Filed 8/7/23 In re A.S. CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B322404

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

20CCJP02653D

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and 

remanded with instructions.

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

The juvenile court removed A.S. from his mother’s custody 

after finding she physically abused him, left him unsupervised

for long periods, and has substance abuse issues. Mother 

tested positive for marijuana throughout the dependency period, 

displayed minimal insight into the issues that led to removal, and 

was arrested for a domestic violence incident with her partner. 

The juvenile court terminated her reunification services. A few 

months later, mother filed a petition to reinstate her services 

on the basis that circumstances had changed. The court denied

mother’s petition, terminated parental rights to A.S., and 

selected the child’s caregiver as his prospective adoptive parent. 

On appeal, mother argues the court erred in denying 

her petition and refusing to grant her request for a continuance 

and bonding study. She also argues the Los Angeles County

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)

failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under state law 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) implementing the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) when it 

did not ask extended family members if the child had Indian 

ancestry.1 The Department does not contest remand for 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we 

do the same for consistency, although we recognize other terms 

are preferred. (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 

739, fn. 1.)
3

compliance with ICWA. We accept the Department’s concession 

and conditionally affirm the termination of parental rights

but remand the matter for the limited purpose of ensuring 

compliance with ICWA and related California law. We affirm 

the court’s other orders. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

1. Investigation and detention

In April 2020, the Department received a report that 

mother was physically abusing and neglecting three-year-old 

A.S. and his younger half-sister, A.C.3 At the time, mother was 

living in a transitional housing facility. During the Department’s 

investigation, a social worker observed A.S. had bruises on his 

body, a mark on his forehead, a “red hand print” on his arm, 

and “scratch-like scars” on both forearms.

A resident at mother’s facility told the Department she saw 

mother “sock[ ]” A.S. in the face, slap him multiple times, pinch 

him, and twist his arm. The resident said that when she babysat 

the child, he acted “scared all the time” and would “cry nonstop” 

when mother returned. Other residents reported that mother 

called the child derogatory names, threw shoes at him, “pulled 

him down by his hair and pinched him,” and left him unattended 

in a car for at least 30 minutes while she fought with another 

resident. The residents also suspected mother was using drugs, 

because she had recently thrown up in the restroom while naked.

2 Father did not participate in the dependency proceedings, 

nor did he appeal the court’s orders. Accordingly, we do not 

discuss the facts related to father.

3 This appeal does not concern A.C. Therefore, we do not 

discuss in detail the facts related to A.C.’s dependency case.
4

Staff at the facility denied witnessing abuse but said there 

was an incident where A.S. was walking around the facility 

unattended at 1:00 a.m. Another time, staff said, mother 

attempted to attack a resident while holding A.C. in her arms.

Mother denied abusing A.S. and claimed she had not 

used marijuana for two years. Mother said she was prescribed 

psychiatric medication, but she stopped taking it after suffering 

an allergic reaction. Mother told the Department she was on 

probation for an assault with a deadly weapon conviction, but she 

did not provide details about the conviction. Mother’s probation 

officer said she had offered mother services for years, but mother 

had refused them.

At the Department’s request, the court detained A.S. and 

A.C. from mother. The court ordered the Department to place the 

children with the same caregiver, which it did. The Department 

noted that A.S. was “extremely attached” to A.C., as A.C. was 

the only “constant person” in his life.

After the Department detained A.S., mother confronted 

residents at her facility who spoke to the Department, telling 

them she “ ‘knew where they stayed and that they were on 

paper.’ ”

Mother agreed to drug test for the Department. She was 

a “no show” five times before testing positive for cocaine and 

marijuana in July 2020. Mother admitted using marijuana 

but denied using cocaine. She failed to appear at her next six 

drug tests.

A.S.’s therapist reported the child fights with his peers, 

has a lot of energy, and has difficulty following directions and 

focusing. She recommended he receive mental health services 

and be evaluated for an IEP. The Department reported that 
5

A.S. has limited speech and exhibits severe aggressive behaviors 

towards other children. The Department said he was in “dire” 

need of a regional center evaluation, but mother would not return 

the regional center’s calls.

In September 2020, mother’s significant other, Oscar, 

was arrested for intimate partner violence with injury. Mother 

told the police that Oscar grabbed her by the hair, punched her, 

and grabbed her throat. Mother said she had been involved in 

six prior domestic violence incidents with Oscar, one of which 

A.S. witnessed. She claimed Oscar is a gang member.

2. Jurisdiction and disposition

The Department filed a petition asserting A.S. is a person 

described by section 300. The petition alleged mother physically 

abused A.S., failed to supervise him, engaged in domestic 

violence in his presence, abuses marijuana and cocaine, and 

has unresolved mental health issues. As to the physical abuse, 

the petition specifically alleged mother struck A.S. in the face 

with a fist, struck his face and body with her hand, pinched and 

twisted his arm, grabbed him, threw shoes at him, and pinched 

his ears. The petition further alleged mother left A.S. without 

adult supervision in a vehicle and allowed him to wander alone

in a hallway late at night.

The court held a jurisdiction hearing in September 2020, 

at which it sustained the allegations related to mother’s physical 

abuse, failure to supervise, and substance abuse. The court 

struck the remaining counts—which concerned domestic violence 

and mother’s mental health issues—for lack of evidence.

As to disposition, the court declared A.S. a dependent 

and removed him from mother’s custody. The court ordered 

the Department to provide mother with reunification services 
6

and monitored visitation. Mother’s case plan required that 

she participate in a drug program, submit to drug testing, 

attend individual counseling to address case issues, and take 

all prescribed medication.

3. Six-month reunification period

Mother did not drug test during the initial reunification 

period, but she did enroll in a parenting class. Asked what she 

had learned from the classes, mother replied she was becoming 

more social and had improved her patience. Asked how she 

disciplines A.S., mother claimed she had no need to because 

A.S. listens to her when she speaks firmly. Mother became 

upset when the case worker mentioned the sustained allegations 

related to her use of corporal punishment. Mother insisted 

the women at the transitional housing facility had fabricated 

the stories.

A parent partner—who was working with mother on 

parenting strategies—said mother actively participates in 

lessons, but “ ‘something does not connect’ ” with her.

In February 2021, the Department placed A.S. with 

A.C.’s paternal grandmother, who agreed to care for both 

children. The caregiver reported that A.S. had been displaying 

aggressive behavior, hitting his sibling, and breaking toys 

for no reason. A.S. also falsely accused others of hitting him.

Mother visited A.S. throughout the initial reunification 

period, and A.S. was excited to see her. A monitor described 

mother as “consistent, loving, caring, responsive and engaging 

with the children” during visits.

The caregiver said A.S. returns from visits with mother 

“very aggressive” and he “struggles on the two following days.” 

One time, mother told A.S. she was going to “kick [his] butt” 
7

the next time she saw him. A.S.’s therapist suggested the child’s 

behavior might improve if he did not see mother for two weeks.

The court held a six-month review hearing on March 22, 

2021. The court found mother was not in compliance with her 

case plan and declined to return A.S. to her custody. The court 

continued mother’s reunification services for six months.

4. Twelve-month reunification period

During the next reunification period, mother started a 

new job, obtained housing, and became pregnant with Oscar’s 

child. Mother was arrested on May 29, 2021 for assault with 

a deadly weapon. The Department later learned that Oscar 

was the victim and had called the police on mother. The police 

advised Oscar to get a restraining order against her.

Mother continued to participate in services. As of August 

2021, she had attended eight individual therapy sessions. 

The therapist, however, refused to provide the Department 

substantive information related to mother’s progress, citing 

confidentiality. Mother had been prescribed medication, but 

she reportedly stopped taking it because it made her sleepy.

Mother’s parenting instructor said it was difficult working 

with mother and she was not attending sessions as frequently 

as she had originally agreed. The instructor said mother had 

not implemented what she had learned in class during her visits 

with A.S. She said mother does not know how to process her 

anger and does not know how to communicate appropriately 

with her children.

Mother continued to participate in a drug treatment 

program. However, between March and August 2021, she 

appeared at only two weekly drug tests. She tested positive 

for marijuana both times.
8

Mother visited A.S. consistently, but she missed two visits 

due to her arrest. Her visits remained monitored. The caregiver 

reported that A.S. continued to display aggressive behavior and 

tantrums, but his behavior was improving.

The court held the 12-month review hearing on 

September 22, 2021. Minor’s counsel and the Department asked 

the court to terminate mother’s services. The court found mother 

was in partial compliance with her case plan, and it continued 

her services until the 18-month deadline.

5. Final reunification period and termination of 

services

During the final reunification period, mother told the 

Department she had been sober since learning she was pregnant. 

Mother said she had stopped taking her psychiatric medication 

due to her pregnancy.

Mother continued attending parenting classes, which she 

completed in mid-November 2021. It was reported that mother 

struggled to understand the material taught to her in the classes.

Mother also continued with her substance abuse treatment 

program. She tested negative for drugs throughout September 

and October 2021. She missed a test on November 3, 2021. At 

a make-up test the next day, she tested positive for marijuana. 

Mother said she tested positive because she had been using a 

“CBD pen,” which she had since stopped using.

Mother had attended 19 individual therapy sessions as of 

mid-November 2021. Mother’s therapist said she was engaged 

during treatment, had gained insight regarding case issues, and 

was making progress towards her treatment goals.

The Department reported that mother had made 

inappropriate comments to A.S. during monitored visits. 
9

At one visit, mother told A.S. he would be coming home and she 

would buy him things when he did. During another visit, mother 

asked A.S. if he was still hitting other children at school. When 

A.S. said yes, mother replied, “That’s my boy.”

The court held the 18-month permanency review hearing 

on November 19, 2021. Mother urged the court to return A.S. 

to her custody because she had made significant progress on her 

case plan, including by obtaining appropriate housing, regularly 

attending therapy, participating in a drug program, and testing 

negative for drugs. Alternatively, she asked the court to continue 

her services. Minor’s counsel also asked the court to extend 

mother’s services.

The court found mother had made only partial progress 

on her case plan, and it terminated her reunification services. 

The court noted that mother’s progress had been slow, and it 

was not clear when she could progress to unsupervised overnight 

visitation.

6. Post-termination of services

Mother was a “no show” at all the drug tests after the 

court terminated her services. She continued to have monitored 

weekly visits with A.S. A.S.’s caregiver said mother seemed 

stressed, but the visits had gone well and mother had been 

appropriate. During a Thanksgiving visit, mother told the 

caregiver she was sad because her significant other, Oscar, 

had overdosed on drugs and was in the hospital. Another day, 

mother told the caregiver she would rather A.S. go back into 

foster care than have the caregiver adopt the child.

The Department recommended A.S.’s caregiver adopt the 

child. It reported that A.S. was well cared for, received stability 

and structure, and had developed a positive and healthy 
10

relationship with the caregiver. A.S.’s behavior had improved 

greatly and his tantrums had decreased. The caregiver continued 

to provide “excellent care” and was ready to move forward with 

adoption.

7. Mother’s section 388 petition

On May 24, 2022, mother filed a section 388 petition 

seeking to change the court’s order terminating her reunification 

services. Mother argued there were changed circumstances in 

that she had secured appropriate housing, completed a substance 

abuse and behavioral outpatient treatment program, consistently 

tested negative for drugs, met her therapy goals, and had given 

birth to another child. She urged the court to order A.S. placed 

in her home or, alternatively, grant her additional reunification 

services and unmonitored visitation. Mother argued the change 

would be in A.S.’s best interest because she had maintained her 

relationship and bond with the child, A.S. still considered her to 

be his mother, and being with a biological parent is “always more 

beneficial” so long as the parent is able to provide a safe home.

Mother attached to the petition a March 2022 rental 

agreement, a letter stating she had completed a substance abuse 

program in December 2021, proof of consistent negative drug 

test results since March 23, 2022, and a letter stating she had 

met her individual therapy treatment goals after completing 

24 sessions.

The Department opposed the petition and recommended 

the court terminate mother’s parental rights. The Department 

reported that, although mother and A.S. had a bond and positive 

interactions, the visits had not “contributed to substantial 

emotional attachment between the mother and the child.” 

According to the Department, A.S. had been referring to his 
11

caregiver as “ ‘mom’ ” for the past six months. Mother told A.S. 

not to call the caregiver “ ‘mom’ ” and instead use that term for 

her. A.S. responded that the caregiver is his mother.

A.S. visited mother in her new apartment sometime around 

May or June. A.S. was upset after the visit because mother did

not have anything for him at her apartment, as she had promised 

him before. After the visit, A.S. told the caregiver mother 

“ ‘doesn’t love me anymore.’ ” As the caregiver comforted A.S., 

he called her “ ‘mom’ ” and said, “ ‘I love you so much.’ ”

The caregiver said A.S. exhibited “difficult behavior” 

whenever he had brief unsupervised time with mother. During 

a monitored visit in July 2022, the caregiver left A.S. alone with 

mother momentarily. After the visit, A.S. said “ ‘mom was bad’ ” 

and told him “ ‘to hate grandma and be bad with grandma.’ ” 

A.S. sometimes referred to the caregiver as grandma. A.S. 

then hugged the caregiver and said he loved her. The caregiver 

told the Department she was concerned that mother’s conduct 

would cause A.S. to regress.

The caregiver reported that mother had instructed A.S. 

to destroy objects and throw tantrums with the caregiver, 

in the hopes that the Department would return the child 

to mother’s care. The caregiver also reported the quality of 

visits had recently declined, as mother stopped engaging and 

responding to the child. Mother seemed to be tired from her 

pregnancy, and she would just give A.S. a phone to play with 

during visits. A.S. became less interested in visits, and he 

would sometimes hide from mother during video calls.

Mother consistently tested negative for drugs during this 

period. She was a “no show” for two tests in June and one test 

in July 2022. She appeared for a single make-up test in July.
12

Mother’s parenting class facilitator said mother completed 

the parenting class in November 2021. The class was supposed 

to be six weeks, but it took mother more than a year to complete 

it. The facilitator said it appeared that mother was involved in 

her classes, “ ‘gave insight,’ ” and seemed to have a good grasp 

of the concepts.

One of mother’s neighbors said she was concerned about 

the child in mother’s care. She did not want to say more, 

however, because mother had confronted her in the past about 

talking to the Department.

The Department interviewed mother in connection with her 

section 388 petition. Mother told the Department “ ‘everything 

changed’ ” since she got pregnant with Oscar’s child. Mother said 

going through the classes had helped her to realize the children 

are her responsibility. She stopped therapy in January 2022 

because she and her therapist did not think she needed any more

sessions.

Mother admitted she was a “ ‘heavy user’ ” of marijuana 

in the past, but she claimed to have been sober since July 2021. 

She said she previously used marijuana because “the people she 

associated herself with used marijuana.” She attributed her drug 

use solely to her environment. Mother acknowledged that Oscar 

continues to use marijuana, but she said it did not affect her 

sobriety because he did not use it near her. One of mother’s 

neighbors, however, told the Department she saw Oscar smoking 

marijuana outside mother’s apartment every day.

Mother said her mental health had improved greatly and 

she did not have any more symptoms. She said she stopped 

taking medication when she was pregnant. She had scheduled 

a follow-up psychiatric appointment for August 2022.
13

The Department asked mother about her May 2021 arrest. 

Mother claimed she “ ‘got into it with a bartender’ ” and the 

incident did not involve Oscar. Mother remained silent when 

the investigator told her the police had reported that Oscar was 

the victim. Mother denied domestic violence, but she said she 

and Oscar sometimes had loud arguments. Mother had enrolled 

in a domestic violence class and convinced Oscar to do the same.

The Department asked mother’s case manager why mother 

had decided to enroll in a domestic violence class. The case 

manager stalled and then refused to provide a meaningful 

answer.

8. Denial of mother’s petition and termination of 

her parental rights

The court considered mother’s section 388 petition at a 

hearing on August 1, 2022. The Department urged the court to 

deny the petition because mother was not taking her psychotropic 

medication, it was apparent she was not being honest about her 

history of domestic violence, and she continued to associate with 

Oscar, who uses marijuana.

Minor’s counsel asked the court to reinstate mother’s 

services for six months. Alternatively, counsel asked the court to 

delay the permanency planning hearing pending a bonding study. 

Counsel argued a bonding study was warranted because counsel’s 

investigator had observed a visit at which mother brought toys 

and A.S. was engaged. According to counsel, the investigator’s 

observations contradicted the Department’s reports that there 

was not a bond between mother and A.S.

Mother asked the court to grant the petition and order A.S. 

returned to her home. She pointed to her completion of parenting 

and drug programs, consistent negative drug tests, and stable 
14

housing. Mother asserted she was not in a relationship with 

Oscar; they were simply co-parenting their child. She argued 

granting the petition would be in A.S.’s best interest because 

the child lived with her for the first three years of his life, he 

was always happy to see her during visits, mother maintained 

the role of a parent, and she was consistent and responsive 

during visits. Alternatively, mother joined in minor’s counsel’s 

request for a continuance and a bonding study.

The court denied mother’s petition. The court found that, 

although circumstances were changing, they “have not changed 

to the level where it would be appropriate to grant her 388, nor 

would it be in the child’s best interest.” The court explained that 

A.S. has been in a stable and secure home for a significant period, 

and he clearly is bonded with the caregiver and A.C. The court 

expressed skepticism about mother’s ability to reunite with A.S. 

after six additional months of services. It also noted the record 

suggests mother had not resolved her domestic violence issues.

After denying mother’s petition, the court turned to the 

issue of permanency planning. The court found A.S. is adoptable, 

his bond with mother was insignificant, and the bond was 

outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit the child 

would receive through adoption. The court concluded adoption 

was in A.S.’s best interest and no exceptions to adoption existed. 

The court then terminated parental rights to A.S. and designated 

A.S.’s caregiver as his prospective adoptive parent. The court 

did not address mother’s requests for a continuance and bonding 

study.

Mother timely appealed the denial of her section 388 

petition and the court’s order terminating parental rights to A.S.
15

DISCUSSION

1. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

mother’s section 388 petition

Mother argues the court erred by denying her section 

388 petition. Mother contends she demonstrated changed 

circumstances—not just “ ‘changing’ ” circumstances—and 

that granting the petition would be in the child’s best interest.

a. Relevant law and standard of review

Section 388 allows a parent of a dependent child to petition 

the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside its prior orders. 

(§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) Section 388 was designed as an “ ‘ “escape 

mechanism” ’ . . . [to] allow[ ] the juvenile court to consider 

a legitimate change in the parent’s circumstances after 

reunification services have been terminated.” (In re Alayah J.

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) It affords a parent a last 

opportunity for continued reunification services prior to the 

final resolution of custody status. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 

5 Cal.4th 295, 309–310.)

At the hearing on a section 388 petition, the parent has 

the burden to prove (1) the existence of new evidence or changed 

circumstances justifying a change in the juvenile court’s prior 

orders, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best 

interests of the child. (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 

611; In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1216–1217.)

“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification 

of a prior order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances 

must relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the 

modification of the prior order is appropriate.” (In re A.A., supra, 

203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) Generally, this means the change in 
16

circumstances must remove or ameliorate the problem that led 

to the prior order. (Ibid.)

When considering the best interests of the child, the 

court must take into account that “ ‘[a]fter the termination of 

reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody and 

companionship of the child is no longer paramount. [Citation.] 

Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child 

for permanency and stability. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Jacob P. (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 819, 828.) As a result, a parent at this stage 

must establish how the requested change will advance the 

child’s need for permanency and stability. (In re J.C. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)

We review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse 

of discretion. (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) 

An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court exceeds 

the bounds of reason by making a determination that is 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Marcelo B.

(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642, disapproved on other grounds 

in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 637, fn. 6.)

b. Application

Mother insists the court erred by finding insufficient 

changed circumstances to warrant granting her petition. 

According to mother, she showed changed circumstances by 

remaining sober for 270 days, completing drug and parenting 

programs, obtaining stable and appropriate housing, meeting

her therapeutic goals, and regularly visiting A.S.

At the outset, it is not clear that all of the circumstances 

mother cites actually changed after the termination of her 

services. For example, mother completed a parenting program 

in November 2021, before the court terminated her services. 
17

Similarly, at the 18-month review hearing, mother cited the fact 

that she had obtained appropriate housing as a reason the court 

should return A.S. to her custody. Although it appears mother 

moved into a different apartment after that hearing, she 

does not explain why that fact constitutes the sort of changed 

circumstances that would warrant the court reinstating her 

services or returning A.S. to her custody. Nor does she explain 

why her continued visitation with A.S. warranted a finding of 

changed circumstances. If anything, the record shows the quality 

of the visits deteriorated over time, which would weigh against 

extending her services or returning the child to her care. 

With regards to mother’s substance abuse issues, the 

record does not support her contention that she had remained 

sober for 270 days. In support, mother points to the fact that 

she did not have a positive drug test after the court terminated 

her services in November 2021. While true, mother overlooks 

the Department’s report that she was a “no show” at every test 

between the termination of her services and March 22, 2022. 

She also was a “no show” for three tests in June and July 2022, 

at least one of which was unexcused. The court reasonably could 

have inferred that mother did not appear for those tests because 

she knew she would have tested positive. (See In re Kadence P.

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [“a missed drug test, without 

adequate justification, is ‘properly considered the equivalent of 

a positive test result’ ”].) 

The record also supports a finding that mother’s completion 

of a substance abuse program and therapy did not constitute 

the sort of changed circumstances that would warrant relief. 

Although mother participated in services for more than a year, 

she displayed a severe lack of insight into the issues that led 
18

the court to remove A.S. from her custody. Mother, for example, 

never acknowledged that she had physically abused the child, 

despite the reports from multiple eyewitnesses and the physical 

evidence of abuse on the child’s body. Nor did mother ever 

acknowledge having used cocaine, despite testing positive 

for the drug. “One cannot correct a problem one fails to 

acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.)

Even when mother demonstrated some insight into 

the issues that led to removal, the record indicates she failed 

to apply those insights. For example, mother acknowledged her 

past marijuana use was tied to her “environment” and association 

with other people who used drugs. Nevertheless, she continued 

to associate with Oscar, who frequently used marijuana and 

was hospitalized after overdosing on drugs.

While mother’s continued efforts to comply with her case 

plan are commendable, they fail to demonstrate the removal 

or amelioration of the problems that led to her loss of custody 

and the termination of reunification services. On this record, 

the court reasonably could have concluded mother failed to 

demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to warrant 

her requested relief.

Even if mother had shown a sufficient change in 

circumstances, the juvenile court reasonably denied mother’s 

petition on the basis that her requested changes would not 

be in A.S.’s best interest. Given mother had never progressed 

beyond monitored visitation, she clearly was not in a position 

to take immediate custody of A.S. Nor is it apparent that an 

additional six months of services would have had a significant 

chance of leading to reunification. As of the hearing on her 

petition, mother had participated in services for more than
19

a year, including substance abuse programs, individual 

counseling, and parenting classes. Nevertheless, as discussed 

above, she failed to demonstrate meaningful insight into the 

most significant issues that led the court to remove A.S. from 

her custody.

The court also was rightly concerned about mother’s 

relationship with Oscar. The record shows mother and Oscar 

were involved in at least two serious incidents of domestic 

violence, one of which led to mother’s arrest. However, when 

the Department questioned mother about her arrest, she lied 

and claimed she got in a fight with a bartender. The record also 

shows Oscar has serious, unresolved substance abuse issues, 

increasing the likelihood that mother will relapse. 

There is also abundant evidence that visits with mother

—and the continued uncertainty around reunification—were 

having a negative effect on A.S.’s behavior and emotional 

wellbeing. According to A.S.’s caregiver, the child’s behavior 

regressed after some visits with mother, and the child’s 

therapist even suggested he not see mother for two weeks. 

The Department also reported that mother made inappropriate 

comments during the visits, including encouraging A.S. 

to be aggressive with other children and to misbehave with 

his caregiver.

In contrast to the uncertainty surrounding mother’s 

ability to care for A.S., the child’s caregiver had been providing 

a stable and supportive environment for a year and a half. 

The Department reported that A.S. had bonded to his caregiver, 

referred to her as “mom,” and frequently expressed his love 

for her. The caregiver was meeting all of A.S.’s needs, his 

behavior had improved significantly while under her care, and 
20

she was committed to providing A.S. a permanent and stable 

home through adoption. By all accounts, A.S. was thriving in 

his placement.

Mother contends this case is analogous to In re J.M.

(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833. In that case, the mother presented 

“ample evidence” that she had addressed the basis for jurisdiction

as well as every other concern the court cited in terminating 

reunification services. (Id. at p. 846.) The juvenile court

nevertheless denied the mother’s section 388 petition, citing 

her lack of training to care for the child’s special needs, despite 

never having required the mother to participate in such training. 

(Id. at pp. 849–850.) In holding the juvenile court abused its 

discretion, the appellate court explained the lower court “did 

not have discretion to write off Mother as a parent entirely, or 

to force her to prove an above average level of parental ability 

in order to meet her burden of establishing it was in her son’s 

best interests to have a chance of being raised by his biological 

mother.” (Id. at p. 850.) Here, there is nothing in the record even 

to suggest the court required something similar of mother. True, 

the court cited concerns about domestic violence, which was not 

a basis for jurisdiction. However, it is apparent this was not the

only reason the court denied mother’s petition. 

Mother’s reliance on In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 

Cal.App.4th 519 is also misplaced. There, the court removed 

the children due to their mother’s “dirty and unsanitary” home. 

(Id. at pp. 521–522.) The appellate court reversed the denial of 

the mother’s section 388 petition, finding evidence she had made 

her home “clean and safe,” although still cluttered, showed she 

had removed the reason for the dependency. (Id. at pp. 521–523.) 

Here, mother’s circumstances are entirely different. As the 
21

Kimberly F. court noted, a dirty home is not “as intractable 

a problem as a parent’s drug ingestion, or physical . . . abuse.” 

(Id. at p. 532.) Nor is it anywhere near as serious as recurring 

domestic violence. Considered with all the other circumstances, 

mother’s severe lack of insight into those issues provided a 

sufficient basis for the court to deny her petition. 

2. The court did not err by implicitly denying mother’s 

requests for a continuance and bonding study

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her 

request to continue the permanency planning hearing and order 

a bonding study.

“In a hearing to terminate parental rights in a dependency 

proceeding, the primary issue often is whether the parents 

can establish that the child would benefit from a continuing 

relationship with them and that termination of parental rights 

would therefore be detrimental to the child. [Citation.] In 

attempting to establish or eliminate this exception to the 

preference for adoption, the parties or the court may require 

a bonding study to illuminate the intricacies of the parent-child 

bond so that the question of detriment to the child may be 

fully explored.” (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 869.) 

Our Supreme Court recently noted that bonding studies can 

be informative for courts when determining whether the 

parental-benefit exception to adoption applies. (In re Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633 & fn. 4.) The high court 

advised juvenile courts seriously to “consider, where requested 

and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant 

expert testimony.” (Id. at p. 633, fn. 4.) We review a juvenile 

court’s denial of a request for a bonding study for an abuse of 
22

discretion. (See In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 

1197.)

We also review an order denying a continuance for an 

abuse of discretion. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 

585.) We do not disturb the court’s ruling unless its decision 

was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and resulted 

in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (In re Karla C. (2003) 

113 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.) Courts may continue dependency 

proceedings only if the delay is not contrary to the child’s 

interests and only on a showing of good cause. (In re Ninfa S. 

(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810.) In exercising its discretion 

and “considering the minor’s interests,” the statute requires 

the court to “give substantial weight to a minor’s need for 

prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to 

provide children with stable environments, and the damage 

to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. 

(a)(1).) Continuances are expressly discouraged and meant 

to be difficult to obtain. (Elijah V., at p. 585; Ninfa S., at 

pp. 810–811; Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 

1238, 1242–1243.)

Here, mother argues reversal is required because the 

court refused to exercise its discretion by failing to rule on 

her requests. True, the court did not explicitly deny mother’s 

requests. Nevertheless, it did so implicitly by terminating 

mother’s parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent 

plan. Mother provides no authority that a court must explicitly 

deny requests for a continuance or a bonding study. Moreover, 

absent some affirmative indication in the record that the court 

misunderstood the scope of its powers or otherwise refused to 
23

exercise them, mother has not shown the court failed to exercise 

its discretion. 

Mother alternatively argues the court abused its discretion 

by denying her requests. Once again, we disagree. It is not clear, 

and mother has never meaningfully explained, why a bonding 

study would have been helpful given she did not argue for the 

existence of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception 

to adoption. Nor has mother explained why she waited until 

the hearing to request the study for the first time. Mother 

apparently relied on minor’s counsel’s remark that an 

investigator had observed mother bring toys to a visit and 

that A.S. was engaged. The Department, however, noted similar 

observations in its reports during the reunification period, and 

there is no indication that the visits meaningfully improved after 

the court terminated mother’s services. Mother could have cited 

those reports to request a timely bonding study. Instead, she 

waited until the last minute to do so, when ordering the study 

would have required a continuance and delayed permanence 

for A.S. Under these circumstances, the court reasonably could 

have found mother’s last-minute requests were little more 

than a stalling tactic and not in A.S.’s best interest. (See In re 

Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 [“While it is not 

beyond the juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding study 

late in the process under compelling circumstances, the denial 

of a belated request for such a study is fully consistent with 

the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due process.”].)

Mother’s reliance on In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 

1474 is misplaced. In that case, the parent argued the court 

abused its discretion by granting minor’s counsel’s request for 

a continuance. (Id. at pp. 1480–1481.) Here, in contrast, the 
24

issue is whether the court abused its discretion by failing to grant 

a continuance. That the juvenile court in Mary B. acted within 

its discretion in granting a continuance says nothing about 

whether the juvenile court in this case was compelled to do 

the same. Accordingly, Mary B. provides no help to mother.

3. We remand the case for compliance with ICWA

Before the detention hearing, mother and father 

each submitted a Judicial Council form ICWA-020, Parental 

Notification of Indian Status, indicating they have no reason 

to know A.S. is an Indian child. Based on those forms, the court 

found it had no reason to know A.S. is an Indian child. The 

record does not reflect that the Department performed any 

further inquiry into the issue. 

Under California law implementing ICWA, when the 

Department takes a child into its temporary custody, its duty 

of initial inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, 

parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party 

reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, 

an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b); In re Benjamin M., supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742; see also In re Darian R. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 502, 507.) Extended family members include adults 

who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, 

brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second 

cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) 

[adopting federal definition].)

Mother argues the Department failed to comply with its 

inquiry duty under ICWA by not interviewing A.S.’s extended 

family members. She contends it was particularly important 

that the Department interview extended family members given 
25

mother was not raised by her biological parents and had limited 

contact with them.4 (See In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 

548, 552–553 [the Department was required to interview 

extended family members where the mother was adopted and 

had no information about her biological relatives].) Therefore, 

mother urges us to remand the case for the Department to make 

a meaningful effort to inquire of extended family members as 

to whether A.S. is, or may be, an Indian child. The Department 

does not oppose remand “for the purpose of making the 

appropriate ICWA inquiry.” We accept the Department’s 

concession, conditionally affirm the judgment, and remand 

the case for the Department to comply with its inquiry duties 

under ICWA.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the denial of mother’s section 388 petition. 

We conditionally affirm the court’s orders terminating parental 

rights to A.S. The case is remanded to the juvenile court to 

order the Department immediately to comply with the inquiry 

provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, 

consistent with this opinion, and update the court on its 

investigation within 30 days of the remittitur. After ensuring 

the Department has complied with the inquiry—and, if 

applicable, notice—provisions of ICWA and related California 

law, the juvenile court shall determine whether ICWA applies. 

If the court determines ICWA does not apply, the orders 

terminating parental rights shall remain in effect. If the court 

4 Mother told a social worker she was placed in foster care 

when she was five years old and adopted two or three years later. 

According to mother, her father committed suicide and her 

mother was deported to Mexico.
26

determines ICWA does apply, it shall vacate its orders 

terminating parental rights and proceed in conformity with 

ICWA and related state law.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.