NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

QUINCY D. HALL,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3011

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-0752-12-0006-B-1.

______________________ 

Decided: April 8, 2015

______________________ 

QUINCY D. HALL, Houston, TX, pro se.

DANIEL S. HERZFELD, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN 

E. WHITE, JR. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.
2 HALL v. TRANSPORTATION

PER CURIAM. 

Quincy D. Hall (“Hall”) appeals from the final order of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) affirming the decision by the Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration (the “FAA”) to remove 

him from the position of air traffic control specialist at the 

Houston Intercontinental Tower. See Hall v. Dep’t of 

Transp., No. DA-0752-12-0006-B-1, 2014 WL 5338879 

(M.S.P.B. July 10, 2014) (“Final Order”); Hall v. Dep’t of 

Transp., No. DA-0752-12-0006-B-1, 2013 WL 6384048 

(M.S.P.B. June 6, 2013) (“Initial Decision After Remand”); 

Hall v. Dep’t of Transp., 119 M.S.P.R. 180 (2013) (“Remand Order”); Hall v. Dep’t of Transp., No. DA-0752-12-

0006-I-1, 2012 WL 543856 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 31, 2012) (“Initial Decision”). Because the Board’s decision contained no 

error of law, and its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In September 2006, Hall began employment with the 

FAA at the San Juan air traffic control tower in Puerto 

Rico. In July 2007, the FAA terminated his employment 

during his probationary period. The FAA noted that Hall 

“continue[d] to have multiple safety related performance 

deficiencies at the Flight Data/Clearance Delivery position despite recent skill enhancement and remedial 

training,” and that his employment would not “promote 

the efficiency of the service.” Resp’t’s App. at 60.

In September 2008, Hall entered the FAA’s National 

Air Traffic Technical Training Program (“NATTTP”) to 

certify as an air traffic control specialist at the Houston 

Intercontinental Tower. Hall’s training was terminated 

in October 2010 due to his failure to successfully complete 

the Local Control phase of the program. On August 12, 

2011, the FAA issued a notice proposing to remove Hall 

from employment for his failure to complete the required 

training and denied his request for placement at a lower 
HALL v. TRANSPORTATION 3

level facility. Id. at 63–65. The FAA’s Air Traffic Manager explained that Hall was “a developmental employee 

who ha[d] failed to progress” in the training program, and 

that he did not qualify for placement at a lower level 

facility under the FAA’s Human Resources Policy Manual 

EMP 1.14. Id. The manager also stated that Hall had not 

“exhibited sufficient skills to be recommended for placement at another lower level facility,” and that his “previous employment with the FAA reflect[ed] that [he had] 

already been unsuccessful at a lower level facility.” Id.

On September 16, 2011, the FAA removed Hall for his 

failure to successfully complete the NATTTP. Id. at 68–

70. Hall appealed to the Board. The Administrative 

Judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision affirming the FAA’s 

removal decision. Initial Decision, ¶¶ 2, 15. Hall petitioned for review by the full Board, which affirmed the 

AJ’s finding that the FAA had proven its charge, but 

vacated the AJ’s decision on “nexus and penalty” because 

the AJ failed to address Hall’s affirmative defenses. 

Remand Order, 119 M.S.P.R. at 181–82 & n.2. The Board 

thus remanded the appeal and instructed the AJ to issue 

an initial decision addressing those defenses. Id. at 184.

On remand, the AJ advised Hall of his burden of proving the affirmative defenses and provided the parties with

an opportunity to submit additional evidence and argument. Resp’t’s App. at 52–53, 55–57. In June 2013, the 

AJ issued another initial decision, finding that Hall failed 

to prove each of his affirmative defenses, and again affirmed the FAA’s removal decision. Initial Decision After 

Remand, ¶¶ 2, 5, 15, 17, 20, 23. The AJ rejected Hall’s 

argument that the FAA’s Human Resources Policy Manual EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) required the agency to reassign him to 

a lower level facility, reasoning that:

The provision speaks to situations where an employee who has failed to successfully complete 

training at the “Academy” is reemployed by the 
4 HALL v. TRANSPORTATION

agency. At issue in this appeal is not the appellant’s reemployment. The issue is whether the 

agency had an obligation to reassign the appellant 

to a lower level facility after the appellant failed 

to successfully complete his training at the IAH.

Initial Decision After Remand, at ¶ 15. Moreover, the AJ 

found that Hall failed to show that the FAA was required 

under the collective bargaining agreement to reassign 

Hall to a lower level facility after he failed to successfully 

complete his training. Id. 

Hall again petitioned for review, and the full Board

denied the petition and affirmed the AJ’s 2013 initial

decision, which became the Board’s final decision. Final 

Order, ¶ 1. The Board found that Hall only disagreed 

with the AJ’s factual findings, but failed to show that the 

AJ “made erroneous findings of material fact, erroneously 

interpreted statutes or regulations, or erroneously applied 

the law to the facts of the case.” Id. at ¶ 7. The Board 

specifically determined that the AJ correctly interpreted 

EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) and that it was “inapplicable here because [Hall] was not reemployed by the agency.” Id. 

Hall appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Briggs 

v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). The Board’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence “if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
HALL v. TRANSPORTATION 5

conclusion.” Brewer v. U.S. Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 1093, 

1096 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Board’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo. 

Salmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 663 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2011).

Hall argues that the AJ misinterpreted EMP 1.14, 

¶ 6(e) and that the full Board misconstrued the AJ’s 

decision. According to Hall, EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) applies in 

his case because the FAA rehired him in Houston after he 

left his position in Puerto Rico. Hall asserts that 

EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) requires the FAA to reassign a rehired 

employee to a lower level facility. He maintains, moreover, that he resigned from the position in Puerto Rico for 

personal reasons, and that the Board erred in finding that 

he was a “training failure.” Reply Br. 2. Finally, Hall 

contends that the Board erred because it did not specifically address each of his affirmative defenses in the final 

order.

The government responds that the Board correctly determined that the FAA had no obligation to assign Hall to 

a lower level facility and that the FAA acted reasonably in 

declining to reassign Hall after he failed to complete the 

required training. According to the government, 

EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) is inapplicable to an FAA employee at 

the removal stage. The government also responds that 

the record shows that Hall did not resign, but was terminated from his position in Puerto Rico after “multiple 

safety related performance deficiencies.” Resp’t’s Br. 11. 

Finally, the government responds that the AJ correctly 

found that Hall failed to prove any of his affirmative 

defenses, and that the full Board properly adopted the 

thorough findings of the AJ in its final order. 

We agree with the government and the Board that 

EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) does not apply in determining whether 

the FAA must reassign Hall to a lower level facility when 
6 HALL v. TRANSPORTATION

removing him from his position in Houston. EMP 1.14, 

¶ 6(e) provides that:

Former Performance Verification failures at the 

Academy may not reenter the ATCS occupation 

above the FG-1 level or the current entry-level 

rate; successful completion of the initial qualifications training course is mandatory. Former facility failures (at any phase of field training), if 

rehired, must be assigned to a lower level or less 

complex facility than the one in which previously 

employed. 

Resp’t’s App. at 79. That provision applies when the FAA 

rehires a former employee, providing guidance to the 

agency on the placement of the newly rehired employee, 

not when, as in this case, the FAA removes an employee. 

Contrary to Hall’s assertions, the AJ’s and the full 

Board’s decisions were not based on whether he was 

“rehired” or whether he was an “Academy” failure or a 

“facility” failure. Pet’r’s Br. 3. Rather, the record shows 

that the AJ correctly concluded that EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) did 

not apply to Hall’s circumstances because his reemployment was not at issue, but rather his removal for failure 

to complete the required training. Initial Decision After 

Remand, ¶ 15. The full Board agreed with the AJ that 

EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) is “inapplicable” in this case. Final 

Order, at ¶ 7. We find no error in that conclusion. 

We also reject Hall’s allegation of “harmful procedural 

error” for his employment in Houston after his prior 

unsuccessful employment at a lower level facility in 

Puerto Rico. Pet’r’s Br. 3, 10–19. To the extent that Hall 

asserts that under EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) the FAA should not 

have hired him in Houston, we find that Hall failed to 

establish how that alleged error prejudiced his rights in 

the removal proceeding at issue here. 
HALL v. TRANSPORTATION 7

Moreover, we agree with the government that the full 

Board did not err in adopting the AJ’s decision without 

specifically discussing all of Hall’s affirmative defenses. 

The AJ’s decision analyzed and rejected each of Hall’s 

affirmative defenses. In denying Hall’s petition for review, the full Board correctly found that “[t]he record 

evidence and the applicable law support the administrative judge’s explained findings.” Final Order, ¶ 8. The 

full Board thus had no obligation to “reinvent the wheel” 

in a final decision because the AJ had properly and fully 

addressed the issues in an initial decision. Gonzales v. 

Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s affirmance of the FAA’s decision to remove Hall for failure 

to successfully complete the NATTTP, and the Board did 

not otherwise err, we affirm its decision.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Hall’s remaining arguments but 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

decision of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.