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2022 IL App (5th) 210363-U 

NO. 5-21-0363 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Effingham County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 20-CF-306 

 ) 

CHARLES D. YODER, ) Honorable 

 ) Christopher W. Matoush, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to reconsider his 

sentence following an open guilty plea, and defense counsel filed an 

appropriate certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), and 

any argument to the contrary would lack even arguable merit. Accordingly,

we grant defendant’s appointed counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Charles D. Yoder, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion to 

reconsider sentence. Defendant’s appointed attorney on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate 

Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, OSAD has filed a 

motion to withdraw as counsel for the defendant (see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)) 

along with a brief in support of the motion. OSAD has provided defendant with a copy of its 

Anders motion and brief. This court has provided him with ample opportunity to respond, but 

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/30/22. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
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defendant has not done so. Having read OSAD’s Anders motion and brief, and having examined 

the record on appeal, we agree that this appeal lacks merit. There is no potential ground for appeal. 

Accordingly, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with methamphetamine delivery (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1) (West 

2020)). On February 24, 2021, he pled guilty to unlawful possession of methamphetamine (id.

§ 60(a)(1)). There was no agreement about a possible sentence. The State did agree to dismiss 

the more serious delivery charge and that defendant would be released pending sentencing to attend 

to medical issues.

¶ 5 The circuit court explained to defendant the nature of the charge and the possible penalties. 

Based on the prosecutor’s statement that defendant was not eligible for an extended term, the court 

told him that the offense was punishable by a sentence of two to five years in the Illinois 

Department of Corrections (IDOC). Defendant said that he understood.

¶ 6 The court told defendant that he had a right to be physically present in the courtroom, but 

defendant agreed to proceed remotely via Zoom. Defendant denied being threatened or promised 

anything other than the terms of the agreement in exchange for his guilty plea.

¶ 7 The court explained the rights defendant would give up by pleading guilty. He said that he 

understood. The factual basis was that on November 17, 2020, Effingham police officers searched 

defendant and found a crystal substance that proved to be .4 grams of methamphetamine. The 

court continued the matter for sentencing.

¶ 8 A presentence investigation (PSI) showed that defendant had been convicted in Illinois of 

theft, driving while license revoked, intimidation, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, burglary, 

and driving under the influence, as well as other minor offenses. These resulted in six sentences 
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to the IDOC. He was convicted twice in Wisconsin of armed robbery, with the second conviction 

resulting in a 15-year prison sentence.

¶ 9 At sentencing, the parties presented no evidence. The circuit court, having reviewed the 

PSI, said that defendant was almost certainly eligible for an extended-term sentence. However, 

given that it had not admonished defendant of the possibility of an extended term, it would not 

impose such a sentence. However, the court found that a substantial prison sentence was necessary 

to deter others from committing similar offenses. Furthermore, a sentence of probation would 

deprecate the seriousness of the offense. The only significant mitigating factor the court found 

was defendant’s age (he was born in 1961). Thus, the court sentenced him to five years’ 

imprisonment, the maximum nonextended term.

¶ 10 Defense counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 

1, 2017) and a motion to reconsider the sentence. The circuit court denied the motion, and 

defendant appeals.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 OSAD identifies two potential issues that defendant could raise, but concludes that neither 

has even arguable merit. We agree. 

¶ 13 The first potential issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

defendant. The circuit court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence and its 

sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000).

¶ 14 The circuit court is granted such deference because it is in a better position than a reviewing 

court to decide the appropriate sentence, having the chance to weigh such factors as the defendant’s 

credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. Id. 
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Consequently, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court merely because we 

might have weighed these factors differently. Id.

¶ 15 Here, while defendant’s offense, as revealed by the factual basis, was not singularly grave, 

his extensive criminal history itself justified a lengthy sentence. His eight prior trips to the 

department of corrections in two states allowed the circuit court to find that his rehabilitative 

potential was minimal. He apparently avoided an extended-term sentence only because the court 

had not admonished him of that possibility when accepting the plea. Thus, even though the fiveyear sentence represented the maximum nonextended term, there is no arguable merit to a 

contention that it represented an abuse of discretion.

¶ 16 The only other potential issue is whether defense counsel complied with Rule 604(d). The 

rule requires that counsel representing a defendant on a postplea motion shall: “file with the trial 

court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, 

electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the 

entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of 

the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any 

amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in those 

proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 17 Here, counsel filed a certificate that closely tracks the rule’s language. Thus, there is no 

arguably meritorious contention that counsel failed to comply with the rule.

¶ 18 CONCLUSION

¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we grant OSAD’s Anders motion and affirm the judgment of 

the circuit court.

¶ 20 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.