N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

QUINCY D. HALL, Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP ORTATION, Respondent

______________________

2015

- 3011

______________________ Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. DA

- 0752

- 12

- 0006 -B- 1.

______________________

Decided: April 8, 2015

______________________ Q UINCY D. H ALL , Houston, TX, pro se.

D ANIEL S. H ERZFELD , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by J OYCE R. B RANDA , R OBERT E. K IRSCHMAN , J R ., F RANKLIN E. W HITE , J R

.

______________________
Before L OURIE , T ARANTO , and H UGHES , Circuit Judges.HALL v. TRANSPORTATION 2

P ER C URIAM

. Quincy D. Hall (“Hall”) appeals from the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) affir ming the decision by the Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administra tion ( the “FAA”) to remove him from the position of air traffic control specialist at the Housto n Intercontinental Tower

. See Hall v. Dep’t of Transp. , No. DA

- 0752

- 12

- 0006 -B- 1, 2014 WL 5338879 (M.S.P.B. July 10, 2014) (“ Final Order ”); Hall v. Dep’t of Transp. , No. DA

- 0752

- 12

- 0006 -B- 1, 2013 WL 6384048 (M.S.P.B. June 6, 2013) (“ Initial Decision A fter Remand ”); Hall v. Dep’t of Transp. , 119 M.S.P.R. 180 (2013) (“ R emand Order ”); Hall v. Dep’t of Transp. , No. DA

- 0752

- 12

- 0006 -I- 1, 2012 WL 543856 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 31, 2012) (“ In itial Decision ”). Because the Board ’s decision contained no error of law, and its factual determinations were suppor ted by substantial evidence , we affirm

. B ACKGROUND In September 2006, Hall began employment with the FAA at the San Juan air t raffic control tower in Puerto Rico. In July 2007, the FAA terminated his employment during his probationary period. The FAA noted that Hall “continue[d] to have multiple safety related performance deficiencies at the Flight Data/Clearance Delivery pos it ion despite recent skill enhancement and remedial training

, ” and that his employment would not “promote the efficiency of the service.” Resp ’t’s App. at 60.
In September 2008, Hall entered the FAA’s National Air Traffic Technical Training Program (“NATTTP ”) to certify as an air traffic control specialist at the Houston Intercontinental Tower . Hall’s training was terminated in October 2010 due to his failure to successfully complete the Local Control phase of the progra m. On August 12, 2011, the FAA issued a notice proposing to remove Hall from employment for his failure to complete the required training and denied his request for placement at a lowerHALL v. TRANSPORTATION 3

level facility

. Id. at 63

– 65. The FAA’s Air Traffic Mana ger explained that Hall was “a developmental employee who ha[d] failed to progress” in the training program

, and that he did not qualify for placement at a lower level facility under the FAA’s Human Resources Policy Manual EMP 1.14. Id. The m anager also stated that Hall had not “exhibited suffic ient skills to be recommended for plac ement at another lower level facility

, ” and that his “prev ious employment with the FAA reflect[ed] that [he had] already been unsuccessful at a lower level facility .” Id.
On September 16, 2011, the FAA removed Hall fo r his failure to successfully complete the NATTTP. Id. at 68

– 70. Ha ll appealed to the Board. The Administrative J udge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision affirming the FAA’s removal decision. Initial Decision , ¶¶ 2, 15. Hall pet itioned for review by the full Board, which affirmed the AJ’s finding that the FAA had proven its charge, but vacated the AJ’s decision on “nexus and penalty” because the AJ failed to address Hall’s affirmative defenses. Remand Order

, 119 M.S.P.R. at 181

– 82 & n.2. The Board thus remanded the appeal and instructed the AJ to issue an initial decision addressing those defenses. Id. at 184. On remand, the AJ advised Hall of his burden of pro ving the affirmative defenses and provided the parties with an opportunity to submit additional evidence and arg ument. Resp ’t’s App. at 52

– 53, 55

– 57. In June 2013, the AJ issued an other initial decision, finding that Hall failed to prove each of his affirmative defenses, and again a ffirmed the FAA’s removal decision. Initial Decision A fter Rema nd , ¶¶ 2, 5, 15, 17, 20, 23. The AJ rejected Hall’s argument that the FAA’s Human Resources Policy Man ual EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) required the agency to reassign him to a lower level facility

, reasoning that:
The provision speaks to situations where an e mployee who has failed to successfully complete training at the “Academy” is reemployed by theHALL v. TRANSPORTATION 4

agency. At issue in this appeal is not the appe llant’s reemployment. The issue is whether the agency had an obligation to reassign the appe l lant to a lower level facility after the appellant failed to successfully complete his training at the IAH.

Initial Decision A fter Remand

, at ¶ 15. Moreover, t he AJ found that Hall failed to show that the FAA was required under the collective bargaining agreement to reassign Hall to a lower level facility after he failed to successfully complete his training. Id.

Hall again petitioned for review

, and t he full Board deni e d the petition and affirmed the AJ’s 2013 initial decision, which became the Board’s final decision. Final Or der , ¶ 1. The Board found that Hall only disagreed with the AJ’s factual findings, but failed to show that the AJ “made erroneous findings of material fact, erroneously interpreted statutes or regulations, or erroneously applied the law to the facts of th e case.” Id. at ¶ 7. The Board specifically determined that the AJ correctly interpreted EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) and that it was “inapplicable here b ecause [Hall] was not reemployed by the agency.” Id.
Hall appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction u nder 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

D ISCUSSION The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board d ecision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s dec ision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Board’s decisio n is supported by substantial evidence “if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aHALL v. TRANSPORTATION 5

conclusion.” Brewer v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 647 F.2d 1093, 1096 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. The Board’s legal determination s are reviewed de novo

. Salmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin. , 663 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Hall argues that the AJ misinterpreted EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) and that the full Board misconstrued the AJ’s decision. According to Hall, EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) applies in his case because the FAA rehired him in Houston after he left his position in Puerto Rico . Hall asserts that EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) requires the FAA to reassign a rehire d employee to a lower level facility. He maintains, more over, that he resigned from the pos ition in Puerto Rico for personal reasons

, and that the Board erred in finding that he was a “tr aining failure.” Reply Br. 2. Finally, Hall contends that the Board erred because it did not specifically address each of his affirmative defenses in the final order.
The government responds that the Board correctly d etermined that the FAA had no obligat ion to assign Hall to a lower level facility and that the FAA acted reasonably in declining to reassign Hall after he failed to complete the required training . A ccording to the government, EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) is inapplicable to an FAA employee at the removal stage. The government also responds that the record shows that Hall did n ot resign

, but was term inat ed from his position in Puerto Rico after “multiple safety related performance deficiencies.” Resp’t’s Br. 11. Finally, the government responds that the AJ correctly found that Hall failed to prove any of his affirmative defenses, and that the full Board properly adopted the thorough findings of the AJ in its final order

. We agree with the government and the Board that EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) does not apply in d etermining whether the FAA must reassign Hall to a lower level facility whenHALL v. TRANSPORTATION 6

removing him from his position in Houston . EMP 1.14

, ¶ 6(e) provides that:

Former Performance Verification failures at the Academy may not reenter the ATCS occupation above the F G- 1 level or the current entry -level rate; successful completion of the initial qualific ations training course is mandatory. Former facil ity failures (at any phase of field training), if rehired, must be assigned to a lower level or less complex facility than the one in which previously employed.
Resp’t’s App. at 79. That provision applies when the FAA rehires a former employee

, providing guidance to the agency on the placement of the newly rehired employee

, not when, as in this case, the FAA removes an e mployee.

C ontrary to Hall’s assertions, the AJ’s and the full Board’s decisions were not based on whether he was “rehired” or whether he was an “Academy” failure or a “facility” failure. Pet’ r’s Br. 3. Rather, t he record shows that the AJ correctly concluded that EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) did not apply to Hall’s circumstances because his reemplo yment was not at issue , but rather his removal for failure to complete the require d training

. Initial Decision A fter Remand , ¶ 15. The full Bo ard agreed with the AJ that EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) is “inapplicable” in this case. Final Order , at ¶ 7. We find no error in that conclusion

. We also reject Hall’s allegation of “harmful procedural error” for his employment in Houston after his prior unsuccessful employment at a lower lev el facility in Puerto Rico. Pet’ r’s Br. 3, 10

– 19. To the extent that Hall asserts that under EMP 1.14, ¶ 6(e) the FAA shou ld not have hired him in Houston , we find that Hall failed to establish how that alleged error prejudiced his rights in the removal proceed ing at issue here

.HALL v. TRANSPORTATION 7

Moreover, we agree with the government that the full Board did not err in adopting the AJ’s decision without specifically discussing all of Hall’s affirmative defenses. T he AJ’s decision analyzed and rejected each of Hall’s affir mative defenses. In denying Hall’s petition for r eview , the full Board correctly found that “ [t] he record evidence and the applicable law support the administr ative judge’s explained findings .” Final Order , ¶ 8. The full Board thus had no obligation to “reinvent the wheel” in a final deci sion because the AJ had properly and fully addressed the issues in an initial decision. Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency , 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Because s ubstantial evidence supports the Board’s a ffirmance of the FAA’ s decision to remove Hall for failure to successfully complete the NATTTP

, and the Board did not otherwise err, we affirm its deci sion.

C ONCLUSION We have considered Hall’s remaining arguments but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

C OSTS

No c osts.