NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 13a0519n.06 No. 12-2519 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

CI ERA DANI EL , Plaintif f-Appellant ,
v. COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY, Defendant-

Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FR OM T HE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR T HE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: COL E and MCKEAGU E, Circuit J udg es; Z OUHARY, D istrict J udg e. * PER C URI AM. Plaintiff-Appellant Ciera Daniel appea ls the district c ourt’s aff irmance of the Social Security Commi ssioner’s denial of her application for Disability I nsuranc e Be nefits (“D I B” ) and Supplemental Security I ncome (“SSI ”). Daniel contends that the Administrative L aw J udg e’s (“A L J ”) finding that she was not disabled was unsupported by law or substantial evidenc e. Daniel applied for DI B and SSI on April 24, 2008, alleg ing disability due to bipolar disorder and claiming an onset date of Aug ust 26, 2003. The AL J denied her claims. After the denial, Daniel reque sted an administrative hear ing, which was held via v i d eo -c o n ference

. The AL J denied her claims ag ain on Marc h 18, 2010, afte r the hear i n g. T h e Ap p eals Council declined to revie w the decision, wher eupon Daniel appea led t o t h e district court. The mag istrate judge rec ommended

The Honora

ble J ack Z ouhary , United State s District J udg e for the Norther n District of Ohio, * sitti ng by desig nation.No. 12-2519

Ciera Daniel v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec. aff irming the AL J

. The district court reje cted Daniel’ s objections to the repor t and rec ommendation, adopted it, and a ffirme d the denial of benef its. Daniel appe als to this court. We reviewthe district court de cision de novo, which me ans t hat—like t he dis trict court—

we revie w the Commi ssioner’s decision to verify that the fac tual finding s wer e supported by substantial evidenc e and that the corr ect leg al standards wer e applied. See W alters v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. , 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations o m i t ted). When a finding is supported by substantial evidenc e, we must defe r to i t , ev en if substantial evidenc e also supports an opposite conclusi on. See Colvin v. Barnhart , 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Substantial evidenc e is “such releva nt evidenc e as a reasonable m i n d might acce pt as adequate to support a conc lusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Daniel contends that four specif i c fi ndings of the AL J wer e not supported by substantial evidenc e: (1) that Daniel fails to “ meet or equal” a 12.04 or 12.08 listing; ( 2) that the testimony of D a n ie l’ s tr e ating phy sician lacke d cre dibilit y ; (3) that Daniel’ s medication does not cause side e f f e c ts

so debilitating that she cannot eng ag e in substantial g ainful activity ; and (4) that jobs that Daniel can perf orm despite her impairments exis t in signific ant numbers in the national economy . These four issues wer e compre hensively addre ssed by both t h e m agi s t rate judge —in the repor t and

rec ommendation ado p t ed i n full by the district court—a nd by the district court itself afte r Daniel raised them as objections to the repor t and rec ommendation. Having revie wed the appellate briefs and the rec ord, we ag ree with the district court’s thoroug h, soundly rea soned opinion a nd add only two points of clarific ation, neither of which cha

ng es the outcome of this case

.

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Ciera Daniel v. Comm’r of Soc . Sec. First, we disag ree with Daniel’ s contention that the AL J “appe are d to pick and choose” from the statements of p s y ch iatrist Dr. Sung- Ran Cho—who conducte d a consultative psy chiatric examination i n J u l y 2 0 0 8 —in concluding that Daniel suffe rs only a modera te limit ation in social functioning

. See Cole v. Astrue , 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that a conclusion is not supported by substantial evidenc e wher e the AL J “lea ves [t he] Court without a clea r understanding ” of why one part of a doctor’s testimony was cre dited while another part was discredited)

. The AL J explained that he found the evidenc e g at h er ed b y Dr. Cho to be in tension with the GAF (g lobal assessment of functioning ) score , and there fore “turn[ed] to the longitudinal trea tment rec ord for a

more acc urate picture.” This is a rea sonable explanation for the AL J ’s decision to weig h Dr. Cho’s conclusion less hea

vily than the “de tailed nar

rative summar

y ” of his clinica l findings. Second, Daniel contends that the AL J eng ag ed in “unsupported theorizing” in ra ising the possibili ty that the trea

ting phy sician’s opinion was unduly influence d by sy mpathy for Daniel. See W hitson v. Finch , 437 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) (refusing to selec tively view the trea ting phy sician' s repor

t skeptically due to the possibili ty of sy mpathy , noting that “ a simil ar skepticism” equally applies to the opinion of a g overnme nt phy sician). Howeve r, even with possible sy mpathy

remove d from the analy sis, there is other substantial evidenc e to support the AL J ’s decision on the trea ting phy sician’s c redibility

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm.

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