KOREA

1951–1953

by

John Miller, jr.

Owen J. Curroll, Major, U.S. Army

and

Margaret E. Tackley

Center of Military History

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 56–60005

Facsimile Reprint, 1989, 1997

CMH PUB 21–2

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
FOREWORD

To the 1997 Edition

The fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War gives both the Army and the nation an opportunity to honor those veterans who served in that bitter conflict. This volume, a companion

to a similar work treating the first six months of the war, was prepared shortly after the war

ended. Despite the passage of time, it still provides a valuable summary of more than two

long years of combat through its text, photographs, and maps. Keeping this material in print

for the commemorative period provides a new generation of soldiers with the opportunity to

better understand that struggle and the sacrifices made by so many for a cause that was central to the international security policies of the United States. I am thus pleased to release this

new printing of a classic photographic collection.

Since the source of every photograph is noted at the back of this book, it is the Center of

Military History’s hope that various commands and offices throughout the Army will find

this work useful also as a catalog of available photographs as they develop their own projects

commemorating the anniversary of the war. Finally, I am mindful of the fact that as we honor

those who served in the Korean conflict, we are also recognizing by extension those soldiers

who continue to serve in Korea today, doing their own part in preserving freedom in a significant part of the world.

Washington, D.C. JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

11 Oct 1996 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History
Foreword

In Korea the American soldier, with his Korean and United Nations

allies, fought with bravery and skill against his communist foe and met

the test in accordance with the best traditions of the service. His valor

and determination defeated the communist aggression and stabilized the

battle along the present demilitarized zone. The location of this line

largely above the 38th parallel is historic evidence that in Korea

aggression did not pay.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff
Preface

This volume records briefly, by text and photograph, the Korean

conflict from January 1951 to the cessation of hostilities in July 1953.

Like its predecessor, Korea 1950, it attempts to provide an accurate

outline of events in order to show the U.S. Army veteran of the Korean

conflict how the part he played was related to the larger plans and

operations of th United Nations forces. For this reason Korea 1952–1953

focuses on the o rations of the United States Army but summarizes the

achievements of the sister services and of the other United Nations troops

in order to make clear the contributions of all to the successful resistance

against armed aggression. It does not purport to be a final history. Fuller,

more detailed histories of all phases of the Korean conflict are now being

prepared by this Office. Two of these have already appeared in print:

Captain Russell A. Gugeler’s Combat Actions in Korea and Captain John G.

Westover’s Combat Support in Korea, both published by Combat Forces

Press in Washington, D. C.

The text, which is based upon records and reports of the Far East

Command, the United Nations Command, and the Eighth Army, was

written by Dr. John Miller, jr., and Maj. Owen J. Carroll, using, in part,

drafts prepared by Capt. Robert K. Sawyer and 1st Lt. Walter K.

Lukens, Jr.

The photographic sections of this volume were prepared by Miss

Margaret E. Tackley.

The maps appearing with the text were prepared under the supervision of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff. Those inside the front and back covers

are from Army Map Service.

A. C. SMITH

Major General, U.S. Army

Chief of Military History

Contents

1 JANUARY–21 APRIL 1951

Chapter Page

I. THE ENEMY HIGH TIDE: 1–24 January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. ATTACK AND COUNTERATTACK: 25 January–28 February

1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

III. CROSSING THE 38TH PARALLEL: 1 March–21 April 1951 . . . . . . . . 21

Illustrations

Section

1. l–24 JANUARY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2. 25 JANUARY–28 FEBRUARY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3. 1 MARCH–21 APRIL 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

22 APRIL–12 NOVEMBER 1951

Chapter

IV. THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK: 22 April–19 May 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

V. THE UNITED NATIONS RESUME THE ADVANCE: 20 May–

24 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

VI. LULL AND FLARE-UP: 25 June–12 November 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Illustrations

Section

4. 22 APRIL–19 MAY 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

5. 20 MAY–24 JUNE 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6. 25 JUNE–12 NOVEMBER 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952

Chapter

VII. STALEMATE: 12 November 1951–30 June 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

VIII. SUPPORT AND SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Illustrations

Section

7. 12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
1 JULY 1952-27 JULY 1953

Chapter Page

IX. OUTPOST BATTLES: 1 July-31 December 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

X. THE LAST BATTLE: 1 January-27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

Illustrations

Section

8. 1 JULY–31 DECEMBER 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

9. 1 JANUARY–27 JULY 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

LIST OF PICTORIAL SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Maps

No.

1. Enemy Offensive, January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. United Nations Offensive, 25 January–28 February 1951. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. United Nations Offensive, 1 March–21 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4. Enemy Offensive, 22 April–19 May 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5. United Nations Offensive, 20 May–24 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6. United Nations Front, 25 June–12 November 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

7. The Last Battle, 1 January–27 July 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
1 JANUARY–21 APRIL 1951
2

MAP 1
3

CHAPTER I

The Enemy High Tide

1–24 January 1951

As the first day of 1951 dawned in Korea,

weary soldiers of the United Nations braced

themselves to withstand the expected onslaught of North Korean and Chinese

armies. The outlook for the United Nations,

though not hopeless, was far from promising, for the unpredictable history of the

fighting in Korea seemed only to be repeating itself. Since the initial North Korean

invasion across the 38th parallel into the

Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950, the

months had been filled with bitter reverses,

gallant defenses, spectacular advances,

sudden blows, and more withdrawals for

the U.N. forces.

When United States forces were ordered

to Korea in July 1950, the enemy’s advance

had forced them to withdraw to a relatively

small perimeter in the vicinity of Pusan at

the southeast tip of the Korean peninsula.

Here, as several of the United Nations other

than the United States sent in reinforcements, the beleaguered troops made a

gallant and successful stand throughout the

latter part of the grim summer of 1950.

Then, on 15 September, when General of

the Army Douglas MacArthur’s forces

made their spectacular amphibious envelopment at Inch’on, on Korea’s west

coast about halfway between the 37th and

38th parallels, the tide of war turned

abruptly in favor of the United Nations.

The South Korean capital city of Seoul was

recaptured; the troops broke out of the

Pusan perimeter. As the North Koreans

fled northward, the U.N. forces crossed the

38th parallel in hot pursuit. They scored a

series of victories until late November 1950,

when they launched an offensive directed

toward seizing the line of the Yalu River,

the boundary between North Korea and

Manchuria, and ending the conflict.

But now the tide of war changed once

again. Some Chinese Communist “volunteer” troops had appeared at the front in

October, and in late November more

“volunteer” forces, crossing over from

Manchuria, struck in strength. They halted

the U.N. advance, then forced a withdrawal.

The two principal ground commands in

Korea, the U.S. Eighth Army and the U.S.

X Corps, had been physically separated

from each other when the Chinese struck.

The Eighth Army was in the western portion of the Korean peninsula, the X Corps

in the east, with towering mountains between. Both had been operating directly

under the United Nations Command in

Tokyo, which was led by General MacArthur, who in turn received orders from

President Truman and the U.S. Joint Chiefs
4

of Staff in Washington acting as executive

agents for the United Nations Security

Council.

December 1950 was a period of withdrawal and reorganization. The Eighth

Army and attached Republic of Korea

(ROK) forces withdrew rapidly to the

south with Chinese forces in pursuit. The

X Corps, valiantly resisting the enemy in

the bitter cold of the northeastern mountains, made its way to Hungnam on the

northeast coast. From there U.N. naval

forces took it safely off in one of the greatest

sea evacuations in all history. The corps

was brought to the vicinity of Pusan for

reorganization.

Meanwhile, in mid-December, the U.N.

commanders selected a defense line for the

Eighth Army. Lying generally along the

38th parallel, it started from the flats of the

Han River delta south of the parallel, ran

northeastward along the Imjin River, then

bent eastward through steep mountains to

the Sea of Japan. By the end of 1950,

enemy forces estimated at nearly half a

million men were poised in the snowcovered mountains along the 38th parallel.

On 30 December, General MacArthur

warned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that

the Chinese Communist forces could, if they

desired to make the effort, drive the United

Nations forces out of Korea. The United

States Government, though anxious to

avoid a full-scale war in Korea, was also

determined to resist the Chinese-North

Korean aggressors. Therefore, MacArthur

was ordered to defend his positions, to retire, if forced, through a series of defense

lines as far as the old 1950 perimeter

around Pusan, to inflict as much damage

on the enemy as possible, and to maintain

his units intact. Though no one wished to

evacuate Korea, MacArthur was authorized to withdraw his troops to Japan if that

drastic measure proved necessary to avoid

severe losses. At this time, his forces for

Korean operations included the U.S.

Eighth Army with attached troops from

nine other United Nations, the Army of

the Republic of Korea, the Far East Air

Forces, and the Far East Naval Forces.

To Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who

replaced the late Gen. Walton H. Walker

as commander of the U.S. Eighth Army on

26 December, MacArthur passed on the

orders to defend positions, inflict maximum

damage on the enemy, and maintain major

units intact. Within this framework he

vested Ridgway with complete authority to

plan and execute operations in Korea and

ceased the close supervision he had formerly

exercised over the Eighth Army and the X

Corps. He assigned the X Corps to the

Eighth Army so that for the first time since

the X Corps landed at Inch’on the Eighth

Army commander controlled all U.N.

ground troops in Korea. By now fifteen of

the United Nations-the United States,

Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New

Zealand, India, South Africa, France,

Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines,

Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, and Swedenhad troops in Korea.

Ridgway commanded about 365,000

men. The largest single contingent was the

Army of the Republic of Korea, which was

under his control but not part of the Eighth

Army. The next largest was the Eighth

Army, to which certain U.S. Air Force,

U.S. Marine Corps, and several United

Nations units, including Koreans, were attached. The U.N. command estimated that

about 486,000 enemy troops, or twenty-one

Chinese and twelve North Korean divisions, were committed to the Korean front

and that reserves totaling over one million

men were stationed near the Yalu, in Manchuria, or on the way to Manchuria.
5

In establishing the defense line along the

38th parallel in late December, General

Ridgway concentrated the bulk of his

Eighth Army forces in the relatively flat

central and west sectors because it was obvious that the enemy was concentrating

strong forces above Seoul. Maj. Gen. Frank

W. Milburn’s I Corps held the left (west)

sector south of the Imjin River; on the right

(east) of the I Corps, Maj. Gen. John B.

Coulter’s IX Corps held the center.1 Because it was believed that the mountainous

land in the east could be more easily held

than the western portion of the peninsula, a

seventy-mile mountain front was first assigned to the weakened ROK II Corps and

the newly committed, inexperienced ROK

III Corps. Shortly afterward these were reinforced by the ROK I Corps with the

crack ROK Capital Division. The U.S. X

Corps, under Maj. Gen. Edward M.

Almond, was reorganizing in the vicinity

of Pusan. The 1st Marine Division, until

recently a part of the X Corps, was held in

army reserve.

At daybreak on 1 January 195 1, after a

night of incessant mortar and artillery

bombardment all along the line, enemy

soldiers struck southward through minefields and barbed wire in great force. They

attacked along the entire front but directed

their major effort against the U.S. I and IX

Corps in the west and center. Seven

Chinese Communist armies and two North

Korean corps penetrated deeply toward

Seoul and the rail and road center of

Wonju, in the central sector.’ The only

units escaping the fury of the attack were

the U.S. 25th Division and the Turkish

Brigade on the extreme left and the ROK

Capital Division on the east coast.

As the offensive gained momentum General Ridgway reluctantly ordered the U.N.

forces to pull back to a line which ran along

the south bank of the frozen Han River to

Yangp’yong, thence to the Sea of Japan

through Hong’chon and Chumunjin. This

line included a crescent-shaped bridgehead

around Seoul which was intended to delay

the enemy armies and deny them the Han

River bridges. Co-ordinating their move

with the retiring ROK forces in the east, the

I and IX Corps pulled back to the Seoul

bridgehead line. The U.S. X Corps (the 2d

and 7th Infantry Divisions) re-entered the

fight on 2 January; next day it assumed

control of three additional ROK divisions

in a new corps zone on the central front between the U.S. IX and the ROK III Corps.

U.N. forces now presented a stronger, more

solid front than they had in the tragic

month of November 1950 when the Chinese

had struck the widely separated Eighth

Army and X Corps.

With three enemy armies comprising a

total of nine divisions astride the northern

approaches to Seoul, and a division from

each of two adjacent armies in position to

exploit successes, the South Korean capital

was imminently threatened. The enemy,

evidently sure that he would not be seriously opposed, followed up successes much

faster than before. And though the Eighth

Army fought hard, it could not check the

advance.

In the belief that standing in place would

invite destruction, General Ridgway decided to withdraw instead of holding his

present line. Withdrawal offered the chance

to preserve the U.N. forces and to capitalize

on the fact that the enemy’s logistical capabilities did not match his tactical abilities. 1

 The I Corps consisted of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division,

the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Infantry Division, the

Turkish Brigade, the 29th British Infantry Brigade; the

IX Corps included the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, the ROK 6th Infantry Division, the 27th

British Commonwealth Brigade, and the Greek and Philippine Battalions. 2

 A Chinese army is equivalent in strength to a U.S. corps.
6

This weakness had been noted in China

when the Communists’ attacks against the

Nationalist forces had invariably slowed

down, then stalled after the first blow,

presumably while the attacking units were

resupplied and reinforced. The Chinese attacks against the American forces in November had followed the same pattern.

Lacking complete motorized transport, and

using pack horses, ox carts, and human

backs to bring up supply, the enemy had

outrun his supply lines and was forced to

pause above the 38th parallel before continuing the attack.

Ridgway’s decision to roll with the punch

accorded with MacArthur’s orders to maintain his nits intact and to achieve “maximum punishment, maximum delay.” U.N.

forces would damage the enemy as much as

possible while withdrawing to carefully selected defensive positions. When the attack

stalled, the U.N. troops could strike back

before the enemy’s supplies and reinforcements came up.

As the enemy intensified his attacks and

began crossing the ice of the Han River

both east and west of Seoul, it became clear

that the capital city bridgehead could not

be held. Ridgway ordered another withdrawal south to a line in the vicinity of the

37th parallel. This line ran from P’yongt’aek on the Seoul-Taejon highway east

through Ansong, northeast to Wonju, thence

in a curving, irregular fashion to the east

coast town of Samch’ok. The U.S. I and IX

Corps were first to occupy intermediate

positions in front of Suwon, about sixteen

miles south of Seoul, to cover the removal

of great stocks of supplies. Movement to the

new line began on 3 January, with bumperto-bumper columns of vehicles jamming the

roads.

With the advancing enemy hard on their

heels, the U.N. troops had no time to save

nearly 500,000 gallons of fuel and 23,000

gallons of napalm at Kimpo Airfield west

of Seoul. These were burned in a great

holocaust, as were barracks, hangars, and

other military installations.

On 4 January South Korean government

officials and the U.N. troops pulled out of

Seoul as the points of enemy columns

entered it from the north. Incendiaries set

to work, and office buildings, hotels, and

shacks burned. Smoke swirled through the

streets as civilians who had waited until the

end in the hope that the capital might be

saved stumbled along in a haze of windwhipped embers. When the civil police left,

bands of looters ranged the city. All during

the day columns of U.N. jeeps, trucks, staff

cars, and soldiers poured south over two

engineer bridges that spanned the Han.

Refugees clogged the single footbridge that

was spared them. That night huge clouds

of black smoke billowed up into the bleak

winter sky as Seoul changed hands for the

third time in a little more than six months.

Once Seoul was evacuated, its port of

Inch’on was abandoned. Port troops and

thousands of civilians were brought safely

out, their withdrawal covered by carrierbased U.S. Marine aircraft and by gunfire

from U.S., Canadian, Australian, and

Dutch warships. Docks, quays, and cranes

were destroyed, all stores that could not be

taken were burned, and the last two LST’s

were floated off the mud flats as Chinese

troops swarmed into the port area.

Endless streams of refugees from Seoul

and North Korea flooded the roads and

railways leading south. Some of the refugees

carried only small bundles, others dragged

rude carts loaded with household possessions, and still others had only the clothes

on their backs. Many died of exposure and

starvation. Families became separated, as

children wandered and their frantic par-
7

ents sought them among the milling

throngs. Crying babies were taken from the

backs of their dead mothers. Many old

people gave up hope and squatted beside

the roads waiting for death. Civil assistance authorities did their best to help, and

provided food, clothing, and shelter of a

sort for a large number, but there were too

many to care for them all and great numbers of innocent victims perished.

The shifting masses endangered military

operations. Refugees had always presented

a problem, but now the homeless wanderers

trying to reach Pusan, which was already

jammed, clogged vital highways and railroads. Finally control points were established at key road and rail junctions to

channel the people into the southwest

provinces.

At the front the U.S. I and IX Corps fell

back to their intermediate positions on the

P’yongt’aek-Samch’ok line after the supplies at Suwon had been removed and the

airfield installations were burned. Osan,

where the U.S. 24th Division had begun its

heroic delaying action almost six months

before, was abandoned. But now the

Chinese attacks in the west tapered off, the

enemy pushed light forces south of Seoul

but did not follow up in force. As the U.N.

units withdrew farther south, contact with

the enemy diminished sharply. Consequently, on 7 January, even before the I

and IX Corps had occupied their new positions, the U.S. 27th Infantry (the “Wolfhound” regiment) of the 25th Division, reinforced with field artillery, tanks, engineers, and two air force liaison parties,

pushed north from P’yongt’aek toward

Osan without finding an enemy soldier. A

IX Corps patrol went as far as Ich’on, east

of Suwon, and met only scattered enemy

detachments. Local patrols along the western front made no contact.

But the central and eastern fronts saw

heavy fighting. The North Korean II corps,

in late December, had driven through the

eastern mountains to place large numbers

of enemy soldiers behind U.N. lines, and as

the January offensive continued enemy

guerrilla activities in these sectors increased.

Obviously, these were carefully timed to

coincide with the attacks from the north.

Elusive enemy groups disrupted communications and raided military installations.

During the first days of January the situation in the U.S. X Corps area in the center

was obscure. Contact had been lost with the

ROK 5th and 8th Divisions to the X Corps’

right; the ROK 9th Division was badly disorganized, and the ROK 2d Division had

virtually disintegrated. Thus there were

only isolated pockets of South Korean

troops between the X Corps and the ROK

III Corps, and an estimated 18,000 enemy

soldiers poured into the gap. To counter this

threat General Ridgway formed a defensive

line facing east and northeast on the X

Corps’ right flank, and another to block the

enemy’s movement to the south. But the

enemy had already penetrated so deeply

and in such force that it looked as if U.N.

forces would be forced to withdraw still

farther south.

Now that Seoul had fallen, many enemy

units shifted eastward to concentrate on

driving through the rough, mountainous

land along the Hongch’on–HoengsongWonju axis. Success in this area would place

the enemy in position to attack southwestward behind the U.S. I and IX Corps.

Further, this attack threatened the railroad and highway between Hongch’on and

Pusan, the main U.N. north-south supply

route. The capture of Wonju, moreover,

would seriously limit U.N. movement in

central Korea. Thus when Hongch’on and

Hoengsong were abandoned and the U.S.
8

X Corps retired in co-ordination with the

withdrawals of the I and IX Corps to the

P’yongt’aek–Samch’ok line, the enemy

quickly followed up with strong attacks

against Wonju.

Wonju was defended by elements of the

U.S. 2d Division. This unit had suffered

severe losses when it screened the Eighth

Army withdrawal in North Korea in late

1950. Now reconstituted and strengthened

by the French and Dutch Battalions, the

“Indianheads” showed their mettle by

making a stand on high ground immediately south of Wonju and holding in the

face of repeated assaults by at least two divisions. January produced some of the worst

weather of the winter, and air support was

seriously limited. On 10 January, for example, the Far East Air Force could fly no

close-support sorties. On other days during

this period F-80 and F-84 jets skimmed the

tops of hills through snow flurries and

clouds to give what support they could.

Thus lacking complete air support, and

fighting in temperatures as low as 25 degrees below zero, the men of the 2d Division

hurled back all the enemy’s assaults and

counterattacked time and again through

knee-deep snow. But this defense was not

enough. The almost total disintegration of

the line to the 2d Division’s right forced

abandonment of Wonju. During this action

the division was commanded by Maj. Gen.

Robert B. McClure to 13 January, thereafter by Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner.

By 10 January large numbers of the

enemy had flooded through the gap to the

2d Division’s right and infiltrated the ROK

III Corps, while enemy guerrillas harried

the supply lines. To meet this threat

Ridgway ordered Maj. Gen. Oliver P.

Smith to move his 1st Marine Division from

the vicinity of Masan on the south coast

northward to prevent enemy penetration

from north of the Andong–Yongdok road

on the east and to protect the supply routes

to the ROK units.

With the central and eastern sectors seriously threatened, the west was now comparatively quiet. Patrols of the U.S. I and

IX Corps ranged north in attempts to make

contact with the enemy. Air reconnaissance

in front of the I Corps revealed a build-up

of enemy troops and supplies between

Suwon and Osan, astride the main highway

from Seoul to Taejon and Taegu. This,

coupled with police reports of large groups

of guerrillas between Taejon and Yongdong,

indicated that the enemy might soon renew

his attack along this main route to southeast

Korea. But ground sightings and contacts

in the I Corps sector were so few that it

seemed the enemy was moving at night and

avoiding roads, or that the bulk of his forces

was moving eastward.

Clearly, General Ridgway needed more

exact information about the enemy. To attempt to re-establish contact in the west,

and to force the diversion of some forces

from the X Corps sector, he planned Operation WOLFHOUND, a reconnaissance in

force in the I Corps sector. Accordingly, the

27th Infantry was again reinforced with

field artillery, tanks, and engineers and

ordered north.

The task force struck out northward in

the early morning hours of 15 January. A

battalion from the U.S. 3d Infantry Division covered its right flank, while other

units to the west delivered local covering attacks. Blown bridges and other obstacles

that the withdrawing U.N. troops had set

up were the chief impediments to the advance. As the task force moved north along

the Seoul highway toward Osan, it passed

over bare, frozen hills and through deserted

villages where an occasional solitary civilian might be seen dimly beside his ruined
9

home. Thin wisps of smoke showed the

presence of other human beings in this

barren land, but investigating patrols found

only more wretched South Koreans huddling around small fires. Not a single

enemy soldier was encountered until the

task force reached a point just south of

Osan, where it met and exchanged shots

with a small enemy detachment, which

then fled.

Advancing in two columns, the task force

converged on Suwon the next day, 16

January, and met machine gun fire about

800 yards south of the ancient city. But by

now the high command was satisfied, and

ordered the task force to withdraw about

twelve miles southward.

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,

General J. Lawton Collins, arrived in

Korea in mid-January to assay the fighting

qualities of the U.N. forces and promptly

settled the question of evacuation. “As of

now,” he announced to news correspondents, “we are going to stay and fight.” General Ridgway expressed his confidence in

his troops, avowing that the Eighth Army

could readily take care of itself in its present

situation. The Eighth Army, Collins informed Washington on 17 January, was in

good shape and constantly improving under

Ridgway’s leadership.

This optimism was confirmed by events

to the east of the I and IX Corps. On 15

January, when the WOLFHOUND force

moved north, U.N. troops south of Wonju

had begun further withdrawals to a shorter

defense line which ran roughly between

Wonch’on and Yongwol. The situation in

the central and eastern sectors, though still

serious, had improved by the third week of

the new year, and enemy pressure was

gradually decreasing. Guerrillas still harassed the rear areas, but the threat was

abating as U.N. troops contained and

hunted down enemy irregulars. The enemy

armies had suffered heavily in their efforts

to drive down the center of the peninsula.

In one action, for example, the North

Korean 2d, 9th, and 31st Divisions, while trying to encircle the U.S. 2d Division, were

estimated to have lost one thousand men

per day to U.N. infantry, armor, artillery,

and aircraft. Eighth Army headquarters

later estimated that the hostile armies had

lost 38,000 men during the first twenty-six

days in January.

Broad expanses of the Eighth Army front

had now become quiet, but quietness did

not necessarily indicate that the enemy had

given up his attempts to drive to Pusan. Air

reconnaissance revealed that he was building up reserves or supplies and bringing up

thousands of replacements to his depleted

units. It became apparent that, as the U.N.

troops developed their positions along the

P’yongt’aek–Samch’ok line, the enemy

thinned his forward elements, establishing

screening forces to maintain light contact,

and concentrated the bulk of his troops

farther north.

General Ridgway, on 20 January, issued

orders designed to exploit this situation. He

directed his subordinate commanders to

create opportunities for brief but violent

counteraction with armor, artillery, infantry, and air power with the intention of

disrupting enemy preparations for a new

offensive. He found the moment promising.

“Never have members of a military command,” he told his troops, “had a greater

challenge than we, or a finer opportunity

to show ourselves and our people at their

best—and thus be an honor to the profession of arms, and a credit to those who

bred us.”

As local patrols were still making very

little contact, the U.S. IX Corps planned a

reconnaissance in force on its front. For this
10

mission a task force was organized out of

elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, a

Regular division which fought as infantry in

World War II and in Korea. The force included the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, the

70th Tank Battalion, a battery of field

artillery, and a platoon of engineers. With

the mission of conducting aggressive operations in a triangular area bounded by the

towns of Kumnyangjang-ni, Ich’on, and

Kyongan-ni, the force struck out at 0530,

22 January, and advanced northward to a

point on the Ich’on–Kumnyangjang-ni

road about five miles east of the latter town.

There it split into two groups. One turned

to the east and traveled as far as Och’on-ni

without encountering any opposition. The

other went west for nearly a mile, came

under fire from a small enemy group which

dispersed under an air strike, and then

moved north for several thousand yards.

This element encountered no more resistance until en route back to the U.N. lines,

when it met and scattered another small

hostile band.

This reconnaissance, and Operation

WOLFHOUND, further demonstrated that the

enemy did not occupy any positions close to

the front lines of the U.S. I and IX Corps in

strength. Therefore Ridgway scheduled a

still larger operation, THUNDERBOLT, for 25

January. THUNDERBOLT was to be another

reconnaissance in force, with each U.S.

corps authorized to use one U.S. division

and one ROK regiment. Since the terrain

in the coastal sector was flatter and the road

network denser, the I Corps planned to use

five columns of infantry and armor, while

the IX Corps employed but two. The

operation was to be a methodical, coordinated advance designed to push through

the area south of the Han River and seek

out the enemy.

The two-day period preceding Operation THUNDERBOLT was unusually quiet,

even in the zones of the U.S. X and ROK

III Corps. The 1st Marine Division had the

only contact with strong enemy forces—

guerrillas to the south. Heavy snow impeded movement along the east coast, but

active patrolling by ROK elements failed

to locate any large enemy concentrations

within fifteen miles of the front. In this setting, combat reconnaissance units of the I

and IX Corps went forward on the night of

24 January to the line of departure for

Operation THUNDERBOLT. The pendulum

was swinging north again.

12

MAP 2
CHAPTER II

On the first day of THUNDERBOLT (25

January) six of the seven participating

columns proceeded against scattered resistance. Only the Turkish Brigade east of

Osan encountered stiff opposition. By nightfall elements of the U.S. 35th Infantry,

25th Division, were on the south edge of

Suwon, and in the U.S. IX Corps zone a

column reached Ich’on and took up positions north and east of the town. U.N. air

units meanwhile co-ordinated their close

support missions, armed reconnaissance,

and interdictory attacks with the fire and

movement of the advancing ground elements. General Ridgway requested U.N.

naval forces to intensify their offshore patrolling along the west coast in order to prevent any amphibious infiltration of the

army’s left flank.

The support furnished by the air forces

was most effective during this period. When

Eighth Army foot elements flushed elusive

enemy soldiers into the open, U.N. aircraft

closed in to destroy them. Air strikes softened up points of resistance almost as fast

as they developed. Most important was the

damage being inflicted upon Communist

supply lines by air power, which, according

to air intelligence estimates, kept as much

as 80 percent of the enemy’s supplies from

reaching his front lines. The enemy now

had to move not only ammunition but food

down from the north, for local rice stockpiles had been removed or destroyed by

withdrawing U.N. forces or burned during

the fighting, and he could no longer live off

the countryside.

During the rest of the month the U.S. I

and IX Corps advanced slowly as all units

proceeded cautiously and methodically,

ridge by ridge, phase line by phase line, to

clear out every enemy soldier. U.N. task

forces advanced a limited distance each

day. The tanks, “quad .50’s” (multiple

antiaircraft machine guns mounted on halftracks), and field artillery would cover a

certain number of hills with fire; and the infantry, under this cover, would sweep the

same ground clean. Each pocket of resistance was wiped out before the next coordinated advance was made. The Eighth

Army commander insisted that U.N. forces

maintain a solid front, for an attempt to advance only in roadbound columns would

surely invite the enemy to drive down the

ridgelines between roads to U.N. rear areas.

During the first days of THUNDERBOLT

the enemy launched a few small night

counterattacks, but in general fought only

outpost actions. Prisoners of war reported

that only two divisions of the Chinese Communist 50th Army occupied a front of nearly

Attack and Counterattack

25 January–28 February 1951
14

thirty miles, a strong indication that it had

a screening mission.

But by 30 January resistance had stiffened, and the enemy began launching

counterattacks in battalion strength. Hostile machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire

north and northwest of Suwon increased,

and in some sectors Chinese, armed only

with grenades and sticks of dynamite, attacked. But the enemy still fought a delaying action. The U.S. 3d Division had joined

the battle on 27 January, and as the operation continued it developed from a reconnaissance in force to a full-scale attack.

Eighth Army troops were not only finding

and destroying the enemy but were taking

ground and holding it.

Then came indications that the extended

frontage of the Chinese Communist 50th

Army was being greatly reduced. Identified

from west to east across both corps’ zones

were the 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions of

the Chinese Communist 50th Army, the

North Korean 8th Division and the 112th,

113th, and 114th Divisions of the Chinese

Communist 38th Army. U.N. air observers

warned of numerous freshly dug enemy

foxholes along the Inch’on–Yongdungp’o

highway, and on the last day of January the

U.S. I Corps advanced less than one mile,

with some units engaging in hand-to-hand

fighting. Nevertheless, U.N. armored spearheads probed aggressively toward Seoul,

their way paved by massed Eighth Army

artillery, bombing and napalm attacks, and

naval gunfire that included the 16-inch

rifles of the U.S. battleship Missouri. During

Operation THUNDERBOLT, the Eighth Army

was for the first time able to bring the full

weight of two major weapons—armor and

artillery—to bear on the Chinese enemy. In

return, the enemy increased the size and

strength of his counterattacks. Columns of

U.N. tanks and other vehicles found roads

heavily mined, and defensive mortar and

artillery fire dropped into U.N. lines with

mounting intensity.

The enemy resisted vigorously until 9

February, then abruptly gave way. Patrols

that penetrated to a point three miles east

of Inch’on reported no enemy activity.

Other patrols raced north through a heavy

snow storm, past abandoned foxholes and

frozen rice paddies, to the Han River without contact. Task forces from the U.S. 25th

Division made an 11,000-yard advance the

following day to secure Inch’on and Kimpo

Airfield without firing a shot. By nightfall

on 10 February, the U.S. I Corps closed up

to the south bank of the Han River and

U.N. troops looked across at the capital

city.

Although no massive amphibious invasion had been necessary to recapture

Inch’on, the U.N. demolitions during the

January evacuation were so complete that

the port looked as if it had suffered another such destructive operation. The city

was three-quarters destroyed. Piers were

smashed and battered; barbed wire entanglements and twisted metal blocked the

streets; buildings were blackened and deserted. At Kimpo hundreds of charred 55-

gallon gasoline drums, which withdrawing

U.N. troops had set afire, still littered the

bomb-pocked runways, and the hangars

were now but gaunt skeletons.

On the central front, meanwhile, U.N.

armored patrols reached Wonju, now deserted except for a few civilians. Since there

was little activity in the center and east at

the end of January, Ridgway ordered the

U.S. X Corps to create diversionary efforts

to the north. Elements of the corps. accordingly pushed toward Hoengsong along the

Wonju–Hoengsong road, and captured the

town on 2 February against light resistance.

But presence of the North Korean II and V

Corps in the vicinity foreshadowed stiffer
15

opposition to a farther advance northward.

The time now seemed ripe for more ambitious efforts. Ridgway instructed the X

Corps and the ROK III Corps to initiate an

attack similar to that being so successfully

carried out in the zones of the U.S. I and IX

Corps. The plan called for the ROK 5th

and 8th Divisions of the X Corps to spearhead enveloping attacks on Hongch’on in

order to disrupt the regrouping of North

Korean forces south of the town. At the

same time ROK III Corps units would advance in the central-east zone to protect the

X Corps’ right flank.

This attack, called Operation ROUNDUP,

began on 5 February, and all units moved

forward without opposition on the first day.

By nightfall on the sixth, however, the

ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were both

meeting resistance. The former, on the

right, found the going particularly difficult

northeast of Hoengsong. Moreover, ROK

III Corps units to the east could not keep

pace with the advances in the central zone,

and by 8 February strong North Korean

forces were hitting the right flank of the

U.S. X Corps. The ROK 5th Division

therefore took up blocking positions along

the exposed flank, and the ROK 3d Division was given the mission of continuing the

envelopment of Hongch’on from the east.

For several days pressure on the U.S. X

Corps increased steadily and signs pointed

to a large enemy build-up on its front. U.N.

troops encountered mine fields and boobytrapped foxholes. Although the enemy was

definitely on the defensive he began launching stronger counterattacks all along the

line. In some cases the enemy seemed to be

trying to entice U.N. troops into attacking.

Air observers reported the presence of large

enemy groups north of the boundary between IX and X Corps and of other groups

moving south and east above Hoengsong.

In addition, U.N. intelligence thought

it probable that the enemy had shifted the

bulk of his forces in the west to the westcentral zone, and the threat of a counteroffensive there became more likely as U.S.

I and IX Corps closed up to the Han River.

This threat materialized on the night of

11–12 February, when elements of the

Chinese Communist 40th and 66th Armies

and the North Korean V Corps struck violently in subzero weather against the ROK

3d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, north of Hoengsong. Signaling his attack with bugle calls,

whistles, and the beating of drums, the

enemy made immediate penetrations and

forced the ROK divisions to withdraw

rapidly. Large enemy groups moved southeast through the snow-clogged, ice-glazed

mountains in the battle zone, and air

observers reported numerous enemy road

blocks behind U.N. lines. The three ROK

divisions attempted to build a defensive line

just north of Hoengsong, but the situation

had already deteriorated to a point where

an organized defense was impossible. Only

remnants of the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions

remained. One regiment of the ROK 3d

Division north of Hoengsong was surrounded, U. N. units became disorganized

and individuals streamed southward, fighting desperately to break through the road

blocks. Hoengsong was abandoned on 13

February, as Eighth Army troops battled

their way south toward Wonju.

At nightfall on the 13th, the enemy attacked in strength at Chip’yong-ni, on the

left hinge of the U.S. X Corps zone northwest of Wonju. This tiny village, no more

than a few thatch-roofed huts clustered in a

valley surrounded by snow-covered rocky

peaks, happened to be the junction of several roads, and as such was a keystone of

the central zone. If it fell the entire Eighth

Army front might be endangered. The 23d

Infantry of the U.S. 2d Division and the

French Battalion formed a defensive perimeter on a ring of low hills immediately

around the town, and by mid-morning of
16

the 14th they were surrounded by a force

later estimated to have comprised three

Chinese Communist divisions. For three

days the stalwart U.N. troops fiercely defended the Chip’yong-ni road junction

against repeated assaults as enemy fire

poured in on them from the surrounding

mountains.

U.N. air forces dropped food and ammunition to the beleaguered men and destroyed hundreds of enemy troops with

strafing and napalm attacks. Even at night,

aircraft were able to give a measure of support by using magnesium flares to illuminate the battlefield. American and French

ground troops were fighting gallantly when

an armored task force from U.S. 5th Cavalry Regiment ran the gantlet of enemy fire

to join them. The following day when

weary American and French soldiers

climbed out of their foxholes they found

that enemy pressure had melted away.

For its extreme bravery in this action the

French Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col.

Ralph Monclar, a Foreign Legion veteran

who had given up his four-star rank of

Général de Corps d’Armée to take a battalion to

Korea, was awarded the American Distinguished Unit Citation as were also the U.S.

23d Infantry and attached troops. The defense of Chip’yong-ni proved to be the turning point in the enemy advance.

During the action at Chip’yong-ni, some

twelve miles of front had lain totally undefended between Chip’yong-ni and a

point southwest of Wonju. Two units of the

U.S. IX Corps, the ROK 6th Division and

the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, hurriedly

moved to fill the gap. Although the time lag

in getting them to their assigned sectors

could have been exploited by the enemy, he

apparently was more intent on driving on

the road junctions at Chip’yong-ni and

Wonju, and the IX Corps filled the hole

before he could act.

While U.N. soldiers were thus bitterly

defending in the central and central-west

sectors, strong North Korean forces had attacked northeast of Wonju in an attempt

presumably to recapture P’yongch’ang.

This attempt was believed to be an effort

secondary to the major thrust in the U.S. X

Corps zone, but the North Koreans soon

made a deep penetration east of Wonju and

drove to within ten kilometers of Chech’on

to expose the right flank of the X Corps

once more. General Ridgway had to muster

all his resources to contain the enemy

salient. Elements of the U.S. 7th Division

and remnants of the recently disorganized

ROK 3d and 5th Divisions hastily formed a

defensive line north of Chech’on. The situation was unstable for several days, but the

enemy’s southward surge near Chech’on

was at least temporarily arrested.

At the same time the U.S. I and IX

Corps were gradually taking all the ground

up to the Han River in their zones to the

west. Some I Corps units were in position

along the south bank west of Seoul. Here

the action was confined largely to patrolling

and duels between U.N. tanks and enemy

self-propelled guns located across the river.

Several ROK patrols attempted to slip over

to the north bank, but were driven back by

artillery and mortar fire. The South Korean

capital was reported to be bristling with

enemy troops, and it was estimated that the

Chinese Communist 50th Army, numbering

approximately 18,000 men, was in the city

itself, while the North Korean 8th and 47th

Infantry and 17th Mechanized Divisions, totaling about 19,800 men, were in the vicinity.

The enemy still retained a sizable foothold south of the Han, generally between

Seoul and Yangp’yong. Although he defended it resolutely, troops of both U.S.

corps were steadily narrowing it down. On

the night of 13–14 February, a powerful

enemy counterattack from the bridgehead
17

pushed between two U.N. units and

plunged into I Corps near areas toward

Suwon. This counterattack, probably intended to divert attention from the enemy’s

main effort in the central regions, was

quickly contained. During the next day,

U.S. troops searched out the hostile force

and, by actual count, killed 1,152 and took

353 prisoners. The remaining enemy troops

fled to the north.

Meanwhile, far to the south, guerrillas

and remnants of the North Korean II Corps

continued operations in the rear area. Although these forces were scattered throughout the entire southern Korean peninsula,

large concentrations between Andong and

Uisong posed a constant threat to the U.N.

supply routes. No truck convoy was safe

from the marauders. All attempts to destroy

the guerrilla groups by attacks from a single

direction had failed. The enemy simply fell

back and disappeared. The U.S. 1st Marine

Division, which fought them until the middle of February, soon learned the most

effective technique: first, surround the hostile bands to prevent their escape; then, attack with the support of mortars and

artillery.

Gradually the guerrillas became less

active, less eager to fight, and prone to disperse after short skirmishes. It was estimated

that U.N. counteractions had reduced the

strength of these forces to about 18,000 by

the end of February, a decline of approximately 15 percent during the first two

months of 1951.

The last two weeks of February, however,

saw the enemy strengthen his forces considerably on the fluid central front. Elements

of nine Chinese divisions had been identified in the enemy offensive in the central

zones, as well as elements of the North

Korean II and V Corps, with the North

Korean III Corps attached. In addition, one

more Chinese Communist army was known

to be immediately available.

The enemy attack at Chip’yong-ni had

followed the expected pattern. Within a

week after the initial blow the offensive had

slowed down, and the enemy thinned his

lines in the west-central area and around

Wonju. The penetration by North Korean

troops in the east-central zone had continued to move toward Chech’on, but the

momentum of the thrust abated and it degenerated into infiltration. Two factors had

apparently forced the enemy to suspend his

offensive: tremendous casualties and the

need to pause for resupply and reorganization.

When the Chinese Communists attacked

in November, they had been fresh, confident, and unhurt. By the time their midFebruary attack died down, they had been

weakened by U.N. air and ground action,

and had suffered cold, hunger, and disease.

The cold, in particular, had affected the

Chinese much more than the U.N. forces

for most of them were inadequately clothed.

Moreover, they did not have, by Western

standards, proper medical facilities. As few

towns were left standing, they could not

find buildings to protect them from the

freezing weather. When they did, U.N. aircraft wiped out the buildings along with the

enemy soldiers. Frostbite and trench foot

were taking their toll within enemy ranks

and, if prisoners of war were to be believed,

they were plagued by typhus, that age-old

scourge of armies. Fighting 260 miles south

of the Manchurian border, the Chinese

found the situation quite different from that

in November when they had had their

bases to their immediate rear.

At 0745 on 18 February, Maj. Gen.

Bryant E. Moore, who had assumed command of the U.S. IX Corps on 31 January,

reported to Ridgway that one of the regiments in the sector of the U.S. 24th Division

had found no opposition before it. The enemy’s foxholes were empty, and abandoned
18

weapons and cooking equipment lay strewn

about. Eighth Army headquarters passed

this information to the U.S. I and X Corps

with the request that combat patrols be sent

out to gain contact. The army commander

warned that any withdrawal by the enemy

might be a ruse, but findings of the patrols

confirmed the fact that enemy forces along

the entire Eighth Army central front were

beginning a general retreat. General Ridgway immediately ordered U.S. X Corps to

attack eastward to destroy the North

Koreans on its eastern flank, near Chech’on.

At the same time, he directed the IX Corps

to seize positions running from Hajin to

Yangp’yong, and thence northwest to the

intersection of the U.S. IX Corps boundary

with the Han River. These moves met very

light, scattered resistance and disclosed evidence of hasty retreat. By 19 February the

initiative all along the front had passed

from the enemy into U.N. hands.

General Ridgway was determined to give

the North Koreans and Chinese neither rest

nor opportunity to reorganize. On 21 February, he inaugurated a general advance

(Operation KILLER) by both the U.S. IX

and X Corps to deny important positions to

the enemy and to destroy as many hostile

troops as could be found. The objective was

a line which ran generally eastward from

Yangp’yong on the Han River east of Seoul

to points north of Chip’yong-ni and Hwangsong-ni, and thence eastward so as to secure

the east-west portion of the Wonju–Kangnung road between Wonju and Pangnimni. In order to include the U.S. 1st Marine

Division in KILLER, the boundary between

the two corps was shifted eastward so that

Wonju and Hoengsong fell within the IX

Corps zone. The Marine division was relieved of its antiguerrilla mission and committed near Wonju as part of the IX Corps.

During the first week of Operation

KILLER the U.N. troops advanced up to ten

miles in the Chip’yong-ni area, and by 24

February the 1st Marine Division had

seized the high ground overlooking Hoengsong. That same day General Moore, the

U.S. IX Corps commander, died of a heart

attack following a helicopter accident in

which he and his pilot crashed into the Han

River. General Smith, commander of the

U.S. 1st Marine Division, assumed temporary command of the corps pending the arrival of Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge who

took command on 5 March.

Advances in both corps zones were slow

and unspectacular, for South Korea was

just beginning to thaw. Swollen streams and

mud greatly hampered military operations.

In the X Corps zone thaws coupled with

extremely mountainous terrain made each

day’s advance a test of endurance for both

men and equipment. Heavy rains turned

frozen rice paddies into treacherous brown

slime, and men stumbled and slithered in

deep mud. At night, U.N. troops scraped

through sodden sand and muck to hack out

foxholes in the frozen ground beneath.

Though opposition in front of the U.S. IX

Corps was heavy, enemy tactics along the

entire central and central-east fronts were

much like those encountered by Operation

THUNDERBOLT a month before. Enemy

groups contested U.N. advances, but their

mission was plainly one of delay.

As U.N. troops began moving back into

the areas lately occupied by the enemy,

they found evidence of the effectiveness of

their attacks. The hills around Wonju and

Chech’on were littered with enemy dead.

Many more had been buried in shallow

graves on the bleak mountain sides. Apparently the Chinese and North Korean invaders had been even more severely mauled

than had been imagined. The Eighth Army

Psychological Warfare Branch went into

action, and shortly thereafter the Fifth Air

Force began dropping leaflets to the retreat-
19

ing enemy with the terse invitation: “Count

your men!”

In the I Corps zone the Han River became a formidable obstacle shortly after the

beginning of the thaws. Behind this obstacle

the Communist defense of Seoul and other

areas on the north bank was apparently

being conducted with a reduced number of

troops. The port of Inch’on was again in

limited use, but many weeks would pass before piers, cranes, tidal gates, and other port

installations could be fully restored. Kimpo

Airfield would not again be operational

until May.

In eight days U.N. forces had advanced

to their assigned objectives in the central

and central-east zones. Operation KILLER

was nearly completed. Its success had been

due in large measure not only to continuous

pressure against an enemy who appeared

unable to launch a major counterattack

unless granted time to organize, but also to

the strict observance of the basic tactical

doctrine of co-ordinated movement.

On 28 February, after weeks of ceaseless

hammering by U.N. forces, the Communist

foothold south of the Han River collapsed.

By 1 March the entire Eighth Army front

was relatively stable. For the first time, the

U.N. line had no gaping holes, no soft spots,

and no enemy salients threatening to tear it

in two.
20

MAP 3
21

CHAPTER III

Operation KILLER—the advance by the

IX and X Corps—had not fulfilled all of

General Ridgway’s hopes for it, for the enemy had managed to withdraw while

wretched weather was disrupting Allied

road and rail movement. But in large part

the recent losses had been recouped and the

geographical objectives were attained by

1 March. The U.N. line, situated about

halfway between the 37th and 38th parallels, swung in a concave arc from south of

the Han River in the west through

Yangp’yong and Hoengsong, then curved

gently northeast to Kangnung.

With MacArthur’s approval, Ridgway

determined to continue the offensive with a

new attack, Operation RIPPER. He planned

to attack northward in the central and

eastern zones to capture Hongch’on and

Ch’unch’on and seize a line, designated

IDAHO, just south of the 38th parallel.

RIPPER’S purpose was, again, to destroy

enemy soldiers and equipment, to keep up

pressure that would prevent the mounting

of a counteroffensive, and to split the Chinese from the North Korean forces, most of

which were posted on the eastern front. The

U.S. IX and X Corps were to advance in

the center through successive phase lines to

IDAHO while the ROK units in the east

covered the right flank with local attacks

and the I Corps in the west maintained its

positions south and east of Seoul. The drive

by the IX and X Corps would create a

bulge east of the capital city from which

U.N. forces could envelop it.

Operation RIPPER began on 7 March

when, after one of the most tremendous artillery preparations of the war, the U.S.

25th Division crossed the Han River near

its confluence with the Pukhan and established a bridgehead on the north bank.

Simultaneously, the ROK 1st Division delivered a diversionary thrust northwest of

Kimpo Airfield, and the U.S. 3d Division

demonstrated along the Han River south of

Seoul in an attempt to draw attention from

the 25th Division. At first the enemy vigorously contested the bridgehead, but after

three days of heavy fighting retired in disorder. In the central and eastern zones,

U.N. forces made substantial gains on the

first day, and thereafter moved steadily forward. Opposition to the drive took the form

of a series of small unit delaying actions, a

tactic well adapted to the rugged terrain.

Wherever the land was least favorable to

attacks, wherever roads were lacking, slopes

precipitous, and natural approaches few,

there the enemy held most stubbornly. For

the next six weeks a grinding type of warfare prevailed. Nevertheless, by 11 March

Crossing the 38th Parallel

1 March–21 April 1951
22

elements of the U.S. IX Corps had reached

the first phase line. Other units reached it

in the next two days, and the attack to the

second phase line began on the 14th.

As intended by General Ridgway, the

advance in the central and eastern zones

had threatened the enemy’s control of the

capital. To search out the positions that still

barred the way, a patrol from the ROK I

Division crossed the Han River west of

Seoul and proceeded northward for several

miles before running into enemy fire. Another patrol probed the outer defenses of

the city, found them almost deserted on the

night of 14–15 March, and U.N. troops

moved in. Thus Seoul changed hands for

the fourth time. Within a matter of hours

the Republic of Korea flag was raised over

the National Assembly Building.

Heavily blasted by U.N. and enemy

bombardment, some of its principal buildings the scenes of previous fighting, Seoul

showed both new and old scars. The Bun

Chon shopping district, untouched when

U.N. troops had withdrawn in January,

had been flattened. United States Ambassador John J. Muccio’s official residence

had taken two more direct hits. The great

brass-studded red gates of the embassy

compound were leveled and buried in

rubble. No utilities were in operation.

Streetcar and light wires dangled from

poles. Of the city’s original population of

1,500,000 only some 200,000 ragged civilians remained. By the end of March, however, a city government was once more

functioning in Seoul.

During the next week the enemy fought

only delaying actions. In the X Corps zone,

some of the worst terrain yet encountered

proved to be more of an obstacle than the

enemy. The mountainous country consisted

of high peaks and narrow valleys, and U.N.

troops were constantly either descending

sharp slopes or climbing steep heights to attack enemy positions that were sometimes

above the clouds. Each enemy position was,

in effect, a strong point which had to be approached, enveloped, and carried by assault. The early spring’s rising temperatures

were turning battlefields into quagmires.

All supplies had to be hand-carried, and

usually only the barest essentials reached

the front lines. Prompt action by air rescue

and evacuation units saved many wounded

who otherwise would have died, for it sometimes took two days to carry the wounded

out to litter jeeps. Far East Air Forces cargo

aircraft contributed by dropping food and

ammunition, and thus gave the ground

forces greater flexibility. Despite the enemy

and natural obstacles, Operation RIPPER

ground slowly forward.

About this time Ridgway ordered the

ROK I Corps in the east to complete the

destruction of remnants of the North Korean 10th Division in the Chungbong Mountains southwest of the coastal town of

Parhan-ni. This enemy division, currently

harassing the South Korean forces engaged

in Operation RIPPER, had infiltrated southward in January through the mountains

from the 38th parallel to within twenty

miles of Taegu. Relying on the countryside

for food and clothing and on captured materiel for ammunition, it had been able to

make itself the full-time concern of at least

one U.N. division plus ROK security forces.

It had suffered constant attack and heavy

losses. Because it had no medical facilities,

only the fittest survived. Yet the North Korean 10th Division managed to maintain the

form of a military organization.

As early as 13 March, what was left of

the division had made its way as far north

as the Chungbong Mountains, where the

surviving elements continued their operations. During the next few days, four ROK
23

regiments harried the North Koreans in an

effort to wipe them out. Though the 10th

Division casualties were high, many must

have survived to escape: the major activity

in the sectors of the ROK 3d and 9th Divisions, on 17 and 18 March, consisted of

fighting enemy groups that entered U.N.

areas from the rear, fought their way

through, and disappeared to the north.

With this threat eliminated, other ROK

forces in the east were able to move to Line

IDAHO by 17 March. The U.S. IX and X

Corps neared their third phase line in the

central zone and, Hongch’on having been

secured, U.S. marines advanced toward

Ch’unch’on. The enemy in this sector

fought vigorously from bunkers which were

little affected by aircraft and artillery attack. In many instances enemy soldiers had

to be dislodged by the bayonet. Since

Ch’unch’on was an enemy supply and communications center, and it seemed probable

that the city could be taken only after a

hard fight, the 187th Airborne Regimental

Combat Team (RCT) was alerted to make

a drop there on 22 March. By the 19th,

when U.N. armored patrols entered the

Ch’unch’on basin, it became apparent that

the progress of Operation RIPPER and the

withdrawal of the enemy had been so rapid

that an airdrop would not be profitable.

The project was canceled.

Once Seoul had fallen I Corps troops

took up positions on a line from Yongdungp’o through the capital’s northern

suburbs, thence northeast. Ridgway then

enlarged RIPPER to include a move by the I

Corps westward to the Imjin River, and the

corps began its attack on 22 March.

Next day the 187th Airborne RCT and

two Ranger companies parachuted from

more than 100 twin-tailed “Flying Boxcars”

onto drop zones at Munsan-ni about 20

miles northwest of Seoul. An armored task

force from the I Corps then rolled forward

through mine fields and quickly made contact with the paratroopers. But the jump,

which had been designed to block enemy

movement along the Seoul–Kaesong axis

and trap large numbers of enemy troops,

failed to achieve these results. The enemy,

here and elsewhere during Operation

RIPPER, had elected to withdraw, rolling

with the punch and trading space for time.

His prompt withdrawal made the advance

to the Imjin River rapid and very nearly

bloodless.

This advance placed Eighth Army troops

on the west flank of the enemy. The U.S. I

Corps commander quickly ordered the

187th RCT to attack due east to capture

the commanding ground behind the enemy

troops facing the U.S. 3d Division. This

move would allow the latter to attack and

hammer the enemy against the anvil

formed by the airborne regiment. But foul

weather and all but impassable roads—

supporting armored elements were forced

to return to Seoul—slowed the eastward

movement of the 187th RCT. By the time

the objective was reached the enemy had

withdrawn.

By the last days of March, as RIPPER

came to a close, Ridgway’s forces had

fought their way through rain and mud

generally to the 38th parallel. In the east

the ROK III and I Corps had pushed

patrols more than twelve miles north of the

parallel, and by 31 March South Korean

troops were in control of the roads leading

west and south from Yangyang on the east

coast. In the west, an American armored

column probed over the line north of

Uijongbu above Seoul. The enemy had

pulled back and broken contact in many

areas across the front. All U.N. forces were

in position on Line IDAHO, and all geographical objectives had been taken. But
24

the main body of the enemy had slipped

away and escaped destruction. RIPPER was

thus a qualified success.

Throughout February and March, U.N.

naval forces played an important role in

the Korean conflict. Ships from the navies

of the United States, Australia, Canada,

Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand

constantly harassed the enemy. A blockading force had initiated a continuous bombardment of Wonsan and Songjin that was

to surpass the Civil War record established

when Federal ships shelled Vicksburg for

forty-two consecutive days. Both Wonsan

and Songjin were communications centers

for the road and rail networks along the

east coast, and the blockade and bombardment were designed to keep the supply

arteries severed. By the end of March the

siege was in its forty-third day.

In addition, South Korean units raided

Wolsa Peninsula, about forty-five miles

southwest of P’yongyang, killed and

wounded a number of the garrison, and

withdrew with a bag of prisoners. Similar

raids were delivered at Inch’on, and ROK

marines hit far up the east coast in the

vicinity of Wonsan. The U.N. commanders

launched these operations for several purposes: to inflict physical damage on the enemy; to net prisoners who could furnish

valuable information; and to force the enemy to keep garrisons in areas where such

raids might be expected.

When the main enemy forces had pulled

back before RIPPER, it was to a line north of

the 38th parallel which had apparently

been built before the North Korean onslaught of June 1950. This line was probably the strongest position in enemy territory. The most stalwart portion of this line

lay in the center, where a series of fortifications, built in solid rock and reinforced by

logs and concrete, protected the road network and supply and assembly areas in the

popularly termed “Iron Triangle” bounded

by Ch’orwon, Kumhwa, and P’yonggang.

Sending U.N. troops in force across the

38th parallel was not an undertaking to be

entered into lightly. A northward advance

would lengthen their communication lines

while correspondingly shortening the enemy’s, and eventually a point would be

reached where U.N. air superiority would

be nullified. General MacArthur had reported that his forces could successfully

proceed for one hundred miles over the

parallel before they reached this point, but

in the United States and among the other

participating United Nations, it was all too

easy to remember the debacle of late 1950

after the first U.N. crossing of the parallel.

On the other hand, the enemy armies could

not be allowed to regroup and reorganize

unmolested for a counterattack which intelligence sources considered inevitable.

To complicate matters, the forthcoming

March–July rainy season would limit the

mobility of armored and mechanized forces.

The decision whether to cross the parallel

or stand pat was a vital one. President

Truman considered it a tactical decision

which should be made by the responsible

commander. The choice was made by

Ridgway. With MacArthur’s approval,

he elected to continue the advance with

the hope of achieving maximum destruction.

In making their plans, U.N. commanders were sure that the enemy was engaged

in a full-scale buildup of troops and matériel not far to the north. While U.N. tactical

advances were taking place, they gave careful consideration to the expected Chinese

Communist spring offensive. That it would

come was a foregone conclusion, and the

only elements that remained in doubt were
25

the time and the place of the attack. The

enemy was still generally on the defensive,

but there were definite offensive overtones

in his actions. He was building no new positions farther to the rear. The Chinese were

believed to have moved their XIX Army

Group (consisting of the 63d, 64th, and 65th

Armies) close to the Eighth Army’s western

front. If so, they could be expected to attack

in the west and west-central zones over

open, comparatively flat land, the only territory along the existing line where armor

could be used advantageously. That armor

would be used seemed certain, for air observers had reported the presence of the

equivalent of one armored division and possibly two armored regiments in enemy rear

areas. And on the central and central-east

fronts, additional Chinese and North Korean troops had moved to within striking.

distance of the line.

By the end of the first week in April,

U.N. intelligence officers reported that nine

Chinese Communist armies had been positively identified, and ten more tentatively

identified, together with eighteen North

Korean divisions and six brigades. The

combat efficiency of three of the armies had

doubtless been reduced by the recent offensives, but the other armies were a formidable force.

The possibility that the enemy, might use

his increasing air strength—now believed

to be a minimum of 750 aircraft of all

types—was a cause for concern. Numerous

reports and air photographs left little doubt

that the North Koreans were making airfields ready for immediate use. In some instances runways were being lengthened to

accommodate jets or bombers. In P’yongyang the enemy was readying a street to

serve as a runway by demolishing adjacent

houses. It was reasonable to assume that all

this was intended to permit use of air power

in conjunction with a ground offensive.

In the face of these potential threats, it

was better for the U.N. forces to move forward than to stand still. Thus on 5 April

Ridgway followed RIPPER with Operation

RUGGED, a general advance toward a new

objective line called KANSAS. Running

along commanding ground north of the

38th parallel, KANSAS was approximately

115 miles in length, including fourteen

miles of tidal water on the left flank and, in

the center, the ten-mile water barrier of the

Hwach’on Reservoir, which was Seoul’s

source of water and electric power. The terrain on the right flank of this line was

rough, nearly devoid of roads and therefore

difficult for both U.N. and enemy units.

But by shortening and strengthening their

line, the U.N. commanders could use the

water and terrain barriers to establish a

stronger defense in depth. They could also

make KANSAS the base for later operations

designed to seize the Iron Triangle.

By 9 April, all units in the U.S. I and IX

Corps and the ROK I Corps on the east

coast had battled their way against fluctuating enemy resistance to positions on Line

KANSAS. Although the U.S. X and ROK

III Corps, in the central and central-east

sectors, had been delayed by rugged, terrain

and hampered by the lack of adequate supply routes, they were steadily drawing up.

On the same day, 9 April, the enemy

opened several sluice gates of the dam that

controlled the water passing from the

Hwach’on Reservoir into the lower Pukhan River. The Pukhan, originating in the

mountainous country to the north, flowed

south to the reservoir and thence southwest

to its confluence with the Han River east of

Seoul. Within an hour the water level had

risen several feet; one engineer bridge was

broken, and IX Corps Engineers were

forced to swing a second one back to the
26

banks. To prevent the enemy from opening

all eighteen sluice gates and flooding the

Pukhan, a task force from the 7th Cavalry

and the 4th Ranger Company was hastily

organized and sent to seize the dam, close

the gates, and immobilize the gate-opening

machinery.

This raid failed for a variety of reasons:

lack of enough landing craft, poor visibility,

difficulty of movement over the almost

trackless terrain, and stubborn enemy resistance. But the enemy’s opening of the

Hwach’on gates, while dramatic, had less

effect on U.N. operations than originally

feared and the task force was recalled after

two days.

While the U.S. X and the ROK III

Corps drew up to the KANSAS line, the U.S.

I Corps and left-flank units of the IX Corps

continued the advance by attacking toward

Ch’orwon, the southwest corner of the Iron

Triangle, with the intention of seizing a line

designated UTAH which was in effect an

outward bulge of KANSAS. As UTAH’S

northernmost point lay just south of Ch’orwon, this move would place the U.N. forces

in position to strike at the Triangle. The

main body of the IX Corps remained in

position and patrolled, and on the east coast

the ROK I Corps advanced by column of

divisions.

Meanwhile U.N. forces continued to

edge forward, although the enemy burned

off large areas of his front to create dense

smoke screens that reduced the effectiveness

of close air support. The Hwach’on Dam

fell on 16 April, and on the east coast South

Korean forces took Taep’o-ri. Other ROK

troops north of Seoul sent patrols across the

Imjin River and far to the northwest. By 17

April the Eighth Army’s front-line units

could not make contact with the enemy and

U.S. IX Corps units not already moving

joined in the advance north from Line

KANSAS. Thereafter the general progress

toward Line UTAH was virtually unopposed. Even as the advance continued,

however, evidences of enemy preparation

for counterattack continued to be reported

to Van Fleet.

The enemy had long boasted in his press

and radio releases that his offensive would

be designed to force a military decision by

either driving the U.N. forces from Korea

or destroying them in the field. Van Fleet

foresaw different results. His army had improved during the winter campaign. U.S.

soldiers had become highly skilled in the

months since they had entered the war as

green occupation troops. Van Fleet decided

to meet the expected attack by continuing

the doctrines developed by his predecessor—those of “maximum punishment,

maximum delay . . . .” The U.N. forces

would, if compelled, buy time with space,

and conduct a co-ordinated withdrawal to

defensive positions well south of the 38th

parallel, maintain contact with the enemy

at all times, and inflict maximum losses on

him by utilizing superior U.N. fire power

from the ground and the air. When the

offensive had run its course the Eighth

Army would counterattack, cut the enemy’s

supply lines, and endeavor to destroy all

hostile troops in the forward areas.

During this period came a dramatic

change in command. On 11 April, after a

series of public utterances revealed sharp

differences over national policy and military strategy, President Truman relieved

General MacArthur of all his commands

and replaced him with General Ridgway.

Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet was dispatched

posthaste from Washington to take command of the Eighth Army and attached

forces. He arrived and assumed command

on 14 April.
27

The U.N. campaign in Korea bore a

striking resemblance to the Duke of Wellington’s campaigns against Napoleon’s

armies in Spain and Portugal. Wellington,

like U.N. commanders, was pitted against

enemy forces that were capable of receiving

steady overland reinforcements, while his

troops, like those of the Eighth Army, were

supplied chief ly by superior sea power.

Wrote the Duke, describing his war of

maneuver: “If they advance against me I

shall retire before them, accepting battle if

they give me a favorable opportunity, for

the . . . action of my lines is superior to

the shock action of their columns . . . .”

To anticipate an enemy offensive did not

mean to sit and wait for it. By 19 April, all

U.S. I and IX Corps units were in position

along Line UTAH and preparing to continue

the advance to Line WYOMING, an eastward

extension of the UTAH bulge. After consolidating their gains for two days these

corps started northward again. If this attack proved to be successful, U.N. forces

would be on the high ground overlooking

Ch’orwon at the base of the Iron Triangle.

But during the daylight hours of 22 April

enemy activity across the whole front

sharply increased, and the U.N. offensive

halted abruptly. Their lines alive with

movement, the Chinese and North Koreans

abandoned cover and concealment and

moved boldly into the open. The expected

enemy spring offensive was at hand.

SECTION 1

l–24 January 1951

31
32
33

CONGESTION ON THE HONGCH’ON–WONJU ROAD, central sector, 3 January 1951
34
35

BUILDINGS BURNING IN SEOUL as South Korean government officials and U.N. troops leave the city

for the second time, 3 January.

AMMUNITION DUMP ON FIRE AT KIMPO AIRFIELD
36

TROOP-LOADED TANKS MOVING

BABY-SAN WAITING FOR PARENTS to arrange passage out of Inch’on.
37

SOUTH after crossing the Han River.

LAST TROOPS TO LEAVE INCH’ON HARBOR boarding

an LST, 4 January.
38

RAIL BRIDGE ACROSS THE HAN RIVER is demolished by engineer troops. Both photographs were

taken on 4 January.
39

PONTON BRIDGE SPANNING THE ICY HAN is blown up after last of the U.N. forces evacuate Seoul,

4 January.
40

HORDES OF REFUGEES FLEEING FROM SEOUL clogging a dike across rice paddies, 5 January.

A SEEMINGLY ENDLESS COLUMN OF SOUTH KOREANS plodding
41

through the heavy snow south of Kangnung near the east coast.

TWO KOREAN MOTHERS pushing a cartload of their younger children.
42

2D DIVISION VEHICLES IN MOUNTAIN PASS south of Wonju, 10 January. In this sector enemy troops

flooded through the gap to the right of 2d Division positions and ROK III Corps lines.
43

SUPPLY CONVOY HELD UP by accident on icy highway. Temperatures reached 25 degrees below

zero during the fighting for Wonju, attacked by Communist forces 7 January.
44

A 25-pounder Field Gun-howitzer. Artillerymen of the 29th British Brigade prepare to support

the Turkish Brigade fighting in the west sector, 19

January. Both brigades were attached to the 25th

Division.

ROK 3d DIVISION TROOPS ADVANCING to the mountains southeast of Yongwol on the central

front, 20 January.
45

Moving Out over the frozen ground, X Corps

area. Note rocket launcher in foreground.

25TH DIVISION TROOPS MOVING UP TO OSAN, 23 January. Operation THUNDERBOLT, a reconnaissance-in-force designed to seek out the enemy, was scheduled to start on 25 January.
46

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF,

U.S. ARMY, stopping for a conference in

Japan before going to Korea, is greeted by

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG, CHIEF OF STAFF,

U.S. AIR FORCE (left), confers with Lt. Gen.

George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

ARRIVING IN JAPAN afater turning over their commands, Maj. Gen. David G. Barr (left) commanded the 7th Division and Maj. Gen. John H. Church the 24th Division.
47

GENERAL MACARTHUR VISITING NEAR THE FRONT LINES, north of Suwon, 28 January, He is

accompanied by his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, 2d from left, and Lt. Gen.

Matthew B. Ridgway, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, wearing his characteristic

grenade. Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Commanding General, 25th Division, is behind General

MacArthur.
48
49

“WESTERN JAMBOREE,” Special Services road show

playing in the 25th Division area.

SECTION 2

25 January–28 February 1951

53
54

U.N. AIRCRAFT GIVING CLOSE SUPPORT to the 1st Cavalry Division near Ich’on, 26 January.

96TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION WINDING ITS WAY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS to the 1st

Cavalry Division area, 26 January.
55

FOUR CHINESE CAPTURED BY ROK 1ST DIVISION north of Ansong.

ADVANCING WEST OF SUWON on 27 January, U.N. troops pass a small village recently vacated by

the Communist forces.
56

PREPARING B OXES O F C RATIONS T O BE

AIRDROPPED

LAST-MINUTE INSPECTION OF CARGO BEFORE

TAKING OFF

C-119 FLYING BOXCAR LOADED WITH CARGO flying
57

RECOVERING A N AIRDROPPED 55-GALLON

DRUM OF GASOLINE

over jagged mountains to a drop zone, January 1951. KOREAN LABORERS ASSEMBLING AIRDROPPED

C RATIONS
58
59

LINEMAN REPAIRING TELEPHONE LINES between Tanyang and Chech’on. Railroad is part of

South Korea’s main rail system from Pusan to Seoul.
60

MEMBERS OF THE 187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL

COMBAT TEAM firing the 75-mm. recoilless rifle,

5 February.

25TH DIVISION MEN OBSERVING WHITE PHOSPHORUS falling on enemy positions near the small

village of Ansan.
61

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY EARL D. JOHNSON (center) with General Kean (left) and

General Ridgway watching the 25th Division advance.

5TH INFANTRYMEN PATROLLING IN RUGGED TERRAIN near the Han River, 5 February.
62
63

BACK FROM CAPTIVITY. Two American and four

Australian soldiers in the 24th Division Medical

Clearing Station after reaching U.S. lines.
64
65

15TH INFANTRYMEN fighting their way to the Han

River, 13 Febr uar y.
66
67

CROSSROAD AT CHIP’YONG-NI, central Korean front.

On 13 February the 23d Regimental Combat

Team, 2d Division, and attached French Battalion

were surrounded by three Chinese Communist

divisions. For three days this U.N. force defended

the road junction against assaults by the enemy

entrenched in the surrounding mountains.
68

SUPPLIES COMING IN at the X Corps command post airstrip, Wonju, 12 February.

GREEK SOLDIERS SHARING THEIR WARMTH with an adopted Korean orphan.
69

AT CHIP’YONG-NI, 23 February. From left: General Ridgway; Maj. Gen. Charles D. Palmer,

Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division; Col. William A. Harris, Commanding Officer, 7th

Cavalry Regiment; and Col. John Daskalopoules, Commanding Officer of Greek Battalion

attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment.
70

WALKING WOUNDED HEADING FOR AID STATIONS. Canadian infantryman is helped along by a fellow countryman, left; a 2d Division casualty is supported by an Australian soldier, right.
71

ARMY NURSE OFF DUTY
72

INFANTRYMEN OF THE 27TH REGIMENT CAUTIOUSLY MOVING UP A MOUNTAIN near Kyongan-ni,

southeast of Seoul in the west sector, 17 Febr uar y.
73

MEN OF THE 17TH INFANTRY TAKING COVER BEHIND A STONE WALL, 20 February. On 18 February the 17th Regimental Combat Team, 7th Division, attacked northwest from Chech’on in the

central sector.

7TH DIVISION TROOPS TRUDGING UP HILL 675 after crossing the snow-covered valley (background). On 20 February Chuch’on-ni was secured.
74

All Hands Join in To Fight a Raging Fire, 2d

Logistical Command, Pusan, 19 February.
75
76
77

CATCHING UP ON NEWS FROM HOME, 23 February. Men are from the Belgium–Luxembourg Battalion, which arrived in Korea on

31 January.

BRINGING IN ENEMY PRISONERS, 1st Cavalry Division area, 27 February. On 21 February Operation

Killer was launched along sixty miles of central

Korean front to annihilate enemy forces and reestablish U.N. line east of Wonju.

SECTION 3

1 March-21 April 1951
80

WHITE PHOSPHORUS SHELLS FALLING ON ENEMY

POSITIONS north of the Han. The 3d Division attempted to divert enemy attention from the 25th

Division south of Seoul. Operation Ripper was

launched on 7 March to take Ch’unch’on, an

enemy supply and communications center, and

outflank Seoul.
81

M4 TANKS OF THE 89TH TANK BATTALION, 25th

Division, crossing the Han River near its confluence with the Pukhan River, 7 March.
82

COMPANY K, 32D REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM, NEARING THE TOP OF ANOTHER HILL. Smoke is

from white phosphorus shells.
83

7TH DIVISION TROOPS moving north (above) rest their weary feet during a break along the roadside (below) near P’yongch’ang, east central sector.
84
85

REMAINS OF A HANGAR AND MAINTENANCE

SHOP

SEOUL TWO DAYS AFTER IT WA S RETAKEN BY

U.N. FORCES, 17 March.
86

AFTER CROSSING THE HONGCH’ON RIVER, men of the 5th Infantry tackle another enemy-held hill,

central sector, 19 March.
87

CROSSING AN ENEMY-MADE FOOTBRIDGE. The 24th Division advanced to positions northwest of

Ch’ongp’yong-ni by 23 March.

ENEMY SOLDIERS BAGGED BY THE 5TH INFANTRY are escorted south, 24 March.
88

187TH AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM PRACTICE-JUMPING FROM C- 119’s, the twin-tailed

“Flying Boxcars.”

PREPARING T O L OAD FOR THE AIRDROP A T

MUNSAN-NI, designed to block enemy movement

along the Seoul-Kaesong axis and trap large numbers of enemy troops, 23 March.
89

LOADED “FLYING BOXCARS” heading for the drop zone.
90

187TH IN POSITION EAST OF MUNSAN-NI. After

parachuting in, the troops were ordered to

capture the commanding heights behind the

enemy troops facing the 3d Division.

3D DIVISION INFANTRYMEN CLIMBING UP THE TRAIL

to their objective near Uijongbu, 23 March. By the

end of the month the enemy had pulled back to a

line north of the 38th parallel.
91
92

TANK-INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE PATROL moving through a war-torn street in Hongch’on.
93

A BATTALION STAFF OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION observing artillery fire, central front, 17 March.
94

MEDIUM TANK M26 GRINDING ALONG A NARROW MOUNTAIN ROAD, central sector. On 23 March

the 1st Marine Division advanced to positions north and east of Ch’unch’on.
95

CONVOY CROSSING THE SOYANG RIVER. By 8 April the 7th Division put two battalions across the

Soyang River, and by 19 Apr il U.N. forces were in position along Line UTAH.
96

MARSHALING YARD O N THE MAIN RAIL LINE leading south from Wonsan undergoing a fiery

napalm bomb attack by B-26’s of the 452d Light Bomb Wing, Fifth Air Force. Both Wonsan and

Songjin were enemy communications centers for road and rail networks along the east coast of

North Korea.
97

FIVE KNOCKED-OUT ENEMY BRIDGES over the Ch’ongch’on River near Sinanju.
98
99

ROLLING OUT THE RED CARPET AT OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, for the first marines rotated home.

22 APRIL–12 NOVEMBER 1951
102

Map 4
CHAPTER IV

By the light of a full moon in the early

evening hours of 22 April, three Chinese

Communist armies attacked the U.N.

forces following four hours of artillery bombardment. The initial attack, a secondary

one, was delivered through the Kwandok

Mountains in the Yonch’on–Hwach’on

area of central Korea. By daybreak the

enemy was in motion across the whole

peninsula.

Delivering his main effort against the

U.S. I and IX Corps, the enemy attempted

a double envelopment against the west

sector to isolate Seoul, coupled with the

secondary thrust in the Yonch’on–Hwach’on

area and a push against the eastern part of

the line near Inje. Radio P’yongyang announced that the ultimate objective—destruction of the U.N. command—would be

readily accomplished. Of an estimated total

of 700,000 available troops in Korea, the

enemy commanders employed about half

in the offensive, but they used little artillery,

few tanks (contrary to U.N. expectations),

and no close air support. Their tactics—assaults by a “human sea” of massed infantry—were the same as before, and again

bugle calls and flares co-ordinated night

attacks in which small units infiltrated the

U.N. lines. When dawn came the enemy

broke contact and, using camouflage and

natural and man-made features, sought

cover and concealment against artillery fire.

The U.N. lines held firm against the first

assaults everywhere except in the central

sector held by the IX Corps, where the

ROK 6th Division was defending the center

with the U.S. 24th Division on the left and

the 1st Marine Division on the right. Here

the enemy struck the ROK division in the

Namdae River valley south of Kumhwa

and drove it back. As the division withdrew in confusion south of the UTAH line,

the enemy attempted to exploit his advantage by moving into the gap between

the 24th Division and 1st Marine Division,

which refused their exposed flanks and held

on.

With his line cracked, General Van Fleet

ordered the I and IX Corps to retire step by

step to KANSAS while the infantry, supported by artillery and aircraft, slowed the

enemy. Thus was lost the ground gained in

the recent U.N. offensives. Task forces built

around the U.S. 5th Cavalry and the 27th

Commonwealth Brigade darted into the gap

left by the ROK 6th Division, struck the advancing Chinese south of the 38th parallel,

and stopped the exploitation. On the right

the 1st Marine Division retired southward

The Enemy Strikes Back

22 April–19 May 1951
104

from the Hwach’on area to take up new

positions before Ch’unch’on. When an

enemy thrust cut the Seoul–Ch’unch’onKansong highway near Kap’yong on 26

April, Van Fleet pulled the IX Corps back

to the Hongch’on River.

Meanwhile, although the enemy did not

throw his full weight against Seoul until

after the Seoul–Kansong road was cut, the

I Corps was heavily engaged in the west.

Fording the waist-deep Imjin River about

midnight of 22 April, Chinese infantrymen

established shallow bridgeheads on the

south bank between Korangp’o-ri and Majon-ni. Other enemy troops cut south along

the Ch’orwon–Seoul highway, but the I

Corps slowed the attacking Chinese as it retired to the KANSAS line until the morning

of 23 April, when the enemy drove the

ROK 1st Division south of the KANSAS line.

This setback exposed the left flank of the 1st

Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment,

of the British 29th Brigade. During the next

few days this unit gallantly held its position

even after it was isolated and virtually overrun. Only a handful of soldiers from the

Gloucestershire battalion were able to

make their way back to the main U.N.

line.

Once the enemy had cut the Seoul–Kansong highway on 26 April, he put his weight

into a strong attack against Seoul. Next day

he outflanked Uijongbu and the U.S. 3d

Division pulled back to positions four miles

from the outskirts of Seoul while the ROK

troops withdrew down the road from Munsan-ni. Van Fleet directed the establishment of a new transpeninsular line to halt

the enemy in front of Seoul and north of the

Han.

On 29 April U.N. pilots strafed an estimated 6,000 enemy soldiers when they tried

to ferry the Han and attack down the

Kimpo Peninsula to outflank Seoul from

the west. The survivors were never able to

offer a serious threat to the peninsula’s defenders, the ROK 5th Marine Battalion.

The enemy also attempted to outflank

Seoul to the east in the V-shaped area between the Han and the Pukhan Rivers, but

the 24th and 25th Divisions checked this

maneuver and held the enemy on the north

bank of the Han in the vicinity of Kumgong’ni and Punwon-ni. On the east-central

front North Koreans attacked the ROK

units in the Yanggu–Inje area, made several

gains, and captured Inje, but by 29 April

their drive had been halted.

On this day General Van Fleet established a new line, not named and therefore

termed NO-NAME-LINE which extended

from north of Seoul to Sabangu, thence

northeast across the 38th parallel to Taepori on the east coast. Because the major

weight of the enemy’s attack had struck in

the west, Van Fleet reshuffled his units to

put more American divisions there. Assigned to the I Corps, on the left, were the

ROK 1st Division, and the U.S. 1st Cavalry

and 25th Infantry Divisions, with the U.S.

3d Division in reserve. Holding the Kimpo

Peninsula was the British 29th Brigade.

The IX Corps, on the I Corps’ right, had

the 28th Commonwealth Brigade (this

was the redesignated 27th Commonwealth

Brigade), the U.S. 24th Division, the

ROK 6th and 2d Divisions, and the U.S.

7th Division in line, with the U.S. 187th

Airborne RCT in reserve. In the center the

X Corps, consisting of the U.S. 1st Marine and 2d Infantry Divisions and the

ROK 5th and 7th Divisions, held the line,

and the ROK III and I Corps defended the

eastern sector.

Thus by the end of April the U.N. infantrymen, strongly supported by artillery and

air (U.N. airmen flew 7,420 sorties during

the last eight days of the attack), had halted
105

the enemy short of Seoul and the Han, and

held a strong, continuous defense line. The

enemy had fallen far short of his announced

intention of destroying the U.N. forces.

U.N. intelligence officers, reasoning on the

basis of information gained by air reconnaissance, concluded that he would start

another offensive soon.

While the Chinese and North Koreans

regrouped and brought supplies forward,

General Van Fleet decided to capitalize on

the lull and take the initiative. During the

first week of May regimental patrol bases

were established almost eight miles in front

of NO-NAME-LINE, and armored patrols

ranged ten to twelve miles into enemy territory to harass the enemy troops that were

withdrawing from NO-NAME-LINE. U.N.

forces cleared the Kimpo Peninsula. The

ROK 1st Division fought its way up the

Munsan-ni road. Uijongbu fell to the 1st

Cavalry Division on 6 May, and a 25th

Division task force drove northeastward up

the Seoul–Sinp’al-li highway. In the westcentral sector an armored patrol regained

control of the Seoul–Kap’yong road for the

United Nations, and on 7 May U.S. marines dug North Koreans out of camouflaged bunkers on the Wonju road and captured Ch’unch’on. A task force consisting

of the French Infantry Battalion, the U.S.

1st Ranger Company, one company of the

U.S. 9th Infantry, and the U.S. 72d Tank

Battalion probed northeast of Chaun-ni.

On the extreme right the ROK III and I

Corps also advanced northward. General

Van Fleet then planned a general offensive

based on NO-NAME-LINE designed to carry

through to KANSAS, but increasing evidence

that the enemy was preparing to resume the

offensive forced the Eighth Army commander to postpone his plan.

The signs were unmistakable. After 10

May enemy resistance to local attacks stiffened. Airbase construction was still increasing. U.N. intelligence placed enemy air

strength at 1,000 planes, with fifty new airbases being pushed to completion. Supply

columns moving southward were reported

daily, and air patrols noted heavy troop

movements north of the IX Corps.

To cripple enemy air strength before the

new offensive, the Fifth Air Force and the

1st Marine Aircraft Wing stepped up their

attacks. A good example of their efforts

came on 9 May when a total of 312

planes—F-80 Shooting Stars, F-84 Thunderjets, F-86 Sabres, F9F Panthers, F4U

Corsairs, and F-51 Mustangs—struck at

Sinuiju airbase on the south bank of the

Yalu and reported demolishing fifteen enemy jets and over 100 buildings.

During the first ten days of May, when it

looked as if the enemy would concentrate

his attack west of the Pukhan River against

Seoul, General Van Fleet had strengthened

the western portion of his line. But between

10 and 15 May, according to intelligence

reports, the Chinese had moved five armies

eastward and deployed them in front of the

Ch’unch’on–Inje area held by the U.S. X

Corps and the ROK III Corps. Because

time was short, Van Fleet decided not to

shift his forces from the west, but he alerted

the U.S. 3d Division, in I Corps reserve, to

move out on his order. The rough and

mountainous Ch’unch’on–Inje area generally favored the defender, but it would provide the attacker with some security from

air and armor.

The daylight hours of 15 May saw all the

usual signs of impending enemy attack, including an increased number of enemy

agents trying to slip through the lines. Air

patrols reported more bridge construction,

and enemy probing attacks grew more

numerous. Van Fleet’s command made

ready to stand firm.
106

By 14 May NO-NAME-LINE had been

considerably strengthened. The U.N. forces

had laid mines, registered artillery, established bands of interlocking machine gun

fire, and strung over 500 miles of barbed

wire. Interspersed among the mine fields

and barbed-wire networks were 55-gallon

drums of gasoline and napalm, ready to be

detonated electrically. General Van Fleet

resolved not to yield ground, but to hold his

line with all the weapons and power at his

disposal. As he phrased it, “We must expend steel and fire, not men. . . . I want

so many artillery holes that a man can step

from one to the other.”

After darkness fell on the night of 15–16

May, an estimated twenty-one Chinese divisions, flanked by three North Korean divisions in the west and six in the east, struck

down the center of the peninsula against

the U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Corps

in the Naep’yong-ni-No-dong area. The X

Corps held a thirty-seven-mile sector of

NO-NAME-LINE from the high ground west

of Hongch’on northeastward to Inje. The

U.S. 1st Marine Division held the left part

of the corps line on the jagged terrain overlooking Ch’unch’on plain. To the right was

the U.S. 2d Division, with the ROK 5th

and 7th Divisions on its right, and the ROK

III Corps to their right. Chinese units

crossed the Pukhan River west of Ch’unch’-

on, and on 16 May other units struck hard

against the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions.

The patrol base regiments fell back to NONAME-LINE, and by 1930 hours of 16 May

the two ROK divisions were heavily engaged along a twenty-mile front in the

vicinity of Han’gye-ri, a village ten miles

northeast of Inje. The two divisions held

their ground for a time, then fell back, disorganized and broken.

On the left (west) shoulder of the enemy

salient, the U.S. 2d Division, including the

French and Dutch Battalions, withstood

resolute enemy attacks until 18 May, and

then, together with the 1st Marine Division,

moved right to fill the gap left by the two

ROK divisions. The IX Corps extended its

front to the right to cover the area left by

the 2d Division and the marines. Van Fleet

raced the 15th RCT of the U.S. 3d Division

from Seoul to bolster the west face of the

salient, and sent the 7th and 65th Infantry

Regiments to blocking positions at the

southernmost part of the penetration. The

swarming columns of Chinese and North

Koreans soon almost surrounded the 2d Division, pushing against its front, right, and

rear. The Chinese even blocked the 2d’s

main supply route, but a co-ordinated attack by the U.S. 9th Infantry driving

northward, and the U.S. 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments attacking southward

along with their French and Dutch contingents, regained control of the route. The 2d

Division stood fast and punished the enemy

heavily. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion,

firing in support, threw 12,000 105-mm.

rounds in twenty-four hours.

It was this kind of monumental artillery

support which helped to create the so-called

ammunition shortage that later was the

subject of public debate and a Congressional investigation in the United States.

All U.N. artillery units were firing the “Van

Fleet load,” which was five times larger

than the ammunition allowance previously

in use. The Van Fleet load, together with a

shortage of motor transport and the difficulties of supply inherent in mountain warfare, was largely responsible for the muchpublicized shortage.

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commanding the X Corps, ordered the 2d Division back to a new line south of Han’gye-ri

on 18 May. The division, commanded by

Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, successfully
107

withdrew. During its defense it lost 900

men—killed, wounded, and missing—and

estimated enemy casualties at 35,000. During this period, while the Seoul sector was

relatively quiet, the divisions of the ROK

III Corps, on the X Corps right, were heavily engaged, broke, and pulled back to the

P’yongch’ang–Kangnung road. The ROK

I Corps, on the coast, withdrew from

Taep’o-ri to Kangnung.

While the battle raged on the central and

eastern fronts, the enemy struck in the western sector held by Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn’s I Corps and the IX Corps. On the

night of 17 May, an enemy force estimated

at 25,000 men struck down the Pukhan

River toward the Han, but the U.S. 25th

Division and the ROK 6th Division

stopped this drive just south of Masogu-ri in

three days of violent action. A weak attack

directed against Seoul by some four North

Korean battalions was quickly halted.

By 20 May the U.N. troops had brought

the enemy’s offensive to a standstill. The X

Corps stabilized its front. The U.S. 1st Marine Division still held its portion of NONAME-LINE, and the U.S. 2d Division, with

the 15th Infantry attached, prepared to

wrest the initiative from the Chinese and

retake its positions on NO-NAME-LINE.

Having thus stopped two major enemy offensives in as many months, and with two

more U.N. battalions about to join the

Eighth Army, General Van Fleet decided

to take the offensive again.
108

MAP 5
CHAPTER V

General Van Fleet opened his new offensive with a series of local attacks designed to

relieve enemy pressure on the U.S. X

Corps. On 18 May he ordered the U.S. I

and IX Corps, and the U.S. 1st Marine Division, the left flank element of the X Corps,

to send out strong patrols and prepare to

attack a phase line (TOPEKA) about halfway

between NO-NAME-LINE and KANSAS. The

next day, after bolstering the U.S. 3d Division by attaching to it the newly arrived

Canadian 25th Brigade, he enlarged the

goals of his offensive by directing the I, IX,

and X Corps to advance to enemy supply

and communications areas near Mansedari,

Hwach’on, and Inje. The ROK I Corps, on

the east, was to advance and conform to the

movements of the X Corps’ right flank. The

ROK III Corps, which had recently broken

under enemy attack, was deactivated. Together with part of the old ROK III Corps

front, the ROK 9th Division was given to

the X Corps, and the ROK 3d Division

and its front were given to the ROK I

Corps.

The new offensive, Van Fleet hoped,

would deny the enemy any chance to gather

himself for another counterstroke, threaten

the enemy supply route in the Hwach’on

Reservoir area, and eventually result in the

capture of the Iron Triangle. He shifted

boundaries to place the western third of the

Hwach’on Reservoir in the IX Corps zone,

leaving the remaining two thirds the responsibility of the X Corps. Once the X

Corps had taken its objectives, he hoped to

send it in an enveloping move northeastward to the coast to block the enemy while

the ROK I Corps attacked northwestward.

As he put it, “The 38th Parallel has no significance in the present tactical situation.

. . . The Eighth Army will go wherever

the situation dictates in hot pursuit of the

enemy.”

Once more, as the enemy pulled back,

the United Nations forces rolled forward

against generally light resistance. On 19

May units of the ROK 1st Division reconnoitered the Seoul highway toward Munsan-ni. Within the next few days I Corps

troops reached the Imjin River north of

Munsan-ni and entered Uijongbu and

Sinp’al-li. Elements of the IX Corps pushed

toward Kap’yong, drove the enemy across

the Hongch’on River, and moved toward

the Hwach’on Reservoir.

In the X Corps zone, while aircraft

executed a continuous series of close supThe United Nations Resume

the Advance

20 May–24 June 1951
110

port missions, the American divisions made

ready to trap or destroy the enemy soldiers

that had burst through the lines in the offensive just halted. Using tank-infantry task

forces as well as regular formations, General Almond planned to employ the U.S.

1st Marine Division, on the left, in the

Yanggu area to push the enemy back

against the Hwach’on Reservoir while to

the southeast the U.S. 3d Division struck at

the farthest point of enemy penetration. At

the same time, the 187th Airborne RCT

was to drive northeast along the Hongch’-

on–Kansong highway to cut the enemy

supply route at Inje, east of Yanggu, while

a task force composed of American and Korean infantrymen covered the right flank.

The ROK 8th and 9th Divisions were in reserve; the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions were

reorganizing.

The 1st Marine Division attacked toward

Yanggu at 0800 on 24 May, while the 187th

RCT started out for Inje. One battalion of

the airborne regiment broke loose and

crossed the Soyang River the next day to

hold a bridgehead pending the arrival of

the 23d Infantry of the U.S. 2d Division

two days later, when the 7th Marines also

reached the Soyang. Almond formed a task

force of the 187th, the U.S. 72d Tank Battalion, and other elements to drive to the

coastal town of Kansong in accordance

with Van Fleet’s orders.

Although rain, mud, and enemy resistance slowed the offensive on 27 and 28

May, and in many instances permitted the

enemy to withdraw with his supplies, the

187th had taken Inje by the 27th) the marines were making a final push toward the

Hwach’on Reservoir and Yanggu, and the

17th Infantry of the 7th Division, in the IX

Corps, had taken Hwach’on. At the end of

the month the X Corps was deployed along

the Soyang River. Its f lanking drive to

Kansong proved unnecessary, for that town

fell to the ROK Capital Division of the

ROK I Corps.

The Eighth Army had scored a significant advance which had brought it just

about back to the Kansas line. The front

now ran from Munsan-ni through Yongp’yong, Hwach’on, and Yanggu, dipped

southward sharply, and then swung north

and east to Kansong. Except in the west

where it slanted southward to take tactical

advantage of the Imjin River, the line lay

north of the 38th parallel. South Korea was

virtually cleared of the enemy.

Enemy casualties for the last half of May,

Eighth Army headquarters reported, included 17,000 counted dead and 17,000

prisoners of war. Its own casualties for the

entire month numbered 33,770. The South

Koreans had lost the most; American losses

totaled 745 dead, 4,218 wounded, 572 missing, and 6,758 nonbattle casualties, most of

which were caused by disease.

What should be done next? General Van

Fleet’s statement about the hot pursuit of

the enemy did not mean that he intended

another advance to the Yalu, for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had prescribed that the

Eighth Army was not to go beyond the general vicinity of Line KANSAS. General Ridgway, however, had authorized local advances to gain better ground. In any event,

it was clear that the U.N. forces were not

numerous enough to encircle and destroy

the enemy in large-scale maneuvers, but

would have to stabilize along a strong defensive line. In addition to KANSAS, there

were other transpeninsular lines—the

Yesong River–Wonsan line, and the

Sukch’on–Wonsan line north of the 39th

parallel—that were relatively short; but

they possessed less defensible terrain than

KANSAS, their road systems were poorer,

and to seize them would lengthen the U.N.
111

communications lines while shortening the

enemy’s Clearly, then, the best policy appeared to be to defend KANSAS, meanwhile

taking advantage of Ridgway’s authorization to conduct local advances to more

favorable ground.

On 1 June, therefore, Van Fleet directed

reserve elements of his forces to clear out

all civilians and to strengthen KANSAS by

stringing barbed wire, clearing fields of fire,

laying mines, constructing shelters with

overhead cover, establishing trail and road

blocks, and plotting artillery concentrations.

He hoped thus to make the line virtually

impregnable. Meanwhile the I and IX

Corps were to continue their advance

toward Line WYOMING, the bulge north of

KANSAS that ran from the Imjin River to

just south of Ch’orwon and Kumhwa,

thence southeast. With this order Van Fleet

lowered his sights slightly, for his earlier

plans had aimed at capturing the Iron

Triangle rather than stopping short on

WYOMING.

This advance, dubbed Operation PILEDRIVER, was carried out with comparative

ease except along the approaches to the

Iron Triangle where the enemy resisted

stoutly. Except for a range of hills, the Triangle was a low-lying area surrounded by

saw-toothed mountains. It was the terminus

of a main highway from Manchuria and

was interlaced with dirt roads and two

single-track railroads. It served the enemy

as a supply and communications area. Elements of both the I and IX Corps fought

their way toward the WYOMING line near

the Ch’orwon–Kumhwa base of the Triangle, and the enemy fought back hard

from defenses arranged in depth. As happened so often, heavy rains in the first few

days of June limited direct air support and

turned the roads into veritable quagmires.

But the Eighth Army edged forward. The

1st Cavalry Division pushed from Uijongbu

toward Ch’orwon against hard-fighting

Chinese, as sweat-soaked engineer parties

moved ahead of creeping tanks to probe for

wooden box-mines. Infantrymen of the

U.S. 3d and 25th Divisions used flame

throwers against mud and log bunkers. By

10 June, aided by drier weather that made

possible round-the-clock air support, the 3d

Division, with the ROK 9th Division and

the 10th Philippine Battalion, attacked and

gained the high ground south of Ch’orwon,

while the 25th Division and the Turkish

Brigade fought their way to within three

miles of Kumhwa. Next day at 1330

Ch’orwon fell, abandoned by the enemy;

two hours later the Turkish Brigade entered

Kumhwa, from which the enemy had also

departed.

Now firmly in control of its portion of

Line WYOMING, the I Corps sent out task

forces to pursue the enemy. On 13 June two

tank-infantry task forces, from Ch’orwon

and Kumhwa, reached P’yonggang, which

they found deserted. When they discovered

that the enemy held the dominating ground

north of the city, however, the two task

forces quickly returned. Units of the IX

Corps pushed northeast toward Kumsong

and found the enemy present in strength

and obviously establishing a defensive line.

As the Triangle was dominated by the surrounding heights, neither side attempted to

hold it in strength thereafter, although

Chinese troops struck back at the I and IX

Corps and reoccupied P’yonggang on 17

June.

On the east-central front, meanwhile, the

X Corps had pushed through mountains

toward its sector of the KANSAS line, which

extended over a series of ridges from the

Hwach’on Reservoir northeastward to the

lower lip of the “Punchbowl,” an aptly

named circular depression north of Inje.
112

Using three divisions, the ROK 7th, the

U.S. 1st Marine, and the ROK 5th (which

had relieved the U.S. 2d Division), the X

Corps ground forward against the North

Korean II and V Corps. The enemy, well

dug in on the ridge tops and amply supplied with machine guns, mortars, and

artillery, fought back hard. Marines and

South Koreans assaulted successive bunkerstudded ridges to push the enemy out, and

on 16 June elements of the 1st Marine Division reached KANSAS, while on the right of

the X Corps the ROK I Corps advanced

from Kansong toward Kosong.

Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army had

largely attained the principal terrain objectives of PILEDRIVER, although the enemy

had again managed to get away. Action for

the rest of the month, except in the Punchbowl area where the 1st Marine Division

fought a violent battle, was confined to developing the KANSAS and WYOMING lines,

and to patrolling and local fights which,

although fierce and bloody, did not materially affect the dispositions of either side.

As the first year of the Korean conflict

came to an end, the United Nations could

look back on their accomplishments with

considerable satisfaction. South Korea had

been cleared of the invading enemy, and

the U.N. forces, after receiving and delivering severe batterings, had pushed north of

the 38th parallel and successfully executed

the missions that were within their power to

accomplish. Thus, when on Sunday evening, 23 June, in New York City, Jacob

Malik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and his

country’s delegate to the United Nations,

proposed cease-fire discussions between the

participants in the Korean conflict, his proposal, while it may have been made for the

convenience of the Chinese, came at a

fortunate time for the Eighth Army.

114

MAP 6
CHAPTER VI

After Mr. Malik made his proposal, the

Peiping radio followed his lead and indicated that the rulers of Communist China

favored a truce. President Truman then

authorized General Ridgway to conduct

negotiations with the enemy generals. The

U.N. commander at once sent radio messages to his opposite numbers in the enemy

camp, and after some argument both sides

agreed to meet in Kaesong, a town near

Korea’s west coast about three miles south

of the 38th parallel and between the opposing armies’ front lines. After liaison officers

had made preliminary arrangements, the

negotiations opened on 10 July with Vice

Adm. C. Turner Joy, the Far East naval

commander, acting as chief delegate for the

United Nations. Lt. Gen. Nam Il led the

enemy delegation.

Both sides agreed that hostilities would

continue until a truce was signed, but

neither side was willing to start any largescale offensives while the peace talks were

in progress. All along the front—which now

extended from the Imjin River to Ch’orwon, paralleled the base of the Iron Triangle, swung southeast to the lower edge of

the Punchbowl, and then ran north and

east to the Sea of Japan above Kansong—

the fighting died down. U.N. troops busied

themselves improving their positions and

consolidating the ground they had just won.

Action was characterized by artillery fire

and air strikes, plus a continuing bombardment of Wonsan. Combat patrols went out

regularly; enemy attacks were repulsed.

Offensive action consisted chiefly of limited

regimental or battalion attacks designed to

seize more favorable terrain, capture prisoners, and keep the enemy from nosing too

close to the U.N. lines. With the exception

of the flare-up in the fall of 1951 that followed the breaking-off of the truce negotiations in August, this general pattern was

to prevail until just before the signing of the

truce in 1953.

Enemy policy appeared to follow the

same lines as that of the United Nations,

whose intelligence officers concluded that

the Chinese forces were being strengthened.

New Chinese units were identified northeast of the Iron Triangle, in front of the IX

Corps below Kumsong, and in the vicinity

of the Punchbowl. The enemy, like the

U.N. forces, appeared to be holding a main

line of resistance with screening units in

front rather than relying on defense by

maneuver.

Throughout the summer months there

was continuous, though local, fighting for

limited objectives, and no day passed without casualties. In general the front lines remained stable except in the Iron Triangle

and the Punchbowl. The Triangle action

Lull and Flare-up

25 June-12 November 1951
116

focused on the low Sobang Hills which the

Chinese had reoccupied after being driven

out during Van Fleet’s June offensive. On

1 July tank-infantry task forces from the

Corps tried to eject the Chinese but failed.

Repeating the attacks through Independence Day, tanks and infantry finally pushed

the enemy entirely from the area between

the Triangle’s base and P’yonggang, then

withdrew to the main U.N. line. At the

same time I Corps patrols crossed the Imjin

to harry the enemy, and the X Corps

bombed and shelled positions in the Punchbowl where North Koreans appeared to be

concentrating artillery and mortars.

Later in July Van Fleet ordered a northward advance in the X Corps zone to

shorten the line, prevent the enemy from

freely observing the KANSAS line, and force

the enemy to pull back his mortars and artillery. The specific objective was a 3,890-

foot-high mountain, designated Hill 1179

or Taeu-san, at the southwest edge of the

Punchbowl which ROK marines had unsuccessfully attacked. It was defended by

what was estimated to be a regiment (1,700

men) of North Koreans. Elements of the 2d

Division, strongly supported by aircraft and

artillery, took over and after a four-day assault secured the crest of Taeu-san.

In August the strength of all forces under

Van Fleet’s command numbered 586,769 at

their peak. This figure included, in addition

to 229,339 in the Eighth Army proper,

357,430 from the Republic of Korea, the

U.S. Marines, the Fifth Air Force, and the

seventeen other U.N. contingents. By now

the Colombian Battalion had reached Korea to join in alongside the men from the

United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France,

Great Britain, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the

Union of South Africa.

Action was focused again in the zone of

the X Corps and the ROK I Corps to the

east. Both corps, the latter supported by

gunfire from warships lying offshore, advanced their fronts to gain more favorable

terrain to the northeast and west of the

Punchbowl, and the U.N. units on the

western portion of the line sent out raiding

parties and combat patrols to divert the enemy reserves. The X Corps and ROK I

Corps offensives were carried out almost exclusively by South Koreans under American command and supported by American

units. But on the night of 27–28 August,

when a unit of the ROK 5th Division

crumpled under an enemy counterattack

delivered against a newly captured hill

mass (“Bloody Ridge”) west of the Punchbowl, the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment of the

2d Division was committed. It was unable

to retake the lost ground.

Late in August, after the truce negotiations had been suspended, Van Fleet determined to resume the offensive in order to

drive the enemy farther back from the

Hwach’on Reservoir (Seoul’s source of

water and electric power) and away from

the Ch’orwon–Seoul railroad. Success in

each of these enterprises would also

straighten and shorten the U.N. front, give

greater security to the KANSAS line, and inf lict damage on the enemy. Therefore,

when the 9th Infantry’s attack failed, the

U.N. commanders determined to put forth

a major effort in the X Corps zone, using

all five divisions in that corps to continue

the ridge-top and mountain actions in the

Punchbowl area.

The U.S. 1st Marine Division, with

ROK marine units attached, opened a

drive against the northern portion of the

Punchbowl on 31 August. Two days later

the 2d Division attacked northward against

Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges in the vicinity of the Punchbowl’s western edge and
117

Taeu-san. Both assaults, delivered uphill by

burdened, straining infantrymen, met with

initial success. By 3 September, the two divisions had reached their first objectives.

Van Fleet ordered them to continue the advance as far north as the northwesterly leg

of the Soyang River above the Punchbowl.

On 11 September the 1st Marine Division attacked again. After seven days of

heavy fighting, with the enemy resolutely

defending each ridge top from mutually

supporting positions and yielding only after

repeated counterattacks and seesaw struggles, the marines secured their objective on

18 September.1

Meanwhile the 2d Division, on Bloody

and Heartbreak Ridges west of the Punchbowl, was engaged in the fiercest action

since spring. Like the marines, the 2d Division infantrymen, often carrying 60-mm.

mortar or 75-mm. recoilless rifle rounds as

well as their own ammunition and equipment, crawled hand over hand up towering, knife-crested ridges to assault the hardfighting enemy who would yield a ridge

only in desperation, then strike back in vigorous counterattack. The same crest often

changed hands several times each day.

By 19 September the X Corps front was

stabilized except in the 2d Division’s zone.

Supplied by airdrop and by sturdy Korean

carriers with A-frames strapped to their

backs, and heavily supported by aircraft

and artillery, the 2d Division fought on bitterly. In one instance it delivered, within

the space of twenty-four hours, no less than

eleven separate assaults, all unsuccessful,

against one ridge. The battle raged into

October. Finally, on the 14th, after the enemy seemed to be willing to reopen the

truce talks, the last ridge was secured and

the 2d Division consolidated its hard-won

gains.

Along the western portion of the front,

action in September was characterized by

local attacks, counterattacks, and combat

patrols which culminated, in the eastern

portion of the Triangle, in a series of successful raids by tank-infantry task forces from

the IX Corps. Once these were accomplished, the five divisions-the ROK lst,

the 1st British Commonwealth, the U.S. 1st

Cavalry, 3d, and 25th Divisions—struck

north across a forty-mile front from the

Kaesong area to Ch’orwon to advance the

front three or four miles, establish a new

line, JAMESTOWN, and thus protect the

Ch’orwon-Seoul railroad. By 12 October

JAMESTOWN was secured. The IX Corps, to

the right, followed with aggressive patrolling toward Kumsong. By 21 October the

24th Division had seized the commanding

heights just south of Kumsong. The successful advances of August, September, and

October gave the U.N. forces possession of

commanding ground along their entire

front, and may have influenced the enemy

leaders to decide to sit down at the peace

table once again.

General Ridgway had attempted to persuade the enemy to resume negotiating on

4 October, while the 2d Division was fighting hard west of the Punchbowl. Six days

later liaison officers met again, this time at

Panmunjom, a tiny village on the Seoul

highway north of the Imjin River. Their

deliberations were interrupted by a misdirected U.N. air attack near Panmunjom

that brought from the enemy a violent protest. It was 22 October before the liaison

officers met again, and three days later the

plenipotentiaries once more resumed the

negotiations that were to continue for many

weary months. Meanwhile, for the soldier

at the front, the war went on.

1

 Several days later the marines tried the first troop lift by

helicopter in a combat zone. During September they moved

company-sized units, and in October managed to move a

whole battalion.

SECTION 4

22 April–19 May 1951

121
122

U.N. FORCES WITHDRAWING UNDER THE WEIGHT

OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE. Top, Belgian Battalion

heading south; middle, British 29th Brigade resting along the roadside; bottom, 24th Infantry

Division moving to new defensive positions.
123

Top, 65th Infantry, 3d Division, moving down a

valley road; middle, M46 Patton tank towing a

crippled mate through Uijongbu; bottom, battalion commander calling in the position of his men

near Uijongbu.
124

F-80 SHOOTING STAR BOMBING ENEMY POSITIONS south of Ch’orwon.

“LONG TOMS” OF THE 204TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION firing north of Seoul.

25TH DIVISION MEN IN THE HILLS south of Ch’orwon expecting an enemy attack, 23 April.
125

INFANTRYMAN OF 24TH REGIMENT SQUEEZING ONE OFF, west central sector.

CLEANING OUT ENEMY EMPLACEMENTS. Note

Hant’an River in background.

ESCORTING A WOUNDED 25TH DIVISION INFANTRYMAN down the hill to an aid station, 22 April.
126

F-9F PANTHERJETS RETURNING TO THE CARRIER USS PRINCETON (left center) after a bombing

mission. USS Philippine Sea is in the right background.
127

AD SKYRAIDER on the deck of the USS Princeton lowering its wings as it swings into take-off

position.

T H E HWACH ’ O N DA M UNDER ATTACK by Navy AD Skyraiders using aerial torpedoes.
128

RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS THE TAEDONG RIVER, south of Tokch’on, is blown up by Superforts of

the Far East Air Forces, May 1951.
129

MARSHALING YARD NEAR YANGYANG on east coast undergoing a bombing attack by B-26 light

bombers of the Fifth Air Force.

SECTION 5

20 May–24 June 1951
132
133

MARINE PATROL CLOSING IN ON A KOREAN HUT. Note feet of enemy casualty in the doorway. U.N.

offensive, opened on 18 May, was slowed by heavy rains, mud, and stiff enemy resistance.

17TH INFANTRY, 7TH DIVISION, TAKING TIME OUT

along a road near Chungbangdae-ni, south of the

Hongch’on River, 22 May.
134

HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE. From left, Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX

Corps; Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Commanding General, 24th Division; Lt. Gen. James

A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army; and General Ridgway.
135

31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT, 7TH DIVISION, on a hill near Ch’unch’on, 24 May. Note 57-mm. recoilless rifles in photograph above. A casualty (opposite page, bottom) receives emergency first

aid. On the 25th, elements of the 7th Division moved north of Ch’unch’on.
136

SUPPLIES FOR THE 187TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM dropping near Umyang-ni, south of Inje.

AIRDROPPED SUPPLIES NEAR THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE south of Inje. On 27 May, the 187th drove

into Inje.
137

MOVING OUT UNDER ENEMY FIRE, 26 May.

ROK 8TH DIVISION MEN ON THEIR WAY FORWARD passing combat-worn troops resting on their

way to the rear.
138

ROK 16TH REGIMENT ADVANCING to positions held by 7th Infantry.

EVACUATING 2D DIVISION CASUALTIES across the Soyang River.
139

M4 TANKS OF 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION fording the Imjin River,

ENEMY-MADE FOOTBRIDGE used by 7th Infantry, 3d Division, in withdrawing from the front lines.
140

CHINESE PRISONERS captured north of the Imjin River by 1st Cavalry Division.

PUERTO RICAN INFANTRYMEN, 65th Infantry, 3d Division, in an enemy-made trench, 1 June.
141

COMPANY I, 5TH CAVALRY REGIMENT, moving across rice fields before starting the climb up Hill

513, north of Tokchong, 1 June.
142

F-80 SHOOTING STAR on a strafing mission north of Inje, 1 June.

OBSERVATION P LANE S EARCHING THE R UGGED

PEAKS for information on enemy positions to relay

to ground troops.
143

ENGINEERS PROBING FOR ENEMY MINES ahead of a creeping tank south of Ch’orwon, 10 June.

MEDIUM TANK M4A3 FIRING at enemy positions in

the hills north of Inje, 4 June.
144

MINE EXPLOSION CASUALTY AWAITING EVACUATION BY HELICOPTER. Above, medical corpsmen

administer plasma to one of five marines wounded in the explosion. Right page: top, a Sikorsky

helicopter approaches a marker placed as a landing guide; bottom, marines hold down the

helicopter after it lands on the windy slope.
145
146

HAULING IN A “PIG” aboard the mine sweeper USS Mocking Bird. This device, properly termed a

paravane, is used in minesweeping operations.
147

U.S. NAVY HOSPITAL SHIP Haven docked at Pusan. Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden

also furnished special medical elements for the U.N. effort in Korea.
148

USS NEW JERSEY FIRING OFF THE EAST COAST

OF KOREA. Below is a close-up of the 16-inch guns

aboard the ship. Enemy-held east coast is barely

visible in background.
149

“MEN FROM MARS” FIRING ROCKETS AT ENEMY-HELD WONSAN. The men are wearing one-piece

suits, with hood and gloves, made of plastic-coated glass fabric designed to give head-to-toe protection against back blasts of fuming acids.
150

MARINES PUSHING FORWARD. By 9 June the 1st Marine Division had advanced north of Yanggu,

east central front.

RECOILLESS RIFLE CREW, 7th Cavalry Regiment, firing near Ch’orwon.
151

TRYING TO WARD OFF THE DEAFENING BLAST OF a 75-mm. Recoilless Rifle.
152

DIRECT HIT ON AN ENEMY WAREHOUSE IN WONSAN
153

B-26 INVADER OVER A TARGET IN NORTH KOREA

NAPALM BOMB ATTACK ON AN ENEMY INDUSTRIAL CENTER

SECTION 6

25 June–12 November 1951

157
158

RIFLEMEN OF THE 7TH INFANTRY, 3D DIVISION,

MOVING OU T T O ATTACK HILL 17, south of

P’yonggang in the Iron Triangle, 3 July.
159
160

UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION AT KAESONG. From left: Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie, USAF;

Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commanding General, ROK I Corps; Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, Far

East Naval Commander (acting as chief delegate for the U.N.); Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes,

Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Eighth Army; and Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, U.S.N.
161

CONFERENCE SITE IN KAESONG. Photograph was taken 10 July 1951, the day negotiations opened.

ENEMY DELEGATION AT CONFERENCE SITE. From left: Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang and Lt. Gen. Teng

Hua, Chinese Army; Lt. Gen. Nam Il, chief delegate for the Communists; Maj. Gen. Lee Sang

Cho and Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, North Korean Army.
162

SIGNAL CORPS MEN REPAIRING COMMUNICATIONS LINES in a mountain pass south of Hwach’on.
163

F-86 SABREJETS READY TO TAKE OFF FOR “MIG ALLEY,” an area in North Korea where Russianbuilt MIG-15 jets were frequently encountered.

ARRIVING AT X CORPS HEADQUARTERS FOR A LIAISON VISIT, July 1951. Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull

(left), Commandant of the National War College, and Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward (center), Chief

of Military History, talk with Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, Commanding General, U.S. X Corps.
164

GENERAL BYERS VISITING A COMMAND POST in the 2d Division area.

ENGINEERS REPAIRING ROAD DAMAGE caused by heavy rain near Inje, 21 July.
165

TRUCKS HEADING FOR INJE along newly repaired road, 1 August.
166

STRETCHER-BEARERS ACCOMPANYING TROOPS UP HILL 1179, southwest edge of the Punchbowl.
167

WALKING WOUNDED FROM 38TH INFANTRY going

down Hill 1179 to an aid station. On 30 July elements of the 2d Division seized Taeu-san (Hill

1179).

ENEMY SOLDIERS CAPTURED IN THE PUNCHBOWL

AREA are searched at command post of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, ROK 8th Division.
168
169

ORPHANED KOREAN CHILDREN received money, clothing, food, and toys contributed by thousands

of Americans.
170

LST LOADED WITH BOXCARS moving into Pusan harbor, August 1951.

KOREAN LABORER CARRYING EMPTY SHELL CONTAINERS on an A-frame. Because of poor roads and

hilly terrain, the A-frame, an ancient native

wooden pack carrier, became indispensable for

supplying many forward units.
171

CRANE UNLOADING A BOXCAR AT PUSAN
172

F-84 THUNDERJETS, securely anchored aboard a carrier, en route to Japan for action over Korea.
173

GIANT CRANE loading a mobile crane onto a barge for shipment to Korea.
174

PONTON BRIDGE IN 3D DIVISION SECTOR washed several hundred yards downstream by flash

floods. During August heavy torrential rains bogged down lines of communication to the front.

MEN OF THE 23D INFANTRY trying to save equipment in the swollen Soyang River.
175

AID STATION housed in bunkers along the side of a mountain.

OBSERVATION POST, 36TH REGIMENT, ROK 10TH DIVISION, 20 August. One week later the 36th

Regiment abandoned its positions, returning to Worun-ni, south of Hill 1179.
176

KOREAN LABORERS helping to carry 75-mm. recoilless rifles up to 2d Division troops.

WEARY SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

moving to new positions near Yanggu. In late

August the 9th Infantry fought at Bloody Ridge,

west of the Punchbowl.
177

GUN CREW OF BATTERY C, 204TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION, firing a 155-mm. self-propelled

gun at enemy positions north of Yonch’on.
178

CLOUDS OF SMOKE FROM PRECISION BOMBING of enemy marshaling yards after a surprise attack

by thirty-five B-29 Superforts, 25 August. The yards are at Rashin, seventeen miles south of the

USSR boundary on the northeast coast of Korea.
179

HELICOPTER LANDING ON FLIGHT DECK of the USS Boxer after an air-sea rescue mission.

REFUELING IN SEA OF JAPAN. A Navy tanker (center) is servicing a destroyer (left) and a cruiser

(right).
180

UP THE STEEP SLOPE OF HILL 940 trudges Company F, 9th Infantry.
181
182

NEAR THE CREST OF BLOODY RIDGE. This position changed hands several times during September.

RIFLE TEAM FIRING AT AN ENEMY POSITION

with a 57-mm. recoilless rif le.

QUAD .50’s giving support to the 9th Infantry

fighting for Bloody Ridge.
183

HILL 983, crest of Bloody Ridge.
184

FIRING AN 81-MM. MORTAR at enemy positions on Hill 931, 13 September.
185

FRENCH TROOPS USING PACK ANIMALS to carry supplies.
186

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL TEAM of the 23d Infantry within view of Hill 931, crest of Heartbreak Ridge in background.
187

COMPANY E, 23D INFANTRY, ON ITS WAY TO HILL

931 to relieve Company C, which had been fighting on the ridge for nine days. One of the men rests

near an enemy casualty, below.
188

FRENCH BATTALION TROOPS ATTACHED TO 2D DIVISION occupying Hill 931, 23 September.
189

CASUALTIES OF FIGHT FOR HILL 931 receiving medical attention at an aid station in 2d Division area.
190

M4 TANKS firing in support of the 2d Division, north of Pia-ri near Hill 1179, 18 September.

105-MM. HOWITZER MOUNTED ON GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE M7 firing in support of the 1st Marine

Division, 22 September.
191

PLOWING THROUGH MUD NEAR KUMSONG, 21 September. Leading vehicle is a multiple-gun

motor carriage M16, better known as Quad .50’s.
192

ENEMY CASUALTY NEAR BUNKER overrun by 7th Marine Regiment. Note trees sheared off by

artillery fire.

GU N CREW L OADING A CAMOUFLAGED 105M M.

HOWITZER used in support of the 7th Marine

Regiment.
193

SIKORSKY HELICOPTER HOVERING OVER HILL 884 with supplies, 20 September. During September the marines moved company-sized units by helicopter; in October they moved units the size

of a battalion.
194

POSITIONS ON THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE occupied by the Colombian Battalion, attached to

the 24th Division, near Chup’a-ri overlooking the Kumsong Valley.
195

SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE ROK 21ST REGIMENT in a cove near the Hwach’on

Reservoir.

BRIDGE OVER UNDERCUT ON ROAD BETWEEN INJE AND YANGGU, Engineers removed bridge after

filling the undercut area to road level.
196

GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at 7th Division

headquarters area. From the left: Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, Commanding General, IX Corps;

General Bradley; Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division; Maj.

Gen. Frank F. Everest, Commanding General, 5th Air Force (shaking hands with General

Bradley).
197

GENERAL RIDGWAY, Commander in Chief,

United Nations Command (left), with Maj.

Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, Commanding

General, 7th Infantry Division, 2 October

1951.

MA J. GE N . CLOVIS E. BYERS (left, foreground), Commanding General, U.S. X

Corps, with Brig. Gen. Min Ki Sik, Commanding General, ROK 5th Division, on the

way to a training demonstration.
198

LOADING A DUKW FROM A VICTORY SHIP, Inch’on harbor, 3 November. The DUKW will transfer its cargo directly to railroad cars.
199

CARGO NET FILLED WITH TURKEYS for Thanksgiving Day dinner.

KOREAN WORKERS LOADING GONDOLAS with artillery ammunition for the front.
200

USS NEW JERSEY along the North Korean coast

firing all nine of her 16-inch guns, November 1951.
201

12 NOVEMBER 1951–30 JUNE 1952

CHAPTER VII

As the year 1951 drew to a close the

character of the conflict returned to that of

July and early August. Fighting tapered off

into a monotonous routine of patrol clashes,

raids, and bitter small-unit struggles for key

outpost positions. By the end of the year a

lull had settled over the battlefield with the

opposing sides deployed along defense lines

that spanned the breadth of the peninsula.

Not until the early summer of 1953 was the

fighting resumed on a larger scale, and then

only briefly.

The lull resulted from General Ridgway’s decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea. Two factors influenced

his decision: the cost of further major assaults on the enemy’s defenses would be

more than the results would justify; and the

possibility that peace might come out of the

recently reopened armistice talks ruled out

the mounting of any costly large-scale offensive by either side. His orders to Van

Fleet, therefore, issued on 12 November

1951, were to cease offensive operations and

begin an active defense of the Eighth

Army’s front. Attacks were to be limited to

those necessary for strengthening the main

line of resistance and for establishing an

outpost line 3,000-5,000 yards forward of

the main positions.

The line to be defended was manned by

three American and one South Korean

corps and extended from the Yellow Sea in

a great arc eastward for 155 miles to the

shores of the Sea of Japan. Defending the

army’s left wing, the U.S. I Corps, now

commanded by Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel,

occupied the sector originating at the confluence of the Imjin and Han Rivers and

extending northeast to a point midway between Ch’orwon and Kumhwa. On the

U.S. I Corps right flank the defenses of

Maj. Gen. Willard G. Wyman’s U.S. IX

Corps began, bulging northward toward

Kumsong and east to the Pukhan River,

which formed the corps’ right boundary.

East of the Pukhan the U.S. X Corps,

under Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers from 15

July to 5 December and thereafter under

Maj. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, extended

its lines eastward over the mountainous

spine of the peninsula to the Nam River,

to meet the left boundary of the ROK I

Corps. This latter corps, commanded by

the ROK Army’s Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup,

defended the Eighth Army’s right wing; its

zone extended due north along the Korean

east coast from the Nam River to Kosong.

Action on the Eighth Army front during

the last two months of the year was limited

mostly to patrol clashes and repelling light

enemy attacks. Blanketed by U.N. harassStalemate

12 November 1951–30 June 1952
206

ing artillery fire, the enemy moved only at

night, and his own artillery was restricted

by the liberal use of U.N. counterbattery

fire. In the U.S. I Corps sector the ROK 1st

Division mounted a series of tank-infantry

raids against enemy positions in the area

south of Panmunjom, but after 16 December these small-scale actions gave way once

more to patrolling.

The third week of December saw a series

of changes on both sides. The U.S. 45th Division, the first National Guard division to

fight in Korea, arrived from Japan and replaced the 1st Cavalry Division north of

Seoul in the I Corps sector. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to Japan for a wellearned rest. Following up this change the

U.S. 2d Division, which had been in IX

Corps reserve, relieved the U.S. 25th Division on the line.

On the enemy side, Eighth Army intelligence reported, the North Korean I Corps

had moved from its positions on the western

sector of the enemy battle front to reserve

positions in the eastern sector. As a result

the Chinese now defended the entire western and central parts of the enemy line.

This concentration of the North Korean

forces in the rugged eastern sector, where

there was little likelihood of a major U.N.

thrust, indicated that the North Korean

Army might be suffering from a manpower

shortage.

The air conflict over Korea continued at

a slower pace as snow, fog, and heavy cloud

cover reduced visibility, but sorties averaged

700 daily. Enemy pilots seemed reluctant

to close with American Sabres. Either their

losses had begun to tell, or a new group was

being pushed through a jet training cycle

and the enemy flyers were not ready to do

battle with the Sabres. U.N. bombers and

fighter-bombers continued their interdiction campaign, Operation STRANGLE,

against railroad tracks, bridges, and highway traffic.

At sea, naval units of nine nations tightened their blockade around the coast line of

North Korea. Naval planes from the fast

U.S. carriers Antietam and Valley Forge

bombed the rail systems around Yonghung,

blasted bridges, and blew up boxcars. A

landing ship, equipped with 5-inch rockets,

joined in the bombardment of the northeast

port city of Songjin. Two thousand rockets

fell on the harbor area to destroy a large

supply point, shunting yards, and bridges

while coastal roadways were raked with

shell fragments. United States destroyers

continued to bombard Wonsan while the

cruiser Saint Paul, supporting the ROK I

Corps at the eastern extremity of the front,

fired on targets of opportunity. Off the west

coast, south and west of Chinnamp’o, the

British light cruiser Belfast, the U.S. destroyer Eversole, and the British frigates

Mounts Bay and White Sand Bay scored direct

hits on three enemy gun emplacements and

blew up a small arms supply depot.

On the ground, patrols from both sides

were out in force. As expected, the enemy

jumped off in a series of small-scale attacks

during Christmas week. The initial thrust,

delivered by about a battalion, came in the

X Corps sector deep in the eastern mountains. Covered by 82-mm. mortar and artillery fire, the enemy captured an outpost of

the ROK 3d Division. Two counterattacks

failed, but on 28 December a battalion of

the ROK 3d restored the outpost position

and enemy attacks stopped. That afternoon

action. erupted on the far left flank of the

otherwise quiet front. A Chinese battalion,

its members wearing white parkas in the

snow-covered terrain, lashed out at a company-held outpost of the ROK 1st Division

that served as a patrol base for the division.

A forty-minute pitched battle ensued in
207

bitter, subzero weather before the ROK

company fell back. Two days later, tanksupported elements of the ROK 1st won

back 900 yards of the ground the company

had lost but failed to recapture the outpost

itself. The high ground was secured by the

last day of the year in spite of bad weather

and heavy enemy resistance that cut short

the attack.

Although the decision by General Ridgway to discontinue offensive operations

changed the Eighth Army’s mission to one

of defense, he had not implied that all

action should cease. His order did not preclude raids, attritional warfare, or local

limited offensives under favorable conditions. Therefore in December 1951, Van

Fleet directed his corps commanders to

make their attacks against enemy positions

as costly to the foe as possible. Later, at a

meeting with the corps commanders, he directed them to begin attacking with artillery and air strikes to impress the Chinese

and North Koreans with the tremendous

fire power of the Eighth Army. As the new

year began, the Eighth Army made ready

to carry out these instructions.

The 155-mile front remained generally

quiet in the opening days of 1952, although

patrols were regularly dispatched to gain

prisoners and information. The most significant activity during the first month of the

year occurred in the western extremity of

the I Corps line. When light counterblows

had failed to dislodge the Chinese from a

ROK 1st Division outpost, the division

opened a co-ordinated attack on the height

on 3 January. After a five-day struggle, the

infantry succeeded in seizing and securing

the hill and adjacent positions. The Chinese

lost heavily in this action, suffering an estimated 4,000 casualties and the destruction

of a considerable amount of precious equipment and supplies.

In January 1952 the Eighth Army

opened a month-long artillery-air campaign against enemy positions. The artillery

units of the four corps fired on remunerative targets, and on alternate days U.N.

aircraft struck at others with high explosives

and fire bombs. Thousands of rounds of artillery shells and bombs fell on the targets

during the month. No doubt this artilleryair attack discouraged enemy offensive

action, but the strength of the enemy’s positions and his skill in camouflage minimized

its effect.

The superiority of U.N. air and artillery

fire forced the Chinese and North Koreans

to dig in deeply. Simple emplacements became dirt and log fortifications with overhead cover that varied from four to fifteen

feet in thickness. It was common practice to

place primary defense positions on the forward slope of a hill and dig personnel shelters, artillery emplacements, command

posts, and supply points, all well-camouflaged, on the reverse slope. Tunnels or

covered trenches connected the fighting

positions with the shelters. Thus enemy

troops could move to the shelters when attacked by aircraft or artillery, then return

to their positions when the fire lifted. All

positions afforded cover from high-angle

fire and provided good fields of fire.

U.N. artillery and the infantry’s recoilless weapons, employing direct fire, neutralized many of the positions on the forward slopes of hills but were less effective

against enemy fortifications on the reverse

slopes. Many times the shells would fall into

the valley below rather than on the target.

The aerial fire bomb was no more effective.

Only a direct hit from a 500- or 1,000-

pound bomb would destroy these emplacements.

Sporadic, light ground action continued

to mark the fighting during the remainder
208

of January and February of 1952. Patrols

went out daily to feel out the enemy, capture prisoners, and locate enemy positions.

The newly arrived 45th Division carried

out a number of tank-infantry raids near

the end of January to destroy enemy positions and seize prisoners. Various ruses

aimed at luring the enemy out of his positions met with little or no success.

While the spring rains and mists that

cloaked Korea in March and April limited

air and ground operations, Van Fleet shifted

his units along the front to give the South

Korean Army a greater share of responsibility for defending the battle line and to

concentrate American fire power in the

vulnerable western sector.

By 1 May the 1st Marine Division had

moved from the Punchbowl area in the

U.S. X Corps zone to replace the ROK 1st

Division in General O’Daniel’s I Corps.

Here the marines’ amphibious training and

equipment could be utilized to conduct

small raids across the Imjin River. The

ROK 1st Division, after nine weeks training, replaced the U.S. 3d Division in the

corps’ right center sector. General O’Daniel

now had the 1st Marine Division on the left

wing, the 1st British Commonwealth and

the ROK 1st in the center, and the 45th on

the right.

General Van Fleet made more extensive

changes on the central front. He erased the

U.S. I Corps–U.S. IX Corps boundary and

redrew it farther west. At the same time he

also had the right boundary of the latter

corps moved west. With this shift General

Wyman’s IX Corps, by 1 May, consisted of

the ROK 9th Division on the left, the U.S.

7th Division in the center, and the U.S.

40th Division on the right. The 40th, the

second National Guard division to fight in

Korea, arrived in late January 1952. Assigned to the IX Corps, it relieved the U.S.

24th Division, which returned to Japan. On

the IX Corps’ right flank, into the gap

created by the shift in boundary, Van Fleet

moved the reactivated ROK II Corps. The

new corps’ battle front, defended on the left

by the ROK 6th Division, in the center by

the ROK Capital, and on the right by the

ROK 3rd, extended eastward from Kumsong to the X Corps boundary.

Only two changes occurred on the east

central and eastern fronts. In General

Palmer’s X Corps, the ROK 8th replaced

the 1st Marine Division. General Palmer’s

sector now had the ROK 7th Division on

the left wing, the U.S. 25th in the center,

and the ROK 8th on the right wing. On

the eastern front, the ROK 11th Division

moved up from its training area and took

over defense of the left half of the ROK I

Corps zone, while the ROK 5th assumed

responsibility for the right sector on the Sea

of Japan.

Ground action had continued to be limited to patrols in March and April, but the

enemy became bolder in May. He increased

his probing attacks and patrols, intensified

his artillery fire, and aggressively intercepted U.N. patrols. The increased enemy

activity was most pronounced in the U.S. I

Corps sector, where the Chinese executed

thirty probing attacks, all unsuccessful, during May against the ROK 1st Division. But

Chinese thrusts in the 45th Division sector

overshadowed all other action across the

entire front. When the Chinese made three

raids against the 45th, the U.S. division

countered by sending nine tanks of the

245th Tank Battalion and a ROK infantry

unit to raid the town of Agok, eight miles

west of Ch’orwon, on 25 May. That night

the Chinese launched an unsuccessful attack against one of the division’s patrol

bases. Three nights later two Chinese companies intercepted a patrol from the 279th
209

Infantry Regiment, on the division’s right.

Cut off, the patrol engaged the enemy with

small arms and automatic weapons fire and

radioed for assistance. Although the

Chinese fired nearly three hundred mortar

and artillery rounds on the main line of resistance, a relief platoon started out immediately and reached the besieged patrol

three hours later. When aircraft illuminated the battle area with flares, the

enemy’s fire lessened. Finding the patrol

reinforced and the battlefield light as day,

the Chinese broke off the engagement and

withdrew.

The enemy’s increased aggressiveness

was greatly aided by his growing strength

in artillery. In July 1951 the enemy had

fired an estimated 8,000 artillery and mortar rounds, but in May 1952 an estimated

total of 102,000 rounds fell on the Eighth

Army’s positions. Furthermore, the firing

was more effective. The Chinese and North

Koreans showed ability to mass eight to ten

guns on a target, and to place counterbattery fire accurately. They fired widely

spaced alternating guns and moved their

artillery pieces frequently. In May the

Chinese also moved artillery forward to

within 2,000–6,000 yards of the Eighth

Army’s defenses.

As a result of increased Chinese ground

activity at the hinge of the Eighth Army’s

line west of Ch’orwon, Maj. Gen. David L.

Ruffner, the 45th Division commander,

planned an operation to establish eleven

patrol bases across his division’s front. If his

plan succeeded these bases would screen

the division’s main line of resistance more

adequately by denying the enemy their use.

This operation, known as Operation

COUNTER, began on 6 June when the two

front-line regiments of the division launched

a series of attacks to occupy the eleven objectives. By 7 June all but one objective had

fallen to the assault units of the division.

The enemy followed up with a series of

counterblows during the next five days, but

these were successfully repulsed.

Seven days later, 13 June, the 45th Division opened Phase II of COUNTER to seize

the last objective, a hill which the 45th had

abandoned in March. It lay at the southern

tip of a T-shaped ridge line eight miles west

and slightly north of Ch’orwon. The struggle

for the height began with an air strike and

a preparatory artillery bombardment. The

2d Battalion of the 180th Infantry then

crossed the line of departure and engaged

the Chinese at close quarters. American infantry repulsed four company-size Chinese

counterattacks. Next day the regiment’s 3d

Battalion relieved the 2d and secured the

objective. U.N. aircraft flew fifty-eight

close-support missions during the first eighteen hours, and U.N. guns fired 43,600

rounds during the forty-eight-hour battle.

At noon on 14 June, Phase II of Plan

COUNTER ended with the new chain of

patrol bases one half to two miles in front of

the main line of resistance secure in the

division’s hands.

The Chinese immediately launched

counterattacks along the entire front of the

45th Division. They first expended about

two battalions in futile efforts to retake Hill

191. Then, on the night of 20–2 1 June, they

opened a regimental assault, supported by

5,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire,

against Hill 255, southwest of Hill 191.

When this failed they struck at outpost positions on the western anchor of the division’s

outpost line, climaxing their efforts on the

night of 28–29 June with an unsuccessful

attack that lasted four and a half hours.

Throughout June the 45th sustained 1,004

casualties, but the Chinese lost an estimated

5,000 men, including thirty captured.

Patrol clashes and light probing attacks
210

by the enemy marked the action elsewhere

on the front during May and June. Strong

positions and the mountainous terrain acted

as deterrents to any large-scale action on

the central and eastern fronts.

If ground action waned during the first

half of 1952, so did air action. Enemy jet

pilots had flown 3,700 sorties in January

1952 but only 308 in June. Even though the

Chinese and North Koreans put fewer and

fewer operational aircraft into the air, they

continued to expand their air potential.

U.N. intelligence estimated that they had a

total of 1,000 planes, including 400 jets, in

Manchuria and China during May 1951,

but twelve months later they were reported

as possessing 1,800 planes, including 1,000

jets, in the same areas. The enemy also

tightened his night air defenses. Over a

dozen of his cannon- and rocket-firing jets

attacked ten B-29’s on the night of 10–11

June as the U.N. aircraft were carrying out

a bombing raid on the Kwaksan railroad

bridge south of the Yalu River. Assisted by

radar-controlled searchlights, the jets shot

down one bomber and caused a second to

make a forced landing.

Throughout the first half of 1952, then,

the U.N. forces waged a war of containment. U.N. infantry units parried enemy

thrusts and launched attacks of their own,

while naval units blockaded the coasts of

North Korea and established an anti-invasion patrol to protect ROK partisans holding offshore islands. Sabrejets successfully

limited hostile aircraft to the area north of

the Ch’ongch’on River line, and friendly

bombers interdicted hostile supply lines.

The front-line soldier continued to watch

for enemy assaults while hoping that the

armistice negotiators would soon reach

agreement.
Support and Service

The prosecution of the war in Korea

called for a tremendous administrative and

logistical effort on the part of the Eighth

Army. Decisions in Washington and Tokyo

required that the army not only carry on its

tactical mission but operate the supply lines

within the peninsula, administer the rear

areas, give relief to the disrupted civilian

population, and run the prisoner of war

camps until August 1952—tasks normally

carried out by the theater headquarters.1

In addition, the Eighth Army had to integrate the multinational forces fighting in

Korea within its command structure. Multitudinous problems arose in carrying out

these various responsibilities.

To integrate the ground contingents

offered by member countries of the United

Nations most efficiently, the U.N. commander’s plan was to assign them, according to their size, to American units within

the Eighth Army. Thus the Turkish Brigade

came under control of an American division. The United Kingdom’s two brigades

and the one from Canada were placed

under army control until July 1951, when

the 1st British Commonwealth Division was

formed and assumed control of all Commonwealth forces in Korea. This division,

in turn, came under operational control of

an American corps. Since all other ground

combat units were of battalion size, they

were attached to U.S. infantry regiments.

A number of problems required immediate solution. Language barriers, different

standards of training, divergent tactical

concepts, variations in dietary habits, dissimilar religious and national customs, and

other discrepancies had to be reconciled.

Some were resolved with little or no difficulty; others required extensive planning

for solution.

The difficulties experienced when the

first U.N. contingents came to Korea led

the Eighth Army to organize the United

Nations Reception Center. The center became responsible for clothing and equipping U.N. forces upon their arrival in Korea and for providing them with familiarization training in American arms and

equipment. As the newcomers went through

the reception center, American officers

could evaluate their proficiency. These

officers soon learned that some of the units

were not so well trained as advance reports

had indicated and that some lacked aggressiveness. As a result, the familiarization

training programs were expanded.

Training and other factors influenced the

assignment and subsequent role of the U.N.

contingents, although the most desirable

1

 In August 1952, the Eighth Army was relieved of these

tasks when the Far East Command organized the Korean

Communications Zone, under its direct control, for this

purpose.
212

course of action was to employ all U.N.

units exactly as similar U.S. units were employed. Those units whose training did not

approximate U.S. standards and who did

not develop satisfactorily received additional training while on line of communications guard duty before being committed.

Troops not naturally aggressive and under

poor leadership were not given an assault

role in the attack. Those lacking in soldierly

steadfastness did not receive key defense

missions. But most U.N. units were considered capable of executing any tactical

mission appropriate for a similar U.S. unit.

In assigning the U.N. units and in giving

them missions U.S. commanders had to

reckon with divergent staff and tactical

concepts and techniques. One unit preferred organizing the high ground when on

the defense, whereas American doctrine

favored organizing the forward slopes to

obtain maximum effect with grazing and

interlocking fire from automatic weapons.

Another unit considered reconnaissance in

force and combat patrols wasteful in that

casualties were suffered without the compensatory gain of a physical objective. Some

units did not think in terms of massed fire

power to the degree U.S. forces did. There

were other minor variations, but generally

the non-U.S. units endeavored to pattern

their actions after those of their American

counterparts. Most of the U.N. officers from

other countries, particularly staff officers,

had attended various U.S. service schools.

They were thus familiar with American

tactical doctrine, and their military concepts and practices were generally in accord

with it.

With so many nationalities operating

under a unified command in Korea it was

only natural that language difficulties

should develop. Although the language

problem was never completely solved, it

did not interfere with the army’s tactical

operations. English was the official language, and all orders, directives, and instructions were issued in that tongue. The

task of translation fell on the non-U.S. contingents for they had enough men that

knew English well, whereas the American

commands to which the contingents were

attached had too few soldiers that were

competent in a language other than their

own. The integrated U.N. units also furnished liaison officers to these same American commands.

In theory it would have been desirable to

have each U.N. country furnish the necessary logistical support for the men whom it

sent into the conflict in Korea. In practice,

however, it was simpler to have the United

States furnish the support on a reimbursable basis. Thus the Eighth Army, which

had the responsibility for supplying all of

the units integrated into it, could do the job

via a single line of communications instead

of many. Nonetheless it encountered a

number of difficulties.

National differences in customs and tastes

led to many complications in supplying

U.N. forces with rations. Because of Moslem religious restrictions, the Turks could

not eat pork or pork products. The Hindus

of the Indian contingent could not eat beef

because of similar restrictions. The Turks

wanted strong coffee, spices, and butter instead of margarine. The Hindus had to

have rice, curry powder, and strong spices.

Thailanders and Filipinos required rice,

strong spices, and strong tea and coffee.

The Dutch missed their milk and cheese,

and the French their bottle of wine. Nearly

all of the Europeans wanted a great deal

more bread than the American ration provided. The Japan Logistical Command

Quartermaster modified the ration to meet

these various requirements.
213

Types of provisions furnished to particular countries changed from time to time,

but in May 1952 only three countries—

Canada, Norway, and Sweden—were accepting the complete American ration with

nothing taken away or added. British Commonwealth forces, other than the Canadians, received all food supplies except

perishables from British Commonwealth

sources. All other units depended fully on

the United States for their food supplies,

with the rations modified to suit their tastes

and customs.

Items of American clothing generally

won the favor of the U.N. troops from other

countries, though many of them were not

convinced that two layers of light clothing

were better for winter than a single layer of

heavy clothing. The major problem was in

measurements. Western Europeans are of

about the same size as Americans; so are

the Greeks and Turks, though their wider

feet made fitting of shoes difficult. Oriental

troops such as the Thailanders and Filipinos, on the other hand, are considerably

smaller and their clothing had to be cut

down. For them too, fitting of shoes was a

problem, especially for the Thailanders.

Supplying the integrated units was part

of the generally difficult task of the Eighth

Army in carrying out its overall logistical

mission. The logistical responsibility held

by the army involved operating the ports

and railways, receiving and classifying the

incoming supplies and equipment, and forwarding them to the battle front. To organize and control this logistical effort, the

Eighth Army formed the 2d Logistical

Command. This command also took over

the job of administering the rear areas.

Logistical support of an army in the field

is an arduous task, even under ideal conditions. In South Korea, conditions were far

from ideal. The country has only one

port—Pusan—considered adequate to

handle incoming military supplies. The

mountainous east coast and the extreme

tidal range of the west coast prohibit construction of adequate ports. Inch’on, the

port for Seoul, and several smaller ports on

the west and south coast were available, but

deep-draft vessels had to remain offshore

and have their cargoes lightered in. Hence

Pusan became the major port for the Eighth

Army and received nearly all supplies.

There were disadvantages in using Pusan

as the chief port. It is located at the extreme

southeast tip of the peninsula. As the Eighth

Army moved northward its supply line was

correspondingly extended. The lack of adequate railroads and highways from Pusan

to the battle front added to the burden of

maintaining the supply line. Moreover,

concentrating the bulk of supplies at one

port provided an excellent target for enemy

air attack.

To move supplies and equipment forward from Pusan to the front the 2d Logistical Command utilized the Korean railroads as the chief means of transportation.

But the Korean rail system left much to be

desired. Its 3,500 miles of track are concentrated mostly in the western half of the peninsula, because the mountains prevent construction of lines in eastern Korea. Another

complication is that the system’s main

trunk lines, one double track from Pusan to

Seoul and a single track from Pusan to

Ch’unch’on, have very few feeder lines. The

forces in eastern Korea therefore had to

truck supplies from the main lines over

great distances.

The problems of rail support increased as

the Eighth Army advanced northward and

track mileage under its control lengthened.

The rail system had suffered a good deal of

damage in the fighting, and a shortage of
214

rolling stock developed. Air and artillery

bombardment had destroyed tracks and

rolling stock, yards and repair shops, railroad bridges and tunnels, and a lack of

enough skilled workers hindered the restoration of the damaged lines although the

Eighth Army’s engineers worked constantly

at the job. The army’s transportation section instituted a system of movements control to help overcome the shortage of rolling

stock. It insisted that every car be fully

loaded before shipping and unloaded

quickly at its destination. The transportation section also obtained some rolling stock

from Japanese sources and the United

States, including locomotives. Despite all of

these measures, a shortage of cars and motive power persisted throughout the course

of the conflict.

As for the highway system of Korea, it

was not built to support modern military

operations. The roads are narrow, badly

drained, and poorly surfaced. Snow and ice

cover them in winter, and spring thaws and

summer rains make them impassable.

There were few laterals to connect with the

main highways, and in many areas roads

did not even exist or were merely ox-cart

trails. Because supply agencies had to rely

heavily on truck transportation, the Eighth

Army’s engineers spent a great deal of time

and effort in improving and maintaining

the existing roads and in constructing new

roads.

Yet the tremendous improvements made

by the engineers in South Korea’s land

transportation facilities were not enough to

get the supplies to the combat troops. Trains

and trucks brought the supplies from the

ports to forward supply points. But from

there to many sections of the front, food,

clothing, ammunition, and other battlefield

needs had to be hand-carried over the

rugged terrain, a process that required a

large number of men. Since combat troops

could not be spared for such a task, the

South Korean Government, at the request

of the Eighth Army, organized the Korean

Service Corps to carry supplies to the front

lines. Laborers of this corps, using A-frames,

daily toiled up the slopes of steep hills carrying needed supplies to the companies and

platoons. They also assisted the front-line

troops in building and improving fortifications.

As its principal means of communication

in the Korean conflict, the Eighth Army

used wire and very high frequency radio.

Because the telephone and telegraph systems of South Korea had been seriously

damaged by the war and were in a bad

state of disrepair, the army’s signal section

built its own wire system extending from

Pusan all the way to the front. The radio

network supplemented the wire system to

insure rapid and constant communication

between all echelons of command. The ingenuity and hard work that went into the

construction of the wire and radio networks

produced in the end what was probably the

finest communications system that any field

army ever enjoyed.

Another problem posed for the Eighth

Army was maintaining the supply of ammunition. When the conflict began, a great

amount of ammunition left over from

World War II was available for the support

of the army. Transporting this ammunition

to the front placed an additional burden on

the inadequate rail and highway system of

South Korea. As hostilities extended into

the summer of 1951, ammunition levels in

the depots began to approach the absolute

minimum needed to sustain combat operations in Korea. The ammunition affected

was shells for light and medium artillery

and for mortars. A rationing program for

normal combat operations was adopted to
215

solve the problem. This program helped to

relieve the strain on transportation facilities

and insured that the army’s guns would

have all the ammunition necessary to stop

an enemy drive or to support offensive operations.

Besides giving logistical support to the

South Korean Army, the Eighth Army

aided the civil population with relief supplies. From the very beginning of the conflict the Republic of Korea required civil

assistance for its population. As the fighting

spread over the whole country, the destruction of homes and fields, economic dislocations, and threats of disease and starvation

imperiled the new nation. The South

Korean Government did not have the

means to cope with the problems of its tens

of thousands of homeless refugees. Unless

something was done, civil unrest would

seriously impair the military effort of the

U.N. forces in Korea. Thus civil relief became a military problem, at least while the

fighting continued.

When the U.S. Army received responsibility for providing civil assistance to the

Republic of Korea, it moved quickly. The

Far East Command shipped food, clothing,

and medicine from its supply depots to care

for the refugees. Other relief items were

purchased from Japanese sources. The

Eighth Army organized the United Nations

Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK)

to provide relief. Working with the South

Korean Government and U.N. representatives, this command supervised the organization of refugee camps, distributed food

and clothing, and established medical facil;

ities for the civil population. To prevent the

spread of communicable diseases, more

than three fourths of the population received inoculations against smallpox, typhoid, and typhus. Aircraft dusted cities

with DDT to kill disease-bearing insects

while teams dusted millions of South

Koreans.

Thousands of children who had lost their

families wandered with the refugees. Orphanages within the country rounded them

up and cared for them, receiving aid from

the Civil Assistance Command. In addition,

thousands of American soldiers voluntarily

contributed money to support homes for

them. Many units of the Eighth Army

“adopted” orphanages, supporting them

with money, clothing, food, and other

necessities.

Another objective of the civil relief mission in Korea was to assist the country in

rebuilding its economy. The Civil Assistance Command helped to rebuild and expand the agricultural economy by providing technical guidance and material aid. At

the same time the South Koreans were

helped and encouraged to build factories

for the production of war materiel and consumer goods, and the nation’s government

took steps to reduce inflation. This economic

program was reinforced by the Eighth

Army’s employment of thousands of Korean workers and the rebuilding and improvement of the railroads, highways, ports,

and airfields of the country.

Another problem bristling with difficulties arose from the large number of enemy

soldiers held by the Eighth Army. When

the North Korean forces collapsed near the

end of 1950, the Eighth Army had well

over 100,000 prisoners of war on its hands.

These prisoners were held on the island of

Koje-do, situated thirty miles southwest of

Pusan. The camp consisted of four barbed

wire enclosures each subdivided into eight

compounds, with each compound capable

of holding 6,000 prisoners.

The camp administration carried out the

principles of the Geneva Convention of

1949 regarding prisoners of war. Guards re-
216

ceived instructions in these principles, and

representatives of the International Red

Cross inspected the compounds frequently.

The captives were permitted to engage in

athletics, and classes of instruction in a

great variety of subjects were offered to

those who wished to attend.

Camp authorities also instituted a screening program to separate South Korean

civilians from the real prisoners of war.

These civilians had been forced to fight or

to work as laborers in the North Korean

Army when it overran the Republic of Korea during the first months of the war. As a

result of the screening program 38,000 captives were reclassified as civilians during

November and December 1951. Then, in

January 1952, the camp commander began

a second screening cycle to correct mistakes

made in the first one. Communist leaders

within the compounds resisted this screening because it meant that they would lose

control over the anticommunist prisoners

and that the guards could keep a closer

watch over antagonistic groups.

During the early months of the camp’s

operation disorders occurred often, but

rioting did not break out until late in 1951.

Evidently a core of tough communists had

been organized in each compound with the

objective of seizing control over the anticommunists among the prisoners. Gangs of

thugs cowed those who would not conform,

and kangaroo courts sentenced leaders of

the opposition to death. This attempt to

seize control of the captives within each

compound led to factional strife and a

number of deaths.

Violent opposition to screening began in

early 1952, when the inmates of Compound

62 attacked a battalion of troops from the

U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment. The battalion had entered the compound to keep

order while the Republic of Korea screening committee performed its duties. The

prisoners attacked the Americans with

rocks, pick handles, homemade knives and

axes, tent poles, and barbed wire flails. The

soldiers threw concussion grenades to stop

the attack, but the mob continued to move

forward. The American commander ordered his troops to fire, and the prisoners

were forced back. When the melee ceased,

200 inmates of the compound were casualties and one American had been killed and

thirty-eight wounded.

As a result of the riot the guard strength

was increased and a new screening and

segregation program instituted. The new

program called for separation of those

prisoners and civilian internees who desired

repatriation from those who did not and for

construction of new prisoner of war camps

on the mainland and the island of Cheju-do.

As the new screening program began, in

April 1952, it met with increasing hostility

from the communist prisoners. Mass meetings, flag raisings, and other acts of defiance

took place. The climax came in May when

the prisoners seized the commander of the

prisoner of war camp. General Van Fleet

immediately moved reinforcements to the

island, including flame-throwing tanks.

Upon release of the camp’s head, Brig.

Gen. Haydon L. Boatner took over command and proceeded to bring the situation

under control. General Boatner had all

civilian residents of the island moved off,

reorganized the staff, and ordered his

guards to enter forcibly any compound displaying slogans or flying North Korean

flags. Engineers began rebuilding the compounds to reduce their capacity to 500 men,

and the army commander sent the 187th

Airborne Regiment to reinforce the guard

strength of the camp.

The communist leaders prepared to fight

against any removal of the prisoners. They
217

secretly fashioned weapons, filling crude

grenades with hoarded cooking gasoline.

The inmates of one compound dug a waistdeep trench before the main gate on the assumption that the guards would enter

there.

On 10 June the camp commander proceeded to move the prisoners to the new

compounds. The leader of Compound 76,

where the trench had been dug, was ordered to form his men into groups of 150 in

preparation for the move. He failed to do

so, and General Boatner ordered the commander of the 187th to move two battalions

into the compound. The troops did not

enter by the main gate. Instead engineers

cut through the barbed wire in rear of the

compound while tanks patrolled outside of

the enclosure. Then the troops, wearing gas

masks, advanced through the cut in the

wire and threw tear gas grenades into the

unruly mob. The grenades ignited gasoline

hidden in the compound, and the inmates

broke before the American troops. Some

locked themselves in the barracks of the enclosure while others jumped into the ditch

near the main gate. The troops began a

methodical job of cleaning out the barracks

and ditch, herding the captives toward the

center of the compound. In one and a half

hours it was all over. Nearly 6,000 North

Koreans squatted in the center of the enclosure while the compound’s buildings

went up in flames. Over 150 inmates were

killed and injured; the Americans had one

killed and thirteen wounded. Shortly afterward the prisoners were moved to the new

compound while their leader was led off to

solitary confinement.

With the collapse of the prisoners’ revolt

in Compound 76, the remainder of the

screening program was carried out with

relatively little difficulty. The noncommunist prisoners were separated from the communists, and the latter moved into the 500-

man compounds. Incidents on the island

continued, but guards used tear gas to stop

demonstrations and riots and to maintain

order and discipline among the unruly

inmates.

SECTION 7

12 November 1951–30 June 1952

221
222

STATION GYPSY, near Hwach’on. Operations van from which programs were broadcast (left) contained two short-wave receivers, two dual-speed turntables, an amplifier for live broadcasts, a

transmitter, console, microphone, tape recorder, and library of over 35,000 song hits; administrative van is on the right.
223

378TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION constructing a treadway bridge across the Pukhan River,

ROK 6th Division sector of IX Corps area, November 1951.
224

PATTON TANK ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE, 3d

Division sector, I Corps area, 17 November 1951.
225
226

WINTRY WASHDAY in the 24th Division area, 24 November.

8-INCH HOWITZER in action, 25th Division area.
227

CLEARING SLUSH from a 24th Division landing strip.

GUARD DUTY. Snow-covered vehicle is a halftrack, Quad .50.
228

VICE-PRESIDENT ALBEN W. BARKLEY, right foreground, is welcomed to the 24th Division area by

the Colombian Battalion Commander; Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Commanding General,

24th Division, is at right.
229

WET AND CHILLED, cavalrymen huddle around a small can of burning gasoline.
230

LITTER BEARERS OF THE 7TH DIVISION, moving cautiously over ice and snow, bring in a wounded

man.
231

ENEMY PRISONER, captured by a 7th Division soldier, is on his way south for the winter.
232

SELF-PROPELLED 155-MM. GUN lights up the night

in the 25th Division area, 26 November.
233
234

FLYING BOXCAR C-119 DISGORGING MAIL for APO 24, Ch’unch’on.
235

ROLLS OF BARBED WIRE AND MAIL on the way up to Company E, 21st Infantry.

PATTON TANKS PINCH-HITTING FOR MAIL TRUCKS carry Christmas mail to front-line troops.
236

RIDGERUNNER, so called because of its maneuverability on the roadway above running along the

ridge line. The tank shown above is credited with having destroyed eighteen enemy bunkers in

one afternoon.

INSULATED CONTAINERS OF HOT FOOD being carried up to hilltop positions, 24th Division area.
237

TANK COMMANDER crouching behind the turret after giving the order to fire.

ENEMY BUNKER AND CONNECTING TRENCH,

Hill 770.

ENEMY KITCHEN on Hill 770 near Kumsong.
238

CABLE CAR, built by 3d Engineer Construction

Battalion. Starting point is at foot of Hill 770, left;

the car nears the platform at the top of the hill, below. Engine from a discarded 3

/4-ton truck supplied

power for the car, which traversed a distance of

1,530 feet from bottom to top. At several stages of

its journey the car dangled as much as 200 feet off

the ground.
239

COMPANY E, 21ST INFANTRY, preparing for a long

winter, near Kumsong. Koreans help with construction of bunker, right. Assistant squad leaders

attend a class on the use and operation of grenade

adapters, below.
240

Some troops see Santa.
241

Some troops do not.
242

Now I lay me down to sleep. . . .
243

REPLACEMENTS for the 1st Marine Division disembarking from an LST.
244

WHITE-CLAD RECONNAISSANCE PATROL from 2d Division moving out, 1 January 1952.

L-20 PREPARING TO TAKE OFF. Seated in front with the pilot is Maj. Gen. Williston B. Palmer,

Commanding General, X Corps.
245

NEW YEAR’S DAY DINNER on its way up to Company L, 21st Infantry, near Kumsong.
246
247

Celebrating New Year’s Day
248

PLOTTING CORRECTIONS ON A MAP in the fire control hut before the next heavy mortar rounds are

fired, west of Ch’orwon, 4 January
249

SERVING A HOT MEAL to the 179th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division, along a mountainside. The

45th Division arrived in Korea during the third week of December.
250

JANUARY 1952. In this month the Eighth Army opened a sustained artillery-air campaign against

enemy positions.
251

DESTROYING AN OLD ENEMY BUNKER WITH TNT,

NEAR KUMSONG, 11 JANUARY.
252

40TH DIVISION INFANTRYMEN preparing to debark at Inch’on harbor, January 1952. The 40th

Division was assigned to the IX Corps to relieve the 24th Division.
253

24TH DIVISION TROOPS aboard the USS George Clymer headed for Japan.

COFFEE BREAK for 40th Division men on their way to the front lines two days after arriving in

Korea.
254

UNCACK Representative Presenting a Jeep-Type Fire Engine to a Korean public safety

officer, Taejon, October 1952.

Partially Contructed Family Housing Units, Taegu, July 1952.
255

UNCACK CHIEF NURSE WITH KOREAN WOMEN examining American women’s uniforms donated

to hospitals, August 1952.

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command

(UNCACK), in providing relief for the civil population of South Korea, distributed food and clothing, reconstructed communities, and furnished

medical facilities.

CEMENT DONATED BY UNCACK was used to

make well casings and pipe, July 1952.
256

FRENCH BATTALION TROOPS ON MANEUVERS, shown in positions along the electric railroad track

at Kumgong-ni.
257

INSTALLING A FIELD TELEPHONE at the 160th Infantry regimental command post.

LEAVING WARMING TENTS to carry out a fire mission. The men above are from Battery B, 37th

Field Artillery Battalion.
258
259

MEDIC TREATING INJURED 2D DIVISION INFANTRYMAN, 14 February 1952,

while a wounded ROK soldier is helped up the steep bank to await his turn.
260

ALL-PRISONER CAST of a play staged for the entertainment of the POW camp, Koje-do, March

1952.

U.N. POW CAMP, KOJE-DO. Korean village, foreground, borders the camp.
261

SEARCHLIGHT IN POSITION, west of Ch’orwon. This searchlight is mounted on the bed of a converted 21

/2-ton truck.

TAKING TIME OUT for coffee and doughnuts, 37th Field Artillery Battalion command post.
262

SAVING AN AIRMAN

FIRING ROCKETS FROM A PT BOAT in a harassing attack against the east coast of North Korea.

The boat is manned by ROK Navy men.
263

LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK on enemy supply center at Suan, thirty-five miles southeast of P’yongyang. Note tank of napalm just released from the left wing of the F-80.
264

PLATOON LEADER BRIEFING HIS MEN before leaving on a reconnaissance patrol, June 1952.
265

CONFERENCE IN THE RAIN, June 1952. General Van Fleet, Eighth Army commander, is on the left;

next to him is Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Cleland, Commanding General, 40th Division; Maj. Gen.

Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General, IX Corps, is at right.
266

Welcome home.
1 JULY 1952–28 JULY 1953

CHAPTER IX

Deadlock continued as the Korean conflict went into its third year in late June

1952. Since November 1951 the battle front

had been relative stable, both sides having

settled down to an active defense of their

positions. In the following winter and spring

the fighting dwindled to patrol clashes,

raids, and small-scale attacks, but the enemy grew more aggressive in May 1952 and

action along the entire front increased.

Enemy attempts to seize key outposts and

terrain guarding the approaches to the

Eighth Army’s main positions sparked frequent and intense fire fights during the

summer and fall of 1952. The army successfully defended these positions, breaking up

the enemy’s attacks and killing thousands

of Chinese and North Koreans.

July began with a series of small-scale attacks by both sides. In the Eighth Army’s

western sector the U.S. I Corps, under its

new commander, Maj. Gen. Paul W. Kendall, conducted a number of raids on Chinese fortifications opposite the corps’ front.

On the first day of the month, infantrymen

from the ROK 1st Division raided enemy

positions overlooking the Imjin River, In

the fight that followed the ROK troops

killed 112 Chinese before returning to the

division’s lines. Two days later, on 3 July,

the marines, on the corps’ left wing, struck

at a Chinese battalion. Supported by mortar and artillery fire, two companies from

the 7th Marine Regiment swept into the

enemy positions to inflict 200 casualties on

the surprised Chinese before retiring. The

corps handed out more punishment when a

tank-infantry team from General Ruffner’s

U.S. 45th Division attacked a hill mass

northwest of Ch’orwon. The tankers and

infantrymen returned to their lines after

killing seventy-nine of the enemy on the

hill.

Light action marked the fighting on the

remainder of the front. In General Wyman’s U.S. IX Corps, troops from Maj.

Gen. Wayne C. Smith’s U.S. 7th Division

raided an enemy-held hill ten miles south

of P’yonggang on 3 July. The raiding infantrymen wiped out the forty-five Chinese defenders and destroyed enemy fortifications

before returning to their lines. The ROK

9th Division followed up this raid with two

of their own against enemy positions, killing

sixty Chinese and destroying bunkers,

trenches, and gun emplacements. In the

ROK II Corps area South Korean infantrymen struck enemy positions northeast of

Kumhwa to kill sixty-five Chinese. In the

ROK I Corps sector North Korean troops

unsuccessfully attacked an observation post

for naval gunfire on the enemy’s Nam

River communications line. The enemy lost

an estimated 600 men in this attempt.

Outpost Battles

1 July–31 December 1952
270

Torrential rains in the last week of July

and the first week of August restricted activity along the front, but periods of clear

weather brought renewed attacks by both

sides. In the U.S. I Corps zone Maj. Gen.

James C. Fry, the U.S. 2d Division commander, sent two reinforced companies

against Hill 266 during the night of 31

July–1 August. Determined to regain the

height that had been lost in July, the infantrymen stormed up the slopes and drove the

Chinese out. Quickly digging in and organizing their position, the 2d Division troops

awaited the inevitable counterattack. It

came the following night, but massed division artillery and small arms fire broke up

the Chinese assault. Enemy attacks later in

the month met with no success, and the hill

remained in the hands of the 2d Division.

Heavy rains again drenched Korea in

the latter part of August to bring the fighting to a near halt. Then, as September began, the skies cleared and the enemy renewed his assaults on the Eighth Army’s

outpost positions. These attacks were accompanied by an increasing amount of

mortar and artillery fire support.

For quite some time the enemy had

gradually been increasing the volume of

mortar and artillery fire used in support of

his attacks. In September an all-time high

of 45,000 rounds fell on the army’s front in

one day. Despite the enormous effort

exerted by the Fifth Air Force and the

naval air arm to sever the enemy’s supply

lines the Chinese and North Koreans kept

their front-line troops supplied and even

managed to accumulate a reserve stock of

ammunition and supplies.

Various sectors of the Eighth Army’s line

came under enemy attack in September.

After unsuccessfully assaulting an outpost

that the marines had seized and established

the previous month, the Chinese shifted

their efforts to the U.S. I Corps’ right wing.

On the night of 18 September, after their

artillery had smothered Hill 266 in the U.S.

2d Division sector with 1,000 shells, an estimated two enemy companies, reinforced

with tanks, swarmed up the slopes and

rapidly overran the crest. The Americans

withdrew 400 yards and established new

positions, then counterattacked. But the

heavy and accurate Chinese artillery fire

prevented the assaulting troops from making any headway. On the evening of 20

September another American counterattack formed and began to envelop the hill.

After slow progress through heavy enemy

fire the attacking companies, reinforced by

a platoon of tanks, made a co-ordinated

assault that carried them to the crest. The

Chinese fell back as the attacking infantrymen swept over the hilltop and secured the

position.

In the central sector of the Eighth Army

line, the enemy struck at two separate

points in the front of the ROK II Corps’

Capital Division. On the division’s left flank

the Chinese overran an outpost position to

threaten the main line of resistance while

another outpost on the division’s right fell

to enemy assaults. Both were soon retaken

by the South Korean infantrymen.

In the eastern sector of the front North

Koreans attacked main line of resistance

positions on the right wing of the U.S. X

Corps on the night of 21–22 September.

While the U.S. 45th Division was in the

process of relieving the ROK 8th Division,

elements of two enemy battalions overran

the western slope and crest of a hill serving

as part of the ROK division’s main line.

Driving one company back about 1,000

yards, the attacking enemy then swung to

the west to widen the penetration. But the

defending South Koreans on the left of the

penetration held firm and halted the North
271

Korean attack. The next morning, 22 September, an infantry company from the

ROK 8th Division, supported by tanks

from, the 45th Division’s 245th Tank Battalion, managed to regain part of the hill. At

noon of the same day, after artillery fire

and air strikes had covered the penetration,

elements of the ROK 8th’s reserve regiment

counterattacked and drove the enemy back.

By nightfall the main line of resistance had

been restored and all enemy troops driven

out. During the next two days the North

Koreans made several weak efforts to penetrate the division’s main line without success. Meanwhile the 45th Division continued its relief of the 8th, completing it on 26

September.

While the troops of the Eighth Army defended their outposts and main battle positions against local enemy assaults, the air

war over Korea intensified during the summer of 1952. Aircraft from the Fifth Air

Force and the Far East Bomber Command,

Marine aircraft, and Navy carrier-based

planes struck at supply centers, troop concentrations, power plants, factories, and

rail and road networks. In addition to striking deep into enemy territory, air units rendered valuable assistance to front-line

troops. Enemy bunkers, trenches, gun positions, and communication lines were

bombed or seared with napalm. On 29

August the Fifth Air Force carried out the

largest air raid of the Korean conflict. Hundreds of Air Force, Marine, and Navy

planes accompanied by aircraft from Australia and the United Kingdom raided

P’yongyang, the North Korean capital. In

this massive strike, supply installations, repair shops, troop concentrations, military

headquarters, and a host of other targets

were destroyed or badly damaged.

An increasing number of enemy jet interceptors rose to challenge Fifth Air Force

Sabrejets during the summer. But the superiority of American pilots was clearly

demonstrated by the number of enemy aircraft destroyed in aerial combat. During

the month of September alone, pilots from

the Fifth Air Force shot down sixty-four

MIG-15’s at a cost of seven Sabrejets.

The Navy maintained its blockade of

both coasts of North Korea. On the east

coast, warships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet

continued to bombard the enemy port of

Wonsan. Ships from the fleet also continued

to provide gunfire support to friendly forces

near the east coast of the peninsula. On the

Korean west coast the U.N. fleet helped

protect islands off the North Korean coast

and assisted guerrilla units to recapture an

island that had been seized by an enemy

force.

The rising tide of enemy attacks that began in May culminated in a series of assaults in October that produced some of the

heaviest fighting in more than a year. Battles raged on many sections of the front as

Chinese and North Korean units, sometimes employing their familiar human-sea

tactics, tried to penetrate the Eighth Army’s

main line of resistance or to seize dominating terrain. The heaviest fighting centered

around two key heights, Hills 281 and 395,

northwest of Ch’orwon. Capture of these

strategic positions, astride the U.S. I CorpsU.S. IX Corps boundary, would give the

Chinese control of the lateral roads behind

the corps’ lines and threaten the main supply route to Ch’orwon.

To herald the opening of their attacks the

Chinese unleashed the largest volume of

mortar and artillery fire received by the

Eighth Army since the fighting began. On

one day, 7 October, more than 93,000

rounds fell on U.N. positions along the

front. The Eighth Army estimated that during these attacks the enemy’s daily expend-
272

iture of artillery and mortar ammunition

doubled to more than 24,000 rounds.

The Chinese began a co-ordinated attack

against both hills on the evening of 6 October after a daylong artillery bombardment

of the objectives. Two enemy companies

struck Hill 281, the eastern anchor of the I

Corps line. The U.S. 2d Division’s French

Battalion, defending the height, repelled

this assault, but the Chinese added two

more companies to the attacking force, reformed, and attacked again. The gallant

French would not yield, and as the battle

progressed the Chinese continued to build

up their attacking strength. By dawn, they

had an entire regiment hammering away

vainly at the French. Finally, with hundreds of their dead and wounded strewn

about the besieged position, the Chinese

broke off the attack and withdrew. They

kept up pressure against the French-held

hill for the next few days, but on 12 October

abandoned further attempts to capture it.

The main enemy attack in the meantime

struck Hill 395, guarding the U.S. IX

Corps left flank. The Chinese hurled an

estimated two battalions against the height

in co-ordination with the attack on Hill

281. Elements of the ROK 9th Division,

defending the hill, held their positions until

the following afternoon, 7 October, when

the enemy threw in additional battalions

and forced the South Koreans to withdraw.

A counterattack restored the lost ground,

but the enemy renewed his assault in regimental strength the next day and again

forced the ROK troops to withdraw. They

established a new defense line south of the

lost positions and then began to counterattack. Assisted by numerous air strikes and

the massed corps artillery, the South Korean infantrymen managed after two days

of heavy fighting to fight their way to the

crest of the hill and drive the Chinese back.

An enemy battalion then attempted to push

the infantrymen back, but the defenders,

backed up by artillery fire, stopped the

Chinese short of their goal.

To relieve the pressure against Hill 395 a

battalion from the ROK 9th Division, supported by a company-sized tank-infantry

team, seized high ground several hundred

yards north of the hill. Securing this newly

won terrain, the battalion continued to advance northward and by 15 October had

secured two screening positions 1,000 yards

north of Hill 395. With the South Koreans

now in firm control of the disputed ground

the enemy gave up further efforts to penetrate the IX Corps left flank. After the battle was all over, the 9th Division reported

that the major part of a Chinese reserve

division from the 38th Chinese Communist

Army had been destroyed. Over 2,000 Chinese dead were counted on the slopes of

Hills 281 and 395 in the ten-day battle.

The Eighth Army countered enemy aggressiveness by making several attacks during the middle of the month. The primary

aim of these attacks was to strengthen the

defense of Kumhwa, the right leg of the

Iron Triangle and the hub of an important

road net. Two dominating hill masses, Hills

500 and 598, about four miles north of the

city were the objectives of the IX Corps’

U.S. 7th and ROK 2d Divisions. The

attack began on the morning of 14 October

when two battalions from the 7th Division’s

31st Regiment executed a double envelopment of Hill 598 from the south and southeast. Advancing under heavy enemy fire,

the battalions succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill after six hours of intense

fighting. The Chinese counterattacked that

night and forced the Americans off the

height.

The next morning, 15 October, the infantrymen of the 31st again attacked. Mov-
273

ing silently and swiftly through the morning mists they went up the slopes of Hill

598 and ejected the enemy from the crest.

Two smaller heights that lay a short distance from the main objective also fell the

attacking troops. The Chinese then retaliated by throwing two battalions against

the hill in an effort to dislodge the Americans. The enemy attack failed. Three days

later, on 18 October, the American infantrymen advanced another 1,000 yards

deeper into enemy territory and seized key

terrain to protect Hill 598 from the north.

But counterattacking Chinese battalions

forced the troops of the 31st to pull back the

main hill mass. Further enemy attempts

to regain Hill 598 failed until 30 October.

At that time, three days after the ROK 2d

Division had taken over the height from the

U.S. 7th Division, an enemy regiment

stormed up the slopes and drove out the

South Korean defenders. Successive counterattacks by the 2d failed to regain the hill.

While the 7th Division had been fighting

for Hill 598, a battalion from the ROK 2d

Division streamed up Hill 500 and seized

the crest against light enemy opposition.

The usual enemy counterattack followed,

and for a week the position changed hands

repeatedly. Near the end of October the

ROK troops finally managed to seize and

hold the height.

Meanwhile more fighting broke out the

ROK II Corps’ sector. Two Chinese

companies attacked hilltop positions near

the left flank of the ROK Capital Division

on the night of 6 October. The South Koreans made a determined stand and prevented the enemy from making any penetration of the main battle line. About 500

yards east of these positions the enemy also

struck with two companies and seized an

outpost guarding the division’s center. The

following morning ROK troops counterattacked and managed to reach positions

300 yards from the crest. The Chinese prevented any further advance, and as October

ended the enemy still remained in possession

of the hilltop.

Fighting along the remainder of the

Eighth Army front consisted of patrol

clashes and light raids by the enemy. Harassing attacks occurred on the U.S. I Corps’

front against the 1st Marine Division when

the Chinese attacked several outposts without success.

With the coming of winter weather in

November, enemy aggressiveness began to

decline. Although the Chinese kept pressure on the central front, the severe defeat

inflicted on them by the IX Corps in October and the adverse weather evidently

dampened their desire to conduct further

large-scale attacks against the Eighth

Army’s battle line. For the remainder of the

year fighting diminished in intensity as both

sides prepared to meet the rigors of the

Korean winter.

Although most of the front remained relatively quiet, in the U.S. I Corps sector the

enemy tried to penetrate a part of the 1st

British Commonwealth Division’s front line

on 19 November. The British threw back

the attack after killing over a hundred

Chinese. Fighting again flared up in the

corps area when the ROK 1st Division beat

back Chinese attempts to overrun outposts

on the Imjin River line in December. The

enemy then tried to seize key terrain in

front of the U.S. 2d Division. In a short but

intense battle the Americans killed 111 of

the enemy and captured four prisoners.

The Chinese then withdrew their attacking

force.

Enemy attacks on the central front during the last two months of the year resulted

in several brief but bitter fights. On the IX
274

Corps left wing an enemy battalion seized

an outpost in front of the U.S. 3d Division’s

lines on 6 November. Shortly after this success the Chinese made an attempt to break

through the defenses of the U.S. 7th Division’s Ethiopian Battalion. After a brief fire

fight the enemy withdrew leaving 131 of his

dead around the Ethiopians’ positions.

On the eastern front an enemy force

struck several positions in the U.S. X Corps

center. The U.S. 40th Division quickly

broke up these assaults, killing 152 of the

enemy and capturing seven. Farther east, in

the ROK I Corps sector, two North Korean

battalions made a minor penetration of the

ROK 5th Division’s lines. Counterattacking South Korean infantrymen ejected the

enemy and restored the positions.

As ground fighting slowed to a near halt

during December, General Van Fleet made

several changes in his battle line. To

strengthen the Kumhwa–Ch’orwon sector

of the Iron Triangle, the army commander

increased the number of front-line divisions

in the IX Corps. The front of the ROK 9th

Division, on the corps’ right flank, was

narrowed and the left boundary of the

ROK II Corps shifted several miles to the

east. The ROK Capital Division then filled

in the resulting gap. One other change occurred in the IX Corps when the ROK 2d

Division relieved the U.S. 3d Division on

the corps’ left flank. Lt. Gen. Reuben E.

Jenkins, who had taken over command of

the IX Corps from General Wyman in

August, now had three ROK divisions and

one U.S. division, the 25th, defending his

front.

In the western sector of the army’s battle

line, the U.S. 7th Division relieved the U.S.

2d Division on the U.S. I Corps’ right flank.

On the eastern front a newly created South

Korean division, the ROK 12th, entered

combat for the first time, replacing the U.S.

45th Division on the right flank of the U.S.

X Corps.

At the year’s end General Van Fleet had

sixteen divisions manning the Eighth

Army’s battle line. Included in this number

were one U.S. Marine, one British Commonwealth, eleven South Korean, and

three U.S. Army divisions. Contingents of

troops from other United Nations countries

reinforced the American divisions, and a

Korean Marine regiment became an important adjunct to the 1st Marine Division.

The army commander also had four divisions available as reserve forces—one South

Korean and three American.

By giving the South Koreans responsibility for defending nearly 75 percent of the

Eighth Army’s front General Van Fleet indicated that he had confidence in the

ability of the revitalized ROK Army to

hold its own against large-scale enemy attacks. It was evident that the South Korean

Army, trained and equipped by the U.S.

Army, was now a fighting force capable of

effective defense.

For over a year now a stalemate had existed in the Korean conflict. Both sides had

constructed defense lines so powerful that

their reduction could be accomplished only

at a prohibitive cost. This had limited the

Eighth Army’s offensive operations during

1952 to small-scale attacks to prevent the

enemy from holding terrain features close

to the army’s main line of resistance and

raids to hamper the enemy’s build-up of

defensive positions.

During the year the Eighth Army also

conducted a vigorous defense of its outpost

positions. These outposts, located on high

ground to screen the army’s main line of

resistance, became the objective of frequent

enemy attack, particularly in the latter half

of the year. The Eighth Army threw back
275

the great majority of these assaults and inflitted thousands of casualties on the enemy.

Positions that did fall, owing to the weight

of enemy numbers, were quickly restored by

counterattacking Eighth Army infantrymen. Occasionally an outpost position had

to be abandoned when it became clear that

the enemy intended to seize the position at

any cost. In this case the outpost lost its usefulness as the price of holding it or retaking

it outweighed its tactical value in delaying

enemy attacks on the main line of resistance.
276

Map 7
CHAPTER X

As the year 1953 began, activity along

the entire front subsided. Patrolling and

small-scale harassing attacks characterized

the fighting during the winter months of the

new year. Then, as spring began, the enemy

renewed his assaults upon the Eighth

Army’s outpost line, attempting to seize

terrain that overlooked the army’s main

line of resistance. These attacks increased in

frequency and intensity until, in July, they

approached the scale of the enemy’s heavy

attacks of May 1951.

During January 1953 General Van Fleet

continued to make changes in the Eighth

Army’s line. In the right-wing corps, he replaced the veteran ROK 5th Division with

the newly activated 15th. In the left-wing

corps, the U.S. 2d Division relieved the 1st

British Commonwealth Division, the first

time the latter unit had been out of combat for nearly eighteen months. In the IX

Corps, in the Eighth Army’s center, the

U.S. 3d Division took over the sector held

by the U.S. 25th Division, while in X Corps

the U.S. 45th relieved the U.S. 40th Division. After these changes the army commander had twelve South Korean and

eight U.N. divisions to defend the army

front. The thousands of service and security

troops that supported the combat divisions

brought the army’s total strength to nearly

768,000 men.

To oppose the Eighth Army’s twenty divisions the enemy disposed a formidable

array of strength along his front. Seven

Chinese armies and two North Korean

corps, totaling about 270,000 troops,

manned the enemy defense line. Another

eleven Chinese armies and North Korean

corps with an estimated strength of 531,000

remained in reserve. With service and security forces, the total enemy strength in

Korea amounted to more than a million

men.

The enemy employed his forces along a

battle line that roughly paralleled that of

the Eighth Army. The Chinese occupied

about three fourths of this line; their armies

extended from the Korean west coast eastward to the Kum River. East of the river

the North Koreans manned the remainder

of the line to the Sea of Japan—a sector, incidentally, where there was little likelihood

of a main U.N. thrust. Although a manpower shortage probably explains this division of responsibility, it is also possible that

the Chinese questioned the fighting ability

of their allies.

Other than a few patrol clashes, little

fighting occurred during January and February. Only in the sector of the ROK 12th

Division did the enemy make any serious

attempts to penetrate the army’s main line

of resistance, and these failed. Meanwhile,

The Last Battle

1 January–27 July 1953
278

the Eighth Army carried out a number of

raids on enemy positions. Supported by air

strikes and accurate artillery fire, raiding

parties from all five corps struck hard at

Chinese and North Korean positions to kill

or capture enemy soldiers and destroy emplacements and fortifications.

During February the command of the

Eighth Army changed hands. General Van

Fleet, after nearly two years as the Eighth

Army’s leader, turned over his command to

Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and returned

to the United States for retirement.

As March began the enemy increased his

attacks on the army’s outpost line, evidently

in retaliation for the U.N. raids of January

and February. The U.S. I Corps bore the

brunt of these attacks. On the first day of

March an enemy battalion assaulted main

line of resistance positions on Hill 355, held

by elements of the U.S. 2d Division. Although part of the enemy force managed to

reach the foxholes and trenches of the defenders the attack was beaten off. The

Chinese hit the hill again on 17 March with

a battalion. Attacking in two elements from

the north and northeast, the Chinese

breached the protective mine fields and

wire and drove into the trenches on the

crest. The center of the line gave way, but

two platoons that had been previously

placed in blocking positions moved up to

contain the penetration. Meanwhile, on the

crest and forward slope of the hill the fighting was heavy. At dawn an infantry company arrived to reinforce the troops on the

hilltop and the Chinese began withdrawing. As they pulled back, U.N. artillery fire

hit their routes of withdrawal and inflicted

further casualties.

The Chinese again struck at the U.S. I

Corps during the final week of the month.

On the evening of 23 March an enemy regiment assaulted Hills 266, 255, and 191,

outposts of the U.S. 7th Division. Defended

by the division’s Colombian Battalion, Hill

266 was the target of the main enemy effort.

A Chinese battalion supported by artillery

and mortar fire drove into positions on the

western slope of the hill at 2100. The

Colombians on the hill received reinforcements amounting to a company, but this

was not enough to withstand the enemy assault and the defenders fell back to positions on the southeastern slope of the height.

The following morning, 24 March, a battalion from the 7th Division counterattacked and managed to gain the crest of the

hill and engage the Chinese in trenches and

bunkers. The struggle continued throughout the morning with both sides supported

by heavy artillery fire. The Chinese stubbornly fought to retain their positions, and

the Americans broke off their attack, pulling back to the southern slope. Early the

next day another American counterattack

failed, and the Chinese still held the crest of

Hill 266.

Concurrently with the attack on Hill 266

two enemy battalions hit Hills 255 and 191.

The battle on Hill 191 was short. As the

Chinese companies advanced up the slopes

the Americans called for and received reinforcements. After a brief fire fight with

the defenders, the Chinese broke contact

and withdrew. Over on Hill 255 the Chinese were more successful. Supported by

tanks and by artillery and mortar fire the

Chinese forced the defenders to withdraw

700 yards. Shortly after midnight two companies from the 7th Division counterattacked up Hill 255 and drove the enemy

off the crest.

Although the Chinese had gained their

chief objective, Hill 266, the price was high.

The 7th Division reported that the battles

on the three hills cost the enemy 750

casualties.
279

While the battle seesawed about the outposts in the 7th Division sector, the enemy

prepared for another attack farther to the

west in the I Corps sector. Early in the evening of 26 March several outposts of the 1st

Marine Regiment received diversionary attacks by small enemy forces. Then the enemy struck three nearby outposts in regimental strength. Overrunning two of the

three positions quickly, the Chinese advanced toward the main line of resistance.

But an American blocking force, placed between the Chinese line of advance and the

main line of resistance, intercepted the enemy regiment. After a vain, all-night effort

to get by this obstacle the Chinese withdrew. Later in the morning of 27 March a

marine battalion counterattacked and recaptured one of the lost outposts. The rest

of the day and all through the following

night the marines pressed their attack forward. By morning of the next day, 28

March, they took the remaining outpost,

but shortly afterward a Chinese counterthrust drove the Americans back 400 yards.

In the afternoon the marines again regained

the outpost. Reinforcing and digging in,

they awaited the next onslaught. It came

that night when a Chinese battalion attacked. More marine reinforcements were

poured in while corps and division artillery

fire isolated the battlefield and prevented

the Chinese from increasing the size of their

attacking force. By the next morning the

enemy had made no more headway and

withdrew.

Friendly and enemy patrols kept busy in

the I Corps sector. The Chinese, apparently

sensitive to the activities of the corps’ patrols

and raiding parties, began to establish ambushes. One patrol of thirty-four men from

the U.S. 7th Division fell into a trap set by

the enemy on 9 March. Surrounded by

some sixty Chinese the whole patrol became casualties: twenty men were killed,

twelve wounded, and two missing. On another occasion a thirty-four-man patrol

from the U.S. 2d Division ran head on into

two Chinese companies. The patrol called

for and received reinforcements, and the

resulting engagement lasted until the next

morning when the enemy broke contact

and withdrew. The Americans suffered a

total of sixty-three casualties in this fight,

twelve of them killed, forty-three wounded,

and five missing. Two platoons from the

Colombian Battalion, raiding enemy positions on the morning of 10 March, engaged

the Chinese in a short but intense fire fight.

Forced to withdraw under heavy enemy artillery fire, the Colombians lost nineteen

men killed, forty-four wounded, and eight

missing.

After the flare-up of fighting in late

March, activity along the battle front again

settled into routine patrolling and smallscale harassing attacks. The calm persisted

throughout April, interrupted only by

Eighth Army raids on the enemy’s outpost

and main line of resistance positions. But as

April ended, and the armistice negotiations

at Panmunjom approached a decisive stage,

there were signs that the enemy intended to

increase the size and frequency of his attacks. Troop movements indicated that he

was shifting his forces from the northern

coastal areas and concentrating them in

more forward areas. His artillery and armor

were being positioned in depth and his

troops realigned on the front and in the

rear. An increasing number of contacts between Eighth Army and enemy patrols

showed considerable tightening of the enemy counterreconnaissance screen.

Then, in the final week of May, the Chinese conducted several attacks against the

army’s left wing. In the sector held by the

IX Corps, attacks estimated to be in regi-
280

mental strength struck the ROK 9th Division. After intense fighting the South

Koreans stopped these assaults and forced

the enemy to withdraw. In the ROK Capital Division sector, two Chinese battalions

tried to make a penetration. Although supported by large volumes of mortar and artillery fire, the Chinese were unable to drive

the South Koreans from their positions and

had to withdraw under punishing corps

and division artillery fire.

The enemy’s heaviest blow struck the

U.S. I Corps. On the evening of 28 May

five outpost positions of the U.S. 25th Division came under attack by an enemy regiment. These outposts, about 1,000 yards

forward of the division’s main line, guarded

routes of approach to the division’s center.

Nicknamed Carson, Elko, Vegas, Berlin,

and East Berlin, they were defended by

platoons from the division’s Turkish Brigade. Moving under extremely heavy artillery support, one Chinese battalion advanced on Carson and Elko. At the same

time another enemy battalion, concealed

by a smoke screen, attacked the center position, Vegas, while a third assaulted outposts

Berlin and East Berlin on the right. Three

hours after the attack began the enemy had

reached the Turkish positions on Carson

and Elko and were engaging the defenders

in hand-to-hand combat. Unable to overcome the Turks the enemy withdrew, evidently to re-form, then attacked again. At

outpost Elko, the action continued intermittently until midmorning of 29 May

when the Chinese broke contact. A few

minutes later they struck again at Elko. The

fight continued about the outpost as the enemy pressed the attack. Finally, near midnight, the division ordered the outpost

abandoned and the Turks withdrew to their

main line of resistance.

Meanwhile, a furious fight had developed around outpost Vegas. One half hour

after the Chinese began the attack on

Vegas they reinforced their attacking elements with another battalion. Pushing forward through the artillery and mortar fire

of both sides, they broke into the defensive

positions and engaged the Turks in close

combat. A Turkish company, rushed to reinforce the outpost, found hand-to-hand

fights going on around the position. Two

hours later the enemy began to break off

the attack, once again suffering numerous

casualties as the 25th Division artillery

raked the enemy routes of withdrawal.

Just after daylight the Chinese attacked

again with two battalions. This assault was

also unsuccessful and the attackers withdrew. Two hours later the Turks counterattacked enemy elements on the north slope

of the hill that contained outpost Vegas and

drove them back. The Turks now had control of the entire outpost, but the Chinese

seemed determined to seize Vegas at any

cost. At midafternoon of the same day, 29

May, another battalion struck the battered

position. The fight raged around the outpost for the remainder of the afternoon.

Then at 2300, the order to withdraw came

from division and the defenders fell back to

their main line of resistance.

The enemy attack on outposts Berlin and

East Berlin did not last long. After a bitter

two-hour fire fight the enemy gave up the

effort on these two positions and withdrew.

The Chinese had succeeded in occupying

outposts Carson, Elko, and Vegas, but they

paid a heavy price. The 25th Division reported evaluated enemy casualties in the

battle as 2,200 killed and 1,057 wounded.

In contrast the Turks reported their losses as

104 killed, 324 wounded, and 47 missing.

By the first of June it appeared certain to

intelligence officers of the Eighth Army that

the Chinese planned to strike a major blow
281

soon. Their failure to follow up the May attacks against the U.S. I Corps indicated

that those had been diversionary efforts to

screen their real intentions. The continued

movement and realignment of troops on the

enemy front and rear and the large buildup of supplies near the battle zone further

confirmed the army’s belief that a largescale Chinese attack impended. When the

enemy blow would fall or where remained

a matter of conjecture. As the first week of

June passed the front remained relatively

quiet. On the night of 10 June, the Chinese

struck.

The enemy directed his efforts against

the ROK II Corps, whose line bulged out

to form a salient in the vicinity of Kumsong.

Striking down both sides of the Pukhan

River with two divisions the Chinese succeeded in forcing the right wing and center

of the corps back about 4,000 yards in six

days of heavy fighting. Not since the spring

offensive of April–May 1951 had fighting

on such a scale occurred.

The main enemy blow fell on the II

Corps’ right wing and center. Shortly after

dark on 10 June a Chinese division attacked

the right regiment of the ROK 5th Division, whose lines lay east of the Pukhan

River. By seizing Hill 973, the dominant

height in the regiment’s sector, the enemy

forced the South Koreans to fall back about

1,000 yards. Counterattacks by the reserve

regiment of the 5th and a regiment from

corps reserve the following morning failed

to restore the main line of resistance or halt

the enemy advance. The Chinese kept up

their unrelenting pressure, forcing the 5th

to withdraw again, and by 15 June the

South Koreans had been pushed back to the

east bank of the river at a point where the

stream cut sharply eastward. There the division formed a new main line of resistance.

In the corps center the situation was just

as critical. On the night of 12 June elements

of another Chinese division struck the

ROK 8th Division’s right, which rested on

the Pukhan. As the Chinese pressed forward they made several penetrations during the next twenty-four hours. Counterattacks by the reserve regiment of the 8th

failed to halt the advance, and the Chinese

began exploiting their gains. Attacking in

regimental strength early on the morning of

14 June they soon enveloped the division’s

right regiment. The hard-pressed South

Koreans began falling back under the

weight of the enemy attack.

While the Chinese were attacking the II

Corps’ right, a smaller enemy force struck

the ROK 20th Division, on the left of the X

Corps. Evidently this was a holding attack,

for the Chinese did not press their assault.

But the collapse of the ROK 5th Division,

on the II Corps’ right, threatened the left of

the X Corps. Lt. Gen. I. D. White, the X

Corps commander, therefore narrowed the

front of the 20th Division on 16 June and

committed the ROK 7th Division, in corps

reserve, on the left of the 20th to strengthen

that flank. Other changes were being made

to meet the situation in the ROK II Corps.

The failure of the 8th Division’s right to

hold coupled with the withdrawal of the

5th east of the river opened a gap between

the divisions. The ROK II Corps commander filled this gap by committing the

ROK 3d Division, in corps reserve, between the 8th and 5th Divisions on 15 June.

At the same time General Taylor, in order

to facilitate control, temporarily shifted the

boundary between the II and X Corps

westward to the river and gave the ROK

5th Division to the X Corps. To replace the

ROK 3d, the army commander shifted the

ROK 11th Division from the ROK I Corps

over to the II Corps but kept it under army

control.
282

The Chinese continued their attacks

against the 8th Division, this time concentrating on the division’s right and center.

Under the heavy blows of the Chinese

assault the South Koreans reeled back. A

counterattack by elements of the division

on 16 June failed to push the enemy back,

and the 8th drew up on a new main line of

resistance 3,000 yards south of the original

one.

While the enemy concentrated his main

effort against the ROK II Corps, he delivered several attacks on other parts of the

front. Two outpost positions in front of the

ROK 1st Division, in the U.S. I Corps, fell

to the enemy near the end of June, after a

prolonged attack by a Chinese regiment.

Farther east, in the sector of the IX Corps,

the Chinese employed forces in battalion

and regimental strength in a thrust against

the U.S. 3d and ROK 9th Divisions. They

made minor penetrations in the lines of the

3d, but counterattacks quickly restored the

positions. In the ROK 9th Division’s sector

the Chinese failed to make a dent. In the

eastern sector of the Eighth Army’s front,

North Korean attacks forced a minor readjustment of main line of resistance positions

on the X Corps’ right wing. At the same

time enemy forces were successful in seizing

Hill 351, the northern anchor of the ROK

I Corps line.

By 18 June, a slackening of enemy pressure enabled the corps to stabilize its front.

General Taylor directed the commanders of

the ROK II and U.S. X Corps to readjust

their forces so as to permit the relief of the

ROK 5th and 7th Divisions and to reestablish the boundary that existed between

the corps before 15 June. The enemy made

no further attacks on the II Corps front

until the middle of July, just before the termination of hostilities.

Meanwhile a major airborne movement

brought General Taylor additional troops

from Japan. The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team assembled at two air

bases in Japan on 21 June. In a matter of

hours the entire unit, completely equipped

for combat with vehicles, artillery, ammunition, and rations, was flown to forward air

bases near the front. A few days later a

similar movement took place. The 34th

Regimental Combat Team (less one rifle

battalion) of the 24th Division, similarly

equipped, boarded aircraft at an air base

near Tokyo and was flown to Pusan and

Taegu.

Measured in terms of ground gained, the

enemy attacks of mid-June on the ROK II

Corps front were successful. The Chinese

succeeded in pushing 15,000 yards of the

corps front back about 4,000 yards. Moreover, their attacks caused three ROK divisions to be redeployed in reinforcing and

counterattacking roles. Both sides incurred

heavy casualties. The Chinese lost an estimated 6,628 men, and the II Corps reported 7,377 casualties as a direct result of

the attacks.

Enemy attacks against the II Corps subsided after 18 June and by the end of the

month action along the entire army front

returned to routine patrolling and light attacks. But the army commander felt that

the Chinese would again launch an attack

in strength. It was not long in coming, this

time against the left flank of the II Corps

and the right flank of the IX Corps. The

Capital Division, defending the IX Corps

right-flank sector, faced northwest.

On the night of 13 July, the Chinese attacked the IX Corps’ right flank with three

divisions and soon broke through the South

Korean lines. A good deal of confusion ensued as the Capital Division’s right and

center fell back. Some of the troops with-
283

drew into the zone of the II Corps as units

became entangled and lateral communication was lost. On the division’s extreme left,

things went somewhat better. There the

units fell back in an orderly fashion under

the crushing weight of Chinese attacks. But

the collapse of the Capital Division made

matters worse for the II Corps, whose situation was already serious.

The Chinese had timed their assault on

the Capital Division with another attack, in

division strength, against the ROK 6th

Division, protecting the II Corps’ left. After

vainly trying to hold back the onslaught,

the South Koreans began giving way. Their

left flank was exposed by the withdrawal of

the Capital Division, and the enemy was

threatening to get into the rear of the 6th

and cut it off. To prevent an enemy envelopment the division had no choice but to

pull back. Retiring slowly, the 6th took

a heavy toll of the attacking Chinese while

farther to the east the ROK 8th and 3d

Divisions moved back under heavy enemy

pressure.

To meet the situation in the Eighth

Army’s center, General Taylor directed the

commanders of the IX and II Corps to

establish and hold a new main line of resistance along the south bank of the Kumsong River, a tributary of the Pukhan. In

order to restore the line in the Capital Division zone, he permitted the U.S. 3d Division to be moved from its sector in the vicinity of Ch’orwon to the right wing of the IX

Corps. The U.S. 2d Division extended its

sector to the right to cover the position vacated by the 3d. The corps commander reinforced the 2d by attaching to it the 187th

Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which

dug in on the division’s right. At the same

time the 34th Regimental Combat Team

(less one battalion) came up from Pusan

and assumed the role of a counterattacking

force. It took up positions in rear of the 2d

Division.

In the II Corps the ROK 11th Division,

in reserve, moved up to relieve the hardpressed 6th. The ROK 7th Division on the

left wing of X Corps moved out of the line,

and its place was taken by the U.S. 45th

Division. The 7th then came over to the II

Corps. Further changes occurred in the

corps when the ROK 6th hastily reorganized and moved into the sectors held by the

ROK 3d and 5th Divisions. The two latter

divisions went into corps reserve. After this

reorganization the II Corps counterattacked on 17 July with three divisions in an

attempt to seize the high ground along the

Kumsong and establish a new main line of

resistance. By 20 July the II Corps attained

its objective and held it. No attempt was

made to restore the original line, inasmuch

as the imminence of an armistice made it

tactically unnecessary to expend lives for

terrain not essential to the security of the

Eighth Army’s front.

Enemy losses in July were tremendous.

The army estimated that the Chinese lost

over 72,000 men, more than 25,000 of them

killed. Out of the five Chinese armies that

had been identified in the attacks upon the

II and IX Corps, the enemy had lost the

equivalent of seven divisions.

While the fighting raged on the central

front, the negotiators at Panmunjom rapidly

approached an agreement on armistice

terms. On 19 July agreement was reached

on all points by both sides. The next day

liaison and staff officers began the task of

drawing up the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. All details of the armistice

agreement and its implementation were

completed in a week. At 1000 hours on 27

July Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., the

senior United Nations delegate to the armistice negotiations, signed the armistice pa-
284

pers. At the same time the senior enemy

delegate, General Nam Il, placed his signature on the documents. The signing took

place at this time to permit the armistice to

go into effect at 2200 hours of the same day,

as required by the agreement. Later General Clark, for the United Nations, General

Kim Il Sung, for North Korea, and General

Peng Teh-Huai, for the Chinese forces on

the peninsula, affixed their signatures.

ment, “not peace in the world. We may

not now relax our guard nor cease our

quest.”

Despite the failure to settle the issue in

Korea, the United States and its partners in

the fight against aggression had gained

some insight into the manner of foe that opposed them. They learned that the communist adversary would use every means at

his command to gain an advantage, both

political and military; that he was willing,

as in his use of human-sea tactics, to expend

his soldiers’ lives prodigally in order to offset superior fire power. And, most important, they learned that the enemy, though

powerful, was not invulnerable.

The countries that fought under the flag

of the United Nations to prevent the conquest of South Korea had demonstrated

their ability to put aside differences and act

in concert against a common enemy. That

nations of highly diverse cultural, religious,

and racial background were willing to place

their forces under a single command, in this

case the United States, was evidence that

free men could rise above national pride in

their never-ending fight to remain free.

The conflict in Korea had lasted three

years, one month, and two days. It had destroyed Korean homes, fields, and factories,

wrecked the nation’s economy, and threatened the populace with famine and disease.

It had consumed the lives of hundreds of

thousands of civilians and soldiers from nations all over the face of the globe. Many

had died who a short time before had

known Korea only as an exotic place name

on a map. The signing of the armistice

brought an end to the shooting; it did not

bring an end to the ideological war. “We

have won an armistice on a single battleground,” said President Eisenhower as the

Panmunjom negotiators reached agree-
SECTION 8

1 July–31 December 1952
286
287
288

TREATING A ROK SOLDIER wounded on Capital Hill, 8 September, right.

BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF CAPITAL HILL, dominated by enemy terrain, background.
289
290

QUAD .50’S adding fire power to a counterattack on Old Baldy, 21 September.
291

BATTLE WEARY from fighting on Old Baldy.
292

ROK MP’s TRYING TO GET WARM near White Horse, 8 October.
293

ASSEMBLY POINT for ROK 9th Division infantrymen.

WHITE HORSE (Hill 395) one of two key heights

northwest of Ch’orwon attacked by enemy units in

October. Vehicle is a 90-mm. gun motor carriage

M36.
294

WOUNDED ON WHITE HORSE, two ROK 9th Division soldiers head for medical treatment.
295

MEDICAL AID MEN DRESSING WOUNDS at an aid station near base of White Horse.
296

F-86 SABREJETS OVER NORTH KOREA hunting for MIG-15’s. During September pilots from the

Fifth Air Force shot down sixty-four MIG’s at a cost of seven Sabrejets.
297

ADJUSTING ROCKETS on the wing of an AD Skyraider before take-off

BANSHEES returning to the USS Kearsarge after a mission over Korea.
298

WINTER 1952
T66 MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS in action, 40th

Division sector, 26 November. Except for brief encounters with the enemy, most of the front remained relatively quiet during November and

December.

299
300
301

PRESIDENT-ELECT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER in Korea, December 1952. Above, the President-elect

is with Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, Commanding General, 2d Division. Left page above, he has

dinner with 3d Division troops, south of Ch’orwon. Below, he leaves 3d Division area by jeep;

in back seat are Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Commanding General, IX Corps (left), and Maj.

Gen. George W. Smythe, Commanding General, 3d Division.

SECTION 9

1 January–27 July 1953

305
306

CLEANING SNOW OFF THE FLIGHT DECK of an aircraft carrier.

TROOPS FROM THAILAND arriving at Inch’on, January 1953.
307

DESTINATION KOJE-DO. Troops from the 23d Infantry, scheduled for guard duty at the prisoner

compound, board ship via cargo net.
308

INSIDE A BUNKER on Hill 200.

PHILIPPINE SOLDIERS attached to the 45th Division put on snow suits before leaving on a night

patrol mission, north of Yanggu.
309

LUNCH PICNIC-STYLE. The men are from Company K, 15th Infantry.
NAVY MEN WORKING IN A SNOWSTORM at an emergency airfield.

310

PATROL OF THE 35TH INFANTRY studying a map of enemy terrain. Armored vests are clearly visible

on the two men at left.
311

ENTERTAINMENT for 55th Transportation Truck Battalion, Eighth Army. The cast is from the

motion picture, “The Girls of Pleasure Island.”
312

TROOPS BOARDING A HELICOPTER to be airlifted up to the line.

ENEMY TERRAIN as seen through chicken wire in front of an outpost. The wire helped to keep

grenades from coming into the bunkers; often the wire was used as a base for supporting

camouf lage material.
313

GENERAL MARK W. CLARK, Commander in Chief, U.N. Command (right), at the Greek

Battalion headquarters. With him are (from left) Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Commanding

General, IX Corps; Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth Army; and

Lt. Col. George Koumanacos, Commanding Officer of the Greek Battalion.
314

WOUNDED 7TH DIVISION INFANTRYMAN is rushed away from the fight on Pork Chop Hill.
315

CARTING AWAY TWO CHINESE PRISONERS captured on Pork Chop Hill, 17 April 1953.
316

U.N. AND NORTH KOREAN OFFICERS acknowledging receipt of returnees.

EMACIATED AND WOUNDED AMERICAN receiving new clothing at Freedom Village, Panmunjom.
317

LIBERATED AMERICANS are escorted down the ramp of a C-124 upon arrival in Japan for

medical treatment before continuing the trip back to the United States.

OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH, April 1953. On 11 April agreement was reached for the exchange of

605 U.N. prisoners for 6,030 enemy prisoners.
318

SIGNING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT at 1000 hours, 27 July 1953, Panmunjom. Lt. Gen. William K.
319

Harrison, Jr., signs for the United Nations (left), and General Nam Il for the Communists (right).
320

7TH DIVISION POSITION just before it was abandoned, 31 July.
321

1ST MARINE DIVISION MEN after receiving word of the armistice.

40TH DIVISION TROOPS all packed and ready to leave Heartbreak Ridge.
322

FIRST SHIPMENT OF REPATRIATED MEN from Korea docking at San Francisco, 23 August.
323

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN boarding a plane at Tokyo for home, 21 September.

325

List of Pictorial Sources

Page

31

32–33

34

35

36–37 (top)

36 (bottom)

37 (bottom)

38 (top)

38 (bottom)

39 (top)

39 (bottom)

40 (top)

41 (top)

40–41 (bottom)

42

43

44 (top)

44 (bottom)

45 (top)

45 (bottom)

46 (top left)

46 (top right)

46 (bottom)

47

48

49

53

54 (top)

Source

USAF

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

Number

79347 AC

355931

355593

355566

355553

425403

425473

355563

355565

355547

356269

355576

355574

356475

356295

356682

356636

356696

356347

356713

355939

355940

356671

356736

375189

(cartoon)

FEC–51–4601

356902

Page

54 (bottom)

55 (top)

55 (bottom)

56 (top)

56 (bottom)

56–57 (center)

57 (top)

57 (bottom)

58

59

60 (top)

60 (bottom)

61 (top)

61 (bottom)

62-63

64 (top)

64 (bottom)

65

66–67

68 (top)

68 (bottom)

69

70 (left)

70 (right)

71

72

73 (top)

73 (bottom)

Source

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USAF

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

USAF

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Number

356897

357169

357402

362393

362139

78972 AC

356733

356880

361469

(cartoon)

357386

357227

357742

357320

358042

358094

358093

(cartoon)

unknown

358336

358494

358774

359414

358263

358159

358508

358624

358622

The following list gives the origin of all photographs and cartoons

which appear in this book. The photographs were selected from those

in the files of the Army Signal Corps (SC), the Air Force (USAF), the

Navy (USN), and the Marine Corps (USMC). The cartoons were

published originally in the Pacific Edition of the Army newspaper,

Stars and Stripes. Further information concerning photographs may be

secured from the agency of origin, Washington 25, D. C. Inquiries

should include the number of the photograph.
326

Page Source Number Page Source Number

74–75 (top)

74–75 (bottom

76–77

77

80–81 (top)

80–81 (bottom)

82

83 (top)

83 (bottom)

84–85

85

86

87 (top)

87 (bottom)

88 (top)

88 (bottom)

89

90

90–91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98–99

121

122 (top)

122 (middle)

122 (bottom)

123 (top)

123 (middle)

123 (bottom)

124 (top left)

124 (top right)

124 (bottom)

125 (top left)

125 (top right)

125 (bottom)

126

127 (top)

127 (bottom)

128 (left)

128 (right)

129

132

133 (top)

133 (bottom)

USN

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USAF

SC

SC

SC

USAF

USAF

USAF

SC

SC

USMC

USMC

USMC

USMC

USAF

USAF

USN

USMC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

USN

USN

USAF

USAF

USAF

SC

SC

USMC

426777

426781

359744

359404

359910

359805

360254

360255

362325

361405

79951 AC

362092

362126

362114

79676 AC

79638 AC

79628 AC

361980

362117

A–8613

A–7091

A–8941

A–8759

79649 AC

80332 AC

708178

A–7797

365854

365440

365791

365849

365755

365760

365542

365570

365544

365547

FEC–51–23765

365537

428635

428637

428678

79842 AC

A–79842–AC

80333 AC

368493

368504

A–156986

134 (top)

134 (bottom)

135

136 (top)

136 (bottom)

137 (top)

137 (bottom)

138 (top)

138 (bottom)

139 (top)

139 (bottom)

140 (top)

140 (bottom)

141

142 (top)

142 (bottom)

143 (top)

143 (bottom)

144

145 (top)

145 (bottom)

146

147

148 (top)

148 (bottom)

149

150 (top)

150 (bottom)

151

152 (top)

152 (bottom)

153 (top)

153 (bottom)

157

158

158–59

160

161 (top)

161 (bottom)

162

163 (top)

163 (bottom)

164 (top)

164 (bottom)

165

166

167 (top)

167 (bottom)

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

SC

SC

SC

USN

USN

USN

USN

USN

USN

USN

USN

USMC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

USAF

USAF

USAF

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USAF

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

367550

368661

368660

368676

368540

368543

369065

368815

369479

368813

368690

369492

369216

368735

429640

368949

369402

370299

429680

429857

429641

430064

430052

429644

429685

429504

A–8615–A

369995

369801

(cartoon)

80508 AC

79848 AC

79852 AC

428390

373296

372740

373647

372280

374102

374889

80703 AC

375088

FEC–51–26651

376086

376744

376719

FEC–51–27649

376599
327

Page Source Number Page Source Number

168

169

170 (top)

170 (bottom)

171

172

173

174 (top)

174 (bottom)

175 (top)

175 (bottom)

176 (top)

176 (bottom)

177 (top)

177 (bottom)

178

179 (top)

179 (bottom)

180–81

182 (top left)

182 (top right)

182 (bottom)

183

184 (top)

184–85 (bottom)

185 (top)

186

187 (top)

187 (bottom)

188

189

190 (top)

190 (bottom)

191

192 (top)

192 (bottom)

193

194

195 (top)

195 (bottom)

196

197 (left)

197 (right)

198

199 (top)

199 (bottom)

200–201

SC

USAF

SC

SC

SC

USAF

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

USAF

USN

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USMC

SC

USMC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

375862

79336 AC

378047

376996

376379

80647 AC

378951

378054

378191

378612

378297

378289

FEC–51–30742

(cartoon)

378303

80805 AC

430680

431295

379463

379465

382525

379470

379512

380915

381464

(cartoon)

381110

381108

381111

381467

382532

380802

381292

380947

A-9765

380918

A–156727

382462

382556

382887

381452

381453

378205

383938

383177

382914

435681

221

222

223 (top)

223 (bottom)

224–25

226 (top)

226 (bottom)

227 (top)

227 (bottom)

228

229 (top)

229 (bottom)

230 (top)

230 (bottom)

231

232–33

234

235 (top)

235 (bottom)

236 (top)

236 (bottom)

237 (top left)

237 (top right)

237 (bottom)

238 (top)

238 (bottom)

239 (top)

239 (bottom)

240

241

242 (left)

242 (right)

243

244 (top)

244 (bottom)

245

246

247

248

249

250

251 (top)

251 (bottom)

252

253 (top)

253 (bottom)

254 (top)

254 (bottom)

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

USMC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

385806

385608

386280

386281

385200

385330

385420

385430

385331

385280

(cartoon)

385790

385626

(cartoon)

385627

385807

386490

386482

385444

386546

386547

386505

386508

389599

386823

386824

386877

386878

FEC–52–37820

387033

(cartoon)

388645

A–157778

388736

387445

388474

387049

(cartoon)

387456

388477

388566

388754

388755

392561

392995

390105

421650

405822
328

Page Source Number Page Source Number

255 (top)

255 (bottom)

256

257 (top)

257 (bottom)

258–59

260 (top)

260 (bottom)

261 (top)

261 (bottom)

262 (top)

262 (bottom)

263

264 (top)

264 (bottom)

265

266

286–87

288

289

290 (top)

290 (bottom)

291

292–93

292 (bottom)

293 (bottom)

294

295

296

297 (top)

297 (bottom)

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USAF

USN

USAF

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

USN

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USAF

USN

USN

421635

405834

390177

390612

390129

392504

399346

395043

397517

398702

83054 AC

444157

81504 AC

(cartoon)

406096

406069

443864

423081

407539

426124

(cartoon)

408532

404701

418366

418372

418362

418375

418380

82042 AC

448324

480057

298

299 (top)

299 (bottom)

300 (top)

300 (bottom)

301

305

306 (top)

306 (bottom)

307

308 (top)

308 (bottom)

309

310 (top)

310 (bottom)

311

312 (top)

312 (bottom)

313

314

315 (top)

315 (bottom)

316 (top)

316 (bottom)

317

318–19

320

321 (top)

321 (bottom)

322

323

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

USN

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

SC

Stars and Stripes

SC

USN

USN

USAF

USN

SC

SC

USN

SC

SC

449917

411730

411732

416354

416389

412361

416204

478280

426136

416243

424253

422625

415948

480136

419512

FEC–53–2238

422077

424400

428313

422963

(cartoon)

422968

633215

481024

82929 AC

625914

431799

432931

626455

425766

435044