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BLACK FLAGS OVER MINDANAO:

TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 12, 2017

Serial No. 115–52

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, senior fellow and director, Transnational Threats 

Project , Center for Strategic and International Studies .................................. 8

Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery, research analyst, Counter Extremism Project .............. 19

Sheena Greitens, Ph.D., assistant professor, University of Missouri .................. 31

Mr. Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, Center for American Progress ....................... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement .................................................. 11

Ms. Supna Zaidi Peery: Prepared statement ......................................................... 22

Sheena Greitens, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 33

Mr. Michael Fuchs: Prepared statement ............................................................... 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 66

(1)

BLACK FLAGS OVER MINDANAO:

TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. Welcome, everybody. The subcommittee will come to 

order. I welcome everybody here. This is a packed room. This is 

great. I love to see all this excitement. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record without objection. 

The hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow 

statements, questions, and extraneous material for the record subject to length limitations of the rules. 

And with that, I love the name of this or the title for this hearing: ‘‘Black Flags over Mindanao: Terrorism in Southeast Asia.’’ I 

think it is so important today to address this growing threat 

throughout the region. 

I am going to put on my new glasses my wife got me. 

Most of the debate in Washington about U.S. policy toward Asia 

focuses on state challenges such as the nuclear belligerence of the 

DPRK, the rise of China and related issues. 

The threat of transnational terrorism in Asia has been at best a 

secondary consideration and, at worse, an afterthought. 

The policy making community doesn’t seem to consider terrorism 

in Asia with the same seriousness as it does in the Middle East. 

But ISIS’ increasingly aggressive moves in Southeast Asia, which 

have to a head in recent weeks have shown us that the issues are 

indivisibly related and that the laxity of our approach is no longer 

tenable. 

The looming threat of ISIS has exploded into open conflicts in 

the city of Marawi on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines. 

ISIS fighters have occupied areas of the city for 7 weeks, resisting efforts by the armed forces of the Philippines to drive them out. 

Fighters from domestic terrorist organizations who previously operated under their own direction appear to have united under an 

emir appointed by ISIS. 

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Reportedly, this criminal named Isnilon Hapilon has been in contact with ISIS leaders in the Middle East and seeks to establish 

an ISIS caliphate on Mindanao. 

The Islamist militant in Marawi are an elite alliance of Abu 

Sayyaf group and the Maute group, the Philippine organizations 

who have come together for this audacious and unprecedented attack. 

To date, over 380 Islamist militants have been killed in the fight, 

far surpassing early estimates, and the number of militants—I 

mean, at first when this first started out we were looking at about 

250 to 300 people and it is already 380 have been killed in fighting 

with more still keeping government forces at bay. 

An unknown number of foreign fighters have supplemented militants from the Philippines. Deceased terrorists have been identified 

as Malaysian, Indonesian, Saudi, Yemeni, Chechen, and Indian nationals. 

The destruction has been immense. Up to 400,000 civilians have 

been displaced. Ninety soldiers and police officers have been killed 

and hundreds—and hundreds wounded. 

Large areas of Marawi have been flattened. The widespread destruction is the latest sign that the nature of terrorist activity in 

Southeast Asia may be changing. 

Islamist militants in Southeast Asia were previously focused on 

domestic concerns such as gaining independence and establishing 

Sharia-style governance. Many were thought of as little more than 

former for-profit criminal organizations. 

As organizations throughout Southeast Asia have pledged allegiance to ISIS, however, their priorities seem to be shifting. 

The siege of Marawi has shown that forces under Hapilon are interested in seizing territory and contesting government control 

similar to ISIS strategies in Iraq and in Syria. 

The Solicitor General of the Philippines has stated what’s happening in Mindanao is no longer rebellion of Filipino citizens. 

It has transmogrified into invasions by foreign terrorists who 

heeded the clarion call of ISIS to go to the Philippines if they find 

difficulty in going to Iraq or Syrian. They want to create Mindanao 

as part of the caliphate. 

At the same time, Southeast Asia’s youth, our Internet-connected 

population, is fertile ground for online radicalization of ISIS specialties. 

A fragmented ISIS can inspire homegrown terrorists, send 

trained jihadists all over the world and the porous borders of the 

Southeast Asia region are especially vulnerable to both. 

The dangers stand to grow as ISIS is driven from its captured 

territory in Iraq and Syria and turns its focus elsewhere. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia’s historically tolerant and inclusive brand of 

Islam is facing fundamentalist challenges as well. 

The recent electoral defeat and subsequent blasphemy convictions of Jakarta government official Ahok, a member of Indonesia’s 

Christian minority, raised questions about the independence of Indonesia’s secular institutions and showcased the rise of hardline 

Islamist politics. 

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The spread of fundamentalism throughout Southeast Asia, exasperated by outside influences such as Saudi Arabia’s propagation 

of Wahhabist institutions risk contributing to radicalization. 

The United States has a role to play and has been quietly supporting the armed forces of the Philippines outside of Marawi with 

intelligence and surveillance assistance. 

To date we have avoided a public role of combat or combat operations. As the threat in the Philippines and throughout Southeast 

Asia intensifies, we must determine what more the United States, 

in cooperation with our ASEAN partners, can do better to counter 

Islamist militancy in the region. 

The siege of Marawi underscores the Islamist terrorism by a 

generational challenge in Southeast Asia as it is throughout the 

world. Strategies to counter the rise of the militancy must be a central component of our Asia strategy rather than a secondary issue. 

Today we are joined by an expert panel—and I appreciate you all 

coming—so that we can discuss the contours of the threat and suggest policy options for forming a strategy so that we can pass this 

on, hopefully, to the State Department and to the executive branch. 

[The opening statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Without objections, the witness written statements 

will be entered into the hearing record and I now turn to my ranking member for any remarks he may have. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding 

these hearings. Thank you for the clever title. Thank you for the 

comments about Saudi support not for—so much for terrorist organizations but for extremist Islamic clerics who lay the groundwork 

and advocate if they don’t plan and conduct terrorist operations. 

I have had significant discussions with the foreign minister of 

Saudi Arabia who tells me they are certainly not doing it anymore—that at most they funded the construction of mosques decades ago, which now may have been taken over by clerics they 

don’t support. 

So I am hoping that one thing comes out of these hearings and 

that is a letter to the Saudi foreign minister identifying very particular mosques and clerics and that we think are being funded by 

Saudi Arabia or individuals therein and let’s run to ground whether or not Saudi Arabia is at this time funding an extremist version 

of Islam. 

On Monday, the Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi declared victory 

over ISIS in Mosul. That’s a welcome development, but the battle 

with ISIS-affiliated groups in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippine terrorist groups continues, including Abu Sayyaf and Maute, 

and continues in the Marawi area of the island of Mindanao. 

A few dozen foreign fighters have traveled from abroad, perhaps 

more than a few dozen. They include nationals not only from nearby Indonesia and Malaysia but also Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, 

Yemen, Morocco, Turkey. 

The ongoing fighting in Marawi has reportedly left over 500 dead 

including 90 Philippine soldiers, 39 civilians and 381 ISIS-related 

fighters. 

The Marawi battle illustrates that despite the counterterrorism 

successes that considerably downgraded Southeast Asian terrorist 

groups in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the terrorist threat 

in the region may be getting a new lease on life and this new generation of terrorists could gain strength by drawing on support 

from ISIS. 

Southeast Asian countries continue to face threats of local and 

international terrorism. There are over a dozen armed Islamic 

groups in the region. 

ISIS has already successfully recruited about 1,000 nationals 

from Southeast Asian countries to come support their efforts in 

Syria and Iraq, their so-called caliphate—we hope dying caliphate. 

As to counterterrorism, in the past we have seen al-Qaeda’s influence appear through Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization 

and its affiliates, which claimed responsibility for the 2002 Bali attacks. 

Today, the battle for Marawi we see ISIS influence elsewhere, 

not only there but also in other parts of Southeast Asia. 

In Indonesia, the mujahideen Indonesia Timor MIT pledged allegiance to ISIS. ISIS even has a dedicated Southeast Asian unit, 

Katibah Nusantara, that is fighting in Syria. 

As smaller splinter terrorist groups create their own space in 

Southeast Asia, breaking from larger groups that may have been 

7

very relevant a decade ago. We need to continue to monitor, 

prioritize, and designate. 

We should continue to work with our regional partners to combat 

and eliminate terrorist organizations as well as prevent ISIS terrorists from returning from the countries of origin in Southeast 

Asia. 

As to our budget, we must ensure that American leadership is 

maintained particularly in Southeast Asia. The President’s budget 

seems to do the opposite. 

Southeast Asia is the home of 625 million people and about 15 

percent of the world’s Muslim population. American foreign affairs 

programming in this region should not be reduced but the 2018 

budget proposal would reduce VOA broadcasting to Indonesia in 

the Bahasa language of Indonesia. That is not a reduction that I 

support. 

We should not neglect the tools that strengthen long-term fight 

against terrorism. Those are, among others, democracy, the rule of 

law, human rights, education, and development. 

Without robust State and USAID programs, Southeast Asia 

would likely be a less stable area and provide for increased space 

for terror recruitment. 

That is why more than 120, three- and four-star retired generals 

and admirals wrote to House leadership in February this year urging that the U.S. maintain a robust foreign affairs budget. Never 

have we heard clearer words from our retired military. 

I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

For you guys that are here—are going to testify, we run our 

meeting a little bit different—our hearing. It is a little bit more informal. 

I want you to be engaged, because what we are looking for is solutions—solutions to bring this threat that is affecting all of humanity—it is a scourge on humanity—to an end. 

It is isolated right now in that one area in Mindanao. I mean, 

it is all over that whole area. But if we can bring it to an end, I 

want you to think of solutions that you can give us, and I have 

read every one of your testimonies and I am going to switch now 

to my colleague, Ms. Ann Wagner, to introduce a person from her 

state and I will take it over. Go ahead. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this important hearing. 

I would like to take my time to welcome Dr. Sheena Greitens, 

who, among her many accomplishments, happens to be the first 

lady of my home state of Missouri. 

Dr. Greitens holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a Master’s from Oxford University where she studied as a Marshall 

Scholar. She has previously served with the U.S. Department of 

State’s Policy Planning staff and is a nonresident senior fellow at 

the Brookings Institution. 

Dr. Greitens has distinguished herself as a professor at the University of Missouri where she has played a leading role in establishing the Institute for Korean Studies. Your books, ‘‘Dictators and 

Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence,’’ hit 

8

the shelves last summer and it is a fascinating take on the foundations of authoritarian power in Asia. 

It is, I think, exceptional and all too rare that a busy mother and 

professional, much less one who is so involved in Missouri’s public 

service—and I speak knowing something about all of these things—

makes time to produce world class research on Asia’s internal security forces. 

We are delighted to have you and such a notable scholar in the 

governor’s mansion and I particularly appreciate your work on 

Korea and the Philippines and I look forward to our continued collaboration and to your testimony today. So welcome, Dr. Greitens. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, and I appreciate—again, I can’t tell you 

how much I appreciate you guys taking your time out. The way 

this works—I am sure you have been here before—you got the 

timer in front of you. 

You get 5 minutes. Try to get as close to that as you can and 

I look forward to getting into the question area. 

With that, we have Mr. Thomas Sanderson, senior fellow and director for the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, welcome here. 

Ms. Supna Peery, research analyst for the Counter Extremism 

Project. Welcome. And then we have Mr. Michael Fuchs, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. 

Look forward to hearing your testimony. Mr. Sanderson, we will 

just go down the line. Press your mic button and make sure it is 

on. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, SENIOR FELLOW 

AND DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT , CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. SANDERSON. It is on. Excellent. Thank you. 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the honor 

and opportunity to testify before you today on the threat that ISIS 

poses to Southeast Asia, an issue that has gained greater attention 

since the battle in Marawi, Philippines began on May 23rd of this 

year. 

This now 7-week-old conflict involves U.S.-advised Philippine 

armed forces and police and ISIS-affiliated terrorists groups including the Abu Sayyaf group and the Maute group. 

My written submission for the record covers the history of terrorism in Southeast Asia, touches briefly on the activities of Arabian Gulf states in the region and then goes into detail on the global threat of foreign terrorist fighters, or foreign fighters, in the battle at Marawi and well beyond, and the implications for that region 

and for the United States. 

My oral comments now will focus on what I see as the most significant issue at hand, ISIS foreign fighters and their presence in 

Southeast Asia. 

Reports from Southeast Asia find that several foreign fighters 

are among the militants that have died with reports stating that 

the casualty count shows fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia, 

9

nearby states, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, and now 

one from Singapore, and the chairman also noted one from India. 

Furthermore, there are indications that between 40 and 80 foreign fighters are in the immediate vicinity of the battle. 

For the past 2 years, my colleagues and I at CSIS have been investigating various dimensions of the foreign fighter threat and, as 

you all know, since 2012 more than 40,000 fighters from 120 countries joined the battle in Syria and Iraq primarily on the side of 

ISIS. 

I would discourage anyone from thinking about killing down that 

number because more can join. That 40,000 number is not finite. 

An unknown number have been killed in battle. Some are in 

prison in the region or back home. But an unknown number still 

engage in battle planning and onward movements. To where, we do 

not know. 

Let me also note, as the chairman noted, there are between 800 

and 1,000 Southeast Asians that have made the visit to Syria and 

Iraq. That, again, number is not certain but it is, roughly, in that 

range. 

What we see in Marawi tells us that the grim reality is something else. Many who went to Syria and Iraq had no prior military 

training. 

What they did go with was a sense of purpose, a desire for adventure, revenge, income, and respect. Some were politically and 

religiously radicalized. Some went for the good compensation package. 

For those that did survive and seek to return home, they realized 

that they have few options. Most nations do not have a program 

to demobilize and reintegrate those fighters who played more of a 

support role. 

Indonesia and Malaysia do have a demobilization deradicalization program. The Philippines does not. 

This off-ramp to membership in a militant group is an important 

way to divide those who can rejoin society from those who pose a 

grave danger and should be prosecuted. 

The actors that we are most concerned about are those that receive combat training and experienced high-intensity combat in 

Syria and Iraq. 

These are terrorists who are accustomed to the rigors of urban 

warfare, who know how to build and disguise bombs, operate small 

and light arms, launch mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, conduct secure communications with encrypted devices, raise and 

move money, manage logistics, and funnel images and propaganda 

into the social media stream. 

These conflict-hardened terrorists, if they do make it back to 

their home countries or end up in third countries, in many cases 

would face police and military with little or no fighting experience. 

It would not be a fair match. 

These violent extremists have experienced what they see as legitimate divinely-sanctioned fighting. They are heroes to their 

friends and many others and are unlikely to want to return to a 

lifestyle less meaningful, in their eyes, and they know that returning to their families and communities is not likely an option. 

10

Governments know that these terrorists have long unexplained 

absences or have even been bragging about their exploits in the 

Middle East. Back home, torture, prison, and execution awaits 

them. Again, the options are few. 

Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition-backed Iraqi forces, Kurdish 

forces, and others have made strong gains against ISIS-controlled 

territory in Syria and Iraq. 

What was once an area as large as Jordan under their control 

is much smaller. At least 60,000 enemy combatants have been confirmed killed and ISIS revenue is falling fast, and it is vital for attracting, equipping, and retaining ISIS members. 

In Moscow a few months ago, a colleague and I were able to 

interview the family of Dagestani fighter who joined the battle in 

Syria before ISIS emerged and then came under their control. 

Heading back to Dagestan is not an option for this individual. 

We heard for 3 hours the contortions that he and his family have 

gone through to find a third country in which to find themselves 

and secure themselves. That means these guys are moving on often 

not back to their own home. 

Three years ago when my team began looking at foreign fighters, 

energy and attention was focused on stopping them from going to 

Iraq and Syria, on discovering and disrupting their facilitators at 

home and en route and trying to get an understanding of what foreign fighters were doing inside the so-called Islamic State. 

Their influence back home via social media was also of great concern. But as ISIS’ fortunes changed, attention shifted to what foreign fighters might do next. 

The battle in Marawi, Philippines provides a sobering example of 

one of those options. Bringing the fighters’ expertise, networks, 

funding, and fighting credibility to bear on insurgencies in other 

countries is appealing to some of them. 

Returning to their home countries or to third countries to stimulate moribund terrorist groups, recruit new members, and take revenge on governments they see as repressive extends their lives as 

heroic fighters and gives them purpose and status. 

Marawi is a powerful reminder of what they are likely to face in 

other parts of Southeast Asia and a wider globe when foreign fighters move on from Syria and the Iraqi battlefield. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Ms. Peery. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SUPNA ZAIDI PEERY, RESEARCH 

ANALYST, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT 

Ms. PEERY. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the threat from extremism in the 

Philippines. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, could she pull the mic a little closer 

maybe? 

Ms. PEERY. My name is Supna Zaidi Peery. I am a strategic policy analyst at the Counter Extremism Project, a not for profit nonpartisan international policy organization that works to combat the 

growing threat from extremist ideology. 

Fears of growing ISIS activity in Southeast Asia became all too 

clear over the siege on the city of Marawi that began on May 23rd. 

Despite President Duterte’s statements yesterday that the siege 

is likely to end within 10 to 15 days, he conceded that ISIS remains a long-term threat to the Philippines and the region. 

In addition to the domestically radicalized Muslim youth by Abu 

Sayyaf and the Maute group, Philippine intelligence believes that 

some of the ISIS-linked fighters in Marawi were foreign fighters 

from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Middle East, as mentioned already. 

The presence of foreign fighters reinforces the argument that 

pro-ISIS propaganda has the power to unify militants across borders in Southeast Asia, raising the possibility that the Philippines 

could become an ISIS hub if extremism in Mindanao is not addressed immediately. 

ISIS is the most successful brand of Islamist extremism globally 

because it has identified a formula to connect its fundamentalist 

principles to proactive action but its adherents. 

It has been effective and consistent in spreading its propaganda 

over the Internet and via social media platforms in numerous languages without much interference from tech companies or effective 

challenges from progressive Islamic organizations online, which we 

often call counter narrative. 

In the Philippines, ISIS ideology filled the void left by the death 

of Abu Sayyaf group founder and charismatic cleric Abdurajak 

Janjalani. 

There is unfortunate continuity in this statement since the ASG 

under Janjalani and ISIS are both al-Qaeda offshoots ideologically. 

Janjalani fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s under an al-Qaeda 

Mujahideen Abdul Rasul Abu Sayyaf for whom Janjalani named 

his terrorist organization once he returned home to the Philippines 

in 1989. 

ISIS rhetoric now replaces Janjalani’s voice to radicalize youth in 

Mindanao along with other extremists like the Maute group, whose 

leader studied in Egypt and Jordan before successfully recruiting 

via social media and through the Islamic schools in Mindanao 

itself. 

ISIS ideology targets Muslims in person online by preying on existing grievances and co-opting them, offering a singular solution 

20

based on the distinctive identity marker of faith without requiring 

an adherent to understand the faith itself. 

Examples include the oft-cited identity issues of lone wolves in 

the West and secular separatist movement turned Islamist, like 

Chechnya in the 1990s and ’80s, or even economic marginalization 

as in the Philippines today on the island of Mindanao. 

A critical bridge connecting root causes to violence in the name 

of faith is the proliferation of proselytizing within Muslim communities by individuals or organizations often labelled orthodox, fundamentalist, or puritanical. 

Professor Mohammed Osman of the S. Rajaratnam School of 

International Studies in Singapore argues that this indoctrination 

toward fundamentalism needs to be addressed by governments 

wanting to combat extremism. 

For example, in Malaysia he notes that the increased fundamentalism of the community has damaged the coexistence between 

Muslims and non-Muslims present for centuries in the region. 

That attitude is problematic, he states, because once one starts 

dehumanizing one group by saying they are deviant, infidels, or 

hypocrites, it makes it easier for people to be influenced by the 

ideas of ISIS, which advocates the murder of Muslim religious minorities, non-Muslims, and homosexuals, as examples. 

Consequently, the U.S. must expand its counter extremism strategy to push allies like the Philippines to embrace a two-prong 

strategy beyond military policies, which are important. 

First, we must work to remove extremist propaganda online and 

on the ground, especially among student organizations and schools. 

Second, we need to replace the extremist propaganda with 

counter narrative ideology and messaging formulated by moderate 

and progressive Muslim organizations. To succeed, these ideas 

must be implemented domestically and regionally as well as online. 

The U.S. can assist the Philippine Government in their effort to 

remove extremist propaganda from the Internet and social media 

platforms by working with them to develop policy and by helping 

them discuss the issues within the private sector and within the 

tech industry specifically. 

Indonesia is of particular importance, given that it hosts about 

70 percent of pro-ISIS Web sites in the region and that information—the visuals, the YouTube videos—it reaches the Philippine 

population as well as the rest of the region. 

Second, the U.S. can advocate for the Philippine Government to 

support community efforts to prevent radicalization because community leaders rather than government are possessed with the 

credibility to build grassroots counter extremism programming that 

focuses on educating the public on the values underlying pluralism, 

tolerance, and community building across race, ethnicity, sect, and 

gender. 

The Philippine Center for Islamic Democracy is one such organization that deserves government and international support. The 

center has been working with the Muslim religious sector, particularly female religious scholars and madrasa teachers to develop capacities and competencies and strengthening their role as advocates for peace and human rights. 

21

For this purpose, the center has developed human rights training 

within a Sharia framework and the peace education manual. 

Regionally, we can also support cross collaborations with organizations like the center to build counter narrative information books 

and content that can go online as well. 

Regionally, like-minded organizations include Nahdlatul Ulama 

and the Wahid Institute in Indonesia, Sisters in Islam in Malaysia, 

which specifically Sisters in Islam focuses on promoting universal 

human rights including advocacy for women through an Islamic 

lens. Sisters in Islam has challenged in the past the legality of 

child marriage and polygamy, for example. 

It is critical to legitimize peaceful debate within Muslim communities and protect balance and progressive grassroots voices. 

The U.S. can encourage allied governments in Southeast Asia to 

recognize grassroots organizations as a source of strength to 

counter extremism and protect their right to speak and engage 

with the public. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Peery follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Dr. Greitens. 

STATEMENT OF SHEENA GREITENS, PH.D., ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI 

Ms. GREITENS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear today to discuss 

the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

My remarks will focus on American security cooperation with the 

Philippines, the U.S. ally most affected by this threat. For time’s 

sake, I will focus today on the policy recommendations that are 

contained in my longer written testimony. 

Before that, there are two brief points that may be useful: First 

is that the Philippines has a more complex security environment 

than most other U.S. allies in Asia because of its internal challenges. Manila has always had to balance between external defense 

and internal needs, which include both disaster relief and counter 

insurgency or counter terrorism. Under the previous President, the 

Philippines had begun to shift toward a more external maritime 

focus, but Duterte’s presidency, combined with recent developments, are returning them toward a more traditional inward focus. 

Second is that the Philippines is an incredibly pro-American 

place. There is, however, a long-running concern, particularly on 

the Philippine left, about potential encroachment by the United 

States on Philippine sovereignty, and that has directly affected our 

security cooperation and basing agreements in the past. Our alliance generally fares best when we acknowledge this domestic political reality. 

In the past two decades, U.S.-Philippine security cooperation has 

focused on counter terrorism and, most recently, on maritime security. 

As we all know, we are here today because in the past year or 

so concerns about terrorism have increased. Those concerns center 

on the so-called black flag militant groups in the southern Philippines who have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State and achieved 

recognition from them, as well as on the ISIS-affiliated fighters 

who are returning to the region. Today, these ISIS-linked groups 

in Marawi have held territory in an urban siege that has lasted almost 2 months and claimed an estimated 500 lives. 

Abu Sayyaf has also increased its kidnapping for ransom operations, which have raised substantial revenue for the organization 

and jeopardized the safety of trade in waters around the southern 

Philippines. 

Today, I would like to offer seven primary recommendations. 

First, Congress can play a real positive role in strengthening 

America’s security cooperation with the Philippines. Despite 

Duterte’s rhetoric, the Philippines remains strongly pro-American, 

and congressional engagement could productively focus on places 

like the legislature, the departments, the military, local governments, and civil society, all places where the value of the alliance 

with the U.S. is broadly recognized. 

Second, Congress can build on broader outreach to ASEAN to 

show that U.S. support for the region is strong and bipartisan. I 

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commend the subcommittee’s activities on that front thus far and 

hope that Congress continues its engagement in this economically 

and strategically vital region. 

Third, the United States can continue or consider expanding 

maritime security assistance. Congress played an important role in 

establishing the Maritime Security Initiative in Southeast Asia, 

and it is important that, even as the Philippines confronts intensifying internal threats, it does not ignore external defense needs. 

Maritime security assistance can improve Manila’s ability to address multiple challenges at once—disaster relief, counter terrorism, and places like the South China Sea. It also allows Congress to support our two countries’ shared security goals while remaining a strong voice for human rights and the shared values 

that underpin the alliance between our two democracies. 

Fourth, if the Philippines requests, the United States should examine its options for reactivating formal counter terrorism cooperation initiatives such as the previous Joint Special Operations Task 

Force Philippines based in Zamboanga. Our military is already providing technical assistance in Mindanao, so clearly defining the parameters of that engagement and its compatibility with the Philippine constitution can help avoid domestic blowback, and keep the 

focus where it fundamentally needs to be—preventing ISIS from establishing a foothold inside the territory of a U.S. Asian ally. 

Fifth, we can support Manila’s cooperation with other U.S. security partners. Trilateral patrols, which have recently begun with 

Indonesia and Malaysia, are an important step and will be more 

meaningful as the Philippines continues to improve its maritime 

capacity. That is a place where partners like Japan, Australia, and 

South Korea can all play an important role. 

Sixth, the United States can identify productive forms of economic engagement, including regional tools for counter terrorism finance. Like maritime capacity building, financial tools can address 

multiple priorities at once, such as counteracting North Korea’s 

money laundering and revenue-generating activities in the region. 

It will be important to limit the flow of funds, especially now, from 

ISIS agents in the Middle East to groups in the Philippines and 

Southeast Asia. 

Seventh, the United States should monitor two issues that are 

likely to affect recruiting and support for ISIS-linked groups 

throughout Southeast Asia. First is the peace process in Mindanao, 

where the collapse of the 2014 agreement has contributed to individuals and factions splintering away from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front toward these more radical groups. Second, the treatment of the Muslim population in Burma could well become a recruitment tool and a rallying cry for Islamic militants region wide. 

The U.S. needs to be carefully monitoring these issues and supporting effective, inclusive, long-term solutions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Greitens follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you, and I appreciate the passion in that. That 

was good. 

And now we will go to Mr. Fuchs, if you would. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL FUCHS, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. FUCHS. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear at today’s important and timely 

hearing. 

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is a serious challenge and a direct 

threat to the lives of innocent civilians in the region and to U.S. 

national security interests. 

The United States has a direct interest in working with the countries of Southeast Asia to counter terrorist threats and can do so 

most effectively through building capacity, supporting democracy 

and human rights, and investing in the necessary diplomatic and 

development tools. 

Terrorism has long been a threat in Southeast Asia and the potential return home of Southeast Asian fighters who have fought 

in Iraq and Syria are raising fears that they might exacerbate an 

already dangerous network of terrorist groups in the region. 

The Governments of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 

others, including the United States, are focused on countering 

these threats. 

There is much work to be done and we must be vigilant. This 

threat, while dangerous, is a threat that we can tackle. 

With focus and practical efforts, the United States can help these 

countries make real progress. There are many challenges that the 

United States and the countries of the region face in combatting 

this threat. 

Governments in the region are often hamstrung by lack of development in governmental capacity, few economic opportunities, 

weak government institutions and rule of law, and porous borders 

are just some of the many obstacles the countries of the region are 

up against. 

The United States too faces difficulties. An over militarized CT 

approach can be counterproductive where rhetoric and actions that 

feed a ‘‘us versus them’’ dynamic hurts U.S. counterterrorism efforts and, likewise, a lack of investment in resources can hamstring 

U.S. policies. 

There are a series of steps that the United States can take to 

make more progress and I, too, have seven recommendations. 

First, the United States must strengthen its diplomatic and development capacities in Southeast Asia including through more 

personnel and resources. U.S. diplomats are best equipped to lead 

the charge. 

They often know best what is happening in these countries, have 

the best relationships with foreign governments and are best positioned to develop locally-tailored strategies to prevent terrorism. 

Gutting the budgets and State and USAID, as has been proposed 

by the Trump administration, will unilaterally disarm U.S. counterterrorism policy. 

40

Second, the United States must prioritize support for democratic 

rights-respecting governments and societies in Southeast Asia. 

The stronger the democratic institutions, rule of law, and tolerance in these countries, the more effective they will be at preventing terrorism and the more resilient they will be in weathering 

any threats. 

Third, the United States needs to support the institutional capacity of partner governments. We should look carefully at how best 

to support countries developing legal frameworks for combatting 

terrorism and training law enforcement and intelligence officials, to 

name just a couple of examples. 

Fourth, the United States should invest in economic growth and 

development. While the region overall has grown economically, millions of people remain impoverished and living in communities cut 

off from economic opportunities, creating environments where people are too often susceptible to terrorist propaganda. 

Education and cultural exchanges are crucial here. We should be 

inviting young leaders from around the world to learn in the 

United States, not making it harder for them to come to this country. 

Fifth, the United States should use the military sparingly and judiciously. The U.S. military can help prevent terrorist acts when 

used carefully in conjunction with other tools, as has been proven 

in the southern Philippines. 

But at the same time, we must be aware of the sensitivities of 

heavy-handed U.S. presence in the region. 

Sixth, the United States should support regional international efforts that can strengthen cooperation amongst the countries of 

Southeast Asia. 

From ASEAN to the Global Counterterrorism Forum to working 

with other partners like Japan and Australia, there are numerous 

opportunities for the United States to support regional counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia. 

And seventh, the United States should engage with the countries 

and peoples of the region as partners instead of lecturing and criticizing. 

People around the world look to the United States for leadership 

and to uphold the universal values. And so the United States must 

act in both word and deed to strengthen those universal values, not 

to foster perceptions of an ‘‘us versus them’’ mentality. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fuchs follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you, and I appreciate everybody’s testimony, 

and we are going to break rank a little bit here, and I am going 

to let Ms. Wagner go first because she has got another meeting 

that she has too and then we will let the ranking member go. Go 

ahead. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you very much both to the chairman and to 

the ranking member for their courtesy. I have got a press conference on human trafficking with the Speaker in about 12 minutes. 

So the conflict in Marawi is highly concerning and my heart goes 

out to all those who have lost their lives and been displaced. 

It is clear that improving U.S. counterterrorism engagement with 

our ASEAN partners and allies is critically important. 

Dr. Greitens, you mentioned in your statement the June launch 

of joint patrols and information sharing between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 

Increased regional cooperation has the potential to be helpful. 

How can the United States better support regional counterterrorism and border control efforts? 

Ms. GREITENS. Thank you very much. 

You know, we are seeing the very beginning of some of these 

forms of multilateral cooperation, particularly, as you mentioned, 

the joint patrols, which are only a couple of weeks old. One of the 

things the United States can do is continue to support the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities that would guide 

and support those patrols and to continue to build, via assistance 

to the Philippines, its overall maritime capacity. 

My general sense of these patrols is that the capacity of the Philippine Government in the Sulu Sea and around those southern waters is an area that particularly needs to be beefed up. That is an 

area where the United States, along with other U.S. security partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia, can be particularly 

helpful. 

Ms. WAGNER. Great. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sanderson and Ms. Peery, as you know, many Indonesian officials have been educated in Saudi-funded schools. There are multiple strains of Salafi ideology, as I understand it. 

How does Salafi ideology express itself in Indonesia and how influential is Wahhabism? Mr. Sanderson. 

Mr. SANDERSON. That is not an area of expertise of mine but let 

me indicate from field work that I have conducted in the region 

among all these countries is that Indonesia in particular has a very 

large moderate mainstream Muslim community. They have 

large——

Ms. WAGNER. Are there moderate political and jihadi strains involved or——

Mr. SANDERSON. Absolutely. I mean, in every country you would 

find those. Indonesia happens to be an excellent example where 

you have very large communities that have rejected those more extreme intolerant interpretations of Islam. 

Groups like Nahdlatul Ulama Muhammadiyah and other communities group are—have rejected that. You saw it in the response to 

the 2002 Bali bombing where there was a rejection of JI’s vicious 

attack that killed 202 people. 

49

So that works to our advantage in the region. But you do have 

the influence of more extreme forms of Islam that have come in 

from the Arabian Gulf, that have been pushed through schools and 

through mosques, and that is of concern to us. 

But let me turn to my colleague for more details on that. 

Ms. WAGNER. Ms. Peery. 

Ms. PEERY. Thank you. 

I think the issue of Gulf State funding in general, non-Arab 

countries with Muslim majority populations is an issue because 

when we look at the way various Muslim communities practice 

Islam, it varies greatly and I can full well understand and respect 

the confusion that there is when people are trying to understand 

that spectrum and try to create policy with that in mind. 

But to your question specifically, the foreign funding that comes 

into countries like Indonesia are not only spent necessarily to construct mosques or create Islamic schools but they can go to civic organizations like a women’s club to do anything that is not really 

on its face a religious issue. 

But that coming together, the way they engage, what they talk 

about usually is—builds on a foundation of a very, very traditional 

fundamentalist way of life and that is what is advocated through 

conversation, socializing, and, for example, in Ramadan the activities that you would have that bring communities together. 

I have had conversations that—take this with a grain of salt because it is anecdotal—but people don’t want to talk about the fact 

that, for example, if the Indonesian Government wants to push 

back on funding that they are not comfortable it has been alleged 

that the Saudi Government will then come back and say, well, we 

won’t give visas to Indonesians that want to come on a pilgrimage 

to Saudi Arabia. 

Now, for practising Muslims like my mother, even, going on pilgrimage is a big deal. So for a Muslim-majority country government to do something that can be perceived in the public space as 

preventing Muslims from practising their faith, the nuances of the 

issue won’t be discussed. 

It will become another point that extremists can grab on to and 

say, this government is not allowing you to be a good Muslim. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Sanderson, there have been reports of Saudi Arabia collaborating with Indonesia on efforts to prevent radicalization and King 

Salman visited Indonesia this spring. 

How effective do you think such deradicalization programs are 

and is there a role for the U.S. in promoting peaceful ideologies? 

Mr. SANDERSON. The Government of Saudi Arabia does not have 

any interest in sponsoring groups or movements that would then 

target its own government, which they do. 

So what the government may do bilaterally in this case does not 

always reflect what happens at a different level among clergy, 

among wealthy individuals who want to fund more conservative 

ideology, more conservative mosques, more conservative madrasas. 

So I applaud Saudi Arabia’s effort to work with the Indonesian 

Government. I think that is a good thing to do. But that is not the 

only channel of influence and money that comes from Saudi Arabia. 

50

A lot of that comes under the table or it comes privately and I 

think that is important and that is what we should focus on. 

I think the U.S. has a role, certainly, in promoting a range of 

voices and making sure that there are multiple sources of information and interpretations available to citizens of countries like Indonesia. 

Ms. WAGNER. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sanderson. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Ms. Wagner. 

We will go to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We talk to the Saudis. They say they are not 

doing anything to promote the extremist views, and I want to draw 

a distinction between intense orthodox Muslim on the one hand 

and Islam that has been perverted by those who teach hatred or 

terrorist acts against those they disagree with. 

If a mosque says five times a day means five times a day, no 

matter what, that doesn’t hurt anybody. 

If it says fast, continue the fast until the sun goes down and even 

if there’s an ember and better wait another 20 minutes just in case, 

that doesn’t hurt anybody. 

So I am focused here on the madrasas and mosques that teach 

or preach a hatred and the wisdom of engaging in violence against 

those they disagree with. 

Ms. Peery, you talk about Saudi Arabia pushing Indonesia to 

have the right to fund certain extremist organizations. Is that only 

anecdotal or do you have the facts that would allow me to confront 

the Saudi Government with that? 

Ms. PEERY. Unfortunately, so far only anecdotal. But——

Mr. SHERMAN. Then I ask every witness here to try to furnish 

specific instances where there is an organization—a mosque, a madras, or other organization that you then identify has engaged in 

a particular act of preaching or teaching hatred or terrorism so 

that we can turn that to the Saudis and say, are you funding any 

of these. 

I would especially want you to highlight those that you have any 

evidence that the Saudis are in fact funding. I get all these anecdotal reports, then I get a denial, and then I go on to another subject. 

Does any witness here have an example of an entity in Southeast 

Asia that isn’t a terrorist group but which preaches or teaches hatred or violence? Ms. Peery. 

Ms. PEERY. There is an organization called Hizb ut-Tahrir which 

is not specifically connected to Saudi Arabia or any one country 

that funds any type of extremism or fundamentalism. But——

Mr. SHERMAN. So you are saying that this is an organization 

doing things on the ground in Southeast Asia? 

Ms. PEERY. Yes, as well as 40 other countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. This organization is funded by whom? 

Ms. PEERY. Multiple sources, apparently. But the issue with Hizb 

ut-Tahrir is—for example, there is even a chapter in the United 

States. 

I have attended one of their events maybe 2 years ago in Virginia 

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tion being pro-caliphate or caliphate in the U.S. or something like 

that. We are lucky in the United States that——

Mr. SHERMAN. And you are using the term caliphate——

Ms. PEERY. Islamic State, specifically. I went there just to see 

what kind of audience comes and I was very happy to say three 

people, if that, and they didn’t look particularly into the topic. 

But if you look at Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia, they have school 

organizations. They send pamphlets out. They have conferences or 

book clubs and Indonesia only now——

Mr. SHERMAN. And we don’t know who funds them but we think 

that Saudi individuals or government might? 

Ms. PEERY. I don’t think it is Saudi specifically, no. But it——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I don’t—so you—do you think their funds include donors from the Government or citizens of Saudi Arabia? 

Ms. PEERY. It is possible. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I would ask you to document for the record 

how this organization preaches or teaches hatred, support for a caliphate. 

Ms. PEERY. I point to that example. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, when I say support for a caliphate I don’t 

mean, like, the peaceful union of——

Ms. PEERY. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Adjoining predominantly Muslim 

states. I mean, North and South Yemen joined together and that 

is fine. It hasn’t worked out so well but it is not——

Ms. PEERY. If I may, I just mentioned Hizb ut-Tahrir to make 

the point that it is one of the most organized and most expansive——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Ms. PEERY [continuing]. In terms of reach. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does any other witness have specifics here on organizations that teach or preach hatred? 

I will move on to another subject—broadcasting. How important 

is Voice of America and other U.S.-paid broadcasting to achieving 

the goals we are trying to achieve in Southeast Asia? 

Mr. Sanderson. 

Mr. SANDERSON. I made a visit many years ago in which I interviewed several militant groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and 

other areas and it also included engaging with the topic you are 

discussing here now in terms of putting a message out there to promote American values, to promote democracy, to give people alternative sources of information. 

There is a broad, broad community of individuals in these countries that are eager consumers of this information but the groups 

that we are most concerned with have long ago rejected any kind 

of message coming from the United States from their own Government, from moderate imams in their communities. 

So when you speak of the influence of Voice of America, it is influential on people who may be too young to make a decision at 

this point. They haven’t been influenced yet. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I mean, obviously, somebody that——

Mr. SANDERSON. But the folks we are concerned about—those 

being recruited into battle——

52

Mr. SHERMAN. I am concerned with the 10-year-olds who might 

go one way or another when they are 15 or 20. 

Mr. SANDERSON. I don’t know how appealing Voice of America is 

to a 10-year-old anywhere in the world, to be honest. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And their—and their parents. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Yes, so it could get to their parents. Their parents could influence them but——

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. Does anyone else have any comment? 

Mr. Fuchs. 

Mr. FUCHS. Yes. I would just say, agreeing in part with my colleague. I would also point out that I think broadcasting mediums 

like VOA are part of a broader strategy that the United States and 

other countries I think can use very effectively to show people of 

the region, first of all, what U.S. values are but also as alternative 

mediums for getting information, as Mr. Sanderson pointed out. 

I think similarly, just as I mentioned in my testimony, vehicles 

like cultural educational exchanges that the United States supports 

in the region are vital. I understand that they may not be on a 

level of hundreds of thousands of people. 

But even so, on the level of hundreds of people and sometimes 

thousands of people they have ripple effects in their communities. 

So I think that supporting those sorts of efforts are very valuable. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. YOHO. I kind of want to just set the stage. You guys all probably know—I am sure you know this very well. 

But when you look at the Asia Pacific region and you look at nation states—archipelago nations like the Philippines has 7,000 islands, Indonesia 17,000-plus. 

I was reading where the government really doesn’t know how 

many. I would hope they would. But when you look at that land 

mass with that much separation between continuity of a country, 

I don’t know how you police that. 

So it is ripe for the development of any kind of a movement. It 

could be peaceful but in this case we are looking at the growing 

threat. 

I have got so many different questions and it is you and I so we 

are going to have fun and you guys will have to tolerate us, if you 

will, please. 

But when you look at the land mass and just the logistics problem of policing, it just adds to the potential terrorist threat than 

can affect not just that region but the whole world. We’ve got more 

displaced people today than we have since World War II and now 

we are adding another 400,000 displaced people just on the island 

of Mindanao. So this is something that we have to take very seriously. 

It is something we have to get under control, and one of my first 

questions is what have we learned from Afghanistan and Iraq with 

us going in there militarily, without taking in the culture, the 

norms of a society, tribal communities in the Middle East, what 

have we learned from there? 

Because in Robert Gates’ book that was one of the downfalls that 

we went in there—we were going to show them how America does 

it without taking into consideration what the people of those countries want. Does anybody want to tackle that? 

53

Mr. Sanderson. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first indicate or suggest that our familiarity with the cultures in Southeast Asia is better than it was with Afghanistan for 

certain. 

It doesn’t mean it is perfect but we have, of course, had a long 

history in the Philippines. We have a good relationship with Malaysia and Indonesia. 

So we are more familiar with those nations. We have had bilateral exchanges, multilateral exchanges with them on law enforcement, military, civilian levels. So we are in better shape there. But 

nonetheless, you still have to work with your local partners. 

What we have learned in Afghanistan is legion—well, I hope we 

have learned it. But what we have observed is quite comprehensive. 

One of the most important things, in consideration of your comment, is it is not easy or effective to work with corrupt governments. If we do not have good partners on the other side, and we 

have a mixed bag here in Southeast Asia, then we will not be that 

successful. 

Also, you mentioned the number of islands, 23,000-plus among 

those two. One thousand islands in Indonesia are inhabited, 600 

permanently inhabited. 

So there is a lot of space where these guys can go and go various 

activities. However, they do need infrastructure in order to carry 

out activities. 

So not all of those places are hospitable even to militant groups. 

But it is a big space. Encouraging more activity in the maritime 

space is excellent, as Dr. Greitens pointed out, and I hope we will 

do that. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Dr. Greitens, let me move to you. Reading your testimony here, 

from 2002 to 2015, the U.S. deployed several hundred special operations personnel to southern Philippines for counter terrorism purposes. 

Why was that not effective? Why—I feel like this has kind of just 

been off the radar. I am sure there is a select few that were there 

that were aware of this. But it seems like from a U.S. foreign policy 

standpoint, this is something that has kind of bypassed us and it 

is, like, uh-oh, we now—now we have to catch up. 

Why was that not effective in what we are doing? You know, and 

I will take just the number of insurgents we thought that were in 

Marawi. 

It was, what, 200 to 300—now we know it is over 400 or 500, and 

there is no telling how many it is going to be. What is your 

thoughts on that? 

Ms. GREITENS. Thank you. 

Sir, I think that the decision to wind down the task force was 

a product of several different factors. One of which was an estimation that perhaps the task force had been more successful in its 

primary mission, which had to do more with Abu Sayyaf than what 

was going on on the land. 

The Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines was principally dealing with Abu Sayyaf. At the time there was also a peace 

54

process underway in Mindanao, and there was an agreement 

reached in 2014, the year before the task force terminated in February 2015, I believe. 

And so at the time, things in Mindanao looked like they were 

perhaps coming together a little bit better than they were. So that 

is one factor that I think affected the decision. As I know that you 

are aware, Secretary Mattis has stated that perhaps that decision 

was premature. 

But the other factor that we have to think about is that what’s 

happened in the Middle East has produced displacement effects 

into Southeast Asia. So we are also seeing that as pressure is exerted against Islamic State in the Middle East, that the Philippines 

has become more appealing. These groups that splintered away 

from the MILF, some of whom have been in the lead, really, in 

Marawi, are both a little bit different and driven by different factors than were the principal emphasis for the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines. 

But, as I noted in my testimony, if the Philippine Government 

recommends it, that is something the U.S. should at least be willing to consider, among a range of other options. 

Thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. That is what we need to be prepared for because as 

these radicals, the terrorists, come back over, the fighters come 

back over, being displaced from Iraq, Syrian, wherever, that they 

are going to come there and there is going to be a coalition or they 

are going to coalesce together and it is going to form a stronger—

it is going to be ISIS Part II, and that is what I think we all need 

to be concerned about and that is what we are trying to prevent. 

So I am going to go to you, Ms. Peery. One of the questions I 

wanted to ask you is about the Internet and social media and how 

it is all interconnected. 

How could the U.S. Government, working with the regional governments, work with social media and other technological companies to reduce terrorist groups’ ability to leverage social media platforms to spread their extremist messages? Do you have any recommendations on that? 

Ms. PEERY. I think there needs to be encouragement to have a 

collaboration between the government, specifically its law enforcement arms and its intelligence services to work with the private 

sector to look at what the infrastructure specifically looks like. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, for example, if Indonesia has 

70 percent of the servers that serves—that proliferates the information in the entire region, that is an opportunity for the Philippines to go directly to Indonesia and have a conversation. 

It can be as simple as getting them to talk to each other to understand what information they have, what these—where the companies are that run the servers, whether there is an opportunity 

to further that collaboration with companies like Facebook and 

Twitter, which are saying more and more that they are willing to 

take down extremist information and propaganda. 

The second part of that, as I mentioned also in my testimony, is 

taking down extremist propaganda is only half of the problem. 

You have to replace it with an understanding of Islam that not 

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jects ISIS propaganda point by point, and that is something that 

only the local governments within the region can do if they support 

the grassroots organizations in the respective countries. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. 

And when you look at it, it just seems like such a daunting task. 

You have got the 23,000 islands or whatever it is—to try to police 

that, and you have different nations in there, different rules of law, 

different levels of the rule of law. 

How do you—how do you police that, and I don’t know if you can 

take an island like Mindanao and just say, we are going to shut 

down the Internet. 

I know this is getting broadcast and I am going to—people are 

going to say I am against First Amendment. I am not. We are trying to get something under control that if we don’t get it under control we are going to be fighting for generations and generations, 

and certainly we have seen that in the Middle East. 

Mr. Fuchs, I wanted to ask you, because one of the things that 

we learned and you had recommended it here was in one of your 

opening statements was that in the long run, managing the security challenge and preventing it from growing into a more direct 

threat to the U.S. interests above all else requires capable governments—I think we are all in agreement with that—that follow the 

rule of law, prioritize sustainability and equitable economic growth 

strategies and which protect the values of human rights and tolerance and work to strengthen democratic institutions. 

This is something I have struggled with for years in Foreign Relations because we all agree with that. I mean, those are the founding principles, the core values of our country and, of course, it has 

taken us over 200, 300 years to get to this point and we have 

fought several wars to protect these rights, number one, to get 

them and to protect them. 

When you go into a country, a foreign country—and certainly we 

learned this in the Middle East—to instill our values and say this 

is a part of the process, I would like to hear your thoughts. 

Should that be at the beginning or should that be the goal and 

bring that country to those beliefs as success happens? 

Because what I see is the foreign policies of the past, we put 

these conditions and say this is the only way we are going to help 

you if you do these things, and put that up here instead of focussing on peace, security, rule of law, and good governance. 

What are your thoughts on that and how can we do that different 

and yet accomplish that, say, maybe over a 5- to 10-year goal if we 

are working in that direction? I think everybody would be better 

off. 

Mr. FUCHS. Absolutely. I think that is a great question. 

I think the reality is that you have to do all of it at once, unfortunately, as difficult as it is. 

I think that one of the things to recognize about Southeast Asia 

as compared to, say, the Middle East or some other places is that 

over the arc of the last few decades we have actually been dealing 

with a better and better situation on that time span. 

These are countries that have become more democratic, 

transitioned for authoritarian to democratic, in many instances. 

56

So, for instances, in a country like Indonesia we actually have a 

partner government that is relatively capable in certain aspects 

and that we can work with on a lot of these very, very challenging 

issues. 

The Philippines, I will say, which has been up and down, right 

now is a much more difficult task and I think is a good example 

of exactly the challenge that you are raising here because with 

President Aquino up until last year, the United States I think was 

able to support a lot of aspects of Filipino policy that would get at 

the roots of terrorism in the region including strengthening anticorruption efforts, growing of the economy, which I think are important aspects of that. 

But with President Duterte, whose interests and policies are 

quite different—his respect for human rights seems quite low, 

frankly, in my estimation—it makes it much more difficult for the 

United States with at the one hand to make sure that we are 

partnering with him and his government to go after terrorist 

groups and other security threats while at the same time not 

condoning the sorts of heavy-handed tactics that he has been using 

domestically in his fight against drugs. 

Mr. YOHO. I just want to end with this before I go to my colleague over here, Mr. Connolly, it was nice to see that President 

Trump called the leaders of those nations and that Vice President 

Pence went down there, and then Secretary Tillerson has put an 

emphasis on that area and General participating in the ShangriLa Dialogue. 

The message that I want to come out of this hearing today, out 

of this committee, that goes out, that is being broadcast is that 

America is back and our focus in on the Asia Pacific region and we 

are focussing on economics, trade, national security, and, as you’ve 

brought up multiple times, cultural exchanges because I think that 

is the one missing link that we haven’t done in the Middle East 

like we should have and that is an emphasis that we want to put 

on that. 

With that, I am going to turn to my good friend, Mr. Connolly 

from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, though I must say I hardly 

think America is back. I think in the brief 6 or 7 months of this 

administration we have done nothing but retreat including from 

this area. 

Nothing is more catastrophic, starting with the retreat from the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership. It creates an enormous void in this region and gives enormous opportunities to our rival, China. 

Maybe some think that is a great leap forward. I think it is a 

great leap backward and definitely not in U.S. interests, and the 

proof of that was within 1 week Beijing convened a meeting in Beijing of all the remaining TPP partners to see if they could carve 

out a trade agreement that circumscribed that part of the globe but 

without us and without our standards. 

I also think it was an enormous retreat and again gave the Chinese in this part of the world an enormous diplomatic advantage 

in withdrawing unilaterally from the Paris Climate Accord. 

57

We are now in the happy company of two countries exactly—

Nicaragua and Syria. What a proud moment for the United States. 

If that is called we are back again, I would rather not be. 

So I think there are other points of view about what has happened in this brief period of time and I honestly believe that those 

two things actually will be seen by history akin to our refusal to 

ratify the Treaty of Versailles that most certainly helped precipitate a successor war to World War I, the war to end all wars. But 

that is a different matter. 

Let me ask—Mr. Fuchs, I don’t know—I thought I heard kind of 

squishy language from you just now on the Philippines. This is a 

dictator who has said, have at it, vigilante violence, and I think the 

number I think is 7,000 dead that we know of. 

He has even advocated for rape as a tactic—as a tool in order to 

get rid of what he has decided are criminal elements and druggies 

and drug dealers and drug users and undesirables. 

Now, my friend, Mr. Yoho, read from a statement, quite correctly, that our goal is to establish governments—capable governments that follow the rule of law. 

How is this a capable government other than being more efficient 

and killing people in extrajudicial ways that certainly the United 

States cannot condone, let alone the rule of law? 

I mean, I don’t want to put words in your mouth but you sounded like, well, except for that—granted, that is a little messy but 

other than that we have got strategic goals we share. 

Well, I mean, Duterte hasn’t even been consistent in that respect. I mean, one day he likes China. One day he likes us. I mean, 

he is threatening. He is not threatening. He could cut a deal with 

China. He could throw us out. 

My head spins with this guy who seems, frankly, unstable and 

thuggish if not murderous—hardly a partner we want to do business with, though we do. But we will get to that in a minute. 

So did you want to clarify your squishy remarks or——

Mr. FUCHS. Sure. Thank you, Congressman. 

Well, I will try to restate I think what I was getting at, which 

is that this is a very, very difficult challenge and I think that without a doubt, democracy and human rights needs to be an essential 

component of our strategy for a wide variety of goals but including 

counterterrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Now, the United States, obviously, has a long-time alliance with 

the Philippines. With the previous government, with President 

Aquino, there was, I think, a very robust partnership on democracy 

and human rights as well as a variety of other issues. 

At the same time, I don’t think that the terrible things that 

President Duterte is doing—and they are absolutely terrible and I 

think that they merit a response from the United States, some of 

which I know that you and your representant and your colleagues 

have already tried to send in a number of different ways—I think 

at the same time we need to focus on what our interests are there 

in supporting democracy and human rights in that country, supporting economic growth and ensuring that our security interests 

are met. 

So I think that while we do not break off diplomatic relations altogether with the country, there are a variety of things the United 

58

States needs to be doing to send messages to Duterte about how 

unhappy we are with what he’s been doing. Can I——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me. Is one of those things to invite him, 

among the very first international leaders, to come visit Washington and the White House? 

Mr. FUCHS. And that was exactly going to be my next point, 

which I actually—just as soon as President Trump made that invitation I actually wrote a piece that said specifically the President 

should not be inviting the President of the Philippines here. 

But I think that there are also a number of other things that we 

can be considering doing to send our—to signal our displeasure including the potential of cutting off certain types of assistance to the 

Philippines. 

The Leahy vetting process is one way of doing that—that already 

exists. But there, frankly, are other types of cooperation with law 

enforcement with the armed forces of the Philippines that, frankly, 

can be suspended or cut off to show him that there is a red line 

that he is crossing right now in the way that he is running his 

country and that our cooperation is not a blank check. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I knew you weren’t squishy. 

Let me ask you final question on this one and then I am going 

to turn to Mr. Sanderson on foreign aid. 

So the Duterte government decided that they needed a special 

envoy to the United States of America and in light of what you just 

said, do you believe the selection of Jose Antonio, who is a business 

partner with Donald Trump in building a tower in the Philippines, 

is an appropriate choice and sends the right signal? 

Or, I mean, is this somebody with whom we can do business? Is 

this somebody who is designed to flatter the President but not to 

ameliorate a real human rights crisis underway in the Philippines 

as we speak? 

Mr. FUCHS. I completely agree with you that this is sending exactly the wrong signal and I think that it is actually indicative of 

a broader problem that we may have with the relations of the 

United States and the countries in this region right now and President Trump’s conflicts of interest—his businesses and his conflicts 

of interest and what that might wreak on our relationships in the 

region. That is one example. 

But, frankly, their corruption is a widespread problem in Southeast Asia. It is a way of doing business in some of these countries, 

unfortunately, and part of the problem is that one of the signals 

that has been sent to some of these countries by President Trump’s 

unwillingness to get rid of his business holdings before taking office 

is that the United States may actually be moving closer to them 

in terms of the way we do business and that the result of that in 

part might be more envoys like this or more entreaties to the 

United States about business. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is why a number of ethicists both Republican and Democrat strongly advocated an absolute blind trust so 

that you weren’t having ongoing questions tainting foreign policy 

as well as other kinds of decisions. Unfortunately, that advice was 

not taken. 

I don’t wish to impose on the chairman. So if you will allow me 

one—just one last set of questions, and I don’t mean to preclude 

59

anyone else that may want to comment. But I thought I would put 

it to you first, Mr. Sanderson, listening to your testimony. 

If you look at the budget submitted by the President and, apparently, supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. Tillerson, we make 

some very substantial cuts in foreign assistance programs including democracy-building efforts in the countries we are talking 

about here today in terms of humanitarian services, in terms of institution building, you name it—co-ops, health clinics, small micro 

businesses, women-owned businesses, empowerment, all that stuff, 

where we have been doing a lot of good work actually for quite 

some time and we actually have some metrics that show some results. 

Takes a little time but, all of that is cut. I mean, not just cut—

really cut, I mean, right to the bone. To make it all special, apparently Secretary Tillerson is thinking of absorbing USAID into State 

Department as just another bureau, even though their missions are 

quite different. 

I wonder if you could comment on that. How does that help us 

in the mission we are talking about in this region if this America’s 

back again, it looks another example to me of no, we are not—we 

are retreating and, again, allowing the Chinese to enter that vacuum with their foreign assistance, which isn’t as punctilious or meritorious as ours in terms of setting metrics that have to be met, and 

making sure there are clear rationales that benefit large numbers 

of people. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Nor does it come with the oversight that ours 

does. You bring up some great points, Congressman. I think it is 

a mistake to cut the State Department’s budget at all. But I understand that all budgets are going to be coming under the knife except for DoD. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not defense. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Yes, except for DoD. So but that does recall the 

secretary and then General Mattis’ comments during his confirmation hearing when he said, if you cut the State Department I have 

to buy more bullets. 

I do think those budgets will not be cut that sharply. I hope they 

are not cut much at all because those are tremendously important 

programs. 

They seed the field with a lot of positive things that have short, 

medium, and long-term benefits. We are a great partner overseas. 

I see it in all the countries that I go to. 

People want the assistance that covers everything from military 

to civilian to economic, judicial. You name it, they want that activity. It is an important part of counterterrorism because you are 

strengthening economies in communities. 

When you have idle hands, they get pulled into the gray market 

and then they get pulled into militant groups sometimes. 

To your comment about engagement, the President has sent 

mixed messages but largely messages about retreat. His national 

security staff, which is superb, goes out after those messages and 

tries to reassure our allies. 

So we have gone into Asia and to Southeast Asia to reassure our 

allies. These are important relationships. The Department of Defense likes to say they—you can’t surge trust. 

60

When you are dealing with a complicated environment like 

Southeast Asia, like foreign fighters, and all the insurgencies that 

you have there, a good healthy widespread multifaceted relationship between the United States and our Asian partners in Southeast Asia in particular is excellent for the counterterrorism partnerships. 

If the rest of the relationship is good, that often redounds to 

the—to the other issues that we are looking at and that is why I 

would encourage deep engagement and budgets that do bring 

American culture, society, and engagement on a high level. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. And I appreciate that dialogue and I can always appreciate my colleague bringing the politics into this. 

But truth be known, TPP wouldn’t have passed. There wasn’t 

support in the House, either Republicans or Democrats, or in the 

Senate, Republicans or Democrats. So it was off the table. 

It was a good call so it can be renegotiated and that is why we 

put in free trade agreements with many countries in the Asia Pacific that we are working on now. 

And let us see—what was the other one? I forget. You were talking about——

Mr. CONNOLLY. The Paris climate——

Mr. YOHO. Oh, the Paris climate—and, again, that would have 

put this country at a disadvantage. We are going to lead on energy 

and you are going to see great things come out of that. 

So I do feel like we are back in that area. The President being 

down there, the Secretary of State, and the State Department is 

light on people. 

People are working double time in these positions. Over 130 positions have been appointed. They just haven’t gone through the 

process in the Senate. So it is being held up in the Senate again. 

But I do want to point out you were talking—Mr. Fuchs, you 

were talking about the importance of diplomatic relations in that 

area. You said strong diplomatic ties will help thwart terrorism. 

Have we not had that over the last 8 years in the previous administration? I mean, what is your thoughts on that or anybody 

else that wants to weigh in on that. 

Mr. FUCHS. Well, I think that we actually have had very positive 

relationships with a number of the countries in the region over the 

last 8 years and, of course, it does not mean that you are going to 

prevent every terrorist threat from spawning in the region. 

But I think that fundamentally you are not going to get anything 

done on counterterrorism in the region if you do not have those 

strong diplomatic relationships because, again, these are the ones 

who have the relationships with their counterparts in the governments in Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines. 

They are the ones who have the best information about what is 

going on in the cities and towns and villages in these countries and 

the best feel for these countries. 

They really are the front lines here in Southeast Asia for our 

counterterrorism strategy. Of course, they are not 100 percent of 

the strategy but they are an essential component of it. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Then I guess my question is if we have got 

these great relationships, did we just drop the ball on this? Did we 

61

not follow up or was this just behind the scene we were distracted 

by North Korea? The Middle East? Anybody’s thoughts on that. 

Mr. FUCHS. If I——

Mr. SANDERSON. I would remark that we do have a very full 

plate worldwide——

Mr. YOHO. We sure do. 

Mr. SANDERSON [continuing]. And it is hard to dedicate sufficient 

energy to every single relationship, and then when things like 

Marawi—the battle of Marawi flare-up then we shift our resources 

here and so it is a question of resources and attention. 

But that gets also back to cutting budgets and making sure the 

Senate moves people through and what not, which I hope that you 

do because we do retain the leadership position globally. 

We do need to be a part of most of these issues and then solving 

problems and I don’t know if it is a question of dropping the ball 

or just being distracted by somewhere else. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, when you look at where we are as a nation. We 

are $20 trillion in debt. I was at a meeting last night. 

They said our deficit spending next year is going to be around 

$750 billion. We are getting worse. There are going to be some austerity measures. 

We want to make sure that we cut in the right area, and I agree 

with General Mattis—if you cut foreign aid you are going to have 

to buy more bullets and that is certainly not the direction we want 

it. 

So we want to have strong diplomacy, we want to have strong 

policies, and we want to make sure that the ideas that you give us 

that we can enact in the legislation are that much stronger. 

I think I had one more question and it was for you, Dr. Greitens. 

Talking about North Korea, funnelling money through there—what 

nexus does that go through? 

Does that go through any of the Chinese banks or any of the 

world banks that we could put secondary sanctions on? 

Ms. GREITENS. Yes. It does both, sir. North Korea has revenuegenerating operations throughout Southeast Asia, and one of the 

things that we’ve seen in recent months is that countries in Southeast Asia—Singapore, Malaysia, some other countries in the region—have actually started to tighten down on some of these North 

Korean revenue-generating operations. 

There is banking that goes through Singapore and some of the 

other financial nodes in the region. But as you indicated, a lot of 

the companies that do business with North Korea, around 80 percent, maybe 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, is with China. So 

from both a banking and a trade perspective, China is really the 

dominant actor. 

That said, North Korea has been very good at adapting when one 

source of revenue or one set of banking networks comes under pressure. I have in the past advocated for the United States to engage 

on the North Korean question in Southeast Asia, in part to keep 

North Korea from moving its center of activity to Southeast Asia 

if China comes under pressure, and I think that is an important 

part. 

The Philippines, according to the World Trade Organization, is 

the third largest trade partner of North Korea today, after India 

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and China, and that is not insignificant. So we should be putting 

all tools on the table. 

Mr. YOHO. We really do and, of course, we just saw that load of 

ivory tusks—I think it was 7,000 pounds—that just got confiscated 

and those are the kind of things that are funding terrorist organizations and it doesn’t serve humanity. 

I can’t tell you how much I appreciate it and, again, feel free to 

offer suggestions that we can do legislation with. We have done 

this in the past and I look forward to your input. 

I thank you for your time. I value your time and everybody else 

here. 

So with that, we thank the panel for joining us today to share 

their experience, and this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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