In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-12-00521-CV 

________________________

MONTE HASIE AND HASIE 

FINANCIAL GROUP, APPELLANTS 

 

V. 

 

COMPASS BANK D/B/A BBVA COMPASS, F/K/A STATE NATIONAL BANK OF WEST 

TEXAS F/K/A FIRST STATE BANK AND BBVA USA BANCSHARES, F/K/A STATE 

NATIONAL BANCHARES, INC., APPELLEES 

 

 

On Appeal from the 72nd District Court 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2006-535,965; Honorable Ruben Reyes, Presiding 

 

October 21, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, J.J, and BOYD, S.J.1 

 

Appellants, Monte Hasie (individually Hasie) and Hasie Financial Group, appeal

entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Compass Bank d/b/a BBVA 

 

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Senior Judge John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by 

assignment. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 75.002.(a)(1) (West 2013).
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Compass, f/k/a State National Bank of West Texas f/k/a First State Bank and BBVA 

USA Bancshares, f/k/a State National Bancshares, Inc., in their civil suit for malicious 

prosecution stemming from a federal criminal prosecution of Hasie, which ultimately 

resulted in a judgment of acquittal. In support, Appellants assert the trial court erred in 

its rulings that (1) a federal statute granted absolute immunity to Appellees and (2) 

absolute immunity under the “judicial proceeding privilege” applied to the facts of this 

case. Appellants further assert (3) this Court should exercise its discretion to remand 

this appeal for further proceedings in the “interest of justice,” (4) Appellees waived their

objections to Appellants’ summary judgment evidence and (5) the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact 

concerning each claim being asserted by Appellants. We affirm the summary judgment 

of the trial court ordering that Appellants take nothing on the claims being asserted 

against Appellees. 

DISCUSSION

Logic dictates we consider Hasie’s fifth issue first. In doing so, we assume 

without deciding that all Hasie’s summary judgment evidence was admissible. With this 

caveat in mind, having reviewed the record, we find the trial court properly granted 

summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all claims asserted, overrule Appellants’ fifth 

issue and pretermit the remaining issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. 

v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). A traditional summary judgment is proper 
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only if the movant establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). See

Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). When 

entitlement to summary judgment is otherwise established by the movant, the trial court 

is required to grant the motion unless the nonmovant comes forward with summary 

judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(b). 

In our review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we take as true all evidence 

favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any 

doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661; Provident Life and 

Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003).

A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment must conclusively negate 

at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or conclusively 

establish each element of an affirmative defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 

S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010). See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 

2005) (matter conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as to the 

conclusion to be drawn from the evidence). Moreover, if, as here, a trial court’s granting 

of summary judgment does not specify the basis for the trial court’s ruling, the summary 

judgment will be affirmed if any theory advanced by the movant is meritorious. Joe v. 

Two Thirty Nine JV, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004). 

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

In October 2004, Hasie was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States

by allegedly violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (bank fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000)
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(credit fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. I 2014) (false statement or overvaluation of 

security), and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000 & Supp. I 2014) (money laundering). After a jury 

trial in federal court resulted in a guilty verdict on twenty-two separate counts, the 

verdict was set aside by the presiding judge and a judgment of acquittal was rendered

as to all counts. Shortly, thereafter, Appellants brought this tort claim against 

Appellees.

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 The cornerstone of Appellants’ tort claims is that Appellees maliciously 

caused Hasie’s prosecution by submitting a criminal referral to federal law enforcement 

authorities while withholding information establishing his innocence.

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim reflect the balance between 

society’s need to compensate those subjected unjustifiably to criminal proceedings and 

“society’s greater interest in encouraging citizens to report crimes, real or perceived.” 

Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2004). To establish a 

claim for malicious prosecution, Appellants were required to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that: (1) a criminal prosecution was commenced against Hasie; (2) 

Appellees initiated or procured that prosecution; (3) the prosecution terminated in his

favor; (4) he was innocent of the charges; (5) Appellees lacked probable cause to 

initiate the prosecution; (6) Appellees acted with malice; and (7) Appellants suffered 

damages. Id. at 793 n.3; Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, Tex., 153 S.W.3d 452, 458-59

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.).

“A person initiates a criminal prosecution if he makes a formal charge to law 

enforcement authorities.” Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 

 

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Appellants asserted claims for malicious prosecution, negligence or gross negligence, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process and tortious interference with prospective 

relations and existing contracts. 
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1994) (emphasis added). “A defendant procures a prosecution when its ‘actions were 

enough to cause the prosecution, and but for [its] actions the prosecution would not 

have occurred.’” Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 354-55 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2013, no pet.); French v. French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 70-71 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. 

denied) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. 881 S.W.2d at 292) (emphasis added). When 

the decision to prosecute is left to the discretion of another, such as a law enforcement 

official or a grand jury, a defendant does not procure a criminal prosecution unless he 

knowingly provides false, material information and the false information causes the

criminal prosecution. Hernandez, 406 S.W.3d at 355 (citing King v. Graham, 126 

S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam)). Thus, causation is an indispensable element 

of a malicious prosecution case. In re Bexar, 224 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Tex. 2007). 

When, as here, the decision to prosecute was submitted to the discretion of a 

grand jury and prosecutor, Appellants have the burden of proving that decision would 

not have been made but for false information supplied by Appellees. Id. To be 

successful on their claim, Appellants must prove not only that Appellees furnished false 

information to the grand jury and prosecutor but also that the false information furnished 

caused Hasie to be prosecuted. Id.; King, 126 S.W.3d at 78. In other words, the false 

information must have been a determining factor in the decision to commence 

prosecution. Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2008, no pet.). 

Having reviewed the record under the caveat we discussed earlier, we find no 

evidence that Appellees initiated Hasie’s criminal prosecution by filing a formal charge 

or complaint of any kind or initiated or procured his prosecution. Appellants submitted 
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the deposition testimony of two experts in an attempt to establish this element. One, a

financial institution expert who testified it was “logical” that Appellees made the criminal 

referral and two, an attorney, former prosecutor and Hasie’s defense counsel in the 

criminal proceeding, who testified “[i]t was my understanding and belief at the time that 

it wasn’t the grand jury who initiated the criminal action but the bank itself.”

Unfortunately, this evidence amounts to mere speculation or guess as to whether 

Appellees initiated or procured Hasie’s indictment. Kroger, 216 S.W.3d at 795 (citing 

Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)). 

Moreover, even assuming Appellees did make a criminal referral or complaint, 

there is also no evidence they provided any false statements to the grand jury or the 

prosecutor that were material to the decision to prosecute Hasie. Appellants assert 

Appellees falsely represented that a loss was suffered on certain loans when there was, 

in fact, no loss sustained. In support, Appellees offered the testimony of Hasie’s

attorney during the criminal proceedings, who was a former prosecutor, wherein she 

stated, “one of the factors that should be considered [by a prosecutor] is to what extent 

anyone suffered any loss.” (emphasis added.) Further, even if Appellees knowingly 

misrepresented there was a loss on the loans when there was not one, whether the 

victim suffers a loss is not an element of any of the federal crimes with which Hasie was 

charged. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. I 2014); 18 U.S.C. § 

1344 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000 & Supp. I 2014). See also Haas v. Henkel, 216 

U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910); United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In other words, the prosecutor could have made the decision to prosecute Hasie with or 

without information that the loans caused a loss to Appellees. 
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Under the facts of this case, Appellants’ evidence creates no more than a “mere 

surmise” or “suspicion” that information regarding Appellees’ losses would have been 

material to any decision by the prosecutor. See King, 126 S.W.3d at 78. Accordingly, 

we find Appellants failed to offer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact 

whether Appellees initiated or procured Hasie’s prosecution and the trial court properly 

granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor on their claims for malicious prosecution.

APPELLANTS’ REMAINING CLAIMS

Summary judgment was also proper on Appellants’ remaining claims. Because 

Appellants’ malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law, Hasie’s individual claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress is merely hypothetical, i.e., there is no 

evidence Appellees intentionally subjected him to distress knowing he was innocent. 

See Kroger, 216 S.W.3d at 796-97. There is also no evidence of any kind of process 

that was abused by Appellees. See Blackstock v. Tatum, 396 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex. 

Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1965, no writ). 

Appellants’ claim that Appellees were negligent in their performance of a 

“shoddy” investigation also fails because he presents no evidence of any investigation 

by Appellees prior to Hasie’s indictment—shoddy or otherwise. In addition, even 

assuming Appellees conducted an investigation before Hasie’s indictment, it is well 

settled that a private person has no duty to investigate a suspect’s alibi or defense

before reporting a crime. See Kroger, 216 S.W.3d at 794. 

Furthermore, Appellants’ claim for tortious interference with prospective business 

relations fails because there is no evidence Appellees engaged in conduct that was 
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wrongful, i.e., independently tortious, actionable under a recognized tort or in violation of 

a statute. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex. 2000). 

Appellants’ claim for tortious interference with an existing contract also fails because 

they presented no evidence of any “tortious interference” or of a contract interfered with 

by Appellees. See All American Telephone, Inc. v. USLD Comms., Inc., 291 S.W.3d 

518, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). Accordingly, we find that the trial 

court did not err by granting summary judgment in Appellees’ favor on all Appellants’ 

claims.

CONCLUSION

Appellants’ fifth issue is overruled. Because we find the trial court properly 

granted summary judgment on at least one of the theories advanced by Appellees, 

issues one through four are pretermitted. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Accordingly, the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice