JSOU Report 09-7 Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for IW Crawford

Manhunting: 

Counter-Network

Organization for 

Irregular Warfare

George A. Crawford

JSOU Report 09-7

September 2009
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

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Kenneth H. Poole, YC-3, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Senior Lecturer, DoD Analysis, Naval 

Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 
On the cover. 14 August 2007, Iraqi special operations forces, advised by 

U.S. Special Forces, conduct a combat operation to detain suspected terrorist leaders of an insurgent force in Baghdad, Iraq. U.S. Navy photo by 

Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Johansen Laurel. 

JSOU Report 09-7

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2009

Manhunting: 

Counter-Network

Organization for 

Irregular Warfare

George A. Crawford
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-39-3
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or 

position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency,

October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing 

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line,

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect 

Approaches, February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White 

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, March 2009 

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy:The Past as Present, the 

Present as Future, April 2009, Roby C. Barrett 

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May 2009, 

John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(16-19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection,

July 2009, William G. Perry

Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment, July 2009, Russell D. Howard 
vii

Foreword

I

n this JSOU monograph, George A. Crawford provides considerations for 

making manhunting a foundation of U.S. national strategy. He argues 

that a well-organized and centrally controlled manhunting capability 

would expand strategic options for national leaders as they advance U.S. 

national interests in a complex and unruly world. 

Mr. Crawford’s argument suggests that manhunting is an instrument 

of national power, if not a basic element such as diplomacy and economics. Thus manhunting effectiveness demands requisite organization and 

doctrine to ensure its effectiveness. The monograph offers the reader some 

ideas for organizing manhunting activities at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels. 

Mr. Crawford envisions a national-level organization, much like the Office 

of Strategic Services (OSS) that would pull together the various skills needed 

for an organization with global reach. Contributing agencies might include 

Special Operations Forces, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals 

Service, the Department of the Treasury, and more. But it took a long time 

for DHS (formed in 2001) to get up and running and it should be expected 

that a national manhunting agency would be a challenging organization 

to stand-up as well. The benefits of such an effort could be cogent policy 

direction, unified operational direction, and effective tactical formations. Of 

course this depends upon accepting the assertion that manhunting should 

be a central feature of U.S. national security strategy. 

The intense search for Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and their ilk 

have been a prominent and consuming feature of our campaigns in Southwest Asia. Hunting for persons of national interest and high value targets 

has been emblematic of U.S. operations—direct action—whereas indirect 

methods such as foreign internal defense should have been seen as the main 

effort. Further, the direct action operations by our U.S. military have been 

superbly organized and executed, suggesting that we have about the right 

mix of organizations to do the job well. 

In addition to the strategic argument for enhancing U.S. manhunting 

capabilities as outlined by his monograph, the author provides a wealth of 

information in the three appendices: a history of U.S. manhunting efforts, a 
viii

view of manhunting from other countries, and some examples of personnel 

recovery operations. 

The monograph draws upon Mr. Crawford’s earlier research, Manhunting: 

Reversing the Polarity of Warfare, and the excellent work of Steven Marks, 

Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson in their Naval Post Graduate School paper 

titled Manhunting: a Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest. 

Mr. Crawford’s excellent endnotes provide a wide array of source material 

and information. Whatever one’s view of the importance of manhunting 

to national security policy, the reader will find Mr. Crawford’s monograph 

interesting and informative reading. 

Kenneth H. Poole

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
ix

About the Author

Mr. George A. Crawford is a 

senior director for Archimedes Global, Inc, where he 

is an adviser on strategic communication, counterterrorism, weapons of mass 

destruction, and other national security 

matters for a client in the Washington, 

D.C. area. He also conducts research 

focused on development of manhunting and counter-network capabilities to 

address growing challenges posed by state and nonstate actors, including 

terrorism, piracy, arms proliferation, organized crime, and other nefarious 

actors.

He received his B.A. in International Relations from the University 

of Kansas in 1985 and M.S. in Computer Applications Management from 

Lesley University in 1990. He also received a linguist certificate in Russian 

from the Defense Language Institute in 1992. He has served in the nation’s 

most sensitive and trusted positions for over 25 years, with “boots-on-theground” operational experience ranging from hostile-fire zones in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Afghanistan to key intelligence command positions 

in the United States, Europe, and Asia. His experience includes operational 

assignments with special operations and special activities, intelligence collection and analysis, information operations and psychological operations, 

as a foreign area officer specializing in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as 

acting Air and Defense Attaché to Kyrgyzstan, and ballistic missile launch 

officer. A trained interrogator, he was selected by the commander of United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as an inspector for the 

Secretary of Defense Interrogation Special Focus Team. He transitioned 

from the U.S. Air Force in 2007, retiring as a lieutenant colonel.

Mr. Crawford has written many documents at both unclassified and 

classified levels, including intelligence reporting and recommendations that 

have been provided to the President, National Security Council, Congress, 

Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense leaders. He personally 

authored the intelligence plan for military operations in Kosovo and was the 
x

lead strategist for developing USSOCOM’s advanced intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for counterterrorism operations. Mr. 

Crawford’s unclassified papers have been published in American Intelligence 

Journal, Airpower Chronicle, and Spokesman. He is the author of Manhunting: Reversing the Polarity of Warfare (Publish America, 2008). 
1

Manhunting: Counter-Network 

Organization for Irregular Warfare

Manhunting—the deliberate concentration of national power to 

find, influence, capture, or when necessary kill an individual to 

disrupt a human network1—has emerged as a key component 

of operations to counter irregular warfare adversaries in lieu of traditional 

state-on-state conflict measures. It has arguably become a primary area of 

emphasis in countering terrorist and insurgent opponents. 

Despite our increasing employment of manhunting, our national security 

establishment has not developed appropriate doctrine, dealt with challenging legal issues, nor have we organized forces and assigned clear responsibility to deploy and employ these capabilities. Were we to do so, manhunting 

could become an important element of our future national security policy, 

as highly trained teams disrupt or disintegrate human networks. Formally 

adopting manhunting capabilities would allow the United States to interdict 

threats without resorting to the expense and turbulence associated with 

deployment of major military formations. Manhunting capabilities could 

play a central role in the implementation of U.S. national security strategy 

in the 21st century. 

Nearly every week, the media announces that a terrorist or insurgent 

figure has been apprehended or killed. Manhunting operations appear to 

have become a generally accepted norm. Indeed, national power has been 

employed with increasing frequency as American policy sought to influence, capture, or kill individuals who posed a national security risk. The 

ongoing combat operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban extremists were 

not America’s first attempt to interdict individuals with martial force. From 

colonial efforts to pacify Native American leaders, through today’s efforts to 

combat terrorists and insurgents, America repeatedly found utility in using 

armed force to seek out key individuals and disrupt human networks. 
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JSOU Report 09-7

This monograph reviews historical cases related to manhunting. The 

United States has employed manhunting since colonial days. American 

manhunting operations, however, have historically been ad-hoc affairs. 

Drawing on overviews of both American and international cases, the monograph derives lessons from a large number of historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, the monograph then explores potential 

doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines how 

to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for 

American national security. 

Appendix A provides a synopsis of American operations through history 

that involved manhunting aspects. Historic government operations demonstrate that manhunting is not only a legitimate form of warfare, but has 

been taking place with accelerating frequency over the last three decades. 

The historical cases listed in Appendix A demonstrate that over 50 discrete 

manhunting operations have been conducted through American history, in 

addition to more than 25 significant campaigns waged in which manhunting 

was a key component of the operational mission.2 Though recurring with 

some regularity, manhunting operations have historically been the exception rather than the norm. They were unique activities, often conducted in 

an ad-hoc fashion, for specific purposes in response to isolated events. For 

the last two decades, manhunting operations have increased in frequency at 

a near-exponential rate. There have been few efforts to institutionalize this 

emerging capability for our nation. 

Manhunting operations are not 

exclusive to the United States; similar 

operations have been carried out at 

least since Alexander harried Darius III 

and Rome pursued Hannibal.3 Appendix B provides a synopsis of historical 

Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby. In 

1863, his daring raid on the Fairfax Court 

House behind Union lines to capture Federal General E. H. Stoughton caused President Lincoln to lament, “I don’t mind the 

loss of a general, for I can make another in 

five minutes. But I hate to lose the horses.” 

National Archives photo (civil-war-148). 
3

Crawford: Manhunting

manhunting operations conducted by other nations. This history includes 

assassinations of key leaders by governments. Appendix B demonstrates 

that many nations would have to seriously evaluate their own history before 

calling into question manhunting efforts by other nations. Appendix B also 

indicates other countries have manhunting experience that could benefit 

American national security planners who are considering these activities. 

Appendix C lists historical American personnel recovery operations. In 

the case of kidnapping, hostage rescue, and in some prisoner-of-war cases, 

manhunting techniques have been employed to find and fix the captors 

in order to rescue the captive. Though the personnel recovery objective 

fundamentally differs from targets of manhunting operations, personnel 

recovery operations have similar tactics, techniques, and procedures to those 

employed for manhunting, with one key difference. While the target of a 

manhunt avoids being found, influenced, captured, or killed, the target of 

a personnel recovery operation seeks to be found and returned home. With 

this proviso, the history of personnel recovery operations may shed light on 

potential manhunting doctrine and organization.

Lessons Derived from Manhunting Operations

Given historic examples from Appendices A through C, what lessons can 

we derive for the success of future manhunting operations? Several trends 

are evident.

First, there is no substitute for knowledge of the target. Cultural, environmental, and linguistic expertise—especially the involvement of native 

experts—is crucial to the successful conclusion of a manhunting operation. Native scouts and allied forces fill crucial roles, providing the cultural 

bridge needed for successful operations. Native expertise is not necessarily 

a prerequisite. Daniel Boone not only gained frontier knowledge needed 

to track his daughter’s captors for 2 days across the Kentucky wilderness; 

his cultural immersion was such that the Shawnee chief—whose own son 

Boone had killed in the pursuit—later adopted Boone as a surrogate son. 

Lieutenant Charles Bare Gatewood’s knowledge and acceptance of Apache 

culture was important in pursuing and apprehending the Apache warriors 

Victorio and Geronimo. Thomas Tate Tobin’s innate skill as a mountain man 

allowed him to find, fix, and finish the renegade Espinosa brothers whose 
4

JSOU Report 09-7

trail of theft and murder across Colorado in the 1860s earned their gang the 

name “Bloody Espinosas.” Billy Waugh’s persistence, knowledge of human 

character traits, and ability to establish an unobtrusive urban observation 

post allowed him to find and fix international terrorist Carlos the Jackal 

for later apprehension by French security forces. These four exemplify the 

potential for “outsiders” to acquire knowledge of a culture. The intelligence 

“analyst-hunters” who drove the successful apprehension of Saddam Hussein acquired the modern version of this expertise in a self-taught manner. 

Schooling can help, but nothing equates to experience gained through 

immersion in the culture and environment. 

Second, persistence pays. Experts who dedicated themselves to the task 

in a cradle-to-grave manner have carried out the most successful manhunts. 

Again, the examples of Boone, Gatewood, Tobin, and Waugh are particularly 

instructive. Law enforcement “sting” operations provide similar examples. 

Most successful hunters stalk their quarry in a deliberate, patient manner, 

waiting for an opportunity to strike. Employment of lures, traps, blinds, 

and deception can augment the efforts of a persistent group of manhunters 

in a manner analogous to those who pursue game in the wild.4 When the 

goal is to influence an opponent, the lures, traps, blinds, and other deception efforts may be more fine-tuned or nuanced; but the goal remains the 

same—to draw the opponents into an area where they can be successfully 

engaged. 

Third, size matters. Throughout the history of manhunting operations, 

small teams have achieved the most effective results.5 Rhodesian and South 

African tracker teams typically employed four men.6 British Commonwealth 

tracker teams in the Malayan Emergency were similar in nature, often 

attaching native Iban and Dayak tribesmen to military elements. American Combat Tracker Teams in Vietnam comprised five to ten men. Modern 

command and control capabilities can help large organizations to achieve 

effective results; the capture of Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega, and Al 

Qaeda terrorists involved organizations of nearly a thousand people. It is 

simply more difficult to manipulate the levers of larger organizations in a 

manhunt because large organizations tend to be less agile than a single individual or small network. Even today, special operations, law enforcement, 
5

Crawford: Manhunting

and intelligence forces that achieve effective results are typified by small 

field elements, with a dedicated support infrastructure to provide intelligence, mobility, and firepower. Additionally, these operations often bypass 

bureaucratic stratification, allowing disparate elements to work in direct 

communication with one another.

Fourth, manhunting is a people- and process-oriented endeavor. In 

successful operations, technology played only a supporting role.7 Similarly, 

the most effective manhunting operations are centered on people with the 

requisite skills, participating in a mutually understood process to achieve 

a clearly articulated goal. In some cases, while technology has enhanced 

this ability, technology has not been the most significant contributor to 

manhunting; even Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Hellfire missiles are merely the respective investigative and lethal arms of a 

distributed organization, comprising people with a clear process, cued by 

intelligence. The primary role played by technology has been to extend the 

span and scope of sensory, mobility, and firepower capabilities and speed 

communications for the manhunting team. 

Afghanistan, 2009. Interaction with the local population plays an 

important role in counter-network operations. Considering every 

citizen a sensor, an informed, alert civilian population can provide 

important tip-off information to locate key targets. U.S. Army photo. 
6

JSOU Report 09-7

Fifth, it is possible to assist active manhunting operations, complementing the offensive efforts with passive or reactive measures involving 

internal security services and the civil population. Law enforcement dragnets, internal security observers, and alert, informed citizens are an important element of manhunting. Be-on-the-lookout—or BOLO—alerts to law 

enforcement, press conferences, and shows like America’s Most Wanted

generate important tip-offs, leads, and information.8 Cooperation from 

the indigenous population and internal security elements can generate 

important advantages. Iraq’s Concerned Local Citizens groups and Awakening Councils exemplify this practice. Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and 

Psychological Operations elements have a key role to play in this regard. 

Energizing the population can present a considerable challenge if a nation 

conducts manhunting operations where the population is either fearful of, 

or sympathizes with, the enemy network. Iraq and Vietnam are examples 

of areas where a population has been intimidated into not cooperating with 

allied forces. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even portions of inner city America 

provide examples of populations who sympathize more with the terrorist 

or criminal than with those in pursuit.9 Energizing internal security forces 

and the local populace should be considered an activity that complements 

active manhunting operations. If manhunting teams merely wait for a highvalue target to raise his head, they may become bogged down in an endless 

Whack-a-Mole exercise, similar to the arcade game where a small animal 

momentarily pops up in a hole, and the player must hit the animal with a 

rubber mallet.10

Sixth, and perhaps the most important lesson, it is possible to employ 

nonlethal means in manhunting operations. All of a nation’s resources 

can be brought to bear against an individual or a network.11 The tools of 

national power include diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) capabilities, all of which 

can be focused against an individual or human network. Employing these 

capabilities in sequence or in parallel against individuals and networks, 

with precise targeting and a means to verify intended effect, U.S. objectives 

might be achieved without resorting to violence.12 Nonkinetic or soft-power 

options can disintegrate a network that supports an adversary. For example, 

rather than to capture or kill, the primary thrust of a manhunting operation may be to influence the support network, widening an existing seam 
7

Crawford: Manhunting

into a rift between the network and the high-value target. Incorporating 

nonlethal options has additional advantages. Because nonlethal methods 

are more palatable to policymakers, including influence capabilities when 

considering manhunting options extends the available conflict spectrum 

to encompass periods of relative peace and crisis, providing more time for 

intelligence collection and preemption to take place. This fact highlights 

the utility of manhunting as a national security alternative to open warfare 

or large-scale military intervention. 

The proper timing and execution of 

nonlethal means could render lethal 

options unnecessary for a given adversary. CIA operations to remove Guatemala’s Arbenz government in 1954 

exemplify relatively low-cost, high-payoff influence efforts targeting a small 

network of foreign leaders.13 The United States employed economic and 

financial sanctions against individuals to deter the Sudanese government 

from committing genocide in the Darfur region of Africa.14 The 2008 rescue 

of Ingrid Betaincourt and three American hostages from Colombian terrorists was accomplished without bloodshed.15 Including similar options in 

the formal capabilities portfolio reduces the human, financial, and resource 

cost of manhunting. Nonlethal options may become the preferred arm of 

manhunting, if leaders are made aware of capabilities and willing to address 

emerging national security problems at earlier stages of development. 

Building a Manhunting Force for the Future

The United States has not yet established doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership, personnel, or facilities needed to field a manhunting 

capability as a means to achieve its national security ends. Eight years after 

the 9/11 attacks, significant elements of our national security establishment 

remain polarized toward conventional, force-on-force warfare in order to 

combat massed mechanized military formations in a linear battle. But our 

adversaries have adapted, employing asymmetric capabilities to circumvent 

conventional capability. Employing conventional capabilities in pursuit 

of high-value targets (HVTs) has proved to be a double-edged sword that 

can result in strategic setback through tactical achievement.16 Despite this, 

America’s modus operandi, at least that which has been revealed to the 

The proper timing and execution 

of nonlethal means could render 

lethal options unnecessary for a 

given adversary.
8

JSOU Report 09-7

media, has often been to hunt the terrorist mosquito with the conventional 

forces’ elephant gun. A formal manhunting capability could reverse this 

polarity. The first step in building a manhunting force involves doctrine 

development. 

One of the first steps in developing doctrine is to define the subject at 

hand. What is manhunting? According to the definition proposed at the 

beginning of this monograph, it is the deliberate concentration of national 

power to find, influence, capture, or when necessary kill an individual to disrupt a human network. As we examine the problem, manhunting refers not 

only to the ability to find an HVT.

17 The definition also includes the concept 

of tracking individuals until friendly forces can achieve a desired end-state: 

to influence HVT behavior, to apprehend the HVT, or where the threat or 

situation demands—to kill them. The definition places manhunting within 

the context of counter-network operations.18 The proposed definition also 

allows the incorporation of nonlethal DIMEFIL elements of national power. 

Considering manhunting in the broadest sense also allows incorporation of 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF)-related activities that make manhunting possible.19

The Department of Defense (DoD) has not yet published a formal manhunting definition. In their graduate thesis and project, Majors Steve Marks, 

Tom Meer, and Matt Nilson provide the following definition of manhunt: 

An organized, extensive search for a person of national interest conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 

environments that employ specialized military capabilities to identify, locate, neutralize, or capture designated individuals. Manhunts 

differ from typical surveillance, reconnaissance, and direct action 

missions by the degree and methods used to search for, investigate, 

and apprehend the targeted individual(s).20

Contrasting the term person of national interest (PONI) with HVT, the 

study points out that a PONI may not be high value, but may provide critical links or intelligence to find the HVT. In other words, while a terrorist 

might be an HVT, the PONI might be the person who schedules the terrorist’s travel. 

Marks, Meer, and Nilson have made an impressive start in the development of manhunting doctrine.21 The three officers performed exhaustive 
9

Crawford: Manhunting

research and investigation to “... collate the best practices in the art of manhunting by drawing on expertise of individuals and agencies that excel at 

identifying, locating, and capturing fugitives.” 22 Marks, Meer, and Nilson 

contrast traditional concepts of warfare between combatants—find, fix, and 

destroy—with the new strategic concepts forming the basis of manhunting. 

Rather than seeking the enemy for destruction, the fugitive seeks to evade 

capture, altering the manhunting engagement into a process of detection, 

exposure, and maneuver. While the friendly force seeks to apprehend the 

fugitive, the fugitive seeks to remain undetected and once detected, evade 

capture. Marks, Meer, and Nilson apply big-game hunting theory to manhunting, outlining potential tactics such as still hunting, stalking, calling, 

and trapping.23 Last, the thesis outlines restrictions that force the manhunter 

and fugitive to conduct operations within certain limitations—for example, 

the legal system and political or administrative borders place limitations 

on the manhunter, which the fugitive can use to advantage.24 By evaluating 

successful manhunting operations conducted by the U.S. Marshals Service, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, private investigators and bounty hunters, 

Marks, Meer and Nilson form several conclusions about best practices. 

Many manhunts succeed on the basis of interagency collaboration, which 

often grants authority to leap across administrative and political boundaries.25 Most successful manhunts also stress the value of information (especially knowledge of the area), the fugitive’s behavior patterns, and “comfort 

zones.” 26 Technology can assist the manhunt; with access to administrative 

databases, biometric or forensic identification, and automated artist rendition or “ageing” programs helping to identify the fugitive.27 Most important for developers of doctrine, Marks, Meer, and Nilson point out that 

manhunting is first and foremost 

a mental pursuit, where in-depth 

collection and analysis of information will assist the pursuer. 

Pointing out that the DoD easily 

falls victim to viewing the terrorist network in conventional military terms—where analysts attempt to 

project the network within the “Cold War” military hierarchy framework 

rather than the flattened links and nodes of interpersonal relationships 

between radicals and criminals—they propose an analytic methodology 

for future manhunting operations.28

...manhunting is first and foremost 

a mental pursuit, where in-depth 

collection and analysis of information 

will assist the pursuer. 
10

JSOU Report 09-7

While no doctrine specifically addresses manhunting, existing doctrine does address related areas.29 By drawing upon related doctrine and 

documenting best practices from current operations, it would be a relatively straightforward task to assemble manhunting doctrine for the DoD. 

While no published doctrine provides concepts for manhunting, there are 

organizations within federal, state, local, and allied governments with the 

expertise to combat terrorism and conduct successful manhunts. Manhunting practices are not only employed by the military; they are employed with 

even greater regularity and effect by law enforcement and intelligence organizations. Doctrine could also be derived through studying the rich number 

of examples from military history provided in Appendices A through C, 

identifying best practices and lessons learned in operations that involved 

aspects of manhunting or related activities. Since much expertise lies outside 

military circles, valuable information can be gleaned from law enforcement 

case studies. American doctrine will be well served through examining the 

promises and pitfalls of allied and adversary manhunting activities.30

Doctrinal models help share knowledge. Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

employed a model known by the acronym F4 or Find, Fix, Finish, and Follow-Up.

31 The F4 model was modified later to its present-day F3EA or Find, 

Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyze, with an emphasis on the actions necessary to exploit information and personnel at the target site and analyze the 

results of the action to develop follow-on targets. The F3EA model takes into 

account the important fact that action taken against a terrorist target often 

produces more intelligence. In the Exploit phase, SOF question personnel 

captured or detained during a raid and collect documents or other items 

Enabling a force to find, fix, 

finish, exploit and analyze 

(F3EA) information on a 

human network depends 

on the ability to provide an 

“unblinking eye” with persistent surveillance assets 

to provide signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) 

about a given geographic 

location, exemplified by 

this aerostat. DoD photo. 
11

Crawford: Manhunting

found at the location in a process known as sensitive site exploitation. In the 

Analyze phase, SOF work with intelligence experts to identify and pursue 

leads generated in the first three phases of the model. The intelligence gained 

often initiates the cycle again. A single raid may generate multiple “strings” 

for follow-up action. As more and more opportunities become available, the 

F3EA process cycle can propagate or “snowball” to the point where leaders 

must choose to exploit a few among many potentially lucrative opportunities 

based on limited operational resources or available time.

When compared with conventional force-on-force warfare, manhunting fundamentally alters the ratio between warfare’s respective firepower, 

maneuver, and psychological elements. Firepower becomes less significant 

in terms of mass, while the precision and discretion with which firepower 

is employed takes on tremendous significance, especially during influence 

operations. Why drop a bomb when effects operations or a knife might do? 

Maneuver adopts new concept and form. In manhunting, friendly forces 

seek to engage the enemy. Like a lone insurgent, the enemy seeks to avoid the 

allied force, biding time until he has an opportunity to strike at vulnerable, 

unprotected, or noncombat assets. The psychological factor becomes more 

significant as well. Popular perception, heavily influenced by the media, 

has an impact beyond the immediate confines of the battlefield. A force 

can emerge from a battlefield with all objectives achieved, yet be perceived 

to have failed. The adversary may be perceived to have gained a victory by 

merely avoiding engagement and surviving. Information heavily influences 

firepower and maneuver. Precise information is critical for the employment 

of precise firepower. Reliable information also serves as a basis for maneuver 

to engage the enemy. In fact it might be said that the concept of maneuver 

expands into the information domain. In this domain, one adversary seeks 

information about the other, while denying the opponent information about 

friendly activity. Information and associated disciplines, including intelligence, communications, command and control, and public affairs play a 

much more significant role in manhunting operations.

Doctrine must also consider the policy and legal framework needed to 

carry out manhunting operations. Developing and adopting manhunting 

as a national security capability is a weighty policy issue. The first policy 

question is for the military, intelligence community, law enforcement, and 

industry: Is it possible to develop manhunting technology and capability? 

The answer is yes, if we focus and prioritize efforts. We have done so in the 
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JSOU Report 09-7

past on numerous occasions. Current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the 

Horn of Africa, and the Philippines demonstrate we can do so effectively. 

Policy and lawmakers must address the second question: Should we develop 

this capability? This question has already been answered: not only should 

we, we have done so on an ad-hoc basis since our nation was formed. The 

real issue is whether we muddle through with ad-hoc capabilities, as we 

have to date, or formally institutionalize manhunting capability in order to 

carry out these operations well. The post-9/11 strategic environment makes 

it imperative to engage HVTs actively—to detect, deter, disrupt, detain, or 

destroy networks before they can harm innocents.32

Another important policy consideration is the realization that manhunting has implications and applications beyond the immediate need to 

combat terrorism. The ability to interdict individual human targets or to 

disintegrate human networks provides a key capability to combat threats 

posed by nonstate actors. Such a capability would also allow the United 

States to influence, apprehend, or neutralize key actors in an adversary state, 

reducing collateral damage to the general population. The United States 

attempted to achieve this goal against key state actors with success in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Potential applications for manhunting 

capabilities also include the following:

a. Counterproliferation

b. Counternarcotics

c. Persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs)

d. Countering organized criminal networks

e. Countering nonstate actors or corporations with interests inimical 

to those of the U.S.

f. Information operations (including the ability to neutralize networks 

of computer hackers or to target key influence networks for psychological operations)

g. Counterintelligence

h. Deterring and apprehending pirates.

From a legal perspective, it is essential to ensure that a manhunting 

capability is developed in a manner consistent with Constitutional concepts 

and international concerns. While legal professionals should be the final 
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Crawford: Manhunting

arbiters for any of the observations that follow, it is worthwhile to explore 

the legal issues associated with manhunting.33

First, there is ample legal precedent to justify manhunting. Preemptive or preventive action, including lethal force, can be employed in order 

to prevent innocent loss of life. Law enforcement officers have historically 

employed lethal force to prevent deaths in hostage situations.34 Military 

forces have repeatedly been employed to interdict terrorist hostage situations.35 Legal policies to control acts of piracy on the high seas date back 

to ancient Rhodes.36 Congress has Constitutional power to issue letters of 

marque and reprisal in order to seize persons or property.37 Britain, France, 

and the United States issued these letters until the 1856 Declaration of Paris 

banned the practice.38

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States governs 

search and seizure, including use of deadly force by law enforcement. The 

Supreme Court determined the Fourth Amendment does not apply to agents 

of the U.S. Government operating overseas against nonresident aliens.39 The 

U.S. Supreme Court also established clear precedent regarding the use of 

deadly force within the United States.40

After the 9/11 attacks, Congress gave the President the authority to 

“...use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such 

organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future actions of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, 

or persons.” 41 Unlike previous legislation authorizing the use of military 

force by the President, Congress authorized military force against organizations and persons linked to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Prior to 

9/11, Congress had permitted action against 

unnamed nations in specific regions of the 

world or against named individual nations, 

but never previously had Congress authorized use of force against organizations or 

persons.42

Other nations have addressed legal aspects related to manhunting. Israel’s 

Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that the Israeli government’s targeted killing 

policy was legal, within certain specified constraints.43 Manhunting is not 

limited to unilateral action; it has been employed on repeated occasions as 

...never previously had 

Congress authorized use of 

force against organizations 

or persons.
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JSOU Report 09-7

a coalition enforcement action. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna branded 

Napoleon Bonaparte an outlaw. The Quadruple Alliance—Britain, Austria, 

Prussia, and Russia—agreed to enforce the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, each 

nation pledging 150,000 men to oppose the Emperor’s return from exile.44

The United States and Mexico conducted a combined military operation to 

apprehend the Apache renegade Victorio in 1880.45 More recently, coalition 

operations were employed to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda alliance and 

to overthrow Saddam Hussein and family. 

The legal context within which to evaluate manhunting operations provides an area for concern and contention. After-action investigations of 

officer-involved shootings employ the perspective of reasonable officers at 

the scene as to whether deadly force was justified. This decision is a conscious one; American investigations deliberately avoid viewing the shootings 

with 20/20 hindsight, because it is believed that burdening officers with 

inflexible rules of engagement would endanger the safety and effectiveness 

of law enforcement organizations.46 In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court’s 

ruling on the “justiciability” of targeted killing directed that an independent investigation should take place after each targeted killing.47 The Israeli 

ruling appeared to call for a more stringent, independent investigation into 

target identification and the decision-making process, directing that recompense be provided in the event of error to compensate for collateral damage 

inflicted. Where follow-on investigations of targeted killing and manhunting are concerned, it would be wise to apply the standard suggested by the 

U.S. Supreme Court. A 20/20 hindsight standard in reviewing manhunting 

decisions made within strict time or information constraints could lead to 

overly restrictive standards, indecision, missed opportunities, and possible 

danger to friendly forces.

Still other legal issues center on the legal environment within which 

manhunting would be conducted. For example, do terrorism, narcotics 

trafficking, insurgency, and piracy constitute crimes or warfare? 48 Opinions 

differ among legal scholars.49 If terrorism and piracy are crimes, precedent 

and procedures are well established for cooperative local, state, federal, 

and international prosecution of the perpetrators once they are identified 

and caught. But the onus is on law enforcement to prove a case and to 

articulate probable cause before initiating an investigation—conditions 

well understood and often exploited by criminal elements. If, as the Israeli 

Supreme Court determined, terrorist organizations and nation states exist 
15

Crawford: Manhunting

in a “continuous state of armed conflict of an international character,” then 

international law and law of armed conflict apply to the situation.50 If terrorism and piracy place us in a war of self-defense, we must consider whether 

the concepts of justice in going to war (jus ad bellum) and justice in the 

conduct of war (jus in bello) carry over to preventive or preemptive interdiction of HVTs and networks.51 International law allows three situations 

as legal cause to go to war: self-defense, defense of an ally under a mutual 

defense pact, or when sanctioned by the United Nations. Theoretically, any 

war for another cause is considered illegal; those who engage in it could 

become subject to prosecution for war crimes. 

Ethical considerations—distinct from legal issues—also come into play. 

On one hand, we do not want to adopt the standards of an enemy in order 

to defeat him. Combating terrorism, 

piracy, insurgency, and narcotics trafficking tempt the U.S. to abandon ideals 

the nation’s founders and citizens hold 

dear. On the other hand, we must weigh 

the rights of innocent civilians against the rights of an adversary. From an 

ethical standpoint, protecting the greater population from harm should 

take precedence over the rights and liberties of an individual intent on 

murder. This issue often seems to be set aside in discussions of terrorism. 

The Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that even terrorists are entitled to 

basic human rights.52 However, one might make an ethical argument that, by 

engaging in hostile acts against civilians, the offender consciously departs 

from the norms of civilized behavior; a departure which carries with it an 

implicit acceptance of a quid-pro-quo: that the offender has tacitly rejected 

the protections afforded by the society from which he has departed.53

In prosecuting terrorists, insurgents, narcotics traffickers, or pirates, we 

must also take pains to avoid granting legitimacy or elevating individuals to 

mythic status (i.e., create a martyr). The Israeli Supreme Court determined a 

terrorist is a civilian who illegally participates in hostilities. At some point, 

we must consider whether engaging a terrorist with military force grants 

perceived legitimacy or elevates the terrorist in a way that arrest or engagement by law enforcement or intelligence forces would not. If we seek to avoid 

granting legitimacy through noble combat, it may prove beneficial that 

only nonmilitary forces engage individuals. One potential benefit can be 

illustrated through the following hypothetical cases: When a military force 

On one hand, we do not want 

to adopt the standards of an 

enemy in order to defeat him.
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JSOU Report 09-7

crosses a sovereign international border to apprehend or kill a terrorist, the 

violation of territorial sovereignty could lead to conflict between countries. 

If a manhunting team deploys from and then retreats to the security of an 

American Embassy compound, the United States would be in severe breach 

of diplomatic protocol. If internal security forces arrest a terrorist, it is an act 

of law enforcement, most often viewed favorably by both the international 

and domestic communities. If a terrorist is killed in an alley by an unknown 

assailant, it is an unsolved crime, a crime which may not be deeply investigated if the terrorist has a lengthy rap sheet. Thus it may be preferable to 

consign terrorist manhunting to intelligence and law enforcement organs 

and to avoid entanglements caused by crossing manhunting with military 

or diplomatic functions. Where manhunting is concerned, there may be 

legal and moral advantage in ambiguity and plausible denial.54

Counter-network operations have generated concern regarding the 

restrictions and boundaries between the DoD intelligence performed under 

Title 10 of the United States Code and the national or interagency intelligence activities covered under Title 50. While many of these debates and 

concerns are legitimate, others are based in bureaucratic or political competition for power, influence, and resources. The Bush administration issued 

Executive Orders to clarify these relationships and strengthen the ability 

of both DoD and the Intelligence Community to conduct counterterrorist operations.55 The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act was the most sweeping change to governmental bureaucracy since the 

National Security Act of 1947 established the DoD and Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA). As he signed the bill into law, President Bush commented, 

“The many reforms in this act have a single goal: to ensure that the people 

in government responsible for defending America have the best possible 

information to make the best possible decisions.” 56

Another legal issue pertains to the employment of manhunting capability 

on United States territory. Most terrorist acts and the conspiracies leading up to the act are federal crimes whether committed during peacetime 

or in military operations. Federal, state, and local law enforcement have 

the domestic authority and mandate to investigate, preempt, and arrest 

individuals who violate the law or conspire to violate the law. It is widely 

but incorrectly believed that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps from performing any kind of 

police work or assisting law enforcement agencies.57 Yet there are many 
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Crawford: Manhunting

historic cases where military force has been employed domestically with 

popular support.58 National Guard forces are authorized to conduct homeland defense activities under Title 32, United States Code.59 Nonetheless, 

it is politically inadvisable to employ military force domestically unless 

law enforcement organizations are incapable of maintaining public safety. 

Domestically employing military or intelligence manhunting capabilities 

without appropriate safeguards will be perceived as a “big brother” threat 

to individual liberties, opposed through special interest group court actions 

and the media.60 It is certainly beneficial for military, intelligence, and law 

enforcement communities to share legally obtained information, exchange 

observers and to confer or train together on tactics, techniques, and procedures. To address the need to balance national security against individual 

liberties and democratic ideals, President Bush appointed a President’s Board 

on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties.61 Many of the reforms undertaken to date fell short of what was desired either by the Bush administration 

or Congress.62 This is a fundamental aspect of democratic systems—no side 

ever gets everything it wants. In providing security for our citizens, leaders 

are well served to remember Thomas Jefferson’s admonition on the matter: “I 

would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too much liberty 

than to those attending too small a degree of it.” Indeed, individual liberty 

presents such a threat; violent extremists often go to great lengths to snuff 

out its flame. 

Organizational Structure

How should the United States organize to conduct manhunting operations? 

As Appendices A and B demonstrate, manhunting has historically been 

an ad-hoc affair. Manhunting took place in spite of federal, state, and local 

organization rather than because of it. America’s stratified bureaucracy 

often impedes the successful conduct of interagency missions. Elements 

currently engaged in manhunting activities are subordinate to agencies and 

departments, each of which must juggle many other competing interests. 

This state of affairs inhibits manhunting function. According to a former 

counterterrorism official, CIA operations officers between May 1998 and 

May 1999 provided the U.S. government with two chances to capture Osama 

bin Laden using agency assets and eight chances to kill him using U.S. military forces.63 For various reasons, the United States was unwilling or unable 
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JSOU Report 09-7

to seize these opportunities, or as reflected in Appendix A, missed killing 

bin Laden by a short period of time. Manhunting is an endeavor of fleeting opportunity in which stratification and bureaucratic decision-making 

compound the probability of failure. 

When conducting counter-network operations on a global scale, it is 

necessary to carry out activities at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 

At the tactical level, it is important to organize forces so that they are best 

aligned to engage and subdue the enemy. The operational level combines 

tactical actions into campaigns to defeat networks. The strategic level of 

a manhunting organization is responsible for orchestrating all of the elements of national power against the enemy, with impact spanning a period 

of years or decades. Strategic manhunting capabilities must be aligned at 

three levels: a) departmental or interagency, b) national, and c) international 

organizations must coordinate and deconflict multiple efforts, bringing each 

organization’s capabilities to bear for best advantage. 

Aviano AB, Italy. Italian Carabinieri (paramilitary police) seize 

a high value target (HVT) during a joint training exercise with 

U.S. Air Force security police. The ability to conduct operations 

in concert with allied internal security forces will be crucial to 

counter-network and manhunting operations in semipermissive 

environments. U.S. Air Force photo. 
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Crawford: Manhunting

Marks, Meer, and Nilson concluded that small five-to-seven member 

teams are the most effective tactical organization for manhunting.64 They 

also proposed a conceptual model for a manhunting organization. In their 

model, the small teams would report to a director and be supported by an 

operational research group and a technical support group. They emphasize 

the necessity to empower any organization’s manhunting teams to work 

closely with interagency counterparts, combining the differing interagency 

perspectives and experience to achieve synergistic effect.

There are many historic examples of successful tactical organizations 

from which organizational planners can develop a model team concept. In 

the United States, these include the United States Marshals Service (USMS), 

DoD elements, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hostage Rescue Team 

(HRT), Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), USMS Special Operations Group, or Nuclear Emergency Search Teams at the federal level, down 

to Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and fugitive or criminal task 

forces in most major U.S. cities.65 Europe fields teams that founded the elite 

unit concept, most notably Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, 

Special Boat Service (SBS) and Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR). 

In addition to these are the lesser-known law enforcement teams, 

including New Scotland Yard’s Antiterrorist Branch (SO13); German Grenzschutzgruppe (GSG)-9, and French Groupe de Sécurité et d’Intervention de 

la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN). Elite units are not confined to America 

and Western Europe. Israel fields some of the most capable elements, including Sayaret Mat’kal, a special reconnaissance unit within Israel’s General 

Headquarters Intelligence Corps. Poland’s Grupa Reagowania Operacyjino 

Mobilnego (GROM) and Russia’s Alpha and Beta groups are among the most 

fit and experienced soldiers in the world. 

Most nations have formed elite units to deal with potential internal 

security situations, including terrorism. In the most successful tactical 

organizations, an alternative, streamlined chain of command allows direct 

responsiveness to national-level leaders. Due to time constraints and fleeting opportunities, the command structure should also employ preapproved 

mission-type orders, with delegation of authority to on-scene commanders. 

Trust between on-scene commanders and geographically separated leadership is an essential element of tactical mission success.
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JSOU Report 09-7

Several different tactical formations would be needed to successfully 

conduct manhunting operations. The four tactical-level formations or teams 

follow:

a. Manhunting teams would be—as put forth by Marks, Meer, and 

Nilson—a specialized interdisciplinary and interagency force, dedicated to the pursuit of a single individual.66 Manhunting teams would 

be trained to interact with federal, regional, and local law enforcement 

or internal security forces to track and apprehend human targets, 

wherever they might be. The teams would include a collage of experts 

with the individual skill sets drawn from several manhunting-related 

disciplines existing within the defense, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.67 They would be trained in physical, intelligence, and virtual-tracking techniques. The team will also include 

“shooters,” supported by on-call logistics and administrative support. 

Rather than an ad-hoc task force in the nature of the current law 

enforcement, Intelligence Community, or DoD operations, manhunting teams would be standing formations, trained to pursue their 

designated quarry relentlessly for as long as required to accomplish 

the mission. In cases where action must take place in uncooperative 

countries, it may be necessary for teams to act unilaterally, with no 

support or coordination with local authorities, in a manner similar 

to that employed by Israel’s Avner team in response to the Munich 

Olympics massacre.68

b. Sensitive site exploitation (SSE) teams are the second tactical formation needed for manhunting. Dedicated teams must be assembled, 

able to respond “on-call” in the event of a raid on a suspect site or 

to conduct independent “break-in and search” operations without 

leaving evidence of their intrusion. While the law enforcement and 

intelligence community may have this capability on-call, the government should establish formal, standing SSE teams. Individual 

skills include physical forensics, computer or electronic exploitation, 

document exploitation, investigative techniques, biometric collection, interrogation/debriefing and related skills. As with manhunting 

teams, SSE teams would combine individual forensic skills in order to 

obtain as much information in as little time as possible and rapidly 

pass it for analysis. 
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Crawford: Manhunting

c. Technical surveillance elements (TSE) or mobile surveillance 

teams (MST). Manhunting will require personnel who are experts at 

conducting surveillance of particular facilities, personnel, or activities 

without arousing suspicion or being detected. While these capabilities 

exist with law enforcement, special operations, and the Intelligence 

Community, the requirement will be much more robust. The British 

Security Service (MI5) includes MSTs—also known as “watchers” 

—whose sole expertise is conducting surveillance.69 In contrast to 

special operations personnel who are selected for high standards of 

physical fitness, surveillance personnel will be recruited and trained 

for their ability to observe key details, to remain alert during periods 

of inactivity, and spring into action when required. They will be taught 

to blend in unobtrusively into an urban or remote background, often 

“hiding in plain sight.” Some may be skilled at employing technical 

surveillance devices—wiretaps, video surveillance equipment, or more 

intrusive devices and methods. They will also be skilled at multiple 

forms of transportation across international boundaries. Their goal is 

to maintain surveillance on suspected activity, either confirming or 

denying hostile intent. Picture in your mind a typical city street scene, 

with a little old lady walking her dog, the phone repair crew descending into a manhole, two little old men playing an innocent game of 

checkers, or the homeless person sleeping on the park bench, and 

you are on the right track. For remote areas, the shepherd, a nomadic 

clan on camelback, or a jungle tribe might be enlisted to serve as a 

surveillance element. For personal safety and security reasons, MSTs 

and TSEs should be separate formations from manhunting and SSE

teams because the exposure of an MST or TSE to the enemy might be 

prolonged, with higher individual risk. An MST or TSE might also 

be tailored to operate in a certain region by selecting personnel who 

would blend with the native population.

d. Coalition training teams would dedicate tactical-level experts to 

instruct coalition partners in manhunting tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP). In some cases, it might be necessary to limit training to those capabilities we would not want to have used against the 

United States or its allies. Therefore, coalition training must include 

a vetting process to ensure training is employed as intended, and not 
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JSOU Report 09-7

for illicit purposes. By training and helping partner nations to police 

their own internal security, the world will gradually shrink the areas 

nefarious human networks can consider safe havens. Shrinking the 

under-governed or over-governed areas will narrow the space in which 

our forces will have to find, fix, and finish the enemy.

Tactical organization models include those employed by intelligence 

agencies, organizing activities by stations. A station chief—or rezident in 

the Slavic intelligence model—leads each station. In the operational concept 

for most intelligence agencies, stations are geographically oriented.70 Similar 

stations exist in law enforcement and diplomatic security organizations. 

Intelligence officers assigned to each station establish relationships with 

host-nation counterparts, enabling the station to exchange information 

with the local government. The station concept also results in officers who 

are intimately familiar with the geographic, environmental, linguistic, and 

cultural idiosyncrasies associated with a particular area. The station concept 

conveys several advantages. Due to the relationships and access with the 

host nation, it is often possible to achieve economy of force; the HVT might 

be apprehended or interdicted by tipping off the host nation to his or her 

presence. Likewise, the station provides a base of operations for unilateral 

action, where necessary. Specialist teams or technicians temporarily augment the station as needed to perform critical tasks, allowing the parent 

organization to husband its most critical skill sets with greater efficiency. 

The weakness in geographic organization is that fugitives and terrorists 

are able to exploit administrative, political, and geographic boundaries or 

seams that inhibit interaction between stations. To address this issue, some 

stations have also been functionally oriented.71

Leaders might combine the best attributes of both regional and functional organization. Functionally organized manhunting teams focused on a 

single HVT could fold in on geographically organized regional stations, each 

with several subordinate MSTs or TSEs intimately familiar with the region, 

in coordinated pursuit of a designated HVT. The station might include an 

on-call regional SSE or in some cases a dedicated local SSE that could deploy 

to the station when an operation reached the stage where exploitation might 

take place. Due to limited or fleeting exploitation opportunities, SSE teams 

should not be more than a day away from any given station and should be 

included at the earliest possible point in operational planning. The stations 
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Crawford: Manhunting

would facilitate the manhunting task force’s operations, assisting the team in 

its interaction with host-nation authorities. If the HVT evaded the authorities within a given country by crossing administrative or political boundaries, the manhunting team could engage in “hot pursuit,” falling in on 

another station responsible for their destination. Federal and international 

law enforcement task forces have employed this organizational structure 

with success. 

A degree of “cover” may be necessary to protect the U.S. operatives or 

to preserve an often-necessary domestic or international public posture 

that downplays host-government cooperation with the United States. We 

can anticipate that U.S. forces would be forced to function in three basic 

operational environments. 

a. Permissive environments—where the United States can openly cooperate with allies—would allow an open American presence. 

b. Semipermissive environments—where U.S. personnel are operating in 

cooperation with the host nation, but for reasons of security or public 

consumption, it is necessary to mask the U.S. presence—would require 

U.S. personnel to operate in a low-visibility or covered status. 

c. Nonpermissive environments—where the host nation is unwilling 

or unable to cooperate with the United States or is openly hostile 

to U.S. presence—would require some sort of clandestine or covert 

capability. 

The operational level also poses challenges for manhunting. At the operational level, an organization must be concerned with the overall campaign 

against the human network or networks. The operational challenge is to 

choreograph multiple manhunts, which is needed for several reasons. First, 

multiple uncoordinated manhunts against the same network could lead to 

fratricide. For example, if one manhunt were discovered prematurely, the 

resulting security clampdown might inhibit other ongoing manhunting 

operations. Second, operational-level leaders would be responsible for minimizing duplication of effort, employing the overall force to greatest effect. 

Third, the operational leadership must keep the eye on the ball. If the goal 

of a manhunting operation is to deter, deny, deceive, disrupt, disintegrate, or 

destroy an entire network, it might not be worthwhile to apprehend a lower 

ranking individual simply because apprehending the “low-hanging fruit” 
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JSOU Report 09-7

is easier and provides quick success. Operational-level functions would be 

most efficient if organized geographically by region, with a given operational 

element in charge of three-to-four related planned or ongoing manhunts.

The organizational construct at the operational level must strike a balance between administration and function. This balance has been done with 

varying degrees of success; healthy tension often exists between functional 

and administrative control elements. Operational-level commands are traditionally organized along regional, cultural, or functional lines. This level 

of command may also involve establishment of subordinate task forces that 

are regionally or functionally focused.

Because a small manhunting force might be able to directly engage a 

human network during peacetime, manhunting may provide an opportunity to reduce the U.S. government footprint forward. A permanent manhunting presence in a given area may make a major military or government 

force deployment unnecessary. Several key functions would be essential for 

successful operational-level activity: 

a. Leadership. Leaders at the operational level set the course for three 

to four manhunting task forces. Their staffs will assess target and 

network strengths and vulnerabilities, develop appropriate campaign 

plans, coordinate and deconflict manhunting plans, and then translate 

those plans into action through collaboration. 

b. Intelligence analysis, collection management, and targeting.

Operational level processes begin with intelligence on the adversary 

capabilities with granular focus to mitigate enemy threats and exploit 

enemy vulnerabilities. Good analysis “presents the enemy” to leaders, 

planners, and execution elements. Collection managers work with 

analysts, targeting experts, decision makers, planners, and operations 

personnel, guiding multidisciplinary intelligence collection to fill key 

gaps in our knowledge of the enemy or to plan follow-up exploitation actions. Targeteers identify key nodes in the enemy network and 

identify operational effects to be achieved by affecting HVTs critical 

to that network. 

c. Planning. Orchestrating broad campaigns combines science with 

art. It requires skilled personnel experienced in the capabilities and 

limitations of operational interagency and coalition forces. Planning is a continuous process. Planners must take into account every 
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Crawford: Manhunting

factor—intelligence on the enemy, intelligence on local or regional 

allies and internal security forces, operational capabilities, weather, 

terrain, logistics, communications and other essential ingredients—

combining these into a coherent operational script. Planners must 

be able to clearly communicate the leader’s intent in a way easily 

understood by execution elements. They will oversee training and 

execution, adjusting plans as the situation dictates. 

d. Operational-level support functions. Those who will administer 

the manhunting forces, provide supplies and transportation, medical 

care, budget, communications, and other services must do so quickly 

and provide short-notice support where the situation dictates. Department, agency or service liaisons with critical skill sets (personnel, 

logistics, training, intelligence) might also be required.72 Logistics 

must expedite global movement of tactical and operational elements 

on short notice. In the manhunt, finding those with the appropriate sense of urgency and dedication in key support roles will be as 

important as fielding the tactical force. 

e. Systems administration and training. Collaborative systems will tie 

together a worldwide force engaged in transnational pursuits. Systems 

developed and deployed to meet manhunting requirements must be 

accompanied by thorough training and systems administration. Training and exercises should incorporate the use of operational systems 

to ensure the advantage of new technology is realized through new 

business processes. Training and certification for SSE teams, TSEs, 

and MSTs might also include the employment of latest surveillance 

equipment. Liaison and CTT personnel must be familiar with setup, 

operation, and protection of secure communications equipment, 

language translation, and interpretation.

There is historic precedent for operational-level organizations.73 The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), U.S. Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS), and Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in World War II managed the 

deployment of teams to conduct strategic, clandestine missions in Europe, 

the Pacific, and South America. SOE, OSS, and AIB had dedicated regional 

logistics support, including civilian watercraft, ground transport, and aircraft. SOE and OSS often conducted cooperative missions with French, 

Yugoslav, and Greek resistance forces. They organized escape networks for 
26

JSOU Report 09-7

downed aircrew and allied POWs. In a similar arrangement, the Military 

Assistance Command—Vietnam, Special Operations Group (MAC-V SOG) 

controlled interagency special activities in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict (1965-1973). Multiple standing Joint Interagency Task Forces 

have been established to direct regional counternarcotics operations. 

Intelligence will play a critical role in all aspects of manhunting, blurring the traditional lines between what constitutes intelligence and operations. The most effective efforts have integrated analytic, collection, and 

operational execution elements into cohesive teams. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), near real-time imagery intelligence (IMINT) including full-motion video (FMV), and measurement and 

signatures intelligence (MASINT) unattended sensors and biometrics collection will prove especially valuable to manhunting. The ability to rapidly task, 

process, exploit, and disseminate information collection and intelligence 

analysis will play an important role in success. The Distributed Common 

Ground System (DCGS) fuses multidisciplinary intelligence collection and 

analysis with operations; a collaborative system based on DCGS would 

ensure actionable intelligence gets to tactical teams within operationally 

viable timelines.74

Like the operational community, the Intelligence Community forms 

special task forces to focus on key issues. The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center 

(CTC) is a dynamic organization that combines analytic and operational 

capability under a single chain of command with significant success. 

Defense Intelligence Agency established a Joint Intelligence Task Force for 

Counterterrorism (JITF-CT) to focus defense analysis for the operational 

Iraq. Biometric scanner 

stores identification data for 

a new employee. Biometrics 

technology can collect, store, 

and rapidly compare identification data. Counter-network 

operations are a people- and 

process-oriented endeavor; 

technology can only serve a 

supporting role. U.S. Army 

photo. 
27

Crawford: Manhunting

level, and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers to focus regional collection 

and analysis.75

The law enforcement community also provides numerous examples of 

operational-level organizations to coordinate the efforts of multiple tactical 

elements. These include the Australian Terrorist Tracking Unit, the British 

International Extradition Unit at New Scotland Yard, and the FBI’s National 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), or the Fairfax County Regional Intelligence Center (RIC) in the Washington D.C. suburbs. An examination 

of the best practices from these and similar bodies will be most useful in 

designing the operational-level organizational construct.

Strategic-level organization is also essential for victory. Several other 

important functions must take place at the strategic level:

a. Leadership. Limited training is available to orient senior leaders 

toward strategic and operational-level issues associated with planning 

and executing manhunting campaigns. Leaders and managers must 

facilitate the collaborative process between geographically separate 

entities, yet avoid hindering the collaborative effort. Leaders must 

understand both manhunting capabilities and the limitations associated with manhunts. Senior leaders must also be attuned to what not to 

do as a strategic leader. A strategic leader who focuses on tactical issues 

or minutiae can paralyze an organization. Senior leader seminars 

should focus on the issues that a decision maker will confront, provide 

realistic timelines for decisions, and include discussion facilitated by 

mentors who have real-world expertise in these areas. 

b. Information operations. The key objective in war is to cause the 

enemy to lose heart—to want an end to the fighting. This objective is 

especially challenging when facing an enemy who regards martyrdom 

as liberation. Manhunting can only succeed with an informed, alert 

public and a demoralized opponent. Where manhunting is concerned, 

influence activities must discourage public support of target networks, 

disrupt hostile networks, or cause the network to take action that 

would allow members to be captured or killed. Many leaders regard 

information operations as an ancillary capability—an afterthought 

to be “scabbed” onto operations at the last minute. Influence must 

be planned as a core line of operations against an enemy—a primary 

strategic thrust in achieving victory. It must be delicately woven into 
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JSOU Report 09-7

planned kinetic operations to increase the probability that a given 

operation or campaign will achieve its intended effect. Personnel 

skilled at conducting strategic information operations—to include 

psychological operations, public information, deception, media and 

computer network operations, and related activities—are important for victory. Despite robust DoD and Intelligence Community 

capabilities in this area, efforts to establish organizations that focus 

information operations have not been viewed as a positive development by the public or the media, who perceive government-sponsored 

information efforts with suspicion.76 Consequently, these efforts must 

take place away from public eyes. Strategic information operations 

may also require the establishment of regional or local offices to 

ensure dissemination of influence packages and assess their impact. 

Thus manhunting influence may call for parallel or independent 

structures at all levels, mirroring that of the operational manhunting elements. Britain’s World War II Political Warfare Executive and 

London Controlling Section, the American Office of War Information, and the OSS Morale Operations group provide examples for 

influence operations.

c. International liaison. Successful counterterrorism operations require 

significant liaison investment to enhance communication. International liaisons will need to be established in key nations to facilitate 

intelligence, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic cooperation. 

While U.S. embassies already have established many of these relationships, the high operations tempo of manhunting demands the dedication of a full-time staff. The personnel must be taught to operate with 

autonomy, yet to keep key personnel in both the U.S. and host-nation 

governments informed of developments. Specialized training should 

focus on those personnel who will serve in strategic-level liaison roles 

with allied governments. An overarching liaison preparatory course, 

similar in nature to the training currently provided for State Department’s Foreign Service officers or the Defense Attaché Service, but 

tailored toward manhunting cooperation, would serve this purpose. 

The training must also include instruction in cross-cultural communication, language, cultural background, and the bureaucratic 

processes in not only the host nation but also those U.S. government 

organizations toward which the liaison will build bridges. 
29

Crawford: Manhunting

d. Planning, programming, and budget must field personnel and 

equipment for manhunting in time to be relevant to the missions 

being performed. Winning the resource battles inside the Washington 

D.C. beltway is just as necessary as manhunting activities. Dedicated 

preparatory courses should be established to prepare those involved 

in the planning, programming. and budget processes for essential 

roles. These courses should also provide education to prepare key 

staff officers to assist Congress in its oversight roles.

e. Systems development and acquisition. Counter-network operations require specialized technology. A cadre of experts familiar with 

the development and acquisition of manhunting technology must 

anticipate and respond to the needs of those fighting the enemy. This 

cadre must also interact effectively with planning, programming, 

and budget personnel for resource planning and with operations and 

support personnel whose needs they will address. 

Manhunting also requires strategic focus, which is often a challenge for 

the nation. Counterterrorism is an example. The U.S. government splits 

authority and responsibility for ongoing overseas contingency operations 

against violent extremists among multiple agencies. The National Security 

Council and its Director for Combating Terrorism develop and manage the 

interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas. This framework 

consists of presidential directives, national strategies, and related guidance.77 For example, the National Security Council coordinated the overall 

National Security Strategy of the U.S., while the Director for Combating 

Terrorism coordinated the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

There are other national-level strategies related to combating terrorism. 

Examples of these include the National Strategy for Homeland Security and 

the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The various strategies were developed for specific and separate purposes. A general 

hierarchy exists among these overlapping strategies.78 The strategies do not 

easily lend themselves to action. 

Specific roles played by federal organizations and agencies comprise 

another element in the interagency framework for combating terrorism 

overseas. Some play a coordinating role. Others serve a lead role in specific 

areas. Many others have support roles for specific activities. Some agencies 

have leaders designated to direct or coordinate their agencies’ terrorism-
30

JSOU Report 09-7

related programs. In addition, individual agencies have their own strategic 

plans or develop interagency plans and related guidance for specific functions.79 Confusion has occurred within departments. Former Secretary of 

Defense Rumsfeld designated United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) as the lead combatant command responsible for synchronizing DoD efforts.80 USSOCOM was tasked to lead, plan, synchronize, and as 

directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks.81 This new 

role placed USSOCOM in a bureaucratic struggle with other organizations 

both inside and outside the DoD and placed military personnel into new 

roles and missions that some believe blurred the lines between traditional 

military activity and covert operations.82 In May 2008 new USSOCOM leaders clarified their role, preferring a consultative approach more in keeping 

with the leadership style of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.83

The Bush administration also consolidated efforts to protect the territorial United States, referred to as the homeland. Establishing the Office of 

Homeland Security by Executive Order on 8 October 2001, former Governor 

Tom Ridge had a broad mandate to develop a national strategy; detect terrorists before they could strike; oversee preparedness to recover from an 

attack—also known as consequence management; prevent attacks in coordination with federal, state and local organizations; protect critical infrastructure including communications, energy, and transportation networks; and 

oversee response and recovery activities in the wake of a terrorist attack.84

In 2002 Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which established 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).85 DHS consolidated those 

portions of federal organizations that had a role in protecting the nation 

from terrorist threat; all or portions of 21 agencies were resubordinated 

under DHS. The DHS report card has been mixed to date. Consolidating so 

many organizations and bureaucracies with disparate resources and cultures 

under DHS leadership proved challenging.86 But quiet successes have also 

thwarted at least 10 major terrorist plots since 9/11.87

While the DHS was created to consolidate agencies involved in combating terrorism within the territorial United States, no similar realignment 

action has been taken for those government organizations tasked to carry 

out counter-network activities overseas. Progress has been slow. The DoD

only recently placed irregular warfare on an equal footing with conventional combat.88 The Intelligence Community endured 14 major reform or 

reorganization efforts since 1947, four of which resulted in varying degrees 
31

Crawford: Manhunting

of success.89 Recent realignment and reform efforts within agencies have 

addressed particular symptoms of the condition, yet no strategic-level 

realignment has occurred. 

Despite all of these measures, and the years that have passed since the 

9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government has not appointed a single authority to 

oversee the campaign against Al Qaeda terrorists. One might argue that 

the President constitutes that authority; however, as head of the Executive 

Branch, the President must also concern himself with other matters. 

Organizations that address manhunting are not functionally aligned. 

Many are buried deeply within stratified bureaucracies. As Marks, Meer, 

and Nilson point out:

The fundamental question concerning manhunting is whether the 

United States Government (USG) is properly organized to conduct 

manhunts? Currently, the USG has no central organization that 

oversees manhunting. Apprehending fugitives has never been a 

core competency of either the DoD or any of the intelligence agencies. Traditionally, apprehending individuals has been considered a 

law enforcement function. However, criminal cases are manpower 

intensive, so most criminal investigations focus on collecting evidence to issue arrest warrants. Furthermore, the suspects in most 

criminal cases are concerned not with running from justice, but 

with concealing their connection to the alleged crime. This dynamic 

has prevented the law enforcement community from developing a 

centralized organization responsible for all fugitive manhunts. Currently, the the attorney general tasks the U.S. Marshals Service as lead 

agency for conducting many of the USG’s fugitive investigations, but 

not all. Due to the lack of a centralized oversight body, the USG has 

not clearly defined the duties and responsibilities between various 

governmental agencies. Since manhunting is an important aspect 

in the war on terror, the USG has multiple agencies expanding their 

jurisdictions past traditional organizational roles.90

Should such a consolidation take place? Unity of command is the first 

principle of military leadership–and an overseas contingency operation 

is substantially a martial endeavor. Many have argued that unity of effort

can replace the concept of unity of command—that multiple, independent 
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JSOU Report 09-7

organizations united by a common vision or interest can succeed. This premise is certainly true of the business world. The evolutionary trend toward 

collaborative command and control is certainly a step in this direction. But 

historical experience has shown that democracy can be outpaced by autocracy; the rapid decisions often demanded in war can be made more quickly 

by dictators than assemblies. During war even democracies shift toward 

benevolent autocracy. This phenomenon is best illustrated by the American 

experience with Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt, or by Great Britain under 

Cromwell, Lloyd-George, or Churchill. Despite much documentation and 

public discourse, the nation has yet to adopt a shared vision of the threat 

or the means by which that threat should be addressed.

The task for policymakers and organizational experts is to align departmental and agency functions to best focus manhunting capabilities to ensure 

national security. A primary goal of realignment or reorganization should be 

to create a clear and efficient “pipeline” to develop and produce manhunting 

capabilities for our nation. In addition, agency or departmental elements 

should serve the following functions:

a. Train, organize, equip, and field military, intelligence, diplomatic, 

and economic elements

b. Coordinate interagency cooperative efforts

c. Monitor readiness of fielded forces to execute mission

d. Write doctrine and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures

e. Sustain and refurbish fielded forces

f. Monitor and promote qualified individuals to leadership and key 

staff positions.

Certainly a single dedicated organization would enhance these activities. 

At the interagency level, combining elements of the following agencies and 

organizations could form the basis of a highly effective national manhunting capability:

a. USSOCOM, subordinate elements and Theater Special Operations 

Commands (TSOCs)

b. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service 

and JITF-CT

c. CIA, National Clandestine Service (NCS) and CTC
33

Crawford: Manhunting

d. National Security Agency

e. FBI, Counterterrorism Division and FBI Academy

f. United States Marshals Service (USMS)

g. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

(FINCEN)

h. DHS, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

In contrast to the glacial progress of national affairs, the international 

community moves at a tectonic pace, and counterterrorism is an example. 

Although the United Nations has 13 Conventions on Terrorism, they have 

not yet adopted a comprehensive treaty on terrorism, nor have member 

states agreed on a definition of terrorism.

91 The failure to conclude a standard international agreement leaves loopholes to be exploited by terrorists and their supporters or sympathizers, creating barriers to enforcement 

of counterterrorism policy. Lack of agreed-upon standards also imposes 

barriers to successful manhunting operations. International action should 

move beyond United Nations declarations, conventions, and reports. During 

World War II, the Allies held conferences to set strategy for defeating the 

Axis powers.92 A similar international venue might create vehicles to formalize coalition manhunting activities. 

The international community requires a more active and decisive coalition body to coordinate world efforts toward a common vision that will 

address the threat posed by 21st century nonstate actors. It is not necessary 

that all countries in the world be accepted into this organization; however, as 

a basis for membership, any country should be required to renounce in word 

and deed specific activities including terrorism, piracy, organized criminal 

activity or illicit trafficking as means to achieve political ends. A standing 

or ad-hoc organization comprised of representatives from all willing international participants is required to coordinate civilization’s response to 

the threat presented by radical extremism and nonstate actors. A strategicinternational organization could be facilitated by a treaty-level document or 

accord that would allow enforcement of international manhunting-related 

law. A model organization should perform several functions:

a. Achieve allied consensus on strategy.

b. Determine where to focus priority international efforts.

c. Decide how to employ DIMEFIL solutions in given situations.
34

JSOU Report 09-7

d. Coordinate international resources dedicated to the issue.

e. Facilitate international cooperation for strategic, operational, and 

tactical echelons.

f. Draft treaties and accords to place legal constraints and consequences 

on nonstate actors or to codify agreements between nations.

Western governments might create a 21st century combined analog to the 

World War II Allied Intelligence Bureau to field a force dedicated to conduct 

clandestine strategic manhunting operations, with operations extending 

from North Africa across the Middle East and Southwest Asia to Southeast 

Asia. Spanning the Islamic Crescent, forces would focus on activities including manhunting, sensitive site exploitation, low-visibility liaison with internal security forces in allied nations, intelligence collection, and information 

operations to subvert extremist networks, sabotage terrorist infrastructure, 

and erode active or tacit support for terrorism. The force would permit allied 

nations to engage in offensive action against nonstate networks in denied 

areas and outside combat zones. This organization could also form the basis 

for international security and cooperation in a post-war environment. Key 

leaders from OSS, SOE, and SIS eventually rose to influential positions in 

post World War II western governments, including such notables as William Casey and William Colby. It is logical to conclude that key leaders from 

overseas contingency operations to disintegrate human networks would rise 

to equally influential positions in post-conflict circles.

Manhunting’s Implications for Future National Security

Over the past 20 years, the United States has greatly expanded its willingness 

and capability to target individuals and human networks through manhunting. A review of Appendix A reflects this accelerating trend. Advancements 

in intelligence and technology made precision engagement a reality in the 

last two decades of the 20th century. In the wake of the September 2001 Al 

Qaeda terrorist attacks, American policymakers became more willing to 

address nonstate threats and to authorize preemptive manhunting action. 

Since 2001, American manhunting operations have become so prevalent 

that it is now difficult to maintain situational awareness of the number of 

ongoing interagency or international manhunts taking place at any given 
35

Crawford: Manhunting

time. Our increasing willingness and ability to employ manhunting has 

significant implications for American national security. 

First, our national leaders no longer have to be tied to Wellington’s 

aristocratic notion that “it is not the business of generals to shoot at one 

another.” 93 For the first time in human conflict, political willingness to 

consider preemptive action against an individual or network offers national 

security planners the option of bypassing force-on-force engagement. In the 

battle of the future, America’s national security apparatus might specifically 

affect the root cause of a problem—an individual leader or the network of 

key people who surround him. In any future conflict where America is 

threatened by a network of individuals, it is theoretically possible to identify and target the key nodes in that human network, wielding all elements 

of national power—diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, 

information, and law enforcement—in order to disintegrate the targeted network. If the network of individuals cannot function, their cumulative effort 

loses coherence and is rendered impotent. The components of the network 

then become vulnerable to nonlethal influence or physical attack. 

Second, national security policy based on manhunting doctrine has the 

potential to counter the entire spectrum of likely adversaries and enemies 

America will face in the coming century. At the turn of the 20th century, 

monarchies fought without success to suppress the rise of popular nation 

states. In the 21st century, western nation states increasingly confront groups 

of nonstate actors, whose interests conflict with those of civilized society.94

Today we are seeing “state versus state warfare” transition toward “state 

versus nonstate actors” as western democracies seek to maintain control 

over religious, national, ethnic, or ideology-inspired movements unassociated with any government. Networks of individuals form the core of 

transnational terrorist movements, today’s most evident threat to national 

security. Human networks are behind narcotics trafficking, arms proliferation, piracy, hiding war criminals from authorities, human trafficking, or 

other smuggling activities. Human networks also lie at the core of national 

governments, offering an increased potential to nonlethally influence state 

actors with precision. A robust manhunting capability would allow the 

United States to interdict these human networks.

Third, the precision necessary for manhunting offers the potential to further reduce unintended consequences of military operations. Recent history 
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JSOU Report 09-7

has clearly demonstrated that it is possible to reduce unintended destruction, 

military and civilian casualties associated with conventional military operations, approaching those levels only necessary to achieve clearly defined 

national objectives. In an era of perceived precision, failure to avoid collateral damage can directly undermine a military effort.95 Likewise, the most 

recent experience of U.S. intelligence and military forces demonstrate it is 

possible through manhunting to target and interdict individual humans 

before they have an opportunity to threaten others. Precisely targeting an 

individual or his or her immediate network offers the opportunity to further 

reduce collateral damage, combatant and noncombatant casualties. 

Fourth, manhunting offers additional options short of full-scale conventional or nuclear conflict. By incorporating nonlethal DIMEFIL options into 

the array of manhunting techniques, national leaders will be presented with 

additional options employed more palatably during the earliest emergence 

of a potential crisis. Picture curling, the Winter Olympics sport. As a skater 

releases the heavy stone onto the ice, a few strokes from a broom can alter 

the speed and trajectory of the stone. Likewise, a small amount of precise 

influence or force employed at an early point in a developing situation might 

divert the trajectory of an event away from crisis or full-scale conflict. 

Fifth, it is possible to visualize manhunting as a spectrum of activities, 

wherein government experts would track individuals who meet a critical 

threshold of threatening behavior. When action must be taken, a ladder 

of escalation allows application of only that degree of influence or force 

necessary to reduce or eliminate the threat. The spectrum of activities is 

illustrated in Figure 1. As one moves up the scale from lower left to upper 

right, operations become more sensitive, intrusive, costly, labor-intensive, 

and information-intensive. 

At the low end of the spectrum of manhunting-related activities, one 

finds the enablers that make manhunting operations possible. These include 

mundane tasks like collecting and archiving biometric, demographic, and 

other data from myriads of government documents needed to conduct 

normal national security affairs. Analysts who monitor foreign individuals 

and their interaction with human networks would come next in the hierarchy. By now, one has passed the halfway point on the spectrum of operations, because the bulk of work will fall into the data collection, archiving, 

and analysis area. 
37

Crawford: Manhunting

Next on the spectrum one finds infrastructure and logistics—preparatory 

actions that must take place to enable any subsequent action—conducted 

in those regions determined most likely to require manhunting activities. 

Personnel selection, training, and administration of a manhunting force 

would also fall into this area. Up to this point on the manhunting spectrum, 

the government has not yet targeted any individuals or human networks. 

When an individual or group of individuals elevate themselves to the 

point where it is in the interest of U.S. national security to track the activities of a network, the manhunting operational planning will begin. In other 

words, an individual chooses to become a target by threatening U.S. or allied 

interests. Terrorists who are willing to employ lethal force would always be 

deemed a threat and automatically be tracked. Other persons of interest 

might include narcotraffickers, hostage takers, organized criminal networks, 

weapons proliferators, key operations personnel, or hostages. 

When an individual breaches the threat threshold to become a PONI, 

“analyst hunters” would begin work to determine patterns of behavior 

or to predict the location of a targeted individual or network. Dedicated 

Covert

Not Intrusive Invasive

Public

High

Risk

Low

Risk •Data Collection

•Data Archiving

•Leadership Decisions

•Target Analysis •Intelligence Collection

•Logistics Infrastructure

•Training •Analysis •Research and 

 Development

•Communications Infrastructure

•Influence through DIMEFIL Options

•Tracking, Tagging, Locating

•Capture

•Kill

•Planning,

 Programming

 & Budgeting

Figure 1. Spectrum of Manhunting-Related Activities
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JSOU Report 09-7

intelligence and internal security forces may be called upon to conduct collection operations to fill information gaps. Policymakers would be informed 

and consulted—at this point, the government will have to determine if it is 

in the national interest to take action. By now, one is two thirds of the way 

toward the end of the spectrum. Clearly, the first option for action would 

be to change an opponent’s mind—to deter the opponent from action that 

would lead to conflict. A leader might choose to employ nonlethal or softpower options in an effort to convince an individual or network to change 

behavior and thus no longer pose a threat. But some individuals cannot be 

reasoned with. By now we are at the last few fractions of a percent along the 

spectrum. It is time to take action to capture an individual and deliver him 

to law enforcement authorities. If the person cannot be captured, or poses 

too great a threat, targeted killing must be considered. The magnitude of 

the threat would be a key determinant in whether or not to employ lethal 

force. Lethal force would clearly be justified if a terrorist were in possession 

of a weapon of mass destruction and intent upon its use. 

One can visualize manhunting as an entire spectrum of activities. Most 

of the spectrum is dedicated to those tasks needed to make manhunting 

operations possible. The identification of individuals and human networks 

makes possible the precise employment of nonlethal capabilities intended 

to dissuade individual threats or disrupt networks that constitute a threat. 

Only at the very extreme end of the manhunting spectrum would a nation 

take action to employ force, and only in extreme circumstances would manhunting employ lethal force. 

Sixth, manhunting could provide a deterrent capability. Were it known 

or widely perceived that the United States had the capability to influence, 

capture, or kill an individual human being or his/her immediate network, it 

is likely that rational individuals would be deterred from becoming a threat. 

When confronting individuals who are not rational or who are irreconcilable, the American capability to influence, capture, or kill them would provide leaders with an option to address the threat presented by the individual 

and his/her network—an option short of the expense and damage caused 

by full-scale force-on-force conflict. 

Conventional warfare has become polarized along the lines of ground, 

sea, and air combat. On the modern battlefield, squadrons, fleets, and divisions face similarly equipped ground, naval, and air forces. Industrial-age 

and information-age warfare have become cost-prohibitive and politically 
39

Crawford: Manhunting

untenable. Theoretically, the United States could reverse the polarity of 

warfare by officially adopting manhunting doctrine as a core element of 

defense policy. Manhunting has the potential to form the basis for national 

security, as highly trained teams disrupt or disintegrate human networks 

or seize threatening weapons. Much as nuclear capabilities underpinned 

national security for the last 60 years, an institutionalized manhunting 

capability might form the foundation of U.S. national security strategy for 

the 21st century.

Conclusion

This paper defined manhunting as the deliberate concentration of national 

power to find, influence, capture, or when necessary, kill an individual 

to disrupt a human network. Appendix A has examples of historic U.S.

employment of manhunting dating back to the colonial period, along with 

other military actions that included manhunting aspects. In an accelerating trend, manhunting has arguably become America’s tactic of choice in 

countering terrorists, insurgents, pirates, narcotics traffickers, and similar 

nonstate actors. Appendix B demonstrates that manhunting is not merely 

an American phenomenon; other countries have also employed these tactics through history. Israel is perhaps the most advanced in developing a 

dedicated manhunting capability with open, legal codification. Appendix 

C has examples of personnel recovery operations that may provide insight 

that will guide employment of manhunting capabilities.

Strategy, doctrine, policy, law, and organization have not kept pace 

with the tactics our forces are currently employing. American manhunting operations have historically been ad-hoc affairs. Despite the increasing 

employment of manhunting, the U.S. national security establishment has 

not yet developed appropriate doctrine, dealt with challenging policy and 

legal issues, nor organized forces and assigned clear responsibility to field 

and employ these capabilities. Were the U.S. to do so, manhunting could 

become an important element of future national security policy, as highly 

trained teams disrupt or disintegrate human networks or seize threatening 

weapons. 

The monograph presented doctrinal, policy, legal, and organizational 

issues associated with manhunting, providing options for consideration in 

formalizing counter-network capability as a primary venue for countering 
threats posed by nonstate actors. Figure 1 envisioned a spectrum of operations associated with manhunting, which would provide escalatory options 

for senior leaders to focus national power against nonstate actors. The monograph also argued that formally adopting manhunting capabilities would 

allow the United States to deter and interdict threats without resorting to 

the expense and turbulence associated with deployment of major military formations. Manhunting capabilities could play a central role in the 

implementation of U.S. national security strategy in the 21st century. In 

order to do so, the U.S. must develop doctrine—including an authoritative 

legal regimen—organize, and assign responsibility to develop manhunting 

capabilities. 
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Crawford: Manhunting

Appendix A. Chronology of American 

Manhunting Operations

1646 Colonial Virginia

In March, Virginia’s Assembly sent the colonial interpreter, Captain Henry Fleet, 

to negotiate peace with the Powhatan chief Opechancanough. Governor William 

Berkeley opposed the conciliatory efforts by the Assembly and took matters into 

his own hands, leading a detachment of soldiers in a preemptive raid against 

Opechancanough’s headquarters. 100 years old and nearly blind, Opechancanough 

was taken to Jamestown, paraded before a crowd of colonists, and later shot in the 

back by a member of Berkeley’s guard force.96

1832 Illinois, Wisconsin, Mississippi River Valley

The Black Hawk War, named for the chief of the British Band of Sacs and Foxes, 

involved nearly 5,000 troops, rangers, and militia members in the pursuit of Black 

Hawk and his two united tribes, totaling no more than 2,000 men, women, and 

children. Abraham Lincoln, a young Illinois lawyer, signed on with the state militia 

to accompany the operation. Though initially successful in defending their hunting 

grounds, the tribe was ultimately decimated in a series of military actions along 

the Mississippi River.97

1835-1842 Florida

During the Second Seminole War, American troops were unable to maneuver as 

large units in the Florida swamps. American commanders enjoyed little military 

success until they too adopted unconventional, small-unit tactics designed to 

bring the war parties to battle or run them to ground. American commanders 

Zachary Taylor and William Worth adapted to their new tactical environment. 

Six other senior commanders requested relief from their involvement in a conflict 

they regarded as unworthy of a true officer and warrior. Commanders established 

a series of heavily garrisoned posts that protected white settlements and limited 

the Seminoles’ ability to move. They also sent patrols from those posts that found 

and destroyed Indian villages, crops, and war parties.98

1846-1848 Mexico

The Mexican Occupation. Away from the immediate battlefields, the Army 

found itself in a foreign country with a small force while battling capable and 

highly motivated guerrillas. By 1847, 24 percent of the Army force was dedicated 

to protecting supply routes. General Winfield Scott created a special 1,800-man 

antiguerrilla brigade under the command of Brigadier General Joseph Lane, who 

stressed mobility tobetter locate and engage Mexican Light Corps units. Lieutenant 

Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock formed a “Spy Company” of released Mexican 

prisoners, who directly led to the capture of two key rebel leaders. Texas Rangers 
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JSOU Report 09-7

were dispatched to conduct manhunting operations in pursuit of guerrilla and 

partisan forces. A decrease in guerrilla attacks in 1848 was attributed to large 

number of troops on security duty, offensive operations against the partisans, and 

on measures taken to separate the volunteer troops from the civilian population. 

After the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ended hostilities, the United States helped 

rebuild the Mexican Army.99

1860-1898 United States

The United States government issued Letters of Marque and Reprisal to citizens 

for seizure of property and persons during the Civil War and Spanish-American 

War.100

1862-1863 Washington, D.C.

During the Civil War, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton appointed Lafayette Baker 

as Provost Marshal. Baker’s National Detective Police, an undercover counterintelligence unit, employed controversial methods to find and capture individuals 

deemed a threat. Baker successfully identified and arrested Confederate spy Belle 

Boyd in 1862.101

1863 Virginia

With the assistance of a deserter from the 5th New York Cavalry, the Partisan 

Rangers, led by Captain John Singleton Mosby, conducted a 25-mile raid behind 

Federal lines on Fairfax Court House on 8 March. Mosby initially planned to kidnap 

Colonel Percy Wyndham, an English mercenary who had offended Mosby’s sensibilities by calling him “a horse thief,” but Wyndham was not at Fairfax Courthouse. 

Mosby also targeted and captured General E. H. Stoughton, commander of the 

Washington defenses south of the Potomac River, along with 25 Federal soldiers, 

26 horses, and assorted equipment. When informed of the raid, President Lincoln 

remarked, “I don’t mind the loss of a general, for I can make another in 5 minutes. 

But I hate to lose the horses.” 102

The United States conducted a 

Punitive Expedition into Mexico 

in search of Francisco “Pancho” 

Villa and his renegades. Here, 

a group of Villistas who raided 

Columbus, New Mexico and 

were apprehended by Army 

soldiers are held in camp near 

Namiqipa Mexico, 27 April 

1916. National Archives photo 

(533443). 
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1863 Shenandoah Valley

Lafayette Baker raised a battalion of cavalry designated the 1st District of Columbia 

Cavalry to pursue Confederate Colonel John Singleton Mosby and his Partisan 

Rangers. The unit was unable to capture Mosby, who continued his guerilla warfare 

until the Civil War ended.103

1863 Colorado, New Mexico

Fort Garland deployed a detachment of soldiers to arrest bandits Felipe Nerio 

Espinosa and Vivian Espinosa, who murdered a total of 30 people in a crime spree 

spanning New Mexico and Colorado. Cornered in a small cabin, the Espinosa 

brothers escaped after wounding several soldiers and killing one. Frustrated by 

the Espinosa’s terror following the ambush of a man and his wife in a nearby pass, 

Colonel Sam Tappin, commanding officer at Fort Garland, called on Thomas 

Tate Tobin—a respected scout, guide, and mountain man—to find the Espinosa 

brothers. Tappin insisted on providing a detachment of 15 soldiers to support the 

capture of the brothers and their band. Once Tobin was away from the fort, he 

left the noisy soldiers at camp and went ahead with a young Mexican boy, whom 

he also left behind when he actually located the band of killers. Creeping up on 

the two bandits and a younger relative, Tobin killed them both in a gun and knife 

fight. To prove he completed his assignment, Tobin returned to Fort Garland with 

the two bandits’ heads in a gunnysack.104

1864 Virginia

Colonel Ulric Dahlgren was killed while leading a 5 March cavalry raid ostensibly 

to free thousands of Union soldiers from Richmond prisoner-of-war camps. A 

search of Dahlgren’s body revealed orders instructing the cavalrymen to find and 

execute President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate cabinet. “The Dahlgren 

Affair” became a sensational public incident. General George Meade ordered a 

full investigation by General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, who commanded the raid 

on Richmond. Kilpatrick denied the orders were issued. In response to southern 

outcry, Jefferson Davis directed General Robert E. Lee to file a protest over the 

Dahlgren papers with Union commander Meade. Meade responded with a curt 

denial that any orders were given.105

1864-1865 District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland

Possibly viewing The Dahlgren Affair as cause for retribution, Confederate Secret 

Service agents planned several operations targeting Federal leaders. John Wilkes 

Booth failed to capture Abraham Lincoln on 17 March 1865. On 10 April, a plot 

to explode a mine (bomb) near the White House unravelled when Federal cavalry 

captured a key explosives expert from the Confederate Torpedo Bureau 15 miles from 

the District of Columbia. Taking matters into his own hands, John Wilkes Booth 

and associates planned to disrupt the Union by assassinating several key Federal 

leaders. At 10:15 p.m. on 14 April 1865, Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln at 

Ford’s Theater. Lewis Powell stabbed Secretary of State William Seward but failed 
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to kill him. George Atzerodt planned to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson at 

home, but made no attempt.106

1865 Washington D.C., Maryland, Virginia

Lafayette Baker was summoned to Washington D.C. to lead the 16 to 26 April 

pursuit of John Wilkes Booth and the Lincoln conspirators. Baker’s agents arrested 

Mary Surratt, Lewis Paine, George Atzerodt, and Edman Spangler within 2 days. 

Uncovering Booth’s trail on 22 April, Baker dispatched a 25-man detachment of 

the 16th New York Cavalry under Lieutenant E. P. Doherty and former Lieutenant 

Colonel Everton Conger to pursue Booth. They caught up with Booth and David 

Herold near Port Royal, Virginia at a barn owned by Richard Garrett. Herold 

surrenders. In violation of capture orders, Sergeant Boston Corbett shot Booth 

in the back. Corbett and the men of his detachment were later given a reward for 

doing so.107

1877 Wallowa Valley, Oregon, Canada

2,000 U.S. Army troops pursued 700 members of the Nez Percé tribe, led by Thunder 

Rolling Down the Mountain (a.k.a. Chief Joseph), after the native Americans refused 

to return to a designated reservation. Starting in July, the Nez Percé conducted a 

brilliant 1,400-mile retreat, finally surrendering on 5 October 1877.108

1877-1880 Texas, New Mexico, Mexico

Units of 9th and 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiments pursued Apache under the leadership of Victorio in a campaign of engagements which began in May 1877. Victorio 

eluded American forces by crossing into Mexico. Mexican military forces, though 

initially slow to respond, ultimately forced Victorio back into the United States in 

late July 1880, in a rare case of Mexican Army hot pursuit into U.S. territory. U.S. 

cavalry units met Victorio, forcing him to cross back intoMexico on 12 August. The 

campaign climaxed when Mexican and U.S. forces agreed to cooperate. With the 

permission of the Mexican government, a powerful U.S. force crossed into Mexico, 

operating in cooperation with 350-man Mexican Army deployment. In October, with 

the situation well in hand, U.S. forces were requested to depart Mexico. Mexican 

forces surrounded and eliminated Victorio’s force at Tres Castillos.109

1885-1886 Arizona, New Mexico, Mexico

General Nelson Appleton Miles fielded a force of Apache scouts and handpicked 

troopers under Captain Henry Lawton to apply pressure to the Chiricahua raiders 

led by Geronimo in May 1885.110 Miles also dispatched Lieutenant Charles Bare 

Gatewood along with two Apache scouts and a small detail including the legendary 

frontiersman Tom Horn.111 Gatewood invested considerable personal time learning 

native American language and culture and had a reputation for integrity and courage. 

An experienced campaigner who participated in the hunt for Victorio, Gatewood was 

known and trusted by Geronimo. Miles ordered Gatewood to convince Geronimo 
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to surrender. Gatewood’s party tracked Geronimo for weeks, finally locating his 

camp near Fronteras, a few miles south of the Mexico border. Gatewood began 

a dangerous and extended negotiation with Geronimo, finally convincing the 

Chiricahua leader to surrender to Federal forces in September 1886.112

1900-1902 Philippines

American forces conducted an antiguerilla campaign against ethnic Tagalog 

and Ilocano insurrectos. The campaign included efforts to win hearts and minds 

through civil activities and establishment of local governments, along with patrols 

and expeditions to capture or kill insurrectos. However, efforts were largely unsuccessful until the Army employed harsh measures to break linkages between the 

civilian population and the insurrectos. At the end of the insurgency, one insurrecto 

leader gave the following reasons for his surrender: “...reconcentration [relocation of rural civilian population to American-controlled towns], the complete 

cleaning up of food supplies outside the towns, and persecution of the insurgent 

soldier by the people, the search for myself by the people, and the demoralization 

of my troops.” 113

1916-1917 Mexico, New Mexico, Texas

Mexican revolutionary general Francisco “Pancho” Villa raided U.S. territory to 

provoke an invasion of Mexico in order to discredit President Carranza, Villa’s 

former commander and political rival. In response to growing outcry over Villista 

raids, President Wilson ordered an expedition into Mexico to end Pancho Villa’s 

reign of terror. In mid-March 1916, General John J. Pershing crossed into Mexico 

from Fort Bliss, Texas with approximately 10,000 Army soldiers on a punitive 

expedition to eliminate the threat posed by Villa’s force of 500 to 1,500 irregulars. 

Penetrating nearly 400 miles into Mexican territory over Carranza’s strenuous 

protests, the expedition threatened to escalate into a second war with Mexico—an 

event Wilson needed to avoid, due to the increasing likelihood the U.S. will be 

drawn into the ongoing European conflict.114 Diplomatic negotiations between the 

Wilson and Carranza governments succeeded, and the punitive expedition was 

withdrawn in February 1917.115

1921-1933 United States

The Lawless Years. The United States did not possess a robust capability to prosecute federal crimes; in fact, there were few federal laws to enforce. The FBI was 

established in part to deal with particularly violent criminal gangs. FBI G-men

pursued infamous criminals, bringing to justice gangsters including George 

“Machine Gun” Kelly, John Dillinger, Charles Arthur “Pretty Boy” Floyd, Lester 

Gillis (a.k.a. Baby Face Nelson), and Clyde Barrow and Bonny Parker, the infamous 

Bonny and Clyde.116
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1942 Philippines

Shortly after being evacuated from the Corregidor to Mindanao by patrol-torpedo 

(PT) boat, General Douglas MacArthur received information that Philippine 

Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon was wavering in his allegiance to the 

United States. Having evacuated Quezon from Manila to Negros, 100 miles northwest of Mindanao, MacArthur feared Quezon would defect to the side of invading 

Japanese forces. MacArthur ordered Navy Lieutenant John Bulkeley to “hop over 

to Negros, find Quezon, and bring him and his whole tribe back here.” Near sunset 

on 13 March, Bulkeley led PT-41 and PT-35 to the port of Zamboquita, narrowly 

avoiding a Japanese destroyer. Wading ashore with three men, a Filipino constable 

informed Bulkeley that Quezon left Zamboquita that afternoon. Threatening the 

constable with his Tommy gun, Bulkeley found that Quezon moved 25 miles up 

the coast to Bais. Returning to the waiting PT boats, Bulkeley waded ashore at Bais, 

where he learned from a local resident that Quezon was hiding in a palm hut several 

miles inland. Appropriating two automobiles, Bulkeley woke Quezon at 2:30 a.m. 

Quezon initially refused to go with Bulkeley, who convinced the President that he 

should think about the treachery and brutality shown by Japanese forces before 

making a final decision. Quezon acceded. Bulkeley and his shore party jammed 

Quezon, his family, Vice President Sergio Osmena, a general, and two cabinet officers 

into the two automobiles, arriving at the Bais dock at 3:05 a.m., only to discover 

that PT-35 had struck a rock and been beached. Quezon had second thoughts, 

When Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon wavered in his 

loyalty to the United States in early World War II, General Douglas MacArthur 

ordered Navy Lieutenant John Bulkeley and his PT-41 patrol torpedo boat 

to force the Philippine president and his family into exile. National Archives 

photo (ww2-59). 
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Crawford: Manhunting

once more refusing to go. Against the President’s wishes, Bulkeley herded Quezon, 

his eight companions, an additional seven cabinet members who appeared at the 

dock, and the crew of the beached PT-35 onto the remaining PT boat along with 

sacks of money estimated at $12-15 million. PT-41 made the 100-mile trip back 

to Mindanao through a violent storm, with Bulkeley refusing Quezon’s repeated 

demands that he be returned to Negros. Arriving at 6 a.m., Bulkeley remarked 

to one of his associates, “I wonder when the statute of limitations for kidnapping 

expires?” Quezon, suffering from tuberculosis, died in the United States in 1944. 

Osmena succeeded Quezon as president in exile.117

1942 Amagansett, Long Island, New York; Ponte Vedra 

 Beach, near Jacksonville, Florida

When the Nazis landed eight saboteurs on American shores, the FBI apprehended 

all from 13 to 27 June, before they were able to accomplish their mission. This was 

primarily due to a turncoat within the Nazi ranks, George John Dasch. Shortly after 

their arrest and subsequent trial by military tribunal, all but Dasch were executed. 

German intelligence was so shaken that no further attempts were made to insert 

agents into the United States for over a year.118

1943 Hawaii, Bougainville

Having broken the code employed by the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy’s 

Pacific Fleet Radio Unit decodeed a message containing an itinerary for an inspection 

tour by the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet and architect of the carrier 

attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Concerned that any strike 

against the key Japanese leader might compromise the American code-breaking 

capability, President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Knox, and commander of the 

U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Nimitz agreed the opportunity to remove Yamamoto 

from the picture justified the risk. A squadron of P-38 Lightning twin-engine 

fighters was assigned to intercept Yamamoto’s transport aircraft, downing his 

bomber on 18 April 1943 as it approaches Kahili Aerodrome, on Bougainville, 

killing Yamamoto.119

1945-1946 Occupied Germany

President Truman in August authorized Project Paperclip to bring German scientists to the United States. On 18 November, the first scientists reached America. 

A hoard of V-2 missiles and documentation was shipped from Germany to White 

Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico. Near the end of the year, more than 100 

Germans, who agreed to come to the United States under Project Paperclip, arrived 

at Fort Bliss, Texas. 

Projects Credulity and Overcast were similar in nature to Paperclip. Other 

programs were initiated in Europe. Operation Applepie was the code name for 

a program to locate and interrogate key German personnel of RSHA AMT VI 

(Chief of Security Headquarters) and members of the German Army staff who 

had knowledge about Soviet industrial and economic matters. Operation Dwindle 
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recruited German cryptology personnel. Operation Goldcup was the Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Forces Europe code name for efforts to locate and collect 

Third Reich records and government ministerial personnel. Operations Alsos and 

Harborage were code names for Allied missions made up of special intelligence forces 

who sought information on German developments in nuclear fission. Operations 

Birchwood, Pajamas, and Panhandle recruited East European “economic experts,” 

German biochemical experts, and exmilitary intelligence personnel, respectively. 

Tally Ho was a Counterintelligence Corps operation in July 1945, to speed up the 

apprehension of Nazi war criminals, while in 1946 Grab Bag sought to break up 

an underground route used by former SS troops escaping Germany.120

1945-present United States

CIA, FBI, and DoD counterintelligence agents employed classic law enforcement techniques to find and expose enemy spies. Efforts met with varied success; 

often unable to prevent compromise of critical secrets, investigations of innocent 

people curtailed several careers. Yet persistent investigation resulted in a litany of 

prosecutions and eventual imprisonment of many perpetrators. Famous counterespionage cases included those of Rudolf Abel, Maksim Martynov, Aldrich Ames, 

Robert Hansen, the John Walker Family, Jonathan Pollard, Christopher Boyce, 

and Andrew Dalton Lee.121

1952-1954 Guatemala, Nicaragua

CIA conducted planning and operations “aimed at removing the government of 

Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala,” due to rising Communist 

influence within Arbenz’ administration. Covert operations under the code names 

PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS included planning and proposals that incorporated 

influence and assassination options. The Guatemalan resistance movement, Castillo 

Armas, may have proposed the assassination options. PBSUCCESS, designed 

to remove the government “covertly, without bloodshed if possible,” combined 

psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against 

Guatemala. On 5 January 1954, a CIA officer requested a special paper on liquidation of personnel, and 8 days later discusseed the training of two assassins.122 The 

operations included CIA training for 85 Castillo Armas insurgents in Nicaragua, 

the establishment of a clandestine radio broadcasting facility code named Sherwood, 

air cargo drops, and attacks against key facilities in order to influence Arbenz and 

his cronies. Conducted at a cost of only $3 million, the operation unmasked Soviet 

assistance to Guatemala; it also resulted in the collapse of the Arbenz government 

and the installation of a military junta acceptable to the U.S. government.123

1960 United States, Cuba

Richard M. Bissell, a CIA operations officer, approached CIA Office of Security’s 

Colonel Sheffield Edwards in August 1960 to determine if the office had any assets 

who might conduct “gangster-type action” to target Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Robert 

A. Maheu, a CIA asset, approached Johnny Roselli, a reputed syndicate member, 
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Crawford: Manhunting

claiming he represented clients who “suffered heavy financial loss” when the Castro 

regime took over syndicate operations in Cuba. Roselli introduced Maheu to Sam 

Gold, who suggested that it might be possible to poison Castro’s food or drink. 

Gold also suggested a potential assassin: Juan Orta, a Cuban official with access 

to Castro. CIA produced six highly lethal pills that were delivered to Orta. After 

several weeks of attempts, however, Orta backed out of the assignment, suggesting 

a replacement. The replacement also made several attempts without success. CIA 

identified Dr. Anthony Verona, a former officer in the Cuban Exile Junta, as another 

potential assassin. Verona was never used because the Kennedy administration 

cancelled anti-Castro operations in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.124

1960 Republic of the Congo

In 1960, after President Eisenhower expressed concern about Patrice Lumumba’s 

Congolese government, CIA conducted planning and discussions with opposition 

figures over possible removal. The week after the August 18 NSC meeting, a presidential advisor reminded the Special Group of the “necessity for very straightforward 

action” against Lumumba and prompted a decision not to rule out consideration of 

“any particular kind of activity that might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.” 

The following day, director of Central Intelligence Dulles cabled Leopoldville, 

Republic of the Congo, that “in high quarters” the “removal” of Lumumba was 

“an urgent and prime objective.” Shortly thereafter the CIA’s clandestine service 

formulated a plot to assassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that 

the CIA delivered lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use 

in an assassination to the Congo Station. There is no evidence that these instruments of assassination were actually used against Lumumba.125

1960s Langley, Virginia

CIA conducted research on executive action, a euphemism that evaluated means 

by which foreign political leaders might be overthrown, including assassination. 

Richard M. Bissell, who was involved in the project, later testified before the 

Church Committee and indicated that executive action covered a “wide spectrum 

of actions” to “eliminate the effectiveness” of foreign leaders, with assassination 

as the “most extreme” action in the spectrum. The agency initiatedZR/RIFLE, a 

project that involved assessing the problems and requirements of assassination 

and developed a stand-by assassination capability. More specifically, it involved 

“spotting” potential agents and researching assassination techniques that might be 

used. Bissell characterized ZR/RIFLE as “internal and purely preparatory.” 126

1965-1975 Republic of Vietnam; Malaysia; New Zealand; 

 Fort Gordon, Georgia

Building on the British Special Air Service (SAS) experience in Malaysia, the United 

States, Great Britain, and New Zealand cooperatively trained 14 Combat Tracker 

Teams (CTTs) to hunt their Vietnamese enemy on his own ground. Trained under 

the supervision of British advisors at Fort Gordon, Georgia, the British Jungle 
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Warfare School in Malaysia, and with Ghurka units in New Zealand, CTTs included 

volunteers from across the Army and comprised a team leader, a visual tracker, a 

tracker dog with handler, and two men to provide cover. All team members were 

trained in visual tracking. Once the enemy evadeed conventional forces, the CTT 

was called in to reestablish contact with the enemy.127

1967 Laos

On 2 June, a flight of Marine UH-1E helicopter gunships escorted five Marine 

CH-46s and nine Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) HH-34 transport helicopters on 

a secret Prairie Fire mission into Laos for Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, 

Special Operations Group (MAC-V SOG). Their mission was to insert a companysized “Hatchet Force” of approximately 100 men into the heart of the main North 

Vietnamese command center for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, known to American intelligence and SOF as Target Oscar Eight, approximately 18 to 22 kilometers southeast 

of Khe Sanh. Ostensibly, the objective of this raid was to assess bomb damage 

following a large raid on the logistical and command center at Oscar Eight. 

The true objective of this raid was to capture or kill General Vo Nguyen Giap, 

commander of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and chief architect of the war. 

Several hundred Special Agent Reports had been intercepted from the target area 

within a 24-hour period. These radio transmissions originated from the NVA 

and indicated General Giap might be present. An Arc Light strike by nine B-52 

bombers hit Oscar Eight at dawn to suppress antiaircraft defenses and disorient 

NVA infantry in the area. Following on the heels of the bombers, the 14 helicopters 

landed the Hatchet Force. Consisting of Nung tribesmen led by American Special 

Forces, the Hatchet Force fanned out from the landing zone, but a quick NVA 

reaction halted them before they could reach their objectives. Soon the Hatchet 

Force was surrounded in several large bomb craters. 

Fighter bombers were called in to attack the enemy positions around the 

Hatchet Force, but Oscar Eight’s heavy antiaircraft defenses soon recovered. Two 

A-1 Skyraiders, an F-4 Phantom, two Marine UH-1E gunships, and one VNAF 

HH-34 were shot down. A Marine CH-46 with a full load of troops was hit as it 

took off from the hot landing zone. The CH-46 crashed near an NVA position. Its 

crew and surviving passengers were either killed or captured by the NVA. MAC-V 

SOG troops fought for 4 days to extract the Hatchet Force survivors. Those killed 

included 23 Americans and approximately 46 Nung tribesmen, and 6 Americans 

were declared missing in action.128

1967 Bolivia

CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces dispatched field agents to Bolivia to assist in 

combating guerillas led by revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara. Arriving in August, 

CIA case officer Felix Rodriguez provided advice to Bolivian rangers in a manhunt 

for Guevara and his guerrilla band. Bolivian rangers made contact near La Higuera 

on 26 September, applied increasing pressure on Guevara, who began a retreat. A 

Bolivian unit trained by U.S. Special Forces captured Guevara on 8 October. Felix 
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Rodriguez met Guevara, interrogated him, and photocopied all of his captured 

documents. The United States wanted to extradite Che for trial in Panama. In order 

to avert the trial becoming a controversial political platform for their prisoner, the 

Bolivian government summarily executed Guevara on 9 October.129

1985 Mediterranean Sea

Palestinian gunmen in October took over the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, 

with 80 passengers and a crew of 340, killing Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly JewishAmerican invalid. Finally anchoring off Port Said, Egyptian, Italian, and Palestinian 

negotiators talked the terrorists into going ashore. President Hosni Mubarak 

announced the “seajackers” had been permitted to leave Egypt before authorities became aware of the Klinghoffer murder. The U.S. intelligence community 

discovered the terrorists were still in Egypt, planning to fly to Algiers aboard an 

Egypt Air Boeing 737. The Reagan Administration took advantage of the fact that 

the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga was steaming in the Mediterranean Sea. Notified 

of the mission only 2 hours ahead of the B737 departure, Saratoga launched E-3A 

Hawkeye surveillance aircraft, E-6B Prowler electronic jamming aircraft, and F-14 

Tomcat fighters, intercepting the Egyptian airliner 45 minutes after it left Cairo.130

Forced to land at Sigonella Naval Base, Italian authorities took custody of the four 

terrorists and Muhammed “Abu” Abbas, a key aide to Yassir Arafat, chairman of the 

Palestinian Liberation Organization. Abbas escaped Italy before being prosecuted 

but was later sentenced to five life sentences in absentia.131

1986 Libya, England, Mediterranean Sea

On 5 April 1986, an explosion at the LaBelle discotheque killed two people and 

wounded 200; one of the dead and 63 of the injured were U.S. military service 

members. With “irrefutable proof” of Libyan complicity—including an order from 

Gaddafi directing an attack “to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties” 

among Americans—President Reagan ordered an attack on Libya’s capability to 

sponsor terrorist attacks. At 2 a.m. on 16 April, the aircraft carriers USS America

and USS Coral Sea and a squadron of F-111 Aardvark attack aircraft—flying long 

distance from their base at Lakenheath, England—struck targets along the Libyan 

coast in Operation El Dorado Canyon. Although the United States emphasized that 

the operation focused on the terrorist support infrastructure, the raid displayed 

manhunting aspects. F-111 attack aircraft targeted the Al Aziziyah Barracks, 

Gaddafi’s headquarters, where Gaddafi was known to keep a Bedouin-style tent. 

Gaddafi claimed his adopted daughter was killed in the attack.132

1989-1990 Panama

On 12 December 1989, Manuel Noriega ordered the Panamanian parliamentary 

assembly to proclaim him Maximum Leader. Three days later, he claimed that a state 

of war existed between his government and the United States. Initially dismissed 

as saber rattling by the White House, the situation deteriorated within hours when 

a Marine officer was killed at a Panamanian roadblock. American forces, which 
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secretly built up strength in the tense days after Noriega’s declaration of war, broke 

out from their bases in the Canal Zone on 21 December to seize key objectives 

and neutralize the Panamanian Defense Forces in Operation Just Cause. Noriega 

eluded a SOF manhunt and went into hiding at mistress Vicki Armado’s villa. His 

routes to sanctuary in either the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies blocked, Noriega 

requested asylum on Christmas Day from the surprised Papal Nuncio—personal 

emissary of the Pope and head of the Vatican Diplomatic Mission. After protracted 

negotiations, Noriega turned himself over to U.S. forces on 3 January 1990. He was 

later tried and incarcerated in the United States.133

1990-1991 Iraq, United States

Prior to open hostilities with Iraq, Secretary of Defense Cheney dismissed Air 

Force chief of staff, General Michael Dugan, after Dugan discussed details of 

planned air strikes in a press interview. During a 16 September 1990 interview 1 

week prior to the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly, General 

Dugan insisted that one of the goals of any future Air Force strikes would be to kill 

Saddam Hussein and his family. 134 Cheney explained that Dugan was dismissed 

not just for revealing operational details but for speaking favorably about a policy 

that might violate the ban on assassinations. “We never talk about the targeting 

of specific individuals who are officials of other governments,” Cheney said.135

Not knowing the precise location of the Iraqi dictator after the commencement 

of Operation Desert Storm in January, U.S. Central Command target planners 

identified several key command and control facilities where Hussein might hide. 

A special guided weapon—the 18-foot long, 4,700-pound GBU-28—was designed 

during Operation Desert Storm in a 17-day crash program to penetrate the most 

deeply buried bunkers. Two of the massive weapons were used before the Gulf 

War cease-fire.136

1992-1993 Colombia

U.S. SOF and intelligence assisted the Colombian government in a manhunt 

for Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, leader of the notorious Medellín drug cartel. 

Providing advice, training, and equipment to a Colombian special police task force 

known as the Search Bloc, the U.S. operatives covertly led a 16-month manhunt. 

A right-wing Colombian vigilante group, los Pepes, applied additional pressure 

by murdering nearly 300 of Escobar’s associates. On 2 December, employing 

communications direction-finding equipment provided by the United States, the 

Search Bloc tracked Escobar’s telephone to a barrio in Medellín. Escobar was killed 

in the ensuing gunfight.137

1992-2001 The Balkans, centering in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

 and the province of Kosovo

The intensity of fighting and “ethnic cleansing” across the Balkans by rival nationalist 

forces shocked the world, spurring the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) to intervene in the civil war. The United Nations passed 
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Resolution 827 on 25 May 1993, establishing an International Criminal Tribunal 

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an investigative body aimed at bringing to 

trial those who committed crimes against humanity including genocide, torture, 

ethnic cleansing, prison atrocities, and rape.138 American elements in NATO’s 

Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) detained Persons Indicted 

for War Crimes (PIFWCS) in the course of normal duties. By November 2001, 

NATO’s SFOR detained 23 PIFWCS—67 percent of publicly indicted PIFWCs. 17 

others were detained overseas; two were killed during the detention process, and 

22 surrendered themselves voluntarily.139

1993 Mogadishu, Somalia

On 5 June, militia forces of the Somalia National Alliance (SNA), under the leadership of General Mohamed Farah Aideed, ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. 

An escalating series of U.S. responses culminated in the 22 August deployment of 

Task Force (TF) Ranger, a Joint Special Operations Task Force to capture Aideed 

and his key leaders. On 3 October, TF Ranger targeted two key lieutenants meeting 

in the Olympic Hotel at the center of Aideed’s “Black Sea” enclave. The assault team 

captured 24 Somalis and prepared to load them into a convoy of Army trucks. As 

they were doing so, the SNA targeted TF helicopters, downing two and damaging 

several others. The manhunt transitioned to a personnel recovery mission. By 

the time TF Ranger’s soldiers ran “the Mogadishu Mile” to the soccer stadium at 

daybreak on 4 October, 18 Americans were dead and 105 wounded. Most sources 

estimated that Somali casualties in the Battle of the Black Sea exceeded 1,000 men, 

women, and children. In the aftermath of the battle, international news agencies 

repeatedly showed footage of American bodies desecrated by celebrating Somali 

mobs. U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin resigned a month later.140 Within 6 

months, the United States withdrew most of its forces from Somalia.141

1993-1998 Pakistan, United States

After the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, accused 

bomber Ramzi Ahmed Yousef fled the United States. Leaflets, posters, even matchbooks distributed worldwide sought Yousef. Not long after, a man Yousef tried to 

recruit offered a tip regarding Yousef’s whereabouts. On 7 February 1995, Pakistani 

intelligence raided the Su-Casa Guest House in Islamabad. They arrested Yousef 

and turned him over to U.S. Diplomatic Security Service agents.142 Extradited to 

Manhattan, Yousef was tried and on 8 January 1998 sentenced to 240 years in 

prison for the attack.143

1993-2002 Pakistan, United States

Pakistani citizen Mir Amal Kanzi opened fire on workers queued in traffic at the 

Route 123 entrance to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia on 25 January 1993. 

Kanzi cased CIA headquarters while working as a courier from 1991. Placed on 

the FBI Most Wanted list with a reward that ultimately rose to $3.5 million, Kanzi 

was betrayed by an informant in Pakistan after he fell out of favor with a tribal 
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leader.144 Apprehended in an early morning raid 15 June 1997 and later returned to 

the United States for trial, Kanzi was found guilty and executed by lethal injection 

on 14 November 2002.145

1994 Sudan

Former Special Forces soldier and CIA independent contractor Billy Waugh and 

a handpicked team find and fix Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (a.k.a. Carlos the Jackal) 

and Osama bin Laden in Khartoum. Waugh and his team establish a clandestine 

observation post to monitor the Jackal’s residence. Seized by his own bodyguards, 

the Jackal was handed over to French intelligence on 14 December.146

1998-2000 Afghanistan, United States

In May 1998, CIA proposed a plan to capture Osama bin Laden at Tarnak Farms, 

Afghanistan. The plan was not approved for fear that a raid might injure women and 

children.147 President Bill Clinton ordered the first direct military action against Al 

Qaeda and supporters in the wake of August 1998 attacks against U.S. embassies 

in Tanzania and Kenya. Acting on intelligence that senior Al Qaeda leaders would 

meet at a camp in Afghanistan, U.S. cruise missiles launched against Al Qaeda 

facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan reportedly missed bin Laden by a few hours. 

President Clinton imposed a ban on trade with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, 

freezing Taliban assets in July 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1333 banned arms shipments and military advice to the Taliban in December 2000. 

The Clinton Administration also pursued a number of covert operations against bin 

Laden during 1999 to 2000. After taking office, the Bush administration considered 

some new options, including arming anti-Taliban opposition groups.148

2001 United States

Terrorist attacks destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon 

on 9/11. The attack ushered in a new phase of intensive manhunting operations 

for America’s defense, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. Viewing 

the attack in a similar vein to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that drew the 

United States into World War II, President George W. Bush made U.S. policy clear 

in a 20 September address before a joint session of Congress: “...Every nation, 

in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are 

with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor 

or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”149

Policy shifts in the wake of 9/11 included the stated willingness to preemptively 

target individual terrorists with lethal force or to capture them and return them 

for detention and trial.

2001 Afghanistan

Chief of Al Qaeda operations Mohammad Atef (a.k.a. abu Hafs) killed in Kabul 

by a missile launched from a Predator UAV in November.150
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2001-present Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia

Within the month of the 9/11 attack, U.S. and British SOF and intelligence agents 

commenced Operation Enduring Freedom, infiltrated Afghanistan, and made 

contact with opposition forces known as the Northern Alliance. A classic unconventional warfare campaign began on 7 October 2001 when allied air strikes destroyed 

Taliban and Al Qaeda infrastructure. American aircraft also supported a Northern 

Alliance advance on Mazar-e-Sharif, an important logistics thoroughfare that was 

seized 9 November. When Taliban forces fled Kabul on 12 November, Northern 

Alliance forces occupied the city the following day. Within the day, Afghan provinces along the Iranian border defected to the Northern Alliance side. The Islamist 

forces split. Pashtun tribal factions fled toward Khost in the northeast. Taliban 

forces fled to their stronghold in Kandahar, while Al Qaeda hardliners retreated 

to their stronghold at Tora Bora. 

From 13 November, allied airpower concentrated on the Al Qaeda presence in Tora Bora. U.S. SOF and British Special Boat Service closed on the site 

by 2 December.151 The hard-line defenders feigned a truce, possibly intended to 

allow key Al Qaeda leaders to escape into the surrounding mountains across the 

Pakistan border. Fighting intensified on 12 December. By 17 December all cave 

complexes were overrun and an estimated 200 mujahideen killed. Though the most 

significant resistance was overcome, senior Al Qaeda leaders slipped away. Taliban 

and mujahideen holdouts continued to resist the new, democratic government in 

Afghanistan and the supporting coalition military presence.152 Since the 9/11 attacks, 

over 3,000 suspected Al Qaeda members had been detained or arrested with the 

cooperation of nearly 90 countries. 650 of the detainees were under U.S. control. 

By 2005, 15 of the 37 top Al Qaeda operatives had been captured or killed.153 As of 

November 2007, the FBI listed 26 terrorists on its Most Wanted list, including Al 

Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.154

2001-present Yemen

New rules of engagement permitted the United States to take more decisive 

manhunting action to find and prosecute those suspected of the USS Cole bombing. 

On 3 November 2002, a Predator UAV fired a Hellfire antitank missile at a vehicle 

carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a suspected planner of the bombing plot. Also in the 

vehicle was Ahmed Hijazi, a U.S. citizen. Both were killed on Yemeni territory. 

The Yemeni government began quiet, but tangible, support for U.S. efforts. A 

Yemeni judge sentenced Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal al-Badawi to death for 

their roles in the bombing on 29 September 2004. Al-Badawi, in Yemeni custody, 

denounced the verdict as American-inspired. For their involvement, four others 

were sentenced to prison terms of 5-10 years, including one Yemeni who videotaped 

the attack. But on 3 February 2006, 23 suspected or convicted Al Qaeda members 

escaped from jail in Yemen. This number included 13 who were convicted of the 

USS Cole bombings and the bombing of the French tanker Limberg in 2002. Among 

those who reportedly escaped was Al-Badawi. The reputed mastermind of the Cole 

bombing, al-Nashiri, was placed in U.S. custody at Guantanamo, Cuba.155
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2002 Pakistan

Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan who ran training camps in Afghanistan, was 

captured by Pakistan and turned over to U.S. authorities in January.156

2002 Afghanistan

Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (a.k.a. Abu Abdallah), allegedly a terrorist training camp 

director, was captured in January by the U.S.-led coalition.157

2002 Pakistan

Pakistani agents in Faisalabad arrested key recruiter and planner Abu Zubaydah 

in March.158

2002 Afghanistan

On 6 May, an airstrike by a CIA Predator UAV narrowly missed killing Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar in the Shegal Gorge area of Konar Province. An unnamed American 

official told Reuters news service: “I believe some others were killed in the strike, but 

the target escaped.” A Pakistani news service put the death toll at 30 people.159

2002 Pakistan

Pakistani agents arrested 9/11 plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Karachi on 11 

September.160

2002 Kuwait

In November, Kuwaiti security forces arrested Mohsen al-Fadli, a senior Kuwaiti 

member of Al Qaeda and the senior leader of the network for the Persian Gulf. 

Kuwait claimed the arrest foiled a plot to blow up a hotel in Yemen used by 

Americans.161

2003 Pakistan

Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman was arrested in Quetta in February. Son of the 

blind Egyptian sheik accused of inspiring the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 

Center, Abdel-Rahman ran a training camp in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks 

and also had a role in operational planning.162 Pakistani agents arrested 9/11 planner 

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed near Rawalpindi on 1 March.163

2003-present Iraq

Implementing a new and unapologetic policy of preemption, the United States 

and a coalition of nations invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003. The first major military 

strike of the campaign was a preemptive “decapitation” attack targeting Saddam 

Hussein and his key leaders. In only 21 days, coalition forces toppled the Hussein 

regime and occupied most of the major Iraqi cities. On 11 April, the United States 

publicly revealed sets of playing cards bearing pictures of key Iraqi leaders.164 The 

cards reflected a list of 55 key Iraqi leaders wanted by the coalition. A clear heir-
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archy started with the aces and kings, used for the people at the top of the Most 

Wanted list. Saddam Hussein’s picture was displayed as the ace of spades, while 

his sons Uday and Qusay adorn the respective aces of hearts and clubs.165 On 22 

July, Qusay and Uday Hussein were isolated in a residential area at Mosul, Iraq 

and were killed in a televised shootout with American forces. In the face of public 

questions and the demands from the international community, coalition forces 

published photographs of the bodies and allowed key members of the interim 

Iraqi government to view the bodies. Aggressively following up on intelligence 

from human sources, American forces on 13 December successfully apprehended 

Saddam Hussein as he hid in a “spider hole” beneath a mud-walled compound on 

the Tigris River 10 miles southeast of Tikrit.166 Secretary Paul Bremer announced 

the apprehension the following day; the U.S. military released video of Hussein to 

confirm the arrest.167 On 30 December 2006, Saddam Hussein was hanged by the 

Iraqi government following a lengthy trial. Coalition manhunting operations were 

successful; as of November 2005, 44 of 55 members on the “deck of cards” had been 

captured or killed—80 percent of the Most Wanted Ba’ath Party leaders.168

2003 Pakistan

A 29 April raid in Karachi nabbed Waleed bin Attash–an alleged Al Qaeda operational commander suspected of helping plan the October 2000 attack on the USS 

Cole in Yemen–along with five other alleged Al Qaeda operatives.169

2003 Thailand

Riduan Isammudin was arrested 11 August. Also known as Hanbali, Isammudin 

was a key operative of Al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).170

2005 Pakistan

Abu Hamza Rabia, a senior Al Qaeda operational planner, was killed in a December 

Predator attack in North Waziristan.171

2006 Pakistan

A 13 January U.S. air strike in Damadola killed as many as five senior Al Qaeda 

leaders. Though the raid targeted Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

he was not killed in the raid.172 Those killed in the raid may have included Abu 

Khabab al-Masri, head of the Al Qaeda WMD committee; Abd Rahman al-Masri 

al-Maghribi, son-in-law of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s and an Al Qaeda commander; Abu 

Ubeidah al-Masri, Kunar Province operations chief; Marwan al-Suri, Waziristan 

operations chief; Khalid Habib, southeastern Afghanistan regional commander; 

and Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, southwestern Afghanistan regional commander.173

2006 Horn of Africa, Red Sea, Indian Ocean

Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, an international naval presence off the Horn of 

Africa, after monitoring increasing piracy off the coast of Somalia, took decisive 

action on the high seas. A U.S. Navy vessel captured a suspected pirate vessel in the 
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Indian Ocean and detained 10 alleged pirates on 21 January.174 On 18 March, USS 

Cape St. George and USS Gonzalez returned fire on a group of suspected pirates 

in the Indian Ocean, killing one and wounding five.175

2006 Iraq

Jordanian-born Abu Musayb al Zarqawi sealed his own fate by releasing an egocentric videotaped message on 25 April, ostensibly to inspire his followers. Intelligence 

analysts, working with Iraqi counterparts, isolated and identified the area in which 

the video had been shot. This narrowed the search space for Zarqawi. In late April 

2006, coalition forces conducted raids on the town of Youssifiyah, during which 

they killed or captured three of Zarqawi’s lieutenants and seized a wealth of documents and other intelligence material. Coalition forces began to shadow Zarqawi’s 

spiritual advisor, Sheikh Abu Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi. Jordanian officials and local 

Iraqis who lived near Zarqawi’s hideout in the vicinity of Hibhib provided additional 

information. Shadowing the sheikh, special operations reconnaissance teams were 

led to a modest farmhouse, where a dinner party was taking place. As the meeting 

broke up, F-16 fighters dropped a single 500-pound GBU-12 laser-guided bomb, 

followed shortly by a GBU-38 satellite-guided weapon. The laser-guided bombmade 

a direct hit, killing three men and three women, including one of Zarqawi’s most 

trusted couriers. Zarqawi suffered massive internal injuries in the attack, but lived 

for nearly an hour. Iraqi police were first to arrive on the scene. With poetic justice, 

in his last moments, Zarqawi attempted to roll off his stretcher as he witnessed the 

arrival of U.S. soldiers. The U.S. ambassador reported, “The information that led 

to his location and to the attack that subsequently took place came from those that 

were arrested, senior members of Al Qaeda in Iraq that are in our custody.” 176

2006-2007 Somalia, Djibouti

United States forces of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa based out of 

Djibouti pursued Al Qaeda operatives sheltered by the Islamic Courts as they fled 

from Ethiopian and Somali forces beginning 25 December. The USS Eisenhower

carrier battle group repositioned from the Persian Gulf. On 8 January, a U.S. AC-130 

gunship carried out a strike near Ras Kamboni, followed on 9 January by American 

helicopter gunship strikes against Al Qaeda camps. The targets were described 

as “the senior Al Qaeda leader in East Africa and an Al Qaeda operative wanted 

for his involvement in the 1998 bombings of two American embassies in Africa.” 

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan were the two operatives 

wanted for the embassy bombings. Fazul was Al Qaeda’s operations chief for East 

Africa, while al-Sudani was the chief strategist and ideologue. Abu Taha al-Sudani 

(or Tariq Abdullah) was the Al Qaeda regional commander in East Africa.177

2007 Sudan

The United States employed economic and financial sanctions over the summer 

against individuals to dissuade the Sudanese government from committing genocide in the Darfur region of Africa.178
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2007 Iraq

The numbers of senior Al Qaeda operatives killed or captured steadily increased 

after the troop surge began in June, with 19 senior Al Qaeda killed or captured 

in July, 25 in August, 29 in September, and 45 senior Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives 

killed or captured during the month of October. Daily raids conducted by Task 

Force 88, hunter-killer teams assigned to dismantle Al Qaeda’s network in Iraq, 

resulted in significant losses for the terror network.179 After a visit to Iraq, a retired 

senior Army officer reported the following: 

...special operations capability is simply magic. They are deadly in getting their 

target—with normally zero collateral damage—and with minimal friendly losses 

or injuries. Some of these assault elements have done 200-300 take-down operations at platoon level. The comprehensive intelligence system is phenomenal. We 

need to rethink how we view these forces. They are a national strategic system 

akin to a B1 bomber. We need to understand that the required investment level 

in the creation of these forces demands substantial dedicated UAV systems, 

intelligence, and communications resources. These special operations formations 

cannot by themselves win the nation’s wars. However, with them we have a tool 

of enormous and decisive strategic significance that has crucial importance in 

the global war on terrorists.180

2007 Qayyarah, Iraq

An MQ-5 Hunter UAV monitoring a major thoroughfare for coalition forces engaged 

and killed two men suspected of emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED) on 

1 September. A scout weapons team from 2nd Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, 

25th Combat Aviation Brigade observed the two unknown enemy fighters near 

the roadside. The scouts requested support from the Hunter UAV. Pilots guided 

the Hunter operator to the scene where it set up for a strike mission and dropped a 

precision weapon, killing both unknown enemies. This was the first time a Hunter 

UAV conducted a lethal engagement.181

2007 Afghanistan, United States

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, during a 28 October interview with American 

media, openly called for an end to the use of airpower during military operations 

in Afghanistan, due to civilian casualties caused by air strikes. Karzai stated he 

made a similar request directly to President Bush during private discussions.182

2007 Iraq

On 24 December, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division received 

a tip-off from local citizens that several insurgents were crossing the Tigris River 

toward Baghdad. Confirming the occupants were hostile, Apache helicopters 

destroyed two vehicles with Hellfire missiles, killing a “high value target linked 

to suicide bomb attacks, including the car bombing of the Australian Embassy in 

Baghdad.” 183
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2007-present Northern Iraq, Turkey

In response to growing tensions between Turkey, Iraq, and the international community, the United States provided Turkey with “actionable intelligence”—including 

information that could be used to target with lethal force—on militant elements of 

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) operating in Northern Iraq.184 By 25 December, 

Turkish military leaders claimed air strikes killed over 150 PKK insurgents and 

struck over 200 targets.185 On 4 February 2008, a statementposted on the Turkish 

Army’s Web site said about 70 targets in Avashin, Basyan, and Hakurk were hit in 

air strikes that began at 3 a.m. and lasted 12 hours. The Turkish military said the 

targets were identified as “belonging to the PKK terrorist organization by intelligence sources,” and the attacks were conducted in a manner designed to avoid 

civilian casualties. Several similar attacks in January caused no casualties.186

2008 Iraq

Coalition forces launched Operation Phantom Phoenix on 8 January, a nationwide 

effort “to pursue Al Qaeda and other extremists wherever they attempt to take sanctuary.” Concerned Local Citizen groups provided tips for criminals and weapons 

and ammunition caches and cooperated with the Government of Iraq. Nonlethal 

aspects of the operation were designed to improve delivery of essential services, 

economic development, and local governance capacity.187 On 10-11 January, with 

tip-offs provided by Concerned Local Citizen “bird-dogs” and confirmed by Army 

elements, two U.S. Air Force B-1B bombers and four F-16 fighters dropped Joint 

Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) on 50 targets in the Arab Jabour area south of 

Baghdad, killing two senior Al Qaeda in Iraq operatives along with 32 foot soldiers 

during fighting in Arab Jabour, Miqdadiyah, and the Samarra region. Another 

34 Al Qaeda fighters were reported captured.188 General Mustafa, the leader of a 

Concerned Local Citizens group in the Arab Jabour, claimed 21 Al Qaeda operatives were killed during the 10 January raids, including Walid Khudair, the leader 

of Al Qaeda in the southern belts of Baghdad. A follow-up strike was launched 

on 16 January, hitting 17 targets. On 20 January, U.S. Air Force B-1 bombers and 

Marine and Navy F-18 fighter-bombers dropped 35 bombs with a total weight of 

19,000 pounds on safe houses, deep-buried IEDs, and weapons caches identified 

by Concerned Local Citizens.189

2008 Pakistan

An air strike by a Predator aircraft killed senior Al Qaeda leader abu Laith al Libi 

in Khushali Tari Khel, Waziristan on 29 January.190 A top-tier Al Qaeda leader, 

abu Laith al Libi, was the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and also 

served as a chief spokesman for Al Qaeda. Laith also commanded Al Qaeda forces 

in Afghanistan.191 Villagers reported seeing an aerial drone before the attack and 

that the strike killed 12 foreigners of Arabic or Central Asian ethnicity.192 He was 

killed at the house of Abdul Sattar, a cab driver suspected of having ties to local and 

foreign militants. U.S. and Pakistani officials declined to comment officially on any 
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U.S. involvement.193 Rumors indicated Egyptian explosives expert Abu Ubaida al 

Masri may have also been killed in the attack, but reports were inconclusive.194

2008 Iraq

In negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government, 

the United States sought to preserve the right to hunt down foreign fighters, gather 

intelligence, and conduct counterterrorism activities. The SOFA replaced a United 

Nations Security Council Resolution governing the coalition presence in Iraq. The 

SOFA articulated when military activities could be conducted unilaterally and 

when they must be coordinated with the Iraqi government.195

U.S. military representatives revealed nine Iraqi civilians were accidentally 

killed and three more were wounded in an air strike in Iskandariya, 25 miles south 

of Baghdad on 2 February. The strike intended to target Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 

militants. Iraqi police claimed the strike, called in support of a military convoy, 

mistakenly targeted Iraqi civilian guards hired to counter Al Qaeda.196

2008 Afghanistan

An air strike in the Bakwa district of Farah province killed two Taliban commanders. 

A third Taliban commander who owned the house, Mullah Manan, escaped with 

four other fighters, but two other Taliban commanders in the compound were killed 

by a ground and air attack. Six civilians were also killed in the attack. A provincial 

official who declined to be named said the civilians were family members of the 

Taliban commander.197

2008 Iraq

Arkan Khalaf Khudayyir, also known as Karrar, was killed during a raid by coalition forces in Khan Bani Sa’ad on 17 February. Multinational Forces Iraq often 

used the generic term coalition forces to describe Task Force 88, special operations 

hunter-killer teams tasked with dismantling Al Qaeda in Iraq’s senior leaders and 

wider network.198

A 27 February helicopter strike killed AQI leader Abu Yasir al-Saudi, who was 

the Southeast Mosul Emir for AQI and led a foreign terrorist facilitation network 

in the city. Intelligence reports led coalition forces to an area where the wanted 

terrorists were believed to be operating. Coalition forces confirmed their location 

and directed a precision helicopter strike, killing the two terrorists and destroying 

their vehicle. Once the area was secure, the ground force confirmed that Abu Yasir 

al-Saudi and another wanted terrorist, Hamdan, were killed during the strike. Abu 

Yasir conducted numerous attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces, including the 

28 January IED attack that killed five coalition soldiers. Within the Mosul AQI 

network, Abu Yasir al-Saudi worked for an alleged AQI military leader detained by 

coalition forces 18 February.199 Multinational Forces Iraq said 142 Al Qaeda leaders 

and operatives were killed or captured in Mosul since January.200
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2008 Pakistan

A missile, believed to have been fired by a U.S. UAV, struck a house near Kaloosha 

village near the Afghanistan border of Waziristan on 28 February, killing at 

least 10 suspected militants and injuring 7, most of them believed to be Arab. “A 

security official said he believed the missile was fired by U.S. forces, who were 

operating in neighboring Afghanistan, and that the house belonged to a Pashtun 

tribesman, Sher Mohammad Malikkheil (a.k.a. Seroo), who was known to have 

links to militants.”201

2008 United States

In late February, The U.S. Marine Corps formally announced that its Combat 

Hunter program would be implemented nationwide after its successful 2007 introduction at Camp Pendleton. Combat Hunter was designed to help Marines stalk 

and kill insurgents by using their senses and instincts. It emphasized a Marine’s 

keen observation of surroundings and meticulous knowledge of the foe’s habits. 

Taught by a cadre of instructors including former law enforcement officers and 

big game hunters, Combat Hunter also taught human behavioral analysis, law 

enforcement profiling techniques, and big game hunting and tracking practices. 

Col Clarke Lethin, chief of staff for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force described 

the training as follows: 

This is the most comprehensive training of its kind in our history. These are 

primal skills that we all have, but that we evolved out of. We are going back in 

time. The Marines who go through this program will never be the same. They’ll 

never look at the world the same again.202

2008 Somalia

The U.S. military targeted “known Al Qaeda terrorist” and FBI Most Wanted 

terrorist Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in the early hours of 2 March near the village of 

Dobley (also transliterated Dhoobley), 140 miles from the port of Kismayu.203 A 

defense official said the strike used one or more Tomahawk cruise missiles fired 

from a U.S. submarine off Somalia’s coast. Nabhan was wanted for questioning 

in connection with the 1998 suicide bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya 

and Tanzania. The Council of Islamic Courts, a radical Islamic movement that 

ruled much of southern Somalia in 2006, took over Dobley in late February 2008, 

led by senior officialHassan Turki. Turki was on U.S. and United Nations lists of 

suspected terrorists for alleged ties to Al Qaida. Turki’s fate after the strike was 

unknown.204

2008 Iraq

Major General Kevin Bergner, the spokesman for Multinational Forces Iraq, said in 

a briefing in Baghdad on 5 March Iraqi and coalition forces continued to pressure 

and disrupt AQI and other extremist groups. In recent weeks, Iraqi and coalition 

forces captured or killed 26 senior leaders in the AQI terrorist network. Eight 
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were Al Qaeda emirs, meaning they exercised responsibility for a geographic or 

functional area. Five were Al Qaeda cell leaders. The remaining 13 were terrorist 

facilitators.205

2008 Thailand, Russia, United States

Victor Bout (pronounced “boot”) and codefendant Andrew Smulian were arrested 

6 March in Bangkok and charged with conspiring to sell weapons, including 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and armor piercing rocket launchers, to the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 

(DEA) officials announced. Bout built a logistics network through a spider web of 

front companies and airlines that included a fleet of 50 aging Russian cargo aircraft. 

He was accused of violating United Nations arms embargos to fly weapons to the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, Liberian dictator Charles Taylor, Zaire dictator Mobutu 

Sese Seko, and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. Changing passports and adopting 

aliases, Bout reinvented himself and his companies regularly to make it difficult to 

locate him. In 2002, he moved from Brussels to Moscow after Belgian authorities 

issued a warrant for his arrest. Efforts to stop Bout intensified after 11 September 

2001, leading to a 2003 United Nations report detailing his activities. Former British 

Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain described the report: “The U.N. exposed Bout 

as the center of a spider’s web of shady arms dealers, diamond brokers, and other 

operatives, sustaining the wars.” In April 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department 

froze Bout’s assets and identified 30 companies connected with him. “Shortly after 

the breakup of the Soviet Union, Bout, a former Soviet air force officer with a gift 

for languages, was able to acquire surplus or obsolete airplanes, which he used to 

deliver arms and ammunition from old Soviet stockpiles,” the Treasury report said. 

“Notably, information available to the U.S. government shows that Bout profited 

$50 million from supplying the Taliban with military equipment when they ruled 

Afghanistan. Today, Bout has the capacity to transport tanks, helicopters, and 

weapons by the tons to virtually any point in the world.”206

According to the DEA, between November 2007 and February 2008, Bout 

agreed to sell weapons to the FARC. According to a DEA press release, “during 

a series of consensually recorded meetings in Romania, Smulian advised the 

confidential sources (CSs), among other things, that Bout had 100 SAMs available immediately and could also provide helicopters and armor-piercing rocket 

launchers. During one of the meetings with the CSs, Smulian provided one of the 

CSs with a digital memory stick that contained an article about Bout, and documents containing photographs and specifications for the SAMs and armor-piercing 

rocket launchers that Smulian had previously said Bout could provide. In between 

his meetings with the CSs, Smulian spoke to Bout over a cell phone provided to him 

by one of the CSs at the direction of the DEA. During one of these conversations, 

Bout and Smulian discussed the $5 million delivery fee for the weapons. Bout and 

Smulian were charged with conspiracy to provide materiel support or resources 

to a designated foreign terrorist organization. If convicted, the defendants each 

faced a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment.”207 Thai authorities said an 
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investigation to determine whether both men violated Thai laws would be conducted 

before granting extradition to the United States.208

2008 Afghanistan, Pakistan

Coalition forces targeted the Haqqani network, a powerful Taliban splinter group 

based in the Pakistani tribal state of North Waziristan, in a series of cross-border 

strikes into Pakistan. On 12 March, precision-guided munitions struck a compound 

owned by a senior member of the network. The strike occurred after multiple 

intelligence sources confirmed the presence of the group’s upper echelon inside 

the compound. At 9:40 p.m. local time, U.S. officials declared the group posed an 

imminent threat to forces inside Afghanistan and authorized the strike. Fixed- and 

rotary-wing aircraft, along with Predator UAV, scanned likely insurgent-attack 

positions inside Afghanistan. Military officials confirmed no women or children 

had been seen in the targeted compound or in any structures near it over the 

previous 5 days. Intelligence sources confirmed several other high level Haqqani 

commanders, including Sirajjudin Haqqani, had planned to attend a meeting. 

Nearly 4 hours later a salvo of indirect fire targeting the compound obliterated the 

building and killed an unknown number of occupants. Initial intelligence reports 

indicated three high level Haqqani network commanders had been killed on 12 

March and that many Chechen fighters also died in the blast.209

On 16 March, state-run Pakistani television reported a devastating explosion 

destroyed the fortress-like home of a tribal elder in South Waziristan. Foreign 

fighters and Taliban insurgents were believed to be among the 20 people dead and 

five others injured. Residents reported seeing a drone circling the village shortly 

before the blasts occurred and said foreigners with links to Al Qaeda had lived 

in the area for some time. One of three missiles fired from an unidentified location was responsible for the massive explosion, according to witnesses. The blasts 

destroyed a fortified compound owned by Pakistani tribal elder, Noorullah Wazir, 

who lived in the village of Dhook Pir Bagh some 5 kilometers from Wana, and 

a second house where Uzbek and Arab fighters recently stayed, owned by Safraz 

Khan, a tribesman sympathetic to the Taliban. Eight to ten fighters were believed 

killed in the attack on the second compound.210

On 6 April, a series of coalition airstrikes killed 16 people after intelligence 

sources reveal Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leading a faction of Hizb-e-Islami, was in 

the Dohabi (Doab) district trying to meet with Kashmir Khan, his top military 

commander.211 

As if to underscore the effectiveness of the attacks, extremists in Pakistan’s 

western tribal areas killed dozens of people suspected of providing intelligence to 

the United States and its allies, releasing video footage of several executions.212

Anonymous U.S. officials and Pakistani sources said the recent wave of Predator 

attacks were at least partly the result of understandings that high level American 

visitors reached with Musharraf and other top Pakistanis, giving the United States 

virtually unrestricted authority to hit Al Qaeda targets in the border areas.213
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2008 Somalia

A 1 May strike by U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles on Dusamareb, Somalia 

killed Aden Hashi Ayro and 10 other people. Ayro was the military commander 

of al-Shabab terrorist group, while one of the others killed was Sheikh Muhidin 

Maalin Umar, the al-Shabab spokesman. Ayro, trained in Afghanistan, was an 

instrumental figure when the Union of Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu 

in the second half of 2006.214

2008 Pakistan

On 14 May, a U.S. air strike killed Abu Sulayman Jazairi and 13 associates in an 

attack against a Taliban and Al Qaeda safe housein the town of Damadola in 

Pakistan’s Bajaur tribal agency. A senior Algerian operative for Al Qaeda’s central 

organization who directed the group’s external operations, Jazairi was known to 

be an instructor, an explosives expert, and an operational commander tasked with 

planning attacks on the West. The Pakistani government protested the air strike 

as a violation of Pakistani’s territorial sovereignty. Taliban elements carried out 

several suicide attacks inside Pakistan in retaliation.215

2008 Iraq

An attack by an American helicopter near Baiji killed eight civilians, including two 

children, on 21 May. The military confirmed the strike, which occurred during an 

operation against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a Sunni insurgent group believed to 

be led by foreign fighters. “The targeted individuals were known terrorists who 

were operating a facility used for weapons storage.” Expressing regret about the 

loss of innocent life and stating that an investigation would explore the incident, a 

military spokesman said the attack took place only after the other occupants of the 

vehicle “exhibited hostile intent.”216 The military said the attacks by AH-64 Apache 

helicopter-gunships saved lives and prevented attacks, despite criticism from the 

Iraqis. Colonel Timothy J. Edens, commander of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, 

said the strikes were as “precise as very hardworking soldiers and commanders can 

make it. These criminals do not operate in a clean battlespace. It is occupied by 

civilians, law-abiding Iraqis.” Soldiers working in 12-hour shifts often monitored 

targets for hours. Major Will Downing, operations center supervisor, described 

insurgent tactics: “The challenge you run into is he can shoot a rocket and pull 

into a garage. They shoot and they are gone.” Six Apaches were kept airborne 

around the clock, tied into a command center several miles from their airstrip 

and working in concert with unmanned drones. In late March over 200 Hellfire 

missiles were expended in the Baghdad area alone, compared to six missiles fired 

in the previous 3 months.217

2008 Pakistan

Security officials in Peshawar, Pakistan announced their belief that a top Al Qaeda 

expert on chemical and biological weapons was killed in an air strike on 28 July. 

Egyptian-born abu Khabab al Masri, whose true name was Midhat Mursi al-Sayid 
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Umar, was believed to have been the target of a missile strike fired by a suspected 

U.S. drone. The 55 year-old Egyptian militant was believed to be one of three Arab 

males and three boys killed when missiles struck a house in Azam Warsak, south 

Waziristan owned by a local tribesman, Malik Salat. The United States had placed a 

$5 million reward for information leading to his apprehension or death. Residents 

said they heard U.S. aircraft and Predator drones flying about the area before and 

after the strike. Pakistan’s military announced it was still seeking confirmation, 

as Umar was erroneously reported killed in a January 2006 air strike in the Bajaur 

tribal region. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a eulogy confirming 

abu-Khabab’s martyrdom.218 

A missile strike destroyed a compound near Angore Adda in South Waziristan 

on 12 August. Pakistani military sources said that nine suspected insurgents were 

killed, including foreigners, while Pakistani intelligence claims the strike killed 

22 to 25 people, including Arab, Turkmen, and Pakistani militants in a camp 

commanded by an Afghan identified as Commander Zangeer linked to Afghan 

warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. American military spokesmen denied involvement. 

Press sources attributed past strikes in the area to CIA Predator drones.219

2008 Afghanistan

On 22 August, U.S. Special Forces and Afghan national army elements called in 

air support from an AC-130 gunship near the western Afghan village of Azizabad. 

The gunship concentrated its attack on two houses after U.S. and Afghan force 

came under fire. The Afghan government claimed 76 to 90 civilians were killed, 

including 60 children. A United Nations inquiry claimed the Afghan numbers 

had been corroborated. The United States, after reviewing the incident, believed 

its figures were accurate.220 U.S. military officials said at least 30 insurgents were 

killed, including the commander, who was known as Mullah Siddiq. A U.S. military spokeswoman dismissed the Afghan government’s assertions that scores 

of civilians had been killed in the attack as “outrageous.” Lt Col Rumi NielsonGreen said U.S. forces inspected the site and found five civilians had been killed. 

An anonymous U.S. official in Washington commented the Taliban was adept at 

spreading false intelligence to draw U.S. strikes on civilians. “The fact is that the 

Taliban now has pretty good insight into where we’re picking up information and 

how we’re developing it into actionable intelligence.... They’ve figured out a way 

to misguide us.” 221

2008 Pakistan

At least five Al Qaeda operatives were reported killed in a 31 August attack launched 

by unmanned Predator aircraft hovering over Wana. The strike targeted the home 

of Noor Khan Wazir in the Korzai region near Wana, which had recently been 

rented to foreigners. “Two Canadians of Arab origin” were killed, and two ethnic 

Punjabis were wounded. The Wana attack was the eighth confirmed U.S. strike on 

Al Qaeda and Taliban safe houses and camps in Pakistan in 2008.222 
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In the first known ground incursion into Pakistan since the invasion of 

Afghanistan in 2001, U.S. troops conducted a helicopter assault, crossing the border 

from Afghanistan to raid suspected Al Qaeda targets in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan on 3 September. Pentagon officials, speaking on 

condition of anonymity, said the raid by SOF targeted suspected Al Qaeda operatives and signaled a possible intensification of American efforts to disrupt militant 

safe havens in Pakistan.223 The Pakistani Foreign Ministry called the raid into 

south Waziristan “a grave provocation...a gross violation of Pakistan’s territory,” 

saying that 20 civilians, including women and children, were killed in the raid, 

according to the governor of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), 

Owais Ahmed Ghani.224 Pakistan’s parliament passed a resolution condemning 

the raid on 4 September.225 U.S. forces based in Afghanistan periodically entered 

Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of militants. According to Pakistani sources, two helicopters flew Afghan and American troops to raid Musa Nika, a small village from 

which a rocket had been launched against a convoy in Afghanistan.226

The raid came in the wake of an admission by Pakistan’s Interior Minister, 

Rehman Malik, that Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his wife had been 

moving freely between Mohmand in the FATA and Afghanistan’s Kunar and Paktia 

provinces. Malik also said that Pakistan had “missed the chance” to apprehend Al 

Qaeda’s second in command. Pakistani officials claimed that approximately 560 

Pakistani and foreign fighters had been killed during recent offensives in the tribal 

areas of Khyber, Bajur and the Swat valley, while government forces suffered 20 

dead and 30 missing.227 

The attack also followed a 26 August military summit in the Indian Ocean 

aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.

228 Pakistan Army commander 

General Ashfaq Kayani and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael 

G. Mullen and other senior U.S. military officials participated in the council of 

war.229 A senior DoD official said the meeting had discussed how the U.S. could help 

Pakistan’s military increase its counterinsurgency efforts in response to increased 

militant violence, threats from senior Al Qaeda leaders, and the resignation of 

longtime U.S. ally President Pervez Musharraf.230

2008 Afghanisan

On 4 September, an American UAV struck a large house in Chaar Kehl, Afghanistan, 

approximately 16 miles west of Miran Shah, Pakistan. The attack occurred at 

approximately 5 p.m. and reportedly killed seven Arab men. Another source said 

the attack killed four to five “foreigners,” suspected to be Islamist militants from 

Central Asia or Arab countries.231 On 5 September, a missile strike on a group 

of houses in southern Afghanistan by an American UAV killed 6 to 12 people. 

Residents in Miran Shah reported three missiles hit a target in Afghan territory, 

striking two residential compounds in Al Must, a village in the Gurwak border 

region less than a mile from the border. Residents of Al Must said UAVs were seen 

in the area around 9 a.m. and that the dead included men of Arab origin as well 

as two women and three children. The houses belonged to Hakeem Khan and 
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Arsala Khan, but it was common in these areas for residents to rent portions of 

their homes to foreigners, especially Arabs planning attacks on NATO forces in 

Afghanistan.232

2008 Pakistan

Five missiles launched from a suspected U.S. UAV hit a compound in North 

Waziristan belonging to Jalaluddin Haqqani on 8 September at around 10:20 a.m. 

The Taliban leader was suspected of organizing recent attacks in Afghanistan 

against U.S. and NATO troops, as well as the assassination of former Pakistan 

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The attack reportedly killed 23 people and wounded 

at least 18, according to Pakistani intelligence officials. Two top Al Qaeda operatives were among four foreign militants killed. Pakistani intelligence identified 

four foreign militants killed in the Monday strike as Abu Qasim, Abu Musa, Abu 

Hamza, and Abu Haris. Abu Haris led Al Qaeda efforts in the tribal areas, while 

Abu Hamza led activities in Peshawar, the main northwest city. Abu Hamza was 

from Saudi Arabia, the officials said. Abu Hamza was believed to be a bomb-making 

expert as well. Abu Qasim was Egyptian, while Abu Musa also was Saudi, but both 

appeared to be lower-ranking Al Qaeda members. Abu Haris’s nationality had yet 

to be confirmed. The attacks were part of a renewed effort to cripple Al Qaeda’s 

central command that began in early 2007 and picked up speed as President Bush’s 

term in office wound down, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials involved in 

the operations. The search for bin Laden and his lieutenants took place primarily 

from the air—CIA officers and U.S. Special Forces were prevented from operating 

freely in Pakistan.233

2008 Syria

On 26 October four U.S. helicopters conducted a cross-border raid near Sukkiraya, 

5 miles across the Syria-Iraqi border from Qaim, Iraq.234 The special operations 

raid targeted Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (a.k.a. Abu Ghadiyah), who was 

named commander for Syrian logistics in 2004 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Several 

armed associates were also killed.235 American troops crossed the border several 

times since 2003 in hot pursuit of militants, and warplanes in some cases allegedly 

violated Syria’s airspace, including a significant May 2005 firefight.236

2008-2009 Pakistan

In January, U.S. and Pakistani authorities intensified the hunt for Baitullah Mehsud, 

commander of Tehrik-I-Taliban, charged by Islamabad and Washington with 

ordering nearly 20 major suicide attacks across Pakistan in the previous 3 months, 

including the 27 December assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Believed to reside in 

a south Waziristan stronghold, Mehsud may have overseen an Al Qaeda plan to 

weaken the Pakistani government.237 Mehsud was believed killed in a 5 August 

2009 Predator air strike on a compound in South Waziristan. Unnamed Pakistani 

intelligence officials said the CIA launched the missile after Pakistan confirmed 
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Mehsud’s presence in the compound. A video shared with Pakistani intelligence 

showed Mehsud and his vehicle at the compound.238

2009 Pakistan

The administration of President Barack Obama signaled its willingness to continue 

lethal UAV strikes in Pakistan. A 23 January UAV strike employing three Hellfire 

missiles against a compound in Zera (near Mir Ali in North Waziristan) reportedly killed 10 people. A second strike against a compound in Gangi Khel (near 

Wana in South Waziristan) killed 10 others. Local press reports acknowledged that 

“foreigners” were among the dead.239 A 14 February Predator UAV strike in South 

Waziristan targeted a Taliban commander’s compound in Malik Khel, killing at 

least 25 Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Uzbek fighters.240

On 6 February, Predator UAVs launched at least four Hellfire missiles at a 

Taliban training camp in Kurram Agency (FATA), killing at least 30 Taliban 

fighters, with many more possibly buried in the rubble.241

On 26 February, CIA director Leon Panetta confirmed the strikes had been 

successful to date, and would continue. “Nothing has changed our efforts to go 

after terrorists, and nothing will change those efforts,” Panetta said. “I don’t think 

we can stop just at the effort to try to disrupt them. I think it has to be a continuing 

effort, because they aren’t going to stop.” 242 

A 1 March Predator attack with two Hellfire missiles killed eight people and 

wounded seven others in the village of Hebat Khan in the Sararogha region.243

On 12 March, a strike targeted a Taliban compound and training camp in the 

Barjo region in Kurram with at least four Hellfire missiles. A villager told Reuters 

“The training camp was completely destroyed.” 244

A 15 March attack against a compound in the town of Jani Khel, NWFP, 

reportedly killed two Al Qaeda and two Taliban operatives.245

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Appendix B. International Manhunting 

Operations

334-331 BC Persian Empire (modern day Turkey, Iraq and Iran)

Alexander the Great based his strategy for conquest of the Persian Empire on the 

capture of King Darius III, also known as Darius Codomanus. Alexander pursued 

Darius 400 miles in 11 days after the Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC), but Darius was 

betrayed and murdered by his cousin Bessus and Persian commanders.246

190-183BC Mediterranean

Romans pursued Hannibal. Hannibal eluded his Roman pursuers, finally taking 

poison in the vicinity of Tyre.247

73-71BC Italy

Roman pursued Spartacus and an army of escaped gladiators and slaves.248

44BC Rome

Members of the Roman Senate conspired to assassinate Julius Caesar. The assassination 

sounded a death knell for republican rule, leading to imperial dictatorship.249

1090-1272 AD Middle East

The Hashashim, a mystic sect of warriors, cultivated a fearsome reputation by 

carrying out targeted assassinations of Muslim leaders, often in Mosques or other 

public places. They may have carried out targeted assassinations of Crusaders as 

well.250

1170 England

Sir Thomas Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, exacerbated tensions with his former 

close friend, King Henry II. Henry was rumored to have raised his head from his 

sickbed, crying out, “will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” Interpreting the 

King’s words as an order, knights Reginald FitzUrse, Hugh de Moreville, William 

de Tracy, and Richard le Breton paid a call on Becket in December. An argument 

ensued, and the four followed the high priest into the cathedral, striking him down 

with sword blows as Becket conducted vespers.251

1291-1305 Scotland

The English pursued Scottish rebel William Wallace. Braveheart’s rebellion 

started with an argument with soldiers over a catch of fish and ended in full-scale 

war.252
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1300-1868 Feudal Japan

Ninja—warriors specially trained in assassination, intelligence, and martial arts—

appeared in popular folklore. Nearly 70 secret organizations practiced the art, 

primarily centered in the Iga and Koga regions. The most famous ninja, Hattori 

Hanzo, lived from 1541 to 1596.253

1462 Wallachia (present-day Romania)

The Night Attack (in Romanian, atacul de Noapte). Mehmet II abandoned his 

siege of Corinth and invaded Wallachia when Vlad III (Vlad Tepes, a.k.a. Dracula) 

refused to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire and massacres 23,000 Turks and 

Bulgarians. Advancing to a position south of Târgovişte, Mehmet II made camp 

prior to laying seige. Before making his attack, Dracula reportedly entered the 

Turkish camp disguised as a Turk and wandered around to find the location of 

the Sultan’s tent and learn about his organization. Hoping to kill Mehmet in his 

tent, Dracula launched an attack by torchlight on the night of 17 June 3 hours after 

sunset, which lasted until approximately 4 a.m. While accounts vary about the 

result of the Night Attack, Dracula was reported to have mistaken the tent of two 

high-ranking viziers for the Sultan’s tent. The sultan escaped, though the attack 

caused much confusion and turmoil.254

1519 Aztec Empire (present-day Mexico)

Hernan Cortes marched to the Aztec capital city, Tenochtitlan, with 500 conquistadores and native recruits, arriving in November. Invited into the city by the 

Aztec ruler, Montezuma II, Cortes kidnapped the king. Montezuma was later 

killed, reportedly stoned to death by his own people. Over the next 2 years, Cortes 

subdued the Aztec empire, which was unable to resist modern technology and the 

loss of their ruler.255

1532 Inca Empire (present-day Peru)

Francisco Pizarro and 168 conquistadores kidnapped the Inca ruler Atahuallpa 

during their initial 16 November meeting in the city of Cajamarca. Holding their 

leader in exchange for gold and silver, Pizarro later garroted Atahuallpa and installed 

a crony to rule the Incan empire.256

1707-1856 England and France

Letters of Marque were issued to French and English citizens for seizure of 

property and persons lead to sanctioned piracy on the high seas, in the form of 

privateers.257

1746-1750 Scotland, Ireland, England

English government officials and military pursued Charles Eduard Stuart, “Bonnie 

Prince Charlie.” Having led an insurrection that was defeated at the battle of Culloden 

(1746), Charles evaded English pursuit and went into exile in France.258
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1780 South Carolina

Following the British capture of Charleston, revolutionary leaders Thomas Sumter, 

Francis Marion, and associated irregular forces became the focus of British counterinsurgency operations. Charles Earl Cornwallis wrote, “Colonel Marion so wrought 

on the minds of the people that there was scarcely an inhabitant between the Santee 

and Pedee that was not in arms against us.” 259 On 28 August, Cornwallis sent Major 

James Wemyss against Marion on the Santee, where Wemyss’ force burned homes 

of Marion’s men. Major Micajah Ganey led loyalist dragoons against Marion on 

4 September, but Marion defeated the loyalists. Wemyss broke off his pursuit of 

Marion when an insurgent force defeated loyalists at King’s Mountain in early 

October, causing the British to regroup. In late October, Cornwallis dispatched 

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to find Marion. The British Legion under 

Tarleton employed such brutal counterinsurgency tactics that “Bloody Ban” and 

“Tarleton’s Quarter” became synonymous with wholesale slaughter. Marion and 

his small band evaded Tarleton by fading into the swamp country. Tarleton reputedly commented, “...as for this damned ‘Swamp Fox,’ the devil himself could not 

catch him.” The comment gave birth to Marion’s nomme de guerre, The Swamp 

Fox. Cornwallis recalled Tarleton in early November due to the threat of a larger 

force under Sumter.260

1815 Europe

Napoleon Bonaparte returned from exile on the island of Elba on 26 February, 

starting “The Hundred Days” and his attempt to renew the glory of Imperial 

France. On 13 March, representatives assembled at the Congress of Vienna voted 

to declare Napoleon an outlaw, banished from the empire, while Napoleon was 

still 5 days from Paris. Within a week, the Quadruple Alliance—Britain, Austria, 

Prussia, and Russia—agreed to enforce the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, each planning to field 150,000 men to oppose the Emperor’s return from exile.261 Defeated 

at Waterloo, Bonaparte was placed under house arrest on the island of St. Helena 

in the South Atlantic under British guard where he lived out the last 6 years of his 

life. The four victorious powers agreed that no Bonaparte would ever be allowed 

to rule France again.262

1879-1880 Mexico

Mexican forces combatted Mimbres Apache under the leadership of Victorio. In 

the latter portion of the campaign, Mexican forces cooperated with American 

forces. The Mexican Army forces defeated Victorio in October 1880 near Tres 

Castillas.263

1916 Russia

Russian aristocracy plotted and assassinated Grigoriy Yefimovich Rasputin. 

Multiple attempts were made, and each successive attempt added to Rasputin’s 

reputation.264
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1919 Mexico

General Pablo Gonzalez and Colonel Jesus Guajardo pursued and killed Mexican 

revolutionary Emiliano Zapata.265

1924-present Egypt

Tensions and violence occured between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian 

government authorities, including indictment for the 1954 attempted assassination of Gamal Abdel Nassar and the imprisonment, torture, trial, and execution 

of Muslim Brotherhood leaders including Sayyid Qutb in 1966.266 The campaign 

spawned a backlash through formation of violent extremist movements in the 

latter half of the 20th century.

1939 Holland

Convinced British intelligence was behind a 7 November attempt on Hitler’s life, 

Heinrich Himmler ordered German intelligence agent Walter Schellenberg to kidnap 

two British intelligence officers in a 7 November raid on the Dutch frontier town 

of Venlo. Major S. Payne Best and Captain R. Henry Stevens were spirited away to 

Berlin, while Dutch intelligence officer Klop was killed in a gunfight.267

1939-1945 Nazi Germany, Occupied Europe

German officials initiated multiple plots and attempts to kill Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, 

including those by Johann Georg Elser (1939), General Kurt von Hammerstein 

(1939), Count Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenberg (1940), Field Marshal Erwin von 

Witzleben (1941), Colonel Rudolf von Gertsdorff (1943), General Hubert Lanz 

(1943), Colonel Henning von Tresckow (1943), Captain Eberhard von Breitenbuch 

(1944), Captain Axel von dem Bussche (1944), Lieutenant Colonel Count Claus 

Schenk von Stauffenberg (1944), and Albert Speer (1945).268

1939-1945 United Kingdom

The British “Double-Cross” (XX) system identified, “turned” or imprisoned all 

known German agents in the United Kingdom. XX was crucial to the success of 

deception operations against Germany.269

1940 Mexico

On the orders of Josef Stalin, Stalinist Ramon Mercador assassinated exiled 

Communist ideologue Leon Trotsky with an ice pick in Mexico City.270

1941 France

Operation Savannah, five SOE-trained Free-French paratroopers dropped into occupied France in March to assassinate Luftwaffe pilots assigned to Kampfgeschwader 

(KG) 100, a German “pathfinder” unit whose operations improved bombing accuracy during the Blitz. The mission was unsuccessful.271
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1942 Occupied Czechoslovakia

Operation Anthropoid resulted in the assassination of Nazi SS Obergruppenfuhrer 

Reinhard Heydrich by Free Czech agents under Edvard Benes. The Nazis carried 

out reprisals against the civilian population.272

1942 Occupied Norway

British Royal Air Force (RAF) Mosquito bombers attacked Gestapo Headquarters 

on 21 March. The raid targeted Vidkun Quisling, the Nazi puppet ruler of occupied 

Norway, who was to give a rally at the Gestapo headquarters in Oslo that day.273

The bombs missed the building, killing 80 civilians.274

1943 Germany

Perfecting low level, high speed bombing techniques, RAF Mosquitoes raided 

Berlin on 31 January with the attack timed to interrupt a parade being addressed 

by Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring. Later on the same day, Mosquitoes similarly 

disrupted a rally being addressed by Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. 

The two nuisance raids were used for propaganda effect.275

1943-1944 Germany, Italy

On 13 September 1943, Adolf Hitler allegedly ordered General Karl Friederich 

Wolff to kidnap Pope Pius XII, in response to Catholic Church protection of ethnic 

Jews and to counter the influence of Christianity in Europe. Known as Operation 

Rabat, Wolff elected not to execute the plan, which included provisions to kill the 

Pope if he was uncooperative.276

1944 Crete, Egypt

Two British officers conceived a plot to travel to Nazi-occupied Crete and kidnap 

a German officer. Stanley Moss and Patrick Leigh-Fermor, with the help of local 

partisans, captured General Heinrich Kreipe, commander of the Sevastopol Division. 

Narrowly escaping a Nazi manhunt, they successfully spirited him off the island 

to Egypt, where he became a prize for Allied intelligence.277

1944 Independent State of Croatia

From 25 May to 6 June, German airborne forces conducted Operation Rosselsprung 

(Knight’s Leap) in Drvar, Croatia. The operation specifically targeted Yugoslavian 

Partisans under Josip Broz Tito. Despite intense fighting, Tito escaped to Italy.278

1944 France

Operation Gaff was a plan by British units to assassinate Field Marshal Erwin 

Rommel. Seven members of Second Special Air Service (SAS) parachuted into 

Ramouillet on 25 July to kill or capture Rommel at his headquarters at La Roche 

Guyon on the Seine.279
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1945 Italy

Former Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci were 

kidnapped and summarily executed by communist partisans.280

1945 Denmark

RAF Mosquitoes attacked the Gestapo Headquarters in Copenhagen on 21 March. The 

raid was timed to coincide with the start of the Gestapo workday. 151 Gestapo men 

were killed and 30 Danish patriots imprisoned in the building escaped. Tragically, 

one of the raiding aircraft crashed into a school, killing 87 children.281

1945-present Worldwide

Jewish Documentation Center pursued Nazi war criminals, particularly research 

conducted by Simon Wiesenthal and the resultant Simon Wiesenthal Centers.282

1945-1991 German Democratic Republic

East German Staatssicherheitsdienst (STASI) operations, led by Markus Wolfe, 

successfully identified, turned, or captured all western agents operating in East 

Germany.283

1947 Burma

Burmese General Aung San and six cabinet ministers of the Executive Committee 

were assassinated by armed paramilitary members acting on behalf of rival politician U Saw.284

1948 India

Mohandas K. Gandhi was assassinated by conspirators from the Indian state of 

Maharashtra.

1948-1963 Malaya

During the “Malayan Emergency,” British SAS units targeted communist terrorists in response to the murder of English citizens and their employees.285 In 1948, 

at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency, groups of Iban and Dayak trackers 

were recruited to help fight the Communist Party of Malaya. Skilled at interpreting 

signs in the jungle, for their uncanny sense of direction, and rumored to practice 

headhunting, Dayak and Iban tribesmen were organized into a regimental formation as the Sarawak Rangers in 1953. The Sarawak Rangers were attached as scouts 

to many British Commonwealth forces serving in Malaya.286

1960 Buenos Aires, Argentina

Israeli Mossad pursued Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann was finally identified in Buenos 

Aires. Apprehended on his way home, he was drugged and flown to Israel on an El 

Al airliner, where he faced trial for Nazi activities related to the Holocaust.287
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1960-1990 Canada, Belgium

Attempts to influence weapons designer Dr. Gerald Bull ultimately led to his assassination in Brussels. Responsibility for Bull’s assassination was never conclusively 

proved, though rumors implicated Israel or Iraq.288

1964-1965 Bomeo

Combat Tracker Teams were formed and employed to conduct counterterrorist 

operations in Borneo and Malaysia, employed into the 1970s and during the 

Vietnam Conflict.289 Claret Operations involved raids by British SAS and Ghurka 

units across the Indonesian border, targeting guerilla forces.290

1966-1980 Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)

During the course of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe War of Independence (Chimurenga 

War) the Selous Scouts were officially credited with either directly or indirectly 

being responsible for 68 percent of all terrorists killed, losing fewer than 40 scouts 

in the process.291 The Rhodesian Army established the Tracker Combat Unit (TCU), 

in 1967, growing from a small cadre of 12 bush veterans selected because they 

were excellent marksmen and trained soldiers. The TCU first operated against 

Zambian-based terrorists who made an incursion into northern Mashonaland 

in 1967. When a park ranger detected evidence of insurgents in Zambezi valley 

campsites, the TCU found 110 communists in camps and killed a significant 

number. Those left uninjured were followed in a series of pursuits by trackers. Joe 

Conway, a TCU member, tracked four guerrillas 60 miles across broken terrain 

for 3 days. The chase ended when the thoroughly demoralized terrorists raised 

their hands and surrendered. Captured communists complained at their trial that 

they had been tracked down like wild animals. The TCU was involved in virtually every incident of insurgent infiltration over the next few years. Hundreds of 

successful pursuits were launched based on TCU information and intelligence. 

Large numbers of terrorists were killed with only one TCU combat death. TCU’s 

tactics and techniques led the Rhodesian government to mandate similar training 

throughout the Army. TCU joined the ranks of the Selous Scouts. Several veterans 

formed Rhodesia’s Tracking and Bushcraft School at Lake Kariba.292 Operations 

by Grey’s Scouts, a Rhodesian mounted counterterrorist unit, tracked Zambian 

terrorists deep into the African veldt.293

1967-1974 Mexico

Mexican government counterinsurgency operations were carried out against Lucio 

Cabanas and the Peasant Brigade of Execution in the Sierra Madre del Sur.294

1968 South Korea

On 20 January, armed North Korean guerrillas under the Revolutionary Party for 

Reunification infiltrated into Seoul in two- and three-man cells. The North Korean 

troop’s mission was to assassinate President Park Chung-Hee. The team leader 
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was forced to improvise a new plan on 21 January 1968, when he noted increased 

security measures. Changing into uniforms of the local Republic of Korea (ROK) 

Army 26th Infantry Division, the guerilla unit formed up to march the last mile 

to the President’s Blue House. The deception succeeded until a police contingent 

halted the unit and began to question its members approximately 500 meters from 

the Blue House. When the nervous North Koreans fumbled their replies, a suspicious policeman drew his pistol. A commando shot him, and a melee ensued in 

which two infiltrators died. The North Koreans scattered and began evading toward 

the Demilitarized Zone. For the next several days, South Korean and American 

soldiers and police conducted a massive manhunt. Three infiltrators were killed 

in the Seoul area, 25 others were eventually killed in various firefights, and one 

captured. Two of the 31 North Koreans were unaccounted for. During the course 

of this assassination attempt, South Korean forces sustained 68 killed and 66 

wounded; casualties included members of the ROK army, law enforcement, and 

approximately 24 civilians. Three Americans died, and three were wounded.295

1968-1971 South Korea

In response to the attempt on President Park’s life, South Korea formed Unit 684, a 

31-member commando unit. The unit reportedly was trained under harsh conditions 

on the island Slimi-Do, in preparation for a mission to assassinate North Korean 

President Kim Jong IL. When relations improved, the mission was cancelled. Left 

on the island, Unit 684 rebelled against the South Korean government in 1971. 

Most of the members committed suicide.296

1969-2007 Northern Ireland

Operation Banner, British Royal Army counterterrorism support to law enforcement elements in Northern Ireland disrupted terrorist cells and captured or killed 

numerous Irish Republican Army members.297

1972 Syria, Israel, Lebanon

Operation Crate-3, Sayaret Matkal operatives kidnapped five Syrian intelligence 

officers who were conducting a border tour with Palestinian terrorists. The Syrians 

were employed as bargaining chips to negotiate a prisoner exchange for Israelis 

captured by the Palestinian Liberation Organization.298

1972-1973 Western Europe, Lebanon, Israel

Israel’s response to Black September killings of Israeli athletes at the Munich 

Olympics included the “Avner” manhunting team, Mossad’s Operation Wrath of 

God, and Sayaret Mat’kal’s Operation Spring of Youth. During the Avner team’s 

2-year deployment, 8 of 11 intended targets were killed; collateral damage included 

one KGB officer, four PLO security personnel, and one freelance assassin in exchange 

for two team members lost. Mossad agents mistook Moroccan waiter Mohamed 

Bouchiki for Black September terrorist Ali Hassan Salameh in Lillehammer, 
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Norway, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of four Israelis. Israel’s pursuit 

of those responsible spread to Western Europe and Norway. On the night of 9 to 

10 April 1973, Sayeret commandos, one disguised as a woman, conducted three 

simultaneous assassinations of Black September leaders in West Beirut.299

1972-present Israel, Lebanon, Palestinian territories

The Israeli government continued targeted killing of Islamic extremist leaders. 

The Israeli government referred to the operations as “extrajudicial punishment,” 

“selective targeting,” or “long-range hot pursuit.” Led and carried out by small, 

highly trained special operations units from Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the 

General Security Service (GSS), and the Mossad, the killings were often carried 

out by helicopter gunships, IDF fighter-bombers, and UAVs. Notable operations 

included April 1973, when Israeli commandos landed in Beirut and killed senior 

members of the Fatah movement including Yasir Arafat’s deputy Yusuf Najjar and 

the Fatah spokesman Kamal Nasir. Israel may have been behind the 1979 explosion 

in Beirut that killed Hasan ‘Ali Salamah, founder of Fatah’s elite Force 17. In April 

1988 an Israeli commando force landed in Tunis and killed the head of the Palestine 

Liberation Organization’s (PLO) military branch Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). In 

October 1995, following a series of suicide attacks that claimed the lives of dozens 

of Israelis, Mossad agents shot and killed the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 

(PIJ), Fathi Shiqaqi, in Malta. Three months later, a booby-trapped cellular phone 

exploded, killing Hamas member Yahya ‘Ayyash, also known as “The Engineer,” 

who masterminded suicide attacks in which 50 Israelis died and 340 were wounded. 

In February 1992, Israeli helicopters fired on the car of Hizbullah leader ‘Abbas 

Musawi, killing him and members of his entourage. Amal’s operations officer, 

Hussam al-Amin, was killed in a similar operation in August 1998. 

On 9 November 2000, near the West Bank town of Bethlehem, an Israeli Apache 

helicopter fired a laser-guided missile at the vehicle of Husayn ‘Abayat, killing him 

andwounding his deputy. Similar operations on 13 February 2001 killed Mas‘ud 

‘Iyyad, a Force 17 officer trying to establish a Hizbullah cell in the Gaza Strip, and 

PIJ activist Muhammad ‘Abd al-‘Al, who according to the IDF was responsible for 

terrorist acts and was on his way to carry out two major attacks. On 22 July 2002, a 

2,000-lb bomb—dropped from an F-16 fighter jet—killed Salah Shihada, the leader 

and founder of Hamas’ military wing of ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam in Gaza.300

1974 Republic of Korea

Mun Segwang, a suspected North Korean agent, attempted to assassinate President 

Park Chun Hee during a speech in August. All shots missed Park, but one killed 

Park’s wife, Yuk Young Soo.301

1975 Saudi Arabia

Prince Faisal Ibn Musad Abdel Azia assassinated King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.302
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1975-1994 South Africa, Angola

South African military and intelligence conducted operations against the Popular 

Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).303

1977 London, England

Bulgarian-born BBC commentator Georgi Markov was assassinated. Using a needle 

embedded in the tip of an umbrella, communist agents injected a pellet of ricin 

into Markov’s leg, killing him a short time later. Also known as “The Umbrella 

Assassination.” 304

1979 Ireland

Lord Louis Mountbatten was assassinated at Mullaghmore, County Sligo; possible 

connections were to the Warrenpoint Ambush of 18 British paratroopers by the 

Provisional Irish Republican Army.

1979 Republic of Korea

Korean Central Intelligence Agency conspirators assassinated President Park 

Chung Hee.305

1979 Afghanistan

In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin seized power, killing fellow Khalq party 

leader and Prime Minister of the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 

Nur Muhammad Taraki. Amid increasing instability and with his loyalty in question, the Soviet Union decided to move against Amin. Having gradually increased 

their presence since an April 1979 Afghan request for military intervention, Soviet 

airborne forces began landing in force on 25 December. 

On 27 December, over 700 Soviet KGB, GRU (Russian Military Intelligence), 

and special forces dressed in Afghan Army uniforms seized key targets in Kabul as 

Soviet major ground forces elements crossed the northern frontier. A portion of the 

force stormed Tajbeg Palace, where Amin resided. Later a formal announcement 

revealed a tribunal from the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee executed 

Amin. Babrak Karmal was installed as Prime Minister of the new government.

1981 Vatican City

Mehmet Ali Agca attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II; allegations were that 

East German and Bulgarian intelligence planned and executed the operation.306

1981 Cairo, Egypt

Egyptian Islamic Jihad assassinated Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar al 

Sadat.
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1983 Burma (Myanmar)

In October, a powerful bomb exploded several minutes before South Korean President 

Chun Doo Hwan was scheduled to lay a wreath at the Martyr’s Mausoleum in 

Rangoon. The blast killed 17 senior South Korean officials and injured 14 accompanying President Chun. The explosion also killed four Burmese nationals and 

wounded 32 others. North Korean army Major Zin Mo and Captain Kang Min 

Chol confessed to the bombing. Kang provided details of his training in North 

Korea and of travel to Burma on a North Korean freighter and disclosed that after 

the arrival of his assassination team in Burma, the team stayed in the home of a 

North Korean embassy official. Canadian police had uncovered a plot to assassinate 

President Chun during his visit to that country the previous year.307

1985 Tunis, Tunisia; Israel

On 1 October, six Israeli F-15 aircraft bombed Borj-Cedria, called Hammam-Plage, 

situated in the southern suburbs of Tunis, after a 1,500-mile flight in Operation 

Wooden Leg. The action resulted in 68 civilian dead and nearly 100 wounded. 

Israel claimed that for the past year, the PLO headquarters in Tunisia had initiated, 

planned, organized, and launched hundreds of terrorism attacks against Israel, 

against Israeli targets outside Israel, and against Jews everywhere. More than 600 

such attacks killed or severely wounded more than 75 Israelis, the PLO’s designated targets. The “butchery” of three Israelis at Larnaca, Cyprus had allegedly 

been perpetrated by “Force 17,” Yasser Arafat’s personal bodyguard unit, which 

occupied the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. The headquarters were the target of 

Israel’s strike, and its action was “a legitimate act of self-defence” in response to 

“terrorism.” Any civilian casualties were the result of the “deliberate PLO tactic...of 

planting its bases among civilians.” Tunisia was strong enough to stop the terrorists 

but it “knowingly harboured the PLO and allowed it complete freedom of action 

in planning, training, organizing, and launching murderous attacks from its soil.” 

The Israeli government stated the action was directed against the “terrorist killers,” 

not against their host country.308

1988 Gibraltar

In Operation Flavius, British SAS interdicted and killed three Irish Republican 

Army (IRA) members who had emplaced a car bomb on the island of Gibraltar as 

they moved toward the Spanish border. Controversy followed when an investigation indicated the three IRA members were unarmed.309

1994 Khartoum, Sudan

Illitch Ramirez Sanchez (a.k.a. Carlos the Jackal)—former Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist and mastermind of the infamous December 

1975 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) hostage crisis in 

Vienna—was seized by his own bodyguards while recovering from a testicular 

operation in Khartoum, Sudan. The raid culminated nearly two decades of pursuit 
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by French and U.S. intelligence. On 14 August, the Jackal was handed over to agents 

from the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST). Tried for the 

murder of a French policeman and informant, he received a life sentence.310

1994-present Chechnya, Russia

Russia responded to Chechen separatist terror with manhunting efforts against 

Chechen leaders Dzhokar Dudayev (1996), Arbi Barayev (2001), Aslan Maskhadov 

(2005), Shamil Basayev (2006), Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev (2006), abu Hafs al Urdani 

(2006), and assassination of former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandirbayev 

(2004).311 Chechen insurgents executed Russian pilots and launch intimidation 

campaigns, selectively targeting pilots and their families to dissuade them from 

participating in combat operations.312

1994-present Rwanda

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal convened to prosecute suspected 

war crimes in Rwanda (ICTR).313

1995-present Former Yugoslavia

United Nations International Criminal Tribunal convened for war crimes committed 

in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).314

1997 Amman, Jordan and Israel

An October attempt to kill Khaled Meshal, the Jordanian-based political chief of 

Hamas, went awry. A struggle ensued. Two Mossad agents and Meshal’s driver, 

Mohammed Abu Saif, were arrested. When Meshal fell ill, Jordanian police 

suspected he had been exposed to a toxic agent. An international debacle ensued. 

King Hussein nearly severed relations between Israel and Jordan. U.S. sponsored 

negotiations with the Palestinians faltered. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 

Netanyahu was forced to provide an antidote to save Meshal’s life, and to release 

Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, who had been 

in custody.315 In the wake of an Israeli investigation, Danny Yatom, director of 

Mossad, resigned in 1998.316

2001-2003 Philippines

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) pursued Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro 

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemah Islamiya (JI) terrorists.317 On 21 May 

2001 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists led by Aldom Tilao (a.k.a. abu Sobaya) 

kidnapped 22 hostages, including American missionaries Martin and Gracia 

Burnham and California native Guillermo Sobero from the Dos Palmas resort 

on Palawan Island, taking them by boat to Basilan Island where they demanded 

ransom. MC-2, an elite Philippine Marine intelligence unit, tracked the ASG and 

hostages using an informant, Alvin Singlos. Philippine Army special forces competed 
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with Marines to pursue the terrorists and hostages, using heavy-handed tactics to 

apply pressure on ASG. To demonstrate his seriousness, Tilao beheaded American 

hostage Sobero not long after Sobero was wounded in a firefight. Increasing Army 

pressure forced ASG to flee with remaining hostages to the Zamboanga Peninsula. 

Given MC-2’s success, the commander received CIA airborne surveillance and 

tracking assistance, locating and tracking the ASG terrorists and their captives 

near Zamboanga. Again, the Philippine Army intervened, claiming jurisdiction 

over the operation. In an overpowering raid after 376 days of captivity, they killed 

several ASG members along with hostages Martin Burnham and Ettabora Yap, a 

Philippina nurse, recovering Gracia Burnham who had been shot in the leg. Tilao 

escaped with several of his compatriots. MC-2 continued to track Tilao and his 

followers, killing them in Operation Black Archer, a daring at-sea attack supported 

by U.S. Navy SEALs on 20 June 2002.318

2002-present Sierra Leone

United Nations Special Court convened for Sierra Leone.319

2003-present Netherlands

The International Criminal Court received case files from The Hague.320

2003 Pakistan, Malaysia, Spain, France

Operation Aquarium, a successful British Revenue and Customs investigation 

conducted in cooperation with French authorities and spanning a dozen countries, uprooted the tentacles of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s illicit nuclear materials 

purchasing network from Malaysia to Spain and France.321

2005 Pakistan

Pakistani forces arrested Abu Faraj al-Libbi near Peshawar in May.322

2005 Lebanon

Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated via a car bomb in 

Beirut. A United Nations probe followed.323

2006 Pakistan

An April air strike in northwest Waziristan killed Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, 

an Egyptian indicted in the U.S. in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings 

in East Africa.324

On 30 October, an air strike on a madrasa (religious school) in Bajura, Northwest 

Frontier Province killed an estimated 80 persons in a raid by helicopter gunships 

and precision weapons against a suspected terrorist training camp.325
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2007 Persian Gulf, Iran

Iranian Pasdaran Revolutionary Corps Navy forces captured and interred 15 

crewmembers from the British Type 22 frigate HMS Cornwall for 2 weeks. 

Subsequent United Nations and United Kingdom efforts secured release of the 

crewmembers.326

2007 Indonesia

Jamaah Islamiya (JI) leader Zarkasih, military operations director abu Dujana, 

and six other JI leaders were arrested in a series of raids across central Indonesia 

in June. Zarkasih led JI at the time it claimed responsibility for the 2002 nightclub 

bombings in Bali that killed 202 people.327

2007 Tizi Ouzou, Algeria

Algerian security forces identified, located, and killed Rachid Sid Ali and Haroun 

el Achaachi, senior military advisor and deputy for the Al Qaeda organization in 

the Islamic Maghreb on 2 August.328

2007 Sri Lanka

S. P. Thamilselvan, head of the Tamil Tiger’s political wing, died along with five 

others in a 2 November air strike by the Sri Lankan military. Sri Lankan Defense 

Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa remarked, “If we want we can take them one by one, 

so they must change their hideouts.” 329

2007 Pakistan

A gunman assassinated former Pakistani prime minister and presidential candidate 

Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi on 27 December. The gunman blew himself up, killing 

a further 20 people. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the assassination.

2007-2008 Iraq

British officials revealed that Special Air Service (SAS) forces operating in concert 

with U.S. counterparts of an elite Task Force Black “have taken 3,500 terrorists off 

the streets of Baghdad in 18 months.” The SAS captured the majority of the terrorists, but killed several hundred who were mainly members of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Six 

SAS personnel were killed and over 30 injured in the operations, while U.S. elite 

forces suffered a 20 percent casualty rate. The operations targeted terrorist cells 

behind bombings that took over 3,000 lives. Using intelligence gleaned from spies 

and informers, Task Force Black reduced bombings from 150 per month to only 

two.330 General David Petraeus, U.S. commander in Iraq, said the SAS “...have 

helped immensely in the Baghdad area, in particular, to take down the Al Qaeda 

car bomb networks and other Al Qaeda operations in Iraq’s capital city, so they 

have done a phenomenal job in that regard.” 331
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2007-present Turkey, Northern Iraq

In response to growing tensions between Turkey, Iraq, and the international 

community, the United States provided Turkey with “actionable intelligence”—

including information that could be used to target with lethal force—on militant 

elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) operating in Northern Iraq.332 

By 25 December, Turkish military leaders claimed air strikes killed over 150 PKK 

insurgents and struck over 200 targets.333 On 4 February 2008, A statement posted on 

the Turkish Army’s Web site said about 70 targets in Avashin, Basyan, and Hakurk 

were hit in air strikes that began at 3 a.m. and lasted 12 hours. The Turkish military 

said the targets were identified as “belonging to the PKK terrorist organization 

by intelligence sources” and the attacks were conducted in a manner designed to 

avoid civilian casualties. Several similar attacks in January caused no casualties.334

Turkey began a ground assault by 3,000 troops on 21 February, which the government claimed killed 33 PKK fighters and a key PKK leader by 23 February, with 

the loss of 8 Turkish soldiers and a Cobra helicopter gunship.335

2008 Philippines

Police and military operatives captured suspected ASG terrorist Aramil Sulayman. 

Sulayman was tagged as one of 128 armed men who took part in the killing and 

beheading of 10 Marines who were ambushed on 10 July 2007 as part of the military 

contingent searching for kidnapped Italian priest Giancarlo Bossi. A combined 

police and military intelligence operation captured Sulayman on 12 January after 

a tip by an informant. The capture of Sulayman formed part of OPlan Shoppers, 

designed to neutralize wanted armed groups with links to the ASG.336

2008 Israel, Palestine

Israeli troops killed PIJ commander Walid Obeidi during an exchange of fire in 

the West Bank village of Qabatiya, near the northern town of Jenin on 16 January. 

The Israeli army said its troops had attempted to arrest Mr. Obeidi, described as 

the head of the armed wing of the radical movement in the West Bank. An air 

strike missed a group of militants, killing three civilians in the Gaza Strip on the 

same day. The raids came on the heels of the previous day’s IDF incursion into 

Gaza that killed 18 people, in response to rocket attacks launched from Palestinian 

territories against Israel.337

2008 Syria

Imad Mughnieh, who headed Hezbollah’s special operations unit, died in a car 

bomb in Damascus on 12 February. Mughnieh, in his late 40s, was wanted for his 

suspected role in a string of attacks against American and Israeli targets, including 

the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people and 

the abduction of Western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s. He was also linked to 

the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut airport in 1983, in which 241 

American servicemen died and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985, in which 
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a U.S. Navy diver was killed. Danny Yatom, former head of the Israeli Mossad, 

said he did not know who had “liquidated Imad Mughnieh, but it was considered 

a success for the intelligence community. He was one of the biggest terrorists in 

the world, in the same league with Osama bin Laden.” 338

2008 Colombia

Colombian commandos killed Raul Reyes, a senior FARC secretariat leader with 

16 other rebels on 2 March. Reyes was killed in an air raid followed by a ground 

operation, Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos said. The rebels had camped 1 

mile on the Ecuador side of the border across from the province of Putumayo 

when the attack was called in.339 A diplomatic rift ensued between Colombia and 

Ecuador, in which Ecuador suspended diplomatic relations, while Colombia accused 

Ecuador’s government of avoiding confrontation with the FARC guerillas. In a 

military crackdown dubbed operation Sovereignty IV, Ecuador’s defense ministry 

announced that it destroyed 15 Colombian rebel bases and two cocaine-processing 

laboratories near the Opuno and Putumayo rivers in the Amazon province of 

Sucumbios along its northern border.340

2008 Israel, Gaza Strip

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) revealed on 14 April that an air strike by an UAV 

killed Ibrahim abu Alba; Palestinian sources confirmed his death. A member of 

the military wing of the Palestinian Democratic Front responsible for operations 

in northern Gaza, the IDF said Alba was responsible for rocket attacks and a recent 

infiltration into Israel that had injured three soldiers. The IDF stated Alba was 

planning another attack when he was killed near Beit Hanoun.341

On 16 April, another airstrike killed Mohammed Ghausain, Islamic Jihad’s 

commander in northern Gaza.342

On 30 April, Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft attacked a building in Southern Gaza 

where rockets and weapons were being produced, causing secondary explosions. 

One Palestinian was killed, reportedly a key leader in Islamic Jihad’s engineering 

and weapons production unit, and five others wounded.343

2008 Afghanistan

A well-coordinated attempt to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai on 

28 April failed. Afghan intelligence had known of a plan. Authorities arrested a 

mortar team and three suicide bombers days before the attack, but failed to track 

down the three gunmen who opened fire Sunday from a hotel room a few hundred 

yards from where the VIPs were sitting.344 Follow-on investigations confirmed the 

attack had inside help; a police captain was connected with the group behind the 

attempt, while an army officer supplied weapons and ammunition for the attack. 

Intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh blamed Al Qaeda for the attack, claiming three 

of the plotters had contacts with people outside Afghanistan, noting the Pakistani 

town of Miram Shah, the main Taliban and Al Qaeda base in north Waziristan.345
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On 30 April, Afghan security forces raided a Kabul hideout, killing militants with 

suspected links to the attack. Two militants—a woman and a child—were among 

those killed, and one of the dead militants had supplied weapons used in the attack 

on Karzai, Saleh said. Three intelligence agents also died, Saleh said.346

2008 Israel, Gaza Strip

On 1 May, an Israeli Air Force missile destroyed a car in the Rafah refugee camp, 

killing Nafez Mansour and wounding another Hamas militant. Mansour had been 

involved in the 2006 abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.347

2008 Philippines

Philippine military forces conducted a 1 May raid on Jolo island. ASG leader Isnilon 

Hapilon was wounded in the hand, fleeing into the jungle. Hapilon’s son Tabari, 

an ASG guerilla, was killed in the raid. The offensive led to a clash in Candinamon 

and the capture of a sprawling ASG camp in the remote town, where they were 

said to be training and assembling bombs with members of the Jemaah Islamiyah 

(JI), the Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian arm. The rebels incurred heavy casualties, the 

military said, without giving an actual body count.348

2008 Spain, France

Spanish and French police arrested the leader of the Basque separatist group ETA, 

along with five other people, amid a recently renewed campaign of bombings blamed 

for killing more than 825 people since the late 1960s. Francisco Javier Lopez Pena, 

Ainhoa Ozaeta Mendiondo, Igor Suberbiola, and Jon Salaberria were detained in 

the southwestern French city of Bordeaux on 20 May. Two more suspects were 

arrested 21 May: 

•	 Jose Antonio Barandiaran, arrested in Spain, was former mayor of a 

Basque town. 

•	 A French citizen arrested in Bordeaux was linked to the apartment and 

was not immediately identified. An unnamed French police official said 

four handguns, false identity papers, computers, and material that could be 

used for making explosives —including sodium chlorate and time-bomb 

equipment—were seized in the apartment.349

2008 Iraq

More than 30,000 Iraqi troops and police conducted Operation Glad Tidings, a 

crackdown focused on the city of Baqouba in Diyala Province. Police arrested more 

than 600 suspected Al Qaeda in Iraq members. A major public affairs campaign 

accompanied the military operations, intended to demonstrate to residents of Diyala 

Province that the Iraqi government had wrested control back from insurgents and 

foreign fighters.350
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2008 Pakistan

Abu Saeed al-Masri, an Egyptian-born member of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership, 

was rumored to have been killed during fighting with Pakistani security forces in 

the Bajaur tribal area along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.351 Abu Saeed al-Masri 

was identified in Palkistani media reports as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Al Qaeda’s 

commander in Afghanistan. Yazid claimed responsibility for the bombing of the 

Danish embassy in Islamabad in early 2008 and was linked to the assassination of 

former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Al-Masri was believed 

to have been a chief financial manager for Al Qaeda.352

2009 Gaza Strip

Israel conducted air strikes targeting Hamas in the Gaza Strip after militants 

repeatedly fired rockets into Israel. On 1 January, Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas leader 

who urged suicide attacks against Israel, was killed in an air strike on his home in 

the northern Gaza Strip. Rayyan was the most senior Hamas leader to be killed 

since the death of Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in April 2004. Rayyan bragged, “we 

will kill the enemy and take hostages,” during a 31 December 2008 interview on 

Hamas’ al-Aqsa television channel. The strike killed at least four other people in 

the Jabaliya refugee camp, including some members of his family.353
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Appendix C. Chronology of American 

Personnel Recovery Operations

1776 Boonsboro, Kentucky

Frontiersman Daniel Boone set off with a group of men on 7 July to pursue a 

Shawnee raiding party who kidnapped his daughter and two friends. Their 3-day 

chase of the Shawnee braves and the subsequent rescue of Jemima Boone, Betsy 

Callaway, and Fanny Callaway inspired James Fennimore Cooper to write The 

Last of the Mohicans.

354

1801-1805 North Africa, Mediterranean Sea

The First Barbary War occurred. Since 1784, the United States Congress allocated 

funds to appease the Barbary Pirates by paying tribute. Upon his election, President 

Thomas Jefferson refused to continue the practice. Tripoli, Morocco, Algiers, and 

Tunis declared war on the United States. Congress authorized the President to 

seize all vessels and goods of the Pasha of Tripoli, “...and also to cause to be done 

all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify.” In 

October 1803, The Pasha of Tripoli held USS Philadelphia and her 300-man crew 

hostage after the frigate ran aground on the Barbary Coast. In one of America’s first 

“special operations,” Lt Stephen Decatur and 84 volunteers entered Tripoli Harbor 

in a captured Tripolitanian ketch renamed Intrepid, and destroyed Philadelphia in 

February 1804. U.S. Marines led a daring 600-mile march, taking Derna in April 

to May 1805. The capture of Derna led to a negotiated end to the war. The Pasha 

of Tripoli freed all U.S. hostages in exchange for $60,000 ransom.355

1904 Morocco

Mulay Ahmad el Raisuli and a band of Berber tribesmen abducted American 

expatriate Ion Perdicaris and his stepson from their home in Tangiers in May. 

President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched the Atlantic Fleet to Morocco, where 

seven battleships demonstrated Roosevelt’s big stick policy. The administration 

engaged the British and French governments to pressure the weakened Sultan 

into resolving the issue. The Sultan agreed to facilitate Perdicaris’ release on 21 

June. Roosevelt continued to milk the affair for political gain. Despite the Sultan’s 

agreement to negotiate Perdicaris’ freedom, Secretary Hay dispatched a telegram 

to Morocco, demanding the Sultan return “Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.” The 

telegram was made public at the 1904 Republican convention. Popular response 

to “The Perdicaris Affair” ensured Roosevelt’s reelection and directly led to the 

Algeciras Conference, where Europe’s Great Powers reached agreement on colonial 

interests in Africa.356
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1942-1945 Western Europe

A broad underground network was established to find and repatriate downed 

airmen. More than 5,000 airmen were located and evacuated safely back to allied 

territory by this network. By 1944, any downed airman who survived to reach the 

ground in France had a 50 percent chance of being discovered by this network and 

safely returned to fight again.357

1942-1945 Pacific

In the Pacific, air-sea rescue aircraft and submarines performed personnel recovery 

operations, sometimes in cooperation with Coast Watchers, local personnel familiar 

with an area who infiltrated behind Japanese lines to observe the enemy.358 A coast 

watcher was instrumental in the rescue of future President John F. Kennedy.359

Air Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard rescue forces conducted broad search patterns 

across endless tracts of ocean to detect those whose aircraft or ships were not able 

to get home.360

1945 Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines

On 28 January, 6th Ranger Battalion, led by Alamo Scouts, stormed the Prisoner of 

War camp at Cabanatuan, nearly 30 miles behind enemy lines. Only two Rangers 

were killed and 7 injured, while two others died and 21 guerillas wounded. The 

assault force killed over 500 Japanese troops, who fanatically charged guerilla and 

Ranger roadblock positions. The Rangers began a long march back to American 

lines with a column of 512 frail prisoners of war, the weakest borne on carts by 

local Philippine citizens. Arriving on 31 January, the mission was a resounding 

success and a major public affairs coup. Alamo Scouts were deemed crucial to the 

mission’s success.361

1945 British Colonial Malaysia (currently Indonesian territory)

On 10 April 1945, Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB)—a joint U.S., Australian, British, 

and Dutch special operations headquarters—received information that the Sultan 

of Ternate and his family were in danger of being executed by the Japanese forces 

in Malaysia. Former ruler of the Dutch East Indies colony, thousands of Malays 

recognized the Sultan as their leader. The AIB launched Operation Opossum to 

rescue the Sultan’s family before the Japanese could take them. 

On 11 April, AIB and Netherlands East Indies Intelligence Service agents 

aboard PT-178 and PT-364 travel from Morotai to Hiri island, 1 mile north of 

Ternate. Leaving the landing party on Hiri, the PT boats returned to Morotai. A 

native guide crossed to Ternate in a canoe, bearing a message from the Opossum 

landing team concealed in his mouth. Atthe same time, the landing party silently 

detained 60 men from a nearby village suspected of being sympathetic to the 

Japanese forces. 

The native guide returned the next afternoon, with a message from the Sultan. 

Fearing spies and traitors in his midst, the Sultan planned to cross to Hiri under cover 

of darkness that night. The Sultan arrived as planned, but announced Japanese forces 
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would attack Hiri in the coming hours. The Opossums’ PT boats were not expected 

until the next morning. Luckily, heavy seas delayed the Japanese attack. 

In the early morning, Opossum men caught sight of Japanese soldiers crossing 

the waters in swift Malaysian outriggers. The landing party opened fire with two 

machine guns, delaying the assault force while the landing team radioed for help. 

As the team’s ammunition ran low, a flight of Australian Beaufighter attack aircraft 

arrived overhead. The PT boats evacuated the rescue team and the Sultan’s party 

at noon. Later debriefed in Australia, the Sultan provided a wealth of intelligence 

on Japanese shipping and dispositions.362

1964-1965 Republic of the Congo

American air and ground forces supported Belgian airborne forces during Operations 

Dragon Noir and Dragon Rouge, the rescue of 2000 European citizens during the 

Simba uprising.363

1965-1975 North Vietnam, Thailand, Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia

Military services revitalized their capability to recover downed aviators. Dedicated 

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) forces—“Jolly Green Giant” helicopters escorted 

by A-1 Skyraider, and HC-130 refueling aircraft—were consolidated under Aerospace 

Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) in 1964. ARRS CSAR Task Forces saved 4,120 

personnel—2,780 of those in combat—and were recognized with two Medals of 

Honor, 39 Air Force Crosses, and numerous other combat action medals.364 Despite 

valiant efforts, one Air Force search and rescue crewman and two aircraft were lost 

for every 9.2 recoveries in Vietnam, while the Navy lost a crewman for every 1.8 

recoveries. Only 9 percent of targeted Navy personnel were recovered.365

1970 North Vietnam; Thailand; United States

In April, intelligence analysts became convinced that American prisoners of war 

(POWs) at Son Tay, approximately 23 miles west of Hanoi, were in dire need of 

rescue.366 For several months, special operations leaders sought approval from 

the Nixon administration to conduct a modest raid to rescue those POWs who 

were sick. The mission objective expanded during the approval process to include 

all POWs held at Son Tay. A bold, large-scale rescue mission was executed on 20 

November with near perfection, resulting in only 2 wounded from a force of 56 

raiders. Unfortunately, as intelligence discovered from a human source during that 

time, the POWs were relocated in July to another camp in Hanoi due to monsoon 

flooding. The task force reported by radio that no POWs were found in the camp. 

The Son Tay raid was not without positive impact—North Vietnam improved its 

treatment of POWs in the aftermath of the operation.367

1975 Kompong Som and Kaoh Tang, Cambodia

The merchant ship S.S. Mayaguez was seized in May by Khmer Rouge forces and 

interred near Kaoh Tang, an island off the Cambodian coast. A rescue operation was planned and executed within 3 days of the Mayaguez’ capture. A Navy 
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destroyer, USS Harold E. Holt, drew alongside Mayaguez, and a force of volunteers 

and merchant seamen boarded the merchant ship and took her under tow. Carrier 

aircraft from the USS Coral Sea struck military targets in the Kompong Som area, 

while Marines made a helicopter assault on Kaoh Tang. One of the critical pieces 

of information—the location of the Mayaguez crew—eluded intelligence and planners. While the Khmer Rouge surrendered the Mayaguez crew to the destroyer 

USS Wilson, 18 U.S. servicemen were killed on Kaoh Tang, while more than 50 

were wounded.368

1978-1979 Teheran, Iran

Iranian officials summoned two senior Electronic Data Systems (EDS) employees, 

Paul Chiapparone and Bill Gaylord, for questioning in December. Accusing the 

pair of making illegitimate claims, the two EDS men were arrested after a daylong 

interrogation and imprisoned for 6 weeks. EDS chief executive officer, H. Ross Perot, 

hired retired Green Beret colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons—leader of the Son Tay 

ground force—to make a rescue attempt. Perot personally infiltrated Iran, disguised 

as a cameraman for NBC, to deliver messages to his two employees. Together with 

volunteers from among EDS’ executives, Simons inserted a team into Tehran. The 

team staged a jailbreak in January 1979, which resulted in the release of the two 

EDS captives along with 11,000 other Iranian prisoners. Following the breakout, 

the team and its two escapees successfully left Iran via the Turkish border.369

1979-1980 Iran; Oman; Egypt; United States

On 4 November 1979, Iranian “students” stormed the American Embassy in 

Teheran, Iran, taking 53 occupants hostage. Several hostages were subsequently 

released. Other embassy personnel escaped with the assistance of the Canadian 

Embassy. Teheran’s government and Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in a breach 

of diplomatic protocol, backed the student occupation of the embassy. When 

6 months of negotiations failed to resolve the issue, the United States executed 

Operation Eagle Claw. In the initial insertion on 24 April 1980, Marine RH-53D 

helicopters flown from USS Nimitz became disoriented and delayed by a dust storm 

over the Iranian desert or were damaged while landing at the Desert One refueling site. Malfunctions caused three of eight helicopters to become unairworthy, 

driving a decision to abort the mission because six helicopters were required to 

ferry the ground force to the forward staging base. While refueling to return to 

the Nimitz, one of the Marine helicopters hit an EC-130 tanker, erupting into a 

fireball. Three Marine helicopter crewmen and five Air Force flight crew from the 

tanker were killed, but the remaining tanker crew and 64 Special Forces soldiers 

in the aircraft managed to escape.370 President Carter assumed full responsibility 

for the failed attempt. SOF planned and rehearsed a follow-on mission under 

the code names Honey Badger and Credible Sport that was never executed.371 The 

failed mission resulted in a series of investigations, ultimately leading to the 1987 

Nunn-Cohen Amendment of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 

1986, which established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
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and Low-Intensity Conflict, and United States Special Operations Command.372 

Iran held the American hostages until January 1980. 

1981-1982 Italy

The Red Brigade kidnapped Brigadier General James Dozier, deputy chief of staff 

for Land Forces at NATO headquarters in Verona, Italy in December. A 42-day 

manhunt to find and fix the kidnappers paid off in January, when specially trained 

Italian police raided a five-room apartment in Padua, where they rescued General 

Dozier. Five Red Brigade terrorists surrendered without a shot being fired.373

1983 Grenada

Concerned over escalating violence and communist involvement on the island of 

Grenada, the Reagan Administration launched Operation Urgent Fury. Several 

personnel recovery and protection operations were carried out during the intervention, including the U.S. Army Rangers and the 82nd Airborne Division rescue 

of over 1,000 American citizens, primarily located at St. George’s Medical School 

True Blue Campus (25 October) and Grand Anse Campus (28 October). A 22-man 

SEAL team rescued Governor General Scoon and his family at their residence 

from 25 to 26 October, fighting off Grenadan attacks for over a day until relieved 

by a Marine company. A Special Forces attack on the Richmond Hill Prison failed 

25 October when two of the lead helicopters were hit by antiaircraft fire. The U.S. 

suffered 19 dead—12 soldiers, 3 Marines and 4 SEALs. Grenadan forces lost 45 

killed and 350 wounded, while Cuban “construction forces” suffered 25 dead and 

59 wounded.374

1989-1990 Panama

On 21 December, American forces seized key objectives and neutralized the 

Panamanian Defense Forces in Operation Just Cause. Kurt Muse, a 39-year-old 

American businessman arrested in early April as he returned from a business 

trip, was held in Panama City’s central prison, La Carcel Modelo. In a spectacular 

jailbreak 13 minutes prior to “H-Hour,” Task Force Garcia—a handpicked special 

operations assault team—landed on the prison roof in helicopters, breached the 

cell block, overpowered the guard force, and opened the door to Muse’s cell with 

an explosive charge. Following the team onto the roof, Muse climbed into the back 

seat of an MH-6 “Little Bird” helicopter as the assault team perched on boards 

mounted along the skids. Small-arms fire damaged the helicopter as they departed. 

The pilot managed a controlled crash landing not far away. Ground forces reached 

Muse and his rescuers the next morning.375

1995-1999 The Balkans

During Operation Deny Flight, Marines from the amphibious assault carrier 

USS Kearsarge rescued Captain Scott O’Grady in June 1995. O’Grady successfully 

evaded Serbian forces for 6 days after his F-16 was shot down by Serbian forces.376

American CSAR forces also attempted to rescue the crew of EBRO-33, a French 
Mirage-2000B aircraft downed over Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, but discovered 

the French airmen were captured shortly after being shot down. French President 

Mitterand personally negotiated the crew’s release. During Operation Allied 

Force in 1999, Special Operations CSAR teams plucked an F-117 pilot from the 

area around Belgrade, Serbia on 27 March. On 2 May, special operations CSAR 

helicopters extracted an F-16 pilot downed over western Serbia.377 The successful 

rescue of downed aviators was a psychological victory over Serbian forces and 

prevented downed airmen being exploited as hostages—a tactic the Serbs employed 

repeatedly during the Balkan civil war.

2003 Iraq

American SOF rescued 19-year old Private First Class Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi 

hospital 1 April, where she was held to treat her wounds. Lynch had been captured 

during a 23 March Iraqi attack, when her Army supply convoy strayed into an 

ambush.378

2007 Middle East

In January, the Air Force Chief of Staff announced that CSAR saved over 470 

members of the joint and coalition team in the Central Command area of responsibility since 11 September 2001.379

2007 Horn of Africa, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean

CTF 150 once more acted against increasing piracy. On 28 October, USS Arleigh Burke

entered Somali territorial waters at the invitation of the transitional government. 

Radio contact was made with several pirate crews to convince them to surrender 

captured vessels. The destroyer USS James E. Williams provided care and assistance 

to crewmembers and pirates aboard the North Korean cargo vessel Dai Hong Dan, 

after the crew regained control of the ship from the pirates on 30 October.380 On 

4 November, Somali pirates released three captive vessels, the Tanzanian registered 

Mavuno I and Mavuno II and later released the Taiwan-registered Ching Fong Hwa 

168 after 5 months in captivity.381 USS Porter fired on and sank two pirate boats tied 

to the hijacked Japanese tanker Golden Nori, but did not employ force against the 

ship due to its volatile benzene cargo.382 By 6 December, U.S. and German warships 

surrounded the tanker near the Somali port of Bossaso, where local authorities 

called on pirates to surrender the vessel.383 They surrendered the tanker and its 

crew on 12 December.384

2008 Colombia

Colombian forces planned Operation Check, an elaborate ruse to convince FARC 

captors to willingly release their most prized hostages. Working diligently since 

January, Colombian staff officers took advantage of a crumbling FARC communications system. The idea resulted from a message found in a computer captured during 

a March 2008 raid on FARC headquarters in Colombia. The message, from Jorge 

Briceño, discussed how guerillas had misplaced a baby boy who was to have been 
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liberated in a hostage release, but lost track of the boy. Colombia’s Vice Minister 

of Defense Sergio Jaramillo commented that Briceño “does not even know what 

happens in his own house.” Planting a false message, Colombian military deceived 

Gerardo Antonio Aguilar Ramirez, the head of the unit guarding the hostages. On 

2 July 2008, posing as members of a sympathetic nongovernment organization, 

a Colombian commando team, replete with Che Guevara t-shirts, landed their 

Russian built helicopters, painted in the colors of a Venezuelan relief organization, 

near the FARC compound. Two commandos, acting as a film crew, interviewed the 

rebel commander, while a handful of others portrayed relief workers. Handcuffing 

the hostages, the commandos took custody of 15 hostages—including former 

Colombian Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, three American hostages, 

and uniformed Colombian security personnel—without firing a shot. The freed 

hostages were flown to an ecstatic reception in Bogota as their former captor was 

overcome and handcuffed naked on the floor of the helicopter. Colombian Defense 

Minister Juan Manuel Santos led a triumphant press conference, praising the 

operation as “inventive and bold.” 385 U.S. forces provided assistance preparing 

for the operation.386

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Endnotes

1. Author’s proposed definition of manhunting. 

2. Know also that Appendix A has some glaring omissions, primarily fugitive manhunts conducted by the law enforcement community and armed militias. From deputized posses in the old West to modern local, regional, national, and international 

law enforcement agencies, many criminals and fugitives have been interdicted. 

Some of these were a threat to national security if allowed to continue their sociopathic behavior. For example, the U.S. Marshals service has achieved an impressive tally of apprehensions, over 600 of which were overseas in 2006. (See www.

usmarshals.gov/investigations/international/index.html; accessed July 2009.)

In no way should this omission be taken to imply that law enforcement manhunts are less worthy of study than military manhunts—quite the contrary. Law 

enforcement has much to teach the national security establishment in pursuing fugitives. It might be argued that law enforcement dragnets are even more 

demanding, as the rules of evidence and oversight placed on peace officers are 

comparatively more restrictive than military rules of engagement. 

Other manhunting stories will take years to be told. For example, the Central 

Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) has directed intelligence 

activities—quite often involving surrogate forces or allied intelligence services—

that led to the detention or death of several thousand terrorists and sympathizers. 

See “CIA & The War on Terrorism,” Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public 

Affairs, Langley, 2007, www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/

index.html; accessed July 2009. While accurate estimates of terrorists captured 

or detained are difficult to obtain due to U.S. government secrecy and natural 

desire to avoid the Vietnam debacle of estimating a “body count,” an unofficial 

“Terrorist Scumbag Scorecard” is available at www.angelfire.com/ultra/terroristscorecard/; accessed July 2009. 

3. Classical sources of Alexander the Great’s life include Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, Arian’s Anabasis, Quintus Curtius Rufus’ History of Alexander the Great of 

Macedonia, and Diodorus’ Library of World History. The most important ancient 

sources on Hannibal are Livy’s books 21-39 and books 3-16 of the World History

by Polybius.

4. Steven M. Marks, Thomas M. Meer, and Matthew T. Nilson, Manhunting: A 

Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval 

Postgraduate School, June 2005), pp. 5-18. Thesis advisors were Dr. Gordon 

McCormick and Dr. Anna Simons. See also:

a. David Scott-Donelan, Tactical Tracking Operations: The Essential Guide for 

Military and Police Trackers (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998).

b. Bob Carss, The SAS Guide to Tracking (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 1999), 

revised 2009.

5. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, p. 78.
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6. Donelan, Tactical Tracking Operations, pp. 61-74.

7. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) acquisition personnel 

chant a mantra to remember this rule: “We don’t man the equipment; we equip 

the man.” – USSOCOM Center for Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) unofficial 

motto.

8. See the America’s Most Wanted site, www.amw.com/; accessed July 2009.

9. T-shirts have been distributed in Washington, D.C. with the admonition “Don’t 

Snitch,” meaning do not inform law enforcement about criminal activity. Radical 

inner city organizations openly promote confronting or even killing law enforcement officials. This monograph does not delve further into this issue because its 

focus is on combating individuals and networks overseas.

10. The Whack-a-Mole analogy was used by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Blackwood in 

2004 to describe time-sensitive targeting operations being planned by military 

leaders. The concept centered on reacting to intelligence indicating a terrorist 

was in a given location. The time-consuming reaction exercises tended to be 

ponderous. 

The Whack-a-Mole analogy was also used by the former chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Richard B. Myers to describe the counterterrorism targeting process. See Tyler Harbert, “General address Bush, terrorism in speech,” The University Daily Kansan (Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas), 3 May 2007, www.

kansan.com/stories/2007/may/03/myers/; accessed July 2009. Myers was quoted 

to say: “How many of you have been to Chuck-e-Cheez? You know that Whack-aMole thing?” Myers went on to argue that the primary thrust of counterterrorism 

should be to influence foreign audiences to reject terrorism.

11. The Department of Defense uses the acronym DIME (diplomatic, information, 

military, economic) to describe the four elements of national power. See Joint 

Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, 

pp. I-8. The acronym DIMEFIL is found in literature to expand on the idea. See 

the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), 6 

February 2006, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., p. 6:

Success in this war will rely heavily on the close cooperation among U.S. 

Government agencies and partner nations to integrate all instruments 

of U.S. and partner national power— diplomatic, information, military, 

economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL). The 

clandestine nature of terrorist organizations, their support by some 

populations and governments, and the trend toward decentralized control and integration into diverse communities worldwide complicate 

the employment of military power.

12. The record on nonlethal action is spotty at best. Economic sanctions were unsuccessful in dissuading the Saddam Hussein regime from illegitimate action. Rather, 

corrupt officials conspired to circumvent the sanctions in an illegal pyramid 

scheme. Sanctions have not been effective against Burma (Myanmar), nor did diplomatic isolation prevent India, Pakistan, Israel, or South Africa from developing 
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nuclear weapons. Yet it could be argued that sanctions drove North Korea to the 

bargaining table. Sustained sanctions and isolation convinced Libya to renounce 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and rejoin the international 

community. It remains to be seen if Iran will be brought back into the fold of 

cooperative nation states.

13. Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh, The Guatemala 1954 Documents, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, George Washington University, www.

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/; accessed July 2009. CIA declassified 

some 1,400 pages on the Guatemalan destabilization program, known as PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS.

14. Fact Sheet: Fighting Genocide in Darfur, President Bush announces increase sanctions against the Government of Sudan, The White House, Washington, D.C., 29 

May 2007, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/print/20070529-2.html; 

accessed July 2009. The quote of interest, obtained from this 2007 fact sheet, 

follows:

The U.S. is targeting sanctions against individuals responsible for violence. These sanctions will isolate these persons by cutting them off 

from the U.S. financial system, barring them from doing business with 

any American citizen or company, and calling the world’s attention to 

their crimes.

15. Juan Forero, “Colombian Officials Recount Rescue Plan—Commandos Took 

Acting Classes to Prepare,” The Washignton Post, 6 July 2008, p. 12, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/05/AR2008070501684.html; 

accessed July 2009.

16. Several recent examples of this phenomenon can be found in the articles below. 

Incidents of fratricide and collateral damage in employing conventional capabilities for manhunting are nearly as frequent as the successes against HVTs.

a. Carlotta Gall, “British Criticize Air Attacks in Afghan Region,” The New York 

Times, 9 August 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/world/asia/09casualties.

html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; accessed July 2009.

b. Scott Pelley, “Karzai: Stop the Air Strikes—Afghan President Tells 60 Minutes 

That Too Many Civilians Are Being Killed,” 60 Minutes, 28 October 2007 and 

updated 28 August 2008, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/25/60minutes/

main3411230.shtml; accessed July 2009.

c. Josh White, “U.S. Boosts Its Use of Air Strikes In Iraq—Strategy Supports 

Troop Increase,” The Washington Post, 17 January 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/16/AR2008011604148_pf.html; 

accessed July 2009.

d. Alexandra Zavis, “U.S. Error Killed Guards, Iraq Police Say: Three are 

reported killed in an airstrike on a neighborhood checkpoint. The military 

hasn’t confirmed it,” Los Angeles Times, 16 February 2008.

e. Tina Susman and Cesar Ahmed, “Iraqi Guards Leave Posts Near Baghdad: 

Members of the Sons of Iraq security corps stage a walkout to protest U.S. 
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airstrakes they say have killed 12 civilians this month,” Los Angeles Times, 

17 February 2008.

f. Robert Farley, “Abolish the Air Force,” The American Prospect, 1 November 

2007, www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=abolish_the_air_force; accessed 

July 2009.

17. The military often uses the term geolocate to indicate that the goal is to detect and 

share the precise geographic coordinates where the individual terrorist is located 

at a given time. To put this simply, we want “a dot on a map.” This knowledge 

allows the military or law enforcement to take decisive action.

18. The interaction of the HVT with others is the basis of a national-level security 

threat. Only through a network can activities that are inimical to the interests of 

the nation reach a level that threatens national security. An individual who does 

not interact with a network is a local threat, usually handled effectively by local 

law enforcement elements. The primary exception to this would be a “lone wolf” 

seeking to acquire or employ WMD.

19. My original definition included the ability to detect, seize, destroy, or influence 

critical technology. The inclusion of critical technology generated much discussion 

and disagreement. Disagreement centered on whether to consider manhunting in 

a purist sense, only focused on finding human targets. In the interest of consensus, 

I withdrew the technological aspect from the definition of manhunting.

Human networks lie at the center of all activities—including the development, 

deployment, or employment of critical technology. Examples of this technology 

include WMD, devices that could generate technological surprise, and technology 

that might lead U.S. to high-value individuals. The threat from possible proliferation or use of WMD justifies including the ability to detect WMD as a key element 

of a manhunting capability. Understanding the human networks involved could 

lead friendly forces to the technological threat. Similarly, a deep understanding 

and ability to track key technology may lead U.S. to detect nefarious human 

activities. There are well-documented cases where technical exploitation served 

as a basis for finding a HVT—as in the cases of Isoroku Yamamoto, Dzhokar 

Dudayev, Pablo Escobar, Aldom Tilao, and disruption of the A. Q. Khan network. The tactics, techniques, and procedures used in manhunting are similar to 

those employed in the seizure of critical technology. These issues are inextricably 

intertwined. For these reasons, historical raids to seize critical technology are 

worthy of study to develop manhunting capabilities, thus are included in the 

appendices. 

For those who say technology cannot be influenced, I disagree. Influence is the 

capacity or power to produce effects on others by intangible or indirect means 

(Random House College Dictionary definition). A sympathetic detonation is the 

result of physical influence on an explosive device. Meaconing, jamming, intrusion, or other techniques can influence the output or reliability of a technical 

device. Phone calls can be rerouted. Electronic bank accounts can be transferred 

or emptied. Geographic coordinates can be altered. Since these techniques involve 

neither the destruction nor seizure of technology, it falls into the category of 
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influence. While not the central element of manhunting deliberations, technology 

does bear on the manhunting problem, thus worthy of study.

20. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, pp. xvii and 99. It is also 

possible to infer from the thesis question on page 2—“How do military planners and intelligence analysts search, locate, and capture fugitives who operate 

within networks that offer support, cover, and security”—that the definition of 

manhunting might be “how military planners and intelligence analysts search, 

locate, and capture fugitives who operate within networks that offer support, 

cover, and security.”

21. Ibid., p. 6. “The U.S. military’s limited experience conducting manhunts has 

created a doctrinal, legal, and procedural void. No established set of systems or 

procedures has been formalized to specifically address manhunting within the 

confines of military operations. Consequently, the U.S. military approaches manhunting according to established processes created for conventional battle—find, 

fix, and destroy. Yet the very nature of finding individuals differs considerably 

from finding a unit on the battlefield. Identifying and locating an individual 

requires significantly different analytical methods and processes.” Special thanks 

to these officers for allowing me to review their thesis in support of a staff study 

conducted for USSOCOM during the spring and summer of 2005.

22. Ibid. Marks, Meer, and Nilson consulted experts in the Department of Defense, 

intelligence, law enforcement, and international organizations. They visited not 

only key law enforcement and counterterrorist organizations around the world 

but also hosted a conference, bringing together international experts to discuss 

the craft of manhunting and identify what the group believed were the core tenets 

of manhunting. Their study concluded that significant differences exist between 

operations conducted to locate and apprehend individuals who are known and 

recognized as fugitives and those whose identities and associations are unknown. 

All fugitives seek to avoid detection and apprehension. Rather than employ technology to find persons of national interest, the thesis concludes the most effective 

way to find them is to employ investigative techniques.

23. In 2007, the United States Marine Corps initiated a training program called 

Combat Hunter. Initiated at Camp Pendleton and now being rolled out nationwide, 

Combat Hunter is designed to help Marines stalk and kill insurgents by using 

their senses and instincts. With an instructor staff including law enforcement 

and big game hunters, Combat Hunter emphasizes keen observation of Marines’ 

surroundings and meticulous knowledge of their foes’ habits prior to initiating 

contact. See Rick Rodgers, “Teaching Marines to be like hunters—Unorthodox 

war training emphasizes ‘primal skills,’” San Diego Union-Tribune, 29 February 

2008, www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20080229-9999-1n29hunter.html; 

accessed July 2009. 

24. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, pp. 13-26.

25. Ibid., p. 32.

26. Ibid., p. 2, 36. 
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 Fugitives also follow certain behavior trends. Those evading the authorities tend 

to seek the sanctuary of family or friends, rural areas with cultural familiarity 

and fewer authorities, or densely populated areas where they can harness the 

“chaff” effect of many other people to drop below the awareness level of pursuers. 

Their flight tends to vary among planned, sudden opportunistic or passion-driven 

strategies. Terrorists evade authorities through multiple techniques, which include 

masking, disengagement, and mobility (pp. 32-33). The most successful fugitives 

also employ deception strategies to throw pursuers off of the scent (pp. 43-54).

27. Ibid., pp. 39-42.

28. The five steps of the analytic manhunting process (p. 60) are as follows: 

a. Conduct an initial background investigation via research.

b. Build a social profile.

c. Identify the support network.

d. Analyze the hunter’s constraints and limitations.

e. Analyze competing hypotheses. 

The thesis also recommends an emerging investigative concept—Nexus Topography—as a means to conduct detailed social network analysis, predict future safe 

havens, and anticipate terrorist behavior or movement (pp. 63-73). A detailed 

explanation of Nexus Topography can be found in Steven Marks et al., Nexus 

Topography: Mapping a Fugitive’s Social Network (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). 

29. Existing doctrine includes a hierarchy for combating terrorism (CbT) actions, 

including antiterrorism (AT) —defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability 

to terrorist acts—and counterterrorism (CT) —offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. AT views terrorism from a force protection 

perspective. Considered the domain of security and host-nation forces, AT is also 

considered every Department of Defense employee’s responsibility. AT doctrine 

recently underwent its first update since 1998. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.2, Joint 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, was rewritten in 2006. 

Strangely, after 6 years of war, no overarching CbT or CT doctrine exists. From 

a doctrinal perspective, CT appears to be considered as a subset of special operations and counterintelligence doctrine. In other words, the CbT and CT mission 

appears to be subordinated to organizational considerations. JP 3-05, Doctrine 

for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003 could be seen to address CT as a 

subset of the following special operations capabilities:

a. Direct action to “...seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.” 

b. Special reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance “...involve locating and 

attacking targets of opportunity—for example, adversary materiel, personnel, and facilities...”

c. Counterterrorism, which “...include offensive measures taken to prevent, 

deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”
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d. Counterproliferation (CP) of WMD, “...to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, 

capture, or recover WMD.”

JP 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations–Classified, 7 May 2002 provided guidance on 

investigations, operations, and multinational operations. The classified document 

was revised and released in 2006 as JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human 

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation 

of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009 includes concepts for performing 

analysis to determine appropriate targets. 

JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006 includes concepts of physical attack and nonlethal operations focused against key nodes within an enemy 

“system.” Information Operations under command and control (C2) warfare 

seek to disintegrate key decision makers from the C2 network as well as disrupt 

or disable an enemy decision cycle. 

Other joint doctrine addresses related areas, including TTP, for personnel 

recovery:

a. JP 3-50.2, Joint Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), 26 January 

1996.

b. JP 3-50.21, Joint TTP for CSAR, 23 March 1998.

c. JP 3-07.7, Joint TTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 30 September 

1997.

Three other doctrine documents address respective coordination of interagency, 

multinational, and domestic operations:

a. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II, 17 

March 2006.

b. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000.

c. JP 3-26, Homeland Security, 2 August 2005.

A new doctrine document, JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, was also released in 

2006. 

To reinforce an earlier point, it appears that doctrine is subordinate to organizational considerations. At the highest levels of the Department of Defense, 

maintaining current organizational structure appears to carry more weight in 

the development of doctrine. Doctrine should drive organization; otherwise, 

doctrine becomes dogma.

30. It is important to distinguish between learning lessons from activities and condoning them. For example, it is not necessary to condone assassination in order 

to extract operational lessons from the execution of either a failed or successful 

assassination plot.

31. Thom Shanker and Scott Shane, “Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence,” 

The New York Times, 6 March 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/international/

americas/08forces.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&oref=slogin; accessed July 2009.
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32. One such measure is the “Cheney Doctrine” or “One Percent Doctrine”—a policy 

that if a 1 percent chance exists that an enemy may attack the United States, we 

must respond as if it is a certainty. See Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: 

Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). Pulitzer Prize winner Suskind hits upon the crux of the issue on p. 

149: 

It is odd, first, for a significant portion of a massive government with 

an annual budget of $2 trillion, to be committed to searching for a 

handful of men. We’ve done it a few times before, as when Woodrow 

Wilson sent the U.S. Army after Pancho Villa and his ragtag band. But 

the circumstances of this era, following 9/11, may mean we’ll have to do 

it on a regular basis. Destructive weapons, obtainable by individuals, 

will do that. They make a small, ardent group of people as threatening 

as an invading army. [Emphasis added by monograph author.] 

The gap between policy and capability has been thrust into public light in the 

controversy over the Uniting and Strengthening America (USA) by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) 

Act—extraordinary rendition and interrogation of detained terrorists and issues 

related to telecommunications monitoring popularly referred to as illegal wiretapping. The potential threat posed by the combination of radical actors armed 

with WMD makes imperative a calculated response. Policy must catch up with 

capability; our nation must focus the development effort. 

History may also imply that the United States is probably the world’s best candidate to develop this capability and to employ it responsibly. Since the U.S. developed nuclear weapons during a time of war, it practiced exemplary restraint in 

the employment of this decisive capability. Nuclear capability underpinned the 

world’s security for over 60 years. U.S. public officials and officers swear oaths 

not to a particular leader or party but to the Constitution. Citizens are held 

accountable not only to legal and policy organs but to their conscience. There is 

no nation in the world better suited to weigh and bring into balance the contrasting importance of democratic ideals and individual liberty against the need to 

protect civilization from those who would employ lethal force against innocents 

in the pursuit of an extreme agenda.

33. For an excellent synopsis of the issues associated with targeting regime leaders, 

refer to the following article by a former CIA assistant general counsel: Catherine Lotrionte, “When to Target Leaders,” The Washington Quarterly, 26:3, 

Summer 2003, pp. 73-86, www.twq.com/03summer/docs/03summer_lotrionte.

pdf; accessed July 2009. 

See also Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford University 

Press, 2008). Melzer is a legal adviser to the International Committee of the Red 

Cross.

34. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable 

search and seizure. Arrest falls into this category. Though standards vary from 
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state to state, the Model Penal Code dictates that decisions to employ deadly force 

must be the reasonable choice under all circumstances at the time of a search 

and seizure. Deadly force can be employed if the officer believes it is necessary 

to prevent escape, the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a 

significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer or others. Refer to:

a. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

b. Klinkel v. Saddler, 211 Iowa 368, 233 N.W. 538 (1930)

c. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)

d. People v. Couch, 436 Mich. 414, 461 N.W. 2d 683 (1990)

e. Scott v. Harris, No. 05-1631, U.S. Supreme Court (30 April 2007)

f. Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Department, 998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 

1993)

g. Harris v. Coweta County, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005)

h. Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1994).

International law enforcement officers have also been instructed to employ lethal 

force. The modern concept of deadly force in law enforcement dates from Thomas 

Hobbes, who wrote in The Leviathan, “...covenants, without the sword, are but 

words and of no strength to secure a man at all.” The concept of a State’s monopoly 

on the legitimate use of physical force (proposed by Max Weber in Politics as a 

Vocation) has been predominant in 20th Century philosophy of law and political 

philosophy. Great Britain’s Antiterrorism Branch (SO13) instituted Operation 

Kratos 6 months after the 11 September 2001 attacks, providing guidance to its 

officers on how to confront terrorism suspects. The policy, which remains secret, 

is believed to have provided instructions to incapacitate suicide bombers with 

shots to the head. (See “Police May Receive Shoot-to-Kill Orders,” The Scotsman, 

15 July 2005 and “Met adopted secret shoot-to-kill policy in the face of a new and 

deadly threat,” Financial Times, 25 July 2005.) The Australian Antiterrorism Act 

of 2005 proposed police officers be granted this power when a suspect might pose 

a threat to others in the future.

35. Appendices A and B provide many examples of in extremis actions taken against 

terrorists.

36. Cindy Vallar, “Piracy and the Law: Modern Piracy - part 2,” Pirates and Privateers, 

September 2000, www.suite101.com/article.cfm/pirates/44213/1; accessed July 

2009. See also:

a. Paul Reynolds, “Rules frustrate anti-piracy efforts,” BBC News/Africa, 9 

December 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/7735144.stm; accessed 

July 2009. 

b. Matthew Hennessey, “Somali Pirates Scuttle Sea Laws,” Policy Innovations, 

Carnegie Council, 18 November 2008, www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/

briefings/data/000090; accessed July 2009.
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37. Article One of The Constitution of the United States, Section 8: Enumerated 

Powers of Congress. “To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and 

make rules concerning captures on land and water...”

38. The United States is not a signatory to the Declaration of Paris. However, the 

United States issued statements during the Civil War and Spanish-American 

War that the U.S. would abide by the principles of the Declaration of Paris for the 

duration of the hostilities. On 11 October 2001, Washington D.C. congressman 

Ron Paul attempted to renew this concept, with the introduction of the September 

11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/

sept_11.asp; accessed July 2009. 

Congressman Paul continues to seek approval of this initiative, most recently with 

the 27 July 2007 introduction of the Marque and Reprisal Act of 2007. The bill 

(H.R. 3216) was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; see www.

govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3216; accessed July 2009.

39. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) determined that U.S. agents 

are not bound by the Fourth Amendment when searching property owned by a 

nonresident alien in a foreign country. The case resulted in multiple opinions with 

two Justices dissenting. See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navb

y=CASE&court=US&vol=494&page=259; accessed July 2009. 

40. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of deadly force to effect 

an arrest or prevent the escape of a suspect unless the police officer reasonably 

believes that the suspect committed or attempted to commit crimes involving the 

infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury and a warning of the 

intent to use deadly physical force was given, whenever feasible.

41. Richard Grimmet, Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 

Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, Library 

of Congress, 4 January 2006, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22357.pdf; accessed 

July 2009. 

Congress, conscious that passage of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution—H.J. Res 

1143: Joint Resolution to Provide the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, 88th Congress of the United States of America, 1 August 1964, www.

ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=98; accessed July 2009—led to the 

unwanted expansion of the Vietnam conflict, omitted White House draft language 

that would have also authorized the President “to deter and preempt any future 

acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States,” including a codicil 

that “Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers 

Resolution.” President Bush believed the resolution “...recognized the authority 

of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts 

of terrorism against the United States... In signing this resolution, I maintain the 

long-standing position of the executive branch regarding the President’s constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States 

and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” – “Statement 

of the President of 18 September 2001 on signing the Authorization for the Use 
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of Military Force,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. 

Bush (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), pp. 1124-1125; 

taken from Grimmet.

42. Ibid.

43. In HCJ 760/02, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government 

of Israel, Israel’s Supreme Court issued a decision on 14 December 2006 (see www.

jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/sctterror.html; accessed August 2009). 

The court found that:

a. A continuous state of armed conflict of an international character exists 

between Israel and terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria, and the 

Gaza Strip; therefore, international law applies to the situation. 

b. Members of terrorist organizations are civilians because they do not fulfill 

the conditions for combatants under international law. Because terrorists 

take part in armed hostilities, they are not afforded the protections granted 

to a civilian under international law during the time that they are actively 

engaged in armed conflict or preparing for subsequent operations—including 

rest and recuperation.

c. Four criteria must be adhered to when conducting targeted killing:

d. Well-based, strong, and convincing information is needed to categorize a 

civilian as a terrorist.

e. A civilian taking part in hostilities cannot be attacked if less harmful means 

can be employed. While the civilian does not surrender his human rights, 

arrest, investigation, and trial cannot always be employed at times when the 

risk is too great to soldiers.

f. A thorough, independent investigation should follow any attack against a 

civilian suspected of taking part in hostilities, regarding the precision of 

target identification and the circumstances of the attack upon him. Compensation should be paid as a result of harm to innocent civilians in appropriate 

cases. 

g. Every effort must be made to minimize harm to innocent civilians. Harm 

to civilians must be proportional to the military advantage achieved by the 

attack.

44. Peter Hofschroder, 1815 – The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German 

Allies, and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 

pp. 33-36. Although the the Hundred Days Campaign was about conventional 

military operations, their declared and intended purpose was to eject one man—

Napoleon—from France.

45. Kendall D. Gott, In Search of an Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign, Global 

War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 5 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp. 15-50, http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/

csipubs/gott.pdf; accessed July 2009.

46. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 396, 397 (1989), the Court said (p. 490):
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...the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. 

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be viewed from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with 20/20 

vision of hindsight.

...allowance [must be made] for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that 

is necessary in a particular situation. 

The question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of 

the facts and circumstances confronting them. 

47. HCJ 760/02: The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of 

Israel. In Sections 56-58, The Israeli Supreme Court also acknowledges and states 

its intent not to intrude into the operational decision cycle. However, the Court 

reserved the right to rule on the character of decisions for preemptive strikes. 

...The scope of judicial review of the decision of the military commander to perform a preventative strike causing the deaths of terrorists 

in the area, and at times of innocent civilians, varies according to the 

essence of the concrete question raised. On the one end of the spectrum 

stands the question which we have discussed in this petition, regarding the content of international law dealing with armed conflicts. That 

is a question of determination of the applicable law, par excellence. 

According to our legal outlook, that question is within the realm of 

the judicial branch...

On the other end of the spectrum of possibilities is the decision, made 

on the basis of the knowledge of the military profession, to perform a 

preventative act which causes the deaths of terrorists in the area. That 

decision is the responsibility of the executive branch. It has the professional-security expertise to make that decision. The Court will ask itself 

if a reasonable military commander could have made the decision that 

was made. The question is whether the decision of the military commander falls within the zone of reasonable activity on the part of the 

military commander. If the answer is yes, the Court will not exchange 

the military commander’s security discretion with the security discretion of the Court...”

Between these two ends of the spectrum, there are intermediate situations. Each of them requires a meticulous examination of the character 

of the decision. To the extent that it has a legal aspect, it approaches 

the one end of the spectrum. To the extent that it has a professional 

military aspect, it approaches the other end of the spectrum. Take, 

for example, the question whether the decision to perform a preventative strike causing the deaths of terrorists fulfills the conditions which 

customary international law determines on that point (as determined 
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in §51(3) of The First Protocol). What is the scope of judicial review of 

the military commander’s decision that these conditions are fulfilled 

in the specific case? Our answer is that the question of the fulfillment 

of the conditions determined in customary international law for performing military operations is a legal question, the expertise in which 

is the Court’s.

48. Policymakers have used phrases like the war on drugs or global war on terrorism, 

while the response to Somali piracy has been to seek United Nations, shipowner, 

and Somali approval to employ military force. On the other hand, leaders repeatedly call for terrorists, pirates, and narcotraffickers to be brought to justice. Shipowners have legitimate concerns to safeguard the crew, the ship, and cargo.

49. See the Crimes of War Project article, “September 11th and its Aftermath: An 

Ongoing Special Feature,” www.crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-main.html; 

accessed July 2009. It contains opinions of noted legal experts on the legal issues 

surrounding the 9/11 attacks.

50. HCJ 760/02: The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government 

of Israel:

The Supreme Court decided that members of the terrorist organizations 

are not combatants. They do not fulfill the conditions for combatants 

under international law. Thus, for example, they do not comply with 

the international laws of war. Therefore, members of terrorist organizations have the status of civilians. However, the protection accorded by 

international law to civilians does not apply at the time during which 

civilians take direct part in hostilities. This too is a fundamental principle of customary international law. It is expressed in Article 51(3) of 

the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions which states 

as follows: ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, 

unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’

Thus, a civilian—in order to enjoy the protections afforded to him by 

international law during an armed conflict—must refrain from taking 

a direct part in the hostilities. A civilian who violates this principle 

and takes direct part in hostilities does not lose his status as a civilian; 

however, as long as he is taking a direct part in hostilities, he does not 

enjoy the protections granted to a civilian. He is subject to the risks of 

attack like those to which a combatant is subject, without enjoying the 

rights of a combatant—e.g. those granted to a prisoner of war...

A civilian taking a direct part in hostilities is not an outlaw (in the 

original sense of that word—people deprived of legal rights and protection for the commission of a crime). He does not relinquish his human 

rights. He must not be harmed more than necessary for the needs of 

security. Among the military means, one must choose the means which 

least infringes upon the humans rights of the harmed person. Thus if 

a terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be employed. Arrest, 
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investigation, and trial are not means which can always be used. At 

times the possibility does not exist whatsoever; at times it involves a 

risk so great to the lives of the soldiers, that it is not required...

51. Franklin Eric Wester, “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq,” 

Parameters (Winter 2004-2005), pp. 26-29. Focusing on the six criteria of jus ad 

bellum, Chaplain Wester, a military ethicist, points out that “Preemptive strikes 

and preemptive war have a recognized historic and narrowly defined place in the 

Just War tradition.” The six criteria are as follows:

a. Legitimate authority. Different countries assign different legitimate authorities for declaring war. In the United States, though the Constitution specifies 

Congress as the agent to declare war, the unresolved tension between the 

President wielding the War Powers Act and the control of appropriations by 

the Congress has functioned sufficiently to legitimize war by U.S. forces. In 

cases of international forces, recognized organizations and institutions have 

formal procedures for legitimizing military power.

b. Public declaration. National leaders, leaders of international organizations, 

and institutions are called on to announce intentions to pursue war and to 

provide the conditions for avoiding or ending conflict.

c. Just intent. A general rule for just intent, or just cause in going to war, is to 

restore the status quo ante bellum, a return to international relations when 

war was not pursued. Other facets of just intent are to protect the innocent, 

recover something wrongly taken, punish evil, or defend against wrongful 

attack.

d. Proportionality. This criterion focuses on restraint and precision in the use 

of force. Warfare presents notorious difficulty in predicting its costs—both 

human and economic—yet the application of military force is legitimate only 

to the degree it takes account of such effects and outcomes.

e. Last resort. This criterion presents a logical conundrum. In theory, something 

else can always be done. The point of this specification is to clarify that force is 

justified only as a sad necessity after other good-faith ways to avoid or resolve 

conflict have failed.

f. Reasonable hope of success. Leaders make a morally grave decision to commit 

the lives of their military forces, and those of innocent civilians, to death 

for the hope of reversing the cause of going to war. Only conflict with some 

expectation of restoration to an acceptable status quo is usually ethical. 

Revenge and “suicide stands” are not moral choices in cases where there is 

no hope of success.

 Wester differentiates between a preemptive strike and preventive war. 

...Preemptive strikes may be actions in war or discrete acts that one 

nation takes against another apart from war. Ethically, a preemptive 

strike in war is evaluated in the category of jus in bello and is a way to 

seize the initiative. A preemptive strike may be preceded by warnings 

and is not necessarily a sneak attack...
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In comparison, a preemptive war is associated with one aspect of the 

just cause standard of going to war (jus ad bellum). If attack is imminent, with a clear and present danger, a nation is right to defend itself... 

Also, the act of proceeding to war before actual attack is moral when 

the threat is real and so near at hand that launching war could be considered self-defense. A nation or nations also may rightly intercede to 

prevent humanitarian abuses, even inside the boundaries of another 

sovereign nation.

In contrast, a preventive war is started well before the imminent threat 

or humanitarian crisis, when the balance of forces is the primary consideration. As noted above, a preemptive war is launched at a time close 

to a documented or presumed threat, when the forces initiating war 

retain tactical, operational, or strategic advantage. Preventive war, on 

the other hand, is built on a sheer calculation of advantage—nation 

X can gain an advantage by acting now to attack nation Y, regardless 

of the threat. By launching a war now, a later conflict—more costly in 

human life, national resources, or even lost victory—is avoided. The 

justification for such a war must withstand the critique of a just intent 

standard.

 Wester also recommends the following sources for more information on just war 

theory:

a. U.S. Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 July 1956 with Change 

1, 15 July 1976), ch. 2, sec. 1, para. 20.

b. U.S. Army, “Apply Just War Tradition to Your Service as a Leader and the 

Profession of Arms,” Training Support Package (TSP) 158-C-1131, Center 

for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, http://web.archive.org/web/20010914070243/www.vanderbilt.edu/Army/TSP/justwar.htm; accessed August 2009. 

52. Same as endnote 50.

53. HCJ 760/02: The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government 

of Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that “[a terrorist] must not be harmed 

more than necessary for the needs of security.” Thus, security trumps individual 

human rights. It follows that as long as the terrorist presents a threat to security, 

his individual human rights—though considered—are of secondary concern. 

The author realizes, however, that this is a slippery slope—that is, one that could 

lead to acceptance of inhumane treatment, including torture. The author does not 

advocate torture or mistreatment of detainees. Inhumane treatment is not only 

counterproductive to intelligence gathering but also affects those who commit 

the act as well as victims. Identifying, tracking, influencing, capturing, or when 

necessary killing a terrorist prevents loss of innocent life. It is an act that may 

impinge on the human rights of a suspected terrorist, but supports and secures 

the human rights of the terrorist’s potential victims.
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54. The Church Committee cast the term plausible denial into the public eye:

Nonattribution to the United States for covert operations was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible denial. 

Evidence before the committee clearly demonstrates that this concept, 

designed to protect the United States and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has been expanded to mask decisions of the 

President and his senior staff members.

Source: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 

with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 20 November 1975, II, Section B, Covert 

Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation, p. 11.

55. Executive Order: Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community, The 

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 August 2004, www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-6.html; accessed July 2009.

56. President Signs Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, The White 

House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 December 2004, www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2004/12/print/20041217-1.html; accessed July 2009.

57. The Posse Comitatus Act is contained in Title 18, United States Code, Section 

1385: 

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 

by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 

Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute 

the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 

2 years, or both.

Posse comitatus is derived from English common law; the term translates to force 

of the county and referred to a sheriff’s authority to assemble a body of men above 

the age of 15 to repress a riot or for other purposes. Congress passed the Posse 

Comitatus Act in 1878 in response to a dispute over the use of federal troops by 

federal marshals in the South. Marshals and sheriffs often pressed Army troops 

into their service without the approval of the commander in chief; the increasing 

frequency of this practice irked many members of Congress, especially when the 

law enforcement authorities also insisted Congress should foot the bill for these 

operations. Southerners in particular questioned this policy. In passing the act, 

the Congress restricted the U.S. marshals’ and local sheriffs’ ability to conscript 

military personnel into their posses. The intent of the act was not to preclude the 

Army from enforcing the law but instead designed to allow the Army to proceed 

only when directed by the President or Congress. 

The Posse Comitatus Act applies only to the Army and Air Force; it is Pentagon 

policy to interpret the decision to affect the Navy and Marine Corps in the same 

way. Likewise, the Army or Air Force can be used when directed by the President 

or Congress. Recent experience demonstrates that it is not only possible but also 

sometimes necessary to employ the military for domestic purposes. Leaders often 

state that the military cannot assist in homeland security, counterterrorism, civil 

disturbances, and similar domestic duties. They are misinformed. 
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Source: John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security,” 

Homeland Security Journal, Homeland Security Institute, February 2002, www.

homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/brinkerhoffpossecomitatus.htm; accessed 

July 2009.)

58. The 1992 Los Angeles riots that erupted after the Rodney King verdict were only 

quelled when National Guard and federal forces were brought to bear. Their intervention was far from unpopular, as the California National Guard commander 

recalled:

There was much applause and other visible signs of support, to include 

thumbs up and waving. Guardsmen had trouble spending money in 

local stores, even those that had been looted, as shopkeepers and eating 

places refused to take money from them. Literally thousands of pizzas 

and other meals, soft drinks, and cookies were delivered to Guardsmen 

by restaurants and individual citizens. Cards and letters of thanks from 

school children were delivered to various staging areas.

Source: James D. Delk, The 1992 Los Angeles Riots: Military Operations in Los 

Angeles, 1992, The California Military Museum, California State Military Department (Etc Publications, 1994), www.militarymuseum.org/HistoryKingMilOps.

html; accessed July 2009.

When local, state, and civil resources in the Gulf States were overwhelmed by 

the magnitude of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina natural disaster, the Department 

of Defense had to reestablish order in New Orleans, conduct search and rescue 

operations, and perform many of the initial engineering efforts to recover damaged infrastructure, including levee repair and reestablishing operations at key 

transportation nodes. Source: Joseph Chenelly, “Troops begin combat operations 

in New Orleans,” Army Times, 2 September 2005.

Likewise, the Department of Defense is a key participant in National Security Special Events, in which federal, state, and local forces collaborate under U.S. Secret 

Service leadership to ensure public security and safety at the Olympic Games, 

the Super Bowl, the World Economic Forum, Presidential Inaugurations, special 

congressional assemblies, or other major public events. Source: National Security 

Special Events, www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml; accessed July 2009.

In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-

62. A portion of this classified document deals with the coordination of Federal 

antiterrorism and counterterrorism assets for events of national interest. PDD-62 

formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the 

development of security plans for major events. When an event is designated a 

National Special Security Event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role 

as the lead agency for the design and implementation of an operational security 

plan. Cooperating federal, state, and local agencies provide a safe and secure 

environment for key personnel, other dignitaries, event participants, and the 

general public.
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Add to this a litany of cases where the military has provided disaster relief or 

border security, and domestic employment of military forces takes on a much 

more popular aspect than is often feared.

59. “Title 32 – National Guard,” U.S. Code Collection, Cornell University Law School, 

www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode32/usc_sup_01_32.html; accessed July 

2009.

60. The USA PATRIOT Act stands at the center of this continuum. (For introduction 

of the acronym, see endnote 32.) For suspected terrorism cases, the Act permits 

government authorities—without proof that a crime has been committed—to 

access personal information like medical, financial and educational histories, and 

library records; track an individual’s Internet communications; install telephone 

and computer wiretaps; and obtain search warrants for voice-mail and e-mail 

messages. It has been proposed that these powers be expanded to allow officials to 

bypass a judge or grand jury in order to obtain subpoenas in time-sensitive terrorism investigations, deny bail to terrorism suspects, and open up the federal death 

penalty for terror-related crimes that result in death. Both supporters and critics 

of the law are involved in a tug of war over what liberties Americans should sacrifice in exchange for public safety. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 

a renowned civil rights advocacy organization, views the Act as a “surveillance 

monster.” The ACLU argued that virtually no rules existed for the new powers. 

Another complaint from civil liberties groups is that the law is increasingly being 

used against criminals who are not terrorists. Source: Sheryl Silverman, “Patriot 

Act Continues to Spark Debate,” Online News Hour Extra, MacNeil-Lehrer Productions, 17 September 2003.

Similar controversy has erupted over Authorization for Use of Military Force 

Against Terrorists (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, enacted 18 September 2001), 

the Protect America Act of 2007 amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act (enacted 5 August 2007 and expired 17 February 2008), interrogating suspects, 

and trying suspects through military tribunals.

61. Fact Sheet: President Issues New Orders to Reform Intelligence: Actions Aimed 

at Terrorism Prevention, Safeguarding Civil Liberties, and Further Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations, The White House, Office of the Press 

Secretary, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-13.html; 

accessed July 2009.

62. The following sources provide examples of tension between the executive and 

legislative branches over counterterrorism-related policy and law:

a. President Signs Intelligence Authorization Act, The White House, Office 

of the Press Secretary, 28 December 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2001/12/20011228-3.html; accessed July 2009. President Bush stated, 

“...The Act authorizes appropriations to fund United States intelligence 

activities, including activities essential to success in the war against global 

terrorism. Regrettably, one provision of the Act falls short of the standards 

of comity and flexibility that should govern the relationship between the 
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executive and legislative branches on sensitive intelligence matters and, in 

some circumstances, would fall short of constitutional standards.” 

b. Fact Sheet: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 

States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, Office 

of the Press Secretary, 28 December 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2004/02/20040206-13.html; accessed July 2009. President Bush 

charged a bipartisan commission to conduct a thorough review of the way 

the United States collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence information related to WMD.

c. Fact Sheet: President Issues New Orders to Reform Intelligence: Actions 

Aimed at Terrorism Prevention, Safeguarding Civil Liberties, and Further 

Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations.

d. President’s Statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act, 2005, The White 

House, Office of the Press Secretary, 23 December 2004, www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2004/12/print/20041223-6.html; accessed July 2009.

e. Charles Babington and Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Overhaul Bill Blocked: 

House Conservatives Deal Blow to President, Speaker in Rejecting Compromise,” The Washington Post, 21 November 2004, p. A01, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A381-2004Nov20.html; accessed July 2009.

f. Esther Pan, “Intelligence: Intelligence Reform,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

Washington, D.C., 31 March 2005, www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7820#3; 

accessed July 2009.

g. Robert Byrd, “Politics Surround Intelligence Reform: Hasty Action Leaves 

Too Many Gaps and Problems,” 8 December 2004, www.cwalocal4250.org/

politicalaction/binarydata/Politics.pdf; accessed July 2009.

h. Helen Fessenden, “The Limits of Intelligence Reform,” Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., November/December 2005, www.

foreignaffairs.org/20051101faessay84610/helen-fessenden/the-limits-of-intelligence-reform.html; accessed July 2009.

i. Richard Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This 

Time?” Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 

May/June 2004, www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501facomment83301/richardk-betts/the-new-politics-of-intelligence-will-reforms-work-this-time.html; 

accessed July 2009.

63. Michael Scheuer, “The Path to 9/11,” The Washington Times, 24 August 2007. 

64. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, p. 74. These authors point 

to one enlightening example of the contrasting results achieved between small 

teams and large organizations:

In his Master’s thesis, ‘The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic 

Massacre,’ Alexander B. Calahan compares two Israeli operations, the 

attempted assassination of Ali Hassan Salameh by Mossad in Lillehammer and the use of the Avner team. The Lillehammer operation was 
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deemed a failure because it resulted in the exposure of seven Israeli 

officers and the death of two innocent civilians. The Avner team, in 

contrast, was more successful. During the 2-year deployment of the 

Avner team, eight of the eleven targets were killed, and the collateral 

damage included one KGB officer, four PLO security personnel, one 

freelance assassin, and two team members. What separated these two 

cases was that the Avner team operated outside the government’s traditional organizational structure. This team had the freedom to develop 

the necessary intelligence and conduct the necessary operations beyond 

the confines of a large political bureaucracy. Due to too much compartmentalization, the Lillehammer incident was doomed from the start. 

Information that was vital for the mission success was rarely shared 

between individuals.

65. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, hearings by the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, 

raised serious concerns about the handling of intelligence and counterterrorism 

investigations within the FBI. (Refer to National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States site, www.9-11commission.gov/; accessed July 2009.) 

President Bush directed the FBI and the attorney general to make their top priority preventing future terrorist attacks against the homeland. The FBI expanded the 

number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces across America from 35 to 66, enhancing 

communications with federal, state, and local agencies. The FBI created a National 

Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters, established new counterterrorism 

“Flying Squads” to deploy into the field at a moment’s notice, and established a 

24/7 Counterterrorism Watch Center. 

The 9/11 Commission also pointed out significant shortfalls in the FBI’s intelligence capability. In response, the FBI established an intelligence program to 

ensure that the collection and dissemination of intelligence were given the same 

institutional priority as the collection of evidence for prosecution, dedicating 

Intelligence Reports officers to facilitate the vital flow of information and training new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division with curriculum developed 

in cooperation with the CIA. A new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence was given direct authority and responsibility for the FBI’s national intelligence program. The FBI also started establishing intelligence units in all of 

its field offices, implementing a new data management system to ensure that 

it would share terrorism-related information internally and with the CIA, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies. Source: Fact 

Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America, The White House, 

Office of the Press Secretary, 14 February 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2003/02/20030214-1.html; accessed July 2009.

In 2005, the United States Marshals Service (USMS) arrested more than 35,500 

federal fugitives, clearing 38,500 felony warrants—more federal fugitives than 

all other law enforcement agencies combined. That year USMS also led fugitive 

task forces—interagency teams of marshals working in concert with state and/
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or local authorities—that arrested more than 44,000 state and local fugitives, 

clearing 51,200 state or local felony warrants. Since the inception of the USMS 

15 Most Wanted Fugitive program in 1983, 182 fugitives on the 15 Most Wanted 

list have been captured. Source: Facts and Figures, U.S. Department of Justice, 

United States Marshals Service Fact Sheet, USMS Pub No. 21-B, USMS Office of 

Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 13 January 2006. 

How does USMS achieve these impressive figures? This description of the organization explains:

a. The USMS Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is the primary point 

of contact when the Marshals Service is involved in sensitive and classified 

missions. OEM has primary responsibility over the agency’s actions involving 

homeland security, national emergencies, and domestic crises. USMS also 

fields a Special Operations Group (SOG), a specially trained and highly disciplined tactical unit. A self-supporting response team capable of responding 

to emergencies anywhere in the United States or its territories, most of the 

deputy marshals who have volunteered to be SOG members serve as full-time 

deputies in Marshals Service district offices throughout the nation, and they 

remain on call 24 hours a day for SOG missions. SOG also maintains a small, 

full-time operational cadre stationed at the Marshals Service Tactical Operations Center at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, where all SOG deputies meet 

rigorous physical and mental standards and must undergo extensive training 

in tactics and weaponry. SOG’s missions include apprehending fugitives, 

protecting dignitaries, providing court security, transporting high profile 

and dangerous prisoners, providing witness security, and seizing assets. 

b. USMS also includes a Technical Operations Group (TOG). The TOG Aviation 

Support Branch provides aerial surveillance, electronic tracking, and other 

aerial platform functions in support of USMS operations. USMS aircraft 

provide vital intelligence during the investigation, arrest, and prosecution 

of some of the country’s most dangerous fugitives. 

c. The Electronic Surveillance Branch (ESB) provides covert investigative and 

intelligence support for the Marshals Service’s major cases and 15 Most 

Wanted fugitive investigations. In addition, ESB provides assistance when 

requested by other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to solve 

complex criminal investigations or violent crimes. ESB achieves a very successful case clearance rate by deploying some of the most sophisticated technologies available. ESB members help prepare court orders, serve as expert 

witnesses in the field of electronic surveillance, and train law enforcement 

personnel from the United States and the international law enforcement community in the use of electronic surveillance. ESB maintains a central monitoring facility and electronic surveillance operation centers, with field offices 

throughout the United States. Source: Operations Support, U.S. Department 

of Justice, United States Marshals Service Fact Sheet, USMS Pub No. 21-H; 

USMS Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 13 January 2006. 
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d. USMS also has a Criminal Information Branch (CIB), a team of analysts 

that provide tactical and strategic expertise for USMS operations. The CIB 

researches and analyzes information in support of fugitive investigations, 

and it manages data-sharing projects with other agencies. The CIB also oversees special information systems used by the Marshals Service, including 

the Warrant Information Network—the agency’s central, law enforcement 

information system. 

e. The Marshals Service is also responsible for tracking fugitives who flee the 

territorial boundaries of the United States, and the agency has also been 

designated by the Department of Justice to locate and apprehend fugitives 

wanted by foreign nations who are believed to be in the United States. The 

Marshals Service has the statutory responsibility to extradite international 

and foreign fugitives after they are captured. In fiscal year 2005, the Marshals 

Service successfully completed a record 653 extraditions or deportations from 

63 different countries. Source: Fugitive Investigations; U.S. Department of 

Justice, United States Marshals Service Fact Sheet, USMS Pub No. 21-C, USMS 

Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 13 January 2006.

66. If manhunting assets were consolidated in a single agency, an interagency team 

would be rendered moot.

67. The disciplines include but are not limited to Counterintelligence; Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors and analysts; Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collectors and analysts; and Measurement and Signatures (MASINT) collectors and 

analysts with expertise in biometrics, linguists with expertise in key languages, 

targeteers who have performed counterterrorist missions, Foreign Area Officers, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel, Civil Affairs (CA) experts, 

and analysts who have experience evaluating demography—particularly ethnic, 

tribal, and religious issues. Key leaders, communications experts, experienced 

international and interagency liaisons, and operations personnel should also be 

considered.

68. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, p. 76. 

See also Alexander B. Calahan, Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to 

the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert 

Action Teams (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 

1995). Steven Spielberg directed the movie Munich (2005) about these operations, based on the book Vengeance by George Jonas. The movie Sword of Gideon 

(1986)—directed by Michael Anderson and starring Steven Bauer, Michael York, 

and Rod Steiger—also chronicles this tale.

69. Source is the MI5 site: www.mi5.gov.uk/output/how-we-operate.html; accessed 

August 2009.

70. Ray Bonds, Intelligence Warfare: Penetrating the Secret World of Today’s 

Advanced Technology Conflict (London: Salamander Books, Ltd., 1987), pp. 48, 

77-78.
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71. See the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 

Commission), “Intelligence Policy Staff Statement No. 7,” p. 3, www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_7.pdf; accessed July 2009:

In 1996, as an organizational experiment undertaken with seed money, 

the CTC [Counterterrorism Center] created a special ‘Issue Station’ 

devoted exclusively to Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin was then still in Sudan 

and was considered by the CIA to be a terrorist financier. The original 

name of the station was ‘TFL,’ for terrorist financial links. The Bin 

Ladin (UBL) Station was not a response to new intelligence, but reflected 

interest in and concern about Bin Ladin’s connections. 

 The 9/11 Commission Report makes repeated references to UBL Station. Also 

see The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Report on CIA Accountability With 

Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, pp. xii, xv, and xx, www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-srv/politics/documents/cia_accountability_report_082107.pdf; accessed 

July 2009.

72. If manhunting capabilities were consolidated in a single agency, liaison requirements would be reduced.

73. A book by Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) professor Dr. Hy Rothstein calls 

for the creation of a separate U.S. military service for unconventional warfare. 

Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, published by 

Naval Institute Press, calls for the establishment of a new organization, based on 

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), to combat terror. Source: Barbara Honegger, 

“New Book Calls for Separate Military Service for Unconventional Warfare,” 16 

May 2006. Ms. Honegger is a senior military affairs journalist for NPS. (See www.

nps.edu/Images/Docs/InReview_2006-7_Low.pdf, p. 4; accessed July 2009.)

74. Dedicated manhunting elements of DCGS would be required. These elements 

should be trained, organized, and equipped for dedicated intelligence integration with deployed manhunting teams. If collaborative systems are to succeed in 

demanding manhunting missions, DCGS elements cannot afford to have their 

loyalty split between competing priorities and administratively separate chains 

of command. DCGS elements should be an integral part of the manhunting 

organization.

75. Performance reviews of these elements are mixed; they are torn between multiple 

chains of command and competing priorities levied by tactical, operational, strategic, and administrative overlords.

76. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended the Army expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel (a 33 percent 

increase) to provide increased support for SOF and the Army’s modular forces. 

(QDR 2006, p. 45.)

The United States recently appointed an Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to oversee U.S. government strategic communication 

efforts. The President’s long-time friend Karen Hughes was appointed to the 

position. See www.state.gov/r/; accessed July 2009. This office is a step in the 
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right direction, but it remains to be seen whether or not it will have the influence 

necessary to redress the imbalance.

See also Gerry Gilmore, “Strategic Influence Office ‘Closed Down,’ Says Rumsfeld,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, D.C., 26 February 2002, www.

defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202263.html; accessed July 

2009: 

The OSI [Office of Strategic Influence], under [Undersecretary of Defense 

for Policy, Douglas] Feith’s purview, was created last November to aid 

U.S. efforts to influence countries overseas to help or at least support the 

war against global terrorism. The office has been under criticism since 

a New York Times report that the office would plant false press releases 

in foreign media outlets to manipulate public opinion. 

The media have asserted that such false stories—or disinformation—

could eventually find their way into American news reports. Such a 

scenario, Rumsfeld has said in recent days, would be entirely contrary 

to DoD’s policy on the dissemination of information to the public.

77 Based on author’s review of Executive Orders issued since 9/11 and posted to the 

White House official Web site, roughly 35 percent of the orders signed by President 

Bush dealt with various aspects of counterterrorism. They addressed issues ranging in importance from restructuring the government by creating the Department 

of Homeland Defense and Strengthening the Intelligence Community, through 

blocking commerce with states sponsors of terrorism, to such mundane matters 

as approving DoD medals.

 National Strategies include the following documents:

a. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House,Washington, 

D.C., 16 March 2006.

b. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 1 February 2006.

c. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2006.

d. National Intelligence Strategy, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

Washington, D.C., 26 October 2005. 

e. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 18 March 2005. 

f. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for 

Today, A Vision for Tomorrow – 2004, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, D.C., 18 March 2005.

g. The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, National Counterintelligence Executive, Washington, D.C., 4-5 March 2005.

h. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, 

Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002.
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i. Action Plan For Creating a Secure and Smart Border, The White House, Office 

of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., 7 January 2002.

j. National Strategy for Homeland Security, The White House, Office of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., 16 July 2002.

k. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 

2003.

l. United States Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, 

Departments of Defense, Energy, Health & Human Services and the Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., January 2001.

m. The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002.

n. Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and 

Response, Centers for Disease Control, 21 April 2000.

o. Strategic Plan 2006-2008: Safeguarding the Financial System from the Abuse 

of Financial Crime, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Washington, 

D.C., February 2005. 

p. Model City Emergency Operations Plan and Terrorism Annex, WMD Incident 

Command Course, Center for Domestic Preparedness, Washington, D.C., 

June 2004.

78. Raymond Decker, GAO 03-165 – Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework 

and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 23 May 2003, p. 6.

79. Ibid.

80. Donna Miles, “Special Operations to Increase in Size,” 1 May 2005, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/jointservices/a/specopsincrease.htm; accessed July 2009. 

81. Fact Sheet: President Bush Receives Briefing from Military Commanders, The White 

House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 February 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2006/02/20060217-2.html; accessed July 2009.

82. Signs of this bureaucratic tension can be gleaned from the following articles:

a. Thom Shanker, “The Struggle for Iraq: Security study is said to find overlap 

in U.S. counterterror effort,” The New York Times, 18 March 2006, Section 

A, p. 8.

b. Thom Shanker and Scott Shane, “Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence,” The New York Times, 8 March 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/

international/americas/08forces.html?ex=1299474000&en=20fecad5a871e6b

2&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; accessed July 2009. 

c. Jennifer Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, March/

April 2004, www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301faessay83209/jennifer-d-kibbe/

the-rise-of-the-shadow-warriors.html?mode=print; accessed July 2009. 
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83. Richard Lardner (Associated Press), “Commando leaders shift away from 

Rumsfeld policy,”10 May 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2004405115_apcommandowarplan.html; accessed July 2009.

84. Executive Order Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland 

Security Council, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 October 2001, 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011008-2.html; accessed July 

2009.

85. H.R. 5005-8, Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107th Congress of the United 

States of America, http://epic.org/privacy/homeland/homeland_security_act.

pdf; accessed July 2009. The agencies included:

a. U.S. Customs Service, resubordinated from the Department of the Treasury 

(DoT)

b. Portions of The Immigration and Naturalization Service, moved from the 

Department of Justice (DoJ)

c. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), from DoT

d. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), from DoT

e. Portions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, formerly under 

the Department of Agriculture (DoA)

f. Office for Domestic Preparedness, from DoJ

g. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

h. Stategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System, from 

the Department of Health and Human Services

i. Federal Protective Service

j. Nuclear Incident Response Team, from Department of Energy (DoE)

k. Domestic Emergency Support Teams, from DoJ

l. National Domestic Preparedness Office, from FBI

m. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) countermeasures 

programs, formerly conducted by DoE

n. National Biological Defense Analysis Center, formerly under DoD

o. Plum Island Animal Disease Center formerly DoA

p. Federal Computer Incident Response Center, formerly under the Government 

Services Administration

q. National Communications System, formerly under DoD

r. National Infrastructure Protection Center, formerly under FBI

s. Energy Security and Assurance Program, from DoE

t. The Secret Service, from DoT

u. The U.S. Coast Guard, from DoT.

86. The press was quick to ridicule DHS when screeners allowed a passenger to board 

a jet with a prohibited object or when security agents were perceived to overreact 
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to a situation. DHS became the brunt of sarcasm when recommendations for 

prudent security measures were blown out of proportion, resulting in a run on 

duct tape and plastic wrap during terror alerts.

87. “Press Briefing on the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances Fragos Townsend, 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,” The 

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 9 February 2006, www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060209-4.html; accessed July 2009.

88. Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. to Raise ‘Irregular War’ Capabilities,” The Washington Post, 

4 December 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/03/

AR2008120303495.html; accessed July 2009. See also:

a. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW),” 

1 December 2008, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf; 

accessed July 2009.

b. Walter Pincus, “Irregular Warfare, Both Future and Present,” The Washington Post, 7 April 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/06/AR2008040601841.html; accessed July 2009. 

c. Jason Sherman, “New Blueprint for Irregular Warfare,” 16 May 2006, www.

military.com/features/0,15240,97301,00.html; accessed July 2009.

89. Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, U.S. Intelligence Community Reform 

Studies Since 1947, Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 2005, www.cia.gov/

library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/US%20Intelligence%20Community%20Reform%20Studies%20Since%20

1947.pdf; accessed July 2009.

90. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, p. 73.

91. United Nations conventions on terrorism are listed here (from United Nations 

Web site):

a. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 September 1963

b. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 

16 December 1970

c. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 

Aviation, Montreal, 23 September 1971

d. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 

December 1973

e. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 

December 1979

f. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New 

York, 15 December 1997

g. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 

New York, 9 December 1999
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h. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 3 March 

1980

i. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the 

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 

24 February 1988

j. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1988

k. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 

Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, Rome, 10 March 1988

l. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Montreal, 1 March 1991

m. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 

New York, 13 April 2005.

92. The Allied powers held 17 strategic conferences at mutually accessible locations 

including Casablanca, Yalta, or Teheran. The conferences set strategic goals and 

outlined plans for conducting the war against the Axis powers; the decisions made 

also set the stage for world security over the next 60 years. These conferences 

established the Atlantic Charter; arrived at a “Europe First” policy; concluded that 

the Allied powers would focus on a peripheral strategy first, then invade Europe 

later; and established a Deadline for Invasion of Europe, settled the post-war 

partition of Europe, and set the Conditions for Surrender. The conferences established institutions, which persist to the present day, including the World Bank, 

International Monetary Fund, and United Nations. The conference attendees also 

selected key leaders for combined operations—most notably the appointment of 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander. Major technological advancements and war materiel production were also addressed in these 

forums, including the announcement of the Manhattan Project.

93. At the height of the Battle of Waterloo, the French emperor Napoleon rode within 

range of the British cannon. An astute artillery officer realized that the battle 

could be won at that moment with a single well-placed cannon shot—kill Napoleon Bonaparte, and the entire reason for the Allied campaign would be over. The 

officer informed Lord Arthur Wellesley of the opportunity, requesting permission to open fire at their French rival. The Duke of Wellington, commander of 

the Allied armies, gave the terse response recorded—generals do not shoot each 

other.

94. Michael Vlahos, “Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars,” Military 

Review (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, NovemberDecember 2007), pp. 2-12.

95. For recent examples, see: 

a. Scott Pelley, “Karzai: Stop The Air Strikes—Afghan President Tells 60 Minutes 

That Too Many Civilians Are Being Killed,” 60 Minutes, 28 October 2007. 
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b. Carlotta Gall, “British Criticize Air Attacks in Afghan Region,” The New York 

Times, 9 August 2007. 

c. Josh White, “U.S. Boosts its Use of Air Strikes in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 

17 January 2008. 

d. “Pakistan in sovereignty warning,” BBC News, 20 September 2008, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7626744.stm; accessed July 2009.

e. “Stop drone attacks, Zardari tells U.S.,” The News, 4 November 2008, www.

thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=18149; accessed July 2009.

96. Alan Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded 

Knee, (New York: Prentis Hall Press, 1993), pp. 12-13.

97. Ibid., p. 151-154.

98. Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-

2005, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), p. 4, http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/

carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf; accessed July 2009.

99. John S. Brown, The Occupation of Mexico May 1846-July 1848, CMH Pub 73-3 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 23 May 2006), www.

army.mil/CMH/brochures/Occupation/Occupation.htm#b7; accessed July 

2009.

100. Major Steve Marks pointed out the potential manhunting implications, the history, 

and existence of Letter of Marque to me during a conference in March 2006.

101. Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, The Encyclopedia of Espionage (New York: 

Gramercy Books, 1997), pp. 44-45. General Lafayette Baker recounted his Civil 

War exploits and pursuit of the Lincoln Plotters in his book History of the United 

States Secret Service (1887). Though he succeeded in slowing down Confederate 

intelligence operations, Baker was also believed to be corrupt by many contemporaries. He ignored legal niceties, often holding suspects without charges. Baker 

was dismissed by President Andrew Johnson, and later testified against Johnson 

during impeachment hearings, providing false testimony about documents that, 

had they existed, would have harmed Johnson.

102. Richard Garrett, The Raiders: The Elite Strike Forces that Altered the Course of War 

and History (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1980), pp. 63-77.

103. Polmar and Allen, The Encyclopedia of Espionage.

104. Buck Connor, “Thomas Tate Tobin,” Buck’s Base Camp Web site, http://buckconner.tripod.com/buck1.html#TOBIN; accessed August 2009.

105. Duane Schultz, The Dahlgren Affair: Terror and Conspiracy in the Civil War (New 

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1998).

106. William A. Tidwell, April ‘65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil 

War (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1995).

107. Polmar and Allen, The Encyclopedia of Espionage.
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108. Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian Wars: From Colonial Times to Wounded Knee, 

pp. 230-235.

109. Gott, In Search of an Elusive Enemy.

110. Geronimo credited Lawton later, remarking:

Soon General Miles was made commander of all the western posts, 

and troops trailed us continually. They were led by Captain Lawton, 

who had good scout.

The Mexican soldiers also became more active and more numerous. We 

had skirmishes almost every day, and so we finally decided to break up 

into small bands. With six men and four women I made for the range 

of mountains near Hot Springs, New Mexico.

Source: Geronimo: His Own Story, www.firstpeople.us/FP-Html-Legends/Geronimo_His_Own_Story_1.html; accessed August 2009. 

111. Tom Horn (21 November 1860 to 20 November 1903) was born in Missouri. He 

held numerous jobs as a scout, soldier, hired gunman, detective, lawman, and 

most infamously as an assassin. A Pinkerton detective from 1890-1894, Horn 

killed 17 opponents in shootouts. He was hanged the day before his 43rd birthday 

in Cheyenne, Wyoming, charged with a murder he probably did not commit. 

During his time he is believed to have killed between 42-47 people. Of his life 

Horn said “...Killing men is my specialty. I look at it as a business proposition, 

and I think I have a corner on the market.” 

For more information on Horn, see Chip Carlson, Tom Horn: Blood on the Moon – 

The Dark History of the Murderous Cattle Detective (Glendo, WY: High Plains 

Press, 2001).

112. Charles Bare Gatewood, First Lieutenant, United States Army, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/charlesb.htm; accessed July 2009. 

113. Robert D. Ramsey III, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the 

Philippines, 1900–1902, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), pp. 23-103, http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/ramsey_24.pdf; accessed July 2009. 

Ramsey concludes this excellent paper with the following statistics: 

The war in the Philippines was costly to all. Of the 126,500 Americans 

who served, 4,200 died (a death rate of 32:1,000) and over 2,800 were 

wounded—a total casualty rate of 5.5 percent. Financial costs totaled 

over $400 million or 20 times the original purchase price for the Philippines. The insurrectos lost 16,000 to 20,000 killed, and about 34,000 

Filipinos died as a direct result of the war. Another 200,000 noncombatants died in a cholera epidemic at the end of the war. These civilian 

losses would be equivalent to the United States losing 1 million out of 

a population of 250 million from war deaths and over 8 million from 

disease. This little known war was more than an insignificant skirmish 

for all those involved.
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114. Robert Leckie, The Wars of America (New York: Harper Collins Pub, 1968 and 

updated 1992), p. 625.

115. U.S. Army Campaigns: Mexican Expedition (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2003), www.history.army.mil/html/

reference/army_flag/mexex.html; accessed August 2009.

116. FBI History – Famous Cases, 2006, www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/famcases.

htm; accessed July 2009. 

117. William B. Breuer, MacArthur’s Undercover War, Spies, Saboteurs and Secret 

Missions, (Indianapolis: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), pp. 14-19, 189.

118. FBI History: Famous Cases: George John Dasch and Nazi Saboteurs, www.fbi.gov/

libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm; accessed July 2009.

119. South London Warlords, Death of an Admiral: The attack on Isoroku Yamamoto 

April 1943, South London Warlords site, www.salute.co.uk/salutegames/yamamoto/Yamamoto.htm; accessed August 2009. This account is probably based on 

the book Attack on Yamamoto by Carroll V. Glines (Schiffer Military History, 

1993). 

See also C. Peter Chen, Death of Yamamoto, 18 April 1943, www.ww2db.com/

battle_spec.php?battle_id=51; accessed July 2009.

120. List of Terms, Code Names, Operations, and Other Search Terminology to Assist 

Review and Identification Activities Required by the Act, The Nazi War Crimes 

and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, United 

States National Archives, www.archives.gov/iwg/finding-aids/list-of-terms-code.

html; accessed July 2009. 

121. Information on famous spy cases taken from official home pages for the FBI, U.S. 

Marshal Service, and Department of Justice.

122. Gerald K. Haines, CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals 1952-1954, CIA 

Historical Staff Analysis, June 1995. Sanitized copies of this paper were released 

in 1997 under the CIA Historical Review Program and are available at www.foia.

cia.gov/; accessed July 2009. 

123. Memorandum, “CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz,” CIA Historical Review 

Program Sanitized Release, 12 May 1975, www.foia.cia.gov; accessed July 2009. 

124. CIA Director of Security, Memorandum for: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee, “Family Jewels,” 16 May 1973. Sanitized copies of this paper 

were released in June 2007 under CIA Historical Review Program and are available at www.foia.cia.gov/; accessed July 2009.

125. United States Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An 

Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with 

Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 20 November 1975), pp. 12-70. The author rearranged excerpts from the 

Church Committee’s interim report to provide a chronological account of the 

operation. 

126. Ibid., pp. 181-190. 
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127. “Two Combat Tracker Teams Join 4th Infantry Division,” Stars & Stripes, 1967, 

Combat Tracker Team Archives, www.combattrackerteam.org/archive3.htm; 

accessed July 2009. See also:

a. Bob Cutts, “Retrievers Never Bark Up Wrong Tree: Dogs Smell Out Reds, 

Ambushes,” Stars & Stripes, 9 July 1968, Combat Tracker Team Archives, 

www.combattrackerteam.org/archive4.htm; accessed July 2009. Quote attributed to 1st Lieutenant Don Hendricks. 

b. 1st Infantry Division yearbook article, Combat Tracker Team Archives, www.

combattrackerteam.org/archive5.htm; accessed July 2009.

128. John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 90-94. See also:

a. Billy Waugh and Tim Keown, Hunting the Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA 

Ground Soldier’s Fifty-Year Career Hunting America’s Enemies (New York: 

Harper Collins, 2004), pp. 47-64.

b. Robert Noe and Brad Ryti, “MACV-SOG MIA/KIA Chronological List,” 

2001, www.macvsog.org/1967.htm; accessed July 2009. 

129. Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz, and Hannah Elinson, 

The Death of Che Guevara: A Chronology, declassified, National Security Archive 

Electronic Briefing Book No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, not dated), www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/index.html#chron; 

accessed July 2009. 

130. David Miller, The Illustrated Directory of Special Forces (St. Paul, MN: Military 

Books International, 2002), p. 164.

131. In April 2003, American forces captured Abu Abbas 50 miles west of Baghdad 

while he attempted to flee to Syria in the face of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Abbas 

died of natural causes in March 2004 while in U.S. custody. See the following 

articles:

a. David Ensor, “U.S. captures mastermind of Achille Lauro hijacking,” CNN, 

16 April 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/15/sprj.irq.abbas.

arrested/; accessed July 2009.

b. Associated Press, “Terrorist Abu Abbas Dies in Iraq,” 9 March 2004, www.

foxnews.com/story/0,2933,113719,00.html; accessed July 2009. 

132. Chris Bishop, The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare, Volume Two: 1945-Present (London: Aerospace Publishing, Ltd., 1997), pp. 184-187.

133. Tom Searle, et al., United States Special Operations Command History: 15th Anniversary (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM History and Research Office, 2002), p. 32.

134. “U.S. to Rely on Air Strikes If War Erupts,” The Washington Post, 16 September 1990. The opening line of the article stated: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have 

concluded that U.S. military airpower, including a massive bombing campaign 

against Baghdad that specifically targets President Saddam Hussein, is the only 

effective action to force Iraqi forces from Kuwait if war erupts, according to Air 

Force Chief of Staff Michael J. Dugan.”
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135. Richard Lowry, “A View to a Kill: Assassination in War and Peace,” National 

Review, Gale Group, 11 March 2002. Note the careful wording of Cheney’s comment: “We never talk about the targeting of specific individuals...” The comment 

leaves open the possibility that the United States did in fact target Hussein, but 

did not talk about it.

136. Donald Blackwelder, The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The Development 

of Precision-Guided Bombs (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, 1992), p. 40. Though not a stated policy, the high priority effort to develop 

the GBU-28 implies that Hussein was a HVT whose convenient demise might 

further the allied cause.

137. Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: 

Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).

138. SFOR Fact Sheet: Persons Indicted for War Crimes, November 2001, www.nato.

int/sfor/factsheet/warcrime/t001116i.htm; accessed July 2009. 

139. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology. 

Marks, Meer, and Nilson also highlight the Balkan PIFWC operations, citing the 

ICTY Web site on p. 9:

A total of 112 individuals have been indicted, with 27 individuals 

cleared, charged, or killed during the arrest (one individual’s indictment being incomplete when he died explains the statistical discrepancy). Altogether, 84 personnel have been indicted for war crimes in 

the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Of these 84, 25 indictees are still 

at large, 9 were released pending trial, and 50 are in custody or serving 

a sentence. 22 indictees surrendered to the appropriate forces, with 6 

PIFWCs surrendering as an indirect result of the economic pressure 

placed on Serbia by the United States. According to the ICTY’s data 

(last updated in October 2002) the U.S. military was responsible for the 

direct apprehension of 5 individuals over a 6-year period, which means 

the U.S. Government caught fewer than 6 percent of the PIFWCs...

140. See the official Pentagon biography of Les Aspin at www.defenselink.mil/specials/

secdef_histories/bios/aspin.htm; accessed July 2009. An excerpt follows: 

In September 1993, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin 

Powell had asked Aspin to approve the request of the U.S. commander 

in Somalia for tanks and armored vehicles for his forces. Aspin turned 

down the request. Shortly thereafter Aideed’s forces in Mogadishu killed 

18 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 75 in attacks that also resulted 

in the shooting down of three U.S. helicopters and the capture of one 

pilot. In the face of severe congressional criticism, Aspin admitted that 

in view of what had happened he had made a mistake, but stated that 

the request for armored equipment had been made within the context of 

delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia rather than protecting troops. 

In an appearance before a congressional committee to answer questions 

about the Somalia disaster, Aspin made an unfavorable impression 
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and appeared weak in response to the detailed probing and criticism 

of his performance. The President publicly defended Aspin but made 

clear that the White House was not involved in the decision not to send 

armor reinforcements to Somalia. Several members of Congress called 

on Clinton to ask for Aspin’s resignation. 

On 15 December 1993 President Clinton announced Aspin’s resignation, for personal reasons. Given the problems that Aspin encountered 

during his short term, most obviously the losses in Mogadishu, observers assumed that the President had asked him to step down. Speculation 

in the media centered on the Somalia embarrassment and on Aspin’s 

differences with the Office of Management and Budget over how much 

the Defense budget should be cut. The Secretary’s health problems, of 

course, may well have also been a factor.

141. Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey, Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy (Westport, 

Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994), pp. 2-3. Another good book is Blackhawk 

Down by Mark Bowden. This book, about the Battle of Mogadishu, was later made 

into a feature film by the same name. See also Tom Searle, et al., United States 

Special Operations Command History: 15th Anniversary, pp. 50-51.

142. Also refer to Samuel Katz, Relentless Pursuit: The DSS and the Manhunt for Al 

Qaeda Terrorists (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2002).

143. Paul Anderson, “Ramzi Yousef Found Guilty on Four Counts,” EmergencyNet 

News, ERRI Daily Intelligence Report - ERRI Risk Assessment Services, Vol. 3, 

317, 13 November 1997, www.emergency.com/alrt1197.htm; accessed July 2009. 

144. Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology, p. 35.

145. Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy, Hearing Before the 

Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred 

Eighth Congress, Second Session, 12 February 2004, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/108/91798.pdf; accessed 

July 2009. 

146. Billy Waugh and Tim Keown, Hunting the Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA Ground 

Soldier’s Fifty-Year Career Hunting America’s Enemies (New York: Harper Collins, 

2004), pp. 120-164.

147. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, 

from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 

pp. 369-525.

148. Kenneth Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, CRS Report for 

Congress, 17 August 2005, p. 5, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf; accessed 

July 2009.

149. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, The White House, 

20 September 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.

html; accessed July 2009. Full text of President Bush’s address is available at this 

site. 
131

Crawford: Manhunting

150. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

151. Sean D. Naylor, “Former Delta officer’s book to shed light on Tora Bora,” The 

Army Times, 2 February 2008, www.armytimes.com/news/2008/01/army_delta_

book_080131w/; accessed July 2009.

152. John Pike, Operation Enduring Freedom – Operations, Global Security.org, 2005, 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-ops.htm; accessed July 

2009. 

153. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

154. FBI Most Wanted Terrorists site, www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm; 

accessed July 2009.

155. Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention 

of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Summary 

of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Al Nashiri, Abd Al Rahim 

Hussein Mohammed (8 February 2007), www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html; accessed July 2009. 

156. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

159. “CIA ‘tried to kill Afghan warlord,’” BBC News, 10 May 2002, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1978619.stm; accessed July 2009.

160. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid., p.9.

163. Ibid.

164. Linda D. Kozaryn, “Deck of Cards Helps Troops Identify Regime’s Most Wanted,” 

American Forces Press Service, 12 April 2003, www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29113; accessed July 2009. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, 

United States Central Command Deputy Director of Operations, confirmed the 

existence of the card deck in a press conference on 11 April 2003.

165. Based on author’s personal copy of the card deck. The deck can be viewed at www.

defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/pipc10042003.html; accessed July 2009.

166. David Alter (producer and director), Ace in the Hole, The Military Channel, 

2006. This documentary highlights the intelligence analysis and actions of the 

4th Infantry Division in the hunt for Saddam Hussein. Of particular interest 

and significance are the personal interviews with the intelligence staff, including Major Stan Murphy, Captain Tim Morrow, Lieutenant Angela Santana, and 

Chief Warrant Officer Brian Grey. They compiled a significant database and a 

wall chart known as “Mongo,” identifying the five key families associated with 

Hussein’s control to power. The documentary also highlights the complete process 

through which the hunt for Saddam, Qusay, and Uday Hussein took place. $25 

million was offered for information leading to the capture of Saddam, while his 
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sons each warranted $15 million bounties. Intelligence from the rewards programs quickly resulted in the discovery and death of Qusay and Uday Hussein, 

along with Saddam’s 14-year-old grandson. Other intelligence prompted raids 

that revealed Hussein’s support hinged on five families in the area of al Ouja, 

Iraq. Sealing off the city, the 4th Infantry Division (4 ID) and SOF detained the 

majority of his supporters. This in turn produced documents and photographs. 

The search narrowed to Saddam’s bodyguards—dubbed “the 42-inch waistband 

club” by 4 ID officers due to their increasing girth as the bodyguards aged and 

prospered—ultimately leading the search to a remote farmhouse.

167. “Saddam Hussein arrested in Iraq,” BBC News, 14 December 2003, http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3317429.stm; accessed July 2009. 

168. “Iraq’s most wanted,” BBC News, 11 November2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

middle_east/2939125.stm; accessed July 2009. 

169. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

170. Ibid.

171. Craig Whitlock and Karen DeYoung, “Al Qaeda Figure Is Killed In Pakistan,” 

The Washington Post, 1 February 2008.

172. “Pakistani agents reached Damadola soon after attack,” Daily Times (Islamabad, 

Pakistan), 21 January 2006, www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5

C01%5C21%5Cstory_21-1-2006_pg1_8; accessed July 2009.

173. Bill Roggio, “Two more al-Qaeda Commanders believed killed in Damadola,” 

The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.) 19 January 

2006, http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/01/two-more-alqaeda-commandersbe/; accessed July 2009. 

See also Bill Roggio, “Developments in Damadola,” The Long War Journal (Mount 

Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 21 January 2006, www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2006/01/developments_in_dama.php; accessed July 2009.

174. “Suspected Pirates Captured Off Somali Coast,” U.S. Naval Forces Central 

Command Public Affairs, 21 January 2006, www.news.navy.mil/search/display.

asp?story_id=22026; accessed July 2009.

175. “U.S. Navy Ships Return Fire on Suspected Pirates,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 18 March 2006, www.navy.mil/search/display.

asp?story_id=22784; accessed July 2009.

176. Bill Nichols and Matt Kelly, “Inside the Takedown: Intelligence Work Guides 

Bombs to Zarqawi,” USA Today, Vol. 24, No. 188, 9-11 June 2006, pp. 1A, 

6A-7A. 

Bill Powell and Scott MacLeod, “How They Killed Him,” Time, Vol. 167, No. 25, 

19 June 2006, pp. 28-37. See also:

a. Evan Thomas and Rod Nordland, “Death of a Terrorist,” Newsweek, Vol. 

CXLVII, No. 25, 19 June 2006, pp. 22-39.

b. “How Zarqawi was found and killed,” BBC News, 9 June 2006, http://newsvote.

bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle _east/5060468.stm; accessed July 2009. 
133

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177. Bill Roggio, “The Rise & Fall of Somalia’s Islamic Courts: An Online History,” The 

Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 4 January 2007, 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_rise_fall_of_som.php; accessed 

July 2009. 

178. Same as endnote 14.

179. Bill Roggio, “Targeting al Qaeda in Iraq’s network,” The Long War Journal (Mount 

Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 13 November 2007, www.longwarjournal.

org/archives/2007/11/targeting_al_qaeda_i_1.php; accessed July 2009. Statistics 

based on interview with Colonel Donald Bacon, the Chief of Strategy and Plans, 

Strategic Communications at Multinational Forces Iraq, in an interview on 13 

November. 

180. Barry R. McCaffrey, After Action Report—General Barry R. McCaffrey USA (Ret.) 

Visit Iraq and Kuwait 9-16 March 2007, Memorandum for Colonel Michael Meese, 

Professor and Head of Department of Social Sciences, United States Military 

Academy, West Point, NY, 26 March 2007, http://media.washingtonpost.com/

wp-srv/nation/documents/McCaffrey_Report_032707.pdf; accessed August 

2009.

181. “Hunter UAV kills two enemy fighters during historic flight,” Baghdad, Multinational Corps, Iraq Public Affairs Office, Release No. 20070908-01, 8 September 

2007, www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=138

47&Itemid=128; accessed July 2009. 

182. Scott Pelley, “Karzai: Stop The Air Strikes—Afghan President Tells 60 Minutes 

That Too Many Civilians Are Being Killed,” 60 Minutes, 28 October 2007. 

183. Tamer el-Ghobashy, “Video shows car carrying 6 Al Qaeda leaders blown up by 

U.S. helicopter,” Daily News (New York), 26 December 2007, www.nydailynews.

com/news/us_world/2007/12/26/2007-12-26_video_shows_car_carrying_6_al_

qaeda_lead.html; accessed July 2009. 

184. “Pressure increases on PKK rebels: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. have all taken steps 

to combat the threat of Kurdish fighters based in northern Iraq and defuse the 

crisis in the region,” BBC News, 1 November 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/

fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7071569.stm ; accessed July 2009. See also: 

a. Al Pessin, “Pentagon Working to Get Turkey ‘Actionable Intelligence’ on 

Kurdish Insurgents,” Voice of America, 31 October 2007, www.voanews.com/

english/2007-10-31-voa66.cfm?rss=europe; accessed July 2009.

b. “U.S. giving Turkey intelligence on PKK in Iraq,” Reuters, 31 October 2007, 

www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN31307050?sp=true; accessed July 

2009.

185. Associated Press, “Turkey’s Military Says More Than 200 Rebel Targets Hit, Hundreds Killed,” 25 December 2007, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,318223,00.

html; accessed July 2009.
134

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186. “Turkish warplans bomb Kurd villages,” CNN Baghdad, 4 February 2008, www.

cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/04/iraq.turkey/index.html?eref=rss_world; 

accessed July 2009.

187. Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, “Multi-National Corps – Iraq commences 

Phantom Phoenix” (Baghdad, Iraq), 8 January 2008, www.mnf-iraq.com/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16298&Itemid=21; accessed July 

2009. 

188 Bill Roggio, “34 al Qaeda killed in day’s fighting during Phantom Phoenix,” The 

Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 12 January 2008, 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/34_al_qaeda_killed_i.php; accessed 

July 2009. 

189. Bill Roggio, “Coalition airstrikes pound al Qaeda in Iraq positions in southern 

Arab Jabour,” The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 

20 January 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/coalition_pounds_

al.php; accessed July 2009. 

190. Jody Warrick and Robin Wright, “Unilateral Strike Called a Model for U.S. Operations in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, 19 February 2008, www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/18/AR2008021802500_pf.html; accessed 

July 2009. 

191. Bill Roggio, “Senior al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al Libi killed in North Waziristan,” 

The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 29 January 

2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/senior_al_qaeda_lead_1.php; 

accessed July 2009. 

192. Josh Meyer, “U.S. won’t say who killed militant,” Los Angeles Times, 2 February 

2008, www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-alqaeda2feb02,0,1572059.

story; accessed July 2009. 

193. Craig Whitlock and Karen DeYoung, “Al Qaeda Figure Is Killed In Pakistan,” 

The Washington Post, 1 February 2008.

194. Sebastian Rotella, “A look inside Al Qaeda,” The Los Angeles Times, Copenhagen, 2 April 2008, www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-ubaida2apr02,0,2079101.story; accessed July 2009.

195. Lolita C. Baldour (Associated Press), “U.S. wants to hunt foreign fighters in Iraq,” 

1 February 2008, www.armytimes.com/news/2008/01/ap_iraq_foreignfighters_080131/; accessed July 2009. 

196. Solomon Moor and Qaiz Mizher, “U.S. Says it Accidentally Killed 9 Iraqi Civilians,” The New York Times, 4 February 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/

world/middleeast/04iraq.html?ex=1359867600&en=0ed24e0b858b58af&ei=508

8&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; accessed July 2009.

197. Sharafuddin Sharafyar, “Afghan air strike kills civilians, Taliban fighters,” Reuters, 

Afghanistan, 4 February 2008, www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSP116

33420080204?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews; accessed July 2009. 
135

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198. Bill Roggio, “Senior al Qaeda in Iraq intel officer killed in Diyala,” The Long War 

Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 20 February 2008, www.

longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02/senior_al_qaeda_in_i_2.php; accessed July 

2009. 

199. Multinational Force-Iraq, “Update: Coalition forces identify AQI leader, associate 

killed in Mosul raid,” Press Release A080301c (Baghdad, MNF-I Press Desk, 1 

March 2008), www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&

id=17393&Itemid=21; accessed July 2009. 

200. Bill Roggio, “Two Saudi al Qaeda operatives killed in Mosul,” The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 1 March 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/03/two_saudi_al_qaeda_o.php; accessed July 2009. 

201. Hafiz Wazir, “Missile hits Pakistan’s Waziristan,” Reuters, Pakistan, 28 February 

2008, www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSISL7744920080228?feedType=RSS

&feedName=topNews&rpc=22&sp=true; accessed July 2009. 

202. Mark Walker, “Making a more cunning Marine,” North County Times, Camp 

Pendleton, 29 February 2008, www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/02/29/news/

top_stories/09_92_472_28_08.txt; accessed July 2009. See also: 

a. Chelsea Carter, “Marines push brainpower over firepower,” Associated Press 

News, Baltimore, 3 March 2008, www.thefreelibrary.com/Marines+push+b

rainpower+over+firepower-a01611472863; accessed July 2009. 

b. Rick Rogers, “Teaching Marines to be like hunters,” San Diego UnionTribune, San Diego, 29 February 2008, www.signonsandiego.com/news/

military/20080229-9999-1n29hunter.html; accessed July 2009. 

203. Pauline Jelinek (Associated Press), “U.S. strike in Somalia targeted an embassy 

bombing suspect, officials say,” 4 March 2008, www.signonsandiego.com/news/

world/20080304-1117-us-somalia.html; accessed August 2009. 

See also Andrew Gray and David Morgan, “U.S. says al Qaeda was target of 

Somalia air strike,” Reuters, Washington, 3 March 2008, www.reuters.com/article/

latestCrisis/idUSN03352644; accessed July 2009. 

204. Mohamed Olad Hassan (Associated Press), “U.S. Strikes at Terror Target in 

Somalia,” 3 March 2008, www.wjla.com/news/stories/0308/500830.html; accessed 

August 2009. 

205. Maj Gen Kevin Bergner, “Operational Update,” Multinational Force-Iraq , Baghdad, 5 March 2008, www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=

view&id=17446&Itemid=131; accessed July 2009. 

206. Department of Treasury Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury Designates Viktor 

Bout’s International Arms Trafficking Network,” 26 April 2005, www.treas.gov/

press/releases/js2406.htm; accessed July 2009. 

207. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “International Arms Dealer Arrested on 

Terrorism Charges in Bangkok: DEA Investigation Nabs Victor Bout for Conspiracy to Provide SAMs to a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” 6 March 2008, 

www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr030608.html; accessed July 2009. 
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208. Wendell Minnick and Nabi Abdullaev, “Legendary Arms Dealer Busted in Bangkok,” Defense News, (Washington, D.C.: Army Times Publishing Company), 

Taipei and Moscow, 7 March 2008, www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=341096

4&c=EUR&source=nletter-%%__AdditionalEmailAttribute1%%; accessed July 

2009. 

209. Matt Dupee, “Unprecedented Coalition strike nails the Haqqani Network in 

North Waziristan,” The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 13 March 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/03/unprecedented_coalit.php; accessed July 2009. 

210. Matt Dupee, “Missile strike kills 20 in South Waziristan,” The Long War Journal

(Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 16 March 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/03/missile_strike_kills.php; accessed July 2009.

211. Matt Dupee, “Coalition airstrike targeted Hekmatyar loyalists,” The Long War 

Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 7 April 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/04/coalition_air_strike.php; accessed July 2009. 

See also:

a. Bagram Media Center, “ANSF, Coalition inflict significant insurgent losses,” 

Combined Joint Task Force-82, 6 April 2008, www.cjtf82.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=554:ansf-coalition-inflict-significant-insurgent-losses&catid=17:press-releases&Itemid=326; accessed July 

2009. 

b. Amir Shah (Associated Press), “16 die in strike against Afghan warlord,” 7 

April 2008, www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2008/04/07/16_die_

in_strike_against_afghan_warlord/; accessed July 2009. 

212. Imtiaz Ali, “Extremists Killing Afghans They Suspect Are Spying,” The Washington Post, Pakistan, 27 March 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/03/26/AR2008032602964.html?nav=rss_world; accessed July 2009.

213. Mark Hosenball, Zahid Hussain, and Ron Moreau, “With a Quiet Blessing, U.S. 

Attacks on Al Qaeda Spike,” Newsweek, 22 March 2008, www.newsweek.com/

id/128617; accessed July 2009. 

See also Robin Wright and Joby Warrick, “U.S. Steps Up Unilateral Strikes in 

Pakistan: Officals Fear Support from Islamabad Will Wane,” The Washington Post, 

26 March 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/03/ The 

26/ST2008032603445.html?sid=ST2008032603445; accessed July 2009. 

214. “Air raid kills Somali militants,” BBC News, 1 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/africa/7376760.stm; accessed August 2009. 

215. Bill Roggio, “Senior Algerian al Qaeda operative killed in May 14 strike inside 

Pakistan,” The Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 

24 May 2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/05/senior_algerian_al_q.

php; accessed July 2009. 
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216. Stephen Farrell, “U.S. Airstrike Kills 8 Civilians in Iraq,” The New York Times, 

Baghdad, 23 May 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/world/middleeast/23iraq.

html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; accessed July 2009. 

217. Ernesto Londoño and Amit R. Paley, “In Iraq, A Surge in U.S. Airstrikes: Military Says Attacks Save Troops’ Lives, but Civilian Casualties Elicit Criticism,” 

The Washington Post, 23 May 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/05/22/AR2008052203869_pf.html; accessed July 2009. 

218. S.H. Khan, “Pakistan seeks confirmation of top Al-Qaeda death,” Agence France 

Presse, 28 July 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iZeuUhq2BG8kHdGutqrP0ujlye8A; accessed August 2009. See also: 

a. Kathy Gannon (Associated Press), “Weapons expert’s killing a blow to alQaida,” Arizona Daily Star, Pakistan, 10 August 2008, www.azstarnet.com/

news/252035; accessed July 2009. 

b. Dexter Filkins, “Right at the Edge,” The New York Times, 5 September 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-t.

html?pagewanted=print; accessed July 2009. 

219. Associated Press, “9 Suspected Insurgents Killed in Missile Strike, Pakistanis 

Say,” 14 August 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/asia/14pstan.html; 

accessed July 2009. 

220. Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, 

Kai Eide on Civilian Casualties Caused by Military Operations in Shindand District of Herat Province, United Nations, 26 August 2008, www.unama-afg.org/

news/_statement/SRSG/2008/08aug26-shindand-district-Herat.html; accessed 

July 2009. See also: 

a. Candace Rondeaux and Karen DeYoung, “U.N. Finds Airstrike Killed 90 

Afghans: Most of Fatalities in U.S.-Led Attack Said to be Children,” The 

Washington Post (Islamabad, Pakistan), 27 August 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082600301_pf.html; 

accessed July 2009. 

b. Mark Thompson, “Afghan Civilian Deaths: A Rising Toll,” Time, 4 September 2008, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1838778,00.html; 

accessed July 2009. 

c. M. Karim Faiez and Laura King, “Afghan President Karzai visits scene of 

deadly American-led raid,” Los Angeles Times, 5 September 2008, www.

latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan5-2008sep05,0,4733683.

story; accessed July 2009. 

221. Ann Scott Tyson, “Pentagon Reports U.S. Airstrike Killed 5 Afghan Civilians, Not 

90,” The Washington Post, 28 August 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2008/08/28/AR2008082802203.html; accessed July 2009. See 

also:
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a. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Officials Describe Afghan Airstrike,” The New York Times, 

27 August 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/washington/28military.html; 

accessed July 2009. 

b. Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Airstrike Inquiry at Odds with Reports of More Afghan 

Deaths,” The New York Times, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2 September 2008, www.

nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/asia/03afghan.html; accessed July 2009.

c. “Losing hearts and minds,” USA Today, 28 August 2008, http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/08/losing-hearts-a.html; accessed July 2009. 

222. Bill Roggio, “Five killed in al Qaeda safe house strike in South Waziristan,” The 

Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia, Inc.), 31 August 2008, 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/five_killed_after_al.php; accessed 

July 2009. 

223. David Morgan, “Pakistan raid may signal more U.S. attacks,” Reuters, 4 September 

2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN0445305020080904; accessed 

July 2009. 

224. Pir Zubair Shah, Eric Schmitt, and Jane Perlez, “American Forces Attack Militants on Pakistani Soil,” The New York Times, 4 September 2008, www.nytimes.

com/2008/09/04/world/asia/04attack.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewante

d=all; accessed July 2009. 

See also Sara A. Carter, “U.S. ground forces hit al Qaeda targets,” The Washington Times, 4 September 2008, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/04/

us-ground-forces-hit-al-qaeda-targets/; accessed July 2009. 

225. Julian Barnes and Greg Miler, “U.S. may step up raids in Pakistan,” 

Los Angeles Times, 5 September 2008, http://mobile.latimes.com/news.

jsp?key=179174&full=1&rc=top; accessed July 2009. 

226. Candace Rondeaux and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Troops Crossed Border, Pakistan Says,” The Washington Post, 4 September 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/03/AR2008090300523.html; accessed July 

2009. 

227. Saeed Shah, “Pakistan admits al-Qaeda moves freely,” San Diego Union-Tribune, 2 September 2008, www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080902/

news_1n2pakqaeda.html; accessed July 2009. 

228. Eric Schmitt, “U.S.-Pakistani Brainstorming on Border Violence,” The New York 

Times, 28 August 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/washington/28policy.

html; accessed July 2009. 

See also Pauline Jelinek, “Pentagon brass meet secretly with Pakistanis,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 August 2008, www.statesboroherald.com/news/archive/14660/; 

accessed August 2009.

229. Other U.S. officers included General David H. Petraeus, soon to lead U.S. Central 

Command; General David D. Mc Kiernan, NATO commander in Afghanistan; 

Admiral Eric T. Olsen, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey, acting commander of American forces in 
139

Crawford: Manhunting

the Middle East, and Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever, the senior U.S. military 

liaison to Pakistan. Senior Pakistani officers accompanied General Kiyani.

230. Saeed Shah, “Al Qaeda Threatens Pakistan,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 August 

2008.

231. Ishtiaq Mehsud (Associated Press), “Suspected Missile Strike in Pakistan Kills 

4,” 5 September 2008.

232. Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Missiles Killed at Least Six People on 

Afghanistan-Pakistan Border, Residents Say,” The New York Times, 6 September 

2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/world/asia/06pstan.html?ref=world&page

wanted=print; accessed July 2009.

233. Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “U.S. Attack on Taliban Kills 23 in Pakistan,” 

The New York Times, 9 September 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/world/

asia/09pstan.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; accessed July 2009. See also:

a. Shaiq Hussain, “U.S. Missiles Said to Kill 20 in Pakistan Near Afghan Border,” 

The Washington Post, 9 September 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2008/09/08/AR2008090800263.html; accessed July 2009. 

b. “Officials: Suspected U.S. missile kills militants,” NBC New, 10 September 

2008, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26633765/; accessed July 2009. 

c. Craig Whitlock, “In Hunt for Bin Laden, a New Approach” The Washington Post, 10 September 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2008/09/09/AR2008090903404_pf.html; accessed July 2009. 

d. Robert Thomason and Gene Thorp, “Hunting Al Qaeda from the Skies,” The 

Washington Post, 10 September 2008 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/graphic/2008/09/10/GR2008091000459.html?sid=ST2008090903480; 

accessed July 2009. 

234. “‘U.S. helicopter raid’ inside Syria,” BBC News, 27 October 2008, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7692153.stm; accessed July 2009. 

235. Ann Scott Tyson and Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Calls Raid a Warning to Syria: 

Copter-Borne Troops Targeted Key Iraqi Insurgent, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, 28 October 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/27/AR2008102700511.html; accessed July 2009. See also:

a. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Officials Say U.S. Killed an Iraqi in Raid in 

Syria,” The New York Times, 28 October 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/

world/middleeast/28syria.html; accessed July 2009. 

b. Albert Aji (Associated Press), “U.S. troops ‘kill eight’ in raid inside Syria,” 

The Independent, 27 October 2008, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

middle-east/us-troops-kill-eight-in-raid--inside-syria-974550.html; accessed 

July 2009.

236. James Risen and David E. Sanger, “GI’s and Syrians in Tense Clashes on Iraqi 

Border,” The New York Times, 15 October 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/

politics/15syria.html; accessed July 2009. 
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237. Jay Solomon and Zahid Hussain, “U.S., Pakistan Pursue Taliban Leader,” The 

Wall Street Journal, 31 January 2008, p. 8.

238. Munir Ahmad and Ishtiaq Mahsud (Associated Press), “Pakistanis admit helping in Mehsud missile strike,” 8 August 2009, www.google.com/hostednews/ap/

article/ALeqM5hkiMxbHNH0BqgpWA2ZG6VD6wVTmAD99UI7Q80; accessed 

August 2009. 

239. Bill Roggio, “U.S. strikes Al Qaeda in North and South Waziristan,” The Long 

War Journal, 23 January 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/us_

strikes_al_qaeda.php; accessed August 2009. 

240. Bill Roggio, “U.S. Predator strike in South Waziristan kills 25,” The Long War 

Journal, 14 February 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/us_predator_strike_i.php; accessed August 2009. 

241. Bill Roggio, “U.S. airstrike in Pakistan’s Kurram tribal agency kills 30,” The Long 

War Journal, 16 February 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/us_

airstrike_in_paki.php; accessed August 2009. 

242. Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, 

CIA Chief Says,” Washington Post, 26 February 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/25/AR2009022503584.html; accessed August 

2009.

243. Bill Roggio, “U.S. airstrike kills 8 in South Waziristan,” The Long War Journal, 

1 March 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/us_airstrike_kills_e.

php; accessed August 2009. 

244. Bill Roggio, “U.S. missile strike in Kurram agency levels Taliban training camp,” 

The Long War Journal, 12 March 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/

us_missile_strike_in.php; accessed August 2009. 

245. Bill Roggio, “U.S. launches second strike outside of Pakistan’s tribal areas,” The 

Long War Journal, 15 March 2009, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/

us_launches_second_s.php; accessed August 2009. 

246. Alexander captured Darius’ family following the Battle of Issus. The following 

quote comes from Barry Porter: “Battle of Gaugamela: Alexander Versus Darius,” 

Military History, undated, www.historynet.com/battle-of-gaugamela-alexanderversus-darius.htm; accessed July 2009:

After Gaugamela, Alexander ordered 500 horsemen to accompany 

him as he began a relentless pursuit of the fleeing Darius. Darius raced 

north toward the pass of the Caspian Gates with some 30,000 infantry, 

a depleted treasury, and a handful of personal attendants. He had hoped 

to meet reinforcements, but they failed to materialize. As his situation 

became increasingly desperate, his own commanders betrayed him. One 

of the leaders of his cavalry, Nabarzanes, plotted with Bessus, urging 

him to assume the throne. Through the night, the traitors calculated 

how to rid themselves of Darius, and then renew the war with Macedonia. Although he had been forewarned, a despairing Darius allowed 

himself to be taken away the next night in a common cart. Resistance 
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Crawford: Manhunting

would have been futile—the weary sovereign had not retained sufficient 

loyalty from his army to prevent his murder.

Meanwhile Alexander followed on his heels, covering 400 miles in 11 

days. Two Persian nobles willing to help rode to the site where the Macedonians were encamped. Before Alexander arrived at the place where 

Darius had been, however, Bessus had stabbed his cousin to death, and 

then fled into the night. When Alexander found him, the Persian king 

had breathed his last. In a respectful gesture, Alexander covered him 

with his cloak, then sent the king’s body to his mother, Sysgambis, for 

proper burial in the city of Persepolis.

247. Leonard Cottrell, Hannibal: Enemy of Rome (London: Evans Brothers, 1960).

248. Brent D. Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave Wars (Bedford: St. Martin’s Press, 2001).

249. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Twelve Caesars: An English Version

tr. Joseph Gavorse, (New York: Modern Library, 1931), pp. 80-82.

250. Kevin M. McCarthy, “The Origin of Assassin,” American Speech, Vol. 48, No. 1/2 

(Spring-Summer, 1973, Durham, NC: Duke University Press), pp. 77-83.

251. William Holden Hutton, Thomas Becket - Archbishop of Canterbury (London: 

Pitman and Sons Ltd., 1910). 

See also Edmond Abbot, St. Thomas of Canterbury (London: Adam and Charles 

Black, 1898) and Piers Compton, The Turbulent Priest; a Life of St. Thomas of 

Canterbury (London: Staples Press, 1957).

252. John Baynes, Soldiers of Scotland (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1997), pp. 

14-15.

253. Steven Turnbull, Ninja: The True Story of Japan’s Secret Warrior Cult (New York: 

Firebird [Penguin Group], 1992).

254. Radu R. Florescu and Raymond T. McNally, Dracula, Prince of Many Faces: His 

Life and His Times (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), pp. 128-149. 

This is the most famous example of Vlad Tepes’ use of assassination during his 

brutal reign. Despite the atrocities he committed, the Pope, who strongly approved 

of the Prince’s battles against Islam, held Vlad III in high regard as a Christian 

hero. 

255. Joseph Cummins, Turn Around and Run Like Hell: Amazing Stories of Unconventional Military Strategies That Worked (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2007). p. 

72.

256. Ibid., pp. 70-79. It is also possible that Cortes had Montezuma executed.

257. Steve Marks shared the potential manhunting implications, the history, and existence of Letter of Marque during a conference in March 2006.

258. Hugh Douglas and Michael J. Stead, The Flight of Bonnie Prince Charlie (Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton Publishing, 2000).

259. Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, 3 December 1780.

260. Hugh Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Crowell, 1973). 
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See also Robert Bass, The Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis 

Marion (Orangeburg, SC: Sandlapper Publishing, Inc., 1974).

261. Peter Hofschroder, 1815 – The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies, 

and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), pp. 

33-36.

262. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Marchall Whithed Baldwin, and Charles Woolsey Cole, 

History of Europe (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), pp. 715-731.

263. Gott, In Search of an Elusive Enemy, pp. 15-50.

264. Edvard Radzinsky, Rasputin: The Last Word (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 

2000), pp. 230-504.

265. John Steinbeck, Zapata (New York: Penguin, 1993). This book was the basis for 

the film Viva Zapata! (which won Steinbeck an Oscar for best screenplay).

266. Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

267. Garrett, The Raiders, pp. 95-96.

268. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany 

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960).

269. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 1972).

270. Isaac Don Levine, The Mind of an Assassin (New York: Signet Books, 1960).

271. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century

(London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 147.

272. Callum A. McDonald, The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich

(New York: Free Press, 1989).

273. Greg Goebel, “Bomber Mosquitos at War,” The De Havilland Mosquito & Hornet, 

1 July 2009, www.faqs.org/docs/air/avmoss2.html#m4; accessed July 2009. 

See also Mark Lax and Leon Kane-Maguire, The Gestapo Hunters: 464 Squadron 

RAAF, 1942-1945 (Maryborough, Queensland: Banner Books, 1999).

274. Hans Fredrik Dahl, Quisling: A Study in Treachery (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 277.

275. Goebel, “Bomber Mosquitos at War,” The De Havilland Mosquito & Hornet.

276. Dan Kurzmann, A Special Mission: Hitler’s Secret Plot to Seize the Vatican and 

Kidnap Pope Pius XII (Cambridge, MA: DaCapo Press, 2007). Based on Vatican 

releases, this information is the subject of controversy, as it coincides with Vatican 

consideration of whether or not to canonize Pope Pius XII. Some have accused 

the Vatican of using this information to “whitewash” Pope Pius XII’s perceived 

silence regarding the genocide taking place in Europe during the World War II.

277. W. Stanley Moss, I’ll Met By Moonlight: The Classic Story of Wartime Daring 

(London: Cassell, 1959).
143

Crawford: Manhunting

278. Wayne D. Eyre, Operation Rösselsprung and the Elimination of Tito, May 25, 

1944: A Failure in Planning and Intelligence Support (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine 

Corps Command & Staff College, 2002). Operation Rosselsprung culminated a 

series of antipartisan operations in Croatia that had taken place since the early 

1940s. The Axis powers conducted intensive antipartisan activity in Croatia, 

Yugoslavia, Greece, Lithuania, Belorus, Ukraine, and other occupied nations 

from 1941-1944.

279. “Allied Operations,” World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/ref.php?q=O&c=a; 

accessed July 2009.

280. Christopher Hibbert, Il Duce: The Life of Benito Mussolini (Boston: Little, Brown 

and Co., 1962), pp. 310-333, www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=3766551#; accessed 

July 2009. 

281. “Attack on Gestapo Headquaters, Copenhagen, 21 March 1945,” Royal Air 

Force History, Bomber Command 60th Anniversary History (London: Ministry of Defence, 6 April 2005), www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/gestapo.html; 

accessed July 2009 . Similar attacks had been conducted against Gestapo headquarters in Aarhus, Denmark on 31 December 1944 and Oslo, Norway on 21 

March 1945.

282. The Simon Wiesenthal Center, www.wiesenthal.com/site/

pp.asp?c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=242023; accessed July 2009. 

283. Refer to the following publications:

a. Wolf, Markus, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s 

Greatest Spymaster (New York: Times Books-Random House, 1997).

b. “The Man Without a Face: An interview with Markus Wolf,” CNN, 30 March 

2005, www.infowars.com/articles/ps/wolf_stasi_chief_cnn_interview.htm; 

accessed August 2009.

c. John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police

(Boulder CO and Oxford, UK: Basic Books, 1999).

284. U Maung Maung, “A Trial in Burma: the Assassination of Aung San,” The Journal 

of Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, 

August 1965), pp. 701-702.

285. Mike Ryan, Secret Operations of the SAS (Osceola, WI: MBI, 2003) pp. 43-55.

See also Tony Beveridge, “An Adventure with the SAS in Northwest Pahang 

October/November 1953,” http://askari_mb.tripod.com/id53.htm; accessed July 

2009.

286. See the following references for information on Dayak and Iban trackers:

a. H. D. Chaplin, The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment: A Short Account 

of its Origins, Service, & Campaigns, 1756-1956 (Maidstone, Eng: Meessenger, n.d.), pp. 42-43.

b. R.C.G. Foster, History of the Queen’s Royal Regiment, Vol. IX (Aldershot, Eng: 

Gale & Polden, 1961), pp. 9-22, UA652Q5F68v9.
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c. Malaya Federation, Federal Director of Emergency Operations, The Conduct 

of Antiterrorist Operations in Malaya, 3d Edition, 1958, Chapter XXI, MALFDEO-ATOM.

d. Bruce F. Meyers, “Malaya Jungle Patrols,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 

1960), pp. 28-35. 

e. Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber, 1959), pp. 202-207. 

f. Guthrie Moir, Suffolk Regiment: The 12th Regiment of Foot (London: Cooper, 

1969), pp. 130-133. 

g. Geoffrey Powell, The Green Howards: The 19th Regiment of Foot (London: 

Hamilton, 1968), pp. 122-125. 

h. Jac Weller, “British Weapons and Tactics in Malaysia,” Military Review, XLVI 

(November 1966), p. 24. 

i. Cedric Beech, “Iban Trackers,” Britain’s Small Wars: The Web Museum, www.

britains-smallwars.com/Museum/Malaya/IbanTrackers.html; accessed July 

2009.

j. John Burrows, “An account of the Communist Terrorists Ambush inflected 

on a platoon of the Royal West Kent Regiment, probably ranking amongst 

the worst during the Malayan Emergency,” National Malaya and Borneo Veterans Association, 2006, www.nmbva.co.uk/ An account of the Communist 

Terrorists Ambush.pdf; accessed Aug 2009.

k. “The George Cross,” Worcestershire Regiment, www.worcestershireregiment.

com/wr.php?main=inc/a_gc; accessed July 2009. 

287. Peter Z. Malkin and Harry Stein, Eichmann in My Hands (New York: Warner 

Books, May 1990). Mossad is the Israeli intelligence service.

288. “Dr. Gerald Bull, Scientist, Weapons Maker, Dreamer,” Canadian Broadcasting 

Corporation Digital Archives, 2006, http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-74-626/people/

gerald_bull/; accessed July 2009. 

289. D. P. Thomson, “1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Combat 

Tracker Teams 1964 – 1966,” TRL Magazine, www.argylls1945to1971.co.uk/

AandSH_CombatTrackers.htm; accessed July 2009.

290. Mike Ryan, Secret Operations of the SAS, pp. 63-65. 

291. T. A. L. “Dozer,” Selous Scouts site, http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/

home_page.htm; accessed July 2009.

292. David Scott-Donelan, “Zambezi Valley Manhunt: Combat Trackers Trail Terrorists,” Selous Scouts site, http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/zambezi_

valley_manhunt.htm; accessed July 2009.

293. Frank Terrell, “Galloping Grey’s,” an article from Ashley Brown and Jonathan 

Reed, ed., The Special Forces (Harrisburg, PA: National Historical Society Publications, 1986), pp. 112-117. 
145

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294. See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency 

and Counterterrorist Operations (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations 

University, June 2007), pp. 39-51.

295. Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington, 

DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1999), p. 121-122. 

See also Richard Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises

(Naval Institute Press, 2003), pp. 22-39.

296. Norimitsu Onishi, “South Korean Movie Unlocks Door on a Once-Secret Past,” 

The New York Times, 15 February 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.h

tml?res=9F0DE3DF163DF936A25751C0A9629C8B63&sec=travel&spon=&page

wanted=1; accessed July 2009.

297. Operation Banner 1969-2007: British Army in Northern Ireland – “The Troubles”

(Banner Media Group, 2007), www.operationbanner.com/; accessed July 2009. 

298. Max Hastings, Yoni: Hero of Entebbe (New York: Doubleday, 1979).

299. Same as endnote 68.

300. Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 

X, No. 1 (Winter 2003), www.meforum.org/article/515; accessed July 2009. Mr 

Luft’s article provides a useful chronology of these operations. Also see:

a. Steven R. David, Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing, Mideast 

Security and Policy Studies No. 51 (Bar-Illan Univ., Israel: The Begin-Sadat 

Center for Strategic Studies, September 2002), www.biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf; 

accessed July 2009.

b. David Eshel, “Israel’s Targeted Killing Controversy Absolved?” Defense 

Update, 2007, www.defense-update.com/newscast/1206/analysis/analysis-141206.htm; accessed July 2009.

c. Laura Blumenfeld, “In Israel, leaders struggle with targeted killings: Moral, 

legal quandaries mark decision to use select weapon against terror,” WashingtonPost.com, 27 August 2006, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14536281/; accessed 

July 2009. 

d. Yossi Melman, “Operation ‘Targeted Killings’: U.S. shows signs of emulating 

controversial Israeli antiterrorism policy,” The Center for Public Integrity, 

30 May 2007, www.publicintegrity.org/militaryaid/report.aspx?aid=862#; 

accessed July 2009.

e. The Associated Press, “Israeli Supreme Court endorses killing Palestinian 

militants in airstrikes,” International Herald Tribune (global edition of The 

New York Times), 14 December 2006, www3.whdh.com/news/articles/world/

BO37023; accessed August 2009.

f. Johnathan L. Snow, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies Briefing: The Targeted Killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, The Foundation for the 

Defense of Democracies, 26 March 2004, www.defenddemocracy.org/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11772972; accessed August 

2009.
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301. “On This Day – 1979: South Korean President Killed,” BBC News (London: British 

Broadcasting Corp., undated), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/

october/26/newsid_2478000/2478353.stm; accessed July 2009. 

302. “On This Day – 1975: Saudi’s King Faisal assassinated,” BBC News (London: 

British Broadcasting Corp., 25 March 1975), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/

hi/dates/stories/march/25/newsid_4233000/4233595.stm; accessed July 2009. 

303. Frank Terrell, “The Terrible Ones,” an article from Ashley Brown and Jonathan 

Reed, ed., The Special Forces, (Harrisburg, PA: National Historical Society Publications, 1986), pp. 127-133.

304. The Markov assassination demonstrates that an individual’s ability to influence 

others can cause the individual to become a target.

305. “On This Day – 1979: South Korean President Killed.”

306. “1981 attack on Pope planned by the Soviets: Report,” Agence France-Presse, 30 

March 2005, www.infowars.com/articles/world/pope_1981_atack_planned_by_

soviets.htm; accessed August 2009. The article stated: 

New documents found in the files of the former East German intelligence services confirm the 1981 assassination attempt against Pope 

John Paul II was ordered by the Soviet KGB and assigned to Bulgarian 

agents, an Italian daily said on Wednesday.

The Corriere della Sera said that the documents found by the German 

government indicated that the KGB ordered Bulgarian colleagues to 

carry out the killing, leaving the East German service known as the 

Stasi to coordinate the operation and cover up the traces afterwards. 

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2000), http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/stress.htm; accessed July 

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October 2003 and was responsible for coordinating all U.S. intelligence support 

at the brigade level. 

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See also “Stalking Jihad,” a documentary based on the article and broadcast on 

The History Channel. 

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2009.

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accessed August 2009.

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2008), www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=91571; accessed July 2009. 

b. Jonathan Calvert, Chris Gourlay, and Joe Lauria, “Inquiry into ‘nuclear 

Mr Fix-it’ dropped,” The Sunday Times (London: Times Online, 13 January 2008), www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3177660.ece; accessed 

July 2009. 

322. Katzman, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, p. 10.

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324. Imtiaz Ali and Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Commander Moved Freely in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, 4 February 2008, p. A01, www.washingtonpost.

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2009. 

325. Bill Roggio, “Airstrikes on Bajaur Training Camps,” The Long War Journal (Mount 

Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia Inc.), 30 October 2006, www.longwarjournal.org/

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326. This event occurred on 23 March 2007 in what Western nations claimed were 

international waters. Although the details are not fully known, this event may 

have been a premeditated attempt on the part of the Iranian government to test 

the resolve of British forces supporting the war in Iraq. If this were the case, it 

would qualify as a government-sponsored “manhunting” act. It is also probable 

that the United Kingdom leaders considered military action to recover Royal 

Navy hostages, but opted instead for quiet diplomacy and influence to secure the 

release of the 15 crew members. The British influence operation would also make 

a worthwhile manhunting study.

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13 June 2007, www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,2101763,00.html; accessed 

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329. “Senior Tamil Tiger leader killed,” BBC News (London: British Broadcasting 

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accessed July 2009. 

330. Sean Rayment, “SAS kills hundreds of terrorists in ‘secret war’ against al-Qaeda 

in Iraq,” 31 August 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2652496/SAS-kill-hundreds-of-terrorists-in-secret-war-against-al-Qaedain-Iraq.html; accessed July 2009. 

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a. Al Pessin, “Pentagon Working to Get Turkey ‘Actionable Intelligence’ on 

Kurdish Insurgents,” Voice of America News, 31 October 2007, www.voanews.

com/english/2007-10-31-voa66.cfm?rss=europe; accessed July 2009.

b. “U.S. giving Turkey intelligence on PKK in Iraq,” Reuters, 31 October 2007, 

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149

Crawford: Manhunting

333. Associated Press, “Turkey’s Military Says More Than 200 Rebel Targets Hit, Hundreds Killed,” 25 December 2007, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,318223,00.

html; accessed July 2009. 

334. “Turkish warplanes bomb Kurd villages,” CNN, 4 February 2008, www.cnn.

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335. Shamal Aqrawi. “Turkish troops and PKK rebels clash in N. Iraq,” Reuters, 

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a. Bill Roggio, “Hezbollah terrorist leader Imad Mugniyah killed in Syria,” The 

Long War Journal (Mount Laurel, NJ: Public Multimedia Inc.), 13 February 

2008, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02/hezbollah_terrorist.php; 

accessed July 2009. 

b. Nadim Ladki, “Hezbollah dealt major blow by death of a ‘legend,’” Reuters

(Berut, Lebanon: 13 February 2008), www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/

idUSL1355648120080213; accessed July 2009. 

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news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7272832.stm; accessed July 2009. 

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accessed July 2009. 

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345. Carlotta Gall, “Police and Army Officers Tied to Attempt on Karzai’s Life,” The 

New York Times, Afghanistan, 5 May 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/05/05/world/

asia/05afghan.html?partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all; accessed 

July 2009. 

See also Carlotta Gall and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Karzai Escapes Attack in Kabul 

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world/asia/28afghan.html?hp; accessed July 2009. 

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347. Avi Issacharoff, Amos Harel and Yoav Stern, “Palestinians: IDF kills 62-year-old 

Gazan; 9 Qassams hit Negev,” Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 1 May 2008, www.haaretz.com/

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accessed July 2009. 

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2009. 

349. Ciaran Giles (Associated Press), “Police: Top ETA official arrested in France,” 21 

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2009. 

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354. Augustus Mason, The Romance and Tragedy of Pioneer Life (Chicago: Jones Brothers and Company, 1883), Chapter XV cited from Web site managed by Kathy 

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355. E.B. Potter, The Naval Academy Illustrated History of the United States Navy 

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a. “Does Teddy Roosevelt Really Deserve This?” The New York Times, 15 June 

1975. 
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b. Paul Baepler, White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American 

Barbary Captivity Narratives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

c. Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: Random House Press, 2001).

357. Sherri Otis, Silent Heroes: Downed Airmen and the History of the French Underground (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).

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Also Eric A. Feldt, The Coastwatchers (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 

1946).

359. John F. Kennedy and PT-109 (Boston: JFK Presidential Library & Museum, 

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360. Jim Teegarden, The History of Air-Sea Rescue, Second Emergency Rescue Squadron 

(Pensacola, FL), www.pbyrescue.com/; accessed July 2009. 

361. Randy Pullen, Army News Service, “Great Raid on Cabanatuan Depicts 

Warrior Ethos,” The Monitor, 18 August 2005, www.fbmonitor.com/

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See also, Michael J. King, “Cabanatuan,” Leavenworth Papers No. 11, Rangers: 

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362. Breuer, MacArthur’s Undercover War, pp. 217-221.

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accessed July 2009. Also see:

a. “Two Combat Teams Join 4th Infantry Division,” Stars & Stripes, 1967, 

Combat Tracker Team Archive, www.combattrackerteam.org/archive3.htm, 

accessed July 2009.

b. Bob Cutts, “Retrievers Never Bark Up Wrong Tree: Dogs Smell Out Reds, 

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July 2009. See also:

a. Earl Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia: 1961-1975 (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1980), 119.
152

JSOU Report 09-7

b. William C. Anderson, Bat-21 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Press, 

1980).

c. Robert F. Dorr and Chris Bishop, editors, Vietnam Air War Debrief (Westport, CT: AIRTime Publishing, 1996), pp. 90-93, 203.

d. Chris Bishop, editor, The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare, Volume Two: 

1945-Present (Westport, CT: AIRTime Publishing, 1997), p. 111.

e. John Morrocco, The Vietnam Experience: Rain of Fire – Air War, 1969-1973

(Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 74-80.

365. Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office Operations Directorate - Fact Sheet, 

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366. Garrett, The Raiders, p. 187.

367. Leroy J. Manor, “History,” Son Tay Raider Association, www.sontayraider.com/

history.htm; accessed July 2009.

368. Toni Horodysky, Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge forces 

in May 1975, U.S. Merchant Marine at War, www.usmm.org/mayaguez.html; 

accessed July 2009 and used with permission. The USMM account was derived 

from the following sources:

a. Howard L. Rosenberg, “Six Brave Men,” Sealift U.S. Navy Military Sealift 

Command Magazine, July 1975. 

b. “Medal Winners,” Sealift U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command Magazine, 

September 1975.

c. Jones, Gregg, “Khmer Rouge reveals fate of forgotten Marines,” Dallas Morning News, reprinted in San Francisco Chronicle, 16 May 1999.

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1988).

e. L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell, From America to United States: The History 

of the long-range Merchant Shipbuilding Programme of the Unites States 

Maritime Commission (1937-1952) Part 2 (London: World Ship Society, 

1981).

369. Ken Follett, On the Wings of Eagles (New York: Penguin Group, 1983). 

370. Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jvanovich Pub, 1983). 

 Also James H. Kyle, The Guts to Try: the Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue

Mission by the On-Scene Commander (Phoenix, AZ: Primer Publishers, 1995).

371. Jerry Thigpen, The Praetorian Starship: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2001), pp. 235-250. 

372. Tom Searle, et al., United States Special Operations Command History: 15th Anniversary (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM History and Research Office, 2002), pp. 3-6. Since 
153

Crawford: Manhunting

9/11, U.S. SOF have flown more than ten missions that exceeded Operation Eagle 

Claw in duration and distance.

373. Russ Hoyle, “Police, Marvelous!” Time (8 February 1982), www.time.com/time/

magazine/article/0,9171,953328-2,00.html; accessed July 2009. 

 See also Michael Smith, Killer Elite (New York: St. Martins Press, 2006), pp. 

22-45.

374. Mark Lloyd, Tactics of Modern Warfare: Rapid Deployment in the 20th Century

(New York: Mallard Press, 1991), pp. 156-157. 

 Also Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada (Washington, D.C.: Office 

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375. Malcom McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of America’s High-Tech Invasion 

of Panama (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 267-275.

376. Scott O’Grady, Return With Honor (New York: Doubleday, 1995). The author 

had the opportunity to personally participate in planning O’Grady’s rescue as 

a member of a special operations planning cell temporarily attached to NATO 

Allied Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) Command headquarters.

377. Searle, et al., United States Special Operations Command History: 15th Anniversary, p.62. The author was on duty at Headquarters, U.S. European Command’s 

battlestaff during the F-117 shoot down.

378. Dante Chinni, “Jessica Lynch: Media Myth-Making in the Iraq War,” Project for 

Excellence in Journalism (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center), 23 June 2003, 

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379. General T. Michael Mosley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, “CSAR-X = HH-47,” 

Angel’s Wings, (Patrick AFB, FL: 920th Rescue Wing, January 2007), p. 2.

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381. “Pirates Release Fishing Vessels,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public 

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382. Barbara Starr, “U.S. destroyer pursuing hijacked ship in Somali waters, military 

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383. “Somalia: Pirates Accuse Hostages of Killing Their Comrades, Want Payment,” 

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384. “Golden Nori Released,” Gulf of Aden, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/5th 

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385. Juan Forero, “Colombian Officials Recount Rescue Plan: Commandos Took Acting 

Classes to Prepare,” The Washignton Post, 6 July 2008, p. 12, www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/05/AR2008070501684.html; accessed July 

2009. 

386. David Luhnow and José de Córdoba, “Details Emerge of U.S. Role in Colombia’s 

Hostage Rescue: Undercover Officers Got Acting Lessons; ‘Crocodile Dundee, 

’” The Wall Street Journal, 5 July 2008, p. A5, http://investing.wsj.com/article/

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