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*********************************************** 
WIOLETTA KRAHEL v. MARIUSZ CZOCH

(AC 40521)

DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and making certain financial

orders. During the dissolution proceedings, the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order that sought financial documents relating

to his personal finances and construction business for several years.

Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the

defendant from providing evidence in the form of documents and records

relating to the discovery order. During trial, the defendant attempted

to provide testimony related to the financial matters contained in the

preclusion order, but the court sustained the plaintiff’s objections

thereto, effectively entering a sanction against the defendant. As part

of the dissolution judgment, the court had ordered the parties to submit

to binding arbitration if they were unable to divide their personal property by agreement. Subsequently, after trial, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for an order to effectuate the judgment and ordered the

parties to submit to mediation, in lieu of arbitration, if they could not

reach an agreement regarding the division of personal property. On

appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial

court improperly sanctioned him for violating the discovery order, and

improperly entered orders for arbitration and mediation regarding the

parties’ personal property.

Held:

1. The trial court properly entered an order of sanctions for the defendant’s

violation of the discovery order: that court’s finding that the defendant

violated the discovery order was not clearly erroneous, as the defendant

effectively conceded that the discovery order was reasonably clear, it

was undisputed that he failed to produce several documents by the

deadline set forth in the order, and the defendant’s counsel admitted

at trial that it was the defendant’s duty to provide the requested information; moreover, the sanction imposed was proportional to the violation

and did not reflect an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, as the noncompliance with the order was attributed to the defendant rather than legal

counsel, the plaintiff would have been prejudiced if the preclusion order

had not been entered, and the defendant’s claim that the sanction of

precluding documents would have been more appropriate than precluding testimony was unavailing.

2. The trial court’s order of mediation was an effectuation of the existing

judgment, rather than a modification of it, as it was proper for the court,

upon the plaintiff’s motion, to protect the integrity of its original ruling

by fixing the error regarding the order of arbitration, for which the court

lacked the authority to issue: nevertheless, because the trial court failed

to distribute the personal property and left the parties without a remedy

for the distribution of their personal property, the court erred in entering

the mediation order to the extent that the order was silent as to whether

the court retained its authority to resolve any dispute in the event

the mediation proved unsuccessful, as courts do not retain continuing

jurisdiction over orders of property distribution, the trial court here did

not expressly reserve jurisdiction as requested by the plaintiff in her

motion, and although mediation may have been an appropriate mechanism for the court to utilize after trial and prior to rendering judgment,

the court was not relieved of its duty to make the ultimate determination

of distributing personal property at the time of judgment as mandated

by statute (§ 46b-81); accordingly, the trial court erred only to the extent

that it failed to reserve final judgment until there was a resolution of

the distribution of the remaining items of personal property.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant a

chose in action for $495,000; although the defendant claimed that the

court erred in awarding him an uncollectable debt because there was

no evidence from which the court could reasonably have concluded
that he could collect $495,000 from the plaintiff’s father, the evidence

in the record to support the court’s finding that the asset had a value

of $495,000 was the defendant’s own financial affidavit, in which he

averred that such sum of money was due to him, the court was entitled

to rely on the defendant’s sworn affidavit as to the value of that claimed

asset and the defendant failed to present any admissible evidence to

challenge that value.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a financial order

requiring the defendant to pay a debt in the amount $67,500 to his fatherin-law; the defendant’s claim that he did not have any means to make

the payment was not substantiated by evidence in the record, and his

claim that it was illogical to order him to pay a debt to a person who

owed him more money was not supported by case law.

Argued May 14—officially released November 6, 2018

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford and tried to the court, Gould, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other

relief, from which the defendant appealed to this court;

thereafter, the court, Gould J., granted the plaintiff’s

motion for an order to effectuate the judgment, and

the defendant filed an amended appeal with this court.

Reversed in part; further proceedings.

Jeffrey D. Ginzberg, for the appellant (defendant).

Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, Mariusz Czoch, appeals from

the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to

the plaintiff, Wioletta Krahel. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court improperly (1) sanctioned him for

violating a discovery order that precluded him from

testifying about his current financial condition and business, (2) entered orders for arbitration and mediation

relative to personal property leaving the dispute unresolved at the time of judgment, and (3) awarded a chose

in action and obligation to repay a debt. We agree in part

with the defendant’s second claim and, accordingly,

reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and

procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this

appeal. The parties, who both immigrated to the United

States from Poland, married in Stamford on January

26, 2005. There are two minor children born issue of

the marriage. Neither child support nor custody of those

children is at issue in this appeal.

Before emigrating from Poland, the plaintiff was

employed as an attorney. At the time of dissolution,

she was employed by International Fund Services, LLC,

with an annual salary of $106,217. The defendant, at

that time, was self-employed in the construction industry. The name of his business is Champion Development, LLC (Champion). Fifty percent of Champion is

owned by the defendant’s son from a previous relationship. According to the defendant’s April 11, 2017 financial affidavit, his net weekly income is $1,597.73, which

includes income from Champion, ‘‘side work,’’ and

weekly rental income from one of the two marital properties.

Those two properties are both located on Soundview

Drive in Stamford. At the time of trial, the plaintiff

resided at 72 Soundview Drive and the defendant, along

with tenants, resided at 80 Soundview Drive. The plaintiff was the sole owner of both properties. The 72 Soundview Drive property had a fair market value of $525,000

and was encumbered by a mortgage of $351,414.20. The

80 Soundview Drive property had a fair market value

of $625,000, subject to a $436,742.60 mortgage. The

plaintiff also owned property in Poland valued at

$150,000, and the defendant owned property in Poland

that was valued at $200,000.

In March, 2015, the plaintiff filed the present dissolution action, claiming that the parties’ marriage had broken down irretrievably. Following a trial, the court, on

May 18, 2017, dissolved the marriage. The court found

that the defendant was more at fault for the breakdown

of the marriage and that the plaintiff was more credible

regarding the reasons for its breakdown.

In its memorandum of decision, the court issued several financial orders related to property distribution
and assignment of debt.1 The parties agreed on a shared

parenting plan, which the court approved and incorporated by reference into the judgment of dissolution. The

court did not award alimony to either party. The court

awarded the two Soundview Drive properties to the

plaintiff and awarded each party their respective properties in Poland. The plaintiff also was awarded a 2010

BMW 750IL motor vehicle, her jewelry, and her

401(k) accounts.2

In addition, the court awarded the defendant ‘‘the

asset listed [on his financial affidavit] as money due to

defendant from father-in-law’’ and his interest in Champion. According to the financial affidavits submitted by

the defendant, $495,000 was due to the defendant for

work and improvements that he performed on his

father-in-law’s property in Poland. The defendant was

also awarded a 2003 Dodge Ram motor vehicle, a 2005

Sea Ray Sundancer vessel, a 2008-2009 Sea Ray 340

Sundancer vessel, a Polaris snowmobile, a 2006 Bennington catamaran, and two pianos.3

Each party was awarded the balance of their separate

bank accounts, as reflected on their respective financial

affidavits. In addition to the aforementioned financial

orders, the court ordered that, if the parties were unable

to divide their personal property by agreement, they

were to submit to binding arbitration with a mutually

agreed upon arbitrator.4 On June 6, 2017, the defendant

filed the present appeal from the judgment of dissolution. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for an

order to effectuate the judgment, in which she

requested a referral of the remaining personal property

issues to mediation. In response, the court amended

its order to state that ‘‘[t]he parties shall divide their

personal property by agreement, and, if they are unable

to do so, shall participate in mediation before a family

relations counselor in the absence of such agreement.’’

The court also ordered that the parties would be equally

responsible for certain loans they had obtained from

the plaintiff’s father, which totaled $135,000. Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

sanctioned him for violating a discovery order that precluded him from testifying about his current financial

condition and business. Specifically, the defendant

argues that the discovery order was not violated, the

remedy of preclusion was disproportionate to the harm,

and the court’s preclusion adversely affected the result

of the trial.5

In response, the plaintiff argues that the

defendant committed a clear violation of the court’s

order, that the preclusion order was proportionate to

the failure to comply with the court’s order, and that

no harm resulted from the preclusion. We agree with

the plaintiff.
The following additional facts are relevant to this

issue. On June 13, 2016, the plaintiff served a supplemental request for disclosure and production on the

defendant. Prior to trial, the plaintiff, on March 21,

2017, filed a motion for order of compliance pursuant

to Practice Book §§ 13-14 and 25-32A, due to the defendant’s failure to comply with the plaintiff’s supplemental request. That motion identified numerous

outstanding discovery requests including, most notably,

his 2014, 2015, and 2016 individual income tax returns

and those of Champion. In addition, the defendant failed

to produce a current sworn financial affidavit, any general ledgers for Champion, any profit and loss statements for Champion, bank statements, and several

other financial statements.

On April 10, 2017, the court held a hearing on those

discovery issues. At that hearing, the plaintiff requested

an order precluding the defendant from offering any

evidence at trial that would be within the scope of the

document request with which he had failed to comply.

Although the defendant was not present for the hearing,

his counsel represented that ‘‘the defendant had an

accountant who fired him right around the time that

this action started. I believe it was . . . in 2015 or 2016.

At that point in time [the defendant] had not filed any

tax returns. The last return he had filed was 2013. He’s

found a new account[ant] who has had to play catch up

for the last three years in putting all of these documents

together.’’ The defendant’s counsel then assured the

court that the defendant would furnish the documents

in question by Monday, April 17, 2017. The defendant’s

counsel stated that ‘‘it is [her] understanding from [the

defendant] . . . that those documents are being prepared and should be ready by Monday to be provided

. . . to [her] so that [she] can in turn provide to the

plaintiff.’’6

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered

production of the outstanding documents by Monday,

April 17, 2017, and reserved the issue of sanctions for

the trial judge.7 The defendant, however, failed to produce the requested financial documents by the April 17

deadline.8 The plaintiff thus filed a motion to preclude

and for sanctions, which sought to preclude the defendant from offering any testimonial or documentary evidence with respect to the substance of those

financial matters.

On the first day of trial, April 18, 2017, the court heard

from the parties regarding the motion to preclude. The

plaintiff represented that the defendant’s compliance

with the order was wholly inadequate and that the plaintiff did not receive any documents related to the defendant’s income, the defendant’s business, or the

defendant’s bank statements. The defendant’s counsel

then stated: ‘‘[M]y client’s position is that the accountant failed him. The accountant was supposed to get it
done. She said that . . . she was going to get it done

and then Monday came and the accountant didn’t get

it done.’’ In response, the court noted that the defendant

was obligated to provide the requested financial information and emphasized that the discovery request had

been pending since June, 2016.

The court then asked the plaintiff to identify the particular documentation that she had not received in contravention of the court’s production order. The plaintiff

at that time detailed several missing documents, including (1) the personal income tax returns of the defendant

for tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016; (2) Champion’s

income tax returns for tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016;

(3) 1099 tax forms for tax years 2015 and 2016; (4)

Schedule K-1 tax forms for the defendant or Champion

for years 2014, 2015, and 2016; (5) a general ledger for

Champion for years 2014, 2015, and 2016; (6) a profit

and loss statement for Champion for years 2014, 2015,

and 2016; (7) account statements for a Bank Polski

account; (8) account statements from a People’s United

Account associated with Champion from July 1, 2015,

to the present; (9) any documents related to the defendant’s properties in Poland; (10) any documents related

to wire transfers sent to or received from Poland; and

(11) receipts from travel expenses and expenses associated with their children. The plaintiff thus asked the

court to preclude the defendant ‘‘from offering any evidence, by way of his testimony, or through records’’

with respect to those matters. The court granted the

plaintiff’s motion to preclude any such evidence as to

accounts, statements, and records listed by counsel as

related to those matters.

Days later, during trial, the defendant’s counsel asked

the defendant about Champion’s hiring practices without giving a specific time frame. The plaintiff objected

to the question, claiming that any testimony regarding

the years for which the defendant failed to produce the

company’s financial information was precluded. The

court sustained the plaintiff’s objection. The defendant’s counsel nevertheless continued to ask questions

about the defendant’s business during the 2014 to 2016

time period and attempted to provide an offer of proof.

In response, the court continued to sustain the plaintiff’s objections on the basis of its outstanding preclusion order and, as a result of that conduct, ultimately

entered a futher order of sanctions against the defendant preventing him from offering testimony related to

matters referenced by the preclusion order. The defendant now challenges the propriety of the preclusion

order.

In Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001), our Supreme

Court set forth the legal standard governing appellate

review of a court’s order of sanctions for a discovery

order violation. ‘‘In order for a trial court’s order of
sanctions for violation of a discovery order to withstand

scrutiny, three requirements must be met. First, the

order to be complied with must be reasonably clear.

In this connection, however, we also state that even an

order that does not meet this standard may form the

basis of a sanction if the record establishes that, notwithstanding the lack of such clarity, the party sanctioned in fact understood the trial court’s intended

meaning. This requirement poses a legal question that

we will review de novo. Second, the record must establish that the order was in fact violated. This requirement

poses a question of fact that we will review using a

clearly erroneous standard of review. Third, the sanction imposed must be proportional to the violation. This

requirement poses a question of the discretion of the

trial court that we will review for abuse of that discretion.’’ Id., 17–18.

We first address whether the discovery order was

reasonably clear. On appeal, the defendant does not

contest the clarity of the discovery order. He also has

not suggested that he was uncertain regarding the fact

or nature of his obligations. Having failed to address

the first prong of Millbrook, the defendant effectively

concedes that the order was reasonably clear. See Yeager v. Alvarez, 302 Conn. 772, 785, 31 A.3d 794 (2011).

Under the second prong of the Millbrook test, we

examine the record to determine whether the discovery

order was violated. ‘‘If an appellate court is called upon

to review the findings of the trial court we apply our

clearly erroneous standard, which is the well settled

standard for reviewing a trial court’s factual findings.

. . . A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is

not supported by any evidence in the record or when

there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faile v. Stratford, 177 Conn. App. 183, 200, 172

A.3d 206 (2017).

The defendant claims that he did not violate the

court’s discovery order because the documents that he

failed to produce did not exist, as his accountant had

not created them yet and ‘‘[o]ne cannot produce what

does not exist.’’ The defendant, therefore, argues that

violating the discovery order was impossible. At trial,

however, his counsel duly admitted that it was the

defendant’s duty to provide the requested information:

‘‘The Court: Whose responsibility is it to talk to the

accountant, your client, right?

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Obviously, I mean,

you know.

‘‘The Court: Whose responsibility is it to provide the

information, your client, right?

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: Okay.’’

Moreover, during the discovery hearing, the defendant’s counsel repeatedly represented that the defendant would produce the requested documents in

accordance with the court’s discovery order. It nonetheless is undisputed that the defendant failed to produce

several documents by the deadline set forth in that

order. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the court’s

finding that the defendant violated its discovery order

was clearly erroneous.

We next address the third prong of the Millbrook test,

under which we utilize the abuse of discretion standard

to determine whether the sanction imposed was proportional to the violation. ‘‘In reviewing a claim that [the]

discretion [of the trial court] has been abused, the

unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the

action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . .

[T]he ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 201. When reviewing the reasonableness of a

trial court’s imposition of sanctions for violation of a

discovery order, we employ the following factors: ‘‘(1)

the cause of the [disobedient party’s] failure to respond

to the posed questions, that is, whether it is due to

inability rather than the willfulness, bad faith or fault of

the [disobedient party] . . . (2) the degree of prejudice

suffered by the opposing party, which in turn may

depend on the importance of the information requested

to that party’s case; and (3) which of the available sanctions would, under the particular circumstances, be an

appropriate response to the disobedient party’s conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Yeager v.

Alvarez, supra, 302 Conn. 787.

An analysis of the three factors set forth in Yeager

supports the court’s decision to preclude the defendant’s testimony. With respect to the first factor, the

defendant claims that the failure to produce the

requested documents was ‘‘not due to willfulness; but

rather inability to comply.’’ The defendant repeatedly

asserts throughout his brief that the documents did not

exist because his accountant ‘‘failed’’ him and his new

accountant ‘‘had not had time to prepare the defendant’s

tax returns or his profit and loss statements.’’ The plaintiff, by contrast, argues that the defendant’s conduct in

failing to produce the requested documents was wilful

or, at the very least, complicit. In so doing, she emphasizes that the defendant admitted at trial that it was his

responsibility, and not his accountant’s responsibility,

to produce the requested documents.

The defendant attempts to analogize the sanctioned

conduct in this case to the sanctioned conduct in Ridgaway v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 165 Conn. App.

737, 761, 140 A.3d 321 (2016), aff’d, 328 Conn. 60, 176
A.3d 1167 (2018). In Ridgaway, this court reversed the

trial court’s rendering of a judgment of nonsuit against

a party for its noncompliance with a court order

because the judgment of nonsuit was disproportionate

to the noncompliance. Id. The sanctioned noncompliance in Ridgaway, however, is clearly distinguishable

from this case because it was attributed solely to the

attorney’s conduct. Id., 760–61. Here, the noncompliance is attributed to the defendant rather than legal

counsel. Furthermore, the severity of the sanction of

nonsuit in Ridgaway is more severe than a sanction

precluding testimony. See Yeager v. Alvarez, supra, 302

Conn. 781.

With respect to the second Yeager factor, we look

to the degree of prejudice suffered by the plaintiff had

the preclusion order not entered. Although the defendant argues that ‘‘the plaintiff didn’t suffer such harm

that she needed an order of preclusion,’’ his argument

overlooks the importance of the requested documents

and the harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s failure to produce such documents. The documents requested by the plaintiff, including tax

documents and statements from the defendant’s business, were crucial financial documents related to the

current financial situation of the defendant. It is axiomatic that the party’s finances are material to dissolution

of marriage actions. Here, the defendant failed to present any documentation regarding his income, other

than that stated in his financial affidavit. As the plaintiff

notes in her brief, had the preclusion order not entered,

the defendant would have had the ability to testify as

to his income outside of the information set forth in

his financial affidavit and the plaintiff would not have

had the ability to confirm the accuracy of such testimony.

With respect to the third factor, the defendant argues

that ‘‘the sanction of limited preclusion of tax accounting documents would have sufficed; and the sanction

of preclusion of testimony was overkill.’’ The defendant

essentially argues that the sanction precluding documents would have been more appropriate than precluding testimony. The alternative sanction suggested by

the defendant would not have been an appropriate

response to the defendant’s failure to produce the

requested documents. Such an alternative sanction

would have defeated the purpose of discovery and precluded the very documents which the plaintiff

requested. ‘‘[T]he purpose of the rules of discovery is

to make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and more

a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed

to the fullest practicable extent.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Tessmann v. Tiger Lee Construction

Co., 228 Conn. 42, 50, 634 A.2d 870 (1993). We, therefore,

conclude that the sanction imposed in the present case

was proportional to the violation and does not reflect

an abuse of the court’s discretion. In accordance with
the principles set forth in Millbrook and Yeager, the

court properly entered an order of sanctions for the

defendant’s violation of the discovery order.9

II

The defendant next claims that the court failed to

enter a property distribution order with respect to various items of personal property, leaving him without a

remedy for that property. He raises several issues

related to this claim, contending that the court improperly (1) ordered arbitration, (2) modified a property

order postjudgment, (3) deprived the defendant of his

right to be heard, (4) abdicated its judicial function by

ordering arbitration and ultimately mediation to resolve

the personal property distribution, and (5) failed to

value the personal property prior to entering its order

requiring arbitration. Furthermore, the defendant

claims that the entirety of the trial court’s ruling requires

reversal because ‘‘the court committed error that cannot be rectified by merely having a trial on personal

property in a vacuum.’’

The following additional facts are relevant to the

defendant’s claim. Paragraph 10 of the court’s memorandum of decision originally stated: ‘‘The parties shall

divide their personal property by agreement, and, if

they are unable to do so, will submit to binding arbitration with a mutually-agreed-upon arbitrator. If they are

unable to agree on an arbitrator, the court will make

the appointment.’’ The parties, however, had not

entered into a voluntary arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for an

order to effectuate the court’s judgment, in which she

requested that, in lieu of arbitration, the court issue an

order referring the distribution of personal property to

the family relations division of the Superior Court for

mediation. The plaintiff further requested that the court

retain jurisdiction over that referral. The defendant filed

an objection to the plaintiff’s motion, claiming that the

change would be an impermissible modification of the

judgment. Neither party requested oral argument.

On October 17, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion and amended paragraph 10 of its memorandum

of decision to state: ‘‘The parties shall divide their personal property by agreement, and, if they are unable to

do so, shall participate in mediation before a family

relations counselor in the absence of such agreement.’’

In so doing, the court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction over the referral.

As a preliminary matter, we note that both parties

acknowledge that the court did not have the authority

to order the parties to submit to arbitration in the

absence of an agreement.10 We need not address this

issue at length because, as we will explain further, the

court subsequently amended its order to require mediation rather than arbitration.11
On appeal, the parties disagree about the propriety

of the court’s order amending the method of dispute

resolution from arbitration to mediation. The defendant

claims that the court’s mediation order was a modification of an existing judgment for which it lacked authority. The plaintiff argues that because the court’s

mediation order was intended to permit the parties to

resolve their personal property dispute with the assistance of a third party, the order simply effectuated the

existing judgment. We agree with the plaintiff.

It is well established that ‘‘[a]lthough the court does

not have the authority to modify a property assignment,

a court, after distributing property, which includes

assigning the debts and liabilities of the parties, does

have the authority to issue postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment. This court has explained the difference between postjudgment orders that modify a

judgment rather than effectuate it. A modification is [a]

change; an alteration or amendment which introduces

new elements into the details, or cancels some of them,

but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subjectmatter intact. . . . In contrast, an order effectuating

an existing judgment allows the court to protect the

integrity of its original ruling by ensuring the parties’

timely compliance therewith.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Richman v. Wallman,

172 Conn. App. 616, 620–21, 161 A.3d 666 (2017); see

also Roberts v. Roberts, 32 Conn. App. 465, 471–72,

629 A.2d 1160 (1993) (order to auction property when

judgment required sale of property constituted effectuation of judgment).

It is undisputed that the parties did not agree to

arbitration and, in the absence of an agreement, the

court lacked the authority to order them to submit to

binding arbitration. Because, as we discuss later in this

opinion, the court can order the parties to mediation,

the court could properly protect the integrity of its

original ruling by fixing an error upon motion of a party.

‘‘We have recognized that it is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are]

required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 471; see

also Commissioner v. Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc., 219 Conn. 657, 670, 594 A.2d 958 (1991). On

the particular facts of this case, we are persuaded that

the court’s order of mediation was an effectuation of

the existing judgment, rather than a modification of it.

The order effectuating the judgment, however, did

not expressly reserve jurisdiction as requested by the

plaintiff.12 Thus, we address the defendant’s argument

that the order is improper because the court failed to

distribute the personal property and left the parties

without a remedy for the distribution of their personal property.13
Pursuant to the court’s order, the parties were to

‘‘divide their personal property by agreement.’’ In the

event that the parties were unable to agree, the court

ordered them to ‘‘participate in mediation before a family relations counselor.’’ The court’s order nonetheless

is silent as to whether the court retained its authority

to resolve any such dispute in the event that mediation

proved unsuccessful. As such, the court did not

expressly ‘‘reserve jurisdiction’’ as requested by the

plaintiff in her motion for an order to effectuate the

court’s judgment. We, therefore, turn to the issue of

whether the court, in entering the mediation order, relegated the parties to a state of ‘‘legal limbo,’’ as the

defendant contends.

At its core, the failure to resolve the distribution of

personal property at the time of judgment and the referral to mediation implicate the issue of whether the court

improperly delegated its judicial authority. That issue

involves a legal question over which we exercise plenary review. See Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 458,

998 A.2d 766 (2010); Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180 Conn. App.

143, 170, 183 A.3d 64, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 937, 183

A.3d 1175 (2018). ‘‘It is well settled . . . that [n]o court

in this state can delegate its judicial authority to any

person serving the court in a nonjudicial function. The

court may seek the advice and heed the recommendation contained in the reports of persons engaged by the

court to assist it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial

entity bind the judicial authority to enter any order or

judgment so advised or recommended. . . . A court

improperly delegates its judicial authority to [a nonjudicial entity] when that person is given authority to issue

orders that affect the parties or the children. Such

orders are part of a judicial function that can be done

only by one clothed with judicial authority.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kyle S. v.

Jayne K., 182 Conn. App. 353, 371–72, A.3d (2018);

see also Keenan v. Casillo, 149 Conn. App. 642, 660, 89

A.3d 912, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 910, 93 A.3d 594 (2014).

‘‘We have consistently held that the trial court is without

jurisdiction to delegate the authority to resolve divisions of personalty in dissolution actions.’’ Casey v.

Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 388, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).

In Casey v. Casey, supra, 82 Conn. App. 388, this

court held that the trial court did not err in ordering

the parties to mediation for specified items of personal

property, although we looked unfavorably on the judgment to the extent that it left the distribution of personal

property unresolved. The trial court’s order in that case

failed to address items of personal property not subject

to its mediation order and ‘‘thereby relegated [the] ownership [of such property] to a state of perpetual limbo,’’

a result we characterized as ‘‘untenable.’’ Id. In so doing,

we emphasized that ‘‘when parties submit an issue to

the court for resolution, they are entitled to have that
issue considered, absent jurisdictional defects or other

substantive impairments.’’ Id.

What this court did not address in Casey is whether

the mediation order itself, if mediation is unsuccessful,

also improperly leaves the parties in a state of perpetual

limbo, especially in the context of General Statutes

§ 46b-81, which requires the court to distribute property

at the time of the dissolution judgment.

‘‘[C]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property

from one spouse to another; instead, that power must

rest upon an enabling statute. . . . The court’s authority to transfer property appurtenant to a dissolution

proceeding rests on . . . § 46b-81. That section provides in relevant part: At the time of entering a decree

. . . dissolving a marriage . . . the Superior Court

may assign to either [spouse] all or any part of the estate

of the other. . . . Accordingly, the court’s authority to

divide the personal property of the parties, pursuant to

§ 46b-81, must be exercised, if at all, at the time that it

renders judgment dissolving the marriage.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hirschfeld

v. Machinist, 131 Conn. App. 352, 358, 29 A.3d 159

(2011).

Unlike orders for the periodic payment of alimony,

the court does not retain continuing jurisdiction over

orders of property distribution nor can it expressly

reserve jurisdiction with respect to matters involving

lump sum alimony or the distribution of property. As

our Supreme Court explained in Smith v. Smith, 249

Conn. 265, 273, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999), ‘‘[o]n its face, the

statutory scheme regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings prohibits the retention

of jurisdiction over orders regarding lump sum alimony

or the division of the marital estate. . . . General Statutes § 46b-82 . . . provides that the court may order

alimony [a]t the time of entering the [divorce] decree

. . . . General Statutes § 46b-86, however, explicitly

permits only modifications of any final order[s] for the

periodic payment of permanent alimony . . . . Consequently, the statute confers authority on the trial

courts to retain continuing jurisdiction over orders of

periodic alimony, but not over lump sum alimony or

property distributions pursuant to § 46b-81.’’ (Emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, in Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 761, 785 A.2d

197 (2001), our Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, expressly

rejected the practice of reserving jurisdiction over personal property. Cf. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 140

Conn. App. 676, 686, 59 A.3d 874 (2013) (having determined formula for division of assets received by the

defendant pursuant to nonqualified plan, court had discretion to retain jurisdiction to effectuate its judgment).

It is axiomatic that an order for mediation ultimately

may not resolve matters in a given dispute, because the

resolution of such matters necessarily is dependent on
the willingness of the parties both to participate meaningfully and to agree to some ultimate resolution. As

contemplated by our rules of practice, court-ordered

mediation to a family relations officer is ordinarily a

resource utilized prior to a final hearing and judgment.

As Practice Book § 25-60 (a) states, ‘‘[w]henever . . .

the Court Support Services Division Family Services

Unit has been ordered to conduct mediation . . . the

case shall not be disposed of until the report has been

filed as hereinafter provided, and counsel and the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to examine it

prior to the time the case is to be heard, unless the

judicial authority orders that the case be heard before

the report is filed.’’ Significantly, the language in this

provision specific to the court’s order to conduct mediation was not in effect when Casey was decided.14 Thus,

although under Casey, mediation may be an appropriate

mechanism which the court may utilize after trial and

prior to judgment entering, we conclude that the court

is not relieved of its duty to make the ultimate determination of distributing personal property at the time of

judgment as mandated by General Statutes § 46b-81. As

such, we conclude that the court erred only to the extent

that it failed to reserve final judgment until there was

resolution of the distribution of the remaining items of

personal property.15

Because we must remand this case to the trial court

with direction to open the judgment and resolve the

outstanding personal property dispute, we are required

to address the further question of whether the court’s

error implicates the mosaic rule, which the defendant,

in his fifth claim of error, alludes to by asserting that

the court cannot ‘‘distribute just the personal property

without reference to the whole, or in a vacuum of information.’’

Under Connecticut law, ‘‘courts are empowered to

deal broadly with property and its equitable division

incident to dissolution proceedings. . . . Generally,

we will not overturn a trial court’s division of marital

property unless it misapplies, overlooks, or gives a

wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration

which it was [its] duty to regard.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 355–56,

880 A.2d 872 (2005). Respecting the complex nature of

the court’s determinations, we have applied what has

become known as the ‘‘mosaic rule’’ when we have

determined that there has been error in the trial court’s

financial orders. Tuckman v. Tuckman, 127 Conn. App.

417, 425–26, 14 A.3d 428 (2011), aff’d, 308 Conn. 194,

61 A.3d 449 (2013).

‘‘We previously have characterized the financial

orders in dissolution proceedings as resembling a

mosaic, in which all the various financial components

are carefully interwoven with one another. . . .

Accordingly, when an appellate court reverses a trial
court judgment based on an improper alimony, property

distribution, or child support award, the appellate

court’s remand typically authorizes the trial court to

reconsider all of the financial orders. . . . We also have

stated, however, that [e]very improper order . . . does

not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial

court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable

when it is not in any way interdependent with other

orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is

linked to other factors. . . . In other words, an order

is severable if its impropriety does not place the correctness of the other orders in question. Determining

whether an order is severable from the other financial

orders in a dissolution case is a highly fact bound

inquiry.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 214,

61 A.3d 449 (2013).

Having found error only with respect to the court’s

orders regarding the parties’ furnishings, which, at

most, are valued at $15,000; see footnote 13 of this

opinion; we do not conclude that the mosaic rule is

implicated here. The record before us indicates that,

as to the property duly distributed by the court, the

value of the plaintiff’s property totaled more than

$550,000, less $67,500 owed in debt from the loan the

parties received from her father, while the defendant

retained his property, which the defendant in his financial affidavit had valued at more than $750,000, including the asset described in that affidavit as ‘‘[m]oney

due to defendant from father-in-law,’’ less $67,500. The

assets awarded to the defendant also include his interest in Champion, which he retains free from any claim

of the plaintiff. The court’s order as to the furnishings

is thus clearly severable given the nature of the personal

property at issue and its relative value as compared to

the other assets distributed by the court.

III

The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused

its discretion in awarding the defendant a chose in

action for $495,000 and ordering him to pay $67,500 to

his father-in-law.16 We disagree.

In its memorandum of decision, the court awarded

the defendant ‘‘the asset listed as money due to defendant from father-in-law.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) The defendant’s financial affidavits repeatedly listed an asset of $495,000 that was due to the

defendant for work and improvements that he performed on his father-in-law’s property in Poland.

Our review of the propriety of that award is well

established. ‘‘The standard of review in family matters

is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial

court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the

court has abused its discretion or it is found that it

could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
facts presented. . . . It is within the province of the

trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences from

the evidence presented. . . . In determining whether

a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic

relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . [T]o

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we

must find that the court either incorrectly applied the

law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . .

Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is

governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there

is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell-Ferri v.

Ferri, 326 Conn. 457, 464, 165 A.3d 1124 (2017).

A

The defendant first claims that, because there is no

evidence from which the court could reasonably have

concluded that he could collect $495,000 from the plaintiff’s father, it was error for the court to award him an

uncollectable debt.17 We disagree.

In his brief, the defendant asserts that he testified at

trial that his father-in-law would never pay him back

and that it would be impossible to collect the money

because it would require a lawsuit, which would be

unsuccessful. The defendant further argues that he

‘‘brought to the court’s attention the fact that the

$495,000 is uncollectable and the court assigned an

uncollectable debt to the defendant’s side of the ledger.’’

Our review of the transcript, however, reveals no such

testimony. The alleged testimony that the defendant

refers to was stricken and remains unchallenged on

appeal.18 As a result, no evidence of the defendant’s

inability to collect the debt was properly before the

court.

The court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous

when there is no evidence in the record to support

them. The evidence in the record to support the court’s

finding that the asset had a value of $495,000 is the

defendant’s own financial affidavit, in which he averred

that such sum of money was due to him. The court was

entitled to rely on the defendant’s sworn affidavit as to

the value of that claimed asset and the defendant failed

to present any admissible evidence to the contrary.

Accordingly, the court was well within its broad discretion in awarding the chose in action to the defendant.

B

The defendant also argues that the court improperly

ordered him to pay $67,500 to his father-in-law because

he does not have any means to make the payment and

‘‘there is no logical rationale for ordering the defendant
to pay a debt to the same person that owes him considerably more in money.’’

The defendant’s sworn affidavit dated April 11, 2017,

lists his total net monthly income as $6870.26. Furthermore, insofar as the defendant claims that he does not

have the means to make payment, we note that the

defendant was awarded assets including two pianos

that, alone, have a total value of over $73,000. In addition

to the Dodge Ram vehicle, the pianos, multiple properties, and multiple boats, the defendant was awarded

his interest in Champion. The value of his interest in

Champion remains unknown due to the fact that the

defendant failed to provide the current financial records

of the company, in contravention of the court’s discovery order.

The defendant’s argument that there is no logical

rationale for ordering him to pay a debt to the same

person that owes him more money is not supported by

any case law. The defendant’s contention that he does

not have the means to make payment is not substantiated by evidence in the record.19 Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that the court abused its discretion in entering

such a financial order.

The judgment is reversed only as to the order concerning the personal property subject to the mediation

order and the case is remanded to the trial court with

direction to open the judgment and resolve the distribution of property still outstanding; the judgment is

affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On August 30, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, which

the court summarily denied on September 8, 2017. The defendant filed a

motion for review of the denial of his motion for articulation with this court

on September 18, 2017. This court granted the defendant’s request in part

and ordered the trial court to articulate the value of the personal property

delineated in its memorandum of decision. In its articulation, the court

stated that the valuation of that property was ‘‘to be as the parties stated

in their sworn financial affidavits.’’ On appeal, the parties do not contest

the value of the assets that were awarded to each party. Moreover, we

note that the court primarily utilized the phrase ‘‘shall retain’’ when issuing

financial orders reflecting that assets of the plaintiff and the defendant were

predominately separately owned.

2 According to the parties’ financial affidavits, the value of the plaintiff’s

BMW is $24,000, the value of the jewelry is $4000, and the value of the two

401(k) accounts is $8644. The defendant did not list any of the aforementioned assets on his financial affidavit although he lists a second BMW

valued at $17,000 located in Poland. Pursuant to the court’s order granting

the plaintiff’s motion for clarification, the court effectively ordered that the

plaintiff shall retain the BMW with a VIN number ending in 1247. No order

was issued regarding the BMW in Poland.

3 On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that one of the pianos

was purchased at a cost of $65,000 from the account of the defendant’s

company, Champion, and was not listed on the defendant’s financial affidavit.

Acknowledging no commercial use for the piano, the defendant testified

that he and his son owned the piano.

4 The court’s order stated in relevant part: ‘‘The parties shall divide their

personal property by agreement, and, if they are unable to do so, will submit

to binding arbitration with a mutually agreed upon arbitrator. If they are

unable to agree on an arbitrator, the court will make the appointment.’’

5

In his brief the defendant argues several other issues within this claim,

including a general argument that the court must consider the present
financial circumstances of the parties, that the defendant was deprived of

a right to cross-examine, and that the defendant was denied his due process

right to make an offer of proof. We need not review these assertions as they

are either inadequately brief or subsumed under the defendant’s overarching

theory that the court erred in precluding his testimony.

‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are

inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather

than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously

and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties

must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not

reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings

that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely

cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts

of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are merely

mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed

abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Pryor v. Pryor, 162 Conn. App. 451, 458, 133 A.3d 463 (2016).

The defendant cites to General Statutes § 46b-81 for the principle that

the court must consider the present financial circumstances of the parties

and, by precluding testimony from the defendant, failed to do so. The defendant, however, provides no analysis beyond the assertion of that principle.

To the extent that the defendant argues that he was deprived of a right to

cross-examine a witness, the record is clear that the defendant was not

precluded from cross-examining any witnesses at trial. Instead, it appears

that the defendant improperly equates the limited preclusion of his testimony

with his due process right to cross-examine witnesses, a proposition we

summarily reject because the issue of preclusion is properly before this

court. With respect to his claim that he was deprived of making an offer of

proof, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced

because the record is inadequate to address his underlying claim that the

court improperly precluded his testimony. See Casalo v. Claro, 147 Conn.

625, 631,165 A.2d 153 (1960). Accordingly, our analysis of the preclusion

order will address only such arguments that are briefed properly.

6 As the court addressed each request, the defendant’s counsel continued

to reiterate to the court that the documents requested were being prepared

and would be available on Monday, April 17, 2016. The following

exchange occurred:

‘‘The Court: All right. Six, you’re looking for a general ledger and a [profit

and loss statement] for [Champion] for 2014, 2015, 2016.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And again, Your Honor, these are documents,

which I understand from my client, are being compiled along with the tax

returns by his accountant. . . . And should be among the documents that

are provided on Monday.’’

7 At the discovery hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘The Court: So then, [counsel for the plaintiff], you’re asking that there

be some preclusion order entered for failure to produce.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, I guess I have to wait to see

what we get.

‘‘The Court: I think you do.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Then, Your—I suppose Your Honor has the

discretion to say that the trial court can take up issue of sanctions . . .

‘‘The Court: Yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: . . . if there’s a claim of failure to comply.

‘‘The Court: Right. And I think that would properly go before the trial

court . . . .’’

8 According to the plaintiff’s motion to preclude, ‘‘[o]n April 17, 2017 at

3:03 p.m., the [d]efendant provided partial compliance with the [p]laintiff’s

supplemental request for production. The [d]efendant[’s] compliance only

included an amended financial affidavit, a mortgage statement, documents

regarding capital improvements, a passport, two handwritten receipts for

children’s expenses, photographs of the children, and a membership letter

from Stepping Stone Children’s museum.’’

9 Because we conclude that the court’s order of sanctions was proper,

we need not address whether the court’s preclusion adversely affected the

result of the trial. We find it necessary to note, however, that the defendant

was unable to articulate how much he earned when asked by the plaintiff’s

counsel. For example, at the April 20, 2017 hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Sir, you have not been candid or honest on
what your income has been on any paper you filed with this court, have you?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I have no idea. I’m not an accountant.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Right. You have no idea and because you don’t

have any idea, nobody in this courtroom has any idea of what you really

earn; isn’t that right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: As well as you don’t. Yes. That’s correct.’’

10 ‘‘A court does not . . . have the authority to order parties to submit

such issues to arbitration absent a voluntary arbitration agreement executed

between the parties. Arbitration is a creature of contract and without a

contractual agreement to arbitrate there can be no arbitration. . . . [T]he

basis for arbitration in a particular case is to be found in the written

agreement between the parties. . . . Parties who have contracted to arbitrate certain matters have no duty to arbitrate other matters which they

have not agreed to arbitrate. Nor can the courts, absent a statute, compel

the parties to arbitrate those other matters.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn. App. 628,

649, 115 A.3d 39, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921, 118 A.3d 63 (2015).

11 To the extent that the defendant argues that he was deprived of his

right to be heard because the court failed to grant a hearing on the plaintiff’s

motion to effectuate the court’s judgment, we reject this claim. Oral argument on such motions is not a matter of right. The record in the present

case reflects that the defendant (1) filed an objection and, thus, his position

was before the court, (2) did not request oral argument pursuant to Practice

Book § 11-18 (f), (3) has not claimed and cannot demonstrate that the motion

before the court was arguable as of right pursuant to subsection (a) of § 11-

18, and (4) did not seek reargument after the court’s ruling. His claim,

therefore, is unavailing.

12 With respect to the defendant’s fifth claim, we note that the court was

not required to value the contested personal property. The defendant claims

that the court failed to find values of personal property that it ordered to

be arbitrated and by distributing some, but not all of the property, the court

did not consider the impact of the economic value on the parties’ estates.

The defendant’s claim is governed by the abuse of discretion standard and,

considering that ‘‘the trial court must consider the value of the assets, but

need not assign them specific values’’; Burns v. Burns, 41 Conn. App. 716,

721, 677 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 906, 682 A.2d 1011 (1996); we

cannot conclude that it was an abuse of the court’s discretion not to assign

specific values to the personal property items.

13 The personal property subject to the mediation order was contested

personal property that the court did not distribute—namely, certain furnishings that the plaintiff valued at $2500 and the defendant valued at $15,000.

On appeal, the defendant suggests that ownership of the his BMW automobile

in Poland, which the court did not specifically address, also was unresolved.

The plaintiff, however, never claimed an interest in that vehicle. Her financial

affidavit plainly indicates that she claimed ownership over only one BMW

and that the court’s order stated that the plaintiff ‘‘shall retain’’ the 2010

BMW 750IL with a VIN number ending in 1247. Unlike the 2005 Sea Ray

Dancer vessel, in which the plaintiff claimed a 50 percent ownership interest

and which the court awarded to the defendant, the defendant’s title to the

BMW in Poland was unaffected by the judgment. As such, we conclude that

only the parties’ furnishings were contested and subject to the mediation

order.

14 The analogous Practice Book provision in effect in 2004 stated in relevant

part: ‘‘Whenever, in any family matter, an evaluation or study has been

ordered, the case shall not be disposed of until the report has been filed

as hereinafter provided, and counsel and the parties have had a reasonable

opportunity to examine it prior to the time the case is to be heard, unless

the judicial authority shall order that the case be heard before the report

is filed . . . .’’ Practice Book (2004) § 25-60 (a).

15 In so holding, we reject the plaintiff’s original entreaty to the trial court

that it ‘‘reserve jurisdiction’’ postjudgment, as it is clear that a reservation

of jurisdiction for property matters is improper under Bender v. Bender,

supra, 258 Conn. 761.

16 The defendant vaguely claims that the court made a disproportionate

award of assets because the $495,000 was uncollectable and without the

$495,000 award, his award was disproportionate to the plaintiff’s award.

Because we conclude that the award of the chose in action was proper, we

need not address that argument.

17 The parties do not dispute that a chose in action is a property interest

subject to distribution. See Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 623, 974 A.2d
641 (2009).

18 At trial, the following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Turning to page two of your financial affidavit, if you would, please? There was some testimony yesterday, on page

two, the very last line item in the asset section says money due to defendant

from father-in-law. Do you see that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Now do you know what you would have to

do in order to try and collect that money?

‘‘[Defendant]: As of right now, I have to file a lawsuit against [the plaintiff’s]

father, which is pretty much impossible because they changed their company

name already.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Move to strike, judge.

‘‘[The Defendant]: So I cannot collect this money at all.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Move to strike.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: You can’t talk.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And I object to the question on the ground of

relevance, Your Honor. This is his debt on his affidavit.

‘‘The Court: The portion of the answer indicating that he needs to file a

lawsuit against the plaintiff’s father may stand. The rest may be stricken

and the objection to the question is overruled.’’

19 The defendant states that he has been left unable to comply with financial

orders similar to the defendants in Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App.

799, 808, 90 A.3d 300 (2014), and Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 362–63.

‘‘In Valentine, this court held that the trial court abused its discretion in

issuing excessive financial orders that left one party with little to no income

to sustain his basic welfare. . . . After determining that the defendant’s net

weekly income was $957.52, the [trial] court ordered him to make payments

in excess of his financial capacity. It imposed a weekly obligation of $600

toward child support and alimony payments, and an additional $200 toward

prior court orders until he satisfied the outstanding amount of $61,392. This

$800 weekly sum alone constituted more than 80 percent of the defendant’s

net weekly income, and left him with a mere $157.52 to satisfy his weekly

living expenses.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Wood v. Wood, 160

Conn. App. 708, 724–25, 125 A.3d 1040 (2015).

In Greco, our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s financial orders

constituted an abuse of discretion because, ‘‘[u]nder the trial court’s order,

the defendant was forced to the brink of abject poverty by his obligations

to pay the required alimony and insurance premiums, and then stripped of

any means with which to pay them by the disproportionate division of the

marital assets.’’ Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 363.

We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Valentine and Greco

because, here, the court awarded the defendant valuable assets, giving him

the means both to comply with the disputed financial order and to sustain

his basic welfare. See Wood v. Wood, supra, 160 Conn. App. 725. Furthermore,

the defendant in this case was ordered to pay the presumptive amount in

child support and no alimony payments.