UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. 

PAULINE BAUER, 

Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cr-00386-2 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

 In a January 2021 bench trial, the Court convicted Pauline Bauer on several charges 

stemming from her participation in the January 6, 2020, riot at the U.S. Capitol. The Court then 

sentenced Bauer to 27 months’ incarceration and 24 months’ supervised release. Bauer now 

moves for a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). She contends that she is eligible 

for the new Adjustment for Certain Zero-Point Offenders, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. If eligible, Bauer 

would shave two levels from her total offense level, giving her an earlier potential release date. 

But the Court concludes that Bauer is ineligible for the § 4C1.1 adjustment because she used 

violence and made credible threats of violence in connection with her offense. And even if 

Bauer did qualify for the adjustment, a sentencing reduction is unwarranted under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). 

I.

The Court briefly recounts the facts of the case based on its findings at the bench trial. 

On January 6, 2020, Bauer traveled to Washington, D.C., to hear Pennsylvania State Senator 

Doug Mastriano speak at a rally. Tr. of Bench Trial/Verdict (Verdict Tr.) at 6, ECF No. 191. 

Bauer and her companions waited for Sen. Mastriano to speak on the east plaza of the Capitol. 
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Id. While she waited, she heard from others in the crowd that Vice President Pence was “going 

to throw President Trump under the bus.” Id. Bauer then saw protesters break through the bike 

racks marking the restricted area around the Capitol. Id. at 7. Bauer joined the riotous mob

streaming towards the Capitol building. Id. She passed police barricades and climbed the 

Capitol steps. Id. at 7. Despite police officers’ attempts to deter her and other rioters, Bauer

forced her way through the Columbus doors on the east front of the Capitol. Id.

Bauer then made her way into the Capitol Rotunda. While there, she yelled repeatedly at 

police officers, demanding that the officers bring out members of Congress, including Speaker 

Nancy Pelosi. Id. at 8. She screamed at the officers, “Bring them out or we’re going in,” “They 

need to hang,” “Bring that fucking bitch out here,” and “We want Nancy Pelosi! That’s who we 

want. Get them all out here!” Id. Based on these incendiary statements, the Court found that 

Bauer was “willing to go to great lengths, including breaking numerous laws and threatening 

physical violence, to stop the certification proceeding.” Id. 

Baur also accosted at least one police officer who was attempting to secure the Rotunda. 

Bauer shoved Officer Travis Coley and yelled, “You back up! Don’t even try,” when he tried to 

move her and other rioters away from the hallway leading to Speaker Pelosi’s suite. Id. at 8–9. 

At trial, Officer Coley testified that Bauer went from being “passive aggressive” to “aggressive.” 

Tr. of Trial vol. 1 (Trial Tr.) at 130, ECF No. 189. When he told her to back up, she “push[ed] 

back against [his] baton” using both hands and told him to “back up.” Id. 

The Court ultimately convicted Bauer on all counts of her indictment. In May 2023, the 

Court sentenced Bauer to 27 months’ incarceration and 24 months’ supervised release and 

ordered her to pay $2,000 in restitution. Judgment 3–7, ECF No. 187. 
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In September 2023, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 821 to the 

Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the Guidelines ranges for certain qualifying defendants. 

Sentencing Guidelines for the U.S. Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 60534-02 (Sept. 1, 2023). The 

Commission determined that Amendment 821 would apply retroactively, effective February 1, 

2024. Id. Bauer believes that Amendment 821 applies to her case. So she filed this motion 

seeking a downward departure based on its retroactive application. Def.’s Mot. for Downward 

Departure (Mot.) at 1–2, ECF No. 192. 

II.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a defendant may move for a reduction in her term of 

imprisonment if she was sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The Court evaluates such a motion in two steps. 

United States v. Wyche, 741 F.3d 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2014). First, the Court determines

whether the defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence and, if so, calculates the amended 

Guidelines range. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010). Second, the Court must 

“consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction 

authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under 

the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. at 827.

A.

First, consider whether Bauer is eligible for a reduced sentence under the amended 

Guidelines. Section 4C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level reduction of the

total offense level if “the defendant did not receive any criminal history points” and meets 

several other eligibility criteria. U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(1). Since Bauer did not receive any 
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criminal history points, the only remaining criterion here is that “the defendant did not use 

violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense.” Id. § 4C1.1(a)(3). 

Bauer argues that she “did not use violence or credible threats of violence” when she 

entered restricted Capitol grounds and obstructed the certification of the Electoral College vote. 

The Court disagrees. While rioting in the Capitol Rotunda, Bauer both used violence when she 

shoved Officer Coley and made credible threats of violence when she incited the mob to “hang” 

Speaker Pelosi. So Bauer is ineligible for the two-level reduction under § 4C1.1.

For starters, Bauer “use[d] violence” when she shoved Officer Coley. Id. § 4C1.1(a)(3). 

In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court applies the ordinary tools of statutory 

interpretation and looks to the plain meaning of its terms. United States v. Seefried, 639 F. Supp. 

3d 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2022). To discern plain meaning, the Court looks to the Guidelines’ own 

definitions, or to dictionaries when no definitions are provided. See Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 

F.3d 475, 485–87 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (relying on dictionaries to determine plain meaning); United 

States v. Pineda-Duarte, 933 F.3d 519, 523 (6th Cir. 2019) (“In considering that plain language, 

we might ordinarily start by looking to the definition of ‘violence’ assigned by the Sentencing 

Commission.”). The Court also looks to precedent to see how other courts have interpreted 

similar words or phrases. See Seefried, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 10. 

The Sentencing Guidelines do not define what it means to “use violence.” So the Court 

turns to dictionaries to fill the gap. Contemporary dictionaries define “violence” as “[t]he use of 

physical force,” typically “accompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage” and “unlawfully 

exercised with the intent to harm.” Violence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see 

Pineda-Duarte, 933 F.3d at 523 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary for definition of “violence” in 
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interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1). Or, similarly, “violence” is the “exertion of any physical force 

so as to injure or abuse.” Violence, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993).1

Baur’s conduct falls within the plain meaning of “violence.” Though the use of violence 

or physical force was not an element of any crime of conviction, the Court noted in its verdict 

announcement that Bauer “shoved” a police officer. Verdict Tr. at 8. It also credited Officer 

Coley who testified that Bauer “be[came] aggressive” and pushed against his baton using both 

hands while telling him to “back up.” Trial Tr. at 130. 

In her Motion, Bauer characterizes her use of force against Officer Coley as “slight.” 

Mot. at 4. She also argues that it was a “pure reaction to being pushed by Officer [Coley]” and 

that she lacked the requisite “intent to harm.” Id. The Court disagrees. Bauer “aggressive[ly]” 

pushed Officer Coley’s baton, while also yelling at him “[f]uck you, you fucking bitch.” Trial 

Tr. at 130. Bauer’s vehement tone and abusive language emphasized the seriousness of her 

physical actions against him. Indeed, Bauer’s companion, William Blauser, had to restrain 

Bauer from further interacting with Officer Coley. Sentencing Tr. at 52. This undermines any 

claim that her use of force against Officer Coley was an “immediate reaction” rather than an 

1

 The Supreme Court has provided extensive guidance on what constitutes “the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” when 

determining whether a predicate offense is a “crime of violence” under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (ACCA). See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 854 (2022) (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)). Neither party argues that the Court’s doctrine defining “crime of 

violence” under ACCA applies to § 4C1.1(a)(3). Nor has any court interpreted § 2D1.1(b)(2)’s 

enhancement for defendants who “used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or 

directed the use of violence” as analogous to “crime[s] of violence” under ACCA. See, e.g.,

Pineda-Duarte, 933 F.3d at 523. If the Sentencing Commission had intended for § 4C1.1 to 

adopt ACCA’s requirements, it would have done so explicitly, as it has for other provisions in 

the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) (establishing that “crime[s] of violence” constitute a 

Grade A violation of supervised release conditions); id. § 4B1.2 (incorporating the definition of 

“crime of violence” from 18 U.S.C. § 924). The Court thus will not turn to ACCA case law in 

determining the meaning of “use violence.”
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aggressive confrontation. See Mot. at 4. In short, Bauer’s use of force was not “slight.” Rather, 

she used force accompanied by fury and vehemence with the intent to harm or abuse Officer 

Coley.

But Bauer is ineligible for a reduction for another reason. Even setting aside whether she

used violence against Officer Coley, the Court concludes that Bauer made credible threats of 

violence against members of Congress, including Speaker Pelosi. Once again, the Guidelines do 

not define “credible threats of violence.” Nor has the Circuit attempted a definition. See United 

States v. Johnson, 64 F.4th 1348, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“Our court has yet to determine what 

constitutes a ‘threat to use violence’ for purposes of [U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)].”). So the Court 

turns to dictionaries to discern the plain meaning of the Guidelines’ text. See Seefried, 639 F.

Supp. 3d at 10. Contemporary dictionaries define “credible” as “[c]apable of being credited or 

believed.” Credible, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993). Meanwhile, “threat”

is defined as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another,” Threat, 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993), or as “a declaration, express or implied, of 

an intent to inflict loss or pain on another,” Threat, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 

Combining these definitions, a “credible threat of violence” is a believable expression of an 

intention to use physical force to inflict harm.

The Court concludes that Bauer made credible threats of violence when she screamed,

“We want Nancy Pelosi, that’s who we want” and “Bring them out! You bring them out or 

we’re coming in!” Verdict Tr. at 8. Bauer also explicitly threatened violence when she yelled, 

“Bring Nancy Pelosi out here now! We want to hang that fucking bitch! Bring her out!” Final 

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 30, ECF No. 181. 
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Bauer does not contest that these statements constituted a threat of violence, but she 

argues that they were not credible threats because she “did not have the ability at the time of the 

offense to carry out her threat due to the numerous officers guarding the corridor.” Mot. at 4. 

But courts look to “contextual evidence” to determine whether a threat was credible. Johnson, 

64 F.4th at 1352. And here, Bauer was not facing a wall of police officers on her own. She was

joined by many rioters who had crossed police lines into a restricted area and had even forced 

officers to temporarily retreat. PSR ¶ 9. Her loud and vehement calls for violence encouraged 

other rioters to pick up the call and added to the danger of a dynamic situation. 

Given this context, the outnumbered police officers in the Rotunda—and any legislators

within earshot—would have reasonably believed that Bauer’s violent threats meant that she

would harm them, possibly with the aid of fellow rioters. As a participant in a violent mob, 

Bauer cannot claim that her threats to “hang” Nancy Pelosi were like a clanging cymbal. This is 

especially so given that Bauer and other rioters were only a few steps from Speaker Pelosi’s 

office—a fact the Court noted in imposing its sentence. Sentencing Tr. at 51. And no matter if

Bauer could have—or would have—hanged Speaker Pelosi, the circumstances make it clear that

her threats were not “innocent hyperbole.” See United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 83 

(2d Cir. 2018) (finding no clear error in application of two-level enhancement when defendant

claimed violent threats were “mere puffery”). Rather, the Court reiterates that her shocking and 

violent threats went beyond “idle talk.” Sentencing Tr. at 51; cf. Johnson, 64 F.4th at 1352 (“[A]

threat is a threat, even if the speaker never intends to carry it out.”). A mob is dangerous in part 

because it can quickly escalate into violent actions that no member of the mob would have or 

could have attempted alone. Bauer’s vicious shouts poured gasoline into this combustible 
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environment. By egging on the riotous mob, Bauer made credible threats of violence against

police officers and members of Congress. 

Last, beyond her specific threats to harm Speaker Pelosi and others, the Government 

argues that Bauer is ineligible for an adjustment under § 4C1.1 based on her mere participation 

in the Capitol riot. The Court is unpersuaded. The text of § 4C1.1 specifies that the “defendant

did not use violence or credible threats of violence.” The Court must therefore evaluate a

defendant’s conduct in determining eligibility for a § 4C1.1 adjustment. It cannot simply impute 

the “use of violence” to a defendant based on the actions of others. 

True, other judges in this district have noted that each individual rioter contributed to the 

disruption of congressional proceedings on January 6. See United States v. Rivera, 607 F. Supp. 

3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2022). But it does not follow that individuals who trespassed and impeded the 

certification of the Electoral College vote are also responsible for the conduct of the most violent 

and egregious rioters. As the Circuit explained regarding pretrial detention, January 6 rioters 

“who actually assaulted police officers and broke through windows, doors, and barricades . . . 

are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence or entered 

the Capitol after others cleared the way.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1284 (D.C. 

Cir. 2021).

So too here. Just as a district court must examine with particularity whether a defendant 

presents an “articulable threat to an individual or the community” for the purpose of pretrial

detention, it must also evaluate with particularity whether the defendant used violence or made 

credible threats of violence. Cf. United States v. Hernandez-Barajas, 71 F.4th 1104, 1106 (8th 

Cir. 2023) (explaining that under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2), “[t]he defendant is the one who must 

make the credible threat, even if it involves the potential use of violence by someone else”). In 
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contrast, by the Government’s logic, the Court should apply a “physical contact” specific offense 

characteristic to any defendant convicted of obstructing or impeding officers in their official 

duties, even if the defendant never made physical contact with a police officer. But, 

unsurprisingly, courts in this district have not done so. See, e.g., United States v. Sheppard, No. 

21-cr-203, 2024 WL 127016, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2024). The Court thus declines to adopt the 

Government’s broad guilt-by-association interpretation of § 4C1.1.

The defendant bears the burden in seeking a sentencing reduction under § 4C1.1. See 

United States v. Keleta, 552 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Some January 6 rioters may qualify 

for a § 4C1.1 reduction if they demonstrate their participation was non-violent. But Bauer has 

not met that burden. Because Bauer both used violence and made credible threats of violence in 

connection with the offense, she is not eligible for a two-point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. 

The Court’s original guideline determination of 21 to 27 months remains appropriate.

B.

Even assuming Bauer was eligible for a reduced sentence under § 4C1.1, the § 3553(a)

factors weigh against any reduction.

As the Court noted at sentencing, there are several aggravating factors here. First, in the 

early stages of this case, Bauer refused to comply with her pretrial release conditions. 

Sentencing Tr. at 53. And when the Court ordered that she be detained, Bauer had to be 

“literally dragged screaming out of the courtroom.” Id. 

More, at trial Bauer repeatedly perjured herself on the stand. At sentencing, the Court 

found that Bauer “offered demonstrably false explanations for her criminal conduct on January 

6.” Sentencing Tr. at 9. For example, Baur claimed to be ignorant of the Electoral College 

certification process. But several Facebook posts and text messages presented at trial showed 
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she was “aware that Speaker Pelosi had a role in the certification process” and that she had a 

“general understanding that certification was happening at the Capitol on January 6.” Id. at 9. 

Bauer also testified that she believed certification was over by the time she reached the Rotunda.

But on January 6, she sent a text saying she knew the process had not been completed. Id.

Finally, Bauer claimed that she demanded members of Congress come out to the Rotunda for 

“crimes against humanity” relating to COVID. Id. The Court, however, found this incredible 

given the clear evidence that Bauer entered the Rotunda to disrupt the Electoral College 

certification process. Id. In sum, the Court concluded that Bauer showed a “disrespect for the 

governing institutions of this country that [it] could not ignore.” Id. at 53. 

The Court’s authority to reduce a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) is 

unambiguously discretionary. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827 (“[Section] 3582(c)(2) instructs a 

court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the 

reduction . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.”). 

So even if Bauer qualified for a two-level reduction under § 4C1.1, the Court still would vary 

upward based on the aggravating factors discussed above. The Court found previously that a 

sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment and 24 months’ supervised release is necessary to achieve 

the purposes outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Nothing Bauer argues here changes that 

conclusion.
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III.

For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s [192] Motion for Downward 

Variance is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: January 29, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.