In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐3784

JORGE BAEZ‐SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United

States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A206 017 181.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 — DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 2017

____________________

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This proceeding begins

where L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2014), ends.

We held in LDG that the Attorney General has authority un‐

der 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) to waive an alien’s inadmissi‐

bility—and thus to halt removal temporarily—while the al‐
2 No. 16‐3784

ien requests a U visa from the Department of Homeland Se‐

curity. After Jorge Baez‐Sanchez requested that relief from an

immigration judge, however, the Board of Immigration Ap‐

peals held that IJs lack authority to grant such requests.

LDG addressed the question whether the Attorney Gen‐

eral has the authority to waive the inadmissibility of an alien

seeking a U visa. We assumed that, in removal proceedings,

IJs may exercise all of the Attorney General’s discretionary

powers over immigration. The panel did not justify that as‐

sumption, because the parties had not doubted its correct‐

ness. But after LDG the Board concluded that the assumption

is mistaken. In re Khan, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (2016), holds that IJs

have only such powers as have been delegated and that the

power to waive an alien’s inadmissibility during proceedings

seeking U visas is not among them. The Third Circuit has

agreed with that conclusion. Sunday v. Attorney General, 832

F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2016). We must decide in this case whether

to follow Sunday and Khan.

Delegation from the Attorney General to immigration

judges is a matter of regulation, and arguably pertinent reg‐

ulations are scattered through Title 8 of the Code of Federal

Regulations. The BIA in Khan observed, correctly, that the

panel in LDG had not mentioned 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.2(d),

1235.2(d), which omit any delegation to IJs of the power to

waive an alien’s admissibility. And that’s true, for those regu‐

lations concern the powers of District Directors rather than

the powers of IJs. The principal regulation that does cover

IJs’ authority is 8 C.F.R. §1003.10, which provides in part:

(a) Appointment. The immigration judges are attorneys whom

the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges within

the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to conduct specified

classes of proceedings, including hearings under section 240 of
No. 16‐3784 3

the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. Immigration judges shall

act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come be‐

fore them.

(b) Powers and duties. In conducting hearings under section 240

of the Act and such other proceedings the Attorney General may

assign to them, immigration judges shall exercise the powers

and duties delegated to them by the Act and by the Attorney

General through regulation. In deciding the individual cases be‐

fore them, and subject to the applicable governing standards,

immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment

and discretion and may take any action consistent with their au‐

thorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and

necessary for the disposition of such cases. Immigration judges

shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, exam‐

ine, and cross‐examine aliens and any witnesses. Subject to

§§ 1003.35 and 1287.4 of this chapter, they may issue administra‐

tive subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the presenta‐

tion of evidence. In all cases, immigration judges shall seek to re‐

solve the questions before them in a timely and impartial man‐

ner consistent with the Act and regulations.

The Attorney General’s brief in this court observes that

§1003.10(b) does not delegate to IJs any power to waive an

alien’s inadmissibility. Sure enough, it doesn’t. But

§1003.10(a) does. It says that “[i]mmigration judges shall act

as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come

before them.” This sounds like a declaration that IJs may ex‐

ercise all of the Attorney General’s powers “in the cases that

come before them”, unless some other regulation limits that

general delegation. The BIA in Khan did not identify any

provision that subtracts from the delegation in §1003.10(a).

Nor did the Third Circuit in Sunday. Indeed, neither the BIA

nor the Third Circuit cited §1003.10(a). We therefore adhere

to the view of LDG that IJs may exercise the Attorney Gen‐

eral’s powers over immigration.
4 No. 16‐3784

Perhaps anticipating that we would reach this conclu‐

sion, the Attorney General’s brief makes a much broader ar‐

gument in defense of the BIA’s decision. The brief contends

that the Attorney General himself has no authority to grant

waivers of inadmissibility to aliens seeking U visas—and

that, if the Attorney General does possess this authority, it

may be used only with respect to aliens who seek that relief

before entering the United States. (Baez‐Sanchez was inside

our borders when he sought the waiver.)

The first of these arguments rests on 6 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)

and 557, which the Attorney General reads as transferring to

the Secretary of Homeland Security all of the Attorney Gen‐

eral’s discretionary powers under the immigration laws.

There are two problems with this contention.

First, §271(b) transfers only a particular set of powers,

and waivers of inadmissibility are not on its list. Section 557

does not independently transfer any powers; instead it de‐

pends for its effect on other statutes, regulations, and reor‐

ganization plans. Although the Department of Homeland

Security is principally responsible for administering the im‐

migration laws, whether the statutory power to waive an al‐

ien’s inadmissibility belongs exclusively to the Secretary of

Homeland Security depends on statutes, regulations, and

reorganization plans that the briefs do not address.

Second, the Board of Immigration Appeals did not rely

on §§ 271(b) or 557 in either Khan or its decision with respect

to Baez‐Sanchez. Instead the BIA assumed that the power to

waive an alien’s inadmissibility belongs to the Attorney Gen‐

eral. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that

the validity of an agency’s decision depends on the agency’s

reasoning. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943).
No. 16‐3784 5

Because the BIA has not made anything of §271(b), §557, or

any law, regulation, or reorganization plan that those two

statutes might implement, we cannot do so either. The sub‐

ject is open on remand, but it is not a ground on which the

current decision may be enforced.

The remaining contention—that the power to grant a

waiver of inadmissibility may be exercised only in favor of

an alien who has yet to enter the United States—was at least

hinted at by the Board. But the BIA did not rest its decision

on this ground. Immigration law has historically applied at

least some rules about “admissibility” to aliens already in

the United States, see In re Menendez, 12 I&N Dec. 291, 292

(1967); In re Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (2012), and the

Secretary of Homeland Security seems to believe that he has

the authority to grant waivers of inadmissibility under

§1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) to aliens in the United States. See 8 C.F.R.

§212.17. If the Secretary can do this, why not the Attorney

General? Perhaps neither official can do so, but Chenery pre‐

vents us from pursuing that question.

It should be clear from what we have said that the par‐

ties’ arguments about the effects of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),

and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), are premature. First

the Board must address and resolve the essential issues; only

then can we consider whether the disposition lies within the

scope of the agency’s discretion.

The Board is free to address all of these matters on re‐

mand, as it is also free to decide whether to exercise in favor

of, or against, Baez‐Sanchez whatever discretion the Attor‐

ney General possesses.
6 No. 16‐3784

The petition for review is granted, the Board’s decision is

vacated, and the matter is remanded for proceedings con‐

sistent with this opinion.