United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Thomas Haynes, Plaintiff,

v.

Carnival Corporation, Defendant.

)

)

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)

)

Civil Action No. 20-21921-Civ-Scola

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

This maritime action arises from damages Plaintiff Thomas Haynes

sustained when he was injured while a passenger aboard the Carnival Glory, a 

cruise ship owned and operated by Defendant Carnival Corporation

(“Carnival”). (Am. Compl. (“complaint”), ECF No. 11 at ¶¶ 9-10.) The complaint 

asserts two counts. Count I is for Negligent Maintenance and Count II is for 

Negligent Failure to Warn. Carnival moved to dismiss, Haynes filed a response, 

and Carnival filed a reply. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 14; Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 15; 

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19.) After careful consideration, the Court agrees with the 

Plaintiff and denies the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14.) 

1. Background1

Haynes was injured aboard the Carnival Glory on or about May 9, 2019, 

“when he slipped on water or a wet, foreign or transitory substance and 

thereby fell” while “entering the interior of the ship by the guest services deck 

from an exterior doorway leading to Deck 3 . . . .” (ECF No. 11 at ¶11.) The 

complaint alleges that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the 

dangerous condition (i.e., the water or slippery substance) because Carnival 

“has had a recurring issue involving the appearance of wet, foreign or 

transitory substances such as condensation appearing on the interior of 

outside to inside doorways on this and other ships in its fleet.” (Id. at ¶12.) The 

complaint also alleges that Carnival knew of this “recurring issue” because it is 

“discussed repeatedly” in its “internal documents such as its meeting minutes, 

guest and crew accident summaries, safety focus group meeting minutes, and 

elsewhere . . . .” (Id.) Indeed, Carnival has attempted to address this issue 

through the installation of “Air Cushions” in doorway areas, but that system 

has not been effective and water or a slippery substance continues to 

accumulate in outdoor-indoor doorways. (Id.) Finally, the complaint also alleges 

1 The Court accepts Haynes’s factual allegations as true for the purposes of evaluating Carnival’s

motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th 

Cir. 1997).

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that the tile floor surface used in the outdoor-indoor doorways “has been 

documented as being below the minimum acceptable standards for passenger 

safety in the marine environment, which has led to” numerous accidents. (Id.

at ¶13.)

2. Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all the complaint’s allegations as 

true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. 

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). A pleading must only contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, the Court is bound 

to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, 

the complaint “must . . . contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna 

Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive issue 

of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of 

action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall 

Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claims if 

he fails to nudge his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive 

dismissal. See Id. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure 

from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not 

unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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3. Analysis

“To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 

defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury, (2) the 

defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach actually and proximately caused 

the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Guevara v. NCL 

(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). “With 

respect to the duty element in a maritime context, a shipowner owes the duty 

of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel.” Id. 

(quotations omitted). To prevail on a negligence or failure-to-warn claim with 

respect to a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “had 

actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition, at least where, as 

here, the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked 

to nautical adventure.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted); Keefe v. 

Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring 

notice with respect to a duty-to-warn claim); Horne v. Carnival Corp., 741 Fed. 

App’x 607, 609 (11th Cir. 2018) (requiring notice with respect to a failure-tomaintain claim).

Notice pleading does not require the pleader to allege a “specific fact” to 

cover every element or to plead “with precision” each element of a claim;

instead, it requires a complaint to “contain either direct or inferential 

allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery 

under some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 

F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the motion to dismiss makes generic 

arguments for the proposition that Carnival lacked notice of the dangerous 

condition. For example, in the motion, Carnival argues that the complaint’s 

notice allegations are made “without any factual support or basis . . . .” (ECF 

No. 14 at 4.) But that is not so. The complaint specifically describes a 

phenomenon whereby the floor area surrounding outdoor-indoor doorways

accumulates condensation (presumably a result of the meeting between air 

conditioned air and humid outdoor air) and that Carnival personnel has 

discussed this issue “repeatedly” in its “meeting minutes, guest and crew 

accident summaries, safety focus group meeting minutes, and elsewhere . . . .” 

(ECF No. 11 at ¶12.) Carnival might later be able to show that none of that is 

true, but the Court cannot credit Carnival’s arguments that are made as if 

none of that is even alleged. The complaint sufficiently alleges notice. See 

Caldwell v. Carnival Corp., 944 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Cooke, 

J.) (holding that allegations that slippery condition of a walkway was an 

"ongoing, recurring, continuous and/or repetitive problem" were sufficient to 

allege Carnival's constructive notice of the condition).

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Count I, for negligent maintenance, adequately states a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Carnival does not dispute that it had a duty to 

take reasonable steps to maintain the floor surface. The complaint plainly 

alleges that the floor area around the outdoor-indoor doorways accumulates 

moisture and is covered in floor tiles that are unreasonably slippery. (ECF No. 

11 at ¶13.) This is not a matter of a few raindrops, a randomly spilled drink, or 

water splashed from a nearby swimming pool. According to the complaint, this 

is a chronic issue on the Carnival Glory and other Carnival ships. Moreover, in 

support of Haynes’s claim that Carnival negligently maintained the doorway 

area, the complaint specifically alleges that Carnival installed doorway air 

cushions that were ineffective and failed to adequately remedy the 

accumulation of dangerous moisture on the slippery doorway surface. Carnival 

does not dispute that the accumulation of moisture on slippery tiles caused 

Haynes to slip and suffer injuries. Rather, Carnival claims that the “Plaintiff 

has zero basis for asserting the subject floor is slippery just because it was 

allegedly wet, and the existence of an incident alone is insufficient.” (ECF No. 

14 at 5.) Carnival again mischaracterizes Haynes’s allegations. Haynes 

specifically describes a slippery substance that accumulated atop slippery floor 

tiles and caused him—and “numerous passenger[s] and crew” members—to 

have accidents. (ECF No. 11 at ¶13.)

Count II, for negligent failure to warn, also adequately states a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. “A cruise line owes its passengers a duty to 

warn of known dangers beyond the point of debarkation in places where 

passengers are invited or reasonably expected to visit.” Caldwell v. Carnival 

Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222–23 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Cooke, J.) (citations 

omitted). The duty to warn “encompasses only dangers of which the carrier 

knows, or reasonably should have known.” McLaren v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 

No. 11–23924, 2012 WL 1792632, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2012) (Altonaga, J.) 

(citation omitted). Thus, to survive Carnival’s motion to dismiss, Haynes must 

allege facts demonstrating that it was “plausible” that Carnival “[knew] or 

reasonably should have known” of the slippery nature of the doorway area. Id.

The Court has already found that the complaint adequately alleges that

Carnival knew that the outdoor-indoor doorway areas were prone to slippery 

moisture accumulation on slippery floor tiles. The Court now finds that Haynes 

has adequately stated a claim for negligent failure to warn as, according to the 

complaint, Carnival did not place “signage or markings,” nor were warnings 

“orally delivered or written . . . .” (ECF No. 11 at ¶24.) Again, the motion to 

dismiss falls short. For example, Carnival claims that the complaint “fails to 

allege any facts regarding . . . the location of the wet, foreign or transitory 

substance.” (ECF No. 19 at 4.) That is a misrepresentation of the contents of 

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the complaint. The complaint expressly states that Haynes’s injury occurred

when he “was entering the interior of the ship by the guest services deck from

an exterior doorway leading to Deck 3 . . . .” (ECF No. 11 at ¶11.) The motion to 

dismiss constructs a straw man and fights it hard, but it does not

acknowledge—much less grapple with—the contents of the complaint.

4. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Carnival’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 14).

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida on December 29, 2020.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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