### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Ma y 9, 200 5 S es sio n
DIA NE WORL EY v. WHITE TIRE OF TEN NES SEE, INC ., and

GAZ AZ BO, L.L .C.

Direc t Appeal from The Law Court for Sull ivan Coun ty No. C11134 Hon. Richard E. Lad d, Jud ge

No. E2004-02025-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JULY 22, 2005

The Tr ial Court entere d J udg ment for plaintiff f or dama g es fr om destruction of roa d over e aseme nt
a ndre fo rm e d d e e d. On app e a l, w e a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Co unt y La w Co ur t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

Rus se ll W. Ad kin s, Ki ng sp ort, T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt, Ga zazb o, LL C.

Mark S. Dessauer, K ingsport, Tennesse e, for appellant, White Tire of

Tenne ssee, Inc.
Shelton B. Hillman, J r., B ristol, Tennessee , for a ppellee.

OP IN ION

Inth is a c ti o n , p la

in ti f f a ll e g ed def

endants White Tire of T ennesse e, I nc.(“ Whit e”) and Gazazbo, L .L .C., ( “Ga zazbo”) trespasse d on her property or ig nored he r ea sement, and slande red he r title. Following trial, the Trial Court ente red Judgment f or plaintiff a nd all parties ha ve appe aled.

I n the Co mp la in t, p la in ti f f a ll e g e d th a t s h e h a d b o u g h t a 2 0 a c r e tr a c t o f la n d from Whit e Tire and alleg ed that in the dee d Whit e Tire reta ined the rig ht to use a 50 foot rig ht-of-w ay to acc es s th e ir a d

jo in in g p r o p e r ty

. F u r th e r , th a t th e r e w a s a 1 5 f o o t w id e g r a v e l r o a d in side the

e a se me nt o n th e pa

rc e l of pr op e rt y that sh e pu rc ha se d, a nd that sh e us e d the pr op e rt y fr om 19 93 to-2-

April 2000 as both a r esidenc e and a commerc ial trucking operation.

I n O c tob e r 1 99 9, sh e a lle g e d th a t Whi te Ti re so ld the tr act it had al re a dy so ld t o plaintiff along with the trac t it st ill owned to Gazazbo. Gazazbo informed plaintiff that it intended to g rade over the g rave l r oad and terminate plaintiff’s use of the same, in the fac e o f p l ai ntiff’s advice s that she was e ntitled to use the roadway

. Further, in April 2000, Gazazbo dug up the g rave l

ro a d a ndde nie d p la int if

f a c c e ss t o h e r h ome a ndbu sin e ss. Additionally , plaintiff alleg ed that White Tire had misrepre sented the location of the g rave l road, a nd that the deliber at e destruction of the roa d, amounted to a slande r of title, and she soug ht judgment f

or dama g es and a n injunction. After de fenda nts answer ed denying the alleg ations of the Complaint, plaintiff amende d her Complaint seeking a re scission of the purch as e of the property from White Tire, asking for he r purc hase price plus all cost of improve ments.
Following a leng thy

trial, the Trial Court entere d a Judgment, finding that plaintiff failed to c arry

her bur den of pr oof re garding resc ission, sl ander of title, or cr eation of a n implied

e a se me nt. Th e Cou rt

didfi ndthat pl a int if

f w a s e nti tle d to the re a so na blere nta l va lue of

he r p ro pe rt y fr om G a zazb o, wi th the pr op e r a mou nt to be de c ide d by a sp e c ia l ma ste r, a ndthat pl a int if f w a s a lso entitled to damag es of $12,000.00 f rom Whit e Tire , plus prejudg ment interest. The Court reformed the dee d to plaintiff from White Tire, to set the bounda ry line along the path of the old road.

I n its Memorandum Opinion, the Trial Court f ound by clea r, cog ent, and c onvincing evidenc e that ther e wa s a mutual mistake of fa ct with reg ard to the orig inal deed to plaintiff, suc h that both parties intended that plaintiff would own the roa d and not just the 50 foot strip. The Court noted that def

endants did not ca ll any one to re fute that testimony , and that Br uce Cross, a part owne r of Ga zazbo, which was in t he business of pr operty development, testified that he did not know wher e the boundaries wer e. The Court ordere d ref ormation of the de ed fr om Whi te Tire to Worley so that the bo un da

ry wo uld be wi th the ro a d, a nd fo un d that Ga zazb o wa s no t a n inn oc e nt p ur c ha se r b e c a us e it wa s on notice that plaintiff claimed the road was the boundary , y et it pr ocee ded to de vel o p t he property at its own risk. Moreove r, the de velopment of the pr operty occur red afte r this a ction was filed, and a fter G azazbo was on notice that this was a n issue.

The Court’s Spec ial Master de termined that Ga zazbo owed rental value to plaintiff of $1,050.99, plus interest, which report wa s confirme d by the Court. A Fina l J udg ment was e ntere d ref lecting these va lues, and these appea ls ensued.

Def endants a rg ue that it wa s i mproper f or the Trial Court to gr ant the re medy of

re fo rm a tio n w he n th e pla int if f d id n ot p le a d s uc h in he r C omp la int

. Plaintiff’s Complaint repeate dly asserts that the g rave l road wa s on her pr operty , and that th e su rv e y

a t th e tim e sh e vie we d th e pr op e rt y sh ow e d th e ro a d b e ing on he r t ra c t a ndthat a ll parties to the tra nsaction ac knowledg ed that the r oad was on her tract. P laintiff then aske d the Court to r e qu ir e de fe nd a nts to “ pr e pa re pr op e r do c ume nts fo r re c or din g re c og nizi ng Pla int if f’ s o wn e rs hip-3-

and/or implied ea sement in said g rave led roa d”.

As we ha ve held:

Whil e we rec og nize that the adoption of the Tenne ss ee R u l es of Civil P roce dure g re a tly re la xedthe re qu ir e me nts a s to ple a din g s, ple a din g of so me fa c ts g ivi ng ri se to a claim for relief is still a necessary require ment. See W & O Con str

. Co . v . Ci ty of S mi thv ill e , 557 S.W .2d 920 (Tenn.1977) . The a d v erse party is entitled to have sufficie nt notice to inform him of the alleg ations he is called upon to a nswer.

J as pe r E ng ine an d Tr

an sm iss ion Ex c ha ng e v . Mill s , 911 S.W .2d 719, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

I n th is c a se , th e pla int if

f p le d f a c ts g ivi ng ri se to a c la im fo r r e fo rm a tio n, a ndsh e a lso asked f or that re lief in her pr ay er, though not spe cifica lly by name. Give n the standar d for plea ding

un de r the re qu ir e me nts of Te nn

. R. C iv. P. 8 , w e c on c lud e pla intif f’ s Co mpl a int

is s uf fi c ie nt t o s ta te
a cl ai m for r eformation. See, e .g. , Adams v. Carter County Me m. Hosp. , 5 4 8 S. W. 2 d 3 0 7 ( Tenn. 19 77 ); W illiamson C ounty v. Twin Law n Dev . Co. , 4 98 S.W. 2d31 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) ; Lamons v. Cha mb e rla in , 909 S.W .2d 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Gazazbo additionally

asserts t h at it was improper f or the Trial Court to order ref o r mati o n w h e r e G a za zb o w a s a n in n o c e n t p u r c h a s e r o f th e p r o p e r ty a n d w a s n o t a p artyto the transac tion between pla intiff and White Tire.

We have also previously stated t hat reformation of a deed f or mutual mistake “is an action in equity

and will not l i e i f it aff

ects interve ning rights of third pe rsons who ac tually and justifiably

rely upon rec orded instruments.” Minton v. Long , 19 S.W .3d 231, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

I n this c as e t h ere is no proof that Ga zazbo actually and justifiably

relied on the

rec orded instruments. I n fac t, Cross testified that he purcha sed the property having no idea whe re the bo un da

ri e s w e re , s a w the ro a d a ndpla int if f’ s u se of sa me , did not

ha ve a su rv e y do ne un til so me months after he had purc hased the property , and only afte r t he surve y learned that the r oad cr ossed the cor ner of

his property . Where a party has notice of the mistake, or ther e ar e fa cts/circumstanc es wh ic h w ou ld p ut a

re a so na ble pe rs on on no tic e that a mis take ha s oc c ur re d su c h that inq uiry

wo uld be prude nt, then that party is typically

not considere d an innoce nt pur ch as er and the de ed may be ref ormed a s ag ainst that person. Johnson v. J ohnson , 6 7 T e n n

. 2 6 1 ( 18 74 ); se e als o Smotherman

v . B lac k we ll , 2 61 S.W. 2d78 2 ( Ar k. 19 53 ); Sh e lor

v . W itt , 387 N.E.2d 18 (I ll. App. Ct. 1979); Sargent v. Coolidge , 4 33 A. 2d73 8 ( Me . 1 98 1) ; W alters v. Tucke r , 308 S.W .2d 673 (Mo. 1957); Deube l v. Dearweste r , 17 2 N. E. 64 0 ( Oh io C t. A pp . 1 93 0) ; Zin k v . D av is , 277 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1954).

Wit h Cross’ admission that, at the time he purc hased the property , he did not know wher e the bounda

ries we re, a nd observe d the roa d and plaintiff’ s use, and that it was the only way in to plainti ff’s property , the Trial Court cor rec tly conclude d that Gazazbo was not an innoce ntTh e tr a c t pl a int if f p ur c ha se d w a s p art

of a larg er tr act ownedby

Whit e Ti re , o f w hic h it 1

re ta ine d a p ort io n, so the tr a c t pl a int if f o wn s w a s n ot a

se pa rate ly -d e e de d tr a c t be fo re thi s transac tion.

-4- pu rc ha se r a ndthat r e fo rm a tio n o f the de e d w a s a pp ro pr ia te . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
Finally , Gazazbo a

rg ues that the fac ts do not support r eformation, w hich re q u i res clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. The proof wa s that p l aintiff and he r husband we re both told by Whit e Tire’s ag ent that the roa dway /drivewa y was include d in the trac t of land they wer e purcha sing. They

wer e further shown survey flag s which supported the idea that the driveway was 1 encompa ssed by

their prope rty , and the testimony of plaintiff’s daug hter and former brother- in-law bolstered this proof. Mor e importantly , the attorne y who was employ ed by Whit e Tire to draw up the dee d with respec t to this transac tion testified that he wa s t o l d b y W h i te Tire’ s ag ent that the

ro a dw a y wa s c omp le te ly

wi thi n th e pla int if

f’ s bou nd ary , an d thus the re wa s n o n e e d to re fe r t o it in the de e d b e c a us e it w a s o n th e tr a c t be ing c on ve y e d to pla int if f. Th e re is n o c on tr a dic tio n o f this testimonyby

any ag ent/witness of White Tire. Given the state of the rec o rd , there was c lear and convincing evidenc e and uncontradic ted proof that there was a mutual mistake in the draf ting of the

su bje c t de e d. Th e re fo re , th e Tr ia l Co urt pr op e rl y g ra nte d p la int if

f r e fo rm a tio n o f the de e d to

c omp ort w ith the pa

rt ie s’ int e nt.

Ne xt, de fe nd a nts arg ue that th e Tria l Co urt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng pa ro l e vid e nc e to contra dict the terms of the deed. A s our Supreme Court ha s previously explained:
The g ener al rule is that par ol evidence is not admissi ble to contra dict a written ag ree ment

. . . As said in Br own v . B ro wn , 45 Tenn. App. 78, 94, 320 S.W.2d 721, the ru le a nn ou nc e d in ma ny of ou r e arl y Te nn e sse e c a se s ha s been c on sis te ntl y fo llo we d. On e of

the se c a se s is Litt lejohn v. Fowler , 45 T e nn . 2 84 , w he re it w a s sa id t h at p ar o l ev i d en ce ca n n o tb e a d m i t t ed t o co n t ra d i ct o r v ar y t h e t er m s o r t o en l ar ge or dimi n i sh the obligation of a written instrument or de ed, exc ept on grounds of fraud, accident or mistake

. (Emphasis supplied).

Cla y ton v . H au ry , 452 S.W .2d 865, at 867-8 (T enn. 1970). Thus, de fenda nts’ contention that par ol evidenc e is normally

not allowed to contr adict the terms of a written document is corr ect, e x cept wher e there is fraud or

mistake, as her e. I n these situations, parol evide nce is a dmissibl e. Id., see als o GR W En te rp ris e s , I

nc ., v . D av is , 7 97 S.W. 2d60 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 0) ; Br own v . B ro wn , 320 S.W. 2d72 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 95 8) . T his iss ue is a lso wi tho ut m e ri t.

The Court asse ssed damag es of $12,000.00 ag ainst Whit e Tire , appar ently based on the estimate plaintiff rec eived reg arding the cost of building a new acc ess road. The Court sta ted that it found that “it was all White’s fault” and thus the Court a ssessed the damag es for the building of the roa d ag ainst Whi te. The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the Court’s awa rd either in the fi nd ing of Whit e ’s lia

bil ity , o r i n th e a mou nt o f d a ma g e s ass e sse d. Th e pr oo f e sta bli sh e d th a t Whi te intended to c onvey the disputed property to pla intiff, but f ailed to do so, and it failed to r ectify the-5-

situatio n wh en it was broug ht to its attention. There was no proof to the contra

ry . Moreove r, the amount of dama g es was based upon an estimate plaintiff re ceive d reg arding the cost to rebuild the road, a nd this proof was undisputed by Whit e.

Whit e also arg ue s th e Tria l Co ur t sh ou ld n ot h a ve a wa

rd e d d a ma g e s in a dd iti on to ref ormation, bec ause pla intiff was made whole by the award of the disputed proper ty . This arg ument ig no re s th e fa c t th a t pl a int if f n o lo ng e r h a s a n a c c e ss r oa d to h er pro perty wh e re on e pr e vio us ly exis ted, and a nother roa d will have to be built, which is a n out-of-poc ket expense to plaintiff which she would not otherwise have inc urre d. Plaintiff was not made whole by the reformation alone , and the ro a d wa s de str oy e d thr ou g h no fa ult of he rs , wh ic h the Tria l Cou rt fo un d to be the fa

ult of Whit e Ti re . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

Plaintiff arg ues the Tr ial Court should have found de fen d ants liable for sla nder of title, and awa

rded da mag es ac cording ly

. Br oo k s v . La mb e rt , 15 S.W .3d 482, 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), sets forth what a plaintiff is re quired to prove to establish a succ essful cla im for s lander of title. I n Brooks , we found that the unsucce ssful defe ndant had a g ood faith basis for their asse rtion of title and t hat they

wer e conve y ed the pr operty in question by

a purported owner

who also owne d adjac ent prope rty

. Id. We f ou ndthat th e re wa s n o ma lic e sh ow n w he n o ne a c te d o n g oo d f a ith c la im of title, even if the claim was de termined to be e rrone ous. Id. I n this case, Ga zazbo relied upon the deed g iven to it by Whit e Tire and the subsequent surve y , and while the c ircumstance s should have put Gazazbo on notice reg arding the dispute ab o u t t h e ro ad way befor e it destroy ed the sa me, the evidenc e does not ne cessa rily establish malice on Ga zazbo’s part, sinc e ther e wa s evidenc e of a g ood f a i t h b a s i s f

o r c l a i m i n g t h e p r o p e r t y. L i k e w i s e , t h e r e w a s n o p r o o f t h a tW h i t e T i r e a c t e d m a l i c i o u s l y. The e vidence does not support a c laim for slande r of title.

Further, plaintiff a

rg ues that the Trial Court erre d in failing to find Gazazbo liable for trespass or

intentional destruction of the r oadwa y , but cites no authority for this contention. As we have r ecog nized, “F ai lure to cite authority for pr opositions i n arg uments submitt ed on appe al constitutes waiver

of the issue.” Messe r Griesheim Industries, Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingspor t, Inc. , 13 1 S. W.3 d 4 57 , 47 4 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 20 03 ). Th e on ly c a se c ite d b y

pla int if f w ith re g ardto this iss ue do e s n ot d e a l w ith tr e sp a ss, bu t do e s st a te a s f oll ow s:

I n order for a n issue to be consider ed on appe al, a pa rt y m ust, in his brief, develop the theorie s or contain autho ri ty to support the aver

red position as re quired by Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure 27(a) . "Wher e a p arty makes no leg al arg ument and cites no authority in support of a position, such issue is deemed to be wai ved and wi ll no t b e con si dere d o n ap peal ."

H a w k i n s v

. H

ar t , 8 6 S .W.3d 522, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)(c itations omi tted). This issue was waived b y t h e p l ai n tiff’s fa ilure to cite authority or deve lop her a

rg ument in relation to such

a u t h o r i t y. Finally , plaintiff ar g ues that an a war d of punitive damag es wa s war rante d in this case,-6-

and that the tria l court er red in fa iling to do so. I t is “established law tha t an aw ar d of punitive damag es lies within the discretion of the trier of fac ts.” W

hittingt on v. Grand Valley Lakes, Inc

. , 547 S.W .2d 241, 243 (Tenn. 1977)

.

Th e Tria l Co urt in thi s c a se fo un d no ba sis fo r pun iti ve da ma g e s, a ndthi s f ind ing is appropriate, since there was no c lear and convinc ing e vidence that defe ndants’ conduct was intentional, fraudulent, malicious or reckless. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to awar d punitive damag es in this case. See also, Hodge s v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W .2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).

We affirm the J udg ment of the Trial Court and re mand, with the costs of the appea l assessed one -half to plaintiff a nd one-ha lf to the defe ndants Whit e Tire of Tenne ssee, Inc.,
a n d G a z a z b o , LL C

. , j o i n t l y.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.