COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DENNIS RAY BARKER, S/K/A 

 DENNIS RAY BARKER, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0078-97-2 BY JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 APRIL 7, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 L. Willis Robertson, Jr. (Cosby and 

Robertson, on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Dennis Ray Barker, Jr., appellant, moved to suppress certain 

statements he made to a sheriff's investigator after being taken 

into custody. The investigator read appellant his Miranda rights 

before arresting him, but did not re-read him his rights before 

questioning him later at the sheriff's office. After the trial 

court denied the suppression motion, appellant entered 

conditional guilty pleas to four counts of larceny. We affirm. 

 The Hanover County Sheriff's Department suspected appellant 

and another person, Christopher Hall, of stealing several 

motorcycles. Investigator Mark Hottle, in the course of his 

investigation into the thefts, went to appellant's home. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Arriving there, he found appellant in the yard and questioned him 

in reference to reports of several motorcycles stolen in the 

county. At first, appellant denied any knowledge of the thefts, 

but eventually admitted stealing a motorcycle. Appellant's 

father approached at that time and stated that someone else was 

in the house that the investigator needed to speak with. 

Bringing appellant with him, Hottle entered the house where he 

found Hall. He read both appellant and Hall their Miranda rights 

from a preprinted card issued by the sheriff's office. Appellant 

indicated that he understood the rights. 

 Hottle interrogated Hall separately. After talking to Hall, 

he placed both appellant and Hall under arrest. Both men were 

taken to the sheriff's office, where appellant was questioned by 

Hottle without being re-advised of his Miranda rights. Thirty to 

forty-five minutes elapsed between the time appellant was read 

his rights at his home and the time he was questioned at the 

sheriff's office. 

 At the suppression hearing, appellant moved to suppress his 

statement made to Hottle at the sheriff's office due to the fact 

that he was not re-advised of his rights after his arrest and 

prior to being questioned again. The trial court overruled the 

motion to suppress. 

 The purpose of Miranda warnings is to ensure that 

 a suspect knows that he may choose not to 

talk to law enforcement officials, to talk 

only with counsel present, or to discontinue 

talking at any time. The Miranda warnings 

ensure that a waiver of these rights is 
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knowing and intelligent by requiring that the 

suspect be fully advised of this 

constitutional privilege, including the 

critical advice that whatever he chooses to 

say may be used as evidence against him. 

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987). See also Shell v. 

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 247, 252, 397 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1990). 

"Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is subjected to 

'custodial interrogation.'" Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

135, 140, 415 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1992) (citation omitted). 

 In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

"[t]he burden is upon [the appellant] to show that this ruling, 

when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). 

 Appellant does not contend that he was unaware of his 

constitutional rights guaranteed by Miranda. He admits that the 

Miranda rights were read to him prior to his arrest. He stated 

to the investigator that he understood them. He at no time 

asserted his right to remain silent. He argues that, as a matter 

of law, a suspect who has been given his Miranda warnings prior 

to being taken into custody, must be re-advised after he is taken 

into custody, even when the custodial questioning begins within a 

short period of time after the warnings are given. We disagree. 

 We find that this case is controlled by principles set forth 

in Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990). The 
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Supreme Court held: 

 "[W]here a person, after receiving Miranda

warnings, has once given a knowing and 

intelligent waiver of his constitutional 

rights, such waiver will be presumed to 

continue in effect throughout subsequent 

custodial interrogations until the suspect 

manifests, in some way which would be 

apparent to a reasonable person, his desire 

to revoke it." 

Id. at 35, 393 S.E.2d at 604 (quoting Washington v. Commonwealth, 

228 Va. 535, 548-49, 323 S.E.2d 577, 586 (1984), cert. denied, 

471 U.S. 1111 (1985)). In Cheng, the Court further held that 

after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, his 

decision to converse with the officer constituted an implied 

waiver of his Miranda rights and that an express written or oral 

waiver of rights was not required. 

 In this case, appellant's decision to talk to Hottle after 

having been read the Miranda rights, constituted an implied 

waiver of those rights. Such is presumed to continue in effect 

throughout subsequent custodial interrogations until the accused 

manifests his desire to revoke it. Appellant never manifested a 

desire to revoke the waiver at any time thereafter. We conclude 

from the record that appellant's statement to Hottle made at the 

sheriff's office was made freely and with full knowledge of his 

Miranda rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

 Affirmed.