### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 4, 200 4

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . KAWI SHA PRICE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Gibson Coun ty No. H 7161 Clayburn Pee ples, Jud ge

No. W2003-00753-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jul y 8, 2004

Th e app e lla nt, Ka wi sh a

Pr ic e , w a s in dic te d f

or a g g ra va te d c hil d a

bu se . Sh e e nte re d a

be st- int e re st plea to aggr av at ed as s ault with a sentenc e of e ight y ear s as a Rang e I I multipl e off

ender , with the trial court to dete rmine the manne r of se rvice of the sente nce. T he trial court subseque ntly order ed her to ser ve the se ntence in confineme nt. She appea l s , ar gu i n g that the trial court decided the

manner of ser vice of

the sentenc e bef

ore any proof was offe red on her beha lf and e rre d in ordering her to ser ve the se ntence in confineme nt. For the foll owing rea sons, we af firm the judg ment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Periann S. Houg hton, Assistant P ubli c De fe n der, Tr enton, Tenne ssee f or the a ppellant, Kaw isha Price.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Gary Br own, District Attorney Gene ral; and Elaine Gwinn Todd, Assistant D istrict A t torney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

I n April of 2002, t h e ap p el l ant was indicte d for the a g g ravated child abuse of her infant daug hter. P u rs u an t to settlement with the State, the appe llant orig inally pled g uiltyto ag g ravated child neg lect, with the sente nce to be deter mined by the trial court. She later withdrew that plea a nd

e n t e r e d a b e s t

- i n t e r e s tp l e a t o a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l tw i t h a s e n t e n c e o f

e i g h ty e ar s a s a

R a n g e II, multipl e o f

f e n d e r w ith th e tria l c o u r t to d e te r mi n e th e ma n n e r o f s e r v ic e o f th e s e n te n c e

. At the
sentenc ing hear i n g, t h e p rosecutor stated that if the c ase ha d g one to trial, the proof would have-2-

shown that on Aug ust 8, 2001, the infant daug hter of the appellant suffere d second deg ree burns over nine per cent ( 9%) of

her body when the appe llant ga ve her a bath a nd that the injuries could not have be e n inf lic te d in the ma nn e r de sc ri be d by the app e lla nt. Af

te r the tr ia l c ou rt

a c c e pte d th e ple a , b oth the State and the a

ppellant proceede d to introduce testimony from various witnesses prior to the trial court’s de cision on sentencing

. Serg eant Dennis Wright of the H umboldt P olice De partment wa s notified on the morning of Aug ust 9, 2001, that a baby was taken to Humboldt Genera l Hospital with severe injuries the nig ht befor e and subsequently transfe rre d to L eB onheur Hospital in Memphis. That afternoon, Ser g eant Wright trave led to Memphis where h e p h o togr aphed the infant’s injuries, spoke w ith the social worke r, and spoke with the appellant.

Serg eant Wrig ht interviewe d the appe llant both at the hospital and ag ain seve ral da y s later at the poli ce station. She g ave e ssentially the same ve rsion of eve nts during both inter views. During the interview at the police de partment she sta ted:

Sir I wa s g ivi ng he r a

ba th an d I le t the wate r r

un be fo re I

pu t he r i n th e wate r a ndit was too hot I

did not check the water

it was just too hot and it burned her f ace

. . . . [when she put the child under the water ] she jumped back and tha t’s when I felt the ho t w a te r a ndthat’ s w he n I pu lle d h e r b a c k o ut o f t

he wa te r.

. . . [Th e c hil d wa s in the wate r] for about a mi nute or two it wasn’t even that long, c ause soon a s I put her under the re she jumped back and I pulled her back and I just seen [sic] her f ace it was peeling

. Serg eant Wrig ht observed tha t the appellant was “very cold, aloof and totally unremorse ful” a nd that she “showe d no conce rn wha tsoever w ith the injuries the child sustained.”

As a re sult of the appellant’ s statement, Serg eant Wrig ht a sked the appe llant for permission to test the water

temperature a t her a

partment. She ag ree d, but Serg eant Wrig ht was re quired by the Housing Autho ri t y t o o b t ain a se arc h war rant prior to his entry

to the apartment. On the day he
te ste d th e wa te r wi th a c a nd y the rm ome te r, the wa te r r e a c he d a te mpe ratur e of

12 5 d e g re e s in le ss than one minut e. Serg eant Wrig ht inspected the hot wa ter he ater , which wa s kept under loc k and key , to insure that it had not been ta mpere d with prior to his inspection. At the time he inspected the unit, it had cobwebs on it and a ppear ed to be undisturbed. Ser g eant Wrig h t al s o observe d the appellant ha d been he ating a bottle in the microwa ve.

Shamaricus Hunt, the vic tim’s father, w as aslee p at t he ti me of the offense. The a ppellant and her brother ha d g one out to “play spades” and he was left with the victim. He r emember s the appellant wa

king him up and they immediately took the child to the hos pital. Mr. Hunt s tated that the appe llant told him that she wa s g iving the vic tim a bath when the injuries o cc u rr ed, that she
appea red to be in shock, and that she w as cry ing, but not hy sterica l. Mr. Hunt did not be lieve that the injuries wer e intentional.-3-

Dr. Robert Van Walling, a pediatric ian and Direc tor of the Crisis Center at L eB onheur, sa w the v i ct i m on Aug ust 10, 2001. He desc ribed the infa nt’s injuries as sec ond deg ree burns over approximately

7% of he r total body

surfa ce, wi t h m o st of the burns being located on he r fa ce. During the hospital stay , the victim had to be fe d throug h a feeding tube because bottl e feeding s were too painful. Whil e the victim was at the hos pital, Dr. W alling spoke with the appellant on severa l

occa sions. He also took photog raphs of the i njuries. Dr. W alling de scribed the appellant’ s actions as def ensive, foc using on he r own ne eds and w hat was g oing to ha ppen to her . Ba sed on the injuries

su sta ine d, Dr . Wall ing fe lt tha t the te mpe ratur e a t mo st w a s 1 27 de g re e s. He de sc ri be d c omf orta ble ba thi ng te mpe ratur e a s 9 8- 10 1 de g re e s a nd ty pic a l ho t tub te mpe ratur e a s 1 06 -1 08 de g re e s. I n h is

e xpe rt op ini on , th e c hil d w ou ld h a ve ha d to be un de r the wate r f ro m on e to two min ute s to su sta in the ty pe of bu rn s th a t sh e re c e ive d if the re wa s n o c oldwate r m ixedin w ith the ho t wate r. He fe lt that if the app e lla nt h a d b e e n hold ing the vic tim un de r the wate r, the app e lla nt w ou ld h a ve fe lt p a in in her ha nd. Dr. Walling c oncluded that the “ burns and pattern of the burns and how they

occur red is not consistent with t he story that - - whic h she tells us.”

The De partment of Chil dren’ s Service s (“DCS”) took steps to dete rmine whe ther to re turn the inf a nt t o th e app e lla nt. L e sli e Ne lms , a tea m lea de r with DCS, a tte nd e d thr e e su pe rv ise d h ome visits between the a

ppell an t an d t he child and de termined that the a ppellant’s beha vior was
appropriate. B oth the appellant a n d t h e i nfant’s f ather , Shamaricus Hunt, a ttended an initial interview a nd evalua tion a t L eB onheur Center for Parents and Children conc erning a permanenc y plan, but ne ither attended a later appointment with a mental health profe ssional or s u b sequent pa re nti ng c la sse s. Th a t app oin tme nt w a s r e sc he du le d a nd
, a g a in, the app e lla nt f a ile d to a tte nd . M s. Ne lms str e sse d the imp orta nc e of the se me e tin g s to the app e lla nt, e ve n c a lli ng he r s e ve ra l ti me s to remind her

of appointment date s. The appe llant n ev er co n t ac t ed Ms. Nelms about the missed appointments. Ms. N elms also never hear d the appellant express remorse over what happene d to the infant. DCS g ave leg al custody of t he victim to the paternal g randmother afte r a f inding of sever e child abuse. D CS has since discontinued visitation between the child and the a ppellant.

Be verly Hunt, the victim’s paterna l g randmother , rec eived leg al custody in October

of 2001. At the time of the sentenc ing hearing, the victim wa s two y ear s old a nd still had sca rring on both the rig ht and left side of

her f ace , as we ll as along he r jaw line a nd the side of he r nose. Thescar ring

wa s d e sc ri be d a s pe rm a ne nt un le ss the vic tim un de rw e nt f

urthe r s ur g e ry . Pr ior

to the he ari ng , M s. Hunt allowed the appellant to ha ve unsupervised visitation with the victim. After seeing the picture s

a ndhe ari ng the te sti mon y , h ow e ve r, sh e ha d re se rv a tio ns a bo ut a llo wi ng the app e lla nt t o h a ve vis its with the child.

Wil liam Seward, the appell an t’s uncle, we nt to the hospital the night of the of fense . He observe d the appe llant as disturbed and upset, but admitted that she was not crying. He also stated that the appe llant did not have a dr ug or alc ohol problem.

L a qu e zi Ch a mpi on , th e app e lla nt’ s aun t, s ta te d th a t sh e wa s aro un d the app e lla nt on a da ily basis and obser ved the a

ppellant’s intera ction with the appellant’ s other child as a ppropriate . The

app e lla nt calle d Ms. Ch a mpi on on the nig ht o f the of fe ns e a nda sk e d h e r t o c ome to the ho sp ita l.-4-

Ms. Champion described the appellant as hy sterica l. Ms. Champion di d not fee l the injuries wer e intentional.

Th e app e lla nt t e sti fi e d a t the he ari ng that she wa s 22 y e ars old a nd , in add iti on to the vic tim
, has a f our-y ear -old daug hter. She c laims that she was not upset with the victim at t h e t i me of the offe nse, but that the victim had been crying, so she attempted to c alm her by g iving he r a bath. The appellant state d that she t urned the water on and bega n washing the child’s hair be fore she tested the temperature of the water. She denied placing the child’s fa ce unde r the water, c laiming instea d that the wate r f

ro m th e c hil d’ s hai r ra n onto he r fa c e

. Th e app e lla nt te sti fi e d tha t whe n s he sa w the c hil d jerk and move her he ad, she quic kly pulled the victim away

from the water a nd saw that he r skin was peeling . The a

ppellant said that the wate r wa s not hot enoug h to burn her ha nd and that she ne ver meant to har m the child. She further claimed that the Housi ng Authority knew that the w ater

was too hot and had the water turne d down bef ore Ser g eant Wrig ht chec ked it.

As to her f

ailure to a ttend pare nting classes, the appellant claimed she did not know a ny thing about t h em

. Since DCS removed the c hild from her c ustody , howeve r, the a ppellant has be en attending pare nting c lasses eve ry Thursday at the C arl P erkins C enter

. She is now employ ed by the Tenne ssee State Ve tera n’s Home.

At the conclusion of the proof from both the State and the a ppellant, the trial c ourt made the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

The que stion that obviousl y rema ins is whe th e r

o r not the evide nce show s that the sentenc e should be ser ved within the Depa rtment of Corre ction or w ithin - -

so me oth e r w a y . T he Sta te didno t a lle g e a ny a g g ra va tin g fact ors; ho we ve r, my understanding is I ’m still required to eva luate the c ase in a ccor dance with the proof that has bee n shown in the sentenc ing he aring an d I ’m requir ed to look to severa l

source s when I

do that. First of a ll, I ’m requir ed t o look at what the pur poses of
pu nis hme nt i n th e Sta te of Te nn e sse e are . G e ne ra lly , th e y ’r e sa id t o b e - - to f a ll i n four differ ent cate g ories. First of a ll, deterre nce. Sec ond, isolation or incapac itation. Th ir d, re ha

bil ita tio n, a nd fo urth re tr ibu tio n. No w, re tr ibu tio n is c on sid e re d b y jus t about eve ry

body to be a non-utilitarian pur pose and tha t will not be considered by the Court to be a leg itimate function of the law

. Now, dete rre nce is g ener ally considere d to be of two ty

pes, both a g ener al deter renc e and spe cial dete rre nce. G ener al de te rr e n c e is w h e n w e p u n is h o n e p e r s o n s o th a t e v e r y b o d y e ls e c a n s e e w h a t ha s happene d and, per

haps, be e ncoura g ed to obey the law. Spec ial deter

renc e is when

we pu nis h o ne pe rs on in h op e s th a t th e y wi ll n ot v iol a te the la w a g a in. Re la te d to det e rr e n c e is th e e d u c a ti v e a s p e c t o f th e la w

. . . . I

d o f in d th a t th e D e f

e n d a nt’s

c ri min a l r e c or d o r l a c k o f c ri min a l r e c or d, in t his c a se , is a

mit ig a tin g factor, but I have to ba lance mitigating fac tors ag ainst whate v er ag g ravating f actor s exi st, and

a lso wh a t I

wo uld re fe r to as the ne e d of soc ie ty fo r mor a l sy mme tr y be tw e e n c ri me and punishment. Statute r eads to a void depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense.-5- I find that the victim in this case was particula rly vulnera

ble bec ause of

her
ag e. I find t h at eve n in these - if this ac tivitywas, in fa ct, re ckless rather than kn ow ing , it

wa s in te nti on a lly e xce pti on a lly c ru e l tr e a tme nt u nd e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s. Of c ourse, those w ould have blende d into the offense of agg ravated child abuse, but that’s not w hat she has pled g uilty to. So I consider them to be aggr av at ing circ umstances.

I do no t f indthat the Defen dant ha s ma de a ny sig nif ic a nt e ff orts at a ll t o reha bilitate hers el f i n o rder

to protect he r childre n in the future. I think the proof shows on the contra

ry that she resisted such eff orts. That the S t at e a n d various

a g e nc ie s o r j us t on e a g e nc y ha s ma de to pr ov ide that. I re luc ta ntl y a ndso rr ow fu lly fi ndthat if I fo llo w wh a t I un de rs ta nd the la w of the Sta te of Te nn e sse e to b e I

mus t order her to ser ve that sente nce in its entirety with the Depa

rtment of Corre ction.

The a ppellant subsequently

filed a tim ely notice of a

ppeal. She c halleng es the trial c ourt’s decision orde ring her to ser ve her eig ht-y ear sentenc e in c onfinement a nd alleg es that the trial c ourt

ma de its de te rm inatio n r e g a r d i n g se nte nc ing pr ior

to the pr e se ntatio n o f a ny

pr oo f f ro m th e app e lla nt.

S en t en ci n g

“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo r eview on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the deter minations made by

the court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “Howe ver, the presumption of corr ectne ss w hich acc ompanies the trial court’s a ction is conditioned upon the aff irmative s h o wi n g in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the
sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fenda nt’s potential for reha bilitation, t he trial a nd sentenc ing he aring evidenc e, the pr e-se nt ence re port, the sentenc ing principles, sente ncing alterna tive arg uments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the e nhancing and mitiga ting f

actor s, and the de fenda nt’s statements. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S

. W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bea rs “the bur den of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n balanc ing these conce rns, a trial court should start at the presumptive sente nce, e nhance the se nte nc e wi thi n th e ra ng e fo r e xistin g e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, a ndthe n r e du c e the se nte nc e wi thi n the rang e for exis ting mit igating factors. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e) . No particular we ight fo r e a c h f a c tor is pr e sc ri be d by the sta tut e

. Se e Sta te v. Sa nti a g o, 91 4 S.W.2 d 116 , 125 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). Th e we ig ht g ive n to e a c h fa c tor is le ft to the dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt a s lo ng a s it comports with the s en t en ci n g principles and pur poses of our c ode and a s long a s its findings ar e supported by

the re cord. I d.A l t houg h i t appear s t hat t he words “ r eport 3/ 21 / 03 @ 7 : 00 am ” are wri t t en i n di f fer ent ha ndwr i t i ng , t he f act 1

re m a ins th a t a c o n fl i ct exi st s b et ween t he t rans cri p t and t he co urt m i nut es. W e have no cho i ce b ut t o de t erm i ne t he
t ran scrip t co ntro l s.

-6- Turning more spec ifically to the fac ts of this case, the a ppellant enter ed a be st interest plea to aggravat e d a ssa

ult a nda g re e d to a n e ig ht- y e ar s e nte nc e to b e se rv e d a s a Ra ng e I I mul tip le offe nder. The only

issue befor e the c ourt was the ma nner of service of the sente nce.

The a ppellant first alleg es that the trial court pre -dete rmined her sentenc e prior to he aring the de fe ns e pr oo f. Citi ng on ly to a do c ke t sh e e t, the app e lla nt cl a ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt or de re d h e r t o

serve her se ntence in incarc eration prior to the conclusion of t he hearing

. The State a rg ues that the

rec ord does not support the a ppellant’s cla im.

The he aring took place on Marc h 13 and 14 of 2003. According to the transcript, on March 13, the trial court acc epted the g uiltyplea, he ard ope ning a rg uments from counse l, and hea rd all of the State’s proof

. On M arc h 14, the t rial court hear d proof f rom the def

ense a nd made a n oral ruling in which the court determined tha t the appellant sho u l d s er v e her sentenc e in conf

inement. The do c ke t she e t con ta ine d in the re c or d co nta ins the fo llo wi ng e ntry fo r Marc h 13, 20 03 : “ Ple a of g uil ty to a g g a s s a u lt ( c f

e lo n y ) s e n t to s e r v e e ig h ts y e a r s a t 3 5 % a s mu lt ip le o f

f e n d e r

. ” Wr it te n o n th e n e xt line appea r the wor ds “re port 3-21-03 @ 7:00 a .m.” The judgme nt she et, enter ed on Marc h 14, 2003 and filed on Ma

rch 20, 2003, indica tes that on Marc h 14, the “Judge deter mined that no part of the

se nte nc e is t o b e su sp e nd e d. De sig na te d p la c e of c on fi ne me nt T e nn e s s e eD e p a r t m e n t o f C or re c tio ns , defe ndant to report for ser vice Ma rch 21, 2003 at 7:00 a.m. ” Ac co rd i n g to the transcript of the hearing, the trial court’ s oral ruling was made at the conc lusion of all the proof a t the end of the day

on Ma rc h 1 4, 20 03 . T hu s, the reis a n a pp are nt co nf

lic t bet we e n the c ou rt min ute s and the tr a ns c ri pt. The minutes re flec t that the appellant wa s order ed to serve the sentenc e on Mar ch 13, prior to the
pres e n tati o n o f

h e r p r o o f
, a n d th e tr a n s c r ip t r e f le c ts th a t th e tria l c o u r t m a d e th e s e n te ncing deter mination at the conclusion of a ll the proof on Mar ch 14.

Ordinarily , when c onflicts exis t betwee n evide n ce t ransc ripts and court minutes, the
transcripts control. State v. Clark, 67 S.W .3d 73, 79 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citing State v. Moore, 814 S.W .2d 381, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) ). We determine that in this case there i s no rea son to bel ie v e o th e r w is e

. T h e tria l c o u r t’ s ru li n g a n d th e e n try o f th e ju d g me n t o c c u rr e d at the 1 conclusion of a ll the proof on Mar ch 14, 2003. This issue is without merit.

With re sp e c t to the app e lla nt’ s c ha lle ng e to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n t hat she sh ou ld

se r v e h e r s e n te n c e in th e D e p ar tm e n t o f Co rr e c ti o n , w e n o te th a t th e ap p e ll a n t is e li g ib le for probation. See Te nn.Code Ann. § 40-35-303( a). Howeve r, bec ause the appellant wa s sentence d as a Rang e I I multipl e offe nder for a Class C felony she is not presumptively entitled to an alter native
sentenc e

. Se e T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 6 )

. F u r th e r mo r e , in d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r to g rant probation, t he trial court must consider the nature and circumstance s of t he offense; the de fenda nt’s criminal re cord, he r bac kg round and s o ci al history ; her pre sent condition, including phy sical and mental condition; and the deter rent e ffe ct on the def

endant. See State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602,-7-

607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Kendr ick, 10 S.W .3d 650, 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . The burden w as on the a

ppellant to show that she wa s a suitable ca ndidate for probation. Tenn. Code An n

. § 4 0 -3 5 -3 03(b); State v. Goode , 956 S.W .2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. B og g s, 93 2 S .W .2d 4 67 , 4 77 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). To me e t th is b ur de n, a de fe nd a nt “ mus t de mon str a te that pr ob a tio n w ill ‘s ub se rv e the e nd s o f j us tic e a ndthe be st i nte re st o f b oth the pu bli c and the de fenda nt.’” State v. B ingha m, 910 S .W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)).

There is no ma thematical equation to be utiliz ed in de termining sentenc ing alternatives. Not only should the sentenc e fit the offe nse, but it should f it the offe nder as well. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-103(2) ; State v. Ba tey , 35 S.W .3d 585, 588-89 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). I ndeed, individualized punishment is the essenc e of alternative sentenc ing. State v. Dowdy
, 894 S.W .2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). I n summary , sentenc ing must be dete rmined on a c ase- by -ca se basis, tailoring

eac h sentenc e to that particular de fenda nt based upon the f acts of tha t case and the circ umstances of that defe ndant. State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)

.

The trial c ourt denied the appellant sp l i t confineme nt or probation on the ba sis that confine ment wa s nece ssary to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense, a nd due to the appellant’ s appar ent lack of remorse for he r ac tions and failure to reha bilitate herself . These a

re appropriate g rounds for t h e d enial of an alternative sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1); D o w d y , 8 9 4 S. W. 2 d a t 3 0 6 ; S tate v

. T r e c a F inchum, No. E 2 0 0 1

- 0 1 0 7 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 2 WL 31190924, at *9 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Oct. 2, 2002), pe rm. to appea l denied (Te nn. 2003).

The victim’s g randmother and leg al custodian testified tha t the appellant’ s actions had
perma nently

scar red the child’s fa ce. T he medica l expert testimonyprese nted at the he aring ind ic a te d th a t the c hil d’ s bur ns c ou ld not ha ve oc c ur re d in the ma nn e r the app e lla nt c la ime d. I n f a c t, Dr. Walling f

elt it would have been necessary for the child to be under water for one to two minutes in order to sustain the ty

pe of burns she re ceive d. The appellant failed to attend classes as manda ted by the pe rm a ne nc y pla n cr e a te d by DC S. Mo re ov e r, the un dis pu te d f a c ts o f this c a se sh ow that in
actua litythe appe llant’s actions most likely constituted ag gra v at ed child abuse. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. T hat offe nse, as a Class A felony , is not subject to probationary sentenc ing. See State v. Hollingsworth, 647 S.W .2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1983) (holding that a trial judg e in consider ing
p r o b a ti o n may

p r o p e r ly lo o k b e h in d a p le a b ar g a in to th e tr u e n a tu r e o f th e o f

f e n s e c o mm it te d )

. We conclude that the t rial court proper ly order ed the appellant to serve her sentence in confineme nt as the evidenc e in the re cord w holly supports that conclusion.-8- Conclusion

After a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE