Department of Defense

Department of Defense 

Infrastructure Capacity 

OCTOBER 2017

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately $258,000 in 

Fiscal Years 2016 - 2017. This includes $66,000 in expenses and $192,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 

December 19, 2016. RefID: 3-2E4B8DE
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Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary 2

II. Force Structure 5

III. Assessment of Probable Threats 6

IV. Inventory of Installations 8

V. Assessment of Capacity and the Value of Retaining Excess 19

VI. Detailed Results 22

VII. Conclusion 33

Appendices (On CD)

A. Inventory of Worldwide Installations

B. Inventory of Leases for Military Departments, Defense Logistics Agency, and 

Washington Headquarters Service
2

I. Executive Summary

This report is provided in response to section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 (Public Law 114-92), and is a follow-on to the interim 

capacity report submitted in March 2016. The report contains the following: a force structure 

plan for each Military Service informed by the Secretary’s assessment of probable threats to 

national security and the end-strength levels and major military force units authorized in the 

NDAA for FY 2012 (Public Law 112-81); and a world-wide inventory of installations for both 

the active and reserve forces. Based on the force structure plan and inventory, the report 

includes a description of the infrastructure necessary to support the FY 2012 force structure; a 

discussion of categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity; and an assessment of 

the value of retaining certain excess infrastructure to accommodate contingency, mobilization, or 

surge requirements. This report demonstrates the Department of Defense (DoD) has 19 percent 

excess capacity using a FY 2012 force structure.

To avoid identifying individual installations, the Department completed a parametric 

analysis similar to our three previous analyses undertaken in response to similar congressional 

language (April 1998, March 2004, and March 2016). All of the reports used a 1989 baseline of 

categories of force structure to infrastructure to develop a ratio (e.g., ratio of aircraft to apron 

space) and compared the 1989 ratio to a ratio of the same categories using a FY 2012 force 

structure to determine the percent excess for each category. Choosing a 1989 baseline assumes 

that the facilities were properly sized, at least in overall capacity, to support assigned missions 

and forces even when accounting for the land and facility requirements of newer weapon 

systems. This analysis does not account for operational requirements or military value. The 

only logical way to do that analysis is within the statutorily structured process of an authorized 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round that treats all bases equally and places primary 

emphasis on military value.

The Department recognizes the limitations of comparing categories over time rather than 

detailing excess by installation. However, this approach is the most logical way outside of the 

BRAC process to provide an indication of the Department’s excess capacity without identifying

individual installations. Specifying excess at a particular installation could cause unnecessary 

and premature concern by the affected community. The Government Accountability Office’s 

(GAO) May 2004 report on the Department’s capacity analysis stated, “While clear limitations 

exist in DOD’s assessment of excess capacity, it does nonetheless point to some areas that 

warrant additional analysis—and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing 

so.” We agree with GAO, and the analysis contained in this report is strictly used to identify 

potential excess capacity that can be analyzed more thoroughly and independently during the 

formal BRAC process. 

DoD has not been authorized to undertake a BRAC analysis for over 14 years. In those 

years, the Department has undergone considerable changes that have impacted the force 

structure, mission requirements, and threats facing the United States. In addition, budget 

constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act have further strained existing resources and 

forced the Department to trim costs of sustaining the infrastructure it does maintain. 

Specifically, the recent Government Accountability Office report, “Defense Facility Condition 
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Revised Guidance Needed to Improve Oversight of Assessments and Ratings (16-369),” notes

that “for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Military Services reported collectively spending on 

average 79 percent ($40 billion for those years) of the facilities sustainment model’s estimated 

requirements (of $51 billion for those years).” This underscores the fiscal reality that the 

Department cannot fully fund all sustainment requirements. Limited construction and 

maintenance funding is better used at enduring locations with the highest military value rather 

than keeping installations the Department does not need. Reality and common business sense 

dictate that infrastructure should be reconfigured to meet specific needs and changing threats. 

On April 14, 2016, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent the congressional defense 

committees an interim report which documents that the DoD has 22 percent excess infrastructure 

capacity compared to projected FY 2019 force levels. The weighted average of 22 percent 

excess infrastructure capacity was distributed as follows in table 1: Army – 33 percent; Navy –

7 percent; Air Force – 32 percent; and the Defense Logistics Agency – 12 percent. The analysis

compared base loading from 1989 to base loading in 2019, using 32 metrics of infrastructure. 

Employing an analysis to compare base loading from 1989 to base loading in 2012 (as 

required by section 2815) using 32 metrics tied to force structure plans indicates that the 

Department has 19 percent infrastructure excess distributed as follows in table 1: Army – 29 

percent excess; Navy – 6 percent; Air Force – 28 percent; and the Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA) – 13 percent. 
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Table 1

Department

Estimated Percentage 

of Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2019 Force 

Structure

Estimated Percentage 

of Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2012 Force 

Structure

Army 33 29

Navy 7 6

Air Force 32 28

DLA 12 13

Total DoD 22 19

As indicated above, the Department has significant excess capacity. Therefore, Congress 

should authorize the Department to undertake a BRAC 2021 round as it has requested. As will 

be discussed in this report, DoD requires a comprehensive BRAC process to reduce excess while 

enhancing military value, achieving recurring savings, and ensuring retention of excess space for 

contingency and surge requirements such as changed missions, tactics, and technology. While 

both the March report and this report clearly show significant excess capacity, neither provides

the detail necessary to identify specific infrastructure for elimination; instead, they only provide

an indicator of the categories of excess. Moreover, a future BRAC round will not eliminate all 

identified excess, as that is not what it is intended to do. In fact, the previous five BRAC rounds 

have each, on average, only reduced Plant Replacement Value by 5 percent; however, they did

provide the Department with significant annual recurring savings. 
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II. Force Structure

Tables 2 and 3 outline the force structure for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force as it existed in FY 2012 along with the force structure that is programmed for FY 2019 as 

of the President’s Budget (PB) for 2016. The Military Departments and DLA used these force 

structures as the basis to indicate categories of excess.

Table 2 – Major Military Force Units

Service Force Units FY12 FY19*

Army BCTs

Active 44 30

Reserve 28 26

Maneuver Battalion Equivalents 140 119

Aircraft Carriers 11 11

Carrier Air Wings

Active 10 10

Reserve 1 1

Battle Force Ships 293 300

Air Force 

Total Aircraft Inventory 5,587 5,332

Marine Corps Divisions

Active 3 3

Reserve 1 1

Table 3 - End Strength Levels

*The FY 2019 Force levels are as of PB FY 2016 as was reported in the Department’s March 2016 

Capacity Report

End Strength (in thousands) FY12 FY19*

Army 

Active 562 450

Reserve 563 530

Army Active Component Divisions 10 10

Navy

Active 326 330

Reserve 66 59

United States Marine Corps

Active 202 182

Reserve 40 39

Air Force 

Active 333 311

Reserve 71 67
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III. Assessment of Probable Threats

A. Range of Challenges

The strategic environment has undergone fundamental changes. In spite of our unique 

position as a global power with worldwide interests and military capabilities this change has 

redefined the range of challenges we must confront. Uncertainty is inherent in assessing future 

threats. Therefore, the potential for surprise should inform all planning efforts.

In general, opponents understand they cannot conventionally match U.S. military power.

Therefore, they will take time to identify U.S. vulnerabilities and act accordingly. We expect 

current and future adversaries, both state and non-state, will adopt a range of asymmetric and 

grand strategic capabilities and methods intended to circumvent our military advantages. Future 

opponents will seek to engage us by acting both indirectly and directly along a vast spectrum of 

domains, including cyber, economic, space, air, land, sea, and undersea. Above all, the enemy 

will seek to do the most harm with the least amount of risk.

Our principal challenges are represented by an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, 

and disruptive methods and capabilities employed by state and non-state actors. Combined, 

these reflect the four persistent challenges we must prevail against in this uncertain era. There 

are often no hard boundaries distinguishing one of these categories from another. While the 

capabilities and methods within each differ, the most dangerous circumstances are those in which 

we are facing, or will face, multiple challenges simultaneously.

B. Traditional Challenges

Traditional challenges come largely from states employing military forces in well-known 

forms of military competition and conflict. While traditional forms of military competition 

remain important, trends suggest these challenges will receive lesser priority in the planning of 

adversaries vis-a-vis the United States. This can be attributed, in part, to U.S. and allied 

superiority in traditional forms of warfare and the enormous cost to develop, acquire, and 

maintain conventional capabilities. But it is also explained by the increasing attractiveness of 

irregular methods as well as the increasing availability of catastrophic capabilities. Even where 

adversaries possess considerable capacity in traditional domains, they often seek to reinforce 

their position with catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive methods and capabilities. Therefore, 

some strictly traditional threats are giving way to hybrid challenges as seen in Ukraine when 

Russia’s traditional invasion of Crimea was combined with disruptive cyber-attacks and irregular 

units’ employment.

C. Irregular Challenges

Irregular challenges are characterized as “unconventional” methods employed by state 

and non-state actors to counter stronger state opponents. Irregular methods of increasing 

sophistication, including terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and third-party coercion, will challenge 

U.S. security interests to a greater degree than they have in the past. Our adversaries are likely to 
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exploit a host of irregular methods to erode U.S. power, influence, and national will over a 

period of time. Two factors in particular have intensified the rapid growth and potential danger 

of irregular challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the erosion of traditional 

sovereignty. Worldwide political, religious, and ethnic extremism continue to fuel deadly and 

destabilizing conflicts. Particularly threatening are extremist ideologies and religious 

denominations that sanction violence against civilians and other noncombatants. Areas in Latin 

America, Africa, the Middle East, throughout Asia, and even in some urban centers of Europe 

have become safe havens for terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and other groups that threaten 

global security. Many governments in these areas are vulnerable to hostile exploitation. 

Irregular challenges in and from these areas will grow more intense over time and are likely to 

challenge the security of the United States and its partners for the indefinite future.

D. Catastrophic Challenges

Catastrophic challenges involve terrorist or rogue employment of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). A number of state and non-state actors are vigorously seeking to acquire 

dangerous and destabilizing catastrophic capabilities. States seek these capabilities to offset 

perceived regional imbalances or to hedge against U.S. military superiority. Terrorists seek them 

because of the potential they hold for greater physical and psychological impact on targeted 

audience.

Porous international borders, weak controls over weapons-related materials and expertise, 

and ongoing revolutions in information technology are increasingly enabling this trend. 

Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transitional terrorists, WMD proliferation, and rogue 

states such as North Korea. Unchecked, this confluence raises the prospect of direct WMD 

employment against the United States or our allies and partners. Indeed, many would-be 

adversaries likely believe the best way to check American reach and influence is to develop the 

capability to threaten the U.S. homeland directly. Catastrophic attacks could arrive via a number 

of delivery means, including the rogue use of WMD-armed ballistic missiles, surreptitious 

delivery through routine commercial channels, and innovative attacks similar to those of 9/11.

Elements of the U.S. national infrastructure are vulnerable to catastrophic attack. The 

interdependent nature of the infrastructure creates more vulnerability; attacks against one sector,

such as the power grid, would have an impact on other sectors. Parts of the defense-related 

critical infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, especially those that rely on 

commercial sector elements with multiple single points of failure.

E. Disruptive Technologies

Disruptive technologies are those posed by competitors employing breakthrough 

technology that might counter or negate our current advantages in key operational domains. In 

doing so, competitors seek to provide themselves new military options that offset our advantages 

in niche areas and threaten our ability to operate from the strategic commons—space, sea, air, 

undersea, and cyberspace. Developments in these domains have changed possible enemy 

advantages from temporary to possibly decisive. Future disruptive challenges could easily 

become catastrophic if we are not prepared for them. New domains, including biotechnology, 
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directed-energy, economic warfare, and other emerging fields have few ready countermeasures. 

Although such developments are unpredictable, resources and defenses must be researched and 

prepared.

IV. Inventory of Installations 

This report provides a comprehensive inventory of military installations for the active and 

reserve forces for each Military Department, including the number and the types of facilities in 

Appendix A. The inventory was derived from the Department’s Real Property Asset Database 

(RPAD), which is updated annually by the Military Departments. The Military Departments 

verified the data contained in the report was accurate. The Military Departments, DLA, and 

Washington Headquarters Services also provided data for their respective leases separately and 

are contained in Appendix B. The inventory identifies 438,057 owned facilities. These owned 

facilities have been arranged into 10 categories with summary tables provided below in table 4. 

Leases are also summarized in table 5. (Note: the report includes a CD for the over 600 page

installation inventory and lease appendices).

Facilities include the following ten basic types:

1. Administrative

2. Hospital and medical

3. Maintenance and production

4. Operations and training

5. Research, development, test, and evaluation

6. Supply

7. Utilities and grounds improvements

8. Family housing

9. Community

10. Troop housing and mess

Within each of these facility types, the inventory arrays the facilities by state (or country 

for non-U.S. locations), Defense Department component, and installation. It also shows whether 

the facilities are primarily active or reserve facilities. 

The comprehensive inventory of worldwide installations summarized in table 4, and in 

the detailed data contained at Appendix A, provides a perspective of the size and variety of the 

Department’s real property assets. The Department used portions of this data and other sources 

(e.g., number of maneuver battalions) to assess whether categories of excess exist for DoD. A

working inventory of 251 major installations within the United States was used as the basis for 

the Assessment of Capacity and the Value of Retaining Excess.
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Inventory of Owned Facilities

Table 4

1. Number of Administrative Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

6,367 

Army - Guard

 

1,591 

Army - Reserve

 

1,603 

Navy - Active

 

2,782 

Navy - Reserve

 

78 

Air Force - Active

 

3,482 

Air Force - Guard

 

418 

Air Force - Reserve

 

138 

Marine Corps - Active

 

1,474 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

73 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

27 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

18,033 

Non-US Army - Active

 

1,285 

Navy - Active

 

618 

Air Force - Active

 

474 

Marine Corps - Active

 

169 

Non-U.S. Total

 

2,546 

Grand Total

 

20,579 
10

2. Number of Hospital and Medical Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

606 

Army - Guard

 

42 

Army - Reserve

 

13 

Navy - Active

 

244 

Air Force - Active

 

423 

Air Force - Guard

 

2 

Air Force - Reserve

 

2 

Marine Corps - Active

 

87 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

1 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

1,420 

Non-US Army - Active

 

104 

Navy - Active

 

69 

Air Force - Active

 

95 

Marine Corps - Active

 

15 

Non-U.S. Total

 

283 

Grand Total

 

1,703 
11

3. Number of Maintenance & Production Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

7,759 

Army - Guard

 

750 

Army - Reserve

 

1,251 

Navy - Active

 

3,703 

Navy - Reserve

 

64 

Air Force - Active

 

4,442 

Air Force - Guard

 

1,049 

Air Force - Reserve

 

201 

Marine Corps - Active

 

1,418 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

52 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

4 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

20,693 

Non-US Army - Active

 

784 

Navy - Active

 

484 

Air Force - Active

 

653 

Marine Corps - Active

 

128 

Non-U.S. Total

 

2,049 

Grand Total

 

22,742 
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4. Number of Operations and Training Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

23,842 

Army - Guard

 

6,600 

Army - Reserve

 

2,613 

Navy - Active

 

12,284 

Navy - Reserve

 

227 

Air Force - Active

 

17,989 

Air Force - Guard

 

3,688 

Air Force - Reserve

 

842 

Marine Corps - Active

 

5,452 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

156 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

109 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

73,802 

Non-US Army - Active

 

3,522 

Navy - Active

 

2,041 

Air Force - Active

 

3,747 

Marine Corps - Active

 

629 

Non-U.S. Total

 

9,939 

Grand Total

 

83,741 
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5. Number of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

3,541 

Army - Guard

 

4 

Army - Reserve

 

2 

Navy - Active

 

3,397 

Navy - Reserve

 

2 

Air Force - Active

 

1,583 

Air Force - Guard

 

9 

Air Force - Reserve - 

Marine Corps - Active

 

35 

Marine Corps - Reserve - 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

4 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

8,577 

Non-US Army - Active

 

11 

Navy - Active

 

53 

Air Force - Active

 

19 

Marine Corps - Active - 

Non-U.S. Total

 

83 

Grand Total

 

8,660 
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6. Number of Supply Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

28,851

Army - Guard

 

3,341 

Army - Reserve

 

970 

Navy - Active

 

8,195 

Navy - Reserve

 

25 

Air Force - Active

 

7,974 

Air Force - Guard

 

1,356

Air Force - Reserve

 

318 

Marine Corps - Active

 

2,428 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

71 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

20 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

53,549

Non-US Army - Active

 

3,254 

Navy - Active

 

897 

Air Force - Active

 

1,790 

Marine Corps - Active

 

251 

Non-U.S. Total

 

6,192 

Grand Total

 

59,741
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7. Number of Utilities and Grounds Improvements Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

35,505 

Army - Guard

 

22,904 

Army - Reserve

 

11,600 

Navy - Active

 

23,536 

Navy - Reserve

 

586 

Air Force - Active

 

30,823 

Air Force - Guard

 

6,300 

Air Force - Reserve

 

798 

Marine Corps - Active

 

9,215 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

705 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

305 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

142,277 

Non-US Army - Active

 

9,376 

Navy - Active

 

4,430 

Air Force - Active

 

6,616 

Marine Corps - Active

 

1,489 

Non-U.S. Total

 

21,911 

Grand Total

 

164,188 
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8. Number of Family Housing Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

1,387 

Army - Guard

 

39 

Army - Reserve

 

164 

Navy - Active

 

3,404 

Navy - Reserve - 

Air Force - Active

 

1,042 

Air Force - Guard

 

110 

Air Force - Reserve - 

Marine Corps - Active

 

57 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

3 

Washington Headquarters

Services - 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

6,206 

Non-US Army - Active

 

1,620 

Navy - Active

 

1,333 

Air Force - Active

 

5,032 

Marine Corps - Active

 

806 

Non-U.S. Total

 

8,791 

Grand Total

 

14,997 
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9. Number of Community Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

14,164 

Army - Guard

 

1,232 

Army - Reserve

 

837 

Navy - Active

 

7,865 

Navy - Reserve

 

17 

Air Force - Active

 

10,103 

Air Force - Guard

 

505 

Air Force - Reserve

 

241 

Marine Corps - Active

 

3,592 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

35 

Washington Headquarters

Services

 

214 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

38,805 

Non-US Army - Active

 

3,459 

Navy - Active

 

1,942 

Air Force - Active

 

2,101 

Marine Corps - Active

 

542 

Non-U.S. Total

 

8,044 

Grand Total

 

46,849 
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10. Number of Troop Housing and Mess Facilities

Area Component Owned

U.S./U.S. Territories Army - Active

 

3,649 

Army - Guard

 

1,658 

Army - Reserve

 

489 

Navy - Active

 

1,064 

Navy - Reserve

 

4 

Air Force - Active

 

2,245 

Air Force - Guard

 

299 

Air Force - Reserve

 

76 

Marine Corps - Active

 

1,259 

Marine Corps - Reserve

 

1 

Washington Headquarters

Services - 

U.S./U.S. Territories 

Total

 

10,744 

Non-US Army - Active

 

1,047 

Navy - Active

 

2,508 

Air Force - Active

 

492 

Marine Corps - Active

 

66 

Non-U.S. Total

 

4,113 

Grand Total

 

14,857 

Number of Leases

Table 5

Organization Number of Leases

Army 3,504

Air Force 469

Navy 476

DLA 42

WHS 84

Total 4,575
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V. Assessment of Capacity and the Value of Retaining Excess

A. Methodology 

To be consistent with the previous capacity reports, the Department elected for this report 

to measure capacity against a 1989 baseline. As stated in the 2004 and March 2016 reports and 

noted by GAO, choosing a 1989 baseline assumes the facilities were properly sized, at least in 

overall capacity, to support assigned missions and forces. In fact, the bases were most likely not 

all properly sized and had excess. As was the case in the prior reports, using 1989 as a baseline 

indicates the excess found in this report is likely conservative because significant excess existed 

in 1989, as evidenced by the subsequent BRAC closures.

As was the case in prior reports, the Military Departments and DLA examined their 

installations inventory to develop 32 metrics that described the infrastructure necessary to 

support their force structure. For example, as one of its metrics, the Army chose to compare the 

ratio of base acres for major training area installations to number of maneuver battalion 

equivalents contained in its force structure. Similarly, the Navy chose to compare available pier 

space (as measured by cruiser equivalents) at its naval bases to the ships (normalized to cruiser 

equivalents) in its inventory. The Air Force chose parking apron to aircraft and DLA attainable 

cubic feet at its distribution depots compared to occupied cubic feet. Section VI describes each 

of these metrics in detail. 

In this updated report, the Military Departments and DLA had the option to modify, add, 

or eliminate categories and metrics (taking into account availability of comparable 1989 data). 

The Military Departments and DLA were also able to determine the particular installations that 

support each metric. This enabled them to re-examine the prior methodology to reflect current 

operations, changes in their base structure as a result of BRAC (including Joint Basing), and 

other factors, such as changed business practices (e.g., conducting maintenance at the tactical 

level). Where necessary, the Military Departments and DLA also had the option to modify the 

1989 baseline to better approximate these changing factors, helping to ensure that excess was not 

overstated. Such an approach also allowed the metrics to be tailored to the differing operating 

principles of the Military Departments. The Military Departments and DLA derived the data for 

this report using the most current data available from existing records. It is important to note that 

this methodology purposely focused on 251 installations selected by the Military Departments 

and DLA. The Department believes this approach is analytically sound because the analysis is 

only designed to indicate whether excess capacity exists in the aggregate, not to identify excess 

capacity at individual installations or make decisions about closing or realigning specific bases.

In calculating a percentage of excess capacity, the Military Departments and DLA 

established metrics (e.g., small aircraft parking apron space) for their respective base categories 

and compared those metrics to an applicable measurement of force structure or requirements 

(e.g., number of small aircraft) to establish a simple ratio for 1989 and 2012 in each category. 

The 1989 metrics are then compared to the 2012 metrics to determine a level of excess capacity. 

2012 was selected for this analysis based on NDAA requirements. This comparison calculated 

the amount of infrastructure necessary to support the 2012 force structure at the same level of 
20

infrastructure usage as in 1989. Increases were then reduced to percentages and expressed as 

excesses. If there was no increase, the excess capacity was characterized as “No Increase.”

B. Findings

The report’s analysis indicates that assessing categories of excess capacity produces a 

range of excess capacity between 19 and 22 percent depending on what force structure is used, as 

shown in table 6.

Using FY 2012 force structure (as required by section 2815) and 32 metrics (as tied to 

force structure plans) the analysis indicates the Department has 19 percent infrastructure excess

distributed as follows: Army – 29 percent; Navy – 6 percent; Air Force – 28 percent; and the 

Defense Logistics Agency – 13 percent. 

Using the FY 2019 force structure (as projected in PB FY 2016) and 32 metrics tied to 

force structure plans, the analysis indicates that the Department has 22 percent excess 

infrastructure capacity compared distributed as follows: Army – 33 percent; Navy – 7 percent; 

Air Force – 32 percent; and the Defense Logistics Agency – 12 percent. 

 Table 6

Department

Estimated Percentage of 

Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2019 Force Structure

Estimated Percentage of 

Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2012 Force Structure

Army 33 29

Navy 7 6

Air Force 32 28

DLA 12 13

Total DoD 22 19

As stated in Section I, this excess capacity coupled with budget constraints has negatively

impacted installations across the Department. A future BRAC round would allow the 

Department to close facilities that are unnecessary and a drain on valuable resources, and to 

relocate their missions to newer facilities at locations with higher military value. 

Having demonstrated the existence of significant excess capacity, Congress should 

authorize the Department to undertake a round of BRAC so it can reduce excess while enhancing 

military value, achieving recurring savings and in balance with the need to have excess space for 

contingency and surge requirements, such as changed missions, tactics, and technology. While 

the report clearly shows excess capacity, it does not provide the detail necessary to identify 

specific infrastructure for elimination, instead only providing an indicator of the categories of 

excess. Only through a BRAC round can the Department undertake the detailed analysis 

necessary to make detailed closure and realignment recommendations. That is not to say that a 

future BRAC round will eliminate all identified excess, as that is not what it is intended to do. 
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In fact, each of the previous five BRAC rounds have on average only reduced Plant Replacement 

Value by five percent; however, they provided the Department with significant annually 

recurring savings that it could direct at operational priorities. 

C. Value of Retaining Excess

During the BRAC analytical process, the Department takes great strides in ensuring 

operations are not adversely impacted and military value is increased, which is why military 

value considerations are the top four criteria in the BRAC process. As was done with all the 

previous BRAC rounds, the value of retaining excess capacity for military value is a priority to 

account for mission requirements, including mobilization, contingency, and surge capabilities.

In a November 1999 DoD study on BRAC impacts to remobilization, it was noted that 

“Our review of past BRAC actions identified that the Services evaluated the infrastructure’s 

military value, and focused on closing assets we characterize as ‘reconstitutable.’ When past 

closures involved bases which had ‘difficult to reconstitute’ assets, in almost all cases these 

assets were retained by the Service for continued use.” The report also noted that it is more 

cost-effective to rebuild a capability rather than to continually maintain unnecessary assets. 

Furthermore, the report stated, “It is expected that any future BRAC process would continue to 

use military value as a predominant factor in determining BRAC actions. Military value analysis 

considers the importance of retaining ‘difficult to reconstitute’ assets to meet potential 

reconstitution requirements.” A criticism of BRAC is the permanent nature of base closures and 

the inability to reconstitute that capability if needed. The remobilization study and recent 

experience in fighting two wars and ongoing contingency operations across the globe 

demonstrate that, after five rounds of BRAC, DoD is successfully completing the missions 

assigned. BRAC rounds retain ‘difficult to reconstitute’ assets and experience and the report 

have shown that it is actually more cost-effective to rebuild capacity versus continually 

maintaining unnecessary assets. Absent BRAC, the Department’s infrastructure remains in a 

status quo configuration that prevents more effective and joint use of its assets. Similar to the 

commercial industry, businesses often close down older and lower performing factories or 

buildings in favor of relocating to, and modernizing, new or more cost-effective locations. 

GAO noted in its 1998 report on the BRAC capacity report that “DOD took several 

actions to minimize potential negative impacts to military capability in previous BRAC rounds, 

including stressing military value in deciding on bases to recommend for closure and 

realignment. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders reviewed the 

Secretary’s closure and realignment recommendations to prevent degradation of military 

capability and endorsed the recommendations. Using such an approach in the future, should the 

Congress decide to authorize any future BRAC rounds, may help to avoid long-term adverse 

effects on military capabilities.” Any future BRAC process will continue to stress military value 

in all decisions being approved, which is why the Department has wanted to maintain the 

legislative process that has been successful in five previous BRAC rounds.
22

VI. Detailed Results

A. Understanding Capacity Table Calculations

The following six steps explain the calculations used in the Military Departments and 

DLA capacity tables. The corresponding letters can be found in the headings for each table.

1. For each Category Type of facilities, we defined a metric. A metric is an equation that 

reflects the ratio of a measure of capacity over a measure of force structure. For example, the 

Army used Base Acres (measure of capacity) over Maneuver Battalion Equivalents (measure 

of force structure) to determine the level of excess for their Maneuver category. 

2. The Military Departments and DLA then collected data for the capacity and force structure 

measures for FY 1989 (A)/(B) and FY 2012 (C)/(D). The Input column shows the data 

collected for each measure. 

3. Once the data is entered into the metric equation, a capacity index is calculated for FY 1989 

(E) and FY 2012 (F) by dividing the capacity measure by the force structure measure. For 

the Army Maneuver category, the FY 1989 capacity measure of 4,494,585 Base Acres (A) is 

divided by the 1989 force structure measure of 193 Maneuver Battalion Equivalents (B) to 

get a FY 1989 capacity index of 23,288 (E). The same calculation is done with the metrics in 

(C)/(D) to determine the capacity index for FY 2012 (F). 

4. In order to determine how much capacity is needed to support the force structure in FY 2012, 

using the same ratio of capacity to force structure in FY 2012 as we did in FY 1989, we 

multiplied the FY 1989 index by the force structure measure for FY 2012. We used the FY 

1989 index because the ratio of capacity to force structure in FY 1989 represented the largest 

force structure accommodated by that infrastructure. The result is referred to as Proportional 

Capacity (G). In the Maneuver category, the FY 1989 index of 23,288 (E) is multiplied by 

the FY 2012 force structure measure of 140 Maneuver Battalion Equivalents (D).

5. We then estimated the change in capacity relative to force structure from FY 1989 to 

FY 2012 by subtracting the capacity measure for FY 2012 (C) from the Proportional 

Capacity (G), which takes into account the infrastructure reductions from prior BRAC 

rounds. This change in capacity is shown as (H). In the Maneuver category, the Delta 

1,547,837 (H) is calculated by subtracting 3,260,321 (G) from 4,808,157 (C). When the 

Delta is an increase in capacity relative to force structure from 1989 to 2012, it is expressed 

as a positive number. When the Delta is a decrease in capacity relative for force structure 

from 1989 to 2012, it is expressed as “No Increase.” 

6. Finally, we determined the percentage of FY 2012 capacity that is excess by dividing the 

Delta (H) (if there was an increase) by the FY 2012 capacity measure (C) and multiplying the 

result by 100. In the Maneuver category, the Delta 1,547,837 (H) is divided by the FY 2012

capacity measure (C) of 4,808,157 to get 0.32, which, when multiplied by 100, shows a 

32 percent excess in the Category for 2012.
23

B. Department of the Army

The Army’s force structure is composed of multifunctional divisions and units in the 

Active Component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. Army units perform six different 

types of warfighting functions, defined as a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, 

information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish 

missions. The six warfighting functions are linked to Joint functions: Mission Command, 

Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires (indirect fire support and air defense), Sustainment, 

and Protection. Army Active Component and National Guard Divisions are composed of 

modular Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The Army has three types of BCTs: Armor, 

Infantry (to include Airborne), and Stryker. The Army utilized BRAC 2005 to complete an 

Army Transformation that shifted significant warfighting function capabilities from Divisions to 

individual BCTs so that each BCT is capable of operating autonomously in its assigned area of 

responsibility. The Army identified nine categories of supporting installation infrastructure key 

to assessing its ability to support its forces: Maneuver, Major Training Active, Major Training 

Reserve, Schools, Depots, Other Industrial Base, Arsenals/Industrial Manufacturing, Test and 

Evaluation/Labs, and Administration. Table 7 provides the overall capacity results by category.

1. Description of Army Installation Categories

Administration. This category includes active component installations that support headquarters 

or administrative organizations stationed there or to provide base operations, family housing, and 

other support to units in the region.

Depots. This category includes Government Owned, Government Operated installations that 

support the full range of Army depot maintenance activities, from tanks and helicopters to 

electronics.

Other Industrial Base. This category includes Government Owned, Government Operated 

installations that support a broad range of industrial functions, including ammunition production, 

weapons systems component production or assembly, and transshipment of units and materiel.

Arsenals/Industrial Manufacturing. This category includes Government Owned, Government 

Operated installations involved in manufacturing and research of weapons systems, chemicalbiological defense systems, specialized metallurgy, and pyrotechnic munitions for the Army.

Major Training–Active. This category includes installations that are owned by the active 

component and support higher unit level training that cannot be accomplished at home station

(typically, brigade-level events prior to deployment). 

Major Training–U.S. Army Reserve. This category includes installations that are owned and 

managed by the U.S. Army Reserve primarily to support unit and individual training for the 

Reserve and similar training for the National Guard as necessary. Many of the Army’s 

warfighting functions are provided by the U.S. Army Reserve. 
24

Maneuver. This category includes installations that support Army fighting forces. Divisions, 

BCTs, and associated tactical units are the primary tenants of these installations. 

Schools. This category includes installations that have as their primary mission support to 

institutional training. The type of school ranges from the U.S. Military Academy and initial 

entry training to branch schools and professional military education.

Test and Evaluation/Labs. This category includes installations that support a range of research, 

development, and test and evaluation, such as basic research, research and development 

engineering, or test and evaluation.
25

2. Results for the Department of the Army

Table 7

FY89 FY12 FY89 FY12

Proportional 

Capacity

Category Type/Metric (A) / (B) (C) / (D) (E) (F) (G) = (E) X (D)

Administration

Administrative Space (Square Feet (000s)) 1, 17, 19, 27 6,627 12,940 0.0691 0.0977 9,151 3,789 29%

Military/Civilian Authorized 19, 20, 21, 27 95,880 132,402

Depots

Capacity Direct Labor Hours (000s) 2, 4, 5 29,000 16,232 1.3810 1.2527 17,894

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Hours (000s) 21,000 12,958

Other Industrial Base 3, 4, 5

Capacity Direct Labor Hours (000s) 2,270 4,385 1.3810 1.2675 4,777

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Hours (000s) 1,644 3,459

Arsenals/Industrial Manufacturing 6

Total Facilities Square Feet (000s) 34,707 12,804 1.4524 2.0177 9,217 3,588 28%

Military/Civilian Authorized 23,897 6,346

Major Training Active 7

Base Acres 1,509,334 945,900 7,820 6,756 1,094,854

Maneuver Battalion Equivalents 12, 13, 14, 15 193 140

Major Training Reserve 8, 11

Base Acres 16 258,413 333,724 0.8101 1.6279 166,065 167,659 50%

End Strength 10 319,000 205,000

Maneuver

Base Acres 9, 16, 24 4,494,585 4,808,157 23,288 34,344 3,260,321 1,547,837 32%

Maneuver Battalion Equivalents 12, 13, 14, 15 193 140

Schools

Instructional Space (Square Feet (000s) 18, 22 14,964 14,997 0.0407 0.0694 8,795 6,202 41%

Military/Civilian Authorized 23 367,613 216,075

Test and Evaluation/Labs

Total Facilities Square Feet (000s) 25 48,924 60,895 0.4793 0.8236 35,434 25,460 42%

Military/Civilian Authorized 26 102,079 73,933

No Increase

Change in Capacity Relative 

to Force Structure Since 

1989

Delta from 

FY12 

Capacity 

(H) = (C) - (G)

Excess 

FY12 

Capacity

(H)/(C)

Metric Values from 

Military Department

Ratios 

( (A)/(B) and (C)/(D) 

as ratio values)

No Increase

No Increase
26

Notes:

1) Ft Knox in FY2012 coded as "Administrative" (was categorized as a "School" prior to BRAC 2005)

2) Depot FY2012 Capacity: 1-shift actual Direct Labor Hours for FY2004.

3) Other OIB FY2012 Capacity: = 1-shift actual Direct labor Hours for FY2004; FY1989 Capacity = FY2000 actual DLH multiplied by 1.381

4) FY12 budgeted workload = FY2016 Budget Estimate Submission (BES) projected new orders for each OIB installation. (SIAD programmed at 

average of 2000-2007 execution)

5) No 1989 data for workload was available, broken out by installation.

6) Arsenal population = Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP) Army Military + Army Civilians

7) Ft Polk has acquired ~41.5K acres of training land for JRTC since FY2009; YTC (~323K acres) is now part of JBLM (included in maneuver)

8) Ft Dix transferred to Air Force JBMDL but is still included in Army analysis because there is no comparable Air Force category/metric

9) Ft Bliss was a "School" prior to BRAC 2005 (~1.1M acres) and YTC (~323K acres) was "Major Training - Active". YTC now part of JBLM; 

1989 acres adjusted to include Bliss and YTA.

10) US Army Reserve end strength in FY2012: 205,000 per National Defense Authorization Act.

11) ARNG is not included in analysis.

12) FY1989 combat service/combat service support enabler functions were held at the division level; Modular BCTs are larger than 1989 BDEs 

(more enablers in BCTs).

13) FY2012 Army BCTs = 2 maneuver battalions (+ RSTA) for Armor and Infantry; Stryker BCTs = 3 maneuver battalions (+ RSTA); total; 

Germany Heavy Brigade had 3 maneuver battalions but no RSTA; 

14) Force Structure calculated in "maneuver battalion equivalents" and counts cavalry squadrons (RSTA) as BNs. 1989 force structure: 

http://www.history.army.mil/books/dahsum/1989/CH5.htm

15) FY12 maneuver battalion equivalents = 140 (with 44 BCTs)

16) Acreage was reviewed to remove obvious non-maneuverable parcels (i.e., cemeteries, museums, Nike sites, recreation areas, closed BRAC 

property, buffer areas at Ft Bragg, etc.)

17) Admin Space used HQIS FAC = 6100 (Gen Purpose Admin)

18) Instruction Facilities used HQIS FCG = F17119, F17120, F17131 thru F17139

19) FY2012 Population Data source: historical data tab for FY15 Q3 LOCKED ASIP DATA 31 JULY 2015 (this includes the force structure 

announcements of 09 July 2015)

20) MIL POPULATION: All Military (all services); CIV POPULATION: All Civilians (including defense agencies and contractors)

21) 1989 Admin installation population was increased by 17.618 percent to reflect an estimated proportion of other service military, civilians, and 

contractors 

22) SCHOOL POPULATION: Army MIL, Army PCS Students, TDY Students and Trainees, Army Civilians, and Army Contractors

23) 1989 School population increased by 5 percent to reflect contractor population (FY2012 = 11.1 percent contractor)

24) Ft Richardson is part of an Air Force Joint Base (JBER) but its acreage is still included as "Maneuver" installation acreage (AF has no 

comparable category/metric).

25) RDT&E facilities square footage for FY2012 was adjusted to remove closed BRAC installations (i.e. Camp Evans, Ft Wingate, WRAMC, 

and Ft Monmouth)

26) RDT&E population 1989 baseline is based on 1993 ASIP data, adjusted backwards to 1989; FY2012 RDT&E population includes Army MIL 

+ Army CIV + Army CTR

27) Admin square footage and population in leased space was not captured in the 1989 or 2012 data (similar to 1998 and 2004 DoD reports to 

Congress).
27

C. Department of the Navy 

The basic warfighting elements of the Navy are surface combatants (battle force ships 

and aircraft carriers) with their Active and Reserve air wings and submarines. For the Marine 

Corps, the principal fighting element is the division, both Active and Reserve. The Navy and 

Marine Corps identified 11 categories of supporting infrastructure key to assess their ability to 

support naval and marine forces: Naval Bases; Marine Corps Bases; Air Stations; Ordnance 

Stations; Supply Installations; Aviation Maintenance; Depot Maintenance (United States Marine 

Corps (USMC)); Shipyards; Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E); Training 

Air Stations; and Training Installations. Table 8 provides the overall capacity results by 

category.

1. Description of Navy and Marine Corps Installation Categories

Naval Bases. This category includes those activities that have a principal mission to homeport, 

support, maintain, and train Navy ships and assigned crews.

Marine Corps Bases. This category includes those activities that have a primary mission to 

house, support, and provide training areas for operating forces of the Fleet Marine Force. 

Air Stations. This category includes those activities that have a principal mission to homeport, 

support, and operate a base from which operational missions can be flown by Navy and Marine 

Corps aircraft squadrons. 

Ordnance Stations. This category includes those activities that provide secure storage for the 

full range of naval ordnance, support the safe receipt of that ordnance from other activities and 

the delivery of that ordnance to fleet units, and perform maintenance and inspection functions on 

ordnance.

Supply Installations. This category includes those activities providing consolidated supply 

services and logistics support of afloat and ashore operating forces and industrial activities.

Aviation Maintenance. This category includes those activities that perform depot maintenance 

and repair across all aviation component mission areas.

Depot Maintenance (USMC). This category includes those activities that provide the full range 

of depot and intermediate maintenance support for Marine Corps amphibious and ground 

equipment to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Marine Forces.

Shipyards. This category includes those activities that function to satisfy the major maintenance 

and overhaul requirements of the operating fleet and to provide depot-level emergent and voyage 

repair to those ships.

RDT&E. This category includes those activities responsible for maintaining a technological 

advantage against the threat, for rapid crisis response, and for maintaining unique facilities, 

capabilities, and corporate knowledge required for national security.
28

Training Air Stations. This category includes those Navy activities that have undergraduate pilot 

training (UPT) as their primary mission. UPT refers to the flight training student pilots and 

naval flight officers undergo to earn their wings before being assigned to fleet replacement 

squadrons.

Training. This category includes those activities that provide professional training, from recruit 

training to postgraduate degree programs for all levels of enlisted and officer personnel.
29

2. Results for the Department of the Navy 

Table 8

Note:

1) All ships in the Navy inventory were equated to a CG-47 class ship and converted to a Guided Cruiser Equivalent (CG-E). 

The CG-E capacity metric means an installation has the pier space, power, dredge depth, and other resource requirements to berth 

a CG-47 class ship.

2) In this category, the Marine Corps is acquiring additional acreage to address documented shortfalls in training area 

requirements. This metric therefore overstates excess capacity.

3) The Fleet Response Plan, with its goal to increase readiness, has resulted in an increased requirement for hangars.

4) The measure of capacity is expressed in workload rather than in physical space.

FY 89 FY 12 FY 89 FY 12

Proportional 

Capacity

Category Type/Metric (A) / (B) (C) / (D) (E) (F) (G) = (E) X (D)

Naval Bases 1

Cruiser Equivalent Available 637 431 1.0670 1.4913 308 123 28%

Cruiser Equivalent Assigned 597 289

Marine Corps Bases 2

Base Acres 802,522 1,035,977 4.1367 5.1261 836,029 199,948 19%

End Strength 194,000 202,100

Air Stations 3

Hangar Modules Available 363 310 1.1748 0.9422 386

Hangar Modules Required 309 329

Ordnance Stations

Available Storage (000 sf) 3,619.9 4,659 1.0000 0.8802 5,293

Inventory (000 sf) 3,619.9 5,293

Supply Installations 4

Potential Workyears 9,896 2,733 1.0181 0.9627 2,890

Budgeted/Programmed Workyears 9,720 2,839

Aviation Maintenance (formerly Aviation Depots) 4

Capacity Direct Labor Hours (000s) 26,000 12,260 1.1454 1.1000 12,765

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Hours (000s) 22,700 11,145

Depot Maintenance (formerly Logistics Bases) (USMC) 4

Capacity Direct Labor Hours (000s) 2,057 2,898 1.0506 0.7043 4,323

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Hours (000s) 1,958 4,115

Shipyards 4

Potential Direct Labor Man-Years 48,400 15,928 1.3596 0.8459 25,599

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Man-Years 35,600 18,829

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 4 

(formerly Test and Evaluation/Labs)

Maximum In-House Workyears 72,000 47,260 1.0976 1.0545 49,189

In-House Workyears 65,600 44,817

Training Air Stations

Available Throughput (Students Per Year) 5,032 2,986 1.0000 0.8274 3,609

Students Per Year 5,032 3,609

Training

Available Throughput (Students Per Year) 765,000 711,821 1.0479 1.0695 697,484 14,337 2%

Students Per Year 730,000 665,573

Degree Granting Maximum (Classroom Hrs) 460,000 630,266 1.0000 1.0997 573,106 57,160 9%

Classroom Hours 460,000 573,106

Excess 

FY12 

Capacity

(H)/(C)

Change in Capacity Relative 

to Force Structure Since 

1989

Delta from 

FY12 

Capacity 

(H) = (C) - (G)

Metric Values from Military 

Department

Ratios 

( (A)/(B) and (C)/(D) as 

ratio values)

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase

No Increase
30

D. Department of the Air Force 

The Air Force structure supports five core missions: air and space superiority; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; global strike; and command 

and control. There are eight categories that describe the key infrastructure necessary to support

these five core missions and the integrated Air Force approach to its current force structure. 

These eight categories include the Air Force Reserve; Air National Guard; Depots; Education 

and Training; Large Aircraft; Small Aircraft; Space Operations; and Product Centers, Labs, and 

Test and Evaluation. Table 9 provides the overall capacity results by category.

1. Description of Air Force Installation Categories

Air Force Reserve. This category comprises Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) major 

installations that support an AFRC operational wing where the Air Force has responsibility for 

the entire installation’s real property. 

Air National Guard. This category comprises Air National Guard (ANG) major installations that 

support an ANG wing where the Air Force has real property responsibility for the entire 

installation. 

Depots. This category includes those installations that conduct depot level maintenance, to 

include software maintenance, performed at the depot level.

Education and Training. This category consists of installations that conduct formal education 

and training: basic military training; operational training at technical schools; professional 

military education; and undergraduate and advanced pilot training, navigator training, and 

foreign student pilot training.

Large Aircraft. This category includes installations with assigned operational wings and large 

primary mission aircraft, such as tankers, bombers, reconnaissance, and airlift aircraft.

Small Aircraft. This category includes installations with assigned operational wings that have 

primary mission fighter aircraft as well as smaller footprint reconnaissance aircraft.

Space Operations. This category includes installations with space launch operations and/or

space operations control and management as their primary missions.

Product Centers, Labs, and Test and Evaluation. Product Center installations develop, acquire, 

and support in-service engineering and design of weapon systems. They provide resources and 

acquisition expertise to support successful program execution. Laboratories are installations that 

conduct discovery, development, and transition of affordable, integrated technologies. Test and 

Evaluation installations include ground and open-air ranges, facilities, and chambers to test 

manned and unmanned aerospace vehicles; conduct ground test, flight evaluation and recovery 

of research vehicles; and simulate and evaluate products and services applications.
31

2. Results for the Department of the Air Force

Table 9

FY 89 FY 12 FY 89 FY 12

(A) / (B) (C) / (D) (E) (F) (G) = (E) X (D)

Air Force Reserve

Parking Apron Space (Square Yards) 1,421,429 3,374,219 29,613.10 36,676.29 2,724,406 649,813 19%

Reserve Aircraft 48 92

Air National Guard

Parking Apron Space (Square Yards) 2,512,185 769,995 17,206.75 15,399.90 860,337

National Guard Aircraft 146 50

Depots

Capacity Direct Labor Hours 46,403 25,929 1.18 1.02 30,152

Budgeted/Programmed Direct Labor Hours 39,172 25,453

Education & Training

Parking Apron Space (Square Yards) 7,227,994 5,923,642 4,597.96 5,380.24 5,062,355 861,287 15%

Training Aircraft 1,572 1,101

Classroom Space (Square Feet) 7,943,941 9,437,319 9.51 18.19 4,935,822 4,501,497 48%

Military/Civilian Authorized 834,939 518,774

Large Aircraft

Parking Apron Space (Square Yards) 24,918,585 14,920,059 14,623.58 20,809.01 10,485,109 4,434,950 30%

Large Aircraft 1,704 717

Small Aircraft

Parking Apron Space (Square Yards) 11,093,787 7,968,341 7,455.50 11,964.48 4,965,364 3,002,977 38%

Small Aircraft 1,488 666

Space Operations

Total Facilities Square Feet (000s) 12,028 16,514 0.50 1.03 8,011 8,503 51%

Military/Civilian Authorized 24,007 15,989

Product Centers, Labs and Test & Evaluation

Total Facilities Square Feet (000s) 37,159 39,522 0.62 0.65 37,653 1,869 5%

Military/Civilian Authorized 60,274 61,075

No Increase

No Increase

Metric Values from 

Military Department

Ratios 

( (A)/(B) and (C)/(D) as 

ratio values)

Change in Capacity Relative to 

Force Structure Since 1989

Delta from 

FY12 Capacity 

(H) = (C) - (G)

Excess FY12 

Capacity

(H)/(C)
32

E. Defense Logistics Agency

DLA provides support to all Military Departments and is not separately identified in the 

Force Structure Plan. DLA identified two categories of infrastructure key to assess its ability to 

support the Military Departments: Distribution Depots and Supply Centers. Table 10 provides 

the overall capacity results by category.

1. Description of Defense Logistics Agency Installation Categories

Distribution Depots. This category includes covered general purpose wholesale warehouse 

storage facilities storing material regardless of material owner/commodity. 

Supply Centers. This category includes installations that manage and procure consumable items 

of supply in support of the Military Services’ missions.

2. Results for the Defense Logistics Agency

Table 10

FY89 FY12 FY89 FY12

Proportional 

Capacity

Category Type/Metric (A) / (B) (C) / (D) (E) (F) (G) = (E) X (D)

Distribution Depots

Attainable Cubic Feet (millions) 693.92 232.85 1.1855 1.3887 198.78 34.07 14.6%

Occupied Cubic Feet (millions) 585.33 167.68

Supply Centers

Total Administrative Space (GSF) 3,993,500 2,033,696 327.98 265.70 2,510,359

Military/Civilian Assigned 12,176 7,654

No Increase

Metric Values from Military 

Department

Ratios 

( (A)/(B) and (C)/(D) as 

ratio values)

Change in Capacity Relative to Force 

Structure Since 1989

Delta from FY12 

Capacity 

(H) = (C) - (G)

Excess FY12 

Capacity

(H)/(C)
33

F. Results for All DoD

DoD developed an estimate of excess capacity for each Military Department, DLA, and 

all of DoD by weighting the individual category excess figures by the number of bases in each 

category. Table 11 shows the Department’s current estimated percentages of excess capacity for 

each Military Department, DLA, and all of DoD, using the FY 2012 and FY 2019 force structure

(as projected in PB FY 2016). 

Table 11

Department

Estimated Percentage 

of Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2019 Force 

Structure

Estimated Percentage 

of Excess Capacity 

(above 1989 baseline)

FY 2012 Force 

Structure

Army 33 29

Navy 7 6

Air Force 32 28

DLA 12 13

Total DoD 22 19

VII. Conclusion

This report addresses congressional concerns by complying with section 2815 of the FY 

2016 NDAA and providing an analysis using the FY 2012 force structure; an assessment of 

probable threats; a worldwide installations inventory; and, based on that force structure plan and 

inventory, an assessment of capacity and the value of retaining excess for contingency, 

mobilization, or surge requirements. The results of these analyses—the Department has 19-22 

percent excess infrastructure overall, and over 50 percent excess in certain categories—

reemphasizes why the Department believes authorization of another BRAC round is essential. 

The Department has worked with Congress to provide suggested changes to the BRAC 

legislation that would maintain the benefits of BRAC while addressing congressional concerns 

with the “transformational” BRAC 2005 round. Our legislative proposal addresses congressional 

concerns while maintaining the core tenets of a process that has worked in five previous BRAC 

rounds. The first four BRAC rounds focused on efficiencies while the BRAC 2005 round was 

more of a transformational BRAC across the Department. To ensure the next BRAC round is 

focused on saving money and maximizing efficiency, the Department’s revised BRAC 

legislation adds a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to certify the BRAC round will have 

the primary objective of eliminating excess infrastructure to maximize efficiency and reduce 

cost. Similar to the existing requirement to certify the need for a BRAC round, this certification 

occurs at the outset of the BRAC process and is a precondition to moving forward with 

development of recommendations. Additionally, subject to the requirement to give priority 

consideration to the military value selection criteria, the proposed legislation would require the 

Secretary to emphasize those recommendations that yield net savings within 5 years of 
34

completing the recommendation, and would limit the Secretary’s ability to make 

recommendations that do not yield savings within 20 years. In order to make a recommendation 

that does not yield savings within 20 years, the Secretary must expressly determine that the 

military value of such recommendations supports or enhances a critical national security interest 

of the United States.

The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns. We have looked

at overseas installations first and successfully completed an efficiency-like BRAC in Europe that 

will save $500 million a year; completed an updated excess capacity assessment based on a 

FY 2012 force structure; demonstrated the transformative nature of BRAC 2005 and how a 

future BRAC will be focused on efficiency; programmed costs and projected savings into the 

budget; and provided proposed legislative changes to the BRAC law. 

The time to authorize another BRAC round is now. The BRAC process requires

considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations 

reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period 

of time. The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend

valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other 

national security priorities. 
35

Appendices (On CD)

A. Inventory of Worldwide Installations

B. Inventory of Leases for Military Departments, Defense Logistics Agency, and 

Washington Headquarters Service