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## I· 

# Soviet Bloc
Economic Activities 

# in the Free World

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951



# * * *

SIXTH REPORT TO CONGRESS
Second Half of 1954

# Soviet Bloc Economic

Acti vities in



# The Free World

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Omce Washington 25, D. C.

- Price 35 cents.

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Oongress of the United States:

I submit herewith the sixth semiannual report of 

### operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 

### 1951.

The report covers the period July to December H)54. To give adequate perspective in judging the impact of 

### the act, however, it has been necessary to range beyond the immediate problems o£ £ree-

. world security controls on East-vVest trade. Thus, to explain**~Ioscow's** 

### objectives and actions, the report reviews recent developments in. Soviet-bloc foreign economic activities, especially its actions in underdeveloped countries and its attempts at economic penetration.· It also illustrates M:oscow's efforts to play off one nation against the other, divide the free nations and neutralize trade controls. It looks behind these events to take note of

some of the difficulties facing free-world traders in their dealings with the Soviet bloc, and finds in the economic situation within the bloc countries some of the explanations of the recent developments in East-West trade.

Although these overtures of the Soviet bloc present a continuing challenge, they have thus far failed to divide free nations which are cooperating in the control of 

### strategic materials. These nations, although willing to trade in peaceful wares, have not only refused
to ship strategic materials but have strengthened their controls over war-potential items. In preparing this report, my staff has drawn heavily upon the expert knowledge of other agencies which have responsibilities in the field of economic defense.

HAROLD 

## E. STASSEN, 

## Director, Foreign Operations Administration.

JUNE 

## 30, 1955

iii

### TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE Strategic Trade Controls in the Last Half of 1954

_ 

### CHAPTERS I. Moscow's Economic Arm ..:

_ Theme of the Chapter The Dilemma of Development Investments of Communism The Picture and the Propaganda A Variety of Methods Sample Operation Moscow Invests in Promises Summing it Up 

### II. The Picture of East-West Trade 

## in 1954

_ East to West, and West to East Trade Agreement Network Spreads The Permanent Pattern of Priorities Wanted: A Merchant Fleet Meat, Bread and Butter What Can the Bloc Sell? Risks in Reliance 

### III. The Voices of Moscow ..:
Around and Around Page 

### VII



### 1



### 13



## 25

IV. Problems in East-West Trading___________________ 29

Lack of Reciprocity Veil of Secrecy Discrimination Under Cover Price Manipulation Communist Preoccupations One- Time Buyer Ups and Downs Uncertainty After the Deal Questions of Quality 

### V. Economic Courses in Eastern Europe_

_____________ 37
Inside the U. S. S. R. Inside the European Satellites Hungary and the "New Course" 

### CONCLUSIONS___

__ __ _ __ _____ __ ________________ __ _ 47

APPENDICES

A. TRADE CONTROLS OF FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES___________ 

### 51 

## B. TEXT OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 

### 1951_____________________________________________ 71 

# C. STATISTICALTABLES__________________________________ 

### 77

v

## PREFACE



## Strategic Trade Controls in the Last Half of 1954

Fifteen nations which carryon some 60 percent of the foreign trade of the free world are working together in a program, begun in 1949, to control the shipment of strategic goods to the entire Soviet bloc. During the second half of 1954,by far the most important happenings in this program came in July and August. It was in those 2 months that the group of governments agreed upon a substantial revision of the lists of commodities controlled toward the 

## U. S. S. R. and its European satellites. No reductions were made in the broader freeworld controls over shipments to Communist China. The revisions which were made and the reasons for those revisionsalso the long negotiations that led up to**them~were** 

### described in the fifth semiannual Mutual Defense Assistance Control (MDAC) Act* report, 

### The Revision of Strategia Trade Oontrols, published on November 23, 1954.· Strictly speaking, that report covered the first six months of1954, but the narrative was carried into August so that the full account of the revisions would be available in a single document.

The present report deals with what Moscow has been doing in its economic relations with the free world. Some further developments in the control program should be mentioned. The additional enforcement measures agreed upon in the

summer of 1954 and described in the last MDAC report have gone into operation. As expected, it took a while for the separate countries
to work out the detailed regulations and procedures, within the framework 'of their own laws, but by the end of January 1955 the new control measures were in operation. 

### Transaationaontrols are designed to prevent evasions of export controls by prohibiting sales of embargoed goods to the Soviet bloc by residents of free-world countries regardless of the. source of the goods. 

### Transit aontrols are designed to prevent the diversion to the Soviet bloc of embargoed items ostensibly bound from one free-world country to another. A coordinated system of transit controls for all participating countries went into effect January 16, 1955.

With these cooperative measures the free-world governments are

now in a better position to combat illicit trade than they were six months**previou~ly.**

>I< 

### Battle Act. 

### vii

### While the 1954 revisions tightened controls on trade in strategic materials, they also relaxed restrictions in other directions so as to provide greater opportunities for commerce between the free world and the Soviet bloc in nonstrategic items. Such trade, it was recognized, could not only be of material benefit to the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain but could possibly serve to lessen political tensions. vVe said in the last MDAC report, page' 24: "It remained
to be seen whether the opportunities would result in a sudden or massive upswing of East-vVest trade, because such a rise depended, as always, on the ability and willingness of the Soviet bloc to engage in peaceful trade on a large scale. But at least the cooperating nations had made it unmistakably clear to the world that they were willing."

As of this writing, no spectacular expansion of East-West trade has taken place since August 1954 when the free-world commodity lists were revised. Total trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc increased in 1954 over 1953 levels; exports to the Soviet bloc by 24 percent and imports by 7 percent. But this rise took place mainly in the first half of 1954 and the trade was more nearly level in the second half. (See Chapter II 

### for more details.)

A note on the China trade will be appropriate in this introduction, since not much will be said about the Chinese Con1munists in the main body of the report. 

## The available data indicate that the free world traded with Communist China at nearly the same dollar value in the second half of 1954 as it did in the first half. For the year as a whole, the trade appears to have dropped off a little from 1953. Estimates for 1954 indicate that the value of the goods exchanged

was close to that of 1952, and 1952 was the lowest of all postwar years. Following are the exports of the free world to Communist China for the last 5 years, expressed in millions of United States dollars:

1950 1951 1952 19fi3 1954 (est.) 452.1 446.2 272.6 287.6 285.0· 

### And here are the free-world imports fron1 Communist China during the same 5-year period:

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 (est.) 534.7 524.7 365.0 434.1 371.2

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce. Figures unadjusted for price changes. 

### One country which showed a marked increase in its trade with Communist China in 1954 was Japan. Japanese exports to the Chinese mainland were $600,000 in 1952, $4.5 million in 1953, and about $19 million in 1954. Japanese imports from the Chinese mainland were $15 million in 1952, $30 million in 1953, and $41 million in 1954.

.

Japan is a 

### member of the group of 15 nations which coordinate their strategic trade controls. Japanese exports to the Communist Chiviii

### · nese were the same kinds of nonstrategic goods as were shipped by the European members of that group-fertilizer, textiles, medicines, and the like. The Japanese embargo until 1954 was much stricter than the internationally agreed embargo, but by the summer of that year Japan had pruned its list down to the international level.

The economic problems of the crowded Japanese Islands are great indeed. They must increase their sales abroad in order to pay for tJle large imports which they must have. It is not surprising that Japanese businessmen are seeking bigger markets in every direction. Communist-controlled markets, however, show no promise of being sufficiently large and satisfactory to help very much in solving Japan's trade dilemma. Incidentally, Japan's 

### total exports, in 1953 and 1954, increased from $1,275,000,000 to $1,630,000,000, but its total imports

were about $2,400,000,000 in each year.

VVhat is the answer for countries with acute trade problems such

as**Japan~**



### The real answer is a dynamic, year-by-year expansion of markets in the free world, a steady building of economic strength and improvement of living standards in all continents. And that would be good,
not only for Japan but also for other nations and for people everywhere. The universal expansion of economic well-being along with

an ever increasing realization of the freedom and dignity of the individual-this is an answer to the dogmas of Communism. It is the hope of the world.

# CHAPTER I


# Moscow's,Economic Arm

They are paving the streets of ICabul. The city is located high on a 

### plateau in the Hindu ICush Range,
west of the IChyber Pass. It is the capital of the ancient kingdom of

. Afghanistan. To it come motor and camel caravans loaded with wool, silk, carpets, hides, spices and dried fruit, to be exchanged for return cargoes of cotton, tea, and sugar. Afghanistan has no railway system and five roads carryall the motor traffic. Commerce threads its
tortuous way over the mountains to this commercial center much as it did in the days when Afghanistan fell to Tamerlane as a strategic prize. Centuries ago the country was known to be rich in minerals-for example, gold, lead, coal, sulfur, iron, antimony, and nitrates. Its mountains no doubt still abound in mineral wealth, but the outside world receives meager evidence of Afghanistan's natural resources, and in fact knows little of what goes on there.

.

Afghanistan was once a "hermit" kingdom, and foreigners were rarely admitted. In recent years, however, the Afghanistan Government has shown an interest in broadening its contacts with the West. The government has engaged school teachers from the United States, and**Am~rican** 

### engineers have laid out an ambitious program of economic development. An important irrigation and flood control project is now in progress with the aid of United States funds provided through the Export-Import Bank. 1 

### Recently, other visitors have come with materials and equipment, and they are overseeing a street-paving job in ICabul. These foreigners are from across the northern boundary-from the U. S. S. R. These are not the first Soviet technicians to come to Afghanistan from the U. S. S. R. In 1951, Moscow sent its experts to help build

a gasoline storage system. In September 1954, Radio Moscow said that this project had been completed and that Afghanistan had given the U. S. S. R. a contract to construct additional gasoline storage facilities.

1 Technical assistance by the U. S. Foreign Operations Administration in Afghanistan and elsewhere is. described in the President's Report to Oongress on the Mutual Security Program for the 6 months endel1 December 31, 1954.



### 1

### Also in 1954, the Soviet Government contracted with Afghanistan
to invest $3.5 million in the building of two grain elevators, an electric flour-grinding mill, and a bread-baking factory. The work was to be completed in 1956. The loan was to be repaid in 5 years beginning in 1957. The Soviet Government would receive 3 percent interest each year on its investment.

In addition, Czechoslovakia has extended a credit to Afghanistan
to be used for industrial construction, including a cement plant, a leather-processing factory, and a textile mill. These loans would be repaid in Afghan products, and thus repayment is tied in with Soviet plans for an expansion of trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet bloc, and possibly for a larger measure of Afghan dependence upon this trade.

Theme of the Chapter


### East-West trade, that is, the value and commodity composition of the exchange of goods between the Soviet bloc and the free world, will be discussed in later .chapters. But the exchange of goods, of
course, is not the only economic activity that the Soviet-bloc Communists conduct in free-world areas. The main purpose of the present chapter is to give a brief survey of their other economic activities in the free world.**~n** 

### doing this, we are confining the chapter largely to the Sovietbloc's economic arm in free-world regions outside Europe. It is not that the Communists are neglecting Western Europe in their foreign economic operations-they are not, although in some countries they,

seem to be "marking time." The reason for taking a longer look at what goes on in the underdeveloped regions is that the activities there

are more novel.

The Dilemma of Development


### It is estimated that the current loans extended to Afghanistan by Soviet-bloc countries probably amount to a little over $10 

### million
to be used over the course of several years. By Western standards, these are small enterprises financially, but they carry considerable economic and political significance to both Afghanistan and the Communist entrepreneurs.

The Afghanistan Government is faced with a dilemma of developlnent and it is not alone in that dilemma. The general problem is

common to many burgeoning national economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In order to develop their natural resources, promote the growth of agriculture, modernize their processing facilities, extend their transportation and communications, and generally improve the well-being of the p'eople and the national economy, these countries need invest2

### ment and technical advice from abroad. The leading Western industrial nations passed through such a stage in earlier centuries. Today's underdeveloped nations can turn not only to private investors but also
to international organizations whose aims are to assist in such evolution. But many countries are coming of economic age at the same time. Thus the demands are great, and the channels for assistance are often slow and cumbersome. Now the .Communist governments are presenting themselves as a

new source of potential help in economic development. The countries that need outside help are wondering what it may ultimately cost them
to accept Soviet offers. They are looking back over Communist history to discern, if 

### possible, any parallels which might illuminate the intentions and the reliability of these new financiers.



## Earlier Patterns of Soviet Investment

Unfortunately, there are no direct parallels by which they can test their current adventures with the investments of Communism. A brief review of earlier Soviet foreign economic activities along these lines, however, can be helpful. First, let us recall that it was only two decades ago that the Soviet Union itself was skeptically inviting foreign capital-mainly in the fo.rm of foreign technicians and technology-from America, Germany, and other industrially advanced nations to help thrust ancient Russia forward out of economic feudalism through the throes of the industrial revolution into the 20th century. Although the Soviet regime sought this technical help from abroad, the leaders were so suspicious of
contacts with f.Jreigners that they often supervised the work to the point of obstruction. Soviet attitudes toward foreign investment activity are distinctive in other ways. The official Communist propaganda views on foreign investment have been continually displayed in verbal and visual pictures of the foreign investor as an ugly symbol of "bloated and decadent capitalism." The interest on his investments was typified as the sin of profit and the tool of anticipated exploitation of the people. This propaganda assault upon the foreign financial activities of nonCommunist nations and their citizens has served often to obscure the foreign financial operations of Communism. Communist investments in foreign publishing firms, theatres, and other a.rms of Soviet propaganda and party activities abroad were fairly common even before World War 

## II. Furthermore, there is

some evidence that investments in Outer Mongolia were used successfully-and in Iran, unsuccessfully-as instruments to further political domination of these target areas in the 1930's. But foreign investment

as an enterprise of the Soviet state has come into its greatest use only in recent years.



### 3

### Investment is the process 

## of lending money, equipment or services with the view of obtaining an income or profit. Soviet Communist investments abroad have some special characteristics worth noting.

Contrary to some impressions, Communist doctrine does not prevent**Communis~s** 

### from using capitalist investment techniques. Local Communists have set up enterprises in a number of 1Vestern European countries, such as Belgium, France and Italy. One of the most publicized current examples is found in the operations of the Oommunistowned and Communist-dominated trading firms in Italy, which not only serve the U. S. S. R. in procurement of needed goods at good prices, but also, through their business profits, act as important sources of revenue for the Communist Party. (The Italian Government has recently announced that it is now taking more forceful action against these firms.) The investments of Communism are meant to yield not only revenue but also broader economic and political benefits for the U. S. S. R. and international Communism. They are certainly not meant to be profitless.

A second feature of the investments of Soviet Communism is the low expenditure of Soviet resources which the investment usually entails. In the former enemy countries, immediately after W orId War II, the capital which the Soviet Government "invested" was primarily, and often exclusively, the resources located in the host country which the U. S. S. R. had in one manner or another acquired

or expropriated. In Eastern Europe, very substantial Soviet "investments" were built on German war assets which the Soviet Government legally or illegally acquired in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet

zone of Austria. These holdings were tremendous. For example, estimates made in 1948 of German assets in Hungary alone were as high as $100 million. In many cases, the U. S. S. R. "invested" these
assets to develop the now well-known "joint companies." In these institutions, nominal domestic management was always subordinate
to actual Soviet direction. The proceeds flowed back to Moscow, often
at a rate which seriously impaired the progress or future health of the enterprise, even though no products or equipment had ever gone out from the U. S. S. R.

In the Far East, the entry of Soviet troops into Manchuria and North !{orea made it easy for the Soviet Govermnent to acquire similar
assets that had belonged to the Japanese.

The pattern of Soviet interests is discernible and significant. The

areas often chosen for investment are transportation, power development, storage facilities, and other strategic points of the economy. In China, the months of August and September 1945, were an especially active time for the creation of Soviet-controlled and joint companies. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945,gave to the U. S. S. R.



### 4

### joint rights in the ownership and operation of the Chinese Chang<;hun Railroad and subsidiary enterprises, and also**provid~d** 

### for the establishment of four joint companies in Dairen. During the same period, the U. S. S. R. acquired operating control of the Dairen Machinery Works, the Shahoku Railway shops, and the Dairen dockyard. The Soviet-controlled Dalny Bank was put in charge of issuing local currency, and the major portion of foreign trade in Dairen was reported
to be handled by the U. S. S. R. In addition to these holdings in Dairen, the U. S. S. R. by means of expropriation and forced sales by Russian emigres, acquired out-. right control of various stores, lumber concessions, coal mines, and light industries in Manchuria.

There can be little doubt that Soviet Communism, as a general rule, considers investment abroad as a means of economic and political penetration as well as a means of acquiring-at low cost-materials and revenues from abroad and disrupting free-world ties in these

areas. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and China, the Soviet Government has recently sold back its interests in some of the joint**com~** 

### panies to the local governments. The U. S. S. R. has maintained its economic influence through tightened trade arrangements and central Communist economic planning directed from Moscow.



## The Picture and the Propaganda

Moscow's economic wooing of the areas outside Europe during 1954 received much public nolice. It became clear that this was a serious campaign. The reports; however, often tended to exaggerate the favors that the Soviet Communists were bestowing on the objects of their attention.

. Unless a postaudit is made on each of the innumerable reports, it is easy to get the impression of Soviet Communist enterprises springing up all over Asia, North Africa, and Latin America. If

one were confined to the Communist information media and believed what was said, one could easily reach the conclusion that the Communists alone value these underdeveloped countries as equal partners, provide scores of competent advisers to solve their problems, and offer all sorts of developmental assistance out of a vast reservoir of Communist goodwill and economic achievement.

The exaggerated impression of Soviet economic activity is not due
to accident or careless reporting. Communism and its spokesmen work assiduously to see that every Soviet demonstration of goodwill

or economic capability is presented to the world**~hrough** 

### a magnifying glass of propaganda. It 'is important that their efforts not be exaggerated in the free world, for to do so would be to play right into Communist hands; they



### 5

### hope to give a false idea of their economic strength and intentions. As a matter of factin many quarters the Soviet intentions are viewed with skepticism;
the ability of the Communists to give large-scale assistancewithout seriously impairing their own development-is in some doubt;
and actual Soviet-bloc investments to date have been very small compared with the assistance which has been flowing into the same

areas since 1949 under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States and other countries of the free world.



## A Variety of Methods

A year ago in 

## East-West Trade Trends, the fourth MDAC* report, we described some of the devices which the Soviet bloc was beginning to employ in "Reaching Outside Europe" (pp. 32-34). The activity of 1953 and 1954 in non-European areas of the free world

can now be summarized in a little more detail.

1. 

### Investments 

### Many of the activities in underdeveloped regions which have come to notice in the last year or so might be termed "investment" or developmental assistance, such as the construction of gasoline storage facilities in Afghanistan already mentioned.. There are hardly any instances of outright grants or even monetary loans to free-world governments; exceptions are a gold loan to Finland and several cases of relatively small contributions for disaster relief. The "investments" take the following form: -supplying technicians to assist on' special projects; -supplying capital equipment or supplies for construction of

specific facilities; -supplying capital**~quipment** 

### and commodities on credit.
We shall note in later sections how, in almost all countries, the Soviet talk far exceeded the transactions.

2. tfAdvertising"


### For all their adeptness at political propaganda, the Soviet Communists for a long time did not go in for the advertising of products, either at home or abroad. Since the war, however, they have apparently realized the advantages of advertising. Billboards, brochures and full-page newspaper advertisements are gradually gaining prominence at home and abroad. This probably reflects the influence of the Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans, who were experienced

* (Battle Act.) 

## 6

### world traders before they were fenced in behind the Iron Curtain. Within the last 2 years, the Soviet bloc began putting out more sales literature and bought a good deal of advertising space in foreign newspapers, such as in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. One of the most recent splurges was a full-page advertisement in the 

## Times of India of Bombay, on March 22, 1955. In it, the trade representation of the U. S. S. R. in India announced the opening of showrooms of machinery and equipment, with pictures of equipment and an invitation to businessmen, Industrialists and engineers to visit the display.

3. Trade Fairs


### Exhibits at trade fairs were the No.1 form of Soviet-bloc advertising in 1954, and an activity which probably ate most heartily into the Soviet foreign economic budget. The purposes of this activity, of course, were far broader than commodity sales promotion. Since 1952, the Soviet bloc has been increasing its participation in international fairs in the free world. In 1953 and 1954, Soviet-bloc countries were represented at between 40 and 50 fairs respectively, compared with representation at 30 in 1952 and 5 in 1951 and 1950. Actually, the Soviet bloc had 5 or 6 fewer exhibits in 1954 than in 1953, but at the same time increased by 5 their special individual national exhibits of their products in free-world countries, aside from the international fairs. Figure I lists the international fairs in which the Soviet-bloc countries participated in 1954. The U. S. S. R. in 1954, in addition to staging individual exhibits of its products at Copenhagen and New Delhi, sent exhibits to 11 international fairs. The Soviet bloc, as a whole, has been increasing its participation in fairs outside Europe. While in 1952 three, or 10 percent of its exhibits, were in those areas, in 1953 it exhibited at nine such fairs (18 percent of the total) and in 1954 at 13 (26 percent of the total). Observers of the Soviet-bloc exhibits at trade fairs in 1954 concluded that the displays were designed more to 

### impress the crowds than to attract prospective buyers. The Soviet-bloc countries generally refused to arrange their wares on a commodity basis, side by 

### side with the products of other nations. They insisted on exhibiting in their own national pavilions, which lent themselves more readily
to propaganda feats.

An example was a U. S. S. R. pavilion used at one of the Western European fairs, which was typical of displays shown in other freeworld countries. An illuminated reproduction of Moscow's Red Square, in color, dominated the entrance. On either side were spectacular graphs showing increases in the output of minerals, steel, and

343901°-55-2 

### 7FIGURE I.-SOVIET-BLOC PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FAIRS, 1954

---
.. I '"

___**~.Bloc** Particlp::mts

___________ 0 '"' Q;I "'til e:J>. oS



# --- u.i 0._ 

### to ..c:l.!t: l:l



# ---**~~** til til. 'd til u.i**~S** b.O I:l



# --- l:l til Location of Fairs



# ------ :::i N til '0 0 P-I

x x

x x

x
x x x

x x x

x x

x

x

x
x x
x
x x
x x xx
x

x x



### x

x x

x
xx
x xx

x
x
x
x X
x x
x x
x
x
xx x
x Austria:

Dornbirn**~__** x

_ Graz .:.__

__ __ ___ x Innsbruck_____________________ x Vienna 1 .;. .:.____ x x Belgium-Luxembourg:

Brussels 2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ x xxx Ghent________________________ x Liege_________________________ x Luxembourg___________________ x Denmark: Copenhagen

.__ x

_ United Kingdom:

London 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ x x ____ x x ____ x Camberley .;. x France:

Lyon _________________________ x

_**Marseille~** x Paris 4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ xxx Strasbourg_____________________ x Germany:

Frankfurt 5

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ x xx

____ ____ _ _ Munich_______________________ x Greece: Salonika__

_ __ _ __ x x Italy:

Bolzano .:.

_ Padua________________________ x Parma

_ Milan___

__ _ ___ _ __ _ x Verona

_ Vicenza

_ Netherlands:

Amsterdam:.______

__ ___ __ x Utrecht 6

__ Sweden: Stockholm .;.

_ Argentina: Mendoza

_ Brazil: Sao Paulo

_ French Morocco: Casablanca

_ Indonesia: Djakarta______________ x Syria: Damascus____

__ __ __ ____ x Turkey: Izmir___________________ x

_

I Includes bloc participation at the Viemia Spring Fair, Mar. 14-21 and at the Vienna Fall Fair, Sept. 12-19.
2 Includes bloc participation at the 37th International Auto and Cycle Exposition, Jan. 16--27; at the International Fair, Apr. 24-May 5; and at the Farm Machinery Fair, Feb. 13-20.

3 Includes bloc participation at the 3d British Food Fair, Sept. 17-18 and at the International Motor Show, Oct. 20-30.

4 Includes bloc participation at the International Business Machine and Office Equipment Exhibit, Oct. 13-24; at the 41st Salon d' Auto Exhibit in October; and at the International Fair, May 22-June 7.

5 Includes bloc participation at the Frankfurt Spring Fair, Mar. 7-12 and the Frankfurt Fall Fair, Sept. 5-9.

6 Includes bloc participation at the 62d International Industries Fair, Mar. 3D-Apr. 8 and the 63dInternational Industries Fair, Sept. 7-16.



### power. Much display was given to alleged expenditures on public health and physical culture in the U. S. S. R. There was an operating table and an X-ray machine. Light classical music was played on the upright and grand pianos on display. Above was a photograph of smiling, bemedaled heroes" listening to a parlor concert. Theover-all theme appeared to be that of an expanding peacetime economy devoted
to satisfying consumer wants.

8

### Soviet-bloc exhibitors at trade fairs were generally unable or reluctant to furnish information on prices, specifications, delivery sched**ules~** 

### replacement parts, local agents, and distributors. A large part of the bloc exhibits consisted of machinery impressive to the untrained eye, but not .to the prospective buyer. The bloc countries,
moreover, did not gear their displays to the markets of the countries where they exhibited. And it was often apparent that they were not prepared to manufacture for export many of the products they were featuring. At the Chinese exhibit of agricultural and industrial machinery at Damascus, for example, the Chinese Communist exhib.:. itors flatly refused to quote prices or appoint sales agents for these items.



## 4. Trade Agreements


### In a sense, the trade agreements are another form of advertising as l\1oscow uses them. Figure IlIon page 16 

### shows how the trade agreement network has expanded in 1954, 

### especially in areas outside Europe.

5. Exchanges of Economic Missions


### All through 1954 

### the Russians laid down the long red carpet fora
stream of missions from abroad. The exchange of missions was given

a high priority. Previously most of the I(remlin's invitations went to labor delegations (some of which were out-and-out Communistfront organizations), but in 1954 

### the groups ranged from industrialists to artists. Many of them were related to trade and other economic '
matters. Some of the missions that were exchanged in connection with trade agreements were official delegations; others were private businessmen from free-world countries. Besides trade delegations, other groups concerned with economic matters included specialists in agriculture, rail transportation, and industry. It would be a mistake to fail to point out that Moscow in many cases is entertaining groups and individuals who have no interest in promoting Communism. The Voice of the I(remlin has been very bitter about free-world visitors who reported the poverty and economic obsolescence which they observed. And some of the visitors from the so-calledunderdeveloped areas have been quite outspoken about such Soviet conditions. It is possible that the leaders of the Soviet Union are still weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the new approach.

6. Permanent Trade Representation


### Besides the exchange of delegations, the Soviet bloc has expanded its
crop of permanent trade offices in the free world, especially in the nonEuropean areas.· For example, Communist China opened·a trade of9

### fice at Kalimpong, India, in March 1955. 

### East Germany established

a permanent trade mission in Cairo early in 1954. 

### Bulgaria posted its first trade representatives to Alexandria and Damascus in 1954. 

### Hungary has had permanent trade representation in Brazil since December of 1953. 

### In addition, a number of the trade agreements signed in 1954 

### provide for the establishment of such Soviet-bloc offices. Since this is almost always a one-sided affair, it is of special significance as a

means of Soviet-bloc economic penetration abroad.


## Sample Operation

India is the only country besides Afghanistan where the Soviet bloc has run the gamut of these economic exercises. The Soviet Communists have been interested in India ever since they came to power, but the current economic attention is nevertheless something special. As is often the case, a much-publicized trade agreement with the 

# u. S. S. R. put the courtship by the Soviet bloc into the**spot~ight.** 

### This was a 5- 

### year agreement, concluded on December 3, 1953, 

### and was accompanied by an exchange of letters in which a permanent Soviet trade mission was established in India and a vague offer of Soviet technical assistance was formally accepted. The first apparent move to implement the technical assistance clause was seen in the news that three Soviet mining engineers had been sent to study an industrial diamond mine in Northern India, mapping the area and estimating the need for more equipment. The U. S. S. R. has apparently offered to meet the entire expenses of the experts and to furnish mining machinery in exchange for paylllent in industrial diamonds, in which the Soviet bloc happens to be deficient. There have been various miscellaneous activities in India; for example, since November 1954, 

### eight Soviet technicians have been working at the Indian Statistical Institute. In the last months of 1954, 

### rumors kept cropping up in the press about negotiations between the U. 

## S. S. R. and Indian Governments for the construction of a steel plant. The interest was heightened by the fact that some vVestern nations also were involved in India's preparations to expand her steelmaking capacity. On February 2, 1955, 

### India and the U. S. S. R. signed an agreement under which the U. S. S. R. would plan, and later construct, a steel mill in central India with a capacity of 1 million tons a year, to be completed by the end of 1959.



### The cost of the mill is estimated at around $200 million. The Russians apparently will invest around $95 

### million in the project, providing machinery and technical assistance. They will receive a return each year equal to 2lh percent of their investment. India will

10

### repay the loan over a period of 12 years, the first payment to be made when the first equipment arrives. The U. S. S. R. will guarantee the plant's operation for 6 months and provide technicians for 3 years after the mill reaches full operation.

Under the contract, Moscow must submit detailed plans within 9 months; these plans must be approved by the Indian Government and costs of equipment to be furnished by the U. S. S. R. must not seriously exceed $91 million. If the plans are rejected, India must pay the U. S. S. R. for all expenses connected with drawing theln up. If the U. S. S. R. fails to comply with any clauses, India has the option of canceling the contract.



## Moscow Invests in Promises

The rest of the story of Soviet foreign economic ventures is, for the most part, one of promises and unconfirmed reports. But these should not be ignored. Some may yet be redeemed, and at least they
create an impression in some people's minds that the U. S. S. R. and its satellites are real and reliable friends of the underdeveloped areas.

e In Egypt, the Soviet Commercial Counselor advertised the U. S. S. R. 's readiness to extend a varied program of technical cooperation. Earlier, there was considerable discussion in" the Egyptian press of an alleged Soviet offer of ted1l1ical assistance in building the Aswan Dam, but it later appeared that no such offer had been made. eThere were rumors of negotiations on possible East German economic aid to the Sudan. 

### ePravda said the U. S. S. R. was giving technical assistance to Iran. The nature or extent of the aid was not Inade known. eTo Ceylon, the U. S. S. R. has made vague offers of technical and capital aid.

e In Burma, the COlnmunist Chinese Government proposed an exchange of students and technicians to help in the development of a textile industry. eA Czechoslovak diplomat in Indonesia indicated that, if requested, Czechoslovakia, could make technicians available to instruct and train workers to run the factories of Indonesia. An Indonesian official has been quoted as saying that a Communist government had offered two "substantial loans."

This brings up the only other project in Asia for which the Soviet bloc is known actually to have contracted in 1954 or early 1955. On February 3, 1955, it was announced that the Indonesian Government had signed an agreement with East Germany for the purchase of sugar mill equipment. East Germany was to send 50 technicians
to aid in the cOl1Etruction and operation 

## of the sugar mill.

11

### • The Hungarian-A.rgentine trade agreement signed in A.ugust 1953 provided for technical assistance in the installation of Hungarian capital equipment.

• Radio Prague described a distillery in Argentina on which "almost 50 Czech specialists" had worked. • A trade and credit agreement was concluded between Argentina and the U. S. S. R. in 1953 and renewed in 1954. It got worldwide publicity

.. Among other things the agreement provided for a Soviet credit of $30 million. In 1954 an Argentine delegation spent 2 months in Moscow trying to arrange for the purchase of capital goods under this $30-million credit. They came back empty-handed. As of early 1955, there appears to have been no substantial implementation of the credit provision. It is an intriguing case in the annals of foreign trade.


## Summing It Up

The activities we have been discussing in this chapter can be briefly summarized in this way:

Underdeveloped regions of the world need capital from abroad to hel p them build their economies.

.

They have obtained considerable assistance from free-world governlnents 

## and international organizations.

. In recent years the Soviet Union has been saying in its propaganda that it was prepared to offer technicians, equipment, and credits to underdeveLoped countries. European satellites have echoed the sentiments.

In 1954 the gestures became more sweeping and more noticeable. Some technicians and some equipment were sent to Afghanistan. In India, negotiations for the building of a steel mill on credit gave

an indication that Moscow had grown more serious about technical assistance.

Elsewhere the Communist gestures were still largely confined to propaganda, promises, and unconfirmed rumors. There was an increase in Soviet-bloc participation in trade fairs and other forms of advertising. The Communist governments have managed to convey an impression among many people that they are doing much more than they are. Though the Soviet bloc is hardly likely to launch a big-scale aid
program, it could supply a number of technicians and a limited amount of capital goods to underdeveloped regions, if 

### it decided to do so in order to make either economic or political gains.

Meantime the whole free world-developed and underdevelopedmay wish to keep a skeptical eye on the "investments" and other activities of Moscow's economic arm.

12

## . THE SOVIET BLOC 

# SHARE·IN WORLD TRADE
1954

SOVIET BLOC INCLUDES:

• U.S.S.R.

• European Satellites

• Communist China

• North Korea

• Northern Viet Nam

(Total World Trade opprox. $156 billion)

SOURCE' Trade figures-Depl. 01 Commerc. Papulation -Bureou 01 Census Area---Bureou 01 Census SOVIET BLOC 2.2% ($ 3.456.000.0001

## TRADE OF FREE WORLD WITH BLOC,**1947~54.·**

PI/nons of tiS [JollarS 

### 2.0 2.0

FREE WORLD 

# EXPORTS

TO BLOC

Figures unadjusted for price changes, do not accurately show trend in physical volume. No reUable price index is avallable. All 1954 figures preliminary.

## CHAPTER II



# The Picture of East-West Trade in 1954

In 1954, East-West trade kindled a lively interest around the globe. This ,vas a year in which the countries dominated by the !{reInlin

were actively promoting wider economic relations with the free world, but in the interest of correctness it must be reported that their talk surpassed their performance.

The two-way trade between the free world and the Soviet bloo in Europe and Asia increased in value by 15 percent over 1953, a modest growth of the sort which was expected on the basis of rising trends
at the end of 1953. Goods flowing to the bloc increased 24 percent; goods flowing out of the bloc increased by 7 percent.

This brief, upward trend in East-vVest trade, however, now appears to have reached a plateau. In some geographical areas and in Some commodities a moderate decrease seems to be underway. Goods moving to the bloc from the entire free world were less in the secon'd half of 1954 than in the first half. Signs of a possible ebbing of the twoway trade are not surprising 

### if it is remembered that the 1954 increase represents, in a large part, a recovery by the U. S. S. R. from an abnormal drop in its trade with the free world in late 1952 and very early 1953. There is reason to think that it may be difficult for the Soviet bloc to maintain trade at the 1954 level.



## East to West, and West to East

The increased level of trade in 1954 between the free world and the entire Soviet bloc was brought about by an increase in both the imports and the exports of the U. S. S. R. and the European satellites, offsetting a decrease in the trade of Communist China**~ith** 

### the free world. The total value of East-vVest trade between the free world and the entire Soviet bloc in 1954 was above that of 1950, 1952, or 1953, but was still below that of 1951 and the peak years of 1948 and· 1949. Since prices have soared high in the meantime, the physical volume of goods. moving in 1954 was smaller-in proportion to the volume in those peak years-than is shown by the dollar values.



## 13FIGURE II 

# FREE WO/(Lf) TRADE WITH THE 

# SOWET BLOC

(Millions of Dollars) 

## 1948

EXPORTS

IMPORTS 500 I 1500 I 2000
I Tolol

Bloc 1,969

2.008 

## 1952

EXPORTS

IMPORTS


## 1953

EXPORTS

-, IMPORTS


## 1954 lml

EXPORTS

IMPORTS 1,620*

1,720

1,738*

*'NCLUDES $3.IIIILLION IMPORTED BY UNITED STATES FROM OUTER 1I0NGOLIA IN 1952 AND $6.T MILLION IN 1953 as 6.0 MILLION EST. IN**19~4** SOURCE' OFFICIAL STATISTICS OF FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES. COMPILED BY COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, NOT ADJUSTED FOR PRICE CHANGES. ALSO NOT ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE SWISS WATCHES WHICH APPEAR IN QfFlCIAL STATISTICS .AS EXPORTS TO CHINA BUT ACTUALLY WENT TO HONG KONG ANO OTHER FREE-WORLD DESTINATIONS. (FIGURES ROUNOEDl 

### The Soviet bloc's increase in imports dominated the year's EastWest trading. This was especially true of 

### the U. S. S. R., whose imports from the free world increased from $424 million in 1953 to

a postwar peak of $585 million in 1954, while its exports to the free world rose from $374 million to $470 million. Imports of the Eastern European satellite countries also increased more than exports, but this did not lead to the deficit found in U. S. S. R. commodity trade.

The U. S. S. R. 1954 excess of imports over exports, amounting to about $115 million and coming on top of a $50 million excess of imports the year before, was made possible by especially large sales of Soviet gold to vVestern Europe in late 1953 and early 1954. These gold exports led some observers to wonder whether the U. S. S. R. could afford
to go on buying vVestern goods at the rate they were buying them in early 1954. Toward the end of the year, there were signs of readjustment. Russian imports from the vVest were cut down, while Russian exports expanded, so that in the second haH of 1954 the U. S. S. R. had an export surplus in its commerce with the free world. In order
to do this, U. S. S. R. imports from the free world during the second haH of the year were cut by about $80 million. The European satellites as a group had an export surplus in EastvVest trade in 1954, shipping out more than they received, as did Communist China. This is more usual for those cQuntries than for the U. S. S. R. Even so, some of the individual European satellite countries developed heavy excesses of imports over exports in the course of


## 14

### the year. As in previous years, there were several instances in which

a Western European country had to suspend its sales temporarily because the satellite trading partner failed to keep its exports up to the levels necessary to pay for imports provided for in the agreement and was going too far into debt. Much of the increase in trade between the free world and the European Soviet bloc that occurred from 1953 to 1954 came from outside of Western Europe. Most noticeable were the big purchases by the U. S. S. R. of products, such as meat, in Argentina and Uruguay. Soviet-bloc trade increased with Pakistan, Brazil, New Zealand, possibly Australia, and on a smaller scale with India and Indonesia

.

. Although trade figures for 1954 are not complete, and all 1954 totals

are preliminary estimates at this time, there is no doubt that this Soviet-bloc commerce with non-European areas began to fall off in the latter part of the year. It appears to have faded partly because the Soviet bloc was unable, or unwilling, to provide enough exports of t.he right kind at the right price for those areas.

Western Europe also had a share of the 1954 increase in East-West trade, and here the trade level-that is, the sum of exports and imports-was still on the upgrade in the second half of the year.

United States imports from the Soviet bloc totaled $49 million in 1954--about the same as in 1953 ($46 million). Polish ham was the principal commodity with imports valued at $16.1 million. Furs and fur manufactures primarily from the U. S. S. R. accounted for $9.5 million and were second in importance. These two items accounted for more than one-half of total Soviet-bloc exports to the United States. United States exports to the bloc in 1954 were slightly under $6 million; the major part, however, consisted of food shipments to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany under the President's Danube flood relief program which amounted to about $2.5 million. Wool rags accounted for $1.2 million.



## Trade Agreement Network Spreads

Like the preceding year, 1954 was notable for the signing of new trade agreements, and for the revival of old ones which had been allowed to lapse. The network of bilateral trade pacts between the free and Soviet worlds was considerably increased in this way. New agreements made good newspaper stories, but the publicity given to them may have created exaggerated impressions of the development of the trade itself. Experience shows that a trade agreement provides

no assurance of any particular level of trade. Figure III lists the most recent trade agreements in effect in 1954 between each pair of Soviet-bloc-free-world trading partners. Twenty-eight of these agreements were brand new, that is, there were

no previous trade agreements between the countries involved

... In



## 15FIGUREIIIMOSTRECENTTRADEAGREEMENTSINEFFECTBETWEENCOUNTRIESOFTHESOVIETBLOCANDTHEFREEWORLDDURING1954U.S.S;R.BulgariaCzechoslovakiaHungaryPolandRumaniaSovietZone,GermanyChinaNetherlandsJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Italy_______________Oct.27,1953,toOct.26,1954.GreeooJuly28,1954,toJuly27,1955.lcelandJuly1,1954,toDec.31,1955.NorwayJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.SwedenJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Suppl.-(Sept.4)1954.*July1,1954,toJuly1,1955.*Jan.1,1953,toDec.31,1953.*Jan.1,1954,to_Dec.31,1954.I*Jan.1,1954,to• _Dec.31,1954.*Jan.I,1954,toDec.31,1954.Suppl.-July19,1954,toDec.31,1954.*Jan.I,1954,toDec.31,1954.*Dec.23,1953,toDec.31,1954.*October1954,toDec.31,1955.*Jan.I,1954,toDec.31,1954.*Sept.1,1953,toDec.31,1954.Suppl.-Feb.8,1954.Suppl.-Aug.11,1954.Dec.19,1954,toDec.19,1955.June1,1954,toJune30,1955.Apr.13,1954,toDec.31,1955.*Jan.I,·1954,toDec.31,1954.JuneI,1954,toMay31,1955.•Apr.I,1954,toMar.31,1955.Apr.1,1954,toMar.31,1955.Apr.1,1954,toMar.31,1955.Sept.3,1948,toSept.3,1949.Annualtacitrenewal.*Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Apr.1,1954,toMar.31,1955.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Mar.1,1953,toFeb.28,1954.Ext.toJune30,1954.Dec.1,1954,toNov.30,1955.July1,1953,toJune30,1954.July1,1953,toJune30,1954.Ext.toDec.31,1954.Jan.1, 1949,toDec.31,1949.Annualtacitrenewal.May1,1954,toApr.30,1955.May1,1954,toApr.30,1955.Mar.1,1954,toFeb.28,1955.Feb.1,1954,toJan.31,1955.Oct.1,1954,toSept.30,1955.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Ext.andsuppl.-toJune30,1955.June5,1954,toJune4,1955.Mar.1,1953,toFeb.28,1954.Ext.toDec.31,1955.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Sept.1,1954,toAug.31,1955.June1,1954,toMay31,1955.Oct.1,1953,toSept.30,Feb.1,1954,toJan.31,1955.Apr.1, 1954,toMar.31,1955.Ext.toJune30,1955.Jan.1, 1954,toDec.31,1954.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.June1,1954,toMay31,1955.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Sept.16,1954,toAug.31,1957.Annualquotasto1955.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.*Jan.1,1954,toMar.31,1955.June15,1947,toDec.31,1948.Annualtacitrenewal.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Sept.1,1953,toDec.31,1954.Jan.28,1947,toJan.27,1948.Annualtacitrenewal.Nov.1,1954,toOct.31,1955.Apr.21,1947,toApr.21,1948.Annualtacitreonewal.July1,1953,toJune30,1954.Suppl.-(Aug.28,1953).July1,1954,toDec.31,1965.Germany(FederalRepublic)France_Denmark_I.EuropeAustria_BelgiumJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.July18,1953,toJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Dec.31,1954.Switzerland•__Apr.1,1948.In·Jan.1.1949,toApr.1,1954,todefinite.Dec.31,1949.Mar.31,1955.Annualtacitrenewal.Turkey••July1,1953,toJune30,1954.UnitedKingdomJuly1,1953,toJune30,1954.FinlandJan.1,1954,toJan.1,1954,toJan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Dec.31,1954.Dec.31,1954.n.OutsideEuropeOct.1,1953,toSept.30,1954.June1949,toMay31,1950.Auto·maticannualextension.Sept.1,1954,toAug.31,11155.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.July1,1949,toJune30,1954.Annualtacitreonewal.July1,1948,toJune30,1949.Annualtacitrenewal.(Nov.11)1954,to1956.Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1954.Aug.1,1953,toJuly31,1954.Apr.15,1954,toApr.14,1955.*Apr.1,1954,toMar.31,1955.May1,1954,toApr.30,1955.Suppl.-Dec.13,1954,toApr.30,1955.(Apr.22,1954)Jan.1,1954,toSept.6,1954.Dec.31,1954.Oneyear.(Nov.23,1954).•__.._Oneyear.Argentina..August1954,to_August1955.BraziL•_AfghanistanJan.1,1954,to(Aug.22)1954.Dec.31,1954.Oneyear.Burma.. . .Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1956.Ceylon•••..•Jan.1,1954,toDec.31,1955.Egypt(Mar.26,1954)to"• .Jan.18,1954.to._Mar.26,1955.Jan.17,1955.India.Jan.1,1954,toJune1,1953,toNov.17,1953,toJune17,1954,toJan.1,1953,toMar.23,1954,toOct.16,1954,toOct.14,1954,toDec.31,1958.Dec.31,1954.Dec.31,1954.Dec.31,1955.Dec.31,1954.Dec.31,1954.Oct.15,Oct.13,1956.Indonesia•July15,1954,toJuly1,1954,toMay1,1954,toJuly1,1954,to.Sept.I,1954.toJuly14,1955.June3D,1955.Apr.30,1955.June30,1955.Aug.31,1955Iran._Apr.1,1954,to•............._Mar.31,1955.IsraeLDec.20,1954,to•Feb.26,1954.toJuly1,1954,toSept.9,1954,to_Dec.31,1955.Feb.25,1955.June30;1955.Dec.31,1955.LebanonSept.11,1954,toNov.20,1954,to.Feb.14,1954,to_Sept.10,1955.Nov.19,1955.Jan.31,1955.Syria..l.1ar.27,1953,to. .._._Mar.26,1954.Sept.3,1952,toDec.31,1954.May17,1953,to._May16,1954.Mexico._...Nov.9,1949,to•._Dec.31,1954.Paraguay._Nov.15,1953,toNov.1,1953,toNov.14,1954.Oct.31,1954.Annualtacitre-Annualtacitrenewal.newal.Uruguay___________July28,1954,toJuly27,1956.*June29,1954,toJune28.1955.NOTES:Italics:Firstpostwaragreement;ineffectin1954butsignedinpreviousyear.BoldFace:Firstpostwaragreement.......*-Nongovernmentalagreement."'"-JDatesWithinparenthesesindicatedateofsignature;effecth'edatenota\·ailable.

### addition, there were several new agreements not listed on the chart that provided payments mechanisms without schedules for delivery of commodities. The Soviet Union, as in 1953, 

### was especially active in adding new agreements to its trade network in 1954. 

### Communist China now has trade pacts with four non-Communist countries in Asia; only one of these was in effect before 1954. 

### East Germany and Rumania accounted for 17 of the new agreements. '

As in 1953, 

### the most novel development in the field of East-West 'trade agreements was the expansion outside Europe, although the great majority of trade pacts are still with vVestern European countries. :J\1any of the non-European agreements are noticeably vague. But they do attract attention to the Communist countries, and thus form a part of their campaign to extend their prestige and influence.



## The Permanent Pattern of Priorities

In late 1953 

### and early 1954 

### a big topic of public discussion in the East-West trade field was Soviet purchases of consumer goods.

The vast, undersupplied consumers' markets iIi the U. S. S. R. and

some of the satellites were often eyed eagerly by East-West traders seeking outlets for the free world's abundance. During that period the novelty of sizeable increases in Soviet-bloc buying of foodstuffs and raw materials and products for light industry caused some to believe that the Soviet-bloc markets were at last being opened. This optimism existing in some circles was fed by the propaganda of Communist governments proclaiming interest in their peoples' weHare, and also by the natural, hope of the free men of the West to see the harness loosened from the Soviet bloc's captive populations.

. On the other hand, many in the vVest, recalling similar periods in Soviet history, were skeptical. They doubted that the commercial forays for food and fabrics represented any fundamental change in Soviet economic policies which would create a permanent expansion in East-West trade. By the end of 1954, 

### the optimism had considerably faded and the skepticism had grown. It became apparent that the primary concern of the Soviet bloc in foreign trade, as' in the past, was still the procurement of equipment and raw materials for its basic industries. This concern can be noticed in different aspects of the bloc's foreign trading operations-in the bilateral trade negotiations, in the character of their statements in meetings of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), in the foreign and domestic propaganda, and in the actual shipments flowing into the Soviet areas from the free world. One of the Western Europeans who had attended the April 1954 

### meeting of the ECE's Trade Consultative Group summed up his



### 18

### impression of Soviet trading interests something like this: The Soviets are not interested in a large revival of East- vVest trade; they only want to buy specific items like copper, electrical machinery, etc., which are called for in their plan; and to get these items, they are willing to buy other goods as well and to sell a minimum amount of their traditional exports. The Soviet bloc's concentrated interest in industrial equipment and

raw materials is most obvious in the trade promotion work of COFRACI, a private organization in France, one of the European propaganda groups which grew out of the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952. 

### Such groups direct their message primarily to business circles. An article in the COFRACI 

## Bulletin for 

## J anuary- February 1954, 

### urges the French to develop their trade with Bulgaria and Rumania. First, importers are urged to buy quantities of Bulgarian cereals, fruits, vegetables, tobacco, and eggs. Then, a long list was cited of "the French products desired by Bulgaria."
Metal-cutting machinery; forge and press equipment; electrical machinery; mining machinery; grain-grinding machinery; metallurgical machinery and rolling mills; transportation and handling equipment pumps and compressors; chemical, food and construction industry machinery; woodworking machinery; medical and laboratory apparatus; bearings; ferrous metals; galvanized steel sheets; tin; steels; soldering electrodes; aluminum (in blocks); aluminum semifinished products; nonferrous metals, products, alloys; copper (in blocks) ; copper, semifinished products and wire; steel-alnminl1ln conductors; chemical products; tanning products and dyes, analine dyes; pharmaceuticals, superphosphates; refractory materials; magnesium bricl{s; automobile tires; raffia; cotton thread; woolens. 

### The bid for expanded French trade with Rumania is similar. But COFRACI does not stop at urging such trade deals. Speaking of Czechoslovakian trade, COFRACI openly presses the French to make "concessions" so they can increase their trade and procure from Czechoslovakia such items as "coal tar, coke and coke dust, timber and paper pulp." The article warns: "The French Administration cannot hope
to obtain these products without making a few concessions. It is the interest of all industrialists for the Administration to do so as these concessions involve the export of French products which have been affected by the Battle Act, aluminum, primarily." This type of continuing pressure to break up the multilateral system of security trade controls is, of course, familiar.

The commodity pattern of European Soviet-bloc imports in the postwar period shows a continual emphasis on three major categories of products: machinery, metals and metal products, and transport equipment (especially marine). Only a few free-world countries have published their detailed commodity trade data for 1£)54. 

### From the fragmentary information that is available, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet bloc's buying of machinery in the free world did not decline.


## 19

## Wanted: A Merchant Fleet
The fourth MDAC report, 

## East-West Trade Trends (pp. 32-33), described how the Soviet bloc went on a "shopping spree" for ships during 1953. Even though many of the orders will take several years to fill, 1954 deliveries of vessels constructed in the free world for the Soviet bloc clearly showed the effect of the new Soviet interest in acquiring a merchant marine.

The bloc has shipyards of its own, but these cannot turn out enough vessels of the types desired to satisfy the demands of the economic planners for military and merchant marines, and the yards concentrate on vessels for military use. The Soviet Union and Poland are the only bloc countries with fleets worth mentioning. l\{any of the ships are slow, old, and badly in need of repair. These fle"ets together

are not yet large enough to carryall the goods shipped in intra-bloc trade, not to mention East-West trade. For example, Soviet Russia's tanker "fleet" increased from 163,000 gross registered tons in 1953 to 218,000 gross registered tons in 1954. But the U. S. S. R. still has only

a handful of tankers, and this shortage is serious. The 15 free-world countries that cooperate in strategic trade controls prohibit the sale of tankers to the Soviet bloc. In Chapter IV will be found the story of how the Soviet Union pressed the Danes unsuccessfully in 1954 to sell them two tankers, and even broke up the trade negotiations when they couldn't get their own way. In such cases, there is no doubt of the impact of free-world strategic trade controls on the military capabilities of the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc can obtain many types of cargo and fishing vessels and marine equipment not on the free-world embargo list. During the first half of 1954, deliveries of ships of various types from Western Europe (excluding Finland) to the Soviet bloc amounted
to $12 million, which is well above the value of $8 million for the vessels delivered in the entire previous year. (Finland is the largest single exporter of ships to the Soviet bloc and made deliveries amounting to $46 million in 1953 and about $50 million in 1954.) A substantial portion ot these purchases were used vessels which are in heavy demand by the bloc.

In addition to the deliveries in 1954, the Soviet bloc placed orders for a large number of new non-strategic-type vessels to be built in Western European shipyards for delivery in 1955 or later. Their interest appears to be chiefly in merchant ships, refrigerated ships, fishing vessels, and specialized harbor craft.


## Meat, Bread and Butter

The European countries of the Soviet orbit bought much more food in the free world in 1954 than in the year before. The rise appeared

20

### to have been checked in the latter part of the year. There was increasing evidence that many of the orders were one-shot affairs. The free-world farmers who furnished the foodstuffs were realizing-if they had not known all along-that their new customers were not necessarily permanent ones.

.

In any case,. the amounts, whether rising or falling, were small in

. terms of the immense populations to be fed. A privileged few may

have eaten better, but the imports could hardly have benefited the
many.

During most of 1954, 

### meat was short in the Soviet Union and rationed in some other Soviet-bloc countries. Meat being scarce, and livestock production being chronically behind plan and in deplorable shape, the Communists turned to the free world as an additional source. By October 1954, 

### the Soviet Union had bought or contracted to buy from free-world countries 142,000 

### tons of beef, mutton, and pork. This is more than seven times the quantity of meat brought into the U. S. S. R. from the free countries in 1953. 

### The largest suppliers were New Zealand and Uruguay, followed by Argentina, Denmark, and France in that order. Soviet buyers also found meat in South Africa, Kenya, Canada, and Ireland.

All these purchases made the U. S. S. R. the world's third largest
meat buyer in' 1954. 

### In addition, Czechoslovakia and East Germany each committed themselves to buy 5,000 

### tons in their trade agreements with free-world countries.

The Soviet bloc imported more fish, too. This might well have been part of the attempt to deal with the meat shortages. Imports of 176,000 

### tons in the first half of 1954 

### may be compared with 91,000 

### tons, in the same months of 1953, 

### and almost 214,000 

### tons in all of 1953. 

### Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Iceland, and the United lCingdom

were· the main suppliers. For Iceland and Norway, the Soviet bloc became a market of considerable importance, buying 23 

### percent and 15 

### percent, respectively, of their fish exports in the first 11 

### months of the year.

.

As for butter, the U. S. S. R., in 1954 

### as in 1953, 

### was the world's second largest buyer and imported at least 28.5 

### thousand tons (not all countries have reported yet). East Germany bought almost 19,000 

### tons, about two-thirds as much as the U. S. S. R. On the other hand, Poland, which was the No.2 

### buyer in the Soviet bloc in 1953,



### a pparently ended its purchases.**Ac~ording** 

### to figures which the U. S. S. R. gave to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), almost all its butter imports in the 1953-54 

### season

were re-exported to satellite countries, and the same program is planned for 1954-55. 

### One of the most interesting of all changes in the pattern of Sovietbloc imports 

### is the recent influx of bread grains from the free**world~**

343901°-55-3 

### 21

### This is especially interesting because Eastern Europe has traditionally relied upon grain as its leading ewport. 

### The shifts in the Soviet bloc's grain trade will be described in the next section.



## What Can the Bloc Sell?

The problem of what to export is a perennial one for the U. S. S. R. and its European empire. The major traditional exports of most of those countries have been products of farm, forest, and mine. Yet, these products are hungrily sought by those responsible for the ambitious heavy industrial program which has been the main economic goal of Soviet planners. Furthermore, the Communist economic system has stacked the cards against agriculture. At the same time the system is not conducive to the production of the high-quality industrial goods which can compete in markets where the products of Western industry are available. This dilemma has gnawed at the foreign-trade planners of the U. S. S. R. ever since the first 5-year plan was started in 1928. It has

come to plague the European satellites ever since their "Sovietization." The problem in the satellites has been further aggravated by Moscow's policy of having "first call" upon satellite production.

Thus the sources of Soviet-bloc products that are exportable to the free world have been drying up.

The traditional grain exports of Eastern Europe, including the 

# u. S. S. R., have been dwindling. Exports of wheat, rye, barley, oats, and corn from the European Soviet bloc to the. free world dropped from 2,875,000 tons in the 1952-53 season to 1,256,000 tons in the 1953-54 season. (See Figure IV.) Prospects for the 1954--55 season

are no better. Contrary to all previous practices, the Soviet-bloc countries stopped including grain on their list of goods available for export to the West, which they distributed in the ECE meetings. Furthermore there have been delays and cancellations in connection with the Soviet bloc's existing commitments to deliver grain.

Hungary, the' former breadbasket of central Europe, imported large quantities of grain in 1954. Poland had become a net importer of grain in 1952, and Rumania, a grain-producing nation, has had severe difficulties in meeting its obligations.

In late 1954 these countries were forced to import grain on a large scale from Western Europe, and to make these purchases in some

cases by means of pri vate Western European credits because they

were already overdrawn**o~** 

### their credit facilities with the Western government.

Additional information on the increasing flow of grains-especially bread grains-from the free world into the "breadbasket" regions hehind the Curtain will be available when more trade figures come in. The story may deserve telling in some future MDAC report.

22FIGURE IV.-GRAIN EXPORTS FROM EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC TO THE FREE WORLD IN

THE LAST 3 SEASONS

[In metric tons]

Year U. 8. S. R. Bulgaria Rumania I Hungary Poland I Totals

611,156 4,950 4,390 21,773 242,518 157,998 

### -----ii;947-
============ ============ 

### -----32;9i7- 642,269 242,518 202,862
1,459,433 2,192, 113

846,007
213,866 210,289 116,915
207,155 96,284 23,978
401,772 133,740 65,874 27,903

_

515

_ 30,206

_ 96, 850 2, 292 30,678 21,674 34,888

. _

99,816 72,341

424 26, 276 28, 860 ll, 401 1l,229 14,499 19,802 9,940

_ 266,974 165,530 63,636 27,879 73,701 112,086

955 8,275

304 202,805 4,350

_ 40,835 6,297 49,152 23,978

_ 274,053 41,863 

### -----i9;02i15,646 19,598 1,065,438 1,900,530

635,397
136,572 176,286 106,671 Barley: 1951-5L

_ 1952-53-.

_ 1953-54

_ Wbeat: 1951-5L

_ 1952-53-.

_ 1953-54

_ Rye: 1951-52

_ ]952-53-.

_ 1953-54

_ Oats: 1951-5L

_ 1952-53

_ 1953-54

_ Corn: 195HiL

_ 1952-53

_ 1953-54

_

Total of all 5 grains from European Soviet bloc: 1951-52 2,924,495 1952-53 2,874,944 1953-54

.. 1,255.636

I Czechoslovakia.



### Coal from Poland is another Soviet-bloc export of traditional importance. It too has been declining as an export to the free world. Most of this drop occurred before 1D54. There Was no sign of revival in that year. Some of the satellites were having difficulties in coal output.· The reduced exports were apparently due to both declining output and to the increase in coal requirements within Poland and in other Soviet-bloc countries. Petroleum from the U. S. S. R. and Rumania appears to have replaced grain as the No.1 export of the European Soviet bloc to the free world in 1954. The two commodities are fairly close in total value, and petroleum seems, temporarily at least, to be on the way up. In quantity, the petroleum exports from the Soviet Union and Rumania amounted to 4.5 million tons in 1954, compared with 1.7 million tons the year before. New purchasers were found, for the first time in

some cases, in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Argentina, India, and Turkey. Most of the exports, however, went to Western Europe, and made up about 5 percent of its total petroleum consumption. For certain countries the percentage was higher; the marketing arrangements which had been set up in Finland and Iceland in 1953, devel.oped in 1954 to the point where the U. S. S. R. was supplying almost all the oil imports of these countries.



## Risks in Reliance
The situation just mentioned concerning oil is not unique. There

are other cases in which the U. S. S. R. has become the major supplier



## 23

### or purchaser for a given commodity in the foreign trade of a given free-world country. This is more often true in regard to Soviet purchases than sales. For example, in 1954 the U. S. S. R. bought 43 percent of Argentina's linseed oil exports and 27 percent of her exports of butter; 23 percent of Iceland's fish exports; and during the first half of 1954, 50 percent of Uruguay's meat exports.

1Vhen, as between two free-world countries, it is said that one of them takes a certain percentage of another's exports or supplies a certain percentage of its imports, this means that the numerous separate transactions of various private (and often highly competitive) individual buyers and sellers have been added together to compute the totals flowing in commerce across the national boundaries. But when we speak of the transactions between a free-world country and a Communist-ruled country, it is a different matter. On the Communist side, the trade statistics represent the purchases· or sales of a single large buyer or seller, the state Ministry of Trade. This single trader-the government-therefore has a considerable influence on trade patterns. When it changes its sales or purchase plans, either calculatedly or through the pressure of new economic conditions at home, the change can have a sharp impact. Sometimes the U. S. S. R.'s sudden exits and entrances have created quite a stir in free-world markets. For example, the sudden re-emergence of the U. S.· S. R. on manganese markets in late;1953 and 1954 was possibly

one of the various factors disrupting and depressing India's foreign markets for manganese in 1954.

When the U. S. S. R. or another Soviet-bloc country becomes a very large or sole supplier to a free-world nation, its withdrawal can result in serious problems. And the mere threat of withdrawal can generate pressures which can be exploited politically. For many countries, all of this is more of a potential problem hovering in the background of East-vVest trade than a current danger. It is, at present, just one of the difficulties of trading with the Soviet bloc. These difficulties are described in some detail in chapter IV.



## 24

## CHAPTER III



# The Voices of Moscow

"The practical task 

### 0/ Communist policy is to incite one against the other 

# * * *. We Communists must use one country against another." -Lenin, 1920.

.


### In the tumultuous three decades since the death of Lenin, nations seeking peace and friendly relations across all borders have been frequently subjected to this Communist tactic of "one country against another." One of the fields in which the tactic has been employed over and over is that of East-West trade.

The Soviet bloc's long-term objectives in its economic relations with the free world may be summarized as follows: 1. 

### To drive wedges among free-world nations at every opportunity. 2. To supply their own economy, especially the industrialmilitary base, with imports which help the bloc become more powerful and less dependent on the free world. 3. To increase the reliance of free-world nations on the bloc for markets or supplies, and thus make those nations more vulnerable to bloc pressures. 

## An analysis of the East-West trade propaganda with which Moscow supports its objectives. shows the recurrence of the following themes:

• That Soviet-bloc countries are always interested in the expansion of world trade, and that they conduct trade without restrictions or prohibitions and without interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

• That trade equals peace; peace equals trade.

• That the Soviet bloc offers vast, stable crisis-free markets; that· economic crisis exists or is imminent in the free world-and that trade with the bloc is the means of achieving economic stability.

• That trade with the Soviet bloc helps non-industrial countries develop their economies, and this trade should be substituted for economic relations with the United States and ",Vestern Europe.

• That free-world strategic trade controls prevent the expansion of East-West trade and are responsible for its low level, and that the
program is not multilateral but is imposed by the United States.



## 25

### • That "other" tree-world countries have more liberal dealings with the bloc and are taking steps to expand trade, while "your country is being left behind."



## Around and Around

By these propaganda lines, Moscow seeks to accomplish many goals within its long-term objectives. One of these is to rouse merchants in each free-world trading nation against the strategic trade controls of their government. By telling merchants**~n** 

### each country that "other" countries are profiting enormously through East-West trade, the Communists aim
not only to stir up bad feeling and weaken free-world unity-in accordance with Lenin's instruction to "incite one against the other"- but also to achieve certain. economic goals. They are trying to get strategic goods. They are also trying to improve the terms on which they buy goods. The idea is to foster rivalry among free-world businessmen, so that they will grant them credits, lower their prices,

or make other concessions in the hope of snaring the business.

Many of the things that the Communist propagandists say in one country would not bear repeating in another. Much of the propaganda is tailored for an

. audience in 

## a specific notion and is not exportable beyond its borders. For example, on October 14, 1954, Radio Moscow announced in

a broadcast to vVest Germany: "Profitable trade with the East has ·had to cease 

# * * *

.. vVest Germany's traditional trade with the East is dead 

# * * 

# *. In no ,other European country have United States authorities been able'to restrict the trade with the East."

At the same time the Communists were saying something different in the United IGngdom. There, they tried to convey the idea that British traders are being outdistanced by the West Germans in the

race for rich markets behind the Curtain. For example, on March 1, 1955,. Radio Moscow said in a broadcast to the U. K. that the Western strategic trade controls were causing "greater competition for the world market," and as a result, "Britain is being forced to cede her position to vVest Germany 

## * * *." (The British are warned about the Japanese too, and, of course, the Japanese are

. warned about the British.) The Communist line in West Germany would also have sounded strange to someone in Denmark who happened to pick up a copy of the Danish Communist newspaper, 

### Land og Folk. On January 9, 1955, this paper declared that Germany's trade with the East was causing the port of Copenhagen to be outdistanced by West Germany's port of Hamburg. For this, 

### Land og Folk blamed Denmark's adherences to the free-world controls over strategic materials. The Communist newspaper said that in vVest Germany the controls were "apparently not taken so seriously."


## 26

### ltalians are told that they are the last to take steps to Increase their trade with the Soviet bloc. The Italian Communist newspaper l' U 

## nita, in a typical article in June 1954, repeated a Communist charge that West Germany had exported Italian sulfur to Rumania. The article said that "after all, many other capitalist countries, first of all Great Britain, are deriving great benefit from the expansion of their trade 

# * * *. Why should we not follow these**examples~"**



### When a Soviet-bloc country entertains a trade mission from a freeworld country, or signs a trade agreement with it, Communist propagandists in other free-world countries try to spread the news-and rub it in. After a group, of private British businessmen visited Moscow in February 1954, West Germans were told that "England, the home. of many discoveries in the past, has especially distinguished herself 

# * * 

# *. The emissaries of the city of London set sail for Moscow
to return with orders' worth 20 million pounds." (The same broadcast, in March 1954, announced that a "sensational piece of news" had just been received from America. Actually the "news" was a relatively moderate fluctuation in steel production, but the announcer said: "The economic crisis which has been looming for so long has arrived and it is gathering momentum like an avalanche, carrying with it and destroying everything in its path. The masters of Wall Street stand helpless by the sickbed of the capitalist economy.")

A typical illustration of how the propagandists report the signing of trade agreements was the Moscow broadcast to Italy on March 1,



### . 1954, picturing greater East- West trade as one of the remedies for Italy's economic difficulties and saying: "Numerous countries have accepted this Soviet proposal, and trade agreements have been concluded with France, Argentina, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Iran and others."

In Austria, the Vienna Communist daily paper opened an article entitled "East-West Trade-Big Business for the West" by demanding: "Does the government intend to wait until the others have got ahead of**us~"** 

### This article highlighted West Germany's trading activities with the Soviet bloc. Back in West Germany, a Communist broadcast announced that "negotiations have been going on successfully in Moscow recently with the representatives of English and French business circles."

And in France, businessmen were told that other countries were lea ving the French behind. In the Persian language there are broadcasts calling attention to Ceylon's trade with Communist China. Broadcasts are beamed to Latin American countries painting a bright picture of Argentina's trade agreement with Soviet Russia. And thus it goes, around and around, different words but fundamentally the same tune in every place.

27

# CHAPTER IV



# Problems 

# in, East-West Trading

Western merchants can do business with Soviet-bloc countries. They can successfully carryon trade with Oommunist governments, find many of them would like to carry on more than they do-that is, in the types of goods which would not contribute directly to military
power. But business with Communist governments is not conuucted in the manner that is normal between free-world commercial enterprises. It is different in many ways, and the merchants soon learn what the differences are. Some of them even learn the hard way. They can gain nothing by ignoring the special problems they must face. One of the prominent features of the year 1954 

### was a noticeable increase in public recognition of those special problems. The press of 'Vestern Europe contained many articles pointing out the difficulties of trading with the Soviet ·bloc. Representatives of almost every \Vestern European government, even while seeking peaceful EastWest trade, spoke out plainly concerning various obstacles that the Soviet bloc places in the way of normal trade. At the trade consultations' sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in April 1954, 

### Western trade experts repeatedly mentioned the failures of Soviet-bloc countries to send them the amount of goods they desired at a price and quality they could accept.

This growing disposition to deplore the difficulties did not, of oourse, lead the West to drop its interest in such markets and supplies as may be had in Eastern Europe. But it did have the effect of further deflating the Communist-promoted myth that beyond the Iron Curtain there exists a vast potential of reliable, profitable, and satisfying commerce which remains untapped only because of the free world's selective controls over strategic exports. Despite the continued efforts of Communist propagandists (discussed in Chapter III), this old myth gives way increasingly to an awareness that the chief obstacles to a large-scale expansion of East- "'Vest trade are inherent in the Soviet economic structure and policies.

A good many of the special problems facing East-West traders stem from the nature of the Soviet-type economy and the fact that the trading system is a 100- 

### percent. state monopoly.1

1 "How the Kremlin Controls Trade" was described in East-West Trade Trends, the fourth MDAC report (May 1954), pp. 6-7. 

## 29

## Lack of Reciprocity

The Soviet system in its dealings with the free world is characterized by a lack of reciprocity. A Soviet-bloc country seeks privileges that it will not accord to other peoples and governments. For example, it does not allow the businessmen and traders of free-world nations to live on its territory, either to establish and keep up contacts with prospective buyers or to keep an eye on localoonditions in order to see what goods they might buy. But the Communist government maintains trading staffs in all free-world countries where it has a trading interest. Recently, the U. S. S.R. has been entertaining private trade missions from time to time for specific purposes, but they are still carefully screened by the Soviet Government. The businessman, in dealing with Soviet-bloc governments, is still prevented from following his· normal practice of working through an office or agent on the spot, and hopping a plane whenever he wants to talk over a deal with the customers or suppliers.



## Veil of Secrecy

This exclusiveness is a part of the· veil of secrecy that surrounds Soviet Communist activities. Economic developments in Soviet-bloc markets are guarded like military secrets. Discussion of markets and prospects, except by accredited high officials, is prohibited by law. Soviet-bloc governments do not follow practices common in other trading nations of publishing data on trade opportunities within the country for the guidance of the foreign businessman. Nor do they provide information on the results of their foreign trade transactions. One motive for this may be the advantage of inaucing traders-armed only with hearsay and not facts-to. outbid each other into terms favorable to the Soviet-bloc government. In the regular trade bulletins of the UN Statistical Office, one can find summaries of the official trade returns of 58 countries, but not the U. S. S. R. and its satellites. In the 

## fali of 1954 the 

## U. S. S. R; slightly modified· its
secrecy policy.by furnishing figures ·to the ECE on its trade with 1Vestern Europe. This was thefirst time any such disclosures have been made since 1937. The figures have, of course, been derived all along from the published statistics of Western European countries, but t,he Soviet action was encouraging, and free-world countries can hope that it was an initial step that will be followed by other similar
movements toward relaxation.



## Discrimination Under Cover

The Soviet Government has ·often said it has no export control laws. True, there are no publishQd rules and regulations. These are unnecessary because all trade is conducted by the government. The



## 30

### plans drawn up periodically by the government simply omit any items-and there are many more than in the West-that it does not wish to offer in any particular markets. To make quick changes, a secret directive circulated among the bureaucracy will" suffice. Thus,

even in the face of existing formal trade agreements or contracts to deliver, Soviet-bloc goods can be and are effectively withheld from a trade partner without any public announcement.

As the one buyer or seller for the entire U. S. S. R., the Soviet Ministry of Trade is in a pmverful position to discriminate against trade partners who are in disfavor for one reason or another. It can easily manipulate the price asked or offered in a manner to discourage any purchase or sale in which the Soviet Government has lost interest.



## Price**~anipulation**



### A state-controlled economy, in its monopolistic trading- operations, is not closely governed by such considerations as costs of production and domestic price levels. The sale of some of ifs goods abroad below
cost is not economically fatal to such an enterprise. M:oreover, such sales are common since the. primary purpose is not to make a profit

on an individual export transaction, but rather to earn purchasing power for the procurement of specified products from abroad, or to acquire political gain.

When the Soviet bloc buys goods in the free world, the purchase cost does not determine the prices at which these goods are offered in the Iron Curtain markets. It is estimated that the butter which the U. S. S. R. buys in the world market for 45 cents a pound is sold for the equivalent (at official exchange rates) of $3 a pound in the state stores. Similarly, oranges are imported at 2lh cents apiece and sold fit 

### $1.25; the people pay $1 a pound for sugar which the government bought at 3 to 4 cents a pound.



## Communist Preoccupations

The preoccupation of the Communists in drawing the Soviet-bloc countries ever closer together and in forcing industrialization upon them is familiar. How this affects trade has been discussed previously. The fluctuation in grain exports described in Chapter III 

### is a good

- exmnple. The Soviet-bloc governments are not shy in admit7" ting the preferences that are accorded to intra-bloc trade. And intrabloc trade has grown enormously at the expense of East- 'Vest trade. The U. S. S. R. conducts over 80 percent of its trade with countries inside its own orbit.

.

Behind all this is the Soviet Communist drive to 

### become independent economically and politically from any non-Communist influences-not necessarily to exclude trade but to put it on their own terms. And this preoccupation provides real problems for any outsider trying



## 31

### to develop a permanent market pattern with the Communist countries. It has helped create the reputation acquired in trade circles that the U. S. S. R. is "the one-time buyer."



## One-Time Buyer

The President of the Federation of British Industries recently ex-' pressed the attitude of many free-world businessmen on the problem of**(1f~aling** 

### with the Soviet monopolies:

Few, if any, of us would put down an expensive new plant or building to cater for trade with countries where initial orders may never be repeated regardless of the price, regardless of the value we may offer but simply on political grounds. 

### The reasons for not repeating an. order may be either economic or political, but the problem is the same for free-world industrialists. Soviet interest in importation of machinery is keen. But a good deal.of it is not a continuing business. The free-world exporter has

no way of checking the Soviet market to see if his sale is one of the frequent ones which the Soviets have no intention of repeating. Some foreign machines are imported just to be copied. They are sent to research institutes where they are carefully studied and copies turned out to enlarge the domestic supply and reduce the need to depend on foreigners for such machines. The Soviet governments do
not honor international patents. In a very real sense, the research institutes serve in part as a substitute for normal foreign trade ties. The foreign businessman engaging in trade with the Soviet Government has found it impossible to plan or maintain a durable commercial relationship by standing ready to fill its needs for the type of merchandise he is especially competent to supply.

For example, in the late 1920's 

### American manufacturers put a good deal of resources and sales efforts into providing high-grade products and building goodwill among Soviet purchasers of their tractors and other agricultural equipment. The effort did not payoff. After 1931, 

### the Soviet Government struck farm machinery from its import list, and the expenditure of foreign exchange on this product came to

a sudden halt. From $41,902,000 

### in 1930 

### and $37,887,000 

### in 1931, 

### United States exports of farm machinery to the U. S. S. R. dropped
to $119,000 

### and $109,000 

### and $12,000, 

### respectively, in 1932, 1933, 

### and 1934.


## Ups and Downs In, normal commerce between pairs of countries, it is not unusual to

see fluctuatiop.s in trade levels from year to year because of changes in the availability or prices of the goods. However, the swift and erratic swings of the pendulum that mark the commerce of the U. S. S. R.

are somewhat different. They cannot be predicted on the basis of



## 32

### the commercial considerations which traders can observe and understand. A new decision, handed down by the Communist Party, can create a sudden spurt in demand for new products on a foreign market-or it can disrupt an established set of export-import arrangements between free-world suppliers with equal suddenness. All too often the Soviet-bloc governments appear and reappear in individual markets either as buyer or seller with no apparent economic reason for their behavior. For example, the Soviet Government withdrew from Iceland's foreign markets in 1947. Total trade dropped from $9.7 million in 1947 to $2 million in 1949. The U. S. S. R. stayed out of Iceland's markets until 1953. In the latter year, however, official Soviet policy called for a display of concern for the Soviet consumer and a display of a new interest in the trade of selected countries; apparently Iceland qualified as a country of current importance to the interests of the U.S.S.R.

The U. S. S. R., always a sporadic buyer of Australian wool, once again entered the Australian wool market in May 1953, after an absence of about 2lh years. Soviet bidding was characterized by bids well above the customary prices and also above the limits which Australia's traditional customers could offer, thus disturbing the market. The volume of total U. S. S. R. imports from Australia, as well, has fluctuated sharply from about $0.7 million in 1947 up to $31 million in 1949, dropping to $25,000 in 1952 and rising again to $31 million for the first 10 months of 1954. In Mexico, the Soviet Union made its appearance some years ago

as a sizeable buyer of a fiber called henequen. In 1948, Mexican exports of henequen to the Soviet Union amounted to $10 million. In 1949 they declined by half, and then they disappeared altogether.

In July 1954 the Soviet Government broke up negotiations for a trade agreement with Denmark by**i~** 

### insistence that the Danish Government reverse its previous decision· and commit itself to build two tankers for delivery to the U. S. S. R. The Danish Government characterized the Soviet ultimatum as politically motivated.

There are other examples of these ups and downs in selected countries. Some abrupt changes, like the Soviet bloc's cutting off trade with Yugoslavia, were done for admitted political reasons. Others remain unexplained.


## Uncertainty After the Deal

The last year has brought forth several widely publicized examples of the uncertainties of trading with the Soviet bloc. Beginning around March 1955, there were a number of newspaper despatches which reported that the Soviet Union had cancelled some of the orders previously placed in free-world countries. Later re

## 33

### ports indicated that some of these orders were reinstated afterwards. During recent postwar years, Finnish manufacturers of prefabricated housing expanded their capacity in order to take care of**th~** 

### Soviet demand for the product. One of the reasons for the industry's optimistic planning was the 5-year trade agreement between Russia and Finland**ir~** 

### which the former committed itself to import an

a verage of 600,000 square meters of housing from Finland annually during 1950-55. Soviet negotiators, however, in January 1955, reduced the' 1955 quota of purchases to 250,000 square meters

as compared with the 1954 quota of 750,000 square meters and 900,000 square meters each during 1952 and 1953. This leaves the future ,of this important Finnish export commodity in a condition of uncertainty.



## Questions of Quality

One of the biggest problems in East-vVest trade has been the poor quality of many Soviet-bloc products. The free world's complaints

are confirmed in the words of the Communists themselves. Both in the U. S. S. R. and the satellites, high officials have urged better quality and have been critical of shoddy goods. These admissions, of course, were made only in the home audiences. The case of the East German tnicks is an interesting one. In the
courts of one of the Western nations in July 1954, two'representatives of an East German automotive monopoly were summoned to answer complaints of the 'Vestern purchasers. These buyers demanded that the contract to buy lhevehicles be legally canceled because of their defective quality. Following is a passage from the complaint to the
court:

The truck was in use from 13 February to 2 April 1954, when the gear box broke and as no replacement parts were available, the purchasers have not since been able to use the truck. Three days after the truck

was purchased the relay was broken and the charge warning light showed whatever it pleased. 'The relay caught fire and threatened to set the whole truck afire. The relay was replaced but then the dynamo burned. The steering mechanism was broken a little later. The gear box was broken the first time., The gauges ceased working; the lights worked badly. The tires fell apart since they were made of old, probably wartime tires, by recapping. The handbrake broke. .' Both windshield wiper motors burned out. From one side' all the wheel bolts broke off and the overload spring brackets broke one after the other. The chassis of the truck was bent badly. On the third working, day the dumping equipment became unoperational. The capacity of the load-platform

was 28 percent smaller than advertised. 

### No one would suppose that all Soviet-bloc exports are that bad. But unfortunately, free-world buyers of Soviet and satellite products all
too often have trouble getting their money's worth-and this applies
to many kinds of goods.



## 34

### The complaints over the defective trucks were probably no surprise
to the East German authorities. A month earlier, a more succinct description of the problem-a little understated-had appeared in their periodical Kl'aftfah1'2eng Technik: 

### "It is common knowledge that some of our bicycle, motorcycle, and car models no longer reach international technical standards."



## 35

# CHAPTER 

# V

Economic Co1;ltses in Eastern Europe

What has been going on behind the Curtain which may have a bearing on East- vVest trade?

. Official statements appear from time to time within the Soviet bloc. Some of these have been reports on the growth of production; others have-urged greater efforts in selected portions 

## of the economy. The facts given the outside world by which these statements could be judged are extremely scarce. vVhat does come out is frequently in confusing or misleading' form. After Stalin died in March 1953, 

### there was a series of offiCial statements which were widely interpreted to 

### indicate a "softer" policy. Internally, the Soviet regime announced a new course. Much was said in official speeches and in the Soviet press about concern for the

consumer. Externally, a desire, to build up more friendly relations with the "capitalist" world seemed to be displayed,although hostile words and actions were mingled with the conciliatory gestures. The European satellite countries followed the lead of the U. S. S. R., and sometimes appeared to outdo the J{remlin with "new courses" in their

own economies. These events of 1953 

### and early 1954, 

### as well as the Soviet economic developments 6f the preceding decades, were described in the fourth MDAC report, 

## East-West Trade Trends, issued a year ago. It was

. pointed out there**(p~** 

### 17) that the Soviet-bloc' rulers had "made a great fanfare about supplying more consumer goods to their people without basically changing their war-oriented economy." Recently there have been new events in the U. S. S. R. which have fascinated the world. Early in 1955, 

### Malenkov resigned as Premier, confessing incompetence in the pursuit of an improved agricultural program. ' During the same general period, both before and after the Malenkov resignation, the official propaganda about heavy industry became more noticeable, and certain Soviet economists who had written about an increase in consumer goods were rebuked. Echoes again were heard in the European satellites. And because the gestures toward the consumer had coincided with the time .when Malenkov was the Soviet Premier, some observers in speculating about the 1955 

### events tended

343001°-55--4 

## 37

### to identily Malenkov personally with a so-called "soft" policy and to identify his successors with a "return" to' the "hard" Stalin policy of concentrating upon heavy industry. It is not our purpose here to present an analysis of the power struggle in the Kremlin. But inasmuch as the policies of rapid heavy industrialization were never basically overruled, it would certainly be risky to identify any individuals-whether they be Malenkov, Bulganin, or I(hrushchev-with either an overruling or a "return." In. trying to interpret the different statements made from time to time by the Soviet leaders, it is important to remember that official pronouncements of all types, and this includes the outpl.lt of the stateowned press and radio, are part of a carefully prepared propaganda "line." This does not mean that everything one hears is untrue. Official statements may or may not. be genuine expositions of a policy which will actually be carried out. But they are sure to be part of. a campaign to manipulate public opinion for purposes which will not be openly expressed. A '5hift in the "line" is a new tactical maneuver. 1Vith this in mind, let us examine some of'the actions that have been taken in the' economies of the Soviet-bloc countries while all the talk

was gomg on. It will be found that more remained the same throughout the 1953- 55 period than was changed. It will also be found that conditions in the satellites were quite different from those iIi the U. S. S. R., despite the similarity in speeches. The conditions were different to start with, different actions were taken, and different results followed.



## Inside the U. S. S. R.
By the time Stalin died in lV53, 

### the output of steel, coal, cement, machinery, and so on, was well above 1940 levels. In the early postwar years the rates of growth had been rapid, in part because they largely represented restoration of facilities damaged during the war. These high rates were not sustained; in fact, since 1950 the 

### rates of increase have been declining. By 1953 it 'was clear that some of the goals set for 1955 in the fifth 5-year plan would not be fulfilled.

,. Most significant was the lag in the productivity of labor. 'rhis meant that in order to attain 1955 production targets, more labor would be needed in indllstry than could well be spared from other sectors, unless the system could be made more productive.

The greatest difficulties, however, were in agriculture. A considerable setback had occurred during the war. The total crop acreage and the number of livestock were-not restored to the prewar (1940) levels· until1951. And even then, the yields per unit of land and per,animal

were so low that agricultural 

### output did not approximate prewar out

## 38

### put until 1952. Then in 1953 it slipped back again below the prewar level.

In the meantime, the population haa grown considerably. Neither food supplies nor housing had kept pace with**thi~** 

### growth. Light industry (such as textiles, clothing, and food processing) had been neglected by comparison with heavy industry, and retail trade was highly inefficient. All of this meant that despite the progress in heavy industry, and despite the new importance of their country in world affairs, the people of the Soviet Union were probably worse off as consumers, especially for food supplies, than they had been in the late 1930's, which had been- no bed of roses.

The low level of consumption and the unsatisfactory productivity of labor in both industry and agriculture are connected with one another. The Soviet rulers are eager to stimulate their people to work harder by means of the old capitalist incentives such as piece
rates "and bonuses. But why should a man break his back to make a little more money when there is hardly anything he can buy with it These problems had been recognized and studied before Stalin died. There are indirect references in his last major statement on economic policy to some. of the reforms which "appeared in 1953 and 1954." Undoubtedly his death had some effect on the timing and extent of their introduction. But the 1953 shift in the propaganda line which

was intended to show a new concern for the consumer exaggerated the differences between pre-Stalin and. post-Stalin economic policies in practice. Basic objectives of the regime remained unchanged, and

even the means of attaining them were not as radically altered as -they

were made to appear.

.

In August 1953, Malenkov spoke in general terms of improved consumerprospects, but Iiothing specific was promised until late October. From then on, a series of high-level decrees raised the 1955 targets**fo~** 

### retail trade, for the food industry, and for other light industry, describing these planned goals in much more detail than earlier announcements. The descriptions were mouth-watering, but the changes in output actually were moderate inmost cases

.. The whole effect was presented as a 2-to-a-year push, which apparently was to taper off in 1956. Other decrees were aimed at the**rejuvena~ion** 

### of agriculture. Increased incentiv.es were offered to farmers to produce more, both in their collective farm work and on their own private plots. Some reforms were also made 

## iIi the organization of Soviet farming.**Ho,,~** 

### was all this to be achieved Partly by an increase in the government's investment in agriculture and light industry, partly by reforms in the Ministry of Trade, and more fundamentally, by a hoped-for increase in the productivity of the economy as a whole; The government seemed to. hope this last could be accomplished by a series

39

### , of measures designed to increase the**efficien~y** 

### of management in industry. The high degree of centralization had bound the manager's
up in a' good deal of red tape and restrictions, and the regime apparently believed that a certain degree of decentralization might free the plants for more efficient work. Higher productivity in agriculture was to be stimulated by lowering the high taxes and by raising the low· prices of farm products.

. It is important to note that no cutbacks in planned output for heavy**indu~try** 

### were**evermentiom~d** 

### in the U.S.S. R., although the satellite· governments did mention such cutbacks. Throughout the year, statements reminding listeners of the importance of heavy industry were included in all major Soviet speeches

on the economy, including Malenkov'sown 'speech of August 1953.

Actual performance in 1953 showed only one change from trends prevailing until then.. Retail trade moved up fast at the end of the year.' ,.Since there had been no corresponding increase in output, this increase**i~** 

### trade resulted from selling off accumulated inventories ,at reduced prices, a sort· of Communist "fire sale." Farm output in 1953 showed no improvement-in fact it worsenedand the increase in industrial output was less than in 1952.

In 1954; however,. over-all industrial output increased at a slightly higher rate than before. Retail trade did not ; apparently the "fire sale'; was a one-shot affair. Agriculture still lagged badly, although**o~tputwa~** 

### larger than in 1953. Investment in light industry during 1954 was raised, but remained a very small fraction of the total. ,There w'asincreased output in both heavy and light industry. If .anything, this increase was larger in heavy industry than in light. In short, the regim,e got,what it wanted most-some increased productivitywhile the average consumer got very little more than before. In 1955, attempts to revive agriculture continued; budget allocations in agriculture increased. The decentralization measures introduced in 1954 remained in effect. In late 1954 some Soviet spokesmen
went back to talking more insistently about heavy industry and less about the consumer. The 1955 budget showed an increase in the allocations to heavy industry and a cut in light industry. But these changes should not be**overemph~sized,** 

### since it must' be remembered that the Soviet Communists never actually sacrificed heavy industry

or went all-out for the consumer.



## Inside· the. European Satellites

The shifts. in the pro,paganda line wi'thin the European satellites

were similar to those in theU. S. S. R. This applies both to 1953 and early 1955.

. . But the circumstances were**different~** 

### The satellite countries were relatively new to Communism. They were only in. the early stages of



## 40

### transition from a free-world type of consumer economy to a Soviettype of war economy

.. The satellites showed greater signs of maladjustments before 1953 than were found in the economy of the U. S. S.R. J 

### n a very general sense they were suffering from the same diseases

as the U. S. S. R. in 1953, with rates of increase in industrial production falling and with agriculture stagnating. But the ailments were much worse in the satellites. The actions taken in the satellites under the 1953 "new courses" were much more sweeping. They were even less successful.

Ambitious long-term industrialization plans had been started in these· Eastern European countries around 1950. These were stepped
up to· very high levels during the Korean War. Signs of· economic strain became quite noticeable in'1952, and .the situation grew worse in 1953. By then it became clear that many of the targets for industrial growth could not possibly be achieved in 1954. So a large element in the "new course" introduced in 1953 was a reduction in these targets for 1954 to levels which were more likely to be obtained in

. practice. Rather than admit .failure, it was possible for satellite

leaders to speak of a reorientation of the economy to help· consumers. (In some cases failures were acknowledged.)

The graph below**·(Fig~re** 

### V) shows the extent to which the original plans for 1954, already the most modest since the adoption of Soviet3tyle planning in these countries, had to be modified at midyear be- ('ause of the failures in the early months.

If Soviet agriculture was sick, the crisis in satellite agriculture was

even more acute. The Communists were uprooting the traditional forms 

# of farm production and substituting Communist collectivization. But collectivization was progressing slowly. The collective farms have not proved to be efficient organizations,

even in the U. S. S. R. But there, at least, the farmers have had 20
years of experience with them. They passed through a period in the early 1930's when almost the entire farm-owning ,population in the 1J. S. S. R. lost their farms in one swoop and either had 

## to join a collective farm or work at forced labor. Herds were slaughtered, farm production fell sharply, and many people starved.

The satellite states, though pressing hard to resha,pe agriculture into Communist patterns, shied away from this extreme and tried to collectivize more gradually. The result has been a state of confusion and uncertainty all around: The private farmers ·had no incentive 

## to work hard when their success would only make them better targets Tor persecution and expropriation, and the minority who were already collectivized felt put upon and had little incentive. to labor for the
state. Consequently, agriculture in the satellites has fallen off badly.

Under the "new courses" satellite agriculture received more attention from Communist rulers, as it did in the U. S. 

## S. R. Investment



## 41FIGUREVANNOUNCEDRATESOFSATELLITEINDUSTRIALGROWTHA3Or--------------------------------------.30NPercentofIncreaseOverPreviousYear1---45:----115--..........oj20'52'53\.!54.J'52'53 '54BULGARIAALBANIARUMANIA'52'53'54o1952'53'-'54.J'52'53\,.'54-''52'53'-'54.J'52'53\..!54.JEASTGERMANYPOLANDCZECHOSLOVAKIAHUNGARY1520....-------•OriginalPlan(1954)RevisedPlan(1954)seenote*-----------------------------125NOTE:FiguresforOriginalPlan1954,asreportedinSovietannouncements;figuresfor1954RevisedPlancalculatedonthebasisofactualincreaseandreportedpercentofplanfulfillment.•*NeitllerRumanianorAlbaniaannounceditsOriginalPlanfor1954.'l'husitisnotImownifthe1951figuresrepresenttheOriginalPlanorarevision.

### was increased and concessions of various kinds were made to the farmers, even including for some countries the permission to leave collecti ve farms under certain conditions.
In many of the Eastern Euro,pean countries, consumptioll and living standards which had been higher than in the U. S. S. R. began
to fall as soon as Sovietization plans were imposed, and were falling lower each year. This had, a special impact on peoples who had known something better and who had had Communism thrust down their throats so recently.

These conditions in industry and agriculture varied somewhat as between satellite countries, and so did the remedies which were applied. Hungary represents one extreme, in that industrial failures and agricultural resistance were' probably the greatest. The' adoption of "new course" measures in 1953 was earliest and most extensive in Hungary, and furthermore Hungary was the only country where official repudiation was made in 1955. Poland is probably the best example of the other extreme..,-that is, most like the U. S. S. R.-in having the slowest and least change, first one way and'then the other. '\Ve shall examine the events in IIungary in some detail, because they bring out most clearly the problems of the last 2 years. But it must not be thought that Hungary's experience was unique in kind; most of what happened there was also happening in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and to a lesser degree in the other countries as well.



## Hungary and the «New Course"

In July 1953,' Prime Minister Imre Nagy and other Communist leaders stepped forth with sweeping proposals for reform of**th~** 

### Hungarian' economy. They said that previous programs for industrialization had been too ambitious, that Hungary should devote more of its efforts to agriculture and should import products of heavy industry from other Soviet-bloc countries better equigped to produce them.

In line with this thinking, the emphasis on heavy-industry targets

was lessened, and some'projects on which construction had begun were abandoned outright. In an effort to encourage the farmer, the· government reduced his taxes and his compulsory deliveries to the state, raised the prices of farm goods, and gave permission to individuals to lea ve collective farms. This last was the most extreme change.

From then on, there was a good deal of confusion

.. Old-line Communists in the IIungarian Party didn't like these new-fangled ideas, and forced some back-tracking. At the same time, thedOlninant group under Nagy was still pushing its program, and they blamed all economic failures on the "left deviationism" of those who could not appreciate the merits of the new policy.**~fany** 

### of the planned goals



## 43

### were revised again in 1954. New farm decrees were issued, often contradicting the effect of the decrees that had come before

..

The farmers' reaction was interesting. About half of the collective farm members pulled out and returned to private farming,even though they had to do so under more and more unfavorable conditions

.

. :Farmers who were forgiven their· past failures to pay taxes or make compulsory deliveries went on to further delinquencies, feeling that if they could get away with it once, they had the government on the run and could do it again.

Labor discipline in the factories <.llso deteriorated. The usual goal is not only to increase. production but also to increase it by a larger
amount each year. Total production in 1954, however, increased much less than its already modest plan. According to government announcements, production in heavy industry even dropped by 3.1 percent. At the same time, the government's bill for wages zoomed, partly as a result of unauthorized wage increases made by factory
managers in efforts to make their quotas. Lower productivity plus higher wage cost equals gross inefficiency

.

. The 1954 output of coal, needed to keep other industries running, fell short of plan by 650,000 tons, even though more labor was forced into the pits

.. Output**~f electric~power**  

### apparently rose only 5 percent in 1953, as compared with 10 percent as originally planned. It

was anounced that steel output (given only for open-hearth steel, but this is the bulk of Hungary's steel output) fell 4.1 percent below 1953, which means that production was 12 percent below plan. Light industry reportedly increased production about 10 percent, but the increase was less than in any year since 1950. Harvests of wheat and
rye, the largest Hungarian crops, decreased; acreage was said to be 6.9 percent larger than in 1953, but the yield per acre was said to have been 22 percent lower. Poor weather and the Danube flood were partly responsible for this last failure. But in addition there were collection failures in almost all crops.

And what of the consumer who was supposed to benefit from the "new**cour~e"?** 

### Manufactured consumer' goods increased, but not as much as planned.

. Retail sales increased, but the largest percentnges of increase were found among items such as butter, candy, radio sets, and bicycles. Such goods are beyond the reach of most of the population. The supply of bread was even more meager than before. Housing was extremely short ;by October 1 only 13,000 of the 40,000

new dwellings planned for the year had been completed. These are all quantity figures; it is impossible to describe in general terms all the complaints about quality which appeared in the
papers. (The papers do print criticisms of specific shortcomings but

never any general criticism of the government.)



## 44

### To put it bluntly, the "new course" in 'Hungary had fallen on its face. Instead of solving old problems it created a lot of new ones and left the old ones about where they were before. And in the first week of March 1955, Premier Nagy also fell. The Central Committee of the Hungarian vVorkers (Communist) Party denounced him as a "rightist deviationist" who had undermined the

. economy. The Central Committee stated in confused terms its intentionof restoring the top priority of heavy industry. The switch'

was not complete; it was still claimed that the pre-1953 pace of industrIalization was exaggerated, and that the June 1953 decisions were right but had been incorrectly applied. The Central Committee reports indicated a crackdown on workers and farmers, the latter through a renewal of the collectivization drive and a return to harsher collection policies. The committee also proposed an increase of 5.7 percent in indllstrialoutput in 1955. This is apparently no more t11an

a return to their original schedules for 1954 and 1955.



## 4S·

# Conclusions**~10st"ofthis** 

### report has been on Soviet-bloc economic activities in the free world. The purpose is not to reveal new facts, but to summarize and hring into focus the over-all picture of what the Soviet bloc has ,been doing. The intention is to give the reader some idea of Sovietbloc operations and activities abroad and the related problems which confront the United States Government and the other governments .and businessmen of the free world. The five chapters of the report

are actually just one chapter OT the much bigger story OT relationships between the free world and the Soviet bloc. The fifth MDAC report, 

### The Revision of Strategic T1'ade Oontrols, told another part of this larger story. But even that is not the whole of it; for economic defense, including strategic trade controls, is but one aspect of the entire foreign economic policy of the United States andthe free world.

An over-all appraisal of foreign economic policy is, of course, beyond the scope of this report. Some of the most recent activities of the lJnited States in this broader field were described inthe President's 

### Report to Oongre88 on the lIfutual Semtrity Progrmn for the 6-month period ended December 31, 1954. But the broader picture must be kept.in mind 

## iT the Tacts and fictions surrounding Communist Toreign economic activity are to be seen in proper perspective. If perspective is lacking, there is apt t9- be either an exaggeration or an under-estima-

. tion 'of the problems which confront the free world in economic relations with the Soviet-bloc countries. The situation calls Tor neither undue alarm nor apathy. This government constantly studies the implications of what the Soviet bloc does in its economic relations with the free world, and takes them into full account. Following are some of the main implications and conclusions that
emerge from the developments we have described in the five chapters of

, this report:

• As we have seen, 1954 was' a year when East-vVest trade showed

a moderate increase and the trade agreement network expanded. The Soviet bloc increased its imports Taster than its exports, but the imports began to taper off in the latter part of the year. Prospects are not bright for another general increase of East..:1Vest trade in 1955. If the recent trend in Soviet-bloc ex'ports continues, the over-all level of East-West trade may even decline.

• Some of the expansion in East-West trade in 1954 came out of the sizeable increases in Soviet-bloc purchases of food. The Communist regimes had made promises to their consumers. Domestic production

### was inadequate; chronic and acute problems plagued agriculture. Though the imports of food made a certain impact in some foreign markets, they did not have any real effect on Soviet-bloc living standards.· For example, the U. S. S. R. purchases of meat---:.one of the most spectacular increases in imports-were only enough to provide a few**me~ls** 

### during the entire year if it had been distributed throughout the population. As 

## it. was, the meat went on the tables of the privileged few. In any case, consumer goods imports seemed to drop off as the
year went on, and the Soviet**consum~r** 

### is left pretty much where he was before----:-with lots of propaganda and not very much to eat or wear.

• Soviet-bloc purchases of all sorts from the free world in 1954 demonstrated the continuing primary interest of the Communist coun-

. tries in-procuring capital goods to keep ,their forced industrialization

rolling along. In order to fulfill their plans to build a merchant marine, they also kept on shopping in "Vestern shipbuilding markets for bargains in both old and new vessels.

• Moscow used various approaches to interest the underdeveloped countries in becoming "economicpartners" .of Soviet-bloc Communism. Although thf} propaganda outdistanced the actions, there was no doubt that the Soviet interest and intentions in these areas were serious. They can be expected to continue. The u'nderdeveloped countries face

a dilemma in their need for outside help.

• Free-world merchants cannot conduct business with Soviet-bloc countries in the manner that is normal between free-world commercial enterprises. One oI" the prominent features of the year 1954 was a noticeable increase in public recognition of the special problems which confront those who trade with the Soviet-bloc countries.

• An important obstacle to East- West trade is the Soviet bloc's inability to act as a reliable supplier of traditional exports, especially farm and forest products. This is illustrated by the recent rise in Soviet-bloc imports of grain, which ·has traditionally moved in the other direction. Another major difficulty in trading with the Soviet bloc is its demand for special concessions in many of its deals. These difficulties arise largely out of the nature of the Communist economic system and its forms of trading.

• In order'to obtain raw materials or as a part of their effort at economic and political penetration, the U. S. S. R. and some of the satellites may in the future sell small additional amounts of capital goods in the free world, at least as token deliveries to the underdevel-

, oped areas. However, a large increase is not likely under present

Soviet-bloc plans, and apparently could be made only at very heavy sacrifices within the European Soviet bloc and China.

.



## 48

### • Looking back at the period 1953 

### to 1955, 

### one main conclusion appears: Despite various alterations in the whole**East~** 

### 1Vest trade picture, there is more that remains the same than has changed-both internally and externally in Soviet foreign economic policy. If anything, this last year has shown more clearly that commodity exchanges entered into by the Soviet-bloc countries are invariably connected to broader government economic and political motivations in which trade is not an end in itself but a vehicle of an often aggressive total foreign policy. There is a growing appreciation of these facts in the free world.



## 49

# APPENDIX A

Trade Controls of Free- Wodd Countries



# 51

# APPENDIX A



# Trade Controls of Free-World COlll1tries

This appendix summarizes the national trade-control measures 01 

### the countries cooperating with one another in the multilateral control system. The descriptions of their controls are supplementary to information contained in the main text of the report. Descriptions of .the trade controls of other friendly countries have been contained in similar appendices to previous MDAC reports, and, since their control procedures have in most cases not undergone substantial revision, they are not repeated in this appendix.

As indicated in previous reports, much of the detailed information

on security trade controls has a security classification. Thus these descriptions must, in a public report, be presented in somewhat general
terms. In most cases, tlley concern primarily the basic export license and customs control procedures originally established for dire.cting foreign trade to particular currency areas, conserving goods in short supply, and for other economic or financial reasons. Security trade control has been generally exercised through these basic procedures, supplemented to increase its effectiveness, by import certificate-delivery verification (IC/DV) procedures, shipping controls, and recently adopted transit and transaction controls. The descriptions which follow describe the main features of these national control systems. The countries are arranged in alphabetical order.



### BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG

License Requirements

The basic legislation from which the present import-export control system in Belgium has developed was a law of June 30, 1931, modified by the law of JUly 30, 1934, which authorized in broad general terms the regulation of Belgium's foreign commerce to promote the general economic well-being of the country. The convention with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on the 23d of May 1935, amending the economic union conYentlon of 1922, established also a combined Belgo-Luxembourg Administrative Commission (the Commission Administrative Mixte Belgo-Luxembourgeoise) and in this way provided a central
agency for coordinating the import and export licensing procedures of Belgium and Luxembourg. Pursuant to the 1935 convention, when the appropriate agency of either government desires to modify or expand regulations pertaining to import and export controls, the recommendation is discussed with the appro343901 °-55--5 

## 53prlate agencies of the other government; their agreement ha Villg been reached, the new policies are communicated to the Mixed Commission which then transmits identical instructions to the Belgian Central Office of Licenses and Quotas and the Luxembourg Office of Licenses. This procedure insures close coordination of the import and export licensing operations of the two governments in order that the general economic welfare of both may best be served.

The control over exports effected by the requirement of export licenses is reinforced by special controls applied at the time of the

. actual export of the licensed merchandise. Submission to these special controls is required as a previous condition to the obtaining of certain licenses, these special a<1ditional controls being applied by reason of the special nature of the merchandise to be exported or to assure the direct delivery of the merchandise to its foreign destination.

Applicants for export licenses must make a· declaration that they are familial' with the conditions upon which licenses are issued and the regulations relative
to exchange controls, and that they accept these conditions and regulations without reserve. The applicant also acknowledges that the licenses are not transferable and that any irregularity in his application or utilization of the license subjects him to possible refusals of any new export license applications and may expose him to prosecution for a criminal offense. Exporters of products whose final destination is controlled must sign an undertaking that their exports are not to be re-exported. In such cases, the exporter renounces his right to obtain any subsequent export licenses in all cases for which nonreexport declarations are required, if the present undertaking is evaded.

Transit Controls

A royal decree of January 17, 1955, authorizes the Minister of Economic Affairs
to impose a transit licensing requirement for certain items coming from or going
to countries he may designate. A second decree of· the same date by the Minister of Economic Affairs requires the production of a Belgian transit license, or a transit authorization certificate (TAC) issued by certain countries, for the shipment through Belgium in transit of items named in the decree coming from the countries participating in the TAC scheme and destined for any of the Sovietbloc countries. Luxembourg issued similar decrees January 20 and February 1,' 1955.

Financial Controls

Prior authorization is required for all buying and selling transactions abroad by Belgian and Luxembourg residents. The exchange control is carried out by the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute.
Shipping Controls

Belgium has taken action to prevent the carrying of strategic goods in Belgian ships to Communist Chinese and North Korean destinations.



### CANADA
Authority for the control of exports in Canada is derived from the Export and Import Permits Act, an act of Parliament, which came into effect on June.1, 1954.

Permit Requirements

The Canadian approach to export control is based on two lists: (i) The Export Control List of strategic commodities for which export permits are required for practically all commercial exports to any destination, except the United States, and (ii) the Area Control List of countries, the shipment to :Which of any goods



### 54requires an export permit. The Area Contl·ol List**co~prises** all Communist countries plus Hong Kong, :Macao, and Indochina. General export permits are in effect which enable shipments of a list of nonstrategic items to Hong Kong; shipments of casual gift parcels of trivial value to Communist countries; shipments to Canadian diplomatic missions; etc.



### Transaction Controls

Under the act, Canada has also enacted a form of transaction control whereby it becomes an offense for a resident of Canada to knowingly cause or assist any shipment of strategic goods to be made from Canada, or any other place, to Communist countries.



### Transit COl1trols

New regulations were made effective January 16, 1H55, respecting transit shipments. These regulations stipulate that no person shall transship or cause or assist in the transshipment of or accept for transshipment to a country included in the Area Control List any goods included in the Export Control List, unless a transit authorization certificate covering such goods and issued by the exporting country, or by the country of residence of the exporter, has been presented to and endorsed by a Canadian collector of customs or, in the absence of such certificate, approval for the transshipment has been given by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, or by a person authorized by biIn to do so.

An export permit is required for all goods originating outside Canada when tendered for export in the same condition as when imported, without further processing 

# or manufacture in Canada. Goods in transit in bond on a through journey on a billing originating outside of Canada, clearly indicating the ultimate destination of the goods to a third country, do not require a Canadian export permit. Foreign goods passing through Canada to a third' country without a through bill of lading'require a Canadian export permit. (If such goods represent United States shipments of controlled goods passing through Canada to third countries, they must be covered by a United States export permit.) All Canadian goods having an undeclared ultimate destination require export permits. Shipments of United States goods through Canada must be accompanied by a copy of the United States export declaration form.

Export controls are administered by the Export and Import Permits Section of the Canadian Department of Trade -and Commerce.



### DENMARK

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for all commodities, except certain agricultural products, if the goods are exported to or intended for end use in countries which

are not members of the European Payments Union or are within the dollar area.

For the goods enumerated in the below-mentioned Commodity Lists A 'and B, export licenses are required, irrespective of the country of destination.

List A of the Danish export regulations consists of items of strategic signifi;.

cance. For most of these items the licensing authority is the Board 

## ot Supply, but the Ministry of Justice controls exports of arms,munitions, military equipment, and machinery for the production thereof. For the exportation of ships, the, Board of Supply must obtain prior approval from the :Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation.

List B consists of nonstrategic goods. Export licenses for these are issued by the Board of Supply, the Board' of Health, the :Ministry of Public Works, or the



## 55National Bank of Denmark according to the nature of the commodity concerned. Denmark has instituted import certificate-delivery verification procedures.
Exchange Controls

The National Bank of Denmark exercises strict controls over all transactions in foreign exchange. Earnings in foreign currencies must be repatriated and sold to the bank unless special exceptions are made.

Transit Controls

The export controls apply. to merchandIse exported from the Copenhagen freeport, inclUding exports frOll1 transit or bonded warehouses and goods from freeport or private warehouses. They also apply to goods in transit through Denmark, unless these are transiting on a through bill of lading and there is no change in ultimate destination. In addition, Denmark has adopted the TAO scheme. These control measures thus prevent unauthorized diversion of embargo goods in transit through Denmark.

All transit transactions financed by Denl11;ark are subject to control by the national bank, regardless of whether the goods in question actually pass through Denmark.or are forwarded. directly bet'ween the countries of

. origin and destination. In its administration of these provisions the bank observes the same rules as the export control authorities' with which the bank cooperates closely in this field.
Shipping Controls

An arrangement has been made by the Danish Government \vith Danish shipping companies to prevent the carrying in Danish vessels of strategic goods
to Communist Ohina and North Korea. This arrangenlent is implemented through a licensing system operated under a voluntary agreement with Danish shipowners.


### FRANCE

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for over one-half the commodities identified in the }-'rench tariff nomenclature. Governmental authority for this control is contained in various decrees, the latest dated November 30, 1944. These de'crees also permit addition to or removal' from the list of controlled commodities merely by publication of a notice in the Journal Officiel.

Applications for license to export, as submitted by French exporters, are examined by the M::inistry of Industry and Energy, by the Office des**Change~** (where monetary and financial factors are given consideration), and on occasion by appropriate technical committees and personnel in other agencies. At the time the application for export license is SUbmitted, the expol.'ter may be instructed by the :Ministry of Industry and Enel'gy to sublnit a sample, photograph, blueprint,drawing, or other detailed description of the commodity in question. These data are used in determining the advisability of issuing the export license requested. At the. port of exit, random samples of actual exports are**extrac~ed** by customs officials and these are conI pared by competent technicians with the original data submitted with. the license application. This procedure is designed to assure in as many instances as practical tba t the commodity exported is identical with the commodity for' which the export license is issued.

In the event fraudUlent action on the part of the exportei' is found and can be legnlly established, the exporter is subject to confiscation of the" goods in question and fines' ranging upward to four times the value of the shipment



### 56plus penal servitude. The control system in operation in France makes it possible to block or' encourage exports to any destination of commodities requiring export licenses.

Transit Controls

On December**~o,** 1954, and January 12,1955, the French Government published

new regulations effective respectively on the 1st and 15th of January 1955 concerning the regulation of imports, exports, and re-exports of a certain nUlnber of products which enter France under transit status. In essence, these regulations state that the products affected cannot be diverted to certain specified countries (which comprise the Soviet bloc) if their exportation begins in countries participating in the transit authorization certificate scheme unless the country of export so authorizes the change in destination.

Financial Controls

. . All transactions in foreign exchange engaged in by French residents, particularly those in which a French resident takes title to foreign merchandise, require the prior authorization of the French Government.

An "exchange comnlitment" (guaranteeing the return to the government of the exchange proceeds of a**transa~tion)** is required for all exports and re-exports' of merchandise to which a French resident holds title. Where the products concerned are subject to export license, the export license suffices for the exchange commitment.
Shipping Controls

In order to avoid the transport on F'rench vessels of strategic commodities
to Communist China, the French Government has reached agreement with the only French shjpping finn operating on the China run that the latter will not transport commodities· of any description to Communist China unless these are covered by export license or permit indicating Comlnunist China as the destination and issued by the French Government or a friendly foreign government maintaining the same level of controls as concerns strategic items to China

as is maintained in France.

The French Government has also instituted controls to deny bunkering facilities to vessels transporting strategic commodities to C<?mmunist China.



### GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) AND WESTERN BERLIN

License Requirements

No commodity can be exported from the Federal Republic of Germany or West Berlin unless it is covered by an export declaration (Aus!uhrerklaerung) which is issued by the interior customs authorities. However, ,certain types of exports require a special export'declaration (Sonder-Aus!uhrerklaentnu) which is granted by the same customs**autl~orities** only after a certificate of approval (Lie!entngsgenehmigung) has been obtained, as appropriate, from the Central Export Control Office of the Federal Government or the Central Licensing Agency of the West Berlin Senate. A certificate of approval is required for' the following: (a) Exports to all countries in the free world of all commodities on the German "restricted list" in excess of DM1,OOO (ball and roller bearings are excluded from this procedure and therefore require a certificate of approval regardless of the value of the shipment). (b) All exports to the European Soviet bloc, Communist China, North I(orea, North VietNam, Hong Kong and Macao, with the exception of certain non

### 57strategic groups of commodities, i. e., foodstuffs, certain, types of textiles and

consumer goods.

The German "restricted list," which is similar to the United States "positive list," comprises commodities under control for security and short-supply reasons and includes all items covered by Title I and Title II of the l\1DAC Act.

Exports to numerous western' countries, including peripheral countries, are subject to one form or another of end-use checks. Import certificate-delivery verification procedures have been in operation since July 1951.

In conjunction with the issuance of either the export control document or the special export control document, the interior customs authorities observe

a definite procedure for physical inspection of commodities being exported. Additional control over commodities being exported from the Federal Republic is exercised by the border customs authorities.

Financial Controls

All triangular transactions between residents of Western Germany and West Berlin and residents of other areas are subject to either a general or a specific transit trade permit (Allgemeine or Einzel Transit Handels Genehmigung) issued by the ,foreign trade banks. A specific transit trade permit is needed for all transactions where the final destination of the goods is in a Soviet bloc country, Hong Kong or Macao. Before the granting of a transit trade permit, the transaction in question is not only screened with respect to the currency problems but also in regard to the strategic nature of the goods. The latter screening is done by export control officials who have the power to prevent the transaction.

Transit Controls

Certain items are prohibited for intransit shipments on the grounds of health and sanitation, but the number of items so prohibited is very. small and the prohibited list has not been changed since 1939. German customs officials may inspect transit shipments at the border and remove any items prohibited under German law. They then seal the containers of all other goods and such goods

are permitted to proceed, in accordance with international agreement on transit traffic, without further inspection or restriction, except to insure at the exit border that the original customs seals remained unbroken.

Effective January 15, 1955, the Federal Government implemented the transit authorization certificate scheme (TAC). Under the German procedure, transit shipments of strategic commodities listed by the Federal Government and originating in a COCOM country, which are destined for the Soviet bloc but are not accompanied by a transit authorization certificate, will be detained pending
proper clearance by the exporting country

.. The same procedure will be followed for strategic transit shipments which originated in a nonparticipating country but where' the principal of the transaction is a resident of a COCOM country.

Intransit shipments arriving in the freeport. of Hamburg are subject to a . customs documentary and' physical check before being allowed to enter the freeport. When in the freeport, such shipments are under the control of the freeport authorities, and may be loaded,unloaded, or reloaded only with their approval. The destination of intransit shipments arriving in the freeport of Hamburg traveling under a "through bill of lading" can only be changed upon instructions of the original shipper, while the destination of intransit goods
tra veUng under an "ordinary bill of lading" can be determined by the responsible local forwarding agent.

Intransit. shipments consigned to West ,German firms and remaining in the freeport of Hamburg for shipment to 'a consignee outside Western Germany,**requir~** an intransit trade permit (T1'ansit Handelsgencllm,igunu), except when the goods are returned to country of origin. Such intransit trade permits are



### 58issued by the State Central Banks after careful scrutiny of the West German firm ,and in accordance with the same regulations applying to shipments of West German origin, and approval by the West German Central Export Control Office. West German firms must be listed in the official trade register in order to qualify for an intransit trade permit.

A similar procedure is enforced in the freeports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, with the exception that the functions within the freeport are carried out by federal customs authorities rather than freeport authorities. This procedure also applies to Cuxha ven, Emden, and Kiel, which are freeports of very minor importance.


### GREECE License Requirements

Export licenses are required for all strategic commodities, all minerals, and for certain nonstrategic commodities for which export quotas have been established. For nonstrategic shipments, licenses are issued by the Bank of Greece in accordance with directives from the Greek Foreign Trade Administration, l\1inistry of Commerce. For strategic shipments, including those to' the Soviet bloc countries, licenses must be obtained from the Foreign Trade Administration. In the case of countries with which Greece has bilateral trade agreements (which includes the Soviet bloc countries), such licenses are limited to the quantities specified in. the respective agreements.

Transit Controls

A transit shipment whose' final destination is not indicated on the manifest

or shipping documents must be licensed by the FTA prior to being**re-e~ported.** If the destination be indicated, no export license is required.

Financial Controls

Foreign exchange proceeds must be surrendered to the Bank of Greece.
Shipping Controls

Effective March 17, 1953, the Greek Government prohibited Greek-flag vessels from calling at Communist ports in China and North Korea. This was accomplished by the Greek Council of Ministers Act No. 204 of March 17, which was enacted into law by the Greel\: Parliament on :May 7. Violators are punishable under the provisions of law No. 2317 of 1953, published in Greek Government Gazettf? No. 61 dated March 17.

The Greek foreign investment law (No. 2687 of 1953) provides that foreign**vessel~** transferred to the Greel\: fiag may only be resold to countries named in t.he instrument of approval executed at the time of the transfer of the vessel to Greek registry. So far, such instrulnents have not included Soviet-bloc countries. With only minor exceptions, the sale to other countries of Greek-flag ships not covered by an instrument under law 2687 requires the prior approval of the Greek Government.

Current bunkering controls require licensing both by the Bank of Greece and the customs authorities. Ship repair controls require licensing by the customs authorities. In neither ease is the licensing control based on the nationality of the vessel to be serviced nor, in the latter ease, the type ,of materials used for repair or installed.


### ITALY
License Requirements

All commodities listed in the new Tab'ella E8port (the Italian export list) dated March 3, 1955, require an export license to all destinations, except Somali

## 59land, which is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.- All items internationally accepted for embargo or quantitative control are included in the Tabella Esport Goods not listed in the· Tabella are exempt from license, but must be exported in conformity with exchange regulations,

. which vary according to the· country of destination and clearing or other financial agreements.

All exports to Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany require

an export license; while licensing of exports for other Soviet-bloc countries is covered by special regulations for each country. Export and import licenses for trade with Communist China and Eastern Germany are pres,ently granted only
to SPEI, a special entity under the Government agency ARAR, appointed to administer this and which acts as agent for firms wishing to trade with these countries.

Exports to the Soviet bloc also require bank validations, as virtually all trade with the·. Soviet bloc· is conducted under bilateral agreements which specify the commodities that may be traded and the methods by which payment is to be made. Normally, shipments to the East comprise only those commodities specified in a trade agreement with an eastern country. In order to facilitate checking of eastbound shipments, trade with the Soviet bloc is funnelled through**sele~ted** frontier customs points.

The formulation of export control policy and the administration of the export licensing system are the primary responsibili ty of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This Ministry is advised by a special interministerial committee.

Italy is employing import certificate-delivery verification procedures and carries out end-use checks for shipments. to destinations outside the Soviet. bloc, particularly for questionable transactions involving goods of a strategic nature. The country of origin is notified if an attempt is made to divert a shipment.

Financial Controls

Financial· control over all export transactions is maintained through the licensing system and through implementation of existing exchange control regula tions.

Strict bilateral trade agreements with almost aU members of the Soviet bloc have constituted, in effect, a financial ceiling on exports to Eastern Europe. Italian exports to 'Communist China, for which there is a unilateral compensation arrangement but no trade agreement, must be paid for in hard currency or must be exchanged for goods acceptable' to the Italian Government, an arrangement that has severely restricted Italo-Chinese trade. Italian exchange control regulations would not normally permit payment for imports from the Soviet bl()c in hard currencies, although sterling is occasionally used in payment for the few items not included in the trade agreements. In certain instances ship charters

are completed for sterling when· circumstances warrant or· 

### it is· considered convenient.

Transit Controls

In order to implement the international TAO agreement on transit controls, instructions were issued to Italian customs offices on January 2, 1955, to the effect that foreign commodities in transit through Italy, in order to be considered in· direct transit, must be covered by commercial or freight documents showing ultimate destination of the commodities to a specific foreign country, which destination should be clearly noted in the origin of the shipment. For embargo items directed to the Soviet bloc, this requirement may be met by the presentation of a transit authorization certificate. If a shipment of this kind arrives at an exit. customs point 'without the proper documentation to establish· that it is in direct transit; customs is required to hold the commodities in storage until its



## 60status can be clarified. These regulations should, in conformity with COCOl\1 agreements, effectively close the loophole previously caused by the lack of control

over shipments in direct transit.

.

In the case of indirect transit shipments, a check is also made on the regularity of the transaction from the foreign currency standpoint. Operators contemplating indirect transit operations must submit an application to the appropriate
agency (Bank of Italy, directly or. through authorized banl{; or :Ministryof Foreign Trade, General Directorate. for Currencies) when any item listed in part A. of the Tabella .Esport (which includes all strategic items except International List III) is purchased abroad. To allow a certain flexibility, a transit operator may purchase the goods abroad and have them shipped to Italy before making application to the l\1inistry of Foreign 'Trade; however, in this case he
must submit to the bank which holds his currency account a written commitment that the goods will be sent directly to Italy and not diverted. He must also obtain the clearance of the General Directorate for Currencies before**t~e** goods

can be onforwarded through Italy to another' country.

The routing of both direct and indirect transit shipments is kept under surveillance to ascertain that it is natural and normal and to avoid routing that
may facilitate diversion.
Shipping Controls

The l\1inistry of l\1:erchant l\farine has drafted a bill which, when enacted into law, will give the Italian Government the power to exercise control over shipping traffic with countries of the Soviet bloc. The bill contemplates quite

.. severe penalties to be imposed upon owners and masters of ships failing to comply with regulations' established by the Ministi·y of :Merchant :Marine. Consideration of this bill by Parliament has been delayed for more than a year and a half, however, and there seems to be no immediate prospect that it will be enacted into law.

Penalties

Penalties that may be imposed under Italian law for violations of exportcontrol regulations include (1) imprisonment up to 3 months, (2) fines up to 40,000 lire, and (3) confiscation of the merchandise involved. These' penalties have on occasion been supplemented by fines as high as 50 million lire ($80,000) for crimes committed in connection with false customs declarations or currency violations in export transactions. Persons and firms under investigation for illegal export transactions are denied foreign trading privileges.

IrregUlarities under the customs law may be punished by fines from ,2,000 to 20,000 lire, while other infractions may incur the penalties contemplated by the penal code.



### JAPAN

License Requirements

Licensesfrom the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry are reqUired for exports of any commodityon the Japanese export control list. No exports to North Korea have been permitted since the outbreak of the Korean War. Exports to Communist China are limited to nonstrategic items. Exports of strategic items to any other Communist bloc country are strictly controlled.

End-use checks are made also on suspicious exports of strategic items, and the import

. certificate-delivery verification procedure has been utilized since A.pril1, 1953.


## 61Transit Controis
Intransit cargo is offloaded under customs supervision and is normally kept in a bonded warehouse or other area under the 'complete control of customs officials.

Japan applies transit authorization certificate procedures to certain offloaded intransit cargo destined for the Soviet bloc exported from any country cooperating in the TAO scheme, or which was exported from any country if the principal in the transaction is a resident of- a COCOl\,iJ country.

Financial Controls

For balance-of-payments reasons, Japan closely controls its receipts and expenditures of foreign exchange. These controls are not related to security measures except indirectly in connection with trade with Communist China and the Soviet Union.

Trade with these areas is largely confined to barter transactions which must be settled on the basIs of back-to-back or escrow letters of credit approved by foreign exchange banks.

Shipping and Bunkering Controls

Since June 1951 it has been required that bills of lading issued by carriers for strategic items licensed for export inust contain a "Notice to Carrier" stating that delivery of the goods to countries other than the destination designated in the export license is prohibited without the express permission of the licensing authority.

Japanese shipowners have been notified that Japanese vessels are not authorized to carry, strategic goods to Communist China from Japan or from any other country unless shipment has' been licensed by a COCOM country.

Administrative measures also have been adopted to prevent foreigners from chartering or using Japanese vessels to carry contraband goods to Communist China or North Korea. The Ministry of Transportation has announced that applications for approval of a bareboat or time charter of a Japanese vessel to a foreigner must show that the charterer has guaranteed that during the period of the' charter the vessel will not enter any port in Communist China or North Korea with strategic goods on board the vessel unless the shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry furthermore has instructed Japanese oil companies not to furnish fuel bunkers to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Communist China or North Korea unless the shipment has been licensed by a COC:OM country.



### THE NETHERLANDS

License Requirements

All exports from the Netherlands are subject to export licenses.- General licenses are granted on transactions of $2,500 or less involving most industrial products and on transactions of' $250 or less involving some items· appearing· on the international control lists, provided that these transactions are with either OEEO or dollar area countries. Under this system, an exporter' completes and submits the export license 'to the Netherlands customs which then approves the transaction without prior reference to the licensing authorities. Individual licenses are required' for all other transactions, including those involving the balance of the items on the international list regardless of whether or not the transaction' involves goods' valued at $250 or less.



### 62Export licenses are generally issued by the 

### Oent"ale Dienst voor In-en Uit

### voer (Central Import and Export Office). The 19/DV system is applied extensivelty. If an application for the export of strategic goods is made,' the "ODIU" informs the exporter that an export license may only be granted after

an import certificate has been produced. In such cases, the applicant is also required to submit a delivery verification form in due course.

If strategic goods are to be exported to countries not participating in the 10/ DV system, the final destination is checked in most cases before the export license is granted. If the application concerns transactions of less strategic importance, the exporter is obliged to prove, on the basis of customs documents,

a bill of lading, or other documents, that the goods arrived in the country of destination. Finally, the customs authorities have the right to satisfy themselves that the goods to be exported are identical with the description thereof on the export license when the goods leave the country. They can also stop the export of goods if it appears that they are being sent in a direction which does not conform with the final destination specified in the export license.

Financial Controls

All transactions by Netherlands residents involving payment .to or received from a party abroad are subject to foreign exchange licenses issued by the 'Netherlands Bank. The export license generally includes authorization for individual banks to act on the proposed transaction.

The IC/DV system is also applied to these transactions to the extent applicable. In other cases, end-use checks a,i'e conducted on a large scale.'
Shipping Controls

The Netherlands instituted voyage controls in May 1953 aimed at preventing the carriage of strategic commodities by Netherlands ships to Communist China and North Korea except pursuant to special permission.

Transit Controls

Pursuant to royal decree regarding the transit control of strategic commodities, strategic goods sent from participating countries or shipped for the account of a resident of one of the participating countries which after unloading pass in' transit through the Netherlands to the Soviet bloc are subject to control. In this' connection, a list of strategic goods subject to such transit control has been published. 

### NORWAY

License Requirements

All commodities to be exported to any destination require export licenses. The licensing authorities using existing powers can prevent the export of any item for security reasons.

NOJ;way applies import certificate-delivery verification procedures.

Transit Controls

Goods which are to pass through the territory of Norway may be re-exported without license only if it is clearly stated by their conveying documents that the goods are going straight to the foreign destination. If the re-export does
not· take place within 90 days, a Norwegian export license must be secured. The destination listed on the original documents must remain the same, and the goods may not be transformed in any way during their stayin the country. The
customs author'ity applies a control to that effect. An export license is required for all commodities in transit to a Soviet-bloc country even though the re-export takes place wi thin 90 days. There are no freeport areas in Norway.-


## 63Financial Controls
Strict exchange controls are maintained by the government through the Bank of Norway. The granting of an export license carries with it the obligation

on the part of the exporter to relinquish the foreign exchange to the Bank of Norway as soon as received from the foreign buyer; a maximum of 60 days is allowed between export and remittance, although under certain circumstances the government may grant the exporter an extension of time. Transfers of capital from Norway require theprior approval of the Bank of Norway.
Shipping Controls

The Norwegian Foreign Office announced publicly in April 1953,' that the Norwegian war risk insurance group had refused to insure Norwegian vessels delivering strategic articles to Communist Chinese and North Korean ports. The Foreign Office also announced that Norwegian ships had not violated the United Nations Resolution of May 18, 1951, prohibiting the shipment of strategic material to Communist China and North Korea. Several allegations that they had done so had been investigated and found to be unjustified.



## PORTUGAL

License Requirements

A.ll exports are subject to licensing under regulations issued in 1948 except that export licenses are not generally required for shipments to Portuguese

overseas provinces. Portugal's export trade with the Soviet bloc is not important and consists almost entirely of corl{, which is not on any strategic or**rest~icted** list. The Portuguese colonies exert varying degrees of export control.

Transit Controls

Portuguese controls over goods in transit are now under reVISIOn and are expected to be amended to establish additional safeguards against undesirable diversions of strategic commodities.

Financial control is exercised over all exportS' as a part of the license control

. system. 

## TURKEY

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for most of the important export commodities, including all goods considered to be of a strategic nature. The goods which

are subject to export licenses appear on List II attached to the Turkish foreign trade regulations issued in September 1953. For the goods appearing on that list, export licenses are required for shipments to all destinations;· the licenses

are issued by the l\1iriistry of Economy and Commerce, with the exception of

some agricultural commodities for which authority to grant export licenses has been delegated to other organizations. Goods not appearing on List II may be, exported upon the presentation of a customs exit declaration which is based

on the exporter's application. A.ll exports are subject to strict foreign exchange regulations.

Turkey applies im'port certificate-delivery verification procedures with respect to the shipment of strategic commodities.

Transit Controls

Goods which are to pass through the territory of Turkey may be re-exported without**li~ense** only if all shipping documents (including bill of lading and ship's manifest) and outer containers carry the name of the Turkish port of



### 64transit, the phrase "in transit to" and the name of the city and country of destination. Goods entered in transit may be re-exported without further control; however, the government reserves the right to inspect transit shipments in cases of suspicion of irregularity. The re-export of goods covered by "in transit" bills of lading, without an export license, is contingent on proof that the goods were not purchased with foreign exchange made 'available by Turkish authorities.

The re-exportation of all foreign goods cleared through Turkish customs is subject to the authorization of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.

The Turkish Government is authorized by law to establish free zones in Turkish ports, but thus far no such free zone has been established.

Financial Controls

Strict exchange controls are maintained by the government through the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. Turkish exporters are required to sell
to a bank in Tur}{ey the foreign exchange proceeds of exports within 3 lllonths from the date of exportation and within 15 days of the date of receipt of the foreign exchange by the exporters. Foreign exchange may be sold to persons and firms in Turkey only by banks, against permits· issued by the**~1inistry** of Finance. All payments in foreign exchange, from funds available abroad to persons and firms in Turkey, are subject to the authorization of the :Ministry of Finance. Other capital transactions involving foreign exchange, by persons and firms in Turkey, are also subject to the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.


### UNITED KINGDOM

License Requirements

The export control system in the United Kingdom is similar to but not identical with that of the United States. It is administered by the Board of Trade. Although the present system grew out of measures originally promulgated at the start of vVorldWar II, its primary purpose now is the safeguarding of the country's requirements of strategic and short-supply goods, and the restriction of the flow of such items to undesirable destinations. The United Kingdom security trade control program was instituted in 1947.

The United I{lngdom export control mechanism operates in the following

manner:

The consolidated order, which encompasses all the items subject to control, is a published document and revisions are issued in the form of statutory orders which are also published in the Board Of Trade Journal (an official weekly). The list is arranged into three schedules. The first schedule lists goods which, in general, cannot be exported to any destination without a license. The second schedule lists additional goods of no strategic interest which, in general, can be exported to any destination without a license. The two schedules are, however, subject to two qualifications. Firstly, a limited number of goods included in the first schedule can be exported without license to destinations within the British Commonwealth, Ireland, and the United States. Such goods are listed ih the third schedule. Secondly, no goods, even those included on the second schedule, can be exported to North Korea or to China, :Macao, North Viet Nam, and Tibet without a license.

The extent of the restriction on individual items is reflected in the admin.;. istration of the control. Strict control is maintained over items which are prohibited exportation to certain- areas, as, for instance, aircraft, firearms, ammunition, atomic materials. The exportation of a wide range of goods of strategic importance,**including~** rubber, to Communist China is prohibited, as is



## 65the exportation'to the Soviet bloc in Europe of a somewhat narrower range of commodities. The export to the Soviet bloc of many**othe~** items is: subject to limitations as to quantities permitted to be shipped. In addition, there is the great bulk of items on which control is achieved through case-by-case scrutiny of individual license applications.

The United Kingdom has effectively implemented import certificate-delivery verification procedures.

Transit Controls

The United Kingdom has had in effect since November 1951 a system whereby certain items arriving from other countries are subject to transshipment control. Individual licenses are required for all of the items on the licensing list before any of the goods, after being landed in the United Kingdom, can be**transshippe~** to any destination other than the British Commonwealth, Ireland, and the United States. The present control is operated overall goods embargoed
to the Soviet bloc. In administering the control, the British authorities normally grant licenses when they are satisfied that the goods will not be diverted
to the Soviet bloc, China, etc., contrary to the wishes of the exporting country.

The United Kingdom also cooperates fully in the implementation of the TAO scheme.

Transaction Controls

As one of the reinforcement measures to strengthen security controls. agreed when the Soviet-bloc embargo list was reviewed in 1954, the United Kingdom introduced a control on merchanting transactions operative from 7th January 1955. This control prohibits the disposal by persons in, or ordinarily resident in, the United Kingdom of sp.ecified strategic goods which are situated outside the United Kingdom to any authority of, or person in, the Soviet bloc, China, Tibet, or North Korea, or to any other person if the person disposing of the goods has reasonable cause to believe that the goods will be imported directly

or indirectly into the Soviet bloc, China, Tibet, or North Korea. The goods covered by the control are those which are subject to embargo for Soviet-bloc countries. Shipping Controls

In order to restrict further the flow of strategic goods to China and as an**additio~al** lueasure of control, a statutory order (titled the Control of 'l'rade by Sea (Ohina and North Korea) Order, 1953) was made on March 13, 1953, pursuant to which the Ministry of. 'l'ransport and Civil Aviation is empowered
to control aU shipping to China and North Korea. In essence, the order applies
to all British ships having a gross tonnage of 500 tons, limits the type of trade in which the ships may engage and the voyages which may be undertaken, affects the class of cargo or passengers which may be car'ried, and imposes certain conditions· on· the hiring of ships. Approximately a hundred items are listed in a schedule which is an integral part of the license issued under the order in question. These items are banned from carriage to China in Britishflag vessels.

While formal shipping controls were not adopted until March 17, 1953, BritIsh shipping Circles were- kept under fairly close scrutiny by the government

ever since the adoption on l\:Iay 18, 1951, by the Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations, of the resolution to apply economic sanctions against China as a result of her aggressive intervention in Korea.

Complementary controls over the bunkering of vessels carrying strategic
cargo (as defined in the Shipping Control' Order) to China were adopted at the

same time that the order affecting shipping became operative. These controls



### 66are administered by the Ministry of Fuel and Power on an informal basis, in cooperation with British oil companies which deny bunkers to ships carrying strategic cargo to China.


### UNITED STATES
Export Controls in General

The Department of Commerce is responsible for controls over nearly all commercial exportations from the United States under the Export Control Act of 1949, as extended.

The Department of State is responsible for control over the exportation of
arms, ammunition, and implements of war; the Atomic Energy Commission administers controls over the export of major atomic energy items ; and the Department of Treasury administers controls over the exportation of gold and narcotics. All such items require export licenses, and. shipments to the Soviet bloc are not permitted.

Administration of Export Controls by Commerce Department

All commodities exported to any destination, except Canada,· from the United States, its territories and possessions are subject to export control. There are three main techniques utilized in the administration of such controls:

1. Shipments of commodities contained in the Positive List 1 are under control
to virtually all destinations.

2. For some commodities, a general license is authorized permitting exportation to virtually all friendly destinations without requiring that an export license be issued.

3. All commodities, whether or not on, the Positive List and irrespective of
any general license provisions, are under licensing control to subgroup A destinations (i. e., Soviet bloc, including Communist China and North Korea), Hong Kong and Macao.

The Comprehensive Export Schedule published by the Bureau of Foreign Conlmerce (BFC) of the Department of Commerce must be consulted in order to determine whether a validated license is required for the exportation of a given commodity to a specific destination as well as to determine other export control regulations of the Commerce Department. The Comprehensive Export Schedule is supplemented 2 or 3 times a month by BFC's Current Export Bulletin. The Secretary of Commerce's Quarterly Report to the President and the Congress reports major policJ" changes and activities of the DepartInent of Commerce in carrying out its export control activities.

The two main policies as indicated in the. Export Control Act which is administered by the Department of Commerce are export controls for security and for short supply reasons. The objective of security controls as embodied in the Export Control Act of 1949, as extended, is to exercise the necessary vigilance

over exports froll1 the standpoint of· their significance to the national security. The controls were designed to deny or restrict the exportation of strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc in order to impede the bUildup and maintenance of the Soviet war potential. Shipments of aU commodities to Communist China and North Korea are mnbargoed while shipments to other Soviet-bloc destinations, Hong Kong, and l\Iacao are either denied or restricted. In addition, all proposed shipments of strategic commodities to all destinations, except Canada, are carefully scrutinized to .assure that the goods will not be transshipped or diverted
to unfriendly. hands. The Commerce Department has developed procedures to

1 The Positive List of Commodities is a current list contained in the Comprehensive Export SchedUle showing the commodities which require a validated license from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the Department of Commerce.



### 67'prevent the frustration. of our own export controls which would result from shipping a strategic item to a country which (1) ships identical or closely similar items to the Soviet bloc, or (2) would use the American item" directly in the manufacture of strategic items for the Soviet bloc.

In order to prevent the transshipment abroad of United States commodities, the Department of Commerce also has regulations covering the unauthorized
movement of United States commodities after they leave United States shores. These regulations generally referred to as the "destination control" provisions

are designed to prohibit the re-exportation from the country of ultimate destination except upon written authorization from BFC. These regulations also restrict ships, planes or other carriers from delivering United States origin goods
to other than the destination specified on" the export control documents. In addition, the United States participates in the international IC/DV (import certificate/delivery verification) system described elsewhere in this report.

In addition to United States export controls for security reasons, it is necessary to administer export controls for short supply· reasons in order to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce :materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal demand. Such controls are usually exercised by means ·of export programs or quotas fixed by the Secretary of Commerce. The easing of supply programs in recent months has led to the prompt lifting of nearly all domestic controls over materials; such actions have generally been followed" by the relaxation of related export controls for short supply reasons. Thus, export controls for short supply reasons. do not· play' as important a part

as before in comparison with security controls.

Transit Controls

A validated export license is required for the exportation" from any" seaport, land frontier,**~.irport,orforeign** trade zone in the United States of certain strategic goods in transit through the United States which originate in or are destined for. 

### a foreign country. The commodities so controlled are the ones which! are identified on the United" States Department of Commerce Positive List by an asterisk. These procedures are used to implement United States**parti~ipation** in the TAC scheme.

Shipping Controls.

Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-1 denies any United States-registered vessel or aircraft authority to carry items listed on the Positive List, or arms, ammunition and implements of war or fissionablematerial, to any Soviet-bloc destination, Hong I{ong, "61' :Macao without 

### a validated license issued by BFe or other appropriate "licensing agencies or the express permission of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation. This order includes shipments from foreign ports as well as from" the" United States.

Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-2 has the effect of**pre~** venting the transportation of" any commodities directly or indirectly to CommunistChina, North Korea, or a.reas under their control, by United Statesregistered vessels "or aircraft. It also prohibits American ships" and" aircraft from calling at any port or place in Communist China.

A validated license is required for" delivery in United States ports of specified types of petroleum and petroleum products to foreign vessels, if the foreign carrier has called at any point under Far Eastern Communist control, or at Macao, since January 1, 1953, or will carry commodities of any origin from the United States destined directly or indirectly for any such point within a period of "120" days in the" case of a" vessel, or 30 days in the case of any aircr3cft. This regula tion also requires that if a carrier is registered in or under charter to a



### 6.8Soviet-bloc country or is under charter toa national of a Soviet-bloc country it will be necessary to apply to BFC for a validated license.

American petroleum companies at certain foreign ports**ar~** prohibited without

a Treasury Department authorization from bunkering any vessel bound for a Communist Far East port or l\Iacao or which is carrying goods destined for Communist China or North Korea. Similar restrictions apply to the bunkering by these companies of vessels returning from Communist Far East ports or Macao.

Financial and Transaction Controls

The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, administered by the Treasury Department, block the assets here of Communist China, North Korea and their nationals and prohibit unlicensed dealings involving property in which Communist China, or North Korea, or their nationals, have any interest. The regulations prevent the use of United States financial facilities· by those countries and their nationals. These regulations also prohibit the unlicensed importation of goods of Chinese Communist or North Korean origin.

Treasury regulations also prohibit Americans, including foreign subsidiaries of United States firms, from participating in the purchase or sale of certain important comlnodities for ultimate shipment from any country outside the United States to the countries of the Soviet bloc. These transactions controls, which are complementary to the United States export control laws, are administered by the Treasury Department under Foreign Assets Control Regulations.



### 69

# APPENDIX B

Text of Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act' (Battle Act)



## 71

## APPENDIX B



# Text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control 

# Act of 1951 [H. R. 4550], Public

Law 213, 82d Congress, 65 Stat. 644, Approved October-26, 1951

AN ACT To provide for the control by the United States and cooperating foreign

nations of exports to any nation 01' combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, and for other purposes.



### Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Americ.a in Oongress rMsembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951."



### TITLE I-WAR MATERIALS

SEC. 101. 

### The Congress of the United States, recognizing that in a world threatened by aggression the United States can best preserve and maintain peace by developing maximum national strength and by utilizing all of its resources in cooperation with other free nations, hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to apply an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of
war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms,1 ammunition, and implements of war to any nation

or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, in order to (1) 

### increase the national strength of the United States and of the cooperating nations; (2) impede the ability of nations threatening the security of the United States to conduct military operations; and (3) 

### to assist the people of the nations under the domination of foreign aggressors to reestablish their freedom. It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that no military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an en1bargo on such shipments to any nation

or combination of nations threatening the security of the United

73

### States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its donlination. This Act shall be administered in such a way as to bring about the fullest support for any resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, supported by the United States, to prevent the shipment of certain commodities to areas under the control of governments engaged in hostilities in defiance of the United Nations. SEC. 102. 

### Responsibility for giving effect to the purposes of this Act shall be vested in the person occupying the senior position authorized by subsection (e). of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance. Act 

### of 1949, 

### as amended, or in any person who may hereafter be charged with principal responsibility for the administration of the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. 

### Such person is hereinafter referred to as the "Administrator."

SEC. 103. 

### (a) The Administrator is hereby authorized and directed
to determine wi thin thirty days after enactment of this Act after full and conlple 1 

### te consideration of the vie,vs of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce; the Economic Cooperation Administration; and any other appropriate agencies,1 and not-withstanding the provisions of any other law, which items are, for the purpose of this Act, arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic**en~rgy** 

### materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and those items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammuntion, and implements of war which should be embargoed to effectuate the purposes of this Act: 

### Provided, That such determinations shall be continuously adjusted to current conditions on the basis of investigation and consultation, and that all nations receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance shall be kept informed of such determinations. (b) All military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation shall, upon the recommendation of the Administrator, be terminated forthwith if such nation after sixty days fronl the date of a determination under section 103 

### (a) kno,vingly' permits the shipment to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union -of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, of any item which he has determined under section 103 

### (a) after a full and complete investigation
to be included in any of the following categories: Arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleunl, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war: 

### Provided, That the President after receiving the advice of· the Administrator and after taking into account the contribution of such country to themutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the



## 74

### strategic importance of 

### imports received from countries of the Soviet bloc, and the adequacy of 

### such country's controls over· the export. to the Soviet bloc of 

### items of 

### strategic importance, may direct the continuance of 

### such assistance to a country which permits shipments of 

### items other than arms, ammunition, implenlents of 

### ,var, and atomic
energy materials ,vhen unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of 

### aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of 

### the United States: Provided**furt7~er,** 

### That the President shall immediately report any determination made pursuant to the first proviso. of 

### this section with reasons therefor to the Appropriations and Arnled Services Committees of 

### the Senate and of 

### the House of 

### Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

### the Senate, and the Committee

on Foteign Affairsof the House 6f 

### Representatives, and the President shall at least once each quarter review all determinations made previ0usly and shall report his conclusions to the foregoing committees of 

### the House and Senate, 'v hich reports shall eontain an analysis of 

### the trade ,vith the Soviet bloc of 

### countries for which determinations have been made. SEC. 104. 

### Whenever military, economic, or financial assistance has been terminated as provided in this Act, such assistance can be resumed only upon determination by the President that adequate measures have been taken by the nation concerned to assure full 

### compliance with the provisions of 

### this Act. SEC. 105. 

### For the purposes of 

### this Act the term "assistance" does
not include activities carried on for the purpose of 

### facilitating the procurement of 

### materials in ,vhich the United States is deficient.

TITLE II-OTHER MATERIALS

SEC. 201. 

### The Congress of 

### the United States further declares it to be the policy of 

### the United States to regulate the export of 

### commodities other than those specified in Title I of 

### this Act to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of 

### the United States, including the Union oT Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its donlination, in order to strengthen the United States and other cooperating nations of 

### the free ,vor ld and to oppose and offset by nonmilitary action acts ,vhich'threaten the security of 

### the United States and the peace of 

### the ,vorld.

SEC. 202. 

### The United States· shall negotiate with any country receiving military, economic, or financial assistance arr'angements for the recipient country to undertake a program for controlling, exports of 

### itelns not subject to embargo under Title I of 

### this Act, but which in the judgment of 

### the Administrator should be controlled to any nation or combination oT nations threatening the security of 

### the United States, including the Union of 

### Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

,75

### SEC. 203. 

### All military, economic, and financial assistance shall he terminated when the President determines that the recipient country

. (1) 

### is not effectively cooperating. with the United States pursuant
to this title, or (2) is failing to furnish to the United States inf.ormation sufficient for the President to determine that the recipient country is effectively cooperating with the United States.

TITLE III-GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. 

### All other nations (those not receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance) shall be invited by the President to cooperate jointly in a group or groups or on an individual basis in controlling the export of the commo'dities referred to in Title I and Title II of this Act .to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination. SEC. 302. 

### The Administrator with regard to all titles of this Act shall- (a) coordinate those activities of the various United States departments and agencies which are concerned with security controls over exports from other countries; (b) make a continuing study of the administration of export control measures undertaken by foreign governments in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and shall report to the Congress from time to time but not less than once every six months recommending action where appropriate; and ( c) make available technical advice and assistance on export control procedures to any nation desiring such cooperation.
SEC. 303. 

### The provisions of subsection (a) of section 403, 

### of section 404, 

### and of subsection (c) and (d) of section 406 

### of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 

### (Public Law 329, 

### Eighty-first Congress) as amended, insofar as they are consistent with this Act, shall be applicable to this Act. Funds made available for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 

### as amended, shall be available for carrying out this Act in such an10unts as the President shall direct. SEC. 304. 

### In every recipient country where local currency is made available for local currency expenses of the United States in connection with assistance

. furnished by the United States, the local
currency administrative and operating expenses incurred in the administration of this Act shall be charged to such local currency funds
to the extent available. SEC. 305. 

### Subsection (d) 

### of section 117 

### of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 

### (Public Law 472, Eightieth Congress), as amended, and subsection (a) of section 1302 

### of the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951 

### (Public Law 45, 

### Eighty-second Congress), are repealed.

76

# APPENDIX C

Statistical Tables



# 77

### Table

Table Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table 

## APPENDIX C

Statistical Tables

1. Trade of free ,vorld with the Soviet bloc, a,nnually 1947-54. and semiannually, 1952-54. 2. Trade of free world with the Soviet bloc,quarterly 1952-54. 3a. Exports of principal free-world countries to the Soviet bloc, 1951. b. Imports of principal free-world countries from the Soviet bloc, 1951.

c. Exports of principal free-world countries to the Soviet bloc, 1952. d. Imports of principal free-world countries from the Soviet bloc, 1952.

e. Exports of principal free-world countries to the Soviet bloc, 1953. f. 

### Imports of principal free-world countries from the Soviet bloc, 1953. g. Exports of principal free-world countries to the Soviet bloc, 1954. h. Imports of principal free-world countries from the Soviet bloc, 1954. 4. Trade of free-world and COCOM countries with European Soviet bloc, 1947-54. 5. Trade of COCOM countries with the European Soviet bloc, semiannually, 1951-54.
6. Trade of COCOM countries with U. S. S. R., semiannually, 1951-54. 7. Trade of free-world and COCOM countries with Communist China, 1947-54. 8. Trade of free world with Oommunist Ohina, annually and semiannually, 1951...:.54. 9a. United States trade with the Soviet bloc, 1937, 1948 and 1952-54. b. United States exports to the Soviet bloc, by principal commodities, 1948 and 1952-54.

c. United States imports from the Soviet bloc, by principal commodities, 1948 and 1952-54.

79

### Table lOa. Free-world exports to the Soviet bloc, by 

### principal commodity groups, 1951-53. 

### b. Free-world imports from the Soviet bloc, by 

### principal commodity groups, 1951-53.


### GENERAL N oTE.-Unless otherwise noted, the Soviet bloc comprises the following: Soviet European satellites, which include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Zone of Gernlany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania; U. S. S. R.; Outer Mongolia; North Korea, beginning 1951; 

### and China for which data since 1949 

### refer (as far as possible)
to mainland China, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet.

SOURCE FOR ALL TABLES: International Economic Analysis Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce.

1. I AllLE i.-TRADE OF FREE \VORLD 'VITH THE SOVIET BLOC, ANNUALLY 1947-54 AND

SEMIANNUALLY 1952-54

[In millions of United States dollars]

Period covered Total 

### I European 

### I European 

# Ius SRI Commu- Soviet bloc Soviet bloc satellites

.... nist China

Free-world exports

Year 1947

_________________________________ 2,005.7 1,333.5 856.5 477.0 Year 1948

__________________________________ 1,968.5 1,434.2 900.7 533.5 Year 1949

__________________________________ 1,679.6 1,355.1 918.4 436.7 Year 1950

__________________________________ 1,544.8 1,092.7 791. 6 301.1 Year 1951

__________________________________ 1,687.9 1,241. 7 854.2 387.5 Year 1952

__________________________________ 1,438.3 1,165.7 682.4 483.3 Year 1953

__________________________________ 1,388.9 1,101. 3 677.8 423.5 Year 1954 1

________________________________ 1,720.0 1,435.0 850.0 585.0 1952: First halt

_______________________ _____ 725.7 606.2 340.9 265.3 Second halL

__________________________ 703.0 549.9 334.9 215.0 1953: First halt

_____________________________ 638.6 470.4 312.4 158.0 Second haIL

___________________________ 745.4 626.0 360.5 265.5 1954: First halL

_____________________________ 902.7 768.1 416.2 351. 9 Second half 1

__________________________ 817.3 666.9 433.8 233.1

Free-world imports

Year 1947

__________________________________ 1,424.7 1,006.8 732.9 273.9 Year 1948

_________ ________________________ 2,008.0 1,519.7 1,026.0 493.7 Year 1949

__________________________________ 1,799.1 -1,371.5 1,090.7 280.8 Year 1950

__________________________________ 1,726.6 1,191. 9 939.8 252.1 Year 1951.

_________________________________ 21,883.0 1,358.1 967.5 .390.6 Year 1952

__________________________________ 21,625.6 1,257.5 794.4 463.1 Year 1953

__________________________________ 21,620.0 1,177.2 803.1 374.1 Year 1954 1

________________________________ 21,738.0 1,360.0 800.0 470.0 1952: First half

______________________________ 2840.6 668.3 398.4 269.9 Second halL

__________________________ 2781.4 585.6 393.2 192.4 1953: First halL

____________________________ 2748.0 518.4 376.2 142.2 Second half

_________________________ -

__ 2868.2 655.0 423.1 231.9 1954: First haIL

_____________________________ 2794.5 616.6 426.4 100.2 Second half 1

_______ ___________________ 2943.5 743.4 463.6 279.8 672.2 534.3 324.5 452.1 446.2 272.6 287.6 285.0

119.5 153.1

168.2 119.4

134.6 150.4

417.9 488.3 427.6 534.7 524.7 365.0 434.1 371.2

171. 7 193.3

225.7 208.4

176.4 194.8

See general note above, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.
N OTE.- Figures are unadjusted for price changes. Semiannual figures are based on monthly data which
are unrevised and partially incomplete. They will not, therefore, add exactly to annual totals.

1 Estimated as of Apr. 1, 1955. 2 Includes Outer**Mo~golia.**



### 80TABLE 2.-TRADE OF FREE WORLD WITH THE SOVIET BLOO, QUARTERLY 1952-54

[In millions of United States dollars]

I European satel- Communist Total Soviet bloc lites U.S.S. R. China

. Period covered
1952119531 19521195311954 19521195311954

## 195~ 1195311954 1954

Exports to the Soviet bloc

January-Marcb

_________ 360.5 337.0 441.1 178.6 163.6 194.4 141. 5 78.3 173.6 40.4 95.1 73.1**April-June_~** ____________ 365.2 301. 6 461. 6 162.3 148.8 221. 8 123.8 79.7 178.3 79.1 73.1 61. 5 July-September

________ 334.6 308.1 375.4 153.0 157.0 214.6 102.3 99.2 90.9 79.3 51. 9 69.9 October-December

______ 368.4 437.3 1441.9 181. 9 203.5 1219.2 112.7 166.3 1142.2 73.8 67.5 180.5

Imports from the Soviet bloc

I January-March

_________ 2440.7 2347.8 2396.4 212.6 176.7 204. 

## 71133. 9 63.7 102.9 93.8 105.4 88.1 April-June

______________ 2399.9 2400.2 2398.1 185.8 199.5 221. 7 136.0 78.5 87.3 77.9 120.3 88.3 July-September

________ 2372.0 2408.3 2469.2 189.9 189.2 232.6 90.6 111.9 145.2 90.4 104.9 90.7 October-Decem ber

______ 2409.4 2459.9 12474.3 203.3 233.9 1231. 0 101. 8 120.0 1134.6 102.9 103.5 11040 1

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc. NOTE.-Figures are unadjusted for price changes. Quarterly figures are based on monthly data which are unrevised and partially incomplete. They will not, therefore, add exactly to annual totals.

1 Estimated as of Apr. 1, 1955.
2 Includes Outer Mongolia.



### 81TABLE 3A.-ELXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE.

SOVIET. BLOC, 1951

[In millions of United States dollars]

.' I Com-

. Exports to w_o_r_ld_.I_T_ot_a_l_S_oV_i_e_t _b_lO_C_I_E_ubr_ol_p_e_an EUtreOIPI.etan U. S. S. R. munist oc sa 1 es China



## ---- 

## ---- ----

As percentage Exporting country Total Total of Total Total Total Total value value exports value value value value to world



## ---- ---- 

## ---- 

## ---- ---- 

## ---- United States

__________________ 16,602.3 2.R (1) 2.8 2.7 0.1 (2) Canada_·

_______________________ 3,608.0 .9 (1) .6 .6 (2) .3

---- ---- 

### ---- ---- ---- ---**--~-** OEEC Countries, totaL. 27,238.4 810.6 3.0 757.6 590.3 167.3 53.0



### ---- 

### ---- ---- 

## ---- ---- ---- .. Austria

________________________ 4.'>3.8 60.5 13.3 59.7 59.7 (2) .8 Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,651. 4 64.4 2,4 55.0 41. 7 13.3 9.4 Denmark

______________________ R3R.8 40.0 4.8 39.9 39.7 .2 .1 France

____ -

_____________________ 4,174.4 40.5 1.0 38.5 33.6 4.9 2.0 Germany. Federal Republic

___ 3,508.5 103.2 2.9 99.2 99.2 (2) 4.0 Greece

______________ __________ 101. 8 .4 .4 .4 .4**~*)** (3) Iceland

_________________________ 14.6 3.5 7.9 3.5 3.5 *) (2) Ireland

_________________________ 228.3 .1 (1) .1 .1 (



## .. ) (*) Italy and Trieste

_______________ 1,644.5 66.0 4·0 65.1 41. 4 23.7 .9 Netherlands

_____ ______________ 1,956.1 40.0 2.0 39.7 38.1 1.6 .3 Norway

________________________ 620.0 29.2 4.7 28.5 16.4 12.1 .7 Portugal.

______________________ 262.9 4.8 1.8 4.8 1.5 3.3 (2)

## ~:f~~~land~**~= ~~=~** **~===:~** 

## ==**~==** 1,778.5 126.7 7.1 125.2 91. 8 33.4 1.5 1,082.0 86.0 7.9 60.3 55.3 5.0 25.7 Turkey

________________________ 314.0 24.7 7.9 24.7 22.6 2.1 (*) United Kingdom.

______________ 7,578.8 120.6 1.6 113.0 45.3 67.7 7.6



### --- ---- -------- ---- ---- 

### ---- OTHER EUROPE
Finland

________________________ 86ft .5 4148.4 17.1 147.6 26.1 4 121. 5 .8 yugoslavia

_____________________ 183.7 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

__________________________ 583.2 54.9 9·4 53.9 46.7 7.2 1.0 French Morocco

________________ 251. I) 8.1 1.2 3.1 3.1 (*)**(*~** Gold CoasL

___________________ 255

.. 1 9.6 3.8 9.6 .1 9.5 (* Iran

____________________________ 590.6 22.6 3.8 22.6 .4 22.2 (*) Iraq

____________________________ 81. 0 (2) (1) (3) (3) (*) (2) Israel

__________________________ 44.8 2.1 4·6 2.1 2.1 (2) (2) Sudan

__________________________ 183. f5 .8 .4- .8 .8 (2) (2) Union of South Africa

__________ 948.4 1.6 .2 1.6 1.6 (3) (2)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 399.9 8.5 2.1 .9 .9 (*) 7.6 Hong Kong

____________________ 775.8 280.7 36.t (2) (2) (*) 280.7 India

___________________________ 1,646.1 80.9 1.9 17.7 4.1 13.6 13.2 Indochina

______________________ 135.1 .6 .4- (2) (2) (3) .6 Indonesia

______________________ 1,291. 8 2.4 .}j 2.3 2.3 (3) .1 Japan

__________________________ 1,357.7 5.8 ·4 (2) (2) (*) 5.8 Malaya

_________________________ 1,957.1 92.9 4·7 60.4 36.3 24.1 32.5 Pakistan

_______________________ 749.8 72.6 9.7 27.2 23.0 4.2 45.4 Taiwan

________________________ 98.2 (3) (*) (3) (3) (3) (3)

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 2,OJ7.0 55.5 2.7 54.5 41. 3 13.2 1.0 New Zealand

___________________ 694.8 26.1 3.8 26.1 22.6 3.5 (2)

LATIN AMERICA Argentina

_______________ -

______ 1,152.3 84.5 3.0 34.5 34.5 t 2 ) \.2) BraziL

_________________________ 1,757.4 7.9 .5 6.6 6.6 (*) 1.3 Uruguay

__ --

____ ---- --- --_--- -- 236.3 .6 .2 .6 .6 (*) (2)

See general note on p. SO, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc. NOTE.-Exports include reexports for the following countries: Australia, Ceylon, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, India. Ireland, Japan. Malaya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sudan, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.

.

1 Less than 0.05 percent. 4 Includes reparatiom delivered to U. S. S. R. valued at $53,899,000 in 1951.

2 Less than $50,000. * None.
3 Not reported. 

# 82TABLE 3B.-IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE
SOVIET BLOC, 1951

[In millions of United States dollars]

""

# T~r I European European l 

### I Com-

### ~ortsfrom __

### ~w_o_r_ld~'I~T~ot_a_I_S_o_Vl_~_t_b_~_C_~~b_I_O_C~I_s_a_te_ll_it_e_s+u~.s_._S_._R~'I~~_~_i_~_~_

# "~. Aspercentage Total Total of Total Total Total Total

.. Importin. g**country~** value value**i~io~ts** value value value value

world 

# -------'1--1-

1

-.

# ------~-- United States 10,967.4 110.31 1.0 63.8 36.3 27.5 146.5 Canada________________________ 3,877.1 8.3 .2 6.5 6. 

# ° .5 1. 8**-~-- --~-** **~~-- ,~~~-** **~~~- ~---** **~~~-** OEEC Countries, totaL_ 33,727.8**1~** 100.4 3.3 936.1 661. 8 274.3 164.3**~--- ~-~-** **~-~- ~---** **--~- ~~--** **~~~-** Austria

_________________________ 652.7 71.9 11.0 71. 6 71. 6 (2) .3 Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,544. 

# ° 57.8 2.3 39.4 22.6 16.8 18.4 Denmark

_______________________ 1,012.5 70.7 7.0 62.1 52.4 9.7 8.6 France

________________________ ,- 4,546.2 70.5 1.6 53.1 39.4 13.7 17.4 Germany, Federal Republic

___ 3,537.5 136.7 3.9 87.9 87.5 .4 48.8 Greece

_________________________ 398.4 .6 .1 .6 .6 (2) (*) Iceland

_________________________ 56.7 3.9 6.8 3.9 3.9 (2) (*) Ireland

_________________________ 572.9 7.7 1.3 6.9 6.4 .5 .8 Italy and Trieste

_______________ 2,166.5 80.9 3.7 73.0 50.9 22.1 7.9 N etherlands

____________________ 2,561. 3 66.9 2.6 49.6 35.6 14.0 17.3 Norway

________________________ 877.3 29.4 3.3 27.0 16.8 10.2 2.4 PortugaL

______________________ 329.4 1.8 .5 1.4 1.4 (2) .4 Sweden

________________________ 1,775.2 137.0 7.7 129.5 116.4 13.1 7.5 Switzerland

____________________ 1,364.4 57.4 4·2 44.5 39.1 5.4 12.9 Turkey

________________________ 402.0 20.0 5.0 19.9 19.9 (2) .1 United Kingdom

_______________ 10,930.8 287.2 2.6 265.7 97.3 168.4 21. 5



### ---- ----**-~-- ~~~-** **--~- ~---** **-~--.** OTHER EUROPE Finland

________________________ 676.0 108.2 16.0 107.5 66.1 41.4 .7 Yugosla via

_____________________ 390.8 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

__________________________ 803. 

# ° 43.2 5.4- 42.3 22.0 20.3

.. 9 French Morocco

________________ 456.2 15.8 3.5 3.2 2.7 .5 12.6 Gold CoasL

___________________ 177.3 2.2 1.2 2.2 2.2 (2) (2) Iran

____________________________ 249.1 23.6 9.5 23.5 4.6 18.9 .1 Iraq

_____________________ '-

______ 142.4 4.3 3.0 4.2 4.2 (2) .1

# ~~d:~:_~~= == == =

=== ==== = =

=== = == = 343.3 10.5 3.1 9.8 9.6 .2 .7 120.5 3.6 3.0 3.5 3.1 .4 .1 Union of South Africa

__________ 1,278.1 9.0 .7 8.4 8.4 (2) .6

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 327.3 2.4 .7 1.5 1.2 .3 .9 Hong Kong

____________________ 852.3 155.1 18.2 4.1 3.7 .4 151. 

# ° India

___________________________ 1,770.3 38.4 2.2 9.7 8.1 1.6 28.7 Indochina

______________________ 303.9 7.6 2.5 .9 .9 (2) 6.7 Indonesia

______________________ 873.2 6.8 .8 4.3 4.3 (3) 2.5 J apan

__________________________ 2,047.9 24.0 1.2 2.2 2.2 (2) 21. 6 Malaya

_________________________ 1,542.1 46.7 3.0 5.2 5.2 (2) 41;5 Pakistan

_______________________ 519.9 24.6 4.7 7.6 6.3 1.3 17. 

# ° Taiwan

________________________ 134. 

# ° 6.8 5.1 .1 .1 (3) 6.7

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 2,112.5 31.6 1.5 23.8 21. 6 2.2 7.8 New Zealand

_________ _________ 578.3 2.9 .5 1.4 1.0 .4 1.5

LATIN AMERICA Argentina

______________________ 1,360.8 38.6 2.8 38.5 38.5 (2) .1 BraziL

_________________________ 2,010.6 10.3 .5

. 10.3 10.3 (*) (2) Uruguay

_______________________ 309.4 1.1 .4- 1.1 1.1 (2) (2)

See general note on p.80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.

t United States imports from Outer Mongolia are included with China since data are not separately available.

2 Less than $50,000.

3 Not reported.
4 Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of $200,000. ·None.



### 83TABLE 3c.-ExPORTS OF PRINOIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES, TO THE

SOVIET BLOC, 1952

[In millions of United States dollars]

# ~rts 10_______________ World r ComTotal Soviet bloc European European U S S R munist bloc satellites

.., . China 

### 1-----:-----1-----1-----

--------

Exporting country Total value As percentage Total' of value exports to

. world Total value Total value Total value Total value**-----------~I----** 

### ---- ------------ ---- ---- United States__________________ 15,200.7 1.1 (1) 1.1 1. 1 (2) (*) Canada

1 4,396.4

. .6 (1) .6

_ .6 (2)

_ (*)

_ OEECCountries,totaL_ 27,185.5' 788.8 2.9 744.8 513.4 231.4 44.0



## ---- ---- ---- ---- 

## ---- ---- 

## ---- Austria 506.9 64.5 12.7 64.2 63.9 .3 .3

### ~~~:k~~~~~~~~_r~_-_-_-_-~=::== 2,

### ~~~:**~~J ~:** **~~:& ~t** **~~J** 

# : France_________________________ 3,889.4 42.0 1.1 38.8 32.3 6.5 3.2 Germany, Federal Rcpublic___ 4 077 0 92 9 2 3 90 1 89 9 2 2 8 Greece_________________________ ' 119: 9 : 4 : 3 : 4 : 4 (2) • (*)

. Iceland_________________________ 39.4 2.8 7.1 2.8 2.8 (*) (*) Ireland_________________________ 284.1 (2) (1) (2) (2) (*) (*) Italy and Triesto_______________ 1,386.5 59.4 4.3 55.7 35.3 20.4 3.7 Netberlands 2,113.4 36.4 1.7 36.4 31. 5 4.9 (2) Norway 565.3 29.9 5.3 28.2 17.9 10.3 1. 7 PortugaL______________________ 236.9 7.2 3.0 7.2 1.3 5.9 (2)' Sweden_ 1,571. 4 118.2

. 7.5 117.6 73.1 44.5 .6**Switzer1and~ ~__**  1,100.1 60.4 5.5 42.4 4.0.0 2.4 18.0 Turkey 362.9 20.3 5.6 20.2 17.8 2.4 .1 United Kingdom_______________ 7,632.2 159.1 2.1 146.3 41. 4 104.9 12.8

====- 

## === ======: 

## === ===== ====:== 

## ====== OTHER EUROPE Finland

_____________________ •

__ 717.6 3183.8 25.6 177.2 21. 9 3155.3 6.6 Yugosla via

___________________ -- 246.5 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

______ ..

_________________ -- 416.8 73.0 17.5 64.1 35.3 28.8 8.9 Frencn Morocco

________________ 273.8 1.5 .5 1.5 1.5 (*) (2) Gold Coast.

____________________ 241. 6 12.0 5.0 12.0 «() 12.0 (*) Iran

____________________________ 151.1 24.3 16.1 24.3 1.0 23.3 (*) Iraq

____________________________ 55.9 .2 .5 .1 (2) .1 .1 Israel

__________________________ 42.6 2.6 6.1 2.6 1..4 1.2 (2) Sudan

______________ .

_________ •

__ 122.8 .8 .6 .8 .8 (2) (2) Union of South Africa

__________ 922.5 2.1 .2 2.1 2.1 «() «()

FAR EAST Ceylon

_______ __ ____________ -- 315.5 28.9 9.2 2.9 2.4 .5 26. 

# ° Hong Kong

______ .:.

_____________ 507.3 91. 0 17.9 (4) «() (*) 91. 0 India

________________________ --- 1,303.3 16.4 1.3 6.2 2.0 4.2 10.2 Indochina

______________________ 116.7 .1 .1 (4) «() «() . 1 Indonesia

______________ -'

_______ 907.5 9.8 1.1 9.8 9.8 «() (2) Japan

_______ __________________ 1,272.0 .8 .1 .2 (2) .2 .6 Malaya

_____________________ -

___ 1,239.7 30.3 2.4 30.3 20.9 9.4 (2) Pakistan

___________________ - _ -- 532.'5 119.6 22.5 35.7 20.3 15.4 83.9 Taiwan_ -'

____________ .

___ ,

_____ -- 116.5 «() «() (4) «() (4)

OCEANIA Australia

_____________________ ._ 1,716.2 8.9 .5 8.3 8.3 (2) .6 New Zealand

___________________ 673.6 10.0 1.5 10.0 10. 

# ° (*)**(~)**
LATIN AMERICA Argentina

_____________ ________ 709.5 12.9 1.8 12.9 12.9 (2)**~2)** Brazil

_____________________ .

____ 1,408.8 6.5 .5 6.5 6.5 «() 2) Uruguay

__________________ --

___ 208.9 1.3 .6 1.3 1.3 (*) (*)

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included inthe Soviet bloc and note on table 3a for countries whose data include reexports.

1 Less than 0.05 percent.
2 Less than $50,000. 3 Includes reparations delivered to U. S. S. R. valued at $35,719,000 from January to September 1952 when reparations deliveries were terminated.

( Not reported. *None.



### 84TABLE 3D.-IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE
SOVIET BLOC, 1952

[In millions of United States dollars]

Imports from

_ World 

### I Total Soviet bloc Com**Eu~y~;an ~~~lt~:~**  

### u. s. S. R. munist China**"""-------I----I----~---·I----II----** ----- ----

# ImpOrtlng~ As per- centage Total Total of Total Total Total Total value value imports value value value value from world 

# "" United States

__________________ 10,716.8 167.3 0.6 39.6 22.8 16.8 24.6 Canada

________________________ 4,120.3 8.7 .2 7.4 5.0 2.4 1.3

---- ====== ---- ---- --- ---- OEEC Countries, totaL_ 32,322.1 925.4 2.9 867.7 565.4 302.3 57.7

---- 

### -------- ---- ---- 

### -------- Austria

________________________ 653.6 73.6 11.3 73.6 73.5 .1 (2) Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,460.5 37.4 1.5 32.7 21.1 11. 6 4.7 Denmark

________ -

_____________ 962.2 39.2 4. 1 39.2 28.1 11.1 (2) France

_________________________ 4,432.1 63.0 1. 4 57.4 38.7 '18.7 5.6 Germany, Federal Republic

___ 3,884.8 105.5 2.7 87.9 83.9 4.0 17.6 Greece

_________________________ 346.2 .6 .2 .6 .6 (2) (2) Iceland

________________________ 55.9 3.7 6.7 3.7 3.7 (2) (*) Ireland

_________________________ 482.2 2.3 .5 2.0 1.8 .2 .3 Italy and Trieste

_______________ 2,335.6 86.8 3.7 84.6 50.5 34.1 2.2 Netherlands

____________________ 2,257.2 59.3 2.6 54.4 28.8 25.6 4.9 Norway

________________________ 873.5 35.5 4. 1 32.3 20.9 11. 4 3.2 PortugaL

______________________ 347.4 .8 .2 .7 .7 (2) .1 Sweden

________________________ 1,728.6 108.4 6.3 107.6 87.6 20.0 .8 Switzerland

____________________ 1,205.1 45.4 3.8 35.5 32.7 2.8 9.9 Turkey

________________________ 555.9 20.6 3.7 20.6 20.6 (*) (2) United Kingdom

_______________ 9,741. 3 243.3 2.5 234.9 72.2 162.7 8.4

---- ======= =====
---- 

### =======
---- OTHER EUROPE Finland

________________________ 791. 7 153.5 19.4 153.2 71.6 81.6 .3 yugoslavia

_____________________ 373.0 '(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

_____________ '

_____________ 628.3 46.3 7.4 45.6 14.5 31.1 .7 French Morocco

________________ 515.8 8.6 1.7 3.1 3.1 (2) 5.5 Gold CoasL

___________________ 186.4 1.6 .9 1.6 1.6 (2) (2) Iran

__________________________ :._ 165.2 27.4 16.6 27.3 3.4 23.9 .1 ][raq

___________________________ . 173.2 4.1 2.3 4.0 4.0 (2) .1 Israel

__________________________ 321.1 5.0 1.6 4.9 4.9 (2) .1 Sudan

________ ..;

_________________ 177.2 5.5 3.1 5.4 5.3 .1 .1 Union of South Africa

__________ 1,172.9 4.4 

### ·4 4.4 4.4 (3) (3)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 357.5 8.0 2.2 1.1 .8 .3 6.9 Hong Kong

____________________ 661. 4 146.6 22.2 1.3 1.0 .3 145.3 India

___________________________ 1,688.0 40.4**2.~** 6.4 4.6 1.8 34.0 Indochina

______________________ 448.4 8.2 1. .8 .8 (3) 7.4 Indonesia

______________________ 924.0 5.3 .6 3.4 3.4 (3) 1.9 Japan

__________________________ 2,028.8 17.9 .9 3.0 2.5 .5 14.9 Malaya

_________________________ 1,256.9 42.5 3.4 3.0 3.0 (2) 39.5 Pakistan

_______________________ 609.7 8.6 1. 4 6.0 5.6 .4 2.6 Taiwan

________________________ 187.2 9.7 5.2 (2) (2) (*) 9.7

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 1,734.8 14.0 .8 10.5 9.4 1.1 3.5 New Zealand

___________________ 644.2 2.3 ·4 1.6 1.4 .2 .7

LATIN AMERICA Argentina

______________________ 1,177.3 17.1 1.5 16.8 16.8 (*) .3 Brazil

__________________________ 2,009.5 5.9 .3 5.9 5.9**~*)** (2) Uruguay

_______________________ 257.3 1.1 

### ·4 1.1 1.1 *) (*)

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.
1 Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of $3,100,000. 2 Less than $50,000. 3 Not reported. *None.

34,3901 0 -55--7 

### 85TABLE 3E.-ExPORTS- OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE

SOVIET BLOC, 19'53

[In millions of United States dollars]

# ~rts to

_______________ European European I ComWorld Total Soviet bloc U.S.S.R. munist bloc satellites China

As per# EXPOrling~ centage Total Total of Total Total Total Total country value value exports value value value value to world



# '"

---- --- 

### ---- ---- 

## ---- United States

_____________ .:.

____ 15,766.8 1.8 (1) 1.8 1.8 (2) (*) Canada

________________ -,

_______ 4,184.8 .5 (1) .5 .5 (2) (*)

---- 

### ---- --- ---- --- --- ---- OEEC Countries, totaL. 27,602.6 804.4 2.9 709.0 518.2 190.8 95.4

---- 

### ---- ---- 

## ---- ---- ---- ---- A ustria

________________________ 537.6 58.5 10.9 58.5 57.0 1.5 (2) Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,259.3 66.1 2.9 64.7 48.2 16.5 1.4 Denmark

______________________ 893.9 44.3 5.0 44.0 23.1 20.9 .3 France

_________________________ 3,987.8 63.3 1.6 50.9 34.9 16.0 12.4 Germany, Federal Republic

___ 4,483.2 140.3 3.1 115.3 113.6 1.7 25.0 Greece

_________________________ 132.0 8.3 6.3 8.3 6.5 1.8 (2) Iceland

_________________________ 43.3 8.6 19.8 8.6 3.1 5.5 (2) Ireland

_________________________ 319.2 .4 .1 .4 .4 (*) (2) Italy and Trieste

_______________ 1,488. 1 62.7 4-.2 58.0 34.9 23.1 4.7 N etherlands

____________________ 2,129.0 60.9 2.9 56.9 34.2 22.7 4.0 Norway

________________________ 508.6 32.9 6.5 32.0 16.9 15.1 .9 PortugaL

______________________ 218.5 5.6 2.6 5.6 1.0 4.6 (2) Sweden

________________________ 1,477.0 69.7 4-.7 67.0 45.2 21. 8 2.7 Switzerland

____________________ 1,204.4 60.8 5.0 34.3 31. 4 2.9 26.5 Turkey

________________________ 396.0 29.3 7.4- 29.3 26.9 2.4 (*) United Kingdom

_______________ 7,524.7 92.7 1.2 75.2 40.9 34.3 17.5

--- ---- --- ---- ---- ---- ---- OTHER EUROPE Finland

________________________ 572.0 179.3 31.4- 173.9 28.4 145.5 5.4 Yugosla via

__ .

__________________ 186.0 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

__________________________ 394.5 48.2 12.2 37.8 25.9 11. 9 10.4 French Morocco

________________ .269.4 1.9 .7 1.9 1.9 (*) (2) Gold CoasL

___ _______________ 251.4 10.1 4-.0 10.1 (2) 10.1 (*) Iran

____________________________ 89.6 11.2 12.5 11. 2 2.3 8.9 (*) Iraq

____________________________ 55.5 1.7 3.1 1.4 1.3 .1 .3 Israel

__________________________ 57.5 2.0 3.4- 2.0 .9 1.1 (*) Sudan

__________________________ 127.5 .1 .1 (2) (2) (*) .1 Union of South Africa

________**~_** 920.7 1.8 .2 1.8 1.8 (3) (3)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 329.3 51.5 15.6 .6 .6 (*) 50.9 Hong Kong

____________________ 478.4 94.6 19.8 (*) (*) (*) 94.6 India

___________________________ 1,114.3 14.6 1.3 7.3 6.5 .8**7~** 3 Indochina

______________________ 95.4 (3) (*) (3) (3) (3) (3) Indonesia

_________________ .,;

____ 819.6 4.5 .5 4.5 4.5 (3) (2) Japan

__________________________ 1,274.8 4.6 .4- .1 .1 (2) 4.5 Malaya

_________________________ 951. 2 15.5 1.6 13.6 13.6 (*) 1.9 Pakistan

___________________ -'

___ 438.9 19.8 4-.5 12.5 5.1 7.4 7.3 Taiwan

________ .,;

_______________ 127.6 (3) (*) (3) (3) (3) (3)

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 2,021. 5 62.2 3.1 56.9 23.8 33.1 5.3 New Zealand

___________________ 659.7 11.1 1.7 11. 1 11.1 (*) (*)

LA TIN AMERICA Argentina

______________________ 1,147.8 24.4 2.1 24.4 13.1 11.3 (2) Brazil

__________________________ 1,539.3 11.3 .7 10.4 10.4 (3) .9 Uruguay

_______________________ 269.8 1.2 .4- 1.2 .9 .3 (3)

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc and note on table 3a for countries whose data include reexports.

1 Less than 0.05 percent. 2 Less than $50,000.
3 Not reported. *None.



## 86TABLE 3F.-IMPORTS OF PRINOIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE
SOVIET BLOC, 1953

[In millions of United States dollars]

Total value Total value Total value Total value As per- centage Total of value imports from world Total value 

# "

" Com-
" Imports from___________ World Total Soviet bloc**EUbYE~an ~~~~R~:~** U. 

### s. S. R. munist

"" .1 ----1. 1 1____ China 

# ""

. 

### . Importing country**------------~I----** ---- --- -----

_ United States

__________________ 10,873.8 145.7 04 36.4 25.6 10.8 0.6 Canada

________________________ 4,449.4 6.0 .1 4.9 4.0 .9 1.1

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- OEEC Countries, totaL_ 31,379.2 924.1 2.9 795.9 552.0 243.9 128.2

--- ---- 

### ---- ---- ---- 

### ---- --- Austria

______ ______________ '-

__ 545.7 60,-1 11.0 59.1 59.0 .1 1.0 Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,422.6 47.4 2.0 40.1 23.4 16.7· 7.3 Denmark

______________________ 1,000.3 40.6 4.1 38.5 30.1 8.4 2.1 France

_________________________ 4,006.7 51.4 1.3 40.4 23.5 16.9 11. 0 Germany, Federal Republic

___ 3,877.8 167.9 4.3 134.7 119.1 15.6 33.2 Greece

_________________________ 294.3 3.8 1.3 3.8 3.6 .2 (2) Iceland

_________________________ 67.8 5.8 8.6 5.8 4.2 1.6 (*) Ireland

_________________________ 513.6 2.7 .5 1.9 1.0 .9 .8 Italy and Trieste

_______________ 2,395.1 53.8 2.2 46.4 37.1 9.3 7.4 Netherlands

____________________ 2,354.3 68.6 2.9 53.5 22.2 31. 3 15.1 Norway

________________________ 912.0 43.9 4.8 40.3 23.3 17.0 3.6 PortugaL

______________________ 330.9 .9 .3 .7 .7 (2) .2 Sweden

________________________ 1,577.0 61.4 3.9 59.8 49.7 10.1 1.6 Switzerland

____________________ 1,182.8 50.7 4.3 34.6 30.5 4.1 16.1 Turkey

______________________**~_** 532.6 29.5 5.5 29.5 29.5 (*) (2) United Kingdom

_______ "'

_______ 9,365.7 235.6 2.5 206.8 95.1 111.7 28.8

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --- OTHER EUROPE Finland

________________________ 529.8 182.3 34.4 180.7 91.1 89.6 1.6 yugoslavia

_____________________ 395.3 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

__________________________ 503.2 38.6 7.7 37.9 23.8 14.1 .7 French Morocco

________________ 488.9 13.2 2.7 6.0 6.0 (*) 7.2 Gold CoasL

___________________ 200.8 2.1 1.1 2.1 2.1 (2) (2) Iran

____________________________ 168.2 16.4 9.7 14.5 5.3 9.2 1.9 Iraq

____________________________ 192.3 6.0 3.1 2.9 2.9 (2) 3.1 Israel

__________________________ 286.9 2.4 .8 2.4 2.4 (2) (2) Sudan

__________________________ 145.5 3.6 2.4 3.6 3.2 .4 (2) Union of South Africa

__ _______ 1,191. 0 3.2 .3 3.2 3.2 (3) (3)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 337.6 45.5 13;5 1.6 1.6 (2) 43.9 Hong Kong

____________________ 677.7 150.0 22.1 (2) (3) (2), 150.0 India

___________________________ 1,186.0 7.9 .7 4.4 3.5 .9 3.5 Indochina

______________________ 394.3 6.0 1.5 (3) (3) (3) 6.0 Indonesia

______________________ 753.0 7.0 .9 4.9 4.8 .1 2.1 Japan

_________________________ 2,409.6 37.8 1.6 8.1 6.0 2.1 29.7 Malaya

_________________________ 1,057.9 40.3 3.8 5.9 5.9 (2) 34.4 Pakistan

_______________________ 350.2 4.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 (2) 3.0 Taiwan

________________________ 191. 7 5.8 3.0 (2) (2) (3) 5.8

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 1,289.3 10.7 .8 6.5 4.8 1.7 4.2 New**Zealand~** __________________ 457.8 1.9 .4 1.3 1.2 .1 .6

LATIN AMERICA Argentina

______________________ 861. 6 15.3 1.8 15.3 15.3 (*) (2) BraziL

_________________________ 1,319.9 9.9 .8 9.9 9.9 (3) (3) Uruguay

_______________________ 195.2 .8 .4 .8 .8 (2) (3)

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.
1 Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of $8,700,000.
2 Less than $50,000. 3 Not reported. "'None.



### 87TABLE Bo.-ExPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE
SOVIET BLOC, 1954 1

[In millions of United States dollars]



# " European I European Com- Exports to_,..

_____________ World Total Soviet bloc U.S.S.R. munist bloc satellites China



## ----

As percentage Exporting country Total Total of Total Total Total Total value value exports value value value value to world



### ---- United States

_______________ .;

__ 15,076.8 6.0 (2) 6.0 5.8 0.2 (3) Canada

________________________ 3,982.5 6.1 0.2 6.0 1.0 5.0 0.1

OEEC COUNTRIES Austria

________________________ 609.6 58.8 9.6 57.5 56.0 1.5 1.3 Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,303.5 66.8 2.9 66.3 42.0 24.3 .5 Denmark

______________________ 948.3 61. 9 6.5 61. 5 43.2 18.3 .4 France

________ -- ---- -- -- -- _ ---- 4,190.0 82.8 2.0 74.1 43.2 30.9 8.7 Germany, Federal Republic

__ • 5,354.1 207.0 3.9 185.5 172.9 12.6 21.5 Greece (11 montbs)

__ ..;

_________ 126.1 8.5 6.8 8.5 5.9 2.6 (4) Iceland

_____________________ ---_ 51. 9 12.9 24.9 12.9 5.0 7.9 (5) Ireland

_________________________ 322.3 .3 .1 .3 .3 (*) (*) Italy and Trieste

_______________ 1,636.7 62.8 3.8 56.6 31. 3 25.3 6.2 Netherlands

___________________ 2,384.3 85.8 3.6 84.8 52.0 32.8 1.0 Norway

________ -'

_______________ 582.8 45.1 r.7 45.1 20.8 24.3 (5) Portugal

_______________________ 253.5 6.2 2·4 6.2 1.4 4.8 (5) Sweden

____________________ ---- 1,587.6 67.4 4.3 66.7 43.9 22.8 .7 Switzerland

____________________ 1,230.4 59.1 4.8 35.8 32.2 3.6 23.3 Turkey

________________________ 334.9 53.8 16.1 53.8 48.6 5.2 (4) United Kingdom

_______________ 7,767.8 115.2 1.5 95.8 56.3 39.5 19.4

OTHER EUROPE Finland

____________________ ---- 681.0 190.3 27.9 183.7 37.1 146.6 6.6 yugoslavia

_____________ - --

_____ 235.6 6.1 2.6 6.1 5.1 1.0 (4)

NEAP EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

_________ -

___ -

____ - -- ----- 399.4 56.3 14.1 44.9 39.5 5.4 11. 4 French Morocco

________________ 366.7 3.0 .8 3.0 2.4 .6 (*) Gold Coast (11 months)

________ 283.7 18.6 6.6 18.6 (5) 18.6 (*) Iran (6 months)

________________ 53.5 12.4 23.2 12.4 1.3 11.1 (5) Iraq (9 months)

________________ 33.7 .4 1.2 (*) (*) (*) .4 Israel (11 months)

______________ 76.8 3.1 4·0 3.1 .8 2.3 (*) Sudan (11 months)

_____________ 1.07.9 .9 .8 .7 .7 (*) .2 Union of South Africa (10

months)

______________________ 705.5 1.1 .2 1.1 1.1 (4) (4)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 380.0 46.9 12.3 .4 .4 (4) 46. Hong Kong

____________________ 423.0 68,4 16.2 (*) (*) (*) 68.4 India

_________ _________________ 61,176.9 617.6 1.5 10.4 5.3 5.1 67.2 Indochina (10 months)

_________ 76.9 (4) (*) (4) (4) (4) (4) Indonesia

_________ .

_____________ 856.1 9,1 1.1 6.8 6.4 .4 2.3 Japan

__________________________ 1,629.3 24.1 1.5 5.0 5.0 (5) 19.1 Malaya

_________________________ 975.5 16.7 1. r 10.3 10.3 (5) 6.4 Pakistan (11**months)~** _________ 321. 2 29.8 9.3 7.3 3.7 3.6 22.5 Taiwan.

_______________________ 93.3 (4) (*) (') (4) (4) (4)

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 1,685.1 55.5 3.3 52.3 21. 5 30.8 3.2 New Zealand

___________________ 684.4 15.6 2.3 15.5 7.3 8.2 .1

LATIN AMERICA Argentina (7 months)

__________ 622.9 74.6 12.0 74.6 27.4 47.2 (4) Brazil (10 months)

_____________ 1,250.7 19.6 1.6 17.1 17.1 (4) 2.5 Uruguay

_______________________ (7) 23.7 (*) 23.7 3.8 19.9 (4)

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc and note on table 3a for countries whose data include reexports.

1 January through December except where noted.
2 Less than 0.05 percent.
S $6,000 only, representing shipments for the use-of a diplomatic mission of a friendly foreign country.
4 Not reported.
5 Less than $50,000. 6 Excludes exports to Tibet for October-December.
7 Not available. 

### * None.


### 88TABLE 3H.-!MPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE

SOVIET BLOC, 1954 1
[In millions of United States dollars]

# ~Imports from

_____________ I ComWorld Total Soviet bloc European

### ~~~(m~:~ U. 

### s. S. R. munist bloc

. China



### ---- ---

As perTotal centage Importing country Total of Total Total Total Total value value imports value value value value from world



### ""-

--- 

## ---- 

## ---- ---- ---- ---- United States

__________________ 10,206.7 249.3 0.5 42.3 30.5 11.8 3 O. 2 Canada

________________________ 4,221. 4 5.6 .1 3.9 3.2 .7 1.7

OEEC COUNTRIES Austria.

_______________________ 634.8 60.3 9.5 59.5 58.1 1.4 .8 Belgium-Luxembourg

__________ 2,550.0 51.3 2.0 4R 1 21.1 28.0 2.2 Denmark

_______ .

______________ 1,161. 9 44.6 3.8 44.3 28.6 15.7 .3 France.

_______ :.

________________ 4,215.3 76.2 1.8 66.8 26.6 40.2 9.4 Germany, Federal Republic

____ 4,708.8 226.3 4.8 190.2 168.0 22.2 36.1 Greece (11 months)

____________ 300.8 8.3 2.8 8.3 7.1 1.2 (4) Iceland..:

________________________ 69.4 12.7 18.3 12.7 4.6 8.1 (4) Ireland

_________________________ 503.8 1.9 .4 1.7 1.1 .6 .2 Italy and Trieste

_______________ 2,401. 0 64.8 2.7 62.7 39.0 23.7 2.1 Netherlands

___________________ 2,813.0 58.8 2.1 52.6 29.6 23.0 6.2 Norway

________________________ 1,018.6 44.2 4·3 41. 8 28.5 13.3 2.4 PortugaL

______________________ 350.4 .9 .8 .1 .7 (4) .2 Sweden

________________________ 1,776.3 69.7 3.9 68.1 41.4 26.7 1.6 Switzerland

____________________ 1,305. ] 49.-1 3.7 38.4 32.9 5.5 11. 0 Turkey

________________________ 478.3 45.5 9.5 45.5 42.1 3.4 (4) United Kingdom

_______________ 9,461. 0 231.7 2.4 206.5 89.6 116.9 25.2

OTIIER EUROPE Finland

________________________ 661. 5 190.1 28.7 187.3 98.9 88.4 2.8 yugoslavia

_____________________ 333.6 3.8 1.2 3.8 2.7 1.1 (*)

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt

_________________________ 458.9 26.9 5.9 26.1 19.5 6.6 .8 French Morocco

________________ 479.8 13.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 .1 10.9 Gold Coast (11 months)

________ 178.3 2.6 1.5 2.6 2.5 .1 (4) Iran (6 months)

________________ 104.5 14.6 14·0 10.6 4.8 5.8 4.0 Iraq (9 months)

________________ 148.0 5.3 3.6 2.3 2.3 (4) 3.0 Israel (11 months)

______________ 263.9 6.3 2·4 6.3 4.7 1.6 (4) Sudan (11 months)

_____________ 127.4 8.8 6.9 8.7 8.5 .2 .1 Union of South Africa (10 (6)

months)

______________________ 1,050.6 2.6 .2 2.6 2.6 (6)

FAR EAST Ceylon

_________________________ 293.4 33.1 11.3 1.1 .7 .4 32.0 Hong Kong

______ _____________ 601. 2 121.1 20.1 (4) (6) (4) 121.1 India

___________________________ 61,232.2 610.4. .8 6.4 4.0 2.4 64.0 Indochina (10 months)

_________ 280.8 7.0 ii.5 (6) (6) (6) 7.0 Indonesia (11 months)

__________ 580.3 13.2 2.3 10.1 9.5 .6 3.1 J apan

__________________________ 2,399.4 48.4 2.0 7.6 5.3 2.3 10.8 Malaya

_________________ ..:

_______ 1,025.6 32.7 3.2 ·1.2 -1.2 (4) 28.5 Pakistan (11 months)

__________ 297.2 2.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 .2 1.5 Taiwan.

_______________________ 211.4 3.4 1.6 (4) (4) (6) 3.4

OCEANIA Australia

_______________________ 1,692.0 12.8 .8 8.8 7.4 1.4 4.0 New Zealand

___________________ 596.6 2.3 ·4 1.7 1.3 .4 .6

LATIN AMERICA Argentina (7 months)

__________ 560.4 32.7 6.0 32.7 22.4 10.3 (6) Brazil (10 months)

__________ .

___ 1,356.8 14.0 1.0 14.0 14.0 (6)**(6~** Uruguay

_____________ ---

_______ (7) 2.6 (*) 2.6 2.6 (4) (6

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.

t January through December except where noted.

2 InclUdes imports from Outer Mongolia, of $6,800,000.

3 Imports from China were $179,000 in January-December 1954. 4 Less than $50,000. 6 Not reported. 6 Excludes imports from Tibet for October-December.
7 Not available. 

### * None. 

## 89rrAllLE 4.-1.'RADE OF FREE-WORLD AND COCOJ\1 COUNTltIES WITH EUROPEAN SOVIET
BLOC, ln47-54

[In millions of United States dollars]

Exports to European Soviet bloc Imports froni European Soviet bloc

Total Total European Total Total European free free Year world COCOM COCOM world COCOM COCOM

Percent Percent Percent Percent Value Value of free Value of free Value Value of free Value of free world world world world

--- --- --- --- -- 

### --- --- --- EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC 1947

__________________ 1,333.5 785.8 58.9 410.2 30.8 1,006.8 504.4 50.1 390.3 38.8 1948

__________ _______ 1,434.2 576.1 4.0.2 429.7 30.0 1,519.7 809.8 53.3 688.3 45.3 1949

__________________ 1,355.1 645.1 4.7.6 570.2 4.2.1 1,371. 5 792.4 57.8 701. 9 51.2 1950

___ -,

______________ 1,092.7 533.4 4.8.8 502.4 4.6.0 1,191. 9 732.0 61.4. 641. 6 53.8 1951

__________________ 1,241. 7 512.2 4.1.3 508.8 41.0 1,358.1 752.1 55.4. 679.7 50.0 1952

______ .

____________ 1,165.7 519.8 44. 6 517.9 4.4..4. 1,257.5 695.1 55.3 645.1 51.3 1953

__________________ 1,101. 3 542.5 4.9.3 540.2 4.9.1 1,177.2 684.0 58.1 634.6 53.9 1954

__________________ 11,435.0 757.5 52.8 740.5 51.6 11,360.0 823.4 60.5 769.5 56.6

EURO£EAN SATELLITES 1947

__________________ 856.5 538.2 62.8 316.7 37.0 732.9 338.4 4.6.2 303.6 4.1.4 1948

__________________ 900.7 447.8 4.9.7 333.9 37.0 1,026.0 484.5 4.7.2 452.5 44. 1 1949

__________________ 918.4 506.8 55.2 446.0 4.8.6 1,090.7 612.3 56.1 563.9 51.7 1950

__________ ...

_______ 791. 6 437.5 55.3 407.9 51.5 939.8 546.4 58.1 495.1 52.7 1951

__________________ 854.2 383.2 44. 9 379.9 44. 5 967.5 468.8 4.8.5 424.4 4.3.9 1952

__________________ 682.4 335.5 4.9.2 333.8 4.8

.. 9 794.4 396.2 4.9.9 365.9 4.6.1 1953

__________________ 677.8 383.4 56.6 381.1 56.2 803.1 443.1 55.2 407.5 50.7 1954

__________________ 1850.0 2529.5 62.3 2517.7 aO.9 1890.0 2520.0 58.4. 2480.9 54..0

U. S. S. R. 1947

__________________ 477.0 247.6 51.9 93.5 19.6 273.9 166.0 60.6 86.7 31.7 1948

__________________ 533.5 128.3 24..0 95.8 18.0 493.7 325.3 65.9 235.8 4.7.8 1949

__________________**4~6.** 7 138.3 31.7 124.2 28.4. 280.8 180.1 64..1 138.0 4.9.1 1950

__________________ 301.1 95.9 31.8 94.5 31.4. 252.1 185.6 73.6 146.5 58.1 1951

__________________ 387.5 129.0 33.3 128.9 33.3 390.6 283.3 72.5 255.3 65.3 1952

__________________ 483.3 184.3 38.1 184.1 38.1 463.1 298.9 64..5 279.2 60.3 1953

__________________ 423.5 159.1 37.6 159.1 37.6 374.1 240.9 64..4. 227.1 60.7 1954

__________________ 1585.0 2225.7 38.6 2220.5 37.7 1470.0 2302.4 64..3 2287.6 61.2

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included in the Soviet bloc.
NOTE.-COCOM countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and United States.

1 Estimated as of Apr. 1, 1955.
2 Incomplete. Excludes trade of Greece for December.



### 90TABLE**5.-~RADE** OF 

### COCOM COUNTRIES WITH THE EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC, SEMIANNUALLY, 1951-54

[In millions of United States dollars]

Oountry 1951

First I Second half half 1952

First I Second half half 1953

First 

### I Second half half 1954

First 

### I Second half half

Exports to European Soviet bloc

Total OOCOM________________ 250.0· 262.21 270.5

. 249.3 221. 1 321. 4

I 373.3. 384.2 European COOOM____________ 247.1 261. 7 269.7 248.2 219.9 320.3 I 369.2 371.3

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- Belgium-Luxembourg

_______________ 30.2 24.8 32.1 27.4 33.2 31. 5 33.2 33.1 Denmark

______ .

______________________ 17.1 22.8 18.4 16.7 12.3 31. 7 37.8 23.7 France

_______ .

_______________________ 18.7 19.9 21. 0 17.8 25.0 26.0 37.2 36.9 Germany, Federal Republic

_________ 58.1 41.1 28.8 61. 3 37.3 78.0 77.4 108.1 Greece

______________________ :..

_______ .1 .3 .1 .3 4.4 3.9 5.2 5.6 Italy and Trieste

____________________ 29.1 36.0 26.7 29.0 23.8 34.1 31. 4 25.2 N etherlands

_________________________ 18.5 21.1 22.1 14.3 15.0 41. 9 37.9 46.9 Norway

_____________________________ 16.0 12.5 12.3 15.9 12.5 19.5 24.2 20.8 Portugal

_____________________________ 2.2 2.6 3.4 3.8 3.6 2.0 4.5 1.7 Turkey

______________________________ 13.8 10.9 11. 4 8.8 13.8 15.5 31. 6 22.2 United Kingdom

_____ .

______________ 43.3 69.7 93.4 52.9 39.0 36.2 48.8 47.1

--- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- Other COCOM

________________ 2.9 .5 .8 1.1 1.2 1.1 4.1 12.9

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- United States

_______________________ 2.5 .3 .5 .6 .9 .9 .9 5.1 Canada

_____________________________ .4 .2 .3 .3 .3 .2 3.2 2.8 Japan.

______________________________ (1) (*) (1) .2 (1) (I) (I) 5.0

Total COCOM

_ European COCOM

_ Belgium-Luxembourg

_ Denmark

_ France

_ Germany, Federal Republic

_ Greece

_ Italy and Trieste

.

_ N etherlands

_ Norway

_ PortugaL

_ Turkey

_ United Kingdom

_ Other COCOM

_ United States

_ Canada

_ Japan

_ Imports from European Soviet bloc

374.8 377.3 354.0 341.1 282.5 401. 5 354.5 468.9

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

333.6 346.1 329.5 315.6 256.0 378.6 329.4 440.1

--- --- --- --- --- --- ------

20.4 19.0 13.0 19.7 14.2 26.0 20.0 29.1 32.0 30.1 19.3 19.8 17.7 20.8 22.5 21. 8 22.0 31.1 36.6 20.8 26.5 13.9 30.8 36.0 39.3 48.6 27.5 60.4 48.9 85.8 80.2 110.0

.4 .2 .1 .5 1.3 2.5 4.1 5.2 44.2 28.8 41. 7 42.9 25.1 21. 3 29.5 33.4 26.9 22.7 25.7 28.7 16.4 37.0 21. 7 30.8 14.3 12.7 14.1 18.2 14.3 26.0 21.1 20.6

.7 .7 .2 .5 .5 .3 .2 .6 9.7 10.2 7.6 13.0 12.7 16.7 18.0 27.5 123.7 142.0 143.7 91.1 78. 4 128.3 81. 3 125.1

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

41. 2 31. 2 24.5 25.5 26.5 22.9 25.1 28.8



### --- ------ --- --- --- --- ---

35.7 28.1 19.5 20.1 20.4 16.0 19.7 22.6 3.6 2.8 2.7 4.7 2.2 2.7 1.6 2.4 1;9 .3 2.3 .71 3.9 4.2 3.8 3.8

See general note on p. 80, listing countries included.in the Soviet bloc.

1 Less than $50,000.
* None.



### 91TABLE 6.-TRADE OF**COCO~I** COUNTIUES WITH U. S. S. R., SEMIANNUALLY, 1951-54

[In millions of United States dollars]

Country 1951

First 

### I Second half half 1952

First 

### I Second half half 1953

First 

### I Second half half 1954

First 

### I Second half half

Belgium-Luxembourg

_ Denmark '"

_ France

_ Germany, Federal Republic

_ Greece

_ Italy and Trieste

_ N etherlands

_ Norway

_ PortugaL "- • Turkey United Kingdom

_ Exports to U. S. S. R.

Total COCOM

________________ 39.7 89.3 114.4 69.9 47.2 111.9 127.0 198.7



### --- 

## --- --- --- --- --- --- --- European COCOM

____________ 39.7 89.2 114.4 69.7 47.2 111.9 124.1 196.4



### --- --- --- 

## --- --- 

### --- --- --- Belgium-Luxembourg

_______________**~.** 2 8.1 11.8 3.0 3.0 13.5 12.7 11.6 Denmark

____________________________ .1 .1 8.2 5.6 1.4 19.5 16.4 1.9 France

______________________________ .9 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.4 12.6 19.2 11. 7 Germany, Federal Republic

_________ (2) (2) (2) .2 .1 1.6 4.8 7.8 Greece

______________________________ (*) (*) (2) (2) 1.3 .5 1.9 3 .6 Italy and Trieste

____________________ 8.7 15.0 9.1 11. 3 6.9 16.2 14.1 11.2 N etherlands

_________________________ .9 .7 3.1 1.8 2.2 20.5 17.8 15.0 Norway

__________ .,.

__________________ 6.5 5.6 4.4 5.9 5.6 9.5 13.0 11.3 PortugaL

____________________________ 1.2 2.1 2.9 3.0 2.7 1.9 4.1 .7 Turkey

______________________________ (*) 2.1 1.8 .6 (*) 2.4 .5 4.7 United Kingdom

___________________ 16.2 51. 5 69.8 35.1 20.6 13.7 19.6 19.9**=====~** --- 

### --- ---**~==** --- Other COCOM

__ _____________ (2) .1 (2) .2 (2) (2) 2.9 2.3



## ------ ------ --- ------ --- United States

__ "-

____________________ (2) .1 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) .2 Canada

______________________________ (2) (*) (2) (2) (2) (2) 2.9 2.1 Japan

_______________________________ (*) (*) (*) .2 (2) (2) (2) (2)

Imports from U. S. S. R.

Total COCOM

### J~~**~~~~~11186.0** European COCOM 

### ,1i4.""6l4Q716'6.""91"ii"3 62.""3 1178.4



### ------ ------------------ 9.0 7.8 3. 1 8. 5 4.1 12.6 10. 5 17. 5 4.4 5.3 8.0 3.1 3.1 5.3 8.5 7.2 3.9 9.8 12. 5 6.2 7.4 9.5 18.1 22. 1 .2 .2 .1 3.9 5.2 10.4 7.7 14.5 (*) (2) (*) (2) (2) .2 .5 3.7 16.3 5.8 17.2 16.9 4.3 5.0 9.3 14.4 4.8 9.2 14.3 U.3 5.8 25.5 7.4 15.6 4.6 5.6 3.8 7.6 3.6 13.4 5.9 7.4**~ ~ ~ ~**  (2) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) .9 2.5 71.4 97.0 107.9 54.8 28.8 82.9 40.4 76. 5 Other COCOM

_ United States

_ Canada

_ Japan

_ 

### --- --- 

### --- --- 

### --- --- --- --- 12.3 15.7 9.9 9.8 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.6

--- 

### --- --- --- 

### --- --- ------

12.3 15.2 9.4 7.4 6.4 4.4 5.8 6.0 (2) .5 .5 1.9 .3 .6 .2 .5 (4) (2) (2) .5 .2 1.9 1.2 1.1

1 Incomplete. Excludes trade of Greece for December.

2 Less than $50,000.
3 July-November only.

4 Not reportedi n source. *None.



### 92TABLE7.-TRADEOFFREE-'VORLDANDCOUNTRIES'VITI!cOMMUNISTCHINA,1947-54[InmillionsofUnitedStatesdollars]TotalFreeWorldTotalCOCOMcountriesUnitedStatesTotalFreeWorldTotalCOCOMcountriesUnitedStatesYearValueValueIPercentofworldexportsValueIPercentofworldexportsValueValueIPercentofworldimportsValueIPercentofworldimportaExportstoCommunistChinaImportsfromCommunistChina1947__________________________________672.2482.771.8353.552.6417.9182.043.6116.727.91948__________________________________.534.3364.768.3273.451.2488.3204.841.9120.324.61949__________________________________324.5127.439.382.725.5427.6168.939.6107.125.01950_____________..____________________452;1102.822.74.6.510.3534.7265.949.7146.527.41951__________________________________446.231.17.0(1)(2)524.7212.740.646.58.91952__________________________________272.625.79·4(*)(*)365.087.423.924.66.719.'>3__________________________________287.670.724.6(*)(*)434.1140.232.2.6.11954__________________________________3285.076.9(4)(2)3371.2126.734·1.2.1NOTE.-Chinadata,since1949,referasfaraspossibleonlytomainlandChina,Manchuria,InnerMongolia,andTibet.ForlistofCOCOMcountries.seetable4.1Lessthan$50,000.2Lessthan0.05percent.:IEstimatedasofApr.1,1955.4$6,000onlyrepresentingshipmentsfortheuseofadiplomaticmissionofafriendlyforeigncountry.*None.TABLEB.-TRADEOFFREE-WORLD",VITHCOMMUNISTCHINA,ANNUALLYANDSEMIANNUALLY,1951-54[InmillionsofUnitedStatesdollars]SemiannualAnnual1951195219531954195119521953 1954FirstISecondFirstISecondFirstSecondFirstSecondhalf half halfhalf.halfhalfhalf halfExportstoCommunistChinaTotal_______________________________________.:._____446.2272.6 287.61285.0306.6139.6119.5153.1168.2119.4 134.61150.4---------------------------------------Australia____________:..___________________________________1.0.65.33.2.5.5.2.41.43.91.12.1Belgium-Luxembourg___________________________________9.4.61.4'.57.91.5.3.31.3.1.2.3=============================================7.626.050.946.5(*)7.612.513.525.025.917.928.6.1.2.3.4.1(2).1.1.1.2.1.3Egypt___________________________________________________1.08.910.411.4.9.12.56.44.95.510.31.1Finland_________________________________________________.86.65.46.6.4.4.16.51.04.41.25.4France_____________________________________'_____________2.03.212.48.71.5.5 .92.39.72.75.43.3FrenchMorocco____________________________:..____________(*)(2)(2) (2)(3)(*)(*)(2)(*)(2)(*)(2)4.02.825.0 21.53.3.7.22.613.711.38.013.5280.791.094.668.4201.579.229.161.963.730.9 31.836.6India_______.____________________________________________13.2 10.27.347.26.66.67.03.24.62.72.944.3Indochina_______________________________________________.6.1(2)(35).5 .1(3).1(3)(3) (3)(36)ItalyandTrieste____________________,-___________________.93.74.76.1.8 .12.01.73.9.83.62.5Japan_____________________________..:_______________'-_____5.8.64.519.15.1.7 .3.32.32.24.714.4Malaya__________________________________..:_______________32.5(3)1.96.432.5(*)(3)(3).21.72.53.9Netherlands.____________________________________________.3(3)4.01.0.3(3) (3) (3)2.61.4.4.6Pakistan________________________________________________45.483.97.3722.522.822.654.529.43.63.722.5(8)Sweden________________________________________________1.5.62.7.7.51.0.2.42.3.4.2.5Switzerland_____________________________________________25.718.026.523.313.1 12.67.310.715.710.8·9.613.7Taiwan______________________________'-__________________(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3) (3)(3)(3)(3)UnitedKingdom_______________________________________7.612.817.519.45.71.91.910.98.7 8.8 8.211.2UnitedStates___________________________________________(2)(*)(*)(2)(*)(2).(*)(*)(*)(*)(2) (2)Otherfree-worldcountries__________________________:..____6.12.85.512.12.63.5.42.43.52.04.08.1TABLE8.-TRAJ?EOFFREE-WORLDWITHOOMMUNISTCHINA,ANNUALLYANDSEMIANNUALLY,1951-54-0ontinuedSemiannualAnnual19511952195319541951FirstISecondhalfhalf1952FirstISecondhalfhalfFirsthalf1953SecondhalfFirsthalf1954SecondhalfImportsfromCommunistChinaTotal_524.7365.0434.11371.2269.2255.5171.7193.3225.7 208.4176.11194.8Australia_Denmark_Egypt_Finland_France_FrenchMorocco•__Germany,FederalRepublic_HongKong_India_Indochina_ItalyandTrieste_=============================================Netherlands_Pakistan_Sweden_Switzerland_Taiwan_UnitedKingdom_UnitedStates_Otherfree-worldcountries_7.818.4.98.6.9.717.412.648.8151.028.76.77.921.641.517.317.07.512.96.721.546.521.83.54.76.9(2).7.35.65.517.6145.334.07.42.214.939.54.92.6.89.99.78.424.616.04.27_33.92.1.71.611.0·7.233.2150.03.56.07.429.734.415.13.01.616.15.828.8.620.94.02.232.0.3.82.99.410.936.1121.144.067.02.140.828.56.271.51.611.03.425.2.220.03.311.1.45.4.5.113.04.617.779.71.52.75.914.621.710.411.34.98.91.810.231.87.74.57.3.53.2.4.64.48.031.171.327.24.02.07.019.86.95.72.64.04.911.314.714.12.32.5.3(2).4.23.14.08.260.710.23.3.95.621.02.81.4.23.54.55.022.69.01.22.26.6(2).3.12.51.59.484.623.84.11.39.318.52.11.2.66.45.23.42.07.01.94.222.12.1.3.15.24.714.884.91.43.94.312.620.311.81.2.68.12.912.0.26.12.33.121.8(2).41.55.82.518.465.12.12.13.117.114.13.31.81.08.02.916.8.414.82.01.416.3.3.31.94.45.416.053.02.14.1.818.114.93.4.81.15.51.810.8.111.92.o·.815.7(2)1.0-5.()5.520.168.141.962.9'1.322.713.62.g.8.7.55.51.614.4.18.1Note:ChinadatareferasfaraspossibletomainlandChina;Manchuria,InnerMongoliaandTibet.1EstimatedasofApril1,1955.6July-Octoberonly.2Lessthan$50,000.7January-Novemberonly.3Notreported.8July-Novemberonly.4ExcludesexportstoandimportsfromTibetforOctober-December.*None.6January-Octoberonly...TABLE9A.-UNITEDSTATESTRADEWITHTHESOVIETBLOCCOUNTRIES,1937,1948,1952,1953,AND1954[UnitedStatesstatistics;inthousanddollars]Generalimports19371948195219531954206,506233,48267,31146,12749,294102,884113,13839,.58636,43742,27730,76886,82516,81810,79111,809,72,11626,31322,768 25,64630,468137------------526581,86283127535331137,18322,1251,4772,2623,064n.s.s.ll.s. s.7,1186,5833,794937(*)------2;9i3-------------------------5,5121,6131,7171,3357676----------i-------------------------1,17210------------119,5681,24910,24714,29521,5704,978480683372382103,622120,34527,7259,6907,017103,622120,345{324,605·6111793,1209,0806,839n.s.s.n.s.s.------------------------------------{___________26}-----------------------------------273,400n.s. s.1948195219531954396,6411,0971,7765,964123,2411,0971,7765,95827,879201921995,3621,0771,7575,739344(*)2------------2,086245521,56375401,005n.s.s.6221,0795997------------------------.._----------8,0296922,4761------------------------------------115------------------------------------55,6752866221,5887,542------------766273,400------------------------2649,703n.s.s.Exports,includingreexportsTotalSovietbloc______143,892U.S. S.R__________________________________________42,892Europeansatellites____ ____________ _51,2971-----1------1-----1-----1------1----,...-11"'-----1------1-----1----:---Albania__ ________147Bulgaria:.._______490Czechosovakia_______________________________ ___13,233EastGermanyn.s. s.Estonia_____________________________ _________1,244Hungary._____ ____ ______693Latvia___________1,744Lithuania________________ __ _____ ___511PolandandDanzig_______________________________________26,297Rumania______________ ____ _____ _6,938BlocinAsiaChinaManchuria)}OuterMongoha_NorthKorea_19371CountryNOTE.-Columnsmaynotaddexactlyduetorounding.1DatarepresentdirectshipmentsonlywhichinprewaryearsgreatlyunderstatedthetradewithCentralEuropeancountries;foratotalofdirectandindirectimportsofUnitedStatesmerchandiseseeforeigncountrystatistics.2Representshipmentsfortheuseofadiplomaticmissionofafriendlyforeigncountry.3Consistedchieflyofstrategicmaterialsspecificallylicensedforimport••Consistedchieflyofstrategicmaterialsspecificallylicensedforimportin1952butnotactuallyimporteduntil1953,andChinesemateriallocatedinfreecountriesbeforeDecember1950andpurchasedinthosecountriesbyAmericans.5UnitedStatesdoesnotconsiderOuterMongoliaasapartofCommunistChina;traditionallyforstatisticalpurposes,however,OuterMongoliawasincludedwithOhinathrough1952.SeparatefiguresforthisareahavebeencompiledsinceJanuary1953,the1952breakdownisestimated..*Lessthan$500.N.s.s.:Notshownseparately.TABLE9n.-UNITEDSTATESEXPORTSTOSOVIETBLOCCOUNTRIES,BYPRINCIPALCOMMODITIES,1948,1952,1953,AND1954[UnitedStatesstatistics;inthousanddollars]CommodityU.S.S.R.Europeansatellites1ChinaandOuterMongolia21948195219531954194811952195319541948 1954--------------------------------1-----1---·---1-----1-----1---------------------------Total,includingreexports_Total,domestic,;,_27,879201921995,3021,0771,7575,739273,4002 627,50615 1821994,1171,0171,6745,628273,02726Animaloilsandfats,edihlc----__1,83211--_g:nre::::==::::=:::==::::-------i7-9,::::==:=::================:=:=Calfandkidskins,wet• ---____98_=======================================:==:::::=:=::::::==::::::::::::==::::==:::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:==:===::=:==:===:==:=::===Corn,exceptseedcorn..:---------___1,311100Rice.:.___1021,462_Wheatandwheattlour_____29__7709,984----------Grainsandpreparations,n.e.s,________________________________2133268_._Beansandpeas,dryripe.______18289-------'_==:=============================.::===========:=====---Ii:;:"8:-::======:=::===============:======= =========:===------37i----Ii:;:-----------=::XL=======================Woolrags_____________________________________________________________________911,34931941,1981Paper,relatedproductsandmanufactures____________________________________(*)6316,432Petroleumandproducts______________________________________________________403475113,947Ironandsteel-millproducts__312287(*)7,647Copperandmanufactures_______31__ _2.349__1,769=============================================::==:==================--------i-(*)10iAutomobiles,partsandaccessorics____________________________________________239393658532926Aircraft_______________ ____________________ ___ ______89_ __________ __________155______________11,970Vesse1f;-____4.953Coal-tarproducts_____________________________________________________________81791,0384,475Medicinalandpharmaceuticalpreparations___________________________________411,60310185,392Industrialchemicals__________156590--____3,146--------8---------5--------i6-11,------isi--------25-Books,legalformsandotherprintedmatter__________________________________781 6 11274 6..:_15,418Scientificandprofessionalapparatus__________________________________________3111942211,972l\iilitaryandnavalequipmcnt,n.e.s_________________________________________27,612OtherexportsofUnitedStatesmcrchandise_1,9023437,134444012934,106maynotaddexactlyduetorounding.1TotalexportstoindividualSovietcountrir.sareshowninseparatetable;EastGermanynotincludedin1948.2Datafor1954representshipmentsfortbeuseofadiplomaticmissionofafriendlyforeigncountry;exportswerenilin1952ann1953.3PrincipallytoEastGermany.4Includes$89,000ofreexportsofwoolragstoPolandandDanzig.*I"e51sthan$500.N.e.s.:Notelsewherespecified.N.s.s.:NotseparatelyshOWn.TABLE9C.-UNITEDSTATESIMPORTSFROMSOVIETBLOCCOUNTRIES,BYPRINCIP.ALCOMMODITIES,1948,1952,1953,AND1954[UnitedStatesstatistics;in.thousanddollarsl19541953OuterMongolia1952219541953China319522195419521953Europeansatellites119481954U.S.S.R.195219531948ChinaandOuterMongolia21---...------,---1---.....----,----1948Commodity--------------------1-----------------------------------------Generalimports.:.______________________86.82516.81810,791 11,80926,313 22,76825,64630,468120,34524,6056111793,1209,0806,839Importsforconsumptlon486,18616,808 10,78011,67629,16822,46023,57430,963117,36625,7499782663,2838,2577,385========================Meatsandsausagecasings_________________________913523794967,25910,574 17,677673_FishproductsinclUdingshellfish__________________696565311372(*)2023127402_Otherfoodstuffs___________________________________1 24605444962794,85657108_Fursandmanufactures40,68812,3807,0718,1771,4666683454189,107149137012,3101,079BJ,"istles___________________________________________2108188495503245743731023,13517,84519974_Feathers,crude___________________________________95851622581,6192,8851,6066963,9286,0342991_Tobacco,unmanufactured_________________________2,05312,2284362111_======== ================__======== ================-----26;275-------2-======== ================ ======== ========Cottonwaste_____________________________________473217202111..:__824_Rawcottonandlinters.:_____________________1,9857765627814_Wool,unmanufactured____________________________1,181391696,03134757(*)2,4935,8316,055Hairandmanufactures____________________________49129535922115431032,83710854350251Silkwaste_________________________________________117 14232270216315_Othertextilesandmanufactures___________________73926,0927956211,14616,41352785209063_Glassandglassproducts_1(*)2,4201,2027159134(*)_Potteryandclayproducts_________________________(*)(*).17329614255827151_Preciousandsemipreciousstones,imitationsandindustrialdiamonds_____________________________802________52,767153650493379_Preciousmetals,jewelryandplatedware__________1,774(*)6432191,3091117203653 1 2_==============_========================_1,48r------i;814------------(*y--================================Photographicgoods_------------'------------------6191613381,8971,3371,77127546-----10-2-------9-3------1-1-9---_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_------3---_-_-_-_====Artworksandantiques____________________________8 310111148458===========--7;855-========================___======================================:========:Allotherimports__________________________________2,7799826645145,0873,2193,3814,9859,2552028335.NoTE.-Columnsmaynotaddexactlyduetorounding.1TotalImportsfromindividualSovietcountriesareshowninseparatetable;EastGermanynotincludedin1948.2TradewitnOuterMongoliawasreportedinstatisticsforChinauntil1953.The1952datainthistableareadjustedfigures,showingOuterMongolianproductsseparately.3SinceDecember1950,UnitedStatesimportsofChinesemerchandisehaveconsistedchieflyofstrategicmaterials,forwhichimportlicenseswereissuedin1951andearly1952,andChineseproductspurchasedoutsideChina,fromcountrieswhichhadobtainedthemerchandisebeforeDecember1950.4Commoditydataareimportsforconsumption.Importsforconsumptionrepresentmerchandiseenteredimmediatelyuponarrivalintoconsumptionormerchandisingchannelsplusmerchandisewithdrawnfrombondedcustomswarehouses;"GeneralImports"datarepresentmerchandiseenteredimmediatelyuponarrivalintoconsumptionormerchandisingchannelsplusmerchandiseenteredintobondedcustomswarehouses.. *Lessthan$500.T,ABLE10A.-FREE-WORLDEXPORTSTOTHESOVIETBLOC,BYPRINCIPALCOMMODITYGROUPS,1951-53[InmillionsofUnitedStatesdollars]TotaltoSovietblocEuropeansatellitesU.S. S.R.CommunistChinaCommodityorcommoditygroup195119521953195119521953195119521953195119521953------------------------Exports,total_________________________________________________1,687.91,438.31,388.9854.2682.4677.8387.5483.3 423.5446.2272.6 287.6Dairyproducts_______.;:______________________________________________15.5 19.560.315.213.022.4(1)6.537.7.3(1).2Fish___,.____________________________________________________________25.526.531.318.817.116.66.59.214.7.2.2(1)Otherandunspecifiedfood,beveragesandtobacco__________________94.375.8109.447.436.368.641.936.736.85.02.84.0Oilseeds,fatsandoils_______________________________________________23.515.023.814.68.9 8.87.85.710.21.1.44.8,Cruderubber_______________________________________________________204.5158.182.027.431.216.480.3100.917.396.826.048.3Wood,corkandmanufactures,exceptpaper_________________________58.873.251.937.026.218.620.744.531.61.12.51.7Paper,paperboardandmanufactures________________________________26.025.1 25.36.85.05.91.99.012.5 17.311.16.9Rawwoolandanimalhair__________________________________________122.350.3103.295.832.744.424.710.040.01.87.618.8,Rawcotton_______________________________________________-'_________121.7197.974.977.164.340.41.241.415.943.492.218.6Otherandunspecifiedtextilefibersandmanufactures_______________120.386.987.668.852.648.610;324.231.041.210.18.0Otherandunspecifiedinediblecrudematerialsandmanufactures___36.925.626.628.020.9 20.45.52.12.43.42.63.8Fertilizers,crudeandmanufactured_________________________________27.437.524.016.514.56.3(1)(*)(*)10.923.017.7Nonmetallicmineralsandmanufactures_____________________________21.814.221.117.013.320.1.3.1.44.5.8.6Ironandsteelandmanufactures____________________________________107.877.8126.9'56.563.290.39.212.317.342.12.319.3Baseilletaloresandotherandunspecifiedbasemetalsandmanu-factures___________________________________________________________43.771.168.933.259.550.75.48.312.35.13.35.9Dyeing,tanning,andcoloringmaterials______________________________50.128.437.121.015.916.1,.2.2.928.912.320.1Medicinesandpharmaceuticals______________________________________41.337.740.712.29.54.7.6.6.828.527.635.ZOtherandunspecifiedchemicals____________________________________51.741.346.224.124.728.92.55.44.425.111.212.9Electricalmachinery_____________________________,.__________________61.554.452.235.733.828.312.917.216.5 12.93.47.4Mining,constructionandindustrialmachinery,includingbearings__74.7 67.069.444.239.9 39.827.4 20.922.13.16.27.5Otherandunspecifiedmachinery___________________________________97.358.844.654.939.228.627.217.4 10.4 15.22.25.6andboats_______________________________________________-_____63.274.457.9.21.5.562.872.957.4.2(*) (*)OtherandunspecifiedtransportequipmenL________________________42.314.97.727.712.66.93.72.1.410.9.2.4Prefabricatedbuildings___________________________-__--__------__-__28.432.528.1.1.1(*)28.332.428.1(*)(*)(*)Otherandunspecifiedmerchandise__________________________________127.474.487.874.046.545.56.23.32.447.224.639.9Seegeneralnoteonp.80,listingcountriesincludedintheSovietbloc.NOTE.-Valuesshownaboveshouldnotbeconsideredexactmeasuresofthetradeofthefree-worldwiththeSovietblocineachcommoditygroup.Whilestrenuouseffortshavebeenmadetoachievecomparabilityfromyeartoyear,thishasnotbeenentirelypossible,owingtolimitationsinherentinavailablesourcematerials.Datafor1951arebased_oncom-moditygroupingsnotstrictlycomparablewiththosefor1952and1953.Ingeneralthevaluesofspecificallyidentifiedgroupstendtobesomewhatunderstated,ascommodityfiguresarenotavailablefromallfree-worldcountriesinsufficientdetailtofitintothegroupsshown.The"otherandunspecified"categories,therefore,includeunknownamountsproperlyclassifiableamongthelistedcommoditygroups.Valuesofcommoditygroupsnotavailablefor1954attimeofprinting.'1Lessthan$50,000.*Noneornonereportedinavailablestatistics.ooTABLE10B.--:-FREE-'VORLD11IIPORTSFROMTHESOYIETBLOC,BYPRINCIPALCOMMODITYGROUPS,1951-53[InmillionsofUnitedStatesdollars]TotalfromSovietblocEuropeansatellitesU.S.S.R.CommunistChinaCommodityorcommoditygroup1951 195219531951 1952 1953195119521953195119521953---------------------Imports,total_________________________________________________11,883.011,625.6 11,620.0967.5794.4803.1390.6463.1374.1524.7365.0434.1---------------------LiveanimalsandmeaL____________________________________________79.574.992.064.649.869.21.2.81.113.724.321.7Dairyproducts______________________________________________________31.044.751.916.426.121.5(*)(*)(2)14.618.630.4Cerealsandpreparations__________________________________________219.9346.0229.035.857.2 59.0155.5246.4119.328.642.450.7Fruitsandvegetables_______________________________________________52.069.765.317.716.114.1.1.1.734.253.550.5Sugarandpreparations______________________________________________56.573.152.837.849.029.914.923.816.73.8.36.2Otherandunspecifiedfood,beverages,andtobacco__________________112.355.8 58.738.59.110.220.921.722.352.925.026.2Oilseeds_____________________________________________________________111.543.568.32.84.54.0(*)(2) (2)108.739.064.3Oilsandfats________________________________________________________54.234.647.18.14.3 4.1(2).(*).346.130.342.7Woodandlumber,unmanufactured________________________________64.0 73.3105.920.538.046.7 43.534.458.4(2).9.8Otherandunspecifiedwood,paper,andmanufactures______________62.532.827.432.015.512.922.012.17.48.55.27.1Woolandmanufactures______________________________________________24.9111.6131.38.32.75.04.62.75.912.03.7140Cottonandmanufactures__________________________________________58.641.444.524.524.528.116.212.911.4 17.94.05.0Otherandunspecifiedtextilefibersandmanufactures_______________78.335.950.042.414.917.63.42.51.732.518.530.7Furskinsandmanufactures________________________________________55.6143.8140.11.92.62.651.839.0 33.71.91.51;5Otherandunspecifiedinediblecrudematerialsandmanufactures___65.4 70.262.518.214.415.56.03.44.241.252.442.8Fertilizers,crudeandmanufactured_________________________________22.436.737.219.831.630.02.55.06.6.1.1.6C.oalandrelatedfuels_______________________________________________256.2199.6 173.8244.8181.5154.711.217.116.0.21.03.1Petroleumandproducts_____________________________________________16.625.756.411.215.840.65.49.915.8(*)(2)(*)Otherandunspecifiednonmetallicmineralsandmanufactures______60.752.250.352.344.142.34.65.23.03.82.95.0Basemetals,ores,andmanufactures________________________________37.531.8 32.924.914.113.38.516.0 18.64.11.71.0Chemicals(excludingfertilizers)_____________________________________60.331.543.335.420.427.54.84.45.620.16.710.2l\'fachinery__________________________________________________________45.138.041.84UI37.641.2.4.3.5.3.1 .1Transportequipment______________________________________________23.318.324.7 22.016.921.61.31.43.1(2)(2)(2)Otherandunspecifiedmerchandise_________________________________234.7140.5 132.8143.2103.791.511.84.021.879.532.919.5ISeegeneralnoteonp.80,listingcountriesincludedintheSovietbloc.NOTE.-Valuesshownaboveshouldnotbeconsideredexactmeasuresofthetradeofthefree-worldwiththeSovietblocineachcommoditygroup.Whilestrenuouseffortshavebeenmadetoachievecomparabilityfromyeartoyear,thishasnotbeenentirelypossible,owingtolimitationsinherentinavailablesourcematerials.Datafor1951arebasedoncommoditygroupingsnotstrictlycomparablewiththosefor1952and1953.Ingeneralthevaluesofspecificallyidentifiedgroupstendtobesomewhatunderstated,ascommodityfiguresarenotavailablefromallfree-worldcountriesinsufficientdetailtofitintothegroupsshown.The"otherandunspecified"categories,therefore,includeunknownamountsproperlyclassifiableamongthelistedcommoditygroups.Valuesofcommoditygroupsnotavailablefor1954attimeofprinting.1IncludesimportsfromOuterMongolia2Lessthan$50,000.*Noneornonereportedinavailablestatistics.