C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

J OE ROWE, Ap pe lla nt,

v. KA RA L AN E WA TK I

NS, Appellee

. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 09 -0 00 01 -C V

Appea l from County Court of Jeff Davis County , Texas (TC # 293)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION ON M OTI ON J oe Rowe ha s filed a motion in the above-styled and numbere d appea l asking that we c ompel the trial cour

t to e nter judgme nt a

nd to r ule on Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Texas Rule of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 24 to d e te rm ine the ty pe and amo un t of

se c ur ity wh ic h Ro we mus t po st t o suspend enf

orce ment of the judg ment. Appellee , Kar a L ane Watkins , has filed a response to Rowe’s motion. S he has also reque sted that we dism iss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the trial

c ourt ha s n ot e nte re d a

n a pp e a la ble or de r o r f

ina l ju dg me nt. We d e ny

Watkin s’ mot ion to d ism iss and g rant Rowe’ s motion for relief

. F ACTUAL SUMMA RY The unde rlying dispute betwee n Rowe and Watkins conc erns owner ship of a dog , Sara. The justice court r

uled in Rowe’s favor , awa rding him possession of Sara , and Watkins appea led to the county court. A jury

then deter

mined that Watkins had neither g iven Sara to Rowe nor aba

ndoned he r. Af te r the jur y wa s dis mis se d, the c ounty c ourt imm e diate ly

or de re d Ro we to d e liv e r t he do g to Watkins. R owe’ s attorney objected to immediate enfor ceme nt of the judg ment, expressing a n intent to appea l and s uperse de the judgme nt with a proper bond. The trial court overruled the se objec tionsand g ave Rowe brief pe riod of time to surre nder Sar a. When Rowe re turned to the sher iff’s of fice with the dog , he aske d what would happen if he did not turn her ove r. A de puty sheriff responde d that he would be a

rre sted pursuant to an or der of the coun t y judge . Rowe’s c ounsel was pr esent wh e n th is e xch ang e oc c ur re d. Un de r t

hr e a t of arr e st, Row e de liv e re d Sa ra to Watki ns . The followingday , Rowe filed a n objection to enfor ceme nt of the judg ment and re quested that the cour

t determine the ty

pe of se curity

requi re d t o suspend the judg ment under Rule 24.2( 2) of the Te x as Rules of Appe llate Proce dure. Rowe also filed a motion for judg ment notwithstanding the ver dict and a motion for new trial. Those wer e overr uled by operation of law on F ebrua ry 23, 2009. Rowe then filed a

premature notice of appe al. SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 27.1(a)

. The trial c ourt has not entere d a written judgme nt, nor has it ruled on Rowe’ s reque st to determine the ty pe and a mount of sec urity

require d to permit suspension of the judg ment. The c lerk’s r ecor d and the r eporte r’s rec ord have been rec eived but ha ve not yet been f

iled by the Clerk of this Court beca use the a ppellate r ecor d does not include a written judg ment or other appea lable orde r. Ac cording ly , on J anua ry 1 4 , 2 009, we notified Rowe that his appea l would be dis mis se d f

or wa nt o f j ur isd ic tio n. Row e re sp on de d by fi lin g the mot ion

wh ic h is the su

bje c t of thi s opinion. W atkins filed a re sponse fa ulting Rowe f

or the trial c ourt’s fa ilure to enter judgme nt and

a sk ingus to d ism iss the a pp e a l. WA TK IN S’ M OTI ON TO D ISM ISS Watkins requests that we dismiss the appea l for wa nt of jurisdiction beca

use t he trial c ourt has not e n te r e d a w r itte n ju d g me n t. Watk in s is c o r r e c t th a t o u r ju

r is d ic ti o n is c o n ti n g e n t o nthe exis tence of a f

inal judgme nt or appe alable or der. Se e Le hm an n v . H ar-C on Cor p ., 39 S.W .3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). But Rule 27.1 of the Rules of Appellate Procedur e provide s: “In a civil ca se, a prematurely

filed notice of

appea l is effe ctive and dee med filed on the da y of, but afte r, the e vent thatbeg ins the period for perfe cting the appe al.” T EX .R.A PP .P. 27.1( a). The rec ord befor e us establishes

that a jury verdic t has been rende red and all post-trial motions have bee n overr uled by operation of law. Rowe has f

iled a pre mature notice of appe al and he has ac ted dilige ntly to preser ve his rig ht to an a pp e a l in thi s c a se . Whe n a pr e matur e no tic e of

a pp e a l is fi le d, it i s th e po lic y of the c ourt to permit the trial cour

t a re asonable opportunity to enter a written judg ment. There fore , we de cline to d ism iss the a

pp e a l a t th is j un c tur e . We tur n n owto R ow e ’s mot ion

to c omp e l th e tr ia l c ourt

to enter judgme nt and to rule on Rowe’s motion to determine the ty pe of se curity

require d. We have construed Rowe ’s motion as reque sting manda mus relief. F AILURE TO RENDER JUDGM ENT AND RU LE ON P EN DI NG

M OTI ON To be entitl ed to mandamus relief, a relator must meet two require ments. First, the re lator must show that the trial court c lear ly abused its discre tion. In re Prudential Insurance Company of A m e rica , 1 4 8 S.W .3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004). Second, the r elator must demonstrate he has no adequate re medy

by appea l. Id . at 135-36. Mandamus m ay b e appr opriate to c ompel the consider ation of a motion, the issuance of a

ru lin g , o r e ntr

y of a jud g me nt. W

hite v. Re iter , 640 S.W .2d 586, 594 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). The Rules of C ivil Procedur e require a county court judge to re nder a judgme nt. SeeT EX .R.C IV .P. 300, 301. The trial court has a reasonable time in which to rule on a motion or enter judg ment. See I n re Villarreal , 96 S.W .3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.--Ama rillo 2003, orig

. proce eding ). What constitut es

a re asonable time depends on the f acts a nd circ umstances of

the par ticular c ase. In re Salazar , 134 S.W .3d 357, 358 (Tex.App.--Waco 2003, or ig. pr ocee ding)

. Under ordinary circ umstances, we l ikely would not consider a delay of t hree months to be

unreason abl e. But he re , th e de lay mus t be c on sid e re d in

lig ht o f t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

toimm e diate ly e nf or c e a “ jud g me nt” wh ic h h a s y e t to be re nd e re d a nd the c ourt ’s e xpre ss r e fu sa l to rule on Rowe’s mot ion to deter mine the t y

pe of secur ity

he must post. Bec ause the trial court ha s not enter ed a written j udg ment, Rowe i s preve nted from a ppealingthe merits of the c ase or raising on appea l the trial court’ s noncompliance with Rule 24. I t is under these circ umstances that we find the trial cour

t has clea rly abused its discre tion by

failing to enter a written judg ment and by failing to rule on Rowe’ s motion t o deter mine secur ity . Moreove r, Rowe does not ha ve an a dequate reme dy by appea l. Accor dingly , we g rant Rowe’ s motion for an o rder direc ting the tr ial court to ente r jud g me nt a

nd to r ule on Row e ’s Rul e 24 .4 mot ion . T he Judg e of th e County

Court of Jef f D a vis County is direct ed to enter a

written judg ment within thirty day s from the date of this opinion. Additionally , t h e C o u n t y Court J udg e is direc ted to rule on Rowe’ s Rule 24.4 motion. W e ar e

c on fi de nt t

he County

Court Judg e wi ll c omp ly

wi th t he se dir e c tiv e s and the wr it of mand a mus wi ll only issue if he fa ils to do so. Aug ust 26, 2009 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.