Report on Occupational Safety and Health Inspections 

Conducted Under 

The Congressional Accountability Act 

General Counsel 

November 2002 Office of Compliance 

— 

United States Congress 
Report on Occupational Safety and Health Inspections 

Conducted Under Section 215 of 

The Congressional Accountability Act 

Prepared by:


Gary Green


General Counsel


Michael Lemov


Deputy General Counsel


Cheryl Polydor


Attorney


Kate Tapley


Attorney


Stephen Mallinger 

Special Assistant to the 

General Counsel 

Thomas Seymour


Fire Protection Engineer


Terry Lane 


Occupational Safety Consultant


General Counsel 

Office of Compliance 

— 

United States Congress 
Table of Contents 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................ .............. 1


II. INTRODUCTION ............................ .................... 2


III EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH ......... 3


A. OSHA Standards Relating to Emergency Planning and Preparedness . 4


B. Emergency Action and Evacuation Plans ........................ 5


C. Emergency Response to Suspected Chemical and Biological Attacks .. 9


D. Respiratory Protection Programs ............................ . 12


E. Interaction of Security and Safety ............................ . 14


IV SAFETY OF IRRADIATED MAIL – A SECOND LOOK .................. 16


V.	 FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY – CURRENT STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE BRANCH


COMPLIANCE ............................ ..................... 21


VI. REQUESTS FOR INSPECTIONS – BIENNIAL REVIEW ................ 26


VII. ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL – AN IMPROVING SAFETY RECORD .... 29


VIII. 	 CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE INSPECTIONS – EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS


AND OTHER SAFETY ISSUES ............................ ........ 31


IX. NON-OFFICE INSPECTIONS – SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUES ......... 35


X. CONCLUSION ............................ ..................... 39


Appendices


A. Citations Issued–Abatement Action


B. Significant Safety and Health Hazards–107th Congress 


C. OSHA Safety and Health Standards Applied During Inspections


D. Schedule of Inspections –107th Congress


E. Personnel and Methods


F. Employing Office Comments


iii 
November 19, 2002 

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Speaker

U.S. House of Representatives

H-232, The Capitol Building

Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

President Pro Tempore of the Senate

United States Senate

S-311, The Capitol Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker and Senator Byrd:

Section 215(e) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1314(e), 

requires the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance to conduct periodic inspections, at 

least once each Congress, of all Legislative Branch facilities for compliance with employee 

health and safety standards. On the basis of such inspection, the General Counsel is directed to 

prepare and submit a report identifying the violations uncovered, describing the steps necessary 

to achieve their abatement, and assessing the associated risks to employee health and safety. The 

inspection of facilities during the One Hundred Seventh Congress has been conducted, the 

results have been compiled, and the mandated Report is herewith delivered. 

The events of September 11, 2001, have influenced the focus of this Report. As we 

show, many occupational safety and health standards deal directly with the planning, training, 

operations and equipment necessary to minimize the casualties of terrorism. Subjects like 

emergency evacuation, fire suppression, emergency communication methods, and 
Page 2

November 19, 2002 ltr.

chemical/biological response plans are regulated in detail. These regulations, promulgated at a

time when most fire, explosions and toxic releases were considered accidental, will serve both

employers and employees well in an age when such hazards are often inflicted deliberately. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Gary Green 

General Counsel 

Enclosure 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The focus of this Report is emergency preparedness. Several Occupational Safety and 

Health Act (“OSHA”) standards bear directly on this issue. This Report describes those 

standards and the state of compliance by the Legislative Branch. We have found significant 

improvement in this area since our first Report in 1996, and particularly since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001. There are still, however, some important deficiencies, 

specifically in matters such as emergency action plans, evacuation plans, chemical/biological 

response, communications, and fire safety systems, which we discuss in detail in this Report. 

There has also been an overall improvement in workplace safety during the 107th 

Congress. Our inspectors found that most House and Senate offices had an effective emergency 

plan which was well communicated to employees. Of particular note were the actions of the 

Capitol Police in coordinating the individual office plans with overall evacuation plans for 

Capitol Hill. There remain deficiencies in the audibility of fire alarm systems, primarily in the 

Capitol, in communication systems for both employees and responders and in fire and life safety 

systems. 

In our inspections of non-office facilities, we found significant safety issues relating to 

blockage of fire extinguishers and sprinklers, inadequate fire alarm systems, blockage of egress 

routes, inadequate exit signs and emergency lighting, failure to inspect fire extinguishers and 

electrical hazards. 

Our Report also notes the markedly improved safety record of the Architect of the 

Capitol (“AOC”). In our 1998 Report to the Congress, we stated that the AOC had the highest 

accident rate among all federal government agencies. That rate has been reduced in the most 

recent two-year period. This improvement is due, we believe, to the Architect’s commitment to 

improving the safety of working conditions on Capitol Hill and to the recruitment of competent 

and motivated professional safety staff. 

For the reasons elaborated in this Report, we believe that the Congress and its agencies 

must, particularly in light of the continuing threat to our institutions, devote increased oversight 

and resources to occupational safety and health issues. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (“CAA”) requires the General Counsel of 

the Office of Compliance to inspect facilities in the Legislative Branch for compliance with 

occupational safety and health standards at least once each Congress. The General Counsel is 

required to report the results to the Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 

and employing offices responsible for correcting violations. 

Safety and health inspections for the 107th Congress were conducted between April and 

July 2002, and at other times during this Congress. They included all Legislative Branch 

buildings and other facilities in the Washington, D.C. area which serve as places of employment 

covered by the Act. Approximately 30,000 employees work in the covered facilities. These 

facilities encompass about 20 million square feet of space, including the Capitol, the House and 

Senate chambers and office buildings, the Library of Congress, and the power plant that provides 

heating and air conditioning for the Capitol complex. In addition to office space, the facilities 

contain warehouses, workshops, storage facilities, electrical and mechanical equipment. The 

inspections and other investigations which form the basis for this Report were performed by the 

staff of the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance, assisted by leading fire and life safety 

consultants. 

All of the employing offices mentioned in this Report were given an advance 

opportunity to comment on the draft. Their comments were carefully considered and, where 

appropriate, adopted, before the draft was approved for publication. 

This Report is being released in two different formats. First, a detailed confidential 

version has been prepared which is intended as a basis for action by the responsible management 

officials, and to inform interested Committees and Members of the Congress. The second 

format, intended for public consideration, omits some detail in the interest of security, but still 

seeks to convey a fair characterization of the results of the General Counsel’s inspections. 

All of the citations issued during the two year period covered are summarized in 

Appendix A. In Appendix B, we list all of the deficiencies noted during our inspections which 

were not the subject of citations, usually because the responsible employing office immediately 

effected or initiated an appropriate abatement of the hazard. Appendix C summarizes the 

pertinent OSHA regulations which governed our safety determinations. Appendix D shows the 

schedule of inspections upon which this report is based. Appendix E identifies the investigators 

2
and their methods. Appendix F incorporates employing office comments. 

III. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 

The events of September 11, 2001, brought emergency preparedness to the forefront in 

workplaces throughout the country. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 

Pentagon in September were followed by the release of anthrax spores, by as yet unknown 

persons, in 16 congressional offices in October 2001. These events dramatically altered 

attitudes and safety margins in the Legislative Branch. The risk of future attacks makes it 

essential that all Legislative Branch employers promptly and effectively implement 

comprehensive emergency action and emergency response plans for chemical and biological 

threats, and achieve full compliance with related occupational safety and health standards. 

The Congressional Accountability Act made workplace health and safety requirements --

including the regulations governing emergency evacuation procedures and emergency response 

training and equipment -- fully applicable to the Legislative Branch. While the relevance of 

these regulations may have been less apparent when the Act was first passed by Congress, their 

importance cannot be overstated in the current climate. 

A. OSHA Standards 

Relating to Emergency

Emergency response vehicle near U.S. Capitol during Anthrax incidents October 2001 

3
Planning And Preparedness 

The primary OSHA standards applicable to emergency preparedness are: 

• 29 CFR 1910.38 - Employee Emergency and Fire Prevention Plans 

(“Emergency Action Plans”) 

• 29 CFR 1910.120(q) - Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

(“Chemical/Biological Response”) 

• 29 CFR 1910.134 - Respiratory Protection 

The Emergency Action regulations require Legislative Branch employers to develop and 

implement plans to ensure that all employees know what to do in an emergency. The 

Chemical/Biological1

 Response regulations require employers charged with the duty of actually 

responding to emergencies, such as the Capitol Police, to develop and implement plans 

informing their employees of assigned responsibilities and how to effectively perform them, and 

to provide adequate protective equipment. The respiratory protection standard mandates that all 

employees required to wear respiratory protection be equipped with National Institute of 

Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”)-certified respirators appropriate for their intended 

use. A written respiratory protection program, including adequate training in the use of 

respirators, is also required. Employees given respirators for optional use must also be given 

appropriate training, and be covered by a less extensive respiratory protection program. 

Compliance with fire and life safety standards is essential to emergency preparedness. 

The standards require employee emergency and fire prevention plans; adequate means of egress; 

fire suppression systems; fire detection and employee alarm systems, and proper storage of 

flammable and combustible materials. The status of Legislative Branch compliance with the fire 

and life safety standards is addressed in Chapter V of this Report. 

Our emphasis on the need for effective emergency planning and response is not a recent 

development. The first Biennial Occupational Health and Safety Report of the General Counsel, 

issued in June 1996, recommended that a comprehensive fire and emergency action plan be 

developed for the Legislative Branch, and that coordinated plans be developed for each 

1

 “Chemical/Biological” is a shorthand term used to collectively describe potentially 

hazardous chemical, biological, radiological, explosive and industrial substances. 

4 
employing office as quickly as possible: 

The most significant finding of the inspections was the 

fragmented, largely uncoordinated and insufficient planning for a 

fire or bomb emergency. As this is the most likely type of hazard 

to be faced by all employees and by the public, improvements in 

this area should be made as quickly as possible. (1996 Report at 

p.10.) 

The importance of emergency planning was emphasized in subsequent reports. The 

General Counsel’s November 1998 Biennial Report stated: 

The steps taken by the Capitol Police and other employing offices 

have resulted in notable improvements in emergency planning in 

the Capitol Hill complex. Nevertheless, the inspections conducted 

during this Congress revealed that there are still serious and 

widespread problems. (1998 Report at p.14.) 

Our most recent Biennial Report, issued in December 2000, focused on fire safety, 

largely based on deficient fire protection systems and emergency procedures brought to light by 

a 

series of fires in the Capitol complex during 1998 -1999. Now, an even more forceful response 

to these critical needs is required. 

B. Emergency Action and Evacuation Plans 

OSHA regulations governing the development and implementation of employee 

emergency plans, made applicable to Congress by Section 215 of the CAA and codified at 29 

CFR 1910.38, require each employer to have an Emergency Action Plan, and communicate it to 

employees. Employers with more than 10 employees must provide a written plan to their 

employees. The plan must establish the procedures to be used in case of an emergency and must 

include the following items at minimum: 

• Emergency escape procedures and emergency escape route assignments; 

• Procedures for employees who remain to operate critical operations before 

evacuation; 

• Procedures to account for all employees after emergency evacuation is completed; 

• Rescue and medical duties for employees who are to perform them; 

• Means of reporting fires and other emergencies to responsible officials; and 

• Names or job titles of persons or departments to be contacted for further 

information. 

5
Equally important, the employer must provide training on the Plan to all employees to help 

ensure its effectiveness in the event of an actual emergency. This would normally include 

unannounced evacuation drills conducted on a regular basis. In addition, the Plan must designate 

an individual within each office as the emergency coordinator. 

The regulations addressing emergency action plans also require employers to establish 

and maintain an employee alarm system that promptly and reliably alerts all employees of the 

need to evacuate in an emergency, in accordance with the requirements found in the OSHA fire 

protection regulations, 29 CFR 1910.165. 

The importance of emergency evacuation plans and training cannot be overstated. Two 

large employers at the World Trade Center in New York, Morgan Stanley and the U.S. Customs 

Service, were able to get most of their employees to safety before the towers collapsed. Both 

employers attribute their success to the time and effort they invested in improving their 

emergency evacuation planning and training after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The 

likelihood of saving lives in an emergency evacuation is greatly increased by thorough and 

comprehensive planning for all possible contingencies, including attempting to plan for the 

unexpected (e.g., blocked doors, no lights); updating the evacuation plan as needed; providing 

training to all employees, including new and part-time employees; and conducting 

frequent practice drills. 

In November 2001, the Office of Compliance (“OOC”) issued a Bulletin providing 

guidance on emergency evacuation planning and a model for individual office evacuation plans. 

Both were utilized by most Congressional offices, and are posted on the OOC web site at 

www.compliance.gov. 

During the current OSHA inspections, we assisted Capitol Police and AOC officials 

responsible for fire safety in revising the existing emergency evacuation brochures for the 

Capitol and each of the House and Senate office buildings. We also helped develop and 

distribute a model for individual office plans to supplement the building plans that had 

previously been distributed. 

One of our particular concerns was the designation of exit routes for each Congressional 

office. Fire drills had shown that certain exits were overtaxed. We had previously identified 

inadequate exit capacity as one of the major fire safety problems in many Capitol Hill Buildings. 

6
See 2000 Biennial Occupational Health and Safety Report, at p. 6. Working with the Capitol 

Police, we coordinated the designation of exit routes to avoid or minimize this problem in the 

future. 

During our congressional office-by-office inspections, we found a high level of 

compliance. Virtually every office had an emergency evacuation plan containing the elements 

required by the standard, and the plans were well communicated to employees. These plans, 

coupled with more frequent and unannounced evacuation drills now being conducted by the 

Capitol Police, will reduce the dangers to employees in actual emergencies. 

In contrast, we found that the Library of Congress (“LOC”) Police management has 

failed to play a significant role in coordinating emergency evacuation plans in the LOC 

buildings. We discovered during our inspection that the vast majority of LOC offices still had 

outdated and incomplete emergency evacuation plans. The most common date shown on 

individual office evacuation postings was 1996, and many of them listed as key emergency 

response staff employees who had already retired or transferred to other LOC divisions. Many 

employees we interviewed stated that they had never seen the plan for their office. This situation 

was unacceptable even before September 11, 2001. It must be remedied promptly. 

We intend aggressively to pursue compliance with OSHA standards relating to 

Emergency Action and Evacuation. We urge LOC officials to correct existing hazards and 

complete and adopt a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan, integrating the responsibilities 

of the LOC Police, as soon as possible. 

Emergency Action and Evacuation Training –Library of Congress Police 

On October 5, 2001, we received 43 individual Requests for Inspection from LOC Police 

officers complaining about the lack of training in emergency action and evacuation procedures. 

Following an investigation, the General Counsel concluded that, at a time when other law 

enforcement organizations were strengthening their security procedures and their emergency 

preparedness, the LOC Police management had yet to meet the basic requirements. While LOC 

Police officers have significant responsibilities in connection with emergency evacuations, 

management has failed to develop written procedures describing many of their duties or how 

they are to perform them. Accordingly, the General Counsel issued a citation alleging that, in 

7
violation of OSHA Emergency Action standards, the LOC lacked written emergency action 

procedures covering the designated responsibilities that LOC Police officers are expected to 

perform in an emergency, and had failed to review their assigned responsibilities with them. 

The LOC was required to provide a certificate of abatement demonstrating that 

management had developed and implemented the requisite written emergency procedures and 

review the procedures relevant to each officer’s duties with the officer initially when the 

procedures are developed, and whenever duties are changed. LOC management provided a 

certificate of abatement on August 16, 2002, and copies of revised General Orders. The General 

Counsel has noted some apparent deficiencies in these plans, however, and has requested 

additional information in order to assess compliance before this case can be closed. 

The case also raises questions about the adequacy of training and protective equipment 

for LOC police during emergency response involving possible exposure to chemical or 

biological 

toxins. The General Counsel is currently monitoring LOC Police compliance with the relevant 

OSHA standards. 

Emergency Evacuation-Jefferson Building Fire 

The General Counsel issued a citation involving a failure by the LOC Police to evacuate 

the Jefferson Building when a fire occurred there on April 3, 2002. Following a Request for 

Inspection filed by the LOC Professional Guild, we conducted an investigation and determined 

that the LOC Police officials on duty had summoned the D.C. Fire Department, but failed to 

evacuate the building, in response to reports of the fire. This action directly contravenes the 

management procedures for both the Jefferson and Adams buildings, which mandate immediate 

evacuation whenever there is a report of fire. Accordingly, the General Counsel cited the LOC 

for a violation of the OSHA regulation requiring notification to employees as called for in the 

employer’s emergency action plan, or as required for sufficient reaction time to allow for safe 

evacuation. See 29 CFR 1910.165(b)(1). LOC management responded to the citation with a 

8
certificate of abatement reporting that police officers had been given written notification of these 

requirements, and that future reminders would be provided at police roll calls. 

During 2002, a number of other Requests for Inspection were filed by LOC employees 

and the Professional Guild. The number (12) is a sharp increase over previously filed requests. 

Many of the Requests alleged serious fire or life safety deficiencies and are under investigation. 

Effective Alarm and Communications Systems 

OSHA regulations require that employee alarms be capable of being perceived above 

ambient noise levels, and recognizable as a signal to evacuate. See 29 CFR 1910.165(b)(2), (3). 

Nonetheless, LOC management has acknowledged that, a year after the terrorist attacks, 

employees continue routinely to report that alarms and public address messages are inaudible in 

various work spaces throughout the LOC buildings. Problems with the audibility of alarms are 

reported by employees throughout the Capitol complex. An engineering firm has completed a 

study for AOC assessing the audibility and intelligibility of fire alarm systems throughout the 

Capitol complex. AOC has begun designing a complex-wide fire detection and monitoring 

system which will report all alarms directly to the Capitol Police and the appropriate building 

superintendent, and will activate the public address system. 

C. Emergency Response to Suspected Chemical and Biological Attacks 

Regulations governing the development and implementation of Chemical/Biological 

Response Plans, codified at 29 CFR 1910.120, require employers who provide or assist 

emergency response services to develop and implement a written Emergency Response Plan. 

While Emergency Action Plans are used to ensure that all employees know what to do in an 

emergency, Emergency Response Plans are directed at employees actually required to identify, 

respond to, and control emergencies, such as designated Capitol Police and LOC Police officers. 

The Emergency Response Plan must be made available for inspection and copying by all 

employees assigned to respond in such an emergency. 

9
Such plans must include, at minimum, the following items: 

• Pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties 

• A description of personnel roles 

• Lines of authority and communication procedures 

• Emergency recognition and prevention 

• Site security and control 

• Safe distances and places of refuge 

• Evacuation routes and procedures 

• Decontamination procedures 

• Emergency medical treatment and first aid 

• Emergency alert and response procedures 

• Personal protective and emergency equipment 

• Critique of actual response incidents and follow-up 

Designated employees must be given the level of training and equipment required to perform 

their assigned roles in the event of an emergency, such as a suspected hazardous chemical or 

biological release. Annual refresher training is also required. 

The OSHA Emergency Response regulations also require establishment of a site-specific 

Incident Command System (“ICS”) to be headed by the most senior emergency response official 

at the scene. All emergency responders and their communications must be “coordinated and 

controlled through the individual in charge of the ICS . . .” See 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3)(i). 

Recent analysis of the events at the World Trade Center indicates that inadequate 

communications equipment and training may have been responsible for slowed evacuation and 

increased loss of life when the towers collapsed. Communications were adversely affected by 

inadequate equipment, conflicting radio traffic and an inability to reach units positioned in 

remote locations. See McKinsey and Company Report Concerning the New York Fire 

Department’s Response on September 11 (August 15, 2002), at pages 7-8, 18-19, 85-97. 

Investigation by our office, particularly in the cases described here, indicates that the 

communications requirements of 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3)(i) should be carefully reviewed by 

Legislative Branch employers and police officials. 

10
Decontamination After Exiting the Hot Zone 

Anthrax - Emergency 

Response Training & Procedures 

The Fraternal Order of Police Labor Committee filed a request for inspection relating to 

the October 2001 discovery of anthrax spores in Senator Daschle’s and other offices. The Union 

alleged that the U.S. Capitol Police management had: 

• Failed to take measures to secure the site and control access to 

Senator Daschle’s office and other areas after determining that 

anthrax was present; 

• Permitted officers to enter the Senator’s office and other areas 

without the requisite personal protective equipment, including 

positive-pressure self-contained breathing apparatus; and 

• Failed to implement appropriate decontamination procedures for 

individuals who had been exposed to the anthrax release. 

The allegations were also reported in the press. See e.g. “Police Union Charges That Leaders 

Endangered Them,” The Hill (October 31, 2001). 

U.S. Capitol Police management (“USCP”) did not cooperate in the General Counsel’s 

ensuing investigation. According to the USCP, the needs of Capitol Hill security dictated that no 

information be shared with investigators unless the General Counsel first executed an agreement 

that would give absolute and unreviewable authority to the USCP to determine what information 

is “confidential” and who is entitled to receive it. The General Counsel concluded that under 

such conditions his statutory authority to investigate and disclose alleged safety and health 

hazards would be fatally compromised. Accordingly, he declined to execute the USCP proposal, 

sought to negotiate alternative arrangements, and continued the investigation without USCP’s 

11
cooperation. 

Eventually, we concluded that Capitol Police management had failed to follow 

appropriate procedures to protect emergency response personnel during the anthrax attacks, 

exposing officers and others to the danger of anthrax contamination. Moreover, we concluded 

that the actions of the Capitol Police during these incidents were the predictable result of the lack 

of an appropriate Emergency Response Plan governing training, equipment and procedures. 

Accordingly, the General Counsel issued citations, alleging that the Capitol Police Board had 

violated the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1910.120(q). This standard requires employers to 

develop and implement a Chemical/Biological Emergency Response Plan addressing site 

security and control, the provision of personal protective equipment, and decontamination 

procedures. 

Thereafter, following extensive discussions with our staff, with OSHA, and with other 

experts, USCP under new leadership, certified that it has implemented a comprehensive 

Emergency Response Plan for dealing with hazardous substance releases, and, as this Report 

goes to press, is apparently implementing the plan as required by law. The General Counsel has 

met with new Chief Terrance W. Gainer, and has recently requested and received additional 

information regarding implementation of the plan. Whether or not any further enforcement 

proceedings are warranted is now under evaluation by the General Counsel’s staff. 

In addition, discussions with Chief Gainer have resulted in informal agreement on a 

method for protecting confidential information without impairing Office of Compliance 

investigations. 

D. Respiratory Protection Programs 

Regulations addressing the use of respiratory protection are found at 29 CFR 

1910.134(d)(1). All employees required to wear respiratory protection must be equipped with a 

NIOSH - certified respirator that is appropriate for the intended use. The regulations also state 

12
that employees required to wear respirators must be covered by a written respiratory protection 

program detailing workplace-specific procedures. Key items to be included in the program are: 

• Proper selection of respirators 

• Medical evaluation of employees required to wear respirators 

• Testing for proper fit 

• Use and maintenance 

• Training 

• Annual evaluation of the program. 

All employees given respirators for optional use also must be given appropriate training. In 

addition, the employer must implement those elements of a respiratory protection program 

necessary to ensure that any employee given a respirator for optional use is medically able to use 

the respirator, and that the respirator is properly cleaned, stored and maintained. 

In early 2002 the Capitol Police Board purchased emergency negative pressure 

respirators (“escape masks”). The Capitol Police have distributed them to their officers, with 

some training at roll call sessions, and to Congressional staff members in the Capitol, House and 

Senate office buildings. LOC management has announced that it will purchase the escape masks 

for all LOC employees. A Capitol Police officer has filed a Request for Inspection regarding the 

safety and effectiveness of the escape masks. 

The Senate Sergeant at Arms informs us that these masks have been tested by the U.S. 

Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (“SBCCOM”) and have been found by 

SBCCOM to meet its own performance criteria. According to NIOSH, however, the proper 

criteria and testing have not yet been established for these devices, especially for use in a civilian 

or indoor environment. 

Based on our preliminary review of the escape masks, including consultation with OSHA 

experts, we have identified several issues of concern. First, the masks have not been approved 

by NIOSH, and in fact, NIOSH does not have test criteria in place for this type of respirator. As 

noted above, the respiratory protection standard requires that respirators that employees must 

wear on the job are approved for their intended use. NIOSH is planning to have certification 

test criteria in place in 2003. 

13
Second, as the name implies, the masks must be used solely for emergency escape from a 

contaminated area. They are unsuitable for use by employees responding to an attack, such as 

the Capitol and LOC Police officers, and it would therefore be a violation of the regulations to 

require the officers to wear them while performing emergency response duties. Further, care 

must be taken to prevent the mask from being prematurely opened and exposed to air, since even 

the ingredients in a normal room environment will degrade the filtration mechanism in the mask. 

Periodic inspection of the masks is important to assure that they will function if needed. In 

addition, no tests have been conducted to evaluate the mask’s effectiveness against a large 

number of potential toxins. Moreover, the escape mask does not allow wearers to speak, since 

users must keep both a nose clip and mouth bit on to ensure the limited protection the mask 

offers. (During an emergency, communication between emergency response workers is 

essential.) Finally, the escape mask does not offer skin protection, so that employees entering or 

required to remain on the scene of a chemical attack would require full body chemical protection 

in addition to proper respiratory protection. 

If employers wish to limit use of the escape mask to use by staff and visitors during an 

emergency evacuation, the respirators would not be required to meet all elements of the 

respiratory protection standard. Employers must, however, determine that use of the respirator 

will not in itself create a hazard, and must implement the necessary elements of a respiratory 

protection program, including ensuring that any employee using the respirator is medically able 

to do so, and that the respirator is properly cleaned, stored and maintained. See 29 CFR 

1910.134(c)(2). 

The escape masks, properly used, may furnish effective, if limited, protection during an 

emergency evacuation. But employers and employees must be properly trained in their use and 

be aware of the inherent limitations of the masks. 

E. Interaction of Security and Safety 

As a society, Americans expect that their political and military leadership will seek to 

limit the dissemination of certain kinds of information in times of crisis. It is, of course, in our 

own interest to avoid disclosure of our vulnerabilities in a way that stimulates or enables 

aggressors. We also expect, as Americans, to be warned by the proper authorities about the risks 

14
they know we will face as individuals: storms, epidemics, war. Sometimes these two 

expectations conflict with each other. One illustration of that conflict is a case that arose under 

the OSHA provisions of the CAA this year involving the Capitol Police Board (“CPB”). 

After the General Counsel issued citations against the CPB for failing to establish an 

Emergency Response Plan, CPB filed a special motion with the Office of Compliance’s Board of 

Directors requesting permission to deviate from the explicit requirement of the CAA that every 

citation be prominently posted so that employees affected would be aware of the hazard. CPB 

argued to the Board that the substance of the citations was “sensitive law enforcement and 

security information” and that the citations should, in the interests of security, neither be posted 

nor even divulged to any CPB employees. The General Counsel opposed the CPB insofar as it 

sought to deny affected employees the opportunity to read the citations. The Board noted that 

the CAA provided no explicit guidance on the question of how to handle issues affected by 

security concerns, and proceeded to decide the case by striking a balance between the competing 

considerations: 

Both of these responsibilities [the CPB’s and the General 

Counsel’s] have been rendered more urgent by the events of the 

past six months. Indeed, in the ill-defined area of ‘environmental 

terrorism’, the two agencies’ duties overlap. However, these 

responsibilities are also characterized by well-founded 

countervailing policies that simultaneously urge confidentiality 

and broad dissemination of the same information, when such 

information is ‘law enforcement security sensitive’ and related to 

health and safety issues. 

That [appropriate] balance of competing statutes, policies, and 

interests is best attained in this case by the adoption of a process 

which ensures, to the greatest extent possible, that the substance of 

the citations at issue remains confidential while, at the same time, 

it is disseminated to responsible representatives of the Capitol 

Police Officers whose health and safety is allegedly at risk. U.S. 

Capitol Police Board, Case No. OSH-1017, Decision and Order at 

p. 4 (April 29, 2002). 

15
The balance struck by the Board resolved the case in the manner sought by the General 

Counsel; but it must be noted that the underlying problems remain very much alive. How will 

the appropriate balance between disclosure and confidentiality be struck the next time an 

employing office concludes that the imperatives of security override the employees’ right to be 

informed? In our view, indiscriminate suppression of sensitive information about imminent 

hazards or vulnerabilities can be counter-productive. An informed and alerted community may 

better protect itself against the risks of illness and injury, even when terrorism is the source. 

IV. SAFETY OF IRRADIATED MAIL--A SECOND LOOK 

The irradiation of Congressional mail represents the first use of this process to eradicate 

anthrax spores from the mail delivery system. Since January 2002, when the United States 

Postal Service began delivering irradiated mail to Congressional offices, numerous employees 

complained of adverse health symptoms apparently caused by contact with irradiated mail, 

including headaches, nausea, nose bleeds, rashes, eye and skin irritation and similar symptoms. 

On February 6 and 26, 2002, we received requests for inspection from two House of 

Representatives employees concerned about the health effects of handling irradiated mail. On 

February 11, we received a request for inspection from Senator Charles E. Grassley regarding 

the health effects of irradiated mail and of the Hart building decontamination process.2 In 

response to these requests, we initiated an investigation, as required by the Congressional 

Accountability Act. 

2 Neither air sampling in the Hart Building nor employee survey data provided any 

indication of possible adverse health risks associated with the decontamination process. 

Accordingly, the General Counsel closed the Hart Building investigation on September 16, 2002. 

16 
Hart Building Anthrax Response Workers 

Report of the General Counsel 

On July 2, 2002, we issued a Report of Investigation of the Health Effects of Irradiated 

Mail. The report described our investigation in detail, and summarized our findings as follows: 

Handling irradiated mail for substantial periods of time may be the 

cause of adverse health symptoms in a significant number of 

Legislative Branch employees. These symptoms have continued to 

be evident in a recent re-survey by the Office of Compliance, 

although the number of affected employees and the severity of 

symptoms has declined. We do not currently have enough 

information to reach any final conclusion on whether there is any 

serious health risk from extended periods of mail handling under 

existing working conditions. We do recommend that additional 

studies . . . be undertaken in order to attempt to reach a firm 

conclusion on any health risks to which employees may be 

exposed. We believe these studies are essential to safeguard the 

right of covered employees to work in a place free from recognized 

hazards that are causing or are likely to cause serious physical 

harm. 

See General Counsel’s Report, at p. 14. The full text of the Report is available on the 

Office of Compliance web site at www.compliance.gov. 

17
Pending completion of these additional studies, we recommended that health officials 

monitor on a regular basis those employees who report symptoms which they believe are based 

on handling irradiated mail. We requested that employees experiencing symptoms see a 

physician and also advise OOC. We also recommended that several interim steps be taken, 

including making gloves (preferably non-latex) available to employees; airing out mail prior to 

delivery; and, in general, considering reduced exposure when symptoms are present by limiting 

the amount of time individual employees spend in mail handling. 

In recommending follow-up study, our July report differed from a report on irradiated 

mail symptoms prepared earlier by NIOSH, and released on April 23, 2002, by the Legislative 

Mail Task Force. NIOSH concluded that “multiple factors” were the likely cause of employee 

symptoms, including damage to the paper resulting from the irradiation process; odors which can 

trigger symptoms in some individuals; humidity levels in some areas, and heightened awareness 

and resultant employee stress from the terrorist attacks. See NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation -

Irradiated Mail Handling (April 2, 2002), at p. 34. The NIOSH Report summary stated that, “We 

did not find evidence suggesting the potential for long-term health effects from handling 

irradiated mail”, and did not recommend any additional safety and health studies relating to 

potential exposure of employees chemical by-products in irradiated mail. 

Recent Developments Regarding Irradiated Mail 

We have obtained copies of two investigative reports which were not available to us 

when we released our July 2002 Report. Both reports substantially confirm our findings that low 

levels of known chemical irritants are present in irradiated mail. The first, prepared by the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Hazardous Materials Response Division 

(“NOAA/HMRD”), represents the results of a January 2002 investigation into reported allergic 

reactions to irradiated mail at the Commerce Department’s Herbert C. Hoover Building. 

18
The NOAA/HMRD team concluded that low levels of volatile organic compounds were 

present in irradiated mail, and that it was possible that a small number of individuals could be 

sensitive to these compounds at the low levels detected. The compounds detected were the same 

in many cases as those we found. See NOAA’s Report on the Scientific Investigations Into 

Reported Allergic Reactions to Irradiated Mail at the Herbert C. Hoover Building on January 10, 

2002, at p. 3 (Executive Summary). In language similar to that found in our own Report, the 

NOAA Report proceeds to state that: 

Given all the data generated and obtained by this and other teams, 

it remains impossible to establish a firm causal connection between 

the chemical compounds found in the irradiated mail and the 

symptoms and complaints of (DOC) employees . . . While the 

authors of this report cannot definitively say that chemicals 

generated in the irradiation process caused allergic reactions, 

neither can we say they did not. There is, however, ample 

chemical and circumstantial evidence to suggest a connection 

between the mail and some of the symptoms reported. 

See NOAA Report, at p. 3. 

We also received a draft report prepared by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (“DARPA”), which presents an analysis of mail samples taken from various Postal 

Service facilities during February - March 2002. This report also was not available to us when 

we released our July 2002 Report. DARPA found that most of the chemical compounds 

identified in the facilities are regularly observed in other office settings. However, the chemicals 

identified from samples taken in early February in mail sorting areas contained an unusual 

amount of known chemical irritants and corrosives. DARPA also found several of the chemical 

irritants which we found in our study. 

The Office of Attending Physician (“OAP”) also reportedly performed a follow-up 

survey in May and June 2002 of 131 employees who had originally complained to OAP of 

symptoms. The survey found that 15 per cent of the employees had returned to the office for a 

follow-up visit, or reported that they were continuing to experience symptoms, and that an 

unspecified number of staffers with persistent or severe cases were sent to their own physicians 

for follow-up care. See “Hill Mail Getting Less Radiation”, Roll Call, (August 15, 2002). 

Since the publication of our July report, we solicited and obtained a proposal for a 

19
follow-up employee exposure study. The proposal was submitted by Dr. Clifford Mitchell and 

Dr. Timothy Buckley of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. The proposal 

submitted a design for a workplace exposure assessment which is intended to better understand 

the exposures employees may face when handling irradiated mail. 

Following the publication of our Report, we also met with members of the Legislative 

Mail Task Force, and have provided them with the detailed scientific evidence upon which our 

Report was based. We are encouraged to learn that, as recommended in our Report, the Armed 

Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (“AFFRI”) and DARPA will continue to study, on an 

ongoing basis, the handling of irradiated mail. We have provided the Johns Hopkins proposal to 

members of the Task Force and sought their comments. The General Counsel and the Task 

Force have established a joint subcommittee of technical and scientific experts which will study 

all of the available data and provide objective evaluation of the feasibility and proper design of a 

further workplace exposure assessment. 

Another significant development appears to be the Postal Service’s decision to stop 

bagging mail destined for Congressional offices. Instead, mail is placed in open boxes, thus 

allowing it to air out, presumably accelerating dissipation of chemical irritants before delivery to 

staff members. Consideration is now also being given to irradiating the mail by means of X-ray 

technology, rather than the e-beam process currently used for Congressional mail. X-ray 

technology is believed to be less damaging to the mail, and therefore less likely to produce 

chemical irritants. 

We will continue to monitor scientific data and employee symptoms associated with 

irradiated mail handling, and will report on the results of further study of this novel issue. 

20
V. FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY–CURRENT 

STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMPLIANCE 

Since 1996, the General Counsel’s reports to the Congress have stressed that fire and 

bomb emergencies were the most likely hazard facing the Legislative Branch. 

Our 1998 biennial Report on Occupational Safety and Health Inspections, emphasized: 

Several fires that occurred during 1998 highlighted the need for review of 

fire protection and life safety systems and firefighting procedures in 

Capitol Hill buildings... NFPA codes contain criteria for the manner and 

frequency of testing, inspecting and maintaining fire protection and life 

safety equipment of systems. A testing and maintenance program that 

closely adheres to these criteria should be established. In addition, 

projects to update fire protection systems, including sprinkler and alarm 

systems should be accelerated. Additional staffing may be needed to 

accomplish these objectives. (1998 Report at p. 16) 

In the 2000 biennial Report on Occupational Safety and Health Inspections, fire safety 

was again highlighted. That report summarized our comprehensive fire and emergency response 

inspection of the primary Legislative Branch buildings: the U.S. Capitol, the Russell, Dirksen 

and Hart Senate Office Buildings and the Cannon, Longworth and Rayburn House Office 

Buildings: 

These buildings which together contain over 7 million square feet of 

space, serve as the place of employment of over 12,000 employees 

covered by the Congressional Accountability Act and are visited daily by 

tens of thousands of members of the public. 

... 

The inspectors found that while there was some difference in 

safety from one building to another, the overall level of fire safety 

was far below that of most other American office buildings of 

similar size and age. Most of the problems found in the buildings 

have existed for many years. The most significant deficiencies 

include: lack of fire barriers to retard the spread of fire and smoke, 

inadequate exit signs and exit capacity, deficient emergency 

lighting, limited sprinkler coverage, and dangerous storage of 

flammable or (and) toxic materials. There was a regrettable 

consistency throughout the complex in a lack of proper testing and 

maintenance of major electrical system and of fire safety systems 

such as sprinklers, suppression systems and emergency 

preparedness (2000 Report at pp. 5-6) (emphasis added). 

The original decision by our office to undertake a comprehensive assessment of fire and 

21
bomb safety in Capitol Hill buildings was prompted by several factors, including employee 

Requests for Inspection under Section 215(c) of the Congressional Accountability Act, and a 

series of fires in 1998 which had demonstrated deficiencies in the capacity to prevent and cope 

with such emergencies. 

Comprehensive fire and safety inspections were conducted primarily in three phases 

resulting in separate reports: 

• Fire Safety Inspections of Congressional buildings–January 2000 

• Fire Safety Inspections–Library of Congress buildings–January 2001 

• Fire Safety Inspection–Capitol Power Plant–July 2001. 

Each of these reports is available in a public version through the Office of Compliance. 

In addition, detailed confidential analyses of specific fire and life safety defects were furnished 

to each employing office of the legislative branch and to Congressional Oversight Committees. 

During the 107th Congress, the two final reports in this series were issued. These are discussed 

below. 

Fire and Life Safety in the Library of Congress–January 2001 

This Report was based on comprehensive inspections of all Library of Congress 

buildings. The Report noted that the historical and cultural significance of LOC buildings 

should -- and can -- be taken into account in implementing necessary 

fire and life safety measures. 

The primary occupational safety and health standards applicable 

to fire and life safety, which form the basis for the General Counsel’s 

inspection and report on the LOC buildings, are summarized in 

Appendix C to this Report. They include adequate means of egress in 

the event of fire or other catastrophe; employee emergency plans and 

fire prevention plans; appropriate storage of flammable and combustible Old Edison phonographic 

cylinders made of highly 

materials, availability of fire extinguishers; automatic sprinkler systems; flammable cellulose nitrate 

fire detection, and employee alarm systems. In addition, the National Fire Protection 

Association (“NFPA”) has issued guidance specifically addressing the problems of retrofitting 

historic structures to meet modern safety standards. See NFPA 914-2001 Code of Fire 

22
Protection for Historic Structures. This standard allows for flexible application of fire safety 

principles and requirements using performance-based options. 

The most significant deficiencies found in our inspection of the Library of Congress 

buildings were: 

Inadequate or ineffective fire barriers to retard the spread of fire 

and smoke, inadequate exit signs, deficient smoke detection and 

emergency lighting, inadequate sprinkler coverage, dangerous 

storage of flammable and toxic materials...lack of proper testing 

and maintenance of major electrical systems and fire safety 

systems, such as fire alarms, smoke detectors, sprinklers, 

suppression systems and emergency generators. 

In March 2001, the General Counsel issued seven (7) citations based on the fire safety 

inspection of the LOC buildings, requiring the AOC and the LOC to jointly initiate programs to 

abate the following violations: 

• Storage of flammable materials without following recognized precautions 

• Exit enclosures which fail to provide adequate fire resistance because of 

penetrations made for pipes, ducts, and cables. 

• Fire doors not maintained to avoid undue danger to occupants. 

• Fire extinguishing systems not in proper operating condition. 

• Unprotected openings and inadequate fire resistance in book conveyor systems, 

creating a danger to occupants from smoke or toxic fumes. 

• Inadequate energy isolating safety devices. 

• Vertical openings between tiers of book stacks creating danger to occupants from 

smoke or toxic fumes. 

• Exit stairwell and pathways not constructed to avoid spread of toxic fumes and 

fire. 

The AOC and the LOC subsequently initiated programs and sought funding to eliminate 

some of these hazards or substitute reasonably safe alternatives. It is appropriate to note that the 

AOC and LOC staff have worked cooperatively with us to abate some of the hazards we 

observed, and to provide improved safety systems and planning in LOC buildings, but that 

abatement is not yet completed. 

A recent organizational change has, however, come to our attention that could adversely 

impact the LOC’s progress toward addressing fire and life safety deficiencies. An announced 

reorganization would subordinate the Safety Office so that it reports to Facilities Service and 

23
Management, effectively downgrading the Safety Services Officer’s position. It could, we 

believe, prove counterproductive. The LOC’s safety mission should not compete with, or be 

subordinated to, such priorities as maximizing the use of space or completing facilities projects 

as quickly and inexpensively as possible. See 29 CFR 1960.6 (“The head of each agency shall 

designate an official with sufficient authority and responsibility to represent effectively the 

interest and support of the agency head in the management and administration of the agency 

occupational safety and health program. This designated Agency Safety and Health Official 

should be of the rank of Assistant Secretary or of equivalent rank, or equivalent degree of 

responsibility, and shall have sufficient headquarters staff with the necessary training and 

experience.” (Emphasis added) 

The LOC General Counsel responds that 29 CFR 1960.6 is not violated because the 

Director of Integrated Support Services, a high LOC official, has been designated as the 

agency’s primary safety official. But this dual designation is, itself, problematic because of the 

Director’s potentially conflicting responsibilities. Besides, the LOC staff with necessary safety 

training and experience will not, under the announced reorganization, have direct access to the 

Director but will report through another LOC official. 

Progress in improving the fire and life safety status of LOC Buildings is continuing, but 

final completion of necessary improvements is expected to take several years and additional 

funding from Congress. We are compelled to express grave concern over these delays. 

24
Fire and Life Safety–Capitol Power Plant–July 2001 

As part of the General Counsel’s three-part investigation of fire and life safety in 

Legislative Branch buildings, our office conducted an inspection of the operations of the Capitol 

Power Plant. The Plant produces steam and chilled water that provide heating and air 

conditioning to over 15 million square feet of space in and around Capitol Hill. Failure of the 

Capitol Power Plant to operate safely, or a shutdown due to fire or other emergency, could 

seriously impair the functioning of Congress and the Supreme Court. 

Our report on the Capitol Power Plant was issued in July 

2001. It found major hazards threatening the life and safety of 

employees and the functioning of Congress. These included 

dangerous operations being conducted with antiquated equipment 

lacking adequate safety features; inadequate or non-existent fire 

protection systems such as alarms, extinguishers and emergency 

generators; improper electrical equipment and other ignition 

sources in hazardous areas; deficiencies in inspection and 

maintenance of boilers; inadequate emergency lighting systems, 

Lightning protection systems at the and improper storage of flammable gas. plant were upgraded in response to 

Most of the problems found at the Capitol Power Plant an OOC citation. 

have existed for many years. Some of the hazards identified by our inspectors were promptly 

corrected by the Architect of the Capitol. Work orders have been written to correct other 

hazards that can be remedied with existing resources and personnel. Our Report notes, however, 

that there are a number of serious life and fire safety hazards remaining that will require 

additional funds and major construction to remedy, in some cases over a number of years. 

The General Counsel issued a series of six (6) citations in September 2001 for violations 

of OSHA standards relating to the Capitol Power Plant. The office has been monitoring 

abatement by the AOC regarding the plant since that time. Significant progress has been made 

by the staff of the AOC in improving safety conditions at the Capitol Power Plant. 

25
VI. REQUESTS FOR INSPECTION–BIENNIAL REVIEW 

The periodic inspection mandated by statute is not the sole basis for the detection and 

remedy of employment hazards. Section 215(c)(1) of the CAA directs the General Counsel to 

conduct an investigation whenever any employee or employer makes a valid request, and it 

allows employees to maintain anonymity. In the past two years, the General Counsel has opened 

thirty-eight (38) such employee-initiated investigations. Typically, such investigations are 

preceded by an opening conference with the employer, and conclude with a written report of the 

General Counsel’s findings and recommendations. When necessary, the General Counsel’s staff 

is assisted in the investigation by outside experts. 

Most health and safety issues are voluntarily abated in response to the General Counsel’s 

report; occasionally, issuance of a citation has been required as well. But in no cases to date has 

the General Counsel been required to resort to litigation in order to achieve compliance. 

Employee Requests for Inspection have proven an invaluable procedure for uncovering 

hazards that might otherwise have gone unnoticed until a person was injured. All of the 

investigations described in this chapter, and many mentioned elsewhere in this report, resulted 

from employee Requests for Inspection. 

Regrettably, as a consequence of severe budgetary limitations, the backlog of Requests 

awaiting official action by the General Counsel has grown in recent years. A larger budget and a 

larger staff will be needed to keep pace with the widening concern over occupational safety and 

health on Capitol Hill and the increasing complexity of the issues raised. 

Investigations Resolved During the 107th Congress 

About half of the employee Requests filed in this time period involved familiar 

workplace hazards such as exposure to lead paint dust, asbestos, arsenic treated wood dust, 

blood-borne pathogens, pesticides and herbicides. In most cases our investigators did uncover 

unsafe conditions. The principal standards relevant to these investigations are summarized in 

26
Appendix C. The responsible employing offices usually responded promptly to abate the 

hazards that were found. For example: 

• Pesticides and Herbicides – Several employees of the U.S. Botanic Gardens developed 

fungal lung infections or other respiratory diseases

which they attributed to their workplace use of

herbicides, pesticides and other hazardous

chemicals. Following OOC investigations, the

Botanic Gardens discontinued the use of many

hazardous chemicals and hired a full-time safety

specialist. AOC also instituted a comprehensive

respirator and approved personal protective

equipment program in all facilities. Working in wet locations with pesticides

• Lead Dust – Employees repairing the pedestrian tunnel between the Cannon Building 

and the Capitol Building filed a Request for Inspection concerning potential exposure to 

lead paint dust. OSHA standards limit employee exposure to lead. As a result of our 

investigation, the AOC implemented comprehensive lead paint abatement procedures. 

This included purchasing equipment to detect lead in old layers of paint, training 

specialized teams of employees on the OSHA requirements and proper removal of lead 

paint, and offering these employees regular blood-lead screening. 

• Exposure to Blood-Borne Diseases – Union officials for the Library of Congress Police 

filed a Request regarding the use of a disinfectant at police inspection stations. Officers 

required to touch the personal belongings of members of the public were concerned about 

the possible spread of viruses. Following our investigation, the inspection stations are 

now supplied with a type of disinfectant that officers can use if contaminated from blood. 

The disinfectant kills most bacteria and provides protection from blood-borne pathogens. 

In addition, as a consequence of the inspection, Library management has instituted a 

comprehensive blood-borne pathogens program for LOC police officers. 

27
• Fire Safety in Library of Congress Storage Facilities – A recently built Library of 

Congress storage building in Fort Meade, Maryland, did not meet current fire safety 

regulations. The building was designed before the enactment of the CAA, and many firesafety devices were not installed properly even though the building was constructed after 

the law was in force. During our investigation, the AOC made significant fire safety 

renovations to the facility. We then approved a plan of abatement allowing the AOC to 

continue to correct existing deficiencies and, in the meantime, permitting the LOC partial 

use of the facility for book storage. 

• Anthrax - In response to the anthrax release, decontamination procedures were instituted 

by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the Environmental 

Protection Agency and others. An Office of Compliance industrial hygienist assisted by 

providing detailed descriptions of the interiors of the quarantined buildings, and by 

conducting test-sampling of air and dust in the Jefferson, Madison, and Adams buildings. 

Unresolved Investigations 

Other employee Requests filed in this time period have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 

Many of the Requests relate to employees’ heightened safety concerns following the terrorist 

attacks. For example: 

• Overcrowding of Capitol Building – Employees of 

the Capitol Guide Service submitted several 

Requests to us about overcrowding, noise and fire 

safety in the Capitol Building. Following our 

investigation, the Capitol Police Board implemented 

a plan limiting the number of tourists allowed in the 

building. However, many other fire safety issues in 

the Capitol Building, such as the audibility of fire 

alarms, and exit capacity, have not yet been Crowding in the U.S. Capitol Rotunda 

resolved. We are advised that it may be five years

before these problems can be remedied because the AOC is required to follow a lengthy

design, funding and approval process, even for serious fire safety issues violations. This

28
protracted schedule is troublesome. 

• Evacuation – Employees in several buildings on Capitol Hill filed Requests regarding 

evacuation procedures and malfunctioning fire alarms. There has, generally, been good 

progress on emergency evacuation issues. As previously indicated, Congressional offices 

now have adequate evacuation plans. Many hazards relating to exit doors and egress 

routes persist, however, awaiting construction and design work. Until these 

acknowledged hazards are abated, Capitol Hill buildings will continue to undermine the 

safety of occupants in violation of important life safety codes. Other problems remain: 

the LOC personal alarm system for deaf employees was unreliable; one test of evacuation 

for night-time workers in the Hart Building created confusion among employees; and a 

potentially dangerous stairwell gridlock developed during a recent fire alarm evacuation 

of the Madison Building. The increased risks of a terrorist attack intensify the urgency of 

prompt action on all these problems. 

VII. ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL–AN IMPROVING SAFETY RECORD 

In our 1998 Report to the 105th Congress, we pointed out that the Architect of the Capitol 

(“AOC”) had the highest accident rate in the Federal government. In this Report, we are pleased 

to announce that AOC has effected a dramatic improvement in its employee accident and injury 

rate over the past four years. 

We rely here for our information upon the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety 

And Health Administration (“OSHA”), which complies and publishes safety statistics for about 

130 Federal agencies and entities. According to the latest OSHA reports, the AOC has reduced 

its total injury rate from a high of 17.90 in FY 2000 to 11.02 in FY 2001. In addition, AOC’s 

lost-time injury rate – a measure of the more serious employee injuries – declined by almost 80% 

from 10.35 in FY 1998 to 2.07 in FY 2001. AOC’s lost-time injury rate is therefore now very 

close to those experienced at the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Forest Service, two 

29
organizations whose employees engage in comparable work and with whom we have previously 

compared AOC’s rates. 

These statistics represent a substantial 

reduction in employer costs as well as a marked improvement in employee welfare; they also 

correspond with a striking change in AOC safety attitudes which our investigators have noticed 

during all recent inspections. e believe that the two phenomena are related: management and 

employees alike have demonstrated a change in priorities which begins to give safety 

considerations the place they deserve. ises major 

economic benefits and, of course, a reduction in human suffering and disability. 

credit is due to Architect Alan Hantman himself, as well as to the interest in improved workplace 

safety manifested by both the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. 

No. 107-169, at 15 (July 2001); S. Rep. No. 107-37, at 28 (July 2001). 

We also believe that further reductions in AOC’s injury rates can be achieved. The 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration has expressed a willingness to enter into a 

cooperative arrangement with OOC and AOC to develop and implement management techniques 

at AOC which OSHA has successfully utilized in the private sector and in various Federal 

agencies to improve workplace safety. 

to an agreement, subject only to resolution of questions of confidentiality. 

has agreed to participate in this arrangement. 

As this Report goes to press, however, we are informed that the Architect has determined 

that there is now a “diminished need” for OSHA’s services, largely because of technical 

W

This change in attitude, if it lasts, prom

In our view, 

See H.R. Rep. 

As we understand the discussions, the parties are to close 

The General Counsel 

30
assistance provided during 2002 by OSHA’s Executive Leadership Program, Dupont Safety 

Resources, and the U.S. Public Health Service. 

A proposed organizational change currently under review by AOC will bear careful 

scrutiny. According to Mr. Hantman, the reorganization would place AOC’s principal safety 

officer within the organization of the Office of Facilities Manager; in his view, this 

reorganization will improve the safety program, not detract from it. But if the highest ranking 

safety officer is formally subordinated to the official in charge of facilities management, the 

practical consequences may well be that the occasionally competing interests of facilities 

management - such as deadlines and budget - will prevail over the objectives of safety. See 29 

CFR 1960.6: “The head of each agency shall designate an official with sufficient authority and 

responsibility to represent effectively the interest and support of the agency head in the 

management and administration of the agency occupational safety and health program. This 

designated Agency Safety and Health Official should be of the rank of Assistant Secretary or of 

equivalent rank, or equivalent degree of responsibility, and shall have sufficient headquarters 

staff with the necessary training and experience” (emphasis added). AOC may wish to 

reconsider the reclassification of its principal safety officer in light of the important policy 

expressed in this regulation, even though the regulation is not legally binding upon AOC. 

VIII. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE INSPECTIONS– 

EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS AND OTHER SAFETY ISSUES 

All Congressional offices in the Capitol, Rayburn, Longworth, Cannon, Dirksen, Hart 

and Russell buildings were inspected between April and July 2002. Inspections of these and 

other Legislative Branch facilities are discussed in this Chapter, Chapter IX and Appendix B. 

The primary focus of the inspections of the office spaces on Capitol Hill was to assess the status 

of emergency preparedness and compliance with 29 CFR 1910.38 regarding Employee 

Emergency Action and Fire Prevention Plans. In addition, other typical office-space deficiencies 

were noted and are 

31
discussed below. The responsible employing office has been notified of the specific location of 

each violation found. 

Emergency Action Plans and Emergency Preparedness. 

The initial inspections conducted during the 104th Congress revealed that planning for 

fire or other emergencies was “fragmented, largely uncoordinated, and insufficient.” That 1996 

Report recommended that a comprehensive fire and emergency plan be developed for the 

Legislative Branch and that coordinated plans be developed for each employing office as quickly 

as possible, since a fire or bomb emergency was the most likely type of hazard to be faced by all 

employees and the public. Each subsequent inspection has found improvements but also 

significant and widespread problems. 

As noted in Chapter III of this Report, our current office inspections disclosed that 

significant improvement in Emergency Action planning has taken place during this Congress. 

The majority of the Congressional offices had floor plans and exit routes posted in prominent 

locations and emergency numbers posted near each phone. Of particular note were the actions 

and efforts of the Capitol Police to coordinate, monitor and administer the overall plans for the 

majority of the buildings on Capitol Hill. With the support of the AOC they have developed 

building evacuation plans for each of the buildings within their jurisdiction. The plans were 

printed and distributed to each office within each building. The printed plans show building 

evacuation routes, emergency telephone numbers and locations for persons who cannot use the 

stairs to gather to await rescue assistance. 

In contrast, the LOC Police management has not become involved to the same extent, 

making the Library’s overall Emergency Action Plan less effective. The limited role of the LOC 

Police officers in the Plan presents a problem. When we interviewed officers, they stated that 

their primary duty in an emergency was to assist people out of the building. However, these 

same people are likely to be assisting any outside responder, such as the D.C. Fire Department or 

a Hazardous Materials team. Since they have not been appropriately trained in the Emergency 

Action Plan, the officers could only provide limited assistance to the outside responders. 

32
Further, the LOC relies entirely on individual offices or divisions to prepare plans and 

train employees, with no apparent oversight to ensure that required actions have been completed. 

A few of the LOC divisions had completed all the required elements of an effective plan and 

appeared to be working to keep their plans current. But the majority were out of date. Because 

the plans are outdated and uncoordinated, many LOC employees and police officers do not know 

the proper procedure to follow in an emergency evacuation. 

Other Deficiencies 

Improper Exit Signs 

In the LOC’s Madison Building, a large number of the 

exit signs located within the Library’s offices were improper and 

misleading. Apparently, this office space had been reconfigured 

after these exit signs were installed and many did not lead 

directly to the shortest and most direct route of exit. The exit 

signs for the public portions of the building generally appeared to 

be adequate. 

Conflicting Exit Signs for Doorway 

Blocked Access to Electrical Breaker Boxes 

The older House Buildings are configured with electrical 

breaker boxes located in the occupied office space. Access to 

the boxes was often blocked by desks, computers, bookcases and 

other heavy objects. In an emergency, quick unobstructed 

access to these boxes may be essential, in order to minimize the 

danger of electrocution or fire. Labeling the boxes “Electrical 

Box–Do Not Block” would help to minimize these blockages. Blocked Electrical Cabinets Prevent 

Access in Case of an Emergency 

33
Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupters 

Most of the House Members’ offices have bathrooms and kitchen areas that are supplied 

with water. The National Electrical Code requires that any electrical receptacles located in such 

areas be equipped with ground-fault circuit interrupters. Almost none of these offices were so 

equipped. Accordingly, employees, Members and others in these rooms are exposed to electrical 

shock hazards. AOC has advised us that they are aware of this shortcoming, and have planned a 

major effort to install the required safety devices as soon as possible. 

Fire Sprinklers Blocked 

In all inspected buildings we noted varying degrees of deficiencies in storage of 

materials. Storage is not permitted within eighteen (18) inches of the bottom of a sprinkler head. 

Such storage tends to disrupt the intended sprinkler flow, making it less effective in suppressing 

fires. Additionally, in most noted instances, there was no safe access to retrieve the stored 

materials without climbing onto furniture. This type of deficiency was noted in varying degrees 

in all inspected buildings. 

Uninspected Fire Extinguishers 

In the LOC buildings, the required monthly inspection of fire extinguishers is performed 

by two different entities, depending on the location of the extinguisher. Those located in public 

and shop space are inspected by AOC. No problems were noted with these devices. Those 

located within the Library’s offices are expected to be inspected by the occupants. 

Approximately half of these were past due for inspection. Although most were only a month or 

two out of date for inspection, the number is indicative of a need for change in inspection 

procedure or oversight. 

Improper Use of Electrical Extension Cords 

Electrical extension cords are permitted only for temporary situations and may not be 

used in place of permanent wiring. In most cases where extension cords were found, they were 

being used in place of permanent wiring and additional electrical receptacles could have been 

installed instead. This type of deficiency was noted in varying degrees in almost all of the 

buildings except the LOC buildings. The LOC employee safety committee has identified and 

eliminated this condition in their buildings and should be commended for their efforts. 

34
IX. NON–OFFICE INSPECTIONS–SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUES 

As required by the CAA, we inspected non-office work areas in most facilities of the 

Legislative Branch. These inspections were conducted by OOC staff, together with outside fire 

and life safety consultants, between April and July 2002. A schedule of the dates and locations 

of each inspection, including office and non-office space appears in Appendix D to this report. 

A detailed listing of all violations of OSHA standards which our inspectors found during 

evaluation of non-office, as well as office space, is found in Appendices A and B. In many 

cases, violations were corrected immediately by AOC staff. In these cases the Appendices 

reflect that the violation has been abated, with the date of repair and responsible agency noted. 

The responsible employing office has been notified of the specific location of each 

violation found. A summary of the most significant violations in terms of their potential effect 

on the health and safety of Legislative Branch employees and members of the House and Senate 

follows: 

Malfunctioning Fire Alarm Systems 

Fire alarm systems either were not 

functioning, or were missing pull stations, or were 

not monitored and connected to a twenty-four (24) 

hour monitored station in eight (8) locations. These 

locations were in warehouses and other non-office 

facilities. Fires in workshops, garages or other nonoffice spaces can expose all employees in the 

Legislative Branch office buildings to the danger of 

Fire Alarm Electrical Panel Requiring serious injury or death. Repairs 

Egress Routes/Exit Doors Blocked 

In twelve (12) locations including the Russell and Hart Senate 

Office Buildings and Capitol Police Headquarters, we found the exit 

routes contained doors or doors that did not close automatically to 

create a fire barrier and in one instance a padlocked exit door. 

Emergency Exit from 

Projection Room Blocked 

35
Exit Sign Hazards 

Exit signs in nineteen (19) locations had burned out lights, gave incorrect directions, or 

were entirely lacking. Only one (1) involved a Congressional office building - the Dirksen 

Building. Others involved the GAO building, warehouses and Capitol Police buildings. 

Exit Lighting Hazards 

In thirteen (13) locations exit lighting was insufficient or non-existent. In some cases, 

battery operated emergency lights needed new batteries. Locations included the Russell and 

Rayburn Buildings and the LOC Jefferson Building. 

Fire Sprinklers Blocked 

In thirteen (13) locations, we found that fire sprinkler heads were blocked by either 

stored materials or ceiling tiles. Some heads had been damaged and required repair or 

replacement. The buildings involved were Dirksen, Cannon, Rayburn, Capitol Police 

Headquarters and, several other facilities. 

Stored materials prevent proper operation of 

fire sprinklers 

Fire Extinguishers Blocked 

In nine (9) situations, we found that fire extinguishers were blocked by stored materials 

or would otherwise be inaccessible if a situation arose requiring their use. The locations 

included non-office spaces in the Russell, Dirksen, Cannon and Rayburn Buildings. 

36
Fire Extinguishers Not Inspected 

In twenty-eight (28) locations we found that fire extinguishers had not been regularly 

inspected or that they were not tagged to reflect inspection as required by the OSHA standard, as 

incorporated in 29 CFR 1910.157. 

Storage of Flammable or Pressurized Materials 

In thirteen (13) locations, including House and Senate Office Buildings, we found 

chemicals improperly stored, creating the potential for fire and explosion. 

Unsecured Compressed Gas Cylinders 

Electrical Hazard/Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters Not Provided 

In fifty (50) non-office locations and many offices, we found power outlets near sinks, or 

in wet locations, which presented the serious potential for electrical shock. The National 

Electrical Code, as incorporated in OSHA standards, requires ground fault circuit interrupters in 

these areas as protection against electrical shock hazards to employees, Members and others. 

Locations included the Capitol, House and Senate Office Buildings, the Supreme Court, Capitol 

Police Headquarters and the Botanic Gardens. 

Missing Covers for Electrical Junction/Switch Boxes 

37
In thirty-three (33) locations we found electrical 

junction and switch boxes that were not fully enclosed in 

order to contain live wires, hot materials or sparks. This 

is a violation of the National Electrical Code and OSHA 

regulations, 29 CFR 1910.305(i)(3)(iv). 

Electrical Junction Box with no Cover and 

Energized Wires 

Violations Unabated–Unassigned AOC Responsibility 

During our periodic inspection, OOC inspectors discovered a number of facilities where 

on site personnel did not appear to know who had responsibility to maintain the facilities or 

assure compliance with OSHA regulations. Some of the facilities are off-site and away from 

Capitol Hill. They are used by a number of organizations including the Chief Administrative 

Office of the House, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, the Library of Congress, Architect of the 

Capitol and the Capitol Police. All users of these facilities believe that the Architect of the 

Capitol should be responsible for maintaining safety systems and correcting any health hazards. 

The facilities include the Fort Meade Warehouses and the Vehicle Repair Facility. In addition, 

the AOC’s Construction Management Division (“CMD”) has a facility at Blue Plains where 

many safety hazards were identified. The CMD representatives informed OOC inspectors that 

they had no budget and, therefore, did not have the funds to make needed repairs at the facility. 

The AOC has subsequently advised us that site maintenance and safety officials are designated 

for these facilities and that on-site personnel will be informed of which officials have these 

responsibilities. In addition, materials have been purchased to abate the violations of CMD’s 

Blue Plains Division. 

38
X. CONCLUSION 

There has clearly been significant improvement in occupational safety and health since 

our first Report in 1996. This improvement has assuredly been fostered by increased funding 

from the Congressional Committees of jurisdiction, continuing enforcement of the CAA’s 

provisions, and improved high - level safety staffing by the AOC. In spite of this improvement, 

expedited additional efforts are required. The anthrax attack of October revealed inadequate 

compliance with the standards designed to protect those employees who must respond to such 

incidents. Emergency Action Plans remain incomplete in some locations. Studies of the safety 

of irradiated mail indicate that low levels of chemical irritants are present in the mail as a byproduct of the irradiation process, and suggest the need for further investigation of potential 

effects on employee health. And the risk of future terrorist action emphasizes the importance of 

promptly completing all fire and life safety abatement projects that were initiated in more 

peaceful times. All of our apparent vulnerabilities -- inadequate building exit capacity, inaudible 

alarms, missing fire barriers -- loom much larger now as the prospect of an emergency has 

become more imminent. 

39