UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

October 04, 2023 

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Clerk - Southern District of Florida

U.S. District Court 

400 N MIAMI AVE

MIAMI, FL 33128-1810 

Appeal Number: 23-10299-GG 

Case Style: Adelaide Dixon, et al v. University of Miami

District Court Docket No: 0:20-cv-60851-AHS

Secondary Case Number: 1:20-cv-22594-AHS

A copy of this letter, and the judgment form if noted above, but not a copy of the court's 

decision, is also being forwarded to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's decision 

was previously forwarded to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued. 

The enclosed copy of the judgment is hereby issued as mandate of the court. The court's opinion 

was previously provided on the date of issuance. 

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Enclosure(s) 

MDT-1 Letter Issuing Mandate

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JG Oct 4, 2023 MIAMI

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Eleventh Circuit 

____________________ 

No. 23-10299 

____________________ 

ADELAIDE DIXON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus 

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Florida 

D.C. Docket Nos. 0:20-cv-60851-AHS,

1:20-cv-22594-AHS 

____________________ 

JUDGMENT 

ISSUED AS MANDATE 10/4/2023

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2 23-10299 

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion issued 

on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this Court. 

Entered: July 31, 2023 

For the Court: DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court 

ISSUED AS MANDATE 10/4/2023

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10299

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ADELAIDE DIXON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 0:20-cv-60851-AHS,

1:20-cv-22594-AHS

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10299

____________________

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

This suit is one of many filed in the wake of the COVID-19 

pandemic. As the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread across the country in 

the spring of 2020, universities transitioned to remote, online learning. The University of Miami (Miami), a private institution, was 

no exception. Adelaide Dixon filed suit against Miami, alleging the 

school should refund a portion of the payments that she made for 

the Spring 2020 semester, since she did not receive the expected 

benefit of in-person learning. Dixon marshals a number of claims, 

including breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, 

and unjust enrichment. 

Miami filed a motion for summary judgment on each of 

Dixon’s claims, which the district court granted in full. In re Univ. 

of Mia. COVID-19 Tuition & Fee Refund Litig., No. 20-60851, 2022 

WL 18034457 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022). For the reasons below, we 

affirm. 

I. Background

A. The Disputed Conduct

In the spring of 2020, Dixon lived in an on-campus dormitory at Miami. On March 1, 2020, in response to COVID-19’s rapid 

spread, Florida’s Governor issued Executive Order 20-51, which directed the State Health Officer and Surgeon General to declare a 

public health emergency. About a week later, on March 9, the 

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23-10299 Opinion of the Court 3

Governor issued Executive Order 20-52, formally declaring a state 

of emergency in Florida. 

At that time, Dixon and other Miami students were on

spring break, which was scheduled to end on March 15. However, 

taking into account the pandemic’s expansion and the Governor’s 

executive orders, Miami informed its students on March 12 that it 

was extending spring break through March 22. Miami further informed its students that it would transition to “distance learning” 

when classes resumed on March 23. At first, distance learning was 

scheduled through at least April 4. 

Then, on March 19, Miami-Dade County’s Mayor issued 

Emergency Order 7-20, which ordered Miami to close its campus, 

remaining open “only as needed to facilitate online or distance 

learning.” Later, this Order was amended to permit residence halls 

to remain open “to the extent needed to accommodate students 

who cannot return to their homes.” See Amendment No. 1 to Miami Dade County Emergency Order 07-20 (Mar. 19, 2020). On 

March 30, the Florida Governor issued Executive Order 20-89, 

which essentially adopted the Miami-Dade County Order, thus requiring the closure of Miami’s campus for all purposes other than 

the facilitation of online learning and providing housing for students who could not travel home. 

On March 25, between the issuance of the Miami-Dade 

County and State of Florida Orders, Miami began closing on-campus housing, which resulted in Dixon moving home. Miami transitioned to online learning for the remainder of the Spring 2020 

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semester. Dixon remained enrolled at Miami throughout the 

spring semester; earned the credits for which she paid; and, when 

given the choice, opted to take her classes online the following fall 

semester. 

On April 29, 2020, Miami announced that it would provide 

students with a prorated refund for the fees and services that could 

not be provided during the remote learning period. Those refunds 

included fees paid to Miami for housing, dining, parking, student 

and wellness center usage, counseling, athletic fees, and various 

student activities. 

Dixon alleges that she had either an express or implied contract with Miami that required the university to provide an in-person education, and Miami breached that contract when it transitioned to remote learning. Alternatively, Dixon alleges that Miami 

was unjustly enriched by taking her payments and transitioning to 

an online format. As to the fees that Miami refunded, Dixon contends they were insufficient. 

B. Procedural History

Dixon’s case was consolidated with other class action suits 

against Miami in the Southern District of Florida. Four co-plaintiffs 

filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint, and Miami subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The district court determined 

that two of the plaintiffs—who were parents of Miami students—

lacked standing, but otherwise let the case proceed. Following discovery, Miami filed a motion for summary judgment on the 

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23-10299 Opinion of the Court 5

remaining claims, which the district court granted in its entirety. 

Dixon timely appealed.1 

II. Standard of Review

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo, viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ilias v. USAA Gen. Indem. 

Co., 61 F.4th 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If a reasonable person “could draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of 

material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment.” Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1125 (11th 

Cir. 2021). 

In diversity cases such as these, “we are required to apply the 

substantive law of the forum state.” Mesa v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 

799 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). So here, we apply 

the laws of Florida. 

III. Breach of Contract

A. Contract Law

In Florida, a student’s relationship with his or her private 

university is contractual in nature. Jallali v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 992 

So.2d 338, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing John B. Stetson Univ. 

v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924)). The terms of this contract

1 The other plaintiff who remained after the motion-to-dismiss stage did not 

appeal the district court’s unfavorable summary judgment decision. 

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“may be derived from university publications such as the student 

handbook and catalog.” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Alexandre, No. 

3D22-0072, 2023 WL 3485498, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 17, 

2023) (quoting Rhodes v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc., 513 F. 

Supp. 3d 1350, 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2021)). 

To succeed on a breach-of-contract claim, a student-plaintiff—like any other plaintiff—must establish “(1) the existence of a 

contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3) damages resulting from the breach.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 

1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 985 So. 2d 

56, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 

Courts endeavoring to interpret contracts under Florida law 

must give effect to the instrument’s plain language. Hahamovitch 

v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015). Ordinarily, this is a 

legal exercise for the court. DEC Elec., Inc. v. Raphael Constr. Corp., 

558 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1990). However, when the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the parties’ intentions become a question of 

fact for the jury. See id. 

B. Dixon’s Claims 

Dixon argues that Miami should pay damages for its breach 

of an express or implied contract to provide in-person education 

and access to its campus facilities. The district court disagreed on 

two alternative bases. First, the district court concluded that Dixon 

had failed to prove the existence of a contract—express or implied. 

Second, the district court held that even if a contract did exist, Miami retained “the express right to alter or amend its procedures or 

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23-10299 Opinion of the Court 7

policies and to close its classrooms and facilities.” In re Univ. of Mia.,

2022 WL 18034457, at *5. Because we agree with the district court 

on the second basis, we need not address the first.2 

To support the proposition that it reserved the right to transition classes to remote learning, Miami points to two provisions in 

the Student Handbook. First, Miami highlights a sentence in the 

Handbook’s “Foreword,” which states:

From time to time it may be advisable for the University to alter or amend its procedures or policies. Reasonable notice may be furnished to the University 

community of any substantive changes, but is not required.

2 Miami also defends against Dixon’s breach-of-contract claims by correctly 

noting that Florida does not recognize claims of educational malpractice. See 

Armstrong v. Data Processing Inst., Inc., 509 So.2d 1298, 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

1987). As the name suggests, these claims are typically packaged in state tort 

law and allege that a student’s educational experience fell beneath an objectively reasonable standard of care. See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. 

B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 908, 914–16 (Fla. 1995) (claiming a state agency acted 

negligently in deciding where to place a juvenile offender and choosing what 

services to offer him); Tubell v. Dade Cnty. Pub. Schs., 419 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam) (alleging a school negligently tested and classified a student, resulting in the student’s improper placement in a special educational program). Although it poses an interesting question, we need not 

address whether this doctrine applies to Dixon’s claims—Miami’s reservation 

of rights is sufficient for us to affirm the district court’s judgment. 

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Second, Miami cites a provision from the “General Administrative Policies and Guidelines” in the “Student Code of Conduct” 

(also located in the Student Handbook). That section reads: 

A.9 Restriction/Revocation of Facilities Use

The University of Miami reserves the right at any 

time to deny, revoke, or modify authorization to use 

any University facility or premises.

Decisions to authorize use of University facilities are 

made by the appropriate facility coordinator. Decisions to deny, revoke, or modify the authorization to 

use University facilities, because of potential danger, 

are made by the President of the University upon recommendation by the Vice President and/or the appropriate administrator involved with use of such 

University facilities. When possible, such decisions 

will be made only after review of a written recommendation by the appropriate facility coordinator. 

Decisions made in accordance with the policy are final and may not be appealed. 

We agree that these provisions standing together unambiguously give Miami the authority to temporarily close its campuses 

in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, even if a contract 

did include rights to an in-person education and access to on-campus facilities, those rights were qualified by provisions that permitted Miami to modify its procedures and access to its facilities. 

Thus, Miami did not breach any agreement by temporarily transitioning to remote learning. 

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23-10299 Opinion of the Court 9

Looking at the “Foreword” section of the Handbook, it is true 

that the identified sentence is embedded between paragraphs that 

discuss university regulations and disciplinary procedures, which,

at first glance, might suggest it has nothing to do with the contractual right to in-person learning. See City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 

So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (requiring courts “to read provisions of a 

contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions 

thereof”). But Dixon relies on these Handbook regulations and procedures to prove a contractual promise of in-person education. So, 

if Miami has the ability to change the underlying policies and procedures that create the implied contractual term, it follows that the 

implied term itself is subject to change. 

The provision regarding the “Restriction/Revocation of Facilities Use” in the Handbook’s “Student Code of Conduct” provides 

Miami with more direct authority to temporarily switch to remote 

learning. Dixon alleges that Miami broke its implied contractual 

obligations to provide “on-campus classes” and to provide access 

to its campus facilities. Yet, both of these implied obligations necessarily require access to Miami’s facilities, usage of which Miami 

explicitly reserved the right to deny “because of potential danger.” 

We have no reason to second-guess Miami’s decision to close its 

facilities in response to 1) the spread of a deadly global pandemic 

that resulted in a state of emergency in Florida, see Executive Order 

20-52; 2) an emergency order from Miami-Dade County that ordered the closure of the campus, see Emergency Order 7-20; and 3) 

an executive order from the Governor of Florida ordering the closure of the campus, see Executive Order 20-89. See also Jallali, 992 

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So. 2d at 343 (noting that a “court will not interfere with a private 

university’s enforcement of its regulations unless the university has 

acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of a constitution or 

statute, or for fraudulent purposes”); John B. Stetson Univ., 102 So.

at 640 (holding that “college authorities stand in loco parentis” as 

to the “welfare of the pupils” and that courts may not interfere with 

university regulations so long as they “do not violate divine or human law”). 

Accordingly, even if Miami’s contract included a provision 

for in-person classes and access to campus facilities, we agree with 

the district court that Miami cannot be held liable for switching to 

remote learning at the time and under the conditions that it did.3 

IV. Unjust Enrichment

A. The Law

Florida recognizes that claims for unjust enrichment may be 

appropriate when no contract exists, but the defendant nonetheless 

received something of value from the plaintiff. See Fulton v. 

3 To the extent that giving effect to these broad reservations of rights raises 

concerns about an illusory contract, we note that Miami still provided Dixon 

with instruction in her selected courses and credits that counted toward her 

degree. Whatever terms were contained within Dixon’s contract with Miami, 

we are certain that the obligation to provide instruction and class credit upon 

Dixon’s payment of tuition and satisfactory completion of her courses were 

included. Thus, Dixon’s contract with Miami was not entirely illusory under 

Florida law. See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 

1984). 

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Brancato, 189 So. 3d 967, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Ocean 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2007). 

A plaintiff pursuing an unjust enrichment claim must establish three elements: “(1) plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof; (2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred; and (3) the circumstances 

are such that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 

benefit without first paying the value thereof to the plaintiff.” Doral 

Collision Ctr., Inc. v. Daimler Tr., 341 So. 3d 424, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2022) (quoting Duty Free World, Inc. v. Mia. Perfume Junction, 

Inc., 253 So. 3d 689, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)). 

Reflecting on the theory of unjust enrichment, Florida 

courts have noted that the phrase “‘equitable in nature’ . . . has 

been used in the sense of ‘fairness,’ to describe that quality which 

makes an enrichment unjust.” Com. P’ship 8098 Ltd. P’ship v. Equity 

Contracting Co., Inc., 695 So. 2d 383, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 

(en banc). 

B. Dixon’s Claims

As an alternative to her breach-of-contract claims, Dixon argues that Miami was unjustly enriched by retaining her full tuition 

payment for the Spring 2020 semester. Looking to the elements of 

an unjust enrichment claim, Doral Collision, 341 So. 3d at 429, the 

parties do not dispute the first two: 1) Dixon paid Miami the standard, full tuition payment for the Spring 2020 semester, and 2) Miami voluntarily accepted and retained that tuition payment. The 

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parties do, however, dispute the third element: whether it would 

be inequitable under the circumstances for Miami to retain the full 

tuition payment. 

The district court rejected Dixon’s unjust enrichment claim

on two grounds. First, the court concluded that, as a matter of law, 

Dixon failed to show that the “payment of full tuition for the Spring 

2020 semester violate[d] good conscience and fundamental principles of justice or equity.” In re Univ. of Mia., 2022 WL 18034457, at 

*7. Second, the district court concluded that to the extent Dixon 

claimed her remote education was less valuable than the education 

for which she paid, her claim was barred by the doctrine of educational malpractice. Id. Following the pattern from above, because 

we agree with the district court on the first basis, we need not reach 

the second.4

To start, we note that the decision to transition to remote 

learning was largely out of Miami’s hands. Had Miami continued 

to provide in-person education throughout the Spring 2020 

4 Miami also contends that its relationship with Dixon was governed by an 

express contract—a Financial Responsibility Statement (FRS). Under this contract, Miami argues, Dixon agreed to pay tuition in exchange for educational 

services. As Miami rightly notes, Florida courts have held that “[a]s a general 

principle, a plaintiff cannot pursue an implied contract theory, such as unjust 

enrichment or quantum meruit, if an express contract exists.” F.H. Paschen, 

S.N. Nielsen & Assocs. LLC v. B&B Site Dev., Inc., 311 So. 3d 39, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 2021). While, on its face, it is far from clear that this FRS is the sole, 

integrated instrument governing the relationship between the parties, we 

need not address this argument today. Our holding regarding the fairness of 

the full tuition payment is sufficient to carry the day for Miami. 

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semester, it would have violated not one, but two separate executive orders—one from Miami-Dade County and another from the 

Florida Governor.5 To complete the switch to online courses, Miami expended $7.1 million and ultimately experienced a net financial loss of roughly $50 million from the change in operations. As 

a result of Miami’s efforts and additional expenditures, though, 

Dixon successfully completed her spring courses, received credits 

toward her graduation, and obtained a university education from a 

location that the State of Florida impliedly considered to be safer 

than a populated campus in Coral Gables. 

Further, under Florida law, “an unjust enrichment claim 

cannot exist where payment has been made for the benefit conferred.” Murphy v. Pankauski, 357 So. 3d 149, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court 

pointed out, Miami provided students a choice in the Fall 2020 semester—they could take their courses online or attend in-person. 

In an arms-length transaction, Dixon opted for the former, and she 

has not alleged that she paid (or should have paid) any less for that 

Fall 2020 online experience than she did for her Spring 2020 semester. Thus, the value of the benefit that Dixon provided to Miami—

her tuition payment—does not appear to be out of step with the 

value that she places on the benefit she received in return—a (temporarily remote) Miami education.

5 The legal alternative to remote learning, then, may have been to cancel students’ classes entirely. 

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For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s conclusion 

that, as a matter of law, Dixon failed to show that her “payment of 

full tuition for the Spring 2020 semester violate[d] good conscience 

and fundamental principles of justice or equity.” In re Univ. of Mia.,

2022 WL 18034457, at *7.

V. Adequacy of Prorated Reimbursements

A. Additional Facts

On April 29, 2020, Miami emailed its student body (including Dixon) to inform them that it would be refunding their accounts “with a prorated amount for any Spring 2020 fees and services that cannot be provided in an online or virtual format.” Miami explained that these services included “housing, dining, parking, student center, wellness center, health and counseling, student 

activities, and athletics fees.” The fees were ultimately prorated to 

“March [23,] when classes transition[ed] to an online format.” In 

total, this amounted to a refund for the 42 days remaining in the 

115-day semester, equating to roughly 36.5% of the fee totals. 

B. Dixon’s Claims

Dixon contends that this refund was inadequate. More specifically, she argues that the prorated refund should have extended 

back to March 12, 2020, when Miami announced to its students that 

spring break would be extended by one week. Doing so, Dixon 

maintains, would amount to a refund of roughly 48% of total fees 

for the Spring 2020 semester. Dixon supports her claim with the 

deposition of, and the unsworn report from, economist Charles 

Cowan, Ph.D.

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The district court rejected Dixon’s claim because “the undisputed facts establish that [Miami] made a pro rata refund of the fees” 

and “neither [Dixon] nor [her] expert provide factual support” for 

the greater percentage that they claim Dixon is owed. In re Univ. of 

Mia., 2022 WL 18034457, at *6. We agree. 

It is entirely valid for Dixon to take the position that Miami 

should have based its prorated refunds on a different day than it did. 

The problem, however, is that Dixon fails to present “more than a 

scintilla” of evidence to support her contention that Miami should 

have refunded 48% of the fees for the Spring 2020 semester. Matamoros v. Broward’s Sheriff’s Off., 2 F.4th 1329, 1336 n.5 (11th Cir. 

2021).6 

Dixon points us to Miami’s March 12, 2020, email that informed students that spring break would be extended by one week. 

However, an announcement extending spring break by itself does 

not support the contention that all fee-based facilities and services 

were suddenly unavailable to students such that Miami’s refund 

was inadequate. And while Dixon offers Dr. Cowan’s input as evidence, Dixon cannot rely on Dr. Cowan’s report to show there is a 

genuine issue of material fact about this point. Unsworn reports 

may not be taken into account by a district court when it rules on 

a motion for summary judgment. See Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 

6 Dixon does not argue that Miami erred in conducting its mathematical calculation to reach the 36.5% refund. Instead, Dixon argues that the calculation 

should have covered more days. 

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1259, 1273 n. 26 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).7 Without more, Dixon’s allegations are merely conclusory, and “[t]his 

court has consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.” Myers v. Bowman, 

713 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Evers v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also TocMail, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 67 F.4th 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (noting that to survive summary judgment, “speculation does not suffice”).

Consequently, on this point, we again affirm the district 

court. 

VI. Conclusion

The pandemic forced students of all ages to learn from behind their computer screens for a period of time, and we certainly 

harbor a great deal of sympathy for those students whose educations and relationships were affected by the transition. Yet, for the 

reasons outlined above, we agree with the district court and hold 

that Dixon is not entitled to damages stemming from any alleged 

breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or inadequate refunds on 

the part of Miami. We hope that some comfort can be found, however, in our certainty that despite enduring the hardships created 

by the pandemic, any student who has earned a degree from a 

7 We also note that it does not appear Dr. Cowan had personal knowledge of 

which facilities and services actually were unavailable to students during the 

days that would constitute the difference between a 48% and 36.5% refund. 

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23-10299 Opinion of the Court 17

school like the University of Miami retains the unspoiled potential 

for a fulfilling and prosperous future. 

AFFIRMED.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court 

July 31, 2023

For rules and forms visit

www.ca11.uscourts.gov

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

Appeal Number: 23-10299-GG 

Case Style: Adelaide Dixon, et al v. University of Miami 

District Court Docket No: 0:20-cv-60851-AHS

Secondary Case Number: 1:20-cv-22594-AHS

All counsel must file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, 

unless exempted for good cause. Although not required, non-incarcerated pro se parties are 

permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an account at www.pacer.gov. Information 

and training materials related to electronic filing are available on the Court's website.

Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been 

entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with 

FRAP 41(b). 

The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for 

filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise 

provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is 

timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are 

governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for 

attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3. 

Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested 

Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by 

any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be 

reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See

11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 . 

Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming 

compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate 

or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via 

the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or 

cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher 

system. 

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Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against the appellant.

Please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the court's website at 

www.ca11.uscourts.gov.

Clerk's Office Phone Numbers 

General Information: 404-335-6100 Attorney Admissions: 404-335-6122 

Case Administration: 404-335-6135 Capital Cases: 404-335-6200 

CM/ECF Help Desk: 404-335-6125 Cases Set for Oral Argument: 404-335-6141 

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs

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