), the scale and time frame of planning and rebuilding efforts, and the expected 

return frequency and severity of the event or stressor. 

A resilient recovery to Hurricane Sandy will foster the development of systems that build physical, 

economic, environmental, and social capacity to reduce vulnerabilities and manage known risks. These 

increased capacities should be designed to allow future incident responders to maintain acceptable 

200	 Executive Order No. 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,

October 5, 2009; National Environmental Policy Act section 101, 42 U.S.C. 4331United Nations

General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 60th Session, September 15, 2005.
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levels of functioning across all systems and quickly adapt system structures to changing risk and 

vulnerability scenarios. Furthermore, a resilient rebuilding strategy will consider interdependent system 

elements interacting across multiple scales.201

Risk Assessment And Risk Management

Making informed decisions at community and regional scales to mitigate risks posed by potential 

hazards is a core element of the Task Force strategy. Risk assessment is a process for determining 

what hazards exist, characterizing the effect a hazard might have on valued elements in a community 

or region, and calculating the risk of a hazard occurring and affecting a valued element. Hazard 

identification characterizes the timing of occurrence (and re-occurrence), what effects may occur from 

the hazard, and the magnitude of a hazard. Vulnerability assessment describes effects to a specific 

receptor when exposed to a hazard, the social or ecological value of the receptor, and how resilient 

the receptor and its supporting systems are to effects from the hazard. Exposure assessment collects 

information about the human and ecological systems that the identified hazards could affect.

Risk management is a response strategy, advancing a set of actions that emphasize risk reduction across 

a range of possible futures (hazard mitigation strategies) and revising response strategies periodically 

in light of new knowledge. Risk management strategies must be resilient enough to promote long-term 

investments, yet sufficiently flexible so as to sustain social and economic progress by taking advantage 

of improvements in risk knowledge, tools, and technologies.202 Incorporating risk assessment and risk 

management into broader rebuilding and response planning efforts provides an objective and logical 

framework for assessing risks and vulnerabilities as new information is collected and made available to 

decision makers. Risk-informed decisions must consider a whole-systems perspective. Risk managers 

should understand how multiple human and ecological systems may interact during extreme events 

and consider the potential for concurrent extreme events as well as the spatial and temporal nature of 

these hazards.203

Hazard Mitigation

Hazard mitigation refers to efforts using non-structural measures to reduce loss of life, property, and 

resources by lessening the impact of disasters. Hazard mitigation measures broadly aim to avoid, 

reduce, rectify, or eliminate impacts and risks to affected communities. Hazard mitigation measures 

include but are not limited to investments in measures such as zoning, rehabilitation of coastal 

201	 Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, March 30, 2011; Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure

Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013. HHS, National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America, December

2009; NOAA and USACE, Infrastructure Systems Rebuilding Principles, February 28, 2013; CEQ, Progress Report of the Interagency

Climate Change Adaptation Task Force: Recommended Actions in Support of a National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 2010.

202	 National Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment, 2009.

203	 EPA, “Risk Assessment Principles and Practices,”, 2004, http://www.epa.gov/osa/pdfs/ratf-final.pdf; 

FEMA, “Risk Assessment: A How-to Guide to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks,”01/2005, http://www.fema.gov/

library/viewRecord.do?id=1559; Sayers, Paul., Y. Li, G. Galloway, E. Penning-Rowsell, F. Shen, K. Wen,

Y. Chen, and T. Le Quesne, Flood Risk Management: A Strategic Approach, UNESCO, 2013.
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ecosystems that buffer floods, relocating homes and businesses away from the most vulnerable areas, 

non-structural efforts to improve the resilience of public infrastructure and key resource lifelines as well 

as reduce the risk of specific vulnerabilities from natural hazards, and management and social programs 

to reduce future risks. 

It is important that approaches to hazard mitigation and risk reduction are not only physical 

interventions (i.e., the development and enhancement of community-based social networks) but are 

also invaluable components to community resilience. Members of the whole community—including 

individuals with disabilities, others with access and functional needs and limited English proficiency, 

as well as racially and ethnically diverse communities—benefit from hazard mitigation actions as the 

entire community can expect fewer disruptive disaster impacts and a decreased need for supplemental 

resource support.204

Vulnerable Populations

The Task Force understands that the affected areas include a diversity of businesses, neighborhoods, 

residents, and workers that may have been disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of Hurricane 

Sandy due to their location, limited financial or other resources, less access to emergency services and 

support, or other disadvantages. Accordingly, the Task Force’s Rebuilding Strategy seeks to address 

the needs of such “vulnerable populations,” which is meant to include: low-income communities, 

overburdened populations,205 children and youth, elderly individuals, certain communities of color, 

households and people with limited English proficiency, immigrants, individuals with chronic medical 

conditions, people who are homeless or at risk of homelessness, and individuals with disabilities.

204	 FEMA, National Mitigation Framework, May 2013; National Environmental Policy Act section 1508.20,

42 U.S.C. 4331; Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, March 30, 2011.

205	 Plan EJ 2014: EPA’s Plan EJ 2014 defines “overburdened populations” as minority, low-income, tribal, and indigenous

populations or communities in the ES that potentially experience disproportionate environmental harms and risks as a result

of greater vulnerability to environmental hazards. This increased vulnerability may be attributable to an accumulation

of negative and a lack of positive environmental, health, economic, or social conditions within these populations.
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III Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABFE Advisory Base Flood Elevation

ACF Administration for Children and Families (HHS)

ACHP Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

ACL Administration for Community Living (HHS)

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

BW-12 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012

CDBG-DR Community Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS)

CDFI Community Development Financial Institution

CEQ White House Council on Environmental Quality

CHP Combined Heat and Power

CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS)

CNCS Corporation for National and Community Service

CPCB RSF Community Planning and Capacity Building Recovery Support Function

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOC U.S. Department of Commerce

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOI U.S. Department of the Interior

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

DOL U.S. Department of Labor

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

ED U.S. Department of Education

EDA Economic Development Administration (DOC)

EJ Environmental Justice

EOP Executive Office of the President

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ETA Employment and Training Administration (DOL)

FAA Federal Aviation Administration (DOT)

Fannie Mae Federal National Mortgage Association

FCC Federal Communications Commission
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FDRC Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)

FHA Federal Housing Administration (HUD)

FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency 

FHWA Federal Highway Administration (DOT)

FIO Federal Insurance Office (Treasury)

FIRM Flood Insurance Rate Map

FRA Federal Railroad Administration (DOT)

Freddie Mac Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

FTA Federal Transit Administration (DOT)

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIS Geographical Information System

GSA General Services Administration

GSE Government Sponsored Enterprise

GSP Gross State Product

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration (HHS)

HUBZone Historically Underutilized Business Zone

HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

IBC International Building Code

IBHS Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety

ICC International Code Council

ICP Internal Control Plan

IG Inspector General

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IRC International Residential Code

IRS Internal Revenue Service (Treasury)

ISO Independent Service Operator

ITAC Industrial and Technical Assistance Corporation

JFO Joint Field Office

LDRM Local Disaster Recovery Manager
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LEED U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design

LMI Low and Moderate Income

LSC Legal Services Corporation

LWD New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development

MitFLG Mitigation Framework Leadership Group

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NDRF National Disaster Recovery Framework

NFIP National Flood Insurance Program

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health (HHS)

NIH National Institutes of Health (HHS)

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology (DOC)

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC)

NPCC New York City Panel on Climate Change

NSS White House National Security Staff

NPS National Park Service (DOI)

NTIA National Telecommunications Information Administration (DOC)

NYCHA New York City Housing Authority

NYRCR New York Rising Community Reconstruction Program

OFN Opportunity Finance Network

OHHLHC Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard Control (HUD)

OIPI Office of International and Philanthropic Innovation (HUD)

OMB White House Office of Management and Budget 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL)

OSTP White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 

PHA Public Housing Authority

PII Personally Identifiable Information

PLA Project Labor Agreement

PMO Program Management Office (Task Force)

PPD-21 Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 

PPD-8 Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness 

RATB Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board

Risk MAP Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning 
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RSF Recovery Support Function

RSFLG Recovery Support Framework Leadership Group

Sandy Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013

SBDC Small Business Development Center 

SFHA Special Flood Hazard Areas

SHPO State Historic Preservation Officer

SI Smithsonian Institution

SORN System of Records Notices

SRF State Revolving Fund

SRIA Sandy Recovery Improvement Act

SSA Social Security Administration

SSBCI State Small Business Credit Initiative

STEP Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Program (FEMA)

Task Force Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force

TIFIA Infrastructure Finance Innovation Act (FHWA/DOT)

TIGER Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (DOT)

Treasury U.S. Department of the Treasury

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (DOD)

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USGCRP U.S. Global Change Research Program

USGS U.S. Geological Survey (DOI)

VA U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

WBC Women’s Business Center

WETP Worker Education and Training Program (NIH/HHS)
Belmar, New Jersey - FEMA/Rosanna Arias
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IV Agency Accomplishments

Corporation for National and Community Service

The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), through its AmeriCorps programs, has 

deployed more than 3,600 national service participants in the six states that Hurricane Sandy affected. 

Additionally, CNCS has established and is implementing a long-term recovery strategy in New Jersey 

and New York. AmeriCorps members have mucked and gutted more than 3,700 homes, including 1,443 

in New Jersey and 1,958 in New York. National service members have leveraged the help of 30,000 

volunteers, collaborated with the American Red Cross in operating 45 shelters, and coordinated with 

more than 200 non-profits and community-based organizations. The AmeriCorps National Civilian 

Community Corps program will deploy up to 20 members every six weeks to both New York and New 

Jersey to continue to assist communities as they rebuild impacted communities.

Department of Agriculture

As of July 1, 2013, USDA obligated $2.8 million to 20 projects for emergency food assistance, 

infrastructure, and economic programs that will help rehabilitate farmland, watersheds, and flood 

plains, as well as provide erosion control and infrastructure at National historic sites, forests, and 

non-industrial private forest lands. USDA has steadily utilized state programs and leveraged funding 

for housing, utility, and business recovery, and USDA is providing economic, technical, and scientific 

investments in data and studies to support recovery in the region. USDA’s efforts immediately following 

the storm included providing emergency food assistance for low income households, coordinating 

with state and local governments to identify available USDA programs, and processing applications for 

emergency loans, the Emergency Conservation Program, the Emergency Forest Restoration Program, 

and municipal debris removal. Other efforts have included working with states and municipalities 

on planning and restoration for flood plain easements, soil and water conservation, fisheries and 

hatcheries, and National Forests. USDA is currently accelerating its efforts to review and approve 

projects as quickly as possible, while ensuring that each project is a sound investment in the restoration 

and rehabilitation of impacted areas.

Department of Commerce

Economic Development Administration 

EDA has aided Sandy recovery primarily through enhancing information sharing capabilities and 

providing targeted technical assistance. A key facet of implementing the NDRF is to establish a common 

framework for sharing information about agency programs, community impacts, and troubleshooting 

gaps in recovery assistance. Advancements in this area included the convening of “Economic Recovery 
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Practitioner All Hands” conference calls, establishing recovery topic-focused working groups with key 

stakeholders from Federal, State, academic, and private sector organizations, and facilitating regular 

Federal and State partner coordination meetings to share recovery information and collaborate on 

common recovery objectives. Through enhanced communication, these advancements provided 

opportunities to share recovery and resilience best practices. In the area of targeted technical 

assistance, EDA implemented peer-to-peer forums to assist the New Jersey tourism industry, held 

“Access to Capital Meetings” to inform business resources of traditional and non-traditional financing 

mechanisms, and provided risk management resource information to small businesses in the impacted 

region.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, NOAA vessels began surveying obstructions of 

waterways that lead to critical petroleum facilities within the Port of New York and New Jersey, which 

helped to restore the flow of emergency fuel supplies by the following morning. Furthermore, NOAA 

embedded five senior staff members in FEMA’s New York and New Jersey JFOs for rotating details from 

December 2012 through June 2013 and developed a set of joint principles on Infrastructure Rebuilding 

Systems alongside USACE. NOAA is actively informing recovery and resilience efforts by working with 

impacted communities to provide technical assistance, strengthen long-term coastal observations and 

monitoring, and advance charting and mapping. As highlighted in the President’s Climate Action Plan, 

NOAA, USACE, and FEMA released a new sea level rise planning tool that includes interactive maps 

and a sea level rise calculator to improve community understanding of future flood risks and planning. 

Additionally, NOAA is working to advance integration of natural and built systems in disaster response, 

recovery, and mitigation through fostering partnerships and contributing technical expertise to efforts, 

such as the USACE’s Comprehensive Study. 

Department of Education

Following Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) provided Project School Emergency 

Response to Violence (SERV) awards for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut totaling $3 million. 

Project SERV provides for restoration of the learning environment after a disrupting event and–

although the program began as a response to violent incidents—, has been expanded to include major 

events that disrupt the learning environment. Examples of allowable funds usage include financing 

mental health services, overtime for teachers and counselors, security, and substitute staff.

Department of Energy

DOE has been providing technical assistance to the affected States to help them develop pilot 

projects, financial mechanisms, and policy and market development tools and promote cost-effective 

investments in resilient energy generation and storage using Sandy recovery funds. DOE is collaborating 

with the Task Force, DOE National Laboratories, and State and local governments to advance emerging 

programs that address key energy resilience initiatives using public-private partnerships launched by 
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the States later this year. These projects include: developing a Hoboken Microgrid Plot, enhancing 

New York and New Jersey fuel coordination, holding a regional roundtable to monetize microgrid 

investments in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and providing direct assistance to states on 

leveraging Sandy Supplemental funding to finance emerging energy opportunities.

Department of Health and Human Services

As the Coordinating Agency for the Health and Social Services Recovery Support Function (HSS RSF) 

under the NDRF, HHS deployed Field Coordinators to New York and New Jersey in the days following 

Hurricane Sandy to guide RSF efforts, and deployed subject matter experts from the Administration for 

Children and Families (ACF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to conduct program and impact 

assessments as well as to provide technical assistance. HHS convened and supported multi-sector and 

interagency Task Forces on the needs of children, youth, and families, on environmental health, and on 

other issues related to Sandy recovery. ACF also led the Immediate Federal Disaster Case Management 

Program in New Jersey. At the time of the transition to the State Grant Program, ACF had provided 

disaster case management services to support 4,186 New Jersey Sandy survivor households. ACF is 

also awarding Sandy Supplemental funding for new construction or significant rebuilding of Head 

Start centers in New York and New Jersey that suffered catastrophic damage, $475 million through the 

Social Services Block Grant, and approximately $2 million to support family violence prevention and 

services in affected communities. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration is 

using Sandy Supplemental funding to support behavioral health treatment to impacted populations 

upon referral by FEMA crisis counselors, restore the capability of medication assisted substance abuse 

treatment services in the impacted areas, ensure the disaster distress helpline connects individuals to 

services and supports the crisis center network in the affected regions, and provide resilience training 

to educators on caring for their pupils in disaster areas. The Administration for Community Living (ACL) 

awarded the Connecticut and New Jersey State Units on Aging funding to reimburse the States for 

home delivered meals to homebound seniors after Sandy struck. ACL staff also worked with specific 

Area Agencies on Aging to coordinate relocation and recovery efforts by FEMA and displaced seniors. 

NIH has announced several funding opportunities, funded by the Sandy supplemental, to recover 

losses resulting from Sandy to NIH-supported research, including to help restore their research and 

facilities. NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) carried out a process to 

update Federal and State guidance on mold remediation for protection of volunteers, homeowners, 

and cleanup workers during March 2013. Also, NIEHS’s Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) 

released a supplemental funding request to provide safety and health training to support recovery, 

rebuilding, and resilience in preparing for current and potential future disasters within Sandy-affected 

areas. As of June 2013, WETP had trained over 929 workers in New York and New Jersey. Hurricane 

health and safety booklets ordered included 35,945 copies in English, 15,781 copies in Spanish, and 

290 copies in Vietnamese. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) prepared, in 

collaboration with federal partners, the FEMA Guidance For HRSA Community-Based Service Delivery 

Grantees and the HRSA Disaster Response and Recovery-Flexibilities and Capabilities guidance, which 

serve as tools that support HRSA’s operations, strategic information, and coordination. Additionally, 

CDC and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response are funding research 

activities in several areas.
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Department of Homeland Security: FEMA

FEMA has provided funding to the impacted region through the traditional Stafford Act programs of 

Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and HMGP. As prescribed in the NDRF, FDRCs were appointed, 

and the six RSFs were activated and deployed. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA) 

authorized several significant changes to the way FEMA may deliver disaster assistance under a variety 

of programs. Forms of aid provided by FEMA include: Individuals and Households Program distributions 

to 180,000 survivors, totaling $1.4 billion; Transitional Shelter Assistance Program assistance for 6,000 

survivors in New York and 5,500 in New Jersey; direct housing refurbishing for 115 housing units in 

Fort Monmouth, NJ; and $2.4 billion obligated in Public Assistance funds. The Hurricane Sandy disaster 

response comprised a full implementation of the six RSFs, which were deployed in regional JFOs. A 

federal Recovery Support Strategy was also developed for each state to outline the interagency federal 

approach to support the recovery efforts.

Department of Housing and Urban Development

In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, HUD worked closely with impacted states and other Federal 

agencies to provide for the needs of affected individuals and communities. Working alongside FEMA, 

New York City, New York State, and New Jersey, HUD aimed to ensure housing for displaced residents 

over the short-, medium-, and long-term. HUD also worked in conjunction with FHA and FHFA to 

protect homeowners from potential foreclosures caused by the storm. Due to swift action after the 

passage of the appropriations bill, HUD was able to begin allocating $5.4 billion in CDBG-DR funding 

within eight days of the storm, which communities are using to help rebuild houses, businesses, and 

critical infrastructure. HUD, together with the Task Force, has identified innovative ways to encourage 

and incentivize resilient rebuilding in the Sandy-affected region to ensure communities will be better 

able to withstand future storms. HUD has instituted a uniform flood risk reduction standard that applies 

to all reconstruction projects that the Sandy Supplemental funds, thereby ensuring a basic level of 

protection for those projects that take into account the future risks of climate change.

Department of the Interior

DOI owns and manages land along the coast that is important to coastal resilience and tourism. DOI 

aids recovery through the delivery of actionable scientific information, providing storm surge data 

that identified the extent and elevation above land surface of the storm surge, served storm-related 

geospatial information on a daily basis, and documented storm impacts to coastal barriers, all of 

which informed response and recovery as well as provided a new baseline to assess vulnerability of 

the reconfigured coast. Actions taken by DOI on those parks and refuges can assist in both coastal 

resilience and economic restoration, as well as enable sites to be the subject of long-term research 

and monitoring of effectiveness. Since Hurricane Sandy, DOI has allocated $445 million to 234 projects 

that will help repair facilities, reopen roads, and restore services in national parks, wildlife refuges, 

beaches, and public lands so that they may be reopened to the public. This funding will also provide 
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for investments in scientific data and studies to support recovery, as well as assessments of risk and 

resilience, in the region. As part of this initiative, DOI repaired damage to heat, utilities, walkways, and 

docks in order to reopen the Statue of Liberty National Monument in time for the Fourth of July and 

restored Fire Island National Seashore and Gateway National Recreation Area in time for peak tourist 

weekends and holidays. DOI has also worked with USACE to restore Jamaica Bay Salt Marsh Islands 

at Gateway National Recreation Area. Looking forward, an additional $342 million will be allocated to 

support projects for coastal restoration and resilience at DOI assets, including national parks, refuges, 

and tribal lands across the region.

Department of Labor

DOL’s worker protections agencies have worked closely with Federal, State, and local partners to ensure 

the safety and health of workers who were involved in Sandy response efforts, as well as in current and 

future recovery projects. ETA provided $70.3 million in National Emergency Grants (NEGs) to New York, 

New Jersey, Connecticut, West Virginia, and Rhode Island for continuing cleanup and recovery efforts. 

This included $20.5 million provided by the Disaster Relief Recovery Act of 2013 and $49.8 million 

provided by ETA’s WIA Dislocated Worker National Reserve, which funds NEGs. DOL’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) deployed Safety & Health professionals throughout the 

impacted areas immediately after Sandy’s landfall to protect workers engaged in storm response and 

recovery work, conducting over 4,900 outreach briefings and intervention activities and reaching over 

63,000 workers, which resulted in the removal of 7,900 workers from workplace hazards. OSHA also 

engaged with State and local communities in the impacted region by providing Susan Harwood grants 

to community organizations in New York and New Jersey for recovery-specific training and education, 

holding two Sandy-specific wage conferences for hundreds of stakeholders involved in rebuilding 

projects, and implementing a compliance assistance plan for contractors and subcontractors that were 

awarded storm recovery contracts by FEMA, SBA, HUD, EPA, or USACE. Furthermore, DOL’s Wage 

and Hour Division (WHD) has engaged in outreach for the Hurricane Sandy initiative on a continuing 

basis, such as on May 14 when WHD staff provided Davis-Bacon Act compliance assistance training to 

the agency representatives of the Sandy PMO. In addition, to ensure labor standards protections for 

workers engaged in cleanup and rebuilding activities under the Hurricane Sandy initiative, WHD has, todate, initiated 139 investigations of contractors and employers for compliance with the requirements of 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, Service Contract Act, and/or Davis-Bacon Act.

Department of the Treasury

While Treasury did not receive Sandy Supplemental funding, a variety of accomplishments were 

achieved through standard emergency operations. Treasury provided effective governmental assistance 

to the Financial Service sector through Federal interagency coordination, which Treasury chaired 

and was established to resolve issues, ensure adequate communication among affected parties, and 

identify heightened requirements for resilience. Treasury’s CDFI Fund contacted all certified CDFIs in 

the affected region to survey need and assess impact. Treasury and IRS also lifted income eligibility 

restrictions for Low Income Housing Tax Credit-financed projects, so displaced residents could rent units 
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in these buildings. Additionally, IRS announced that 401(k)s and similar employer-sponsored retirement 

plans could make loans and hardship distributions to victims of Hurricane Sandy and members of their 

families prior to February 1, 2013. In June 2013, Treasury used the conference of SSBCI state program 

managers to promote flexible capital provisions for small businesses still recovering from Hurricane 

Sandy. 

Department of Transportation

Letters to proceed on recovery work currently total $6.8 billion, more than 50% of the $12.4 billion 

authorized to repair and protect the nation’s largest transportation system. These funds have been 

used to repair and rebuild transit assets and facilities, reopen roads and bridges, and restore services 

at impacted airports. As part of these efforts, the Secretary of Transportation directed $185 million in 

Hurricane Sandy Relief funding be dedicated to the Hudson Yards Right-of-Way Preservation project. 

This “game changing” project will help pave the way for two desperately-needed, flood-resistant 

tunnels under the Hudson River, running between New York and New Jersey. Additionally, DOT played 

an instrumental role positioning assets leading up to the storm’s impact and for recovering immediately 

after. FTA, for example, worked expediently to develop a new emergency relief program to facilitate 

recovery grants. Working with other agencies and the White House, DOT administered a host of 

waivers, special permits, and other regulatory flexibilities to expedite operations in the aftermath of 

the storm. By working around the clock to repair damage, FAA restored normal air traffic operations 

quickly, and the Maritime Administration was able to dispatch vessels for emergency relief. In addition 

to dispatching staff to the region to begin damage assessments, FTA worked closely with FEMA and GSA 

to procure 250 buses to replace lost commuter rail and transit service in New Jersey, which allowed 

commuters to take buses to ferry terminals for the trip into Manhattan.

Department of Veterans Affairs

The VA Manhattan Medical Center was severely damaged during Hurricane Sandy, as were multiple VA 

cemeteries. VA was authorized $234 million from Hurricane Sandy supplemental, $232 million of which 

has been allocated to repair, reoutfit, and resupply the Manhattan facility. The National Cemetery 

Administration has completed all of the work at the affected cemeteries, and VA expects to fully 

obligate the funds for the repair of the Manhattan Medical Center in FY 2016. As of June 30, 2013, VA 

had obligated $15.9 million in supplemental funds. 

Environmental Protection Agency

Hurricane Sandy’s flooding and wind damage impacted more than 200 waste water treatment plants 

and over 80 drinking water plants, resulting in the release of potentially millions of gallons of raw 

sewage and impacting the clean drinking water of dozens of communities. EPA deployed over 200 

people to help with the initial response and is now working to manage the funds appropriated to 

the Agency, with the long-term goals of strengthening sewage and drinking water systems to better 
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withstand disasters and supporting other agencies’ effort to better protect human health and the 

environment. Following Hurricane Sandy, EPA assessed 40 drinking water facilities and 23 wastewater 

treatment plants in New Jersey as well as 40 drinking water and 23 wastewater plants in New York. 

Since that time, EPA has been appropriated funds for water treatment, monitoring, and storage and has 

worked both to manage its programs and provide expertise to states and other agencies.

Small Business Administration

SBA has played an integral role in the response and recovery efforts in the Sandy-affected region and 

is committed to providing small businesses with the access to capital, resources, and opportunities 

to rebuild their businesses. As of July 2013, SBA approved $2.4 billion in loans to 36,137 businesses 

and homeowners needing assistance to repair, rebuild, and restart the local economy. As of July 3013, 

SBA has provided 32,194 home loans for $1.9 billion and 3,943 business loans for $448.3 million. 

Additionally, SBA has deployed disaster response teams to the area, worked closely with its resource 

partners to provide technical assistance and counseling to small businesses, and ensured small 

businesses get increased opportunities to Federal and local contracting opportunities. SBA has awarded 

$19 million, received earlier this year through ad-hoc authority, to provide targeted small business 

management and technical assistance. The first award was made to individual resource partners in 

the amount of $5,811,000, and the second was made to resource partner collaborative proposals 

in the amount of $13,189,000. Between April 9, 2013 and June 30, 2013, 4,297 clients were served 

using these funds. As of July 2013, 27.1 percent of Sandy-related prime contract dollars obligated 

in the Federal Procurement Database System went to small businesses, exhibiting a strong Federal 

commitment to small business contracting. Within these Sandy related prime contracts, almost half 

went to local businesses.

United States Army Corps of Engineers

USACE partnered with NOAA to develop Infrastructure Systems Rebuilding principles to promote a 

unified strategy for each agency’s approach to activities associated with rebuilding and restoration 

efforts in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. Working under mission assignments from FEMA at the New 

York and New Jersey Disaster Recovery JFOs, USACE coordinated development of Mission Scoping 

Assessments and Recovery Support Strategies for Infrastructure Systems pursuant to the NDRF. As of 

August 2013, roughly 3.6 million cubic yards of sand has been placed on beaches in support of repairs 

to projects damaged by Hurricane Sandy. Of the 33 coastal storm damage reduction projects in the 

process of being repaired due to Hurricane Sandy, 18 contracts have been awarded, 11 contractors 

have received notices to proceed, and 4 projects have been restored to their authorized design profile. 

Of the 135 navigation projects affected by Hurricane Sandy in the Corps North Atlantic Division, Lakes 

and Rivers Division, and South Atlantic Division, 24 contracts have been awarded, 23 contractors have 

received notices to proceed, and 9 activities have been completed. An evaluation of the performance 

of storm damage reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricane Sandy is forthcoming. USACE, in 

collaboration with other agencies (as described on page 43) also contributed to the development 

and fielding of the Sea Level Rise Tool for Sandy Recovery. USACE is working on the Comprehensive 
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Study, which will inform the effort to promote more resilient communities that are sustainable and 

support the coastal ecosystem. This study will also identify activities warranting further analysis and 

institutional barriers to implementation.
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V Addressing Future Risks

 “But for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate change. Now, it’s 

true that no single event makes a trend. But the fact is the 12 hottest years on record have all come in 

the last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, floods -- all are now more frequent and more intense. We 

can choose to believe that Superstorm Sandy, and the most severe drought in decades, and the worst 

wildfires some states have ever seen were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can choose to believe in 

the overwhelming judgment of science -- and act before it’s too late.”206

President Barack Obama 

It is clear that we are vulnerable to a wide spectrum of natural disasters that will continue to strike the 

United States. This is why the mission of the Task Force is vital to ensuring that we learn how to rebuild 

smarter so we are better prepared for the next storm nature throws our way.

Extreme Rainfall

Extreme rainfall events have increased in intensity and number in many regions of the U.S., especially 

over the last three decades. The largest increases have been in the Midwest and Northeast regions,207

and, in parts of the Northeast, there has also been an increase in flooding events.208 This may be 

associated with the increase in both mean and extreme precipitation, although other factors (e.g., 

antecedent soil moisture) also have important influences on flooding.

Warmer air can contain more water vapor than cooler air. Global analyses show the amount of water 

vapor in the atmosphere has, in fact, increased over both land and oceans. Climate change also alters 

dynamical characteristics of the atmosphere that, in turn, affect weather patterns and storms. In the 

mid-latitudes, where most of the continental U.S. is located, there is an upward trend in extreme 

precipitation in the vicinity of fronts associated with mid-latitude storms.

Figure 1 shows an annual and seasonal time series of precipitation anomalies for the period of 1895-

2011. Annual precipitation has varied over time, showing a clear shift towards greater variability and 

higher totals since 1970. The wettest year since 1895 was 2011, while the 2nd driest year occurred in 

1996. The 1960s were characterized by a very severe, long-term drought that was particularly intense 

in the New England region, where it spanned almost the entire decade. The Northeast’s three driest 

years were 1930, 1941, and 1965. Summer precipitation does not exhibit an overall trend but, over 

the past 10 years, there have been a few very wet summers, including 2006 (wettest on record) and 

206	 Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address, 2/12/13, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2013

207	 Kunkel, K.E, L.E. Stevens, S.E. Stevens, L. Sun, E. Janssen, D. Wuebbles, and J.G. Dobson, “Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios

for the U.S. National Climate Assessment. Part 9. Climate of the Contiguous United States,” 2013, NOAA Technical Report NESDIS.

208	 Peterson, T.C., R.J. Heim, Jr., R. Hirsch, D.P. Kaiser, H. Brooks, N.S. Diffenbaugh, R.M. Dole, J.P. Giovannettone, K. Guiguis, T.R. Karl,

R.W. Katz, K.E. Kunkel, D. Lettenmaier, G.J. McCabe, C.J. Paciorek, K. Ryberg, S. Schubert, V.B.S. Silva, B.C. Stewart, A.V. Vecchia, G.

Villarini, R.S. Vose, J. Walsh, D. Wolock, K. Wolter, C.A. Woodhouse, M. Wehner, and D. Wuebbles, “Monitoring and understanding

changes in heat waves, cold waves, floods and droughts in the United States: State of knowledge,” 2013, Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc.
186

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2009 (second wettest on record). Precipitation trends are not statistically significant for winter, spring, 

or summer; the upward annual and fall trends (as seen in Fig. 1) are statistically significant, with 

magnitudes of +0.39 and +0.24 inches/decade, respectively.209

Figure 2 shows a time series of an index for the number of extreme daily precipitation events for the 

northeastern U.S. An extreme event is defined here as one with a 2-day precipitation total exceeding 

the threshold for a 5-yr recurrence interval. There is substantial decadal-scale variability in the number 

of extreme precipitation events since the 1930s. The most dominant feature is the high values in the 

1990s and 2000s. The highest index value occurred in 1996. The index was quite low in the 1960s, 

coinciding well with the drought that affected the Northeast during that period. 

The recent elevated level in extreme precipitation also manifests itself in estimates of shorter rainfall 

recurrence intervals. These values are used extensively in engineering design and governmental 

regulations (e.g., building codes). Commonly these rainfall extremes are known as the 50- or 100-year 

storm and represent the amount of rainfall that can be expected to occur on average once in 50 or 100 

years, respectively. In terms of these design specifications, an increase in extreme rainfall lowers the 

expected recurrence interval of a specific precipitation amount. DeGaetano (2009) shows that what 

would be expected to be a 100-year event based on 1950-1979 data occurs with an average return 

interval of 60 years when data from the 1978-2007 period are considered.210 Similarly, the amount of 

rain that constituted a 50-year event during 1950-1979 is expected to occur on average once every 30 

years based on the more recent data.

The latest projections of future climate over the U.S. suggest that mean annual precipitation will 

increase in the Northeast. This is part of a large continental pattern of precipitation increase in northern 

latitudes. The contiguous U.S. straddles the transition zone between drier conditions in the sub-tropics 

(south) and wetter conditions at higher latitudes (north). Because the precise location of this transition 

zone varies somewhat among models, projected changes in precipitation in central areas of the U.S. 

range from small increases to small decreases. However, the Northeast is within the belt of northern 

latitude increases, these increases being concentrated seasonally in winter and spring. In addition, 

model projections indicate that the recent trend towards a greater percentage of precipitation falling 

in heavy rain events will continue. Heavy-precipitation events that are presently rare will become more 

common in the future.

There is a high degree of certainty that the heaviest precipitation events will increase everywhere, and 

by large amounts. This consistent model projection is well understood and is a direct outcome of the 

increase in atmospheric moisture caused by warming. There is also more certainty regarding dry spells, 

as the annual maximum number of consecutive dry days increases in future model projections. Thus, 

both extreme wetness and extreme dryness increase.

209	 Kunkel, K.E, L.E. Stevens, S.E. Stevens, L. Sun, E. Janssen, D. Wuebbles, J. Rennells, A. DeGaetano,

and J.G. Dobson, “Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios for the U.S. National Climate Assessment.

Part 1. Climate of the Northeast U.S.,” 2013, NOAA Technical Report NESDIS.

210	 DeGaetano, A. T., “Time-Dependent Changes in Extreme-Precipitation Return-Period

Amounts in the Continental United States,” 2009, J. Appl. Meteorol. Climatol.
187

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Figure 1. Precipitation anomaly (deviations from the 1901-1960 average, inches) for annual (black), 

winter (blue), spring (green), summer (red), and fall (orange) for the northeastern U.S during 1901-

2012. Dashed lines indicate the best fit by minimizing the chi-square error statistic. Based on a new 

gridded version of COOP data from the National Climatic Data Center, the CDDv2 data set (R. Vose, 

personal communication, July 27, 2012). Note that the annual time series is on a unique scale. Trends 

are upward and statistically significant annually and for the fall season. From Kunkel et al. (2013).
188

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Figure 2. Decadal time series of extreme precipitation index for the occurrence of 2-day, 1 in 5-year 

extreme precipitation, for the Northeastern region, during 1901-2012. Based on daily COOP data from 

long-term stations in the National Climatic Data Center’s Global Historical Climate Network data set. 

Values are expressed as anomalies with respect to a reference period of 1901-1960. Only stations with 

less than 10% missing daily precipitation data for the period 1895-2011 are used in this analysis. Events 

are first identified for each individual station by ranking all 2-day precipitation values and choosing 

the top N/5 events, where N is the number of years of data for that particular station. Then, event 

numbers for each year are averaged for all stations in each 1x1° grid box. Finally, a regional average is 

determined by averaging the values for the individual grid boxes. This regional average is the extreme 

precipitation index. The bar for the 2000s includes the 12-yr period of 2001-2012.
189

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Hurricanes

There has been a substantial increase in virtually every measure of hurricane activity in the Atlantic 

since the 1980s (Figure 3) relative to the 1970s and 1980s. However, values were also high in the 

1960s.211

The increases illustrated in Fig. 3 are linked, in part, to higher sea surface temperatures in the region 

which Atlantic hurricanes form in and move through. Numerous factors influence these local sea 

surface temperatures, including human-induced emissions of heat-trapping gases and particulate 

pollution and natural variability. However, hurricanes respond to more than just sea surface 

temperature. How hurricanes respond also depends on how the local atmosphere responds to changes 

in local sea surface temperatures, and this atmospheric response depends critically on the cause of 

the change. For example, the atmosphere responds differently when local sea surface temperatures 

increase due to a local decrease of particulate pollution that allows more sunlight through to warm 

the ocean, versus when sea surface temperatures increase more uniformly around the world due to 

increased amounts of heat-trapping gases. Thus, the link between hurricanes and ocean temperatures 

is complex and this is an active area of research. The high values in the 1960s indicate that natural 

decadal-scale variability is quite high and is likely a component of the recent changes.

Climate models that incorporate the best understanding of all these factors project further increases in 

the frequency and intensity of the strongest Atlantic hurricanes (Figure 4), as well as increased rainfall 

rates in response to continued warming of the tropical oceans by heat-trapping gases. Although the 

current generation of climate models tends to underestimate the frequency of the strongest hurricanes 

for the current climate, the distribution of hurricane intensities in the latest models is believed to be 

realistic enough to use the relative changes in the projections.212

 

211	 Villarini, G. and Vecchi, G.A., “21st Century Projections of North Atlantic Tropical Storms

from CMIP5 Models,” 2012, http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/news-app/story.58.

212	 Knutson, T., J. Sirutis, G. Vecchi, S. Garner, M. Zhao, H. Kim, M. Bender, R. Tuleya, I. Held, and G. Villarini,

“Dynamical Downscaling Projections of Twenty-First-Century Atlantic Hurricane Activity: CMIP3 and

CMIP5 Model-Based Scenarios,” 2013, J. Climate. doi:10.1175/JCLI-D-12-00539.1, in press.
190

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Figure 3. Recent variations of the Power Dissipation Index (PDI), a measure of overall hurricane 

intensity in a hurricane season, in the north Atlantic (from Villarini and Vecchi, 2012) 

Figure 4. Model projections of percentage changes in Atlantic hurricane and tropical storm frequencies 

for different storm categories, by the late this century. Projected changes are for the period 2081-2100 

compared with the period 2001-2020. (Figure source: NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory) 
191

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Winter Storms 

Over the U.S., historical changes in winter storm frequency and intensity are small and not significant 

with the exception that there is limited evidence of an overall increase in winter storm activity near the 

northeast and northwest U.S. coastlines during the second half of the 1950-2010 period. However, for 

the Northern Hemisphere as a whole, there is evidence of an increase in both winter storm frequency 

and intensity during the cold season since 1950, with storm tracks having shifted slightly towards the 

poles. 

The characteristics that constitute a severe winter storm vary regionally. Snowfall greater than 10 

inches is common in many parts of the Northeast, and thus often only a short-term inconvenience. 

However, the same snowfall across the Southeast might cripple the region for a week or longer. A 

Regional Snowfall Index213 has been formulated that takes into account the typical frequency and 

magnitude of snowstorms in each region of the eastern two-thirds of the U.S., providing perspectives 

on decadal changes in extreme snowstorms since 1900. An analysis based on the area receiving 

snowfall of various amounts shows there were more than twice the number of extreme regional 

snowstorms from 1961-2010 (21) as there were in the previous 60 years (9) (Figure 5). The greater 

number of extreme storms in recent decades is consistent with other findings of recent increases in 

heavier and more widespread snowstorms.214

213	 Squires, M.F., J.H. Lawrimore, R.R. Heim, D.A. Robinson, M. Gerbush, T. Estilow, C. Tabor, and A. Wilson,

“Development of new snowstorm indices and databases at the National Climatic Data Center,” 2009,

Eos, Transactions of the AGU, 90(52), Fall Meeting Supplement, Abstract IN13A-1076 Poster.

214	 Kocin, P.J., L.W. Uccellini, “A snowfall impact scale derived from northeast storm snowfall

distributions,” 2004, Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 85, 177–194. doi: 10.1175/BAMS-85-2-177
192

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Figure 5. Number of extreme snowstorms (upper 10 percentile) occurring each decade within the six U.S. climate 

regions in the eastern two-thirds of the contiguous U.S. (Based on an analysis of the 50 strongest storms for 

each of the six climate regions from October 1900-April 2010). The inset map shows the boundaries of each 

climate region. These regions were selected for consistency with NOAA’s monthly to annual operational climate 

monitoring activities. The map includes standardized temperature anomalies and precipitation departures from 

the 20th century mean calculated across all snow seasons in which each storm occurred. The snow season 

is defined as December-March for the South and Southeast regions and November-April for the other four 

regions.215

These extreme storms occurred more frequently in snow seasons that were colder and wetter than 

average (Fig. 5), but not exclusively. Approximately 35% of the snow seasons in which these events 

occurred were warmer than average and 30% drier than average. The implications are that even if 

temperatures continue to warm as they have over the past several decades, for the next few decades, 

at least, such record storms are possible as they have been observed during otherwise warmer- and 

drier-than-average seasons. However, future changes in winter storm frequency and intensity are 

uncertain.

215	 Kunkel, K.E., T.R. Karl, H. Brooks, J. Kossin, J. Lawrimore, D. Arndt, L. Bosart, D. Changnon, S.L. Cutter, N. Doesken,

K. Emanuel, P.Ya. Groisman, R.W. Katz, T. Knutson, J. O’Brien, C. J. Paciorek, T. Peterson, K. Redmond, D. Robinson, J.

Trapp, R. Vose, S. Weaver, M. Wehner, K. Wolter, D. Wuebbles, “Monitoring and understanding changes in extreme

storms: state of knowledge,” Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 94, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-12-00066.1.
193

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Sea Level Rise

Introduction

Coastal planning, management, and risk assessment require analysis of future conditions, particularly 

future sea levels, for the purpose of identifying and evaluating decision options that are resilient to 

environmental change. The impacts of Hurricane Sandy are evidence that coastal plans currently 

underestimate extreme flooding because they do not adequately account for sea level rise and the 

possibility of low probability, high impact storm surge events. 

Any amount of sea level rise will increase the flooding caused by coastal storm events, and recent 

work on the U.S. Atlantic coast demonstrates that the probability of coastal erosion increases with 

higher rates of sea level rise. Flood risk is also related to decision factors such as time horizon (i.e., life 

of the investment), the spatial extent of a planning area, and risk tolerance (i.e., willingness to accept 

a higher or lower probability of impacts). Risk perception, tolerance, and ability to address risks vary 

considerably among and within coastal communities. Considering the limits of tolerable risk is an active 

area of research and public debate, but is important for more resilient recovery and planning.

The sections that follow summarize the current scientific understanding of projected sea level rise 

globally and in the Sandy-affected region, the implications of sea level rise in assessing communities’ 

coastal flood risks, and considerations for incorporating this information in determining risk tolerances 

and in evaluating potential hazard mitigation options. 

Sea Level Rise and Risk Management in the U.S. Northeast

Global sea level has been rising at varying rates since the end of the last Ice Age (21,000 years ago) 

and is expected to continue beyond the end of this century. Over eight million people live in 100-year 

oceanic coastal flood hazard areas as mapped by FEMA. Further, more than 100 million people (33% of 

the U.S. population) live in counties that border the ocean and/or contain 100-year coastal flood hazard 

areas (excluding Great Lakes counties).216 Many of the nation’s assets related to military readiness 

and security, energy, commerce, transportation, and ecosystems are already located at or near the 

tidal coastal lines. Any increase in relative sea level217 increases the frequency and severity of coastal 

flooding in manmade and natural systems, even if storm patterns remain the same. Hurricane Sandy is 

a vivid reminder that we must find ways to contain costs resulting from exposure and increasing risk. 

FEMA is providing information about current risk based on historic conditions, including new ABFE 

maps for parts of coastal New York and New Jersey. Using the best available scientific information to 

address flood risk, including ABFEs, has immediate, short-term benefits to communities, but does not 

account for increasing flood risk resulting from future sea level rise. In order to reduce vulnerability 

216	 Crowell, M, Westcott, J, Phelps, S, Mahoney, T, Coulton, K, and Bellomo, D, “Estimating the United States Population

at Risk from Coastal Flood-Related Hazards,” 2013, In: Coastal Hazards, C.W. Finkl (ed.), Springer: 151-183.

217	 Relative sea level – The height of the sea with respect to a specific point on land.
194

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and increase resilience further into the future, long-term decisions such as where to locate new 

developments or critical infrastructure should incorporate information on future risk, such as sea level 

rise projections.218

FEMA and CEQ have been working with federal agencies and with the New York City Panel on Climate 

Change (NPCC) to provide the best available information on future sea level rise in a planning tool 

developed for decision makers in the Northeast.219 This section provides a synthesis of the scientific 

information on sea level rise incorporated in the planning tool and on risk management considerations 

in using sea level rise information. 

Methods for Determining Future Sea Level Rise 

There are two major approaches to looking ahead: one extrapolates past trends and the other relies on 

models of processes expected to drive future trends. The recent report, Global Sea-Level Rise Scenarios 

for the US National Climate Assessment (Parris et al 2012 – hereafter referred to as the Interagency 

Global SLR Scenarios), builds upon efforts by USACE and the National Climate Assessment to provide 

guidance on sea level rise estimates for these purposes.220

Coastal management decisions based solely on a most probable or likely outcome can lead to 

vulnerable assets resulting from inaction or maladaptation.221 The Interagency Global SLR Scenarios 

provides four plausible global sea level rise scenarios derived from current, peer-reviewed research. 

The scenarios do not precisely predict future changes, but describe potential future conditions in 

a manner that supports decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.222 This provides decision 

makers with alternative scenarios that can be employed based on risk tolerance.223

Sea level rise is highly variable over time and along different parts of the US coast. Changes in vertical 

land movement and ocean dynamics may be applied with different degrees of confidence based on 

218	 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ”Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme

Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” 2012, A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA; Parris,

A., P. Bromirski, V. Burkett, D. Cayan, M. Culver, J. Hall, R. Horton, K. Knuuti, R. Moss, J. Obeysekera, A. Sallenger, and J.

Weiss, “Global Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the US National Climate Assessment, 2012, NOAA Tech Memo OAR CPO-1.

219	 State and local officials, community planners, and infrastructure managers

220	 Parris, A., P. Bromirski, V. Burkett, D. Cayan, M. Culver, J. Hall, R. Horton, K. Knuuti, R. Moss, J. Obeysekera, A. Sallenger, and

J. Weiss, “Global Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the US National Climate Assessment, 2012, NOAA Tech Memo OAR CPO-1.

221	 Weeks, D., Malone, P, and L. Welling, “Climate change scenario planning: A tool for managing parks into uncertain futures,” 2011,

Park Science, Volume 28, Number 1; Gray, S., “From Uncertainty to Action: Climate Change Projections and the Management of Large

Natural Areas,” 2011, BioScience 61(7); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ”Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing

the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” 2012, A Special Report of Working Groups I

and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA.

222	 Moss, R., Edmonds, J. A., Hibbard, K.A., Manning, M.R., Rose, S.K., van Vuuren, D. P., Carter, T., Emori, S., Kainuma, M.,

Kram, T., Meehl, G. A., Mitchell, G. F. B., Nakicenovic, N., Riahi, K., Smith, S.J., Stouffer, R.J., Thomson, A.M., Weyant, J.P.,

and T.J. Wilbanks, “The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment,” 2010, Nature 463,

747-756 (11 February 2010) | doi:10.1038/nature08823; Weeks, D., Malone, P, and L. Welling, “Climate change scenario

planning: A tool for managing parks into uncertain futures,” 2011, Park Science, Volume 28, Number 1; Gray, S., “From

Uncertainty to Action: Climate Change Projections and the Management of Large Natural Areas,” 2011, BioScience 61(7).

223	 Parris, A., P. Bromirski, V. Burkett, D. Cayan, M. Culver, J. Hall, R. Horton, K. Knuuti, R. Moss, J. Obeysekera, A. Sallenger, and

J. Weiss, “Global Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the US National Climate Assessment,” 2012, NOAA Tech Memo OAR CPO-1.
195

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available regional or local data. The Interagency Global SLR Scenarios can be used in the absence of 

more locally or regionally relevant sea level rise estimates, as is the case in New York City. Modeled 

on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), NPCC was convened by Mayor Michael 

Bloomberg in August 2008 as part of PlaNYC, the City’s long-term sustainability plan.224 The NPCC 

consists of scientists who study climate change and its impact, as well as legal, insurance, and risk 

management experts. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg’s office is re-convening NPCC 

to provide updated climate risk information, including sea level rise projections. NPCC has developed 

next generation sea level rise projections for the immediate metropolitan area.225 The approach relies 

on latest global climate models outputs and emerging research to project changes in six sea level 

components (three global and three local). 

Global Mean Sea Level Rise 

Global Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the US National Climate Assessment (Parris et al 2012) states very 

high confidence (>90% ) that global mean sea level will rise at least 0.2 meters (8 inches) and no more 

than 2.0 meters (6.6 feet) by 2100. At this stage, the greatest uncertainty surrounding estimates of 

future global sea level rise is the rate and magnitude of ice sheet loss, primarily from Greenland and 

West Antarctica. The Highest Scenario of global sea level rise by 2100 is derived from a combination of 

estimated ocean warming from the IPCC AR4 global sea level rise projections and a calculation of the 

maximum possible glacier and ice sheet loss by the end of the century. The Intermediate-High Scenario 

assumes recent rates of ice sheet loss, but not the possibility of faster rates as temperature rises. The 

Intermediate-Low Scenario is based primarily on ocean warming and does not assume significant 

contributions increase in ice sheet loss. The Lowest Scenario is based on a linear extrapolation of the 

historical sea level rise rate derived from tide gauge records beginning in 1900 (1.7 mm/yr). The rate of 

global mean sea level rise derived from satellite altimetry (1992 to 2010) has been substantially higher 

(3.2 mm/yr), approaching twice the rate of the longer historical record from tide gauges. Thus, the 

Lowest Scenario should be considered only where there is a great tolerance for risk. 

A highly significant correlation is present between increasing global mean temperature and global 

mean sea level rise.226 The IPCC and more recent studies anticipate that oceanic circulation and thermal 

expansion due to heat transfer will continue to drive global mean sea level rise even if warming 

ceases.227 The Intermediate-Low and Lowest Scenarios are optimistic scenarios of future environmental 

change that assume rates of ice sheet loss and ocean warming slightly higher or similar to recent 

observations.

224	 New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC), “Climate Change Adaptation in New York City:

Building a Risk Management Response,” 2010, prepared for use by the New York City Climate Change

Adaptation Task Force, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, New York, NY.

225	 NPCC, “Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations, Climate Change Projections, and Maps,” 2013, NPCC2,

Prepared for use by the City of New York Special Initiative on Rebuilding and Resiliency, New York, New York.

226	 Rahmstorf, S., “A semi-empirical approach to projecting future sea-level rise,” 2007, Science; Vermeer, M.,

Rahmstorf, S., “Global sea level linked to global temperature,” 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy

of Sciences, DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0907765106; Grinsted, A., Moore, J., Jevrejeva, S., “Reconstructing sea

level from paleo and projected temperatures 200 to 2100 AD,” 2010, Climate Dynamics.

227	 Meehl, G.A., Hu, A., Tebaldi, C., Arblaster, J.M., Washington, W.M., Teng, H., Sanderson, B.M., Ault, T., Strand, W.G., White, J.B.,

“Relative outcomes of climate change mitigation related to global temperature versus sea-level rise,” 2012, Nature Clim. Change 2.
196

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U.S. Northeast Sea Level Rise

Sea level rise has been rising along the entire US Atlantic coast, and it has been rising faster in the MidAtlantic region (Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, including the Chesapeake Bay) and the Carolinas 

primarily due to subsidence.228 In the Mid-Atlantic region, possible causes of subsidence include 

sediment consolidation, glacio-isostatic adjustment (GIA), groundwater extraction, and tectonics.229

Sallenger et al. (2012) detect a “hotspot” of accelerated sea level rise along the 1,000 km of coast 

from Cape Hatteras, North Carolina to near Boston, Massachusetts and suggest it may be related 

to circulation changes in the North Atlantic Ocean.230 Dynamical sea level rise resulting from ocean 

circulation patterns could be additive to the global mean sea level rise trend, creating even higher sea 

levels and potential coastal impacts in Boston, New York, and Washington, DC when compared to the 

southeastern U.S.231 The causal mechanisms and persistence of this regional sea level rise acceleration 

remain an area of scientific debate.232 However, the observed rates of sea level rise and the evidence 

presented by Yin et al. (2010), Sallenger et al. (2012), and more recently by Boon (2012) are sufficient 

to suggest that experts and decision makers should consider accelerated rates along the northeast 

coast in their risk-averse, worst-case scenarios.233

The NPCC projects that, by the 2020s, sea level at the Battery at the southern tip of Manhattan will rise 

by between 2 and 11 inches.234 By the 2050s, the range expands to 6 to 32 inches. The broad range in 

the 2050s is primarily due to uncertainty about how much ice loss from ice sheets, mountain glaciers, 

and land-based ice caps will contribute to sea level rise, although thermal expansion of the ocean and 

dynamical changes in ocean height are important as well. After the 2050s, uncertainties associated 

with the melting of ice sheets, mountain glaciers, and land-based ice caps are projected to increasingly 

dominate.

Physical Science Limitations on Current Flood Risk Information

In many cases, FIRMs provided by FEMA are based on analyses and data that are 20 years old or more. 

The coastal storm flood data depicted in these maps often do not consider future sea level rise, the 

combination of coastal flooding factors, and/or shoreline change. 

228	 CCSP, “Coastal Sensitivity to Sea-Level Rise: A Focus on the Mid-Atlantic Region. A report by the US Climate Change Science

Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research,” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C., USA.

229	 Poag, C.W., Koeberl, Christian, Reimold, W.U., “The Chesapeake Bay Crater,” 2004, New York; Hayden, T.,

Kominz, M., Powars, D., Edwards, L., Miller, K., Browning, J., and Kulpecz, A., “Impact effects and regional

tectonic insights: Backstripping the Chesapeake Bay impact structure,” 2008, Geology, v. 36.

230	 Sallenger, A., Doran, K, and Howd, P., “Hotspot of accelerated sea-level rise on the Atlantic

coast of North America,” Nature Climate Change, DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1597.

231	 Yin J, Griffies SM, Stouffer RJ, “Spatial variability of SLR in twenty-first century projections,” 2010, J Climate 23:4585–4607.

232	 Chambers, D.P., Merrifield, M.A., Nerem, R.S., “Is there a 60-year oscillation in global

mean sea level?” 2012, Geophysical Research Letters 39, L18607.

233	 Boon, John D., “Evidence of Sea Level Acceleration at U.S. and Canadian Tide Stations, Atlantic Coast, North America,”

Journal of Coastal Research, 28(6); Yin J, Griffies SM, Stouffer RJ, “Spatial variability of SLR in twenty-first century

projections,” 2010, J Climate 23:4585–4607; Sallenger, A., Doran, K, and Howd, P., “Hotspot of accelerated sealevel rise on the Atlantic coast of North America,” Nature Climate Change, DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1597.

234	 Relative to a 2002 baseline.
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Sea levels continue to influence extreme weather events, including hurricanes and northeasters, 

which have been and continue to be the primary driver of the highest water levels affecting coastal 

communities.235 The general consensus is that it is likely the average maximum wind speed of 

hurricanes will increase throughout the coming century, although possibly not in every ocean basin, 

and the frequency of heavy precipitation will increase over the 21st Century.236 Sea level rise amplifies 

factors that contribute to coastal flooding: high tides, storm surge, high waves, and high runoff from 

rivers and creeks.237 For example, coastal damage from Hurricane Sandy in much of the New York 

Metropolitan Region is a result of high waves and storm surge occur during an astronomically high tide. 

Shoreline change is a dynamic process that is driven by both climate (e.g., storminess, sea level 

rise) and non-climate (e.g., sediment availability, tectonic uplift, or subsidence) factors. Historical 

trends of coastal erosion in the northeastern U.S. are well-documented.238 Predicting future trends 

of coastal change in response to storms and sea level rise is an active area of research that is critical 

to a comprehensive view of future risk. Recent work on the U.S. Atlantic coast demonstrates that 

the probability of coastal erosion increases with higher rates of sea level rise, and that explicit 

consideration of both climate and non-climate factors increases confidence in predictions.239

Efforts remain underway to develop updated coastal storm flood data for portions of the New York and 

New Jersey coast most severely affected by Sandy. The Task Force previously advised use of FEMA’s 

ABFEs plus 1 foot for rebuilding in the region. In the July-October timeframe, FEMA will release most 

of the Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps for coastal areas in both states, which will replace 

the ABFEs and refine the 1%-annual-chance (100-year) coastal flood elevations based on improved 

modeling. Thus, considering the impact of different weather events combined with scenarios of sea 

level rise and shoreline change is crucial in developing hazard profiles for emergency planning and 

vulnerability, impact, and adaptation assessments.240

235	 Zhang K., Douglas B. C., Leatherman S. P., “Twentieth-Century Storm Activity along the U.S. East Coast,” 2000,

J. Climate, 13; Grinsted, A., Moore, J.C., Jevrejeva, S., “Projected Atlantic hurricane surge threat from rising

temperatures,” 2013, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1209980110.

236	 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ”Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme

Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” 2012, A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA.

237	 Cayan, D.R., P.D. Bromirski, K. Hayhoe, M. Tyree, M.D. Dettinger and R.E. Flick, “Climate change projections of sea level

extremes along the California coast,” 2008, Climatic Change, 87, (Suppl 1), doi:10.1007/s10584-007-9376-7.

238	 Hapke, C.J., Himmelstoss, E.A., Kratzmann, M., List, J.H., and Thieler, E.R., 2011, National assessment of shoreline change; historical

shoreline change along the New England and Mid-Atlantic coasts: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2010-1118, 57 p.

239	 Gutierrez, B.T., Plant, N.G., Thieler, E.R., “A Bayesian network to predict coastal

vulnerability to sea level rise,” 2011, J. Geophys. Res. 116, F02009.

240	 Horton, R. M., V. Gornitz, D. A. Bader, A. C. Ruane, R. Goldberg, and C. Rosenzweig, “Climate Hazard Assessment for Stakeholder

Adaptation Planning in New York City,” 2011, J Appl Meteorol Clim, 50, 2247-2266. doi:10.1175/2011JAMC2521.1.
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Rebuilding Strategy Addressing Future Risks

Coastal Flood Risk Management Constraints

In addition to the factors described above, coastal flood risk is also related to planning choices that 

often include these common considerations: location or planning area, time horizon or planned life 

of use/investment, and risk tolerance.241 Risk tolerance refers to a community’s or decision maker’s 

willingness to accept a higher or lower probability of impacts.

Risk perception, tolerance, and ability to address risks vary considerably among and within coastal 

communities. For example, power stations or airports at specific locations along the coast may be 

critically important to the regional or national economy and thus may be protected with a large flood 

control structure based on projected long-term, regional, and/or global scale risks. However, such flood 

control structures may have adverse effects on adjacent parts of the coast or create a false sense of 

reduced risk as sea level rises and coastal flooding increases.242 Over time, the ability to incrementally 

increase the height of flood control structures may be limited. Some communities are already facing 

limits to their ability to adapt to risk, presenting challenging questions for policy makers about 

managing consequences.243

Factors considered in determining risk tolerance should include, among other things:

• Potential for catastrophic loss of human lives, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, and ecosystem 

function.

• Perceived fairness and voluntary nature of risks.

• Adaptive capacity or the ability or potential of a system to respond successfully to a coastal 

flooding event, including adjustments in both behavior and in resources and technologies.

Incorporating sea level rise into coastal plans can improve risk profiles. However, understanding the 

limits of tolerable risk is an active area of research and public debate.

241	 Mote, P., Petersen, A., Reeder, S., Shipman, H. and Binder, L., “Sea Level Rise in the Coastal Waters of Washington State,”

2008, A report by the University of Washington – Climate Impacts Group and the Washington Department of Ecology.

242	 Smits, A.J.M., Nienhuis, P.H., and Saeijs, H.L.F., “Changing Estuaries, Changing Views,” 2006, Hydrobiologia 565; Parris, A. and L.

Lacko, “Climate change adaptation in the San Francisco Bay: A case for managed realignment,” 2009, Shore and Beach, vol. 77.

243	 Dow, K, Berhout, F, Preston, B, Klein, R.J.T, Midgley, G, Shaw, R.B., “Limits to adaptation,”

2013 Nature Climate Change 3, doi:10.1038/nclimate1847.
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Rebuilding Strategy The Importance of Outreach and Community Engagement

VI The Importance of Outreach 

and Community Engagement

After Sandy struck the eastern seaboard, mayors up and down the coast worked to identify necessary 

steps to protect their community; philanthropists scrambled to determine where their support could 

make the biggest impact; officials at local, State, and Federal agencies worked long hours to implement 

programs to assist residents in rehabilitating their homes. Amid the chaos and destruction caused by 

Hurricane Sandy, it was immediately clear to the Task Force that an effective plan for recovery and 

rebuilding would be the result of addressing needs on the ground, not the product of just one voice. 

The Task Force’s approach reflects this reality, and throughout the process of aiding the rebuilding 

and recovery efforts following Hurricane Sandy, we have taken steps to ensure that a wide range of 

viewpoints are heard and incorporated into our work. 

Community engagement was key to each and every step of the Task Force’s work and the development 

of this Rebuilding Strategy. The Task Force designed its community engagement strategy to maintain 

a thorough public presence that would assist in rebuilding, keep stakeholders informed of Task Force 

efforts, and obtain feedback on Task Force proposals. The Task Force worked closely with State RSFs 

to align with the work of the NDRF. The Task Force established a formal Advisory Group composed 

of State, local, and Tribal elected leaders from the most severely impacted cities and towns in the 

region. Additional outreach extended to State and local officials from other affected areas, subject 

matter experts and think tanks, advocacy organizations, community-based organizations, philanthropic 

organizations and foundations, and private partners.

The extensive efforts of the Task Force to engage a wide variety of perspectives and incorporate a 

diverse set of opinions in the development of our policy recommendations reflect a commitment to 

the principles that guided our work. Whether identifying areas in which communities could bolster 

resilience, providing data in a clear and transparent way, working to ensure that funds were spent 

efficiently and equitably, or working to ensure that systems were put in place to boost the capacity of 

communities to respond to disasters, engagement of key stakeholders in the region was vital to the 

Task Force’s success. Likewise, nowhere was an active engagement strategy more important than in our 

efforts to expand regional coordination and maintain local primacy so as to enable smaller communities 

to access the knowledge and resources that would otherwise be out of reach.
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Engagement Model

In order to ensure we addressed the needs and ideas of a wide variety of stakeholders, the Task 

Force pursued a policy-driven community engagement plan to maintain a public presence with those 

directly involved in recovery and rebuilding efforts and to obtain feedback on our policy proposals 

throughout the development process. The Task Force followed an engagement framework based 

upon the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum,244 to define our goals and 

commitment to the stakeholders. This approach was applied to the work conducted on each of the 

Task Force policy priority issues, including: resilience, infrastructure, housing, small business, insurance, 

capacity building, and data sharing.

The Task Force engaged Members of Congress, state officials, and local stakeholders such as advocacy 

groups, community-based organizations, philanthropies, think tanks, and private partners to ensure 

all stakeholders had an opportunity to share their needs and viewpoints. Through policy focused 

roundtables, local workshops, policy calls, and several hundred meetings with individuals, small groups, 

and regional meetings, the Task Force engaged a wide variety of viewpoints which helped inform its 

information gathering and policy work and remove obstacles to rebuilding.

The Task Force identified four key approaches that were vital to effective outreach and communication. 

Each outlined a clear, deliverable, goal for the Task Force to pursue when working with stakeholders:

• Inform: To provide the stakeholder with balanced and objective information to assist them in 

understanding the problems, alternatives, opportunities, and/or solutions.

• Consult: To obtain stakeholder feedback on analysis and/or decisions.

• Involve: To work directly with the stakeholder throughout the process to ensure that public 

concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered.

• Collaborate: To partner with the stakeholder in each aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.

To ensure that the Task Force was engaging stakeholders throughout the development of its policy 

recommendations, we employed a five-phase timeline to guide our community outreach and 

engagement process:

In Phase I, Task Force staff identified key stakeholders, creating a comprehensive list of experts, 

organizations, and community members that could provide key input. To do so, Task Force staff held 

briefings and one-on-one meetings with Federal and local partners to collaborate regarding whom to 

bring into the process.

Phase II consisted of outreach to nearly 450 stakeholders in the region and in Washington, D.C. The 

244	 International Association for Public Participation, http://www.iap2.org/.
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Rebuilding Strategy The Importance of Outreach and Community Engagement

Chair hosted meetings with Advisory Group members and advocacy groups. Various cabinet members 

including DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and Former DOT Secretary Ray LaHood participated in site 

visits to see the devastation first hand and announce investment in the region. Task Force staff worked 

to inform relevant parties of the Task Force’s objectives through briefings, conference calls, and one-onone meetings.

In Phase III, members of the Task Force consulted and collaborated with members of the affected 

communities and key stakeholders to validate specific policy proposals. Through workshops, 

roundtables, and stakeholder meetings, the Task Force sought to include an abundance of voices in 

order to maximize the variety of opinions and ensure it was identifying key needs.

In Phase IV, the Task Force engaged with stakeholders to finalize policy priorities and recommendations 

while maintaining strong communication within the affected communities.

Finally, In Phase V, the Task Force will provide briefings, fact sheets, and background calls to interested 

stakeholders with details and context on the final policy recommendations included in this report.

Advisory Group

The Task Force’s outreach strategy is reflective of the reality that it is the governors, mayors, and 

local elected officials in the affected regions who are on the ground dealing with much of the day-today aftermath of the storm. In order to ensure the officials on the front lines of recovery efforts had 

both the resources they needed and had a voice, the Chair, in accordance with the Executive Order 

governing the Task Force, established an Advisory Group composed of elected officials that represented 

the worst-hit regions. With a focus on flood risk, housing, small business, capacity building, resilient 

infrastructure and energy, and flood and other hazard insurance, the Advisory Group has served as 

a direct line of communication between communities affected by the storm and those developing 

plans for rebuilding and recovery. Through participation in regional meetings, regular conference calls 

on policy priorities, and informal one-on-one meetings and consultations, Advisory Group members 

provided direct input into the development of the Rebuilding Strategy, ensured that the Task Force’s 

activities and recommendations reflect the input of those directly affected, as well as addressed the 

challenges those directly affected face as they continue to rebuild their communities. 

The Advisory Group consisted of 37 members, including the CDBG-DR grantees: Governors of New York, 

New Jersey, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Connecticut, and the Mayor of New York City; the Chairman 

of the Shinnecock Tribe; 12 additional local New York officials; and 18 additional local officials from 

New Jersey. The Task Force held three in-person meetings of the Advisory Group, one in New York, New 

Jersey, and Washington, and six in-depth policy calls discussing proposed sections of the Rebuilding 

Strategy. One-on-one meetings with Advisory Group members in their regions were also held. 
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Members of Congress

The Task Force facilitated communication between Members of Congress and State and local elected 

officials to further ensure that the needs in the region were being met. By working closely with 

Senators and Representatives of the affected regions, the Task Force ensured that they remained 

informed of the work of the Task Force and the progress of recovery efforts. Task Force staff briefed 

Members of Congress and over 30 staffers from the Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 

and Rhode Island delegations on the initial Sandy Supplemental CDBG-DR allocation and eligible 

uses for these funds. The Chair and Executive Director met with members of the New York and New 

Jersey delegation to update them on the recovery progress. Congressional delegation trips were 

made to Connecticut and Rhode Island to discuss the recovery effort and tour areas impacted by 

Sandy. Congressional conference calls and individual briefings were held for Capitol Hill staffers on 

various issues such as mold remediation, impending risk standards announcements, and forbearance 

modifications to extend foreclosure relief to homeowners adversely impacted by Hurricane Sandy. 
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Rebuilding Strategy Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Staff and Agency Designees

VII Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task 

Force Staff and Agency Designees

Task Force Staff and Agency Detailees

Laurel Blatchford – Executive Director

Marion McFadden – Chief Operating Officer

Rachel Haltom-Irwin – Chief of Staff

Michael Passante – New Jersey State Director

Jamie S. Rubin – New York State Director

Adriana Akers

Christopher Armstrong

Robin A. Barnes

Donna Battistoni 

Peter Bondi

Alex Boota

Nat Bottigheimer

Kevin Bush

Irene Chang-Cimino

Adria Crutchfield

Scott Davis

Fernanda da Rocha

David Dietz

Jennifer DiLorenzo

Mark Dowd

Hannah Edwards

Sandra Edwards

Sarah Ellis-Peed

Warren Flood

Felipe Floresca

DeShaunta Franklin

Stephanie Gidigbi

Brendan Gilfillan 

Sarah Gillespie 

Jose Gil Montanez

Janet Golrick

Alicia Gould

Katherine Greig

James Hairston

Tianhao He

Andrew Heimowitz

Charles Imohiosen

Aaron Jacobs

Naveen Jawaid

Fae Jencks

Omar Khan

Diane Kinnane

Karen Lake

Gina Lee

Jacob Leibenluft

Aracely Macias

Betsy Mallow

Sara Meyers

Rafaela Monchek

Hannah Mullen

Laura Olson 

Roger Mouafo 

Rima Oueid

Henk Ovink

Olivia Papp

Darshini Patel

Jacob Press

Liza Purcell

Micah Ragland

Zachary Richner

Stewart Sarkozy-Banoczy

Josh Sawislak

Justin Scheid

R. Tom Sizemore III, M.D.

Benjamin Spinelli

Lily Sugrue

Sarah Tippens

Jason Washington

Matthew Weinberg

Kevin Werner

Samuel Winningham

Kirsten Wolfington

Program Management Office Working Group

Task Force Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs Working Group

Task Force Communications Working Group
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Rebuilding Strategy Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Staff and Agency Designees

Task Force Member Agency Lead Designees and Additional Federal Contributors

U.S. Department of the Treasury:

U.S. Department of the Interior:

U.S. Department of Agriculture:

U.S. Department of Commerce: 

U.S. Department of Labor: 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services:

U.S. Department of Transportation: 

U.S. Department of Energy: 

U.S. Department of Education: 

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security:

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development:

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: 

Small Business Administration:

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

White House Office of Management and Budget:

White House National Security Staff:

White House Domestic Policy Council:

National Economic Council:

White House Council on Environmental Quality:

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy:

White House Council of Economic Advisors:

White House Office of Public Engagement 

and Intergovernmental Affairs:

White House Office of Cabinet Affairs:

Corporation for National and Community Service:

Federal Communications Commission:

National Endowment for the Arts:

John Fassl

Jon Jarvis

Max Finberg

Matt Erskine & Renee Stone

Robert Asaro-Angelo

Nicole Lurie, M.D.

Vinn White

Pat Hoffman

David Esquith

Jose Riojas

Rafaela Monchek

Janet Golrick

Lisa Feldt

Megan K. Smith

Mark Mazzanti

Jim Holm

Ahsha Tribble

Carlos Monje

Ronald Minsk

Lowry Crook and Susan Ruffo

Tammy Dickinson

Cynthia Nickerson

David Agnew

Ali Zaidi

Kelly L. DeGraff

Gene Fullano

Dan Lurie
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Rebuilding Strategy Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force Staff and Agency Designees

Science Coordination Group, Chaired by Tammy Dickinson, OSTP

U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Department of Interior (Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, US Geological Survey)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

U.S. Department of State

U.S. Department of Transportation

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers


August 2013

Hurricane Sandy

Rebuilding Task Force