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### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: SKYLINE RIDGE , LLC , Debtor

. BAP No. AZ

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Bk. No. 4 : 18

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MEMORAN DUM ∗ SKYLINE RIDGE, LLC , Appell an t , v. CI NCO SOLDADOS, LLC; LANDMARK TITLE ASSURANCE AGENCY OF ARIZONA, LLC, as Trustee for Landmark Title Trust No. 1852

- T , Appellee s
. Appeal from the United States Bankruptc y Court for the District of Arizon a Brenda Moody Whi nery , Bankruptc y Judge, Presiding

Before: LAFFER TY, BRAND , and SPRAKER , Ban kruptcy Judges.

I N T R ODUCT ION In the midst of the bankruptcy court ’ s consideration of competing plans of reorganiz ation, debtor

- in

- possession Skyline Ridge, LLC ( “ Skyline ” ) ( no w the reorganized debtor un der the confirmed plan filed by

∗ Th is d is p osition is not appro pria t e f or p ublication

. A lt h ou g h it may b e ci t ed f o r
w ha t ever per su asi v e value it ma y hav e , se e Fed. R

. A pp
. P. 32

. 1, it ha s n o p recedential

v a l ue, see 9th C ir. BAP R u l e 8024

- 1. 

# FILED

MAR 23 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 Cinco Soldado, LL C ( “ Cin co ” ) ) , file d a state court lawsuit against Cinco , asserting cla ims for breach of contract and judi cial fore closure based on a prepetition note and deed of trust

. A ccording to Skyline, the note compris ed the estate ’ s largest asset

. Cinco re mo ve d th e state court action to the bankruptcy court . Before the bankruptcy court issue d any disp ositive

ru lings in the removed action, it confir med Cinco ’ s plan of reorgan ization, which called for settlement of dispu tes bet ween Skyline and Cin co, includin g th e di sputes arising out of the same note and deed of trust

. T he
note payment called for under the plan was paid and the deed of trust was

recon veyed . After Skyline refused to dismiss the removed action , Cinco moved for summary judgment dism issing it w ithout prejudice, as c all ed for i n the plan. The bankruptcy court granted the motion. Sky line appeals, arguing th at: (1) the bankruptcy court should have

a bs tained and remanded the removed action ; (2) the bankr uptcy cou rt lacked cons titutional au thority to enter a fin al order in the a dversary proceeding ; and (3) b ecause the order confirming Cinco ’ s plan is currently on appeal, S kyline w ill be prejudiced if the order is rever sed because it w ill be time

- barred from collect ing the f ull amount owed to it. As discus sed herein, a bstention doctrines d o n ot app ly to remove d
actions , and t he bankruptcy court had autho rity to enter a final order enforcing the terms of the chap ter 11 plan

. Further, the note and deed of
trus t that we re the su bject of the claim s in the removed action have been paid and recon veyed, respe ctively, thus rendering the claims moot.3 Skyline ’ s arguments regarding the pending appeal of t he confirmation order have been pre sented and r eje cted by this Panel in con n ection with Skyli ne ’ s re quest for a stay pending appeal of the co nfirmatio n order , which we denied . We ther efore AFFIRM

. FACTS A. Pre

- petition events Skyline is an Arizona limited liability company formed in 1994 by Ahmad Za rifi, its sole member and manag e r , to design , buil d , and sell
h omes in the Tucson area. Cinco is an Arizona limited liabilit y company fo rmed in 2006 by Za rifi and other s to acquir e and develop a 160

- acre parcel of land kn own as Rancho Soldados

. The purchase of Rancho Soldad os was funded in part b y a $4 mi lli on lo an fr om Skyline , as

mem orialized in a promissory note ( the “ Skylin e N ot e ” ) , wh ich was secured by a second position deed of trust on Ra ncho Soldado s ( “ Skyline DOT ” )

. Altho ugh t h e Skyline Note provided for the payment of interest , C inco too k th e po sit ion th at t he parties had orally agreed that the loan would not accrue i nterest and that Zarifi would convert the Skyline Note
i nt o equity when Rancho Soldados was platt ed. Cinco failed to pay the Sk yline Loan on its amended maturity d a te of June 30 , 201 6

.4 B. Skyline 's bankruptcy filing and the adversary proce eding Skyli n e file d its chapte r 11 1 bankruptcy case on March 1, 201 8. After the bankruptcy court terminated Debtor 's exclusivity period , Debtor and Cinco proposed comp eting chapter 1 1 plans. Debtor ’ s pl a n proposed
l itigating d isput ed claims; Cinco ’ s plan (the “ Ci nco Plan ” ) called for t he settlement of disputed claims, in clu ding th os e relating to the Skyline loan

. In February 2020, w hile the competing plan s were under consideration , S ky line filed a com plaint agains t Cinco in the Superior
C ourt of Arizona, Pima County . The co mplaint cont ained tw o c laims for relief: (1) breach of contract , based on Cinco ’ s alleged failure t o comply with the terms o f the Skyline Note; and (2) jud icia l for ecl osure of the Sk yline DOT . In May 202 0, Cinco removed t he s tate court lawsuit to the bankr uptcy court

. Skyli ne promptly filed a motion for abste ntion and

rema nd ( “ Remand Motion ” ). The bankrupt cy court deferred ruli ng on the Remand Motion until after plan conf irmation

. In June 2020, a f ter a five

- day trial, t he bankruptcy court issued a

r uling a nd order den ying confirmation of both plan s. Th e parties each filed amended plans, and in Novembe r 202 0, t he bankruptcy cour t ente red an order den yi ng confirmation of De btor ’ s plan a nd confirm ing the Cinco Plan (the “ Confirmation Order ” )

.

1 Unl es s s pecified ot her w ise, a ll cha pte r and secti on re f e rences are to the Ba nkru p tc y C o d e, 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 101

– 1 532

.5 The Cinco Plan pr ovides for compromise and payment of the Skyli ne Note, release of the Skyline DOT , a nd dismissal of th e removed advers ary proceeding

. Specifically, the Cinco Plan provides: “In con sideration of receipt of the Initial Settlement Payment on the Effective D at e, Debtor and Cinco shall exchange mut ual releases, dismiss all pending actions with out prejudice, each party to bear its own attorneys ’ fees, and Debtor sha ll

re lease all liens an d claims upon property of Cinco

. ” The Cinco P la n also provides for the ret ention of ba nkruptcy court jurisdiction to resolve pending adversary proceedings and to ente r o r ders necessary to implement or consummate the provisions of the Cinc o Plan

. On Febru ary 19 , 2021, Cinco transfe rr ed $2,654,942 to the d isbursing

a gent in sat i sfaction of the Skyline Note, as provided in the plan.
T hereafter, the d isbur sing a gent ex ecuted and del ivered and caused to be recorded a Full Deed of Release and Reconveyance of th e Skyline D OT , which released Sk yline’s lien against Ranc ho Soldados

. In the meantime , Skyline appeale d the Confirmation Order to this Panel , which affir m ed

. Skyline Ridge, LLC v. Cinco Soldados, LLC (In re Skyline Ridge, LLC) , BAP Nos. AZ

- 20

- 1264

- BTL & A Z

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- 1000

- BTL , 2021
WL 382931 1 ( 9 th Ci r. BAP Aug. 2 5 , 202 1)

. Skyline has a ppealed the Panel ’ s decision to the Ninth Circ ui t Court of Appeals (No. 21

- 600 52 ) ; as of the date of this M emorandum , that appeal re main s pending. Skyline ’ s request s for a stay pendi ng appeal wer e denied by the bankruptcy court and t his6 Panel ; S kyline has not requested a stay pending appeal from the Ninth
Circ uit. Shortly after the reconve yance was recorded, C i nco moved for summary judgment di smi ss ing the adversary proceeding. Cin co argued that t he Skyline Note had been paid and the S kyline D O T had been released , th us th ere wa s no basis for litigatin g the cl aims , and th e adversary proceeding must be dismissed pursuant to the confirmed plan

. Skyline opposed the moti o n, argui ng that di smissal was
i nappropri ate be cause the Confirm a tion Order w as on appeal and might be

re versed

. Sk yline asserted t hat , even though t he proposed dismissal w as

w ithout prejudice to fi ling a future action , it would be prejudiced because the si x - year statute of lim itations w ould expire with respect to some of the unpai d payments on the Skyline Note

. Skyline also objected to the bankruptcy court ’ s entry of a final order di spo sing of the adversary
procee ding, arg uing that t he court l ack ed constitu tiona l author ity t o enter such an order pursu ant to Stern v. Marshall , 5 64 U.S . 462 (2011 )

. In Cinco ’ s r eply, it argued that Skyline was again attempting to obtain a stay pending appeal, which had al ready been de nied. It also suggested that th e bankruptc y court treat the advers ary proceeding as non

core and enter proposed findings and conclusio n s fo r de novo review by the district court. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued a ruli ng and orde r ( “ D ismi s sal Orde r ” ) granting Cinco ’ s mot ion for summa ry judgment based7 on the terms of the confir m ed Cinco P la n and the fact that t he terms of th e settleme nt of the Sk yline l oan had been satisfied

. With respect to its authority to enter a final judgment , the court concluded th at it had “ related
to ” jurisdi ct ion over the adver sary proceeding , and that i t had ancillary jurisdiction to e nter an order di smissing it because dismissal wa s required under the Confirmation Order. T he court conclude d that , b ased on its

anc illary jurisd ict io n , it had constitutional auth ority to enter a f inal jud gment because it wa s enfo rcing t he Confirmation O rde r
. Nevertheles s,
t he bankruptcy court included a footn ote i n it s ruli ng stating , “ [i] f it is determined that this Court lacks authority to enter a final o rder disposing of this A dversary Proceedin g, the foregoing constitute the Court’s proposed findi ngs of fact and conc lusions of law. ” The bankruptcy court di d not make any findings or conclusions regarding Skyline ’ s R e mand
Motion

. Skyline timely appealed. D espite Skyline ’ s assert ion that the bankr uptc y court l acked constitu tional authority to enter the Dis missal Order, it did not elect to have the appeal heard by the district court. J URIS D ICTION As di scu ssed below, t he ba nkru ptcy c ourt h ad jur isdicti o n un de r 28 U.S.C. § § 13 34 a nd 157 ( b ) ( 2 ) (L) and the retention of jurisdic tion provision of the confirmed plan

. We have jurisdicti on over fi na l orders and d ecrees, and from interlocu tor y orders with leave. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Here, t he bankruptc y8 court ’s order dismiss ed the adversary pro ceeding “ without prejudice. ” Orders dismissing adv ersary proceedings without preju dice are generally interlo cu tory. Barnes v . Belice (In re Belice) , 461 B.R. 564, 571

- 72 (9th Cir. BAP 2011). At the same ti me, “ [ a ] disposition is final i f it contains a complete act of adjudication , that is, a full adjudication of the issues at bar, and c learly evidences the judge ’ s intention that it be the court ’ s fin al act in the matte r
. ” Slimick v. Silva (In re Slimick) , 928 F.2d 304, 307 ( 9 th Cir. 1990) (c leane d up)

. Skyline contends , and we agree, th at the Dismissal O rder meets thes e criter ia

. T he Cinco P lan req uired that pending pro ceedings be dismissed without prejudice , so that is what t he court did. But the court dismissed the adver sary proceeding in its entirety , and nothing in the record suggests that there is anything fu rt her to be done in th at matter

. Accordingly, we may treat the order as final

. We th us have jurisdictio n
. 2 I SSUE S
D id the bankrupt cy court abuse its discretion in implicitl y denying Sk yli ne ’ s Remand M otion ? Did the bankruptcy court have constitutional authority to enter a final order in the adversary pro ceed ing? Did the bankruptcy co urt err in granting summary judg ment dismissing the adversary proc eeding ?

2 C inco does not di sput e that the orde r was intended to be final. To the cont rary, it a s s er ts in i ts brief that the Panel ha s jurisdic ti on ove r the appeal of the dism issal order because the order was final

.9 STA N DARD S OF R E VIEW A bankrup tcy court ’ s denial of a motion to remand un der 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. McCarthy v. Prince (In re McCarthy) , 230 B.R. 41 4, 416 ( 9 th Cir. BA P 1999)

. To d etermine whether the bankruptcy co urt abused its discreti on, we conduct a t wo
- step inquiry: (1) we revi ew de novo whether the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to ap ply to the reli ef requested” and (2) if i t did, whether the bankrupt cy co urt's application of the legal sta ndard was illogical,
im plausible, or “ wit hout support in inferences t hat may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson , 585 F. 3d 1247, 1261

– 6 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc ). Whether the ban kruptcy court had the constitutional authority to finally determine an issue is revie wed de novo. Hasse v. Rainsdon (In re Pringle) , 495 B. R. 447, 455 ( 9 th Cir. BAP 2013)

. We also review de novo a bankruptcy cou rt ’s grant of sum m ary judgment. Salven v. Gal li (In r e Pas s) , 553 B.R. 749, 756 (9th Cir. BA P 2016). Under de n ovo review, we look at th e matter anew, as if it had not been heard before, and as i f no decision had bee n rendered previously, giving no de feren ce to the bankruptcy court's determinations

. Freeman v. Di recTV, Inc. , 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 ( 9th Cir. 2006).10 DISC USS I O N A. The bankruptcy co urt did not abuse its discretion in i mplicitly denying Skyline ’ s Remand Motion

. The bankruptcy court never explicit ly ruled on Skyline ’ s Remand
Motion , but its dis m issal o f the adversary procee ding operated as an
i mp licit denial of t hat motion. On appeal, Skyline does not directly address

rema nd but focuses its argument on abste ntio n doctrines. Skyline co ntends tha t the bankr uptcy court was required to abstain from exercisi n g jurisdiction over t he adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 ( c )

. But a bste ntion provisions do not apply when a state court action has been removed to federal court. Thi s is beca use abstenti on, whethe r discretionar y or mandatory, requires the e xistence of a par allel state court pro ce eding. Schulman v. Cal

. ( In re Laz ar ) , 237 F.3d 967, 981

- 82 ( 9 th Cir. 2001) ; Sec

. Farms v. Int ’ l B hd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers , 124 F.3d 99 9,
10 09 ( 9 th Cir. 1997)

. O nce a state court proceedin g has been removed to federal court, that requirement is no longer met. See id

. at 1010 ( state court proceeding was “ extinguished ” upon remov al to federal court). 3 Accordingly, Skyl ine ’ s request for abstention should be treate d as a

mo tion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 ( b)

. I d. That statute provides, “ The court to whic h such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on an y equitable gr ound. ” Skyline ’ s arguments on

3 At oral argument, co uns el f o r Skyl ine con ceded t ha t th is is a c orrect statement
o f Ninth Circuit law , but he believes it to be wrong a n d wishe s to preserve the argument for a potentia l appeal to th e Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

.11 a ppeal a ddress only the question of mandatory ab stention , which is inap plicable. T he adversary proceeding i nvolv ed an asset of the b ankruptcy estate, and the Cinco Plan that was on f ile at the time of filing provided f or resolution of the claims in the adversary proceeding . Further, the payment of the Sk yline N o te and reconveyance of the Skyline DOT mooted the claims in the removed a ction; there was no case or controversy to remand. W e thus find no abuse of discretion in the bank ruptcy court ’ s implicit denial of the Remand Motion

. B. The bankruptcy cour t had consti t utional authority to enter the Di smissal O rder. Skyline contends that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional autho r ity , i.e., judicial power, to enter a final order in the adversary proceeding because it was not a core proceeding and because Skyline d id
not con sent to entry of a final order . The bankruptcy court rejected this argument. I t implicit ly treated Cinco ’ s motion for summary judgment as a motion to enforce the C onfirmation O rder. Thi s was appropriate: d espite its label, the motion wa s in subst ance a request for the court to e nforce the provision of the Cinco Plan and Conf irmation Order that required the adversary proceeding to be dismissed once the required payment had been made and the Skyline D OT reconveyed. See Bankr

. Receivables Mgmt. v

. Lo pez (In r e Lopez) , 274 B.R. 854 , 862 ( 9 th Cir. BAP 2002) ( “A pleading is to be judged by its substance rather than by its form or label.” (cleaned up) , aff ’ d , 345 F.3d 701 ( 9 th Cir. 2003) ). A lthough Cinco styled the motion as one12 for summary judgment of di smissal and filed it in the adver sary proceeding, Cinco could have instead filed a motion to enforce the Confirmation Order in the main case

. The motion alleged that the conditions for dismissal had been satisfied but that Sk yline had refused to dismiss th e action unconditionally , and the evidence attached to t he motion confirmed this

. Skyline does not contend other wise. Based on this interpret ation, t he bankruptcy court reasoned that it had ancillary jurisdiction to dismiss the adver sary proceeding as

en force ment of the Co n firmation Or d er , a c ore proceeding

. 4 See Huse v. Huse

- Sp orsem , A.S. ( In re Birting Fisheries, Inc. ) , 300 B.R. 489, 499 ( 9th Cir. BAP 2003) ( bankruptcy court ’ s core jurisdiction includes confirmation of plans , and core jurisdiction conti nues for the c ourt to enfo rce its orders, even after the case has been closed ). See also Gray v. CPF Assoc s., LLC (I n re G ray ) , 614 B

. R

. 96, 105 ( D. Ariz. 2020) ( “ Actions to interpret or enforce a prior order are effectively a continuation of that earlier proceeding, thus if that earlier pr oceeding was ‘ core, ’ then the later one is too. ” (citing McCowan v. Fraley (In re McCowan) , 296 B.R. 1, 3

– 4 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) )

. In concluding that it had anci llary jurisdiction, t h e bankr uptcy court recognized that its post

- confir mation jurisdiction is l imited to matters that

4 Skyline assert ed in i ts opening brief that the ban k ruptcy court found tha t th e adv ersa ry proceeding was not a core proceeding. To the contrary, the court s t a t e d, “[g]iven that this Court is exercising ancil lary jurisdiction to enforce t his Court’s Confirmation Order by dismiss ing this Adversary Pro ceeding , it is this Court’s de term ination t hat this is a ‘core’ proceeding.”13 have a “ close nexus ” to the plan ; that is, matters affecting “the interpretation, implemen tation, consummation, execution, or administration of the confirmed plan

. ” Montan a v. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.) , 394 F.3d 11 89, 1194 ( 9 th Cir. 2005) (quoting Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP ( In re Resorts In t ’ l, In c. ) , 372 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)). The dismissal of the adversary proceeding was ind isputably required to implement the confirmed p lan.
But whe ther the bankruptcy co urt had ancillary jurisdiction is not the

re levant question. 5 U nder the unique facts and procedural posture of this

case, the court ’ s entry of the D ismissal O rd er was within its jud icial power for two reasons: first, it w as a ministerial ac t that was requi red under the terms of the co nfirmed plan , i.e., it disposed o f the p rocedural “ shell ” containing the resolved claims ; a nd sec ond, it was a determination of
matter s which did not require the court to make findings on any disputed issues of fact, and theref ore did not implicate any defer ential standard of
review on appeal

.

5 We emphasize here the dif ference be t w een subject matter juris diction and judicial power. A court’s jurisdiction is determined as of the time of filing. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P. , 541 U.S 567, 570 (2004). A nd because subject matter jurisdiction “involves a court’s po wer to h ea r a case, it can never be forfeited or waived.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). Unlike subject m atte r jurisdiction, however, a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to ente r a final order may be consented to,
or a n objection to it can be waiv ed. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif , 575 U.S. 665, 68 3

- 8 4 (2015) (litigant may implicitly consent to bankruptcy court authority).14 With respect to the mini sterial nature of the dism iss al of the adversary proceeding, w e do not suggest that plan confirmation
trans form ed t he substanti ve cl aims in the adversary procee di ng from non
c ore to core. Rather, t he fact that the initial compl ain t involved non
- core claims is irrel evant because those claims , i.e., the parties ’ substa ntive rights, had already been finally disposed of in the plan co nfirmation process ; the Confirmat io n Order was the final order adjudicating the claims. 6 More fundamentally, we discern no error in the court ’ s disposition of the adversary proceeding

. First, the bankruptcy court’s authority to enter a final order or jud gment was not called into questio n here because there were no genuinely disputed issues of material fact as to the claims for which summary judgment was sought. As noted, t he bankruptcy court was

t herefore not making determinations of disputed issues of fa ct that would implicate a deferen t i al standard of review by an Article III tribunal. Moreover, an order granting summary judgment is subject to de novo review upon appeal in any event. United State s v. Phattey , 943 F.3d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Bu t Cinco does not even argue that the adversary proceeding wa s erroneously dismissed.

6 Nothin g in this memorandum should be interpreted to mean that the court ’ s ancillary j urisdic tion to enforce a confirmed plan that settles non

- core claims converts those claims from non

- core to core. Rather, as explain ed, in the unique circumstances presented here, the bankruptcy court had the judicial power to enter the order granting summary judgment.15 Th erefore, t o the ex t e nt it matters, t he policy reasons for limiting the
po w er of an Arti cle I cou rt to enter a final order in a non

- core matter are not pres ent here. This i s not a situation w here a stranger to the bankr uptcy is being forced to have its claim s heard b y a non
- A r ticle III court. See Wellness , 575 U.S. at 68 2

- 8 3 ( “ [T] he cases in which this Court has found a

v iolation of a litigant ’ s right to an A rticle III decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant forced t o litigate i nvoluntarily before a non

- Article III court. ” )

. At the time it filed the removed action, Skyline was a debtor

- in

possession, and the claims it asserted involved the estat e ’ s lar gest asset

. Th os e claims were in the process of being resolved thro ug h plan

c o n firmation , and while Skyline ’ s plan called for the c la ims to be litigat ed, Skyline was n ot required to litigate t hem in state court

. Nevertheless, out of an abundance o f ca ution, th e bankruptcy court included language in it s order d e claring t hat, if ne c e ssary, its order could be treated as proposed findings of fact and conc lusions of law

. Finally, despite Skyline ’ s os tensible objection to hav ing a non
- Article III court dec ide the m ot ion, and the bankruptcy court ’ s explicit provision that the Di smiss al O rder could be treated as propo sed findings and conclusi ons, Skyline appealed to this Panel rather than the d istrict c ourt, which arguably constituted a waiver of its Ster n ob jection. See Wellness , 575 U.S. at 683

- 84

. For all these reasons, we conclude t h a t the bankruptcy court had the power to enter the Dismissal Order.16 C. T h e bankr uptcy court di d n ot err in g ranting s ummary judgment

. Sum mary ju d gment is appr opriate if the p lead ings and supplemental materials demonstrate that the re is no genuine i ssue as to a n y material fact on the claims at issue , and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

ma tter of law

. Rouss os v. Michaelides (In re Rous s os) , 251 B.R. 86, 91 (9th Cir

. BA P 200 0), aff ’ d , 33 F. App ’ x 365 (9th Cir. 2002). Thi s appeal prese nts no factu al d i sputes. As noted, t he payment and rele ase of the Skyline DOT th at occurred in accordance wi th the Cinco Pl an mooted the claims in t he adve r sary proceedi ng
. Moreover, be caus e the con ditions for dismissal of the adversary proceeding set forth i n the Ci nc o Plan had been sat isfied, in th e

a bsence of a stay pending appeal, the bankru ptcy court did no t err i n granting summary judgment a nd d ismissi n g the adversa ry proceeding
wi thou t pre judi ce. Sky line argues that if the Confirma t ion Order is reversed in t he
pe n d ing Ninth Circuit appeal , then the Dism i ssal Ord er should also be reversed. It further argues that even if that occur s , and Skyline i s allow e d to pursue i ts brea ch of con trac t and for eclosure claims against Cinco at a
l ater da te, it would be pr ejudiced b e c ause it m ay be time

- barred from collecti ng interest on payments that came du e more than six y ears before filing. Skyline ’ s arguments wo ul d b e perti ne nt to a re quest for a sta y pen ding a ppeal of the Confirmation Order . But Skylin e has already17 pr ese nted si m i l ar arguments to the bankruptcy court an d this Panel , which rejected them.
C O NC LUS ION
Fo r th e reasons set forth above, t he bankr uptc y court did not a buse its d isc retion in d eclin ing to remand the adversary proceeding. The court also had the c o nstituti on a l authority to en ter the Dismissal Order, and i t did not err in doing so. Acc ording ly, w e AFFI RM.