### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BILLY RA Y R ILEY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty

No. 03-344 Roge r P age, Judge

No. W2004-02016-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jul y 26, 2005

A Ma dis on Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt jury c on vic te d the a pp e lla nt, B ill y Ra y Rile y , of the ft of pr op e rt y valued one thousand doll ars or more but less than t en thous and doll ars, and the trial court sentence d h im a s a Ra n g e I I I o f

f e n d e r to tw e lv e y e a r s in th e D e p a r tm e n t o f Co rr e c ti o n

. I n th is a p p e a l, the appellant c laims that the evidenc e is insufficient to support the c onviction. Upon revie w of the

rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e af firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J
., joined.

Ang ela J

. Hopson (at trial and on appea l), J ackson, Tenne ssee, and Marc us M. Reaves (a t t rial), D e n m ark
, T e n n e s s e e , f

o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , B i l l y R a y R i l e y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Willis, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J ames G

. (Jerry ) Woodall, District Attorney Gene ral; and James Thompson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

Har riet Elaine N ewbe rn testified that she lived in Jackson, Tenne ssee a nd had a twenty -fivey ear -old daught er wh o suffe red f rom diabete s and blindness. Acc ording to Ms. Newbern, her daug hter sometimes had to stay in Maplewood Nursing Home in order to rec eive tre atment for he r diabetes. O n J anuary

13, 2003, Ms. Newbe rn wa s having a birthday party in her home f

or her daug hter. Dur ing the party , Fa rley Har dison and the appe llant arrive d and told M s

. Newbern that they wer e tra veling from Nashville to Memphis. Ms . Newbe rn knew Mr. Har dison, but she had not previously

met the appe llant. Ms. Newbe rn could tell that the men had be en drinking alcohol, and she invited them to spend the nig ht in her home.-2-

After the birthday

party , Ms. Newbe rn , M r

. H a r d is o n, and the a

ppellant drove Ms. Newbe rn’s daug hter ba ck to the nursing home. The ne x t day , Ms. Newbe rn and the appellant dr ove to the nursing home in order

to pick up Ms. Newbe rn’s daug hter. Ms. Ne wber n stated that she a llowed the appellant to drive her c ar to the nur sing home and that she r ode with him. L ater that day , they

drove Ms. Ne wb e rn ’s daug hte r b a c k to the nu rsin g ho me in the a pp e lla nt’ s c a r. On Janu a ry 15 , M s. Newbe rn h a d a d o c to r ’ s ap p o in tm e n t. T h e a p p e ll a n t a s k e d M s

. N e w b e r n if h e c o u ld v is it her daug hter in the nursing home while Ms. N ewbe rn was at the appointment. Ms. N ewbe rn ag ree d and g ave the appellant pe rmission to drive her c ar to Maplewood. The a ppellant left be fore noon, and Ms. Newbe rn left to g o to her a ppointment. W hen she r et u rned home from her doctor’s appointment, the appellant was not there . Concerne d, Ms. Newbe rn drove to Maplewood Nur sing Home and le arne d that the appe llant had neve r ar rived.

Ms. Ne wb e rn re turne d h ome a nd wa ite d f or the a pp e lla nt. Whe n he ha d n ot r e turne d w ith he r c ar by 5:0 0 p .m. , M s. Ne wb e rn te le ph on e d th e po lic e . T he po lic e c a me to h e r h ome , a nd Ms. Ne wb e rn g a ve a re po rt

. Whil e the po lic e we re the re , the a pp e lla nt t e le ph on e d M s. Ne wb e rn . M s. Newbe rn told the appe llant t o return he r ca r, and the appellant r eplied, “I can’ t.” Ms. Newbe rn testified that the appe llant never returne d her c ar, tha t it was worth about $3,500, and that her insurance company paid her $1,400 for it. S he stated tha t she had a llowed the appe llant to drive the

car in order to visi t her daug hter but that she ha d not give n him permission to keep the ca r indefinitely . On cr oss-examination, Ms. Newbern a cknowledg ed that whe n the appe ll a n t t e lep h o n ed h e r o n Ja n u ar y 1 5
, h e to ld h e r th a t h e w a s lo s t. Sh e a ls o a c k n o w le d g e d th a t w h e n she g ave the

app e lla nt p e rm iss ion to d ri ve he r c ar, sh e didno t te ll h im w ha t ti me to r e turn it

.

Melissa Gre en, Har

riet Ne wber n’s daug hter, testified tha t she usually lived with her mother but sometimes rece ived trea tment at M aplewood Nursing Home. On J anuary 13, 2003, Ms. Gree n had a birthday

party at her mother’s home. During the party , Mr. Har dison and the appe llant arrive d. Ms. Gree n stated that she ha d not previously met the appe llant. On J anuary 15, Ms. G ree n was stay ing at the nursing home. The appellant telephoned Ms. Gree n and told her tha t he was pla nning to visit her but ha d g otten lost. Ms. Green state d that the appe llant never arr ived at Maple wood.

I nvestig ator Steve G reg ory of the Jackson Police Depa rtment testified t hat he was assig ned to investiga te Ms. Newbe rn’s case

. At some point, the appellant wa s arr ested. I nvestig ator Gr eg ory

rea d the appe llant his Miranda rig hts and interviewe d him. Accor ding to the a ppellant’s stateme nt to Investig ator Gre g ory , the appellant rode with Mr

. Har dison f rom Knoxvi l l e t o M s

. Newbern’s ho me in Ja c ks on . M s. Ne wb e rn inv ite d th e m t o st ay wi th her, a nd the app e lla nt g ot t o k no w M s. Newbe rn’s daug hter. On J anuary 15, the appe llant asked Ms. Ne wber n if he c ould “borrow ” her car in order to visit her daug hter a t the nursing home. Ms. N ewbe rn allowed the appellant to take the

car but the appellant g ot lost on hi s way to Maplewood. The appellant telephoned Ms. Ne wber n’s daug hte r, a nd sh e g a ve him dir e c tio ns to the nu rs ing ho me . H ow e ve r, the a pp e lla nt g ot l os t a g a in

a nd dr ov e tow ardKn oxvil le . I n th e stat e me nt, the app e lla nt s a id, “ I sh ou ld n ot h a ve we nt t o Knoxvi lle. I

am wrong for that.”-3-

The a ppellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for thef t and that the trial court err ed by deny ing his motion for judgme nt of acquittal. Specif ically , he ar g ues that he did not c ommit a theft because Ms. New bern g ave him permission t o drive he r ca r. I n addition, he c la ims that th e Sta te fa ile d to pr ov e tha t he int e nd e d to de pr ive Ms. Ne wb e rn of he r c a r b e c a us e the evidenc e shows that she gave him permission to use it and did not t ell him when to bring it back. The State a

rg ues that the e vidence is sufficient. We ag ree with the State.

“The standard by

which the tria l c ourt deter mines a motion for judgme nt of ac quittal at the end of al l t h e p roof is, in essenc e, the sa me standar d which applies on a ppeal in dete rmining the sufficie ncy

of the evidenc e afte r a conviction.” State v. Thompson, 88 S.W .3d 611, 614-15 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2000). When an appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the c on victing e vidence , the standard f

or re view is “whe ther, a fter vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the cr ime bey ond

a re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct. 27 81
, 27 89 (1 97 9) ; T e nn . R. App. P. 13(e). O n appea l, the State is entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable or le g itimate i n fe re nces w hich may be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be affor ded the evidenc e, as well as all factual issues ra ised by the evidenc e, ar e re solved by the jury as trier of fact. State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This court will not

rew eig h or re evalua te the evide nce. I d. Be cause a jury con v iction removes the pr esumption of innocenc e with which a defe ndant is initially cloake d at trial and repla ces it on appea l w ith one of g uil t, a c on vic te d d e fe nd a nt h a s th e bu rd e n o f d e mon str a tin g to this c ou rt that th e e vid e nc e is insufficient. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

A p e r s o n i s g u i l t y o f

t h e f ti f t h a t p e r s o n , w i t h t h e i n t e n tt o d e p r i v e t h e o w n e r o f p r o p e r t y, knowing ly

obtains or exercises control over the prope rty

without the owner’ s eff

ective c onsent. See Tenn. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 4

- 1 0 3

. “ D e p r iv e ” me a n s to “ [w ]i th h o ld p r o p e r ty f r o m th e owner perma nently

or for such a pe riod of time as to substantially diminis h the value or enjoy ment of the pr op e rt y to the ow ne r. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -1 06 (a )( 8) (A ). I f the va lue of the pr op e rt y

is betwee n one thousand and ten thousand dollar s, the theft is a Class D fe lony . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105( 3).

Take n in the light most favor able to the State, the e vidence shows that Ms. Newbe rn loane d the appe llant her c ar in orde r for the appe llant to drive to the Maplewood Nu rs ing H ome. The

app e lla nt t oo k th e c ar a nd ne ve r r e tur ne d it . A lth ou g h th e a pp e lla nt i nit ia lly ha d p e rm iss ion to u se the c ar, the e vid e nc e sh ow s tha t whe n he te le ph on e d Ms. Ne wb e rn on Janu a ry 15 , s he tol d h im t o return the car

and he r efuse d. The e vidence is sufficient to support the convic tion.-4- III. Conclusi on

B a se d u po n th e re c or d a nd the pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, J UDGE