United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 30, 2017*

Decided September 1, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 16-4116

GREGORY LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 09180

Andrea R. Wood,

Judge.

O R D E R

Gregory Lee, a former employee of the Chicago Transit Authority, appeals from 

the dismissal of his third amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Lee asserted

that the CTA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by 

 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16-4116 Page 2

failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for an unspecified disability and then 

firing him because of that disability. We affirm.

As set forth in his third amended complaint, the allegations of which we accept 

as true, see W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016), Lee had 

experienced medical problems before being fired from his position as Transportation 

Manager for the CTA. In February 2010 he became ill at work and was rushed by 

ambulance to the hospital. He later took short-term disability leave. Several months into 

his leave, he received a letter from the CTA directing him to report to the Authority’s 

general manager to discuss his status. Lee met with the general manager and told him 

that he would not be released from medical treatment for two or three more months. 

Two weeks later he received another letter from the CTA stating that he had exhausted 

his leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act and was being “administratively 

separated.” After his release from medical treatment three months later, however, the 

CTA reinstated Lee as Transportation Manager.

In early 2011 Lee again began experiencing unspecified health issues and tried to 

address potential accommodations with his supervisors. But delays making contact 

ensued, and in November 2011 he again had to be rushed by ambulance to the hospital. 

He took medical leave once more and five months later received a second letter of 

administrative separation based on his inability to perform his job and his having

exhausted his FMLA leave.

Lee then filed this suit, alleging that the CTA terminated his employment based 

on a disability and refused to offer him reasonable accommodations. Judge Tharp

dismissed this initial complaint without prejudice (his reasons are not reflected in the 

record). Lee amended his complaint, and this time he alleged that he had suffered a 

stroke; that he had been diagnosed with hypertension, anxiety, and depression; and that 

these conditions caused severe headaches, loss of concentration, and memory loss―all 

of which affected his ability to complete his job duties without an accommodation. Lee 

again amended his complaint (to withdraw an age-discrimination claim not at issue 

here).

Judge Andrea Wood, to whom the case had been reassigned, then granted the 

CTA’s motion to dismiss this complaint for failure to state a claim. Lee, the judge 

explained, failed to allege that he had a disability under the ADA because he did not 

suggest how his medical conditions substantially limited his ability to work. Lee, she 

added, also did not allege that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his 

job as Transportation Manager, with or without an accommodation. The judge agreed 
No. 16-4116 Page 3

to give Lee “one final opportunity” to amend his complaint to rectify the identified 

deficiencies, and she “reminded” him to include “all of the facts” upon which he sought 

to rely. 

Lee amended his complaint for a third time, but the district court dismissed it

with prejudice, concluding that he had not sufficiently pleaded facts to support a

discrimination claim under the ADA. This version of the complaint, the court pointed 

out, omitted any reference to a specific medical condition and instead merely 

“parrot[ed]” the statutory definition of “disability”―a recitation insufficient to survive 

a motion to dismiss. And to the extent Lee had suggested in prior court filings that his 

disability related to sleep apnea, anxiety, and depression, he failed to allege how those 

conditions substantially limited a major life activity―“much less connect those dots as 

required.” Lee, the court went on to say, also did not address whether he could perform 

the essential functions of his managerial job with or without reasonable 

accommodation. 

The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of 

disability in regard to job application procedures [and] discharge. “ 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 

To state a claim under § 12112(a), a plaintiff must allege three things: that he has a 

disability that fits the definition in the ADA, that he is otherwise qualified to perform 

the duties of his job either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he 

suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. See Tate v. SCR Med. 

Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 

565 (7th Cir. 2016). At the pleading stage, Lee need not include extensive factual detail, 

but he must include enough information to give the defendants fair notice of the claim, 

which includes identifying a specific disability. See Tate, 809 F.3d at 345–46.

On appeal Lee disputes the district court’s conclusion that he did not adequately 

allege a disability for purposes of the ADA, and he reiterates that he suffers from 

anxiety, depression, sleep apnea, and having had a stroke. But as the district court 

explained, Lee neglected to include these details in his third amended complaint, which 

is the operative complaint for any assessment of his claim. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 

699 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012). And even if we assume that he had sufficiently alleged 

these conditions, he has not alleged that they “substantially limit[ed] one or more major 

life activities,” as required in the definition of disability under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1); Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 209 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Lee next seems to assert that the district court imposed on him a heightened 

pleading requirement with regard to the allegations he needed to make about being 
No. 16-4116 Page 4

otherwise qualified to perform the essential job duties of a Transportation Manager. But 

even if no detailed explanation of these duties was necessary, Lee needed to allege that 

he is able to complete the duties of a Transportation Manager with or without an 

accommodation, see Tate, 809 F.3d at 345, and he did not.

We have considered Lee’s other arguments and none has merit.

AFFIRMED.