Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 

and Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

JIMMY R. COLLINS, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 950648 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 January 12, 1996 

BILLY FULLER, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY 

James C. Roberson, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 

erroneously restricted the method of using an express right of 

way. 

 This case involves the interpretation and location of an 

express right of way contained in a deed for land purchased by 

Jimmy R. and Maggie S. Collins (collectively, Collins). 

Collins' property was part of a tract partitioned in 1883 into 

two lots, Lot 4 and Lot 5. The partition order granted Lot 4 

to Bettie V. Edwards. The grant included an express right of 

way described as follows: "with right of way to the spring." 

The spring was located on Lot 5. 

 Collins purchased approximately 10 acres of Lot 4 in 1983. 

 The deed recited that the purchase also included "all water 

rights and privileges and right of way which was assigned to 

Bettie V. Edwards in connection with the said tract of land in 

the division of the real estate of her father, James S. 

Edwards." The portion of Lot 4 purchased by Collins was 

adjacent to Lot 5. At that time, Lot 5 was owned by J.C. and 

Bonnie Fuller. 

 In 1992, J.C. and Bonnie Fuller conveyed a .75 acre 

portion of Lot 5 adjacent to Collins' property to their son 
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Billy. The portion conveyed did not include the spring but did 

include a house. Billy and his wife, Gina, began renovating 

the house by extending the back of it. At the same time, 

Collins sought to utilize the right of way, crossing Billy's 

land just behind his house to get to the spring located on J.C. 

and Bonnie Fuller's land. 

 Billy and Gina Fuller filed a bill of complaint alleging 

that Collins was engaged in a continuing trespass. The Fullers 

sought an injunction prohibiting Collins from traveling across 

the property and requiring Collins to lay a pipeline across 

land owned by J.C. and Bonnie Fuller to access the spring. 

After viewing the property and considering the evidence and 

arguments of counsel, the trial court entered a final decree 

holding that Collins had a right of way to the spring "no 

greater than (20) feet north of the J.C. Fuller and Billy 

Fuller boundary line then in a straight line to the spring." 

The trial court also limited the use of the right of way to 

"laying and maintaining a water line to the spring with a 

right-of-way of 10 feet to make the necessary repairs on said 

water line." Collins' motion for reconsideration was denied. 

We awarded Collins an appeal. 

 The parties agree that Collins' 1983 deed expressly 

granted the right to use the water from the spring and a right 

of way to access the spring. The issue here is whether the 

trial court could limit the method of using the right of way to 
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laying and maintaining a water pipe to transport water from the 

spring to Collins' property. We conclude that the limitation 

imposed by the trial court was error. 

 The applicable legal principle was stated in Cushman Corp. 

v. Barnes, 204 Va. 245, 253, 129 S.E.2d 633, 639-40 (1963): 

 When a right of way is granted over land . . . 

and the instrument creating the easement does not 

limit the use to be made thereof, it may be used for 

any purpose to which the dominant estate may then, or 

in the future, reasonably be devoted. This rule is 

subject to the qualification that no use may be made 

of the right of way, different from that established 

at the time of its creation, which imposes an 

additional burden upon the servient estate. 

In this case, the only limitation on the right of way contained 

in the granting language is that the right of way be used to 

access the spring. There is no evidence of prior use of the 

right of way. Therefore, we find no basis to impose a 

limitation on the method which may be used in accessing the 

spring.*

 Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the trial 

court's decree restricting the use of the right of way to the 

laying and maintaining of a water line and remand the case for 

 

 *Collins also assigned error to the location of the right 

of way because it "is extremely rocky terrain, and will require 

the defendants to spend approximately $10,000.00 to install" a 

water line. At oral argument, however, counsel for Collins 

clarified this issue, stating that the trial court "has 

discretion as to the location of the easement" and "[t]he error 

in the location is only an error if it's tied into the water 

line." In light of this clarification, we will not address the 

location of the easement. 
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any further proceedings that may be required consistent with 

this opinion. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded.