COVER: A painting by Co/Peter M. "Mike"

Gish depicts a CH-46E from the Black

Knights of HMM-264 delivers relief supplies

to a Kurdish refugee camp in northern Iraq

during Operations Provide Comfort. In

March 1991, more than 760,000 Kurds fled

into the rugged Taurus Mountains of Eastern

Turkey and Northern Iraq to avoid the wrath

of Saddam Hussein.
Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991

WITH MARINES IN

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1995
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991

U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: Anthology and Annotated

Bibliography, 1991

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the

I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Stor,n, 1993

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the

1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1993

U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the

2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1993

In Preparation

With the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm

PCN 19000316500

II
Foreword

This monograph tells the story of more than 3,600 U.S. Marines who

supported Operation Provide Comfort, an international relief effort in northern

Iraq from 7 April to 15 July 1991. The term "monograph" was carefully chosen.

This short work does not purport to tell the entire story of Operation Provide

Comfort, but focuses on Marine activities and contributions. The author presents

historical glimpses of the Kurds, modern Iraq, and non-Marine activities only to

provide necessary background information. This monograph is not an exhaustive

analysis of the operation nor does it try to define Provide Comfort's place in the

diplomatic history of the Middle East.

The U.S. Marines have continued a long tradition of humanitarian relief

operations. Assistance during the San Francisco earthquake, Hurricane Hugo,

and Operations Sea Angel and Fiery Vigil, and Restore Hope are but a few

recent examples of these efforts. Provide Comfort was another such operation.

In less than three months allied forces created a safe haven in northern Iraq,

provided emergency food and medical aid, moved more than 750,000 refugees

back to their homeland, and helped them reestablish normal lives. Marines were

among the first Americans to deploy, and then were among the last to leave

northern Iraq. During that time the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable) operated more than 500 miles from its sea base, the farthest

inland a Marine expeditionary unit had ever been deployed. A purpose of this

monograph is to show how the success of Operation Provide Comfort can serve

as a case study for future humanitarian operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown has been a member of Mobilization

Training Unit (Historical) DC-7 since its inception in 1976. This unit, composed

of specially skilled reservists, augments the activities of the Marine Corps

Historical Center. Members include historians, artists, and museum experts.

Each member is assigned a suitable historical project. Additionally, members

practice fieldcraft and test division doctrine by participating in major exercises

or deployments. However, the ultimate purpose of the MTU has been to provide

historians for combat and contigency operations. It was envisioned that teams

of historians and artists would be called to active duty and assigned to major

Marine commands should such a contingency arise. This plan was first tested

during Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) and was validated during Operations

Desert Storm and Provide Comfort.

Lieutenant Colonel Brown, a history teacher in civilian life, was an infantry

officer in Vietnam. Formerly executive officer of MTU(HIST) DC-7, he is also

the author of A Brief History of the 14th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Brown

was sent to Saudi Arabia in 1991, where he served as deputy command historian,

then later, command historian, I Marine Expeditionary Force. He volunteered

to cover Operation Provide Comfort. He was joined at Zakho, Iraq, by Colonel

Peter M. "Mike" Gish, a retired reservist famous for his work as an artist. The

results of their efforts were combined to produce this monograph.

111
This work is one of an experimental series about U.S. Marine operations in

the Persian Gulf. Each monograph will be written by historians who actually

participated in the events described. It is hoped that those who walked the

ground and smelled the powder can provide insights sometimes lost when history

is written from the official records many years later. It is recognized that these

monographs will have informational gaps and lack the detailed panorama

provided by the passage of time. Therefore, they are viewed as preliminary

works that eventually will be incorporated into a more complete official history.

Lieutenant Colonel Brown completed this monograph immediately after his return

from the combat zone, before many official records had been submitted and prior

to publication of most secondary works about Operation Provide Comfort.

Therefore, in the interests of accuracy and objectivity, we welcome comments

on this monograph from interested individuals.

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

iv
Preface

This monograph tells the story of the U.S. Marine deployment in support of

Operation Provide Comfort from April to July 1991. As part of an international

humanitarian intervention force, U.S. Marines played a major role in almost

every aspect of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: the 24th MEU (SOC)

and CMAGTF 1-91 operated from forward bases at Silopi, Turkey, and

throughout northern Iraq; Marines served as staff officers at Zakho, Silopi, and

Incirlik; 24th MEU (SOC) rear parties remained with Phibron 8 at Iskenderum

Harbor; and FMFEur (Designate) Marines provided long-distance direct support

from Germany and England.

This monograph relies heavily on primary sources, mostly •the author's

observations and the first-hand testimony of participants, to capture the emotions

and perceptions of the moment, what historians call the "climate of the times."

No single source does a better job of capturing this climate than the art work of

Colonel Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR (Ret), whose paintings illustrate this

monograph. Colonel Gish is a great campaigner, a good friend, and a fine artist.

My way into northern Iraq was smoothed by the careful ministrations of

Major Charles V. Mugno and the assistance of Senior Master Sergeant Thomas

L. Robb, USAF; Staff Sergeant Thomas A. Trayor, USAF; and Staff Sergeant

Marie Y. Hererra, USAF, of the Combined Task Force History Office. In the

field, Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, gave me excellent guidance

and opened many doors. Colonel James L. Jones Jr., USMC, and the staff of the

24th MEU (SOC) made me a part of the team and were never too busy to help.

My thanks also to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Byrtus and the Black Knights

of HMM-264 for their time and taxi service. Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Kohl

(MSSG-24) was a gracious host and a fine comrade whose company I enjoyed

immensely. The staff of MSSG-24 was very helpful to me and the best friends

one could have, especially Mongo, Jake, Harley Bob, the Rate, and Doctor No.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bailey and Contingency MAGTF 1-91

enthusiastically provided everything I requested and more. It was a great surprise

to find Captain Wayne 0. Ouzts--an old pal from Desert Storm--at Incirlik, ready

to buy a broke friend his first libatious refreshment after so many months in the

desert.

I owe a special salute to the combat historians of MTU(HIST) DC-7 who

served during Desert Storm: Colonel Charles J. Quilter II, Colonel Dennis P.

Mroczkowski, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, Lieutenant Colonel Frank

V. Sturgeon, and combat artist Lieutenant Colonel Keith A. McConnell.

Thanks also go to the fine staff at the Marine Corps Historical Center,

without whose support this monograph would not have been possible: Brigadier

General Edwin H. Simmons (Ret), Colonel Daniel M. Smith, Mr. Benis M.

Frank, Dr. Jack Shulimson, Mr. Charles R. Smith, Major Charles D. Melson,

Captain David A. Dawson, Mr. DannyJ. Crawford, Mr. Robert V. Aquilina,

Mrs. Ann A. Ferrante, Ms. Lena Kaijot, Ms. Regina Strother, Ms. Shelia

V
Phillips, Mrs. Meredith P. Hartley, Ms. Nancy C. Miller, Ms. Joyce C.

Conyers, Sergeant Kevin L. Parker, Lance Corporal Joshua R. Ford, Captain

Roberta E. Breden, Mr. Charles A. Wood, Mr. Richard A. Long, Mr. J.

Michael Miller, Ms. Jennifer L. Gooding, Mr. William S. Hill, Ms. Patricia E.

Morgan, Lieutenant Colonel Carmen Dragotta, Mr. Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas,

Lieutenant Colonel Steven D. Hinds, Lieutenant Colonel Dale K. Johnson,

Captain Joe Wells, Jr., Staff Sergeant John Hudson, Sergeant Michael S.

Weldon, Sergeant Robert E. Clarke, Sergeant Andre L. Owens III, Lance

Corporal James D. Lyles, Jr., and Staff Sergeant Randy Shouse. Special thanks

to Colonel Allan R. Millett, Mr. Robert E. Struder, Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns

and Ms. Evelyn A. Englander.

The author is solely responsible for the content of this text, including all

opinions expressed and any factual errors. Comments, correctiOns, additional

information, and other pertinent items are solicited from participants and

interested readers.

•

•

• Ronald J. Brown

vi
Table of Contents Foreword . iii

Preface v

Call To Action 1

Joint Task Force Provide Comfort 3

Express Care 5

The First Marines Arrive 7

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort 7

Joint Task Force Alpha 8

International Relief Efforts 12

A New Mission 13

The 24th MEU (SOC) 14

The Command Element . . 16

BLT 2/8 16

The Black Knights of HMM-264 17

MSSG-24 21

24th MEU Forward Command Element 24

24th MEU Forward 26

Humanitarian Service Support

Concept of Operations 30

Incirlik Air Base 32

Combined Support Command 35

HSSB Silopi 37

CMAGTF 1-91 40

The Mission of MSSG-24 44

Planning Operation Encourage Hope Kurdistan 48

The Area of Operations 49

Concept of Operations 52

Additional Forces 52

Encourage Hope Begins 54

Issues Facing the 24th MEU (SOC) 54

Zakho Into Iraq 59

Securing Zakho 62

Life in Zakho 66

vii
Camp Sommers . 69

24th MEU Command and Control 69

Camp Security 73

Marine Reinforcements 73

Launching Gallant Provider:

Expanding the Security Zone 76

BLT 2/8 Moves South 78

Allied Forces 79

The Kurds 81

Opening Dohuk 83

Provide Comfort Winds Down Northern Iraq 85

The Retrograde 88

The Final Days 91

Notes 95

Appendix:

A. Chronology 102

B. Command and Staff List 104

C. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

Task Organization 106

D. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

Major Allied Forces 109

E. Contributing Nations 112

F. International Relief Agencies 113

G. The Kurds 114

H. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations . . 115

Index 119

viii
Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991

With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort

Call To Action

In early April 1991 the rugged, snow-capped mountains of northern Iraq

were flooded by waves of refugees fleeing the wrath of Iraqi dictator Saddam

Hussein. In the aftermath of a failed revolt, more than two million people

decided to leave Iraq. The resulting exodus was a dangerous journey toward an

uncertain future. Many of the roads were mined, and helicopter gunships

sometimes strafed the refugee columns that stretched as many for as 30 miles

back from the border. Some fled in automobiles, others jammed on board buses.

Open-bed trucks overflowed with humanity, tractors and donkey carts hauled

families, and barefoot young mothers carried infants or dragged shell-shocked

children as they trekked toward the chilly safety of the mountains. Most of these

refugees were Kurds, an ethnic tribal minority that comprised one-fifth of Iraq's

population and claimed northern Iraq as an ancestral home, Kurdistan.

After Desert Storm devastated Iraq's military, the Kurds tried to rid

themselves of the yoke of Saddam's regime. At first, they easily drove

disheartened Iraqi soldiers out of Kurdistan. A festival atmosphere prevailed and

the towns and villages were filled with celebrating people. The revelry was

premature. Saddam carefully reconstituted his army, used it to crush a Muslim

revolt in the south, then turned his attention to the north. Saddam's troops soon

overwhelmed the Kurdish Peshmerga ("Those Who Face Death") fighters whose

rifles and pistols were no match for tanks, artillery, and helicopter gunships. One

by one the cities of Kurdistan fell. On 31 March 1991, the city of Zakho, the

final Kurdish bastion before the Turkish border, was bombarded by artillery fire

and strafed by helicopter gunships. When Iraqi forces neared the town, rumors

of an imminent chemical attack spread like wildfire. Most of Zakho's Kurds fled

under cover of darkness and began a difficult four-day journey to the border. For

them, to flee provided the only hope of survival.

The lucky and the rich among them escaped into Turkish or Iranian towns,

but most could only retreat to the dubious safety of the mountains. Soon, the

barren hillsides along Iraq's borders were peopled by thirsty, starving refugees

living without shelter from the wind and bitter cold. Each night families faced

sub-freezing temperatures with a single blanket for warmth. Hunger, exhaustion,

disease, exposure, and dehydration were rampant. Water had to be ladled from

muddy potholes, melted from snow, or dipped from contaminated streams. The

situation was classified a "medical apocalypse" by the international organization

Doctors Without Borders. Measles, cholera, typhus, and dysentery swept through

the unsanitary camps. Health care was almost non-existent. Often one doctor

served several thousand people, able to perform only the most rudimentary

surgery, without anesthetic, and unable to provide proper medication.
HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991: 

(Arabian Peninsula 

and Adjacent Areas) 

*,I.,.,, ? 'W 

\ 

IRAN I .E 

Strart 

EMIRATES I 

Arabian Sea 

/ 

More than 750,000 refugees were starving. Relief workers reported about 

1,500 refugees were dying each day. By early April, two out of three people in 

northern Iraq were dislocated civilians. The situation seemed hopeless. In an act 

of desperation, Kurdish leader Moussad Barzani made an uncharacteristic plea 

for help when he publicly asked the United States for assistance. 

At first, American President George W. Bush was reluctant to intervene, but 

he eventually reacted to public pressure to join relief efforts underway from 

Europe. The decision to commit American resources was made on 5 April 1991. 

Urgent orders for action flashed to American military units around the world. 

The first Marines to be alerted were 19 parachute riggers from the Air Delivery 

Platoon, 1st Landing Support Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group at 

Camp Pendleton, California. On the island of Sardinia in the Mediterranean, the 

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)] was 

ordered to sail for the eastern Mediterranean. On the Pacific island of Okinawa, 

a contingency Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was created from the 3d 

Force Service Support Group (FSSG). At Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 

members of an unmanned aerial vehicle detachment from the 2d Remotely 

Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company, 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and 

Intelligence Group (SRIG), dumped desert sand out of their seabags and mounted 
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 3

out for the Middle East less than three weeks after returning home from

Operation Desert Storm. Ten Marines from the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG),

a Reserve unit from Washington, D.C., turned around and flew back to the

Middle East instead of being released from active duty. In Saudi Arabia, Marine

reservists volunteered to stay in the Persian Gulf to assist the Kurds rather than

return home as scheduled. From the four corners of the globe, Marines embarked

to support Operation Provide Comfort, soon to become the largest humanitarian

relief operation in Marine Corps history.'

Joint Task Force Provide Comfort

In response to President Bush's expressed desire for immediate action to

assist dislocated civilians in northern Iraq, General John R. Galvin, USA,

Commander-in-Chief Europe (CinCEur), ordered the formation of an American

military force to support humanitarian relief efforts. On 5 April 1991, Major

General James L. Jamerson, USAF, was detached from his duties as Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), to serve as the

commander of a joint task force--tentatively named Provide Comfort--created to

assist Iraqi refugees. Military aircraft were ordered to deliver relief-related items

and medical units were prepared to deploy to refugee camps in eastern Turkey.

General Jamerson's initial tasking was a two-phase operation: the first phase

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

MajGen James L. Jamerson, USAF, and BGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, stand at Incirlik Air

Base, Adana, Turkey. MajGen Jamerson was the first commanding general and BGen Zinni was

his deputy when Joint Task Force Provide Comfort was formed in April. They assumed similar roles

during Operation Provide Comfort II in July when this photograph was taken.
4 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

called for delivery of emergency relief, the second was to be a sustained effort

to deliver humanitarian assistance.2

Joint Task Force Provide Comfort deployed to Incirlik Air Base at Adana,

Turkey, on 6 April 1991. General Jamerson's first briefing painted a gloomy

picture. The refugee camps were scattered across some of the most inaccessible

terrain in the world. Refugees were virtually clinging to cliffs. There was

inadequate shelter, no potable water, little food, poor sanitation, and limited

medical care. Hard-pressed Kurdish families often faced the difficult choice of

saving either their aged parents or their young children because there was not

enough food and water to go around. The relief needs were so massive that no

single international agency had the resources to support an adequate effort. To

make matters worse, all this misery existed in a politically complex, potentially

hostile environment.3

The initial Provide Comfort deployment was a scaled-down package made up

of the lead elements of the USAF 39th Special Operations Wing (SOW). The

remainder of the joint task force was assembled from units in England, Germany,

and Italy. They included a headquarters, follow-on echelons of the 39th SOW,

and the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [SFG (A)]. The command

component was Joint Task Force Provide Comfort Headquarters made up of

detachments from USAFE Headquarters; the 7440th Composite Wing;

Headquarters, Joint Special Operations Task Force (later redesignated Joint Task

Force Alpha); and a Patriot missile battery.

Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, USA, was temporarily released from

his post as Commanding General, Special Operations Command Europe

(SOCEur), to lead a joint special operations task force to support Operation

Provide Comfort. This unit was first labeled "Express Care."4 Joint Task Force

Express Care consisted of a headquarters detachment, the 39th SOW, and the 1st

Battalion, 10th SFG (A). The headquarters detachment was provided by SOCEur

at Bad Toelz, Germany. The aviation component was the 39th SOW from Rhein

Main, Germany, and Woodbridge, England. The 39th SOW was comprised of

the 7th Special Operations Squadron flying Lockheed MC- 130 Talons, the 21St

Special Operations Squadron flying Sikorsky MH-53J Pave Low deep-penetration

search and rescue helicopters, and the 67th Special Operations Squadron flying

HC-130 aerial refuelers. Its ground organization included command,

administration, ordnance, maintenance, supply, and support personnel.

The ground component of Joint Task Force Express Care was the 1st

Battalion, 10th SFG (A). The Army's Special Forces were experienced, highly

skilled, unconventional warriors specially trained to work and live with

indigenous populations in remote areas. About 200 Special Forces soldiers were

assigned to support Provide Comfort. These units included headquarters, combat

intelligence, service, support, signals, and tactical detachments. The 1st

Battalion, 10th SFG (A) had one C-Team (command group), three B-Teams

(control detachments), and 12 A-Teams (operational units). The men of the

Special Forces were called the "Green Berets" by most Americans because of

their distinctive headgear, however, during Operation Provide Comfort most
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

Special Forces soldiers in the field opted to wear soft-cloth, ranger-style fatigue

caps. Ironically, the military forces wearing green berets in northern Iraq were

the French, British, and Dutch Marines.

The first Special Forces A-Teams were inserted into the border camps on 13

April 1991. They were air-lifted into the mountains, located the refugee

sanctuaries, then prepared them to receive assistance. A-Teams were composed

of a command element and about 10 specialists above the rank of sergeant, each

an expert in weapons, communications, medicine, engineering, or demolitions.

These small detachments were lightly equipped, air-deployable, self-reliant

combat teams designed for sustained independent field operations. During

Express Care, their mission was to organize refugee camps, receive and assist

supply distribution, and act as liaison between the Kurds and other allied forces.

Express Care

The immediate task facing JTF Provide Comfort was to bring emergency

relief to stop the dying and suffering. Implied in this mission was locating the

refugees, identifying their most pressing needs, and building an efficient

distribution system. This initial effort, the first stage of Operation Provide

Comfort, was labeled "Express Care."
6 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

The first humanitarian relief air operations were conducted on 8 April 1991.

Six Lockheed C-130 two-seat, four-turboprop, medium-lift cargo aircraft

departed Incirlik carrying food (dehydrated combat rations called MREs, an

acronym for the designation Meals, Ready-to-Eat), blankets, and water.5 This

first flight delivered 27 tons of supplies using container delivery system bundles

weighing about 1,000 pounds each. Support sorties were flown by KC-135 aerial

refuelers, RC-135 reconnaissance 'snoopers, EC-130 electronic jammers, and

E-3 AWACS command planes. General Jamerson reported that 3,022 people

from four American services supported these drops: 687 from the task force; 399

Desert Storm personnel, and 1,936 permanent party personnel. These first air

drops took place within 36 hours of JTF Provide Comfort's formation.6

Doctor Marcel Bonnot from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed

the first airdrop while visiting a refugee camp near Uludere, Turkey. He noted

that there were desperate shortages of food and water, that sanitation and

personal hygiene were practically non-existent, and that diarrhea, skin diseases,

and infections were common. The arrival of the first aircraft was a dramatic and

emotional scene. The noisy camp hushed when the sound of arriving airplanes

was heard. At first, many refugees rushed for cover, thinking the humming

engines heralded a reappearance of Saddam's air force. However, when no

bombs began falling, eyes focused upward and followed a lumbering C-130 as

it slowly circled the camp.

A roll of toilet paper thrown from the plane tested wind direction. Suddenly,

a series of large objects dropped from the plane's tail section. The fearful Kurds

were astounded when gigantic white parachutes blossomed and bundles of food

floated toward earth. The hungry people they mobbed the drop zone and each

scrambled to capture one of the small brown plastic MRE packets. Despite the

confusion on the ground, the lack of a distribution system, and poor

understanding about the proper use of MRE rations, the Kurds in the camp

realized that someone was helping them.7

British and French aircraft joined the American airlift the second day.

Australia, New Zealand, and Italy flew supplies to Incirlik. Denmark,

Luxembourg, Japan, Spain, and Belgium flew supplies into Diyarbakir. A

German composite helicopter force commanded by Brigadier General Frederick

W. Ehmann conducted independent relief operations from Diyarbakir using

Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters. Aircrews bringing these

gifts of life flew in marginal weather conditions--low clouds, thunderstorms, and

snow flurries--while navigating through narrow valleys to deliver their payloads

to drop zones on the sides of steep mountains. Operations became more efficient

as time passed and by the sixth day the daily delivery rose from 27 tons to 284.6

tons.

The initial phase of Operation Provide Comfort was underway, but it was

apparent much more needed to be done. Joint Task Force Provide Comfort

identified 12 major camps near the Iraqi border. Each camp had at least 40,000

people! Every camp suffered food and medical shortages. Official estimates

placed the number of dead at about 600 each day, but observers on the scene
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 7

guessed the number to be about triple the official tally. Made aware of the

problem by the international media, sympathetic countries pledged money,

supplies, equipment, and troops to support the relief effort. As a result, General

Jamerson's mission was expanded from 10-day emergency aid to 30-day

sustainment operations, and then was later extended to no less than a 90-day

deployment.

The First Marines Arrive

The first Marine contribution to Operation Provide Comfort was a

detachment of parachute riggers from the Air Delivery Platoon, 1st Landing

Support Battalion, 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton, California. Although just

returned to the United States after a tough eight-month stint in the desert of Saudi

Arabia, they repacked their well-worn sea bags and departed Norton Air Base for

Incirlik on 8 April, less than 48 hours after returning home. At Incirlik, the

detachment was attached to the 21St Theater Army Area Command's 7th Special

Operations Command. The Marines labored side-by-side with other service

personnel for almost three months, often working "eight-hours onleight-hours

off," a round-the-clock shifts. They built and loaded more than 350 pallets daily,

stacked with food, bottled water, baby food, coats, blankets, and tents.

Parachutes were attached and the pallets were placed onto aircraft for delivery

to the refugees. Despite the hardships, these hard-working Marines tackled this

difficult assignment with enthusiasm and were later commended for a job well

done 8

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

The decision to expand Provide Comfort's mission from relief to

sustainment, coupled with a growing international military and civilian presence,

required structural changes in the task force organization. On 9 April 1991, Joint

Task Force Provide Comfort was redesignated Combined Task Force Provide

Comfort in recognition of international cooperation. Lieutenant General John M.

"Shah" Shalikashvili, USA, assumed command of Combined Task Force Provide

Comfort on 17 April. General Jamerson became the new deputy commander and

Marine Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni became the new chief-of-staff.

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort eventually numbered more than 20,000

allied troops divided into two ground task forces, a logistics support unit, and an

air contingent.

Provide Comfort's ground elements were designated Joint Task Force Alpha

and Joint Task Force Bravo. Logistics units were either assigned to, or closely

coordinated with, the Combined Support Command (CSC) at Silopi. Aircraft

were provided by all four U.S. armed services and each multinational force. The

Marines provided a composite helicopter squadron; the U.S. Navy furnished a

carrier air wing and a combat support helicopter squadron; the U.S. Army

brought two attack helicopter squadrons, an assault helicopter squadron, a
8 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

LtGen John M. Shalikashvili, CG CTF Provide Comfort, meets with Iraqi BGen Danoun Nashwan.

transport helicopter squadron, and an aerial medical evacuation company; the

U.S. Air Force had a fighter squadron, a ground attack squadron, and a

fighter/attack squadron. Each of the other allied forces brought its own aircraft.

Not part of the military task force, but closely associated with it, was a host of

international relief agencies and volunteer organizations.

Joint Task Force Alpha

General Potter's Express Care was redesignated Joint Task Force Alpha

(JTF-A) on 17 April and was given the missions of providing immediate relief,

improving the camps, and encouraging dislocated civilians to return to Iraq. The

ground element of the task force was the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG (A), supported

by the USAF 39th Sow and the helicopters of the 24th MEU (SOC) Forward.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group and the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs

Command supplied assistance teams. In late April and early May, the remainder

of the 10th SFG (A), the British 40th Commando, Royal Marines, and Italian

Alpine troops joined JTF-A. There were many tasks implicit in JTF-A's mission. A census of the

displaced civilians living in the area had to be made so that their sustainment

needs could be assessed. A more efficient forward resupply system had to be
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 9

implemented. The camps had to be organized, distribution points established,

basic medical care provided, and lines of communication opened. Humanitarian

service support bases were needed, ideally ones that could be supplied by trucks,

transport airplanes, or railway instead of helicopters. Combat search and rescue

had to be available to support aerial operations. Finally, the entire system had to

be ready to be handed over to civilian agencies as quickly as possible.9

Major General Jay M. Garner, USA, formerly Deputy Commander, V

Corps, and once an enlisted Marine, was named to lead Task Force Encourage

Hope, later redesignated Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B). Colonel John 0.

Easton, a Marine reservist, was transferred from his duties as commanding

officer of the 4th CAG and appointed General Garner's chief of staff on 23

April. Easton, a lawyer from Fairfax, Virginia, had been a Marine platoon leader

in Vietnam in 1967-68, made a Mediterranean cruise in 1969 with the Sixth

Fleet's Marine landing force, then served as a recruiter and instructor before

leaving active duty. A graduate of Baylor University, Easton then attended law

school at George Mason University before beginning to practice law in the

Washington, D.C. area. He had just returned from duty with the I Marine

Expeditionary Force in Saudi Arabia before joining Provide Comfort.

Joint Task Force Bravo's missions were to establish temporary camps inside

northern Iraq and to provide security for the returning refugees. The tasks

implicit in this mission were to select and secure likely camp sites, to deploy

construction personnel and materials, and to develop water points and sanitation

CTFPC-14/33

PROVIDE COMFORT

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT

(TASK FORCE - BRAVO)

TURKEY DIYARBAKIR —

ISKENDERUN

SYRIA

* TEMPORARY LIVING SITES

IRAQ
10 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA

Marine Cols James L. Jones, Jr., and John 0. Easton meet with MajGen Jay M. Garner at JTFBravo Headquarters in Zakho. Cot Easton, a Marine Reservist, was commanding officer of the 4th

Civil Affairs Group before becoming JTF-B Chief of Staff

areas. An important function was to involve the Kurdish leaders in the selection

and development of the camps.

The initial ground force assigned to JTF-B was the 24th MEU (SOC). Its

mission was to build the resettlement camps while providing security and relief

assistance. It did not take the Marines long to go into action. A platoon from

Company E, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines was flown to Silopi and became the

Marine forward security element on 16 April. The rest of Company E, as well

as a combat engineer platoon, a combat service support detachment (CSSD), and

additional aviation support personnel were bused to Silopi the same day, but did

not arrive for almost 36 hours. On 17 April, MEU Service Support Group

(MSSG) 24 began unloading the ships of Amphibious Squadron 8 at Iskenderun

Harbor while moving combat power inland as rapidly as possible. By 19 April

1991, most of the 24th MEU (SOC) had moved to Silopi and the Marines

prepared for the next phase of Operation Provide Comfort, the movement into

Kurdistan.'°
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 11

Painting by Col Peter M. "Mike Gish, USMCR

The color, pattern, and style of this Kurd 's jama dama turban, tight-fitting jacket, pestern sash, and

baggy trousers indicate tribal and territorial associations.
12 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

International Relief Efforts

Operation Provide Comfort was a unique international effort responding to

the tremendous suffering of innocent people. Countries around the world sent

military forces, civilian volunteers, government workers, and relief supplies.

Thirty-nine civilian relief agencies supported Operation Provide Comfort, 12

countries sent military forces, and 36 countries sent money, supplies, or relief

aid. More than two dozen ships carrying relief supplies landed every week.

Tents, blankets, clothing, and medicine flooded into Turkey where much of it

might have remained to spoil had it not been for the immediate availability of

management, labor, and transportation supplied by international military forces

and civilian relief agencies.

Although reluctant to permanently admit stateless refugees, Turkish President

Tugrut Ozal consented to provide limited assistance to dislocated Iraqi civilians.

By mid-April, Turkey was swamped with fleeing refugees and both sides of the

border were crowded with starving people who overwhelmed Turkey's capacity

to assist. With a humanitarian crisis on his hands, President Ozal approved a

United Nations plan to move the refugees back into northern Iraq. Turkey

provided operating locations at Incirlik, Mersin, Iskenderun, Diyarbakir, Batman,

Silopi, and Yuksekova. It dedicated aircraft and railway lines to send relief

supplies forward. Turkish security forces maintained order and provided medical

care in the temporary mountain camps. Fuel, building materials, food stuffs, and

clothing were provided by Turkey. Individual Turks provided carpentry,

sanitation, and transportation services. Operation Provide Comfort could not have

been conducted had it not been for Turkish support.

On 12 April, the government of Turkey approved an increased flow of

materials to the refugees and cut the 'red tape" for incoming relief supplies.

Materials arrived by air at Incirlik and Diyarbakir, and by sea at Iskenderun and

Mersin. These much-needed supplies were sent forward by ground transportation

to humanitarian service support bases (HSSBs). These bases were remote staging

areas for receiving, preparing, and transloading goods destined for refugee relief

by air or land. Two bases were planned, one at Silopi near the tn-border

confluence and another at Yuksekova near the Iran-Iraq border."

Civilian relief agencies participating in Provide Comfort included the United

Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food

Program, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Red Cross,

the Turkish Red Crescent, the League of the Red Crescent, the American Red

Cross, the Italian Red Cross, the Red Cross of Malta, Medical Volunteers

International, Doctors Without Borders, the International Medical Corps, Doctors

of the World, Catholic Relief Services, the World Council of Churches, the

Mideast Church Council, the World Relief Foundation, Cooperative for

American Relief Everywhere (CARE), the United Kingdom Tear Fund, the

International Rescue Committee, Samaritan's Pulse, Swiss Disaster Relief, the

Jordanian Red Crescent, World Vision, Direct Relief International, Christian

Outreach, Save the Children Foundation, Irish Concern, International Action
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 13

Against Hunger, a Swiss Charity Team, Equilibre, Oxfam, German Bergwacht,

the Swiss National Rescue Team, European Helo Mission, the German Red

Cross, Concern International, DamshlNorwegian Church Aid, and Hospitaldienst

Souveraender.12

A New Mission

Three months after entering the Mediterranean the 24th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)], was bogged down in the mud

on the island of Sardinia. Amphibious Exercise Sardinia 1-91 commenced at 0518

on 7 April. A short time later, the initial landing waves of BLT 2/8 were on the

shore slowly crawling through the mire toward their assigned objectives.

Company F crossed the beach in assault amphibian vehicles, Company G

conducted an air assault, and Company E landed using motorized rafts. Lurking

in the hills, Company H played the role of defending threat forces. At sea "on

call" landing waves were preparing to debark when the communications center

on board Amphibious Squadron 8's (PhibRon 8) flagship, the helicopter assault

ship Guadalcanal (LPH 7), received an urgent dispatch.

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 1-91 (MARG 1-91) was ordered to

stop the exercise, to reembark Landing Force Sixth Fleet (LF6F) immediately,

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA

MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA, CG, JTF-B, discusses Operation Provide Comfort with the leaders

of the 24th MEU (SOC) on board the USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7). The Marines are, from left, Cot

James L. Jones, Jr. (CO. 24th MEU [Sod), LtCol Tony L. Corwin (CO. BLT 2/8), and LtCol

Joseph A. Byrtus, Jr. (dO, HMM-264).
14 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

then proceed to the Turkish port of Iskenderun in the eastern Mediterranean.'3

The 24th MEU (SOC) had been ordered to support Operation Provide Comfort.

Phibron 8 was slated to remain on station just off shore. The signal to halt the

exercise was greeted with skepticism at first, but eventually the backbreaking job

of cleaning and reloading equipment began. The Marines worked through the

night and into the next morning. On 10 April 1991, MARG 1-91 set sail for

Iskenderun. A common training exercise had unexpectedly become a complex

"real world" operation.'4

The 24th MEU (SOC)

Marine units are organized, trained, and equipped to provide combined arms

forces to the fleet. In order to do this best, tactical units are united to form

Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). These MAGTFs are self-sufficient

combat teams that unite combat, combat support, combat service support, and

aviation units under a single commander. They are powerful, flexible,

amphibious, expeditionary forces capable of independent (single service), joint

(multiservice), or combined (multinational) operations. They are prepared to

strike anywhere in the world, ready to fight on land, at sea, or in the air.

In 1991, every MAGTF, regardless of size, had a common structure that

included four elements: a command element, a ground combat element, an air

combat element, and a combat service support element. The three most common

MAGTFs were the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), the Marine expeditionary

brigade (MEB), and the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). Contingency Marine

air-ground task forces (CMAGTFs) were sometimes created to accomplish special

missions.'5, 16

The MAGTFs most commonly deployed to forward areas were MEUs. There

were six permanent MEUs, three on the U.S. east coast .and'three on the west

coast. At any given time, two MEUs were forward deployed, two others were

in training, and the remaining two were either standing up, standing down, or in

transit. While MEU headquarters were permanent organizations, the units

assigned to them rotated on a 15-month cycle (nine months stateside and six

months deployed). A normal deployment included the "work up," a six-month

training and familiarization program that welded separate MAGTF units into a

unified combat-ready force; a six-month deployment, known as a "pump"; and

the return trip which included the turnover, wash down, and homebound transit.

The Landing Force Sixth Fleet (LF6F) in April 1991 was the 24th MEU

(SOC). The designation "Special Operations Capable" was never granted until a

unit successfully completed a special training syllabus, had been rigorously

tested, and was certified to perform 18 special missions: amphibious raids,

limited objective attacks, non-combatant evacuations, show of force, reinforcement operations, security operations, training foreign military, civil action,

deception operations, fire support coordination, counter-intelligence, initial

terminal guidance, signal intelligence-electronic warfare, tactical recovery
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 15

A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter of HMM-264 takes off from the flight deck of the amphibious

assault ship Guadalcanal (LPH 7) as another Sea Knight remains on the deck during vertical

replenishment operations during Operation Provide Comfort.

of personnel and aircraft (TRAP), clandestine reconnaissance, military operations

in urban terrain (MOUT), special demolitions operations, and in-extremis hostage

rescues.

Marine expeditionary units sailed on board the ships of U.S. Navy

amphibious squadrons which were designated "amphibious ready groups" (ARGs)

when deployed to forward areas with Marines embarked. Most ARGs consisted

of four or five ships, usually including an amphibious assault ship (LHA or

LPH), amphibious dock landing ships (LPD zr LSD), and some tank landing

ships (LSTs).'7 However, the demands of the crisis in the Persian Gulf changed

that. In January 1991, the 4th MEB, the 5th MEB, and the 13th MEU (SOC)

were in the Persian Gulf on board more than three dozen amphibious ships. This

caused a "ship crunch," so Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 1-91

(MARG 1-91) had to sail shorthanded.

Commodore (Captain, USN) Dean Turner's three-ship Amphibious Squadron

8 (Phibron 8) included the amphibious assault ship Guadalcanal (LPH 7), the

amphibious transport dock Austin (LPD 4), and the amphibious cargo ship

Charleston (LKA 113). 18 The ship shortage forced careful planning, detailed

loading, and use of surge quartering, but still vital equipment and personnel had

to be left behind.'9 The 24th MEU (SOC) was forced to sail without tanks.

Motor transport assets were restricted. MSSG-24 had to leave critical support

items and equipment behind. No fixed-wing aircraft were in the aviation package.

Only one ship could conduct a traditional amphibious assault using amphibian

tractors and surface landing craft. The lack of LSTs meant there was no over-thebeach unloading capability for vehicles or other heavy equipment and logistics

over the shore (LOTS) operations would strain an already short-handed combat

service support element.
16 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

The Command Element

The 24th MEU (SOC) consisted of the 24th MEU Headquarters, Battalion

Landing Team 2/8 (BLT 2/8), Composite Helicopter Squadron 264 (HMM-264),

and MEU Service Support Group 24 (MSSG-24). The commanding officer was

Colonel James L. Jones, Jr. Colonel Jones had strong Marine Corps roots, as the

son of a legendary World War II Marine Reservist who retired as a brigadier

general, and the nephew of a retired Marine lieutenant general.2° He graduated

from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., in 1967, served in Vietnam

as a rifle platoon leader and company commander, then commanded Company

H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines on Okinawa when that unit was one of the

contingency forces for non-combatant evacuation operations in Southeast Asia.

This experience came in handy during Operation Provide Comfort. Later in his

career, Jones commanded the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. His staff duties included

five years as a Senate liaison officer and a tour as senior aide to the Commandant

of the Marine Corps 21 His partially European upbringing and mastery of

foreign languages made him an appropriate choice as the commander of 24th

MEU (SOC) during Operation Provide Comfort.

The command element included the executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Ralph C. Morse; the personnel officer, Captain Dewey G. "Guy" Jordan; the

intelligence officer, Major Richard J. "Rick" Raftery; the operations officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. "Tom" Linn; the logistics officer, Major Michael

D. "Mike" Boyd; and Sergeant Major William E. Hatcher.

The existing 24th MEU headquarters was reinforced by detachments from 2d

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (2d ANGLICO), 2d Force

Reconnaissance Company, 2d Radio Battalion, 8th Communications Battalion,

a force imagery interpretation unit (FIIU), and a sensor control and management

platoon (SCAMP). There were also counter-intelligence, interpreter-interrogator,

and terrain analysis support teams. In Iraq, an unmanned aerial vehicle

detachment was attached to the 24th MEU (SOC) and additional ANGLICO

firepower control teams were attached to allied units.

BLT 2/8

Battalion Landing Team 2/8 was the MEU's ground combat element (GCE).

It was composed of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, reinforced by antitank,

reconnaissance, artillery, combat engineer, assault amphibian, and light armored

infantry units. The battalion included a headquarters and service company, four

rifle companies, and a weapons company. These organic components and their

attached units gave the landing team a lot of fire power: 8 M29E 1 81mm mortars

(range 4,500 meters); 12 M224 60mm mortars (range 1,500 meters); 8 M270A1

tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command link, guided antitank missiles

(range 3,000 meters); 24 M-47 Dragon man-portable antiarmor weapons (range

1,000 meters); 31 SMAW shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapons

(range 250 meters); 10 40mm machine guns (range 500 meters); 4 M1O1A1
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 17

105mm towed howitzers (range 11,000 meters); 4 M198 155mm towed howitzers

(range 23,000 meters); 13 assault amphibious Vehicles; and 8 light armored

vehicles (LAVs) 22

The commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Tony L. Corwin, a veteran

infantry officer. He had been with BLT 2/8 for more than a year and had been

executive officer during its 1989 Mediterranean cruise. Colonel Corwin assumed

command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines at Camp Lejeune on 12 January 1990.

The executive officer was Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hogan III. The senior

enlisted Marine was Sergeant Major William G. Creech. The personnel officer

was First Lieutenant James W. Bierman, the intelligence officer was Captain

Peter H. Devlin, the operations officer was Captain Dennis M. McNulty, and the

logistics officer was Captain Raymond B. Joseph. Headquarters and Service

Company was initially commanded by First Lieutenant Demetrius Bellizaire, then

later by Captain Charles J. Lesko, Jr. Company E was commanded by Captain

Peter J. Streng, Company F by Captain William F. McEvoy, Company G by

Captain Christopher U. Mulholland, and Company H by First Lieutenant Allie

A. Hutchinson, Jr. The BLT artillery was Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines

(Reinforced), commanded by Captain William P. Holowecki; the 3d Platoon,

Company D, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion was commanded by First

Lieutenant Michael L. Kuhn; Detachment 24, 2d Light Armored Infantry

Battalion was led by First Lieutenant James F. Desy; the 2d Platoon, Company

C, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion was led by First Lieutenant Joel B. Baker; and

the 1st Platoon, Company C, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion was commanded by

Captain Peter F. Owen.

The Black Knights of HMM-264

The aviation combat element, appropriately called the ACE, was Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 (Reinforced), known as HMM-264. The

squadron was nicknamed the Black Knights, its emblem was a black chess piece

superimposed on a red and gold checkerboard, its motto was "Checkmate," and

its mascot was a cartoon horse--a spinoff of the squadron's chess knight symbol--

called "Mr. Ed."

The squadron deployed as a composite unit, merging organic and outside

assets under a single commander. This task organization allowed HMM-264 to

best utilize its aircraft and enhanced its ability to perform a wide variety of

missions. In July 1990, the squadron joined utility, attack, heavy-lift, and ground

support assets to become the aviation combat element for Landing Force Sixth

Fleet Deployment 1-91. In addition to the assets of HMM-264, the composite

squadron also incorporated Marines and equipment from Marine Heavy

Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-46 1), Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron

167 (HMLA-167), Marine Air Control Group 28 (MACG-28), 2d Low Altitude

Antiaircraft Defense Battalion (2d LAAD), and Marine Wing Service Support

Squadron 272 (MWSS-272).
18 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

This is the insignia of HMM-264, the helicopter squadron assigned to 24th MEU (SOC), during

Operation Provide Comfort. The squadron nickname is 'Black Knights" and the motto is

"Checkmate."

The commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Byrtus, Jr. He

had been commissioned in 1972 and earned the gold wings of a naval aviator in

1973. Colonel Byrtus had spent most of his flying career with East Coast units.

He also served as a maintenance officer, attended Forward Air Controller School

and Jump School during a tour with 2d ANGLICO, and familiarized himself with

Soviet tactics and weapons during a staff tour with U.S. Central Command. In

1988 he became the executive officer of HMLA- 167, then assumed command of

HMM-264 on 16 March 1990.

The squadron had 61 officers, 289 enlisted Marines, and 8 Navy personnel.

The executive officer was Lieutenant Colonel David L. Ramsey. The squadron

staff was: operations officer, Major Richard J. Crush; intelligence officer,

Captain George Taber; maintenance officer, Major John W. Cowan; logistics

officer, Captain Richard T. McFadden; administrative officer, Major Richard A.

Mehaffey; and safety officer, Major David T. Kerrick. The Black Knights' top

enlisted man was Sergeant Major Francisco Deleon.

As a composite squadron, HMM-264 used a variety of aircraft to accomplish

different tasks. It included heavy-lift cargo helicopters, medium-lift transport

helicopters, attack helicopters, and light utility helicopters. These aircraft

displayed some of the finest nose art in the Marine Corps and were given names

like "American Pie," "Saddam's Revenge," or "Warlock" Composite squadrons

often included a detachment of fixed-wing McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier

II "jump jets," but ship space limitations prohibited this on this Mediterranean

cruise. Lieutenant Colonel Byrtus had operational control over AV-8Bs (VMA542), KC-130s (VMGR-252), and OV-lOs (VMO-1) during the training cycle,

however, during the deployment fixed-wing air support was provided by Navy

Carrier Air Wing 8's McDonnell Douglas F-14 Tomcats, McDonnell Douglas
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 19

F/A-18 Hornets, Grumman A-6 Intruders, EA-6 Prowlers, Lockheed S-3

Vikings, and Grumman E-2 Hawkeyes on board the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN

71). Another source of air support was the U.S. Navy's Mediterranean-based

Combat Support Helicopter Squadron 4 (HC-4) from Sigonella, Italy, which flew

Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift cargo helicopters.

The mainstay of HMM-264 was the Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knight. It

was a shipborne, twin-engine, tandem-rotor, medium-lift transport helicopter.

Although the CH-46 was officially named the Sea Knight, most Marines called

these aircraft "Frogs" because of the dark green paint and squatty appearing

high-nose/low-tail posture on the ground. In tactical situations the crew consisted

of two pilots, a crew chief, and a door gunner. A Sea Knight was supposed to

fly at a cruising speed of 158 miles per hour with a ceiling of about 9,000 feet

and a combat radius of about 75 nautical miles, but age had taken a toll. Safety

factors, terrain, and weather, and extended use, severely limited the performance

of these old work horses during Operation Provide Comfort. So many of HMM246's Frogs had patches covering combat scars from Vietnam, it was a squadron

joke that a pilot couldn't fly a "Forty-six" unless the aircraft was older than he

was 23 Service-life extension programs added years of operational usefulness and

marginally increased capabilities, but the CH-46s were ready for replacement by

more capable aircraft in 1991.24

Two Marine CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-14ft cargo helicopters prepare to lft off the deck of the

Guadalcanal (LPH 7) in Iskenderun Harbor. An AH-JT Bell Sea Cobra attack helicopter sits in the

left foreground.
20 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Photograph by the author

"Leroy Three Two" was a UH-JN two-pilot, twin-engine, utilily helicopter. Although officially

named "Iroquois," UH-ls were always called "Hueys, " a nickname first used during the Vietnam

conflict.

Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallions were the most capable heavy-lift cargo

helicopters in the free world. They had three jet engines, a single main rotor, and

a four-man crew. They could carry 55 Marines internally and sling a 16-ton

external load. These workhorses were able to recover any airframe in the NavyMarine Corps inventory. They flew 172 miles per hour, had a practical

operational ceiling of 10,000 feet, and a ferry range of 1,000 nautical miles.

Nose-mounted aerial refueling probes made the Super Stallions valuable as longrange transports and cargo carriers. Commonly called "Echoes" or "Fiftythrees," they provided the only helicopter lift for M198 howitzers and light

armored vehicles. The four Super Stallions assigned to HMM-264 came from

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) at New River, North

Carolina. Although notorious for leaking fluid, these rugged birds were

dependable cargo haulers that carried heavy loads over long distances. During

a flight from Silopi to Incirlik on board a U.S. Navy CH-53, an alarmed civilian

passenger alerted the crew chief to a hydraulic leak. The Marines on board burst

into laughter at the veteran flier's unconcerned reply: "Be glad, lady! It means

there's some fluid still in there."

Two Bell-made aircraft comprised the squadron's light aircraft contingent.

The Bell UH-1N Iroquois, familiar to most Americans as the "Huey," was a

twin-engine, single-rotor utility helicopter. Two pilots flew it at a cruise speed

of 125 miles per hour, with a ceiling of 10,000 feet, and a range of about 200

nautical miles. The Huey was primarily used for passenger transport, command

and control, and reconnaissance missions, but flew medical evacuation flights

when needed. The squadron's other light helicopters were among the stars of
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 21

Marine aviation, AH-1T Bell Sea Cobra gunships, frequently called "Snakes'

because of their menacing appearance, narrow silhouettes, and long profiles. Sea

Cobras were two-seat, twin-engine, single-main rotor, attack aircraft. They

mounted a wide variety of ordnance, including a three-barrel 20mm M197 chinmounted rotating cannon, TOW antitank missiles, and sidewinder antiaircraft

missiles. The three UH-lNs and four AH-lTs assigned to the Black Knights

came from HMLA-167, stationed at New River, North Carolina.

A detachment from MACG-28 gave the squadron and its associated

amphibious task force the ability to command, control, and coordinate air

operations. This unit provided vital air traffic control systems and personnel.

MWSS-272 provided a detachment of aircraft specialists and ancillary equipment,

including a Helicopter Expeditionary Refueling System (HERS). This refueling

system was a collection of rubber bladders that looked like gigantic black

waterbed mattresses. The associated hoses, pumps, connectors, and generators

enabled the Marines to refuel rotary wing aircraft at a forward area

rearming/refueling point (FARP). The HERS was fully transportable by air or

ground mode and made the squadron a truly mobile expeditionary force. Air

defense was furnished by a detachment from the 2d LAAD armed with hand-held

Stinger missiles. The major drawback for HMM-264 was that it had no Harrier

"jump jets" to provide fixed wing close air support attached.

MSSG-24

MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) 24 provided the MEU's "beans,

bullets, and band aids." This logistics unit was formed by uniting service

Photograph by the author

An AH-1T Bell Sea Cobra attack helicopter was assigned to HMM-264. Four such two-pilot, twinengine, armed rotary wing aircraft provided close-in fire support for the 24th MEU in northern

Iraq.
22 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

support detachments from the 2d FSSG at Camp Lejeune. It contained the

equipment and trained personnel to support an amphibious assault or to become

the MEU's lifeblood on shore. Marine Corps doctrine dictated that MSSG-24 be

organized and equipped to operate using sea-based logistics. Briefly, this meant

MSSG-24 relied on shipborne facilities for maintenance and supply, rather than

bases on the shore. Doctrine anticipated an amphibious campaign conducted close

to the beach, so equipment needed for inland operations or extended periods on

shore was limited. Bulk supplies had to be transported ashore from amphibious

shipping by helicopters or landed from surface craft. The MEU brought only

enough supplies for 15 days of operations on shore, a package called Landing

Force Operational Readiness Material (LFORM). Although this period could be

marginally extended by careful management or reduced demand, any extended

stay on shore required outside support.

The MSSG-24 commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Kohl.

Kohl was a logistics specialist with many years of experience. Originally an

infantry officer, he became a rifle battalion logistics officer (S-4) after being

wounded in Vietnam. He became a logistician full time in 1978. Kohl had

experience with logistics units ranging in size from small combat service support

detachments to Fleet Marine Force level. Lieutenant Colonel Kohl had nine

continuous years of service in the Fleet Marine Force. He was assisted by Major

Charles V. Mugno, MSSG-24's executive officer. Mugno knew the ins and outs

of logistics well, and had an excellent eye for detail. Unfortunately for MSSG24, Mugno would be obliged to attend to other duties during Operation Provide

Comfort. Luckily, Kohl could count on the services of a proficient staff which

Marine engineers from MSSG 24 are busy constructing a water distribution point on the banks of

the Kizabur River in Central Zakho. Clearly visible are a portable electrical generator, the Reverse

Osmosis Water Purjfication Units (ROWPU) holding tanks, and a field antenna. The compound is

protected by a single strand of barbed wire. The Khabur River is a tributary of the famous Tigris

River which runs from the Taurus Mountains through Iraq to the Persian Gulf
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 23

included: adjutant, First Lieutenant Thomas M. Buehner; intelligence officer,

First Lieutenant Robert W. Pavlicin; operations officer, Captain Kevin L. Foley;

logistics officer, Captain Kenneth E. Jacobsen; embarkation officer, First

Lieutenant Matthew J. Connors; supply operations officer, First Lieutenant Todd

L. Eggers; disbursing officer, First Lieutenant Gavin R. Reardon; medical officer

Lieutenant Ronald Buckley, USN; and dental officers Lieutenant Donald R.

Ratliff, USN, and Lieutenant Kenneth P. Nogacek, USN. The senior enlisted

personnel were First Sergeant Donald A. Delgado and Master Sergeant Ross E.

Lewellen.

The MSSG was composed of a headquarters platoon and detachments from

8th Engineer Support Battalion; 2d Landing Support Battalion; 2d Maintenance

Battalion; 2d Medical Battalion; 2d Dental Battalion; 2d Supply Battalion; 8th

Motor Transport Battalion; 2d Support Battalion; and administrative, military

police, and communications personnel from Headquarters and Service Battalion,

2d FSSG. Its diverse equipment list included radio sets, fork lifts, portable

electric generators, water purification units, cargo trucks, ambulances, medical

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

BGen Anthony C. Zinni makes friends with Kurdish youngsters in northern Iraq. Gen Zinni was the

highest-ranking Marine assigned to CTF Provide Comfort.
24 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

supplies, and battery chargers. The MSSG enabled the 24th MEU (SOC) to

"shoot and scoot," feed itself, repair broken equipment, get paid, heal the sick,

and send mail. If one imagined the 24th MEU (SOC) as a mobile village, MSSG24 provided all the civic services for its population.

24th MEU Forward Command Element

After receiving the warning order for movement to Turkey, Colonel Jones

formed the 24th MEU (SOC) Forward Command Element (FCE), composed of

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hogan III (BLT 2/8), Major Charles V. Mugno

(MSSG-24), and Major David T. Kerrick (HMM-264). This team departed the

Naval Air StatiOn Sigonella, Italy, for Incirlik on 10 April. At Incirlik, the FCE

reported to Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort Headquarters and met

with Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC. Zinni was the senior Marine

assigned to Operation Provide Comfort. He had been Deputy J-3, United States

European Command (USEUCOM), but was detached to become Deputy

Commander, JTF Provide Comfort on 6 April. He was later named chief of staff

when Provide Comfort expanded and became a combined task force. A stocky

ex-football player from Villanova University, Zinni's credentials included the

U.S. Army Special Warfare School, the Naval War College, and two master's

degrees. He was a veteran of two combat tours in Vietnam, where he had

commanded the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the 9th Marines. His staff duties

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

BGen Anthony C. Zinni, CTF Provide Comfort chief of staff, poses with Marines assigned to CTF

Headquarters at Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey.
WITH MARINES. IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 25

Photograph by the author

Helicopters of HMM-264 arrayed in "LZLeatherneck 'on the southeast side of HSSB Silopi. HMM264 established the Silopi base in April 1991. A detachment from MACG-28 operated the landing

zones for the first month of Operation Provide Comfort.

included two teaching stints at Quantico, a headquarters tour in Washington,

D.C., and joint-service duty with the USEUCOM.26

Joint Task Force Provide Comfort was to conduct multinational humanitarian

relief operations in northern Iraq until international relief agencies and private

voluntary organizations could assume overall supervision of such operations. The

basic concept of operations included the following tenets: 1) meet life-sustaining

requirements immediately; 2) establish a manageable relief process that could be

easily transferred; 3) promote the role of non-military organizations and

maximize the participation of international agencies; 4) seek active refugee

participation during site development operations; and 5) ensure security of allied

troops and dislocated civilians. The priorities established were: 1) to stop the

dying and the suffering; 2) to resettle the population at temporary sites while

establishing a stable, secure, sustainable environment in northern Iraq; and 3) to

return the displaced civilians to their former homes.27

The MEU FCE carefully read and dissected the operations order, flew a

relief supply mission, discussed the situation, then sent a staff estimate to Colonel

Jones. His highest priority was to get aircraft ashore and into operation as soon

as possible. The rest of the MEU was scheduled remain on board ship. Phibron

8 would remain near the coast at a modified offshore deployment location to

provide logistic support.

This concept changed on 14 April when Combined Task Force Provide

Comfort received a message from the American Ambassador to Turkey, Morton

I. Abramowitz, that outlined a plan for the return of dislocated Iraqi citizens
26 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

from Turkey and Iran. It envisioned a series of relay points along major routes

leading from the refugee camps to locations in northern Iraq. Later that same

day, the American Consulate at Adana announced that President Ozal had agreed

to establish a humanitarian service support base near the Turkish town of Silopi.

The military unit sent to Silopi was assigned to the Haj facility used by pilgrims

making their way to the holy shrines of Islam. A newer facility would be used

for refugees in urgent need of medical care. Permission was also granted to send

humanitarian service support detachments (HSSD5) to the towns of Diyarbakir

and Isikveren.

This mission would not be easy. Kurdistan was located far from existing

bases in some of the region's most forbidding terrain and weather. The political

climate was uncertain. The Turks and Iranians had a long history of problems

with the Kurds and were lukewarm about providing assistance at first. Peshmerga

guerrillas and the Iraqi Army were still fighting, so the Americans had to avoid

taking sides in a historical civil conflict.

24th MEU Forward

Phibron 8 made landfall at Iskenderun Harbor on the evening of 13 April.29

The next morning, operational control of the 24th MEU (SOC) was transferred

to Combined Task Force Provide Comfort. General Jamerson told Colonel Jones

to establish a forward supply base and a forward area rearming/refueling point

at Silopi, an agricultural village located about 450 miles east of Iskenderun in the

Taurus Mountains. To best accomplish this task, Colonel Jones created a special

purpose force, the 24th MEU Forward, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joe

Byrtus from HMM-264.

This ad hoc unit was to fly to Silopi, establish a command post, set up an air

control system, and put a helicopter expeditionary refueling system into

operation. The 24th MEU Forward included personnel from HMM-264, MACG28, MWSS-272, and MSSG-24. Follow-on elements included command, ground

security, aviation, and logistics personnel. A convoy of buses and trucks departed

Iskenderun but did not arrive at Silopi for almost 36 hours.3°

Silopi was a sleepy farming village in Turkey's isolated Hakkari Province,

located about eight miles from the Habur Bridge, the gateway to northern Iraq.

Silopi was so small and unimportant it did not appear on most maps of the area.

There was no airfield, no railhead, and a poor road network. Only a single hardsurface highway ran through the mountains to reach this small town in eastern

Anatolia. Silopi was an agricultural trade center for local wheat farmers. Visiting

there was like traveling far back in time. Its people lived in mud brick huts with

straw roofs and had no electricity. Cultivation was done by hand instead of by

machine. Skinny mules pulled wooden plows to break the ground. Entire families

took to the fields with scythes in hand when it was time to harvest the grain.

However, life in Silopi changed radically after the helicopters of HMM-264

dropped from the sky. The local peasants, unaware of the world situation that
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 27

Photograph by the author

An HMM-264 CH-46E on board the amphibious assault ship Guadalcanal (LPH 7) in Iskenderun

Harbor. The ships of MARG 1-91 served as an afloat logistics base supporting a Marine landing

force more than 500 miles inland.

brought these strangers to their isolated valley, stared at the new arrivals with

unsettled curiosity.

The 24th MEU Forward was placed under the operational control of General

Potter's Task Force Express Care (redesignated Joint Task Force Alpha on 17

April). Its mission was to support Express Care by providing helicopter support,

air traffic control, air space coordination, and refueling capability at a forward

support base. Colonel Byrtus, the MEU Forward's commanding officer, attended

joint task force meetings and acted as Marine liaison between the forward base

and the forces afloat.

The 24th MEU Forward moved its lead elements to Silopi on 15 April. The

Black Knights used three CH-53E helicopters to deploy the advance party

consisting of helicopter expeditionary refueling system personnel and air traffic

controllers. The difficult five-hour flight required aerial refueling while flying

only a few hundred feet above the undulating terrain to reach an undeveloped

wheatfield earmarked to become the main landing zone at Silopi. Within two

hours of their arrival, the Marines had refueled their helicopters and established

an air traffic control station. A primitive landing zone was in operation that

afternoon.

However, the long day was not over. From Silopi, the Black Knights flew

food to Drop Zone One at Isikveren, Turkey. The heavily laden CH-53s followed

the Hazil River as it meandered along the Turkish-Iraqi border, then flew over

a narrow valley dotted by small refugee camps. It was a rough flight because the

helicopters were often buffeted by cold, swirling gusts of wind rising off the

snow-streaked ridges. Eventually, a colorful patchwork of tan, olive, orange,

blue, and white tents came into view. Isikveren was one of the largest refugee
28 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

camps, housing more than 80,000 Kurds. It was located above the 5,000-foot

mark on the slopes of snow-capped mountains.

At first glance, every square foot of level ground seemed to be occupied. A

careful search located an area that was relatively uninhabited, uncluttered by

refuse, fairly flat, and free of flight obstacles. Purple smoke from a landing

marker pinpointed the exact spot. Unfortunately, there was only room for one

helicopter to land at a time. The first Super Stallion to arrive at this minuscule

landing zone parted what was described as "a sea of refugees" who ran from the

winds created by its rotor wash. A great cloud of dust billowed up and pelted the

waiting crowd with pebbles, sand, and broken twigs, causing them to move back.

Blankets, an assortment of loose items, and even a few tents were picked up by

the whirlwind and blown across the camp. The pilot alertly used this temporary

opening to set down. The aircrew hustled to unload the cargo quickly, however,

the impatient crowd swarmed the landing zone. Ignoring the pleas of relief

workers and oblivious to the danger of the whirling rotor blades, refugees

charged toward the idling helicopter. The hungry, thirsty crowd rushed forward

to get desperately needed food and water. Afraid for the safety of those on the

ground, the aircraft commander popped up into a low hover and began to taxi

forward very slowly. This tactic worked. The rotor wash cleared away the mob

and created a lane so the remaining pallets could be shoved off the rear ramp.

The other two aircraft followed this procedure as well.3'

After the drop the helicopters departed the refugee camp for Silopi to pick

up Lieutenant Colonel Byrtus for the return flight to the Guadalcanal, which

Harried Marines try to bring order from choas as starving Kurds charge a CH-46E Sea Knight

helicopter carrying food. LtCol Joseph A. Byrtus, Jr., HMM-264 commander, described these

initial relief flights as "trying to land into a sea of refugees."
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 29

was at anchor in Iskenderun Harbor, but the flight was diverted to Incirlik for the

evening because reduced visibility precluded safe return to the ship. The first

day's operation had been successful and it provided some important lessons for

future operations. General Jamerson credited the Black Knights with pioneering

low-altitude drop techniques that expedited safe delivery of food and water. The

increased flow of supplies resulted in more subdued crowd reactions. However,

better ground control and a more orderly distribution system were still needed.

The number of needy people vastly outnumbered those being assisted. More

Marines were needed, and a prolonged sustainment effort was required. The

forward base at Silopi needed to be expanded to adequately support large-scale,

long-term operations.

On the other hand, the Marines achieved several important milestones. The

Black Knights delivered 1,290 MREs and 18 boxes of bottled water to the

refugees. The first forward Humanitarian Service Support Base was operating.

An interesting sidelight was that the Marines were being used as a true

expeditionary force, rather than an amphibious force, operating far from the

nearest sea base. No MEU in Marine Corps history had ever been deployed so

far inland.32

O WAY STATIONS 0 FOOD DISTRIBUTION POINTS LJJI CUKURCA

DANGER! MINES MAY BE

LOCATED OFF THE ROAD!
30 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

The following day, 16 April, most of the squadron moved to Silopi. Three

CH-53s, nine CH-46s, and two UH-ls arrived at approximately 1500 in the

afternoon. They used the newly installed HERS to refuel, then immediately

launched a supply run to the distant mountain camps. The FARP site was manned

by eight Marines from MWSS-272 (Corporal Charles G. Trainor) and a 45-man

Shore Party Platoon, MSSG-24 (First Lieutenant Chris A. Arantz) worked the

loading zone. The first day the FARP refueled 319 helicopters, then settled down

to an average of about 220 per day, distributing about 55,000 gallons of fuel

each day. The fuel bladders on the ground were pumped full of gas at the rate

of 2,600 gallons per minute from military and civilian fuel trucks. Silopi was

beginning its transition from an unimproved landing zone to a major support

base.33

For the next few days HMM-264 devoted its air assets to Joint Task Force

Alpha. Many Kurdish camps couldn't be reached by truck, so the Marines loaded

more than 100 tons of supplies per day on the helicopters. The squadron usually

flew from sunrise to sunset. Between 15 and 18 April HMM-264 delivered 137

tons of relief supplies to the Kurdish refugees. On one day 170,000 pounds of

food were delivered. On several different days, HMM-264 logged more than 90

flight hours. During the first two weeks the squadron delivered more than one

million pounds of relief supplies and flew more than 1,000 accident-free flight

hours. Distribution operations were turned over to the Kurds as soon as possible

to encourage them to help themselves. However, the rapid pace of events made

it very clear that the entire MEU would soon be required on shore.34

Humanitarian Service Support

Concept of Operations

Logistics planning for Provide Comfort was kept fairly simple. There were

three overlapping phases. At first, the military handled the movement of all

supplies. Emergency support was delivered directly to refugee camps in Turkey

and Iraq by airdrop or helicopter. As the distribution system developed, civilian

agencies assumed responsibility for operation of the camps, while the military

provided security and some logistics support. By the time Combined Task Force

Provide Comfort departed, all supply and security missions in northern Iraq were

handled by civilian agencies or the United Nations. As the Kurds began to move

south, a series of way stations along major travel arteries were established in

northern Iraq. Inside the exclusion zone temporary resettlement camps were built

with the intention of turning them over to civilian agencies as quickly as

possible.35

A supply 'ladder' was established with three 'rungs": reception, movement,

and distribution. There were three main supply and personnel delivery points in

Turkey. Incirlik was the aerial entry port. Mersin and Iskenderun were the sea

entry ports. A three-day supply reserve was established at each entry site.

Aircraft landing at Incirlik were quickly unloaded. All arriving goods were

inspected by customs officials. At first the Turks used an expedited inspection
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 31

Food will be distributed ONE time

each week.

Bring this card with you each week

to receive your FOOD RATIONS.

. .'. f% • J d -'i . o I4_) d:.) idj&

Kurdish families were issued ration cards when they registered at one of the three refugee camps

in the Zakho area. Food supplies were originally U.S. "Meals Ready to Eat" combat rations, but

these were quickly replaced by bulk foods more suited to Kurdish tastes.

system, but as time passed this procedure became more complex and later took

up to eight days for goods and equipment to pass through customs. Supplies were

then either rigged for airdrop, palletized for helicopter transport, or loaded onto

trucks for the trip forward. Similar procedures were used at Mersin and

Iskenderun. Sea-land containers were unloaded, opened, their contents inspected,

the goods were separated and packaged, then loaded onto trucks or trains for

movement forward.

The second phase was movement of relief supplies and personnel from their

port of entry to a forward humanitarian service support base. At first, there were

two, HSSB-1 (Silopi) and HSSB-2 (Yuksekova). Later HSSB-3 was opened at

Sirsenk, Iraq. Sirsenk quickly replaced Yuksekova when the refugees left their

mountain camps and moved south. At the HSSBs, every attempt was made to

expedite the movement of supplies forward to the humanitarian service support

detachments (HSSDs). At the HSSBs, trucks were directed forward after the

drivers made only brief stops for food and fuel. If necessary, supplies were

divided into truck-transportable and air transportable-loads. A two-day supply

reserve was maintained at each HSSB. Other supplies were sent forward as

quickly as possible. The final rung on the supply ladder was distribution. A typical HSSD

included a command element, a helicopter support team, an engineer support

team, civil affairs representatives, and a communications section. These teams,

usually about a dozen people, occupied one or two tents near the landing zone.
32 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

A "mayor's" tent, the civilian relief workers' tents, a medical center, a water

point, and a supply dump were almost always nearby. The detachment directed

airdrops, received the trucks, pumped potable water, manned delivery points, and

coordinated services. The actual distribution was left up to civilian relief workers

or the Kurds. American influence in the camps was obvious when visiting

dignitaries were greeted by children singing "Old MacDonald Had A Farm" or

little hands flashed a "vee" accompanied by the refrain "Kowabunga Dude!"36

Incirlik Air Base

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort Headquarters was located at Incirlik

Air Base near Adana, Turkey. Incirlik was a large, modern NATO base. The

airfield supported a multitude of air operations including fighter, bomber,

reconnaissance, and transport aircraft. A stretch of taxiway and some reinforced

Photograph by the author

Maj (now LtCoI) Charles V. Mugno, executive officer of MSSG 24, was assigned to the 24th MEU

forward command element and flew one of the initial relief missions into northern Iraq.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 33

Photograph by the author

lstLt Frank W. Vido and Cot Peter M. "Mike" Gish wait for a flight to Silopi at Incirlik 's India

Loop. Cot Gish, a well-known painter, was the oldest Marine on active duly in 1991. He was a

naval aviator during World War II and commanded a reserve helicopter squadron before serving

as a combat artist in Vietnam, northern Iraq and Somalia.

concrete hangars known as "India Loop" became the home base for the U.S.

Navy's HC-4 and supported Marine helicopter operations as well. Billeting was

at a premium because on-base quarters and all of the local hotels were filled, so

a tent camp was erected along the main roadway. The primitive facilities led to

crowded, sometimes uncomfortable conditions. However, for those who had just

arrived from the harsh desert environment of Operation Desert Storm, any place

with a swimming pool, a well-stocked post exchange, and fast food eateries

seemed almost like heaven. The post exchange was often filled with smiling
34 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

service people wearing desert cammies enjoying their first pizza and beer in

many months.

Fleet Marine Force Europe (FMFEur) was the conduit between Provide

Comfort Marines and the United States. Both joint and combined task forces

included Marines in staff and liaison positions. Fleet Marine Force Europe

(Designate) in London functioned as the single point of contact for U.S. Marine

matters in Europe. Operation Provide Comfort required FMFEur (Designate) to

shift its focus from Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf to Turkey and

northern Iraq.

Colonel Donald A. Gressly, the chief of staff, sent a liaison team to Incirlik

on 11 April. This team, collocated with a team for Navy Forces Europe

(NavEur), was designated Navy-Marine Liaison Team 10, Combined Task Force

Provide Comfort. Fleet Marine Force Europe (Designate) coordinated material

and personnel movements from Europe, conducted hospital liaison support, and

assisted special logistics support in Europe. The FMFEur G-1 and G-4 sections

provided administrative and logistics support to include fiscal, administrative,

transportation and billeting, and postal services. The G-3 section prepared daily

situation reports, worked on planning issues, and relayed intelligence (especially

threat conditions) to CTF Provide Comfort.37

Photograph by the author

Humanitarian Service Support Base Silopi (HSSB 1) was the site of the Combined Support

Command (CSC). The CSC coordinated logistics efforts for Operation Provide Comfort.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 35

Navy-Marine Liaison Team 10 worked out of a converted warehouse across

the street from the CTF headquarters. On 20 April, 20 additional Marines were

transferred to Headquarters, CTF Provide Comfort from FMF Europe

(Designate). Colonel Robert M. Hansen was the senior Marine. Major Mugno

(MSSG-24) was the MEU liaison officer and acted as executive officer,

supervising administrative matters and arranging transportation for incoming and

departing personnel. The team also included one air liaison officer, three watch

officers, a staff sergeant, and three administrative clerks.

The Joint Operations Center, called the "Jock," was manned by members of

all services. The Joint Operations Center at Incirlik included eight Marines: one

in the personnel section (C-i), two in the operations section (C-3), one in the

plans section (C-5), a protocol officer, a linguist, and two public affairs

officers 38

Colonel Peter M. "Mike" Gish, a Marine combat artist in Vietnam and an

internationally famous watercolorist, covered the activities of Combined Task

Force Provide Comfort at Incirlik and Silopi in Turkey, in northern Iraq, and

with Phibron 8 afloat.39 The Marine historical team worked with Senior Master

Sergeant Thomas L. Robb, USAF; Staff Sergeant Thomas A. Traynor, USAF;

and Sergeant Marie Y. Hererra, USAF, of the Combined Task Force History

Office. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon W. Rudd, USA, an instructor at the U.S.

Military Academy at West Point, later joined the History Office.

Combined Support Command

General Shalikashvili formed the Combined Support Command (CSC) to

administer the logistics needs of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort. The

CSC was based at Silopi and was commanded by Colonel (soon to become

Brigadier General) Harold E. "Hal" Burch, USA. In Europe, Burch had been the

deputy commander of the 21St Theater Army Area Command (21St TAAC0m)

at Kaiserslautern, Germany. Although the CSC eventually became the logistics

focal point, the 7th Special Operations Support Command (7th SOSC) initially

provided planning and support coordination for the U.S. Army forces involved

in Provide Comfort. The expansion of Operation Provide Comfort required more

support than the 7th SOSC could provide, so the 29th Area Support Group

assumed this role. The Combined Support Command was primarily an Army

organization. It served as the principal gateway for theater logistics support for

United States forces in Turkey. Requisitions flowed from the originating unit

through its parent task force, either JTF-A or JTF-B, to the CSC. The Combined

Task Force logistics section (C-4) coordinated support not available through U.S.

sources (commercial cargo and fuel trucks, for example). The CSC directed its

requests to the 200th Theater Army Material Management Command in Europe

for action. Supplies coming from Europe were usually routed from the General

Support Center in Germany. They arrived at Incirlik, Mersin, or Iskenderun.

From there, they were shipped to Silopi, Yuksekova, or Sirsenk, then moved to

a forward humanitarian or combat service support detachment for distribution.
36 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

The CSC was organized into three sections. A helicopter support base

provided refueling, minor repair, and loading and packaging. It was manned by

a joint air component. There was also a joint ground support component to

provide supply, maintenance, engineer, transportation, medical, and personnel

services. The third component was Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force

1-91. This unit provided terminal air control and helicopter landing support at

forward areas.

The Combined Support Command Headquarters was located in an abandoned

warehouse that once served Muslims making pilgrimages to the holy city of

Mecca or other Muslim shrines. The Contingency MAGTF 1-91 Command

Element and the International Red Cross Center were collocated with the CSC

Headquarters. A hard-surface helicopter pad was located in front of the CSC

Operations Center (CSCOC), several dirt landing zones were across the road;

Photograph by the author

Theauthor prepared to ride "shotgun" on a supply convoy from HSSB Silopi to 24th MEU (SOC)

headquarters at Z.akho. Silopi was the home of MSSG 24, HMM-264, and CMAGTF 1-91. its 2,400

tents housed more than 10,000 personnel from 14 d/Jerent nations.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 37

MACG-28 monitored air traffic and MWSS-272 ran the FARP. The U.S. Army's

51st and 66th Maintenance Battalions provided repair services and the 14th

Transportation Battalion coordinated overland movement. The primary medical

care facility at Silopi was the USAF 39th Air Transportable Hospital, a 50-bed

facility capable of emergency surgery and limited post-operative care. The

French, Dutch, British, Italians, and Canadians set up military field hospitals.

Numerous civilian-run medical facilities were scattered around northern Iraq.

Medical evacuation was provided by the U.S. Army's 149th Aviation Company.

Military personnel requiring additional treatment were evacuated to Diyarbakir,

then were flown to the 39th Tactical Air Control Hospital at Incirlik.'°

HSSB Silopi

The humanitarian service support base at Silopi was located in a wheatfield

adjacent to Turkish Route 24, the main road that ran east from the town of Silopi

to the Iraqi border. At the border, the road became Iraqi Route 6 leading to the

city of Zakho. Silopi was nestled in the shadows of snow-capped Taurus

Mountain peaks on the fertile plain that eventually became the Zakho Corridor.

The Silopi site was selected by an advance party on 12 April because it was

level, free of obstacles, located near a river, large enough to support helicopter

operations, and only eight miles from the Iraqi border.

On 13 April, a convoy of support vehicles and equipment departed Incirlik

for Silopi and arrived at mid-day on 15 April. Ease development proceeded

rapidly. More than 200 airmen from the 564th Civil Engineer Squadron

(Ramstein, Germany) and the 36th Civil Engineer Squadron (Bitburg, Germany)

began constructing a 450-tent "city" large enough to accommodate 1,800 Allied

personnel. Base camp materials were provided by USAF Harvest Eagle comfort

kits, were installed by USAF "Prime Beef" teams, and were administered by

USAF "Prime Rib" teams.4' Items like tents, chairs, tables, and cots were

included in the Harvest Eagle package. Soon, more than 300 tents lined the main

road of HSSB Silopi. The first camp commander was Colonel William P.

Tangney, USA, who was also the commanding officer of the 10th Special Forces

Group from Fort Devens, Massachusetts 42

Within weeks the base held more than 3,000 military and civilian workers.

More than 600 tons of supplies were used at Silopi each day. The sprawling base

soon extended several miles along both sides of the road. When Silopi became

the home of the Combined Support Command, that organization assumed

responsibility for base operations and Colonel Burch became camp commander.

Silopi was a focal point for Marine activity. Colonel Kohl established the

MSSG-24 headquarters and a Combat Service Support Operations Center

(CSSOC) in the center of the main camp, across the road from the Combined

Support Command headquarters. The Marine motor pool was placed south of

town in a gravel pit, and the supply center was located just southeast of the

Combined Support Command supply dumps. Colonel Byrtus placed HMM-264's operations center at the northwest corner of the main camp adjoining the
38 HUMANITAIUAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Photograph by the author

A unit designator tree quickly sprouted in front of the Silopi mess hail. Identified units include the

U.S. 24th MEU (SOC) and CMAGTF 1-91, the British 3d Co,nmando Brigade, the Dutch 1st

Amphibious Combat Group, the U.S. 1/10 Special Forces Group, and the French Cougar team.

wheatfield landing zone and Marine operated FARP that serviced allied

helicopters.

The Silopi landing zone was a busy place. In addition to HMM-264's three

UH-lNs, four AH-lTs, four CH-53Es, and a dozen CH-46Es, virtually every

other type of NATO helicopter was also using the airstrip. The U.S. Army was

supported by a medium transport squadron flying CH-47 Chinooks, the 149th
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 39

Aerial Ambulance Company flying UH-60 Blackhawks, and the 4th (Aviation)

Battalion, 3d Infantry Division with UH-60 Blackhawks, UH-1 Hueys, AH-64

Apaches, OH-58 Kiowas, and EH-60 Nighthawks. The British had three

squadrons: the Royal Air Force Chinook Squadron flying CH-47s, 846th Naval

Air Squadron flying HC.4 Westland Sea King transports and HAS.3 Westland

Lynx attack helicopters, and the 3d Commando Brigade Air Squadron flying

Aerospatiale SA-341/HCC.4 Gazelle utility helicopters. The French Combat

Helicopter Regiment used SA-342 Gazelle light attack and AS-332 Super Puma

transport helicopters. The Dutch Composite Squadron (with several female pilots)

used Chinooks, Gazelles, and SA-361 Alouette III helicopters. The Italians and

Spanish used Hueys and Chinooks. Although the skies of northern Iraq were

crowded, no major air incidents or crashes resulted in Marine deaths during

Provide Comfort.

As time passed, Silopi's main base not only increased in size but became

more comfortable as well. Engineers dug a 400-foot well to enrich the water

supply. Showers were set up with 32 water points for the men and 8 for women.

Portable covered latrine facilities with running water were set up. The mess hall

was centrally located. It handled 6,000 people twice each day for pre-packaged

"T" ration hot meals and provided home-made soup, fresh-baked bread, and cold

drinks at noon. The chow lines were sprinided with soldiers and Marines from

many nations. British, French, Italian, and Spanish servicemen joined the

Americans waiting for chow each day. The obligatory signpost showing unit

home bases was placed in front of the mess hail. Its more than 20 arrows pointed

to Europe, North America, South America, and the Pacific Rim. The

international population was so diverse, Silopi had to be declared a "no saluting

area" because almost no one could correctly identify rank insignia from so many

different nations .

There was a busy post office (although postage stamps were not required on

letters, many people mailed packages home). The Mediterranean edition of the

Stars and Stripes newspaper was distributed daily by the joint public affairs

office. The Army and Air Force operated a joint disbursing office, unofficially

called the "First International Bank of Silopi." The U.S. Army 9th Finance

Group provided $60 "health and comfort" pay advances, cashed checks, and

disbursed emergency funds .

A post exchange and other morale, welfare, and recreation facilities were

opened for the military and civilian relief workers. At first, the exchange was

caught short because it brought only enough items to cater to the needs of 1,000

people, and an international crowd estimated at more than 4,000 people began

to visit the busy exchange each week. The store had little to offer until supplies

were sent from Saudi Arabia and its shelves were stocked with snack food,

cameras, film, cassette tapes, tape players, and assorted health and comfort

items. There were two recreation tents, one had two television sets and another

had a game room and a library. Volleyball, soccer, and touch football games

were frequently played.
40 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

Another source of diversion was the street market or "souk." Up and down

the roadway Turkish vendors--called "Meester, Meesters" because of their calls

to passing soldiers--hawked a wide variety of goods including cold sodas, oriental

rugs, and Iraqi money with Saddam's picture on it.45 In all likelihood, however,

the major form of recreation was story-telling. Soldiers from around the world

swapped tall tales about faraway places and exciting adventures or showed off

wounds from previous conflicts. The atmosphere at Silopi was a friendly one

where all nationalities, races, creeds, colors, and both sexes were united by the

desire to assist the Kurdish refugees, and many veteran campaigners felt Provide

Comfort was among the most rewarding experiences of long military careers.

CMAGTF 1-91

Contingency MAGTF 1-91 was formed from elements of the III Marine

Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa in

the western Pacific. The CMAGTF's command element came from the 3rd Force

Painting by Cot Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR

The air control tower at Sirsenk was manned by an arriving/departing air control group from

Okina wa-based CMAGTF 1-91. The Sirsenk airfield had been badly damaged during Desert Storm,

but was repaired by Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 41

Service Support Group (3d FSSG); the ground combat element was from the 3d

Marine Division; the aviation combat element was from the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing; the combat service support element was Company B, 3d Landing Support

Battalion, 3d FSSG. Company B was reinforced by service support detachments

from the 3d FSSG. Detachments came from the 3d Supply Battalion, two dumpsite sections and repair personnel out of the 3d Maintenance Battalion,

administrative personnel from Headquarters and Service Battalion, and a

detachment from the 9th Engineer Support Battalion. The commanding officer

was Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bailey. Major Robert E. "Bob" Milstead, Jr.,

doubled as executive officer and air officer. The personnel chief was Gunnery

Sergeant Michael J. Campbell, the intelligence officer was Captain Charles R.

Sontag, the operations officer was Captain Gregory M. Ferketish, and the

logistics officer was Captain Bruce G. Montgomery.

Contingency MAGTF 1-91 formed very quickly. The 3d FSSG was alerted

on 25 April. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey was notified on 26 April that he would

command the unit. He quickly formed a staff and began analyzing the unit's

mission. Bailey contacted the Marine liaison at Incirlik to find out details, then

briefed Major General Henry C. Stackpole III (Commanding General, III MEF)

about possible courses of action.

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort wanted two support companies or

their equivalent. Bailey suggested that one reinforced support company could do

the job. This concept was approved on 27 April. Contingency MAGTF 1-91 built

up from zero strength to 186 Marines in less than 72 hours. At 0140 on 30

April, CMAGTF 1-91 was at the airhead with all its equipment and cargo.

However, because of problems with aircraft assignment the unit didn't depart

Okinawa until 6 May. That interval was used to complete follow-on training, to

do additional maintenance for equipment and vehicles, and to publish Operation

Order 1-91.

The CMAGTF departed Kadena Air Base in Military Airlift Command

heavy-lift Lockheed C-5A Galaxy transports, but it took more than two and a

half days to get to Incirlik. The specified route went from Okinawa to Clark Air

Force Base in the Philippine Islands; however, some aircraft were rerouted to

Utapao, Thailand, due to bad weather. From Thailand, they flew to the U.S.

base at Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. The airfield at Dhahran, Saudi

Arabia, was the final stop before arriving at Incirlik. This change of plans

resulted in a two-day echelon of arrival, 7 to 9 May 1991. The first plane to

arrive at Incirlik carried the CMAGTF command element and Company B's

advance party.

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey reported to Combined Task Force Provide

Comfort Headquarters. The original plan was for CMAGTF 1-91 to operate two

forward cargo transition shipment points, one at Silopi and the other at

Yuksekova. An Arriving-Departing Air Control Group (A/DACG) was needed

at Yuksekova because C- 130 transports were using the airstrip. The CMAGTF's

specified tasks were to maintain command and control of widely scattered support

teams, provide landing support (helicopter support teams and A/DACG), manage
42 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

on-site commodity dumps, provide local security, and provide landing zone

communications support at six HSSDs.47

After arriving in Turkey, Lieutenant Colonel Bailey discovered Silopi was

well-developed and Yuksekova had almost completed its mission. The CMAGTF

was attached to the CSC on 8 May, then was immediately assigned to support

Joint Task Forces Alpha and Bravo. The CMAGTF deployed over a wide area,

much of it in rugged terrain, in appearance reminiscent of the Grand Canyon.

Forward support teams were assigned to way stations, formally titled Displaced

Civilian Movement Centers (DCMCs). Displaced civilian support teams (DCSTs)

consisted of one officer and about 20 enlisted Marines. There were six of them,

all located in northern Iraq: Kanimasi (Captain Michael K. McClanahan), Baloka

(Captain Charles R. Sontag), Kanibalav (First Lieutenant Kevin S. Brooks),

Nazdur (First Lieutenant Byron J. Paez), Singee (First Lieutenant James A.

Herzberg), and Chimaju (Captain Montgomery). An A/DACG was placed at

Sirsenk. The CMAGTF command element operated from Silopi.48 At Incirlik,

the CMAGTF's gear was impounded for five days. Although the entire unit

couldn't go to the field, an advance party moved to Silopi on 10 May.

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey's first task was to formulate a new plan. He and

his staff wrote Operation Order 2-91 which changed the mission and assigned

new tasks to CMAGTF 1-91. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey also initiated an internal

reorganization because officers were needed in the field to command displaced

civilian movement centers. The parachute riggers from 1st FSSG joined the

CMAGTF on 7 May. These additional Marines gave CMAGTF 1-91 a total

strength of 205 people.49

The DCSTs moved to six different locations in northern Iraq, using U.S.

Army CH-47 Chinooks and UH-60 Blackhawks. On the ground they quickly

established communications with Silopi. The biggest DCMC team was located at

Kanimasi. It mustered 33 people to provide helicopter support teams (HSTs) and

a Class I supply dump (fuel, water, dry cargo, bread, and foodstuffs). During the

first two weeks of operation, Kanimasi changed from a way station to a

resettlement area. The Nazdur DCMC displaced to the city of Begova, again

changing from a way station to a resettlement camp. The Chimaju and Singee

DCMCs and their associated DCSTs moved south of Sirsenk on 24 and 26 May

to support the movement of displaced civilians to Zakho and Dohuk.

One of the highlights of the CMAGTF tour in northern Iraq occurred on 18

May. At about 2100, a six-month old Kurdish girl was diagnosed as having

pneumonia in both lungs and a temperature of 103 degrees. The medic reported

that without advanced treatment, the child would be dead by morning. The

Marines requested a helicopter. Chemical illumination markers were placed

around the landing zone and an infrared strobe marked the touchdown spot.

Using night vision goggles borrowed from the Special Forces, the Marine

helicopter support team directed an Army helicopter safely into the zone. The

helicopter pilot had such a smooth approach and such good landing instructions

that he congratulated the Special Forces for a job well done. After being told it
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 43

Cpl Darryl F. Fuller of MSSG 24 mans a rig-mounted M-2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun atop a

M-934 five-ton truck. This convoy carried bulk foods, building materials, and medical supplies to

Refugee Camp I at Zakho.

was the Marines who brought him down, he shouted a loud "ARRUUGGAHH!

"into the speaker, then gave the Marines an "outstanding" rating. This almost

certainly was the first time night vision goggles and an infrared strobe light were

used for Marine air control.5°

The harsh landscape and long distances created communications problems.

The CMAGTF brought enough satellite communications (SatCom) equipment to

accomplish its original mission, but found it impossible to communicate from

deep valleys more than 60 miles from the receiving station at Silopi. The four

terminals were quickly overwhelmed. This problem was overcome by

"workarounds" using Air Force and Army communications systems. Three of the

four SatCom units eventually needed repairs. Every time repairs were needed,

Army and Air Force technicians had the equipment operating within a matter of

hours. The addition of three SatCom units and four high-gain antennas alleviated

some of the communications problems. Despite technical problems and the wide

dispersal of its units, CMAGTF 1-91 was a key to the efficient movement and

supply of the Kurdish return.

* This guttural yell of unknown origin was a distinctive Marine battle cry.
44 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

The Mission of MSSG-24

Provide Comfort was primarily a logistics operation. The 24th MEU (SOC)

logistics arm was MSSG-24 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Kohl.

It mustered 14 officers and about 230 enlisted Marines. The MSSG was on board

the Charleston when the word to move to Iskenderun came in. While in transit

to Turkey, Lieutenant Colonel Kohl had the staff prepare a detailed list of MSSG

equipment and capabilities. After receiving Major Mugno's preliminary report,

Kohl realized MSSG-24 most likely would be separated from its traditional "sea

base" and would have to operate an inland support base. This was a problem

because MSSG-24 had been forced to leave half of its 5-ton trucks, much of its

material handling equipment (especially forklifts), and some engineer assets at

Camp Lejeune because of the ship shortage. Planning was hampered by

incomplete intelligence, constantly changing information, and lack of specific

instructions. Despite these problems, MSSG-24 completed many alternative plans

and was "good to go" when the Charleston closed Iskenderun Harbor.

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl established the following priorities: 1) combat

service support, 2) humanitarian relief, and 3) civic action. The most immediate

tasks were provision of emergency supplies (food, water, blankets, baby food,

etc.) and rudimentary emergency medical care. The ships began unloading

supplies and equipment on 14 April 1991. At first only personnel, cargo,

equipment, and supplies required by HMM-264 were unloaded. Because Provide

Comfort was a non-combat operation, the BLT, the LFORM supply package, and

ground combat personnel and equipment remained on board ship. On 16 April,

a combat service support detachment was transferred to the forward support base

at Silopi. While much of MSSG-24's equipment was being held by Turkish

customs, the 24th MEU (SOC)'s mission was changed. The new mission made

it imperative to unload all MEU personnel, supplies, and equipment immediately

and to be prepared for potential combat and ready for extended inland operations.

Because the MEU's LFORM sustainment package was only good for 15 days,

requisitions for additional supplies and equipment were flashed back to Camp

Lejeune.

At Silopi, the CSSD acted as an advance party for the remainder of MSSG24 in addition to its aviation support role. On 19 April, a commercial convoy,

escorted by military tactical vehicles, transported MSSG-24's main party and

initial cargo loads more than 450 miles through the mountains to Silopi, which

served as MSSG-24's forward support base throughout Provide Comfort. The

operations section (S-3) manned a Combat Service Support Operations Center

(CSSOC) 24 hours a day to coordinate service support and respond to

emergencies. The logistics section (S-4) managed internal logistics matters

(embarkation, food services, accounting, distribution, and Class V ammunition

storage). A post office was established to support Silopi and Zakho under the

cognizance of the administrative section (S-i). The disbursing section remained

on board ship, but regularly sent contact teams to the field. Lieutenant Colonel
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 45

Kohl lost the services of his executive officer when Major Mugno was retained

at Incirlik with Navy-Marine Liaison Team iO.'

The MSSG had seven key functions: maintenance, supply, medical,

communications, motor transport, landing support, and engineer support. MSSG24, as all MSSGs, was created to support a specific MEU and was task organized

for that purpose. The detachments assigned to MSSG-24 were from the 2d FSSG.

Because of space limitations, MSSG-24 sailed short-handed and left some of its

equipment behind. These shortfalls often were made up for by long working

hours and inventive use of equipment.52

The Maintenance Platoon (Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth D. Franklin)

established an intermediate maintenance activity at Silopi to repair ground

equipment, provide wrecker service for disabled vehicles, man mobile welding

and fabric repair teams, and man mobile maintenance contact teams. The Supply

Platoon (First Lieutenant Todd L. Eggers) warehoused, replenished, and

distributed MREs, dry-cell batteries, fuel and lubricants, LFORM supplies,

military clothing, medical supplies, repair parts, and selected ordnance items.

Medical personnel worked with the Joint Aid Facility, the Joint Dental Facility,

and the 39th Air Transportable Hospital. Hospital Corpsman Arthur W. Angel

ran a small clinic and conducted medical and dental civic action patrols

(MedCaps) to service the refugees and local population. The Communications

Platoon (First Lieutenant Patrick J. Allison) established, maintained, and operated

tactical radio networks, operated camp telephone networks, augmented the Joint

Communications Center, and supported remote communications operations at

Zakho and Dohuk.53

The Motor Transport Detachment (First Lieutenant Luke Marsden) ran a

motor pool including organic maintenance, vehicle dispatching, stationary

refueling, and mobile refueling. Tactical convoys ran twice daily. The first

overland delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to Zakho was made on 22 April.

Security was paramount so each convoy was escorted by armed guards. Trucks

used .50-caliber heavy machine guns on ring mounts for protection. Humvee

(short for High-mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled Vehicle) utility trucks usually

carried a couple of riflemen as "shotgun" guards. Every convoy was treated as

a combat mission. The Turkish border was designated the line of departure where

all weapons were locked and loaded. While no ambushes or fire fights involving

Marines occurred, there were several hair-raising incidents.

On 12 May the occupants of one such convoy were rolling along, enjoying

the bright sunshine and chatting as normal. As the convoy approached Zakho,

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl and his colleague, both of whom had been wounded in

Vietnam, suddenly stopped talking and became abnormally watchful. Each of

them had been alerted simultaneously by a combat-veteran's "sixth sense" that

something was wrong. "If we were in Vietnam, I'd say we were heading into an

ambush," muttered the passenger. Without taking his eyes from the road,

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl nodded his assent and ordered the lead vehicle to slow

down and move forward cautiously. Using this cue, Marines in the trailing

vehicles became restless and hunkered down anticipating possible action. As the
46 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Unexploded ordnance was a major problem in northern Iraq. Here members of an explosive

ordnance demolition team remove live mortar shells from an Iraqi military compound at Zakho.

This compound later became the 24th MEU (SOC) Headquarters, named Camp Sommers to honor

the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps.

convoy entered Zakho, it slowed to a crawl because the normally busy streets

were deserted except for a single mangy dog. Finally, Camp Sommers was

reached without incident and the Marines breathed a collective sigh of relief.

However, this incident was not actually a false alarm. The Marines at Camp

Sommers reported that a mob of Kurds had just overrun the local Iraqi police

station in retaliation for an early morning shooting incident. A similar scare

occurred on 30 May when a two-vehicle convoy was engulfed by a mob of about

1,000 Kurds demonstrating in front of Joint Task Force Bravo Headquarters. It

turned out the demonstrators were pro-American, however, the unexpected sight

of what appeared to be an unruly mob created rapid pulse rates among startled

Marines who did not understand what was going on.54

The Landing Support Platoon (First Lieutenant Christopher A. Arantz),

called the "red patches" because of their distinctive scarlet emblems worn on

trousers, jackets, and utility caps, was a major part of the initial CSSD sent to

Silopi. After arrival, the detachment was controlled by Joint Task Force Bravo.

It single-handedly operated the flight line for the first two weeks, servicing

helicopters from all American services and six nations. The detachment's forklifts

were the only heavy material handling equipment (HME) available and were

critical to helicopter offloading. They also unloaded more than 900 commercial

trucks. During the first three weeks this detachment unloaded 16 million pounds

of supplies. The Red Patches manifested and loaded 2.3 million pounds of relief

supplies onto 442 helicopters. The helicopter support team conducted 91 separate

lifts without a mishap. These loads included the external lift of a disabled CH-53,
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 47

five humvees, 51 fuel bladders, a bulldozer, a small emplacement excavator

(SEE), and more than 50 other sling loads."

The Engineer Support Platoon (First Lieutenant Jeffery M. Reagan) was

always near the tip of the spear. These Marines provided Joint Task Force Bravo

engineer, explosive ordnance disposal, bulk fuel storage and distribution, water

purification, mobile electric power, floodlights, and specialized civic action

special project support. The MSSG's three-man explosive ordnance detachment

(EOD) was strengthened by a U.S. Navy EOD detachment from the aircraft

carrier Roosevelt and were assisted by foreign EOD teams from the British 59th

Independent Commando, Royal Engineers; the French 17th Airborne Engineer

Regiment and Foreign Legion sappers; and Italian engineers. The joint NavyMarine EOD team detonated more than 37,000 ordnance items weighing about

52 tons in April and May. Marines in northern Iraq were frequently dismayed

to find Kurdish children playing with live ordnance. Despite all efforts to warn

the displaced civilians, several tragedies occurred. More than 20 Kurds had to

be treated when explosives detonated in their hands. Three paratroopers were

severely wounded by a detonated mine. At Isikveren, a Special Forces soldier

was killed and a Marine was badly wounded while trying to extract frightened

refugees from a minefield.56

The most pressing issue facing MSSG-24 was the lack of materials and

equipment. The decision to retain combat and combat support personnel and

equipment because of a critical shortage of boat spaces on the ships of Phibron

8 obviated trimming combat service support. The MSSG deployed with only half

its normal allocation of five-ton trucks and without the Amphibious Assault

Fueling System. One-half of its portable electric generators were left behind, and

there was no water truck. During Provide Comfort the motor transport shortage

was offset by doubling the number of runs. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel

Kohl, "We made 10 trucks look like 20."57 This expedient initially provided an

A Marine leads a group of Kurdish men while they plan the layout of Refugee Camp 1, near Zakho,

Iraq in April 1991. The Marines of the 24th MEU (SOC) established this camp to show the Iraqis

their humanitarian intent. Three camps eventually occupied this area.
48 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

acceptable level of transportation support, but eventually compounded maintenance problems which resulted in degradation of overland hauling

capacity. The MSSG's trucks accumulated 27,000 miles in the first 30 days

(during MSSG-24 's previous Mediterranean Cruise it drove only about 25,000

miles in six months).58

The mobile electric power shortage was overcome through interservice

cooperation. Bulk fuel handling eventually became a multi-service, multi-national

effort, although HMM-264 and MSSG-24 carried the whole load for the first

three weeks. Potable water was provided by Reverse Osmosis Water Purification

Units (ROWPU5), existing wells, and commercial and military water trucks.

Again, MSSG-24 carried the entire load for JTF-B until mid-May.59

The Marines of MSSG-24 worked hard and accomplished much. They

carried most of the load for Joint Task Force Bravo in northern Iraq until

additional support arrived, operated a humanitarian service support base at Silopi

and a combat service support detachment at Zakho, set up and ran refugee Camp

One, and unloaded ships at the docks of Iskenderun. It is safe to say their efforts

were critical to the success of Marine forces during Operation Provide Comfort.

Planning Operation Encourage Hope

Kurdistan

Kurdistan was a unique place. It had land but no territory; it once had a king

but was never a kingdom; it had a flag but was not a sovereign state; many

people lived there, but Kurdistan had no "population." A person could search

every modern map of the area and never find a country called Kurdistan, because

this kingdom existed only in the dreams of the Kurdish people.

For centuries, the Kurds constantly searched for, but never truly found,

political independence. Twice in the 20th century this age-old dream almost

became reality. An independent homeland was promised after World War I, but

this dream ended when the provisions of the stillborn Treaty of Sevres were

renounced by Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal. After World War II, the Kurdish

state of Mahabad was formed in Iran, but folded after the Soviet Union withdrew

its support in 1946.

The area traditionally called Kurdistan was located in the rugged mountains,

pleasant valleys, and fertile plains at the convergence of the Taurus and Zagros

Mountains. It occupied parts of four modern countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, and

Turkey. Iraqi Kurdistan was a triangular area north of the Diyala River, east of

the Tigris River, and south of Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran. This area

contained some of Iraq's richest farmland and sat atop its most productive

oilfields. Unfortunately for the Kurds, these economic factors meant the Iraqi

government would never surrender its proprietorship of this valuable region.

In 1970, an official Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) was created by

an agreement known as the March Manifesto. Purposely kept small, this zone

included only parts of three provinces: Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah. This

was done despite the fact that traditional Kurdistan also included Nineveh,
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 49

Photograph by the author

An abandoned Ira qi"Beau Geste" fortress silently guards Highway 6 leading from the Habur

border crossing to the Iraqi provincial capital of Dohuk. Similar fortresses occupied most key

terrain throughout Iraqi Kurdistan.

Attamim, Salahadin, and Diyala Provinces.60 Iraqi Kurdistan now was located

in the coarse highlands where mountain peaks reached 12,000 feet and highland

valleys rose as high as 4,000 feet. Many small streams and several large rivers

traversed the region. One of these, the Hazil-su branch of the Khabur River, part

of the Tigris River's secondary tributary system, marked Iraq's northwestern

border with Turkey. Kurdistan's cities included Erbil, Kirkuk, Mosul,

Sulaymaniyah, Zakho, and Dohuk.

The Area of Operations

The main avenue of approach into Iraq was the Zakho Corridor, a fruitful

plain several miles wide cut only by the narrow Hazil River. Dohuk Province

was located at the eastern tip of this lush valley where Iraq abutted the Turkish

border. The city of Zakho, home to more than 50,000 people before the troubles,

was built around a rocky island in the Khabur River, only six miles from the

Turkish border. Zakho was a famous stronghold where ancient Kurds battled

Xenophon's Greeks, Alexander's Macedonians, and Roman Legions before the
50 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

birth of Christ. It was still viewed as a troublesome center of Kurdish resistance

by the Iraqi government and had been repeatedly struck by chemical weapons

during Saddam's repression campaigns. In more normal times, Zakho's economic

livelihood was the sheep and goat trade, and a brisk grain business also fueled

the local economic fires.

Painting by Col Peter M. Mike Gish, USMCR

A Kurdish woman stands pensively at a displaced civilian movement center in northern Iraq. The

Kurds were an ethnic minority that claimed northern Iraq as a traditional homeland. Unlike their

Arab neighbors, Kurdish women went unveiled and wore colorful, flowing robes decorated with

coins and jewels.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 51

On the Iraqi side of the Habur border crossing, a four-color Iraqi flag

fluttered over the customs house manned by a small border guard detachment.

The crossing had been closed for several months. Both spans of the bridge across

the Hazil River had been destroyed. The river's steep banks and low-lying

marshes were mined to discourage infiltrators. Iraqi trenches, tank revetments,

and artillery positions were dug into the heights that overlooked Habur.

Iraqi Route 6, a two-lane, hard-surfaced road, led from Habur to Zakho and

points east. There was a road junction about midway between Zakho and Dohuk.

The eastern route continued through Dohuk and on to Sirsenk. The southern road

led to Mosul. Comfortably nestled in the foothills, the city of Dohuk was a

provincial capital with paved streets, concrete buildings, and modern

conveniences. This contemporary city was normally the home of about 400,000

people and served as the transportation and communications hub of northern Iraq.

Nearby Saddam Dam harnessed the waters of the Tigris River to provide

irrigation and electric power. The region was cold and wet during the winter but

was hot and dry during the summer.

The debris of wrecked villages dotted the Zakho Corridor. Because of the

battling between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, many towns and villages

in Kurdistan had been razed and their populations scattered. Many villages and

towns that appeared on 1970-vintage maps no longer existed by 1990.61

Unfortunately, these ruins were not the only reminders of Saddam's hostility

toward the Kurds. All Kurdistan was salted with explosive mines and booby

traps. Dangerous unexploded ordnance littered the region. Every building

displayed battle scars from the recent fighting. Less than 2,000 civilians remained

at Dohuk and less than 300 stayed in Zakho. In April 1991, the nearly deserted

streets of Zakho and Dohuk were patrolled by Iraqi "policemen" wearing Army

uniforms and carrying assault rifles. The occupying Iraqis had thoroughly looted

every home and carried off every item of value.

Kurdistan seethed with resistance to Saddam's harsh rule, so it was occupied

by two Iraqi Army corps. The I Corps held northern Kurdistan and the II Corps

was stationed in eastern Kurdistan. The Iraqi I Corps controlled two infantry

divisions, several independent mechanized brigades, and an elite special assault

brigade. These forces were stationed in or near Dohuk Province. Army posts

ranged in size from Saddam's huge summer palace at Sirsenk to small Beau

Geste-type forts found on the crest of almost every ridge. The main supply route

from the Turkish border to the city of Zakho was overlooked by no less than

four such forts. Zakho was the site of a large Iraqi-run Palestinian military

training camp whose walls and entrances were adorned by large murals

portraying a smiling Saddam and colored designs whose theme was IraqiPalestinian solidarity. The Iraqi 44th Infantry Division was also headquartered at

Zakho.
52 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Concept of Operations

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort's initial objective was to provide

immediate emergency relief to dislocated Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq and

southern Turkey. Although the situation quickly stabilized and refugee survival

needs were being met, it was obvious this intense effort could not continue

indefinitely. The new focus of the relief effort was to erect temporary facilities

in the lowlands so the displaced civilians could move to a more accessible locale.

These lowland camps were organized to ease distribution problems, enhance

sanitation, increase Kurdish administrative participation, and facilitate turnover

of the relief effort to civilian control. Additional tasks were to develop new

temporary camps and to improve forward base habitability and accessibility.

The supply support plan was initially based on delivery using prepackaged

supplies, referred to as a "push" system by logisticians. This was the best way

to move supplies forward in a hurry, but was neither the most efficient nor the

most responsive way to supply the camps. Loads had to be relatively small so

they could be delivered by air. They provided general materials, but did not meet

specific requests or individual needs. The effort was costly, time consuming, and

took a high toll on limited air assets. It was far more desirable to use a "pull"

system whereby supplies were delivered by truck or rail to a central point, then

redistributed according to requests by each camp administrator. Logistics goals

were to transition from MREs to fresh food, to move from airdrop to overland

delivery, and to change from "push" to "pull" logistics as quickly as possible.

The major drawbacks to adopting "pull" support were that it required a large

stock of supplies, a complex requisition and delivery system, and well-developed

camp infrastructures (roads, landing zones, staging areas, etc.). These requisites

were developing rapidly, but were not yet in place.

A second force, Task Force Encourage Hope (later renamed Joint Task Force

Bravo), was formed to construct a series of resettlement camps where dislocated

civilians could find food and shelter and a secure environment. Encourage Hope

was designed to integrate civilian relief agencies into the support, organization,

and administration of the camps. The Kurds were expected to assist in the

planning, construction, administration, and sustainment of these camps. The

camps each held about 25,000 people and were initially supplied by the military.

They eventually became self-sustaining and were transferred to Kurdish or nongovernment agency control as soon as possible. It was hoped that Joint Task

Force Encourage Hope could be dissolved after about a month.62

Additional Forces

The increasing complexities of Operation Provide Comfort required everincreasing support. In addition to massive security and logistics efforts, three

other support areas were critical: civil affairs, psychological operations, and

civilian operations. Two U.S. Army civil affairs companies and a Marine civil

affairs detachment were dispatched to Turkey. The Marine detachment was from
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 53

Painting by Col Peter M. 'Mike Gish, USMCR

A young Marine sergeant converses with a Kurdish elder in northern Iraq. Kurdish elders, known

as 'mullahs," are revered for their wisdom and their opinions carry much weight.

the Reserve 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG). Originally, civil affairs teams

were sent to the mountain camps to assess the living conditions and future needs.

Later, civil affairs teams at Silopi, Yuksekova, and Incirlik assisted civilian relief

agencies. Civil affairs personnel played major roles at Zakho and Dohuk as well.

The 4th CAG was a Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit from Washington,

D.C. It was activated for Operation Desert Storm and served with the I Marine

Expeditionary Force at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. The group returned to Camp

Lejeune for demobilization on 16 April 1991. While at Lejeune, Colonel Easton

was informed that 10 members of the unit were needed to support Operation

Provide Comfort. This detachment flew from Cherry Point, North Carolina, on

20 April, arrived at Incirlik on 21 April, and moved to Silopi on 22 April. At

Zakho, the group was divided into two sections and assigned to existing joint

civil affairs teams.63

When Joint Task Force Encourage Hope was formed the civil affairs mission

expanded. In order to smooth the way, civil affairs teams planned to control,

supervise, and look out for the welfare of the displaced civilians as they moved

south. Civilian relief agencies, international private voluntary organizations, and

the United Nations also assisted during this phase of the operation. A secondary

effort was to drum up Kurdish and civilian support for the movement south.M

The U.S. Army's Company A, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th

Psychological Warfare Group provided teams to support Operation Encourage
54 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Hope. They distributed informational leaflets, used loud speakers, made radio

announcements, conducted informational briefings, held meetings with Kurdish

elders, and contacted Christian and Muslim religious leaders at Zakho. These

teams sought to inspire Kurdish self-reliance, to inform Iraqi soldiers that the

multinational force had the capability and the will to protect humanitarian

operations, to discourage the PKK (a Kurdish anti-Turkish splinter group), and

to convince skeptical non-Kurdish civilians that humanitarian efforts were legally

and morally correct.

The United States Office of Disaster Assistance sent two Disaster Assistance

Relief Teams (DARTs) to Turkey. The team assigned to Encourage Hope was

headed by Mr. Frederick C. Cuny. The fact he was a former Marine gave him

a common bond with the Marines in Kurdistan and meant that he understood the

principles of military necessity. Colonel Jones credited Cuny's service as

invaluable."66

Encourage Hope Begins

In mid-April, American Secretary of State James A. Baker III informed Iraqi

Ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Amir Al-Anbari that allied forces

intended to initiate humanitarian operations at the Iraqi tbwn of Zakho "in the

immediate future." He specified the following actions: 1) that Iraq withdraw all

its armed forces 30 kilometers south of Zakho, 2) that a consultative meeting

between U.S. military personnel and an Iraqi military team take place, and 3)

that the meeting be held in Zakho at noon, Friday, 19 April 1991. The purpose

of the meeting was to avoid unfortunate incidents between allied and Iraqi forces,

to inform the Iraqis about future relief operations, and to discuss any other

matters of mutual interest 67

Issues Facing the 24th MEU (SOC)

On 16 April, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the order to begin

security operations in northern Iraq. The next day Encourage Hope was

launched. General Garner moved Joint Task Force Bravo Headquarters to Silopi

on 17 April. Task Force Bravo included a skeleton headquarters and a few Army

helicopter air and ground crews, but General Garner would have to rely on the

24th MEU Headquarters to act as the command element until reinforcements

arrived. Joint Task Force Bravo's initial maneuver element was the 24th MEU

(SOC). When General Garner opened shop, the 24th MEU (SOC) Forward was

already operating from Silopi, Colonel Jones and the Alpha Command Group

flew in, some of BLT 2/8 was already in place and the rest was in transit,

HMM-264 was operating the Silopi landing zones, and MSSG-24 was unloading

the ships of Phibron 8 at Iskenderun Harbor.

General Garner tasked Colonel Jones to move the 24th MEU (SOC) into

northern Iraq on 20 April to secure the town of Zakho. In preparation, a flight

of two MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from the USAF 21st Special Operations
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 55

Marines from the 24th MEU (SOC) sit on their packs as they wait for transportation to the

humanitarian services support base set up in Silopi, Turkey.

Squadron made a reconnaissance of the area. They brought back photographs and

video imagery of the operations area and potential camp sites. During the flight

two CH-53Es from HMM-264 stood by as combat search and rescue aircraft, and

a rifle platoon from Company E, BLT 2/8 acted as a "Sparrowhawk" reaction

force. Under cover of darkness, reconnaissance Marines and sailors from SEAL

Team 3 were inserted into northern Iraq and began clandestine operations

preparing the way for a two-company helicopterborne operation scheduled to

begin three days later.68

After receiving General Garner's orders to secure Zakho, Colonel Jones met

with his staff, then adopted President Theodore Roosevelt's dictate to "Speak

softly, but carry a big stick." The 24th MEU (SOC) was not to back down if the

Iraqis tried to bully the Marines, yet, were to allow them an opportunity to pull

back peacefully. Colonel Jones termed this policy "aggressive restraint," but the

Combined Task Force staff at Incirlik frequently called it "leaning forward in the

saddle." For its part, the 24th MEU (SOC) obviously was handicapped because

not all of its normal assets were available. Lieutenant Colonel Corwin and BLT

2/8 were "good to go," but were vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the

Iraqis. The Black Knights of HMM-264 had to split their efforts to accomplish

three missions at the same time. In addition to combat support for the MEU,

some helicopters transported supplies and personnel. Others supported JTF-A's

emergency relief efforts. Logistics support was still tied to the ships of Phibron

8 at Iskenderun, so supplies had to be hauled long distances by either helicopters

or trucks. The support base at Silopi was being developed, but was not yet fully

operational. A short-handed MSSG-24 was stretched to the limit because of
56 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

scarce transportation, three widely separated work sites, and a supply line that

ran more than 450 miles. Though all of these problems eventually were worked

out, they hampered operations during the 24th MEU (SOC)'s first days inland.

Joint Task Force Bravo's mission was to establish an allied presence in

northern Iraq to convince the Kurds of the allied commitment, to alleviate

refugee suffering by delivering relief supplies, and to protect the dislocated

civilians from Iraqi reprisal. Colonel Jones had some initial concerns about the

proposed operation: He worried about lack of planning time, uncertainty about

future operations, the Iraqi forces in the area, the long distance from support

bases, Iraqi and Kurdish intentions, and interservice cooperation and

compatibility of communications equipment.

Operation Provide Comfort was launched on the spur of the moment. The

hurried movement, hasty nature, sketchy details, and lack of long-range goals

forced Colonel Jones and operations officer Lieutenant Colonel Tom Linn to burn

a lot of midnight oil. Rules of engagement were formulated to cover every

possible situation. Implied tasks had to be deduced and solutions worked out.

Unknown terrain and foul weather could adversely affect operations. There were

no definitive answers about the length of the MEU's stay or the exact structure

of the allied forces. Two key questions kept arising: "Would the Iraqis and the

Kurds stop shooting? Would Saddam live up to his word, or were his promises

just another example of his monstrous capacity for duplicity?"

This last question was troubling. Although Saddam agreed to cooperate, there

was no clear demonstration of any intention to do so. Therefore, it was prudent

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA

MajGen Jay M. Garner addresses the Marines of the 24th MEU (SOC) assembled on the flight deck

of the USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7). The 24th MEU was composed of headquarters, BLT 2/8, HMM264, and MSSG 24.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 57

Photograph courtesy of BGen James L. Jones, USMC

The leaders of JTF Bravo in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort are LtCol John P.

Abiziad, USA (GO, 3-325 ABCT); Col James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (GO, 24th MEU [SOCJ);

MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA (CG, JTF-B); LtCol Cees Van Egmond, DKM (GO, Netherlands 1st

ACG); LtGol Tony L. Gorwin, USMG (GO, BLT 2/8); and LtGol Jonathan Thompson, RM (CO,

British 45th Commando).

to plan both opposed and unopposed scenarios. If hostilities broke out, the 24th

MEU faced vastly superior Iraqi combat power. The MEU was a light

expeditionary force with no tanks, limited antitank assets, and only about 2,000

Marines. Major Richard J. Raftery, the intelligence officer, reported two Iraqi

infantry divisions and several independent tank units inside or near the target

area. Also, Iraqi paramilitary guards manned border positions; a brigade of the

Iraqi 44th Infantry Division was still at Zakho; a dozen T-55 tanks lurked in

armor revetments between Zakho and Dohuk; Iraqi artillery outnumbered and

outranged American guns; antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles

remained in the hills; two Republican Guard armored brigades waited near

Mosul, less than an hour's ride from Zakho; and the Iraqis had planted more

than a million mines in northern Iraq. In the words of one Marine, "The MEU

has enough combat power to get into a fight, but may not have enough to finish

the job." If fighting broke out, Colonel Jones would have to conduct a delaying

action and rely on timely air support from Incirlik or the aircraft carrier

Roosevelt, on station just off the Turkish coast, to tip the combat balance.

There were also concerns about Kurdish reactions. It was obvious that most

Kurds were in dire need of assistance, but they were notoriously fragmented

politically. Allied forces assisting them had to be neutral dispensers of

humanitarian aid and never appear to be "playing favorites." There were fears

that Kurdish guerrillas might use the security zone as a base of operations,
58 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

creating a sort of "Gaza Strip" sanctuary in northern Iraq. Luckily, these

concerns proved to be unfounded.69

Only minor problems with joint and combined interoperability arose. For the

past decade, joint exercises had been held to eliminate problems similar to those

that plagued Operations Eagle Claw (Desert One) and Urgent Fury (Grenada).

Most interservice conflicts had been worked out, but a few problems remained.

Not all Marine communications equipment was compatible with that of other

services. The 24th MEU (SOC) did not have sufficient organic equipment to

meet all the needs of a joint task force. Most non-Marine forces arriving in

northern Iraq were combat ready, but were not expeditionary, so they relied on

the Marines for fuel, food, water, transportation, ground control, spare parts,

and technical assistance.

Operation Provide Comfort was a multinational team effort by players of

different cultures, nationalities, and races. As Operation Provide Comfort went

on, eastern Turkey and northern Iraq became gathering places for representatives

of the Free World's military forces. Northern Iraq was also a "hot spot" for

foreign correspondents. Therefore, Operation Provide Comfort was conducted

in a "glass bowl." Every action was keenly observed by the critical eyes of the

world media.

Photograph by the author

An aerial view of the town of Zakho in northern Iraq. Zakho was the site of the headquarters

compounds of both Joint Task Force Bravo and the 24th MEU (SOC).
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 59

Multinational and interservice planning proved to be no problem because so

many allied officers had attended foreign schools or had been "seconded"

(assigned) to foreign units during their military careers. This was particularly

true for the Marines; many French, British, and Dutch officers attended Marine

schools at Quantico, Virginia. Additionally, the Marines had a long history of

making combined landings in the Mediterranean. The 24th MEU (SOC) had

conducted three such exercises before being assigned to Operation Provide

Comfort. This training paid off handsomely because the Marines had already

became familiar with British, French, Italian, and Spanish operating procedures.

The unique cooperative spirit and the good humor of the allies was shown

at one of the 24th MEU's morning meetings. After a discussion of future

operations by the MEU staff, Colonel Jones repeated what was said in French (he

had lived in France for 12 years), a language understood by the French, Italian,

and Spanish liaison officers. After this impressive recitation, Jones apologizedfor

not being able to translate for the only unit whose language he could not

understand, that of our British allies! A ripple of laughter quickly spread across

the room, and no one appeared to laugh harder than the British representative,

Lieutenant Colonel Graham Kerr, commanding officer of the 29th Commando

Regiment, Royal Artillery. Largely because of this spirit, Operation Provide

Comfort seemed a model of international and interservice cooperation.7° With

preparations complete, the next order of business for the 24th MEU (SOC) was

moving across the Turkish border into Kurdistan.

Zakho

Into Iraq

At noon on 19 April 1991, Lieutenant General Shalikashvili was escorted by

a Marine security detachment when he met with Brigadier General Nashwan

Dahnoun, the senior representative of the Iraqi Army General Staff. The meeting

was held near Zakho and was described as a "polite, proper, frank [discussion

that] clarified all views."7' Rather than beat around the bush or engage in

lengthy pleasantries, General Shalikashvili told the Iraqis what was going to

happen in a straight forward manner. He outlined CTF Provide Comfort's

mission. He emphasized the humanitarian nature of the operation, but made it

very clear that Iraqi interference risked military confrontation. The noise of

American jets passing overhead reinforced this point, providing overall an

excellent example of "aggressive restraint."

General Shalikashvili went over plans to build refugee camps, and the

prospective sites were located on a map. To ensure the safety of the refugees and

the combined task force, General Shalikashvili also requested information about

Iraqi minefields around Zakho. He reminded General Nashwan about the limits

on Iraqi military operations and inquired about the scheduled withdrawal of

troops 72 Nashwan balked at the request to pull back, stating Iraqi "police" were

needed to ensure public order, but promised to provide information about the
60 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

minefields. In closing, General Shalikashvili proposed establishing a Military

Coordination Center (MCC) to prevent future misunderstandings.

At 1330 on 20 April, HMM-264 delivered the first wave of a two-company

helicopterborne task force to Zakho. Company G landed just outside the city.

The heavily laden Marines (some carrying more than 60 pounds of equipment

and ammunition) moved to the high ground and occupied overwatch positions

which gave them a clear view of the objective. The remainder of the force

included the BLT Alpha Command Group, Company F, and an 81mm mortar

section. Lieutenant Colonel Tony L. Corwin noticed Iraqi soldiers still in the

objective area, despite the fact they should have been gone. Reports from the

reconnaissance teams confirmed the presence of many Iraqis and a few armored

vehicles. The Marines and Iraqis were soon standing eyeball-to-eyeball with

neither side about to blink.

Lieutenant Colonel Corwin gave clear instructions for the Iraqis to move out

of Zakho. At first, the Iraqi commander belligerently replied he knew nothing

about Operation Provide Comfort and had no orders to vacate. However, some

menacing overflights by heavily armed American A-b Warthogs and Sea Cobra

helicopter gunships convinced the Iraqis to sling arms and hit the road. As soon

as the Iraqis left, the Marines began building a refugee camp to demonstrate their

humanitarian intent. Before nightfall, a dozen bright blue and white tents had
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 61

been erected. These were the first of more than 10,000 tents that would be put

up in three camps that eventually housed more than 180,000 refugees! The BLT

Bravo Command Group, Companies E and H, the artillery, assault amphibians,

and a light armored vehicle detachment remained at the Iraqi border ready to

move into Zakho the next day.73

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl, commanding officer of MSSG-24, was given an

unusual operational mission by Colonel Jones. The Turkish-Iraqi border crossing

at Habur was closed, but had to be opened to allow overland supply of the

assault force. This task would normally have been given to the ground combat

element, but Lieutenant Colonel Corwin was busy conducting the assault, so

Kohl was tasked to do this. Lieutenant Colonel Kohl, First Sergeant Delgado, a

five-member civilian relief team, and a rifle squad departed Silopi for Habur

during mid-afternoon of 20 April.

During Desert Storm the Iraqis had dropped both bridge spans at Habur and

mined the roadway leading to Zakho, but since the cease fire, a field expedient

bridge had since been thrown across the river. Reports indicated the Iraqis had

removed some, but not all of the mines. At Habur, Lieutenant Colonel Kohl

located a Turkish lieutenant who spoke broken English. Kohl patiently explained

the crossing was to be opened to allied traffic the next morning. The Turkish

A fast attack vehicle (FAV) on patrol carries two U.S. and one British Marine as it crosses the

Khabur River in Central Zakho. A FAV is an M151 jeep mounting either a machine gun or a TOW

antitank missile.
62 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

officer escorted Kohl to the center of the bridge where they met an Iraqi border

guard. Kohl again explained the situation, then indicated he was concerned about

explosives on the bridge and along the main supply route. The Iraqi remained

silent about the mines, but stated he did not have the authority to allow the

Americans to cross and would have to check with his superiors. While Kohl

waited for an answer, Iraqi reinforcements occupied the heights overlooking the

road. To counter this show of force, Marine Sea Cobras, Army Blackhawks, and

Air Force Warthogs droned ominously in the sky overhead. About 20 minutes

later the Iraqi returned and granted permission to cross the bridge. For the

second time that day, the 24th MEU (SOC)'s policy of aggressive restraint paid

big dividends

Unfortunately, the Turks had neither instructions nor authority to allow the

Americans across the border. About 90 more minutes lapsed before Turkish

permission to cross was granted. On the bridge, several Iraqis worked with an

American explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) team. They discovered no mines

but found explosive charges under the bridge and removed them. Lieutenant

Colonel Kohl's mission was a success; the first American convoy moved into

northern Iraq at 0800 the next day (21 April).

During this time, the MEU Command Element, the Aviation Combat

Element, and MSSG-24 settled in at Silopi, while back at Iskenderun convoys

carried the final Marine increments forward. The Charleston and the Austin were

completely offloaded and the MEU's 15-day Landing Force Operational

Readiness Material (LFORM) was on shore. The Guadalcanal remained nearby

to provide aviation support.75 Messages to the United States requested further

logistics and combat support. Included in these requests were those for additional

firepower control teams from 2d ANGLICO, an RPV detachment from 2d SRIG,

and more engineer assets. It was also hoped that an AV-8B Harrier II detachment

might be made available.

Securing Zakho

On 22 April, a Military Coordination Center was established at Zakho. Army

Colonel Richard Naab, a team chief, two liaison officers, and two linguists

comprised the allied team. A similar Iraqi contingent was led by Brigadier

General Nashwan. The Center operated 24 hours a day to provide face-to-face

discussions during tense situations, kept both sides informed about future

operations, and acted as a sounding board for opposing views about current

operations.

General Nashwan used the first meeting to announce that Iraqi forces north

of the 37th Parallel had been ordered to pull back and that Iraqi commanders

were cooperating completely. However, despite these congenial relations at the

MCC, the Iraqis quickly tested the coalition's determination. Although all Iraqi

troops had allegedly left Zakho, more than 300 "policemen" wearing military

uniforms and carrying automatic weapons remained. Major Raftery's intelligence

section later confirmed that they were soldiers from the 66th Special Assault
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 

Painting by Col Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR 

Col Mike Gishportrays the entrance to Camp Sommers in Zahko, Iraq. Camp Sommers, named for 

Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps David W. Sommers, housed the 24th MEU (SOC) 

headquarters, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133, the U.S. Army 18th Engineer Brigade and 

18th Military Police Brigade, and the Joint Civil Affairs Group. 

Brigade. At the next meeting Colonel Naab reiterated the coalition's insistence 

that all Iraqi forces be moved at least 30 kilometers south, but he was answered 

by silence. The second major incident of the day occurred that evening when a 

flight of Iraqi MI-8 helicopters headed for northern Iraq was intercepted by F-16 

fighters from Incirlik. The incident was quickly resolved when the helicopters 

landed and offered no re~istance.'~ 

The American Marines in northern Iraq were joined by their foreign 

brothers-in-arms when the British 45th Commando, Royal Marines, was placed 

under the tactical control of the 24th MEU. This battalion-size unit of 637 Royal 

Marine "Booties" was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Thompson. 

Lieutenant Colonel Thompson established his command post in an abandoned 

school about 10 kilometers outside Zakho. Thompson's headquarters section was 

joined by three rifle companies: X, Y, Z, and Company M (the British 

Commando Mountain and Arctic Warfare Training Cadre). Historically, British 

and Dutch Marines worked closely together and had often formed combined 

United Kingdom-Netherlands landing forces. This tradition continued in northern 

Iraq. On 23 April more than 400 "Cloggers" of the 1st Amphibious Combat 

Group (1st ACG), Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, commanded by Lieutenant 
64 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Colonel Cees Van Egmond, arrived in northern Iraq. With these attachments, the

24th MEU (SOC) formed an unofficial "international brigade" that mustered

about 3,600 personnel.

At first, the 24th MEU (SOC) and Joint Task Force Bravo shared the former

headquarters of an Iraqi infantry division on the northwestern edge of Zakho, but

they had to part company when troop numbers increased. Joint Task Force Bravo

increased in size during the latter part of April. It soon included the 4th Brigade

(Aviation), 3d Infantry Division; the 18th Engineer Brigade with Naval Mobile

Construction Battalion 133 (SeaBees) attached; the 18th Military Police Brigade;

the 432d Civil Affairs Company; and the Canadian 4th Field Ambulance (a

battalion-size mobile medical unit). The 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne)

Combat Team (3-325th ABCT) from a duty station in Italy was expected to

arrive on 27 April. It was a reinforced infantry battalion commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid, USA, that included a headquarters

company, three rifle companies, 20 Humvee-mounted TOW antitank launchers,

an 81mm mortar platoon, a 105mm artillery battery (Battery D, 3 19th Field

Painting by Cot Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR

A U. S. Marine from BLT 2/8 and a French soldier from the 8th Marine Parachute Infantry

Regiment stop a vehicle at a jointly manned checkpoint near Zakho.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 65

Artillery), and small supply and reconnaissance detachments. A Spanish

expeditionary force and an Italian airborne brigade were also on the way and

were scheduled to land the following week.

Despite the presence of multinational security forces, many Kurds were

unwilling to return to Iraq. Kurdish elders reported that the Iraqi police

intimidated them during an exploratory visit to Zakho and stated they would

return only if the Iraqis evacuated and an allied security force remained. General

Shalikashvili felt the problem was the continued presence of Iraqi troops in and

around Zakho. In addition to the "police," an infantry strongpoint was located

only two kilometers from the city and three artillery batteries were in the hills

south of Zakho. General John R. Galvin (CinCEur) directed General

Shalikashvili to begin planning for forcible removal of the Iraqis should it

become necessary. Concurrently, Colonel Naab and General Nashwan reached

an agreement to defuse the situation.

General Garner (CG, JTF-B) ordered Colonel Jones to occupy the town of

Zakho. During the evening of 25 April, BLT 2/8 cordoned off the northern,

eastern, and southern approaches to the city, the Dutch covered the west, and the

45th Commando cleared the city. This was a most appropriate task because the

British had just seen duty in Northern Ireland and were adept at low intensity

urban warfare. Calling on recent experience battling the illegal, underground

Irish Republican Army, the British used a unique combination of force and tact

Photograph by the author

A CH-46E Sea Knight medium l4ft transport helicopter at HSSB Silopi, Turkey, landing zone. The

Sea Knights were sometimes called 'frogs" because of their squat appearance. Most had seen more

than 20 years of service.
66 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

to patrol the streets. They gently reassured the civilians and sent the previously

arrogant Iraqis scurrying out of town. By sundown Zakho was in allied hands.

The 24th MEU (SOC) and its attachments promptly began a rigorous security

program using squad-size patrols to criss-cross the area of operations.

Life in Zakho

After securing Zakho, BLT 2/8 conducted defensive operations. Roadblocks

were established on the main supply routes south and west of Zakho. Companies

E and F provided rifle platoons and either a fast attack vehicle (a jeep with a

machine gun mounted on top) or a combined antiarmor team (CAAT) at each

checkpoint. Company G pulled security duty at the Zakho hospital. Company H

secured headquarters and one of its rifle platoons stood by as the "Sparrowhawk"

rapid reaction force. Weapons Company was divided among the rifle companies

or integrated into the command post security forces. Light armored vehicles

(LAVs) conducted daily road reconnaissance and MSR security operations.

Battery H, reinforced by six lightweight 105mm howitzers of the British 79th

Battery, 29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, set up near Zakho.

The Black Knights of HMM-264 operated from Silopi, usually flying

morning and evening missions to MEU headquarters, providing visual

reconnaissance and medical evacuation flights on request, and making daily runs

to Landing Zone (LZ) Raven and other camps as needed. The squadron's ground

support personnel ran landing zones at Silopi and Zakho, and manned the Silopi

forward arming and refueling point. MSSG-24 set up shop at Silopi, manned rear

areas at Incirlik and Iskenderun, and furnished a combat service support

detachment at Zakho.

In addition to running combat patrols, holding observation outposts on key

terrain, and manning road checkpoints the Marines undertook a wide variety of

humanitarian functions. Such operations were described by Lieutenant Colonel

Kohl as being "right up MSSG-24's alley.78 A 107-man combat service support

detachment (CSSD) moved to Zakho on 21 April. The greatest logistics challenge

was to equitably distribute MSSG-24's limited resources to support the 24th

MEU (SOC) and still meet the needs of so many starving refugees. The first

attempts to provide relief were marked by mass confusion caused by mobs of

hungry people. Organizational meetings with Kurdish leaders, additional camps,

and increased supply flow reduced these problems. Soon, the distribution system

was operating smoothly. The Marines first realized the situation had drastically

improved when Kurdish leaders began to complain about the suitability of MREs

as a food source.79 Ironically, this seemingly ungrateful criticism was an

unconscious compliment, because by then the Kurds were getting enough food

to be picky about what they were eating. Supplies of dry goods and fresh food

stuffs soon replaced MREs.8°

West of town the Marines helped a Kurdish work party pitch more than 600

tents at Camp One, the first of three resettlement camps eventually built near

Zakho. The CSSD established LZ Raven to serve Camp One. A Marine
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 67

Painting by Cot Peter M. 'Mike' Gish, USMCR

As part of the British-conceived plan to provide a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq, the

allies built three large refugee relocation camps in the vicinity of Zakho. The Marines of 24th MEU

(SOC) built the first of these in mid-April, then turned it over to the U.N. High Commission for

Refugees in May 1991.

helicopter support team and the landing party's forklifts were the primary movers

for this civic action project. A combat engineer detachment from BLT 2/8 helped

put up tents and assisted the establishment of supply dumps and water points.

Australian, Luxembourgish, French, Dutch, and Canadian medics serviced the

camps around Zakho. Military police maintained order and civil affairs teams

assisted camp administration. More than 400 wooden latrines were built by the

SeaBees.8' Eventually, the population of Camp One swelled to more than

42,000 people.

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl (MSSG-24) sent engineer and maintenance teams

to Zakho to survey the city's power transmission facility on 22 April. At the

request of local authorities, the generator at the Zakho Hospital was also

examined. These teams reported that the city's power plant and water treatment

facility needed major repairs, and the hospital's generator was beyond hope. General Garner responded by ordering a new generator for the hospital and

providing engineer and technical support to restore Zakho's power and water

plants. However, while these repairs were being made and the requested

equipment was being shipped, MSSG-24 provided these vital services for Zakho.

The Marines delivered more than 1,600 gallons of fuel to the hospital each week,
68 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

operated a water treatment and distribution point in the center of the city, and

opened temporary medical and dental clinics.

This last action was important because the medical treatment capability in

Zakho was almost nonexistent. The Zakho Hospital was staffed by only one

doctor and one nurse. It had electric power only about eight hours each week.

Long lines of sick refugees flooded Zakho's narrow streets, vainly hoping to be

cured at the overworked medical facility. To fill this void, MSSG-24 sent

medical and dental assistance to Zakho. About 2,200 patients were treated by

Doctor Buckley and the Navy corpsmen. Doctors Ratliff and Nogacek, dentists

assigned to MSSG-24, saw about 70 patients. As time passed, French, Irish,

Australian, and Canadian medical teams also set up shop in Zakho.

The engineer detachment (Sergeant David C. Tanczuk) set up two Univox

Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) on 23 April. These units

purified water by removing contaminants. Unpurified water was forced through

a series of cellulose or polyamide membranes fabricated into a spiral element and

stretched over a drum. The ROWPUs could produce pure drinking water from

polluted water, sea water, or brackish water. Each one pumped about 1,800

gallons of drinking water from the muddy Khabur River every hour. A water

distribution point was set up in the center of town where it serviced all who

needed water, including allied military units, Kurdish refugees, the Iraqi

Christian community, and sometimes even Iraqi soldiers.

Chief Hospital CorpsmanArthurAngel treats a young Kurdish refugee's blisteredfoot in a medical

clinic on the outskirts of the city of Zakho, Iraq. Marine Service Support Group 24 (MSSG-24) set

up the clinic and a water purcation station for the Kurdish refugees.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 69

Camp Sommers

The 24th MEU (SOC) Headquarters was located just outside Zakho. The

MEU's first tasks after moving in were to secure the area and to improve

habitability. This former Iraqi army post was a shambles when the Marines first

occupied it. The place had been thoroughly looted. There was no electricity.

Every wooden door and table had been used for fire wood. There were no

unbroken windows. Debris and filth littered the entire compound. Work parties

began cleaning up, but major improvements at the site were provided by the

SeaBees of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 (NMCB-133). Although

attached to the 18th Engineer Brigade, the SeaBees observed naval tradition and

went out of their way to take care of "their" Marines. Latrines, showers,

hardback tents, a mess hall, and volleyball courts sprouted up.

A six-foot wall ran along the roadway to protect the camp. Inside there was

a hard-surfaced helicopter landing pad and an athletic field. Helicopters

constantly droned overhead and the concrete landing pad was busy most of the

time. The athletic field soon sprouted tents housing the Army engineers, the

Seabees, and other assorted support units. The 24th MEU (SOC) headquarters

was located inside a small central building. This command post housed a busy

combat operations center (COC) and a combined personnel and logistics office.

A "U"-shaped outer building housed the communications center, various staff

sections, living spaces, and liaison offices. British and American engineers,

military police, and logistics offices were also located there. A civil affairs office

was located on the compound's northwest corner. The back entrance, gateway

to Joint Task Force Bravo Headquarters, was in the southwest corner. This

compound was named Camp Sonimers to honor David W. Sommers, the

Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, on 5 May.

24th MEU Command and Control

During Operation Provide Comfort the 24th MEU (SOC) staff faced many

problems. As previously mentioned, the command which was configured to

control a battalion-size ground combat element and a composite helicopter

squadron, was actually controlling a 3,600-man international brigade with very

little outside assistance. Although all went smoothly, this strained command,

combat support, and service support capabilities to the limit.82

The personnel officer, Captain Dewey G. Jordan, was responsible for

personnel reporting and mail, both of which were major issues for the Marines

at Zakho and each problem had the same rpot cause, the wide dispersal of MEU

personnel. Daily reporting was a chore because communications between Zakho,

Silopi, Incirlik, and Phibron 8 sometimes broke down. Unexpected personnel

frequently showed up at one of these places, often needing food, equipment, and

transportation. Marine units were scattered across northern Iraq and Turkey so

it was difficult to deliver mail in a timely fashion. Mail delivery was further

complicated because of the sheer volume of incoming letters and packages.
70 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

American support for Desert Storm resulted in an unexpected influx of mail

addressed to 'Any Serviceman." However, while the volume of mail caused the

postal section headaches, the field Marines loved it.83 Captain Jordan's most

unenviable task was casualty reporting. Two Marines were killed during

Operation Provide Comfort; one in a traffic accident and the other as the result

of a tragic accidental weapon discharge. Several other Marines were seriously

injured and required evacuation to Europe or the United States.

Major Raftery and the intelligence section were busy from the time the MEU

departed Sardinia until it was on the way home five months later. The

intelligence section was charged with data collection and interpretation. There

were three, primary collection sources: 1) aerial reconnaissance, 2) ground

reconnaissance, and 3) human intelligence. Aerial reconnaissance was limited at

first. Operation Provide Comfort was only one of many agencies seeking input

from national intelligence sources and the Marines lacked an organic tactical

reconnaissance aircraft because the venerable McDonnell Douglas RF-4B

Phantom II had been recently retired and was no longer in the Marine aviation

inventory. The Marines were scheduled to receive modified F/A- 18 Hornets as

replacements, but these aircraft were not yet in the pipeline. The arrival of the

aircraft carrier Roosevelt allowed U.S. Navy F- 14 Tomcat fighters mounting

TARPS (Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photographic System) pods to provide

tactical aerial reconnaissance. These specially equipped airplanes flew photo

missions over Iraq and returned to the Roosevelt for film processing. The

finished photographs were loaded on a Lockheed S-3 Viking which dropped the

pictures to ground units inside a Sono-Buoy canister.M

Major Raftery used intelligence data to identify enemy positions, estimate

Iraqi strength, evaluate threat capabilities, and anticipate possible Iraqi courses of action. The S-2 section acquired numerous documents and a lot of Iraqi

equipment, including sophisticated communications gear that ranged in size from

an electronics van to hand-held security radios. An extensive human intelligence

collection network was developed. Interrogator-translator teams exploited "walkin" sources. One such source was Iraqi defectors. Another source was nonKurdish local citizens who pointed out minefields, booby traps, and weapons

caches. The Kurds identified strangers and reported atrocities. They also

identified Iraqi secret police. These suspects were investigated, their presence

reported to the Military Coordination Center, and they were removed from the

area. Local citizens appreciated these actions and readily cooperated in the

intelligence collection effort.

One reason for this wealth of human intelligence was that the Kurds were

not the only oppressed minority in the vicinity. Northern Iraq was also the

traditional home of many Christian Iraqis. These Chaldeans, as they called

themselves, were impressed by the generosity and even-handed distribution of

supplies by the Americans. The Marines soon developed a good working

relationship with the Christian clergy and made friends among the Chaldean

people, many of whom spoke English and had relatives living in the United

States.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 71

Painting by Col Peter M. Mike" Gish, USMCR

A satellite dish at the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit headquarters in Zakho, Iraq.

Major Michael D. Boyd was the MEU logistics officer (S-4). His primary

concerns were the lack of combat service support assets, embarkation and

debarkation, maintenance management in the field, and supplying scattered units

with limited transportation. The shortage of MSSG-24 assets resulted from the

lack of shipping space. This shortage sometimes caused delays, but never

cancelled a mission. The situation got better as more joint service assets arrived

in northern Iraq. Embarkation and debarkation were always headaches for

logisticians, but because of their expeditionary nature, the Marines were wellpracticed in these arts and very proficient at loading and unloading ships and

aircraft.

The first problem faced by Captain Charles E. Headen, the communications

officer, was that Joint Task Force Provide Comfort had no standard electronic

operating instructions. Instead, Headen relied on plans he prepared during the

transit from Sardinia. He did such a good job, that these instructions remained

almost unchanged during the entire operation. A second problem was that his

section was over-tasked to provide equipment. The MEU rated only four satellite

radios, but as the expanded 24th MEU (SOC) and its international attachments

spread across Turkey and Iraq, this number proved insufficient. Luckily, the

communications section appropriated four additional sets. This doubled the

authorized number and allowed communications to continue uninterrupted.
72 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Another issue was that the communications section had no organic capability to

leave the ship and still maintain a communications center afloat. This shortfall

was made up using U.S. Navy equipment and personnel.

Captain Headen singled out two Marines for their outstanding work. Gunnery

Sergeant Martin W. Duncan, the communications chief, kept the section's jeeps

running by securing Iraqi parts from destroyed or abandoned vehicles and

adapting them to fix American vehicles. Another resourceful Marine was ground

radio repairman Corporal Daniel J. Slagle. Although he had no formal training,

Slagle repaired satellite communication radios in the field. He repaired radios for

Marine units, U.S. Army units, and a U.S. Navy SEAL team. His actions saved

valuable time because without his intervention these radios would have been sent

the United States for repair without replacement.86

Captain Timothy J. Ott, the 24th MEU (SOC) Staff Judge Advocate, was

concerned with customs procedures, the rules of engagement, host nation legal

matters, and captured weapons. Turkish customs were frustrating, lengthy,

bureaucratic battles that required careful accounting and detailed inspections. For

a time, the Turks relaxed their stringent standards but later reinstituted them so

frustrating delays of more than a week became common. The "Rules of

Engagement" stated when and under what circumstances a Marine was allowed

to fire his weapon. General Shalikashvili, to emphasize the humanitarian nature

of Operation Provide Comfort, called such rules "Commander's Guidance for the

Use of Force.' The first rule was actually a statement of purpose. Provide

Comfort was a humanitarian relief operation, not a combat operation and

personnel should conduct themselves in an appropriate manner. The rule stressed

that the allies were in northern Iraq to give assistance, not to start a war. The

next rule dealt with the right to use force for self-defense. Nothing in the rules

negated the commander's primary obligation to take all necessary action for selfdefense. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort units were authorized to use

force to respond to attacks or threats against humanitarian relief personnel or

displaced civilians, but were to use only the minimum force necessary. Deadly

force could be used only to protect lives in response to a hostile act or to react

to a demonstration of hostile intent. On 1 May, General Shalikashvili gave

further guidance regarding the treatment of civilians. Any armed Iraqi or Kurd

trying to enter the exclusion zone was to be disarmed and detained. This included

Iraqi "police," Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas, and anyone without proper

authorization.

Captain Ott faced two other issues. One was host nation status of forces

agreements. Normally when the United States deployed on foreign territory it

entered into agreement with that particular country to pay for damage

accidentally inflicted on either citizens or their property. There was no such

agreement with the government of Iraq, therefore, payments were not authorized.

The other issue was recovery of abandoned or lost Iraqi equipment and

documents. Captured major weapons were turned over to the Military

Coordination Center which then returned them to the Iraqis. Small arms,

grenades, and explosives were disposed of by EOD teams.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 73

Camp Security

The terrorist threat was high, the compound was exposed, and the Marines

were menaced by unknown enemies •88 Every Marine was well aware of the

infamous Beirut bombing in 1983 and all vowed such an incident would not be

repeated in northern Iraq.89

Needless to say, northern Iraq was a perfect place for such an attack, so the

24th MEU (SOC) had to be particularly alert. Colonel Jones wisely placed

headquarters compound security in the able hands of Master Gunnery Sergeant

John B. MacDonald.

Master Gunnery Sergeant MacDonald, a Vietnam veteran, placed listening

posts along the wall, ran constant patrols, and scattered broken vehicles in the

road leading to the MEU compound.

Marine Reinforcements

Several combat support units were attached to the 24th MEU (SOC) while

it operated in support of Operation Provide Comfort. The need for tactical deep

penetration aerial reconnaissance required the presence of an unmanned aerial

vehicle (UAV) detachment. The U.S. Army and foreign units required air and

naval gunfire liaison teams.

A LAV-25 patrols the streets of Zakho. These lightweight, helicopter-transportable LAVs were the

only armored vehicles available in northern Iraq.
74 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

A shortage of national intelligence assets in northern Iraq and the lack of

organic tactical reconnaissance aircraft led Colonel Jones to request further

intelligence gathering capabilities. His request was granted. On 2 May, an

experimental unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit that used "off the shelf"

technology was ordered to Turkey. Captain Wayne 0. Ouzts, the S-3 Alpha for

the 2d Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group was designated the

officer in charge of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Detachment, 2d Remotely

Piloted Vehicle Company, from Camp Lejeune. The detachment mustered six

personnel and had 15 unmanned aerial vehicles. Members of the detachment had

just finished six grueling months in the desert during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm. Most Marines had been back in the United States for about

three weeks, but Captain Ouzts had been home only three days before being

ordered to Turkey. The detachment arrived in Turkey on 7 May, but it took eight

days to clear customs. From Incirlik the UAVs and their ancillary equipment

took three days to get to Silopi and another day to get to the forward operating

base at Muqbal. The UAV Detachment used an abandoned Iraqi artillery

position. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) selected for use was the Exdrone, a

disposable unmanned aircraft with a fixed camera. About the size of a large

model airplane, its delta shape made it look like a miniature Stealth bomber. It

was hoped these Exdrones could fill the gap between ground reconnaissance and

high altitude photographs. The UAVs gave Colonel Jones and Major Raftery

timely video coverage of choke points and areas of interest. They provided a

cost-efficient, long-range, unmanned aerial vehicle intelligence gathering

platform, and flew approximately 40 kilometers south of Dohuk to photograph

Iraqi rear echelon areas and assembly positions.

The UAV Detachment prepared its equipment the previous night. The UAVs

launched around 0930, flew to Dohuk, then traced the main supply route south

into the heart of Iraq. When the drones overfiew choke points or Iraqi positions,

they swooped low to reveal a video panorama of the target area.

The UAVs made 22 flights in 12 days, often flying two missions per day.

Air space coordination was difficult because there were so many different aircraft

in the area. Pilots were apprehensive about flying with unmanned aerial vehicles

in the air because they were hard to see in the crowded sky. A compromise was

made. The UAVs were sent aloft only at specified times during daylight hours.

There were three crashes during experimental operations and three crashes during

flight operations. The detachment departed Zakho on 28 May 1991 and returned

to Camp Lejeune on 1 June. During Operation Provide Comfort the UAVs

• • . probably saved two years on the developmental process . • • . "9°

Marine air and naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICO) provide air and

naval gunfire support to non-Marine U.S. and allied forces. The Marines of an

ANGLICO firepower control team (FCT) are specially trained to observe, direct,

and coordinate supporting arms. Marine units possess organic capabilities to

control supporting arms, so ANGLICO firepower control teams are tasked to

provide such services for attached or allied units working with the Marines.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 75

Painting by Col Peter M. Mike' Gish, USMCR

Marines of 2d ANGLICO rappelfrom a hovering helicopter demonstrating what is known as a 'fast

rope" insertion. SLfirepower control teams from 2d ANGLICO supported U.S. Army and allied

units serving in northern Iraq.
76 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

The 24th MEU (SOC) Command Element included a detachment from 2d

ANGLICO, but the demands of Operation Provide Comfort required additional

ANGLICO support. On 7 May 1991, 2d ANGLICO at Camp Lejeune was

ordered to send four firepower control teams (FCT) to Turkey. These teams

departed Cherry Point and arrived at Incirlik on 12 May. They were in the field

with Joint Task Force Bravo on 15 May 1991.' Six firepower control teams

were used in northern Iraq: FCT-1 was attached to the British 40th Commando,

Royal Marines; FCT-2 was with the French 8th Marine Parachute Infantry

Regiment; FCT-3 worked with the Italian Folgore Parachute Brigade; FCT-4 was

with the British 45th Commando; FCT-5 was with the Dutch 1st Amphibious

Combat Group; and FCT-6 joined the U.S. Army's 3-325th Airborne Combat

Team92 These ANGLICO Marine participated in combined tactical exercises,

made parachute jumps, and conducted fire support demonstrations.

Unfortunately, several ANGLICO Marines were injured during a training

accident on 4 July and had to be hospitalized. Luckily, no one was killed when

the 'Slide for Life" rope parted and the Marines crashed onto the rocky ground

below.93

In a very short time, all was going well in northern Iraq. The Marines had

settled in, were assisting refugees as they arrived, had cleared the Iraqis out of

Zakho, and were working smoothly with allied forces. However, there was one

gigantic hitch. Many Kurds refused to return to northern Iraq unless the city of

Dohuk was liberated, the security zone expanded, and political issues resolved.

In early May, the decision to expand the security zone, coupled with a concerted

effort to move the Kurds out of Turkey, was announced and named "Gallant

Provider."

Launching Gallant Provider:

Expanding the Security Zone

The next phase of Operation Provide Comfort was Gallant Provider. Despite

its initial success, Provide Comfort had not achieved its ultimate goal. Most of

the Kurds still refused to come down from the mountains. News about the

liberation of Zakho reached the mountains and some Kurds began moving back

into Iraq, but many continued to cling to the dubious shelter of their mountain

hideouts. This was a troubling prospect for General Shalikashvili because the

warm weather was about to dry up the mountain streams and make life there

even more difficult.

To try to encourage more Kurds to leave the mountains General Shalikashvili

decided to expand the security area in northern Iraq. New orders were passed to

Generals Potter and Garner. Joint Task Force Alpha was to close down the

mountain camps, open a series of way stations on the route out of Turkey, and

begin an intense campaign to convince the Kurds to return to Iraq. Joint Task

Force Bravo was ordered to expand its area of operations east and south.

On 29 April, Colonel Jones relinquished tactical control of the 45th

Commando, the 29th Commando Regiment, and the 1st ACG when these units
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 77

Aerial view of a resettlement camp (bajeer) near Zakho. Roads divided this bajeer into 60-person

zanon (hamlets). Zanon were grouped into gunds (villages) of about 1,000 people. Joint medical,

administrative, and food distribution centers, and water distribution points, were centrally located.

This camp served more than 21,000 people.

were turned over to their parent unit, the 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines.

The 3d Commando Brigade was reinforced by firepower control teams from 2d

ANGLICO: the 105mm artillery platoon, Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines;

and an LAV section--two LAV-25s, an LAY-AT (mounting a TOW H antitank

missile launcher), and an LAV-L (logistics vehicle).

When General Garner received the warning order to extend Joint Task Force

Bravo's tactical area to the east, he tasked the 24th MEU (SOC) to assist the

reconnaissance effort. The Marines deployed force reconnaissance teams

approximately 120 kilometers from Zakho. After the British secured Al

Amadiyah and the French moved into Sun, Joint Task Force Bravo began

looking toward Dohuk. To assist this effort, reconnaissance teams relayed

information about Iraqi positions and movements south of Zakho. Colonel Jones

used these reports to monitor the Iraqi movements. Reconnaissance teams also

located and marked many minefields. There were 52 ground reconnaissance

missions during Provide Comfort.
78 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

On 1 May 1991, the United Nations raised its flag over Zakho before a

crowd of about 1,000 Kurds.94 By 4 May, about 3,000 Kurds were living at

Zakho. Bulk food (rice, flour, lentils, sugar, and salt) stored there could feed an

estimated 9,000 refugees two meals per day for about 30 days. The Zakho Civil

Affairs Team met with the mayor, the police chief, and the leader of the Baath

Party. They worked out a compromise and agreed only 50 unarmed police would

remain in town. The major civic problems were electric power and sanitation

because all electric generators were out of order and Saddam stubbornly refused

to switch on external power sources. Despite these handicaps, Zakho 's markets

and shops were open, currency was plentiful, and one of the banks was

operating. The streets of Zakho soon teemed with people hurrying to market.

BLT 2/8 Moves South

On 4 May, Battalion Landing Team 2/8 moved south of Zakho along the

road leading through Summayl to Dohuk. A platoon from Company E relieved

a similar unit from Company F. Company F then formed a combined arms

Painting by Col Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR

Young Kurds on burros in Shiladeza, Iraq
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 79

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA

The commanders assigned to JTF Bravo at Zakho are an international contingent, including

American, British, Dutch, and French Marines. MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA (CG, JTF Bravo),

is seated center front row. The American Marine commander, Col James L. Jones, Jr. (CO. 24th

MEU), is seated second from the right. LtCol Tony L. Corwin (CO. BLT 2/8) stands behind him.

mechanized task force. The rifle company was mounted in assault amphibian

vehicles reinforced by one LAV section and two combined antiarmor teams.

Battery H and the BLT's 8 1mm mortars were in direct support. Sea Cobras from

HMM-264 buzzed angrily overhead and additional air was available if needed.

The Iraqis grudgingly moved from one post after another as the Marines

advanced. Company F eventually moved about five kilometers south of Summayl

Village before stopping. Company G was immediately inserted by the Sea

Knights of HMM-264 and reinforced Company F. The BLT command element,

Company H, and Battery H established a fire support base at Muqbal on 9

May.95

Allied Forces

The British forces assigned to Operation Haven, as the British called Provide

Comfort, were commanded by Major General Robin J. Ross, Royal Marines.

The command element was Joint Force Headquarters, drawn mostly from

Headquarters, Commando Forces. The ground combat element was 3d

Commando Brigade, with three commando battalions, an artillery regiment, and

an engineer squadron. The British 40th Commando, Royal Marines, was

temporarily under the tactical control of Task Force Alpha. The British 45th

Commando, Royal Marines, held Sirsenk and Al Amadiyah. The Dutch 1st

Amphibious Combat Group was located at Batufa. The 29th Commando
80 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Regiment, Royal Artillery, had a headquarters battery and three firing batteries armed with 105mm lightweight towed howitzers. The 59th Independent

Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers, was collocated with 3d Commando

Brigade Headquarters. The British deployed three helicopter squadrons. The

Chinook Force (Royal Air Force) and 846th Naval Air Squadron (Royal Navy)

operated from Silopi. The 3d Brigade Air Squadron flew out of Sirsenk. The

Commando Logistics Regiment (Royal Marines) operated from Silopi, where it

worked closely with the Combined Support Command.96 The Dutch sent about

1,000 troops to support Provide Comfort. About 400 were Marines and the rest

were aviation, service support, or medical personnel.

The French contingent was the "Cougar Force" comprised of a light infantry

brigade, a field hospital, and part of a helicopter regiment. The ground combat

force was drawn from the French Rapid Action Force's 11th Airborne Brigade.

This task force included headquarters, an infantry regiment, an Alpine company,

a medical detachment, and support personnel. The main ground force was the 8th

Marine Parachute Regiment97 French terminology differed from American

usage, and French Marine units were not "soldiers of the sea" as were the

American, British, and Dutch Marines, rather, they were expeditionary units

made up of professional soldiers formerly called "colonial infantry."98 The

French were assigned the far eastern sector of the security zone.

Italy sent elements of the famous Folgore Parachute Brigade, an Alpine

Special forces company, a helicopter detachment, and a field medical unit. The

Folgore Brigade had previously served beside the American Marines as part of

the Multinational Force in Beirut from 1982-84. The Italians were given the eastcentral sector.

The Spanish Expeditionary Force was the first large military unit deployed

outside of Spain since 1898. Its ground combat element was three rifle companies

from the 1st Airborne Brigade, "Roger De Flor." The Spanish also sent engineer,

medical, and helicopter detachments. The Spanish guarded Habur crossing and Zakho 'swestern lines of communication. Germany, Canada, Denmark, Australia,

and Luxembourg also sent small military units, usually medical detachments,

which were attached to larger allied forces.99

By mid-May, the allied security zone spread from the Turkish border about

three-quarters of the way across Iraq toward the Iranian border. The 3d

Commando Brigade pushed west and nudged the Iraqi 36th Infantry Division out

of Batufa. From there the brigade moved on to Sirsenk where it occupied a vital

airstrip that was capable of landing C-130 transport airplanes, but had been

damaged during Desert Storm. Six days of around-the-clock repairs put it back

into action. The airstrip was reopened on 14 May and was operated by an

Arriving/Departing Air Control Group from Contingency MAGTF 1-91. Sirsenk

soon became a major humanitarian service support base replacing Yuksekova in

Turkey.

The 526-man Spanish airborne battalion was assigned route security from

Habur to Zakho. The French "Cougar Force" moved east toward Sun. Battalion

Landing Team 2/8 continued local patrolling, manned three checkpoints,
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 81

Photograph courtesy of MajGen Jay M. Garner. USA

MajGen Jay M. Garner, CG, JTF Bravo, center, and Col James L. Jones, Jr., GO, 24th MEU

(SOC), meet with Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani, second from left, and Moussad Barzani, third

from right, in Zakho. Talabani was leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Barzani headed

the Kurdish Democratic Party. These long-time political rivals joined forces as the Kurdistan

United Front during Operation Provide Comfort.

consolidated defensive positions, and worked on civic action projects. The U.S.

Army's 284th Military Police Company patrolled Zakho, and the 18th Engineer

Brigade built refugee camps, manned fuel and water points, and participated in

numerous civic action projects. In Joint Task Force Bravo's area all was well and

the allies awaited the return of the refugees.

The Kurds

The major stumbling block to a successful campaign was Dohuk. Most

Kurds still in the mountains were from Dohuk Province and wouldn't budge until

it was liberated and secured. More than 1,500 Kurds demonstrated in Zakho,

asking the allies to retake Dohuk on 12 May. Discussions with the Kurds

revealed they would not return unless the allies opened the city of Dohuk,

worked out a political settlement for an autonomous Kurdistan, and agreed to

protect them from Saddam's wrath. General Garner relayed this information to

General Shalikashvili, and patiently waited for further guidance.

The Kurds have never been noted for political unity. Kurdish politics was a

confusing labyrinth not easily explored by the uninitiated. There were six major

political parties: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the Party of United

Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP), the Socialist Party for
82 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Kurdish People (SPKP), the Kurdistan Peoples Democratic Party (KPDP), and

the Workers Party (WP). The Kurds also were deeply divided by tribal rivalry.

The oldest, best known, and most powerful political organization was the

Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). From 1946 until 1975, Mustapha Barzani's

KDP was the single most important conduit for Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. In

1975, Jalal Talibani started the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The

KDP and the PUK have vied for Kurdish leadership ever since. Charismatic

Massoud Barzani inherited the mantle of KDP leadership after his father's death

in 1979.

In late April, Jalal Talibani met with Saddam Hussein, after which he

announced a return to the principles of Kurdish autonomy. He also urged the

Kurds to cease fighting and begin returning home. However, the skeptical Kurds

remained unconvinced because they had heard Saddam's lies too many times

before. In 1970 he promised them autonomy, but by 1975 had renewed a

campaign of repression which included using chemical weapons against Kurdish

civilians in 1988. The brutality of the recent reoccupation of Kurdistan was also

still fresh in their minds. Talabani's pronouncements were ignored by the

Peshmerga who continued fighting Iraqi forces.

Painting by Col Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR

Tents at Zakho I, Iraq
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 83

Iraqi representatives met with Kurdish elders and political leaders at

Kanimasi on 13 May 1991. The Kurds were pleasantly surprised to discover they

were being invited to return to Dohuk. However, they made their return

dependant on two requests. First, an agreement had to be worked out with

Baghdad to guarantee a return to democratic principles, institution of civil rights,

and Kurdish autonomy. Second, they wanted allied security forces to protect

them. Without both guarantees, the Kurds would not return. In the words of one

Kurd, 'We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like pigs."°°

The continued Iraqi occupation of Dohuk remained the main stumbling block

to successfully concluding Operation Provide Comfort, and became a very sticky

point when the Iraqis refused to leave. General Nashwan told Colonel Naab "If

you enter . . . Dohuk, we will . . . take [military] action . "101 The Iraqi

army responded by moving a mechanized battalion nearer to Dohuk. Unsure of

allied resolve, Saddam instigated several provocative acts to test the waters. An

American EA-6B Prowler was fired on twice during a routine reconnaissance

flight. On 5 May, two Iraqi civilian helicopters spraying pesticides "slimed"

Company F while flying over the Marine lines. Although the Iraqi pilots claimed

innocence, this incident appeared to be a deliberate provocation. The helicopters

were quickly intercepted and forced down. A search of the aircraft revealed a

camera and some film, but it was never determined if this was Iraqi intelligence

equipment or the innocent tools of an Iraqi "shutterbug." The chemicals were

tested but contained only normal pesticide toxins and the incident was closed.

There was a major shooting incident on 13 May between Saddam' s palace

guards at Sirsenk and the British Marines. No allied troops were hit during the

firefight. The Iraqis reported two wounded, but burial parties the next day

indicated this report was in error. About a week later, members of the Joint

Historical Team were sent running for cover when Iraqi 82mm mortar rounds

were fired near allied positions.

Several firefights, a few food riots, and continual scuffles broke out between

the Kurds and the Iraqis. In Zakho, General Garner became increasingly anxious

about the safety of General Nashwan after his car was vandalized by angry Kurds

on two different occasions, so the Americans found themselves in the awkward

position of defending the Iraqis from the Kurds rather than vice versa.'02

- Opening Dohuk

Fed up with Iraqi harassment, General Shalikashvili decided to use some

more "aggressive restraint" and ordered an American response. American air

activity increased and Joint Task Force Bravo turned its attention south. Colonel

Jones anticipated three possible solutions to the Dohuk crisis: 1) forcible entry

of Dohuk, 2) peaceful entry into Dohuk, and 3) neutralization of Dohuk with

neither Iraqis nor coalition forces inside the city. Lieutenant Colonel Linn and

the S-3 section prepared plans for all three courses of action.'°3

The plan to capture Dohuk using military force impacted the 24th MEU

(SOC) the most. The 24th MEU (SOC) was given considerable additional combat
84 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

power to achieve this task. The 3-325 Airborne Combat Team was placed under

Colonel Jones' tactical control. The British 29th Commando Regiment's 18

105mm howitzers reinforced the guns of Battery H. Marine Sea Cobras were

reinforced by two Army attack helicopter companies from the 4th (Aviation)

Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, at Zakho. Air Force A-lOs and F-16s from

Incirlik and Navy F-14s, F-18s, and A-6s from the Roosevelt were "on call."

Colonel Jones opted to use a pincer movement. The 3-325th Airborne

Combat Team would isolate Dohuk from the northeast moving down MSR

"Banzai." Battalion Landing Team 2/8 would approach the city from, the

northwest along MSR "Ninja." Combined command post exercises, fire support

coordination exercises, and a sandtable exercise were used to prepare the attack.

Luckily, however, this plan never had to be executed.

Three events loosened the logjam in the mountains and eased tensions at

Dohuk: 1) Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, meeting with Saddam Hussein,

arrived at a tentative agreement about Kurdish autonomy; 2) a new allied-Iraqi

agreement was reached; and 3) the Turks agreed to the establishment of a

multinational residual force to be stationed on Turkish soil. The first two events

opened the floodgates and Kurdish refugees began streaming south; the other one

settled questions about the allied commitment to stay and protect the Kurds.

On 18 May, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party and

the most influential spokesman for the Kurdish United Front, announced an

agreement in principle between the Kurdish rebels and the Iraqi government. It

called for restoration of democracy in Iraq and granted autonomy to the Kurds.

A Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) would be established in northern Iraq, but

it would remain part of Iraq. Kurdish would be the official language and the

Kurds would be responsible for legal and political matters inside the zone, but

would retain close economic ties with Baghdad. The Iraqi government would

continue to handle international .'° This announcement was linked

to further negotiations between the allied command and the Iraqi military. On 19

May, General Shalikashvili met with Iraqi Lieutenant General Abu Firas Saber

to discuss opening Dohuk. A agreement was reached whereby the city of Dohuk

was.cleclared an "open" city. This agreement allowed limited humanitarian, civil

affairs, and logistics teams to enter Dohuk along with United Nations and nongovernment relief agencies. Allied forces held positions north of Dohuk while the

Iraqis pulled back to positions about 15 kilometers southeast of the city. A small

convoy of coalition vehicles entered Dohuk carrying a strictly limited exploration

and observation team on 20 May. This team established its command post in an

empty hotel in the heart of the city and began to restore city services. This

seemed to appease the Kurds and by 25 May most were on their way back to

Dohuk.

Several hundred thousand Kurds left their mountain sanctuaries. They moved

on foot, on horseback, and by mule cart, tractor, car, truck, and bus. Brightly

colored civilian trucks, overflowed, with happy Kurds as they returned home. A

gigantic serpent-like procession snaked its way south stopping at way stations at

Batufa, Kanimasi, Kanibalav, Daudiyah, Sarsing, Qadish, Deralok, and
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 85

Goregavan. Food and fuel were available at Nazdur, Baloka, Al Amadiyah,

Barmini, Mangesh, and Giripit. Suddenly the border camps became ghost towns.

Isikveren dropped from 80,000 to less than 1,000; all 4,500 people at Sinat left;

Kayadiyah went from 8,000 to less than 500; Yekmal dropped from 74,000 to

5,000; Umzumlu went from 45,000 to 10,000; and Cukurca from 118,00 to

8,900. The last camp closed on 7 June 1991. The end of Operation Provide

Comfort was in sight.

Provide Comfort Winds Down

Northern Iraq

The massive movement out of the mountains signaled the end of Combined

Task Force Provide Comfort's mission. After Dohuk was declared an "open city"

on 24 May. The Marines had accomplished their mission and were about to head

home. Old hands at expeditionary operations, the Marines got an early start.

Captain Ouzts and the unmanned aerial vehicle detachment departed Turkey for

Camp Lejeune in late May. The parachute riggers were detached from

Contingency MAGTF 1-91 and returned to Camp Pendleton and Okinawa in

early June. Once the final wave of refugees passed through the way stations,

CMAGTF 1-91 had accomplished its mission and packed up for home as well.
86 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Once the Kurds began returning to northern Iraq, the main tasks left for

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort were to turn the camps over to civilian

control, surrender the security mission to the United Nations, pull up stakes, and

return home. On 30 May, General Cohn L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, inspected Joint Task Force Bravo's area of operations. During his tour

he stopped at several checkpoints, talked with some enlisted Marines, and

thanked them for a job well done. Following his visit, General Powell reported

to Washington that all was going well and Operation Provide Comfort should be

terminated soon as the diplomatic situation allowed.'05

Battalion Landing Team 2/8 remained at the Muqbal fire support base, named

Camp Denton to honor a Marine acidentally killed during Provide Comfort, from

9 May until 15 June. During this time Colonel Jones insisted on maximum cross

training with other allied forces. Live-fire exercises, combined combat patrols,

parachute jumps, and military schooling were constantly taking place. Lieutenant

Colonel Corwin developed a rotation system whereby BLT 2/8 units manned

forward checkpoints for six days, then rotated to Camp Denton for six days

where they participated in live-fire demonstrations, ran squad-sized tactical

exercises, and held organized athletic events. This last activity featured spirited

competition and was a welcome relief from the military routine. The Marines

won the "Northern Iraq International Soccer Championship" after defeating

British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch teams.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 worked at a hectic pace. Each

morning several Sea Knights and Super Stallions were used for routine supply

runs. One CH-46 was stationed at the Zakho landing pad, reserved for

emergency medical evacuation. One or more of the UH-1N's were devoted to

daily aerial reconnaissance, liaison, or transportation missions. Any helicopters

not scheduled underwent a maintenance stand-down. These stand-downs were

necessary because of the hard use and difficult operational environment. The

busy landing zone at Silopi was often crowded and was always dusty. The

squadron headquarters and air control elements operated from tents set up along

the edge of the landing zone. The squadron was billeted in nearby tents.

When the withdrawal plan was announced, Lieutenant Colonel Byrtus

realized night operations were imminent. He, therefore, ordered the squadron to

become proficient at low-light flying and night takeoffs and landings. Low-light

operations were part of the 18 SOC-related missions, but correct use of night

vision goggles required constant practice. Night vision goggles captured visible

light too dim to be used by the human eye, then electronically displayed a

brightened green image not unlike that of a video camera viewfinder. These

devices allowed Marine pilots to fly after dark, but they also imposed some

limitations. Depth perception and peripheral vision were severely hampered, so

these problems had to be overcome by intense training and frequent repetition.

The result was that by late May, the night sky over Silopi was filled with the

constant drone of helicopter engines as the pilots of HMM-264 honed their night

flying skills.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 87

Painting by Col Peter M. Gish, USMCR

BLT 2/8 withdrawal from Zakho, Iraq

The major topic in MSSG-24's future was the 24th MEU (SOC)'s departure

and reembarkation on board the ships of Phibron 8. This did not promise to be

an easy task. More than 2,200 Marines had to be moved from northern Iraq to

Silopi and then to Iskenderun. At the same time, MSSG-24 had to continue

normal supply and maintenance operations in the forward area. The

accomplishment of these multiple tasks required detailed planning, careful use of

resources, and use of outside materials.

During its deployment to Turkey and northern Iraq, MSSG-24 had notable

achievements. Foremost, the efforts of MSSG-24 Marines helped to save the

lives of nearly three-quarters of a million refugees. In the process, its trucks

drove 42,426 miles, hauled 998.2 tons of cargo, delivered 297 pallets of food,

transported 8,628 passengers, and spent 8,109 hours on the road. Its engineers

produced more than 150,000 gallons of purified water, dispensed almost 3.5

million gallons of water to displaced civilians at Zakho, set up more than 1,000

tents, and destroyed approximately 45,000 ordnance items. Tragically, one

MSSG-24 Marine was killed in a motor vehicle accident.

Despite being designed to support the tactical employment of a single Marine

expeditionary unit for 15 days, MSSG-24 provided the lion's share of service

support to an almost division-size joint task force for almost a month. MEU
88 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Service Support Group 24 operated further inland than any previous MSSG and

was a critical element in the longest, most complex, and largest Marine

humanitarian effort in history •106

The Retrograde

It had been obvious from the start that Combined Task Force Provide

Comfort's main mission was to work itself out of a job by moving the Kurds

back into their homeland. General Cohn L. Powell's visit confirmed that this had

been done, so the Combined Support Command issued a warning order for the

pull-back of allied forces in late May. In military jargon, an unpressured

withdrawal is called a "retrograde." At the first retrograde planing session,

General Burch repeated the diplomatic sensitivity of the issue, then identified the

French as the first contingent to fall back. His goal was to reduce occupied areas

quickly, so he ordered that the last increments be flown out no later than 15

June.

These orders came as no surprise to the Marines. The 24th MEU (SOC) had

been planning for this since mid-May and put its plans into effect in early June.

Colonel Jones' intent was use a phased withdrawal. Because of Iskenderun's

limited facilities, it was to be an 18-day evolution. The first 15 days were

devoted to the movement of MEU, HMM, and BLT personnel with no tactical

mission. Most of the combat service support element, all bulk supplies and

equipment not necessary to support combat operations, and most vehicles were

scheduled to move back as soon as possible.

All vehicles and equipment had to be disassembled and thoroughly cleansed

of dirt and micro-organisms before being loaded on board ship. Normally, a

departing MEU accomplished this "washdown" at Rota, Spain, during the MARG

"turnover," however, this was not possible because the "turnover" was going to

take place in Turkey. The presence of dangerous micro-organisms in the dirt

required the Marines to strip down and carefully wash each vehicle and piece of

equipment. To do this properly, specially constructed wash racks and high

pressure steam hoses were needed. Lieutenant Colonel Kohl had to make

arrangements to have these shipped from Haifa, Israel, to Iskenderun. Each

vehicle required about 24 man-hours of labor to strip, wash, and reassemble.

After the washdown, a medical team conducted a rigorous inspection making sure

there was no dirt or dust before clearing each item for embarkation. One rifle

company was to be sent to Iskenderun to act as a security force and to assist the

washdown.

The final three days would see one-third of the remaining Marines returned

to Silopi each day. To cover the pull-back and keep the Iraqis guessing, all

movement was scheduled during the hours of darkness. Colonel Jones wanted a

strong urban presence. All checkpoints would be manned until the very end.

Silopi was designated the 24th MEU (SOC) transfer point and Sirsenk was the

3-325th Airborne Combat Team's transfer point. The Combined Support
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 89

Command's 14th Transportation Battalion was responsible to coordinate overland

movement from Silopi to Incirlik and Iskenderun.107

Colonel Jones worried about several issues. There were no firm plans as to

where the respective command posts were going to be located or how they were

going to be configured as Joint Task Force Bravo moved back to Turkey. Jones

hoped they could be collocated somewhere near the border. He also had

questions about the overall force structure. Jones recommended that only combat

echelons, what he called "trigger pullers," stay until the last day. Finally, it was

necessary to carefully synchronize plans with the other allied forces, Joint Task

Force Bravo, and the 3-325th Airborne Combat Team.

Lieutenant Colonel Kohl (MSSG-24) was most concerned about Turkish

customs and the agricultural inspection. The Turks had been very cooperative of

late, but had recently returned to stringent customs inspections. They intended

to strictly limit cross-border traffic at Habur and initiated detailed inspections to

ensure no weapons were being smuggled inside Turkey to arm PKKterrorists.

The washdown and follow-up agricultural inspection were difficult jobs. The first

elements pulled back were the Bravo Command Group, Company H, and

advance parties from MSSG-24 and HMM-264. They moved to Iskenderun on

1 June.

General Shalikashvili declared 8 June "R-Day," the official beginning of the

retrograde. The first CTF unit out was Joint Task Force Alpha. The 24th MEU

(SOC) was scheduled to begin pulling out once JTF-A left. Within two weeks,

most of the 24th MEU (SOC) rear echelon personnel, equipment, and vehicles

were either at Silopi or Iskenderun. On 12 June, the 4th Civil Affairs Group

departed Zakho for Camp Lejeune. Colonel Corwin closed Camp Denton on 15

June. Battalion Landing Team 2/8's Command Element and Company F moved

to Silopi after turning over the security zone to the Italians. Operational control

of Company G was transferred to the French at Shaladiza, and Company E was

attached to the British 40th Commando.

On 16 June, Colonel Jones closed Camp Sommers and the 24th MEU (SOC)

Command Element moved to a new command post which it shared with Joint

Task Force Bravo. The new command post was located about four miles from

the Turkish border along Route 6. Major Boyd, the 24th MEU (SOC) S-4, used

a phased redeployment to move cargo, equipment, and personnel back to

Iskenderun by echelon. His plan worked well and the MEU had returned 97

percent of its cargo, 85 percent of its equipment, and 50 percent of its personnel

to the ships by the end of June.'°8

Contingency MAGTF 1-91 ceased operations and recalled its teams in the

end of June. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey noted a sense of accomplishment. During

a visit by Lieutenant General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commanding General, FMF

Atlantic/FMF Europe, Brigadier General Burch (CG, CSC) told the Marine

commander that he was very pleased with the performance of CMAGTF 1-91

and intended to pass favorable comments to Major General Stackpole on Okinawa

and to the Marine Commandant in Washington, D.C. The Marines of CMAGTF

1-91 had efficiently accomplished every mission given them.
90 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Marine emphasis on rapid planning paid off when the CMAGTF staff

published two entirely different operation orders and an additional fragmentary

order within two weeks. Marine flexibility was shown when staff noncommissioned officers were unexpectedly called upon to fill key staff billets in

the command center because the officers were needed to be team leaders in the

field. The CMAGTF also demonstrated its ability to work in a joint and

combined service environment. The Marines of CMAGTF 1-91 worked with

U.S. Special Forces, British Royal Marines, Dutch Marines, and French soldiers.

Professional relationships and feelings of mutual respect were established all

around. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey noted that morale was high throughout

Operation Provide Comfort. The CMAGTF suffered no fatalities because safety

and common sense prevailed under the most difficult conditions. Contingency

MAGTF 1-91 returned to Okinawa on 3 July 1991 .'°

Although the Marine movement went smoothly, General Shalikashvili

encountered some unanticipated problems. After learning of plans to pull out, the

Painting by Cot Peter M. "Mike" Gish, USMCR

American and Western European forces built a series of temporary refugee relocation camps

throughout northern Iraq in April to encourage the Kurds to come down from their mountain

hideouts in Turkey, Iraq, and iran.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 91

Kurds held demonstrations protesting the allied departure. At Dohuk, the Iraqis

and the Kurds engaged in a two-hour gun battle during which at least 17 people

died. The British and the Peshmerga got into a firefight near Al Amadiyah.

There were scattered incidents between the Kurds and the Turks along the

border. These actions forced General Shalikashvili to postpone the allied egress

until 15 July.

To try to settle things down, General Shalikashvili decided to have a meeting

with Kurdish leaders. Colonel Jones, combat artist Colonel Gish, and Sergeant

Major Hatcher flew to the 3d Commando Brigade Headquarters. There, they met

with General Shalikashvili and the British commander to discuss future options

and to anticipate the Kurdish response. From Sirsenk, the group moved to the

heavily guarded French compound at Shaladiza where the Kurdish mullahs had

gathered for this important meeting.

General Shalikashvili met with the Kurdish elders, each one dressed in

distinctive ceremonial robes and fancy turban. The Kurds talked of their dreams

for a free Kurdistan and told the general they wanted the allied forces to expand

the security zone to include Mosul and Kirkuk. After their passionate

presentations, General Shalikashvili rose and addressed them. He told them that

what he was going to say was sure to be a disappointment to them, but that he

had to be honest with them. He said the security zone was not going to be

expanded and that the allied security forces were going to leave Iraq. He

reassured the Kurds that the United Nations would keep the peace and urged

them to settle their differences with Baghdad through negotiations. This did not

satisfy the Kurds, who pressed for a continued alliedpresence.'1° Shalikashvili

pointed out that Saddam was well aware that any intrusion into the security zone

would bring a strong allied response, then closed the meeting by saying that he

would convey their concerns about the future to his superiors, but that he could

make no promises.

The Final Days

On 6 July, the Turkish government agreed to allow an international reaction

force, called Combined Task Force Poised Hammer, to remain at Silopi. Poised

Hammer was comprised of a headquarters, an international infantry battalion, an

aviation component, and a service support component. General Jamerson was

designated commanding general and General Zinni was made deputy commander.

The U.S. Army's 6th Battalion, 6th Cavalry, and 6th Battalion, 502d Infantry,

were the major American combat units assigned to Poised Hammer. The 6th

Battalion of the 502d was actually a provisional rifle battalion that included rifle

companies from the United States (Company A, 6th Battalion, 502d Infantry),

United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, and Turkey. The 6th

Cavalry's 6th Battalion included scout, utility, attack, and transport helicopters.

Fixed-wing air support was provided by the U.S. Air Force at Incirlik. The only

Marine units assigned to Task Force Poised Hammer were the firepower control

teams from 2d ANGLICO.
92 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Marines paddle down the Khabur River during a Fourth of July field day that featured international

military and athletic contests.

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 2-91, with a MEU embarked, and

a Navy carrier battle group were designated standby forces, and would conduct

normal operations unless needed in northern Iraq. Amphibious Squadron 4

replaced Amphibious Squadron 8 as the Mediterranean amphibious ready group
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 93

on 11 July. Colonel Jones and his staff briefed the incoming MEU command

element at Iskenderun, then the 24th MEU (SOC) turned over its duties as

Landing Force Sixth Fleet to the 26th MEU (SOC). The aircraft carrier Roosevelt

had already been relieved on station by the Forrestal (CV 59)."

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort had successfully accomplished its

mission. Before the allies departed northern Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein was

given some final terms: No Iraqi aircraft could operate above the 36th parallel.

A coalition force would be located at Silopi, ready to intervene if necessary.

Allied aircraft would continue to patrol the skies of northern Iraq without

interference. The Military Coordination Center would continue to monitor the

security zone and report Iraqi compliance with the stated terms. It was made

clear that only Iraqi acceptance of this understanding would pave the way for the

end of Operation Provide Comfort.

On 12 July 1991, the Bush administration publicly announced its decision to

pull American forces out of northern Iraq. The next day, thousands of Kurds

lined the road near Habur and blocked an allied convoy for about three hours.

More than 3,000 people carried banners that thanked the allies, but also warned

that "the job is only half done." They were grateful for the help rendered, but

fearful of what would happen after the allies left. General Garner, the senior

American officer on the spot, tried to calm their fears by reminding them that

Iraqi military forces were prohibited from entering the 3,600-square-mile

exclusion zone established in April, and that a multinational rapid reaction force

would remain at Silopi to repel any Iraqi advances. General Garner stated, "We

have told [Saddam] not to come back in here." Fadhil Merani, a top official of

the Kurdistan Democratic Party, accompanied Garner when he went to talk to the

Kurds. Merani's words, "Shame on you, these people came here to help us, and

look at the way you treat them," appeased the crowd which silently pulled back

and allowed the movement to continue."2

At 1600 on 15 July 1991, a bugler sounded "Colors," and the American flag

was hauled down for the last time in northern Iraq. The convoy carrying the last

Marines and soldiers to Silopi was stopped at the Habur Bridge. A peaceful

crowd of about 500 people gathered to thank them for all they had done. General

Garner accepted emotional well-wishes and reaffirmed coalition support for the

Kurds. As the sky darkened behind the towering mountain peaks in the east,

Colonel Jones and General Garner crossed the border into Turkey. The last

elements of the 24th MEU (SOC) were in Silopi by 15 July. As it turned out,

debarkation was not a problem and the MEU loaded the last of its equipment in

less than 96 hours. The 24th MEU (SOC) sailed for home on 19 July 1991.

Provide Comfort, the largest humanitarian relief operation in Marine history

to that time, was over. In early April, everyone had been skeptical about

launching a such an operation. Politicians didn't want to get involved, host

nations refused to help, and a ruthless dictator banked on world-wide apathy to

achieve his goals. After the refugees fled to the mountains, U.N. relief experts

surveyed the situation and said it was hopeless. They predicted it would take at

least seven months for recovery and stated that the Kurds would never return to
94 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Iraq. But within seven weeks, more than 750,000 starving people were being fed,

the sick were bing nursed back to health, and once fearful expatriates had

returned to their homeland filled with hope.

When they arrived, the Marines were greeted by the horrifying sight of

starving, freezing refugees in the mountain camps and the haunting images of the

deserted towns of Kurdistan. By mid-July, however, the mournful wails of

mothers with dying children had given way to the joyous laughter of the children

themselves, and the once empty streets of Zakho and Dohuk teemed with people.

It became business as usual when shepherds drove their flocks to the open-air

markets and the cafes were filled with arguing men. Children who once quaked

with fear when soldiers appeared now stopped playing and yelled "Meester,

Meester, wave at me!" as Marines passed by.

In the spring of 1991, the Marines proudly called themselves "Devil Dogs,"

but to the appreciative Kurds they were known by a different name, the "Food

Soldiers." Returning veterans of Desert Storm were cheered by the American

people because of their stunning performance as warriors; the unheralded

Marines of Provide Comfort proved no less adept at their craft while acting as

Samaritans in northern Iraq. Humanitarian Relief Operations (HROs) are referred

to as "Heroes" in military shorthand, for the Marines of Operation Provide

Comfort it was a fitting accolade.
NOTES

Unless otherwise noted the material in this monograph was derived from the following: LtCol

Robert L. Bailey intvw, 2Jun91, hereafter Bailey intvw; LtCol Joseph A. Byrtus intvw, 25May91,

hereafter Byrtus intvw; Capt Charles E. Headen intvw, 27May91, hereafter Headen intvw; MajGen James

L. Jamerson,. USAF, intvw, 16May91, hereafter Jamerson intvw; Cot James L. Jones, Jr. intvw,

31May91, hereafter Jones intvw; Capt Dewey G. Jordan intvw, 29May91, hereafter Jordan intvw; LtCol

Richard L. Kohl intvw, 11May91, hereafter Kohl intvw; Capt Timothy J. Ott intvw, 28May91, hereafter

Ott intvw; BGen Richard W. Potter, USA, intvw, 17May91, hereafter Potter intvw; Commo Dean Turner

intvw, 1Jun91; BGen Anthony C. Zinni intvw, 10Jun91, hereafter Zinni intvw; SMSgt Thomas L. Robb

and SSgt Thomas A. Traynor, CTF-PC Chronology, 7Apr-8Jun9l, hereafter PC Chron; FMFEur

ComdC, Jan-Jun9l; 24th MEU(SOC) ComdC, Jan-Jun 91; HMM-264 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l; MSSG-24

ComdC, Jan-Jun9l; Maj Charles V. Mugno presentation to CTF-PC, 9May91, hereafter Mugno Brief:

CMC SitReps, Mar-Apr9 1; Col Peter M. Gish, Provide Comfort Journal, hereafter Gish Jnl; LtCol

Ronald J. Brown, Provide Comfort Journal, hereafter Brown Jnl; Dept of Army, Area Handbook for Iraq

(Washington, GPO, 1969); John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1992); Albert Houroni, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1991); Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1990); Sheri Laizer, Into Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1991); Trevor Mostyn, The

Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: University Press, 1988); Peter

Douglas, "Bloody, Beautiful Kurdistan" Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Nov91, pp. 52-57; Col James L.

Jones, Jr., "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," Marine

Corps Gazette, Nov91, pp. 99-107, hereafter Jones, "Provide Comfort."

1. Provide Comfort later was eclipsed by Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

2. USCinCEur/ECJ3/CAT msg dtd 6Apr91.

3. JTF-PC SitBrief, 7Apr91.

4. This designation was later changed to Joint Task Force Alpha.

5. These aircraft were actually four C-130 Hercules and two MC-130 Talons.

6. JTFPC SitRep #1, 7Apr91.

7. CTF-PC Chron; some of the Kurds ate the MREs dry, then drank water, causing the dehydrated food

to swell and resulting in severe gastro-intestinal problems.

8. CG, JTF-PC "Bravo Zulu" msg to 1st LSB dtd 271325Z Jun91.

9. CTF-PC Chron.
96 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

10. Jones intvw.

11. CTF-PC "Concept of Operations."

12. FMFEur ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

13. Mediterranean phibrons were known as the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG);

embarked Marine forces were designated Landing Force Sixth Fleet (LF6F); in this case, PhibRon 8 was

MARG 1-91 and the 24th MEU(SOC) was LF6F.

14. SSgt Lee J. Tibbetts, "24th MEU Hits Sardinian Beach," Marines, Jun91, p. 20.

15. In 1991 most special-purpose forces were designated contingency forces (CMAGTF or CM);

currently these forces are designated special purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTF).

16. Senior Marine leaders felt the term "expeditionary" implied a mission, while "amphibious" was

simpiy a transportation method.

17. When an ARG used an LPH, a landing ship dock (LSD)--capable of launching surface landing craft--

was normally included.

18. The necessary inclusion of the Charleston degraded the 24th MEU's amphibious capabilities;

although an amphibious cargo ship, the Charleston could neither conduct an underway launch nor offload

directly onto the beach.

19. Surge quartering was the use of all available space to house embarked personnel: non-berthing space,

temporary cots, hospital bunks, and "hot racking," whereby several men shared the same sleeping area,

are all used for surge quartering.

20. His father commanded the daring amphibious reconnaissance units in the Pacific--the antecedent of

modern Force Recon--before returning to civilian life as vice president of International Harvester; his

uncle was Lieutenant General William K. Jones, known to readers of the Marine Coris Gazette as

"Baseplate McGurk."

21. One legislator jokingly cited Col Jones as the perfect commander for Provide Comfort because he

had dealt with so many poor helpless wretches during his time as Senate Liaison Officer.

22. The amtracs were 11 AAV7P, 1 AAV7C, and 1 AAV7R; the armor was 6 LAV-25s, 1 LAY-LOG,

and 2 LAY-TOWs.

23. After one flight, the author jokingly claimed he probably rode that particular helicopter into combat

in 1969; a check of its record of service by a curious crew member proved this was well within the realm

of possibility.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 97

24. It was hoped the Bell-Boeing MV-22 Osprey rotating twin-turboprop, S/VTOL airplane would

replace both the CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters as Marine shipborne assault aircraft by the mid-i 990s,

but budget problems have delayed its development.

25. Mugno was described by another Marine as 'being able to spot a gnat on a zebra's behind at twice

the engagement range."

26. In 1992-93 MajGen Zinni saw extensive service during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia,

eventually being appointed special assistant to the U.N. Ambassador.

27. Mugno Brief.

28. CTF-PC Chron.

29. Iskenderun was the site of a famous battle where Alexander the Great defeated Persian King Darius

III.

30. Jones intvw.

31. Jones, "Provide Comfort," p. 101; Brytus intvw.

32. Byrtus intvw; CTF-PC Chron.

33. Cpl E. H. Hughes, "Refuelers Keep Birds Flying," Marines, Jun91, p. 4.

34. Brown Jnl; Byrtus intvw; Jones, "Provide Comfort," p. 100.

35. The exclusion zone was all Iraqi territory north of the 36th Parallel.

36. "Relief Supplies Distribution," Mugno brief.

37. FMFEur ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

38. FMFEur ComdC, Jan-Jun9l; Mugno intvw.

39. The activities of this historical team are covered in "Historian Documents Marine Assistance To

Refugees," Fortitudine, Summer 1991, pp. 12-13.

40. CTF-PC Chron.

41. These were Air Force expeditionary packages designed to supply materials, engineer assets, and

specially trained personnel to operate forward bases; Prime Beef teams were support engineers who

provided construction and maintenance, and Prime Rib teams were support personnel who administered

the camp.

42. CTF-PC Chron.
98 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

43. A humorous incident occurred when an excited messenger burst into the MSSG-24 tent and told the

author that an Italian brigadier general wanted to see him. The "general" turned out to be a private

(Italian enlisted men wear star emblems on their collars).

44. Ron Jensen, "Base Camp Arises From a Wheatfield," The Stars and Stripes, 13May91, p. 3.

45. This was true capitalism in action. Iraqi 25 Dinar bills had an international exchange value of about

$5.00, but vendors sold them for as much as $20.00.

46. Bailey intvw.

47. CMAGTF OpO 1-91.

48. CO, CMAGTF 1-91, sitrep #1.

49. CMAGTF op0 2-91.

50. Bailey intvw.

51. MS SG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9 1.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57. Kohl intvw.

58. MSSG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

59. MSSG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

60. The KAZ had been notoriously gerrymandered to keep the Kurds from controlling Iraq's oilfields.

61. The number is estimated to be as high as 3,900 villages.

62. CG, CTF-PC, "Concept of Operations."

63. Col John 0. Easton intvw 15Apr92.

64. CTF-PC CA Brief.

Kohl intvw.

MSSG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

Brown Jnl.

MSSG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

Brown Jnl.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 99

65. This was necessary to offset Baathist propaganda that the U.N. had no right to interfere in Iraqi

affairs.

66. Jones, "Provide Comfort," p. 102.

67. CTF.-PC Chron.

68. SEAL is an acronym for Sea, Air, Land; both U.S. Navy SEALs and Force Reconnaissance Marines

are trained for deep penetration and clandestine operations in enemy territory.

69. Raftery intvw.

70. Brown Jnl.

71. CG, CTF-PC SitRep, l9Arp9l, p. 7.

72. General Shalikashvili's warnings were taken seriously because two Iraqi jets had been shot down in

March after the Iraqis ignored warnings by General Schwarzkopf.

73. Mugno brief.

74. Kohl intvw.

75. 24th MEU (SOC) ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

76. Brown Jnl; CTF-PC Chron.

77. MajGen Robin J. Ross, RM, "Operation Haven," Globe and Laurel, Nov-Dec9l, p. 208-09.

78. Kohl intvw.

79. The Kurds did not complain about the taste or monotony of a MRE diet, but pointed out most MREs

contained pork, violating Islamic dietary laws; the Marines began saying MRE meant "Meals Rejected

by Everyone."

80. Supply officers were baffled when the Kurds requested a shipment of potatoes, food most Kurds

considered unpalatable; the mystery was solved when the MCC reported Iraqi police were being pelted

by potatoes as they walked the streets.

81. These latrines required close supervision because Kurdish families used these comfortable, roofed,

and screened enclosures as homes.

82. See LtCol Gordon W. Rudd, USA, "The 24th MEU (SOC) and Operation Provide Comfort: A

Second Look," Marine Corps Gazette, Feb93, pp. 20-22.

83. Jordan intvw.
100 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

84. The Viking was an antisubmarine warfare aircraft whose capabilities were used in an imaginative

way in northern Iraq.

85. Raftery intvw.

86. Headen intvw.

87. Ott intvw.

88. These threats included Iraqi and Palestinian terrorists, disgruntled Kurds, and Turkish leftist groups.

89. The 24th MAU, the lineal antecedent of 24th MEU, was the command element of the Marines in

Beirut when the bombing occurred.

90. Ouzts intvw.

91. FMFEur ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

92. Brown in!.

93. Gish intvw, 21Dec91.

94. CTF-PC Chron.

95. Brown ml.

96. MajGen Robin J. Ross, 'Operation Haven," Globe and Laurel, Jul-Aug9l, pp. 208-09.

97. French regiments were about the size of American battalions mustering about 800 men each.

98. French law prohibited draftees from serving outside France; French Marines are professional soldiers

who can be sent anywhere in the world.

99. Brown Jnl.

100. Brown Jnl.

101. CTF-PC Chron.

102. Brown Jnl.

103. Linn intvw.

104. "Kurd Leader Says Saddam OKs Accord," Stars and Stripes, 19May91, pp. 1, 10.

105. CTF-PC Chron.
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 101

106. MSSG-24 ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

107. MSSG-24 retrograde meeting, 3Jun91.

108. 24th MEU ComdC, Jan-Jun9l.

109. CMC brief 15Jul91.

110. One Kurd tearfully told Col Gish a single platoon of Marines would do more to guarantee peace

than 200 U.N. policemen.

111. CMC Brief, 30Jun91.

112. AP, Washington Post, 14Jul91, p. A20.

113. Boyd intvw.
Appendix A

Chronology

1991

April

6 Joint Task Force Provide Comfort formed.

7 Joint Task Force Provide Comfort deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey.

9 MARG 1-91 received warning order to deploy to Iskenderun, Turkey.

10 Backload completed, MARG 1-91 with 24th MEU (SOC) embarked, sails for eastern

Mediterranean; 24th MEU (SOC) receives Provide Comfort Operation Order 1.

11 24th MEU (SOC) Forward Command Element arrives at Incirlik.

13 24th MEU (SOC) FCE flies first relief mission.

14 24th MEU (SOC) under operational control of CTF Provide Comfort.

15 24th MEU Forward moves to Silopi; HMM-264 flies first Marine relief mission; offload of

Phibron 8 begins.

16 24th MEU Forward operates from Silopi.

17 Task Force Bravo established; Operation Encourage Hope announced.

19 24th MEU (SOC) CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE at Silopi; General Shalikashvili meets Iraqis.

20 24th MEU (SOC) secures area around Zakho.

21 First Marine convoy enters northern Iraq; CTF-PC Navy-Marine Liaison Team 10 opened at

Incirlik.

22 45th Commando, Royal Marines, attached to 24th MEU (SOC).

23 Dutch 1st ACG attached to 24th MEU (SOC).

26 American, British, and Dutch Marines clear Zakho.

27 CMAGTF 1-91 formed on Okinawa.

29 British and Dutch Marines transfer to 3d Commando Brigade.
WITH MARINES IN PROVIDE COMFORT 103

May

5 24th MEU (SOC) HQ named Camp D. W. Sommers; CMAGTF 1-91 arrives at Incirlik.

8 UAV Det, 2d RPV Company, 2d SRIG deploys.

9 BLT 2/8 opens fire support base at Muqbal.

12 2d ANGLICO FCTs arrive from Camp Lejeune.

17 29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, attached to 24th MEU (SOC).

19 29th Commando returned to 3d Commando Brigade.

20 Marine civil affairs personnel enter Dohuk as part of international relief team.

21 Negotiations succeed; Dohuk proclaimed "open city."

28 UAV Det, 2d RPV Company, 2d SRIG detached.

30 General Powell, Chairman, JCS, visits 24th MEU (SOC).

June

1 24th MEU (SOC) initial contingent returns to Iskenderun.

5 Rigger dets leave Incirlik for home bases.

8 CTF-PC Retrograde order issued to 24th MEU (SOC).

15 BLT 2/8 moves to Silopi.

16 Camp Sommers closed, 24th MEU (SOC) CE moves to JTF-B HQ.

18 Retrograde halted.

July

11 24th MEU (SOC) turns over LF6F duties to 26th MEU.

15 24th MEU departs northern Iraq.

19 Operation Provide Comfort, Phase II begins; 24th MEU sails for home.
Appendix B

Command and Staff List

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

CG MajGen James L. Jamerson, USAF

LtGen John M. Shalikashvili, USA

Deputy CG BGen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

MajUen James L. Jamerson

Chief of Staff BGen Anthony C. Zinni

A/CS, Plans Col Daniel M. Pender, USMC

Air Force Force

CG BGen James L. Hobson Jr., USAF

Civil Affairs

CG BGen Donald L. Campbell, USA

4th CAG, USMCR Col John 0. Easton, USMCR

Joint Task Force Alpha

CG BGen Richard W. Potter, USA

Joint Task Force Bravo

CG MajGen Jay M. Garner, USA

Chief of Staff Col John 0. Easton, USMCR

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

CO Col James L. Jones, Jr.

ExO LtCol Ralph C. Morse
WITH MARINES IN PROVIDE COMFORT 105

S-i Capt Dewey G. Jordan

S-2 Maj Richard J. Raftery

S-3 LtCol Thomas C. Linn

S-4 Maj Michael D. Boyd

BLT 2/8 LtCol Tony L. Corwin

HMM-264 LtCol Joseph A. Byrtus, Jr.

MSSG-24 LtCol Richard T. Kohl

Contingency MAGTF 1-91

CO LtCol Robert L. Bailey

UAV Detachment, 2d RPV Company

OIC Capt Wayne 0. Ouzts

Navy-Marine Liaison Team 10

OIC Col Robert M. Hansen

4th Civil Affairs Group Detachment

CO Col John 0. Easton, USMCR
Appendix C

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

Task Organization

Headquarters, Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

Air Force Forces

Headquarters

7440th Composite Wing (Provisional)

Composite Aviation Logistics Force

Composite Helicopter Squadron-Provider

Composite Helicopter Squadron-JTF Bravo

Joint Task Force Alpha

10th Special Forces Group (USA)

1-10 SFG

2-10 SFG

3-10 SFG

40th Commando, Royal Marines (UK)

112th Signal Battalion

4th Field Ambulance (Canada)

432d Civil Affairs Company (-)

Detachment, 6th Psychological Operations Group

39th Special Operations Wing (Reinforced)

7th Special Operations Squadron

21st Special Operations Squadron

67th Special Operations Squadron

667th Special Operations Maintenance Squadron

Detachment, 52d Signal Battalion

Joint Task Force Bravo

HQ, JTF-B

18th Military Police Brigade

18th Engineer Brigade

NMCB 133

24th MEU (SOC) (USMC)

BLT 2/8

HMM-264

MSSG 24

3-325th ABCT (USA)

Italian Special Forces Group
WITH MARINES IN PROVIDE COMFORT 107

4th Aviation Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (USA)

6th Battalion, 6th Cavalry

Task Force 23

3d Commando Brigade (UK)

45th Commando, Royal Marines

1st Amphibious Combat Group (NL)

USMC ANGLICO FCTs

French 'Cougar" Force

Parachute Brigade (Fr)

Security Platoon (Sp)

Italian Special Forces Group

USMC ANGLICO FCT

Spanish Expeditionary Force

Parachute Brigade

USMC ANGLICO FCT

Italian Force

Parachute Brigade

USMC ANGLICO FCT

Combined Support Command

21st Theater Army Area Command (-)

29th Aviation Support Group (-)

CTF Surgeon (-)

Contingency MAGTF 1-91

Task Force Provider

Civil Affairs

CMOC

354th Civil Affairs Brigade (-)

96th Civil Affairs Battalion

432d Civil Affairs Company (-)

418th Civil Affairs Company

USMC 4th Civil Affairs Group Detachment

Navy Task Force 60

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)

Carrier Air Wing 8

Belknap (CG 26)

Richmond K. Turner (CG 20)

Leyte Gulf(CG 55)

Virginia (CGN 38)
108 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991

William V. Pratt (DDG 44)

Caron (DD 970)

Vreeland (FF 1068)

Hawes (FFG 53)

Preble (DDG 46)
Appendix D

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort

Major Allied Forces

British Forces, Operation Haven

(Major General Robin J. Ross, Royal Marines)

Headquarters, Commando Forces, Royal Marines

3d Commando Brigade

(Brigadier A. M. Keeling)

Headquarters

40th Coni.mando, Royal Marines

45th Commando, Royal Marines

29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery

59th Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers

Commando Logistics Regiment, Royal Marines

3d Commando Brigade Air Squadron

Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre

Chinook Helicopter Force, Royal Air Force

846 Naval Air Squadron, Royal Navy

Netherlands Expeditionary Force

1st Amphibious Combat Group, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps

(Lieutenant Colonel Cees Van Egmond)

Composite Helicopter Squadron, Royal Netherlands Air Force

Mobile Field Hospital Unit

French Cougar Force

(Brigadier General Paul Marie LePage)

1st Brigade, 11th Airborne Division

(Brigadier General Xavier Prevost)

Headquarters

8th Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment

Alpine (Special Forces) Group, 27th Mountain Division

17th Parachute Engineer Battalion Detachment

5th Helicopter Regiment Detachment

Field Hospital Group
110 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

Italian Expeditionary Force

(Brigadier General Mario Buscemi)

Headquarters

Folgore Airborne Brigade

1St Carabinieri Company

9th Alpine (Special Forces) Group

26th Composite Helicopter Squadron

Field Hospital Detachment

Canadian 4th Field Ambulance Battalion

(Lieutenant Colonel Mike Murphy)

Headquarters

4th Field Transport Detachment

4th Field Hospital Company

Zakho Field Medical Detachment

Yekmal Field Medical Detachment

Kanimasi Field Medical Detachment

German Composite Helicopter Force

(Brigadier General Frederich W. Ehmann)

Headquarters

Heavy Helicopter Squadron

Utility Helicopter Squadron

Spanish Expeditionary Force

(Colonel Juan Narro)

Independent Parachute Brigade

(Colonel Javier Ledesma)

1st Airborne Battalion "Roger De Flor"

Engineer-Signals Detachment

Mobile Antitank Detachment

Expeditionary Combat Engineer Force

Expeditionary Field Medical Unit

FAMET Helicopter Force

1st Transport Helicopter Battalion

5th Combat Helicopter Battalion Detachment
WITH MARINES IN PROVIDE COMFORT 111

Other National Military Detaclunents:

Australia

Belgium

Luxembourg

Portugal
Appendix E

Contributing Nations

Australia France Japan Romania

Austria Germany Jordan Saudi Arabia

Belgium Greece Luxembourg Spain

Bulgaria Hungary Netherlands Sweden

Canada Iceland New Zealand United Kingdom

Czechoslovakia Ireland Norway United States

Denmark Israel Pakistan

Finland Italy Portugal
Appendix F

International Relief Agencies

Action Nord-SVD

Adventist Development and Relief Agency

American Friends Service Committee

American Red Cross

American Refugee Committee

AMHURT

Catholic Relief Service

Christian Outreach

CONCERN

Danish Church Aid

Doctors Without Borders

Doctors of the World

Equilibre

German Bergwacht

German Red Cross

Global Partners

HELO Mission

Hul Aan Kuterdan

International Action Against Hunger

International Committee of the Red Cross

International Medical Corps

International Refugee Year Trust

International Rescue Committee

Italian Red Cross

Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee

Maltese Dienst

Medical Volunteers International

Mideast Council of Churches

Operation Mercy

OXFAM

Red Cross and Red Crescent

Red Cross of Malta

Samaritans Pulse

Save the Children

Swedish National Rescue Board

Swedish Rescue Service

Swiss Charity Team

Swiss Mission

Swiss Project of Emergency Help

TEAR Fund (United Kingdom)

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

World Council of Churches

World Food Program

World Relief International

World Vision Relief and Development

World Vision, Australia
Appendix G

The Kurds

An ancient myth tells us that in olden times King Solomon the Wise was troubled by the antics of

a group of wild spirits called the Jinn, so he had them imprisoned in a bottle. When the bottle was

accidentally opened, the Jinn escaped. While in Europe, they abducted some beautiful women, then fled

to the most isolated area in the world, the rugged mountains of Kurdistan. There, safe from retribution,

the Jinn happily ignored a curse that their descendants would have to endure endless sorrow to make up

for the wanton acts of the Jinn. Modern Kurds call themselves "the children of Jinn," and stoically accept

the misery of their lives. This myth is often used to explain the presence of fiercely independent, lightskinned people living in the Middle East.

The Kurds are separated from their Arab neighbors by race, language, religion, and culture. There

are about 20 million Kurds, most living in the Taurus Mountains of eastern Anatolia or in the Zagros

Mountains of southwestern Iran. Most are hospitable to strangers but are suspicious of their neighbors.

The Kurdish language, probably an archaic form of Farsi, is the glue that binds the diverse Kurds

together. The Kurds accepted Islam in the 7th century, and today many are devout Sunni Muslims. Most

Kurds, however, reject the Arab culture associated with Islam. For the most part, rural Kurds are a closeknit, tribal society. The major Kurdish tribes are the Barzani, the Dizai, the Hamawandi, the Herkki, the

Jaff, the Sorchi, and the Zibari.

Kurdish history has been a repetitive story of rebellion and disunity. Ancestors of the modern Kurds

were first mentioned in history when Greek General Xenophon's Ten Thousand battled local warriors

near the modern town of Zakho (Iraq) during the 5th century B.C. The actual name "Kurds" was first

applied by Muslim conquerors around 750 A.D. The most famous Kurd was Saladin the Great.

Traditional enmity between the Kurds and their rulers resulted in a tenacious struggle for Kurdish

survival. The Persians, Mongols, and Ottoman Turks have conquered Kurdistan, but never successfully

subdued its rebellious inhabitants. Relations between the Iraqi Kurds and Saddam Hussein have been

acrimonious. Although pEomising peace and autonomy in the March Manifesto (1970), Saddam is

suspected of initiating a policy of genocide. He used duplicity, lies, exile, assassination, and military

force (including chemical weapons) to subdue the Kurds.
Appendix H

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A-6--Grumman Intruder; a shipborne, twin-seat, twin-jet attack aircraft capable of striking point targets

masked by inclement weather or darkness.

AAA--Antiaircraft artillery; Iraqi AAA included 12.7mm, 23mm, 37mm, and 57mm guns and surface-toair (SAM) missiles.

AAR--After action report.

AAV--Assault amphibious vehicle; AAV7A1 amphibian manned by a crew of three, capable of

transporting 25 Marines through water or cross-country; officially designated "AAVs" they were

sometimes called "Hogs"by the Marines and "Tracks" or "APCs" by allied soldiers.

AB--Air base.

ABCT--Airborne battalion combat team; the U.S. Army's 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne) and

its combat support and combat service support units stationed at Vincenza, Italy.

ACG--Dutch Korps Mariner 1st Amphibious Combat Group, a battalion-size unit attached to the 3d

Commando Brigade, Royal Marines.

AdminO--Administrative officer; military shorthand refers to AminOs as S-i (bn), G- 1 (div), or J- 1

(joint).

AH-1T--Bell Sea Cobra; a twin-seat, single-rotor, twin-jet, attack helicopter; also known as a "snake."

AirO--Air officer.

AK--Kalishnikov-designed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm assault rifle with an effective range of about

400 meters; made in numerous Communist Block countries, the AKM was the standard rifle of the Iraqi

Army, but was often mistakenly identified as an "AK-47."

ALMAR--A CMC bulletin directed to all Marines, usually dealing with a sweeping change of previous

orders or the practical application of new policies.

ALO--Air liaison officer; a naval aviator/flight officer attached to a ground unit who was primary advisor

to the ground commander; in the 24th MEU the ALO was a member of the operations section (G-3).

AO--Area of operations.

APC--Armored personnel carrier.

ARG--Amphibious ready group.
116 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

Arty--Artillery; Marine artillery included M198 155mm towed howitzers and M1O1A1 105mm towed

howitzers; the British 29th Commando was armed with lightweight 105mm towed howitzers.

Bde--U. S. Army designation for brigade.

BLT--Battalion landing team; a task-organized combat team including a rifle battalion and combat support

units (engineers, AAVs, LAVs, artillary, communications, medical, etc.).

Bn--Battalion; an American organization of about 1,000 personnel, the British equivalent was called a

Commando.

C-130--Lockheed Hercules four-turboprop, medium-lift transport airplane.

CAS--Close air support.

Cdo--Commando; in this monograph it refers to British units of battalion size, not specific soldiers.

CH-46E--Sea Knight medium-lift transport helicopter; a tandem rotor, twin-engine, two-pilot craft capable

of carrying 25 troops or 4.5 tons over a 50-mile radius; known to Marines as a "Frog."

CH-53E--Super Sea Stallion heavy-lift cargo helicopter; a single main rotor, triple engine, two-pilot craft

capable of lifting 55 troops or 16 tons and has aerial refueling capability; also called an "Echo."

CH-47--Boeing Vertol Chinook; a heavy-lift helicopter used by the U.S. Army and allied forces; it was

commonly called a "Hook."

CMAGTF--Contingency Marine air-ground task force.

ComdC--Command chronology.

CSC--Combined support command.

CSSD--Combat service support detachment.

CTF--Joint: Combined task force; Naval: task force commander.

CTF HO--Combined Task Force History Office.

CTF PC--Combined Task Force Provide Comfort.

CTF 61--Commander Task Force 61.

CTF 62--Commander Task Force 62.

DCMC--Displaced civilian movement center.
WITH MARINES IN PROVIDE COMFORT 117

DCST--Displaced civilian support team.

Det--Detachment.

Dragon--Medium antitank/assault weapon, consisting of man-packed, tube-launched, optically-tracked,

wire-guided missile with range of approximately 1,000 meters.

HC--US Navy combat service helicopter squadron (HC-4).

HMM--Marine medium helicopter squadron (HMM-264).

HSSB--Humanitarian service support base.

HSSD--Humanitarian service support detachment.

Intvw--Interview.

Jnl--Journal.

JTF--Joint task force.

KDP--Kurdish Democratic Party, headed by Moussad Barzani.

KUF--United Kurdistan Front.

LKA--Attack cargo ship.

Ln--Liaison.

LPD--Amphibious dock transport.

LPH--Amphibious assault ship.

LSB--Landing support battalion.

Ltr--Letter.

MAGTF--Marine air ground task force.

MARG--Mediterranean amphibious ready group.

MEU--Marine expeditionary unit; about 2,800 Marines.

MSSG--MEU service support group.
118 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991

Phibron--Amphibious squadron.

PPK--Turkish Kurdish Separatist Movement, a terrorist organization opposed to Operation Provide

Comfort.

PUK--Kurdistan Patriotic Union; headed by Jalal Talabani.

RFA--Royal field artillery.

ROWPU--Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.

RM--Royal Marines.

SF--Special forces.

SFG--Special forces group.

SOC--Special operations capable.

SRIG--Surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group.

UAV--Unmanned aerial vehicle.
Index

Abizaid, LtCol John P., USA, 64

Abramowitz, Ambassador Morton I., 25

Adana, Turkey, 4, 26, 32

Al Amadiyah, 77, 79, 91

Al-Anbari, Abdul Amir, 54

Allison, lstLt Patrick J., 45

Amphibious Exercise Sardinia 1-91, 13

Amphiibious Assault Fueling System, 47

Anatolia, 26

Angel, HN Arthur W., USN, 45

Arantz, lstLt Christropher A., 30, 46

Attamim, 49

Austin (LPD 4), 15, 62

Bailey, LtCol Robert L., 41, 42, 89, 90

Baker, Secretary of State James A., III, 54

Baker, lstLt Joel B., 17

Baloka, 42

Barzani, Massoud, 2, 82, 84

Batman, 12

Batufa, 79

Bellizaire, lstLt Demetrius, 17

Bierman, lstLt James W., 17

Bonnot, Doctor Marcel, 6

Boyd, Maj Michael D., 16, 71, 89

British Commands and Units

1st Amphibious Combat Group, DKM, 63

29th Commando Regiment, 84

29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, 59, 79-80

29th Commando Regiment, Royal Marines, 66

3d Commando Brigade, 79, 80, 91

3d Commando Brigade Air Squadron, 39

3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, 77

40th Commando, Royal Marines, 8, 76, 79

45th Commando, Royal Marines, 63, 76, 79

59th Independent Commando, Royal Engineers, 47

59th Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Marines, 80

846th Naval Air Squadron, 39

Royal Air Force Chinook Squardon, 39

Brooks, lstLt Kevin S., 42

Buckley, Lt Ronald, USN, 23, 68

Buehner, lstLt Thomas M., 23

Burch, BGen Harold E., USA, 35, 37, 88, 89

Bush, President George W., 2, 3
120 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Byrtus, LtCol Joseph A., Jr., 18, 26, 27, 28, 37, 86

Camp Denton, 86, 89

Camp Lejeune, 2, 22, 44, 74, 76, 89

Camp Pendleton, 7

Camp Sommers, 46, 69, 89

Campbell, GySgt Michael J., 41

Canadian 4th Field Ambulance, 64

Charleston (LKA 113), 15, 44, 62

Chimaju, 42

Combined Support Command Headquarters, 36

Combined Task Force Poised Hammer, 91

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 7, 24, 25, 30, 32, 35, 52

Connors, lstLt Matthew J., 23

Contingency MAGTF 1-91 Command Element, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, 85, 89,

90

Corwin, LtCol Tony L., 17, 55, 60, 61, 86, 89

Cowan, Maj JohnW., 18

Creech, SgtMaj William G., 17

Crush, Maj Richard J., 18

Cukurca, 85

Cuny, Frederick C., 54

Dahnoun, BGen Nashwan, 59

Deleon, SgtMaj Francisco, 18

Delgado, lstSgt Donald A., 23, 61

Desy, lstLt James F., 17

Devlin, Capt Peter H., 17

Displaced Civilian Movement Centers, 42

Displaced Civilian Support Teams, 42

Diyala Province, 49

Diyarbakir, 12, 26, 37

Doctors Without Borders, 1

Dohuk, 42, 45, 48, 51, 53, 57, 74, 76, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 91,

94

Dohuk Province, 49

Duncan, GySgt Martin W., 72

Dutch 1st Amphibious Combat Group, 76, 79

Dutch Composite Squadron, 39

Easton, Col John 0., 9, 53

Eggers, lstLt Todd L., 23, 45

Ehmann, BGen Frederick W., 6

Erbil, 48, 49

Exdrone, 74
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 121

Ferketish, Capt Gregory M., 41

Fleet Marine Force Europe (FMFEur), 34

Foley, Capt Kevin L., 23

Forrestal (CV 59), 93

Franklin, CWO 2 Kenneth D., 45

French 8th Marine Parachure Infantry Regiment, 76

French 17th Airborne Engineer, 47

French Combat Helicopter Regiment, 39

Galvin, Gen John R., USA, 3, 65

Garner, MajGen Jay M., USA, 9, 54, 55, 65, 67, 76, 77, 81, 83, 93

Gih, Col Peter M., 35, 91

Gressly, Col Donald A., 34

Guadalcanal (LPH 7), 13, 15, 28, 62

Habur Bridge, 26, 93

Habur, 51, 61, 80, 89

Hakkari Province, 26

Hansen, Col Robert M., 35

Hatcher, SgtMaj William E., 16, 91

Hazil River, 27, 49, 51

Headen, Capt Charles E., 71, 72

Hererra, Sgt Marie Y., USAF, 35

Herzberg, lstLt James A., 42

Hogan, LtCol John J., III, 17, 24

Holowecki, Capt William P., 17

Humanitarian Service Support Base, 29, 31

Hutchinson, lstLt Allie A., Jr., 17

Incirlik, 7, 12, 20, 24, 30, 35, 37, 45, 53, 57, 63, 69, 74,

89, 91

Incirlik Air Base, 4, 32

International Red Cross, 36

Iraq, 1

Iraqi 36th Infantry Division, 80

Iraqi 44th Infantry Division, 51, 57

Iraqi 66th Special Assault Brigade, 62-63

Isikveren, 26, 27, 47, 85

Iskenderun, 10, 12, 14, 30, 31, 35, 55, 87, 88, 89, 93

Iskenderun Harbor, 26, 29

Italian Folgore Parachute Brigade, 76, 80

Jacobsen, Capt Kenneth E., 23

Jalal Talibani, 82

Jamerson, MajGen James L., USAF, 3, 4, 6, 7, 26, 29, 91
122 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

Joint Historical Team, 83

Joint Task Force Alpha, 27, 30, 42, 55, 76

Joint Task Force Bravo, 42, 46, 48, 52, 54, 56, 64, 69, 76,

81, 83, 86, 89

Joint Task Force Express Care, 4, 5

Joint Task Force Provide Comfort, 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, 71

Jones, Col James L., Jr., 16, 24, 25, 26, 54, 55, 56, 57,

59, 61, 65, 73, 74, 76, 77, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93

Jordan, Capt Dewey G., 16, 69, 70

Joseph, Capt Raymond B., 17

Kanibalav, 42

Kanimasi, 42, 83

Kayadiyah, 85

Kemal, Mustafa, 48

Kerr, LtCol Graham, 59

Kerrick, Maj David T., 18, 24

Khabur River, 49

Kirkuk, 49

Kohl, LtCol Richard T., 22, 37, 44, 45, 47, 61, 62, 66, 67, 88, 89

Kuhn, lstLt Michael L., 17

Kurdish Autonomous Zone, 48, 84

Kurdish Democratic Party, 81, 84

Kurdistan Democratic Party, 93

Kurdistan Peoples Democratic Party, 82

Kurdistan Socialist Party, 81

Kurdistan, 1, 10, 26, 48, 51

Kurds, 1, 3

Lesko, Capt Charles J., Jr., 17

Lewellen, MSgt Ross E., 23

Linn, LtCol Thomas C., 16, 56, 83

MacDonald, MGySgt John B., 73

Mahabad, 48

Marine Corps Commands and Units

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 15

1st Force Service Support Group,

1st Landing Battalion, 2, 7

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 2, 8, 10, 13, 15, 14, 16, 24, 26, 27, 44, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,

59, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 83, 87, 88, 89, 93

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), 93
WITh MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 123

2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 16

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, 10

2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 17

2d Dental Battalion, 23

2d Force Reconnaissance Company, 16

2d Force Service Support Group, 22, 23, 45

2d Landing Support Battalion, 23

2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 17

2d Low Altitude Antiaircraft Defense Battalion, 17, 21

2d Maintenance Battalion, 23

2d Medical Battalion, 23

2d Radio Battalion, 16

2d Reconnaissance Battalion, 17

2d Supply Battalion, 23

2d Support Battalion, 23

2d Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group, 74

2d Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, 2

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, 17

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 16

3d Battalion, 10th Marines, 17, 77

3d Force Service Support Group, 2, 40-1

4th Civil Affairs Group, 3, 9, 53, 89

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 15

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 15

8th Communications Battalion, 16

8th Engineer Support Battalion, 23

8th Marine Parachute Regiment, 80

8th Motor Transport Battalion, 23

Battalion Landing Team 2/8, 16, 24, 54, 55, 65, 66, 67,

78, 84, 86, 89

Combined Support Command, 7

Composite Helicopter Squadron 264, 16

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 53

III Marine Expeditionary Force, 40

Joint Task Force Alpha, 8

Joint Task Force Bravo, 9

Marine Air Control Group 28, 17, 21, 26, 37

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, 17, 20

Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron 167, 17

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, 17, 18, 20, 26, 30, 37,

38, 44, 48, 60, 66, 79, 86, 89

Marine Service Support Group 24, 22, 24, 26, 30, 35, 37, 44,

45, 47, 48, 55, 61, 62, 66, 67, 68, 71, 87, 88, 89

Marine Wing Service Support Squadron 272, 17, 21, 26, 30,

37
124 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORThERN IRAQ, 1991:

MEU Service Support Group 24, 10, 15, 16, 21

Marsden, lstLt Luke, 45

McClanahan, Capt Michael K., 42

McEvoy, Capt William F., 17

McFadden, Capt Richard T., 18

McNulty, Capt Dennis M., 17

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 1-91, 13, 14, 15

Mehaffey, Maj Richard A., 18

Merani, Fadhil, 93

Mersin, 12, 30, 31, 35

Milstead, Maj Robert E., Jr., 41

Montgomery, Capt Bruce G., 41, 42

Morse, LtCol Ralph C., 16

Mosul, 49, 51, 91

Mugno, Maj Charles V., 22, 24, 35, 44, 45

Muiholland, Capt Christopher U., 17

Mundy, LtGen Carl E., Jr., 89

Muqbal, 74, 79, 86

Naab, Col Richard, USA, 62, 63, 65, 83

Nashwan, BGen Dahnoun, 62, 65, 83

Nazdur, 42

Nineveh, 48

Nogacek, Lt Kenneth P., USN, 23, 68

Operation Desert Storm, 1, 3, 53

Ott, Capt Timothy J., 72

Ouzts, Capt Wayne 0., 74, 85

Owen, Capt Peter F., 17

Ozal, President Tugrut, 12, 26

Paez, lstLt Byron J., 42

Party of United Kurdistan, 81

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 82

Pavlicin, lstLt Robert W., 23

Persian Gulf, 3

Peshmerga, 1, 26, 72, 82, 91

Potter, BGen Richard W., USA, 4, 8, 27, 76

Powell, Gen Cohn L., 86, 88

Raftery, Maj Richard J., 16, 57, 62, 70, 74

Ramsey, LtCol David L., 18

Ratliff, Lt Donald R., USN, 23, 68

Reagan, lstLt Jeffery M., 47

Reardon, lstLt Gavin R., 23
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 125

Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU), 48, 68

Robb, SMSgt Thomas L., USAF, 35

Roosevelt (CVN 71), 47, 57, 70, 84, 93

Ross, MajGen Robin J., Royal Marines, 79

Rudd, LtCol Gordon W., USA, 35

Saber, LtGen Abu Firas, 84

Saddam Hussein, 1, 82, 84, 93

Salahadin, 49

Sardinia, 13

Saudi Arabia, 3

Shaladiza, 91

Shalikashvili, LtGen John M., USA, 7, 35, 59, 60, 65, 72,

76, 81, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91

Sigonella, Italy, 19, 24

Silopi, 7, 10, 12, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 37, 38, 40,

42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 53, 54, 55, 61, 62, 66, 69, 74, 86, 87,

88, 89, 91, 93

Sinat, 85

Singee, 42

Sirsenk, 31, 35, 42, 51, 79, 80, 83, 88, 91

Slagle, Cpl Daniel J., 72

Socialist Party of Kurdish People, 8 1-82

Sommers, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, David W., 69

Sontag, Capt Charles R., 41, 42

Spanish Expeditionary Force, 80

Stackpole, MajGen Henry C., III, 41, 89

Streng, Capt Peter J., 17

Sulaymaniyah, 48, 49

Summayl, 79

Sun, 77, 80

Taber, Capt George, 18

Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photographic System, 70

Tanczuk, Sgt David C., 68

Tangney, Col William P., USA, 37

Task Force Encourage Hope, 9, 52, 53

Task Force Express Care, 27

Taurus Mountains, 26, 37

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), 19

Thompson, LtCol Jonathan, 63

Tigris River, 49, 51

Trainor, Cpl Charles G., 30

Traynor, SSgt Thomas A., USAF, 35

Turner, Capt Dean, USN, 15
126 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 1991:

U.S. Air Force Commands and Units

10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 4

1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 4, 8

21st Special Operations Squadron, 4, 54-55

36th Civil Engineer Squadron, 37

39th Air Transportable Hospital, 37

39th Special Operations Wing (SOW), 4

39th Tactical Air Control Hospital, 37

564th Civil Engineer Squadron, 37

67th Special Operations Squadron, 4

7440th Compsite Wing, 4

7th Special Operation Squadron, 4

Headquarters, Joint Special Operations Task Force, 4

Patriot Missile Battery, 4

U.S. Army Commands and Units

7th Special Operations Support Command, 35

10th Special Forces Group, 37

14th Transportation Battalion, 37

18th Engineer Brigade, 64, 81

18th Military Police Brigade, 64

21st Theater Army Area Command,

7th Service Operations Command, 7

29th Area Support Group, 35

149th Aerial Ambulance Company, 3 8-39

149th Aviation Company, 37

200th Theater Army Material Management Command, 35

284th Military Police Company,8.1

3-325th Airborne Combat Team, 76; 84, 88, 89

4th (Aviation) Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, 39, 84

4th Brigade (Aviation), 3d Infantry Division, 64

51st Maintenance Battalion, 37

66th Maintenance Battalion, 37

6th Battalion, 502d Infantry, 91

6th Battalion, 6th Cavalry, 91

6th Psychological Operations Battalion, 53

Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEur), 4

U.S. Army's Civil Affairs Command, 8

U.S. Navy Commands and Units

39th Air Transportable Hospital, 45

Amphibious Squadron 4, 92

Amphibious Squadron 8, 10, 13, 15, 92

Combat Support Helicopter Squadron 4, 19

Landing Force Sixth Fleet, 13, 14, 93

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 2-91, 92

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133, 64, 69
WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 127

Navy Forces Europe (NavEur), 34

Navy-Marine Liaison Team 10, 34, 35, 45

Uludere, Turkey, 6

Umzumlu, 85

United States European Command (USEUCOM), 24

Van Egmond, LtCol Cees, 64

Woodbridge, England, 4

Workers Party, 82

Yekmal, 85

Yuksekova, 12, 31, 35, 41, 42, 53, 80

Zakho Corridor, 37, 49

Zakho, 1, 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 59,

60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84,

87, 89, 94

Zinni, BGen Anthony C., 7, 24, 91
The device reproduced on the back cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States. It first appeared, as

shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. W7ith the stars changed to five

points this device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day.