The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Orde Wingate

And the British Internal Security Strategy

During the Arab Rebellion in Palestine,

1936-1939

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College

by

MARK LEHENBAUER, MAJOR, US ARMY

B.S., Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2012-01

iii

Abstract

Orde Wingate and the British Internal Security Strategy 

During the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939

By Major Mark Lehenbauer

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion campaign of 1936 

to 1939 in Palestine exhibited many features of modern insurgency and 

counterinsurgency. This thesis traces the British military thought and 

practice for countering rebellion as influenced by their Small Wars’ 

experiences, and it then presents the rebellion and counter-rebellion 

campaign as a case study in their military and political contexts. This study 

focuses on the evolution of the internal security strategy, and it examines 

the actions of Captain Orde Wingate both within the campaign and in his 

attempts to influence it at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This 

research is intended to inform military practitioners about the campaign 

while highlighting the issues that are encountered when they seek to: 

(1) apply the contemporary wisdom of military thought and practice to 

a specific operational environment; (2) negotiate the policy constraints 

on the possible military “solutions” to the security problems incurred by 

insurgency; (3) influence various facets of the greater campaign when 

outside the hierarchy of responsibility and authority to do so; and (4) expose 

some of the issues involved with a counterinsurgent force’s utilization of 

portions of the indigenous population toward converging interests. This 

study finds that Wingate sought to shape the evolving internal security 

strategy through both military and political channels, and that he utilized a 

variety of mechanisms to do so. Despite tactical successes in his validation 

of proofs of concept through the Special Night Squads, his determined 

efforts failed to achieve his stated goals at the operational and strategic 

levels.
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining 

earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected 

to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns 

throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of 

understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and 

doctrinal response to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 
v

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... 

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil... 

is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr. 

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Commanding General

CAC LD&E

Daniel Marston 

DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

in the Art of War

US Army Command & General 

Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

I owe a debt of appreciation to many for making this research both 

possible and a great experience. First and foremost, to my wife and 

children’s support while daddy spent his time traveling, at the library, or “in 

the cave” researching, thinking and writing. The next cabal of individuals 

to whom I owe my appreciation are the military practitioners and student 

scholars who shared my experience in the Art of War Scholar’s program at 

CGSC under the fearless leadership and incisive mentorship of our chair, 

Dr. Daniel Marston. This year not only proved to be one of a professional 

“renaissance” for me, but it has tremendously challenged and edified me 

as a professional. Dr. Stephenson and Dr. Murray from the Art of War 

cadre provided excellent (and much needed) constructive feedback.

I also owe a personal word of thanks to three exceptional men that 

greatly benefitted me by their generosity in time and patience to sit down 

and discuss my thoughts and questions while researching. I appreciate 

the scholarship and depth of research on Orde Wingate that has been 

conducted by Dr. Simon Anglim, the wisdom and insight of Dr. Matthew 

Hughes on the whole of my era of study, and the excellent conversation 

with Dr. Hew Strachan that leaves me at a loss to narrow down the many 

ways that he has influenced and contributed to my thought. Of course, 

despite the attributions, any and all errors or shortsightedness contained 

within this study are wholly mine.
vii

Table of Contents

Abstract...................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments.................................................................................. iv

Table of Contents .................................................................................. vii

Glossary ................................................................................................viii

Chapter 1 Introduction .............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2: Military Thought and Practice for Countering

Rebellion in the British Army .........................................................7

Chapter 3: Operational Environment of Palestine 

and the Grounds for Rebellion.......................................................23

Chapter 4: The Arab Rebellion

and Internal Security in Palestine ..................................................31

Chapter 5: Conclusions..................................................................83

Bibliography .......................................................................................... 93
viii

Glossary

AO Area of Operations

COIN Counterinsurgency

GOC General Officer Commanding

HC High Commissioner

HM His Majesty’s

KIA Killed in Action

SNS Special Night Squads
1

Chapter1

Introduction

I first met Wingate when I took over command in Palestine 

in 1937 and found him on my Intelligence Staff. The name 

drew my attention at once, since I had known and admired 

his relation, General Sir Reginald Wingate. I enquired 

about him and was told he was rather an oddity, clever 

but eccentric; he had been in the Sudan for some years 

and knew Arabic well, but since coming to Palestine had 

developed pronounced Zionist tendencies and was now 

learning Yiddish or Hebrew. When I met him I realized 

that there was a remarkable personality behind those 

piercing eyes and rather abrupt manner. He was obviously 

no respecter of persons because of their rank. ... I left 

Palestine early in 1938, before he performed the exploits 

in defence of Jewish colonies which gained for him the 

D.S.O., but I carried away in a corner of my mind an 

impression of a notable character who might be valuable 

as a leader of unorthodox enterprise in war, if I should 

ever have need of one.1

—Field Marshall Viscount Wavell, Good Soldier

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion in Palestine from 1936 

to 1939 provide many valuable features for a case study with issues of 

contemporary relevance. This study of the campaign and Orde Wingate’s 

actions within it highlight the evolution of internal security strategy along 

with the ways in which that evolution can be influenced as it progresses. 

Because militaries often find themselves as the primary executors of 

nations’ foreign policies in complex and challenging environments, 

the many facets of military practitioners’ abilities to shape strategic 

approaches are of great significance. Lives, campaigns, and nations’ 

interests rely on them. Some of these facets include the military officer’s 

ability to (1) analyze the operational environment, (2) synthesize varied 

individual experiences with the collective experience of the military as an 

organization, and (3) apply both doctrine and the principles that have been 

distilled from the greater body of military knowledge as they pertain to 

their particular form of warfare and the campaign’s context. These skills, 

in conjunction with the ability to both provide proofs of concept and to 

exercise influence, are assets of extreme relevance to military officers of 

all grades (and arguably more so in junior officers).

Wingate’s analysis of the operational environment led to his own 

development of tactical methods and operational concepts. His assessment 

of the overarching strategic goals for Palestine within the British Empire 

put him at odds with the official assessment and goals pursued. At every 
2

level, Wingate sought to influence the greater campaign. His actions in 

Palestine highlight the issues concerning the way in which strategy can be 

influenced by those outside the hierarchy of responsibilities and authorities 

to do so, or from the bottom up. His actions in London highlight the 

challenges, risks, and issues of propriety associated with an officer of his 

rank and position interjecting assessments straight to the “top.”

The Arab Rebellion

The Arab Rebellion and British Counter-rebellion Campaign themselves 

are a particularly valuable case study with contemporary relevance for three 

reasons. First, the rebellion was composed of many of the complexities 

that mark some of the most difficult aspects of insurgencies in modern 

times. These included:

1. Political organization that was used to foment and instigate violence 

against the governing power;

2. The population’s ethnic and religious composition along sectarian lines;

3. The population’s varied political composition that led to numerous and 

competing political organizations with both the potential and practice of 

alliances and fractures;

4. The rebel militants’ employment of guerrilla tactics, sabotage of 

infrastructure, captured weapons, and improvised explosive devices;

5. The presence of a clandestine insurgent infrastructure able to sustain a 

campaign of violence; and

6. Insurgent sanctuary and support afforded by foreign countries.

Second, the composition of the military forces available to 

implement an internal security strategy were sufficiently modern enough to 

deal with many of the doctrinal, organizational, and operational challenges 

that endure until today. The composition of forces and the ways in which 

they employed force were paramount to formulating military solutions 

for the identified security problems. Third, political considerations led to 

an increased need for civil-military cooperation in applying synergistic 

political and military solutions, but these sensitivities also led to a civilmilitary relationship that was often tenuous. Deliberations between 

the military and civil authorities over policy and security actions were 

constantly requiring the exertion of attention and energy both within and 

between governmental bodies. In typical British practice up to this point, 

the authorities and responsibilities for decisions on both security and 

political matters were both to be found in the hands of either the military 

command or the civil government. The other party would act only in an 

advisory role. During the Arab Rebellion, however, the emergence of new 

practices for delineating these responsibilities line by line would create 

administrative lag-times, loopholes, and power struggles between the 

military and other governmental bodies. Regardless of the overarching 
3

decision-making relationships, the impact of policy restrictions on the 

available military options for resolving security issues generated friction 

within the military. These restrictions also raised questions as to the 

appropriateness of methods and channels or challenging policy for change.

There are a few well-researched works on the Arab Rebellion that are set 

in the contexts of Arab and Jewish politics, the Arab national movement 

in Palestine, and the evolution of Zionist politics toward their realization 

of statehood. Respectively, these primary works have been written by J.C. 

Hurewitz, Yehoshua Porath, and Christopher Sykes. Tom Bowden has 

added two key works for understanding the security apparatus in Palestine 

during this period, one with a focus on the maintenance of public security 

against organized political violence and another with regard to the state of 

the Palestine Police prior to 1936. Less is known about the inner workings 

of the Arab Rebellion itself, though Hurewitz and Porath draw from many 

of the available primary sources in Arabic to reconstruct what can be 

known. The British and Jewish perspectives are well documented from 

primary source material and memoirs. In this case study, as it focuses on 

the evolution and implementation of the internal security strategy, primary 

sources are heavily relied upon from both the official British documents 

along with correspondence and documents produced by the military and 

governmental officials that influenced it.

Orde Wingate

Orde Wingate was a relatively junior officer in Palestine and never 

held a position of official capacity within which he shared the military 

responsibilities and authorities for contributing to the internal security 

strategy. This point, however, is particularly what makes his actions there of 

interest and relevance to many modern military practitioners. Consistently 

throughout his career, Wingate was a controversial figure. This is often 

attributed to his relative unorthodoxy in relation to more conventional 

military approaches. The fundamental elements of his military thought and 

practice, however, do not appear to greatly depart from the contemporary 

military thought as influenced by British military tradition.2

 The individual 

experiences and personalities of able commanders are often catalysts to 

clashes of opinion on the “proper” strategy to be employed and the emphasis 

that they emplace upon its ends, ways, and means. While they often seek 

to shore up their arguments on grounds of historical soundness and current 

practicalities, they are often more wed to their ideas and opinions because 

of intangibles. These include what they interpret as being “learned” from 

experience, their own operational style, their own ideological and/or 

political beliefs, and differences in their understanding of the operational 

environment whether subtle or blatant. While none of these intangibles 

can be argued as absolutes, they prove to be pivotal influences on how a 

military officer interprets what “right looks like.”
4

Wingate’s eccentric personality has also added to his controversial 

legacy both among those who knew him and until today. His rather odd 

propensities and pointed communication style have resulted in many an 

apologia from those praising him for exhibiting military genius. Others 

have been less nuanced in distinguishing the whole of the man from his 

military actions, noting little if any distinction in their condemnation for 

what they considered as maniacal tendencies through and through. Notable 

among Wingate’s military critics was the Field Marshall William Slim, 

while many military friends and subordinates have written in his defense 

to include the counterinsurgency (COIN) expert Sir Robert Thompson 

who worked with Wingate’s unit in Burma.

Wingate is most widely recognized for his actions during World War 

II in Burma where he died commanding nearly 20,000 soldiers behind 

Japanese lines as a Major General. This pinnacle event in conjunction 

with the controversies that he always seemed to leave in his wake has 

resulted in two overarching approaches to Wingate’s historiography. The 

first has been to view the whole of his military career through the lens 

of his actions in Burma. This approach has produced many of the works 

most pertinent to the military historian and practitioner, but it has also 

led to a mere highlighting of previous events that were deemed relevant 

to understanding his later actions as the Chindit Commander. A second 

approach is also typical among his biographers. Though many of the details 

of his life and career prior to Burma have been well researched in these 

works, they often over-emphasize the leitmotif of Wingate’s personality 

necessitating that he always act as the contrarian and maverick. The most 

useful of these biographies to the military historian and practitioner are 

the ones by Trevor Royle and Christopher Sykes because of the depth and 

breadth of their research. The historian and author Simon Anglim should 

be noted as of special interest to the military historian and practitioner for 

his significant contribution to the body of research and thought on Wingate 

both during and prior to Burma. This is not only because of the research 

found within his numerous works on Wingate, but because of the analysis.

Methodology and Thesis

This study will treat the entirety of the Arab Rebellion and British Counterrebellion Campaign in Palestine from 1936 to 1939 as a case study because 

it relies on an explanation of the relevant military and political contexts 

for understanding the internal security strategy that was employed. This 

approach, therefore, will first cover topical issues of relevance that 

influenced the British Military thought and practice of its day before 

presenting a chronological account of the rebellion and counter-rebellion 

campaign. Within this framework, Wingate’s actions will be woven into 

the evolution and implementation of the internal security strategy as it 

unfolded to include consideration of both the significance of his attempts 

to influence the strategy along with the means and channels he used. The 
5

goals for this research are to provide a case study sufficient to inform 

military practitioners about this campaign while highlighting the seemingly 

timeless issues that are encountered when a practitioner seeks to:

1. Apply the contemporary wisdom of military thought and practice to a 

specific operational environment without necessarily being bound within 

the proverbial “box”;

2. Negotiate the policy constraints on the possible military “solutions” to 

the security problems incurred by insurgency; and

3. Expose the issues of a military force in using portions of the indigenous 

population towards converging interests.

This study finds that Wingate sought to shape the evolving internal security 

strategy through both military and political channels. Wingate’s bottom-up 

approach conducted through military channels was two-tiered. Through a 

successful series of proofs-of-concept, Wingate validated the employment 

of unique organization and methods capable of tactically interdicting 

and defeating rebel bands upon contact. This was accomplished through 

Wingate’s emphasis on employing small-unit, nighttime patrolling, 

and assault techniques from tactical formations composed of British 

Soldiers and Jewish supernumerary police. Wingate’s operational plan for 

widespread neutralization of the rebel bands with the goal of bringing rural 

areas under governmental control was never realized through his intentions 

for the expansion of the organization and dissemination of the tactics 

employed. Failing in this, Wingate sought to influence the overarching 

strategy and policy with which he was at odds and that he had determined 

to be the limiting factor. Wingate engaged the military and political 

policy-makers as well as those that were influential among them in a topdown attempt to accomplish this. Wingate’s failed attempts to impact the 

internal security strategy in Palestine were a result of:

1. The failure of widespread adoption of his tactics due to a surge in British 

Military Forces which rendered the tactical risks inherent in his methods 

to be deemed unacceptable;

2. The prevention of his organization’s operational expansion due to a 

policy that restricted both the strength and types of employment of Jews 

within the security forces; and

3. The loss of trust from the military command toward Wingate due to his 

crossing the accepted boundary of a military official’s obligation to submit 

his own opinions to established policy.
6

Notes

1. Archibald Wavell, Good Soldier (London: MacMillan, 1948), 

62. Wavell would later need just such a character and leader, and not only once 

but twice. He would call upon Wingate for action in Ethiopia and again in Burma.

2. Simon Anglim, Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944

(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010), 17-18. Anglim’s driving research question 

was “how far did the military thought and practice and Major General OC Wingate 

really part company with British Army doctrine of his time?” His short answer 

was “not as much as some people claim” as he sought to “establish Wingate’s true 

‘place’ in British military tradition.”
7

Chapter 2

Military Thought and Practice for Countering Rebellion

in the British Army

“Big Wars” and “Small Wars”

The orientation of the British Army leading up to the Arab Rebellion 

in Palestine between 1936 and 1939 was a result of long-standing threats 

both to the homeland and to its interests and territories throughout the 

empire. The need to maintain and re-prioritize various capabilities led to 

organizational and managerial reforms that were enacted before World War 

I.1

 One such reform created the regimental system in order to allow units to 

be employed on a rotating basis between home and overseas assignments, 

where up to half of the army was required to garrison the empire at any 

given time.2

 While it was necessary for the army to be an expeditionary 

force to counter threats both on the European Continent and within the 

greater empire, few other similarities existed between the challenges 

that were posed in preparing for and waging either “big wars” or “small 

wars.” The Field Service Regulations of 1930 state “the British Empire is 

confronted with problems peculiarly its own. Unlike a continental power, 

it consists mainly of a number of self-governing communities widely 

separated and of varying resources. In defence of its vital interests it may 

be called upon to place a force in the field under conditions varying from 

a small expedition against an uncivilized enemy to a world-wide war.”3

Big Wars were classified as major land wars against first-rate 

opponents that were organized along relatively symmetrical bases. Small 

Wars, on the other hand, included various types of expeditions and 

security missions against external and internal threats to territories abroad 

that harbored British interests.4

 Initially, the primary distinction was that 

Small Wars would consist of military forces employed against “irregular, 

or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.”5

 There was no differentiation 

between the degrees of force to be applied in war whether Big or Small. 

Small Wars entailed the use of the military to undertake “deliberate 

campaigns with a definite military objective ... [with] no limitations .... 

placed on the amount of force which [could] legitimately be exercised. 

...”6

Subsets of the Small Wars tradition would progressively be introduced 

that challenged these initial and primary bases for distinction. These subsets 

were delineated for two primary reasons. First, different and unique sets of 

tactics were required for the variations encountered in terms of the terrain 

and enemy. Second, the presence of an acting British Civil Government over 

the territory in which the military action was to be conducted introduced 

a peculiarly new set of requirements. This type of political environment 

necessitated both cooperation and delineation of authorities between the 

military and civil instruments of British power. The degree to which such 
8

civil governments required military assistance was a primary determinant 

for both the framework in which the cooperation would take place and 

how the authorities would be distributed. These issues constituted a 

primary concern for Britain when countering rebellion during the interwar 

period. They would also determine which governmental entities would 

drive the internal security strategy as well as the authorities that they 

had in implementing it. They are thus a primary concern for this thesis. 

Two Small Wars subsets of particular importance came to be defined by 

the terms of military operations conducted in support of an acting civil 

government. These were “imperial policing” and “acting in the aid to the 

civil power.” These types of military operations were conducted as part of 

an internal security strategy that was determined by the civil government 

under the advisement of the military for dealing with security issues. 

When the acting civil government was no longer viable due to extreme 

deterioration of the security situation, the military could then be granted 

the full authority and responsibility for both governing and restoring order 

until the civil government could be restored.

The Evolution of Small Wars Doctrine

and the Doctrinal Gap

Until as recently as 1989, none of the British army’s longstanding 

and unique bodies of experience and knowledge found themselves to be 

truly codified into comprehensive written doctrine, at least not in terms 

of how it was coming to be accepted among Western nations.7

 The Field 

Service Regulations of 1909 was the first such debut of official British 

Doctrine, but it negotiated the varied needs of British Military Officers by 

taking a deliberately nonprescriptive approach. General principles were 

set forth for the conduct of war, but the emphasis was on the commander’s 

use of his experience and judgment for application. Despite the fact that 

Small Wars were the predominant British Army experience throughout 

this period, only one chapter was devoted to them in the Field Service 

Regulations. Publications specific to the imperial experience and even to 

particular campaigns would later come into being in order to address the 

peculiarities of Small Wars and their multiple subsets. These publications 

filled some of the void for guidance on Small Wars, but there were 

identifiable gaps between the ever-expanding experiences and the official 

publications.8

 These official publications specific to Small Wars subsets 

were eventually embodied in rather short works such as Duties in Aid to 

the Civil Power (1923 and 1937), Notes on Imperial Policing (1934), and 

Operations on the North-West Frontier (1925).9

It should not be assumed, however, that a lack of official doctrine was 

widely acknowledged as a problem during this era. There even appears to 

have been resistance to such doctrine caused by practical obstacles such 

as the organization of the force. The regimental idiosyncrasies created an 

environment that elevated a subunit’s collective experience and tradition. 
9

This aspect of British Military culture flouted even worthy attempts to 

systematize a common operating doctrine.10 A few key influential writings 

appeared before the official publications that captured the greater British 

Small Wars experience. They would significantly contribute not only to 

the development of the doctrinal publications but to the military thought 

and practice in countering the Arab Rebellion of 1936 to 1939. The 

counter-rebellion campaign would even produce its own semidoctrinal 

publications covering not only the organizational and tactical lessons 

learned, but histories of the political events and assessments that shaped 

the conflict.

There is much agreement among historians concerning the fact that 

the British Army was guided in its conduct of war more by “pragmatism 

and expedience, not [by] theory” or prescriptive doctrine.11 Alternate and 

unofficial bodies of wisdom, however, existed to help guide officers in the 

employment of their organization and the force that they could bring to 

bear. These publications consisted of historical case studies, collations of 

“best practice” methods, unofficial “doctrine,” professional journals, and 

the writings by theorists such as B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller.12

The key works among the Small Wars literature that acted as unofficial 

doctrine were first and foremost those written by Colonel C. E. Calwell and 

Major General Sir Charles Gwynn. Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Simson would 

continue the Small Wars literature tradition in a work contemporaneous 

with the Arab Rebellion.

Calwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice was published 

in three editions between 1896 and 1906, and it was long held as the most 

definitive work on the subject. Calwell chose to communicate his extensive 

Small Wars experience and study through 559 pages full of historical 

references that provide the basis for his conclusions.13 Gwynn’s Imperial 

Policing was published in 1934 and includes two short chapters titled 

“The Nature of the Army’s Police Duties” and “Principles and Doctrine” 

which are then followed by 10 chapters of case studies.14 Simson would 

later write British Rule, and Rebellion in 1937, whereby he introduced 

the concept of “sub-war” and explored the types and logic of available 

political and military responses to this emerging form of warfare, followed 

by a critical case study of the British response to the Arab Revolt in 1936.15

These works, in conjunction with the official publications, comprised the 

most complete bodies of thought of this period dealing with conflict short 

of a Big War. It will be necessary to address these works in further detail, 

but first the methodological approach to Small Wars literature both requires 

an explanation and offers an insight into how they aided the practitioner in 

application of their works.

A significant contribution of Small Wars literature appears to be in 

the approach that it took toward preparing and equipping the army to best 

utilize the aspects of their tradition, experiences, and best practices that 
10

were earned over a long history of conducting Small Wars. The means 

of communication included a combination of emphasis and style in 

translating the depth and detail of Small Wars history into conclusions 

offered as summarized concepts. In general, two historically based 

methodologies were used. The first was of brief and broad principles 

that were either accompanied by long lists of case studies selected for 

their relevance by virtue of the types of operations conducted and/or their 

regional focus. The second was one of pithy points that captured firsthand experiences or lessons digested from study, and these were then 

accompanied by the historical references that provided the basis for their 

detailed examination, explanations, and conclusions on the subject. This 

literature was intended to provide a vicarious experience in addition to 

that of the reader’s experience in order to inform the proper judgment 

and to be used according to the particular circumstances for application. 

This practice is evidenced through publications chronicling both specific 

campaigns and ongoing security challenges throughout the empire. The 

Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion, 1936 states that 

“The tactics based on North-West Frontier principles, with common sense 

modifications, to suit local conditions, are the most suitable.”16

The use of unofficial doctrine and the multiple adjuncts that were 

eventually made to compliment the Field Service Regulations in addressing 

subsets of Small Wars highlights that there are inherent difficulties in 

codifying a useable and widely applicable Small Wars Doctrine. Callwell 

acknowledges the universality of ideas such as “principles of war” that 

were derived from studying war in general, but he goes on to specifically 

note that “the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode 

of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theaters of operations present such 

singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a 

method totally different,” and that the “conduct of small wars is in fact in 

certain respects an art by itself. ... ” He adds that “the strategical problems 

presented by operations of this nature have not altered to [a great] extent. 

Therefore there is much belonging to this branch of the military art still to 

be learnt from campaigns dating as far back as the conquest of Algeria and 

as the terrible Indian struggle of 1857-58. ...” He concludes that principles 

“can be learnt from the military history of early times just as well as it can 

be learnt from the more voluminously chronicled struggles of the present 

epoch.”17

Based on the track record of successful British Small Wars campaigns 

that were guided with the aid of Small Wars literature, modern practitioners 

of warfare that are Small Wars legacies might consider the significance of 

this historically based approach. Equipping military officers in depth and 

width of relevant military history accomplishes two important functions. 

It enhances both their judgment in application of their doctrine and their 

ability to apply critical evaluation of the transferability of historical 
11

“lessons” from one context to another.18

Countering Rebellion: Enduring Concepts

as a Legacy of Small Wars

Countering rebellion composed a great deal of Britain’s Small Wars 

experiences. Significant aspects of this experience have been translated 

into the modern body of knowledge known as counterinsurgency, or COIN. 

Thomas Mockaitis, a historian with extensive research on the legacy of 

British Small Wars and the development of COIN methods and principles 

both before and during the classic COIN theorists of the mid-20th century, 

identifies the imperial era’s three most pertinent contributions to modern 

COIN wisdom.19 He summarizes these concepts as “minimum force, civilmilitary cooperation and tactical flexibility.”20 Each of these concepts 

requires further explanation to clarify both how they were understood and 

how they influenced the thought and practice of countering rebellion during 

the inter-war period. Such a discussion is incomplete and inadequate for 

the practitioner, however, without an emphasis on context and application.

Internal Security Strategy: Concepts in

Context and Application

The concepts of “minimum force,” “civil-military cooperation,” 

and “tactical flexibility” each have long histories that predate the Arab 

Rebellion. They have evolved and continue to evolve over time. As they do 

so, they have necessarily been contemporized but not always beneficially 

summarized as buzzwords and simple phrases. The value in these concepts, 

however, is not easily translated into contemporary wisdom apart from 

understanding the contexts in which they were wrought. These contexts 

highlight the continuities and changes that have taken place within the 

concepts themselves, as well as the frictions that are inherent in the details 

of applying them. The contexts bring the concepts to life as the challenges 

of their application are shown to be inseparable from the practitioners’ 

interaction with the specific dynamics of a campaign.

The military practitioner’s understanding of his contemporary 

operational environment is the first imperative in the application of 

historically derived military concepts and principles. From this proceeds 

his identification of the “military” problem for which a solution can be 

brought to bear, though it must be borne in mind that the social, political, 

economic, and military situations in countering rebellion tend to be 

inextricably linked. The process of applying conceptual principles in war, 

which is dialectic, plays itself out in strategy. For countering rebellion, 

this strategy is inherently concerned with internal security. Strategy 

includes the employment of the organization and the force that it can bring 

to bear in its tactical methods and operational goals toward achievement 

of the desired strategic end-state. 21 Changes in the variables throughout 

this process over time require constant reassessment and readjustment 
12

to the overall internal security strategy if it is to achieve and maintain 

coherence and synergy. It is important to bear in mind that the levels of 

war which strategy must address in its component parts are not strictly 

hierarchic in terms of importance, nor is the process of the formulation of 

strategy strictly chronological.22 Furthermore, the formulation of strategy 

is often not purely a military endeavor because it is not strictly concerned 

with only military and security matters. Because this is often the case, 

the military has a duty to advise the policy-makers on the effects of their 

policy as it interacts with each of the levels of war. Sometimes policies 

are determined by the military as detrimental to military goals. When the 

military’s assessment of the political considerations that shaped those 

policies are at odds with the policy-makers, then the military has a duty 

to attempt to influence a change of policy. When the military has failed to 

achieve this or is awaiting policy change, they must negotiate the effects of 

policy directives and limitations on the available solutions to the military 

problem.

Minimum Force

During the Arab Rebellion, the concept of “minimum force” had 

been well established in the literature and publications most recently and 

thoroughly up to that point by Gwynn.23 Minimum force was relative 

to what was deemed to be required to successfully achieve the desired 

effects. It was primarily concerned with the military’s application of force 

as it related to the legal authorities for employing it. It should also be borne 

in mind that the concept’s impact on the military thought took place in an 

era of relatively less prohibitions than today.24 The general framework of 

opinion was that aggressive action was required early in the response to 

internal threats to security and stability.25 While actions needed to be taken 

within the legal framework, this rested on a legal repertoire of potential 

military authorities and powers that allowed for strict (even draconian) laws 

to be emplaced. The implications were that force and judicial punishments 

could be employed generously, if necessary, toward the achievement of 

their desired effects.26 The Manual of Military Law, 1929, states “The 

existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree of 

force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection.”27

The cautionary tone of minimum force is derived from the fact 

that military actions in countering rebellion have political, social, and 

economic impacts that directly correlate to the achievement of the desired 

strategic end-state. The experiences of the interwar period would be added 

to later experiences leading to a general acceptance of caution in modern 

COIN against an overly militarized approach towards the problems of 

counter-rebellion. This was not yet fully apparent in the interwar period. 

The military thought of the time was encountering the emergence of new 

kinds of real and perceived political realities. This resulted in tensions that 

were growing between the military and other governmental bodies who 
13

played significant roles in policy-making. The former often wanted to use 

traditional military methods and available legal authorities in suppressing 

rebellion, whereas the latter wanted to tighten their control over military 

actions to mitigate anticipated political fallout. This control was exercised 

through policies that directed or restricted the particular types of security 

operations to be conducted, the organization of the forces employed, and 

the employment of force itself.28

Gwynn takes particular note of junior officers when addressing the 

issue of minimum force. He notes that “Responsibility is often thrown 

on quite junior officers for the action necessary. Mistakes of judgment 

may have far-reaching consequences.”29 Gwynn endeavors to define the 

differences between what is required of officers in Imperial Policing 

versus traditional military operations. Beyond his observation of the fact 

that they “must rely on their own judgment to reconcile military action 

with the political conditions,” he states that “as a rule, they have to decide 

what is the minimum force they must employ rather than how they can 

develop the maximum power at their disposal.”30

Such caution was (and still is) prescient while countering rebellion 

(and conducting COIN campaigns) due to the roles that intangibles play. 

Attention to important concepts such as public opinion and legitimacy of 

the government in the eyes of the population have long been prevalent 

and respected for their role in achieving success in the counter-rebellion 

“fight.”31 Such considerations were clearly linked to the long-term 

political objectives of restoring peace and stability among a pacified 

population. The practical military benefits were likewise argued against 

those with a predilection for the use of overwhelming force to solve 

most security situations.32 Intelligence for operations is derived from a 

cooperative portion of the population, and this is potentially jeopardized 

through excessive severity in the application of military force. Further, the 

military’s use of indiscriminate or imprecise application of force could 

result in a boon to insurgent recruiting.33 The rebels’ use of the media and 

propaganda in exploiting real, perceived, or contrived uses of excessive 

force was yet another contributing factor for the caution.34

In conjunction with these practical military concerns, the era of the 

Arab Rebellion in Palestine was witnessing an enlarged stage upon which 

war in general was being played out. “Political” concerns have always 

been present in war with varying degrees of direct impact on the ends, 

ways, and means for and by which wars are to be conducted. The notion 

that binds politics and war is most clearly defined as the use of military 

force as an element of national power to further policy aims, and pointed 

out by Carl von Clausewitz as an essential part of the very nature of war 

itself.35 The recognition of particular political influences on the campaign 

in Palestine was captured in an official military publication titled the 

Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936. A chapter on 
14

“Conditions in Palestine as Affecting Operations” specifically highlights 

the powerful influences upon the campaign resulting from heightened 

international attention among both the Western and the Arab worlds, the 

intertwined racial and religious facets of the internal politics there, and the 

enormous impact of propaganda and the media.36 The difficulties presented 

by these factors were beginning to take on a magnitude of importance that 

is better understood today in light of COIN experience, but at the time it 

was just beginning to reveal a collision between traditional Small Wars 

practices and increasing policy limitations placed upon commanders.

The policy limitations resulting from these political sensitivities that 

were in conflict with traditional military applications of force created a 

paradox for a commander. Guerrillas needed to be “hunted down,” and 

measures needed to be taken to separate them from the population.37

There was also the argument that “Anything which can be interpreted as 

weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good 

terms with the rebels.”38 Political agitators and persons providing support 

to the rebels, though nonviolent in and of themselves, were much more 

difficult to handle both militarily and legally. Inaction would allow the 

rebel infrastructure to remain intact, while strong action would invariably 

lead to negative consequences for innocents among the population. The 

resulting problem of counter-rebellion campaigns, where there is tension 

between the necessity of both restraint and aggression, is not one that 

modern COIN theory has mastered though the vocabulary, arguments 

and logic have become more nuanced. For the purposes of this study, it 

is sufficient to point out that today there is a perceptible distinction in 

both the terms and their associated frameworks for applying force in (1) 

COIN operations as a whole on the one hand, and (2) counterguerrilla 

(sometimes described as counterterrorist or countergang) operations 

which can either be a subset or conducted entirely outside of COIN on 

the other. Counterguerrilla operations have taken on an appreciation in 

modern times of precision targeting and isolated concentrations of force 

against militant guerrillas.

Civil-Military Cooperation

An understanding of “civil-military cooperation,” again in its proper 

context, must also take into account the available arrangements for 

authorities and responsibilities over the handling of internal security crises. 

While the policy of the government was to be carried out regardless of the 

framework for the division of duties and powers between civil and military 

authorities, the military’s role was acknowledged to be a significant one 

toward the formulation and execution of internal security policies. The 

spectrum of military obligations and authorities were primarily dependent 

upon:

1. Whether existing civil laws were in effect under a functioning 

government over a relatively pacified population; or
15

2. Martial law had been instated due to a breakdown in public security 

and loss of civil control.

The former would entail the military’s responsibility to render advice 

to the civil administration concerning the effects of policy on security 

considerations, while the latter entailed full military authorities over 

both security issues and the civil administration.39 Variations between the 

extremes in the scope of authorities granted to the civil government and 

the military during the Arab Rebellion in Palestine would be described as 

resembling “a rainbow, [with] the shades of colour merging so gently that 

it is hard to say where one ends and the next begins.”40

Gwynn not only highlights civil-military cooperation as one of the 

four major principles to guide the successful conduct of Imperial Policing, 

but he notes that the “duty of giving advice [to the government] may often 

fall on quite junior [military] officers.”41 Though the immediate context of 

this statement is that the advice rendered would be from a junior military 

officer to the civil authorities, the statement can be assumed to be dependent 

upon the size of the military force employed and the command hierarchies 

in place. It can be inferred that this same advice could be beneficial within 

the military ranks as well, regardless of strength and structure. Whether 

in yesterday’s counter-rebellion or today’s COIN campaigns, matters of 

policy and strategy are closely intertwined with tactical considerations 

involving the composition of forces and the employment of force. Junior 

officers are the ones in contact with both the rebels (insurgents) and the 

population as well. Collectively, junior officers hold the knowledge of the 

“ground truth” that in turn may or may not be sufficiently communicated 

up the levels of command, where a comprehensive picture of the 

operational environment should reside. Junior officers’ experiences of 

policy limitations on the military objectives that they’re literally living 

and dying to achieve, show no distinction between the cliché and reality 

of “fighting with one hand tied behind their back.” It is not a stretch to 

assume that they were, on the whole, not always privy to the deliberations 

that resulted in these decisions. Rules of engagement, requirements and/

or prohibitions to work with indigenous forces, and “no-hit” lists are just 

a few of the arenas where the junior officer and soldier meet policy on a 

day-to-day basis.

Tactical Flexibility

Mockaitis states that the collective wisdom of the British Army during 

this period demonstrated that “Warfare against elusive insurgents requires 

small-unit operations, tactical flexibility and a high caliber of junior 

leadership. ...”42 These characteristics are less in need of explanatory caveats 

that were due to the peculiarities of the period than the aforementioned 

modern COIN principles that were derived from the Small Wars experience. 

An enduring element in campaigns of countering rebellion is that junior 
16

leaders leading small units are at the point of friction between the rebels 

and those countering rebellion. Guerrilla operations short of a “war of 

movement” often employ small-unit organization in order to elude and 

evade larger military formations, which inevitably leads to decentralized 

and small-unit actions to take their place among military “best practices.” 

This is a particularly relevant point to the counterguerrilla operations that 

are necessary as an element of a campaign to counter rebellion. Irregular 

enemies and unconventional tactics often require a departure from 

yesterday’s Big Wars and today’s “conventional” approaches in both the 

organization and tactics employed. The requirements for such operations 

have taken on an appreciation in modern times that has led to the use of 

Special Operations Forces that combine such features as select individuals 

for the force, habitual work with indigenous personnel, and specialized 

organization, training, equipment, modes of employment and operational 

techniques. The distinctions during the Arab Rebellion were present in 

the tradition of assembling ad hoc units for specific operations, though 

they had not yet developed into the practice of standing up enduring 

organizations with focused mission-sets as seen in more modern times.

Present during the British response to the Arab Rebellion was the 

legacy of employing a specially trained unit formed around “the man” 

to overcome tactical problems that were not readily answered within 

the capabilities and limitations of the security forces paradigm. Security 

forces normally consisted of the separate organizations of military, police, 

and auxiliary security forces (the latter two often being composed in part 

or whole of indigenous personnel). This paradigm, if strictly adhered to in 

practice, resulted in a blurring of the lines of the “police” and “military” 

duties. Tactical dilemmas would often be a catalyst for the British to 

improvise the right organization with the right capabilities to leverage force 

in countering rebellion. Charles Townshend comments that the “deleterious 

effect of militarizing the police on the one hand, and of using soldiers as 

policemen on the other, naturally raised the question of creating a ‘third 

force’ which would be neither one nor the other. The obvious attractions 

of such a hybrid force, matching the hybrid legal state of ‘emergency,’ 

produced repeated discussions and experiments.”43 In Mockaitis’ words, 

Britain “has a history of creating hybrid forces to recoup deteriorating 

situations. ... ”44

Application of Doctrine and Learned Principles

in Countering Rebellion

After posing the question “How are officers to be trained for such 

[Imperial Policing] duties?”, Gwynn continues, “It is hardly possible to 

draw up exercises in which the work can be practiced. One can formulate 

general principles, but the difficulty lies in providing opportunities of 

learning to apply them.” He further states, “In the absence of literature on 

the subject, tradition becomes the only means of broadcasting experience, 
17

and tradition is apt to be based on experience limited to a small number 

of cases ... [and] it has its dangers.”45 Gwynn’s statements identify the 

inherent difficulties and complexities of countering rebellion and he 

inquires on the means by which an officer can be prepared for conducting 

it.

To continue along his line of thinking, a few additional points are 

worth noting. The first is that more “literature” does not necessarily 

mean that the experience it captures is any better than one’s tradition, 

though it should increase the chances of finding relevant lessons learned. 

Experience is helpful, whether personal or learned from others, but the 

“right” experience is particularly key. Principles are helpful, but they are 

only as useful as they can be applied effectively to the situation at hand. It 

is “dangerous” to assume one’s own experience is superior to that of others 

or what might be found in the literature. It is also dangerous to assume 

that effective application of the principles can take place apart from a deep 

appreciation of the particularities of the operational environment at hand. 

It can be assumed, therefore, that countering rebellion will often require 

a campaign commander to not only be willing to look outside of his own 

experiences and understanding but to probe the environment, assume risk, 

experiment, and underwrite the mistakes of others in the search for success.

The legacy of the Small Wars experience, with its most pertinent 

points up to the Arab Rebellion being captured by the literature, highlights 

the long-standing recognition of the inherent difficulties in countering 

rebellion. The significance of considerations concerning minimum force, 

civil-military cooperation, and tactical flexibility were understood to 

be crucial elements of a campaign to counter rebellion during the Arab 

Rebellion. These Small Wars contributions to COIN doctrine, which 

continue to gain wide acceptance through nearly a century of experience, 

emphasize the fact that even the combination of identified issues and timetested guidance are still difficult to apply towards a military solution.

In countering rebellion, military officers will be required to:

1. Effectively employ force to achieve its desired effects with minimal 

negative repercussions;

2. Inform and influence policy-makers with regard to the policies and 

their effects on the campaign; and

3. Understand and exploit the tactical strengths and weaknesses 

between one’s own force and that of the enemy.

These actions rely upon a military practitioner’s thorough understanding 

of the operational environment. The practitioner benefits from an in-depth 

understanding of the hard-won principles that are available to guide his 

judgment in their application. The classic COIN theorist Frank Kitson 

summarizes the gravity of these points by commenting that “Military 

commanders in counter-insurgency operations cannot do without a real 
18

understanding of this sort of war in the widest sense.”46 He further adds, 

“There is no single thing more important than being able to size up the 

situation, as it exists, and make the best of it.” The operational environment 

in Palestine between 1936 and 1939 would challenge many officers that 

would later prove their skill and proficiency as able commanders in World 

War II and include Montgomery, O’Connor, Dill, and Wavell. The Arab 

Rebellion would present a magnitude of challenges not only peculiarly 

its own, but of a more general type that the British had only first begun to 

encounter in Northern Ireland in 1920 to 1921 and would later routinely 

experience as those associated with the modern complexities inherent in 

COIN.
19

Notes

1. Hew Strachan, “The British Way in Warfare,” Oxford History of the 

British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 403-408; David French, 

“Big wars and small wars between the wars, 1919-39,” in Big Wars and Small 

Wars: The British army and the lessons of war in the twentieth century, ed. Hew 

Strachan (London: Routledge, 2006), 38.

2. Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The Colonial Wars Source Book (London: 

Arms and Armour, 2007), 17-20.

3. War Office, Field Service Regulations. Vol. 1. (Organization and 

Administration) (London: War Office, 1930), 1-2 as cited in David French, 

“Big wars and small wars between the wars, 1919-39,” in Big Wars and Small 

Wars: The British army and the lessons of war in the twentieth century, ed. Hew 

Strachan, (London: Routledge, 2006), 36.

4. Training Regulations (London: War Office, 1934), 1; Major General 

Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: Macmillan and Co., 1935), 3-4. 

While incipient definitions of modern terms that recognize categories and subcategories of war and tactics have long been present, these can be confused with 

modern developments and interpretations of the terms. This study will use the 

terms of the period at hand. Definitions will be offered as either those defined or 

widely accepted at the time, or those clarified through the distinctions made by 

the primary sources consulted for this study. To apply modern definitions to some 

of the types of warfare encountered and the operations conducted in “small wars” 

which included countering rebellion, one would find irregular warfare in terms of 

both the use of indigenous forces and the varieties of enemy combatants, as well 

as counter-insurgency, counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism operations among 

others.

5. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: 

Harrison and Sons, 1906), 21

6. Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 3.

7. For an overview of the British doctrinal approach and evolution 

over the period concerned, see Alex Alderson, “The Validity of British Army 

Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq 2003-2009” (Ph.D dissertation, 

Cranfield University, 2009), 35-41, 99-103; Hew Strachan, “The British Way in 

Warfare,” Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1994), 404-405, 411; David French, “Big wars and small wars between the wars, 

1919-39,” in Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War 

in the Twentieth Century, Hew Strachan, editor (London: Routledge, 2006), 36-

41.

8. David French, “Big wars and small wars between the wars, 1919-39,” 

40-41; Alderson, “The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after 

the War in Iraq 2003-2009,” 38-39, 99-103.

9. These documents are referenced within the internal War Office 

publications specific to the Palestine campaign such as Notes on Tactical Lessons 

of the Palestine Rebellion, 1936, and Military Lesson of the Arab Rebellion in 

Palestine, 1936.
20

10. French “Big wars and small wars between the wars, 1919-39,” 42.

11. Strachan, “The British Way in Warfare,” 400; French, “Big wars and 

small wars between the wars, 1919-39,” 40.

12. Anglim, Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944, 23. Anglim’s 

Chapter 2, “The Doctrinal Background,” provides an excellent survey of British 

army doctrine while the book as a whole addresses the question as to whether 

Wingate’s military thought and practice was a departure from it (see 17).

13. See Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.

14. See Gwynn, Imperial Policing.

15. H. J. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion (Edinburgh: William Blackwood 

& Sons Ltd., 1937).

16. Notes on Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1937), 8.

17. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 23.

18. See Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” RUSI 

Journal (February 1993, reprint from 1961): 29-30.

19. Classic COIN theorists widely accepted for their capturing of pertinent 

COIN experiences and principles include, among others, Frank Kitson, Robert 

Thompson, and David Galula.

20. Thomas Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-Imperial era

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 2.

21. Strategy, as considered here, is defined as the identification of the 

desired political and military end-state in conjunction with the operational goals 

and tactical methods employed toward the accomplishment of these end-states. 

“Good” strategy implies the coherence and synergy of ends, ways, and means in 

conjunction with the effective and efficient use of organization and resources.

22. The levels of war, as considered here, include the strategic, operational, 

and tactical.

23. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1935), 4-7,14-15; Alderson, “The Validity of 

British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq 2003-2009,” 100-

103.

24. Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-Imperial era, 8.

25. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1935), 15, 19; See Chapter VI “Boldness and 

Vigour: The Essence of Effectively Conducting Such [Small War] Operations” 

in C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd ed. (London: 

Harrison and Sons, 1906), 71-84.

26. Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-Imperial era, 9; 

Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1935), 17-18.

27. Manual of Military Law, 1929, War Office, issued by Command of the 

Army Council, 255.

28. Modern COIN theory accepts that facets of the political, social and 

economic dynamics of the environment must be rigorously considered and 
21

addressed beyond strictly military considerations. These responsibilities for 

assessments and policy in these arenas often lie with non-military governmental 

entities; Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-Imperial era, 1.

29. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1935), 5.

30. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 6.

31. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 5.

32. Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the 

Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 33.

33. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, 23.

34. B. C. Denning, “Modern Problems of Guerrilla Warfare,” Army Quarterly 

and Defence Journal, 13 (1927): 349.

35. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87-88.

36. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 28-37, TNA WO 191/70.

37. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1935), 5.

38. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 5

39. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 13-16.

40. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 103.

41. Gwynn, Imperial Policing, 14.

42. Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-Imperial era, 2.

43. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth 

Century, 25.

44. The remainder of this quote continues “[such as] Orde Wingate’s Night 

Squads during the Arab Revolt in Palestine,” Thomas Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency in the post-Imperial era (Manchester University Press: Manchester 

and New York, 1995), 11.

45. Thomas Mockaitis, British counter-insurgency in the post-imperial era

(Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York, 1995), 6.

46. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London/Boston: Faber and Faber, 1977), 

300-301.
22
23

Chapter 3

Operational Environment of Palestine

and the Grounds for Rebellion

Seeds of Arab Jewish Conflict

Palestine and its governance after the Great War were shaped by 

Britain’s wartime activities of political schemes, vague promises, and 

military victories.1

 These actions merged with changing dispositions within 

the international community concerning territorial spoils of war. Together, 

these greatly affected the dynamics of both the domestic politics that arose 

as a result of the aspirations of the indigenous peoples as well as the British 

approach to mandate versus imperial rule. The High Commissioner (HC) 

for Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, wrote in 1915 to the Sharif of Mecca, 

King Hussein, about British support for Arab independence in return for 

their staging of a revolt.2

 The vagueness of the loosely defined territories 

to which such support would apply was most certainly intentional in order 

to allow room for future political maneuvering.

The British diplomat Sir Mark Sykes entered into secret negotiations 

with the French in 1916 in order to establish spheres of influence should 

the allies defeat the Ottoman Empire. Palestine, it was agreed, would 

fall to the British, though the subsequent discovery and release of this 

information put the British Government on the defensive. The British 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Arthur Balfour, wrote of 

the Cabinet decision in 1917 that “His Majesty’s [HM] Government 

view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 

the Jewish people.”3

 Then, in 1918, British General Edmund Allenby’s 

exploits during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign resulted in the capture of 

Ottoman Palestine and an ensuing British rule. The acceptability of longheld practices of appropriating and ruling territory, however, were giving 

way during this age of nationalism to local demands and international 

pressure for self-determination.4

Soil of the British Mandate for Palestine

The San Remo conference of 1920 entrusted a mandate for Palestine 

to British tutelage toward independence that took effect in 1923 under the 

auspices of the League of Nations.5

 The mandate’s preamble included the 

aforementioned phrase of the Balfour declaration along with a subsequent 

phrase stating that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil 

and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”6

While the mandate reinforced the statements contained in the Balfour 

Declaration, it did not clarify them further even though the concept of a 

“national home” had no precedent in international law, nor were “civil and 

religious rights” easily defined. Article Two of the mandate charged Great 

Britain with “placing the country under such political, administrative 
24

and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish 

national home ... and the development of self-governing institutions.”7

Arab nationalists countered any apparent political gains in favor of 

Zionist aims to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, as ill-defined as they 

were, on equally ambiguous legal grounds of their own.8

 These were 

primarily enumerated as (1) the British wartime assurances to Hussein; 

(2) the history and overwhelming majority of the Arab population in 

Palestine; and (3) an article in the Covenant of the League of Nations 

that implied support for independence to certain communities of the 

former Ottoman Empire. While it appeared that the Zionist case had the 

initial political momentum according to the wording in the mandate, the 

Palestinian Arab Nationalists quickly secured policy statements from the 

British. These ensured that they would not be subordinated to Jewish rule 

and that Jewish immigration would be regulated.9

 British initiatives to 

develop a system of Palestinian self-governance were to be furthered by 

first instituting a multi-sectarian Legislative Council. This was intended 

to build the machinery of a unified Arab-Jewish state, but this repeatedly 

failed due to the intransigence of each community to cooperate with the 

other.10 Failing in this, the form of governance closely followed the model 

of the British Crown Colony and it was placed under the jurisdiction of 

the Colonial Office.11

The British officials that composed the civil government in Palestine 

were under the overall authority of the HC who also held the title of 

Commander in Chief. In the discharge of his broad executive and legislature 

powers, he was aided by Executive and Advisory Councils. A series of 

departments provided the machinery for administering governance. 

Administrative Districts were defined as Northern, Southern and 

Jerusalem Districts for which each was assigned a District Commissioner. 

The District Commissioners presided over District Officers that could be 

either British, Arab, or Jewish, and they maintained contact with the local 

forms of indigenous leadership that were usually represented by Mukhtars

(village leaders).12

Religious, cultural, social, and educational autonomy was increasingly 

granted to the indigenous population groups along with the freedom to 

form organizations necessary to administer activities in support of these 

aims.13 Many of these organizations progressively provided operational 

bases for various legal and illegal political and martial activities.14 The 

organizations among the Jewish community, however, matured to a 

greater extent relative to the Arab community, both in their domestic and 

international functions.15 The Yishuv (settlement) comprised the Jewish 

population residing in Palestine, and they were largely responsive to the 

direction provided by a recognized but complicated quasi-government that 

combined domestic and international Jewish organizations with distinct 

authorities.16
25

While multiple illegal paramilitary organizations were active 

among the Yishuv throughout this period, the major such organization 

was known as Hagana (The Defense [Force]).17 On the whole, it was 

responsive to the centralized leadership’s policy decisions such as 

havlagah (restraint) that were intended to maintain an effective system 

of self-defense against Arab threats, while diplomacy was used to achieve 

political concessions. This responsiveness occurred despite the fact 

that it employed a rather decentralized organizational hierarchy largely 

under the direction of local commanders.18 Hagana was established in 

1920 with support by the quasi-government. Among the Yishuv it earned 

the recognition of the people as the underground Jewish defense force 

representative of the collective needs of the community. There were, 

however, militant separatist groups and individuals alike that participated 

in both offensive and reprisal acts of violence. The enduring missions of 

Hagana would prove primarily to be settlement defense, facilitation of 

illegal immigration, and the maintenance of an all-Jewish para-military 

capability.19 Leaders within the Jewish quasi-government encouraged legal 

paramilitary training of Jews by participation in the British security forces 

apparatus. Expansion of such forces, to include those with capabilities for 

offensive operations, would be progressively sought towards the goal of 

forming the nucleus of a Jewish Army. It was debated among the Jews as 

to whether a Jewish Army would be a catalyst to or a result of the creation 

of the hoped-for Jewish state.20

The fears and interests of the Arab fellaheen (peasant class) were 

a force of its own that would lead to various forms of support and 

involvement within the grass-roots element of the Arab militancy of the 

period. Arab nationalists, elites, and extremist groups would consistently 

exploit the fellaheen as they managed the organization, aims, and direction 

of the Rebellion in varying degrees and at varying stages throughout the 

rebellion.21 Concerning these groups’ efforts to further their respective 

agendas, they were increasingly emboldened in their view of the efficacy 

of a resort to violence to gain political concessions from the British. 

This was often done in such a way as to afford deniability.22 This trend, 

however, would not appear to gain consistent overwhelming support from 

the Arab populace, at least not willingly.23 Coercion and intimidation 

would be the catalysts that led to the Arab population’s rational analysis 

of their individual security and livelihood interests, to favor the benefits of 

noncooperation with the government. These terror methods also led to active 

support or passive noninterference with organized actors of violence.24

Militant bands eventually formed a sustained military problem for the 

British and a constant threat to the Yishuv. These armed bands of rebels 

were composed of Arab foreign fighters, religiously inspired militants, 

and locals motivated by personal vendettas, nationalism or brigandage.25

These armed bands, however, would continually experience a high degree 

of factionalism despite attempts to centralize their organization.26 At times, 
26

it would appear that top-down political direction was either ignored or 

subjugated to the leaders’ of the rebel bands use of violent acts as a means 

for their own ends and interests.27

The tortuous but rather consistent British attempts to pursue policies 

of impartiality and fairness regarding domestic issues in Palestine proved 

impossible to satisfy either the Arab or Jewish population, let alone both.28

The difficulties in governing a population so severely divided along two 

distinct lines of interwoven racial, religious, and political motivations were 

nevertheless accepted because of the perception of Palestine’s strategic 

interest to the British.29 The problems of governing Palestine consistently 

demanded a strong purpose. This purpose was presented as the necessity 

of Palestine to the defense network of the Near East that in turn was vital 

to the communications across the Empire. The invocation of the strength 

of the Empire rested more and more solidly on the monetary and symbolic 

value of the neighborhood for which Palestine was to “defend,” even if only 

to keep out others that might hold hostile or unfavorable views to British 

interests. The Suez Canal in Egypt afforded trade and communications to 

the Empire’s holdings in the East, including the “crown jewel” of India. Oil 

that originated in Iraq was increasingly shipped through the Suez Canal, 

and in 1935, it then traversed Trans-Jordan and Palestine via pipeline to 

the port of Haifa. The British Naval, Army, and Air Force bases in Iraq and 

Egypt were secured by treaty from the time that their independences were 

granted in 1932 and 1936, but this depended on agreements that needed to 

be renewed and potentially enforced. Palestine linked the two by securing 

maritime and overland lines of communication.30

Before and during the Arab Rebellion, however, the increasingly 

worrisome posturing of the Nazis and Fascists in Europe and North Africa 

would often eclipse the internal concerns taking place in this “vital” British 

interest of Palestine.31 Communications between the senior British Army 

commander in Palestine and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff shed 

some insight into how Palestine’s troubles would be overshadowed by the 

gathering war clouds. During the height of the 1936 phase of the rebellion, 

and just after the arrival of a division of troops to assist in countering 

it, Major General John Dill wrote to Field Marshall Cyril Deverell. He 

noted, “From what I know of your probable pre-occupations I shall not 

be surprised to hear that Palestine has become very small beer. I feel quite 

odd, with only one problem on which to concentrate. But what a problem 

it is.”32

Roots of the Arab Rebellion

The Arab Rebellion of 1936 to 1939, itself consisting of multiple 

phases of intensity and methods of violence, is rightly considered in its 

broader context to be but a stage in the evolution of the long-standing 

and burgeoning social, religious, and political frictions at play among the 

inhabitants of Palestine that were under the rule of the British mandate.33
27

Outbreaks of violence by Arab elements against the Jewish population 

occurred in 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933. Violence directed against the British 

governing authority evolved in frequency and intensity during this period 

as well. This was a result of a combination of known factors. Increasingly, 

Arab desires for political independence were stirred, especially with the 

news of the nationalist surges and achievements in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. 

Even more importantly, the Arab fears of impending social upheaval 

resulting from Jewish immigration and land purchases were turning into 

a grave anxiety that the trend would not only shatter Palestinian Arabs’ 

Nationalist hopes but lead to eventual subjugation by the Jews.34

Meanwhile, Jewish aspirations for Palestine to become the refuge 

for world Jewry were extremely heightened in their experience of rising 

anti-Semitism and persecution in Europe. This was heavily experienced 

in Poland but epitomized by the events accompanying the rise of Adolf 

Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany from 1933 onward. As a result, 

Jewish immigration into Palestine from 1932 to 1935 grew exponentially 

both legally and illegally.35 After a Jewish arms-smuggling operation was 

exposed and a highly publicized Palestinian “freedom fighter,” Sheikh ‘Izz 

al’Din al-Qassam, was killed in a clash with security forces in 1935, the 

tensions in Palestine were nearing the crisis point. The arrival of 1936 

brought not only an economic crisis and another failure to establish a 

Legislative Council in Palestine, but it also brought ever-heightening 

anxieties and perceived opportunities in a seemingly imminent European 

War.36 The stage was set for a cascading chain of events that would 

crystallize into the first phase of the Arab Rebellion and encompass most 

of the remainder of 1936.
28

Notes

1. For an overview of the British in the Middle East during this period, 

specifically from 1914 to 1922, see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace

(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989).

2. McMahon later stated that “it was not intended by me in giving this pledge 

to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was 

promised” and that he “had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that 

Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.” 

See letter to the editor of The Times from A. Henry McMahon, 23 July 1937, LHC 

15/5/297. For a contextual overview of this period see J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle 

for Palestine (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 17-20; and Christopher Sykes, 

Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 

1973), 3-40.

3. Balfour later admitted that “Our policy may fail. I do not deny that this 

is an adventure.” See Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948 (Bloomington, IN: 

Indiana University Press, 19733-4), 3-4, 7.

4. Sykes, Cossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 10; Hurewitz, The Struggle for 

Palestine (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 17.

5. For an overview of the mandate and a reference for its original 

documents, see The Mandate for Palestine as prepared by The Division of Near 

Eastern Affairs for the US Department of State in 1927, reprinted as The Palestine 

Mandate (Documentary Publications; Salisbury, NC, 1977).

6. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 17-18.

7. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 18-19.

8. For a comprehensive understanding of Zionism, see Howard Sachar, A 

History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, 2nd ed. (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 13. Here, 

“Zionism” refers to the movement standing for the establishment of a Jewish state 

in Palestine.

9. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National 

Movement (Safety Harbor: Simon Publications, 2001), 390-391; Hurewitz, The 

Struggle for Palestine, 18-23.

10. War Office, Palestine: Information for Commanders of Reinforcing 

Troops, TNA WO 33/1436.

11. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 23.

12. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 23; “Palestine: Information for 

Commanders of Reinforcing Troops,” 7 September 1936, TNA WO 33/1436; H. 

J. Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons 

Ltd., 1937), 161-163.

13. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 24, 38-63.

14. Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion, 164-168.

15. For an extensive overview of the social and political organization of the 

Arab and Jewish populations, see Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 33-63.
29

16. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 38-42.

17. Hagana was known to exist and to possess unauthorized weapons, but 

the enforcement of the British policy was generally lax. This was largely due to 

the recognized need of the Yishuv to protect itself in conjunction with the inability 

of the official security forces to provide protection with such a low density of 

forces to cover widely dispersed settlements.

18. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 3, TNA WO 191/88; 

Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 24; Uri Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli 

Militarism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 3; Yehoshua 

Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, 

Volume Two: 1929-1939 (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 70.

19. David Ben-Gurion. “We Defend Ourselves – Illegal Immigration The 

Strongest Weapon,” Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 13 September 

1963, LH 15/5/311.

20. Ben-Eliezer, The Making of Israeli Militarism, 3, 19-21. For an insider 

account on the history and deliberations on policy for the Haganah, see the series 

of articles written by David Ben-Gurion in 1963-64, especially, David BenGurion, “Britain’s Contribution to Arming the Hagana,” Jewish Observer and 

Middle East Review, 20 September 1963, LH 15/5/311; Hurewitz, The Struggle 

for Palestine, 24.

21. See Tom Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of 

Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 1936-1939 (London: Sage Publications, 1977), 

178-192, where he describes the rebellion as “a racial, religious, colonial, familial 

and peasant struggle intermingled.” For one of the most extensively researched 

works on the period drawing from English, Arabic and Hebrew sources, see 

Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 162-273.

22. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 24.

23. Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939), 

365-372, as posted in the 2004 Internet edition, http://www.combatreform.org/

PENTOMICARMYAGAIN/imperialpolicing.htm; 51-63, 67; Simson, British 

Rule, and Rebellion, 165-168; Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 

1936 (War Office, February 1938), 29, TNA WO 191/70; See George Antonius, 

The Arab Awakening, 405-409, for the view that the Arab rebellion was manned 

and persisted consistently by the grievances and nationalist ideals of the Arab 

peasant class.

24. Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-

1921 and Palestine 1936-1939, 179-182; Gwynn, Imperial Policing (1939), 389-

390; Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, 

Volume Two: 1929-1939, 177-178, 187, 190.

25. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 181, 183, 185, 188-189, 194.

26. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 182, 191-193, 300-

301. For one of the few collections and analysis of captured Arab rebel documents, 
30

see Ya’acov Shimoni, and Ezra Danon, Documents and Portraits from the Records 

of the Arab Gangs in the Arab Revolt, 1936-1939 (Jerusalem; Magnes Press, 

1981). A translated copy can be found at TBL M2313.

27. One of many such periodic assessments by the British was recorded 

as: “the campaign of violence... appears to have broken away entirely from the 

control of the Higher Arab Committee and is now in the hands of irresponsible 

extremists” as stated in Palestine: Information for Commanders of Reinforcing 

Troops, 7 September 1936, TNA WO 33/1436; See the War Office release in 

January 1939 for an overview of the issues discussed in this paragraph at that 

time, LH 15/3/71; Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of 

Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 1936-1939, 192-204.

28. It should be noted, however, that these internal policies were heavily 

influenced by the government’s accounting for how they might resonate with the 

greater Arab and Muslim world, for which British interests were closely tied. 

Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 20; Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 

23-24.

29. For the strategic interest of Palestine as enumerated by the Committee 

on Palestine in a report for the Colonial Office as of April 1939, see TNA CO 

733/410/11.

30. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 21, 25-26; Sykes. Crossroads to 

Israel: 1917-1948, 9; See also Herbert Sidebotham, British Imperial Interests in 

Palestine (Letchworth; The Garden City Press Ltd., 1937), 2, LH 15/5/299, for 

the text of his memorandum submitted to the Royal Commission headed by Lord 

Peel, wherein he states “It is no longer necessary to stress the Imperial interest of 

Great Britain in Palestine.” Mr. Sidebotham was sympathetic to Zionism, but the 

statement is telling of the almost axiomatic case he presents as it comes from “the 

leading political journalist of his time” according to Hurewitz.

31. Winston Churchill, Step By Step: 1936-1939 (London: Thornton 

Butterworth Ltd, 1939), 290.

32. Letter from Major General John Dill to Field Marshall Cyril Deverell, 22 

September 1936, LHC Dill Collection 2/9, Document 5a, 3.

33. See the official History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: 

Notes on Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 

TNA WO 191/88.

34. Simson, British Rule, and Rebellion, 160; Porath, The Palestinian Arab 

National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 140.

35. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 39-40, 133-140; Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 

1917-1948, 20; Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 135-138, 144.

36. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 140-141, 143-159.
31

Chapter 4

The Arab Rebellion and Internal

Security in Palestine

April 1936—Breakdown of Public Security

In mid-April of 1936, the unfortunate but rather ordinary sequence of 

inter-ethnic violence escalated beyond the typical spate of limited attack 

and reprisal. The news of murder and its accompanying rumors spread 

throughout Palestine, leading to riots in the major cities. A flurry of Arab 

political activity at all levels over the following days led to a breakthrough 

in the deadlock that had heretofore prevented a unified Arab political front 

with nationalist goals. A Higher Arab Committee was formed. A general 

strike was decreed for Arab workers while political demands were put forth 

to the government to include a cessation of Jewish immigration and land 

purchases as well as the establishment of a representative government. 

These were quickly followed by calls to the Arab public for civil 

disobedience while sporadic acts of violence and sabotage against both 

the Jews and the government started to the take the shape of an organized 

campaign of violence. Arson, sniping, bombing, sabotage of infrastructure, 

and attacks on motor vehicles were beginning to establish themselves as 

fundamental elements of the rebellion within the first month. The volume 

of these incidents prompted the civil government to send requests for 

military reinforcements. The British Government declared that a Royal 

Commission would proceed to Palestine in order to investigate Arab 

political grievances. The announcement came with the stipulation that it 

would only proceed to Palestine after order was restored.1

May to June 1936—Action and Reaction

As the first military reinforcements were arriving in May to undertake 

security and defensive operations, the rebellion was spreading from the 

cities to the rural areas. The formation of armed bands prompted further 

calls for reinforcements by the civil government. The reinforcements 

arrived piecemeal in response to the gradual escalations and then dispersed 

into small protective details throughout the country acting “in aid to the 

civil power.” They had neither the concentrated strength nor the authority 

for providing offensive action.

By mid-June the smuggling of arms and foreign fighters from Iraq 

and Syria through Jordan had swelled some of the gangs’ operational 

strengths to between 50 and 70 fighters. These numbers led to an increase 

in the frequency and audacity of their attacks while they gained valuable 

experience through experimentation in their use of guerrilla tactics. 

Another emerging trend that would mark the rebellion revealed itself in the 

rebels’ employment of an organized and persistent propaganda campaign 

along with the use of civil and legal complaints against the security forces. 
32

These actions heightened the political sensitivities among the British 

public and government toward the counter-rebellion campaign. In turn, 

the propaganda and complaints were catalysts that emplaced limitations 

and restrictions on the security forces’ actions and employment. In 

Palestine, legal challenges from Palestinian Arabs exposed a weakness in 

the cooperation of the legal apparatus to enforce the severe punishments 

authorized through a series of defense and emergency regulations.2

As engagements between HM Forces and the bands became a regular 

occurrence, another trend emerged: The initiative and surprise was with 

the armed gangs of rebels. Despite (or rather because of) the firepower 

that HM Forces were able to bring to bear, the Arab guerrillas sought to 

avoid decisive engagements and were successful in choosing the battle 

site and initiating contact more often than not. Engagements often took 

the form of ambushes. After ambushing a motorized convoy in a location 

chosen for its tactical advantage, the rebel gangs were able to retreat with 

at least a psychological victory given the most probable scenarios that 

would play themselves out after the initial engagement. If the mission of a 

convoy required haste, then its haphazard returning of fire and continuing 

of mission led to the disadvantages of inevitably inaccurate fire from the 

vehicles as well as the perception of having fled the battlefield. If HM 

Forces were to be dismounted for counterattack, not only were they 

now exposed in a gunfight against covered and concealed guerillas, but 

the lightly clad and armed rebels who held the advantage in knowledge 

and navigation of the terrain could disperse quickly. The rebels could 

even “transform” themselves into villagers or shepherds to escape their 

pursuers only to return later to claim the battlefield. The tendency for the 

rebels to stage such attacks with the approach of dusk or at night took 

away the advantage that airpower was discovered to bring to the fight in 

maintaining contact once the elusive rebels were found (or rather exposed 

themselves) and engaged.3

The armed bands would pose a constant problem in their persistent 

elusiveness and maintenance of guerrilla capabilities. Throughout the 

rebellion, the rebels’ emphasis on the types of guerrilla operations to be 

conducted would change to both maximize the frustration of the security 

forces’ measures taken against them and to preserve their force.4

 The 

“warrior ethos” of the rebels never earned the respect of HM Forces on 

account of the fact they would not stand to fight and that their overall 

effectiveness in guerrilla warfare would remain highly dependent 

on individual bands’ experience and leadership. Rebel attempts to 

“professionalize” their force, however, would emerge.5

 Foreign fighters 

and guerrilla leadership, funding, and “full-time” Palestinian rebels would 

progressively emerge. A guerrilla warfare doctrine would also emerge, 

named the Damascus F.S.R. (Field Service Regulations), and it would be 

published in pamphlet form.6
33

July to August 1936—Strengths and Weaknesses

In July and August, the violence continued unabated. The close of 

the Abyssinian War allowed the release of British troops from Egypt and 

Malta for duty in Palestine. For the first time, the military was able to field 

sufficient forces capable of conducting large sweeps for village searches 

and, if encountered, to bring the armed bands to battle. These actions proved 

to be largely unsuccessful. Between poor operational security, the leak of 

information on security operations from Arab governmental employees, 

and the time and distance necessary for units to travel, in conjunction 

with the “eyes” of the rebels or rebel informants, the rebels would more 

often than not enjoy ample warning of HM Forces’ moves.7

 In August, 

an ex-Iraqi and Syrian Military Officer, Fawzi al-Quwuqji, infiltrated into 

Palestine with experienced guerrilla fighters and leaders. Meanwhile, the 

latest of attempts at political mediation failed despite the civil government’s 

facilitation of foreign Arab officials to act as interlocutors.8

At the outset of the rebellion, the government’s security forces in 

Palestine included a garrison of military forces that included two infantry 

battalions, more than a squadron of the Royal Air Force and a Royal Air 

Force company of armored cars. These would grow to almost two full 

divisions in six months. Air Vice Marshal R.E.C. Peirse of the Royal 

Air Force commanded the military forces, but he did so as the military 

adviser to HC Arthur Wauchope. Therefore, the military acted under 

the authority and direction of the HC. The Trans-Jordan Frontier Force 

operated in eastern Palestine along the Jordan River Valley for frontier 

security under the direction of the HC.9

 The Palestine Police consisted of 

nearly 3,000 policemen to include about 750 British Officers and other 

ranks in conjunction with about 1750 Arabs and 375 Jews. The police 

were organized under the civil government with an inspector general as 

their senior representative under the authority and direction of the HC.10

Auxiliaries to the police were employed for duties ranging from 

drivers, protection of infrastructure, and reinforcements to the police 

force. They were expanded during the first six months of the rebellion 

to number around 3,500 by September. The overwhelming majority of 

these auxiliaries, referred to as “supernumeraries,” were Jewish. These 

Jewish supernumeraries were primarily employed as security guards for 

the defense of Jewish settlements against Arab attacks.11 This force would 

continue to expand throughout the rebellion owing to their increased need 

in conjunction with shortages of other security forces to fill this role. 

Another factor for this growth was the Jewish lobbying for increased 

capability to protect the Yishuv. The largely Jewish character of this force 

created a heightened political sensitivity to their numbers and employment 

throughout the rebellion due to their impact on Arab sensibilities.12

The military mission was conducted “in aid to the civil power,” 

therefore the Palestine Police were expected to take the lead in restoration 
34

of order.13 A description of the time stated that “its armament and training 

are much more nearly military than is usual and resemble those of 

Gendarmerie.”14 Under the direction of the HC, the military was dispersed 

in order to conduct protective duties, secure lines of communication, 

and provide security details for convoys. The military was generally 

employed to conduct any security activity necessary to help the police 

force maximize its manpower for priority missions. This arrangement 

often resulted in military personnel executing “police” duties while the 

police conducted military-style operations.15 The traditional British 

security emphasis on the primacy of the police has many roots, but one of 

the police’s primary practical reasons for being pushed into the lead when 

countering rebellion was the capability for obtaining information. The 

police worked among the people and held the language ability necessary 

to perform this function, but there were issues developing in Palestine 

that prevented this asset from meeting its expectations.16 Already divided 

loyalties among the Arabs of the Palestine Police were further widened as 

a result of the progressively intensive campaign of Arab-on-Arab coercion 

and terror to enforce “loyalty” to the cause. Cracks in the police were 

beginning to show as early as June.17 In the absence of martial law, powers 

had to be conferred upon the military to include those of search, arrest, and 

the imposition of collective fines.18

Fall 1936 to Spring 1937

Policy and Subwar

Despite requests from the military for the instatement of martial 

law and the implementation of “repressive measures,” the government’s 

policy decision up to this point was one of “endeavouring to protect life 

and property without adopting repressive measures.”19 This policy would 

continue until September when the military forces required to execute a 

new policy were en route to employ “intensive measures designed to crush 

the resistance.”20 With no end of the violence in sight, this change in policy 

was prompted by an acknowledgment among British Government officials 

that their current policy was failing in its near-term expectations for 

restoring order. The HC’s approach to the policy thus far was driven largely 

by considerations of the policy’s effects toward the future restoration of 

peace. His intention was to prevent the arousal of unnecessary bitterness 

toward the government. It was his hope that the civil government could 

resume its work to fulfill the mandate charter with the smallest degree 

of setbacks post-rebellion. He would later state to General Dill, the new 

General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the two divisions now employed 

there, that sterner measures would also have been a political liability if 

the Royal Commission were to report that the Arab grievances were well 

founded.21

Martial law was initially approved in London, but ensuing 

governmental deliberations led to the withdrawal of the authorization. In 
35

its stead, specific authority was to be delegated to the military for making 

regulations on security issues. The emergency regulations would take time 

to be developed due to their requirements to be spelled out in detail.22

Before these measures were able to be implemented, though, the Higher 

Arab Committee called off the strike and the violence. This was a result of 

the threat of martial law, the influx of troops, the mediation of foreign Arab 

kings, and the fact that the Arab population had suffered significant financial 

loss. These developments coincided with the impending commencement 

of the citrus harvest that was a major source of employment and income 

for the fellaheen.

23

General Dill was frustrated with the security strategy and he voiced 

his criticisms toward the limitations imposed on his military options for 

countering the rebellion.24 Internally, he issued a statement to the troops 

under his command commending them for their efforts that had led to the 

waning of the rebellion “in spite of hampering and difficult circumstances.” 

This reference clearly pointed to policy limitations, as the publication of 

these remarks in the local press were immediately prohibited on order 

of the HC.25 In communications with the War Office, Dill criticized the 

effects of a purely defensive strategy and expressed his opinions on the 

failure to instate martial law. It was his “impression that HM Government’s 

intention had not been carried out ... ” and that “an opportunity had been 

missed of re-establishing British authority.”26 Dill witnessed the denial of 

his recommendations to the HC to apprehend the leader of the Higher Arab 

Committee as well as the cancellation of an operation that he had planned 

to strike at the armed Arab gangs that were still in existence. He further 

expressed his concerns for the likelihood of a renewed rebellion, owing to 

the facts that the Arab political and military organizations maintained their 

capabilities for renewing acts of violence.27 In a memorandum to the HC, 

Dill points out that:

Any failure to take prompt measures in the face 

of organized rebellion, including the declaration of 

Martial Law, will always lead to waste of effort and the 

ultimate necessity of having to provide more and more 

reinforcements to cope with the situation. This is the main 

lesson of the recent rebellion when a policy of forbearance 

and particularly a desire not to leave bitterness prevented 

the early declaration of Martial Law and led to greater and 

greater forces being required. I am sure you will agree 

that such a policy cannot be followed in the face of a fresh 

rebellion. In any case it is a policy which it would be the 

duty of any commander to resist.28

While Dill’s opinions and words were communicated strongly as he 

executed his duties as GOC in Palestine and military adviser to the HC, they 

appear to be consistently nuanced in appropriateness for both his audience 
36

and the channels through which he exercised his influence. Elsewhere 

within the military, the policy and its restrictions drew criticism that can 

only be described as scathing.29 The War Office publication titled Military 

Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 was published in early 

1938 and devoted seven pages to such criticisms. Its critical evaluations 

were against (1) the policy of “conciliation” that was pursued versus 

the policy of “repression” that was preferred; (2) the civil government’s 

failure to employ effective counter-propaganda; and (3) the policy’s 

detrimental effects on the conduct of military operations. Criticisms of the 

government’s policy were also present in the book written by H.J. Simson, 

a serving British officer in Palestine in 1936.

Simson first introduced the concept of subwar, which he identified as 

rising in prominence since World War I and epitomized in both Northern 

Ireland and in Palestine. He defined subwar as an insurgency employing 

guerrilla warfare in combination with propaganda against the government, 

terrorism to control the population and neutralize the police, and secret 

organizations to control and/or exploit the complex collage of actors, 

motivations, and incidents toward the achievement of political goals.30

Simson acknowledged the political difficulties in supporting the means 

necessary to defeat subwar as well as the challenges to implementing 

an effective form of martial law. He did not propose, however, that this 

emerging form of war required a total departure from the traditional 

military methods needed to quell rebellion. He asserted that prompt use of 

force against the subversive organization and better cooperation between 

the civil, military, police, and legal organizations were imperative for an 

effective, synergistic, and comprehensive strategy to prevail over such an 

insurgency.31 He identified the government’s ineptitudes in understanding 

this form of rebellion and establishing effective policies to defeat it.32 He 

declares that “The Army in particular gains wide experience in constant 

contact with rebellion . . . [,] But the policy governing its action . . . [is] 

controlled by amateurs.”33

Wingate’s Entrance into Theater

The influx of troops into Palestine from the military surge in September 

of 1936 brought about a restructuring of the military organization with the 

now two divisions in country. The experienced units already in Palestine 

were consolidated under the 5th Division in the North due to the higher 

levels of rebel activity there. The newly arrived division was given an 

Area of Operations (AO) in the South.34 With the reorganization of forces, 

the staff of the 5th Division Headquarters in Haifa was expanded. Orde 

Wingate was assigned as a General Staff Officer, Grade 3 (Captain), 

Intelligence.35 He would quickly set about learning the contemporary 

history and modern politics of Palestine which would build upon his select 

knowledge of its ancient history gained through the reading of the Bible 

and his Christian faith.36 He also began learning Hebrew, which would 
37

distinguish him as one of the few officers to read and speak the three 

official languages of Palestine.37

A few months later Wingate would be transferred to an intelligence 

officer position within the corps General Headquarters in Jerusalem. 

During his initial months in Haifa, however, his endeavors to understand 

the situation would have already led him to accept a staunch pro-Zionist 

position. This was on the whole counter to the general attitudes within the 

British civil administration and military.38 He revealed his early (and what 

would prove to be long) held opinions on a few points of interest as early 

as January 1937 in a letter to his “Cousin Rex” (Sir Reginald Wingate, the 

accomplished British general and administrator in Egypt and the Sudan). 

Orde Wingate recognized the military potential of the Jews for use in 

countering the Arab rebellion. He also noted the idea’s merits in allowing 

for the British Military to treat Palestine as an economy-of-force mission 

within the greater Empire. Wingate criticized the civil administration, 

the civil administrators themselves, and the policies undertaken thus far 

in Palestine. He particularly noted his perception of the “anti-Jew[ish]” 

sentiment of the Palestine Administration.39 He would later comment on 

his perception of the anti-Jewish sentiment within the military as well. 

The attitudes within the military appear to have been less overtly proArab than those of the Colonial and Foreign Offices, but they could still 

be considered as such in general.40 The strength of Wingate’s Zionist 

opinions, however, would easily interpret anything less than his extremes 

to fall into that category; therefore, his writings refer to them as such. 

There were pro-Zionist voices within the political and military realms, but 

these were the minority.

The Colonial and Foreign Offices’ deep apprehension for potential 

offenses to Arab and Muslim sensitivities was rooted in practical concerns 

for the empire that included large swaths of this ethnicity and religion. The 

military considerations included practical concern over Arab and Muslim 

sensitivities because of the potential effects on the Arab components of 

the security forces within Palestine. It must also be remembered that there 

was a longstanding and widely accepted practice in the British Military 

thought of the day to classify races as “martial” and “non-martial.” The 

Jews had long been considered the latter while the Palestinian Arabs 

were a step away from the former. For the Jews, this meant that their 

military utility to the British was implicitly recognized as questionable at 

best. As for the Palestinian Arabs, they did not fit neatly into the Martial 

and Non-Martial theoretical paradigm. The British Army’s experience 

with Arabs and Muslims most certainly contributed to a familiarity and 

comfort level with their employment; however, the “fighting” prowess of 

Palestinian Arabs would repeatedly be called into question whether acting 

as friend or foe. The association of Palestinian Arabs’ with the Bedouin 

was likely a psychological contributor to those in the British Military 
38

who did tend to lean towards a pro-Arab bias. The Bedouin were a highly 

romanticized martial race in general British opinion; especially given the 

drama and publicity that was taking place during this time surrounding

T. E. Lawrence’s exploits during World War I and his recent death. While 

Wingate was in fact a distant relative to Lawrence, he would vociferously 

point out the differences in their military thought and operational practice 

despite, or rather because of, the temptation of many to draw comparisons. 

Wingate’s forceful contradistinction could very well have been more of 

a function of Zionist versus Arab bias than the argumentation that he 

employed, but this is unclear.41

Wingate would establish many local contacts during his tenure in 

Palestine, and got off to a quick start. These were primarily with influential 

Jewish personalities associated with either Jewish political organizations 

or Hagana. These acquaintances included such figures as Emmanuel 

Wilenski, Eliahu Golomb, Abba Eban, Moshe Shertok and David BenGurion. His Arab acquaintances also included men of such prominence 

as George Antonius.42 Wingate also met and quickly established a close 

relationship with Chaim Weizmann, one of the principal Zionist leaders 

of the era. This particular introduction was inadvertently initiated by Sir 

Reginald Wingate when he arranged for Orde Wingate to meet the HC. 

The HC hosted a dinner party that both Wingate and Weizmann attended.43

Orde Wingate’s adept use of “patrons” in conjunction with his experiences 

in the efficacy of influencing those who were influential, were at this point 

an already developing skill.44 Though there were explicit instructions that 

British officials were not to become involved in Palestinian politics, this 

appears to have been widely ignored in practice. Wingate would stand 

out, however, not only because his circles included those in positions of 

such great influence but also because they were largely Jewish instead of 

Arab.45 His ability to make a quick and deep impression on those he met 

would be a trait recounted by numerous military and political notables 

from this point in his career and forward.46

A “Loaded” Spring

Throughout the winter of 1936 and into the spring of 1937, Lieutenant 

General Dill sought to influence and clarify both policy and civil-military 

relations for the anticipated recrudescence of violence. He strongly 

advocated the instatement of martial law. As he continually fell short in this 

endeavor, he simultaneously sought to maximize the effects of his force 

within the constraints of the policies.47 Meanwhile, the Royal Commission 

finished its hearings and collection of evidence in Palestine in January of 

1937, but its findings would not be released until July. During this period, 

the garrison was reduced to six battalions, emergency powers for both 

the police and the military were refined (though with much difficulty), 

and the violence remained relatively abated in anxious anticipation of 

the Royal Commission’s Report.48 The tensions remained high while the 
39

organizations and capabilities for further rebellion remained intact. This 

was due in part to the intervention of the Foreign Office in curbing the 

military’s recommendations to disarm the population. This intervention 

was initiated out of fear that such a move would “endanger the peaceful 

settlement which now seems to be in sight.” The military also harbored 

concerns about pursuing a policy of disarmament, but their argument 

followed a very different line. While disarmament was believed necessary 

for an enduring peace, they would not recommend such a move without the 

authorities (i.e. martial law) and the troops available to properly execute 

and enforce it.49

Partition Plan and “Palliatives”

The Royal Commission’s Report declared the mandate unworkable 

due to the political impasse of the Arab and Jewish political demands. 

Therefore, a partition scheme was recommended to create independent 

Arab and Jewish states with British interests secured by privileged treaties. 

A narrow British zone of control would encompass Jerusalem and a strip 

of land connecting it to the Mediterranean as well as isolated ports in Haifa 

and Aqabah.50 These primary findings were partially unacceptable to the 

Jews based on their overriding concern that Palestine be sufficiently large 

enough to provide a place of refuge for persecuted Jewry worldwide. The 

findings were wholly unacceptable to the Arabs as they reiterated their 

initial political demands. Attention shifted to the “palliatives” offered by 

the Royal Commission that were provided as alternatives if its primary 

recommendations proved unacceptable, though these were prescribed 

as treatment for symptoms and therefore not intended to be a cure. 

These included addressing the rates of Jewish immigration as well as 

recommendations for the handling of the security situation. An overhaul 

of the Palestine Police was one such recommendation among the report’s 

criticisms of the policies and actions pursued thus far towards gaining 

control of the security situation.51

Fall 1937 to Spring 1938

Severe Measures

Acts of violence were increasingly renewed with vigor over the 

course of the remainder of 1937. The violence directed against the British 

Government was preceded by growing Arab on Arab terrorism with 

occasional Jewish reprisal attacks for Arab assaults against the Yishuv. 

After the assassination of a District Commissioner in early September, 

the threats of severe policies were acted upon.52 Suspect Arab political 

leadership was targeted for arrest in October resulting in the detention, 

deportation, or dispersal of many rebel leaders and supporters to include the 

Mufti himself. He escaped the country to eventually set up a headquarters 

in Syria, around which many Arab political and militant dissidents from 

Palestine would coalesce. From within and without, preparations were 
40

made for continuing the rebellion. The Mufti continued to exert influence 

over the armed bands that enjoyed a renewed influx of foreign fighters 

as well as a surge of Arab Palestinians. These militant rebels harbored 

a variety of motivations that included repaying blood feuds, personal 

profit and racketeering, and carrying on the struggle as Arab Nationalist 

Freedom Fighters. Throughout the fall and winter, the establishment of 

military courts streamlined the efficiency of prosecuting violators of the 

revised laws that were brought about through emergency powers. The two 

Brigades of military forces also began offensive operations against the 

armed bands.53

General Wavell replaced Dill as the GOC in September of 1937. In 

October, Sir Harold MacMichael was chosen to replace Wauchope as the 

HC but it would not be until February of 1938 before the transition would 

occur. It was not only determined that Wauchope was representative of a 

policy that had proved too lenient, but that his former life of being a British 

Military Officer was more of a hindrance than a help. The dynamic of 

civil-military relations relied upon the HC’s respect for military expertise 

for two important functions. The first of which concerned the military’s 

duty to advise the civil government in its handling of the security situation. 

The second concerned the HC’s capacity to transfer powers from the civil 

to military spheres.54

The issue of declaring martial law was fully debated by the British 

Cabinet but it was decided that it would not be implemented in Palestine. 

The new HC would prove much more willing to support a more severe 

line however, especially after having taken account of the multitude of 

criticisms directed at the policies taken thus far.55 “Military control” was 

the hybrid legal state that undergirded the authority of the military to 

take action from November of 1937 until December of 1939. It would 

not be until late in 1938, however, that the legal infrastructure would be 

built and the forces available to enforce it would be able to effectively 

exploit the more severe authorities. These authorities were less than 

those offered under martial law, but they allowed for matters of public 

security to be handed over and made the overall responsibility of the GOC. 

This arrangement included powers that were delegable to Military Area 

Commanders thereby allowing them to publish area-specific emergency 

regulations on all issues relating to security.56

Military Actions and Police Reform

Shaping operations for military offensives included both the building 

of roads along the frontiers to enable access by mobile forces as well as 

measures taken in an effort to separate the rebels from the population. The 

latter was primarily achieved through the use of the military for village 

occupation in conjunction with the use of punitive actions against both 

individuals and communities for rebel activity.57 Throughout the rebellion, 

the rebel bands would consistently concentrate themselves most heavily 
41

in the North due to the advantages afforded by the hilly terrain. The Royal 

Commission had recommended this area of northern Palestine to be part 

of the Jewish state under partition. This resulted in further motivation 

for the Arabs that resided there to rebel. The area fell within the 16th 

Infantry Brigade’s AO under the Command of Brigadier General Sir 

John Evetts. The combination of village occupation by HM Forces and 

an experiment by the rebel leaders to fully utilize the numbers of fighters 

available to them, led to the mustering of large rebel bands that operated 

in the countryside throughout this area. Repeated engagements took place 

throughout the winter and into the spring of 1938, in which British Forces 

employed tactical formations that were developed for frontier warfare. 

These were composed of multiple mobile columns acting in concert 

with each other and with the Royal Air Force. This resulted in both the 

rebel bands’ attrition and their realization that employment of such large 

formations (often numbering in the hundreds) were clearly to their military 

disadvantage.58

Meanwhile, the Royal Commission’s recommendation for an overhaul 

of the Palestine Police led to the hire of one of the most respected 

police administrators of the time, Sir Charles Tegart. He was brought 

in to both assess and make recommendations for the reformation of the 

Palestine Police.59 Having arrived in the fall of 1937, he made a series of 

recommendations over his several-month stay that were being reviewed 

and successively implemented beginning in early 1938.60 Of note were 

Tegart’s recommendations to (1) reorganize the Criminal Investigation 

Department for better intelligence collection; (2) address his concern 

over the frontier units’ lack of patrolling at night; (3) build a fence across 

the Northern frontier; and (4) stand up a Rural Mounted Police Unit as 

a hard-hitting mobile paramilitary force designed to counter the rebel 

gangs.61 While the execution of basic police duties were overwhelming by 

simple virtue of the amount of work to be done in correcting the security 

situation, the armed bands would prove themselves to be a constant and 

formidable threat to the police throughout 1938. Rebel attacks on Police 

Stations would at times result in their being completely overrun and the 

surrounding areas falling under rebel control, and their intimidation of 

police officers and their families was increasingly effective.62

Jewish Security Forces, Policy, and Wingate

The rebel capability of massing to attack during this period was 

a serious threat, not only to the smaller police outposts that Tegart had 

recommended to be consolidated for better protection, but to the Yishuv

settlements as well. As of January 1938, the Jewish supernumeraries 

being used for settlement defense had been expanded to number about 

5,000. Though only 1,000 of these supernumeraries were on the books as 

being paid, armed, and employed fulltime, all but 700 of the remaining 

supernumeraries were on call for emergencies with arms that were issued 
42

and stored for emergency defense.63 The Jewish strategy of planned rural 

settlement through the successive establishment of Jewish villages was a 

largely successful and continuous aim throughout the whole of the Arab 

rebellion. These settlements were intended to display their resolution in the 

face of Arab terror as well as to pre-position the Jews for a more favorable 

partition settlement through both reinforcement and expansion of the areas 

of their population densities.64

In addition to the underground Jewish security apparatus that included 

intelligence and defense units, Jewish requests were increasingly made 

throughout the rebellion for a more permanent and robust integration of 

Jews into the British security forces apparatus in Palestine.65 In 1936, 

British policy set conditions such as the dismantlement of Hagana before 

they were willing to accede to such requests. According to Ben-Gurion, 

this condition was dropped in no small part due to “pressure from the 

Military (which did not always support the pro-Arab tendencies of the 

Administration and understood the difference between the Arab gangs 

and the Hagana)”.66 A progressive tendency for the British Government 

to lessen the restrictions placed on the employment of supernumeraries 

throughout the Arab Rebellion did take place.67 It was never extensive 

enough, however, to satisfy an increasingly loud Jewish voice for such 

units, though the Yishuv and its leadership would never unanimously agree 

on the issue. The requests for expansion of the use of Jews in the security 

forces especially called for units or sub-units to be composed of either 

entirely Jewish personnel or a combination of Jewish Soldiers and Officers 

with British Officers. British security forces that were made up in whole 

or part by indigenous personnel were a long tradition of British Military 

practice. Both the region and Palestine itself saw the use of such units to 

include the Arab Legion in Trans-Jordan and the Trans-Jordan Frontier 

Force, though they were both of an overwhelmingly Arab character.68

Wingate himself would hail from this tradition having commanded 

a Sudanese Defense Force Idara (tactical unit roughly equivalent to an 

oversized light infantry company) comprised of about 300 indigenous 

Sudanese Soldiers. He gained what would prove to be valuable 

experimentation and practice in tracking down and bringing gangs of 

poachers to action.69 It should not be surprising or odd, therefore, given his 

conviction in the military potential of Jews as an indigenous population 

group that he would see the potential for such a unit being formed. 

Considering his own qualifications in experience and language (as well as 

in his sympathies and determination), it is also not surprising that he would 

see the potential in his being chosen to lead such an organization. He stated 

his desire to do so in his letter to Sir Reginald Wingate as early as January 

of 1937. He stated that “I’d sooner be raising a Jewish Brigade (under 

Govt.!) to defend our interests in the coming war!”70 Shortly thereafter in 

May, and on no other authority than his own, he would formally plant the 
43

seed in Weizmann’s mind. In Wingate’s recognition of the “paramount 

importance to look far ahead”, he would communicate through a letter 

to Weizmann both the potential of “the formation of a Jewish Palestine 

Defence Force” and his desire to lead it.71 Wingate duly recounted his own 

qualifications for such a position and requested further communication 

about the subject, though no written records exist for what surely remained 

to be discussed discretely and in person.72

The concept for a Jewish Military Force was one that was often 

officially discussed, and it would continue to be discussed throughout the 

Arab Rebellion and into World War II.73 In late 1937 and early 1938, official 

deliberations over such a force were spurred on by a Jewish request and 

they led to talks between the GOC, the HC and the Colonial Office. The 

request was not recommended or accepted at the time due, in the words of 

Lieutenant General Sir Robert Haining, to “political objections” considered 

to “rest on the fact that we are the mandatory power, endeavoring to hold 

a nice balance between two antagonistic races. ...”74 It was admitted 

that “the scheme for forming a Jewish unit is, for the present at any rate, 

inopportune ...” but that “this question will crop up again later.”75 The 

HC stated that “If it were not for political considerations, I should be only 

too glad to see a Jewish force formed; it will have to be done some day 

presumably.”76

One of the major conditions that was cited as being present at this time 

by the GOC, Police Inspector General and the HC, in consultation with 

political advisers and one another, was that “there is sufficient armed force 

at our disposal to deal with any internal situation which is reasonably likely 

to eventuate ... ”. The statement continued “From the Government point of 

view, therefore, there is no need on practical grounds for a Jewish military 

unit unless it could be used in substitution for an equivalent number of 

British soldiers who could thus be released for service elsewhere.”77 The 

conditions would change, however, as 1938 witnessed the Arab Rebellion 

reach its height. Some of the personnel holding these key positions upon 

which the recommendations were made for the formulation of policy 

would also change. The momentum of the policy would remain, though, in 

the form of political sensitivities to the use of Jewish Forces for offensive 

operations.78 Another flurry of discussions on this policy would erupt later 

that summer, and this would be due in no small part to Wingate.

The Mobile Column and Village Occupation

March and April of 1938 were noted for the refined British Military 

techniques in the tactical and operational employment of “mobile” or 

“flying” columns.79 These consisted of about 100 soldiers and officers 

organized into two platoons, a headquarters section, a mortar detachment 

and a rear guard using 13 motorized transport vehicles (two of which were 

“Donkvans” for transporting about 10 donkeys to be used as pack animals 

when traveling cross-country). Weaponry consisted of rifles (.303 caliber) 
44

for most soldiers (pistols were used by soldiers with specialist duties), 

two “Lewis guns” (.303-caliber machine guns with 47- or 97-round drum 

magazines), grenades, and one mortar (3 inch).80 These usually operated 

in a coordinated effort of multiple columns in order to provide a system 

of cordon, search, maneuver, and strike capabilities. A system of mounted 

battle drills was developed, and wireless transmitters were carried 

for coordination with each other and with aircraft that were capable of 

providing close air support with machine guns and bombs.81

The mobile columns proved effective in their engagements 

with large rebel bands resulting in the bands’ dispersal into smaller 

groups. In the History of the Disturbances in Palestine, 1936-

1939, the War Office notes that this success was followed by “A

period ... when mobile columns were searching areas in an attempt to 

exterminate the leaders and cadres which remained with them. This proved 

a fruitless task. The numbers were so small, the country so difficult, and 

intelligence so meager that large numbers of troops were being used for 

exceedingly small results.”82

After the GOC changed from Wavell to Lieutenant General Haining in 

April of 1938, the military assessment for the following two months was 

that “From our point of view the whole situation had changed radically. 

There were no more big military targets. At the same time the villages 

in the hills were being effectively terrorized and made to produce men, 

money and weapons.”83

At this stage of the rebellion, the military identified that a primary 

component of the security solution was to separate the elusive rebels from 

the population through denial of the villages to the gangs. The police 

were acknowledged as being “stretched to the limits of their capacity,” 

so the military expanded its village occupation scheme.84 The results 

were palpable in the areas where these operations were concentrated. The 

now-smaller rebel gangs, however, simply moved to the fringes of the 

zones of occupation and changed their tactics to once again avoid decisive 

engagements while focusing on sabotage of infrastructure, sniping, and 

selective ambushes.85

The security situation would be noted as entering into a steady decline 

due to a combination of factors. The Arab population was increasingly 

harboring antigovernment sentiment due to their belief that partition was 

imminent.86 The difficulty experienced by HM forces in bringing the rebel 

bands to battle left the rebels with the tactical initiative, especially as they 

grew in proficiency at using guerrilla tactics while acting as small bands. 

The rebels benefited from a constant flow of intelligence from a willing or 

coerced population that often resulted in the loss of operational initiative 

for the security forces. The rebels also maintained a largely unchecked 

ability to maintain logistical resupply from either compliant or terrorized 
45

and unprotected portions of the population, as well from across the 

frontiers by foreign sources of supply.87

Wingate’s Intelligence Duties

Wingate’s official duties as an intelligence officer from his entrance 

into theater and throughout this period had included coordination of the 

collection of information on enemy and indigenous political activity, 

to include participation in its collation and distribution.88 He conducted 

intelligence training for other officers,89 and he used his Arabic language 

skill to collect human intelligence as well as to read, file, and report 

information from written sources of information.90 Wingate would steadily 

gain the confidence of his superiors to begin undertaking a series of special 

missions.

After securing permission from Wavell, Wingate carried out a 

reconnaissance in late March and early April 1938 in order to identify 

alleged smuggling routes. Fording sites along the Jordan River were 

presumed to be chokepoints for such activities, but an earlier reconnaissance 

from another party had failed to produce any information of value.91 At 

some point during this period, Wingate used his Jewish contacts within the 

Hagana intelligence to secure their cooperation. This is the first recorded 

such cooperation that would henceforward continue to benefit Wingate.92

He used a Jewish settlement as his base of operations, and he operated 

covertly (undercover as a journalist while his true identity was known only 

to the settlement leader). Wingate’s stated intentions were first to judge the 

veracity of the reports about smugglers. He also intended to learn of their 

methods, assess the efficacy of the security forces’ preventive measures, 

devise more effective measures, and finally to obtain specific intelligence of 

a smuggling operation on which he could test new concepts to counter these 

activities. While the mission can only be partly known to have succeeded 

in meeting his initial objectives because the source documents that capture 

this information do not survive in whole, he learned some valuable lessons. 

He concluded that antismuggling operations would require a battalionsized element if the employment of forces used the current methods while 

acting on the typical information available in existing intelligence reports. 

He suggested guidelines for a new reporting format that highlighted the 

specificity required of intelligence reports to be “actionable.” A discovery 

that proved to be of significance to his later counterguerrilla operations 

was that it was possible to operate clandestinely from Jewish settlements. 

This, he argued, could help prevent military operations from becoming 

known among the Arab population and therefore among the rebels.93

In May, Wingate had an opportunity to voice his opinions on the 

overarching politics and policy of Britain towards Palestine due to the 

presence of another Royal Commission that had arrived on a fact-finding 

trip. Based on the first Royal Commission’s recommendation for partition, 

this second Royal Commission was sent under the leadership of Sir John 
46

Woodhead in order to investigate the practical application of the first 

commission’s partition plan.94 After being introduced to the commission 

by Haining, Wingate was able to present his views during his session of 

investigative questioning by the Commission that British support of a 

Jewish state with a standing army was in the empire’s best interests.95

In late May, Wingate produced a memorandum that appraised the 

organization and responsibilities of officers within the newly announced 

regional Intelligence Centers.96 These centers were designed for the 

purpose of fusing information from all available government agencies 

(indicated as civil, police and military) for analysis and timely distribution 

of intelligence. The two brigades were directed to man one such center 

each with their brigade intelligence officers. They were to work with 

permanently posted representatives of the Police Force while the civil 

representative would liaise on a nonpermanent basis. This latter aspect 

of the arrangement was clearly to the chagrin of the military who desired 

the organizational structure to support complete and efficient cooperation 

from all agencies. The 14th Infantry Brigade was directed to establish one 

such center, while the 16th Infantry Brigade was to establish two. One of 

these centers was to be directed by Wingate who would be lent from the 

Force Headquarters Intelligence section.97 While Wingate’s memorandum 

titled an “appreciation on intelligence duties” has not survived, a letter 

from Wing Commander A.P. Ritchie (head of the Intelligence section) to 

Wingate confirms that he (Ritchie) and the GOC carefully considered at 

least one measure that Wingate proposed. Though the recommendation was 

thought to be unfeasible at the time due to less than “open” inter-agency 

relations, it is clear that Wingate recommended that the organization of the 

Intelligence Center include an “inspecting Intelligence officer.” This was 

presumably to be a Military Intelligence officer that had the authority to 

“inspect” and therefore enforce cooperation from the other contributing 

agencies.98

Summer to Fall 1938

A Tactical Dilemma of Strategic Importance

Haining observed the effects of the military successes during the spring 

in breaking up the larger rebel bands in the north, then he witnessed the 

constant harassment caused by the smaller and elusive bands. He desired 

to continue effective offensive action against the rebel bands but both 

tactical challenges and a shortage of forces prevented further success. The 

bands were operating rather freely in the hills, conducting both sabotage of 

infrastructure as well as sniping and ambushing of HM Forces, all of which 

was occurring primarily at night. Before Haining was to make a personal 

tour of this area in July to assess the situation, measures were already 

being taken to counter the change in the guerrilla bands’ organization and 

tactics.99 Wingate had proposed a solution to Evetts for the implementation 

of a countergang scheme that assumed risks that were assessed as too 
47

high, due to the fact they were to be conducted by small units and at 

night. Wingate emphasized the practical aspects of military economy of 

force in conjunction with a strong argument that the risks incurred could 

be mitigated. He won Evetts’ approval in late May and received the 

authorization to initiate a proof-of-concept with three British squads that 

would operate in conjunction with police. Wingate’s proposal assessed the 

primary weaknesses of the military that prevented their tactical success 

as a lack of (1) night focused tactics and training; (2) intelligence; and 

(3) local knowledge of the terrain, Arabs, and Arabic. Wingate assessed 

the different elements within the security forces’ infrastructure that could 

rectify the latter deficits, and he argued for the advantages of using Jewish 

supernumeraries on practical grounds.100 Haining’s approval would follow 

a few weeks later after the preliminary training and missions validated the 

organizational and tactical merits of Wingate’s proposal.101

The overarching tactical dilemma for HM Forces throughout the Arab 

Rebellion was well understood: “In this type of guerrilla warfare ... the 

greatest difficulty of all is to find the enemy and bring him to action.”102

This was consistently identified as a function of the rebels’ strength and 

HM Forces’ weakness in (1) abilities to gain intelligence on the opponent; 

(2) maintaining their own operational security; (3) achieving surprise and 

maintaining the initiative; (4) knowledge of the local terrain and language; 

and (5) fighting at night. HM Forces were recognized as holding the 

advantages in military discipline as well as in firepower, but the rebels 

consistently mitigated these advantages. The rebels achieved this through 

(1) choosing to operate in small units; (2) operating at night or with the 

approach of nightfall; and (3) avoiding decisive engagements. As a result 

of HM Forces not being able to consistently maintain a sufficient troop to 

task ratio to dominate the entirety of their AO with the available repertoire 

of methods recognized as being effective, they could not (1) secure 

everything that required it at all times; (2) consistently and effectively use 

their firepower (including airpower); and (3) maneuver their relatively large 

forces to “close with and destroy” the enemy.103 The prevailing military 

methods for employing its forces and force were proving insufficient in 

providing answers to the security problem that revolved around a tactical 

dilemma.

An Organizational and Tactical Solution

to the Military Problem

Wingate’s proposed solution to this tactical dilemma first appears in his 

“Appreciation ... of the possibilities of night movements ...with the object 

of putting an end to terrorism. ...”104 He addresses the major issues of the 

tactical dilemma and offers innovative solutions. A new organization with 

an accompanying set of tactics was proposed. While even the “lessons 

learned” of the 1936 portion of the rebellion had identified many of these 

challenges, considering them as lessons learned obscures an inescapable 
48

fact: The difficulties they presented still remained to be overcome through 

both devising solutions and then applying them. Wingate’s proposal listed 

as its Object: “To set up a system and undetected movement of troops 

and police by night, across country and into villages, surprising gangs, 

restoring confidence to peasants, and gaining government control of rural 

areas.”105 Wingate would produce a series of consecutive documents that 

built upon his initial proposal in order to flesh out details, add the insight 

gained from experimentation, and establish the organizational and tactical 

principles to be employed.106

A comparative analysis of the trends of the conventional military 

approach in its organization and tactics, versus those proposed by Wingate, 

highlights the major differences. First, the internal security strategy 

pursued thus far by military and police forces focused primarily on:

1. The security of the population through physical presence;

2. The physical destruction of militant rebels; and

3. The denial of the physical resources for continued rebellion (i.e. 

weapons and ammunition).

The means employed to achieve these goals were (corresponding to 

the above):

1. Police outposts, military movements to “show the flag” and village 

occupation by military forces;

2. The use of police and military “columns” to locate and destroy rebel 

bands; and

3. Patrols and obstacles along the frontiers in conjunction with village 

searches to block and confiscate contraband.

The noted deficiencies were (applicable to all of the above):

1. The lack of a sustainable ratio of available forces to physical security 

needs;

2. The lack of intelligence on rebels to include cooperation from the 

population in providing information;

3. A resigned attitude in continual admission that the rebels owned the 

tactical advantage at night; and

4. The lack of ability to achieve tactical surprise and maintain 

operational initiative against rebel bands in the military’s effort to destroy 

them.

Given the military’s consistent identification of the rebel bands as the 

primary military problem, this last point was particularly frustrating for 

HM Forces.107

Wingate’s proposal of the organization and tactics that would be 

embodied by the Special Night Squads (SNS) would meet the noted 
49

deficiencies head on. By employing the largely untapped segment of the 

population in Jewish manpower available for security duties, the shortage 

of security forces could be addressed. This indigenous portion of the 

population would bring knowledge of the local terrain and language to the 

organization that in turn were also crucial to both knowledge of the terrain 

in tactical employment and language skills for intelligence collection. The 

lack of intelligence was to be solved initially through Wingate’s own unique 

resources and capabilities to include his connection with the Intelligence 

Center and the Hagana, his own Arab sources of information, and his 

method of “forecasting” based on analysis of the enemy and terrain. The 

perception of the rebels’ tactical advantages at night was refuted in full by 

Wingate. He argued that the right combination of small-unit organization, 

battle drills, and the discipline embodied by soldiers in conjunction with 

well-trained police could overcome any of the assessed tactical advantages 

of the rebels outright. Tactical surprise was to be gained and maintained 

through intelligence driven operations that employed stealth, deception, 

and coordinated movements of small dismounted forces. Upon making 

contact with the rebels, the patrols would use pre-planned battle drills to 

aggressively attack with “bayonet and bomb.”108

Wingate’s emphasis was not primarily on the physical destruction of 

the enemy, though this was intended to occur. Rather, the psychological 

effects of continuous small-scale but overwhelming tactical defeats through 

engagements at night would deter the rebels’ willingness to accept the 

risks of mustering to conduct subversive operations. This could now occur 

regardless of whether the rebels were operating in large or small bands. 

Concerning the population, Wingate’s emphasis was not primarily on their 

physical protection, such as that achieved through physical presence, but 

on a psychological state of government-enforced security, reinforced by 

random and unexpected visits. These visits were to be made effectual by 

virtue of two factors. First, surprise was expected to lead to either (1) 

successful searches for contraband because the rebels or rebel supporters 

would not have time to properly hide it; or (2) irrelevant searches because 

the rebels or rebel supporters’ fear of the surprise visits outweighed the risk 

that they were willing to accept in order to retain contraband. Second, the 

tactical dominance that the unit represented over the rebels, and therefore 

the rebels’ ability to terrorize the population, would lead to cooperation 

of the population with the government. This would in turn lead to the 

population supplying the government with information on the rebels, 

which would further result in more effective targeting of rebel bands.109

Operational initiative and momentum was to be maintained by steady 

expansion of the organization and methods until guerrilla activities were 

neutralized, after which police or police auxiliaries that were trained in the 

new methods could be employed to maintain security for governmental 

control of the area.
50

The Special Night Squads

Wingate’s establishment of the SNS organization was clearly intended 

both by Wingate and the 16th Infantry Brigade (in whose battle-space 

his Intelligence Center was operating) to serve two primary functions. 

The first function was to operate as a night-time battle-space owner in 

which the organization would conduct “moving ambushes.” These were 

intended to neutralize guerrilla activities and build public confidence in 

the efficacy of the government security forces to maintain security. The 

purpose of this function was ultimately for the “gaining [of] Government 

control of rural areas.”110 The secondary function was for the organization 

to act as a test bed for both small-unit night-time offensive tactics, as well 

as for an organization composed of both British Officers and Soldiers as 

well as police. Effective tactics and tactical training, once refined, were 

to be synthesized, published, and disseminated along with a reproducible 

training plan suitable for both expanding the organization as well as 

distributing the capabilities across the force.111 The SNS was associated 

with the Brigade Intelligence Center and comprised its action arm. Wingate 

was afforded all the latitudes and authorities for direction and employment 

of the SNS as would be expected of a commander of a conventional unit, 

but he reported directly to the brigade commander.

The SNS as an organization was composed of three “squads” under 

the overall command of Wingate. Three British Officers acted as Squad 

leaders, each leading 24 to 36 Jewish supernumeraries that worked 

in conjunction with 10 to 12 British Soldiers. The soldiers trained the 

supernumeraries and then operated with them for tactical employment, 

but the soldiers themselves were not permanently attached to the SNS and 

therefore would rotate back to their unit to be replaced by others. The 

SNS use of the term Squad was, therefore, an organizational term for the 

composition of forces stated above as distinguished from a typical British 

squad that would normally consist of 8 to 12 personnel. The operational 

unit strength of the SNS organization as a whole at any given time generally 

consisted of about 100 to 150 personnel, though many more Jewish 

supernumeraries were trained. Many of these supernumeraries would 

operate continuously throughout the lifespan of the SNS and therefore 

become the veteran experts in employing their tactics. Others would 

often rotate in and out of operational status. The use of the term Squad, 

therefore, was either an intentional misnomer in order to mislead others as 

to its actual size, or it was meant to be understood in a more general sense 

as representative of a tactical formation without reference to its actual size 

at all. The SNS would sometimes vary the size of formations employed on 

individual operations in order to meet its specific requirements, yet each 

such operational element was also referred to as a Squad when acting in 

this capacity regardless of size. Wingate himself would assume tactical 

leadership of a Squad as well as operational command of multiple squads 
51

acting in conjunction with each other. Wingate’s initial recommendation 

for the name of the organization was Night Movement Group, though this 

would be changed to SNS before operations commenced.112

Evetts was intent on destroying the rebel bands and had desired the 

tactical capabilities within his force to use surprise and the maintenance 

of the initiative to achieve this effect.113 He distinctly realized, first, that 

this would require owning the night, and second, that the current skill 

sets and techniques for such night actions were not up to par within the 

force.114 Evetts, therefore, determined that the capability would have to 

be developed from the bottom up. The language of Wingate’s proposal 

points to Evetts’ influence in the broader sense of the understanding of the 

tactical problem and the available traditional military solutions. Wingate’s 

proposal, however, appears to be a unique synthesis of his own:

1. Military experience.

2. Understanding of the operational environment.

3. Views on the risk assessment and its possible mitigation.

4. Capacities as an intelligence officer.

5. Personal influence among the Jewish population and its leadership.

6. Overarching strategic objectives of forming the nucleus of a Jewish 

Army for protection of British interests in the region.

Evetts would vigorously resource and support Wingate’s proposal.115

Within a month of the inception of the SNS, it had begun to produce tangible 

military results, and Evetts took note. During the first week of July, Evetts 

published an operations instruction complete with a set of control measures 

specifically for night ambushes and “night work” for the security forces 

operating within his brigade’s AO. Night ambushes were to be conducted 

at the discretion of both battalion commanders and supernumerary police 

units within separate and defined areas of responsibility. Night Work was 

charged as the responsibility of battalion commanders in conjunction with 

the police authorities throughout all remaining areas of their AO. The SNS 

was allotted its own AO for Night Work.116 The operations instruction’s 

association between night ambushes being conducted around static posts 

implies, in operational terms, the concept of active versus passive defense. 

The delineation between night ambush and Night Work is intentionally 

nuanced, with the latter assuming an even more aggressive style of 

operations. At the tactical level it was offensive, though at the operational 

level it could be argued to be offensive or defensive, depending on the 

operational context in which it was framed.

The SNS operations were considered Night Work and are known 

to include “moving ambushes” or movements to contact. These were 

coordinated movements of small units that actively sought visual or 

physical contact with rebels from which an assault battle drill could 
52

be employed to achieve a decisive tactical engagement.117 Other types 

of operations conducted at night, in distinction from night ambushes 

and otherwise common nighttime activities such as mounted patrols of 

roads, are known to include infiltration and pre-positioning of cordons 

for village searches that would commence at dawn.118 The Jewish 

supernumerary police were not officially addressed as being given Night 

Work responsibilities apart from their participation in the SNS. The use 

of Jewish security personnel for offensive operations had already caused 

friction with civil authorities due to the SNS in mid-June. The local 

District Commissioner, who had political jurisdiction over the SNS AO, 

ordered Wingate to cancel an operation precisely on this account. Wingate 

forwarded the written prohibition to Evetts alongside his intelligencedriven plan to interdict an expected sabotage operation directed at the wire 

fence along the northern frontier. The intelligence proved correct as the 

saboteurs struck at the time and place indicated, which was also duly noted 

in Wingate’s correspondence, and the prohibition was removed.119

The tactical successes of the SNS under Wingate’s command 

had produced significant results relative to its small size and minimal 

resources from June until Wingate’s departure on leave in mid-October. 

As the experience of the force grew, and Wingate’s confidence in them, 

the consistent practice of small dismounted patrols conducting movements 

to contact expanded to include coordinated operations using most or all of 

the available Squads. These larger operations included the use of multiple 

dispersed infiltration routes that either (1) provided mutually supporting 

columns employed on search and destroy missions, or (2) converged for 

the envelopment of rebel gangs that were occupying villages or supposed 

safe-sites. This latter type of SNS operation often employed techniques to 

either dislodge or lure the rebel gang out of the village. An area ambush 

would be preplanned along potential rebel egress routes so that one or 

more engagements would likely be successful from the series of static 

ambushes. The initiation of contact from such an ambush Squad would 

then provide a trigger for the others to displace and reposition or conduct 

movements to contact.120

The friction of battle sometimes blurred the distinction between the 

type of SNS operation that was planned and the one that would eventually 

be executed due to unforeseen developments in the situation. One example 

of such a mission took place on the night of 11-12 July centering on an 

area that included the villages of Ein Mahil and Dabburiya. Intelligence 

indicated that a rebel gang that had recently occupied villages and attacked 

police stations was overnighting in the area. Wingate narrowed down the 

potential enemy locations through pattern analysis in conjunction with 

physical and map reconnaissance. The location of a police station in 

Dabburiya led Wingate to believe that the village of Ein Mahil was the more 

likely enemy location, so he devised an operation employing 32 British 
53

Soldiers and 55 Jewish supernumeraries. The plan was to flush the rebel 

gang out of the village and into a series of ambushes laid by supporting 

SNS along the most likely enemy egress route that happened to lead 

towards Dabburiyah. The squad closest to Dabburiyah ended up making 

contact with the enemy first, so the squads displaced and converged on 

the sound of the guns. Nine rebels were confirmed Killed in Action (KIA) 

through recovery of their bodies, though 15 were estimated to be KIA 

along with 20 wounded in action. The rebel leader fled the engagement 

early and, due to the casualties inflicted upon the rebel gang, they would 

not conduct operations for another seven weeks. The SNS suffered one 

Jewish supernumerary KIA and a few wounded in action overall, including 

Wingate,121 who would be awarded the Distinguished Service Order after 

this action. This was a particularly exceptional and rare event because he 

was junior officer and it was technically “peacetime.”

The patrols conducted by the SNS were often long and arduous 

endeavors. One that took place in August was recorded as covering 25 

miles, and this not only occurred in the mountainous region north of 

Tiberius but it included an engagement that killed four rebels. The latter 

half of August was spent in experimentation by the SNS for operating 

in conjunction with an infantry regiment, but Wingate would conclude 

that “large combinations in this guerrilla fighting defeat their own object. 

This is a subaltern’s war.”122 The noteworthy events in September included 

an authorized expansion of training Jewish supernumeraries123 as well as 

an action at Khirbet Beit Lidd that rendered 14 rebels KIA as proved by 

recovery of their bodies and included a prominent rebel sheikh.

124 Haining 

would again praise the SNS in an official dispatch for this operation.125

Information gathered during this action led to subsequent intelligencedriven operations to include one against a mayor who was implicated by 

documents found on the rebel leader.126

A set of SNS operations conducted 3 and 4 October proved some of 

the most notable, not only because of what they were able to achieve but 

because of what the other security forces could not. A rebel infiltration 

of Tiberius resulted in the massacre of 19 Jewish civilians. Garrisons of 

military and police were unable to pursue the rebel gang, but SNS forces 

that were operating west of Tiberius intercepted the rebel element as it 

departed. Six enemy casualties were confirmed KIA through recovery of 

their bodies while “at least forty casualties must have been suffered by the 

enemy”.127 The next morning, Wingate was traveling alone to Nazareth, 

presumably to the Intelligence Center, when he spotted two rebel leaders 

in taxis that were also possible participants or facilitators in the previous 

night’s rebel actions. Wingate conducted a link-up with nearby SNS (less 

than 20 personnel) and pursued the rebel leader. An engagement ensued 

at the summit of Mount Tabor and, despite their numerical inferiority and 

hasty attack, they killed the rebel leader and an estimated 13 more rebels.128
54

Wingate’s summary of achievements for the SNS from June to October 

1938 included more than 70 rebel KIA confirmed through body recovery, 

with the estimate that “at least double this number were killed, and as 

many as 300 wounded.” Wingate himself compiled this summary, but he 

did so in a letter to Evetts. The information he was giving was immediately 

verifiable, and certainly intended for an audience well beyond Evetts 

himself. It is likely that Wingate’s purpose in summarizing the exploits 

of the SNS was to silence critics, and to do so with Evetts’ authority 

behind the verification of the details. Wingate closes his summary with the 

claim that “I do not think that there is a battalion, let alone a company, in 

Palestine, that can show such a record, even for a whole tour of duty.”129

Evetts’ long-term intentions in underwriting the tactical experimentation 

of the SNS were two-fold. First, he recognized their tactical value for 

countering the rebel bands and for enhancing force-wide capabilities. 

Second, he saw their potential operational value for a sustainable 

economy-of-force mission in securing rural areas. These intentions are 

evidenced, first, by the procedure with which Wingate was required to 

report. This included submission of operational after-action reports that 

served not only the function of typical reporting requirements but also as 

validation of the proof-of-concept. These reports included the submission 

of tactical “lessons learned” and training plans as well.130 Second, Wingate 

was certainly under the impression that his communications with Evetts 

implied the intention to expand both his newly formulated tactics forcewide and the SNS itself as an independent tactical formation of British 

and Jewish character. In Wingate’s proposal that he submitted to Evetts 

for the establishment of the SNS, he states that “As lessons are learned 

and experience gained, the Group can be expanded both with troops 

and with supernumeraries. The ultimate goal is continual movement by 

night of ambush squads in all areas. ... ”131 This initial expectation for the 

expansion of the SNS would be followed up with a limited request for 

expansion within five weeks of its inception. Another specific request for 

expansion was initiated in September, but this time it was larger in scale 

and in accord with his initial expectation to be able to do so after about 

three months.132 Evetts would at this time recommend the duplication 

of the SNS organization and tactics for use by all three brigades. Amid 

higher-level discussions for the potential disbandment of the SNS, Evetts 

wrote to the higher headquarters that “I think it would be a great mistake 

to break up this organization and I consider it should be used for all three 

[Brigades]. Capt. Wingate has asked my permission to write privately to 

the GOC on the question of training and expanding SNS and ‘Police’ for 

the whole country and ... I have given this permission.”133

Haining states in his official report on operations during this period 

that “One of my objectives has always been that we should be ‘top-dog’ 

by Night as well as by day. Consequently great efforts have been made by 
55

all units to re-establish Night control of the country by constant patrols, 

ambushes and searches. ... I cannot speak too highly of ... the special 

Night Squads that have been organized ... for active offensive Night 

work.”134 After Haining’s declaration of widespread emphasis and effort 

on night operations during this period, the successes of the SNS were 

put into the broader context of the tactical dilemma by the same report. 

Haining states that “effective and widespread control of the country by 

Night is a most difficult problem. The advantage must be with the lawless 

and the saboteur, and the forces of law and order suffer from numerous 

disadvantages by comparison.”135 Wingate’s submittal of his proposal for 

the SNS in June declares that this focus on night operations had not yet 

taken place prior to this time, so it is unclear whether Wingate influenced 

Haining’s emphasis on night operations or if Wingate’s proposal merely 

coincided with the shift. Wingate heartily disagreed with the assessment of 

strengths and weaknesses favoring the rebels at night, and he disagreed with 

any account that HM Forces’ were displaying a zeal for night operations. 

In the proposal, he criticized the police and military for not conducting 

operations at night “as a general rule” and he also commented on the 

ineffectiveness of their procedures for engaging the enemy at night.136

Haining praises Wingate by name in his continuation of the report. 

He also mentions the use of Jewish supernumeraries operating within the 

SNS as well, albeit specifically in relation to “protecting the I.P.C. [Iraq 

Petroleum Company] pipeline”.137 The SNS operated from three separate 

settlements. Initially, the squads were operating primarily along the 

pipeline; however, only one of them would be habitually concentrated on 

engaging the rebel gangs conducting sabotage of the pipeline.138 Wingate 

would later recount that “The prevention of pipe-line sabotage is, properly 

speaking, the task of only twenty four of the Jewish SNS. Nearly all the 

SNS operations of importance took place elsewhere and for different 

objects [purposes of missions].”139 Here, “twenty four of the Jewish SNS” 

is a reference to Jewish supernumeraries that would make up part of one 

Squad within the three-Squad structure of the SNS as an organization.

Wingate’s intention in the beginning was to operate near the pipeline, 

but this was not primarily for its protection. This was not only generally 

an area of heavy activity for rebel bands, but the rebels’ targeting of the 

pipeline for sabotage simply increased the chances of the SNS for making 

contact with the rebels as they approached or departed from their target. 

The bottlenecks along infiltration routes and the lure of wire fence along 

the northern frontier for rebel sabotage also offered similar circumstances 

that focused Wingate’s employment of the SNS.140 Wingate’s later defense 

of the efficacy of the SNS organization and the techniques that they 

employed against rebel gangs would require him to point out that pipeline 

security was never the priority mission. It would, however, reasonably 

appear to be so from the point of view of anyone who was not aware of 
56

the operations first hand but had only read about them from the official 

military reports.141

The emphasis in the official reports concerning the use of the SNS for 

pipeline protection appears to be an attempt by Haining to achieve two 

results. Haining’s first objective appears to be to exploit a loophole in the 

policy of non-use of Jews for offensive operations off of their own land. 

The history of the security forces employed for infrastructure protection in 

Palestine had well-established roots for being composed of units of largely 

Jewish character.142 There was even a Jewish-proposed security scheme 

before the employment of the SNS for 200 Jewish ghaffirs (security guards) 

to guard the pipeline. This constituted yet another attempt to exploit the 

momentum already in place for this duty being recognized as one suitable 

for a security force of Jewish character. This scheme was either picked up 

by Wingate or similarly developed by him to exploit the same momentum. 

It was Wingate’s intention to train a suitable force of locally based Jewish 

supernumeraries that could then replace the SNS in the area for continued 

pipeline protection operations while the SNS focused elsewhere.143

The second objective of Haining appears to be to test the waters 

in challenging the policy and influencing its change, albeit this would 

eventually prove to be limited in scope when compared to Wingate’s 

intentions. Haining’s official reports were not only circulated among the 

War Office but in the Colonial Office as well. Haining’s official reports 

and dispatches on operations were one way in which he, as GOC Palestine, 

fulfilled not only his duty to inform but to “advise” the policy-makers on 

the effects of their policy. The nature of “advising” in this manner allowed 

for arguments to be made based primarily on pragmatism while generally 

void of politicized emotion. It was certainly expected, however, that robust 

and highly politicized discussions would be generated among the policymakers. Haining’s reports entailed an element of taking action based on 

what was deemed as military necessity, and then waiting for the lag time 

of political discussion to unfold while a stronger case was potentially 

being built to counter, if need be, being told to stop what he was doing. 

Haining had consulted with the HC over the SNS and they were both in 

agreement to support the organization and its controversial use of force 

by Jewish supernumeraries before asking for permission. The HC’s letter 

to the Secretary of State for the Colonies clearly expresses support for the 

overall policy in place, though he carefully notes his reasoning for suitable 

small-scale departures. He further confirms that these decisions were 

arrived at in consultation with the GOC. He states “that the broad principle 

of employing armed Jews for defensive purposes only and in areas mainly 

Jewish has been adhered to, although a certain latitude in the application 

of that principle has been necessitated by varying circumstances. I should 

like ... to emphasize that in every case the modifications have been 

dictated by reasons of utilitarian expediency and not at all by political 
57

... considerations ... [and that I might] have to extend the employment 

of armed Jewish supernumeraries in cases where the local circumstances 

demand it.”144 The parallel reporting on the SNS by both Haining and the 

HC proved to stir up inquiry from “higher” as expected. The Secretary 

of State for the Colonies wrote to the HC in August, “I note that a small 

column of Jews and British troops is being employed on operations in 

Galilee, including (on occasion) ‘ambush work’. I assume that ‘ambush 

work’ can properly be regarded as falling within the category of defensive 

or protective operations[?]”145

The general policy of disallowing security forces of largely Jewish 

character to conduct offensive operations outside of Jewish areas was 

again confirmed through interdepartmental meetings as a result of the 

reintroduction of the subject by the GOC and HC’s reporting. The Colonial 

Office condoned the limited departure from this policy with regard to the 

employment of the SNS based on the GOC and HC’s support of the unit 

and its operations. The understanding appears to be that the SNS was not to 

significantly exceed the known extent of its initial composition except for 

practical expediency, and that the details would be reported. The political 

considerations, as discussed, included what were anticipated as the 

negative effects of a policy reversal both on the greater Arab and Muslim 

worlds, as well as on the Arab elements of the security forces in Palestine. 

These concerns were repeatedly considered well-founded within both 

the military and political spheres. Palestine’s internal security concerns, 

despite reaching their height in 1938, would consistently fall short of the 

advantage to disadvantage analysis for a wholesale policy reversal.146 The 

red-lines for a policy reversal that would allow massive expansion of the 

use of Jews within the security forces were well discussed and articulated. 

These included, first, the possibility of an “insurrection following the 

publication of the Partition Commission’s [second Royal Commission] 

report” in which both the Jewish and Arab populations would be involved, 

and second, the outbreak of major conflict in the anticipated war among 

European powers for which the military would have to transfer forces out 

of Palestine.147

Haining’s testing of the policy was for limited objectives in the end, 

namely, to preserve the SNS as it was initially organized and employed 

in the heart of the rebel gang activity. It is unclear if this was a change 

from earlier and more overarching desires for a policy change that would 

allow the military to expand the organizational and operational concepts 

utilized by the SNS. Such a development would have elevated Wingate’s 

organizational and tactical “experiment” to a centerpiece of the overall 

internal security strategy. Such a desire by Haining, if it existed, could 

have been mitigated during the course of deliberations with the HC and 

other governmental departments. By September, Haining would frame 

his desires for achieving efficiency in his employment of the military 
58

in terms of economy of force. He wanted to achieve localized security 

objectives while freeing the military from duties that could effectively be 

accomplished by other units within the security forces infrastructure. The 

SNS experiment was but one authorization among many concurrent plans 

that were in conflict with strict adherence to the policy. He “recommended 

the enlistment of a number of temporary police (Jewish) for service with 

the army.”148 Haining had communicated that such duties would include 

convoy protection as well as infrastructure repair and protection, but it is 

unclear as to the extent that he might have intended to expand the SNS 

within this framework of Jewish security forces. It is also unclear whether 

these requests were intended to obscure an attempt at limited expansion.149

The War Office published a document in 1939 that chronicled “The 

Development of the Palestine Police Force. ... ” The SNS and the police 

attached to the military, as requested by Haining and referenced above, are 

noted to have resulted from the “shortage of troops. ... ” It is further noted 

that “In the case of the Special Night Squads organization, the enrolment 

of a limited number of Jews was agreed to by the Secretary of State on the 

understanding that they would be used on offensive-defensive tasks under 

the direct command of and together with British troops, (e.g. protection of 

IRAQ Oil pipe line). Although the hybrid nature of these categories has 

caused considerable administrative difficulties, they have fulfilled their 

tasks satisfactorily, especially the men of the Special Night Squads.”150

The military and political situation, however, was about to change. These 

changes would increase the amount of forces available to Haining, and 

they would therefore affect his employment of those forces. These changes 

would also advance the heightened political sensitivity towards the use of 

the Jews within the security forces.

No matter what Haining’s initial goals were or how much he might have 

desired to provide cover for the expansion of the SNS as an organization, 

the stabilization of the SNS strength that did occur was in conflict with 

Wingate’s goals and expectations. Wingate desired an overarching policy 

change that would lead to permanent and expanding formation of units 

of British and Jewish character within the security forces apparatus in 

Palestine. In turn, he hoped that these would form the nucleus of a Jewish 

Army that was in keeping with his own strategic assessment for Palestine’s 

role in securing British interests in the region.151 The policy constraints 

on the employment of force for security forces of Jewish character was 

not one that Wingate had to confront directly. Wingate had secured the 

“stretching” of that policy through military channels as represented by the 

authorization and resourcing of the SNS. The SNS made good on Wingate’s 

promises, but his hopes for expansion of the SNS organization and tactics 

had been blunted by the policy. This policy conflict would prove to be 

the fulcrum for the limitations that would prevent the organizational and 

operational expansion of his military “solution” to the security problem. 
59

Having expended his options and his patience, Wingate was left to assess 

what course of action that he should pursue.

Pivot Point

The Munich Agreement, which occurred in late September of 1938, 

ceded the Sudetenland (parts of then Czechoslovakia) to Germany. 

British tensions over the rising Nazi threat remained, but the pressure for 

maintenance of a military force capable of immediate response to their 

military threat had eased some in the wake of this event. Some believed that 

Hitler had limited aims that had been sufficiently satisfied with the terms, 

while most would at least concede that the seemingly unavoidable war was 

at any rate postponed for the near term. British troops were now available, 

and they were needed. In Palestine, the security situation had deteriorated 

to its worst yet in September and October. The nearly complete loss of 

control by the civil government led to military control, but the now steady 

flow of reinforcements that would amount to a second division required 

time to arrive and prepare for operations.152 Entire sections of Jerusalem 

fell under rebel control and were not able to be retaken until the end of 

October. The Palestine Police were put under the operational control of 

the military, but the Arab element was disarmed due to its unreliability 

and ineffectiveness.153 Two able division commanders, however, would 

join the fight: Generals Ryan Neith O’Connor and Bernard Montgomery.

In October, international politics and its impact on the policy in 

Palestine were again being reassessed. In Cairo, a meeting by the World 

Inter-parliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem Countries for the 

Defense of Palestine accentuated British fears concerning the threat of 

Arab and Muslim countries’ potential alliances with Germany and Italy.154

In London, interdepartmental meetings between the War, Colonial, and 

Foreign Offices in consultation with the HC concluded that the outstanding 

consideration of foreign political consequence in determining domestic 

policy in Palestine was the safeguard of the greater Arab and Muslim 

worlds’ goodwill towards Britain. Their assessments and conclusions for 

the way forward included:

1. Consideration of the situation throughout the empire in the event of 

future European crisis;

2. That the Balfour Declaration was a mistake;

3. That an independent Jewish state in Palestine was infeasible;

4. That British rule should continue over Jewish and Arab cantons but 

with their increased governmental participation; and

5. That consideration of either an Arab or Jewish state in Palestine 

was likely irrelevant because the whole of Palestine would eventually be 

absorbed into an Arab federation.

This last consideration, however, was only valid as long as Jewish 
60

immigration was sufficiently restricted to keep them in the minority. Early 

November witnessed the release of the Second Royal Commission’s 

Report that declared partition as an unviable option. Simultaneously 

with the release of this report, a conference was proposed to discuss 

alternate solutions among British, Jewish, and Arab (Palestinian and nonPalestinian) officials for the way forward in Palestine.155

The Jewish leadership was in crisis mode as the details of the 

forthcoming British announcements were being discovered in October. 

The land allotment to the Jews that was to be proposed by the British 

Government as a starting point for negotiations was smaller than that of 

the First Royal Commission’s proposal. This, in conjunction with the 

proposed restrictions on Jewish immigration, was deemed unacceptable 

by the Jewish leadership, who then began to mobilize in order to put 

political pressure on the British Government. Throughout the previous 

year, it had been increasingly difficult for the Jewish leadership to reign in 

the militant Jewish fringe that had increased the intensity of their reprisal 

attacks and flouted the policy of havlagah. British security forces had, 

however, targeted the Jewish political and military organizations that were 

behind such attacks and significantly degraded their ability to operate prior 

to this tenuous period.156 While the policy of havlagah would again be 

commended by Haining in a secret cypher message to the Chief of the 

Imperial General Staff in January 1939, he would also note the period 

had witnessed a resurgence in the militant factions of the Jews. He adds 

his assessment that “any further concessions to Rebels may very likely 

lead, in my view, to more than protests on the part of the Jews.”157 One 

historian’s summary of the Arab Rebellion up to this point was that “The 

sponsors of the Arab revolt had . . . won two major political victories by the 

fall of 1938.”158 These were stated as the British Government’s admission 

“that the Palestine Mandate was unworkable” and that there was at this 

point a “scuttling of the partition scheme, even before any attempt was 

made to implement it.”159 The conclusion was that “These events taught 

the lesson that the use of violence as a political weapon produced results 

which otherwise appeared unobtainable.”160 This “political weapon” would 

remain an effective instrument for another year in the Arab Rebellion, but 

the Jewish leadership would, on the whole, decide to keep theirs holstered 

in favor of diplomacy due to their assessment of the greater threat to their 

political goals being the rise of Nazi Germany.

Wingate Speaks to Power

Wingate took leave in mid-October and left Palestine for London. He 

had noted earlier that summer that he intended to take leave during the 

winter, and it is also likely that the accumulation of mental and physical 

demands over the several preceding months had influenced his decision.161

It is unclear if the decision to take leave was also driven in part by his 

perceived sense of “duty” to voice his opinions about policy and strategy 
61

in Palestine.162 This would, however, be the way in which he would spend 

much of his time there. Some biographers suggest that requests by the 

Jewish leadership for his aid in engaging the policy-makers factored into his 

decision.163 The British Army of the time prided itself on being apolitical, 

and Wingate’s actions would take him well beyond “the line” considered 

appropriate for a military officer of his rank and official capacity.

The knowledge of Wingate’s exact words and actions with many 

senior British political and military officials during his leave are difficult 

to establish with certainty. Most of the secondary sources repeat the 

early biographers who used personal interviews and recollections from 

individuals that were not always cited and are no longer verifiable. 

The weight of evidence among the primary sources that does exist, in 

conjunction with Wingate’s determined persistence to influence the policy 

in Palestine both before and after this period, all point to his extensive 

engagement of both policy-makers and those influential among the policymakers. Even if some of the unverifiable meetings were not conducted 

as supposed, the first-hand sources citing his political involvement are 

extensive enough to establish this facet of his influence on the policy 

towards Palestine.164 In addition to this, Wingate’s written documents 

throughout this period and beyond clearly state the common threads of his 

opinions on policy and strategy.165

Ben-Gurion recalls that he, Weizmann, and Wingate met with Lord 

Lloyd (former High Commissioner to Egypt and future Secretary of State 

for the Colonies) in late October. The three had proposed an alternative 

plan to Lloyd than those that they had known to be under consideration by 

the British Government for introduction at the forthcoming British-JewishArab Conference in London. Wingate addressed the strategic importance 

of Palestine to Britain and their advantage in securing its interests there by 

means of an armed Jewish state.166 A letter from the Chief of the Imperial 

General Staff to Lloyd confirms his receipt of Lloyd’s letter, recommending 

that he meet with Wingate. The outcome of the proposed meeting is 

unknown, but the letter also indicates that Wingate had already met with 

the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.167 Wingate would 

contact Basil Liddell Hart (military historian, journalist, and strategist that 

had influence with the Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha) 

and provide him with documents concerning the SNS. Liddell Hart would 

in turn pass along a letter of introduction and the SNS documents to 

Winston Churchill, but it appears that Wingate might have already met 

and discussed Palestine with Churchill through another channel.168 The 

Wingate biographer and Middle East expert Christopher Sykes submits 

that Wingate even secured a meeting with the Secretary of State for the 

Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald.169 The news of Wingate’s activities in 

London reached Palestine, and because of this he would not return to the 

SNS but was ordered to Force Headquarters in Jerusalem upon his arrival 

in early December.170
62

Winter 1938 to Winter 1939

Wingate Sidelined in Palestine

Wingate’s superiors sidelined him for his actions in London. The 

details surrounding this event invite analysis, and they are dealt with 

in detail in the concluding section of this case study because the source 

information that provides insight into this affair was compiled at the end 

of Wingate’s tour in Palestine. The SNS continued under a younger British 

Officer after Wingate’s removal from command. Any considerations for 

future expansion were dropped not only because of the reaffirmation and 

hardening of policy concerning the employment of Jewish security forces 

but because a division of reinforcements had arrived in country. The SNS 

operations refocused on infrastructure protection along the pipeline for 

three reasons. First, the rebels again shifted tactics to concentrate on 

sabotage of infrastructure because of the increased military pressure.171

Second, pipeline protection remained a necessary task and there doesn’t 

appear to have been any better solutions than the economy-of-force 

mission provided by constant night-time dismounted patrolling. Even 

with the military reinforcements in country, the other available military 

methods to conduct such a mission of secondary importance were not 

practical in terms of force requirements. Third, the assumption of risk for 

the larger and more expansive SNS operations was no longer acceptable 

either tactically or politically. Wingate would later comment on his being 

informed that he would no longer command the SNS as resulting from the 

“great changes [that] had come about. The country was full of troops and 

it was no longer found necessary to rely so much on the loyal section of 

the population. For political reasons a policy of ‘passive’ use of the SNS 

was embarked upon and pursued until they virtually ceased to exist in a 

recognizable form.”172

Waning of Rebellion

Meanwhile, the changes in the operational environment and the 

internal security strategy in Palestine would eventually lead to the waning 

of the Arab Rebellion as a Big War was waxing in Europe. The division 

of reinforcements that arrived in the fall of 1938 enabled robust efforts to 

execute and enforce the military authorities that were granted under military 

control. This allowed for a change in strategy.173 Haining’s plan was first 

to re-establish security and governmental control in the major cities and 

across the south. Then, he would secure the lines of communication and 

expand operations into the rural areas in the north. Efforts to reorganize 

and rebuild the Palestine Police were simultaneously undertaken under 

military direction and control. Disarmament of the population was a major 

focus of operations. Haining understood that the objective would never 

completely be attained, but he would comment on the importance of the 

effort for both its practical value and its political effect. Haining stated 

that “it is essential that every endeavor should be made to collect as many 
63

arms as possible in order that a slackening of the rebellion consequential to 

the publication of the new British policy may not be looked on as a moral 

victory for the Arabs, and especially to reduce the possibility of armed 

disorders breaking out again at any later date when conditions might 

appear more favourable for rebel activities.”174

The London conferences of Arab, British, and Jewish delegations 

in the Spring of 1939 ended in deadlock despite the British threats of 

unilateral decision on Palestine’s future. Meanwhile, the Arab Rebellion 

was fracturing with some rebel factions turning against each other in either 

blood-feuds or attempts to stop the Arab-British cycle of violence. When 

the British Government released its white paper on 17 May, it was clear 

that the Arab demands had been given the maximum deference short of a 

total appearance to have ceded political ground to violence. The reception 

of the announcement by the Palestinian Arab community was mixed as 

many demands were still left unmet, but continual military pressure had 

exhausted a large portion of the Arab population. Sporadic terrorist attacks 

would continue by both Arabs and an enlarged Jewish militant fringe, but 

the outbreak of the European hostilities with the Nazi invasion of Poland 

in September sobered the resistance to the realities of worsening hardship 

amidst the political and economic crises that both communities were 

enduring. The rebellion fizzled out.175

Wingate’s Fallout and Farewell

Wingate would remain in Jerusalem until his transfer back to the 

United Kingdom in May 1939.176 His annual confidential reports (officer 

evaluation report) written by his rater, Wing Commander Ritchie, and 

his senior rater, Lieutenant General Haining, criticized him among their 

praise for his other exceptional qualities as an officer.177 Haining, after 

praising Wingate’s actions with the SNS, states his major criticism of 

Wingate, which are along the same lines as Ritchie’s major criticism, as 

“[his] tendency ... to play for his own ends and likings instead of playing 

for the side ... has become so marked, and a matter of such general 

comment as to render his services in the Intelligence branch nugatory and 

embarrassing.”178

Wingate would file a complaint in rebuttal of the critical comments 

made by Ritchie. Some sections from his lengthy statement are worthy of 

evaluation and consideration here. Wingate states:

It is indeed owing to the fact that my sympathy does 

not waiver with every political tide that I owe my standing 

and my potential usefulness to His Majesty’s service. It 

is certain that to express sympathy with Zionist aims is 

to court wide unpopularity in official circles. It is also 

widely believed and widely stated without contradiction 

that this is not so when pro-Arab feelings are expressed. 
64

No doubt the distinguished officers that read this will 

say that there should be no question of a political bias. 

I agree, I had none. My bias was and is Imperial, but I 

differ from Wing Commander Ritchie and most of his 

brother officers in my views as to what is the true Imperial 

interest. Unless to be in a small minority is to be wrong 

there is no reason to think I am so until my arguments 

have been answered. I know that my views are shared by 

some many distinguished officers and I have no doubt that 

in a few years they will be proved correct. In any case 

my free expression of them to my superiors was a duty. 

... I would be judged by results, not opinions. My public 

and private support of the Jews was obligatory. They had 

always been loyal to me and to Great Britain. ... I became 

during my official studies convinced that the Imperial, 

Jewish, and Arab interests all ally in one direction. I 

have never made the slightest secret of my views form 

my superiors. Persons who have not served in Palestine 

will not readily believe the extent of the indiscretion, the 

violence of partisanship even in official circles.179

Here, Wingate’s argument displays a line of logic that connects the 

results of his receiving critical comments in his annual confidential report 

by Ritchie (and likely his being withdrawn from SNS command as well) as 

being caused by personal differences in political opinion and assessment 

of British Imperial strategic interest. As strong as Wingate’s argument 

might have been if these were the only factors, it does not appear that 

Wingate captures the central issue, namely, his meetings in London. Sykes 

quotes a letter of comment by Ritchie in which Ritchie records that he told 

Wingate that he “had acted improperly as an officer serving in Palestine 

in obtaining an interview with the Secretary of State for the Colonies.”180

The nature of Wingate’s relationship with Ritchie was likely a strained 

one.181 This could have been a result of any number of factors, not least of 

which was Wingate’s strong personality and willingness to forcefully put 

forth his arguments regardless of another’s authority or position. Wingate 

would likely prove to be a difficult subordinate for almost any first line 

supervisor, let alone one to whom Wingate’s mantra was disagreeable. 

Wingate states that his political and strategic opinions were communicated 

openly and often. There is no reason to doubt these claims, as it would 

have not only been in character for Wingate but refutable by Ritchie to the 

effect of weakening Wingate’s argument. Any differences of opinion that 

Ritchie might have had concerning Wingate’s pro-Zionist sympathies and 

strategic assessments, had not led to any known adverse actions towards 

Wingate by Ritchie prior to Wingate’s activities on leave. Therefore, this 

raises doubts concerning the validity of Wingate’s logic on the central 
65

issue behind Ritchie’s (and Haining’s) statements. While Ritchie does not 

explicitly reference Wingate’s meetings with senior military and political 

officials in the annual confidential report, he does make a statement that 

captures the essence of the “line” that Wingate chose to cross. Ritchie says 

of Wingate that “his ardent nature which gives him the power to pursue an 

objective enthusiastically often obscures his judgment and obstructs his 

sense of proportion.”

In Wingate’s continuation of his rebuttal, he not only continues the 

aforementioned line of logic but he also continues a theme introduced 

in the segment of his rebuttal above. He identifies that the extent of his 

usefulness in service to the Crown was tied to his extreme position of 

support for the Jewish cause. Wingate writes,

It is unwise to forget that during the past three years 

to sympathise with Arabs was to side with the rebel, to 

sympathise with Jews was to side with our friends. ... I 

early formed the theories which I was later to put into 

successful practice. Briefly me [sic] theory was that 

in order to master the rebellion it was essential to gain 

continual surprise. This was possible only by employing 

to the utmost the resources of the loyal element in the 

population. ... You cannot gain the confidence and loyalty 

of an alien community without publicly defending it and 

making known your sympathy for it. The value of hanging 

at least one officer trusted and loved by each section of the 

population that remains loyal is evident. I had supposed 

that my superiors realized this and approved my policy 

generally. Naturally the difficulty of filling such a role 

is immense and I am open to criticism. I welcome such 

criticism so long as my bona fides [character] are not 

called into question and it is realized that I must be a true 

friend to the Jews if I am to command their loyalties. I am 

not ashamed to say that I am a real and devoted admirer of 

the Jews and I submit with all respect the opinion that had 

more officers shared my views the rebellion would have 

come to a speedy conclusion some years ago. ... [By] 

creating and maintaining this connection I performed an 

important service to the Crown. ... I further claim that 

future developments are likely to render my services in 

Palestine as again of great use and that they should be 

employed there.182

First, Wingate’s opinion that using the Jews in countering the Arab 

Rebellion would have led to a relatively quick achievement of military 

success was not a unique point of view. In the War Office’s publication 

Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion, 1936, it states:
66

The Civil Service and the armed forces of the 

country had been built up upon Arabs, and there were 

not sufficient trained Jews to replace them. In the end, 

force of circumstances compelled the Government to 

organize the Jews in the defence of law and order, and 

in particular a large force of Supernumerary Police was 

raised. But by then it was too late to provide in full the 

organization and training necessary with a result that their 

real value was never properly exploded [exploited]. There 

is little doubt that in the end the authorities benefited by 

the subterranean defence organizations which their policy 

had forced underground, and it might perhaps have been 

better to have legalized and controlled at an earlier period 

the very natural activities which developed below the 

surface.183

This view has easily identifiable merits, but if it ignores the political 

implications in Palestine and the strategic implications for the greater 

empire, then it is also over-simplistic. The statement in the Military 

Lessons... assumes the feasibility of employing indigenous security forces 

composed of separate elements of distinctly Arab or Jewish character 

simultaneously on a large scale. The policy-makers, whose responsibility 

it was to consider the political and strategic ramifications of such a 

choice, never deemed this course of action acceptable. While the Jewish 

supernumeraries would be employed as an adjunct to the Palestine Police 

that was composed primarily of Arabs, this would be justified on grounds 

of practical necessity for localized security needs and on a relatively 

small scale. It was never done on political grounds or as a function of 

overarching policy.

Wingate’s comments, however, don’t advocate such a middle road 

of employing indigenous security forces made up of units distinctly 

composed of each segment of the population. His comments point to the 

future possibility of British Forces operating solely with an indigenous 

security force of Jewish character. His thoughts were developing on this 

issue throughout this period and beyond for securing British interests in 

Palestine and the region, but they consistently advocated a Jewish state 

with a standing army as being fundamental to securing British interests. 

The strategic thought and argument surrounding Palestine and the British 

Empire that Wingate espoused before, during and after this letter of 

complaint had their merits. However, once again, the difference in opinion 

between Wingate and his superiors is not the crux of the issue, but it was 

his unprofessionalism in going outside of the approved channels that 

ultimately resulted in a loss of trust in Wingate’s ability to submit his own 

opinions to established policy.

Wingate’s own defense highlights that his greatest potential for 
67

service to the Crown in Palestine was inextricably linked to his support of, 

affiliation with, and built trust among the Jews and their leadership. This is 

most certainly true, but the realization of this potential was in turn linked 

to whether or not the overarching policy would allow this relationship to 

be exploited to its fullest (in Wingate’s point of view). The development 

of the British Government’s thought and practice of the policy pursued 

towards Palestine has already been established in this study. The political 

and strategic assessments resulting from considerations of international 

interests constrained the potential military solutions to the internal security 

problem in Palestine throughout the Arab Rebellion. Because this resulted 

in a policy that limited the employment of forces and the use of force for 

units of Jewish character, many potential avenues of utilizing Wingate and 

his influence with the Jewish community were limited. Wingate, in the 

end, sacrificed the trust and confidence of his superiors in their perceptions 

of his utility and loyalty to the Crown and to the British Army in Palestine, 

when he used methods and channels for voicing his opinions that went 

beyond those acceptable for an officer of his rank and official capacities. It 

was his actions in London that brought his political and strategic opinions 

into question as to whether or not that they could be controlled to remain 

within the stated policy regardless of what it might be.

Wingate’s argument for the British Military to allow, encourage, and 

stand ready to use an officer with a unique relationship and influence over 

a portion of the indigenous population while countering rebellion is an 

interesting one. Wingate’s inability to walk the line of appropriateness 

and professionalism in espousing his opinions, which rightly deserves the 

criticism that he invites, does not disprove his argument on this point. 

However, it definitely highlights the difficulty that he also identifies for 

one playing such a role.

Wingate’s rebuttal of the comments in his annual confidential report 

would eventually be dropped. The reports would not prove to hurt his career, 

though. This was chiefly due to Sir Archibald Wavell, who Wingate had 

impressed in Palestine and would become one of his chief military patrons. 

Wavell recognized Wingate’s mind and talent for the “unorthodox.” As he 

would later recall, “I carried away in the corner of my mind an impression 

of a notable character who might be valuable as a leader of unorthodox 

enterprise in war, if I should ever have need of one.”184 From Wingate’s 

posting to the Home Guard in the United Kingdom that followed Palestine, 

he would be summoned by Wavell to work with irregular forces in an 

unconventional compliment to a conventional campaign in Ethiopia.185

After successfully aiding in the campaign there, Wavell would shortly 

thereafter summon him yet again, this time to Burma. There, Wingate 

would fight, and die, as the commander of the Chindits which he designed 

and led to operate behind Japanese lines.
68

Notes

1. The Royal Commission was headed by Lord Peel, and is therefore often 

referred to in historical works as the “Peel Commission” in order to distinguish 

it from others; see the official statement of policy from the Colonial Office 

announcing the Royal Commission, 7 September 1936 in TNA WO 32/4176; J.C. 

Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 67-68; 

Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 1973), 148-149.

2. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, as published 

by the War Office, February 1938, 11-14, 19-20, 36, TNA WO 191/70; Tom 

Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-1921 and 

Palestine 1936-1939 (London: Sage Publications, 1977), 222-228; H.J. Simson, 

British Rule and Rebellion (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1937), 

209-210; Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From 

Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939 (London: Frank Cass and Company 

Limited, 1977), 197-198.

3. The tactical use of aircraft and their ability to engage rebel bands with 

machine gun fire and small bombs reached a high level of proficiency in response 

time and coordination with maneuvering ground forces. Great attention was paid 

to this capability of close air support, as would be expected with an RAF GOC, 

but it also appears to have retarded overall intensive efforts by ground forces to 

innovate and adapt their tactics in order to overcome their repetitive experience 

of finding themselves at a tactical disadvantage. Notes on Tactical Lessons of the 

Palestine Rebellion, 1936, as published by the War Office, February 1937, 5-7, 

15, 19-20; Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, as published 

by the War Office, February 1938, 14-15, 159-162, TNA WO 191/70.

4. See the Notes of Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 and 

December 1939, (War Office), 10-11, TNA WO 191/88.

5. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 1-2, 21, 115, TNA WO 191/70.

6. History of Disturbances in Palestine, 1936-1939 (War Office), Appendix 

“B”, 1-3, TNA WO 191/88.

7. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 17-19, 33, 51, 152-155, TNA WO 191/70.

8. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 69-70.

9. The TJFF was unique in its flexibility as a “frontier” security force 

because the Palestinian and Trans-Jordanian border posed no political obstacle 

to this force. It was run by the Colonial Office under the direction of the High 

Commissioner in Palestine, and was composed of British officers with soldiers 

recruited from indigenous populations in both Palestine and Jordan. For a concise 

summary on their history as well as the British practice of employing such hybrid 

units in the Middle East, see Matthew Hughes, “British Private Armies in the 

Middle East? The Arab Legion and the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, 1920-56, ” 

RUSI Journal 153, no. 2 (April 2008): 70-76.

10. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 1, 5-6, TNA WO 191/70. For a description of the command 
69

relationships between the security force commanders and the HC wherein the 

“civil power kept to itself, not only the right of saying what was to be done, but 

also the right of saying how it was to be done,” see Simson, British Rule and 

Rebellion, 209.

11. Report generated by the Chief Secretary’s Office of the Palestine 

Government, TNA CO 733/313/2; Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in 

Palestine, 1936 (War Office, February 1938), 118, TNA WO 191/70.

12. Supernumeraries would eventually be categorized into subsets with titles 

corresponding to either their various functions or their state of permanence within 

the security forces infrastructure. Examples of these titles include “temporary 

additional police” and “special constables” among others. For specific debates 

highlighting the political sensitivities discussed as a result of requests for increases 

in this force, see the documents contained in TNA CO 733/371/1 and TNA CO 

733/359/1; Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 69-70.

13. The Palestine Police were a paramilitary force of mixed British, Arab 

and Jewish policemen, though predominately Arab. On the whole, the Arabs 

and Jews were used in communities of their racial affiliation for “traditional” 

police work (in the modern American sense of the term) with the British element 

providing the bulk of both supervisory positions and “shock troops.” See Bowden, 

The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 

1936-1939, 143-176.

14. For a detailed overview of the Palestine Police, their successes and 

failures, and their falling under military control by September 1938, see the 

official military document The Development of the Palestine Police Force Under 

Military Control, June 1939, 1, TNA WO 191/90.

15. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 35, 114, 120-122, TNA WO 191/70; Hurewitz, The Struggle for 

Palestine, 69.

16. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 45, 52, TNA WO 191/70.

17. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 13, 17, 29, TNA WO 

191/70.

18. Palestine: Information for Commanders of Reinforcing Troops, 7 

September 1936, Part V.2, TNA WO 33/1436.

19. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 13, 21, 30, TNA WO 191/70; “Letter from CIGS to the Secretary 

of State for the Colonies,” 30 June 1936, 4, TNA WO 33/1436.

20. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 13, 21, 30, TNA WO 191/70; “Letter from CIGS to the Secretary 

of State for the Colonies,” 30 June 1936, 4, TNA WO 33/1436.

21. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 69-71; See “Note of a discussion 

on the 26th of November 1936 between His Excellency the High Commissioner 

and General Dill...”, TNA WO 32/9401.

22. A series of issuances of Orders in Council and Emergency Regulations 
70

in 1936 and 1937 led to rule by statutory martial law. This was a state of rule 

between full authority by either the civil power or the military, though one in 

which the military versus the High Commissioner would eventually maintain the 

balance of power on issues of security.

23. “Precis of General Dill’s dispatch ... dated 30 October 1936,” TNA WO 

32/9401.

24. See the correspondence between Dill and the CIGS, LHC Dill Collection 

2/9.

25. “Precis of General Dill’s dispatch ... dated 30 October 1936,” TNA WO 

32/9401.

26. “Precis of General Dill’s dispatch ... dated 30 October 1936,” TNA WO 

32/9401.

27. “Precis of General Dill’s dispatch ... dated 30 October 1936,” TNA WO 

32/9401.

28. “Memorandum on Point Raised by ... the High Commissioner ... in letter 

of 15 November 1936,” TNA WO 32/9401. For remarks of similar frustrations 

voiced by the Inspector General of the Police, see Bowden, The Breakdown of 

Public Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 1936-1939, 229-

231.

29. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936 (War Office, 

February 1938), 119-120, TNA WO 191/70.

30. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion, 36-53.

31. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion, 99-117, 331.

32. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion, 4-5, 9-18, 68-69, 77-82, 91-113, 

118-128, 200-202, 205-212, 218-219, 220-227, 244, 259, 276-277, 295-297, 306-

311.

33. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion, 7.

34. For General Dill’s deliberations and conclusions on the disposition of 

units, see the letter from Dill to the CIGS, Field Marshall Deverell, 14 September 

1936, LH Dill Collection 2/9, Document 1A.

35. Wingate was an artillery officer, but his fluency in Arabic after having 

attended language courses and served in the Sudan earned him this intelligence 

job; Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate (London: Collins, 1959), 102.

36. For insight into Wingate’s upbringing as a Christian in the words of his 

sister and a friend from his days in the Army, see Major General Derek Tulloch, 

Wingate: In Peace and War (London: MacDonald, 1972), 17-20, 44-45; Trevor 

Royle, Orde Wingate: A Man of Genius 1903-1944 (London: Frontline Books, 

2010), 99.

37. Wingate’s Arabic was brought to a high standard after study at the School 

of Oriental Studies and perfected while serving a five-year tour in the Sudan. See 

Sykes, Orde Wingate, 53-63; Royle, Orde Wingate: A Man of Genius 1903-1944, 

99.

38. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 109-120.
71

39. The complete text of this letter is very nearly intact between a partial 

copy of it being preserved in the TBL, File M2313, and its being published in a 

slightly edited form by Sykes, Orde Wingate, 121-125.

40. For commentary on the pro-Arab bias within the military, to include 

a challenge against the extent to which it has often been claimed, see Simon 

Anglim, Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944 (London: Pickering & 

Chatto, 2010), 71-73.

41. See Wingate’s comments on T. E. Lawrence in his information paper 

Palestine in Imperial Strategy, 6 May 1939, TBL File M2313. Even B.H. LiddellHart compares Wingate’s actions in Palestine with those of Lawrence. See LiddellHart’s letter to Winston Churchill (that was accompanied by several of Wingate’s 

documents on the SNS), LHC 15/5/300.

42. Wingate’s Jewish contacts included many leading figures that held high 

positions in the Jewish quasi-government to include those in or with oversight 

of Hagana during the Arab Rebellion. Many would later assume high positions 

within the Israeli government as well. Antonius was involved primarily as an 

adviser to Arab Palestinian political figures during the Arab Rebellion. He wrote 

a highly praised book in 1938 titled The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab 

National Movement.

43. Royle, Orde Wingate: A Man of Genius 1903-1944, 101-103; Sykes, 

Orde Wingate, 56-57; Derek Tulloch, Wingate: In Peace and War (London: 

MacDonald, 1972), 127-129.

44. Wingate had benefited both from intervention by “Cousin Rex” as well 

as his own direct approach to meet and influence high-ranking British officers. 

This helped to shape his career path up to this point. Cousin Rex helped Wingate 

overcome a deficiency in the qualifications for a position in the Sudan. A direct 

and personal appeal to the CIGS, General Deverell, resulted in his being selected 

for a General Staff position (which happened to be Palestine) even though he 

was not a “qualified” Staff College graduate. See Sykes, Orde Wingate, 56-57; 

Tulloch, Wingate: In Peace and War, 43-45.

45. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 131-132.

46. The numerous memoirs and books are too many to cite here, but apart 

from those relationships already noted they include such personalities as General 

Wavell, General Ironside, Sir Winston Churchill, and Field Marshal Viscount 

Slim.

47. For Dill’s comments on issues of policy as well as his deliberations on 

military matters from tactical to strategic importance, see LH Dill Collection 2/9, 

and TNA WO 32/9401;

48. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 72; For the difficulties faced in 

“subwar” when a court system is uncooperative with the policy and military 

strategy, as well the problems posed by the checks and balances inherent in 

the British system of law that allowed martial and statutory martial law to be 

challenged, see Simson, British Rule and Rebellion, 83-128;

49. For the quotation as cited from Colonial Office documents, see Porath, 

The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two: 

1929-1939, 233.
72

50. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 73-75.

51. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 3, TNA WO 191/88; 

Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 76-82.

52. For the GOC’s comments on this period covering rebel activity, military 

operations, the use of military courts, see his official Report on the Operations 

Carried Out by the British Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan In Aid of the 

Civil Power from 12th September 1937 to 31st March 1938, TNA CO 733/379/3; 

History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations in 

Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 2-3, TNA WO 191/88; 

Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 82.

53. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 3, TNA WO 191/88; 

Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, 

Volume Two: 1929-1939, 233-237, 239; Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 

83-84.

54. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 238-239.

55. Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-

1921 and Palestine 1936-1939, 242-244; Porath, The Palestinian Arab National 

Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 239.

56. A sampling of the Defence Orders in Council and Emergency Regulations

can be found in TNA CO 733/39/8; History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-

1939: Notes on Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 

1939, Appendix “C”, TNA WO 191/88; Bowden, The Breakdown of Public 

Security: The Case of Ireland 1916-1921 and Palestine 1936-1939, 244-245.

57. For a well-researched study on the techniques, legality and cases of excess 

in the methods used for repressive and punitive military measures, see Matthew 

Hughes, “A Very British Affair? British Armed Forces and the Repression of the 

Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical 

Research, (Part One) 87 (351): 234-255, and (Part Two) 87(352): 357-373.

58. For the official reports of this period by the GOC, one in which the rebel 

bands were reported to have mustered between 300-400 fighters, see Report on 

the Operations Carried Out by the British Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan 

In Aid of the Civil Power from 12th September 1937 to 31st March 1938, TNA 

CO 733/379/3; History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on 

Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 2-4, 7, TNA 

WO 191/88.

59. Tegart was actually chosen to replace the Palestinian Inspector General, 

but he politely asked to be funded for a trip to assess the situation and then develop 

recommendations for review by the government before he would entertain such an 

offer. See his correspondence with the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 

TNA CO 733/355/8.

60. The British government was eager to implement Tegart’s ecommendations, 

but the speed with which they could do so depended on he height and length of 
73

the bureaucratic path that each was required to travel for approval. See documents 

addressing Tegart’s recommendations and their approval/implementation process 

in TNA CO 733/383/1.

61. For Tegart’s full report on his 28 recommendations submitted for the 

reform of the Palestine Police, see the documents in TNA CO 733/383/1.

62. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 4-5, TNA WO 191/88.

63. See the documents located in TNA CO 733/380/13.

64. These settlements were designed as militarily defensible and largely 

self-sustainable outposts. See Ben-Gurion, “When Bevin Helped Us,” Jewish 

Observer and Middle East Review, 4 October 1963; LH 15/5/311; Hurewitz, The 

Struggle for Palestine, 84.

65. For documents on the evolving policy of integration of Jews into the 

security forces throughout 1938, see TNA WO 32/4176, and TNA CO 733/371/1; 

For David Ben-Gurion’s recounting of the emphasis the Jewish community’s 

leadership placed on seeking positions for Jewish personnel to be integrated into 

the British security forces, see David Ben-Gurion, “Our Friend: What Wingate 

Did for Us,” Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 27 September 1963, LH 

15/5/311; For history of the debate within the Jewish community to press for a 

standing Jewish security force before the Arab Rebellion, see David Ben-Gurion, 

“Britain’s contribution to Arming the Hagana,” Jewish Observer and Middle East 

Review, 20 September 1963, LH 15/5/311.

66. David Ben-Gurion, “Britain’s contribution to Arming the Hagana,” 

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 20 September 1963, LH 15/5/311.

67. Tom Bowden, “Policing Palestine 1920-1936,” in Police Forces in 

History ed. George Mosse (London: Sage Publications, 1975), 120-121; David 

Ben-Gurion, “Britain’s contribution to Arming the Hagana,” Jewish Observer 

and Middle East Review, 20 September 1963, LH 15/5/311.

68. See the official Jewish request and the documents on the ensuing British 

deliberation over a proposal for a Palestinian Frontier Force of thoroughly Jewish 

character, to include a justification by the requestor by citing the contemporary 

practice with the Arab Legion and TJFF in TNA CO 733/380/13.

69. For an overview of Wingate’s experience in Sudan, see Anglim, Orde 

Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944, 43-48; Sykes, Orde Wingate, 62-63.

70. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 124.

71. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, 130-131.

72. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, 131-132.

73. Wingate himself would be requested to establish and lead such units that 

were either proposed by the Jews or already under consideration by the British 

in 1942, to include a Jewish “Home Guard,” a “Jewish Regiment,” and even a 

special unit of Jewish commandos. See the documents contained in TNA CO 

967/96; Jewish requests for such units in 1937 can be found in the documents 

contained in TNA CO 733/353/11.
74

74. See documents contained in TNA CO 733/380/13; the one specifically 

cited here is from General Haining to John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office, 17 

February 1938.

75. See documents contained in TNA CO 733/380/13; the one specifically 

cited here is from General Haining to John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office, 17 

February 1938.

76. See documents contained in TNA CO 733/380/13, the one specifically 

cited here is from HC Wauchope to the Colonial Office Secretary of State W.G.A 

Ormesby-Gore, January 1938.

77. See documents contained in TNA CO 733/380/13, the one specifically 

cited here is from HC Wauchope to the Colonial Office Secretary of State W.G.A 

Ormesby-Gore, January 1938.

78. Wauchope’s opinion against using Jews for offensive operations on the 

grounds of its causing irreparable damage to the relationship between the Arab 

and Jewish communities in Palestine was the origin of this policy. His views can 

be found in letters to both the military and the Colonial Office as early as 1936. 

See the documents in TNA WO 32/4178 and TNA WO 32/4176.

79. For the official reports and dispatches on operations by Lieutenant 

General Haining starting in April and continuing throughout this period, see 

the documents contained at the LHC, Evetts Collection Box 1-2; History of the 

Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations in Palestine Between 

November 1937 & December 1939, 3, TNA WO 191/88.

80. See Appendix “A”, 1-2 in History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-

1939: Notes on Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 

1939, TNA WO 191/88.

81. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 3, TNA WO 191/88.

82. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 4, TNA WO 191/88.

83. For the official reports and dispatches on operations by Lieutenant 

General Haining starting in April and continuing throughout this period, see 

the documents contained at the LHC, Evetts Collection Box 1-2; History of the 

Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations in Palestine Between 

November 1937 & December 1939, 5, TNA WO 191/88.

84. In January of 1939, it was recognized that both the military forces 

conducting internal security duties such as village occupation would eventually 

have to be replaced, and that the police were still not capable of controlling the 

security situation. Therefore, it was proposed that the time had arrived to stand up 

a gendarmerie. The composition of such a force is thoroughly discussed to include 

the use of Jews, though they rank at the bottom of the list of recommendations 

that include British, Circassians, Sikhs, Sudanese and Arabs. See Memorandum 

Regarding a Gendarmerie or a Semi-Military Force For Palestine in TNA 

CO 733/371/6; History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on 

Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 5, TNA WO 

191/88.
75

85. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 6, TNA WO 191/88.

86. Based on the Royal Commission’s recommendation for partition, a 

second Royal Commission led by Sir John Woodhead would arrive in April of 

1938 in order to investigate the practical application of the partition plan; History 

of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations in Palestine 

Between November 1937 & December 1939, 7, TNA WO 191/88.

87. History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on Operations 

in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939, 6-7, TNA WO 191/88.

88. For a description of the military Intelligence section and its officers 

duties as well descriptions of the other intelligence organizations operating within 

the government, see Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936

(War Office, February 1938), 45, TNA WO 191/70.

89. See Wingate’s letter of complaint to his immediate supervisor Wing 

Comander Ritchie concerning his “confidential report” (evaluation report), 27 

June 1939, TBL File M2313.

90. Wingate’s immediate supervisor, Ritchie, acknowledged Wingate’s 

fluency in reading, writing, and speaking both Hebrew and Arabic. See Wingate’s 

annual confidential report by Ritchie, 18 November 1938, in TBL M2313; Royle, 

Orde Wingate: A Man of Genius 1903-1944, 111.

91. Wavell would later recount that he “carried away in the corner of my 

mind an impression of a notable character who might be valuable as a leader of 

unorthodox enterprise in war, if I should ever have need of one,” and he would. 

See Wavell, The Good Soldier, 62; The documents contained in File M2313 at the 

British Library contain his plan for the reconnaissance as well as an Appendix A: 

Narrative attached to Appreciation of arms smuggling, undated; “Certification for 

travel for O.C. Wingate,” signed by Ritchie, 26 March 1938, TBL M2313.

92. David Ben-Gurion, “Our Friend: What Wingate Did for Us,” Jewish 

Observer and Middle East Review, 27 September 1963, LH 15/5/311.

93. “Letter to A.I.P. from Orde Wingate,” TBL M2313; For a summary of 

these events and lessons learned, see also Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate 

of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements 

by armed forces of the Crown with the object of putting an end to terrorism in 

Northern Palestine, IWM, Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

94. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 17-20; Sykes, Crossroads to 

Israel: 1917-1948, 92-94.

95. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 162-168.

96. Letter to Wingate from Ritchie, 25 May 1938, TBL M2313.

97. Force Intelligence Instruction No. 1, 20 May 1938, TBL M2313.

98. Letter to Wingate from Ritchie, 25 May 1938, TBL M2313.

99. See the official reports on operations during this period in LHC Evetts 

Collection, specifically, Haining’s Report on the Operations Carried Out By the 

British Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan both for 1st April to 18th May, 1938, 

and for 20th May to 31st July, 1938.
76

100 . For the general military assessment of the risks for conducting offensive 

night operations see Notes on Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion, 1936, 

as published by the War Office, February 1937, 23-24, IWM Wheeler Collection 

GB 0099. Wingate had already conducted initial experiments to test some his 

theories for organization and employment of the force. For the proposal in its 

entirety, see Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 

5.6.38 at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the 

Crown with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM 

Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

101. Wingate’s personnel arrived over the first two weeks of June and 

operations were commenced after a few days of training for each as each squad 

was formed. Evetts delivered the news in person that the SNS were “officially 

blessed” on 22 June. See A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From Its 

Foundation Towards the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. 

Wingate on 13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL 

M2313, and Lieutenant R. King-Clark’s diary at the IWM 83/10/1.

102. Quote by Evetts in Appendix F of Palestine: Information for 

Commanders of Reinforcing Troops, 5, TNA WO 33/1436.

103. These issues are most clearly captured and addressed in Notes on 

Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion, 1936, LHC GB 0099 Wheeler, and 

Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, TNA WO 191/70.

104. Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM Major 

General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

105. Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM, Major 

General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1, 1.

106. A comprehensive set of Wingate’s documents are contained in the LHC 

15/5/300, the IWM in the Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1, and at TBL 

M2313.

107. This analysis is based on the synthesis of the official and personal 

documents consulted throughout this study. These can be found at the IWM, TBL, 

LHC and TNA.

108. Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM Major 

General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

109. This analysis is based on the synthesis of documents consulted for this 

study in relation to the SNS and are contained in the LHC, IWM, TBL, and TNA.

110. 16th Infantry Brigade Operations Instruction No. 20, Night Work, 4 July 

1938, TBL M2313; Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence 

on 5.6.38 at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of 

the Crown with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, 
77

IWM, Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

111. Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM, Major 

General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

112. See Wingate’s Principles Governing the Employment of the Special 

Night Squads, 10 June 1938, IWM King-Clark Collection.

113. The influence of Callwell is clearly discernible in Evetts’ communications 

on the necessities for effectively countering rebellion. It is not known whether 

Wingate was influenced through reading Calwell directly, through Evetts, or 

through a combination of the two, though Wingate was known for being well 

read on military matters since a “renaissance” that occurred in his military 

professionalization during his time at Woolwich. For the reference to Wingate’s 

military professional “renaissance,” see Sykes, Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 

38-42; for an analysis of Callwell’s influence on Evetts’ and Wingate’s thoughts, 

see Anglim, Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944, 76-80.

114. See Evetts remarks in Appendix F of Information for Commanders of 

Reinforcing Troops, TNA WO 33/1436.

115. Wingate would later attribute to Evetts that it was his “enthusiasm 

and understanding alone [that] made my experiment [the SNS] possible.” See 

Wingate’s Palestine in Imperial Strategy, 6 May 1939, TBL File M2313.

116. 16th Infantry Brigade Operations Instruction No. 20, Night Work, 4 

July 1938, TBL M2313.

117. Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, IWM Major 

General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

118. These types of operations are numerously recounted in the reports on 

operations throughout this period of the rebellion. See the reports and dispatches 

on operations found at the LHC Evetts Collection Box 1-2.

119. A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From Its Foundation Towards 

the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 13/10/38

in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

120. Several of Wingate’s official reports on SNS operations can be found 

between TBL File M2313 and LHC 15/5/300. King-Clarke’s narrative of several 

operations can be found in IWM King-Clarke collection 83/10/1. An overview of 

the SNS actions as recorded by Wingate can be referenced in A Brief History of 

the SNS Organization, From Its Foundation Towards the End of May, 1938, Until 

the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to 

Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

121. See Wingate’s official report, Report of Operation Carried Out By 

Special Night Squads on the Night of 11th/12th July 1938, By Captain O.C. 

Wingate, O.C.S.N.S, 22 July 1938, LHC 15/5/300.

122. See A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From its Foundation 
78

Towards the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 

13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

123. See Wingate’s “Palestine in Imperial Strategy,” 6 May 1939, TBL File 

M2313.

124. See Wingate’s official report Action of Special Night Squads on Night 

3rd/4th September, 1938, 4 September 1938, LHC 15/5/300.

125. See the official dispatch in TNA CO 733/379/3.

126. See Wingate’s official report Action of Special Night Squads on Night 

3rd/4 th September, 1938, 4 September 1938, LHC 15/5/300.

127. See A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From its Foundation 

Towards the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 

13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

128. See A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From its Foundation 

Towards the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 

13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

129. See A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From Its Foundation 

Towards the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 

13/10/38 in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

130. The Liddell Hart Center contains the most complete set of these 

documents on the SNS that were written by Wingate to include his proposals, 

principles governing their employment, notes on the their development, reports 

on their operations, standing orders, and a document on their organization and 

training. See LHC 15/5/300. Some of these documents are also found at the 

Imperial War Museum, and they are referenced in this paper. Note that some of 

the documents by the same title have been re-typed as copies on different sizes of 

paper, therefore the page numbers are not always congruent between the reports 

held by different institutions.

131. “Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine,” 6, IWM, 

Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

132. See Principles Governing the Employment of the Special Night Squads,

1, June 1938; Note on the Development of Special Night Squads..., 1-2, 14 July 

1938, LHC 15/5/300;

133. Letter from BG Evetts to Force Headquarters, September, 1938, TBL 

File M2313.

134. See Haining’s Report on the Operations Carried Out By the British 

Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan, Period 20th May to 31st July, 1938, 6, LHC 

Evetts Collection Box 1-2.

135. See Haining’s Report on the Operations Carried Out By the British 

Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan, Period 20th May to 31st July, 1938, 7, LHC 

Evetts Collection Box 1-2.

136 . Appreciation by Captain O.C. Wingate of Force Intelligence on 5.6.38 

at Nazareth of the possibilities of night movements by armed forces of the Crown 
79

with the object of putting an end to terrorism in Northern Palestine, 1, IWM 

Major General H.E.N. Bredin Files 81/33/1.

137. For a British military officer to be specifically mentioned in an official 

dispatch was an honor that was even recorded among official military awards and 

decorations as a notable event in an officer’s career.

138. For Wingate’s initial intentions to operate along the pipeline then expand 

operations elsewhere, see Principles Governing the Employment of Special Night 

Squads, 1, LHC 15/5/300.

139. See Wingate’s letter to Evetts in which he recounts the purpose and 

history of the SNS (verifiable by Evetts), 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

140. Principles Governing the Employment of the Special Night Squads, 1, 

June 1938, LHC 15/5/300; “Note on the Development of Special Night Squads 

...”, 1, 14 July 1938, LHC 15/5/300.

141. A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From Its Foundation Towards 

the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 13/10/38

in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

142. This was a result of the employment of security details that were at 

various times and in various combinations conducted by units of largely Jewish 

character either by the IPC company or infrastructure security units acting in 

combination with police and military forces.

143. David Ben-Gurion, “Our Friend: What Wingate Did for Us,” Jewish 

Observer and Middle East Review, 27 September 1963, LH 15/5/311; See 

Principles Governing the Employment of the Special Night Squads, 1, June 1938, 

LHC 15/5/300.

144. See the letter from the HC to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 

July 1938, in TNA WO 32/4176.

145. Letter from Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald 

to HC Harold MacMichael, 22 August 1938, TNA CO 733/371/1; The HC’s 

report, when compared to the GOC’s report, captures some interesting nuances 

concerning their timing and style in breaching the topic that they had agreed as 

“better to ask for forgiveness than for permission,” though it cannot be determined 

how much of this is a result from organizational culture versus personal style.

146. For this debate in detail as it circulated between the primary military 

and political advisers and decision makers, see the documents contained in 

TNA WO 32/4176 and TNA CO 733/371/1. There are references in this debate 

concerning the authority of this policy that point back its establishment in an 

interdepartmental meeting that took place in January of 1937.

147. See the documents in TNA WO 32/4176, specifically the letter from the 

HC to the Secretary of State for the Colonies; for the admission by commander 

of HM Forces in the ME that “I had made up my mind to arm the Jews and to 

withdraw most of the troops” if war broke out in the fall of 1938; see the letter 

from General Ironside to Wingate, 8 June [1939], TBL M2313.

148. See the reference to this request in the “Telegram from the High 

Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,” 11 

September 1938, TNA WO 32/4176.
80

149. Telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary 

of State for the Colonies, 11 September 1938, TNA WO 32/4176.

150. The Development of the Palestine Police Force Under Military 

Control, June 1939, 1, TNA WO 191/90.

151. Sykes. Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 175-176; Wingate would 

openly state his expectation for the SNS trained Jewish supernumeraries to 

become noncommissioned officers and potentially officers if and when the 

expected war between the European powers escalated. For one such example, see 

Wingate’s letter to Wing Commander Ritchie contending his confidential report 

(officer evaluation report), 27 June 1939, TBL File M2313.

152. For the official military reports on this entire period, see the two 

following reports. Report on the Operations Carried Out by The British Forces 

in Palestine & Trans-Jordan: Period 1 August to 31 October, 1938, 30 November 

1938, TNA CO 733/379/3; Dispatch on Operations Carried Out by the British 

Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan: Period 1 November, 1938 to 31 March, 

1939, 24 April 1939, LHC Evetts Collection Box 1-2.

153. “History of the Disturbances in Palestine 1936-1939: Notes on 

Operations in Palestine Between November 1937 & December 1939,” 8-9, TNA 

WO 191/88; Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 94.

154. For an overview of Arab and Muslim countries with regard to their 

cooperation in international politics as well as their evolving relationships with 

Axis powers, see Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim 

Congresses (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), 167-171; Bernard 

Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (New York: 

Oxford University Press), 167-171; for the anxiety and impact of these issue 

within the British government, see Sykes. Crossroads to Israel: 1917-1948, 190.

155. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to 

Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 277-281.

156. See the official report by the Criminal Investigation Division in 

Palestine on the Jewish Revisionist political organization and the Irgun Tvai 

Leumi militant organization, as well as the effects of their being targeted, August 

1938, TNA CO 733/386/8.

157. See the letter from Haining to Directorate of Military Operations and 

Intelligence, 19 January 1939, LHC O’Connor Box 3/4.

158. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 93.

159. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 93.

160. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 93.

161. See Wingate’s letter to his mother, 2 August 1938, TBL File M2313.

162 . See Wingate’s complaint to Ritchie on his annual confidential report, 

27 June 1939, TBL File M2313.

163. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 185, 193-194.

164. The most extensive work on Wingate’s activities during this leave 

period is recorded by Sykes, who conducted many interviews for otherwise 
81

unattainable information, although he does not cite all of his material in detail. 

See Sykes, Orde Wingate, 188-194.

165. For later documents written by Wingate in addition to those already 

cited in this work, see Palestine in Imperial Strategy, 6 May 1936, and Plan for 

Employment of Jewish Forces in the Prosecution of War, 13 October 1939, TBL 

File M2313.

166. David Ben-Gurion, “Table Talk with Lord Lloyd,” Jewish Observer 

and Middle East Review, 13 December 1963, LH 15/5/311;

167. See the letter to Lord Lloyd from CIGS Gort, 1 November 1938, TBL 

File M2313.

168. See the letter from Liddell Hart to Churchill, 11 November 1938, LHC 

15/5/300; For the Churchill-Wingate meeting at a dinner party, see Sykes, Orde 

Wingate, 192-193.

169. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 190.

170. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 194.

171. A Brief History of the SNS Organization, From its Foundation Towards 

the End of May, 1938, Until the Departure of Captain O.C. Wingate on 13/10/38

in a letter from Wingate to Evetts, 31 January 1939, TBL M2313.

172. See Wingate’s complaint to Ritchie on his annual confidential report, 

27 June 1939, TBL File M2313.

173. For Haining’s official military reports on this period, see Report on 

the Operations Carried Out by The British Forces in Palestine & Trans-Jordan: 

Period 1 August to 31 October, 1938, 30 November 1938, TNA CO 733/379/3. 

O’Connor, one of Haining’s division commanders, also summarized the strategy 

of this period with special attention to his area of operations in the south. See 

O’Connor’s Operations in Palestine 1938–1939, LHC O’Connor Files Box 1.

174. Report on the Operations Carried Out by The British Forces in 

Palestine & Trans-Jordan: Period 1 August to 31 October, 1938, 30 November 

1938, 8, TNA CO 733/379/3.

175. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, 94-113; Porath, The Palestinian 

Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Volume Two: 1929-1939, 

256-260, 281-294.

176. See Wingate’s appointment orders, 11 May 1939, TBL File M2313.

177. See Wingate’s annual confidential reports by Ritchie, 18 November 

1938 and 9 June 1939, and by Haining, 10 July 1939, in TBL File M2313.

178. See Wingate’s annual confidential report by Haining, 10 July 1939, in 

TBL File M2313.

179. See Wingate’s complaint to Ritchie on his annual confidential report, 

27 June 1939, TBL File M2313.

180. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 194.

181. Sykes, Orde Wingate, 144.

182. See Wingate’s complaint to Ritchie on his annual confidential report, 
82

27 June 1939, TBL File M2313.

183. Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, as published 

by the War Office, February 1938, 28-37, TNA WO 191/70.

184. See Wavell’s personal recollection of Wingate as recorded in a written 

account at the IWM 97/20/10, Wingate Chindit Papers, Box 5.

185. Orde Wingate led irregular forces in Ethiopia in 1940 and 1941 to 

Great Britain’s first “victory” of World War Two. Archibald Wavell, Commander 

in Chief of all British Forces in the Middle East, had summoned him. The British 

strategy resulted in the provision of conventional and unconventional military 

support to restore Haile Selassie to his throne after the Italian invasion resulted in 

his being expelled.
83

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Orde Wingate sought to shape the evolving British internal security 

strategy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactically, he 

developed and employed a system of organization and associated tactics 

to be employed as both a counterguerrilla specialist unit and as a test bed 

for capturing and disseminating tactical and training “lessons learned.” 

Operationally, he proposed a plan to expand his organization and tactical 

methods for counterguerrilla operations to be conducted on a widespread 

and sustainable basis in order to bring rural areas under governmental 

control. Strategically, he envisioned the formation of security forces of 

Jewish character as capable of securing British interests in Palestine as 

well as furthering British strategic interests in the Near East.

Wingate’s attempts to shape the overall military strategy can be 

considered to take place by means of two primary avenues. The first 

was through a bottom-up proposal to reform organizational and tactical 

methods in order to solve a tactical and operational military dilemma. The 

second was through influencing the policy makers for top-down reform 

of policy governing the composition and employment of the internal and 

external security apparatus in Palestine. Wingate used many methods to 

achieve these effects, to include proofs of concept, writing information 

papers, disseminating his ideas through military reports, personal contacts 

and correspondence, and meeting with policy makers or those who were 

influential among them.

Tactically, Wingate was able to employ successful tactical and 

organizational innovations within the unit that he secured to operate under 

his command, the SNS. He was enabled by his ability to analyze and 

synthesize the applicable lessons learned of his own experience and that 

of others. These included those of his military commanders, the official 

Lessons Learned of the campaign in which he was participating, and most 

probably the small wars’ traditions (though this latter connection cannot 

be supported through concrete evidence). Wingate excelled (1) in his 

understanding and abilities for analysis of the operational environment; 

(2) the use of intelligence in targeting; (3) maximizing the psychological 

element of operations to achieve desired effects; (4) organization of tactical 

units to maximize effectiveness; and (5) employing effective techniques 

for tactical engagement of guerrillas.

Despite the tactical successes of this force and its methods, there 

were three primary factors that mitigated Wingate’s success in achieving 

his intentions to impact the internal security strategy at the operational 

and strategic levels. His intentions were to reshape the composition and 

employment of security forces towards expanded use of Jewish personnel 

without restrictions on the types of operations that they could undertake. 
84

The mitigations and their causes were:

1. The failure of widespread adoption of his tactics due to a surge in 

British Military Forces which rendered the tactical risks inherent in his 

methods to be deemed unacceptable;

2. The prevention of operational expansion due to the composition of 

his organization in friction with a policy that restricted the strength and 

employment of Jews within the security forces; and

3. The loss of trust from the military command toward Wingate due 

to his crossing the accepted boundary of a military official’s obligation to 

submit his own opinions to established policy.

The study of Wingate and his actions in Palestine have potential for 

modern relevance in numerous military domains. A study of Wingate’s 

confrontation with the tactical and operational dilemmas of the Arab 

Rebellion reveal the process and skills necessary for a practitioner to 

identify military problems and formulate solutions. The details that are 

revealed have utility for general military use, and they will be especially 

beneficial in their specifics to units concerned with counterguerrilla and 

counterterrorist operations.

Furthermore, some topics are proposed for further study and 

consideration as a result of this case study.

 First, the military mechanisms and roles of officers in:

1. Tactical, operational and strategic reform during a campaign; and

2. Advising policy-makers on policy.

Wingate did not initially occupy a position within the military hierarchy 

that included responsibilities and authorities for the reform of tactics. He 

was never in this type of position with regard to formulation of strategy. He 

was therefore outside the chain of responsibility and authority for making 

recommendations and decisions on these issues until he interjected himself 

into the process. No military officer is ever truly outside the domain 

of concern with regard to these issues, and every military organization 

inherently has mechanisms that officers of various rank and position can 

leverage to influence the campaign. These mechanisms can be official or 

unofficial, robust or scarce in opportunity, and accepted or unaccepted as 

either stated by rules or implicit by general consensus. The outlets for 

an officer to address concerns outside of his area of responsibilities and 

authorities can be destructive, neutral, or constructive to the military 

organization. Whether expressed concerns take the shape of complaints, 

comments or recommendations, the channels through which they are 

communicated and the audiences to whom they are expressed are key in 

determining which of the three effects will be achieved.

Officers and officials within the British security forces in Palestine 

chose many different routes to communicate their opinions, ideas and 
85

criticisms. A few notable examples: (a) Simson wrote a book; (b) the 

Inspector General of the Palestine Police wrote a letter to the editor of 

a newspaper; (c) officers captured Lessons Learned of the campaign 

on a wide variety of topics for widespread distribution (and in a timely 

enough manner to influence the campaign); and (d) the GOC and Chief 

of the Imperial General Staff communicated officially and unofficially to 

occupants of higher, parallel, and lower-level positions in both the military 

and political realms on a variety of issues of concern, both within and 

outside of their official capacities for duties.

Wingate, as a junior military officer, wrote “appreciations” and 

memorandums blending critical analysis of current issues outside of 

his scope of responsibility and authority with proposed solutions for 

consumption by senior leaders. Militarily, these issues included those of 

strategic argument, operational employment, tactical reformation, and 

organizational composition. Beyond his written communications, he 

secured personal meetings with senior military officers through personal 

requests and introductions by patrons.

Military culture usually embodies a logical framework for the 

general determination of what is appropriate and inappropriate for 

such communications. Policies restricting particular forms or methods 

concerning the actions of military members in doing so are often enacted 

to clarify the rules of staying within one’s “lane.” These rules are often 

emplaced in reaction to challenges of the military culture’s guidelines. 

These issues of appropriateness for the methods and content of officers 

voicing their concerns when outside of the responsibility and authority 

hierarchies require further consideration. Such consideration should 

especially address both the organizational utility of such concerns when 

expressed in a constructive manner, as well as the mechanisms that 

might be available to promote this utility. The course of this research has 

shown history to highlight the importance of junior officers in campaigns 

of countering rebellion. Modern COIN commanders might consider the 

importance of these officers not only for what they contribute tactically 

to the fight, but how their analysis of the operational environment might 

contribute to the body of knowledge upon which tactical, operational and 

strategic decisions are made.

Second, the potential roles and utilization of junior officers with 

unique abilities, experiences, and influence within a military organization 

and campaign.

Another issue that this study highlights that is worthy of addressing 

in future works is the capacity of a military organization to identify and 

utilize junior leaders with unique abilities, experiences, and influence. 

Efforts can be made to place them in positions that best use these assets 

for furthering a military organization’s goals. Wingate’s experience in 

Palestine (and especially his ensuing experiences in Ethiopia and Burma) 
86

show that elements of the British Army during this period were capable 

of flexibility in assignments, award of rank, and organizational flexibility.

In Palestine, Wingate was selected to serve as an intelligence officer 

despite his official function as an artillery officer. This was based on his 

language abilities and having served long-term in the Arab world. He was 

then heard out and supported in his proposal of a proof-of-concept and 

given command of an ad hoc unit. It is also worth noting that Wingate’s 

influence among the Jewish leadership was both recognized and factored 

in to minor decisions in Palestine. The recorded experiences of this 

occurring, however, were a result Wingate’s direct requests rather than an 

intentional plan that was initially formed or later expanded to exploit his 

influence’s potential.

After Palestine, he would be hand-selected to participate in the British 

Campaign in Ethiopia where he was involved with the British emplacement 

of Haile Selassie as political and military ruler in opposition to the Italianbacked regime. During World War II, Wingate would be promoted well 

beyond the standard paradigm associated with time in grade in order to 

organize and command the Chindits. The beneficial aspects of these types 

of flexibility should be explored and compared to the modern strictures of 

the officer career path, as well as with the award of rank and its associated 

positions. Furthermore, the concept of talent management and the use 

of officers with unique experiences, abilities, and influence should be 

explored for greater utilization of the utility that they offer the military as 

an organization.

Third, a historically based formulation of modern doctrine for 

conducting warfare of small-wars legacies is best utilized in its application 

by historically informed practitioners within the officer corps.

In consideration of the Small Wars tradition from which Wingate 

hailed, the methodological approach of Small Wars literature deserves 

further examination. Even if the military practitioners accept that the 

doctrine has gotten it “right,” however, this still only consists of half of the 

equation as the particularities of the situation at hand will always require 

the use of judgment in its application. An officer’s individual operational 

experiences, education, and access to synthesized and disseminated 

“lessons learned” as a campaign progresses all inform this judgment. While 

each of these is a valuable contributor, there is yet another contributor 

that not only acts in this same capacity but also serves a further purpose. 

Breadth and depth of historical knowledge concerning the peculiarities of 

warfare relevant to the campaign that a practitioner is waging acts both as 

a mental compass and to give perspective when personal experience and 

education fail to adequately inform. History informs doctrine, and history 

must also inform the practitioner in its application.

For commanders, staffs, campaign planners, and junior officers, their 

judgment is shaped by these same guides as they participate in their portion 
87

of the process to analyze the operational environment, define the problem 

sets, develop a military strategy, identify operational goals and approaches, 

develop effective tactics, employ their force(s), and make adjustments on 

all of the above as the situation develops. An effective staff and trusted 

inner circle will no doubt be a weapon that an astute commander will 

employ in creating a similar environment to that of the doctrine writer 

so that his observations, assumptions, and visualization of the battlefield 

takes the shape of a sound, coherent, and communicable approach that has 

undergone the rigors of intellectual examination and cross examination. 

A more historically informed officer corps should produce a significantly 

better appreciation of the environments in which they are expected to 

perform, as well as a more sound application of doctrine in their roles, as 

both commanders and commanders’ confidants.

A significant contribution of Small Wars literature appears to be 

found in the approach that it took toward preparing and equipping the 

officer corps to best use the aspects of their tradition, experiences, and 

best practices that were earned over a long history. The means was a 

combination of emphasis and style for communicating its history. This 

history was communicated in depth and detail in conjunction with pithy 

maxims and summarized concepts. The inclusion of numerous historical 

references provided the basis for detailed examination, explanations and 

conclusions that were intended to guide and inform the proper judgment 

of the one referencing it, according to his particular circumstances, for 

application. The traditional approach to Small Wars literature was written 

by practitioners for practitioners, with the purpose of providing military 

officers a few broad principles and many examples to guide their conduct 

in Small Wars. The historical background from which these principles 

were drawn was not neglected, but rather it was recognized as an integral 

part of the process from which others could and should learn. Callwell 

acknowledges the universality of ideas such as principles of war that were 

derived from studying war in general, but he goes on to note that “the 

conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting 

is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular 

features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method 

totally different,” and that the “conduct of small wars is in fact in certain 

respects an art by itself. ... ” He adds that “the strategical problems 

presented by operations of this nature have not altered to [a great] extent. 

Therefore there is much belonging to this branch of the military art still 

to be learnt from campaigns dating as far back as the conquest of Algeria 

and as the terrible Indian struggle of 1857-58. ... ” He concludes that 

principles “can be learnt from the military history of early times just as 

well as it can be learnt from the more voluminously chronicled struggles 

of the present epoch.”1

Militaries should consider an organized and progressive program, 
88

designed to equip their officer corps to employ a historically informed 

approach to their application of doctrine commensurate with their 

expected levels of responsibility and command. The process of inculcating 

this historical knowledge base should be started early. Officers should 

be sufficiently grounded in the history of the potential forms of warfare 

in which they are expected to participate, and they should be engaged 

throughout the military education phases of their career with opportunities 

to continue building and exercising the “historical” element of their 

professional education and abilities. The realm of “self-development” 

should not be relied upon to serve this function, but should complement 

an organized, focused, and resourced approach to equip the officer corps 

with a strong historical character in its pursuit of building and maintaining 

a professional force.

Professional military education venues should be used to support 

an organized evolution of the officer’s knowledge and understanding of 

relevant history as well as the skills needed to handle and employ it. This 

process could include:

1. A survey of military history in order to create “width” of historical 

knowledge;

2. Rigorous analysis of case studies from the tactical to strategic levels 

relevant by virtue of the types of operations conducted and their regional 

focus in order to create “depth” of historical knowledge; and

3. An emphasis on the use of original sources for the process of 

research, analysis, synthesis, and formulating and defending a thesis in 

order to build and hone the abilities to interact with, critically evaluate, 

and communicate historical knowledge.

These objectives should increase the officers’ capacity to both know 

and then properly “use” relevant history, such as employing the necessary 

skills required for critical evaluation of the transferability of historical 

“lessons” from one context to another.

An insightful and concise framework for educating military officers 

in the art of war by means of a historically based approach has been 

proposed by Professor Michael Howard in his article “The Use and Abuse 

of Military History.” He states:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne 

in mind by the officer who studies military history as a 

guide to his profession and who wishes to avoid pitfalls. 

First, he must study in width. He must observe the way 

in which warfare has developed over a long historical 

period. Only by seeing what does change can one deduce 

what does not; and as much as can be learnt from the 

great discontinuities of military history as from the 

apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the 
89

great captains through the ages. ... Next he must study 

in depth. He should take a single campaign and explore 

it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, but from 

memoirs, letters, diaries ... until the tidy outlines dissolve 

and he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of 

real experience ... and, lastly, he must study in context. 

Campaigns and battles are not like games of chess or 

football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars 

are not tactical exercises writ large. They are ... conflicts 

of societies, and they can be fully understood only if one 

understands the nature of the society fighting them. The 

roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far 

from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic 

factors which explain why armies are constituted as they 

are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way they 

do. ... It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, 

military or civil ... is not to make men clever for the next 

time; it is to make them wise forever.2

A systematic approach to guiding and developing a more historically 

informed officer corps would not be a wasted effort in the money, time, 

and rigor invested. It would produce a generation of officers acting as 

commanders, staff, peers, and subordinates that is more competent in how 

they think about and execute their missions, as guided by appropriate 

historical contexts. It would enable them to more effectively employ their 

force and its capabilities in war—and all this regardless of whether they had 

the “right” individual experiences to best prepare them, or even whether 

the doctrine had gotten it “right” or “wrong.” According to Clausewitz, 

“Historical examples clarify everything. ... This is particularly true of the 

art of war.”3

Fourth, considerations for establishing Wingate’s influence on Israeli 

military thought and practice.

Wingate’s attempts to change British policy for using Jews within 

the security forces on a large scale, to include forming a Jewish Army, 

were not successful. While Wingate’s tactical methods and operational 

plans held the greatest potential for impact on the British internal security 

strategy, a different lens must be used to evaluate his potential impact on 

Israeli Military thought and practice. Though this subject goes beyond the 

supported evidence offered in the research and thesis presented here, some 

points are offered that could prove useful for readers interested in how 

Wingate’s actions in Palestine might relate to later Israeli development of 

military thought and practice.

Numerous points of comparison could be drawn between Israeli 

Military thought and practice and Wingate’s emphases. For illustration, 
90

just two points are mentioned here: the psychological effects of tactical 

dominance, and the preeminence of particular Principles of War (i.e., 

surprise).4

 While such lines of influence would most certainly be difficult 

to prove, two points are worth noting. First, many prominent Israeli 

Military soldiers and leaders shared the experience of having Wingate as 

their first “professional” military commander. While this influence might 

appear on the surface to be minor, the significance of the impact should 

not be underestimated. Many a soldier can recount even their most early 

experiences of serving under such an able and respected leader as Wingate. 

Such experiences can deeply shape a soldier’s military mind. The fact that 

Wingate would be requested by name to return to Palestine to stand up a 

Jewish security force during World War II reveals the extent of this impact. 

This point is particularly poignant given that it took place before Wingate 

had undertaken the Chindit operations in World War II, for which he is 

best known in the Western world. Second, many memoirs and interviews 

by Israeli Military professionals would later reveal their personal accounts 

of his powerful influences upon them.
91

Notes

1. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice

(London: Harrison and Sons, 1906), 23.

2. Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History.” 

RUSI Journal (February 1993; reprint from 1961), 29-30.

3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated by 

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1984), 170.

4. A copy of Wingate’s training notes for the SNS is a part of 

the IWM Wingate collection 2/1. “Surprise” is listed as number one among the 

principles of war.
92
93

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