NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0694n.06 

No. 16-4761 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LM INSURANCE CORPORATION., et al., 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

AMANDA CRISS, Administratrix for the estate of 

George Szuhay, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Amanda Criss, 

serving as Adminstratrix for the estate of George Szuhay, appeals the district court’s declaratory 

judgment holding that Appellee LM Insurance Corporation (“LM Insurance”), which underwrote 

a commercial general-liability insurance policy (the “Insurance Policy”) for non-party Empire 

Die Casting Co., Inc. (“Empire”), has no obligation to satisfy a default judgment that Szuhay 

obtained against Empire. We affirm. 

I. 

Non-party Barnett & Brown Personnel Services, Inc., d/b/a Integrity Staffing Services 

(“Integrity Staffing”), is a staffing service that “leases” employees to companies. Integrity 

Staffing and Empire entered into an agreement (the “Leasing Agreement”) that allowed Empire 

to “lease” employees from Integrity Staffing when Empire needed to fill a position in its 

company. The Leasing Agreement provided that when Empire wanted to lease an Integrity 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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Staffing employee, it would provide Integrity Staffing a description of the position it sought to 

fill, the experience required for the position, and any other relevant job specifications. Integrity 

Staffing would then identify candidates in its employ and send materials for those candidates to 

Empire. Empire had the option to accept or reject any candidates Integrity Staffing sent, and the 

Leasing Agreement did not require Empire to fill a position with an Integrity Staffing employee. 

The Leasing Agreement governed the companies’ respective responsibilities to each other 

and to leased employees should Empire elect to fill an open position with a leased employee 

from Integrity Staffing. Relevant to Szuhay’s arguments before us, the Leasing Agreement 

required Empire to “maintain liability insurance coverage covering the acts of [l]eased 

[e]mployees to the same extent as it maintain[ed] [liability insurance] coverage with respect to 

the acts of [its] direct employees,” and included a reciprocal indemnification clause instructing 

that Integrity Staffing and Empire would indemnify and hold harmless one another for any 

damages1

 arising from their own respective conduct.2

 1

 The Leasing Agreement defined “[d]amages” as “includ[ing] any claims, actions, demands, losses, costs, 

expenses, liabilities (joint or several), penalties and damages, including, without limitation, reasonable counsel fees 

and costs.” 

2

 The indemnification clause provided in pertinent part: 

8. Indemnification 

(a) [Empire] agrees that it will indemnify and hold [Integrity Staffing] harmless from any and all 

“Damages” (as hereinafter defined) arising out of or related to (i) claims arising out of a breach of 

any obligation of [Empire] pursuant to this Agreement, . . . (iv) claims of Leased Employees 

arising out of conduct of [Empire], such as (but not limited to) wrongful or unjust termination, 

breach of contract (express or implied), promissory estoppel, negligent or intentional (tortious) 

conduct, [and] negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . . [Empire] releases 

[Integrity Staffing] from any claims or liability to it related to any of the foregoing and agrees not 

to institute any legal proceedings against [Integrity Staffing] with respect thereto. 

(b) [Integrity Staffing] agrees that it will indemnify and hold [Empire] harmless from any and all 

Damages, as defined in Paragraph 8(a) above, arising out of or related to (i) claims arising out of a 

breach of any obligation of [Integrity Staffing] pursuant to this Agreement, (ii) claims of Leased 

Employees arising out of the conduct of [Integrity Staffing], such as the conduct described in 

paragraph 8(a)(iv) above, and (iii) claims from any third party arising out of or related to the 

conduct of a Leased Employee while the Leased Employee was acting under the direct supervision 

of [Integrity Staffing] . . . . [Integrity Staffing] releases [Empire] from any claims or liability 

related to any of the foregoing and agrees not to institute any legal proceedings against [Empire] 

with respect thereto. 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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In compliance with the Leasing Agreement’s liability-coverage requirement, Empire 

maintained a commercial general-liability insurance policy with Plaintiffs-Appellees LM 

Insurance (the “Insurance Policy”).3

 The terms of the Insurance Policy obligated LM Insurance 

to “pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 

‘bodily injury’ . . . to which this insurance applies.” An “insured” included Empire, any person 

or organization Empire listed as an additional insured, and “any person or organization to whom 

[Empire] [is] obligated by a written agreement to procure additional insured coverage, but only 

with respect to liability for ‘bodily injury’ . . . caused, in whole or part, by [Empire’s] acts or 

omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting on [Empire’s] behalf[] . . . [i]n the 

performance of [Empire’s] ongoing operations.” 

Of particular importance here, the Insurance Policy specifically excluded coverage for 

“‘[b]odily injury’ to[] . . . [a]n ‘employee’ of the insured arising out of and in the course of: (a) 

[e]mployment by the insured; or (b) [p]erforming duties related to the conduct of the insured’s 

business.” “Employee” included a “leased worker,” defined as “a person leased to [Empire] by a 

labor leasing firm under an agreement between [Empire] and the labor leasing firm, to perform 

duties related to the conduct of [Empire’s] business.” 

II. 

At some point Empire communicated to Integrity Staffing that it needed to staff the 

position of a machine operator of aluminum-casting machines. Integrity Staffing selected 

Szuhay as the candidate and, upon approval from Empire, assigned him to Empire’s aluminumcasting facility. While Szuhay was operating one of Empire’s aluminum-casting machines, 

 3

 As the district court discussed briefly, the Insurance Policy also required Empire to name Integrity 

Staffing as an additional insured under the Insurance Policy, which the record suggests Empire did not do. Whether 

Empire did or did not explicitly name Integrity Staffing as an “additional insured” makes no difference to the 

resolution of this case. 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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molten aluminum spilled onto him. Szuhay sustained severe burns and bodily injury. Szuhay 

concedes he was a leased employee/leased worker, as defined in the Leasing Agreement and 

Insurance Policy.

Following this workplace accident, Szuhay hired an attorney and in October 2011, 

brought suit against Empire in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, claiming 

employer intentional-tort and premises liability. After engaging in some discovery, Szuhay 

voluntarily dismissed the case in December 2012. A year later, in December 2013, Szuhay 

refiled the action against Empire in the Court of Common Pleas, again claiming employer 

intentional-tort and premises liability. 

During the year between Szuhay’s voluntary dismissal of the case and his refiling it, 

Empire petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. See In re E.D.C. Liquidating, Inc. (f/k/a Empire 

Die Casting Co., Inc.), No. 6:14-bk-61086 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (filed October 2013). Because of 

the pending bankruptcy proceedings, Empire filed in the Court of Common Pleas a notice of 

suggestion of automatic stay. The Court of Common Pleas granted the motion and the automatic 

stay commenced. 

Szuhay filed a motion in the bankruptcy court asking that it lift the automatic stay and 

allow the case before the Court of Common Pleas to proceed. The bankruptcy court granted the 

motion and lifted the stay. However, the bankruptcy court limited Szuhay’s ability to recover 

against Empire “to [Empire’s] insurance policies covering losses, if any, incurred by [Szuhay] 

pursuant to the terms of said policies.” 

With the stay lifted, Szuhay resumed the litigation in the Court of Common Pleas and 

filed a motion for default judgment against Empire for failing to answer or to otherwise defend 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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the action. The Court of Common Pleas granted the motion and entered default judgment against 

Empire. 

After holding a hearing on damages, the Court of Common Pleas awarded Szuhay 

$696,937.09 for lost wages, medical bills, and non-economic damages against Empire. Because 

the bankruptcy court limited Szuhay’s means of collecting a judgment against Empire solely to 

Empire’s insurance policies, Szuhay sought to collect payment from Plaintiff-Appellee LM 

Insurance under the Insurance Policy. LM Insurance refused to pay on the ground that the 

Insurance Policy did not cover Szuhay’s claims for bodily injury. 

LM Insurance then initiated the litigation underlying this appeal, filing a complaint in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio requesting a declaratory judgment 

that LM Insurance was not responsible for paying the default judgment entered by the Court of 

Common Pleas against Empire. Szuhay filed an answer and a counterclaim for a declaratory 

judgment that he may recover from LM Insurance, and asserting bad faith. LM Insurance filed a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Szuhay opposed. The district court granted the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings, entered a declaratory judgment for LM Insurance that it is 

not responsible for payment of the judgment Szuhay obtained against Empire, and dismissed 

Szuhay’s counterclaims with prejudice. We affirm. 

III. 

We review the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(c), applying the same de novo standard of review applicable to orders of dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6). Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 

2011). “[A]ll well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be 

taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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entitled to judgment.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Coyer v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 

701 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 2012). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual 

allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But it must “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). 

The parties agree that Ohio law governs the matter in dispute. Under Ohio law, “[a]n 

insurance policy is a contract.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ohio 

2003). “When confronted with an issue of contract interpretation, the role of a court is to give 

effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement.” Id. Courts should “examine the insurance 

contract as a whole and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in 

the policy.” Id. “When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look no further 

than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” Id. “As a matter of law, a contract is 

unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal meaning.” Id. 

Szuhay seeks payment under the Insurance Policy of a judgment against Empire for an 

injury that “ar[ose] out of and in the course of” his employment as a “leased employee/leased 

worker” with Empire. That kind of injury is specifically excluded from coverage under the 

Insurance Policy. This Insurance Policy is not an employers’ liability policy or a worker’s 

compensation policy; rather, it is a commercial general-liability policy, and “[u]nlike worker's 

compensation insurance or employers’ liability insurance, which exist to provide employers with 

coverage for injuries that occur to employees during the scope of employment, the sole purpose 

of commercial general liability insurance is to provide coverage for injuries that occur to the 

public-at-large.” W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey, 773 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Orange & Blue Const., Inc., 545 F. App’x 851, 855 (11th Cir. 2013). The 
No. 16-4761, LM Insurance Corp., et al. v. Criss 

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judgment, therefore, is not for a “sum[] that [Empire is] legally obligated to pay as damages 

because of ‘bodily injury’ . . . to which this insurance applies.” As we have already noted, the 

Lease Agreement obligated Empire to maintain liability-insurance coverage for the acts of leased 

employees to the same extent as it maintained liability-insurance coverage for the acts of its 

direct employees. Empire did just that. The Insurance Policy is a commercial general-liability 

policy that covers the acts of employees causing injury to the public, and specifically excludes 

the kind of bodily injury at issue here if suffered by a direct employee of Empire. 

Szuhay’s argument that Integrity Staffing is an “additional insured” under the Insurance 

Policy makes no difference to the resolution of this case.4

 Szuhay has at no point asserted any 

claims against Integrity Staffing or obtained a judgment of liability against it.

5 The only 

justiciable controversy before this panel is whether the Insurance Policy covers the judgment 

against Empire. It plainly does not. 

IV. 

The district court did not err by granting declaratory judgment for LM Insurance that it 

has no obligation under the Insurance Policy to satisfy a default judgment secured against 

insured non-party Empire. We AFFIRM. 

 4

 Before the district court Szuhay also asserted that the Leasing Agreement, specifically its indemnification 

clause, created an “insured contract” that obligated LM Insurance to pay for his bodily injury. Szuhay has waived 

this line of argument on appeal.

5

 In any event, the Insurance Policy specifically excludes the injury for which the judgment was awarded.