106th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the

2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

A Report Prepared by the Staff of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

WASHINGTON:2000

REPORT ON

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

IN GEORGIA

APRIL 9, 2000
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

234 Ford House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515-6460

(202) 225-1901

csce@mail.house.gov

http://www.house.gov/csce/

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado, Co-Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, Department of State

EDWARD L. WARNER III, Department of Defense

PATRICK A. MULLOY, Department of Commerce

COMMISSION STAFF

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Chief of Staff

RONALD J. MCNAMARA, Deputy Chief of Staff

BEN ANDERSON, Communications Director

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN F. FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Staff Advisor

ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel

KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion

MICHELE MADASZ, Staff Assistant/System Administrator

MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law

MAUREEN WALSH, General Counsel

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces

its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33

European countries, the United States and Canada. Since then, its membership has expanded to 55,

reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. (The Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, has been suspended since 1992, leaving the number of countries

fully participating at 54.) As of January 1, 1995, the formal name of the Helsinki process was changed to

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, it undertakes a variety

of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among

the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various locations and

periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION (CSCE)

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance with

the agreements of the OSCE.

The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives, nine members

from the U.S. Senate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and Senate and rotate every two years,

when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the Commissioners in their work.

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates information on Helsinki-related

topics both to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports reflecting the

views of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing information about the activities of the Helsinki

process and events in OSCE participating States.

At the same time, the Commission contributes its views to the general formulation of U.S. policy

on the OSCE and takes part in its execution, including through Member and staff participation on U.S.

Delegations to OSCE meetings as well as on certain OSCE bodies. Members of the Commission have

regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from OSCE participating States.
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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

ELECTION LAW........................................................................................................................... 4

CANDIDATES AND PLATFORMS ............................................................................................ 5

CAMPAIGN ................................................................................................................................... 5

VOTING AND VOTE COUNT ..................................................................................................... 5

RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 6

OSCE/ODIHR ASSESSMENT...................................................................................................... 6

CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS ....................................................................................... 6

U.S.-GEORGIAN RELATIONS .................................................................................................. 12
1

REPORT ON THE

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 On April 9, 2000, Georgia held a presidential election. According to the Central Election Commission, turnout was almost 76 percent. Incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze won reelection with about 80 percent of the vote. Former Communist Party boss Jumber Patiashvili came in

second, with 16.6 percent. The other candidates on the ballot were largely irrelevant.

 Shevardnadzes reelection was no surprise, having been predetermined by the October 1999

parliamentary contest, when his ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), handily defeated the opposition Batumi Alliance. The CUGs triumph, despite its flagging reputation amid

widespread discontent, demonstrated the partys influence over election commissions countrywide, as well as the power of incumbency in the absence of a credible alternative, and ensured

Shevardnadze a second five-year term six months later.

 Though Shevardnadzes victory was anticipated, it remained unclear until election eve whom he

would defeat. Batumi Alliance leader Aslan Abashidze, boss of the Autonomous Republic of

Ajaria, had announced last year plans to mount a presidential race, but many expected him to drop

out, as he had no real chance of winning. By threatening a boycott, Abashidze won concessions

from the CUG on the election law, but his overall strategy collapsed when his Batumi Alliance

colleague, Jumber Patiashvili, announced plans to run against Shevardnadze no matter what. One

day before the election, Abashidze withdrew, leaving Patiashvili as Shevardnadzes only serious

contender.

 The OSCEs Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights election observation mission

began its assessment by stating that considerable progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet

its commitments as a participating state of the OSCE. Among the problems in the election, ODIHR

noted, inter alia, the authorities support for the incumbent, the failure of state media to provide

balanced reportage, and the dominant role of the CUG in election commissions at all levels. While

voting was generally conducted calmly, the counting and tabulation procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency. The ODIHR also observed ballot stuffing and protocol tampering.

 Considering the widespread cynicism and apathy among voters, the official results, especially

turnout, strained credulity beyond the breaking point. Despite Shevardnadzes denials of chicanery, even his advisors and allies concedesome publicly, some privatelythat the tallies were

falsified, and blame local officials eager to present Shevardnadze with a landslide. While everyone

agrees nobody could outpoll Shevardnadze, the announcement of implausible totals has discredited Georgias democratization. Nor has Shevardnadzes own standing improved, as he has been

reelected with figures more typical of Central Asian dictatorships than had been expected in reformist Georgia.

 Shevardnadzes priorities now involve addressing the related problems of economic decline and

rampant corruption. Georgia has an abysmal record in tax-collection, with a debilitating impact on

state revenues: the government owes $175-200 million in unpaid wages and pensions. After the

October parliamentary election, Shevardnadze undertook no bold anti-corruption initiatives, apart

from creating yet another commission. But many hope that with the election behind him and mind-
2

ful of his place in Georgian history, he will finally display the necessary statesmanship to put Georgias

fiscal house in order. Shevardnadze would have to arrest corrupt officials, dismiss others, create

new law enforcement structures, and  considering stories openly reported in the Georgian press

perhaps move against his own family members and relatives.

 According to Georgias constitution, Shevardnadze may not run again. For several years, the two

leading contenders to succeed him have been Zurab Zhvania, Speaker of Parliament, and State

Minister Vazha Lortkipanidze. But after the election, Shevardnadze replaced Lortkipanidze. Though

Zhvania now clearly leads the field, the strongly pro-Western, pro-reform Speaker is also identified with current power structures and current problems, and whether the ruling party can improve

living standards will affect his chances.

 Shevardnadzes prospects for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia are bleak and he has little reason

to expect help from Russia. Since the beginning of Russias latest campaign against Chechnya,

Moscow has accused Tbilisi of allowing or abetting the transit of Chechen fighters through Georgian territory. These allegations also aim to pressure Georgia in negotiations about the withdrawal

of Russias four military bases. High-level Russian political and military figures have made it plain

that Moscow will try to retain the bases and will reassert its interests in the region to counter gains

by Western countries, especially the United States.

 Tbilisi will need help from the United States in resisting a newly aggressive Moscow. Eduard

Shevardnadze has long enjoyed good relations with Washington, which gratefully remembers his

contribution as Soviet Foreign Minister to ending the Cold War peacefully. The United States has

provided substantial assistance to Georgia and backed Shevardnadze morally as well. Presumably

the congratulations tendered at the beginning of the State Departments April 10 statement reflected appreciation for his past services, rather than acceptance at face value of the elections

results. President Clinton noted the elections shortcomings in a post-election letter to Shevardnadze,

reiterated Washingtons longstanding exhortation to attack corruption, and pressed him to implement urgent economic changes.

BACKGROUND

Georgias anti-communist, pro-independence movement gathered strength in the late 1980s, spurred

on by universal outrage at the April 9, 1989 killing of unarmed demonstrators in Tbilisi by Soviet Army

troops. Two years later, Georgia declared independence and in May 1991, longtime dissident and writer

Zviad Gamsakhurdia became president of Georgia. But his political rivals and forces outside the country

were determined to engineer his downfall, and his nationalist rhetoric and policies alienated the countrys

ethnic minorities. At the end of 1991, armed confrontations broke out between the authorities and insurgents, and by January 1992, Gamsakhurdia had to flee.

In March 1992, the leaders of the successful uprising invited Eduard Shevardnadze, who was living

in Moscow after resigning as Soviet Foreign Minister, to return to his native country. Georgias former

Communist Party First Secretary made the transition to nationalist leader and began consolidating power.

By the mid-1990s, he had gotten rid of or neutralized the men who had brought him back to Tbilisi. In

November 1995, Shevardnadzes party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) won a majority in the

parliamentary election and he was elected president.
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After four years in power, during which Georgia charted a pro-Western course, launched economic

reforms and largely restored stability, 1 the CUG faced the voters again in October 1999. Well aware of

widespread discontent over poor socio-economic conditions, rampant corruption, the failure to resolve

Georgias territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the resulting inability to return some

250,000 refugees to their homes, the anxious ruling party faced a serious challenge from the antiShevardnadze opposition. Led by Aslan Abashidze, the boss of Ajaria, an autonomous region bordering

Turkey, the Batumi Alliances campaign focused on combating corruption and improving living standards,

especially the payment of salaries and pensions and job creation, while emphasizing the need for good

relations with Russia.

Despite its concerns, the CUG won easily, gaining 42 percent of the party list vote and strengthening

its hold on the legislature. Of the participating parties, only the opposition Batumi Alliance and the bloc

Industry Will Save Georgia passed the seven-percent threshold for entry into parliament. Given the CUGs

flagging reputation, the surprising margin of its electoral victory owed much to the ruling partys control of

most election commissions and successful electioneering. Equally important, while many Georgian voters

have lost faith in a ruling party they see as corrupt, most see the alternatives as even worse. Abashidzes

alliance suffered a particularly damaging blow a week before the vote when the commander of the Russian

military base in Ajaria forecast the Batumi Alliances victory, crowing that Russias four bases could then

remain in Georgia for 25 years. Though all opposition parties claimed the campaign had been unfair and the

results falsified, the OSCEs observation mission gave the election a qualified OK.2

The outcome of the parliamentary election, which demonstrated the influence of the CUG and the

power of incumbency in the absence of a credible alternative, predetermined Shevardnadzes victory in the

presidential contest scheduled for April 2000. Nevertheless, he campaigned actively inside the country

and drew heavily on his international assets, as well. Emphasizing his statesmans aura, Shevardnadze

arranged to be visited by heads of state and high-level dignitaries: Turkeys Suleyman Demirel, Ukraines

Leonid Kuchma, Azerbaijans Heydar Aliev, U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, and finally Armenian

President Robert Kocharian. Building on Alievs suggestion during the OSCE summit last November,

Demirel proposed a Caucasus Stability Pact while in Tbilisi, clearly demonstrating to Georgian voters

and to Russiathat Georgia is not alone in the region. Shevardnadze, for his part, reiterated during Kuchmas

visit the pledges he made last fall that Georgia will apply for NATO membership by 2005.

But while everyone assumed Shevardnadze would win, it was never quite clear whom he would

defeat. Aslan Abashidze publicly announced last year his intention to run, but his prospects suffered a

major blow after the Batumi Alliances loss in Octobers parliamentary election. Moreover, Abashidze is

more a regional boss than a plausible national leader, and he rarely leaves his Ajarian fiefdom, claiming that

Georgias central governmentespecially Parliament Speaker and Shevardnadze ally Zurab Zhvania

wants to assassinate him. Finally, the Batumi Alliance included another serious candidate: Jumber Patiashvili,

the leader of the minority in parliament and former Communist Party leader (who took over when

Shevardnadze joined Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in 1985).

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1

 True, Shevardnadze has barely survived two assassination attempts and short-lived uprisings by proGamsakhurdia diehards periodically take place. Nevertheless, the anarchy and criminal marauding of the early 1990s are

long gone.

2

 The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said the election represented a step

towards compliance with OSCE commitments, although the election process failed to fully meet all commitments. See

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Georgias Parliamentary Election, October 1999.
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Considering that Abashidze had no real chance to win, many expected him to withdraw before the

election but to go through the motions in order to influence the election law. Indeed, the Batumi Alliance

initially threatened not to participate if the ruling party did not adopt all its proposed amendments, warning

that a boycott, amid voters general apathy and disaffection, would keep Shevardnadze from getting the

required 50 percent turnout. Then it seemed as if Abashidze would be the Alliances candidate, as Patiashvili

did not submit the required number of signatures until the last possible day (February 19), although another

scenario involved Abashidze and Patiashvili both running in an effort to deprive Shevardnadze of a first

round victory.

It gradually became increasingly clear, however, that Abashidze and Patiashvili were at odds, as

opposed to following a coordinated strategy to pressure Shevardnadze. Patiashvilis pledge to run no

matter what irritated Abashidze, who apparently thought that he, as leader of the Batumi Alliance, should

make that decision. Patiashvilis announcement also undercut Abashidzes ability to negotiate concessions

from Shevardnadze, who needed to run against and defeat a credible candidate.

Assuming Abashidze would not participate, the election shaped up as a contest between Shevardnadze

and Patiashvili, a rerun of the 1995 presidential election. Patiashvili could count on a certain pro-communist nostalgia vote, Shevardnadze-haters and those who are weary of him and the CUG. But given the

CUGs hold on the government apparatus and Shevardnadzes international reputation, Patiashvili faced

insurmountable odds. Indeed, the very date of the electionApril 9worked against him, inescapably

associating him in voters minds with a barbaric Soviet act against Georgias independence when he was in

power.

With the situation inside the Batumi Alliance unclear or indicating tensions, opportunities emerged for

Shevardnadze. Both he and Parliament Speaker Zurab Zhvania went to Batumi to meet with Abashidze;

the content of their talks remained secret but it was universally assumed that they were bargaining over

Abashidzes exit from the race and what he would get from Tbilisi in return. As voting day approached,

then, the question marks were not whether Shevardnadze would win but by what margin and whether and

when Abashidze would pull out. Finally, the day before the election, Abashidze issued a statement announcing his withdrawalwithout, however, offering a reason or calling on his supporters to cast ballots

for Shevardnadze, as some had expected.

ELECTION LAW

To enter the race, candidates needed 50,000 signatures. They had to get 50 percent-plus-one of

participating voters to win, and a 50 percent turnout was required for the election to be valid.

In negotiations with Abashidze and the Batumi Alliance, the CUG-dominated parliament agreed to

increase the number of minority party representatives in the Central Election Commission and lower level

commissions. Parliament balked, however, at marking voters with indelible ink.
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CANDIDATES AND PLATFORMS

Ultimately, the Central Election Commission (CEC) registered seven candidates. Four others were

rejected; two of them appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the CEC.3 Below are

brief descriptions of the programs of the only two relevant candidates.

Eduard Shevardnadze: Like the CUG last October, Shevardnadze promised voters that having

ensured Georgias survival and stability, he would now see to the countrys prosperity. Apart from pledging

to resolve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian disputes, Shevardnadze called for fighting corruption, collecting

taxes, ending all wage and pension arrears within five years, restoring free education and health care, and

revamping tax legislation, ultimately generating a radical turnaround in the economy.

Jumber Patiashvili: Patiashvilis slogan was Change Life for the Better. His program called for

ensuring Georgias territorial integrity, eliminating poverty, establishing a socially-oriented, mixed economic

system, creating free economic zones in Georgias regions, and giving Abkhazia and Ajaria special status

in the constitution. Naturally, Patiashvili also urged a war on corruption.

CAMPAIGN

State television provided 70 minutes of free air time as of March 20, giving each candidate five

minutes in the morning and another five in the evening. During the 3 days before the election, candidates

received 10-minute spots in the evening.

With everyone convinced Shevardnadze could not lose, the campaign was lackluster. The incumbent,

who could rely on TV coverage of his activities as president, only began to make use of his free air time on

March 27. Nevertheless, he traveled all over Georgia, meeting voters and holding rallies. Abashidze remained in Ajaria throughout. Though he released a platform, he did not actively campaign, even in Ajaria.

Patiashvili, by contrast, campaigned around the country, calling for the restoration of Georgias territorial

integrity and stressing socio-economic issues. On several occasions, protesters and hecklers threw eggs at

him, prompting Patiashvili to charge that Shevardnadze was using dirty tricks. The public paid little attention; with the outcome clear in advance, all commentators noted that voters were bored and cynical.

VOTING AND VOTE COUNT

Helsinki Commission staff observed the voting in various precincts in Tbilisi. Voting proceeded normally and Commission staff saw no violations. Most striking was the small number of voters present,

regardless of the time of day precincts were visited.

An American observer told Helsinki Commission staff that he had witnessed the following sequence

of events during the vote count. In his polling station, Shevardnadze received about 550 votes, Patiashvili

about one hundred fewer. At the end of the count, police came into the polling station and took all the

ballots and voting materials. The American observer then followed the police to the territorial election

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3

 Among those ineligible were Josef Stalins grandson, barred because he is a Russian citizen, and Igor

Giorgadze, former minister of national security, whom Tbilisi accuses of having organized the 1995 assassination attempt

on Shevardnadze. Since then, Giorgadze has been living in Moscow and the law required candidates to have lived in

Georgia for the last two years.
6

commission, where the eventual protocol reflected significantly inflated turnout figures, a huge win for

Shevardnadze and few votes for Patiashvili. It is difficult to say, of course, how representative this observers

experience was.

RESULTS

The CEC released preliminary results on April 10, giving Shevardnadze about 80 percent. The final

results, which followed on April 19, confirmed the incumbents landslide victory. According to official

tallies, turnout was 76 percent. Shevardnadze received 79.8 percent, to Patiashvilis 16.6 percent.4

OSCE/ODIHR ASSESSMENT

On April 10, the ODIHR election observation mission began its preliminary assessment by stating

that Considerable progress is necessary for Georgia to fully meet its commitments as an OSCE participating state. Among the problems in the election, ODIHR noted, inter alia, the authorities support for the

incumbent, the failure of state media to provide balanced reportage, and the dominant role of the CUG in

election commissions at all levels. While voting was generally conducted calmly, the counting and tabulation procedures lacked uniformity and, at times, transparency. The ODIHR also observed ballot stuffing

and protocol tampering.

The European Institute for the Media, which monitored coverage of the candidates, established a

clear bias in favor of Shevardnadze in state media, singling out state TVs Channel One as the worst

offender. Non-state media, by contrast, were far more balanced; so were newspapers, but their small

circulations limited their ability to counter pro-Shevardnadze bias in the electronic media.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

Democratization: Especially after last Octobers parliamentary election, which may have gotten a

better assessment from OSCE than it deserved, Georgias April 9 presidential election marked regression.

Even to judge by the clipped, diplomatic tone of the ODIHR assessment, the election was a step backwards, if only because the observation mission, in contrast to its judgement on the parliamentary election,

did not see it as a step forward. In fact, ODIHRs first sentence, unusually strong commentary on an

election in Georgia, signaled clear disapproval.

Though all candidates could compete and appeal to voters, and the voting process was largely

uneventful, the official results of the election are not credible. Despite Shevardnadzes public statements

dismissing allegations of vote fraud, even his advisors and allies concedesome publicly, some privately

that the official tallies have been falsified. While everyone agrees nobody could outpoll Shevardnadze

today in Georgia, which means that he would have won a second term in any case, the flagrant boosting of

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4

 None of the other participants received one percent. An unusual candidacy was that of the former Mayor of

Batumi, Tengiz Asanidze, who has been in jail in Ajaria since 1993, on charges of terrorism. Though Shevardnadze has

pardoned him, Abashidze has refused to release him. Asanidze withdrew from the race on April 8 but his name remained

on the ballot and he got 0.12 percent.
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turnout totals and his figures has discredited Georgias democratization, and surely aggravated already

widespread public cynicism about democracy and the countrys leadership. In this connection, ODIHR

made a none-too-subtle dig at the CECs turnout figures: observers reported...polling stations were not

crowded.5

Eduard Shevardnadze: The CECs release of election results which few find credible has also damaged Shevardnadzes own standing. His supporters have sought to absolve him of responsibility: Misha

Saakishvili, head of the CUG faction in parliament, pinned the blame for inflating turnout figures and

Shevardnadzes tallies on regional governors and local officials.6 Allies of Shevardnadze privately told

Helsinki Commission staff that the official results were implausible and an embarrassment, but also pointed

the finger at local officials. Those less admiring of Shevardnadze may wonder if he himself wanted a big

win.7 In any case, Georgias president is now associated with vote fraud. Indeed, if Shevardnadze went to

Batumi so soon before voting day to bargain with Abashidze over the latters withdrawal from a race

nobody expected Shevardnadze to lose, he may really have been seriously concerned about his ability to

pull the necessary votes to win convincingly.

After his reelection, Shevardnadze moved to placate segments of the population unfavorably disposed towards him. On April 20, he amnestied 279 prisoners, including some 65 supporters of Zviad

Gamsakhurdia, some of whom presumably still see Shevardnadze as a usurper, if not worse. The prisoners

had been convicted of various crimes, including involvement in terrorist activity or attempted coups.8 On

April 20, parliament passed a resolution On Eliminating the Consequences of the 1991-92 Civil Conflicts

and Seeking National Reconciliation, which called Gamsakhurdias ouster an unlawful act of overthrowing the legitimate authorities.

The gesture was useful and perhaps overdue, but trying to mollify pro-Gamsakhurdia constituencies

and releasing other prisoners can only win Shevardnadze so much good will. If the newly reelected president wants to make people forget the bad odor of the election results and justify his 80 percent mandate,

he will have to improve the quality of peoples lives. Unfortunately, he faces a complex of chronic problems

that have bedeviled Georgia for years, along with some newer ones.

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5

 The BBCs Moscow correspondent, Rob Parsons, wrote the following on April 10, 2000: The people of

Georgia...voted Eduard Shevardnadze back into office by a margin even more monstrous than in 1995. He won some 80%

of the vote... It is inexplicable because all the pre-election surveys showed that Georgians were thoroughly...fed up with

Mr. Shevardnadzes government. And with good reason - 70% of the people in this once relatively prosperous country

live below the official poverty line, the electricity supply is intermittent at best, life in some mountain villages is almost

medieval and corruption is gnawing like a cancer at the heart and soul of the country.... And yet, the Central Electoral

Commission would have them believe that four fifths of those who voted did so for Mr. Shevardnadze. The cynicism of

the count takes the breath away.

6

Economist, April 15, 2000.

7

 In the 1995 election, he got around 75 percent. In 1998, Azerbaijans Central Election Commission said

President Heydar Aliev had been reelected with 76 percent. Perhaps Shevardnadze is upping the ante on his old Soviet

Politburo colleague.

8

 Also among the amnestied prisoners was Jaba Ioseliani, former leader of the paramilitary organization

Mkhredrioni, and a bitter enemy of Gamsakhurdia, who was sentenced to 11 years for helping to organize an assassination attempt on Shevardnadze.
8

Economy: Georgias Government has made much of the countrys economic prospects as an EastWest transit point for energy and other goods. Despite the hoopla surrounding the signing in Istanbul last

November of agreements for the Baku-Ceyhan (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) oil pipeline, afterwards,

negotiations stalled because Georgia demanded higher tariffs. Apart from economic and security issues,

Shevardnadze presumably wanted to show voters that he was strongly representing Georgias interests.

During Azerbaijani President Heydar Alievs visit to Tbilisi in late March, he and Shevardnadze reached

agreement on tariffs, allowing Shevardnadze to claim that Baku-Ceyhan would proceed as planned, and

Georgians would reap the economic and geo-strategic benefits.9

Tbilisi has already been earning money from the transit of Azerbaijani early oil through the BakuSupsa pipeline and recent claims of oil discoveries within Georgia have sparked some hopes of revenues

derived from oil production. But otherwise, the countrys economy is still in poor shape, with production

lagging and unemployment high. Though Tbilisis reforms are backed by the international financial institutions and Georgia has been accepted into the World Trade Organization,10 the population has endured

plummeting living standards. Georgias abysmal record in tax-collection has had a debilitating impact on

state revenues. Shortfalls exceeded 30 percent in 1998 and 1999. On April 27, the chairman of parliaments

Budget Office said that the government owes $175-200 million in unpaid wages and pensions.11 In the first

quarter of 2000, the government collected 14 percent less than projected. Particularly disappointing has

been revenue collection from the notoriously corrupt customs service, despite Tbilisis hiring of a British

firm (ITS) to supervise the operation.

These continuing revenue shortfalls will probably result in more budget cuts. Moreover, the

governments inability to collect money jeopardizes new credits from the IMF, which insists on improved

fiscal performance, and World Bank credits are linked to Georgias agreement with the IMF. Unless Tbilisi

can solve its revenue problem, the countrys prospects for macroeconomic stability and growth are problematic.

Against this background, and considering Shevardnadzes campaign pledges, his new cabinet might

have been expected to feature new faces. In fact, 14 of the 18 ministerial nominees were holdoversas

one commentator put it, members of the same government which ran up a $300 million budget deficit in

1999 and wrote off another $200 million in debt in the first four months of this year.12

Shevardnadze did make one big personnel change, however. He appointed Gia Arsenashvili, Governor of Kakheti, as State Minister, replacing his longtime associate Vazha Lortkipanidze. Arsenishvili told

parliament, which confirmed him on May 11, that his priorities are economic reform, combating the shadow

economy, and resolving social problems, especially paying off pension and wage arrears, and creating new

jobs.13

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9

 Annual transit fees are expected to be over $60 million.

10 Kyrgyzstan is the only other former Soviet republic to have joined, apart from Latvia and Estonia.

11

 RFE/RL Newsline, April 28, 2000.

12 Ia Antadze, Georgias Nomenclature Still Sitting Pretty, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 32, May 19, 2000.

Among Shevardnadzes choices was Agriculture Minister Bakur Gulua, who is implicated in a major corruption scandal.

13 Parliament also approved Shevardnadzes plan to restructure the government and reduce the number of

ministries from 21 to 18.
9

Corruption: Along with economic problemswith which it is closely intertwinedbattling corruption is Shevardnadzes chief priority. After Octobers parliamentary election, he undertook no bold initiatives, apart from creating yet another anti-corruption commission. But many hope that with no more elections to contest and mindful of his place in Georgian history, he will finally display the statesmanship needed

to address the issue and put Georgias fiscal house in order. He would have to arrest corrupt officials,

dismiss others, create new law enforcement structures, and  considering stories in the Georgian press

perhaps move against his own family members and relatives.

Addressing Georgias pervasive corruption represents for Shevardnadze not only an act of statesmanship. Since returning in 1992, he has always sought to balance competing interests and groups, many

of which have profited hugely from the corrupt status quo. Striking at them could entail genuine risks,

considering the two assassination attempts Shevardnadze has already survived. But even favoring honest

officials and punishing bribe-takers requires a conscious effort to transform the political system with which

he has reached his own understandings and over which he presides. It remains to be seen whether

Shevardnadze can revamp his established modes of thinking and governing the country.

Closely connected to the crisis of corruption are the prospects of democracy, particularly freedom of

the press. Rustavi-2, an independent TV station that has often experienced official intimidation in the past,

has launched a popular show called 60 Minutes, modeled after the American original, which features

investigative reporting and exposes of official malfeasance and corruption. Rustavi-2 representatives told

Helsinki Commission staff credible, alarming stories about pressure by the authorities. Most recently, on

May 19, Rustavi-2 held a press conference in Tbilisi to announce that someone in Georgias Procuracy

had issued a death threat to a journalist.14

However reports about corruption by Rustavi-2 or other independent media may annoy the authorities or Eduard Shevardnadze, he is obligated as President to protect their freedom of expression. If he is

serious about battling corruption, he must make sure officials do not silence or intimidate his greatest ally,

a free press.

Succession: The Mayor of Tbilisi has suggested nominating Shevardnadze for a third term, despite

constitutional prohibitions. Assuming the 72-year old Shevardnadze, who prides himself on his Western

orientation and democratic reputation, does not take this Central Asian path, he will begin playing the game

of indicating preference for a successor. For several years, the two leading contenders have been Zurab

Zhvania, Speaker of Parliament (who ran Shevardnadzes campaign) and State Minister Vazha Lortkipanidze,

who had the unenviable tasks of handling the economy and managing the negotiations with Abkhazia.

Shevardnadzes nomination of Gia Arsenashvili to replace Lortkipanidze as State Minister, however, clearly

altered the balance between him and Zhvania.Though some observers expected Lortkipanizde to get the

new post of minister without portfolio for conflict resolution, Shevardnadze instead named Malkhaz

_____________

14 Students and representatives of 27 Georgian NGOs held a demonstration on May 22 in Tbilisi to demand the

resignation of Prosecutor-General Djamlet Babilashvili and his deputy, Anzor Baluashvili, whom they accused of warning reporter Akaki Gogichaishvili to leave Georgia or risk being murdered. RFE/RL Newsline, May 17, 2000.
10

Kakabadze, Georgias Ambassador to Russia, leaving the former State Minister out of the government.

Still, Lortkipanidzes apparent fall from grace, though it gives Zhvania a leg up, does not automatically

make him Shevardnadzes successor. The strongly pro-Western, pro-reform Speaker is also identified

with current power structures and current problems, and whether the ruling party can improve living standards will affect his prospects. Shevardnadzes final term does not expire for 5 years, a long time in volatile

Georgian politics, and new contenders could appear on the horizon. It is generally agreed, however, that

Shevardnadze will play a key role in choosing his successor, so everyone will be watching carefully to see

whom he favors.

Shevardnadze-Abashidze Relations: Though Abashidze did not endorse any other candidate when

he withdrew, the election results in Ajaria indicate they had struck some deal: Shevardnadzewhom

Abashidze had often implicated in assassination plots against himwon about 80 percent in a region

Abashidze tightly controls. By contrast, in Octobers parliamentary election, Shevardnadzes CUG received, according to official results, about 35 percent in Ajaria.

At the end of February, after Shevardnadze visited Ajaria, he submitted proposals to parliament to

define Ajarias status in the constitution as an Autonomous Republic, as Abashidze had demanded. After

the election, parliament overwhelmingly passed in the first reading an amendment to that effect. On April

24, Lortkipanidze told journalists that a free trade zone in Batumiwhich Abashidze has also long demanded, and which Georgias parliament has consistently rejectedwould be economically expedient.

Lortkipanizde added that Adjaria might get representation in the new government.

In the event, Ajaria did not get a ministerial post when Shevardnadze announced his new cabinet, and

negotiations about a free trade zone may continue for a long time. Apart from the acknowledgment of

Ajarias autonomous status in the constitution, it is unclear what else Abashidze sought or may have wangled

from Shevardnadze when he dropped out of the race. In any case, despite the apparent improvement in

relations and accommodation on the regions status, Aslan Abashidze and Ajaria will remain a problem for

Tbilisi. Shevardnadze has not figured out how to get rid of Abashidze, with his strong ties to Moscow, or

to weaken him into political insignificance. Abashidze, for his part, even if his presidential prospects have

dissipated, clearly enjoys his role as a thorn in Shevardnadzes side, opposition leader and perennial

alternative.

Abkhazia: Shevardnadzes initiative to formalize Ajarias autonomous status in the constitution was a

signal to Georgias other troublesome regions, as well. As he said explicitly on April 10, the gesture

should demonstrate to the Abkhaz and the Ossetians that Georgia is offering a real model of autonomy to

the former autonomies, and Abkhazia in particular.

Nevertheless, one troubling scenario for Tbilisiwhich Shevardnadze presumably did not have in

mindis the prospect of Armenians demanding autonomy. During Shevardnadzes campaign stop in Armenian-populated Akhalkalaki, demonstrators representing an unregistered organization Virk (Georgia,

in old Armenian) demanded autonomy for the region.15 Official Yerevan has not supported these demands:

both former President Levon Ter-Petrossyan and current President Robert Kocharian have urged cool

_____________

15 Asbarez, April 8, 2000.
11

heads in Akhalkalaki, where an eruption of tensions would cause great difficulties for Armenia, as well as

Georgia.16 Nevertheless, tensions persist, which may tempt parties hopeful of destabilizing Georgia. Russian officials, well aware of the prospects for meddling, have openly warned Tbilisi against trying to close

the Russian military base in the region.

OSCE Diplomats and Georgian officials are cautiously optimistic about South Ossetia, where Georgians can travel and Ossetian leader Ludvig Chibirov is considered a man Tbilisi can do business with.

On April 25, South Ossetias Foreign Minister said that the region is closely watching how Ajarias

status is defined in Georgias constitution. He added, however, that South Ossetia has experienced an

armed conflict (unlike Ajaria), which presumably indicates the region expects more than Ajaria got (or will

get) from Tbilisi. Chibirov has specifically pointed to South Ossetias need for economic rehabilitation. It

would appear, then, that the region might agree to return to Georgian jurisdiction if its autonomy were

guaranteed and an economic revitalization program were forthcoming.

Abkhazia, however, is quite another story, both in terms of substance and personalities, not to mention outside players. Negotiations in this dispute have gone nowhere, and the UN and OSCE Missions

consider it a victory when the two sides manage to sit down together. Tbilisi has not changed its longstanding

offer of the highest level of autonomy. Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, who last year orchestrated a

referendum in support of his pro-independence policy, continues to insist that Abkhazia and Georgia be

equal members of a common state.17

Russia: There is little likelihood of serious negotiations, much less an actual resolution, of the Abkhaz

conflict without help from Moscow. Russian peacekeepers have been in place since 1993, with a mandate

that is periodically renewed. Georgia wants peacekeepers from other countries to join the operation but

Abkhazia on May 1 barred Ukrainian participation, insisting that Russia retain its exclusive role. Unfortunately, prospects of significant assistance from Moscow are not promising, given persistent, serious problems in Russian-Georgian relations.

For Moscow, the ongoing war in Chechnya is not merely a battle against terrorists, or a campaign

to ensure the integrity of the Russian Federation: it is also, as high-level diplomatic and military figures have

made plain, an effort to stop or at least slow Western, and especially American, penetration of the Caucasus and to reassert Russias interests. Since the beginning of hostilities, Moscow has accused Georgia (and

Azerbaijan) of aiding the Chechen insurgents. At Georgias urgent behest, the OSCE decided in December to expand the existing OSCE Mission in Georgia to include a border monitoring operation which could

_____________

16 On March 30, Kocharian said he and Shevardnadze had agreed to build a power line to supply energy from

Armenia to Georgias Armenian-populated southern Javakheti region. RFE/RL Newsline, March 31, 2000.

17 On May 11, the UN Security Council noted that the failure to resolve the conflict and determine Abkhazias

status has an unfavorable effect on stability and the economic and humanitarian situation in the region. Abkhazias

leadership, however, has even refused to discuss a UN plan to divide constitutional powers between Abkhazia and the

Georgian government, and is apparently prepared only to begin talks on economic restoration and the repatriation of

ethnic Georgian displaced persons to Abkhazia. Moreover, the Abkhaz had developed good working relations with

Vazha Lortkipanidze, and have voiced doubts about the appointment of Malkhaz Kakabadze to negotiate the conflict.

RFE/RL Newsline, May 15, 2000.
12

_____________

18 By midJuly, the OSCEs Permanent Council will re-evaluate the operation and decide whether any changes,

including the dispatch of more monitors, are necessary.

19 Jamestown Monitor, May 18, 2000. Moscow has also charged that Afghanistans Taliban use Georgian

territory to assist the Chechens.

verify that Chechen fighters are not transiting Georgian territory. On April 12, the OSCE prolonged the

border monitoring operation until November 15 and increased the size of the mission to 42 international

personnel.18

Unless Russia totally defeats the Chechens, better spring and summer weather will allow Chechen

fighters to step up their operations. An intensified military campaign may lead Moscow to cross Georgias

border to pursue Chechens. Meanwhile, Russian officials continue to point publicly to alleged Georgiabased threats to Russian security: on May 16, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev warned that Russian

forces plan preventive measures against Chechen gangs in Georgia before they cross into Chechnya.19

One of the goals in Russias continuing accusations of Georgian assistance to the Chechens is to

pressure Georgia for concessions in the ongoing negotiations on the withdrawal of Russias four bases. At

the November 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, Tbilisi and Moscow reached agreement about the closing

and handover of Russias bases in Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and Gudauta (in Abkhazia) by July 2001, and of

the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi by 2003. Though procedures and a timetable have apparently been

agreed for the closure of Vaziani and Gudauta by the end of June 2001, Russia has refused to leave

Akhalkalaki and Batumi by 2003. In fact, apart from Vaziani, Georgia will have problems closing the

bases: Tbilisi is in no hurry to close the base in Akhalkalaki, the main source of employment for the local,

restive Armenian population. Aslan Abashidze, for his part, will resist efforts to dismantle the base in

Batumi, and Vladislav Ardzinba has warned that his forces would take over the base in Gudauta if Russian

troops withdraw, which could spark new Abkhaz-Georgian fighting.

In mid-May, a high-ranking Russian military officer made plain that Russia will not hurry to vacate

its bases. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov also cautioned Georgia (and Azerbaijan) against pursuing their

rapprochement with NATO, warning that Russia has the right to take countermeasures, including military

ones, in order to protect Russian interests. Moreover, he limited participation in discussions on any South

Caucasus security pact to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia, Iran and Turkeypointedly excluding the United States.

Tbilisi steadfastly denies Russian claims about the presence of Chechen fighters on Georgian territory, but Georgia cannot on its own resist intensified Russian pressure, especially if it takes military form.

To deal with an increasingly aggressive Moscow under a new president, clearly determined to restore

Russias influence in the region, Tbilisi looks to Washington.

U.S.-GEORGIAN RELATIONS

The State Department on April 10 issued a statement which began by congratulating Shevardnadze

on his reelection. But the rest of the statement noted the concerns expressed by the OSCE/ODIHR

assessment, specifically mentioning serious irregularities, including instances of ballot stuffing, media
13

_____________

20 President Clintons letter has not been officially released and the White House has declined to make it

available. Nevertheless, the letter appeared in the Georgian press.

21 By contrast, no congratulations were tendered to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossyan (1996), Azerbaijani

President Aliev (1998) or Kazakstani President Nazarbaev (1999) after they won elections criticized by the OSCE.

Granted, ODIHRs assessment of those elections was substantially harsher than its verdict on Georgia.

22 According to the State Department, total U.S. budgeted assistance to Georgia from 1992-1999 was $733.4

million. The figure for 2000 is $115.2 million.

bias, and lack of transparency in vote counting and tabulation. In a post-election letter to Shevardnadze,

President Clinton voiced confidence that he would work with the OSCE to consider its remarks on the

irregularities that took place during the election.20

Considering the general view that the election results had been falsified, Washingtons willingness to

congratulate Shevardnadze reflected residual good feelings towards him.21 Indeed, Shevardnadze does

enjoy a different relationship with Western capitals, which still gratefully recall his services in ending the

Cold War peacefully and withdrawing Soviet troops from Europe. In no small measure, the generosity of

Washington 22 and the European Union, which have given Georgia considerable humanitarian assistance,

especially during the worst period of the early 1990s, has reflected this sense of indebtedness to

Shevardnadze personally.

Nevertheless, Washington has long been urging Shevardnadze to address the critical problems of

corruption and tax collection. President Clinton reiterated that message in his letter, calling for urgent

changes in the economic field  a full-scale attack on corruption and a special effort to raise budget

revenues. Shevardnadze, with no elections ahead of him, now has to make tough decisions if he wants to

ensure his legacy.
14

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