TELECOMMUNICATIONS

FCC Updated Its 

Enforcement Program, but 

Improved Transparency Is 

Needed

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2017

GAO-17-727

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-727, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2017

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

FCC Updated Its Enforcement Program, but Improved

Transparency Is Needed

What GAO Found

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has taken actions in the last 5 

years to update its enforcement data collection and processes. In 2012, FCC 

implemented a new enforcement data system, which combined five previously

separate databases and contains pertinent information related to each 

enforcement case. In 2014, FCC launched a new consumer complaints portal 

that FCC officials can use to identify trends and determine whether to investigate 

a particular company or practice. FCC also updated its internal enforcement 

program guidance, which includes case prioritization policies as well as 

timeliness goals for case resolution. Lastly, FCC completed its reorganization of 

the Enforcement Bureau’s field office division in January 2017, closing 11 of 24 

field offices and decreasing personnel from 108 to 54. FCC officials stated they 

do not anticipate a decline in enforcement activity because FCC is taking steps 

to use the anticipated annual cost savings of $9 to $10 million from the 

reorganization to invest in training, equipment, and technology that will improve 

efficiency. Given the recent changes, it is too early to determine the impact these 

actions will have on enforcement efforts.

FCC has not quantified most of its enforcement performance goals and 

measures. FCC officials told GAO that in 2009 the Chairman’s Office decided 

that narrative examples, rather than quantifiable goals and related measures,

were the most appropriate way to report on the enforcement program. For 

example, FCC’s 2016 Annual Performance Report describes details of

settlements or fines levied without reporting such goals or measures. Although 

such metrics can be difficult to develop, GAO found that other enforcement 

agencies report quantified performance goals and related measures and that 

FCC has the data it would need to develop such goals and measures. Without 

meaningful program performance goals and measures, FCC lacks important 

tools for assessing and reporting on the progress of its enforcement efforts and

determining whether it should make changes to its program. FCC also may be 

missing an opportunity to help promote transparency and support congressional 

oversight by clearly communicating enforcement priorities.

Most of the selected stakeholders GAO interviewed affirmed the importance of 

enforcement, but cited concerns about FCC’s current enforcement process and 

communication efforts with stakeholders. Fourteen of 22 selected stakeholders 

said enforcement is important for deterring violations of federal statutes and FCC 

rules. However, 17 of 22 also expressed concerns regarding the transparency or 

fairness of the enforcement process or regarding FCC’s emphasis on generating

publicity by proposing high dollar fines for potential violators. FCC does not have 

a formal communications strategy that outlines its enforcement purposes and 

processes. Instead, FCC tailors the extent of its communications to stakeholders 

on a case-by-case basis. FCC officials told GAO that information about the 

enforcement process is sensitive and could undermine their cases. However,

leading practices on enforcement highlight the importance of disclosing agency 

enforcement processes, including how to challenge and appeal conclusions, as a 

way to foster fair and consistent enforcement. Increased communication from 

FCC could improve transparency and stakeholder perceptions of FCC

enforcement actions.

View GAO-17-727. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

FCC’s Enforcement Bureau is primarily 

responsible for ensuring the 

telecommunications industry’s

compliance with federal statutes and 

the Commission rules and orders

designed to protect consumers, ensure 

public safety, and encourage 

competition. Some industry 

stakeholders have raised questions 

about the transparency and fairness of 

the Enforcement Bureau. GAO was 

asked to review FCC’s management of 

its enforcement program.

In this report, GAO addresses: (1)

actions FCC has taken in the last 5

years to update its enforcement 

program, (2) FCC’s enforcement 

performance goals and measures, and 

(3) selected stakeholders’ views on 

FCC’s enforcement program and 

external communications. GAO 

reviewed FCC’s enforcement policies

and procedures; analyzed FCC’s 

performance measures and spoke with 

officials of similarly sized independent 

agencies with enforcement missions; 

and interviewed FCC officials and 22

stakeholders from public and private 

organizations who were 

knowledgeable of the Enforcement 

Bureau and the communications 

industry.

What GAO Recommends

FCC should establish and publish: (1)

quantifiable performance goals and 

related measures for its enforcement 

program; and (2) a communications 

strategy outlining its enforcement 

program for external stakeholders.

FCC concurred with the 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Letter 1

Background 4

FCC Has Taken Actions to Update Its Data Collection and 

Enforcement Processes 9

Most of FCC’s Enforcement Performance Goals and Measures 

Have Not Been Quantified 14

Selected Stakeholders Affirmed the Importance of FCC’s 

Enforcement but Cited Concerns about the Agency’s 

Enforcement Process and Communication Efforts 18

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments 28

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29

Appendix II Comments from the Federal Communications Commission 33

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35

Tables

Table 1: Enforcement Cases Opened and Closed by the Federal 

Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement 

Bureau by Enforcement Division, Calendar Years 2014–

2016 7

Table 2: Number of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 

Enforcement Cases Closed by Type of Action, Calendar 

Years 2014–2016 8

Table 3: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 

Enforcement Program Performance Goals 15

Table 4: Examples of Other Enforcement Agency Performance 

Goals for Fiscal Year 2015 17

Table 5: Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) Issued by the 

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Calendar 

Years 2012-2016 23

Table 6: Top-Five Proposed Fines Issued by the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC), Calendar Years 

2011–2016 23

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Table 7: Formal and Informal Federal Communications 

Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Communication with 

Stakeholders 25

Table 8: Organizations and Individuals GAO Selected for 

Interviews 31

Figures

Figure 1: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 

Enforcement Bureau Division Offices 5

Figure 2: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) General 

Process for Enforcement Cases 6

Figure 3: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 

Enforcement Field Offices before and after Field Office 

Closures 12
Page iii GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Abbreviations

APA Administrative Procedure Act 

CFTC Commodities Futures Trade Commission 

CGB Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau 

EBATS Enforcement Bureau Activity Tracking System

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FTC Federal Trade Commission 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

LTE Long-Term Evolution 

NAL Notice of Apparent Liability 

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

OMB Office of Management and Budget

SEC Securities Exchange Commission 

USF Universal Service Fund

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 14, 2017

The Honorable Greg Walden

Chairman

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Fred Upton

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Latta

House of Representatives

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent federal 

agency, regulates the telecommunications industry, which includes radio, 

television, cable, satellite, wireless, and wireline industries. FCC’s 

Enforcement Bureau is primarily responsible for ensuring industry 

compliance with the Communications Act of 1934, as amended and 

Commission regulations and orders designed to protect consumers, 

ensure public safety, and encourage competition. For example, FCC

enforces regulations to resolve wireless communications interference 

issues involving commercial carriers and public safety officials.

1 FCC also 

takes action against companies or individuals violating regulations or 

statutes that directly affect consumers, such as calling people on the DoNot-Call Registry or broadcasting indecent or profane programming 

during certain hours. The Enforcement Bureau undertakes investigations, 

and if the investigation reveals a violation occurred, FCC can issue nonmonetary and monetary penalties. Monetary penalties can be significant. 

For example, in 2017, the Enforcement Bureau issued a $120 million 

proposed fine to an individual for allegedly making almost 100 million 

spoofed robocalls—telephone calls that caused the display of misleading 

or inaccurate caller ID information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, 

 1 Wireless devices typically connect via the radio frequency spectrum, which is the 

medium for wireless communications and supports a vast array of commercial and 

governmental services. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

or wrongfully obtain anything of value—in violation of the Truth in Caller 

ID Act.2

In 2008, we found FCC’s enforcement program lacked clear performance 

goals and data on the outcomes of FCC’s enforcement efforts.3 FCC 

implemented our recommendations by taking steps to establish 

performance goals and update its enforcement data. Recently, however, 

some stakeholders have raised questions about the openness, 

transparency, and fairness of FCC’s enforcement processes. For 

example, some have noted an apparent shift away from enforcing 

regulations such as those regarding the operation of unlicensed radio 

stations, or “pirate radio”, and stated the Enforcement Bureau may not be 

setting the appropriate priorities and is less productive than it used to be. 

You asked us to review FCC’s management of its enforcement program.

This report examines (1) actions taken by FCC in the last 5 years to 

update its enforcement program; (2) performance goals and measures for 

FCC’s enforcement program; and (3) selected stakeholders’ views on 

FCC’s enforcement program and FCC’s communication with these 

stakeholders.

To describe what actions FCC has taken in the last 5 years (calendar 

years 2012 through 2016) to update its enforcement program we 

reviewed FCC documentation, such as policies and reports related to 

internal improvement efforts. In addition, we interviewed FCC 

headquarters officials about recent changes to the program including 

investments in new technology, management, and process changes. We 

also interviewed FCC officials located in two field offices (Columbia, MD,

and Dallas, TX), chosen, in part, because, in the past, they have 

conducted greater numbers of investigations than some other field

offices.

 2 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 

prohibits any person from knowingly transmitting misleading or inaccurate caller 

identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain 

anything of value, subject to certain exceptions. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 

73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended by Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 

111-331, 124 Stat. 3572 (2010) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1)). For more 

information, see FCC Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture and Order: 17-80, June 22, 

2017. 

3 GAO, Telecommunications: FCC Has Made Some Progress in the Management of Its 

Enforcement Program but Faces Limitations, and Additional Actions Are Needed, 

GAO-08-125 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2008).
Page 3 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

To determine what performance goals and measures are in place for the 

enforcement program we reviewed FCC’s annual performance and 

budget reports and strategic plans from 2008 to present; 2008 was the 

last time we reviewed FCC’s enforcement program performance goals 

and measures. We evaluated goals and measures—as listed in FCC’s

fiscal year 2015 annual performance and fiscal year 2017 budget reports4

against criteria for developing federal agency performance goals and 

measures as established in the Government Performance and Results 

Act, as enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010,

5 and Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) guidance related to implementing 

performance measures.6 In addition, we reviewed the most recent annual 

performance reports of three other independent regulatory agencies with 

enforcement divisions: the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Federal Trade 

Commission (FTC). We selected these three agencies, in part, because 

they have enforcement missions and are similar in size and budget to 

FCC. In addition to interviewing FCC officials on their performance goals 

and measures, we also interviewed officials from each of these agencies 

to gain their perspective on managing performance and measuring 

enforcement efforts.

To determine stakeholder views on FCC’s enforcement program we 

interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 22 stakeholders—including 

private companies, public interest groups, industry associations, and 

telecommunications experts. We determined the stakeholders were 

knowledgeable about the communications industry by taking into account 

a stakeholder’s prior work and their level of FCC comment activity. We

selected stakeholders based on area of expertise (phone, radio, 

television, and wireless) to get a cross section of non-generalizable 

viewpoints. To determine how FCC communicates with stakeholders we 

reviewed FCC documentation and policies for formal and informal 

communication with stakeholders. We compared FCC communication 

policies and practices to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development’s (OECD) Best Practice Principles for Regulatory 

 4 FCC did not list enforcement program goals in the fiscal year 2016 annual performance 

and fiscal year 2018 budget reports.

5 Government Performance and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), as 

enhanced by GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 

(2011). 

6 OMB Circular A-11 Part 6, Section 200 (Washington, D.C.: July 2016).
Page 4 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Enforcement7 and federal internal control standards on managing 

external communications.8 We also analyzed publically accessible data 

on monetary enforcement actions that are on FCC’s website from 

calendar years 2012 through 2016 to determine whether stakeholder 

views matched recent FCC enforcement outcomes. We determined that 

these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by reconciling the 

publically accessible data with FCC provided data and interviewing FCC 

officials on their data validation efforts.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 to September 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more 

detailed explanation of our scope and methodology.

In 1999, FCC established the Enforcement Bureau to investigate potential 

violations of applicable statutes and Commission regulations and orders 

that are within FCC’s mission of protecting consumers, promoting 

competition, ensuring responsible use of the public airwaves, and 

addressing risks to public safety. Prior to the establishment of the 

Enforcement Bureau, the Compliance and Information Bureau handled 

enforcement of matters currently handled by the field offices, and

individual policy bureaus, such as the Media Bureau handled 

enforcement within their bureau’s responsibilities.9 When the Commission 

created the Enforcement Bureau, it consolidated most of these 

responsibilities to streamline enforcement.10

 7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD Best Practice 

Principles for Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections. (Paris: OECD 

Publishing, 2014.) 

8 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

9 At the time of the creation of the Enforcement Bureau, the Media Bureau tasks were 

divided between the existing Mass Media Bureau and Cable Service Bureau, which were 

consolidated into the Media Bureau in 2002. 

10 Some policy bureaus still have limited enforcement responsibilities. For example, the 

Media Bureau continues to conduct some of its own enforcement actions related to media 

station license violations. 

Background
Page 5 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Currently, the Enforcement Bureau has five divisions that conduct 

investigations (see fig. 1 below).11 As of August 2017, there are 

approximately 199 employees (full time equivalents) in the Enforcement 

Bureau.

Figure 1: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Bureau Division Offices

Enforcement Bureau officials conduct reviews of potential violations and 

open enforcement cases if they determine an investigation is warranted. 

According to FCC officials, information about potential violations comes 

from a variety of sources including: (1) consumer complaints;

12 (2) 

industry and/or public safety complaints on interference, such as weather 

 11 In 2014, FCC created the Universal Service Fund (USF) Strike Force, which is housed 

within the Enforcement Bureau, but is separate from the other divisions, to safeguard the 

USF. The USF is a fund paid for by contributions from telecommunication service 

providers, usually passed on to consumers through their bills, to subsidize programs to 

make telecommunication services more accessible. 

12 FCC distinguishes complaints it receives as formal and informal. FCC officials stated 

that formal complaints are managed by the Enforcement Bureau, must be filed in 

accordance with FCC rules, and must allege facts, which if true, constitute a violation of 

FCC rules or the Communications Act, whereas informal complaints are those received 

through the FCC’s electronic portal, by phone or postal mail. For purposes of this report we 

are not making this distinction. Most consumer complaints are made directly to the 

Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, which develops and implements the 

Commission’s consumer policies and also directly responds to consumer inquiries and 

complaints.
Page 6 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

or cell tower interference; (3) referrals from other FCC bureaus such as 

the Media Bureau that administers broadcast licenses; (4) congressional 

interest/direction; and (5) trade/news reports on potential company 

violations. Figure 2 below shows the general process the Enforcement 

Bureau uses once it decides to open a case and pursue an investigation. 

In most instances, cases conclude with one of the three following 

outcomes: the Enforcement Bureau determines there is no violation, and 

the case is closed without action; the Enforcement Bureau and the 

company reach a settlement; or FCC issues an enforcement action, 

which can include a monetary penalty.

Figure 2: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) General Process for Enforcement Cases

If an investigation for an enforcement case reveals a potential violation, 

the Enforcement Bureau may issue a non-monetary or monetary 

enforcement action. Non-monetary actions include written warnings such 

as a notice of unlicensed operation or a notice of violation. For example, 

FCC can notify a party that it is operating a radio station without a license 

and warn that continued operation could result in more severe penalties 

such as a fine, seizure of equipment, and imprisonment. Below are the 

three main enforcement actions that could involve a monetary penalty:

• Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL): A notice to inform the party of an 

investigation of a violation that FCC believes has occurred and 

forfeiture in a specified dollar amount is warranted. The subject of an 

NAL may elect to pay the proposed forfeiture, ending the proceeding, 
Page 7 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

or file a response making legal or factual arguments that the proposed 

forfeiture should be modified, reduced, or cancelled.

• Consent Decree: An agreement between FCC and the party of an 

investigation that sets forth the terms and conditions in exchange for 

closing the investigation. This can include a plan for reaching 

compliance and an agreed upon civil penalty payable to the U.S. 

Treasury.

• Forfeiture Order: An order that requires the monetary forfeiture 

proposed in an NAL be paid. If a party does not pay the forfeiture, the 

case is referred to the U.S. Department of Justice, which may bring an 

enforcement action in district court to recover the forfeiture.

From calendar years 2014 through 2016, the Enforcement Bureau 

opened 3,075 cases. Of these, 2,591—approximately 84 percent—were 

field office cases, which are under the Office of the Field Director.13 Many 

of the cases handled by the field offices relate to wireless spectrum 

interference, such as, a radio station operating outside of its licensed 

spectrum and interfering with other radio communications. For the 

number of cases opened and closed by each division from calendar years 

2014 through 2016, see table 1 below. 

Table 1: Enforcement Cases Opened and Closed by the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Bureau 

by Enforcement Division, Calendar Years 2014–2016

Enforcement Division

Calendar Year 2014 Calendar Year 2015 Calendar Year 2016

Opened Closed Opened Closed Opened Closed

Universal Service Fund Strike Force 14 0 4 9 1 3

Investigations and Hearing Division 147 94 44 79 19 57

Market Disputes Resolution Division 34 51 17 36 6 9

Spectrum Enforcement Division 24 58 13 28 35 81

Telecommunications Consumers Division 46 46 41 57 39 85

Field Offices 872 1,100 458 645 1,261 1,294

Totals 1,137 1,349 577 854 1,361 1,529

Source: FCC Enforcement Data | GAO-17-727

Note: Cases are not always opened and closed in the same calendar year. A case can be closed 

several years after it was opened.

 13 There are currently 13 field offices after a recent FCC effort to restructure the field 

offices. This restructuring effort is discussed in more detail later in this report. 
Page 8 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

FCC closes most cases the Enforcement Bureau investigates without 

monetary penalty. In calendar years 2014 through 2016, FCC closed 

3,732 cases (see table 2). Of these cases, 359 (approximately 10 

percent) had a monetary penalty in the form of a NAL, Consent Decree, 

or Forfeiture Order. In this same period, FCC closed 1,509 cases 

(approximately 40 percent) through non-monetary enforcement actions 

such as written or verbal warnings or notice of unlicensed operation.14

FCC closed the remaining 1,864 cases (approximately 50 percent) 

without an enforcement action.

Table 2: Number of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Enforcement 

Cases Closed by Type of Action – Calendar Years 2014-2016

Calendar 

Year 2014

Calendar 

Year 2015

Calendar 

Year 2016

Total Cases Closed 1,349 854 1,529

 Cases Closed with Monetary Action 171 108 80

 Consent Decrees 45 38 39

 Forfeiture Orders 58 47 17

 Notices of Apparent Liability 68 23 24

 Cases Closed with Non-monetary

 Action

785 366 358

 Total Cases Closed without

 Enforcement Action 

393 380 1,091

Source: FCC Enforcement Data | GAO-17-727

 14 A Notice of Unlicensed Operation is a formal notice telling a party to cease in its 

operation because the party does not have a license.
Page 9 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

FCC recently improved the collection of data for its enforcement program 

by implementing a new enforcement data system and consumer informal 

complaint portal.

Enforcement Bureau Activity Tracking System (EBATS): EBATS is a 

new data system that serves as the system of record for the Enforcement 

Bureau. EBATS captures data inputs for investigations (such as key 

dates and close out status), and contains pertinent notes and documents 

investigators obtain or create related to a case.15 Prior to the 

implementation of EBATS, there were five distinct data systems, one for 

each division within the Enforcement Bureau. In 2008, we reported that 

FCC’s separate data systems and the limitations with each hampered 

FCC’s ability to use data to inform management of the enforcement 

program, and we recommended the data systems be improved.16 EBATS 

addresses these previously reported issues by unifying the databases 

and capturing key Enforcement Bureau data and information in a manner 

that we found, during our current review, to be generally reliable 

beginning with calendar year 2014.17

 15 FCC officials estimated EBATS cost at approximately $2.2 million, which includes 

determining requirements for the database, building the database, as well as continued 

development work. The officials stated that this is their best approximation since FCC did 

not complete EBATS through a stand-alone contract.

16 GAO-08-125. 

17 FCC officials told us they began implementation of EBATS in 2012, but the system was 

not fully implemented until the beginning of calendar year 2014. According to these 

officials, EBATS was rolled out to each of the divisions one at a time, and FCC made 

substantive revisions to the database to improve its quality between initial implementation 

and the beginning of calendar year 2014. For example, officials stated that improvements 

such as, the linking of complaints directly to cases housed in EBATS and migrating some 

information from the legacy systems was not automatic and thus was open to more errors 

that had to be noticed and corrected over time.

FCC Has Taken 

Actions to Update Its 

Data Collection and 

Enforcement 

Processes

FCC Implemented a New 

Enforcement Data System 

and Consumer Informal 

Complaint Portal
Page 10 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Managers across FCC’s divisions use data from EBATS to monitor 

ongoing work. FCC officials told us that managers of each division review 

reports based on available data on a weekly basis, which includes the 

number of cases closed and opened during that week. FCC officials said 

Enforcement Bureau managers such as the deputy chief of the 

Enforcement Bureau and assistant bureau chiefs, review EBATS data on 

a monthly basis. FCC officials noted that the monthly review focuses 

mainly on cases with pending Commission reviews and external 

deadlines such as referring debt collection of an issued fine to the U.S. 

Department of Justice, which is the final step by FCC if a party does not 

pay an ordered fine.

FCC officials said EBATS allows for closer management of dates that 

resulted in improved case efficiency and provided two examples. First, 

officials said FCC has decreased the use of tolling agreements, in which 

FCC requests that parties waive the statute of limitations. Data on the 

number of tolling agreements from 2014 through 2016 showed FCC used 

tolling agreements in approximately 1–2 percent of the cases investigated 

each year. Although FCC officials told us this is an improvement over 

previous years, they could not provide reliable data on tolling agreements 

used before 2014. The second example provided by FCC officials is a 

decrease in the number of backlogged cases, which are those cases 

considered overdue for resolution. However, when we requested 

information on the total number of backlogged cases over the last 5 years 

FCC officials informed us that they do not currently track this information 

over time. While the database improvements should increase the 

availability and reliability of data FCC officials can use to assess the 

program, the agency’s current enforcement performance goals are not 

quantified, as is discussed later in this report.

Consumer Informal Complaints Portal: FCC implemented a new 

consumer complaints portal in December 2014 at a development cost of 

$297,514. This portal allows consumers to receive e-mail updates on the 

status of their complaints as well as ask questions and receive answers

related to the complaint. The Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau 

(CGB) manages and houses the consumer informal complaints portal. 

FCC officials stated that most complaints are directly addressed by CGB 

officials through actions such as providing information to consumers 

and/or forwarding the complaint to the service provider. FCC officials told 

us that most complaints do not become enforcement cases because most 

do not represent a violation of a federal statute or commission regulation. 

For example, in calendar year 2016 consumers filed 344,045 complaints 

through the portal; these complaints resulted in 402 enforcement cases, 
Page 11 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

according to FCC officials. Regardless of whether a complaint initiates an 

enforcement case, FCC officials have access to the information in the 

consumer complaint portal and officials stated that they can use this data 

to help identify trends and determine whether to review a particular 

company or practice.

FCC recently updated its enforcement processes by developing an 

enforcement handbook and reorganizing the field office division of the 

Enforcement Bureau to enhance efficiencies.

Enforcement Handbook: The enforcement handbook is an internal 

guidance document for the Enforcement Bureau. The handbook contains 

and organizes previously disparate policy guidelines and added additional 

guidelines. According to FCC officials, in 2014, there was an agency wide 

process reform effort and an Enforcement Bureau specific reform effort 

that resulted in the creation of the enforcement handbook. Officials stated 

that this document helped in meeting several goals of the reform effort 

including increasing efficiencies and consistency across divisions and 

improving effectiveness of allocated resources. The handbook sets 

explicit timelines for major case milestones. The handbook also provides 

a case priority rating system to improve efficient use of resources. The 

case priority rating system is used by most divisions to determine how to 

prioritize investigations to improve efficient use of resources with the 

exception of the field office division, which conducts the majority of 

investigations. The Office of the Field Director has a separate priority 

rating system to prioritize public safety interference, such as interference 

to emergency communication networks, above all other cases. FCC 

officials said they found the case priority rating system helpful for day-today management of the enforcement program. To improve consistency 

across the divisions, the handbook also has standardized templates for 

various forms and official documents. Previously, each division had its 

own guidance for preparing these documents.

Field Office Reorganization: FCC contracted for a study to review its 

field offices and received the results in March 2015. In July 2015, FCC 

issued an order stating it could achieve efficiencies through reorganizing 

and closing some field offices.18 As of January 2017, FCC had closed 11 

 18 Reorganization of the Enforcement Bureau’s Field Operations, Order, 30 FCC Rcd 

7649 (2015).

FCC Updated Internal 

Enforcement Guidelines 

and Reorganized Field 

Offices
Page 12 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

of 24 field offices (see fig. 3), and FCC officials stated that this reduction

included eliminating 16 of 21 management positions, and reducing the 

total number of staff from 108 to 54 employees. FCC officials estimated 

the reorganization would cost $2 to $4 million and would save $9 to $10 

million per year.

Figure 3: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Field Offices before and after Field Office Closures 

FCC had originally proposed further cuts to the field office division, but 

while FCC was considering the field office reorganization in 2015, some 

stakeholders—ranging from members of Congress, to industry groups, 

and private companies—raised concerns that the decrease in field staff 

would hinder FCC’s effectiveness and timeliness of response to 

interference. Two stakeholders (one expert and one industry association) 

we spoke with for our review remain concerned about this issue. For 

example, one expert whom we interviewed stated that with the current 
Page 13 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

transition in technology there is likely to be an increase in spectrum 

interference. According to this expert, wireless broadband is important to 

the economy because it is used in so many different ways19 and without 

effective interference enforcement, wireless’ potential could be 

undermined. The expert added that if there is an increase in interference 

FCC will need more, not fewer, field resources to resolve interference 

between spectrum users. Similarly, the industry association 

representatives we spoke to, expressed concerns that FCC’s ability to 

effectively respond to interference issues has diminished since the field 

office reorganization. According to FCC officials, to help mitigate 

concerns about responsiveness to interference issues FCC has employed 

mobile “tiger teams.” These tiger teams are currently located in the 

Columbia and Denver field offices where FCC officials stated they can be 

quickly deployed to support high-priority initiatives of the Enforcement 

Bureau or other entities from headquarters.

FCC officials also told us that they are taking steps to use the anticipated 

cost savings from the field office reorganization to invest in training, 

equipment, and technology updates that will improve efficiency. For 

example, some efforts already under-taken or planned, according to 

officials include the following:

• Training: FCC officials said field office staff completed a 3-day 

training on Long-Term Evolution (LTE) wireless networks in July 2016 

to increase staff knowledge of this technology. FCC officials said that

LTE is increasingly being used for wireless communication and that it 

is important for FCC officials in the field to understand what it is and 

how interference with it can cause harm. Officials stated that they plan 

to conduct more training in the future.

• Equipment: FCC is in the process of purchasing a remote radio 

location detector system, which officials stated will act as a “force 

multiplier” because the detectors can be easily deployed and left in 

place to measure interference over time. Previously field personnel 

had to collect this type of data in-person. FCC officials stated they 

have conducted hands on evaluations of the top four vendors and are 

developing purchase recommendations. Also, according to FCC 

officials, FCC recently purchased mobile direction finding equipment 

 19 For example, we have reported on the increased use of wireless broadband for the 

internet of things. See GAO, Technology Assessment: Internet of Things: Status and 

implications of an increasingly connected world GAO-17-75, Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2017).
Page 14 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

for use on rental vehicles and is in the process of purchasing 

equipment such as amplifiers, filters, and spectrum analyzers to 

improve the technological capability of field office personnel.

• Technology: FCC officials are working on a new complaint portal for 

businesses and public safety officials to use when they experience 

interference. FCC planned to implement this portal in spring 2016 but 

has faced delays.20

Given the recent changes, it is too early to determine the impact these 

actions will have on enforcement efforts.

We found that most of FCC’s enforcement program goals as published in 

its Annual Performance Reports and Budget Estimates to Congress are 

missing key elements that could improve oversight and performance 

evaluation. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), as 

enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 requires agencies to 

develop objective, measurable, and quantifiable performance goals and 

related measures and to report progress in performance reports in order 

to promote public and congressional oversight as well as improve agency 

program performance.21 OMB guidance on implementation of the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010 states that performance goals should include a 

specific measure with a targeted level of performance to occur over a 

defined timeframe.22 In comparing FCC’s recently published goals to 

OMB guidance, FCC has only one enforcement performance goal that 

partly meets OMB’s guidance and FCC’s remaining seven performance 

goals do not have associated measures with target levels and 

timeframes, see table 3 below.

 20 A Federal Register notice on February 9, 2017 provided stakeholders and the public a 

60-day period (ending on April 10, 2017) to submit comments on the proposed information 

collection. FCC officials said, as of July 11, 2017, they are seeking internal budgetary 

approval to expend funds to develop the website and systems needed to implement the 

portal once OMB has approved the information collection.

21 Government Performance and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), 

as enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 

3866 (2011). 

22 OMB. Circular A-11 Part 6, Section 200 (Washington, D.C.: July, 2016).

Most of FCC’s 

Enforcement 

Performance Goals 

and Measures Have 

Not Been Quantified
Page 15 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Table 3: Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Program Performance Goals

Performance Goal Performance Indicator Target Timeframe

Act swiftly and consistently in the use of 

enforcement authority to protect consumers.

None None None

Take enforcement action in appropriate cases 

against violations of spectrum-related rules, such 

as interference and unauthorized use of 

frequencies.

None None None

Promote compliance with rules designed to 

maximize competitive choices by taking 

enforcement action in appropriate cases.

None None None

Ensure that consumers have access to advanced 

public safety services in an emergency by 

reviewing service provider compliance and outage 

reports and taking enforcement action where 

appropriate.

None None None

Preserve the integrity of public safety 

communications infrastructure by taking action on 

99 percent of complaints of interference to public 

safety communications within one day.

Action taken in response 

to public safety 

complaints

99 percent responded to 

in one day

Nonea

Promote compliance with the Commission’s rules 

by taking action, where appropriate, on all new 

complaints and referrals concerning the 

Commission’s 911, E911, and NG911 rules.b

None None None

Ensure that communications networks are 

available during emergencies and crises by 

developing reliability standards and enforcing 

network outage reporting requirements.

None None None

Continue developing custom-adapted investigative 

tools that enable FCC to timely resolve 

interference and take appropriate enforcement 

action across a wide range of services.

None None None

Source: GAO analysis of FCC’s Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates to Congress with Office of Management and Budget Guidance. | GAO-17-727

a

FCC publishes information on this goal quarterly on its website.

b

Basic 911, transmits only the voice call to a Public Safety Answering Point and E911, Enhanced 911, 

transmits the voice call as well as the caller’s telephone number and information about the caller’s 

location. NG 911, Next Generation 911, refers to a service that is working to enable, among other 

things, the public to send texts, photos, videos, and other data to 911 call centers.

Our review of FCC’s annual performance report found that it includes 

descriptions of enforcement actions taken against companies, but does 

not include quantified performance measures. FCC officials stated that 

narrative examples, rather than quantified goals and related measures, 

were the most appropriate way to report on FCC’s efforts to help 

consumers and protect the public through its enforcement program. In 

2008, FCC reported two additional performance measures related to the 

number of cases they investigated and the length of time that it took to 
Page 16 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

close cases. FCC officials told us the Chairman’s Office made the 

decision in 2009 to stop reporting data driven measures and to replace 

them with narratives of the types of investigations performed, penalties 

issued, and examples of what it considers bad behavior. According to 

FCC officials, it is difficult to develop effective performance goals and 

measures for its enforcement program because enforcement is usually in 

reaction to the activities of companies. As a result, in lieu of performance 

goals and measures, FCC’s Fiscal Year 2016 Annual Performance 

Report contains descriptions of specific settlements or proposed fines 

issued; including one fine in excess of $34 million assessed to a company 

that illegally imported jamming devices that overpower, jam, or interfere 

with authorized communications. However, the Enforcement Bureau’s 

new database—EBATS—described earlier in this report, has the data that 

FCC could use to help establish and report on objective, measurable, and 

quantifiable performance goals and related measures.

Three other regulatory agencies with inherently reactive enforcement 

programs similar to FCC’s have developed objective, measurable, and 

quantifiable performance goals. During our review we spoke with officials 

from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodities Futures 

Trading Commission (CFTC), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 

which all have enforcement programs and have developed objective, 

quantifiable, and measureable goals for their programs.23 Officials from 

these agencies agreed that it is difficult to measure enforcement 

performance in part due to the reactive nature of enforcement as well as 

the difficultly of quantifying deterrence. However, they believe there are 

performance measures—timeliness, monetary outcomes, and 

enforcement actions taken in relation to consumer complaints, among 

others—that can capture essential program information. Examples of 

three agencies’ performance goals for their enforcement programs are 

shown in table 4 below.

 23 For more information on how we selected these agencies, see appendix I.
Page 17 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Table 4: Examples of Other Enforcement Agency Performance Goals for Fiscal Year 2015

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Performance Goal: Percentage of first enforcement actions filed within 2 years of 

opening of an investigation. 

Performance Indicator: Percentage of first filing actions

Target: 65 percent of total investigations

Timeframe: 2 years after opening an investigation

Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Performance Goal: Percentage of enforcement investigations completed within 

18 months of opening. 

Performance Indicator: Percentage of completed investigation

Target: 70 percent of total investigations

Timeframe: 18 month after opening an investigation

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Performance Goal: Percentage of the FTC’s consumer protection law enforcement actions that 

targeted the subject of consumer complaints to the FTC.

Performance Indicator: Percentage of law enforcement actions based on consumer complaints

Target: 80 percent of total law enforcement actions taken

Timeframe: Assessed annually

Source: Examples from SEC, CFTC, and FTC Annual Performance Reports with Office of Management and Budget Guidance. | GAO-17-727

Note: We did not conduct an assessment of these goals during the course of this review.

We have previously reported that a key element in an agency’s efforts to 

manage for results is its ability to set meaningful performance goals and 

to measure progress towards those goals.24 We have also found that 

communicating what an agency intends to achieve and its approach for 

doing so are fundamental aims of performance management.25 Without 

developing meaningful, quantifiable goals and related measures for the

enforcement program, FCC (1) lacks important tools for assessing and 

reporting on the progress of its enforcement program and determining 

whether changes should be made to improve performance, and (2) may 

be missing an opportunity to help promote transparency about its 

program and support congressional oversight.

 24 GAO, Managing For Results: Executive Branch Should More Fully Implement the 

GPRA Modernization Act to Address Pressing Governance Challenges, GAO-13-518 

(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2013).

25 GAO, Telecommunications: Additional Coordination and Performance Measurement 

Needed for High-Speed Internet Access Programs on Tribal Lands, GAO-16-222 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2016).
Page 18 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

We interviewed stakeholders with a wide range of perspectives however 

most agreed that FCC’s enforcement is important for deterring violations 

of federal statutes and FCC regulations.26 Fourteen of the 22 

stakeholders explicitly stated that FCC enforcement is important to deter 

violations and/or provided examples of appropriate FCC enforcement 

against violators.27

• Ten of the stakeholders highlighted the importance of Enforcement 

Bureau actions in helping to protect consumers.28 For example, two 

telecommunications experts said FCC enforcement actions against 

prepaid calling card companies for deceptive marketing practices 

have protected consumers. In calendar years 2010 through 2015, 

FCC investigated and issued separate $5 million dollar fines to six 

companies for deceptive marketing of pre-paid calling cards. FCC’s 

announcement of the fines said that in each case, companies sold 

cards that advertised hundreds or thousands of minutes for 

international calls at a low cost but consumers were only given a small 

fraction of the advertised time unless they used all of the minutes in a 

single call. FCC officials we spoke with also cited these cases as 

 26 For more information on how we selected stakeholders to interview, see appendix I.

27 This group of stakeholders consisted of three public interest groups, two industry 

associations, seven telecommunications companies, and two telecommunications experts.

28 This group of stakeholders consisted of three public interest groups, three industry 

associations, two telecommunications companies, and two telecommunications experts.

Selected 

Stakeholders Affirmed 

the Importance of 

FCC’s Enforcement 

but Cited Concerns 

about the Agency’s

Enforcement Process 

and Communication 

Efforts

Most Stakeholders Stated 

FCC’s Enforcement Is 

Important for Deterring 

Violations
Page 19 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

instances in which they believed there may be a deterrent effect to 

other companies that might consider conducting similar practices.

• Four stakeholders said Enforcement Bureau actions help address 

interference with emergency communications systems or violations of 

public safety regulations.29 For example, representatives of one public 

interest group and one industry association said FCC is quick to 

respond and resolve interference issues with communications 

systems used by first responders, which ensures that risks to public 

safety are minimized. One telecommunications company official said 

FCC’s fines to companies for insufficiently lighted radio towers appear 

to be effective because according to this official, the number of aircraft 

accidents involving towers appears to have decreased.

Most stakeholders expressed concerns regarding the transparency, 

fairness, or emphasis on publicity in the enforcement process. Of the 22 

stakeholders we interviewed, 17 mentioned at least one of these 

concerns.30

Lack of Transparency: When asked about their perception regarding the 

transparency of the enforcement process 16 of the 22 stakeholders we 

interviewed expressed concern that the enforcement process was not 

transparent.31 As an example, stakeholders noted their unsuccessful 

attempts to obtain information during an investigation.

• Eight stakeholders said companies are unable to obtain information 

from the Enforcement Bureau about the potential violations under 

investigation until the final stages of an investigation.32 Of these 8 

stakeholders, 4 said that this situation is different from their 

 29 This group of stakeholders consisted of one public interest group, one industry 

association, and two telecommunications companies.

30 This group of stakeholders consisted of five industry associations, eight 

telecommunications companies, and four telecommunications experts.

31 This group of stakeholders consisted of five industry associations, eight

telecommunications companies, and three telecommunications experts. Representatives 

from one public interest group we spoke with said they also perceived the enforcement 

process to be non-transparent; however, this was not a concern for them. They believed 

that it is important for the enforcement process to be non-transparent and that it would be 

inappropriate if details became public during an investigation.

32 This group of stakeholders consisted of one industry association, six

telecommunications companies, and one telecommunications expert.

Most Stakeholders 

Expressed Some 

Concerns about FCC’s 

Enforcement Processes
Page 20 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

interactions with other regulatory enforcement agencies that inform 

companies of the specific violation the agency is investigating earlier 

in the process.33 FCC officials we spoke with said their lack of 

transparency during the course of an investigation is, in part, to 

protect the reputation and business interests of the target in the event 

that no violation is found and ensure that sensitive information that 

could undermine a case is not revealed to the party being 

investigated.

Perceived Unfair Process: Fourteen stakeholders said the enforcement 

process was not always fair.34 Stakeholders provided the following 

examples.

• Ten stakeholders said that requests for information from the 

Enforcement Bureau can be broad and burdensome and require a lot 

of time and resources from the company to comply.35 FCC officials 

told us they often work with parties they are investigating to narrow

the scope of a request like a letter of inquiry, which can reduce the 

resource burden on the party and the Enforcement Bureau. FCC 

officials added, however, that they are careful to avoid overly 

narrowing the scope of a letter of inquiry because doing so could 

preclude the Enforcement Bureau from gathering information about all 

potential violations by the party.

• Nine stakeholders said the Enforcement Bureau issued fines when 

there was no clear violation of the regulations.36 In addition, seven 

stakeholders commented that FCC is using enforcement actions to 

set precedent and effectively create new policy.37 Two industry 

associations stated that they believe this type of action bypasses the 

notice and comment requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act 

 33 This group of stakeholders consisted of one industry association, two

telecommunications companies, and one telecommunications expert.

34 This group of stakeholders consisted of four industry associations, eight

telecommunications companies, and two telecommunications experts.

35 This group of stakeholders consisted of three industry associations, five

telecommunications companies, and two telecommunications experts.

36 This group of stakeholders consisted of two industry associations, six

telecommunications companies, and one telecommunications expert.

37 This group of stakeholders consisted of two industry associations, four

telecommunications companies, and one telecommunications expert.
Page 21 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

(APA).38 For example, one industry association cited a 2015 FCC 

enforcement policy statement that adopted a treble damages 

approach to calculating fines for companies not making their full 

contributions to FCC administered funds such as the Universal 

Service Fund.39 Four industry associations filed a joint petition with 

FCC that asked FCC to reconsider the policy statement because they 

considered it a substantial change, issued without public notice and 

therefore in violation of the APA. FCC officials stated that this petition 

for reconsideration is pending at the FCC. When we asked FCC 

officials about claims that FCC issued fines where there was no clear 

violation of the regulations, officials directed us to a written response 

to a question for the record for a 2015 congressional oversight 

hearing, where former FCC Chairman Wheeler stated that penalties 

may be issued in the absence of an agency regulation governing such 

conduct. He stated that this is because the Communications Act of 

1934, as amended, demonstrates Congress’s intent that certain 

conduct be prohibited and the act as established by Congress does 

not require the additional creation of an agency regulation. He further 

stated that because the Commission has the choice to decide whether 

to carry out their activities through rulemaking or adjudication under 

the APA, FCC may use adjudication to interpret and apply statutes 

Congress has directed FCC to enforce.

• Nine stakeholders said industry participants have lost the incentive to 

self-report potential violations because it does not appear that the 

 38 Among other things, the APA gives agencies the ability to carry out their authorized 

activities through rulemaking or adjudication. In rulemaking, the APA generally requires 

that agencies publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. After giving 

interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule and after considering 

the public comments, the agency may then publish the final rule. In adjudication, an 

agency generally undergoes a judicial process through an individualized fact-specific 

examination of past conduct. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in 1966 in 

scattered sections of title 5, United States Code).

39 According to FCC, under a treble damages approach, FCC would fine a company three 

times the amount of money that it appeared the company had failed to contribute to an 

FCC fund or cost recovery mechanisms. For more information on this enforcement policy 

statement see FCC Policy Statement: 15-15, February 3, 2015. The Universal Service 

Fund is a fund paid for by contributions from telecommunication service providers, usually 

passed on to consumers through their bills, to subsidize programs to make 

telecommunication services more accessible.
Page 22 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Enforcement Bureau will treat them fairly.40 Of these 9 stakeholders, 4 

said they know of companies that acted quickly to correct and report 

violations, but the Enforcement Bureau still issued significant 

penalties.41 FCC officials stated that industry’s self-policing is 

important to an effective enforcement regime and that pursuant to 

FCC regulations, good faith or voluntary disclosure can factor in 

decisions of leniency on parties.42

Emphasis on Generating Publicity through Large Proposed Fines: Fifteen 

of the stakeholders expressed concerns that there has been an emphasis 

on generating publicity by proposing high dollar fines through NALs.43 In 

addition, 10 of the 15 stakeholders said fine amounts appeared to be 

calculated arbitrarily and without rational basis.44 To determine whether 

there has been an increase in the amount of FCC issued NALs, we 

reviewed FCC data on NALs from calendar years 2012 through 2016. As 

shown in table 5 below, the average dollar amount of NALs issued by 

FCC increased from approximately $180,000 in 2012 to approximately 

$6,300,000 in 2016. The median NAL fine amount has also generally 

increased over this same period though not to the same extent. From 

2012 through 2016 median fines increased from $15,000 to $25,000. 

Also, the total number of NALs decreased from 111 in 2012 to 24 in 2016.

 40 Self-reporting a violation means that a company or individual would inform FCC of a 

potential violation without FCC’s asking about it first. This group of stakeholders consisted 

of two industry associations, five telecommunications companies, and two 

telecommunications experts.

41 This group of stakeholders consisted of two industry associations, one

telecommunications company and one telecommunications expert.

42 47 C.F.R. § 1.80.

43 This group of stakeholders consisted of four industry associations, eight

telecommunications companies, and three telecommunications experts.

44 This group of stakeholders consisted of one industry association, seven

telecommunications companies, and two telecommunications experts.
Page 23 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Table 5: Notices of Apparent Liability (NALs) Issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Calendar Years 

2012-2016

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Total NALs 111 73 70 23 24

Average Proposed Fine 

Amount

$183,223 $1,417,439 $1,300,292 $5,261,565 $6,370,818

Median Proposed Fine Amount $15,000 $18,000 $15,000 $25,000 $25,000

Source: GAO analysis of FCC’s information of NAL Public Orders issued Calendar Years 2012 through 2016. | GAO-17-727

Note: NALs are proposed fines, and parties are not legally required to pay an NAL unless they agree 

to do so, or FCC issues a subsequent forfeiture order.

Compared to previous years FCC has recently issued a small number of 

fines with very high dollar amounts.45 In 2016, FCC issued two of these 

high fines compared to none in 2012 (see table 6). When asked about the 

apparent increase in proposed fines, FCC officials acknowledged fines 

have increased. However, these officials stated that they have recently 

focused resources to investigate difficult cases they believe have the 

biggest impact on consumers and that the fine amounts they issue are 

appropriate for the violation. FCC officials also stated that publicity and 

large fines can be effective deterrents and can alert consumers that 

certain activities are unlawful. Seven stakeholders agreed that publicity 

and headlines can be effective tools for enforcement.46

Table 6: Top-Five Proposed Fines Issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Calendar Years 2011–2016

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

1) $5,000,000 $22,399,761 $34,912,500 $100,000,000 $51,070,322 

2) $1,758,465 $18,397,814 $11,937,549 $9,065,000 $49,598,448 

3) $1,680,000 $11,702,695 $10,000,000 $5,900,000 $21,691,499 

4) $1,680,000 $9,461,978 $7,620,000 $2,400,000 $9,620,000 

5) $1,584,000 $8,753,074 $5,230,000 $1,588,988 $8,020,000 

Source: GAO analysis of FCC’s information of NAL Public Orders issued Calendar Years 2012 through 2016. | GAO-17-727

Note: The bolded fines are more than three standard deviations above the 2012 through 2016 mean 

proposed fine of $1,623,743.

 45 Very high dollar amount is defined as a proposed fine more than three standard 

deviations above the 2012 through 2016 mean proposed fine of $1,623,743. One standard 

deviation equals $7,743,730.

46 This group of stakeholders consisted of two public interest groups, two industry 

associations, two telecommunications companies, and one telecommunications expert.
Page 24 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

FCC currently has a variety of ways it communicates with stakeholders 

varying in terms of formality and public versus private communications 

but does not have a clear communication strategy for its enforcement 

activities (see list of all communications in table 7 below). Instead, FCC 

tailors the extent of its communications to stakeholders on a case-bycase basis. FCC officials told us they use this approach because they 

have concerns that in some cases sharing too much information about 

their enforcement processes or case sensitive information could help 

parties of investigations undermine FCC’s case. For example, FCC does 

not publish an enforcement manual or similar overall policy document on 

its website outlining their enforcement policies and processes. In contrast, 

other agencies such as FTC and SEC publish enforcement manuals on 

their websites to provide information about the enforcement process as

well as brief summaries to explain agency regulations to help ensure the 

clarity of both. FCC officials also told us they work under very strict time 

deadlines because of the one-year statute of limitations that applies to 

many cases that the Enforcement Bureau investigates. FCC officials also 

stated that at least some courts have found that this one-year deadline 

begins at the time of the violation—not at the time the Enforcement 

Bureau learns of the violation—further reducing the time the Bureau has to 

negotiate the scope of the investigation. During this one-year period FCC 

officials say they must make sure that communications with the parties do 

not jeopardize the agency’s ability to act within the one year statutory 

deadline.47 However, as described earlier, FCC can use tolling 

agreements, which allows FCC—with agreement from investigated 

parties—to waive the statute of limitations in cases where it needs 

additional time to conduct or complete the investigation. 

 47 The FCC officials added that how an investigation proceeds including interaction with the target 

and the statute of limitations is dependent on the specific facts of the case.

FCC Lacks a Clear 

Communications Strategy 

for Industry Stakeholders
Page 25 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Table 7: Formal and Informal Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Enforcement Communication with Stakeholders

Formal Public/Private Description 

Letter of Inquiry Private FCC sends this letter to a party if there is a potential violation or to collect 

information from the party to determine whether there is a violation. This letter 

communicates to a party that FCC has opened an investigation, although 

FCC may not disclose the reason for the investigation.

Enforcement Orders Public FCC issues these orders to communicate to a party about an apparent 

violation, which may include a proposed fine. Examples of enforcement 

orders are Notices of Apparent Liability, Notices of Violation, and Forfeiture 

Orders.

Enforcement Advisories Public FCC periodically publishes these documents to educate parties and alert 

consumers about FCC requirements, purpose of regulations, and 

consequences for failure to comply. 

Close Out Letters Private FCC sends, as a general practice, letters to parties who are aware they are 

the subject of an investigation saying that FCC will not pursue enforcement 

action and the investigation is closed, if FCC has determined not to pursue an 

enforcement action at the time of the letter.

Informal Public/Private Description 

Meetings Private FCC conducts meetings and other interactions with parties during and outside 

of an investigation.

Public Events Public FCC officials attend public events to give speeches and participate in panel 

discussions to talk about the work of the Bureau.

Source: GAO analysis of FCC information. | GAO-17-727

Despite the communication efforts outlined in table 7, 16 of 22 

stakeholders we spoke with expressed concern that the enforcement 

process was not transparent or fair.48 Additionally, 10 of these 16 

stakeholders said there is a perceived lack of communication between 

stakeholders and the Enforcement Bureau.49

Clear communication strategies are important to promoting transparency 

particularly in the case of enforcement activities. In a publication on the 

Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement, the Organisation for 

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that 

government should ensure a clear and fair process for enforcement.50

 48 This group of stakeholders consisted of five industry associations, eight 

telecommunications companies, and three telecommunications experts.

49 This group of stakeholders consisted of three industry associations, and seven 

telecommunications companies.

50 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD Best 

Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections.(Paris: 

OECD Publishing, 2014.) 
Page 26 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

The Best Practice Principles include clearly informing parties of what 

rights and obligations they have in the process, how to challenge and 

appeal the conclusions, where and how to obtain compliance assistance 

and/or report any abuses. Federal internal control standards state that 

management should design appropriate control activities for programs 

including externally communicating the necessary quality information to 

achieve the entity’s objectives.51 In the case of enforcement, agencies 

can help promote compliance by establishing strategies that foster open 

two-way communications with external parties to help ensure the clarity of 

regulations and processes for enforcement.

A communication strategy would serve to relay the purposes, objectives, 

and processes the Enforcement Bureau employs to achieve its mission 

as well as the rights and expectations of those under investigation. 

Furthermore, the creation of a communication strategy to provide 

necessary and quality information to external stakeholders could (1) 

clarify aspects of the enforcement process that are not transparent or are 

confusing to stakeholders, and (2) promote clear, fair, and consistent 

enforcement. For example, such a strategy could include clearly 

identifying the rights and obligations parties have in the enforcement 

process, and where and how to obtain additional information regarding 

questions about the enforcement process, or to report any abuses,

without revealing information considered sensitive during the course of an 

investigation.

Recently, FCC has taken steps toward improving the transparency of 

Commission processes to external stakeholders. Since January 2017, the 

new FCC Chairman has implemented six changes including two intended 

to improve external transparency. One of the newly implemented changes 

is for FCC to publicly release, in advance of monthly Commission 

meetings, the text of all agenda items that the Commission will vote on 

during the monthly meeting.52 Previously, FCC’s practice was to release 

the full text of agenda items only after the Commission voted. However, 

an exception will be made for enforcement actions that are to be voted on 

before the Commission; FCC officials explained that the information 

contained in enforcement actions is considered law enforcement sensitive 

until it has been voted upon by the Commissioners. The other change 

 51 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

52 In February 2017, the FCC Chairman announced this was a pilot program to publically 

release the text of meeting items.
Page 27 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

intended to improve transparency is releasing a one-page fact sheet that 

summarizes the text of the meeting’s agenda items.53 FCC’s statement 

released about this change said that the one-page summaries will 

improve the public’s accessibility to Commission information. Although 

these policies have a limited direct impact on enforcement, increased 

focus on external transparency for the enforcement program could 

improve stakeholder perceptions of FCC actions and help promote the 

perception of a fair process as well as greater industry cooperation and 

compliance with FCC regulations.

In recent years, FCC has taken certain actions to improve the efficiency 

of its enforcement program. However, the extent to which FCC’s 

Enforcement Bureau is achieving its mission of protecting consumers, 

promoting competition, ensuring responsible use of the public airwaves, 

and addressing risks to public safety is difficult to determine because 

FCC has not developed performance indicators, targets, and timeframes 

that would enable a meaningful assessment of its enforcement program. 

Furthermore, without quantifiable performance goals and related 

measures, Congress does not have information needed to fulfill its 

oversight role, and industry and consumers lack information that would 

provide transparency regarding FCC’s enforcement priorities. Similarly, 

without a communications strategy that publicly outlines the purposes, 

objectives, and processes used by the Enforcement Bureau in carrying 

out its mission, FCC may be missing an opportunity to improve 

transparency for industry and consumers and to further engage with both 

to improve their understanding of FCC’s enforcement process.

• The Chairman of the FCC should establish quantifiable goals and 

related measures—performance indicators, targets, and timeframes—

for its enforcement program and annually publish the results to 

demonstrate the performance of this program and improve 

transparency regarding FCC’s enforcement priorities. 

(Recommendation 1)

• The Chairman of the FCC should establish, and make publically 

available, a communications strategy outlining the agency’s

enforcement program for external stakeholders, to improve 

 53 In February 2017, the FCC Chairman announced a one-page fact sheet that 

summarizes the text of meeting items to be released to the public for meetings.

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 28 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

engagement with the telecommunications community on the 

purposes, objectives, and processes the Enforcement Bureau 

employs to achieve its mission. (Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft of this report to the Federal Communications 

Commission for review and comment. FCC provided written comments 

that are reprinted in appendix II. In written comments, FCC stated that it 

agreed with both of our recommendations and noted steps it plans to take 

when making changes to implement quantifiable performance goals and 

increase transparency regarding the enforcement process. FCC also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Mark Goldstein,

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

This report addresses (1) actions taken by FCC in the last 5 years to 

update its enforcement program; (2) performance goals and measures for 

FCC’s enforcement program; and (3) selected stakeholders’ views on 

FCC’s enforcement program and FCC’s communication with these 

stakeholders.

To identify trends in enforcement actions and outcomes, we analyzed 

calendar years 2014 through 2016 summary data from FCC’s 

Enforcement Bureau Activity Tracking System (EBATS). Although EBATS 

was implemented in 2012, a rolling implementation and major system 

upgrades limited the available reliable data to 2014 through 2016. We 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by 

reviewing documentation related to how the data were collected and 

processed, by reconciling the publicly accessible data, and by 

interviewing FCC officials on their data validation efforts.

To describe what actions FCC has taken in the last five years (calendar 

years 2012 through 2016) to update its enforcement program we 

reviewed FCC documentation, such as policies and reports related to 

internal improvement efforts. In addition, we interviewed FCC officials 

from the Enforcement Bureau, Consumer and Government Affairs 

Bureau, as well as the Office of Managing Director. We also interviewed 

FCC officials located in two of FCC’s field offices, Columbia, MD, and 

Dallas, TX, because these field offices represent 2 of the 3 regions and in 

the past have conducted greater numbers of investigations than some 

other field offices. In Dallas, we accompanied FCC officials on a field 

investigation to observe officials use equipment to locate sources of 

interference.

To determine what performance goals and measures are in place for the 

enforcement program we reviewed FCC’s annual performance reports, 

budget estimates to congress, and strategic plans from 2008 to present 

and interviewed FCC officials. We evaluated FCC’s performance goals 

and measures as listed in FCC’s Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Performance 

Report and the Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Estimates to Congress, against 

criteria for developing federal agency performance goals and measures 

as established in the GPRA Modernization Act of 20101 and OMB 

guidance related to implementing performance measures.2 We also 

 1 The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). 

2 OMB Circular A-11 Part 6, Section 200 (Washington, D.C.: July, 2016).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

reviewed documents including OMB’s Circular A-11, Part 6, Section 200,

and GAO’s Federal Internal Control Standards related to performance 

measures.3 We also reviewed FCC’s fiscal year 2016 Annual 

Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Estimates to 

Congress; however, FCC did not include enforcement program goals in 

these reports.

To obtain information on the performance goals and measures used by 

other agencies with enforcement programs, we selected three additional 

agencies to review: the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 

Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal 

Trade Commission (FTC). We selected these agencies from a group of 

comparison agencies that also had (1) federal independent regulatory 

authority and (2) a dedicated enforcement bureau/division. After applying 

the first set of criteria, we selected the three agencies based on similarity 

to FCC in terms of budget and number of employees allocated in the 

congressionally approved budget for fiscal year 2016. For each of the 

agencies selected we reviewed its most recent performance plans and 

other relevant enforcement related documentation. We also interviewed 

officials from each of these agencies to gain their perspectives on 

managing performance and measuring enforcement efforts.

To determine stakeholder views on FCC’s enforcement program we 

interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 22 stakeholders who were 

knowledgeable of the Enforcement Bureau and the communications 

industry. We selected these stakeholders in order to get a range of 

perspectives using the following criteria: (1) type of industry perspective, 

(2) size of a company (where applicable), (3) level of activity in filing 

comments with FCC, and (4) area of expertise. After applying these 

criteria we assembled a list of stakeholders who viewed the industry from 

different perspectives (telecommunications companies, public interest 

groups, industry association, telecommunications experts) and different 

areas of expertise (phone, radio, television, and internet). By taking into 

account stakeholders’ prior work and their level of FCC comment activity, 

we also ensured these selected stakeholders were knowledgeable of the 

industry. For a full list of the stakeholders whom we interviewed see table 

8 below. To determine how FCC communicates with stakeholders, we 

reviewed FCC documentation and policies for formal and informal 

communication with stakeholders. We compared these policies to the 

 3 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 

Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy: Enforcement and 

Inspections4 and Federal Internal Control Standards on managing 

external communications.5

We also analyzed publicly accessible data on monetary enforcement 

actions that are on FCC’s website from calendar years 2012 through 

2016 to determine whether stakeholder views matched recent FCC 

enforcement outcomes. We determined that these data were sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes by reconciling the data with FCC provided data 

and interviewing FCC officials on their data validation efforts.

Table 8: Organizations and Individuals GAO Selected for Interviews

Stakeholder Type Name 

Telecommunications Companies AT&T

Blue Jay Wireless

Comcast

Schurz Communications

Smart City Holdings

T-Mobile

Urban One

Verizon

Public Interest Groups Consumers Union

Electronic Frontier Foundation

National Consumer Law Center

Public Knowledge

Industry Associations Association of Federal Communications 

Consulting Engineersa

Association of Public-Safety Communications 

Officials

CTIA

INCOMPAS

National Association of Broadcasters

United States Telecom Association

 4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD Best Practice 

Principles for Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections (Paris: OECD 

Publishing, 2014) 

5 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Stakeholder Type Name 

Telecommunications Experts James L. Casserly, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP

Frank G. Lamancusa, Morgan Lewis & Bockius 

LLP

David H. Solomon, Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP

Philip J. Weiser, University of Colorado

Source: GAO | GAO-17-727

a

This association was not interviewed, but chose to provide written response to our questions.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 to September 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission

Page 33 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Appendix II: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission
Appendix II: Comments from the Federal 

Communications Commission

Page 34 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 35 GAO-17-727 Telecommunications

Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Derrick Collins, Assistant 

Director; Jade Winfree, Analyst-in-Charge; Dennis Antonio, Anne Doré, 

Camilo Flores, Josh Ormond, Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100896)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov

and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering 

information is posted on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison

Please Print on Recycled Paper.