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i 

25–147 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–31] 

CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT 

FOR RUSSIA’S VIOLATIONS OF 

THE INF TREATY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

[Serial No. 115–57] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 30, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

RO KHANNA, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director 

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services ......................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Rose, Hon. Frank A., Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 

Verification, and Compliance, Department of State .......................................... 1 

Scher, Hon. Robert M., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, 

Plans, and Capabilities, Department of Defense ............................................... 3 

Wolfsthal, Jon Brook, Former Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council ............................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services ......... 37 

Keating, Hon. William R., a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs ...................................................................... 39 

Poe, Hon. Ted., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs ................................................................................................................ 35 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 33 

Rose, Hon. Frank A. ......................................................................................... 40 

Scher, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 49 

Wolfsthal, Jon Brook ........................................................................................ 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey ............................ 81 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013 report ..................................................................... 83 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 99 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 95 

(1) 

CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FOR RUSSIA’S 

VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIF- ERATION, AND TRADE, Washington, DC, Thursday, 

March 30, 2017. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. ROGERS. This joint hearing will come to order. Since we were 

called away for votes at a bad time, we have agreed to dispense 

with opening statements from the members and go directly to our 

witnesses. We want to thank our witnesses for being here and taking the time to not only attend, but to prepare. We know it takes 

a lot of time and energy, and it is a great help to us, so thank you 

very much. 

We have a distinguished panel with us today. The Honorable 

Frank Rose, former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 

Verification, and Compliance; the Honorable Bob Scher, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; 

and Jon Wolfsthal, did I say that right? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Excellent, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Former Senior Director of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council. 

We will start with Mr. Rose. You are recognized for an opening 

statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK A. ROSE, FORMER ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, 

AND COMPLIANCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ROSE. Great. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how 

the United States and its allies should respond to Russia’s violation 

of its obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, or INF, 

Treaty. As I outlined in my prepared statement, I believe it is highly unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obliga-
2 

tions under the treaty for a variety of political and military reasons. Specifically, I believe that Russia no longer views the EuroAtlantic security architecture put in place in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s as in its interest, and it is slowly but surely trying to, 

I would say, dismantle that architecture, and the INF Treaty violation is a symptom of that. 

Therefore, a strong but proportional response is required by the 

United States and its allies to effectively deal with Russia’s violation. I would recommend that the United States and its allies adopt 

a, quote, ‘‘countervailing strategy’’ in response to Russia’s violation 

that seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets 

at risk. That response should also include limited defensive measures to deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment of the new ground launch cruise missile. This approach would 

include several elements. 

First, I think it is important that the United States remain focused on maintaining the unity of our alliance, both in Asia and 

in Europe. The INF Treaty is not simply a bilateral treaty between 

the U.S. and Russia, but it goes to the heart of Euro-Atlantic security. So as we develop our response options, I think it is imperative 

we do that in a way that maximizes coordination with allies. And, 

furthermore, as we look at military response options, I think it is 

important that we find ways to include the allies. 

Secondly, I think the United States needs to place the blame for 

the demise on the INF Treaty squarely with Russia. It is Russia 

who has cheated on the treaty and got caught. We need to be careful, though, that we don’t unilaterally withdraw and give Russia a 

victory. My predecessor in the Bush administration, Steve Rademaker, in testimony before this committee in July of 2014, made 

the same point. We don’t want to give the Russians a gift. 

Third, I think it is very important that the United States continue to fund the nuclear modernization program, specifically the 

new air-launch cruise missile, the long-range standoff system, or 

LRSO. This will improve our ability to hold critical Russian targets 

at risk. 

Fourth, I think the United States should develop a conventional 

variant of the LRSO. Again, this conventional variant of the LRSO 

will further allow us to hold critical Russian targets at risk. 

Fifth, I think we should facilitate allied acquisition of air- and 

sea-launch conventional strike capabilities, particularly the joint 

air and surface standoff missile, or JASSM, and we should also 

consider selling the Tomahawk sea-launch cruise missile to interested allies. 

Sixth, I think it is critical that we remind Russia that NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] remains a nuclear alliance, 

and implement all of the key nuclear recommendations from 

NATO’s Warsaw Summit of July 2016. 

And, finally, the United States and NATO should deploy limited 

cruise missile defenses to protect key alliance assets in the event 

of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment of limited 

cruise missiles, I would caution against moving forward with the 

deployment of a larger set of mission defense capabilities aimed 

against Russia, especially Russia’s strategic deterrent. Such an ap-
3 

proach would be extremely expensive and technologically challenging. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and our allies for almost 30 

years. It is not just a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia, 

but goes to the heart of European security. However, it is clear to 

me that Russia is not coming back into compliance, or unlikely to 

do; therefore, a strong but proportional response is required. Those 

response options should be implemented in a way that maintains 

alliance unity, and places the blame for the demise of the treaty 

squarely where it belongs, with Russia. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Scher, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. SCHER, FORMER ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SCHER. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As I am sure you 

all know, my testimony represents my personal views only, and not 

those of the previous administration. And I will try to touch on just 

the key highlights of my written testimony, which I know will be 

put into the record, in this opening statement to keep lots of time 

for questions and answers. 

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and its deployment of the 

violating system must be considered within the context of Russia’s 

overall aggressive behavior. Given this, any approach to Russia’s 

violation needs to be considered within a complete context of a 

strategy towards Russia. Having said that, within this context, I 

believe it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to bring Russia 

back into compliance, but I also believe that right now, it remains 

in our best interests to try to get Russia to return. Having the INF 

Treaty in force enhances strategic stability, and continuing to be 

seen by our allies as working diligently with Russia is important. 

The centerpiece of any policy must be approaching this with all 

levers of national power and using these to demonstrate that we 

will not allow the Russians to benefit from their violation. As such, 

the administration should consider taking some combination of 

military actions along with diplomatic and economic actions to 

show Russia it will not achieve the advantages it seeks by deploying this system. And further, I would argue that U.S. government 

policies should be oriented towards demonstrating to Russia that 

they are actually going to be worse off militarily and diplomatically 

if they continue to field this system. Certain actions clearly need 

to be taken or are already being taken and should be built upon. 

We need to better protect our forces and our allies directly from 

these missiles, and I believe that there should be consideration of 

increasing those capabilities, especially in the area of cruise missile 

defense. The United States and its allies must look to field systems 
4 

into and around the region that can hold at risk key targets inside 

of Russia, including, but not limited to, the violating systems. 

The U.S. and NATO should continue to improve the readiness 

and presence of their conventional and nuclear forces. As the 

United States and NATO allies step up pressure, other actions 

should be considered in any review. When considering these options, however, we must realize that any policy has to strike the 

difficult balance between demonstrating to Russia that it cannot 

take its aggressive actions and expect that there will be no response, against ensuring that any actions taken to increase overall 

strategic stability—sorry—that any actions will increase strategic 

stability, not reduce it. 

Some examples of military actions I described in my testimony 

that could be considered are: increasing deployments of SSGNs 

[cruise missile submarines] in and around Europe to increase 

strike capacity of U.S. assets in the region; fielding unilaterally and 

in conjunction with NATO allies broader and more sophisticated 

rocket artillery systems on the territory of our eastern allies; speeding up the deployment of the LRSO and quickly developing a conventional cruise missile variant; transitioning the Air Force program office overseeing LRSO development into a joint program office; and considering how to develop or how we might field a 

ground-launch cruise missile similar to the one Russia has apparently deployed. While consideration of this option is not a violation 

of the INF Treaty, clearly, many would see this as the most 

escalatory of the options. 

Critical to any coordinated political, economic, and military set of 

actions that we take is that they are developed and carried out in 

coordination with our allies. Our alliance structure is key to our 

strength, and it is a comparative advantage we have over Russia. 

However, we also cannot afford to let NATO drift into paralysis, 

and must make it clear to our allies that inaction is unacceptable. 

I appreciate the attention that these subcommittees have paid to 

this important issue. I appreciate the chance to testify in front of 

you, and look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scher can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for that statement. 

Mr. Wolfsthal, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JON BROOK WOLFSTHAL, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Members Cooper, Keating, and other members, thank you very 

much for the opportunity and honor of testifying today. I will just 

note that I am also testifying in my personal capacity, and I will 

ask that my longer remarks be submitted for the record. I responded to many of the questions that the committee posed, but 

want to frame my remarks in three guiding principles that I think 

should influence any decision to take action in response to INF violation, and many of these are echoed, I think, by my colleagues 

here. 
5 

First and foremost is anything we do must maximize alliance 

unity, both in NATO and in East Asia. We have to remember that 

this is not just an Atlantic problem, this is also something that affects Japan and South Korea. 

Second, we should make sure that Russia gain no military advantage through its violations. The Obama administration, as this 

program was under development, took steps in that direction. The 

deployment of this system, I think, does necessitate other steps to 

ensure that is the case, and I will recommend some in a minute. 

And then, third, I am very mindful, as I know my colleagues are, 

about the danger to crisis stability in Europe. We should be mindful not to do anything that makes that problem worse, as long as 

it does protect our security interests. We are in an action-reaction 

cycle with Russia. It doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t take action, 

but we need to understand how it will affect that dynamic, because 

the risk of conflict is real and growing. 

I want to include one last factor that I would not put in the same 

category as guiding principle, but I think is important, and that is 

that we should remember that arms control has never been a 

standalone purpose. It is a tool in our toolbox. The INF Treaty has 

allowed us to catch the cheating of Russia in time to take response, 

and it is one that we can use wisely if it is in the context of a larger policy, just as we are now with the new START [Strategic Arms 

Reduction] Treaty, which remains very much in our interest, and 

I don’t believe should be an area where we think about countermeasures unless and until Russia fails to comply fully with that 

agreement. 

So to the meat of how to respond to this violation. First and foremost, I think our response should and can be diplomatic. We need 

to be much more forceful in how we confront Russia’s actions and 

the damage—and be clear about the damage that Moscow is doing 

to the global nuclear landscape. We must move to share publicly 

with our allies and with the broader public information about Russia’s violation that heretofore has only been shared with Russia 

and to our closest allies. I believe that the scale should now tip 

much further towards public release, because that will assist in the 

second step of this campaign, which is to put increased public pressure on Moscow. 

Why did Moscow cheat on the INF agreement as opposed to withdrawing from it, which it is legally entitled to do and they have 

mentioned for many, many years as a possibility? It is because they 

don’t want to be responsible for the collapse of an arms control 

treaty. And so putting the onus directly on them, I believe, may be 

an effective way to cost them politically and diplomatically, and 

might guide some of their future actions. I don’t suggest it is a beall and end-all response, but it strikes me it is a clue to their 

thinking. 

I also think that we should be unwilling to allow Moscow to 

maintain its traditional role as a leader in the global nonproliferation and arms control community. That is a responsibility that you 

earn, one that we have continually earned, that Moscow has abdicated. And so putting pressure on Moscow in the context of the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the permanent members of the 
6 

U.N. [United Nations] Security Council, the P5 fora, I think are all 

viable diplomatic measures. 

Third, I believe that we can and should take legal countermeasures in response to this violation. If the administration finds 

Moscow in material breach, we have the right to not only take 

countermeasures within the context of the INF Treaty, but also 

within the context of other arms control treaties that Moscow may 

care about more than our own. We care about the INF Treaty; Moscow clearly does not. Moscow cares a lot about other treaties, like 

the Open Skies Treaty, one that is not as deeply rooted in our security interests as in Moscow. And so, I think that we can work within the alliance structure to put pressure on Russia and deny them 

their rights to fully exercise their Open Skies Treaty rights in a 

way that might put additional pressure on them to come back in 

compliance with the INF. The benefit of this is also it puts our allies in NATO, their skin in the game. They also care about Open 

Skies, but they are not parties to the INF Treaty, and so showing 

that we going to take measures in one area may bring them to take 

action in others. 

I will sum up also in the military sphere. Some of what I will 

say echoes some of my colleagues’ remarks. I do not support deploying land-based missiles in Europe in response to Russia’s actions. 

I believe that we have many better options. We have the ability, 

and we already have the capability, to have air- and sea-launched 

cruise missiles in the European theater, but I think the risks of 

trying to push that avenue with our allies outweigh the benefits. 

I do believe that we should establish a joint program office for 

the new long-range standoff missile, one that would look into the 

possibility of a conventional variant to this nuclear program. I 

would actually go further. I don’t believe that there is a very strong 

case for the nuclear-armed LRSO with a penetrating bomber, so I 

would redirect the entire program towards conventional, but I 

know that is an issue that we looked at both by the administration 

and this committee. But I would also make a virtue out of necessity, and make clear that we are doing this in direct response to 

Russia’s violations, and to echo my colleague Bob Scher, that this 

would make it very clear that Moscow will suffer from both a security and a diplomatic standpoint as a result of their actions. 

So just to echo, I would say that we clearly do need to act in response to this, but we need to take care not to overreact, and to 

keep our security and the goals of stability and alliance management in mind as we craft our response. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfsthal can be found in the 

Appendix on page 63.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I recognize myself for the first set of 

questions. 

Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, in 2015, the Congress asked Chairman 

Dempsey to come up with a list of recommendations for the President as to how the U.S. should respond to the INF violations, and 

we also wanted to know what they were later, but do you know 

what those recommendations were that Chairman Dempsey made 

to the President? Did you support his military options, why or why 

not? 
7 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. Certainly we in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense were well aware and, frankly, worked with the Joint Staff 

to develop those military options and did see them. I supported 

them all going forward as credible options in different cases. Honestly, my memory will fail as to which ones specifically I didn’t support or did support, but I did think it was a very useful exercise 

and to make sure that a full set of options was put on the table 

and delivered for interagency discussion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know if any of them were exercised? 

Mr. SCHER. Honestly, I believe very few were exercised, if any. 

Some of the very—the small pieces, but, in fact, in large part, 

many of—most of them, I believe, were not. There were, however, 

things that were done in conjunction with conventional forces in 

ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] and other places that did 

fulfill some of those pieces, but they were not necessarily directly 

related or—said to be directly related to the INF Treaty violation, 

but to the full suite of Russia aggressive action, which is, in fact, 

what we have always said we were going to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rose. 

Mr. ROSE. Yeah, I would just concur. I thought that was a very 

useful exercise. I was involved in that. I don’t remember every single option, and a lot of that was classified. I would concur with Mr. 

Scher’s statement that not many of the specific INF-related options 

were exercised, but they were, I would say, include—some of the 

other ones were included in that broader response to the Russian 

threat. And I think that is a really important point to make, is that 

we need to put this in a larger strategic context in which the INF 

is part of a larger challenge that Russia is presenting. As I mentioned in my opening statement, sir, I don’t think the INF is a separate thing. I think it is part of this larger picture, and that is, 

Russia no longer sees the Euro-Atlantic security structure put in 

place in the 1980s and the 1990s as in its interests. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. At this time, if there is no objection, I 

am going to enter into the record a letter that Mr. Poe, Mr. Cooper, 

Mr. Sherman, and I sent to Chairman Dempsey in January of 2015 

asking for a copy of these recommendations. We have never received it. And we have fenced off money in the NDAA [National 

Defense Authorization Act] last year from the administration until 

we do receive it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, again, are you aware of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report in 2013 stating 

that there are at least four validated military requirements that 

call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited in the INF? 

I am going to include a copy of this unclassified report for the 

record as well. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 83.] 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I didn’t become assistant Secretary until late 

2014, so I wasn’t directly involved on the INF work attending the 

IPCs [Interagency Policy Committees]. I am sure it was there, but 

I don’t recall that specific document. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. Scher. 
8 

Mr. SCHER. I also did not work on the document, but I am aware 

of it, but wouldn’t profess to be an expert on the contents. 

Mr. ROGERS. And, Mr. Scher, you heard Mr. Wolfsthal make reference to the Open Skies Treaty. Why did the Department believe 

it was necessary to recommend that Russia was also violating the 

Open Skies Treaty? I understand that both the Joint Staff and 

OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] jointly made that recommendation, and why was there no determination ever made? 

Mr. SCHER. Honestly, I cannot speak to the why not a determination was made, in part, because actually in the way that the OSD 

system was set up, it was not within my purview, but also that is 

sort of—you know, but I do understand that that was the determination from the Department and that was the recommendation 

put over. I would have to leave it to others to go into the details 

of any conversations about why it wasn’t specifically brought up. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. I yield to Chairman Poe for any 

questions he may have. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman. 

The Russians have a pattern, and I think because of their pattern and our reaction or lack of reaction, we are living in fantasy 

land if we think the Russians are ever going to come and comply 

with this treaty. In 2008, the Russians violated the treaty, and the 

administration told Congress in 2011 that the treaty was violated, 

and then it took—in 2014, 2015, and 2016, the State Department 

confirmed that the treaty was violated. And so here we are in 2017, 

with all of the other actions by the Russians; 2008, we might all 

remember, they invaded Georgia, then they went into Crimea, and 

then they went into eastern Ukraine. And so they are violating the 

treaty at the same time they are being an aggressor nation and 

taking territory that belongs to other countries, and nothing has 

happened to any of that. 

So, that is the pattern of the Russians. And here we are in 2017, 

9 years after the violation, and we are talking about, okay, finally 

we are going to do something about this, but there are still no solutions; nothing has been done to react to this aggressive tendency 

by the Russians. 

And I agree with you, Mr. Rose, that we should try to work on 

solving this in a diplomatic way, that is always the ultimate answer to getting this, but I don’t think the Russians are—they are 

calling our bluff about this. 

So what specifically can Congress do or the administration or the 

Department of Defense do to get the attention of the Russians, or 

are they just going to keep being in violation of this treaty? 

Mr. ROSE. Thanks very much for that question, sir. I would say 

a couple of things. One, we have taken some actions with our allies, specifically at the Warsaw Summit, to respond to Russian aggression. We have the enhanced readiness initiative. And Bob 

Scher, in his capacity as the NATO high level group chairman, the 

NATO group responsible for nuclear policy, has done a number of 

things to make sure that the alliance has the nuclear capabilities 

to conduct operations should deterrence fail. 

I agree with you, we have tried diplomacy. As I outlined in my 

statement, there was almost 4 years of diplomacy beginning in 
9 

2013 with the objective of trying to bring Russia back into compliance. Those diplomatic efforts have not worked. So that is why—— 

Mr. POE. Let me reclaim my time, because I only have a total 

of 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROSE. Yeah. 

Mr. POE. And you have a lot of information. We have read all of 

the statements. 

Mr. ROSE. Okay. 

Mr. POE. Meanwhile, though, the Russians continued the deployment—or development and deployment, maybe, of the violation 

cruise missiles. 

Mr. ROSE. Yep. 

Mr. POE. And so we are at a place now where all of this has not 

helped—— 

Mr. ROSE. Right. 

Mr. POE [continuing]. Hasn’t solved the problem. 

Mr. ROSE. Right. 

Mr. POE. And I understand, I can even understand the reason 

the Russians are not in compliance. That is pretty clear to me. So 

what are the options of the U.S. right now? 

Mr. ROSE. I think there are a number. Specifically, I think developing a long, conventional variant of the LRSO is very, very important. And I—— 

Mr. POE. So we can have that development and—— 

Mr. ROSE. Well, we have a nuclear capable version. 

Mr. POE. But not a conventional? 

Mr. ROSE. Not a conventional. But let me commend Chairman 

Rogers and his committee, because they have been pushing for a 

conventional variant. So that is number one. 

Number two, we can make available to our allies strike capabilities, JASSM–ER [extended range], but also Tomahawk. 

And, three, I think NATO should be developing some limited 

cruise missile defenses to protect key command and control nodes, 

ports, and airfields. So those are three things that I would do. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Would you agree or not that we are more concerned about the Russian violation than maybe even our NATO allies are concerned about it? 

Mr. ROSE. I think some of our NATO allies. It depends. I mean, 

some NATO allies are more concerned than others. 

Mr. POE. Last question for all three of you. Should the United 

States suspend our portion of that treaty? 

Mr. ROSE. I would not do it at this moment. 

Mr. POE. All right. Mr. Scher. 

Mr. SCHER. I am not sure that gets us any benefit that we can’t 

accrue other ways, so, no. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Mr. Wolfsthal. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I think we can take countermeasures under the 

rights afforded to us in international law without withdrawing or 

suspending from the treaty. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up 

on Chairman Poe’s line of questioning regarding our European 
10 

friends. The primary threat of these INF Treaty violations is to Europe, right? And I am worried we care more about this than our 

European friends do. Is there any information you can supply us 

with that shows that they really do care and are willing to pay and 

willing to make defense adjustments? 

Mr. SCHER. So I think we have—I mean, we have seen that all 

of the NATO allies are actually—almost all of them are making 

progress towards getting to a 2 percent goal, or have ceased falling 

in terms of their defense budgets. That is not the strongest statement I would like to be able to say, and it certainly is insufficient. 

I do think that your general assessment that there are a lot of 

European nations who don’t take this as seriously as we do is correct. I also think it, unfortunately, is a political issue in many 

places where there are some people who do—within countries, do 

take it seriously and some other members of that same governing 

coalition who have a harder time with it. 

It is our job to lead NATO. We need to make sure that NATO 

is part of this answer, but we need to lead it as well. And I think 

one of the things that was stated in Mr. Wolfsthal’s testimony, in 

fact, trying to ensure that we do as much as we can to make it 

clear that this information that we have, the intelligence we have, 

is absolutely right and correct and bringing people onboard. So we 

can wait in terms of doing something, but we can’t wait forever. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If I may. So we have not been effective in our 

international diplomacy, because we have not been able to openly 

share the information we have about this violation. I think that 

would dramatically help. It would make it hard for Europeans to 

hide behind the ‘‘We are not sure’’ excuse, even though privately 

we have shared some of this information and they are convinced. 

But I think Mr. Scher’s point, and I think Frank Rose would back 

me up on this, the Europeans are unwilling to get onboard any sort 

of INF response, in part, because they are not members to the treaty; and two, because we have not been clear in what it is we are 

trying to do. What are we asking them for? Nobody is going to give 

the United States a blank check in this environment, and so we 

need to determine what our position and policy should be, we need 

to work within the NATO context and keep them united, and then, 

I think, we have a very good chance of actually pushing back on 

the Russian violation. 

Mr. COOPER. You don’t have to be the signatories of a treaty to 

be the primary victims of a breach of the treaty. So that is kind 

of an illogical—— 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. It is true that that is not an excuse. I am just 

trying to explain what we have heard from them. In part, however, 

we need to recognize the Europeans have already been targeted by 

Russian nuclear weapons even without the INF Treaty. Russia can 

strike everything in Europe with their long-range systems. What 

this violation actually allows them to do is use these systems 

against Europe and then have more weapons to strike at the 

United States. So it is not purely about Europe. 

Mr. COOPER. Which countries in NATO care most about this violation? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, I don’t want to get in in an open session too 

much into that, but I think it is fair to say our eastern allies tend 
11 

to be more concerned about the threats from Russia. And what I 

would also add is that, as Assistant Secretary, one of my primary 

objectives in 2015 and 2016 was to try to get as much intelligence 

information available—made available to allies. And what I would 

say is this: We are in a much better position now than where we 

were 2 years ago with the allies, and I think there is a very good 

foundation for the new administration to build upon. 

Mr. COOPER. Final question. Is our reluctance to state the name 

of any NATO ally in this hearing proof of the success of Russian 

disinformation campaigns in Europe that makes this issue a hot 

potato politically? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, I don’t necessarily think it is Russian propaganda. I think it is a concern that many of these countries cannot 

verify this information on their own, because, as you know, this is 

some of our most sensitive sources and methods, number one. And 

number two, they have so many other challenges with the Russians. So I would not say that. 

Mr. SCHER. I would just add, I think, my belief is we will have 

a better chance to pull together as an alliance if we don’t single 

people out individually. We want to do everything we can to help 

those within each of these countries who understand the problem 

fight their battle against other voices within their same countries 

who are having a harder time, and singling people out won’t help 

build that alliance cohesion. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would just point out, I wouldn’t put this in the 

same category as what we are concerned about in interfering with 

elections and fake news. Russia has been stating, falsely, for many 

years, that the United States is in violation of the INF Treaty. We 

abide by our legal processes and ensure that we are, in fact, complying, but that muddying of the waters has been successful, in 

part, because we have had to keep much of this information classified. It is one of the reasons I suggest we now err on the side of 

release. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Keating for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to welcome 

Mr. Rose, who comes from America’s hometown in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and I think whose folks are still in Cape Cod, so welcome. But I want to just—we have said a lot about military response, we have touched upon some of the diplomatic response, 

but, Mr. Scher, in your remarks, your opening remarks, you talked 

about also economic response to this. And I would like to ask the 

whole panel, since we were just broaching on this, and I think it 

is important, what kind of economic responses, specifically, do you 

think we could undertake? I will start with Mr. Scher, since you 

brought it up yourself in your opening statement. 

Mr. SCHER. I did, although that is a tried and true tactic of the 

Department of Defense to make sure that the other parts of the 

interagency are represented and get a voice. Fortunately, you have 

created this panel with that voice in mind. So I am going to defer 

to my State Department—my former State Department and former 

White House colleagues. 
12 

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Keating, what I would say is two things. First, 

there are very limited economic options on the table, so they would 

be more symbolic. I would say because of the Ukraine sanctions, 

that has basically sucked all the air out of the room, number one. 

Number two, we would likely need to implement these sanctions on 

our own. Most of our European and other allies don’t have the legal 

mechanisms available to impose sanctions for the violation of the 

INF Treaty. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would echo Mr. Rose’s testimony. I think there 

are some limited options that we could choose if we are willing to 

have these be unilateral sanctions, and I think they can affect not 

only the Russian entities involved, but there are other countries 

who provide direct support to these programs. I won’t get into that 

in this session, and I no longer have access to classified information, but I think there are some other opportunities there that bear 

digging into, and happy to talk about that off-line. 

Mr. KEATING. I also want to touch on the possibility—and I hope 

it isn’t a possibility—that, indeed, you know, actions like this could 

be used later on as creating a bargaining chip for other negotiations, and what comes to my mind is Crimea, and the danger, I 

think, in having this activity where they take this action, and then 

all of a sudden in other discussions, having them say, well, we are 

going to stop the suspension of this and conform to it in exchange 

for something else. I look at that as a terrible downward spiral that 

would have great implications. But can you comment on that kind 

of reaction or the use of this, you know, under those circumstances? 

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Keating, that is a really good question, and it 

leads me to another point. I am not trying to dodge your question, 

but I think what it tells me is that we really need to have strategic 

stability discussions with the Russians. I am known, both publicly 

and privately, for being very tough on the Russians. However, we 

are not talking to them about the fundamental issues associated 

with strategic stability. So one of my key recommendations to the 

new team is that they initiate, not an arms control negotiation, but 

a set of discussions focusing on better understanding their strategic 

concerns and the Russians better understand our strategic concerns. I think that is very, very important. 

Mr. SCHER. I think, Congressman, the only thing I would add is 

that your caution is well-taken. When you are looking at this as 

a broad set of issues, as you have to, and then a broad strategy 

with Russia, what we need to make sure we don’t do is fall into 

the trap of if they do something bad, then we give them something 

to return to the situation it was before. That is a net win for them. 

Now, if you look at it in a, you know, specific context, you might 

be willing to do that in order to gain overall, but it is always a concern about what we do. We have seen that pattern of behavior in 

North Korea, we have seen it all over the place, and it is something 

that we do need to watch for and, frankly, it is something, I think, 

we need to make sure that our alliance watches for as well. And 

simply by highlighting it, we actually go a long way to not letting 

that go down that path. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I agree with those comments. I would remind 

people there was a suggestion, I can’t remember if it was during 

the transition or early in this administration, that perhaps we 
13 

would trade a new round of arms control with Russia in exchange 

for lifting sanctions over Crimea, and it doesn’t work that way. We 

have to prioritize. We know that Russia is suffering as a result of 

these sanctions. I think it is one of the reasons you have heard us 

talk about not wanting to link INF directly to the Crimea sanctions, and that is something we are just going to have—we have 

to chew gum and walk at the same time. 

Mr. KEATING. That is why I highlighted the question. And I 

wanted Russia to know that this Congress realizes the dangers in 

doing that. And I think I can speak for most of my colleagues, they 

are not going to go down that road. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Scher, I will 

direct this first to you. You know, I heard, I think, pretty compelling indications from you and Mr. Rose specifically that it was 

going to be very difficult to bring the Russians back into compliance, because obviously, they have already deployed systems in 

contradiction to that, and it seems like a real challenge; but in the 

interests of open pursuit here of that goal, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon testified on two occasions that 

DOD [Department of Defense] was going to recommend three categories of military response options to convince Russia to return to 

compliance under the treaty. These included active defenses and 

counter-force and countervailing military capabilities. 

Mr. Scher, could you give me some examples of these capabilities 

as he may have been indicating? 

Mr. SCHER. Certainly. I think—so in the active defense realm, 

that is—the majority of that is pointed at, you know, cruise missile 

defense, specific missile defense around specific areas, and I think 

that, as I said in my testimony, the written testimony, cruise missile defense, I think, is something that we don’t do as good a job 

on as we would like to, as I think we should, and we need to kind 

of look at that as well as, you know, missile defense. We should 

not, however, get caught in the trap of believing that there is ever 

going to be enough missile defense, because it cannot ever get to 

the point where we can outspend our adversary of missiles versus 

missile interceptors; but we can get to the point where we can protect critical infrastructure, and that is something I think we might 

want to take a look at doing more. 

The countervailing—the two other pieces are strike assets, and 

one is the concept is looking at how can you take out the offending—the actual offending, you know, system, and, certainly, we 

have many forces in and around the region that can do that. Then 

there is also saying we don’t have to go just after the offending system, but we can go after other things that Russia holds of value, 

and obviously, those same effect—same that we have, you know, in 

terms of everything air-, ground-, sea-based, can go after those assets. And I think what all of us recommend, certainly I know I recommend it, is that we need to continue what we have done in 

terms of the European Reassurance Initiative, something that Congress has funded a number of years in a row and I hope continues 

to fund, so that we can move more forces more regularly in and 
14 

around the eastern parts of our NATO alliance, and that we can 

bring firepower there, as well as encouraging our allies to step up 

to the plate and purchase more systems that can be integrated into 

the NATO alliance. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Rose, I am just taking off of what Mr. Scher 

said. Did any of these capabilities that Mr. McKeon indicated, did 

they really ever get developed to any extent? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, you know, some of these capabilities, for example, JASSM–ER, extended range JASSM, we are deploying that, 

and that gives us the ability to hold conventional targets at risk 

with conventional weapons. 

With regards to some of the nuclear things that we talked about 

for deterrence that we are procuring, the duel-capable F–35. So 

some of these things—— 

Mr. FRANKS. We are on our way in some of those areas? 

Mr. ROSE. Yeah. Some of those areas. 

Mr. FRANKS. But does it remain your opinion that it is going to 

be extremely difficult to pull Russia back into compliance? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I think it is going to be extremely difficult to pull 

Russia back into compliance. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the reason I emphasize that, obviously, is if 

that is our stated conclusion, then it certainly puts a great deal of 

emphasis on the question of how long we want to remain tied to 

its restrictions as well. 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, can I just add, I just want to reemphasize the importance of alliance unity. And as the new administration moves 

forward, I would think that whatever they do, they want to be in 

close coordination with our allies in both Europe and Asia. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Final question, and I will start with you, 

Mr. Rose. Do you think that—I mean, sometimes I have an opinion 

on the questions I ask, as you might imagine, but has Russia violated the Open Skies Treaty? 

Mr. ROSE. What I would say, and I don’t have access to classified 

information, if you look at this year’s—or last year’s compliance report, we had many compliance concerns about Russian implementation of the treaty. 

Now, my understanding is that the administration is working 

with allies to resolve those compliance concerns, but we are not 

there yet. So we have certain—I wouldn’t say it is a violation, but 

we certainly have compliance concerns. 

Mr. FRANKS. And, Mr. Scher, would you characterize it that way? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. I think I always like to take my lead from the 

State Department colleagues about compliance issues, but it is certainly a concern for the Department of Defense. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to add my list to 

those concerns. So with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

Mrs. Davis from California for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for joining 

us. Just taking from the discussion about NATO, and I am sort of 

trying to get a sense of where it falls on a range of issues that we 

have with our counterparts, a few of us will actually be joining 

them in a few hours overseas, and so I just wanted to get a sense. 
15 

Mr. Scher, you said that you would prefer to err on the side of 

releasing some of the information so that they could have a greater 

sense of what the challenges are. Is that something that—or Mr. 

Scher—Mr. Wolfsthal—I am sorry. Mr. Wolfsthal, I think you said 

that. I am sorry. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If it sounded smart, I usually—— 

I do think that we need to be more public about the information 

that we have and we need to be sharing it more widely within 

NATO. There is always a tension between not burning a source 

with inside the intelligence community, and revealing that information, because it will allow the Russians to take countermeasures 

and we won’t have that source anymore. But I think now, particularly with the system reportedly in deployment, there is much more 

information, and even visual information that can be deployed diplomatically in the alliance and just as a public diplomacy campaign 

that can be very effective in galvanizing some support within 

NATO; but I also think we have to do that with the thought in 

mind what is it we want to do once we get that support, and so 

they have to be linked together. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. I think part of my concern was in having 

those discussions, if they were appropriate, that it also might mean 

that we would take some actions in terms of deploying in Europe, 

and whether or not that would create some feeling of confidence in 

what we are doing as opposed to a real pushback. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I think that is exactly right, ma’am, and I think 

you have heard all of us talk about there is a great danger in the 

idea that we would move or suggest that we would move to deploy 

ground-based strike capabilities in Europe in response to INF. 

First, I don’t believe, and I, again, have been out of the administration for several months, that the military believes that that is a 

military necessity or requirement. Without that, then I think we 

would risk alliance unity, because some countries might be willing 

to support it and others will be very much opposed. And having, 

I think, all of us work through the decision in the 1980s to deploy 

both GLCM [ground launched cruise missile] and Pershing II, I 

won’t say it nearly broke the alliance, but it fed into the Soviet 

strategy of weakening it, and I don’t think we need to do that at 

this point. 

Mr. ROSE. Ma’am, can I just add on that point, I am not necessarily opposed to ground-based capabilities, but I think there are 

a couple of questions that you want to ask before you move down 

this road. One, do we need this to meet our military requirements? 

Two, is it cost-effective? And three, where are you going to deploy 

it? And having negotiated a number of basing agreements, I understand how challenging it is to put capabilities in foreign governments. And I—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. I guess I would ask—I am sorry, because my time 

is running out. I would just add, I mean, and is it the appropriate 

response to their violation of the INF? 

Mr. ROSE. Ma’am, I would not recommend doing a GLCM in response. I think we can do what we need to do with sea- and airlaunch capabilities. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Rose. Can I ask you, and I hope you 

can feel free to be forthcoming, does the State Department now 
16 

have the appropriate staffing level and expertise to deal with this 

issue as well as other issues that are out there, given the personnel 

shortfalls, and obviously the desire to slash the State Department 

budget? 

Mr. ROSE. Ma’am, let me say this: I thought we had a good team 

when I was there, but we have a problem getting younger staff into 

the State Department. And this is a real problem, because we are 

losing expertise and we are not training the next generation. I gave 

a plea to the transition team when I left, is we have got to find 

a way to get younger people into the State Department. So previously, I thought we had a good team, but that was the concern 

that I had, is that we did not have a mechanism to bring junior 

staff, and we have a dearth of people who understand these issues. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Wolfsthal. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. If I can just make a point, I will be very quick. 

I was very honored in the administration to actually run an interagency process. I would convene Deputy Assistant Secretaries of 

State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and we would prepare materials up to the Deputies and the Secretaries to make decisions. 

This administration has not yet even appointed people at those 

levels in the Defense or State Department. There are people available, and I think it is to our detriment to not have a fully staffed 

interagency in something that I think—it is not surprising that 

they may be a little slow off the mark, but it is something that 

worries me in terms of our ability to respond. 

Mr. SCHER. Just to go back to your other point, even though I 

don’t believe right now we need to field ground launch cruise missiles, I don’t think it is proper for us to take it off the table, nor 

do I believe anyone is suggesting it. It is a real capability with real 

effects. If it didn’t have real effects, the Russians wouldn’t be fielding it. And I don’t think it is something we should necessarily take 

off the table, because, depending on the combination of assets, it 

can be very effective, and can be very cost-effective, but it has got 

to be looked at in broad case and we have got to do it with our alliances. I don’t think we are there yet, but as you noted in my testimony, I think it behooves us to take a look at it, and I think Russia 

will pay attention to that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Scher and Mr. Rose, 

what are some of the factors the United States should consider 

prior to the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty? 

Mr. ROSE. I would say a couple of things. One, is it in the interest of the United States to maintain the New START Treaty. My 

view is yes. You know, despite all the concerns that we have with 

INF, I believe it is in our interest to maintain the New START 

Treaty, because it puts limitations on Russian forces, and furthermore, it provides us insights we would not necessarily get from our 

national technical needs. But the bottom line is, are they in compliance. And two, does it serve our national interest? 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Scher. 

Mr. SCHER. I would mirror exactly what was said, but obviously 

my focus is on, is it in the U.S. national interest? I believe it still 
17 

is, as long as they are not violating, and as long as we continue 

to have the ability to inspect and do other pieces, so, worthwhile. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. A follow-up question for Mr. Scher and 

Mr. Rose, but on a different treaty. Now, we have heard suggestions from some corners that we should try to multilateralize the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. According to unclassified reporting, Iran has roughly several hundred intermediaterange ballistic and cruise missiles that would be prohibited and 

have to be eliminated if Iran came under the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty. Similarly, Pakistan has hundreds of missiles that would have to be eliminated—or limited by the treaty. 

China has at least 1,500. In what world would these countries 

agree to just give up these missiles? That is the first question. And, 

second, is there a risk that multilateralizing the INF will only give 

Russia a convenient excuse for its illegal behavior? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would note is that in 2007, the United 

States and Russia proposed the idea of multilateralizing the INF, 

so it is not a new issue. However, I would caution, I would say, 

one, we should not entertain this idea until Russia comes back into 

compliance with its obligations under the treaty. And secondly, and 

I think you hit the nail on the head, it would be very difficult to 

get North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, China, and India to agree to give 

up their ballistic missiles. So I don’t think it is very much a viable 

idea at this point. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Scher. 

Mr. SCHER. Yeah. I don’t think that is the world in which we live 

right now. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Wolfsthal, they were both briefer than I anticipated they might be. Would you like to comment on either of those 

two sets of questions? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am as surprised as you are, sir. 

On the multilateralization, I agree; I think it is not realistic to 

think that we will have a multilateral treaty that bans INF. I 

guess I would frame my response the following: What we are seeing Russia do is not just an action. They are reacting to the fact 

that we have developed tremendous military capability to protect 

our allies, and that they feel that they have not been able to do 

the same. 

We have now seen them come online with both air- and sealaunch cruise missiles, as they demonstrated in Syria. And so while 

I think that they are not likely to come back into compliance with 

INF, I think we do need to be talking to them at a military level, 

and at a political level, to understand how we can reduce the risks 

of unintended and accidental conflict, and that could involve some 

agreement regarding how and when we would deploy certain capabilities in response to how and when they deploy certain capabilities. 

I am not suggesting we validate what they are doing, because 

they have violated a treaty that has been ratified by the United 

States and there should be consequences for that, but we need to 

understand the broader context in which that is happening. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 
18 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad we are holding 

these hearings today about Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, because given the administration’s potential ties to the Russian administration, I think it is very important that the congressional 

committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services keep a close eye 

on our relationship with Russia and what is happening in this 

area. 

We have heard a lot from all of you on the panel about the need 

for alliance unity. In fact, Mr. Rose and I think Mr. Wolfsthal 

opened with that. That was your number-one recommendation, 

that we do it. But I am afraid that we are not going to be able to 

do it, given the set of circumstances that exist today. Just in the 

last 70 days of the Trump administration, we have had our allies 

disparaged and insulted; we have had conflicting information and 

opinions and positions come out of the administration on where we 

stand on NATO; we have had a Secretary of State who said he 

doesn’t even want the job, his wife told him to do it; you mentioned, yourself, dozens of empty appointments at top levels, so I 

don’t know who is going to be having these discussions that you 

think we need to have; and we have got a State Department budget 

that is cut by 30 percent. 

Would you comment on that, whether you are even optimistic 

that we can do anything about holding anybody accountable, or set 

a new set of standards moving forward? All three of you. 

Mr. ROSE. Well, ma’am, let me just say, every administration, it 

takes a little bit of time to get up. So let’s hope that over the next 

couple of months, we see some solid appointments by the President. 

And I am actually encouraged to see some of the people at the Pentagon who I have worked with in the past. But the bottom line, I 

will come back to your point: Our allies are an asymmetric advantage of the United States. It is what makes the United States the 

United States. It is something Russia and China don’t have. So we, 

in our foreign policy, should be doing whatever we can to maximize 

the benefits of those alliances, because those alliances provide us 

so many benefits from a diplomatic perspective, but also a military 

perspective. 

Ms. TITUS. I couldn’t agree more. 

Mr. SCHER. You have listed an appropriate and a large set of 

problems that we have to face to overcome to get the 28 nations 

of NATO to agree to things. I would suggest that we have always 

had a lot of things to get over to get 28 nations to agree to pretty 

much anything, so I hold that while it sounds daunting, I still hold 

out some hope. And to emphasize the point that Mr. Rose made, 

we are better off with a less good solution in 28 countries working 

together than with the perfect solution and not having the alliance 

held. You have to believe—it is, as Frank said, an asymmetric advantage. If Russia didn’t resent the fact that we had this and didn’t 

think this was a plus on our side, they would not work so hard to 

try to divide it, and we can’t let that happen. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am an eternal optimist, and so I believe that 

things that are readily self-apparent, like maintaining a strong alliance is helpful to the United States, will take root and be endorsed 
19 

and blessed in any administration. And we have seen evidence in 

the past of skepticism when it comes to other things that I believe 

are self-evident; cooperative threat reduction and helping to eliminate stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological materials around the 

world was something quite controversial in the early Bush administration. They came to embrace that. So I think there is hope, but 

I think we have to keep reminding the body politic of exactly why 

we have NATO and why it benefits us. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. All three of you mentioned the word 

‘‘hope,’’ so we now have a foreign policy based on the concept of 

hope. I hope it works. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think the gentlelady. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just start with 

Mr. Rose. It is safe to say, based on the cost to procure and develop, that the IRBMs [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and 

MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] that we discussed and 

addressed in the INF, are cheaper and more readily available than 

an ICBM, correct? 

Mr. ROSE. I think that is a fair assessment, sir. 

Mr. GARRETT. And it is also fair to say, based on the Pershing 

platform and the Griffin platform and Soviet-era platforms, that 

the technology to fill that gap if we were to essentially flip the 

switch to off exists today, correct? 

Mr. ROSE. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. GARRETT. And we could also presumably upgrade that Griffin system, that land-based Tomahawk cruise missile that we abandoned with the INF to the Block IV capability pretty much with 

the flip of a switch, correct? 

Mr. ROSE. I would have to go into the specifics, but I am—— 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, and we can’t go into but so many specifics, 

but—— 

Mr. ROSE. Yeah. Yeah. 

Mr. GARRETT. In the theoretical abstract world. 

Mr. ROSE. Theoretically, absolutely. 

Mr. GARRETT. So I am looking at a New York Times article, 

which is entitled ‘‘Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty, Challenging Trump,’’ specifically addressing new Russian land-based 

cruise missiles. And, again, I would source it from The New York 

Times. We don’t have any current capability, nor do our allies in 

the European theater, to match this. Am I correct? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would say is we don’t have ground-launch 

capabilities with a range between 500 and 5,500. Sorry. However, 

we do have a series of capabilities, air- and sea-launch capabilities, 

that I can believe—I believe holds at risk what the Russians view 

as critical, and I think we need to continue to improve those capabilities. I would just add, I am not opposed to a GLCM. 

Mr. GARRETT. Let me—I am not hostile to you, but I have a finite 

amount of time. We have no idea what our generation 5 aircraft 

can do against the S–300, S–400. 

Mr. ROSE. I don’t know. 

Mr. GARRETT. We just don’t know. So we think we have a capability. I guess what I am ultimately driving at is, if the multilateralization of the treaty is not an option, because people who want 
20 

to be ICBM players can’t afford it, and the Soviets can essentially 

replicate capabilities for cheaper by virtue of violation of this treaty, and there are no ramifications today, right? The Obama administration addressed the potential deployment as early as 2014, now 

the present administration has a quandary, is it not in our best interest to encourage our European allies to do what was suggested 

earlier, and that is start picking up some of their own weight, as 

they are not signatories to the INF Treaty, and the United States 

is already carrying a lot of water for a lot of people in a lot of 

places. 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, I think there are things that our allies should do, 

specifically, purchasing JASSM–ER and Tomahawk. On groundlaunch cruise missiles, my point is this, do we have a military requirement? Is it cost-effective, compared to, for example, developing 

a conventional variant of the LRSO, and where would we deploy 

it? I want to emphasize that, because this is controversial in some 

allies within NATO, and we don’t want to give the Russians an opportunity to create mischief. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Scher, am I pronouncing that 

correctly? I had the opportunity to speak with the defense minister 

in Germany in February, and very gently and tactfully, I would 

like to believe, suggested that that 2 percent expenditure on defense was a welcome addition that the Germans as they are aware, 

are the long pole in the European defense tent. You know, we can 

spend money on this, or our allies can spend money on this, ironically having the benefit, potentially, of helping us help them, if 

you don’t mind me grabbing from the movie Jerry Maguire. What 

is to stop our allies from taking this responsibility, and what is the 

best way to convey this request in a diplomatic and tactful manner 

so that we can live in a safer world? 

Mr. SCHER. I think the key is, certainly—and nobody—you know, 

in my past job, and I think all of us made the point to the European allies that they had to start pulling more weight than they 

had been doing previously. Two percent is a nice figure. It is a good 

talking point. It is not the extent of what we need them to do. In 

some cases, I would argue some countries need to do more; in some 

cases, maybe they can do less, but do more elsewhere. 

Having said that, it is a nice target, frankly, and a target that 

most of the NATO countries are not meeting. 

As much as it would be great to be able to focus only on the violation, I think we have to look at the Russian aggression writ large, 

use that as the piece to make it clear to our allies, both in Western 

Europe and in Eastern Europe, that there is a concern and a problem. The Eastern Europeans understand it inherently; the Western 

Europeans have conflicts within their own populace. We need to 

help that process along and get them to spend more and do more. 

If it is ground launch cruise missiles, maybe, who knows, but more 

has to be done. 

Mr. GARRETT. I just hope the Russians don’t force their hands 

sooner rather than later. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes. 
21 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I have a little bit of a variety pack of questions, but certainly related to the 

big topic we are talking here. 

But some—Mr. Wolfsthal, I will start with you. You mentioned— 

we have all talked about the Open Skies Treaty. This is not a bilateral treaty, right? So why is it important, therefore, to consult our 

allies in any discussion about using the Open Skies Treaty with regards to Russia? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. So we have been working with our allies over 

our concerns regarding Open Skies and Russia for many years. I 

think that has been a very fruitful exercise. It has been—as we 

have been able to work with them so they understand our concerns, 

and we have also supported our allies when Russia has been selectively complying in ways that affect them. 

My suggestion, that we think about countermeasures for INF violations in the Open Skies context, was a response, in part, to the 

fact right now, Europe aren’t members to INF but they are members to Open Skies. And so if we wanted to try this approach, we 

would have to coordinate in advance with the allies. But I think 

we have a firm legal basis, both within the Open Skies and the 

INF context, that that might have some potential to actually motivate them a bit more. Because we have to view all of these treaties 

as a network. They are designed to create stability and predictability in the European theater. Russia’s undermining them means 

that they cannot, and that is something that directly affects us and 

our European friends. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Rose, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. ROSE. I would agree with my former colleague from the NSC 

[National Security Council]. 

Mr. LARSEN. You don’t have to anymore, you know. 

Mr. SCHER. It is fun. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Scher, could you talk a little bit about this 

question that came up a couple of days ago at our HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] hearing with General Scaparrotti, the 

request to have a full division, an additional division in the European theater, and how that—do you have thoughts from your past 

life in how that would fit into the signaling part of deterrence as 

we have the capabilities here, or does it? What would the use be 

other than to have 10,500 more troops, U.S. troops, in the European theater? 

Mr. SCHER. So I will admit to have not gone—not done my homework to go back and see what General Scaparrotti proposed. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Mr. SCHER. But I think you need to have enough forward presence of U.S. forces to demonstrate clear commitment to the alliance, and deterrence to the adversary. 

There is a point at which you would like to have all the forces 

you could ever imagine and want there, but you won’t be able to 

because there are commitments that we have elsewhere. I would— 

I think that having a maneuver division—the capability to have a 

maneuver division in Eastern Europe on a short amount of time is 

an incredibly important—important in terms of both deterrence to 

show our will to Russia, and real capability and assurance. More 

than that, certainly, would add, but also, you would have to look 
22 

at the broader context of strategic stability. Does that actually 

make Russia want to do more and put more forces forward. So 

there is a balance there. And also, recognizing that we never had 

enough forces on the continent to win. That was not the goal of our 

forces, even during the height of the Cold War. The focus was 

forces there, and then you pull forces forward, you know, from the 

continental United States and elsewhere if you needed it. 

We shouldn’t imagine that forces that are in Europe are going to 

stop any, you know, push by Russia, should they so choose with no 

warning, but we need to have enough to demonstrate to our allies 

that we are there, and to Russia that we are not—— 

The exact numbers are always—it is an art rather than a 

science. A full maneuver division with all of the enablers that go 

along with it to land quickly and be able to maneuver immediately 

is critically important. I don’t know how much more than that we 

need. I would leave that to the folks who are still in office. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, sure. The reason I am asking the questions is 

in the context of this particular hearing, because I think all three 

of you have made the case that a tit-for-tat on INF Treaty really 

isn’t the—wouldn’t be the top option for us to take, that there are 

many other options that we ought to consider before we get to the 

point where we pull out of the INF, just because the Russians are 

not in compliance. 

Mr. SCHER. And I would say the—you know, there is certainly 

a political aspect to the INF Treaty violation, without a doubt. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Mr. SCHER. There is a real operational piece as well of what 

those missiles, if deployed at scale, could do, and what they hold 

at risk within NATO. So that is how I would argue that my successors in the Department of Defense need to think about this. So 

what military capability can we bring to make sure that those don’t 

achieve an overwhelming balance of power on the Russian quickly 

and immediately. 

But it is a real capability, make no doubt about it. It is hard to 

find; it is hard to take out; it is hard to defend against; and it is 

immediate and quick. You don’t have to do any movement for them 

to suddenly hold at risk a lot of NATO. We won’t be able to counter 

all of it, but can we make it clear that our forces will be there, they 

will be affected, we will be part of that war immediately and that— 

but critically, that the NATO alliance will go at it together. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you all for your testimony. I say this very seriously, it ranked among some of the best testimony that I have had 

the opportunity to read. I really did enjoy it. You know, in that, I 

am going to focus primarily—as much as I love the kinetic side of 

things, I am going to focus on more of the other side of things. 

And I want to point to you, first, Mr. Wolfsthal and some of your 

comments. I find myself just a little bit confused by them, and I 

think we can find ourselves in a good place, maybe by clarifying 

them. You made some of these comments: You know, in the last administration it was very clear that violations of arms control treaties would be confronted and have consequences. But in a—you 
23 

know, in a different piece you said: Up until now, the U.S. has been 

reserved in its condemnation of Russia. And then in another place, 

you know, you said about the Russkies, that they shouldn’t be allowed to gain a military advantage, and then went on further to 

say: You know, to this point, the Russians have been allowed to 

pretend that they are a responsible nuclear actor, and that very 

specifically—this is what interests me—we should no longer provide cover for that posture of them pretending to be a responsible 

actor. 

So I want to know, you know, diplomatically, what can we learn 

from the past so that we don’t make that same mistake going forward in the next 8 years? What cover was provided to them that 

we should do that now going forward? What did they miss? What 

do we need to learn from that so they don’t give us the political 

middle finger in this? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Sure, Congressman. Thank you, and thank you 

for the thoughtful reading and response. 

Russia is a nuclear power. They have the largest nuclear arsenal 

outside of our own, and they have the ability to destroy the United 

States and any other country that they choose. We recognize that 

they have that capability. But at the same time, they also have 

been very active in working with us over many decades to support 

the cause of nonproliferation. We worked with them very closely for 

20 years to enhance nuclear security. They had been active supporters in trying to deal with the challenge of nuclear Iran. But 

over the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen a lot of that cooperation 

ebb. And, so, we still go through the motions in places like the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, inside the United Nations Security Council, inside the P5 meetings of nuclear states on 

nonproliferation, and treat them as coequals. We have chosen not 

to take that fight that we have, and the very serious concerns, into 

those fora, because we don’t want to do further damage to the nonproliferation system, because that matters to us, too. We care about 

people complying with the NPT and putting pressure on North 

Korea. 

My point was simply that we should be very clear and direct in 

those fora that Russia is not living up to its historic responsibility, 

that we in the United States are, and that Russia has a lot of work 

to do if they want to be a legitimate international actor in those 

areas. 

Mr. MAST. They do have a lot of work to do, unquestionably. But 

I really want to get to, you know, can you see any specific points 

beyond that cover that we have given them—and that is an important word, ‘‘cover’’—and beyond that, I would ask you to follow up 

with, do you see us having to readdress—obviously, you know, 

there is going to be another nuclear posture review going on, but 

our nuclear strategy in general? You know, we have gone through 

the tide of years from mutually assured destruction all the way up 

to selective ambiguity. Do you see a need to readdress what is our 

nuclear strategy? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Very specific point I would make, in my private 

capacity, is I think we should not engage Russia in the P5 on nonproliferation and nuclear security. I think that we should resolve 

back down to the P3 with us and the British and the French. The 
24 

Chinese can be supporters in that. That, I think, has limited effect, 

but I think it is something that we can do and that would send a 

very strong message to Russia diplomatically. 

In terms of the Nuclear Posture Review, every President has the 

right, and I think should put their stamp on nuclear policy. What 

are nuclear weapons for? Why do we have them? When would we 

consider using them? Those are critical decisions that only the 

President of the United States can answer. 

We worked very hard to make sure that our policy was supportive in the Obama administration of our global nonproliferation 

efforts and our global efforts to prevent the use and spread of nuclear weapons. And I think in that, we were very effective. 

The Trump administration has, quite frankly, spoken on multiple 

sides of the issue: Let there be an arms race on the one hand, but 

it would be great if we could get rid of all weapons on the other 

hand. These are issues that I think a fully formed interagency 

needs to wrestle with, and that the President needs to digest and 

internalize before putting a stamp on them. But I think there is 

room for adjustments, both towards real reductions—I think we 

have more nuclear weapons than we need—but we may want to 

have more strategic ambiguity if that is the desire of the President, 

that is his right as the President. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you for your comments. I appreciate it. I yield 

back, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to, as well, thank the witnesses. I will concur. I 

found the testimony very helpful, and I appreciate you sharing 

your experiences with us. 

As I read through the testimony last night, as I have listened 

this afternoon, one of the common threads that seem to run 

through all of your testimony is this emphasis on maintaining 

unity, maintaining unity with our allies. 

And I would like to discuss in the little bit of time that we have, 

both short and long term. I will start with the short term. In the 

short term, if each of you could expand, on what opportunities are 

there that you would highlight for the administration and for Congress? What are some of the cautions you would give us? And the 

key priorities we should focus on short term? 

And, Mr. Rose, we will start with you. 

Mr. ROSE. With regard to the allies? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. 

Mr. ROSE. With regard to the allies, number one, I would focus 

on implementing—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Your microphone needs to be turned on. 

Mr. ROSE. Sorry. Sorry, sir. 

With regard to the allies, number one has to be implementing 

the recommendations of the Warsaw Summit, both on the conventional side of the house but also on the nuclear side of the house. 

Number two, improving their strike capabilities, in a conventional area, specifically JASSM–ER as well as Tomahawk. And, 

three—and this is something that is bipartisan—we need to continue to push our allies to spend more on defense. This is—you 
25 

know, it is not just the Trump administration who has been pushing this pressure on the allies, but it has also been the three or 

four previous administrations. So those would be my key recommendations. But you are right, sir, alliance unity is key, and the 

Russians are trying to undermine alliance unity. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Mr. Scher. 

Mr. SCHER. I think Frank is showing his Department of Defense 

roots. He has, I think, ably put forward some of the key elements. 

Following up on the commitments is always critical, continued 

spending. But I also think we need to—frankly, they need a sense 

of predictability, right? We need to both be able to tell them they 

need to do more, while simultaneously ensuring that they know 

that we will be there. That it is in our interests, not anybody else’s, 

for us to be a part of the NATO alliance, and that we are better 

off because more things—we get to fight away games. We get to be 

out into other places. That is directly and foremost in our interests. 

Maintaining that alliance is critical. They should never—we should 

never lose fact—lose sight of that. They should not lose sight of the 

fact they benefit by being in the alliance just as much as we do. 

I think with—you know, because those are the facts of the case, 

in my opinion, it should be easy to push forward with alliance management if we can do it deftly and make sure that they both spend 

more, continue to move forward on the Warsaw commitments, but 

also realize that the world is changing around them. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Wolfsthal. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I would say in the near term, we need to understand that tone and form matter, that we need to be prioritizing 

the schedule of the NATO Summit; we need to be prioritizing the 

visits by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Members of 

Congress, the House, the Senate. We need to show that this is the 

most important military alliance on the face of the planet, and has 

preserved the peace for two generations plus, and talking about 

NATO as an integral part of our defense strategy is part of that. 

And I don’t mean that to be a partisan comment. I think you can 

put pressure on NATO for spending. You can put pressure on them 

to take their defense requirements more seriously, but in the end, 

we have to talk as a responsible international leader, because that 

is what the United States is. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you. 

In the minute left, I know it is not fair to put you on the spot 

like this, but Mr. Rose, you used the term ‘‘strategic stability discussions.’’ In the context of where we are today, what is happening—we talked about the State Department earlier—to what 

extent have our strategic stability considerations changed, and how 

do we effectively communicate those, both to people in the State 

Department, but to the outside world as well? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, what I would say is this: We need to reestablish 

a forum to talk with the Russians on strategic stability issues. That 

doesn’t mean moving forward with a new negotiation, but we don’t 

have that mechanism. We tried at—the last couple of months of the 

Obama administration to reestablish that mechanism; the Russians 

decided not to move forward. However, I strongly encouraged the 

new administration to begin a very serious discussion with Russia 

about strategic stability. 
26 

And, furthermore, that relationship over the last 25 years has 

been based on further strategic reductions. I think we may be in 

a different place. I am not necessarily convinced that the Russians 

are interested in further strategic reductions; however, I think it 

is in our mutual interests to maintain stability, and we should take 

actions to encourage that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. Obviously, an issue that needs more 

than 5 minutes, but I very much appreciate your input. And I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Does the INF Treaty—it covers, basically, intermediate-range 

and cruise missiles? Is that what we are talking about? Okay. 

Let me just say that some of the premises of this discussion has 

been one that is disturbing to me. And let me just ask: Is it your 

premise that if there was a nuclear exchange, we should be preparing for a situation where we could come out of a nuclear exchange with some warfighting capabilities left? I mean, when you 

are talking about we need to defend, with missile defense, some 

particular storage or some capabilities, if there is ever a nuclear exchange. Do you believe that we could have a limited nuclear exchange with the Russians? 

Mr. ROSE. Sir, no. Why I am such a supporter of the modernization is we want to deter that from happening. And the best way 

to deter a nuclear exchange is to have capable U.S. nuclear forces. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, certainly. But anything but capable nuclear forces that are after an exchange, I will have to say that if 

there—do we believe that if Russia actually invades Western Europe that they—that that would happen without a nuclear exchange? That we would not, then, move forward? That there 

wouldn’t be rockets going off? That they would take the chance of 

just going in and allowing us a first strike? That is a—anyway, is 

that—it makes no sense, when I am listening to you, talk about 

these things. 

Quite frankly, we—as you are aware, we have enough weapons 

to destroy them instantaneously. 

Do we believe that the Russians have a plan to invade Western 

Europe? 

Mr. SCHER. So I won’t touch on whether—on the intel perspective. The key from the Department of Defense is we need to plan 

as if they would, and as if they do. And planning to do that—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is part of our plan that they can invade, and 

we wouldn’t have a nuclear exchange? 

Mr. SCHER. We would love—yes, absolutely. If they do not use 

nuclear weapons, I would argue that we have sufficient—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You actually—any sane person who thinks 

that there would be a massive invasion of Western Europe, and 

there wouldn’t be a nuclear exchange is living in la-la land. 

Let me ask you this: When you say about—when we have—okay. 

Are sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons, you know, the cruise 

and intermediate-range weapons, are they covered in the INF Treaty? 
27 

Mr. ROSE. No, sir. The INF Treaty only deals with ground-based 

capabilities. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Okay. So when we have maneuvers, 

which we have had in Estonia, when we put—by the way, when we 

put our—have our maneuvers right on their border, and we are not 

expecting them—that to have an impact on their view of the world, 

when we do that, if we have B–52 bombers flying from England as 

part of the maneuvers that we have had in the Balkans, is the B– 

52 bomber capable of carrying these cruise missiles, and these intermediate-type range nuclear weapons? 

Mr. SCHER. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. We have ships that have also been part 

of these maneuvers in the Balkans—excuse me, the Baltics. Are 

the ships that we send there, are they capable of carrying these nuclear weapons? 

Mr. ROSE. Well, sir, my understanding—and I will defer to Bob— 

is that we made a decision in the early 1990s to remove nucleartip cruise missiles from our surface ships, but we do maintain the 

ability, and deploy conventionally armed Tomahawks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The answer is, yes, they are capable of this? 

Mr. SCHER. No, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have—and we are complaining about the 

Russians and their intent with developing some weapons that are 

now in their country, but now we are sitting engaged in sending 

to their border—to their border, weapons systems that can deliver 

these very same nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SCHER. And they are doing the same to us. In fact, I would 

argue that their exercises on their border with NATO allies are 

even more provocative. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They are doing it to us. They are doing it in 

their country. We are not in our country. We are—they are doing 

it—you know, we had—I just had a hearing a couple of weeks ago 

on the Baltics. And, no, I personally don’t buy that when Russia 

has maneuvers inside their own country versus us having maneuvers on their border is the same. No. When they have maneuvers 

in their country, just like we have maneuvers in our country, it is 

not something that, in some way, we should look at as a hostile act. 

They might even be a defensive act, perhaps us flying our B–52 

bombers right at them, and then turning around at the last 

minute, or our stationing ships that deliver nuclear weapons, perhaps that—and perhaps sending more armored units right up to 

their border in the Baltics, perhaps that is the reason they have 

those maneuvers. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Scher, you 

were wanting to make a response. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, please. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to hear your response. 

Mr. SCHER. First of all, just to be clear, despite the fact that surface ships could theoretically retain the capability to launch nuclear weapons, they currently do not have them on, that can’t always be the case, necessarily, but we do not have that capability, 

period, full stop. Secondly—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead. I want to hear your statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are here. That is right. 
28 

Mr. SCHER. We all—we all have—you know, everyone gets to see 

the exercises going on in different perspectives. I would argue that 

a Russian exercise on its border out of its garrison that is oriented 

towards NATO allies is something that we need, as an alliance, to 

understand and respond to. It is certainly a potentially vicious 

cycle, and wonders—you know, but I would argue that we, in the 

alliance, have done nothing to make it clear that we—we have done 

nothing that says we are looking to invade Russia. Russia has done 

all of—many things that make it very uncomfortable, and we are 

there to protect the alliance and make it clear that our commitment to our allies is as steadfast as it always has been, and that 

an invasion of, an attack on, any ally is the same as if it were on 

the United States per our treaty commitment. 

Mr. ROGERS. I want to thank all the witnesses. Your testimony 

has been very enlightening and helpful to these committees. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 30, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 30, 2017 

(33) 

Opening Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Joint Hearing of the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces and the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

"Consequences and Context for Russia's Violations of the INF Treaty" 

March 30, 2017 

Good morning. 

This Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces/House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade hearing on the "Consequences and Context for Russia's violations 

of the INF Treaty" is hereby called to order. 

I note this is the third joint hearing of these two subcommittees on this 

subject since 2014. 

l want to thank Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Keating, along 

with my Ranking Member, Mr. Cooper, for the seriousness and bipartisanship 

with which we have focused on this very grave matter. 

In fact, I'm not sure if it gets more bipartisan than for two Republican 

Majority subcommittees to convene a hearing with an entire panel of 

witnesses from the other party. 

But this has not, and should not, be a partisan matter. 

The violations of the INF treaty are a particularly acute symptom of a 

very dangerous disease: Russian revisionism and belligerence under the 

dictator Vladimir Putin. 

I fear that our failure to confront Russia's violation ofiNF in a 

meaningful way to date, especially after we publicly acknowledged it almost 

three years ago, encouraged and encourages more lawlessness on arms 

control and, indeed, other areas of Russian adventurism. 

But, we'll have a chance to more completely explore these subjects 

today. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses; they are: 

• The Honorable Frank Rose 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and 

Compliance. 

• The Honorable Robert Scher 

Fonner Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and 

Capabilities 

• Mr. Jon Wolfsthal 

Fonner Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 

National Security Council 
34 

Just this past Tuesday, in response to questions, the Commander of 

U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated, 

"we have to respond to their violation of that treaty, one way or the other, we 

have to take steps we have to address it." 

He also stated regarding Russia's intention to return to compliance with 

the treaty that, "I don't have any indication that they will at this time." 

So that's our task this morning: we have a new Administration and a 

critical inflection point in our relationship with Russia and the seminal anns 

control treaty of the nuclear era. 

As a co-equal policy-making branch of the United States government, it 

is our role to help fashion a policy regarding how we deal with Russia's 

violation of this, and other, anns control treaties and agreements. 

So, I hope when we are through here this morning we will have a clear 

view on a policy to work with the new Administration to implement. 
35 

Statement for the Record Submitted by Congressman Ted Poe 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

This is the third time we are holding this hearing. It's a little like 

Groundhog Day. Every year we meet again to discuss Russia's continued 

violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and talk about the 

lack of consequences for their violations. 

But this year things have gotten worse. In past years we discussed 

Russian tests of missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty. This year we know 

there have been actual deployments. 

According to reports, Russia has actually deployed prohibited cruise 

missiles at two locations in Russia. This game-changing action makes our 

hearing especially crucial as we search for appropriate U.S. responses to these 

dangerous violations. 

These violations should not be viewed in isolation. They are a mark of 

a continued pattern of Russian aggression. 

In 2008, the same year that Russia first violated the !NF Treaty, it 

invaded a sovereign country- the Republic of Georgia. I was there shortly 

after and saw the Russian tanks up on the hill. Nine years later Russia still 

occupies a quarter of the country. 

Then in 2014, Putin was at it again. He told the world that Russian 

troops were not in Crimea as we all watched Russian tanks and troops rolling 

into the peninsula. 

So it is no surprise that Russia is breaking its word again when it comes 

to arms control agreements. 

We entered into the INF treaty with Russia in 1987. The treaty places 

limits on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 

500 and 5,500 kilometers. It was a landmark agreement between two 

countries with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. It also showed that 

Washington and Moscow could find areas to cooperation even in the midst of 

the Cold War. 

We've held up our end of the bargain. The Russians have not. 

Their blatant violations of the treaty go back to 2008 when they tested a 

ground launched cruise missile. 

For some reason, it took the past Administration a full three years until 

they notified Congress in 2011. 

Even more surprising is that fact that it took the past Administration a 

whole five years to even bring up this violation directly to the Russians. 

While the White House was biding its time, the Kremlin continued 

violating the treaty. The State Department confirmed in its 2014, 2015, and 
36 

2016 report on arms control agreements that the Russians were in breach of 

the INF treaty. 

All we've done in response is to tell the Russians our concerns. We 

have urged them over and over again to come back into compliance. 

Not only did the Russians refuse to come back into compliance, they 

denied even violating the treaty and simultaneously increased their violations. 

Now that the Russians have actually deployed missiles prohibited under 

the treaty, U.S. security is in jeopardy. 

The result is that now the Russians have weapons that we don't. 

American allies and interests abroad are vulnerable to the Russian bear. 

Chairman Rogers and myself have been tracking this serious national 

security threat for years. We've made several appeals to the State Department 

and the Defense Department about this issue. 

The responses we received led me to believe that our government was 

simply not taking this issue seriously. 

That's why we included an amendment to the NDAA last year that 

prohibits government contracts with entities that have contributed to Russia's 

INF Treaty violations. 

We've also introduced H.R. 1182 The INF Treaty Preservation Act 

which would fund research and development of countervailing military 

capabilities and puts suspension of U.S. compliance with the treaty on the 

table if Russia remains in violation of the treaty. 

More needs to be done to confront the Napoleon of Siberia. Putin needs 

to be held accountable. 

That is exactly why we've called a hearing on this topic yet again. How 

are we going to convince the Russians that we mean business? How will we 

protect U.S. national security in light of the most recent Russian deployment? 

The US needs to show leadership and coordinate a unified and 

meaningful response with our NATO allies. 

A treaty with a party of one is no treaty at all. 

And that's just the way it is. 
37 

Opening Statement for Ranking Member Jim Cooper 

Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces/House 

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade 

"Consequences and Context for Russia's violations of the INF Treaty" 

March 30, 2017 

I join Chairman Rogers in welcoming our witnesses, Robert Scher, 

Frank Rose and Jon Wolfsthal. We thank you for your service to national 

security and welcome you today to this hearing on how to respond to Russia's 

on-going Intermediary Nuclear Forces Treaty violation. On this issue, we 

have a strange convergence of bipartisan consensus on having three 

Democratic witnesses! I look forward to hearing your insights. 

Russia's violation of the INF, including testing, producing and now 

deploying a new ground-based cruise missile, demands a firm response. 

Russia constitutes a unique threat to the West by maintaining an enormous 

nuclear arsenal and undermining the stability of our strategic relationship 

embodied in negotiated agreements. The best way to manage the risk of an 

unconstrained nuclear arms race is through negotiated agreements, but now 

Russia is violating many of these, creating grave uncertainty about the future 

of negotiated nuclear security. 

Raising the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, which has stood for 

thirty years as a pillar for European security and as a key tenet of the USRussian strategic relationship, must be done publicly. The intelligence 

community uncovered these actions and the Obama administration diligently 

and repeatedly raised US concerns to Russia. 

However, Russia has continued its violation of the Treaty, producing 

and more recently apparently deploying the system. The Obama 

administration reviewed three kinds of response capabilities to ensure that 

Russia does not gain a significant military advantage from its alleged 

violation of the INF treaty: "active defenses" to enhance the defense of 

locations the noncompliant Russian cruise missiles could reach, "counterforce 

capabilities" to actually attack these missiles, and "countervailing strike 

capabilities" to enhance U.S. or allied forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

continue their review to shape an appropriate response. In 2014, General 

Martin Dempsey, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states in a 

letter in October to the Senate Armed Services Committee, that the INF 

violation constituted "a serious challenge to the security of the United 

States and our allies" and "These actions, particularly when placed in the 

context of Russian regional aggression, must be met with a strategic 

response." 
38 

The Trump administration must continue to take these actions 

seriously, confront Russia and demand that Russia reverse course and return 

into compliance. Given the administration's ties to Russia, I am concerned 

that this will be yet another grave security threat that will go unchallenged. 

We should also consider taking specific and direct action in response to 

Russia's actions, but we must do so in coordination with our NATO allies. In 

doing so, it is important for the free world to be unified to deter to Russian 

aggression. Responding in a way that keeps NATO unified is a key 

component of an effective response to Russia. 

First, while we must protect sources and methods, must share 

additional information on Russia's violation with our allies and raise this 

issue, together with NATO allies, more publicly. 

Second, we should use military as well as non-military responses. 

These responses could include imposing additional sanctions on Russia. They 

should also include effective steps to enhance European Deterrence Initiative 

and European Reassurance Initiative. As examples, deploying additional 

conventional cruise missiles such as JASSM-ER in NATO and forwarddeploying them could provide a strong military response that would not cause 

a violation of the treaty but send a strong signal that we will not stand for 

Russia's latest nuclear provocation. 

Third, we must not play into Russian hands by further undermining 

strategic stability or risking a divided NATO. Developing and deploying a 

new intermediate ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles may not respond to 

any military requirement, undermine regional stability in a crisis, and elude 

NATO consensus. Similarly, developing and deploying cruise missile 

defense could further divide NATO consensus by prioritizing certain NATO 

sites while leaving other populated areas undefended, and prove very costly. 

Additionally, we must preserve and extend the New START Treaty as we buy 

time to resolve the INF issue, and maintain a frank but open dialog with 

Russia to attempt to address concerns on both side and to urge Russia to 

return to compliance with its legally-binding commitments under the INF 

Treaty. 

I look forward to hearing your views on how to best address this issue 

at this important turning point. 
39 

Ranking Member Keating Opening Remarks 

Joint House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

and House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade 

"Consequences and Context for Russia's Violations of the INF Treaty" 

March 30, 2017 

Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Chairman Poe, for holding this 

hearing today. And, thank you to Ranking Member Cooper for your 

leadership on this issue. 

In December 2015, our Subcommittees held a hearing on this very 

topic. Since then, Russia's role at the center of many concerning issues has 

only increased: 

• ... closest to home, with their interference in our recent elections; 

• ... with their ongoing interference not only in the elections of our 

European allies but with respect to their territorial integrity; 

• ... and through their involvement in Syria and Afghanistan, just to name 

a few. 

Today, we take up yet another, in Russia's continued violations of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

This Congress and this Administration have decisions to make with 

respect to our foreign policy towards Russia. 

Today, I hope that we can hear from our expert panel about the options on 

the table for addressing Russia's violations, the costs and benefits of these 

options, and how we can look at this globally alongside our allies, so that we 

may be strategic in our policy towards Russia's treaty violations and other 

destabilizing actions going forward. 

Russia cannot be trusted to negotiate honestly nor to uphold its negotiated 

commitments. We have witnessed Moscow become increasingly willing to 

engage in provocative actions and rhetoric. 

We must, therefore, choose a path forward that avoids unnecessary or 

miscalculated escalations, while remaining steadfast in promoting security 

and adherence to the rule of law. 

I look forward to our insightful testimony this morning, and to working 

with my colleagues on both the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 

Committees as we consider policy options moving forward. 

Thank you, and [ yield back my time. 
40 

Statement of The Honorable Frank A. Rose 

Joint Hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and House 

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

"Consequences and Context for Russia's Violations of the INF Treaty" 

March 30,2017 

Introduction 

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, 

Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how the United 

States and its Allies should respond to Russia's violation of its obligations under the Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces (or INF) Treaty 

Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is an issue that I worked on elosely when I served as the 

Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance from December 

2014-Januaty 2017. In my statement, I'd like to focus on a couple of areas. First, I 'II briefly 

discuss the nature of the Russian violation and the attempts by the United States to find a 

diplomatic solution that brought Russia back into compliance the Treaty in a verifiable manner. 

Second, I'll provide you my assessment as to why I believe Russia chose to violate the INF. 

Third, I'll outline my recommendations as to how the United States and our Allies should 

respond to the Russian violation. Finally, I'll share my thoughts as to whether the United States 

should develop a new ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) or withdraw from the New 

Strategic Arms Treaty (New START) in response to the Russian violation. 

The Russian Violation of the INF Treatv 

In the July 2014 edition ofthe U.S. Department of State's annual Arms Control Compliance 

Report, the United States declared that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations 

under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight test a ground-launched cruise missile 

(GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to produce launchers of such 

missiles.! I assure you, the United States did not come to this decision lightly. Prior to the July 

2014 declaration, there was over a year of senior-level diplomatic engagements with Russian 

officials on the INF Treaty violation. The objective ofthat diplomacy was to encourage Russia 

to acknowledge the existence of this new GLCM, and return to compliance with the Treaty in a 

verifiable manner. Although these initial diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful, we continued our 

diplomatic engagements with Russia after the July 2014 public declaration. 

Despite two additional years of diplomacy, culminating in the November 2016 meeting of the 

INF Treaty Special Verification Commission (or SVC), the body under the Treaty responsible 

1 U.S. Department of State, 2014 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control. Nonproliferation, 

and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, p. 8, July 2014. 
41 

for resolving compliance concerns, Russia refused to acknowledge the existence of the new 

GLCM and has shown no interest in returning to compliance with the Treaty. 

According to a February 14,2017, New York Times article, Russia has moved forward with 

deployment of the new GLCM.2 At a March 8, 2017, hearing before the House Arn1ed Services 

Committee, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that 

Russia has deployed the system. Selva stated: "We believe that the Russians have deployed a 

land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 

Treaty."J 

Russia's Political and Strategic Rationale for Violating the INF Treaty 

Let me now turn to the question of why Russia decided to violate the INF Treaty. l think it's 

important to remember that the INF Treaty was always controversial within the Soviet Union. 

Indeed, some in the Soviet military did not want to sign the Treaty due to the fact that as a land 

power, the Soviet Union was always more dependent on ground-based missile systems than the 

United States. However, these concerns were overruled by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 

who was seeking ways to defuse tensions with the West in order to restructure the Soviet 

economy. 

In 2005, senior Russian officials proposed that the United States and Russia "jointly withdraw" 

from the INF Treaty, arguing that the strategic situation in Eurasia had changed dramatically 

since the INF Treaty was concluded in 1987.4 Specifically, Russia was concerned about the 

emergence of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats on its periphery, and 

argued it needed its own medium- and intermediate-range systems to deter these threats. The 

United States declined to take Russia up on its offer tor a "joint withdrawal" from the lNF 

Treaty. That said, given the timelines associated with the development of new missile systems, it 

was probably in this general timetrame that Russia made the political decision to begin 

developing the new GLCM. 

Russia has also been modernizing its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles which are allowable 

under the TNF Treaty- tor over a decade. These new systems have been demonstrated 

effectively during recent combat operations in Syria. This begs the question if Russia possesses 

2 Michael Gordon, "Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump." The New York Times. 

February 14.2017. 

3 John M. Donnelly. "Hill Wants Answers on Russia's Fielding of New Missiles." CQ Roll Call, March 8. 2017. 

4 Brian Green, Statement of Brian D. Green, Depu(v Assistant Secretary of Defense fOr Strategic Capabilities Before 

the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Stralegic Forces: l!earing on the FY08 Budget Request for 

,T\.1issile Pror;rams, March '27, 2007, accessed at 

2 
42 

effective and treaty-compliant cruise missiles, why would it violate the INF Treaty by 

developing a treaty-prohibited GLCM? 

In my view, there arc scveralmilitmy factors driving Russian decision-making. First, as part of 

its military modernization program, Russia has been seeking to improve its theater-strike 

capability. The deployment of a new GLCM would almost certainly improve Russia's ability to 

strike theater-level targets in both Europe and Asia. The system also supports Russia's evolving 

Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy, which seeks to deny the United States and NATO 

access to key ports, airfields, and command and control nodes during a conflict. 

Second, the new GLCM would improve the survivability of Russian theater strike systems. 

While Russia has developed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, ships can be sunk, and aircraft 

can be destroyed on the runway or shot down during flight. However, it's very difficult to locate 

and destroy mobile missiles. For exmnple, during the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its 

Coalition partners flew over 3,000 sorties over Iraq with the objective of destroying Iraq's 

mobile ballistic missile targeting Israel. According the most estimates, it is unlikely that the so 

called "Scud hunt" destroyed a single mobile ballistic missile or launcher. Russia is significantly 

larger than Iraq and it's much easier to conceal mobile missile systems there. As a result, finding 

and destroying mobile missile systems based in Russia would be extremely difficult. 

Third, there is probably a level of inter-service politics at play within the Russian defense 

establishment. For example, with the Russian Air Force and Navy procuring their own 

intermediate-range cruise missiles, it is quite possible that the Russian Army is seeking to 

acquire a similar capability. 

In addition to the military reasons, there is also a larger political dynan1ic driving Russian 

decision-making. In my view, Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is merely a symptom of a 

larger problem, that problem being that Russia believes that the Euro-Atlantic security system 

put in place at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's and early 1990s is no longer in its 

interest. There is a prevailing view among Russian foreign policy and security elites not just 

President Putin- that the current Euro-Atlantic security system was put in place at a time when 

Russia was politically and militarily weak. Therefore, they believe that the current system needs 

to be replaced with one that better takes into account Russia's interests. 

lfwe look back over the last decade, it's clear that Russia has been slowly removing the key 

building blocks of the Post-Cold War European security system. This process began with 

Russia's unilateral suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007, was 

reinforced by former Russian President Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty in 2010, 

Russia's selective implementation of the Vienna Document, violation of the INF Treaty, 

occupation of Crimea, intervention in Ukraine, etc. 

3 
43 

Recommended U.S. Response Options to the Russia's INF Treaty Violation 

It is extremely unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF 

Treaty. Therefore, a strong-- but proportional -- response is required by the United States and 

its Allies to etTectively deal with Russia's violation. In general, I would recommend that the 

United States and its Allies should adopt a "countervailing strategy" in response to Russia's 

violation that seeks enhance detetTence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response 

should also include "limited" defensive measures to deny Russia any significant military benefit 

from the deployment of the new GLCM. Below are some my key recommendations for the 

Administration and Congress. 

• The United States should remain focused on maintaining Alliance unity. The INF 

Treaty is not merely a bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but 

it is fundamentally about wider Eurasian security and directly impacts the security of our 

Allies in both Europe and Asia. Therefore, as the United States develops response options to 

the Russian violation, it is critical that those actions be done is close coordination with our 

Allies. Not surprisingly, Russia will seek to drive wedges between the United States and its 

Allies by making false claims and accusations about our compliance with the INF Treaty. 

Continued close coordination with our Allies will help minimize Russian efforts to "wedge 

drive." Furthermore, in the interest of burden sharing, the United States should seek ways to 

include Allies in the implementation of military response options. 

• Place the blame for the INF Treaty's demise squarely on Russia. From a diplomatic 

perspective, it is critical that the United States place responsihility for the demise of the INF 

Treaty exactly where it belongs-- with Russia. Under the INF Treaty, Russia has the option 

to legally withdraw from the Treaty, but chose not to exercise this option as the United States 

did when it legally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 200 I. Instead, Russia chose to violate 

the Treaty in secret and was caught. There's a reason for this: Russia did not want to sutTer 

the negative political consequences of withdrawing from the Treaty. As the new 

Administration develops its response options to the Russian violation, I would strongly 

encourage them to take careful steps to ensure that the United States is not blamed to killing 

the INF Treaty by unilaterally withdrawing. From my perspective, this would be a gift to the 

Russians. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control in the George W. Bush 

Administration Steve Rademaker took a similar approach at a July 17, 2014, hearing of 

HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Rademaker stated: "I don't think we should respond 

to what we know Russia to have done at this point by pulling out of the treaty. I think from a 

Russian perspective that would be more of a reward than a punishment. .. Because t!·om my 

personal dealings with them I know that they would very much like to get out from under the 

treaty. And so, I think they would welcome a U.S. decision to withdraw because that would 

obviate the need for them to withdraw."s 

• Continue to fund the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems. 

Congress should fully fund the modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems. This 

5 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, '"Russian 

Violations ofthe INF Treaty: After Detection-What?" July 17,2014 [HASC 113-120]. 

4 
44 

includes a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), a new intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM), a new strategic bomber (the B-21 ), and a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile 

(the Long-Range Stand-off system or LRSO). In particular, l want to stress the impottance 

of the LRSO. Russia is developing increasingly sophisticated air defense systems. The 

LRSO will provide the United States the ability to penetrate these sophisticated air defenses, 

and improve our ability to hold critical Russian targets at risk. 

• Develop a conventional variant of the LRSO. In addition to modernizing our nuclear 

delivery vehicles, it is also critical that the United States and its Allies improve their air- and 

sea-launched, conventional strike capabilities. Therefore, I recommend developing a 

conventional variant of the LRSO, which will allow the United States to deliver conventional 

payloads in heavily contested air defense environments with the appropriate stand-off range. 

This new system would improve upon the existing conventional variant of the Air-launched 

Cruise Missile (ALCM), the AGM-86 C/D or Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

(CALCM). Chairman Rogers, I want to especially commend you and the HASC Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee for your leadership and advocacy on the need to develop a 

conventional variant of the LRSO. 

• Facilitate Allied acquisition of air- and sea-launched conventional strike capabilities. 

We should also work closely with our Allies to improve their conventional strike capabilities. 

Several of our Allies and partners (e.g., Australia, Poland, Finland) currently deploy the Joint 

Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). In response to the Russia violation of the INF 

Treaty, the United States should consider ways make .JASSM available to more Allies. 

Additionally, we should sell Allies the extended-range variant ofthe missile, JASSM-ER. 

The JASSM-ER has a range of around l 000 km as compared to the JASSM's range of about 

370 km.6 Finally, we should also give consideration to selling the Tomahawk sea-launched 

cruise missile (SLCM) to interested Allies. A number ofNA TO Allies cmTcntly have the 

necessary infrastructure to launch the Tomahawk SLCM from their naval vessels. The 

United Kingdom is currently the only U.S. Ally to have purchased the Tomahawk SLCM. 

However, according to press reports, Poland has expressed interest in deploying Tomahawk 

on its new attack submarine7. The United States should approve such as request if it is made 

by Poland or another Ally. 

• Remind Russia that NATO remains a nuclear Alliance. We should remind Russia that 

NATO remains a nuclear alliance that possesses the appropriate military capabilities to 

conduct nuclear operations. At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the Alliance 

endorsed a number of actions to revitalize nuclear planning, exercises, and burden sharing 

within the Alliance. I believe it is critical that NATO implement the initiatives agreed at the 

Warsaw Summit. Fmthermore, NATO nations need to move forward with their plans to 

procure the dual capable version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the United States must 

complete the refurbishment of the B61 gravity bomb. 

'CSIS Missile Defense Project, "JASSM/JASSM-ER (AGM-158A/B)." accessed at 

!ill!~1lli.Wtlh[fll!!£li§Jlrgi_tn.i;;.lli\:i.i.illiliill on March 27,2017. 

Sub Tender, Eyes Tomahawks", Defense News. March 12, 2015. 

5 
45 

• Deploy "limited" cruise missile defenses to protect critical assets. As I noted earlier, 

Russia is deploying this new GLCM as part of its overall A2AD strategy to deny the United 

States and its NATO Allies access to critical ports, airfields, and command and control nodes 

during a potential conflict. In response, the United States and NATO should deploy 

"limited" cruise missile defenses to protect key Alliance assets in the event of a conflict with 

Russia. While I support the deployment of"limited" cruise missile defenses, I would caution 

against moving forward with the deployment of larger set of missile defenses aimed against 

Russia, especially against its strategic deterrent. Such an approach would be extremely 

expensive, technologically challenging, and would likely encourage Russia to deploy 

additional missiles in response. 

Should the United States Develop and Deploy GLCMs? 

I'd also like to address the issue of whether the United States should develop and deploy its own 

GLCMs in response to Russia's violation. Indeed, Chairman Rogers and Chairman Poe, I note 

that you have introduced legislation, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Preservation Act of 

2017, which among other things, would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program 

of record to develop a dual-capable, road-mobile, ground-launched cruise missile system with a 

range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. 

I am not necessarily opposed to the development of such a capability by the United States if 

Russia fails to return to compliance with the INF Treaty and the United States requires such a 

capability to meet its military requirements. l Iowever, there are a number of questions that 

should be asked before we begin the development of such a capability. First, are there military 

missions that require us to have a new GLCM that cannot be addressed with existing U.S. airand sea-launched cruise missiles? Second, how cost-effective would it be to develop a new 

GLCM, especially given that the United States faces numerous budget challenges modernizing 

its military forces, in particular its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles? For example, would it be 

more cost-efl'ective to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO instead of a new GLCM? 

Third, where would United States deploy a new GLCM if we decided to develop such a system? 

Anyone who is familiar with the history of previous attempts to deploy ground-launched ballistic 

and cruise missiles overseas knows how politically and diplomatically contentious such 

deployments have been. For example, the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and 

cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s was highly controversial. If the United States were to 

propose deploying GLCMs in Europe in response to the Russian violation, it would likely be 

highly controversial within NATO. Furthermore, Russia would almost certainly do everything in 

its power to create political problems for the Alliance. 

The political challenges associated deployment of ground-based missile systems are not limited 

to Europe. Though the system is purely defensive, the recent deployment of a Terminal High 

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has 

proven to be controversial within the ROK and in the region. That said, I believe the deployment 

ofTHAAD to the Korean Peninsula is necessary to defend U.S. deployed forces and the ROK 

against North Korea's medium-range ballistic missiles, in particular its large number of 

extended-range Scuds and No Dongs. 

6 
46 

Russia's Violation of the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty 

Finally, some have argued that in response to the Russia violation of the INF Treaty, the United 

States should withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). In my 

view, the United States should not withdraw from the New START in response to Russia's 

violation of the INF Treaty. l strongly believe that the continued implementation of the New 

START Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States for a variety of reasons. 

First, it places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy 

against the United States and our Allies. Second, through New START's on-site inspection 

regime, data declarations, and notifications, the Treaty provides the United States with key 

insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might not have access to without the Treaty. 

Third, according to the U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on Implementation of the New 

START Treaty, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty.s 

Unlike the existing Euro-Atlantic security system, it appears that Russia still believes that the 

bilateral U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear framework, of which the New START Treaty is the 

foundation, remains in its national interest. For example, according to press reports, during his 

January 2017 telephone call with President Trump, Russian President Put in proposed extending 

the New START Treaty by five years, as allowed by the Treaty. 

The Reagan Administration had serious concerns about the Soviet Union's compliance with the 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as result of its building of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile 

early warning radar. However, these concerns did not prevent the United States from negotiating 

and ratitying the JNF Treaty in 1988, because despite concerns about Soviet compliance with the 

ABM Treaty, it was l'elt that the INF Treaty was in the national security interest of the United 

States. In my view, the same holds true for the New START Treaty today. 

Conclusion 

The INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States and its Allies in Europe and 

Asia for almost thirty years. The Treaty is not just a bilateral arms control treaty between the 

United States and Russia, but goes to the heart of Eurasian security. However, it is clear that 

Russia, for a variety of political and military reasons that [have outlined, no longer sees the INF 

Treaty as in its interest and is unlikely to return to compliance. 

Therefore, a strong -- but proportional -- political and military response is required by the United 

States and its Allies to effectively address Russia's violation. I would recommend that the 

United States and its Allies should impose a "countervailing strategy" that seeks to enhance 

deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include "limited" 

cruise missile defimses that would deny Russia significant military benefit from the deployment 

of the new cruise missile. These response options should be implemented in a way that 

maintains Alliance unity and places the blame for the demise ofthe lNF Treaty squarely where it 

belongs- with Russia. 

s U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty. January 2016. 

7 
47 

Biography of Frank A. Rose 

Frank A. Rose served as assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, 

and compliance from 2014-17. In this position, he was responsible for advising the 

secretary of state on a wide variety of arms control, strategic policy, verification, and 

compliance issues. From 2009 to 2014, Rose served as the deputy assistant secretary of 

state for space and defense policy where he was responsible for key issues related to arms 

control and defense policy including missile defense, military space policy, chemical and 

biological weapons, and conventional arms control. 

Prior to joining the State Department in June 2009, Mr. Rose held various 

national security staff positions in the US House of Representatives, including service as 

a professional staff member on both the House Armed Services Committee and the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Rose has also held numerous 

positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including as special assistant to 

the assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction; and policy advisor in 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. 

Previous to that, he worked as a national security analyst with Science Applications 

International Corporation and on the staff of U.S. Senator John F. Kerry (D-MA). 

Mr. Rose received his bachelor's degree in history from American University in 

1994 and a master's degree in war studies from Kings' College, University of London in 

1999. He is also a recipient of numerous awards including: the Department of Defense 

Exceptional Public Service A ward (200 I); the Office of Secretary of Defense A ward for 

Excellence (2002); the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian 

Service (2005); the State Department Superior Honor Award (2012); and the Ordinul 

National Serviciul Credincios (Knight) ftom Romania (20 14) in acknowledgement for his 

role as the lead US negotiator for the 20 II missile defense basing agreement.. 
48 

DISCLOSURE FORM F'OR WH'NESSES 

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49 

Not for Public Release until Approved by the 

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SCHER 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE HOUSE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

AND 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND 

TRADE 

"CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FOR RUSSIA'S VIOLATIONS OF 

THE INF TREATY" 

MARCH 31,2017 
50 

Introduction 

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member 

Keating, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to testify on possible 

next steps in light of Russia's violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (IN F) 

Treaty. This is the first time I have had the honor to testify in front of this Foreign 

Affairs Subcommittee and the first time I have testified since leaving my position 

in the Obama Administration. As such, I do want to emphasize that my testimony 

represents my personal views only, not those of the previous or current 

Administrations. 

To begin my testimony today, I want to start with a somewhat obvious and critical 

point that deserves emphasizing: Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and its 

subsequent deployment of the violating system must be considered within the 

context of Russia's overall aggression and the security environment more 

broadly. While some believe, myself included, that it will be very difficult, if not 

impossible, to bring Russia back into compliance, I also believe that right now it 

is in our best interest to do all we can to press the Russians to return. Having the 

INF Treaty in force enhances strategic stability, and our Allies want to see that 

we have worked diligently to try to convince Russia. Any such diplomacy must 

be accompanied by clear indications that we will not allow the Russians to benefit 

from their violation. The Administration should consider taking a combination of 

military actions-all of which would be Treaty compliant-along with diplomatic 

and economic actions to tangibly demonstrate that we can ensure Russia does 

not achieve the advantages they seek by deploying this system. These actions 

must be developed and carried out in coordination with our Allies. Our Alliance 

structure is key to our strength, and it is imperative that we continue to maintain 

and cultivate it. 
51 

Background 

The INF Treaty has been a mainstay of stability in Europe since it was signed in 

1987 and entered into force in 1988. Since that time, while there are many 

military systems and forces in Europe, no one on the Continent has had to worry 

about the threat from these types of missiles. 

That is until recently. The US State Department officially announced in July of 

2014 in the Department's Compliance Report: "The United States has 

determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the 

INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise 

missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or 

produce launchers of such missiles." This determination should not have 

surprised anyone given that Russian leader Vladimir Putin had made it clear he 

no longer felt that this treaty was in Russia's interests. 

So while this hearing is about what to do now that the Vice Chairman has 

indicated his belief that the violating system has been deployed, I would note that 

it is not the deployment of the missiles that violated the treaty ... the Russians had 

already been in violation of the treaty for a long time. However, there is now a 

need for a stronger and more concrete US response. 

The violation of the INF Treaty is important for both political and operational 

reasons. Politically, INF was one of the more stable, and stabilizing treaties 

signed during the Cold War. It was one of the few arms control treaties that did 

what many thought could not be done ... it eliminated a class of weapons, not just 

reduced their number. And the treaty's survival beyond the dissolution of the 

Soviet Union was another example that Russia valued strategic stability and that 

these Cold-War era treaties remained valuable in the region. The fact that 

Russia is willing to violate this treaty cannot be taken lightly, although the fact 

that they continue to deny this violation indicates that they still place some value 
52 

in the perception that they are compliant with the treaty and that the treaty itself 

still exists. 

Operationally, these Russian missiles provide Russia with a significant offensive 

capability that would directly threaten the whole of Europe and nearly all NATO 

Allies. These missiles are by no means the only way to hold NATO territory at 

risk-Russia has multiple systems that can do that without violating the INF 

Treaty. Yet these missiles, deployed in significant numbers, would give Russia 

an operational capability to immediately and significantly threaten and, with little 

warning, attack NATO capitals and facilities. While the Alliance has some overall 

capabilities to counter these threats, the violation presents a diplomatic and 

operational problem today, and any increase in the number of these Russian 

missiles would continue to complicate Alliance planning, increase significantly the 

number of priority targets in any operation, and quickly overwhelm any current air 

and missile defense systems deployed in Allied nations. 

While I do not want to speculate on why Russia has chosen to develop, test, and 

field a system that violates the INF Treaty, I do think that it is important to see 

this activity within the context of the entirety of Russian aggression over the past 

few years. The House Armed Services Committee heard much of the military 

context from General Scaparrotti during the hearing earlier this week. While we 

do not have time to delve into all of Russia's recent activities, the broader point 

remains: we have seen a series of both meditated and opportunistic actions 

taken by Russia to either expand its influence in the nations nearest to Russia, or 

to try weaken the international system, most notably-but not limited to-the 

NATO Alliance. In some cases this has been done with the use of force, for 

example the illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea along with support to 

separatists in other parts of Eastern Ukraine. In other cases Russia's actions 

have been more subtle and targeted at sowing discord within European 
53 

democracies, and even here in the United States. All the while, Russia has 

flaunted international norms while brandishing its nuclear arsenal for the first time 

in a generation, as if daring the world to respond. Fielding this system, denying 

that they are violating the INF Treaty, and then countering US findings of their 

violation with specious assertions of US violations falls directly within this pattern 

of behavior. 

The question then turns to what to do about this violation and the serious nature 

of the political and operational threat caused by Russia's actions. I will focus on 

what I believe are the operational and Defense Department responses that we 

should consider as a result of the violation and leave the diplomatic and 

economic recommendation to my fellow witnesses and former colleagues, but I 

do want to repeat that I endorse the idea of trying to bring Russia back into 

compliance with the INF Treaty. Continuing to talk to the Russians while they 

maintain denial may have the effect of somewhat slowing down their fielding of 

the system. 

While we work to persuade Russia to comply with the treaty, I recommend we 

plan as if they will continue to produce and field the violating system. This 

planning is prudent and strategic-our only chance at getting the Russians to 

even contemplate compliance is by pursuing concrete measures across all 

elements of US power to convince the Russians that violating the treaty makes 

them worse off and less secure. And the foundation of that pressure should be 

measures taken by the US Department of Defense in conjunction with our NATO 

Allies. 

US and Allied Responses 

From the defense perspective, the first requirement is that the United States and 

our Allies take action to ensure that Russia does not achieve any operational 

advantage from fielding a system that violates the INF Treaty. Even though 

politically the violation is a significant problem, given what I have read to be the 
54 

assessed small scale of the current deployment, the actual military implications 

right now would be relatively easy to address within our current structure and 

forces in Europe and globally deployed. However, any prudent planner would 

have to consider that the operational challenge will become more difficult if 

Russia continues to increase its deployment of this system. Further, I would 

argue that since the US government has assessed that this system has been 

fielded and is not just in testing, our policies should be oriented towards 

demonstrating to Russia that they are actually going to be worse off militarily if 

they continue to field this system. That is a harder task, and will require more 

thought and likely more or different equipment than we have in Europe right now. 

But, it is important that we not think about responses to this violation only in 

terms of the threat from a particular system or missile. Since this violation is in 

the broader context of the range of aggressive behavior we've seen from Russia 

and in the context of an across-the-board modernization of its military equipment, 

I would argue that the United States can and should think about countering the 

military capabilities of the missiles using the full range of US military capabilities. 

In other words, we need not think that the only response to their violation is to 

pursue the same type of system that they are now fielding ... although that is 

certainly a possibility. 

The first question the US government should address is how do we better protect 

our forces and our Allies directly from these missiles? We have some tactical air 

and missile defense systems in place in Europe, as do our Allies, but I believe 

that there should be active consideration of increasing those capabilities. Cruise 

missile defense is an issue that the US military has not focused on as much as I 

think is warranted given this and other developments worldwide, and a real push 

in that area is needed. 

Even with increased defensive capabilities, no air and missile defense system 

can keep up with the number of offensive missiles Russia might choose to field. 
55 

While we might be able to protect certain discreet locations, the answer cannot 

be only defense. The United States and its allies must look to field systems into 

and around the region that can hold at risk key targets inside of Russia, 

including, but not limited to the violating systems. While it is tempting to think 

about just going after those particular missiles, that would be an unproductive 

and unnecessary path .. in the end, this missile system is just one way they have 

of striking NATO territory. From a military perspective, we should not become so 

consumed by this one system that we either 1) think that the threat to NATO is 

gone if these missiles are destroyed (whether by Russia or by us); or 2) that the 

only way to ensure that Russia does not get an advantage by this deployment is 

to field a similar system of our own. We do not have to match Russian 

deployments in a tit-for-tat manner. We have a flexible and resilient set of 

conventional and nuclear capabilities that can respond to a range of threats, and 

that flexibility puts us in a good position to deal with growing Russian aggression. 

In fact, the United States and our Allies have many ways that we can and do 

deter the Russian Military, and I would like to briefly highlight some of these 

ongoing initiatives. Since the Wales Summit in 2014, we have seen NATO Allies 

recognize a need to bring its forces to higher states of readiness with the Very 

High Readiness Joint Task Forces; invest more in defense overall; and position 

more forces on a rotational basis further east with NATO's Enhanced Forward 

Presence forces. The Alliance is once again becoming familiar with nuclear 

deterrence policy, doctrine, and capabilities so that it improves what some call its 

"nuclear IQ" and ensure that the full spectrum of its nuclear capabilities presents 

a credible deterrent to Russia or any other potential adversary. Unilaterally, the 

United States has enhanced its forward presence forces in Europe through the 

European Reassurance Initiative funds appropriated by Congress that allow for a 

larger rotational presence of armored forces in Europe than we have had in the 

recent past. These activities are in response to the overall changes in the 

security environment caused by aggressive and illicit actions on the part of 

Russia, which have included the development and deployment of a system that 
56 

violates an existing arms control treaty. And, these activities help to show that 

Russia's aggressive actions have caused a response that does not make Russia 

safer. 

New Possibilities for US and Allied Response 

The question now is what should we be doing to better position ourselves given 

the INF violation and other aggressive behaviors from Russia. I would argue 

there are some actions we can take to provide the United State with additional 

strike options and/or tangibly demonstrate that Russia's violation will make it less 

secure. When considering these options, however, we must realize that the 

overall goal has to strike the difficult balance between demonstrating to Russia 

that it cannot take its aggressive actions and expect that there is no response, 

with ensuring that any actions taken increase strategic stability not reduce it. I 

predict the issues I have discussed here today would be a part of any nuclear 

posture review from this Administration-a review that will be a critical part of any 

overall review of the defense program. 

First, we could increase deployments of SSGNs in and around Europe. These 

submarines bring incredible capabilities to, and increase the net strike capacity 

of, US assets in the region. 

Second, we could look to field unilaterally and in conjunction with NATO Allies 

broader and more sophisticated rocket artillery systems on the territory of our 

eastern Allies. These systems, like High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

(HIMARS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), do not violate the INF 

Treaty, and provide significant firepower to the Alliance that can range key 

locations and targets inside of Russia. Acquisition of these systems by our Allies 

would be a serious signal of their displeasure and a real boost to the operational 

capabilities of the Alliance. 
57 

Third, we could do whatever we can to speed up the deployment of the follow-on 

nuclear cruise missile (the Long-Range Standoff missile or LRSO) and quickly 

develop a conventional cruise missile variant Nuclear and conventional airlaunched cruise missiles have been around for decades and have been effective 

at enhancing strategic stability as well as providing the United States with 

important strike assets. 

Fourth, we could transition the Air Force program office overseeing LRSO 

development into a joint program office to explore potential applications for a 

conventional cruise missile for other Services besides just the Air Force. 

Finally, we could begin to consider what alternatives exist for us to develop or 

field a ground-launched cruise missile similar to the one Russia has developed 

and deployed. To be clear, I believe that exploring this would not be a violation 

of the INF treaty, nor would any of the other recommendations I have made, but 

Russia and even our Allies could see this as escalatory. However, if Russia 

decides to formally pull out of the treaty, or if the US government is compelled to 

make the decision that the treaty is, in practice, dead, then I believe that it would 

be important to know what it would take for us to deploy a new missile to 

symmetrically counter the threat posed by Russia's system. We would have to 

work carefully with Allies on this alternative. 

In fact, any effort will only be effective if we respond as a cohesive alliance with 

real actions. A combined response is key for maintaining strategic stability as it 

shows our strength to Russia and proves that its efforts to weaken the Alliance 

are failing. One of the United State's most unique and important comparative 

advantages are the friendships we have earned. These alliances are critical to 

national security, and the security of the world in which we live. Russia 

understands this reality, which is why one of it's main objectives is to weaken, 

exploit fissures in, or ultimately even break the Alliance. We cannot let that 

happen. So, we cannot act unilaterally ... but nor can NATO afford paralysis. And 
58 

while we may all find it frustrating at times, less than perfect action taken together 

as an Alliance is far better than what might be seen as the perfect response if it is 

executed unilaterally. 

Conclusion 

While I, like all of us, hope that Russia will admit that it has violated the INF 

Treaty and come back into compliance, as we always said in DoD, "hope is not a 

strategy." I do believe that there is a chance that we can convince Russia that it 

is better off coming back into compliance with the Treaty, but up to this point, 

making that case to them through diplomacy has been ineffective, and I doubt 

that will change. As a result, I believe that the United States and our NATO 

Allies can and should take concrete actions across the diplomatic, economic, and 

military dimensions to make it clear to Russian decision makers that fielding their 

system will not give them any military or political advantage. In fact, the 

deployments would actually make Russia less safe by allowing and mandating 

that the Alliance take actions that Russia has professed not to want, for example 

more forces further east on NATO territory. Considering some of the additional 

military options listed above would have the dual advantage of more effective 

pressure on Russia to come back into compliance AND better position the 

Alliance to deal with the military threat should Russia scrap the INF Treaty 

permanently. 

I appreciate the attention these Subcommittees have paid to this important issue. 

I also appreciate the chance to testify today in front of you, and I look forward to 

answering any questions you may have for me. 
59 

Robert M. Scher 

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities 

Mr. Robert Scher was appointed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the new office of 

Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in December 2014 and served in that position until 

January 2017. Mr. Scher was responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national security and defense strategy; the forces 

and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy; global allocation and 

posture of the US military; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security 

cooperation plans and policies. 

Mr. Scher previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans within 

the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In 

this role, he oversaw the development of guidance for military campaign and contingency 

plans, the processes for reviewing and assessing these plans, and the development and 

implementation of U.S. global defense posture. Prior to serving as DASD Plans, Mr. Scher 

was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia within the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. In this capacity, Mr. 

Scher served as the principal advisor to senior leadership within the Department of 

Defense for all South and Southeast Asia policy matters pertaining to strategies and plans, 

including international strategy development, and implementation. He was responsible for 

managing the bilateral security relationships with the nations of this region and 

spearheaded DoD participation in regional multilateral fora. 

Prior to his first appointment in 2009, Mr. Scher was an associate at the consulting firm of 

Booz Allen Hamilton where he led efforts to assist Asian nations in improving their 

defense and national security decision-making processes. He also led analytical efforts 

supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on strategy development and 

Asia-related issues. Earlier, Mr. Scher worked for 15 years in the Departments of Defense 

and State, and held numerous posts covering Asian security and defense policy issues. He 

served as Chief-of-Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific 

Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, overseeing the operation of the OSD 

office responsible for bilateral and multilateral security relations in Asia. Additionally, Mr. 

Scher helped develop the strategic basis for U.S. defense strategy, participating in the 1993 

Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. He co-authored 

Presidential Decision Directive-56 on conducting complex contingency operations, and 

was involved in planning for U.S. support to operations ranging from Iraqi election support 

to deploying U.S. forces to East Timor and the southern Philippines. While at the 

Department of State, he served on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff providing advice 

on Asia, counterterrorism and political military affairs. Mr. Scher entered government 

service through the Presidential Management Fellowship Program. 

Mr. Scher has a Bachelor of Arts from Swarthmore College, conferred with High Honors, 

and a Masters of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International 

and Public Affairs, where he was awarded a DuPont International Affairs Fellowship. 
60 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the ll51

h Congress requires nongovemmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

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foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either 

by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter 

of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House 

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of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy 

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Witness name: Robert M. Scher 

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63 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY 

JON BROOK WOLFSTHAL 

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE 

BEFORE THE HOUSE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

AND 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE 

"AFTER DEPLOYMENT: 

WHAT? RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY" 

MARCH 30,2017 
64 

Chaim1an Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, Ranking Member Keating, 

distinguished members, I appreciate and am honored by the opportunity to testify before 

your joint subcommittees on such an important topic. As a former official of the Obama 

Administration, I wanted to note for the record that I am testifying today in my personal 

capacity, and not speaking for any organization or governmental agency or institution. 

I was asked to address a series of questions regarding Russia's violation of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, and I know my colleagues at the 

witness table will also provide their views on this issue. We were asked to assess: the 

significance of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty; why Russia is violating the treaty 

and what they hope to gain; how the United States should respond to this violation 

including all of the tools at its disposal; what is the future of the INF Treaty and does it 

make sense for the United States to remain a party to this agreement; and how should 

Russia's violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world. To help make 

my answers are clear as possible, I have framed my remarks within a set of guiding 

principles that I believe the United States should use as we decide how to manage the 

political, diplomatic and military consequences of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. 

The United States should have three priorities for addressing Russia's violation of the 

INF Treaty, and all three must be factored into any response for it to benefit US and 

allied security. l) The US approach should maximize NATO and East Asian alliance 

unity; 2) Russia should gain no military advantage from its violation of the INF 

Treaty; aud 3) any response should not further undermine crisis stability. To some, 

these may seem obvious, but spelling them out helps explain why developing a direct, 

simple and compelling response to Moscow's INF violations that benefits our security is 

a challenge. 

In the end, some of these objectives may have to be subordinated to others, but there 

should be a clear discussion of those tradeoffs, just as we had had under the previous 

Administration. There is no magic bullet that will compel Russia to return to compliance 

or that will ensure the deterrent and military status quo ante. Russia's decision to deploy 
65 

the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile is a more substantial violation than its testing 

program and makes it very difficult to see how the INF Treaty can be preserved. That 

said, if a way could be found to bring Russia back into full compliance, it would be in the 

security interests of the United States and American allies in Europe and Asia. These are 

hard choices that should be made analytically, and should not be influenced by the desire 

for a quick or easy fix as none exists. 

I want to include one last factor. We should be clear, as we were in the last 

Administration, that real violations of arms control agreements must be confronted, and 

must have consequences. However, while we pursue this goal, we need to remember that 

arms control has never been and should never be a stand-alone objective. As has been 

said for many decades by both Republican and Democratic administrations, arms control 

is one tool among many that can advance our security, reduce security threats, promote 

stability and create predictability. This was the case with the INF Treaty, just as it 

remains with the New START agreement now, an agreement both very much in the 

interests of both the United States and Russia. We should be careful not to throw the 

arms control baby out with the lNF bath water. While I believe it politically impossible 

to seek new agreements with Russia while it remains in compliance with !NF, I would 

not hesitate to pursue new steps if we can effectively verify Russia's compliance and if it 

enhances US and allied security. 

In any decision to adopt, or to withdraw, ftom a treaty, we should be mindful that we 

should only do so when we can enhance our security or if there is a specific objective we 

can achieve through its implementation. Arms control is a means to an end and we should 

have no qualms about withdrawing from agreements, or entering into new ones, as long 

as the net result for our security is positive. The underlying impacts, goals, and 

assumptions must always be clearly defined when doing so. 

Now onto your specific questions. 

How significant is Russia's violation of the INF Treaty? From a military perspective, it is 
66 

not clear that Russia's deployment of a limited number of SSC-8s is strategically 

significant. This is a question that should best answered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 

the context of our overall European defense plans, and coordinated within the appropriate 

defense mechanisms in NATO and European Command. 

There is no question however that the violation is politically and diplomatically 

significant. It is another clear sign that Russia is no longer fully committed to the 

strategic stability model we support, and that Moscow remains committed to a failed 

strategy of destabilization and division in Europe, and to a lesser extent in East Asia. 

Russia pursued this approach throughout the Cold War and in the 1980s. NATO 

responded to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 by deploying US Pershing II and 

ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, at some political and economic cost. 

However, that move led to the INF Treaty itself because the overall balance hurt Russia's 

security more than that of the United States. The lNF Treaty eliminated those missiles 

and increased crisis and strategic stability in one step. Russia may believe that a 

prosperous NATO and distracted United States is unwilling or unable to respond 

effectively to this challenge, but we must be clear that the United States cannot be 

blackmailed or deterred from meeting our solemn Treaty and political commitments to 

our allies. Fortunately, we do not need to, nor should we consider repeating our 

deployments in Europe from the 1980s. Such a move would play into Russia's hands to 

weaken and divide Europe. I do not believe repeating the Dual Track decision is in our 

interest. We have other, better options. 

Regardless, Russia's decision to back up its rhetoric on the possible resort to the early use 

of nuclear weapons with military capabilities designed to carry out that approach 

confirms that our models of strategic and crisis stability have diverged. Serous analysis 

here and engagement with Russia is needed to reduce the risks of accidental or sudden 

conflict. Secretary of State Tillerson should pursue a balanced approach when he next 

travels to Moscow, making clear our concern over the INF violations is real, while 

pursuing efforts to preserve New START and initiate wide-ranging strategic stability 

talks to define and address conflicts with Moscow. Reports suggest President Putin 
67 

offered to take up the Obama-era offer of strategic stability talks in his phone call with 

President Trump. If so, we should accept as long as they include representatives from the 

Kremlin and General Staff. 

Why is Russia violating the treaty and what they hope to gain? Russia has stated for 

many years that the bilateral nature of the INF agreement, the development and 

deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles by third countries (all of 

which are nearer to Russia than to the United States), and the development by the United 

States of air- and sea-based, long-range precision strike capabilities has reduced the value 

it derived from the INF Treaty. Russia even sought, weakly and for a limited time to 

push a globalization of the INF treaty, but to no avail and with little real sense of 

commitment on their part. Their concern about the development of such capabilities 

outside of the bilateral context, however, seems a driving motive. 

While I make no excuses for Russia's behavior, I do understand why they might see the 

INF Treaty as having less value in the post-Cold War setting than does the United States. 

At the very time Russia's military was in decline in the 1990s and 2000s, the United 

States and our allies gained an ability to hold more targets at risk with conventional strike 

capabilities. These are capabilities that Russia has only now been able to acquire, as 

evidenced by their displays of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles in Syria. However, 

Russia also cites the proliferation of cruise missiles in South Asia and Chinacapabilities ironically they have helped to proliferate - as further justification for their 

concern that the burden of the INF Treaty has fallen disproportionately on them. This of 

course ignores Russia's large arsenal of strategic nuclear and other capabilities that more 

than offset any third-country's intermediate-range missiles. It also ignores the original 

and continued value of the INF to avoid a dangerous deployment of short flight time 

and highly accurate missiles in and around Europe and Asia that reduced leader decision 

time and created great pressures of crisis instability. This is a lesson Russia has either 

forgotten or chosen to ignore as it pursues its regional destabilization strategy. 

Regardless, we need to understand their motive to ensure we can craft an effective 

response. 
68 

It is not for me to say whether Russia is right to think the way they appear to think. But 

analytically it is clear that Russia has complained about this dynamic for many years and 

now apparently has taken steps to reduce what the Russians regard as an unfair burden on 

them. Of course, as an American who respects the rule of law and who believes that 

negotiated agreements have an important place in bilateral and multilateral security, I am 

concerned that instead of availing itself of the legal withdrawal provision in the INF 

Treaty, Russia has decided to act illegally and dangerously in concealing its actions in the 

hopes of escaping notice and the diplomatic fallout from its fonnal withdrawal. This, 

however, may also inform how we respond. 

How should the US respond to this violation? The United States has many tools at its 

disposal and I have no doubt that the overwhelming factors of economic, political and 

military resources are strongly in our favor. I believe we have to pursue three lines of 

action. 

I) Diplomatic -First, we need to be more forceful and public about Russia's actions and 

the damage Moscow is doing to the global nuclear landscape. We must move to share 

publicly with our allies and the general public the information we have shared with 

Russia about its violations. I know why this information has not been released, and 

respect the concerns of my friends in the intelligence community. However, I believe 

that the scale should now tip toward the release of more information to the public. This 

information is both compelling and could be used to put increased pressure on Russia 

over its illegal actions. Moscow has been allowed to pretend it is a responsible nuclear 

actor. We should not longer provide them cover for this posture. 

This leads to my second diplomatic point. Up until now, the United States has been 

reserved in its condemnation of Russia. This should end. Moscow is threatening the 

fabric of both preserving a stable strategic balance (strategic stability) and increasing the 

incentives on both sides to initiate and escalate conflict (crisis stability), as well as the 

broader nuclear arms control and nonproliferation system we have championed for 
69 

almost 50 years. We should no longer let Russia play the charade that they are a leader in 

nonproliferation fora such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United Nations, 

the P-5, or other venues. This is a role they must earn, just as we have. It is a role I hope 

Russia will take seriously and that our combination of pressure and engagement could 

encourage. But as Moscow moves to deploy this INF Treaty violating system, this is no 

longer a hypothetical and Moscow should not be afforded any courtesies in this regard. I 

believe given the effort Moscow has gone to hide their violations that this holds out some 

prospect for putting real pressure on Moscow's international legitimacy, something the 

Kremlin's leadership values. 

Third, if the Administrations finds Russia to be in material breach on the INF Treaty, we 

have the ability to take countermeasures against Russia in both the INF and other arms 

control contexts. One agreement Russia clearly values in the Open Skies Treaty. While I 

believe we should remain pm1y to the INF Treaty, something we can do with no 

reduction in our security, I do support taking countermeasures to deny Russia to right to 

fully exercise its rights under the Open Skies Agreement until such time as they return to 

compliance with the INF Treaty. These responses must comply with international law 

and be proportionate and such a step should only be taken after extensive consultations 

with our European allies, who also value the OST. This step would have the added 

advantage of giving our European allies a stronger stake in resolving the INF violations 

with Russia. 

I do want to be crystal clear, however, on one important factor. I do not support taking 

steps that would undermine our implementation or of Russia's ofthe New START 

Treaty. This agreement remains very much in our security interest as long as Russia fully 

implements its central limits. Putting this pillar of nuclear stability, predictability and of 

transparency over Russia should not be on the table in response to Russia's current INF 

Treaty violation. 

The diplomatic track, however, cannot be all negative. We must continue to seek a 

negotiated solution as this holds out some hope of success in returning Russia to full INF 
70 

Treaty compliance. Doing so also increases our ability to get our allies, who value the 

Treaty, to supp01i our efforts. This positive agenda should include a willingness to 

provide Russia with transparency measures including on-site visits to US missile defense 

deployments in Europe to counter Russian claims that these are INF Treaty violations and 

to provide assurances that these system are not altered to deploy and fire offensive 

missiles. However, any such steps should be contingent on Russia providing necessary 

access for US inspectors to both its missile testing and deployment sites to verify the 

elimination and non-deployment of the SSC-8. While some will complain that this 

allows Russia to claim we are in some sense validating their false claims that Aegis 

Ashore is a violation of the INF Treaty, if that would open the door to eliminating the 

SSC-8 system and restoring a measure of crisis stability in Europe, it is worth the effort. 

If coupled with a public diplomacy campaign that includes evidence of Russia's 

violations and open briefings about why EPAA is compliant with the INF, this concern 

could be greatly reduced. 

2) Economic -Moscow is under great economic strain due to the sanctions put in place 

over their seizure and illegal annexation of Crimea and their support for separatism in 

eastern Ukraine. Given the high stakes, we should not make resolving the Crimea crisis 

and implementing the Minsk accords any harder by linking our sanctions over Crimea to 

Russia's violation ofthe INF Treaty. At the same time, European allies have said that 

since they are not parties to the INF Treaty, they lack the legal basis for imposing 

sanctions over INF violations. Nonetheless, I believe there is value in the United States 

unilaterally imposing sanctions on Russian and companies in other countries who are 

linked directly to the INF Treaty violations. 

3) Military- As mentioned above, I do not support development and deployment of landbased INF range system in Europe in response to Russia's violations. Until and unless the 

Joint Chiefs determine that such a weapon capability is needed for deterrence or defense, 

the risks of such buying and seeking to station such systems in Europe or Asia outweigh 

the prospective benefits in my mind. It would be potentially disruptive for the United 

States to ask NATO countries, Japan and South Korea to host deployment of such 
71 

weapons systems on their territory. This is especially true under current political 

circumstances. I am also concerned about redirecting the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach including Aegis Ashore - to protect it and other European assets against 

Russian systems. I would support a plan developed under a European-wide defense plan 

that added some means to protect the EP AA against direct threats but do not see the value 

of redirecting the EP AA itself against Russia and there are many political and diplomatic 

downsides to doing so. Explicitly making EPAA about Russia may be required in the 

future but I would only support doing so if there was a direct military need as doing so 

could validate a long-standing and previously unsubstantiated claim by Russia that EP AA 

is in fact geared to undermine Russian capabilities. It also remains highly questionable 

that broader cruise missile defenses in Europe, or in the United States for that matter, will 

ever be cost effective. It may be more effective for us to counter Russia's capabilities 

with asymmetric systems of our own, such as enhanced ISR and counter-mobile missile 

capabilities. 

I do support the creation of a joint program office within the Pentagon to assess how the 

proposed Long-Range Stand-Off (next generation cruise missile) can be adapted to a 

conventional role for deployment on sea and air platforms. I do not support pursuing a 

land-based variant of the LRSO- nuclear or conventional- as both are unneeded and 

would muddy the waters over Russia's violations. Personally, I believe there is a strong 

case against pursuing a nuclear-armed LRSO in any form, and would rather re-direct the 

entire program toward a conventional capabilities for possible deployment on bombers, 

surface ships and submarines, but that is a decision under the purview of the new 

Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and that will also be decided by Congressional 

funding decisions. I do support JASSM-ER deployments in Europe and Asia and we 

should be prepared to enhance those further where and when there is a direct military 

benefit and that benefit outweighs the impact on crisis instability. 

It seems readily apparent that Russia is vastly more concerned about our conventional 

precision strike capabilities than our nuclear capabilities. That being the case, given the 

likely need for conventional precision strike capabilities in the future, we should make a 
72 

virtue out of necessity and make clear to Russia that it is their actions that have 

precipitated a move by the United States not to reduce our conventional capabilities, but 

to enhance them. The future size, and possibly even limits on these could be considered 

as part of a broader political and negotiated agreement with Russia, but again only in the 

wake of a satisfactory resolution on the INF Treaty violation. 

remain a party to this agreement? Unless and until the United States needs to undertake a 

military or diplomatic action that is not permitted under the INF Treaty, including those 

that could be taken as a legal counter-measures in the wake of a finding of material 

breach, I support the United States remaining a fully compliant party to the TNF Treaty. 

Doing so will clearly enhance our ability to bring diplomatic and even economic pressure 

against Russia and give us a stronger political standing among our friends and allies. 

Withdrawing from the Treaty, or at least doing so without careful diplomatic and political 

preparation and military justification, would run the risk that the United States would be 

seen as responsible for the collapse ofthe agreement. We should not bear the burden of 

ending the treaty; that would provide aid and comfort to Russia, free them of the 

politically costly step with withdrawing themselves, and leave Moscow free to deploy 

intennediate-range missiles. 

Tfwe cannot ensure our security and that of our allies in East Asia or Europe under the 

INF Treaty, including steps we can take as a legal counter-measure, then I remain open to 

arguments for our withdrawal. After having worked this issue closely for some time, T 

have yet to hear of or assess such a scenario, however. 

How should Russia's violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world? 

I came of age in the final days of the Cold War. I grew up under the fear of a nuclear 

strike at any time, living in ground zero New York. I cut my political teeth in the nuclear 

activism of the late 1970s and 1980s and am proud to have played a small part in a bigger 

movement that helped end the cold war nuclear competition in the 1980s. I am 

constantly reminded of how we thought in those days about the Soviet threat and the cold 
73 

blooded and calculating Soviets who were waiting for their chance to attack if only a 

bomber or missile gap could be created and exploited. 

History has proven both how stupid and lucky we were. Far from the beast of global 

domination we projected, Soviet leaders were as worried about our plans for their 

destruction as we were of theirs. This cycle of fear led to trillions of dollars in inefficient 

investments that bankrupted them and led to systemic shortfalls in US investments in 

education, infrastructure, healthcare and other areas. 

I have no illusions about Vladimir Putin's Russia. But it is also remains abundantly clear 

that his actions are driven as much from weakness and fear (often baseless) as from a 

desire to dominate Europe or destroy the West. To be sure, such ambitions can emerge 

over time, so and we must be firm in our resolve and strategy and our watchfulness of 

Russia- the same commitment that brought the lNF violation to light in a timely fashion. 

However, my desire that we not take steps that would further undermine crisis stability is 

rooted here in a concern not to overplay Russia's actions and further a growing narrative 

we are witnessing today, especially in light of other concerns about Russia's global 

behavior and actions here in the United States. 

The risks of conflict with Russia are real and growing. The danger of an accidental or 

unintended conflict, or military engagement driven by concern over short decision times, 

miscommunication or mechanical malfunction are as high as they have been since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. We have the most to lose forrn nuclear war and open 

conflict, and we should take the steps we need to take in order to protect ourselves and 

our allies while preserving crisis stability and ensuring we have the means and the time to 

react rationally and firmly in a crisis. Time for decision makers to engage, defuse and if 

necessary de-escalate is critical and a fundamental goal of many of the improvements we 

have made in the nuclear arena over the past decade. We should be careful not to 

undetmine those goals through our response to the INF issue. 

Russia is a declining power. Moscow can undermine our security and our alliances, and 
74 

undermine our institutions to bring us down to their level of dysfunction. They also 

remain the only country that can challenge our nuclear capabilities and bring about a 

global Annageddon. But it remains true that we are vastly more capable, richer and 

stronger than Russia and we hold the best cards and have the best chance to shape the 

global landscape for the 21st century. Only we, with the wrong choices, can deny 

ourselves that influence. Preserving our advantages means we must confront Russian 

aggression where it threatens our interests, remain committed to our allies, and to 

preserving a world order based on economic vitality. This depends on our credibility, 

and our championship of the legal, liberal democratic order. By staying true to these 

values, and understand that our leadership is based as much on our tone as our policies, 

the United States can effectively protect the foundations of our security. Any decision 

made in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty should be viewed in this 

context. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 
75 

Bio for Jon Brook Wolfsthal 

Jon Wolfsthal is currently a fellow at the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's 

Kennedy School of Government and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is 

also a Senior Advisor to Global Zero. 

Jon Wolfsthal is the former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National 

Security Affairs and senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and 

nonproliferation. Before that, he was Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies in Monterey. He 

joined Monterey after having been Special Advisor to Vice President Joseph R. Biden for 

nuclear security and nonproliferation and as a director lor nonproliferation on the National 

Security Council from 2009-2012. 

During his time in Government he was involved in almost every aspect of U.S. nuclear weapons, 

arn1s control, nonproliferation and security policy. He helped negotiate and secure the 

ratification of the New START arms reduction agreement with the Russian Federation, and 

helped support rhe development of nuclear policy including through the 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review and other elements of the Obama Administration's security policies. He was previously 

a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and deputy director for 

nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in several 

capacities during the 1990s at the U.S Department of Energy, including an on-the-ground 

assignment in North Korea during 1995-96. 

With Joseph Cirincione, he is the author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and a leading authority on nuclear weapons policy, regional proliferation, arms 

control and nuclear deterrence. His work has included extended assignments in Russia, North 

Korea and travel to fran. He is the author of dozens of scholarly articles and op-eds and has 

appeared on or been quoted in most leading domestic and international news media outlets. He 

is an avid cook, fly fisherman and runner and lives in Washington DC with his wife and two 

children. 
76 

I)ISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

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(including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a 

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by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter 

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of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy 

(including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic 

form not later than one day atler the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if 

necessary. 

Witness name: Jon Brook Wolfsthal 

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Oxford Analytica $2,000 articles for publication on risk analysis 

3 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 30, 2017 

(81) 

January 13,2015 

Dear Chairman Dempsey: 

On December l 0, 2014, the Forces Subcommittee conducted a joint hearing 

with the Terrorism, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to review the latest intibrnlatiion on Russia's continued violation of the Intermediate-range 

Nuclear followed a closed session with additional 

~'"'~~u,"'~' ma<ul> O'fR'Llssia's actions and the United States' 

response. 

Based on the discussion at these events, we tmderstand the Joint Staffhas 

cornpr,eh(ms,ive assessment of; and is Russian vk•lations ofth1e 

We also tmderstand that, based assessment, recommendations 

to the Secretary of Defense and the President regarding be pursued. 

We request that you provide our subcommittees 

options assessment, the recommendations yon made to 

assessment, and the implications 

deterrence, and ensuring strategic Our subcommittees believe Russia's v •""'"lv!Jt ca 

INF treaty is concem for the U.S. and 

the actions in the past years. Otll' dleliber·ations on the way 

ahead for ad<:!ressingthis viol:aticm :anc! er1co,ur<tgiJ1g Russia to return to compliance, if possible, 

would be of the objective military assessment and the 

best military senior military officer. 

We appreciate your attention to our request and look forward to continue to work with 

you in support of our armed forces. 

Sincerely, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, NonProliferation, and Trade 
82 

Page2 

Ranking Member 

SubcQmmittee on Strategic Forces 

Sherman 

Ranking Member 

Subc01mnittee on Terrorism, Non· 

Proliferation, and Trade 
83 

UNCLASSIFIEI) 

Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike 

Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between 

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics 

Preparation of this report cost the llepartment of 

Defense a total of approximat~ty $8,550 for the 

llNCLASSIFIEI) 
84 

UNCLASSlFIE.D 

(U) Executive Summary 

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) tor Fiscal Year 2014 directed "the 

'vnuumun. Joint Chiefs ofStaf(, in consultation with the Commander, U8 

toprovide t;; th~ congressional defimse committees not later than Ser>ternb<'f' 

detailing what concepts the 'varfi•>ht,er.<' 

would seek to develop United States 1vas no longer cm1st,·ai11ed 

ltVF treaty. Such report 

exist that 

assessment risk, and time line advantages that could be achieved with 

capabilities not available to the United States due to its adherence to the JNF 

The reporl include an assessment (~l at{J! risks and benefits to strategic 

of developing such systems. '' 

The 200 l Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) defined 

nffC>n<im> and defenSiVe by a rObUSt llHI'<"UUCllUC. 

un,.,UU<He COnVentional Strike, COUld reduce 

its oftensive deterrent Subsequently, U.S. 

Command embarked on an effort to advocate the development of 

gn·pre·c1smn conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability. 

or multi-theater environment, 

(U) The Intenneniate-Range Nuclear Forces (IN F) Treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional 

ground-launched bal.!istic and cruise missiles ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. The treaty 

prohibits the production, flight test or launch of any shorter· {500-1,000 km) to intermediate· 

(l ,000-5,500 km) range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles or production or 

possession of any stages and/or launchers of such missiles. In the .absence of the INF Treaty, 

tour types of weapons systems could assist in closing the existing JROC·validated capability 

gap: 

(!) lv!odifications to existing short range or tactical weapon systems to exte11d range 

(2) Forward-hased, ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) 

(3) Forward-based, ground·launched intennediate-range balListic missiles (IRBMs) 

( 4) Forward·based, ground· launched intennediate-range missiles with trajectory shaping 

vehicles (TSVs). 

(U) Because of lNF restrictions, examination of prohibited concepts has not been perfonned by 

industry or the Services. Trade studies regarding capability, aftordability, and development 

2 

UNCLASSIFIED 
85 

UNCLASSIFUm 

timelines would have to be completed prior to providing au accurate estimate of cost, technology 

risk, and time!ine advantages that could be achieved with respect to these concepts. Extensive 

knowledge could be leveraged from past and current land- and sea-based systen1s to assist in 

potential development and deployment of these currently prohibited concepts. 

l.O (U) Background 

1.1 to Enclosure 9 in the "HASC Report 

Defense Act tbr Fiscal 2014 Classified Annex 

Report of the Committee on Armed Services Honse of Representatives on H.R. 1960, 

dated 7 June 2013." 

2.0 (U) Conventional Prompt Global Strike 

2.1 Per the PGS ICD and as stated in USSTRATCOM's CPGS 

Opera1tmr1s, CPGS could be emnlo•ved 

against ll!Uh·t•avrnr, tm1e-serlsllwe 

gec}grapllic<!lly isolated areas when 

or not preferred. 

2.2 The 2010 NPR noted the DoD "is studying the appropriate mix 

strike capabilities, bombers as well as nol1·nuc.J•ear 

strike. in tbllow-on 20 l 0 Qu:adremtia! 

DoD has not made 

acquisition pru•eraans 

3,0 (ll) Intermediate-Range Nnclear Forces Treaty 

3.1 

stages of such 

aircraft. air-launched or sea-launched 

ranges less than 500 km or greater than 

3.2 If the INF Treaty ceases to be in effect, the !Jenrutment 

test, and conventional grcmn.d-la\llncl·ted 

range and c.onstruct. 

systems, the of which is pn:•hillite:d 

regarding other would need to be assessed, New 

1 National Research Council ofthc National Academies, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 

and Beyond, 2008 

UNCI,ASS.IFnm 
86 

UNCLASSIFIED 

accountability. !NF and NST use the same or similar det!nitions that could impact 

CPOS efforts (see Enclosure A). 

se1:1anttio'n exists between INF and NST. Any that 

de1rcl<1nedin absence of the INF Treaty would need to of the 

could make it accountable as det!ned by the NST (Figure 2). 

4.0 (U) Military Requirements 

4. I Any CPOS capability ballistic or cruise 

with ranges between and 5,500 should with the specit!c 

requirem.eni:soutlined in the POS lCD. These were validated by 

and revalidated in 2013. These requirements are not affected by the 

status of the INF treaty. 

4.2 prohibitions, four additional types of weapon 

to close tbe JROC-validated capability gap 

(ALCM) and GLCM programs. 

he required in anti-access environments, 

4 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Development of 

current and 

of a 
87 

UNCLASSIFU:D 

4.3 (U) Any future CPGS system with greate.r than 50 percent non-ballistic tra,,ectorv 

would not fall under NST restrictions as as the rernainirtg 

are not defined as an ICBM or SLBM. INF States 

could gmund-launehed with ranges 500 and 5,500 km 

capable shaped, or non-bal!istic ). This would result 

in systems effects on target, and surv i vabi!lty needed to 

close the existing 

4.4 pr<)bfbilitons, sJpecawoatty the definition of a ballistic missile, 

De1nartm•~nt is boost-glide 

vehicles to achieve a Without INF, 

the benefit would the a system, such as 

an with a TSV. This type ~.- ''""''~- could deliver the same or better capability 

as a boost-glide vehicle, with less technological risk and cost. 

5.0 (U) Assessments of Cost, Teclmology Risk am! Timeline Advantages 

5.1 Cunent CPGS cflbrts do not include nuclear or conventional gr<lUr!d-.lau.ncilled 

and cruise rnissile.s with ranges between 500 and 5,500 

partners has examined lNF prohibited Cost and acquisition 

caunot be accurately until decisions are made 

tecnn<)!O:gles, concepts, and 

however, analysis won!d be 

usefulness versus a more 

Shorter-range systems require a greater number 

5.!.2 

coverage. This would increase overall program cost. 

a torwrurcH,as•ed 

and acquisition timelines. 

locations to provide 

cornp~1ralble to cunent cruise missile nrc'"'''""" such as the Long 

Standoff cruise missile; however, it would in capabilities such 

as range, speed, stealth, and \Varhead lethality. 

5 

UNCI,ASSIFIED 
88 

UNCLASSIFIED 

proven success in numerous test 

comparable to any other 

Expected costs would 

improvements in military enectivene~;s. 

6.0 (U) Potential Effects on Strategic Stability 

6.! The request to assess the risks and benefits to strategic stability associated with 

wllJldJca\'l'lmz from the INF Treaty and currently 

6.2 

6.3 (U) It is also foreseeable that U.S. development and c~,.,,!nvm""' 

could enhance our strategic vis-a-vis rival 

and extended deterrent Stability 

critical areas where U.S. and Allied interests 

Militarily, rorwara·netllo•veu 

some to fixed-site a persistent presence 

and decrease burden to submarine or systems. could 

provide new and e!1ective PGS capabilities, reduce the nuclear uwru•J;w<y 

associated with conventionally armed lC.BMs. 

6 

llNCLASSI.FlED 
89 

UNCLASSIFIED 

forward-deployed systems risk increased instability depending on the location and 

situation. 

7 

UNCLASSlFUW 
90 

llNCLASSlFlED 

(U) J:<:NCLOSURE A 

1.0 (U) N~Jw Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

1.1 is a nuclear arms reduction between the United States and the Russian 

Fe<:lcrati•on. It was entered-into-fbrce on February 20 I l and is expected to remain in 

until2021. The Department of State Fact Sheet on "Investment in Conventional 

Global Strike" states "The New START Treaty allows the United States to 

CPGS systems, and does not in any way limit or constrain research, 

de,vel<lpnlent, testing, and evaluation of such and which offer the 

prospect of striking in the world in less CPGS 

would count central limits of the 

definitic•ns of an intercontinental or submarine 

1.2 (U) New START Treaty definitions that could impact CPGS: 

Ballistic Missile: A missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a 

trajectory over most of its tlight. 

!.2.2 {U) ICBM: A !and-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 km. 

one has been contained in, or 

excess of 600 km of a type, any 

from, a submarine. 

1.2.4 (U) vehicle: For ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile 

of a any one has been launched or t1ight-tested, 

be as a weapon, that is, as mechanism or device that 

against any target, is designed to or destroy 

1.2.5 Cruise Missile: A missile that is an unmanned, seli~p,roJJelled weapondelivery vehicle that sustains night through the use lift over most of its 

t1ight path. 

!.2.6 (U) "New of ICBM: A type of!CBM, the technical characteristics of 

which difier fmm technical characteristics of an ICBM declared in at 

least one of the (a) uurnher type 

either the assembled missile or the 

stage, by more than 3 percent, or (d) diameter of the first stage, by more 

than 3 percent. 

Pro,tot,me: ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM ofa. nevv 

have been launched, and no lam1eher 

no more 

of which 

1.2.8 "New Kind" refers w new offensive arms of strategic rauge that 

do not meet the treaty's rl,t;,;,,;,w,. of these existing strategic otTensive arms. 

tJNCLASSWIEl) 
91 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1.3 INF and NST use the same definition for ballistic missiles. NST cruTies the 

further, into a distinction between "new types" (new 

etc.) versus "new kinds" of weapons (hypersonic 

9 

UNCLASSIFIED 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 30, 2017 

(95) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Please discuss your views on the risks of the treaty currently being 

negotiated to ban nuclear weapons. Is it inconsistent for a NATO member who just 

signed on to the Warsaw Communique ́ to now sign on to this treaty? What about 

non-NATO members who rely on our nuclear umbrella? 

Mr. ROSE. I oppose the current efforts to negotiate a nuclear weapon ban treaty. 

Such a treaty would be fundamentally at odds with long-standing U.S. and Alliance 

defense and deterrence policies. A key objective of the proponents of the treaty is 

to undermine U.S. extended deterrence. I urge the United States and its allies not 

to participate in the negotiations, and not become parties to the treaty if one is negotiated. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does Russia’s violation matter? Is this something that has to 

be confronted? Why? 

Mr. ROSE. The INF Treaty has served the security interests of the United States 

and its allies in Europe and Asia for almost thirty years. The Treaty is not just a 

bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, but goes to the 

heart of Eurasian security. However, it is clear that Russia no longer sees the INF 

Treaty as in its interest and is unlikely to return to compliance. Therefore, a 

strong—but proportional—political and military response is required by the United 

States and its Allies to effectively address Russia’s violation. I would recommend 

that the United States and its Allies should impose a ‘‘countervailing strategy’’ that 

seeks to enhance deterrence by holding critical Russian assets at risk. That response should also include ‘‘limited’’ cruise missile defenses that would deny Russia 

significant military benefit from the deployment of the new cruise missile. These response options should be implemented in a way that maintains Alliance unity and 

places the blame for the demise of the INF Treaty squarely where it belongs: with 

Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long was the INF violation teed up in the interagency before 

the policy decision was made to call Russia’s conduct a violation? 

Mr. ROSE. I was not directly responsible for this issue at the State Department 

until I became assistant secretary in December 2014, after Russia was declared in 

violation of the INF Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe Russia will return to compliance with INF? Do you 

think we could effectively verify a return to compliance? How? Please be specific. 

Mr. ROSE. I believe that it is unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with 

its obligations under the INF Treaty for a variety of reasons, which I outlined in 

my written statement. That said, if Russia were to a make a decision to return to 

compliance with the treaty, I do believe it could be done in a verifiable manner. This 

would likely require resuscitating the INF Treaty verification protocols, which expired in 2002, or similar measures. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it possible to take certain steps to convince them to return to compliance? How? By doing what? 

Mr. ROSE. Again, I believe it is extremely unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty for a variety of reasons, which 

I outlined in my written statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon 

testified on two occasions that DOD was going to recommend three categories of 

military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance with the treaty. 

These included active defenses, and counter-force and countervailing military capabilities. What are some examples of these kinds of capabilities? Did they ever get 

developed? 

Mr. ROSE. I would defer to my colleague Robert Scher who was actively involved 

in the development of these options when he served as assistant secretary of defense 

for strategy and capabilities. That said, many of the response options that I recommended in my written testimony are consistent with the military options that 

Under Secretary McKeon noted in his. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Russians were developing more than one system that violated 

the treaty, what would that mean for their intent to return to compliance? How 
96 

would such a fact influence how the U.S. should proceed on developing its own capabilities? 

Mr. ROSE. I cannot confirm whether or not Russia is developing additional systems that violate the INF Treaty. However, if they were developing additional systems, it would only strengthen my view that Russia is unlikely to return to compliance. Therefore, I recommend moving forward with the military response options 

that I outlined in my written testimony, in particular developing a conventional variant of the Long-range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, and facilitating the sale of 

air- and sea-launched cruise missile capabilities (e.g., JSSM–ER and Tomahawk) to 

allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you familiar with the recommendations to confront Russia’s violation made by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey? Did you support them? How many of these recommendations were implemented by the administration? If none, why? 

Mr. ROSE. I am familiar with those recommendations, but was not the assistant 

secretary of state at the time they were made. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you support R&D, as distinct from flight test or acquisition, 

of the long-range stand-off weapon (also known as LRSO) in a ground- or sealaunched option? Would such R&D violate the INF Treaty? 

Mr. ROSE. I support the development of air- and sea-based variants of the LRSO. 

While R&D of the ground-based variant of the LRSO would not violate the INF 

Treaty, I would not recommend the development of a ground-based version of the 

LRSO at this time. Such a move could generate strong political opposition among 

some NATO allies, as we saw in the early 1980s, and provide an opening for Russian wedge-driving. U.S. and Allied military requirements can be met with air- and 

sea-launched cruise missiles, with less risk of political controversy. 

Mr. ROGERS. It occurs to me that testing a sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, 

of which we have several thousand missiles in inventory, on a fixed-test stand would 

not violate the treaty. Am I right? What if we then demonstrated the ability to mate 

it to a mobile ground launcher, but didn’t flight test it? Would that violate the treaty? Would these actions send the Russians a powerful message? 

Mr. ROSE. It is my understanding that testing a sea-launched cruise missile on 

a fixed-test stand would not violate the INF Treaty. While demonstrating the ability 

to mate a Tomahawk on a mobile ground launcher and not testing might not be a 

‘‘violation’’ of the treaty, it would be inconsistent with the ‘‘spirit’’ of treaty and 

could raise political concerns among allies. Furthermore, I’m not convinced that it 

would have much of an impact on Russian thinking. I believe that U.S. and Allied 

military requirements can be met with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, with 

less risk of political controversy. Therefore, I recommend moving forward with the 

military response options that I outlined in my written testimony, in particular developing a conventional variant of the Long-range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, 

and facilitating the sale of air- and sea-launched cruise missile capabilities (e.g., 

JSSM–ER and Tomahawk) to allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Isn’t it a false narrative that developing ground-launched cruise or 

ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means we’re redeploying nuclear-armed 

Pershing IIs in Germany or the U.K.? Isn’t this a false narrative spun by Russia 

and their allies? 

Mr. ROSE. It is my understanding that the United States currently has no plans 

to develop, or deploy, intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles, nuclear or conventional, to Europe. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty? Why then 

do some allies not agree with the U.S. position? Is it a political choice or are they 

really not convinced? 

Mr. ROSE. I have no doubt that Russia has violated the INF Treaty. However, 

during my tenure as assistant secretary of state, I had access to significant intelligence information related to the issue. Allies have not had access to the same level 

of information. Therefore, I would strongly encourage the U.S. Government to make 

additional intelligence information on the subject available to allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. I gave you a copy at the hearing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff’s report from 2013 that lists at least four validated military requirements 

that call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited by INF. It appears to 

be the case that our adherence to this treaty has a very real price for the U.S. and 

our military forces, in that we cannot meet these validated military requirements. 

Do you agree? How might such capabilities be useful in countering A2/AD in Asia? 

Mr. ROSE. I believe that the United States can meet its current military requirements without deploying INF Treaty-prohibited systems. However, as I noted in my 

written testimony, I am not necessarily opposed to the development of such a capability in the future if: 1) Russia fails to return to compliance with the INF Treaty; 
97 

and 2) and the United States requires such a capability to meet its military requirements. However, I remain concerned about where we would deploy such a system 

if it were eventually developed. History has shown that deployments of groundbased missile systems remain politically controversial in democratic countries. For 

example, the deployment of U.S. INF-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe 

in the 1980s was highly controversial. Furthermore, the recent deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to the Republic 

of Korea (ROK), though strictly a defensive system, has proven to be controversial 

both within the ROK, and in the region. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are some of the factors the U.S. should consider prior to the 

extension of the New START treaty, which isn’t required until 2021? 

Mr. ROSE. A U.S. decision to extend the New START Treaty should be based two 

overarching factors. First, is extension of the treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and its allies? Second, is Russia is in full compliance with 

its obligations under the treaty? 

Mr. ROGERS. Please discuss your views on the risks of the treaty currently being 

negotiated to ban nuclear weapons. Is it inconsistent for a NATO member who just 

signed on to the Warsaw Communique ́ to now sign on to this treaty? What about 

non-NATO members who rely on our nuclear umbrella? 

Mr. SCHER. The discussions underway to ban nuclear weapons are not in our interests or in the interests of our allies. Any ally who believes in the security assurances of the United States and NATO should not participate in the nuclear weapons 

ban negotiations, nor consider signing any such treaty. These discussions have set 

a dangerous course that if realized would destabilize NATO and undermine global 

security. While there are some who will state that this treaty is just aspirational, 

consideration of a nuclear ban runs counter to how the United States and its allies 

should think about the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and how we seek to deter 

nuclear war. As such, signing on to the treaty would be in direct conflict with Alliance statements in the Warsaw Communique ́ and elsewhere and would severely 

damage the Alliance and the extended deterrence commitments of the United States 

in Europe and East Asia. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why does Russia’s violation matter? Is this something that has to 

be confronted? Why? 

Mr. SCHER. Russia’s violation of the INF treaty is dangerous from an operational 

and political perspective. It also undermines the relevance of treaties and arms control treaties beyond the INF treaty. 

From an operational perspective, the intermediate-range missiles that Russia is 

building provide Russia with another capability to hold NATO forces and territory 

at risk. While we can address the threat from these missiles in different ways, their 

presence forces us to pursue costly defenses and additional offensive strike capabilities for the defense of NATO. 

On the political side, the continued violation falls into a pattern of Russian actions that threatens its neighbors, weakens strategic stability, and defies international norms. Russia’s behavior also has a direct impact on the validity and purpose of international agreements. If there is no reaction to their violation of the 

treaty, the entire system of arms control is weakened and calls into question international agreements globally. 

Mr. ROGERS. How long was the INF violation teed up in the interagency before 

the policy decision was made to call Russia’s conduct a violation? 

Mr. SCHER. I took up my position overseeing these issues within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense after the State Department officially announced that Russia 

was violating the INF treaty in July 2014. Hence, I do not know how long the interagency community was examining the evidence before making that formal declaration. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe Russia will return to compliance with INF? Do you 

think we could effectively verify a return to compliance? How? Please be specific. 

Mr. SCHER. I do not believe that Russia will return to compliance with the INF 

treaty. However, it continues to be in the best interest of the United States to try 

to convince Russia to return, even as we do more to counter the operational and 

political threat from the deployment of the violating system for reasons noted in my 

testimony. 

I am not an expert on verification, but I do know from many discussions that 

verification would be very difficult and likely require an expansive and intrusive regime that Russia would be unlikely to accede to. However, if for some reason Russia 

were to claim to want to come back into compliance, this kind of intrusive compliance regime should be a part of any deal that the United States would accept. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it possible to take certain steps to convince them to return to compliance? How? By doing what? 
98 

Mr. SCHER. As noted, I believe it unlikely that the Russians will agree to come 

back into compliance with the INF treaty. The only way to get Russia to consider 

compliance is by convincing Russian leaders that fielding the violating system will 

ultimately be costlier operationally and politically than returning to the treaty and 

that will require the coordinated military and political approach of the United 

States and the NATO alliance. For example, on the military side of the equation, 

Russia would need to see that because of the violation, the balance of forces between 

it and NATO had shifted and that the Alliance had become increasingly unified and 

militarily potent. 

Mr. ROGERS. Then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon 

testified on two occasions that DOD was going to recommend three categories of 

military response options to convince Russia to return to compliance with the treaty. 

These included active defenses, and counter-force and countervailing military capabilities. What are some examples of these kinds of capabilities? Did they ever get 

developed? 

Mr. SCHER. Active defenses would include some point-missile defense systems we 

currently have in inventory such as the Patriot systems and some additional systems we have or could develop to target cruise missiles. Counter-force and countervailing capabilities are strike capabilities we have across the armed forces that 

would either directly target the violating systems or target other critical capabilities 

in Russia. The U.S. military currently has many such systems, but is always looking 

to improve its strike capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. If the Russians were developing more than one system that violated 

the treaty, what would that mean for their intent to return to compliance? How 

would such a fact influence how the U.S. should proceed on developing its own capabilities? 

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the Russians do not intend to return to the treaty now, 

but certainly the development of any additional, violating systems would make me 

even more certain about that fact. However, an additional system on their side does 

not change my calculus about the United States developing its own intermediaterange cruise missile. That should be done when and if the Administration, in coordination with Congress, believes 1) that this type of capability is needed for offensive 

purposes, 2) is a better investment than other strike capabilities, 3) increases strategic stability. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you familiar with the recommendations to confront Russia’s violation made by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey? Did you support them? How many of these recommendations were implemented by the administration? If none, why? 

Mr. SCHER. I am generally familiar with the recommendations made by then 

Chairman Dempsey and support them as credible options that were rightfully presented to the President for his decision. I believe that very few were implemented 

by the Obama Administration but do not know what has happened since. In some 

cases, the recommendations were assessed to not be operationally necessary at the 

time and would, in fact, reduce strategic stability and run counter to the efforts 

being undertaken to try to convince Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you support R&D, as distinct from flight test or acquisition, 

of the long-range stand-off weapon (also known as LRSO) in a ground- or sealaunched option? Would such R&D violate the INF Treaty? 

Mr. SCHER. As I understand it, R&D for a ground-launched variation of the LRSO 

could be done in a way that does not violate the INF treaty—although that ultimately is a determination made by treaty lawyers at the Department of State. Assuming that my initial understanding is true, I would support such R&D at this 

time. 

Mr. ROGERS. It occurs to me that testing a sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, 

of which we have several thousand missiles in inventory, on a fixed-test stand would 

not violate the treaty. Am I right? What if we then demonstrated the ability to mate 

it to a mobile ground launcher, but didn’t flight test it? Would that violate the treaty? Would these actions send the Russians a powerful message? 

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the actions you describe would send a clear message 

to the Russians that they would view as a direct consequence of their violation of 

the Treaty. I am not a lawyer and cannot formally comment on whether or not that 

would be a violation of the treaty, although based on what has been briefed to me, 

it would not seem to be a violation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Isn’t it a false narrative that developing ground-launched cruise or 

ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means we’re redeploying nuclear-armed 

Pershing IIs in Germany or the U.K.? Isn’t this a false narrative spun by Russia 

and their allies? 
99 

Mr. SCHER. Yes, it is not true that simply developing ground-launched cruise missiles or ballistic missiles at an intermediate range means that it is inevitable that 

these capabilities would be redeployed into Europe or that they would be nuclear 

armed. In fact, any such new capability would have applications globally and could 

more easily be conventionally armed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty? Why then 

do some allies not agree with the U.S. position? Is it a political choice or are they 

really not convinced? 

Mr. SCHER. I do not have any doubt that Russia is violating the treaty. I cannot 

speak for other nations about why they have not made the same statements. It is, 

however, critical that the United States continue to share as much intelligence as 

possible to make it abundantly clear that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty, 

and I believe as Russia continues to deploy these systems, that will become an easier task. 

Mr. ROGERS. I gave you a copy at the hearing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff’s report from 2013 that lists at least four validated military requirements 

that call for the U.S. to use military capabilities prohibited by INF. It appears to 

be the case that our adherence to this treaty has a very real price for the U.S. and 

our military forces, in that we cannot meet these validated military requirements. 

Do you agree? How might such capabilities be useful in countering A2/AD in Asia? 

Mr. SCHER. If the United States made the determination to withdraw from the 

INF treaty, there would be capabilities militarily useful for our forces that DOD 

could then develop. However, I do not believe that simply because these systems 

would be militarily useful or that they fill validated requirements necessarily means 

that they are the only, or even the best way, to address those requirements. Hence, 

pursuing any such capabilities would have to be done with an overall look at what 

options are available to meet the military requirements in a way that best reinforces 

strategic stability and supports U.S. interests. 

The value of intermediate range systems in Asia would be our ability to locate 

them within the range of many systems China installed and developed to keep some 

U.S. systems out of range of Chinese forces. While this could have some operational 

advantages, it would also present more fixed targets to any adversary. Beyond this 

reality, we also have other systems that can penetrate and/or survive in the Pacific. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are some of the factors the U.S. should consider prior to the 

extension of the New START treaty, which isn’t required until 2021? 

Mr. SCHER. I believe that the New START treaty, if implemented as agreed to, 

remains in U.S. interests and that extending New START makes sense. However, 

given recent Russian actions in regards to the INF treaty and its other aggressive 

actions, extending it early should only be done if we have confidence that it would 

be implemented in accordance with U.S. views of the treaty. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New 

START Treaty? Why/why not? 

Mr. ROSE. I believe that continued implementation of the New START Treaty is 

in the national security interests of the United States for several reasons. First, it 

places limitations on the number of strategic nuclear systems that Russia can deploy against the United States and our allies. Second, through New START’s onsite inspection regime, data declarations, and notifications, the Treaty provides the 

United States with key insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces that we might 

not have access to without the Treaty. Third, according to the U.S. Department of 

State’s Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty, Russia is adhering to its obligations under the Treaty. Indeed, the Reagan Administration had 

serious concerns about the Soviet Union’s compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) Treaty, as result of its building of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early 

warning radar. However, these concerns did not prevent the United States from negotiating and ratifying the INF Treaty in 1988, because despite concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, it was felt that the INF Treaty was in the 

national security interest of the United States. In my view, the same holds true for 

the New START Treaty today. 

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States and NATO countries pursue cruise missile 

defense to counter the Russian INF violations? Why/why not? 

Mr. ROSE. Russia is deploying the new GLCM as part of its overall A2AD strategy 

to deny the United States and its NATO Allies access to critical ports, airfields, and 

command and control nodes during a potential conflict. In response, the United 

States and NATO should deploy ‘‘limited’’ cruise missile defenses to protect key Alli-
100 

ance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia. While I support the deployment 

of ‘‘limited’’ cruise missile defenses, I would caution against moving forward with 

the deployment of larger set of missile defenses aimed against Russia, especially 

against its strategic deterrent. Such an approach would be extremely expensive, 

technologically challenging, and could undermine strategic stability. 

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC–8 in violation of the 

INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how? 

Mr. ROSE. In my view, Russia developed and deployed the SSC–8 in violation of 

the INF Treaty for a variety of political and military reasons, which I outlined in 

my written testimony. From 2013 to 2016, the United States attempted—unsuccessfully—to resolve Russia’s noncompliance with the INF Treaty through diplomatic efforts. During those discussions, the United States directly addressed each of Russia’s alleged concerns about U.S. compliance with the INF Treaty. Based on this history, I believe it is unlikely that Russia will return to compliance with the treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in 

the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly 

in a crisis? Why/why not? 

Mr. ROSE. I believe that is in the mutual interest of United States and Russia 

to initiate strategic stability talks to help prevent misperceptions and miscalculations. 

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New 

START Treaty? Why/why not? 

Mr. SCHER. The United States should not withdraw from the INF treaty right 

now. It continues to be in the best interest of the United States and our Allies to 

do everything we can to bring Russia back into compliance, even if we eventually 

fail. However, I do believe that there is a range of actions that the United States 

should take within the bounds of the treaty to improve our operational position and 

make it more likely that Russia might see it in their interest to return to compliance. 

I believe that the New START treaty remains in our interests given that it reduces the number of deployed nuclear weapons and established a solid verification 

regime, especially as Russia continues to implement that treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC–8 in violation of the 

INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how? 

Mr. SCHER. I cannot speak to why Russia violated the INF treaty, nor do I believe 

that they had any reason to do so. As they have not admitted to deploying this system, I have also not seen any publicly stated rationale for why they have developed 

the violating system. Russia certainly talks about how it is threatened by NATO, 

but given what has transpired over the past few years, Russia has been the aggressor on its periphery, not the Alliance. 

Mr. COOPER. Does the Russian deployment of this missile threaten the U.S. ability to defend the United States and our European allies? Does it threaten our nuclear deterrence capability? 

Mr. SCHER. At this point, I do not believe that this missile threatens the ability 

of the United States to defend ourselves and our Allies, and it does not significantly 

threaten our nuclear deterrence capabilities overall. However, the violation is not 

just a political statement; it is a real military capability. This system, especially if 

deployed in greater numbers, would have a measurable effect on the strike capability of Russia and would directly threaten NATO forces and territory, including 

possibly part of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Threatening our air leg would force 

the United States and NATO allies to spend more money on protection of the Alliance and more money on systems that could strike Russia in order to maintain the 

level of security we currently enjoy. 

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in 

the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly 

in a crisis? Why/why not? 

Mr. SCHER. I believe that there is often a benefit to talking with other nations. 

Whether or not a military-to-military channel is the right approach depends on the 

particulars of the case. Given that strategic stability is much more than just a military concern, I am not convinced that such military talks between the United States 

and Russia would be the best approach. However, I do believe that there is value 

in retaining this channel as an option and not have it be specifically restricted by 

law as it could be helpful to those seeking to find the best way to enhance strategic 
101 

stability. And, yes, it would be particularly useful to have open channels of communication in the event of a crisis. 

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States withdraw from the INF Treaty or the New 

START Treaty? Why/why not? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The United States has a vested interest New START’s continued 

full implementation and the United States should not withdraw from New START. 

New START provides critical insights into Russian nuclear developments and also 

provides the only constraint on Russia nuclear modernization. It provides a critical 

element in an otherwise destabilized relationship with Russia and should be preserved as long as Russia continues to comply with its terms. It should be extended 

for five years if the Executive Branch and U.S. military believe that we can achieve 

our goals of deterrence and reassurance under the mutual constraints adopted 

under the agreement. I do not believe the United States should withdraw from the 

INF agreement unless the U.S. military determines that we have to develop and deploy a system denied to us by the terms of the agreement. Even then, it would be 

preferable for us to pursue such a program as a counter-measure under the INF 

given Russia’s violations of the agreement. U.S. withdrawal from the INF is a favor 

to Russia and would enable Russia to claim we, not they, are responsible for the 

demise of the agreement. 

Mr. COOPER. Should the United States and NATO countries pursue cruise missile 

defense to counter the Russian INF violations? Why/why not? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The missile defense options within our technical and military capability will make no significant impact on Russian or European military thinking, 

deterrence or reassurance. Moreover, the decision to deploy missile defenses in Europe was made to protect NATO allies from Iranian missile capabilities. Russia remains convinced that this is cover for American ambitions to direct missile defenses 

against Russia to deny it a retaliatory capability to deter American military actions. 

As such, any decision to direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 

defense against Russia has significant political and diplomatic implications. If there 

is no significant military gain and directing missile defense against Russia adds to 

the damaging political narrative in Europe that the united States is undermining 

strategic stability in Europe, then such steps should be approached cautiously. I do 

not believe at this time that EPAA should be redirected against cruise missiles and 

even if it is, it is unlikely to have any significant military capability. 

Mr. COOPER. Why did Russia develop and deploy the SSC–8 in violation of the 

INF Treaty? In addition to responding strongly to Russian violation, should we address Russian alleged concerns, and if so, how? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Russian actions suggest that they are seriously concerned about 

the expansion of NATO and the growing ability of the United States to hold at risk 

strategic assets in Russia without resorting to use of nuclear weapons. Russian military doctrine now reserves the right to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons if it 

is facing a conventional military defeat with strategic implications, and their strong 

pursuit of precision strike conventional and nuclear capabilities on land, air and sea 

are consistent with this effort. While I have no doubt that Russia is in full violation 

of the INF Treaty, Russian thinking on the issue is unclear. Some officials in Russia 

may not be aware that the testing and development of such missiles is prohibited. 

However, if media reports of actual deployments are accurate, any such distinction 

is mute. Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. I do believe that it is worth the 

effort to seek to preserve the INF Treaty and to bring Russia back into compliance. 

If a dialogue at a high enough level could be initiated, there is a chance that Russia 

would agree—in exchange for certain American actions or inaction—to reverse 

course and come back into compliance with the INF Treaty. Moreover, making such 

an effort would steady the resolve of NATO allies and should Russia refuse to come 

back into compliance, make a strong NATO response easier to achieve. 

Mr. COOPER. Are there non-military responses that have yet to be used to respond 

to this violation? Which ones would you recommend? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I am a strong advocate for naming and shaming Russia actions. 

I believe that we should declassify a large majority of the information that confirms 

Russia’s violations with our allies and to call Russia out in multiple international 

and legal form for their actions. Russia takes great pride in being a depository state 

for the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty and for being a responsible nuclear superpower. Making clear that their actions are no longer responsible and are a major 

detriment to international peace and security is one way to create pressure on Russia to return to compliance and avoid such destabilizing actions. 

Mr. COOPER. This is currently prohibited by law per a congressional mandate in 

the national defense authorization, but should we have a channel that allows military-military dialogue with Russia to discuss strategic stability issue, particularly 

in a crisis? Why/why not? 
102 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The lack of a strategic stability dialogue with Russia is a major 

concern and adds to the danger that an accident or conflict could escalate outofcontrol. Russian high-level officials or convince the United States is seeking to undermine the current political leadership control of the country and to deny Russia 

what it sees as it’s rightful place in European global affairs. This paranoia can only 

be addressed through direct and sustained dialogue including national leadership 

and high-level military officials. This is in no way a reward for Russian actions but 

a necessary step to manage the strategic competition that is growing between two 

nuclear superpowers. 

Mr. COOPER. Russia was also in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 

(ABM) with the construction of its Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile early warning 

radar. Did the Russians eventually resolve those concerns? How many years did it 

take? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. In contravention of the ABM treaty Russia built the radar system that was capable of performing battle management functions for missile defenses. It took five years for the United States and Russia to address these concerns 

and to bring Russia back into compliance. 

Mr. COOPER. You mentioned in your testimony that you do not believe the LongRange Stand-Off Weapons is necessary. Why? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. The United States currently has five different means of delivering nuclear weapons globally. The Air Force has determined that a new Stealth 

bomber is necessary to replace the aging fleet of strategic B–52 and B–2 bombers. 

The goal of a Stealth bomber is to penetrate enemy defenses and delivered it’s payload at close range. The cost for developing a Stealth bomber a significantly higher 

than for developing a standoff strategic bomber aircraft. It makes little sense to invest the extreme sums of money necessary to develop a truly stealthy bomber and 

also invest considerable psalms to develop a long-range standoff missiles. I am in 

favor of bought building either a non-stealthy long-range bomber and a long range 

stand off missile OR a stealth bomber with gravity bombs. I am not in favor of 

spending scarce resources on a redundancy and is redundant to our land and sea 

based ballistic missiles. 

Æ