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ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 5, 2017 

Serial No. 115–23 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Jason Chaffetz, Utah, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matthew Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

John Sarbanes, Maryland 

JONATHAN SKLADANY, Majority Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA General Counsel 

SHARON ESHELMAN, National Security Subcommittee Staff Director 

ARI WISCH, Professional Staff Member 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DESANTIS, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 5, 2017 ................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Lieutenant General Michael Barbero, U.S. Army, Retired, Advisory Board 

Member, United Against Nuclear Iran 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Chief Executive Officer, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 55 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 57 

Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 62 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 64 

APPENDIX 

Response from Lieutenant General Barbero, United Against Nuclear Iran, 

to Questions for the Record ................................................................................. 90 

Response from Mr. David Albright, Institute for Science and International 

Security, to Questions for the Record ................................................................. 92 

Response from Dr. Dubowitz, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, to 

Questions for the Record ..................................................................................... 97 

Response from Dr. Takeyh, Council on Foreign Relations, to Questions for 

the Record ............................................................................................................. 108 


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ASSESSING THE IRAN DEAL 

Wednesday, April 5, 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice, Comer, 

Lynch, Demings, and Welch. 

Also Present: Representative Jordan. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We will have some additional colleagues that are 

not here now. I will recognize them and waive them in when they 

are here. 

On July 14, 2015, the United States, United Kingdom, France, 

Germany, Russia, and China reached an agreement with Iran 

called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, widely known as 

the Iran nuclear deal. The Obama administration pushed an agreement giving Iran massive and immediate sanctions relief. In return, the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism agreed to temporarily pause its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Shortly after announcing the deal, then-President Obama called 

it, quote, the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated, 

and promised it, quote, cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a bomb. 

But over a year and a half later, those words ring hollow. Instead 

of cutting off a path to the bomb, the JCPOA gives Iran a clear 

road to the bomb. 

The nuclear deal’s sunset clauses phased out most of its significant restriction on Iran’s nuclear agreement over the course of the 

next 10 or 15 years. Once this happens, Iran will have access to 

a large-scale nuclear program powered by advanced technology and 

vastly increased resources due to the lifting of sanctions. President 

Obama acknowledged that lifting sanctions would give Iran access 

to advanced centrifuges, and by year 15 of the deal, the time it 

takes for Iran to, quote, break out and create a nuclear weapon 

will, quote, have shrunk down almost to zero, end quote. 

This is a bad deal. That’s why President Trump called it the 

worst deal ever negotiated. It’s also why Senate Minority Leader 

Schumer and the Democratic ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

all opposed it. And that’s only part of the story. 


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After the JCPOA was adopted, the Obama administration made 

a bad deal even worse through its feeble implementation. The 

Obama administration failed to penalize Iranian violations, gave 

Iran exemptions from the JCPOA’s nuclear restrictions, weakened 

sanctions far beyond the terms of the agreement, allowed Iran’s 

ballistic missile launches and regional aggression to go unchecked. 

Not only did the Obama administration give Iran a pass, Secretary 

of State John Kerry actually served to lobby on behalf of Iran, flying to London and pitching European bankers that Iran was, quote, 

open for business, as his staff pressed Governors across the country 

to drop their State’s Iran’s sanctions. 

Thankfully, the Trump administration signaled the beginning of 

a different approach this February. When Iran continued pursuing 

an agenda of regional aggression against us and our allies, the new 

administration responded by putting Iran, quote, on notice, and imposing new sanctions. 

This hearing will highlight the numerous problems with the Iran 

nuclear deal that demand correction by the new administration, as 

well as Iran’s destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. 

The Obama administration failed to hold Iran to the JCPOA’s nuclear restriction on critical issues like uranium, heavy water, and 

centrifuge restrictions. Independent experts have identified numerous ways in which Iran has been allowed to violate the deal’s provisions, exploit loopholes, and being granted secret exemptions with 

no penalty. 

There are also serious questions about the effectiveness of the 

IAEA’s verification process and the degree of access its inspectors 

are receiving. There are other serious problems with the deal besides the implementation of its nuclear provisions. 

After numerous U.S. sanctions on Iran were lifted on implementation day, Department of Treasury officials continue to weaken 

the sanctions. Treasury changes official guidance on a Friday 

evening before a holiday to allow foreign companies to do business 

with entities controlled by the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, 

IRGC, process on dollar transactions involving Iran and loosen due 

diligence standards. 

Treasury also removed a number of entities tied to Iran’s ballistic 

missile program and the IRGC from its sanctions list. For example, 

Treasury lifted sanctions on Bank Seppa, which it previously called 

the financial linchpin of Iran’s missile procurement network. 

Despite all these concessions, the deal failed to quiet Iran’s belligerence. Just last week, the head of U.S. Central Command testified before Congress that, quote, we have not seen any improvement in Iran’s behavior since the deal was finalized in July of 

2015. This is evident from Iran’s numerous ballistic missile tests 

conducted in defiance of U.N. restrictions and its escalating aggression towards the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf. 

The State Department has identified Iran, still to this day, as the 

world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism. And now the funds 

Iran has gained through the deal sanctions relief are flowing in 

part to terrorists and insurgent groups, something former Secretary of State Kerry admitted would likely happen. The IRGC continues to use terror and insurgency to expand Iran’s influence 

throughout the Middle East, including support for the Assad GovVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:42 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26555.TXT APRIL

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ernment in Syria, radical Shiite militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. 

Simply put, the deal, along with the way it has been implemented, is not a viable course of action going forward. The U.S. 

must make clear that Iran’s nuclear violations, illicit financial networks, ballistic missile tests, and otherwise malignant activities 

will not be tolerated. This hearing will specifically identify where 

these problems originate, and discuss what we need to do to fix 

them. 

And with that, I will now recognize the ranking member of the 

subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’d also like 

to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise 

known as the Iran nuclear agreement. I’d also like to thank today’s 

witnesses for helping the subcommittee with its work. 

As reported by director—former Director of National Intelligence, 

Jim Clapper, in 2016, worldwide threat assessment, Iran remains 

the, quote, foremost state sponsor of terrorism and presents an enduring threat to U.S. interests because of its support to regional 

terrorists and militant groups and the Assad regime, as well as its 

development of advanced military capabilities. 

Similarly, the most recent State Department counterterrorism report issued by the Obama administration in 2016 again underscored that Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984, and is maintaining its terrorist-related activity 

through support for Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia terrorist 

groups in Iraq, Palestinian militant organizations in Gaza, and 

Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia fighters aiming to bolster the 

Assad regime in Syria. 

There is no doubt that Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle 

East and continues to provide arms, financing, and training to terrorist groups in the region. It also remains unequivocally clear that 

we cannot trust the Iranian leadership, given these subversive 

military and foreign policy objectives. That is precisely why the 

U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany, and 

Iran sought to contain them. For these same reasons, successful 

implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement is not dependent on 

our trust that Iran will simply abide by the terms of the deal and 

limit its nuclear program and nuclear weapons capabilities. 

A key advantage we gained is the ability to place inspectors and 

investigators on the ground in Iran. In referencing adversarial nations in the nuclear arms race in his 1960 inaugural address, President Kennedy remarked that the sincerity of negotiations, quote, 

‘‘is always subject to proof,’’ close quote. And to this end, a determination of whether Iran is living up to its commitments under the 

nuclear agreement is entirely based on the proof in the form of onthe-ground, realtime, robust nuclear inspections conducted by the 

independent International Atomic Energy Agency. 

On March 8, the IAEA director general, Yukiya Amano, released 

his latest report on Iran’s compliance with the nuclear agreement 

and corresponding U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. As reported by the IAEA, Iran has already permanently disabled the 

core of the heavy water reactor at its water plant—heavy water 


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plant in Iraq by filling it with concrete, quote, ‘‘such that the agency was able to verify that it is not useable for a future nuclear application,’’ close quote. In addition, all existing uranium pellets and 

fuel assemblies related to the original design of the Iraq reactor remain under continuous IAEA supervision. 

This is solid verified proof that Iraq has abided by its commitment under the Iran nuclear agreement to render the Iraq reactor 

inoperable so they can no longer produce weapons grade plutonium. 

According to the IAEA, Iran is thus far abiding by its commitment 

to refrain from producing or attaining uranium enriched at a level 

greater than 3.67 percent for 15 years, and is far less than the approximate 90 percent enrichment level of weapons grade uranium 

and the 20 percent level of uranium that Iran had previously stockpiled. 

The IAEA also reports that there are currently no more centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant than are in accordance with Iran’s obligation to dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges to enrich uranium for the next 10 years. 

The IAEA enjoys unprecedented and open access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. It conducts formal reviews on at least a quarterly 

basis, and has determined that Iran has met its commitments in 

every one of its reports. This is a vast improvement over previous 

international ballpark estimates to try to assess Iran’s nuclear capabilities based on hypothetical breakout times. It is in light of the 

critical and continued work of the IAEA to verify Iranian compliance with the nuclear agreement that we must make every effort 

to ensure that the agency is able to carry out its inspections and 

verification workload. 

Director General Amano recently stated that absent a 2.1 per- cent increase to its operating budget in 2018, or $400 million from 

its contributing member states, the IA will not be able to implement the verification and monitoring activities required in Iran. In 

stark contrast, the budget blueprint recently submitted to Congress 

by President Trump proposes a nearly 29 percent, or $10 billion, 

cut to the State Department budget. This could drastically decrease 

our estimated $200 million annual contribution as the IAEA’s largest contributor, given that our typical 25 percent share of IAEA 

funding comes from the State Department. 

While I understand that members on both sides of the aisle may 

have concerns with the rationale behind the agreement itself, I 

strongly believe we must continue to support the IAEA’s work of 

inspection that the Iran nuclear deal is in place. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing with today’s witnesses what additional steps we can take in furtherance on the sole 

purpose of the agreement, and, quote, ‘‘that under no circumstances 

will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons,’’ close 

quote, as required in the agreement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of our 

time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

I’ll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members 

who’d like to submit a written statement. 

We’ll now recognize our panel of witnesses. I’m pleased to welcome Michael Barbero, retired lieutenant general, United States 


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Army, and advisory board member for United Against Nuclear 

Iran; Mr. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and 

International Security; Mr. Mark Dubowitz, chief executive officer 

at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Mr. Ray Takeyh, 

Ph.D., the Hasib Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East Studies at 

the Council on Foreign Relations; and Mr. Jim Walsh, Ph.D., senior 

research associate for the Security Studies Program at MIT. 

Welcome to you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before you testify. Can you please rise and raise your right hands? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you’re about to give will be 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God. 

Okay. Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we’d appreciate it if you 

limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement 

will be made part of the record. 

We now recognize General Barbero for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL BARBERO 

General BARBERO. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss the threat posed by the everexpanding ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

I served as an infantry officer for 38 years, including a total of 

46 months in Iraq over three combat tours from 2003 to 2011. And 

as a soldier and commander in Iraq, along with my good friend, 

Congressman Steve Russell, I witnessed Iran’s subversive activities, hegemonic ambitions, and the direct targeting of American 

troops. In the 3 years since my retirement from the Army, I’ve 

made more than 20 trips to the region, meeting with many senior 

government and business leaders, witnessing the spreading domination of the Iranian regime from Tehran to the Mediterranean 

Sea. 

Just 2 weeks ago, I was part of an international group in Israel 

to review the situation on the ground and assess the threat of 

Hezbollah and meet with national security leaders, including Prime 

Minister Netanyahu. 

In the next few minutes, I’d like to highlight how Iran is directing its proxies, specifically those in Lebanon and Iraq, to successfully pursue a strategy of regional hegemony and carving a permanent zone of control. And I believe the actions of Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon present the most imminent challenge to 

the United States interests in the region. 

In Lebanon, as we all know, Hezbollah is a creation of Iran, and 

today, it’s funded by Iran to the tune of estimates of $800 million 

annually. Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for 

killing more Americans than any other terrorist organization. 

Iran’s military support to Hezbollah in Lebanon has only grown 

over time. In 2006, the last time Israel—hostilities broke out between Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbollah had approximately 13,000 


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mid- to short-range missiles and rockets. Since then, Hezbollah’s 

influence and capabilities have increased dramatically. 

According to Israeli estimates, Hezbollah now has an expanded 

arsenal of over 100,000 rockets and missiles, including long-range 

systems that possess greater precision, lethality, range, greatly 

threatening Israel population centers and critical infrastructure. 

Also, Hezbollah has fully integrated itself into Lebanon’s political, 

social, and military and security apparatus. In recent combat operations in Syria to support the Assad regime, Hezbollah has gained 

important conventional capabilities, and is now a hybrid military 

power that is stronger than many conventional armies, including 

Lebanon. In Israel, the universal accepted view is that the third 

Lebanon war is not a question of if, but when, and that when is 

very short-term. 

Turning to Iraq. The good news on Iraq is that ISIS is being 

driven from Mosul. The bad news comes the day after Mosul, when 

Iraq is sunk into endless sectarian strife fueled by Iran’s support 

for brutal Shia militias, and the inability of the Iraq Government 

to control them. The Badr Organization, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asaib 

al-Hak, these and other Iranian proxies fighting in Iraq are commanded by Qasem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, 

and have evolved into a permanent force in Iraq. 

In a post-ISIS Iraq, these Iranian proxy forces represent the 

greatest threat to stability and security. The well-documented sectarian actions of Iranian-backed Shiite militias are establishing the 

de facto sectarian partition of Iraq. The brutal treatment of Sunnis 

and other minorities by these militias has served to deepen sectarian divisions and increase Sunni alienation from Baghdad Government, thereby damaging the prospects for post-ISIS political 

reconciliation in Iraq. 

Our closest ally, the Kurds, have already clashed with these militias, and Kurdish leaders say their next fight is with these Iraniancontrolled militias. If unchallenged, these well-resourced Iranian 

proxy forces will serve in the vanguard of the Hezbollahization of 

Iraq. 

The Iranian resourcing and control of these militias and other 

proxy forces operating in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain is part of a 

well-established strategy following the Hezbollah model. More than 

a year after signing the deal to postpone its ability to acquire nuclear weapons, as its actions across the region clearly demonstrate, 

Iran’s desire is to dominate rather than be a positive force in the 

Middle East. Unfortunately, with the lifting of sanctions that accompanies the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran’s resourcing 

of its proxy forces has continued unrestricted. And as we have seen 

in its aggressive and subversive actions across the Middle East, 

Iran will continue to pursue its strategic goals at the expense of regional stability, the security of our allies, and most importantly, at 

the expense of American strategic interests. 

I thank you, and look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of General Barbero follows:] 


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Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

April 5, 2017 

'Assessing the Iran Deal' 

Michael D. Barbero 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Retired) 

Advisory Board Member, United Against Nuclear Iran 

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Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you to discuss one of the most pressing national security 

challenges facing America and its closest allies today: the threat posed by the ever-expanding 

territorial and ideological ambitions of the Islamic Republic oflran. 

I am Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero (retired). I served as an Infantry Officer and 

General Officer for 38 years. I have commanded at every level from Lieutenant Colonel to 

Lieutenant General. I served a total of 46 months in Iraq over three combat tours. In my last tour 

of duty in Iraq, from 2009 to January 201 I, I was responsible for the training, equipping and 

development of all Iraqi security forces, while serving simultaneously as the Commander of 

Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq and the Commander of the NATO 

Training Mission-Iraq. Most recently, I was the Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization, responsible for leading the Defense Department's actions to rapidly 

provide counter-lED capabilities in support of combatant commanders. military services and 

other federal agencies to enable the defeat of the lED as a weapon of strategic influence. 

As a soldier and commander in Iraq I have witnessed Iran's hegemonic ambitions and direct 

targeting of American troops. In the three years since my retirement from the Army, I have 

made more than 30 trips to the region, meeting with many senior government and business 

leaders. I have seen, first hand, the spreading domination of the Iranian regime from Tehran to 

the Mediterranean Sea. Just two weeks ago, I was part of a group of international senior retired 

military officials who traveled to Israel. We were there to review the situation on the ground, 

assess the threat ofHezbollah, and meet with national security leaders, including Prime Minister 

Netanyahu. 

I am proud to be here today as a member of the Advisory Board of United Against Nuclear Iran 

(UANI), a not-for-profit, non-partisan, advocacy group that seeks to heighten awareness of the 

danger the Iranian regime poses to the international community. UANI's private sanctions 

campaigns and state and federal legislative initiatives focus on ending the economic and 

financial support of the Iranian regime by corporations, individuals and other entities until Iran 

abandons its nuclear weapons program. support for terrorism and gross human rights violations. 

On September 27, 2014, Ali Riza Zakani, a member oflran's parliament and a close confidante 

of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, stated that Iran is at a phase of''Grand Jihad" and 

"Three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad) have already fallen into Iran's hands and 

belong to the Iranian Revolution.'' That's not to mention Yemen, where Iran continues to support 

the Houthis in their quest for control of the country. 

In the short time I have today, I would like to focus on how Iran is directing its proxies in 

Lebanon and Iraq, taking full advantage of the world's concern with ISIS and the civil war in 

Syria to successfully pursue its strategy of regional hegemony and carving what it hopes will be 

a permanent zone of control that surrounds Israel with hostile forces. The actions of Iran and its 

proxies in Iraq and Lebanon present the most imminent challenge to United States interests in the 

region. 
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I ran in Lebanon 

Iran's money helped create the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s 

and today directly funds the group with an estimated $800 million annually. 

In a speech broadcast on June 25, 2016 Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said: ''We are open 

about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its 

weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran. As long as Iran has money, we 

have money ... Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our 

money. No law will prevent us from receiving it. .. " 

Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for killing more Americans than any other 

terrorist organization. Among other deadly attacks, Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 attack 

on U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon; the 1992 suicide bombing at the Israeli embassy in Buenos 

Aires, Argentina; the 1994 suicide bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association in 

Buenos Aires; and the 2012 bombing of an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria. Hezbollah is also 

suspected of involvement in the February 2005 Beirut suicide bombing that killed 23 people, 

including former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 

Iran provides critical military support to Hezbollah in Lebanon-support which has only grown 

over time-in the form of armaments and training. In 2006, when hostilities last broke out 

between Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbo!lah had approximately 13,000 short and medium-range 

rockets which could directly threaten northern Israel. Since then, however, Hezbollah's 

weaponry, training and experience have increased as it defends the Assad regime in Syria. 

According to Israeli estimates, as of2015, Hezbollah now has an expanded arsenal of over 

I 00,000 rockets and missiles, including long-range systems which are capable of threatening 

Israeli cities and ports and paralyzing the economy. These I 00,000 rockets and missiles are more 

precise, with greater lethality and range, greatly exacerbating this threat to Israel's population 

and critical infrastructure. 

In a February speech, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah issued a threat to Israel's nuclear 

reactor at Dimona and to a large fertilizer plant. 

"I urge the enemy [Israel] to shut its ammonia tank in Haifa and dismantle its Dimona nuclear 

reactor [in the Negev Desert],'' Nasrallah said in a televised speech. "The enemy knows what 

will happen if our rockets strike this reactor," he added. 

Complicating Hezbollah's status, the terror group has tully integrated itself into Lebanon's 

political, military and social institutions. Hezbollah holds 12 seats in the Lebanese Parliament 

and 17 of the 30 Ministers in the Lebanese Government are from Hezbollah or allied parties. 

Hezbollah orchestrated the political agreement that underpins the current government and was 

largely responsible for the current president, Michel Aoun, taking office. 

We are also seeing the increasing influence ofHezbollah over the Lebanese Armed Forces and 

the institutionalization of Hezbollah into Lebanon's security apparatus. In addition to the very 

serious threat posed by its rockets and missiles, it is estimated that Hezbollah's tactical military 

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capability has grown to between 20,000 to 25,000 fighters and 2500 artillery and mortar systems. 

Hezbollah is a hybrid military power that is stronger than many conventional armies. 

In operations in Syria to protect the Assad regime, Hezbollah has gained valuable operational 

experience and conventional abilities such as employing airpower, operating with armored forces 

and seizing and holding terrain. In Israel, it is universally accepted by the officials with whom I 

met that once the threat to the stability of the Assad regime is defeated in Syria, Hezbollah will 

redeploy to southern Lebanon and a "Third Lebanon War" between Israel and Hezbollah will be 

inevitable. 

I rag 

The good news in Iraq is that ISIS is being driven from Mosul. The bad news comes the day after 

Mosul, when Iraq could sink into endless sectarian strife, fueled by Iran's support for brutal 

Shiite militias and the inability oflraq's government to control them. Collectively known as 

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), these groups have deep ideological and financial ties to Iran 

and a long history of human rights abuses against Sunni and minority populations. Given their 

history of sectarian violence, these groups and their leaders will be an enduring challenge in any 

post-ISIS Iraq. 

The Badr Organization is Iran's oldest proxy in Iraq and even fought alongside Iranians during 

the 1980-1988Iran-lraq war. From 2004 to 2006. the group's leader, Hadi al-Amiri, is accused 

of ordering attacks on up to 2,000 Sunni Iraqis. Since 2014, the group has also been documented 

carrying out summary executions ofSunnis and widespread burning and demolishing of homes. 

One Human Rights Watch employee in 2015 said that out of all the militias fighting ISIS, 

'"we've documented the most abuses ... definitely [by the J Badr Organization." 

Despite a long history of sectarian violence, Hadi al-Amiri-with deep ties to Iranian Quds 

Force commander Qasem Soleimani-has wielded tremendous influence in Iraq, having served a 

number of high level officials and in behind-the-scenes roles in the Iraqi government. 

Kata'ib Hezbollah is a U.S.-sanctioned Iraqi terrorist organization formed in 2006. During the 

U.S. war in Iraq, Kata'ib Hezbollah earned a reputation for planting deadly roadside bombs and 

using improvised rocket-assisted mortars to attack U.S. and coalition forces. Its leader, Jamal 

Jaafar lbrahimi-also known by his alias Abu Mahdi ai-Mohandes-is the alleged mastermind 

behind the U.S. and French embassy bombings in Kuwait in 1983 and the 1985 assassination 

attempt on Kuwait's emir. After the battle to recapture Tikrit in 2015, Kata 'ib Hezbollah was 

accused, alongside Badr and Asaib Ahl ai-Haq, of carrying out summary executions of Sunnis 

and "indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas," according to a report by Human Rights Watch. 

Formed in 2006 during the U.S. war in Iraq, Asaib Ahl ai-Haq ("League of the Righteous") 

carried out more than 6,000 bombing and kidnapping attacks targeting U.S. soldiers. In recent 

years, monitoring groups have documented numerous sectarian and homophobic attacks carried 

out by AAJ-1, including the massacre of dozens of Sunni men in Iraqi towns. 

These and other Iranian proxies fighting in Iraq are fully loyal to the Iranian regime and its 

supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While operating under the guise of"Popular 

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Mobilization Units" committed to defeating ISIS, these proxy Shiite militias are commanded by 

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, have evolved into a permanent force in Iraq and will play a 

critical role in Iran's strategy for regional control. The Iranian resourcing and control of the Shia 

militias in Iraq is repetition of a well-established strategy of arming, funding and training of 

similar groups. Following the Hezbollah model, these forces are part oflran·s strategy to spread 

Iranian domination, extend Shia influence and exert dominant political control. As a result. they 

have grown to become, arguably, the most powerful military force in Iraq, and based on their 

true allegiance, these forces arc ready to play any military role the Iranian leadership assigns to 

them. 

In a post-ISIS Iraq, these Iranian-proxy forces represent the greatest threat to stability and 

security in Iraq. The sectarian actions of the Iranian-backed Shia militias are establishing the de 

facto partition of Iraq along sectarian lines. The brutal treatment of Sunnis and other minorities 

by these militias has served to deepen sectarian divisions and increased Sunni alienation from the 

Baghdad government, thereby damaging prospects for post-ISIS political reconciliation in Iraq. 

Kurdish Peshmerga and these Shia militias have already clashed, and Kurdish leaders have said 

that, following the defeat of ISIS, their "next fight" will be with the Iranian-controlled militias. 

These fully resourced proxy forces will continue their well-documented, brutal sectarian actions 

and will serve in the vanguard of the ·'Hezbollahization" of Iraq. 

Whether it is propping up the Assad regime or directing Shiite militias in Iraq, the point man for 

Tehran's ambitions remains Major General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran's Quds 

Force, the external wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

As head of the Quds Force. Soleimani reports directly to the Iranian Supreme Leader. The U.S. 

government, the United Nations and the European Union have all sanction-designated Soleimani 

for involvement in either Iran's nuclear program or the Syrian civil war, yet he traveled at least 

three times to Russia and other places with impunity. U.S. Central Command documents 

declassified in 2015 reveal that Iraqi Shiite militants under Soleimani's command killed more 

than 500 U.S. service members in Iraq between 2005 and 2011 and that Soleimani also 

reportedly influenced then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri ai-Maliki to insist on the 20 II U.S. 

withdrawal. 

Soleimani reportedly oversees approximately I 00,000 Iraqi Shiite fighters and six Iranian 

training camps, according to August 2016 U.S. military estimates. In Syria, Soleimani directs 

Iran's military support for Syrian Dictator Bashar al-Assad. One Free Syrian Army commander 

told the Wall Street Journal in 2013 that Solcimani was "running Syria. [President] Bashar [alAssad] is just his mayor." 

What to do? 

In Lebanon, the United States must work with its European allies in cutting off the financial 

pipeline that makes Hezbollah such a powerful actor. While the U.S. State Department has 

designated Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist entity, the European Union has not done so. It has 

only sanctioned its military wing, which is indistinguishable from its political operation. 

Through the years, Europe has been a significant destination for Hezbollah fundraising. The 

recent arrest of Kassim Tajidecn, a dual Lebanese-Belgian citizen, who was charged with 

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conspiracy, fraud, and money laundering, is a recent example. Also, in February, Hezbollah 

members were detained after funneling millions of dollars from the sale of cocaine in the United 

States and Europe to purchase arms in Syria. Europe needs to do better, and following the lead 

of the United States would be a good start. 

Secondly, the United States must work with its Lebanese counterparts to better ensure against the 

misuse ofU.S.-supplied arms. Lebanon was the fifth largest recipient of American military 

assistance in 2016. Nevertheless. reports surfaced last year of Hezbollah parading Americanmade M !13 armored personnel carriers in Syria. And more broadly, as recently as February 

2017, Hezbollah has claimed the Lebanese army supports its actions against Israel. 

There are allies to be found in the Lebanese political establishment to prevent Hezbollah from 

profiting off of U.S. assistance--just last week, as Arab leaders gathered for the 28'h Arab 

League Summit in Amman, five former Lebanese presidents and prime ministers sent a letter to 

King Abdullah of Jordan requesting that "the Arabs show solidarity with Lebanon [in] "the 

rejection of illegal arms [i.e. Hizbullah arms]." With the current makeup of the Lebanese 

government-particularly with Hezbollah-supportcd Michel Aoun as president-Congress and 

the Trump administration should undertake a full review of the relationship between the 

Lebanese army and Hezbollah, and to guarantee that the army is sufficiently empowered and 

independent from any malign influence. 

In Iraq, much of the attention over the last few months has been on clearing ISIS from Mosul. 

While there has been much tactical progress, there has not been the requisite focus on what 

happens the day after ISIS is pushed out of Iraq's second-largest city. The U.S. must remain 

engaged in Iraq after the defeat of IS IS and we must not repeat the strategic error of withdrawing 

as we did in 2011. Many leaders in Iraq have voiced their strong desire for continued American 

engagement to assist the legitimate leaders and the Government oflraq to protect Iraq's 

sovereignty. We must work with the Government of Iraq to improve representative governance 

and support the Iraq Government's efforts to check the power of Shiite militias while 

empowering Sunnis, Kurds and others within Iraq's federal structure. 

Conclusion 

More than a year after signing a deal to postpone its ability to acquire nuclear weapons, Iran has 

moved aggressively against its neighbors, America, and its allies. As its actions in Syria, Iraq, 

Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen clearly demonstrate, Iran's desire is to dominate, rather than be a 

positive force in the Middle East. The most aggressive and most effectively subversive forces in 

the region remain those controlled and resourced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Unfortunately, with the lifting of sanctions that accompanies the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, 

Tehran's rcsourcing of its proxy forces has continued unrestricted. Iran is the greatest threat to 

stability in the Middle East and the greatest threat to American interests in the Middle East. 

And, as we have seen in its aggressive and subversive actions across the Middle East, Iran has, 

and will continue to pursue its strategic goals at the expense of regional stability, our interests 

and the security of our allies. 

6 
13 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Albright, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

other members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

The Iran deal needs to be implemented more effectively and its 

nuclear conditions strengthened and better verified. At its core, the 

Iran deal is a bet that by the time the nuclear limitations end, 

Iran, the region, or both will have changed so much that Iran will 

no longer seek nuclear weapons. But despite immense sanctions relief, Iran has been increasing its conventional military power in efforts at establishing regional hegemony. The bet does not appear 

winnable under the current circumstances, and Iran’s current trajectory is a threat to the United States and its allies in the region. 

Armed with substantial funds and a growing economy, Iran is 

challenging the U.S. in the region and appears as committed to 

maintaining the capability to pursue a nuclear weapons path as before, just a longer path. A solution needs to be thought through and 

a remediation path developed that will strengthen and fix the 

JCPOA, but as this longer term process develops, the deal needs 

to be better enforced and verified. A priority is knowing how Iran 

has been violating the deal and associated U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2231. Also important is understanding how Iran exploits loopholes in the deal and pushes the envelope of tolerated behavior. 

In my written testimony, I conclude that Iran is not in full compliance with the Iran nuclear deal and is flirting with violations in 

several areas. It is fair to conclude that Iran is not in compliance 

with the arms and ballistic missile provisions of Resolution 2231. 

However, it is difficult to argue that Iran has so violated the Iran 

deal, nuclear deal or the Resolution 2231’s provisions as to justify 

snapping back sanctions. 

Based on available information, certain patterns of Iranian noncompliance are clear. Iran often conducts small scale cheating on 

the nuclear deal’s limitations, such as we were able to identify at 

least two cases involving centrifuge research and development. It 

misinterprets clauses to justify actions that should be viewed as 

violations. Iran policy to deny IA inspectors access to military sites 

should be viewed as fundamentally inconsistent with the nuclear 

deal and, in fact, renders its weaponization development ban, 

called section T, unverifiable. 

A damaging pattern developed during the Obama administration 

where Iran could create a crisis over a potential violation, the 

United States and allies would find—would have to find a, quote, 

solution, and Iran would cynically demand compensation as part of 

that solution. A far more effective approach would have simply 

been the United States insisting that Iran solve its own compliance 

issues or simply be in noncompliance with the JCPOA. 

The deal’s implementation under the Obama administration was 

too permissive and tolerant of Iran’s violations of the deal, its exploitation of loopholes, and its avoidance of critical verification requirements. The result was that Iran was able to push the enveVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:42 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26555.TXT APRIL

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lope of allowed behavior in directions harmful to the U.S. national 

security. Moreover, U.S. actions muddied the waters of determining 

compliance with the JCPOA. 

Until today, the Trump administration has continued to implement the deal, and I hope that policy continues. However, that does 

not mean that the Trump administration should continue the previous administration’s overly permissive way of implementing the 

deal and its avoidance of dealing with the deal’s shortcomings. I 

certainly expect the Trump administration to chart a new path forward that better protects U.S. interests in national and Middle 

East regional security. 

A key part of a new approach is looking again at compliance. As 

the leading negotiator of the JCPOA, the United States has a special responsibility to thoroughly evaluate Iran’s compliance with 

the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231. The Trump administration 

can look freshly at the issue and provide a more objective review 

than done previously. 

If the nuclear deal is to succeed, let alone survive, the Trump administration will need to take aggressive actions to adequately enforce the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231 toward a policy of stricter enforcement. The administration should announce that the 

United States will strictly interpret these deals, it will demonstrate 

zero tolerance for Iranian violations, and will respond both within 

and outside the context of these agreements. Where violations are 

significant, the United States should start the process of snapping 

back U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:] 


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Testimony of David Albright, 

President of the 

Institute for Science and International Security, 

before the House Subcommittee on National Security, 

Committee of Oversight and Government Reform 

Assessing the Iran Deal: Examining Iranian Non-Compliance with the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action and United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 2231 

AprilS, 2017 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) needs to be implemented more effectively 

and its nuclear conditions strengthened and better verified. A critical part of that effort is to 

determine the type and extent of Iranian non-compliance with provisions in the JCPOA and 

associated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2231. 

The deal's implementation under the Obama administration was too permissive and tolerant of 

Iran's violations of the deal. its exploitation ofloopholes, and its avoidance of critical 

verification requirements. The result was that Iran was able to push the envelope of allowed 

behavior in directions harmful to U.S. national security. Too often, the Obama administration 

made concessions, tolerated cheating, or avoided strengthening steps out of a misplaced fear that 

Iran would walk away from the deal or that somehow President Rouhani's presidency needed 

protecting. This led to absurd situations where U.S. officials badgered European JCPOA country 

officials to support initiatives clearly favoring Iran that were contrary to their own views and 

interests. One must ask based on the JCPOA's implementation so far, why have the deal in the 

first place if verification steps or strengthening measures have been avoided for fear of the 

JCPOA failing? 

Until today, the Trump administration has continued to implement the deal. I hope that policy 

continues. However, that docs not mean that the Trump administration should continue the 

Obama administration's overly permissive way of implementing the deal and its avoidance of 

dealing with the JCPOA 's shortcomings. I certainly expect the Trump administration to chart a 

new path forward that better protects U.S. interests and national and Middle East regional 

security. 

There is an urgency to focus on fixing deficiencies in the Iran deal. At its core, the Iran deal is a 

bet that by the time the nuclear limitations end, Iran, the region, or both will have changed so 

much that Iran will no longer seek nuclear weapons. But despite immense sanctions relief, Iran 

has been increasing its conventional military power and efforts at establishing regional 

hegemony, including interfering in the affairs of and threatening its neighbors. The bet docs not 

appear to be winnable under the current circumstances, and Iran's current trajectory is a threat to 

the United States and its allies in the region. 

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Those who argued that a key benefit of the nuclear deal would be a moderation of Iran's 

behavior in the region have been sadly disappointed. Armed with substantial funds and a 

growing economy, Iran is challenging the United States in the region and appears as committed 

to maintaining the capability to pursue a nuclear weapons path as before, just a longer path. 

When the major nuclear limitations end at the end of year 15 of the deal, Iran has stated it will 

have industrial-size enrichment facilities. With this capability, it will be poised to rapidly break 

out to make weapon-grade uranium, first within a few months and in successive years, breakout 

times will decrease toward a few days. Iran will have developed advanced centrifuges that 

would enable a quick sneak out to nuclear weapons. It is seeking to master long-range, nuclearcapable ballistic missiles including possibly intercontinental nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. 

So, in a sense, the JCPOA potentially delays and creates an even worse reckoning. This Iranian 

nuclear future is unacceptable. A solution needs to be thought through, and a remediation path 

developed that will strengthen and fix the deal. 

But as this longer-term process develops, the deal needs to be better enforced and verified. A 

priority is knowing how Iran has been violating the deal and associated United Nations Security 

Council resolution 223!. Also important is understanding how Iran exploits loopholes in the 

deal and pushes the envelope of tolerated behavior. 

Identifying Violations 

At my Institute, we devote resources to assessing Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. However, 

determining Iranian violations and loopholes has been complicated by the excessive secrecy 

surrounding the implementation of the deal and its associated parallel arrangements. In addition, 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting on the situation in Iran has dramatically 

decreased in quantity and quality. Much of this secrecy is unnecessary and counterproductive, 

and some of the secrecy of the Obama administration appeared more aimed at hiding potentially 

problematic implementation issues as part of a plan to fend off critics of the deal. Despite the 

roadblocks, a great amount of information has been learned, as would be expected with an 

international deal involving so many countries and individuals. 

I should also note and commend the Joint Commission's move last December to release publicly 

its major decisions. 1 It undoubtedly felt increasing pressure to do so as a result of the election of 

Donald Trump who has supported more openness, pressure from groups like mine, and finally 

the important role played by Congress in demanding more transparency. However, much of the 

key information remains secret. Moreover, the IAEA continues to underreport the actual 

situation on the ground, which makes it harder for governments and publics to evaluate the true 

situation with respect to Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. 

1 Communication Dated 2 I December 2016 to the Agency Sent on Behalf of High Representative Mogherini in Her 

Capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission Established Under the .Joint Comprehensive Plan ojAction. 

INFCJRCI907 and Revisions and Addendums. December 21. 2016 and January 12, 2017. 

2 
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Based on available information, certain patterns of Iranian non-compliance are clear. Iran often 

conducts smatl-scale cheating on the JCPOA's nuclear limitations. It misinterprets clauses to 

justify actions that should more properly be viewed as violations. A damaging pattern that 

developed during the Obama administration is that Iran would create a crisis over a potential 

violation, the United States and allies would have to find a "'solution," and Iran would cynically 

demand compensation as part of that solution. Throughout this process, Iran has demanded an 

unjustified amount of secrecy from the P5+ l and the IAEA, hiding many of its activities from 

governments and the public and thereby more easily accomplishing its deceptive and brazen 

goals. 

Violations of UN Security Council Resolution Involving Ballistic Missiles and Conventional 

Arms 

Iran continues to test ballistic missiles that are inconsistent with or in violation of UN Security 

Council resolution 2231. Iran's ongoing development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear 

weapons is a direct threat to the nuclear deal and cannot be treated as somehow unrelated to the 

JCPOA. A nuclear weapon is properly defined as a nuclear warhead and a delivery system. This 

definition was used by South Africa for its nuclear weapons program back in the 1980s, when 

that program was active and engaged in intense secrecy and obfuscation to deceive the world2 

When the program became more overt with the onset of missile flight testing, it too denied that 

its missiles would ever carry nuclear weapons. But it admitted the interconnectivity of the two 

programs only after it verifiably abandoned its nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s. 

Iran's ballistic missile program should be viewed as the other half of a nuclear weapon whose 

development continues unabated today, and it should be treated accordingly. At the least, Iran's 

continued testing of ballistic missiles should be viewed as a violation ofUNSC 2231 and 

inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the JCPOA. 

In addition, Iran is not in compliance with UNSC resolution 2231's prohibition on conventional 

weapons sales and transfers and against making procurements for its military and missile 

programs without UN Security Council authorization (see references in footnote). 3 

Iran/North Korean Cooperation 

The United States has also sanctioned Iranian and North Korean entities for cooperating on 

ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, including coordinating shipments of commodities 

2 David Albright with Andrea Stricker. Revisiting South Africa ·s :Vue/ear Weapons Program (Washington, DC: 

Institute tor Science and International Security. 2016). http://isis-onlinc.org/up!oadsiisisreportsidocuments/RevisitingSouthAfricasNuclearWeapon~Program.pdf 

3 '"!ran Tests Ballistic Missile in Defiance of liN Resolution. U.S. Officials Say:· FoxNews.com, January 30.2017, 

http:i/www.foxnews.com/world/20 I 7 /QJ 130/iran-conducts-ballistic-missiie-test-us-o ffiria!s-say .html ; U.S. 

Department of Treasury. '·Treasury Sanctions Suppotters oflran·s Ballistic Missile Program and Jran·s Islamic 

Revolutionaf)' Guards Corps- Qods Force;· February 3~ 2017, https:/1\\ \'{~y_Jfcasurv .gQv/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/as0004.aspx; Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council 

Resolution 2231 (2015). S/2017/49. January 18. 2017. 

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and traveling to share technology and development efforts. 4 There are also unverified concerns 

that they may be undertaking nuclear cooperation or transferring nuclear technology. equipment, 

or materials to each other. It goes without saying that Iran's missile and conventional military 

cooperation with North Korea also violates UNSC resolutions on North Korea. 5 Any nuclear 

cooperation that is uncovered would be a breach of the JCPOA. 

Heavy Water 

Iran has twice had more than its heavy water limit of 130 metric tonnes inside Iran, as has been 

noted by the IAEA in its quarterly reports. As it was approaching its second violation, the IAEA 

warned Iran that it would soon reach the cap. Instead of stopping heavy water production or 

blending down some heavy water into normal water, Iran knowingly violated the 130 metric 

tonnes cap. More recently, it has argued that the cap is not really binding. In early March 2017, 

Iran stated: "Nothing in the JCPOA requires Iran to ship out the excess Heavy Water which is 

made available to the international market but has not yet found an actual buyer to which the 

heavy water needs to be delivered (bolding in original)."6 In essence Iran is fallaciously 

reinterpreting the JCPOA so as to eliminate the 130 tonncs cap, as long as it states that it is 

seeking an international buyer. As Iran continues to make heavy water, it is expected to once 

again have more than I 30 metric tonnes of heavy water inside Iran by May or June. The Trump 

administration should look at Iran's recent statement as both a compliance issue and an attempt 

to extort more heavy water sales. It should make clear at the Joint Commission that Iran is 

simply wrong to continue this practice. Any excess heavy water over 130 tonnes should be 

blended down into normal water. Heavy water is not radioactive and it can be simply thrown 

into a river. 

These Iranian actions and statements serve to highlight a far deeper problem in the way the 

heavy water cap was implemented under the Obama administration. Rightfully, the cap should 

apply to all the heavy water Iran owns and controls, whether in or outside Iran. In secret, the 

Joint Commission acted so as to exempt Iranian heavy water held overseas. The problem goes 

back to before Implementation Day, when the Joint Commission undertook several moves that 

served to conciliate and redress potential Iranian violations of the JCPOA which undermined the 

cap and provided Iran with financial incentives and even uranium it did not deserve. As 

referenced above, on January 14, 2016, shortly before Implementation Day, the Joint 

Commission allowed Iran to send out heavy water in excess ofthe 130 metric tonnes cap, with 

the expectation that it would be sold to a buyer and delivered expeditiously, rather than blending 

down the heavy water to normal water as a sounder interpretation of the deal would require. 

Under this decision, Iran apparently exported about 50 metric tonnes of heavy water to Oman for 

consignment while awaiting a buyer, which turned out to be the United States and Russia, two 

countries that did not need the heavy water and had little reason to subsidize and legitimize 

Iran's heavy water production. The only purpose would have been a swiftly orchestrated effort 

4 U.S. Department of Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement tor Iran." 

January 17, 2016, https:/ /www.treasurv.govlpress-ccntet/prcss-releasesiPagesij 10322.aspx 5 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 17/8 (2006). SIRES/1718 (2006), October 14,2006. 

" Communication dated 3 March 20 I 7 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of fran to the 

Director General on in Iran, INFC!RC/915, March 

4 
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to help Iran avoid being in violation of the JCPOA on Implementation Day, or under a more 

cynical reading, part of a payoff to Iran to stay in compliance. 

In the months lead-up to Implementation Day, the United States should have instead asked Iran 

whether it in fact had an international buyer for the excess heavy water that could take 

possession prior to Implementation Day. If not, the United States would have been far wiser to 

simply tell Iran to address the problem. Iran could have decided to throw the excess into a 

nearby river or be in violation of the deal on Implementation Day. Instead, the United States 

sought to solve Iran's compliance problem and acquiesced to what de facto amounted to paying 

Iran to do so. Russia repeated the mistake but in return for a shipment of heavy water it 

received, Russia provided Iran with 149 metric tonnes of natural uranium? 

On two separate occasions after this initial export of 50 tonnes, Iran subsequently exported about 

31 metric tonnes of heavy water to Oman. No Joint Commission decisions have yet been made 

available authorizing these subsequent shipments. But Iran felt comfortable exporting the heavy 

water, as if the cap applied only to what it held in Iran rather than to the more accurate and 

reasonable standard of what it owns and controls in total. 8 

To fix this compliance issue, the Trump administration should make clear that the 130 metric 

tonnes cap applies to all the heavy water Iran owns and controls, whether in or outside Iran. But 

it needs to take further action about any Iranian heavy water stored in Oman. 

A literal reading of the JCPOA would conclude that the shipments of Iranian heavy water from 

Oman to the United States and Russia should have been subject to approval by the Procurement 

Working Group. Oman should have submitted a proposal to the Procurement Working Group 

(PWG) for approval. It did not do so. 

The PWG is a Joint Commission body set up at the United Nations to administer and approve or 

not approve proposals by countries seeking to participate in or permit certain transfers of nuclear 

or nuclear dual-use goods and technology, or engage in nuclear or nuclear related transactions 

for the benefit of Iran (italics added). Heavy water is a nuclear good on Part 1 of the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group (NSG) list, and the onward transfer of Iranian heavy water by Oman clearly 

benefits Iran, a key condition listed in the relevant section of the nuclear deal discussing the Joint 

Commission approvals of exports and transfers of goods (JCPOA paragraph 6.1 of annex IV, see 

footnote below),9 even though the heavy water originated in Iran. As a result, under the nuclear 

7 ·'AP Exclusi,c: Diplomats: Iran to Get Natural Uranium Batch," The Associated Press. January 9, 2017. 

http://bigstorv.an~, rgLarticle/db5a8d6cag]Q.4_c20S322939cd84!!.0d49 1t turned out that there was a second shipment 

that brought the total to 149 metric tonnes. 8 More information about the heavy water exports can be found in, Heat)' Water Loophole in the Iran Deaf. by 

David Albright and Andrea Stricker. Institute for Science and International Security Report. December 21.2016. 

http://isis-on!ine.org/isis~reports/detail/hea~'v-_yvatcr-loophole·-in-thc-iran-deal 

9 L'nder 6.1. of annex IV of the JCPOA: 

With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel. the Joint Commission will. except as othenvise 

provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this .JCPOA. review and decide on 

proposals by states seeking to engage in: 6. r 1. the supply, sale or tran.~fer directly or indirect(v from their 

territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, orfor the use in or benefit of 

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deal, Iranian heavy water transfers from Oman to a foreign customer should require a proposal 

from the government of Oman subject to PWG review. Of course, the Obama administration 

would not have blocked such a proposal, but this expectation should not excuse the lack of a 

proposal or use of this mechanism in the future. The Trump administration should make clear 

that Oman's lack of an official proposal would violate the Iran deal's provisions. Moreover, the 

new administration should move to end the Oman heavy water loophole in its entirety. The cap 

should be viewed as a hard cap where heavy water in excess of 130 metric tonnes must be 

blended down. Although Iran can sell its heavy water internationally, any such sale should not 

lead to Iran owning or controlling more than 130 metric tonncs of heavy water, whether in Iran 

or abroad. 

It should also be noted that the Trump administration should make no further U.S. purchases of 

Iran's heavy water. My Institute has written in a separate report that the purchases serve to 

undermine the creation of a stable North American supply chain that is under development and 

legitimize Iran as a nuclear supplier before it has earned that distinction. 

Centrifuge Research and Development (R&D) Issues 

One of the more pressing compliance issues involves Iran's centrifuge R&D program. Although 

the publicly known violations are not that significant, they do illustrate Iran's frequent low level 

cheating on the JCPOA. 

There are allegations that Iran is exploiting allowed "quality assurance" criteria at Kalaye 

Electric for centrifuge rotor assembly to conduct additional mechanical testing of centrifuges 

beyond that allowed under the JCPOA. 

Iran is also operating IR-6 centrifuges in excess of the limit of"roughly 10" allowed, choosing to 

interpret this condition as allowing 15 to operate. A limit of I 0 plus or minus one may make 

sense but Iran's interpretation is not supported by the JCPOA. 

Iran's Denial of Access to the IAEA 

One of the most serious compliance issues concerns Iran's on-going refusal to allow the IAEA to 

access military sites and interview personnel. The access was sought before the JCPOA to settle 

issues associated with the Iran's past nuclear weapons efforts. In one key case, the IAEA wanted 

to visit Sharif University, a site linked to past undeclared nuclear activities. Evidently, it was not 

allowed to do so; it stated that it satisfactorily obtained answers to its questions from Iran. One 

has to ask if this outcome is indeed satisfactory and not the result of backing down from creating 

a compliance crisis over Iranian intransigence regarding access. Access to military sites is 

needed after Implementation Day as part of reaching a broader conclusion under the Additional 

Iran, and H'hether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and 

technology set out in INFC/RC: 254/Rev./2/Part I. 

Since heavy water in amounts greater than 0.2 metric tons is subject to Part I of the NSG and Iran benefits from the 

retransfer of heavy water from Oman to a customer, this provision appears to require Oman to submit a proposal to 

the PWG for each heavy water shipment from its territory to an overseas customer. It has not done so. 

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Protocol and verifying nuclear weapons development bans in the JCPOA (section T of Annex 1). 

Because of fears that such access requests could torpedo the JCPOA, the IAEA and the Obama 

administration have resisted pushing Iran to allow access to military sites. Therefore, the JCPOA 

remains largely unverified by the IAEA on the nuclear weapons development side. 

Under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the IAEA has the right to visit any site in Iran, 

whether military or civilian in furtherance of its safeguards obligations to ensure that the Iranian 

nuclear program is peaceful. Iran has challenged this right and frequently denied inspectors 

access to sites and individuals. 

Section T of Annex I of the JCPOA contains bans on Iranian nuclear weaponization activities, 

namely activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive 

device. 10 The IAEA has the authority under UNSC resolution 2231 to request access to sites 

associated with these section T bans. The resolution "requests the Director General of the IAEA 

to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for 

the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA." In addition, the resolution states: 

"The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the 

voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA." These section T bans remain 

unverified in the absence ofiAEA visits to military and other sites. 

In addition, fear of derailing the JCPOA negotiations or the agreement itself led to a poorly 

designed arrangement between Iran and the IAEA on investigating and drawing conclusions 

about alleged nuclear weapons-related high explosive work at a site at the Parch in military 

complex. Not surprisingly, this weak arrangement in which the IAEA was limited in its visits 

and sample taking at the site, failed to resolve the issue. Moreover, it put the IAEA in a weaker 

position to access the Parchin site in the future to resolve this issue, which includes making sense 

out of uranium particles detected by environmental sampling taken the one time the IAEA visited 

the site. The presence of these particles combined with many previous, suspicious site 

alterations by Iran are dramatic evidence that Iran likely conducted secret nuclear weapons 

activities at Parchin. despite Iran's on-going denials. However, the IAEA has not been able to 

make that conclusion. Access also makes sense as part of the IAEA reaching a broader 

conclusion or verifying nuclear weapons development bans. It should be able to further 

investigate the Parehin case, deploying its special verification expertise. It should also be 

10 Section T, Annex 1, JCPOA: 

ACTIVITIF:S WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO 711£ DESIGN AND DEVF:l.OPMF:NT OFA NUCLEAR 

tXPLOSIVE DEVICE' 

82. iran will not engage in the following actirities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear 

explosive device: 

82. I. Designing. developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices. 

82.2. Designing, deve/oping..fi7bricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems 

suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved hy the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes 

and subject to monitoring. 

82.3. Designing, developing. fabricating. acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic s_vstems (.streak cameras. 

framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suilahle jar the development of a nuclear explosive device. 

unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring 

82.-1. Designing. developing. fabricating. acquiring, or using explosivel_v driven neutron sources or 

speciali::ed materials for explosively driven neutron sources. 

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facilitated in accessing key individuals and additional sites, including those ncar the Parch in high 

explosive bunker and relevant manufacturing sites. It may well find other important information. 

Inhibition of Investigation into Iran's Past Military Nuclear Program. As part of the 

JCPOA, the Obama administration and its counterparts in the P5+1 in effect gave away via an 

unrealistic deadline, the IAEA's ability to resolve its concerns about Iran's past nuclear weapons 

work, referred to in shorthand as the possible military dimensions (or PMD) of its nuclear 

programs. This is reflected by the !AEA 's sparse report and investigation into Iran's past nuclear 

weapons program issued in December 2015. It is underlined by IAEA's inability to access 

Iranian military sites and individuals. It also involved Iranian refusal to provide answers to 

IAEA questions; part of the refusal of access was reportedly to prevent the risk of Iranians 

making contradictory statements that could serve to uncover past undeclared activities and create 

a lengthy investigation that would extend well past the Obama administration's plan to 

implement the agreement in January 2016. To this day, the lAEA has not been able to state that 

Iran has addressed its concerns and questions about past nuclear weapons activities or to 

determine the exact status of what Iran achieved and may have hidden away. 

The Trump administration should insist that the IAEA revisit the issue of the past military 

nuclear program through its effort to reach the broader conclusion under the Additional Protocol. 

This is imperative to ensuring Iran's past military nuclear program has truly ended, a key aspect 

of determining that Iran's nuclear program is truly peaceful. 

These denials of access would not be tolerated by the IAEA or international community in other 

nonnuclear weapon states with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Denial of access would 

be rightly called a major violation. The Obama administration decided to ignore Iran's actual 

and potential obstacles to the IAEA' s right to visit military sites. However, the Trump 

administration should no longer ignore Iran's intransigence on this critical issue. 

Stricter Interpretations Needed for an Acceptable Deal 

The implementation of the JCPOA has highlighted a number of loopholes in the deal. 

Natural Uranium Imports. The Procurement Working Group recently allowed Iran to acquire 

149 metric tonnes of natural uranium in payment for Iranian heavy water exported to Russia 

instead of cash. The receipt of this uranium, which contributes to building Iran· s nuclear 

capability, is an added benefit Iran did not deserve. Iran's nuclear chief proclaimed that this 

decision would allow Iran to have 60 percent more stockpiled uranium than it did prior to the 

JCPOA. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, was quoted by 

the semi-official Fars News Agency stating that Iran would receive a final batch of 149 metric 

tonnes of natural uranium, in addition to 210 metric tonnes already delivered since early 2016. 

The 149 metric tonnes of uranium were received instead of a cash payment for part of its cache 

of heavy water in Oman, heavy water that should have instead been blended down into normal 

water, if the deal had been seriously enforced. Interestingly, the caching of heavy water in Oman 

and the decision to approve sending natural uranium to Iran were considered secret by the Joint 

Commission and the Obama administration. These 149 metric tonnes, if enriched to weapongrade uranium. would be enough for over 15 nuclear weapons. 

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Iran also sought to import 950 metric tonnes of natural uranium from Kazakhstan in an effort that 

was blocked by Britain. This sale was being negotiated in secret late last fall and in the early 

winter. According to an official of one government of the P5+1, this uranium was being offered 

as part of Iran accepting an arrangement that would blend down much if not all of the low 

enriched uranium held-up in its Enriched U02 Powder Plant (EUPP). Iran wanted the preapproval of the Joint Commission for this large import of natural uranium and subsequent 

conversion of about a third of it into uranium hexafluoride. However, Britain blocked the effort 

during the last months against the wishes of the Obama administration. Iran subsequently 

decided to make this case public, including identifying Britain as obstacle of the export to Iran. 

Iran's motivation for doing so is unclear, but it likely has not given up trying to obtain the 

uranium. 

The Trump administration should thank Britain for its decision and further block any further 

Iranian efforts to stockpile natural uranium. Not only does Iran not need this uranium, but its 

export to Iran would substantially benefit Iran's nuclear program and help legitimize a large 

nuclear program that it inimical to U.S. goals in the region. Moreover, once the JCPOA ends, a 

program that was running low on uranium to run enrichment efforts would be well poised to 

continue and expand them. 

Suspicious Nuclear Procurement Efforts 

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has sought sensitive nuclear-related materials and 

facilities beyond what it needs or should get. In at least two cases, the requests could have been 

tests of the JCPOA's nuclear and nuclear-related goods procurement channel and a supplier 

country's ability to police the channel. Under the deal. Iran is viewed as being able to ask for 

whatever it wants as tar as nuclear or nuclear-related goods from overseas and does not have to 

report the request to the Joint Commission. Suppliers must seek permission for sales from their 

governments, which then send a proposal to the Procurement Working Group, which is the final 

arbiter of the export. Although in the two cases referenced, a government detected and made 

clear its intention to deny the suppliers both exports, Iran could repeat the pattern in other 

countries, testing other countries' systems of controls and their processes of submitting requests 

to the PWG. In this way, this loophole lays the basis for Iran to find less scrupulous suppliers 

and countries that will eventually make unauthorized sales. Armed with this knowledge, Iran 

would be far better positioned to find those able and willing to assist secret Iranian illicit 

procurements of controlled dual-use goods for its nuclear, missile, or other military programs. If 

it is caught making these requests, it can claim it is not violating the deal. If it receives any of 

the controlled goods, it may have violated the JCPOA and its PWG's rules. However, there is no 

mechanism to demand Iran return ill-gotten goods. Iran can also claim it made the import by 

mistake or insist that the goods are for a civilian, non-nuclear program and should be treated as 

an insignificant or nonexistent violation. 

The United States should recognize this Iranian practice of seeking goods as inconsistent with 

the JCPOA and likely intended as a scheme to aid in the violation of the JCPOA and UNSC 

resolution 2231. It should insist that Iran report any further requests for nuclear or nuclearrelated goods to the Joint Commission and Procurement Working Group. 

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Cap on Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 

Iran is limited to 300 kilograms (kg) oflow enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEU with less than 

3.67 percent uranium 235). Iran has sought and received exemptions to this cap in the form of 

enriched uranium in low level waste and likely in EUPP LEU holdup that is not blended down. 

Iran would like additional exemptions to this cap. In particular, it would like to undertake 

domestic research, development, and testing of enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power reactors. 

This effort could involve hundreds. if not metric tonnes, of LEU that would be produced in the 

Natanz enrichment plant and exempted from the cap. The JCPOA controls this activity under 

section J of Annex I of the JCPOA, and this section should be interpreted strictly to prevent Iran 

from exempting LEU for any domestic production of fuel for nuclear power reactors. 11 In 

practical terms, Iran could not produce LEU fuel for power reactors that would meet a reasonable 

interpretation of section J. With that recognition, further exemptions to the 300 kilograms 

enriched uranium cap should be deferred indefinitely, except in the case of LEU fuel for Iran· s 

modified Arak reactor. 

Naval Reactors and Extra Enrichment Loopholes 

Iran is seeking to exploit a loophole in reactor restrictions involving naval propulsion reactors. 

The United States should make clear that it interprets the JCPOA as banning the research and 

development of naval propulsion reactors, including land prototypes. 

Iran has also sought to avoid the 300 kg cap on LEU by enriching depleted uranium to natural 

uranium. Because this activity is enrichment, the product (albeit natural uranium) should be 

considered part of the 300 kilogram LEU cap. 

Export Controls 

According to the JCPOA, "Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with 

the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and 

technology (emphasis added)." 12 Iran has not committed to do so, and Tehran could interpret 

this condition far differently than the United States. 

11 According to section .1. Annex I. JCPOA: 

Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in fran and 

certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, ~viii 

not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint 

Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot he readily 

reconverted into Ufo. This couldfor instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or 

otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemica/form such that direct conversion back 

to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria 

will guide the approval process of the Technical fVorking Group. 12 JCPOA. Annex I. par. 73: .. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the 

internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material. equipment and technology. For 15 years. Iran 

will only engage, including through export ofuny enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology. with 

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As part of creating a strategic trade control regime in Iran, the United States should also interpret 

the JCPOA as stating that Iran will commit not to conduct illicit commodity trafficking for 

government controlled or owned military, missile, nuclear, or other industries and programs, and 

it will agree to enforce this ban on private Iranian companies. Conducting illicit commodity 

trafficking is not in line with internationally established standards for strategic trade control 

systems. 

The United States should request regular UN reporting on Iran's progress in establishing 

strategic export controls that meet international standards. The United States and its counterparts 

in the PS+ I should cooperate with the United Nations Secretariat to ensure that its reporting on 

Iran's efforts to conduct illicit commodity trafficking for its military, nuclear, missile, or other 

industries is more fulsome. The Facilitator of resolution 2231 stated in its last report that it 

"received no information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015)," yet 

the Facilitator went on to identify potential violations on its own. It is worth noting that the 

report does not cover Iranian missile launches. 13 

Stricter Enforcement against Past and On-Going Iranian Violations of U.S. 

Laws 

The Trump administration should aggressively seck to detect, interdict, and otherwise thwart 

Iran's illicit procurement efforts that violate national laws. In particular, the Department of 

Justice and Department of Homeland Security should more aggressively investigate, indict, and 

extradite those involved in outfitting Iran's nuclear, missile, or conventional weapons programs 

in defiance of U.S. laws and sanctions. 

During the last administration, there were excessive denials or non-processing of extradition 

requests and lure memos out of a misplaced concern about their effect on the Iran nuclear deal. 

These actions, largely concentrated in the State Department, reportedly interfered with 

investigations. The denials, delays, and hold-ups served to discourage new or on-going federal 

investigations of commodity trafficking involving Iran. The new administration should have a 

policy of encouraging investigations of Iranian illicit commodity trafficking efforts that includes 

a determined extradition and lure process. If feasible, past Iran-related lure and extradition 

requests held up or denied by the previous administration should be approved. 

Final Word: Judging Compliance 

Some have tried to state that the IAEA has judged Iran in compliance with the JCPOA. 

However, making this determination is not the responsibility of the IAEA. Moreover, IAEA 

quarterly reporting does not make such broad judgements. 

any other country~ or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities. including related 

research and development activities, !allowing approval by the Joint Commission." 

n Second six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 223 I (20/5). 

S/2017/49,January 18.2017. 

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The latest IAEA report states, as have previous ones: "'Since Implementation Day, the Agency 

has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related 

commitments'' under the Iran deal. Nowhere in the report does the IAEA state that it has judged 

Iran as fully compliant with the JCPOA. The IAEA report lists many areas where Iran has met 

the conditions of the JCPOA' s provisions. Sometimes it reports on violations, such as on the 

amount of heavy water in Iran. However, many of the issues I have discussed here are not 

included in the IAEA reporting but should be. Moreover, the IAEA regularly states that it is still 

unable to determine the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and thus 

unable to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear program is truly peaceful. Although the IAEA is 

a critical source of information about compliance, it is not the determiner of whether Iran is 

complying with the JCPOA. 

The issue ofjudging compliance is rightly the responsibility of the Joint Commission and each 

country of the P5+1. As the leading negotiator of the JCPOA. the United States has a special 

responsibility to thoroughly evaluate Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal. The Trump 

administration needs to carefully review Iran's compliance with the JCPOA and UNSC 

resolution 2231. It can look freshly at the issue and provide a more objective review than done 

previously. 

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of20 l 5, the President must certify every 90 days 

that Iran is: transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing any agreement; Iran has not 

committed a material breach, or if it has. that it has cured such a breach; and Iran has not taken 

any action, including covert action, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons 

program. The next certification is due this April. It is not clear that the new administration, as 

short-staffed as it is so far, can yet realistically perform a new review. But by this summer or 

fall, a more fulsome review should be possible. 

So far, however, in my view, it is not possible to judge Iran in full compliance with the JCPOA, 

and Iran is flirting with violations in several areas. It is fair to conclude that Iran is not in 

compliance with the arms and ballistic missile provisions of UNSC resolution 2231. However, it 

is difficult to argue that Iran has so violated the JCPOA 's or lJNSC resolution 2231's provisions 

as to justify snapping back sanctions. Nonetheless, the administration should review violations 

as part of its Iran policy review and make a judgment based on that assessment. As part of that 

effort, the United States should start to publicize Iranian non-compliance to date with the JCPOA 

and UNSC resolution 2231. By doing so, it will lay a stronger basis for not tolerating future 

violations and build a broader international awareness of such violations and make it easier to 

rectify them. If this deal is to succeed, let alone survive, the Trump administration will need to 

take aggressive actions to adequately enforce the JCPOA and UNSC resolution 2231. Towards a 

policy of stricter enforcement, the administration should announce that the United States will 

demonstrate zero tolerance for Iranian violations of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 and will 

respond both within and outside the context of these agreements. Where violations are 

significant, the United States should start the process of snapping back US and UN sanctions. 

12 
27 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Dubowitz, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK DUBOWITZ 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Thank you. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, members of the committee, on behalf of the FDD and 

our Center on Sanctions Illicit Finance, thank you for the invitation to testify. 

At the heart of the JCPOA is a fatal flaw. Iran does not need to 

cheat to reach threshold nuclear weapons capabilities. By following 

the deal and waiting patiently for key constraints to sunset, 

Tehran can emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment program; near-zero breakout time; an easier 

clandestine sneak-out pathway; an advanced long-range ballistic 

missile program, including ICBMs; access to advanced heavy weaponry; greater regional dominance; and a more powerful economy, 

which will be increasingly immunized against our ability to use 

sanctions. 

The U.N. snapback is deal ending, which makes it highly ineffective against Iran’s incremental cheating strategy that Dr. Albright 

has outlined. 

Since the announcement of the nuclear agreement in July 2015, 

Iran has received a significant economic stimulus through sanctions relief and additional unilateral concessions from the Obama 

administration. In spite of or because of these economic benefits, 

Iran’s destabilizing and malign activities have only accelerated. 

To address these threats, Congress and the new administration 

need to follow in the footsteps of Ronald Reagan. In the early 

1980s, President Reagan instructed his National Security Council 

to develop a comprehensive strategy to undermine the Soviet 

Union. We need a similar plan now, one that uses both covert and 

overt economic, financial, political, diplomatic, cyber, and military 

power to subvert and roll back the Iranian threat. 

The administration, with assistance from Congress, needs to reinvigorate the sanctions regime aimed at deterring Iran’s support 

for terrorism, ballistic missile development, human rights abuses, 

war crimes, and destabilizing activities throughout the Middle 

East. It’s very clear that these nonnuclear sanctions are fully consistent with the JCPOA. In particular, Congress should apply the 

terms of Executive Order 13224, the terrorism executive order to 

the IRGC, and require the Treasury Department to expand the 

number of IRGC entities designated from the current 68 to the 

thousands of entities it owns or controls. There is overwhelming 

evidence to support this designation. Congress should reject the argument that this designation will provoke the IRGC to threaten or 

commit violence. To do so would hold American policy hostage. 

Since 2013, the conclusion of the interim agreement and through 

the final agreement, there has been enormous increase, particularly in Syria, in Iran-related terror attacks, again, terror attacks 

that deliver the use of violence against civilians with a political objective. Iran has perpetrated and supported these attacks through 

the IRGC, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed militias. This is part of 

the reason why the State Department calls Iran the leading state 

sponsor of terrorism. 


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28 

Congress should also require the administration to investigate 

whether or not Iran Air is supporting Iran’s malign activities in 

Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. As the first slide indicates, since implementation day on January 16 of last year, there have been 696 

flights from Iran to Syria. Of those flights, 114 were Iran Air, including some to and from an IRGC resupply base in Abadan, Iran. 

On the second slide, you’ll see an example of a flight that is supposed to travel between Tehran and Damascus, but is actually flying by the IRGC resupply base in Abadan. If Iran Air is complicit 

in Tehran’s illicit behavior, as I believe it is, Iran Air should face 

new sanctions, U.S. licenses for aircraft sales should be revoked, 

and the Boeing and Airbus deals with Iran Air should be canceled. 

When Washington implements stricter sanctions, international 

banks and companies will think twice about working with the Iranian entities engaged in this malign conduct, especially with the 

IRGC. I agree with Mr. Albright. We need to rigorously enforce the 

deal, but it presents a bedeviling paradox. The greater the focus on 

enforcement, the higher the likelihood that Iran will take a patient 

pathway to nuclear weapons capability as a result of the agreement’s sunset provisions and the lack of an effective mechanism to 

physically inspect Iranian military sites. 

To address this, as Mr. Albright has recommended, the Trump 

administration should work with Congress to design a statutory architecture that freezes the Iranian nuclear program where it is 

today, and impose new crippling sanctions if the nuclear breakout 

time drops under 1 year. To achieve this, Iran’s advanced centrifuge research, development, and deployment levels, for example, 

need to be significantly constrained, and IAEA’s physical access to 

military sites must be guarantied. There is no compelling reason 

for Iran to have a breakout time of less than 1 year. 

The Trump administration also needs to put Iran on notice that 

the U.S. will use force to counter Iranian aggression. Sanctions 

without the credible threat of military action will always be insufficient to change the regime’s calculus. 

And, finally, the administration must make it clear to the Europeans, the Chinese, and the Russians that it is prepared to negotiate a follow-on agreement that addresses the fatal flaws of the 

original deal. Iran still struggling to attract foreign investment because of its continued malign activities could benefit from such an 

offer if it is prepared to halt its subversive behavior. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:] 


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.. 

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Mark Dubowitz AprilS, 2017 

Chairmen Chaffetz and DeSantis, Ranking Members Cummings and Lynch, members of the 

committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and our Center on Sanctions 

and Illicit Finance, thank you for the opportunity to testify. This testimony will analyze both the 

nuclear and sanctions elements of the Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action (JCPOA), describe steps taken since the JCPOA by Iran and the Obama and Trump 

administrations, and recommend a path forward for a comprehensive plan to use all elements of 

American power including sanctions to address the continued Iranian threat. 

PA TIE~T PATHWAY TO NUCI"EAR WEAPO~S 

President Donald Trump promised to "rigorously enforce" the JCPOA, 1 which he has also called 

"the worst deal ever ncgotiatcd."2 While strict enforcement is an important first step, it is 

insufficient. The JCPOA provides Iran with a patient pathway to nuclear weapons capability. If 

the United States simply enforces the agreement, Iran will become a threshold nuclear weapons 

state. 

The JCPOA preserved essential elements of the country's nuclear infrastructure and placed only 

limited, temporary, and reversible constraints on Iran's nuclear activities. In exchange, Iran got 

the complete dismantlement of many of the most effective U.S. and international economic 

sanctions. 

At the heart of the JCPOA is a fatal flaw: Iran does not need to cheat to reach threshold nuclear 

weapons capabilities. By following the deal, and waiting patiently for key constraints to 

disappear, Tehran can emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment 

program; near-zero breakout time; an easier clandestine sneak-out pathway; an advanced longrange ballistic missile program, including intercontinental ballistic missiles; access to advanced 

heavy weaponry; greater regional dominance; and a more powerful economy increasingly 

immunized against Western sanctions. 

In less than four years under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in which the JCPOA is 

embedded, the UN embargo on conventional anns sales will disappea~. In less than seven years, 

the restrictions on ballistic missile development will disappear, too.° From there, Tehran can 

significantly enhance its military power-· as well as the capabilities of its proxies by acquiring 

advanced conventional weapons and further expanding its long-range ballistic-missile program 

to include intercontinental ballistic missiles. No country developing ICBMs has ever not also 

obtained nuclear weapons. 

Under the tenns of the JCPOA, Iran's uranium and plutonium pathways to atomic weapons 

expand over time, as well. The deal allows tor Iran to continue limited testing and ultimately 

ramp up the testing of even more advanced centrifuges in seven years, and install these machines 

in its Natanz enrichment facility in nine years from now4 Breakout time the amount of time 

needed to enrich one bomb's worth of fissile material to nuclear grade - drops from one year, 

where it is now, to months and then just wecks.5 

In less than 15 years, the majority of restrictions on vital components of a military-nuclear 

program vanish. This includes bans on uranium enrichment above 3.67 percent purity and the 

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Mark Dubowitz AprilS, 2017 

stockpiling oflow-enriched uranium6 At that time, Iran can restart its uranium enrichment in the 

Fordow nuclear facility a previously secret nuclear site buried under a monntain that is 

believed to be impenetrable to U.S. military strikes. Moreover, Iran can build an unlimited 

number of other advanced centrifuge-powered enrichment facilities just like Fordow. 7 Iran can 

deploy an unlimited number of advanced centrifuges in these facilities. They are more efficient 

than Iran's basic models, can enrich uranium to weapons-grade faster thereby requiring a fewer 

number of machines, and can be housed in smaller, harder-to-detect facilities. \Vhile building 

clandestine facilities and diverting uranium to these sites would be a JCPOA violation, the 

leaders in Iran know that the challenge of monitoring and inspecting such a massive nuclear 

program on a territory more than twice the size of Texas will be a fom1idable challenge for the 

IAEA and Western intelligence services. 

VERIFICATION WITHOUT PHYSICAL ACCESS TO MILITARY SITES 

The nuclear deal also does not guarantee physical inspections of military sites even if the IAEA 

believes Iran is conducting weaponization activities. The case study of the Parchin military base 

makes clear this fatal flaw. 

In September 2015, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visited the Parchin military base, but 

the IAEA did not conduct a physical inspection. Indeed, rather than conducting on-site 

inspections with the physical presence of inspectors at the location (per the IAEA's standard 

practices), Iranian inspectors took environmental samples while IAEA inspectors monitored 

remotely8 This "self-inspection" protocol was a response to Iranian objections over physical 

inspections. 

Prior to the announcement of the JCPOA, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei proclaimed that 

"inspection of our military sites is out of the question."9 Similarly, in the days following the 

announcement of the nuclear agreement, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated before 

the Iranian parliament that Iran had successfully achieved its goal of preventing IAEA access to 

military facilities. 10 Even as U.S. officials asserted that the deal provided unprecedented access 

to Iranian facilities, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to Khamenei, con!im1ed that "entry into our 

military sites is absolutely forbidden.'' 11 

Despite the lack of physical inspections, the environmental samples from Parchin revealed the 

existence of man-made uranium particles. Last summer. The Wall Street Journal reported that 

U.S. officials believed those particles were related to previous nuclear weapons activities. "The 

existence of two particles of uranium there would be consistent with our understanding of the 

involvement of Parchin in a past weapons program, but by themselves don't definitively prove 

anything," a senior administration official said. 12 

William Tobey, former deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, explained that these particles are "prima facie evidence" of 

undeclared nuclear material in Iran. "A larger quantity of uranium left them behind," he notcsu 

For years, Iran has denied that it engaged in nuclear weaponization activities at the site, yet has 

vigorously engaged in cleanup efforts, which have compromised the IAEA's ability to 

investigate. 14 These efforts, Tobey explains, have created an ambiguous situation that is 

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Mark Dubowitz AprilS, 2017 

beneficial to the Iranians. The IAEA 's findings arc inconclusive, and this uncertainty means that 

the international community will not be united in its response. 

That is all the more reason why the IAEA should continue to investigate and attempt to verify 

Iran's declarations about its nuclear activities. As former IAEA Deputy Director General and my 

FDD colleague Olli Heinonen explained, the IAEA "has an obligation to carry out its safeguards 

verification mission under the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The possible existence of 

undeclared uranium at Parchin gets to the heart of those provisions." 15 Yet, to date, the lAEA has 

not specified its follow-up investigation efforts, and its recent reports have lacked important, 

technical details about Iran's compliance with its JCPOA obligations, according to the nuclear 

experts at the Institute for Science and International Security_~ 6 

This is a dangerous precedent. The IAEA did not insist on physical inspections of Parchin, 

instead agreeing to an Iranian demand that its own scientists do the sampling. Then, when the 

IAEA discovered uranium particles in these samples, it did not insist on a follow-up inspection, 

physical or otherwise, which is required under the comprehensive safeguards agreement to which 

Iran is a party. Tehran is establishing the precedent for blocking future inspections of military 

sites; it could deny the lAEA physical access to the facilities, and then invoke the example of 

Parchin to deny access for follow-up inspections, even if suspicious materials or activities are 

discovered. This scenario will severely erode the efficacy of the verification regime that the 

Obama administration touted as an achievement of the JCPOA. 

This problem is compounded by the way all oflran's weaponization activities were resolved. In 

December 2015. the IAEA decided to "close'' the file on outstanding concerns about possible 

military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. 17 Without ever admitting to weaponization 

activities. Iran convinced the international community to wipe the slate clean. The IAEA's report 

on the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program 18 left many questions 

unanswered. 1 

q 

In addition to prohibiting on-site inspections of suspected military sites, Iran can delay JAEA 

inspections of suspected sites without facing consequences. The JCPOA creates a minimum of a 

24-day delay (possibly longer) between a formal IAEA request to access a snspicious site and the 

date Iran must allow access. As Mr. Tobey explains, "24 days ... [is] ample time for Iran to hide 

or destroy evidence."20 

Dr. Heinonen agrees. He argues that, for small facilities, 24 days is enough time for Iran to 

"sanitize" suspected sites, including, for example. where Iran may be engaged in weaponization 

activities. 21 Iran is also likely to have developed contingency plans to respond to IAEA demands 

to visit these sites. According to Dr. Heinonen, Tehran may only need two days to remove 

nuclear equipment from a small facility22 and remove any traces of uranium, which even 

environmental sampling may be unable to detect. As Dr. Heinonen notes: 

Time for 'scrubbing' takes on special salience in nuclear-related developments without 

nuclear material present. Some of the past concealment events carried out by Iran in 2003 

left no traces to be detected through environmental sampling23 

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Mark Dubowitz April 5, 2017 

Finally, to prevent the U.S. and its allies from pushing for greater access and more thorough 

inspections, Iran will likely threaten to deploy its "nuclear snapback." The JCPOA explicitly 

states, "Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as 

grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part."24 In effect, 

if Washington attempts to exercise its rights under the JCPOA to unilaterally snap back the UN 

sanctions to force Iran to allow the IAEA to gain access, Tehran has warned that it will walk 

away from the deal and snap back its nuclear program. Fearing this, the Europeans, Chinese, or 

Russians may be reluctant to pressure Tehran to comply with the tern1s of the deal or even to 

punish Iran for violations short of the most flagrant and egregious violations. The Jack of specific 

sanctions agreed to between the parties (sh01t of deal-ending sanctions) undercuts the inspection 

regime and makes it that much more difficult to force access to Iranian military sites. 

SANCTIONS RELIEF AND IRAN'S ECONOMIC GROWTH 

On January 16, 2016, the nuclear agreement reached "Implementation Day," and Iran receive~ 

substantial sanctions relief, including access to around SlOO billion in restricted oil revenues. 20 

Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, were reconnected to the global financial 

system through the SWIFT financial network. 26 Sanctions on Iran's crude oil export transactions 

were lifted along with sanctions on key sectors of the Iranian economy, including upstream 

energy investment and energy-related technology transfers, the auto industry, petrochemicals, 

and shipping, as well as the precious metals trade. Tehran already appears to be using this relief 

to pay off some of its outstanding debts, repair its damaged economy, fortify itself against future 

sanctions pressure, continue its support for terrorist groups, provide additional funds to allied 

rogue regimes, and expand its conventional military power. 

This sanctions relief served as a major "stimulus package" for Iran. Iran has brought oil to 

market more quickly than expected by drawing down its inventories, while also accessing 

imports, and stabilizing the economy.27 As a result, in the first half of the 2016/2017 fiscal year, 

Iran's real GDP grew by an impressive 7.4 percent according to the Intemational Monetary 

Fund (IMF)28 The organization projects that Iran's economic growth for the entire FY 2016/17 

will have been 6.6 percent, will settle to 3.3 percent this year (FY 2017/18), and will stabilize at 

about 4.5 percent over the medium term. After the implementation of the JCPOA 's sanctions 

relief, inflation has dropped to single digits and has stabilized at about 9.5 percent since the 

middle of last year/9 down from an mmual rate of more than 30 percent between 2012 and 

201430 

This is a major shift. Tn 2012 and 2013, ]ran's economy was crashing. It had been hit with an 

asymmetric shock from sanctions, including those targeting its central bank, oil exports, and 

access to the SWIFT financial messaging systcm31 The economy shrank by more than six 

percent in the 2012113 fiscal year, largely due to the drop in oil exports and revenue because of 

tightening sanctions, and it bottomed out the following year, contracting by another two 

percent. 32 Accessible foreign exchange reserves were estimated to be down to only $20 billion, 

limiting imports. 33 At the time, the rial was collapsing; 34 repottcdly in one week in September 

2012, the rial lost nearly 60 percent of its value.35 

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This all started to change during the nuclear negotiations. During the l S-month period starting in 

late 2013, interim sanctions relief and the lack of new sanctions-induced shocks saved the 

Iranian leadership - including the supreme leader and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGG)- from a balance of payments crisis. This enabled Iran to move from a severe recession 

to a modest recovery 36 In the 2014/15 fiscal year, the Iranian economy rebounded and grew at a 

rate of at least three percent. 

With substantial sanctions relief in hand from the nuclear agreement, the Iranian regime is now 

working to insulate itself from future economic pressure. Iran's plan: undcm1ine the efficacy of 

U.S. sanctions by persuading European and Asia countries to oppose the snapback of sanctions 

and challenge the American position; fortify the economy su!Ticiency to lessen the economic 

blow from U.S. measures; and render sanctions useless against a ncar-zero nuclear program. 

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION PROVIDED RELIEF BEYOND THE JCPOA 

As if it did not concede enough, the Obama administration attempted to provide economic relief 

to Tehran beyond its JCPOA obligations. First, it actively encouraged foreign businesses to 

invest in Iran. notwithstanding the ongoing designation of Iran as a "jurisdiction of primary 

money laundering conccrn .. ~ and the fact that Iran remains on the black list of the Financial 

Action Task Force (FA TF), the global body monitoring and addressing money laundering and 

terror finance 39 Fom1er Secretary of State John Kerry engaged in an international invest-inTehran "road show .. 40 to encourage large European banks to do business with Iran, arguing that 

banks simply needed to "do their nom1al due diligence ... 41 The largest global banks. however, 

have been reluctant to restart relationships with Iranian linaneial institutions because they know 

that there is no "normal due diligence .. in a country that engages in such extensive illicit financial 

activities. 

The Obama administration also urged state and local governments to lift their own sanctions on 

Iran.42 many of which were tied not only to Iran's illicit nuclear program but also to its role as 

the leading state sponsor of terrorism.'" The JCPOA itself contained language that complicates a 

more robust sanctions effort. Under the terms of the accord. the United States and the European 

Union committed to "refrain fi·om any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely 

aficct the normalization of trade and economic relations.''44 Iran interpreted this to mean that the 

United States and EU cannot implement terrorism or other non-nuclear sanctions- and has since 

threatened to walk away from the JCPOA and restart its nuclear program if such sanctions arc 

imposed45 Iranian officials also argue that the United Stales must go further, pushing skittish 

multilateral companies and global banks back into Iran. 

The Trump administration is likely to take a different approach, arguing that there is a big 

di ffercnce hctween not interfering with commercial relations and actively advocating for banks 

and companies to enter the Iranian market. Since taking office on January 20. the new 

administration already has reiterated the position of the Obama administration that non-nuclear 

sanctions arc not a violation of the JC'POA,4

" designated 25 Iranian and foreign persons and 

entities involved in Iran's illicit ballistic missile program or aiding the IRGC's terrorism 

activities:7 sanctioned another ll Chinese, North Korean. and U AE companies and individuals 

for providing sensitive technology to Iran which could aid its ballistic missile development, and 

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sanctioned another 19 companies and individuals for other violations of the Iran, North Korea, 

and Syria Nonproliferation Act48 

Recommendation 1: Congress should play an active role in countering Iran's financial 

legitimacy campaign by drawing attention to the ongoing compliance and business risks 

involved in transactions with Iran. Congress should expose Iran's ongoing deceptive 

conduct and illicit activities through both open-source data and declassified evidence to 

build on the well-documented market concerns of doing business with Iran. These risks 

needs to be highlighted by U.S. administration officials at Financial Action Task Force 

meetings, including at the upcoming June meeting where Washington should resist 

efforts to pern1anently lift the mandatory countcm1casurcs on Iran that were temporarily 

suspended in .June 2016.49 

Recommendation 2: Congress should require the administration to provide detailed 

reporting on Iran's deceptive conduct and illicit activities, exposing Iran's shadow 

networks, the corruption of top Iranian officials, and the role of the IRGC and other 

designated Iranian actors in "legitimate" businesses. This should include passing 

enhanced auditing standards required for a company doing business in Iran, given the 

financial risks. These measures will underscore that responsible actors have an obligation 

to keep Iran at arm's length until there is greater certainty that they are not implicated in 

illegal activity. 

Dollarized Transactions 

The Obama administration's post-JCPOA sanctions concessions were not only limited to 

business roadshows and efforts to undercut state and local sanctions. Secretary Kerry also briefed 

State Department reporters on a plan to license foreign banks to usc dollars when processing 

transactions with their Iranian counterparts 5°- a concession never explicitly negotiated as part of 

the nuclear deal. This prompted a backlash in Congress that had Treasury Department officials 

scrambling to issue guidance that Washington was not pem1itting Iranian access to the U.S. 

financial system, even as they left open the possibility of offshore dollar clearing. 51 

Iran wants direct- or, at a minimum, indirect- access to the U.S. dollar because the dollar is the 

preferred currency for global trade. In 200R, Treasmy banned Iran's last access point to the U.S. 

financial system by prohibiting "U-tum" transactions between a foreign bank and an Iranian 

bank that briefly transit the U.S. financial system to dollarize the transaction52 At the time, 

Treasmy's Office of Foreign Assets Control noted that the move was designed to "protect the 

U.S. financial system from the threat of illicit finance posed by Tran and its banks."53 

Three years later, Treasury designated Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 

concern nnder Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act because of Iran's "support for terrorism,'' 

"pnrsnit of weapons of mass destruction''- including its financing of nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs and the usc of "deceptive financial practices to facilitate illicit conduct and evade 

sanctions."54 In other words, Iran's entire financial system posed illicit finance risks to the global 

system. 

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Permitting Iran access to the U.S. dollar would have contradicted promises the Obama 

administration repeatedly made. 5

5 Most explicitly, Treasury's fom1er Acting Under Secretary for 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Adam Szubin publicly committed in September 2015: 

Iran will not be able to open bank accounts with U.S. banks, nor will Iran be able to 

access the U.S. banking sector, even for that momentary transaction to, what we call, 

dollarize a foreign payment. It was once referred to as a U-tum license, and Iran was 

allowed to make such offshore-to-offshore payments that cross U.S. banking sector 

thresholds for just a second. That is not in the cards56 

However, in October 2016, Treasury updated language in its "Frequently Asked Questions" 

resource about the JCPOA to state that foreign financial institutions arc permitted to process 

dollar-denominated transactions involving Iran. Treasury's guidance previously stipulated that 

foreign financial institutions could not clear "dollar-denominated transactions involving Iran 

through U.S. financial systems," but it never clarified what was actually permitted. 57 Risk-averse 

global banks assumed that actions not explicitly pem1itted remained off~limits. The updated 

guidance represented a further concession to Iran outside the scope of the JCPOA. 

If the United States were to go a step further and provide dollarized access now, Iran would 

claim that this sanctions relief is part of "nuclear sanctions" lifted by the JCPOA. It would then 

be difficult to revoke this access for non-nuclear reasons when Iran conducts another ballistic 

missile test, provides even more lethal assistance to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, executes 

more dissidents, or engages in other provocative and illicit behavior in the future 58 Iran will 

threaten to walk away from the deal and restart its nuclear program, effectively neutralizing 

Washington's ability to usc non-nuclear sm1ctions. 

Recommendation 1: Congress should consider legislation to prohibit U.S. financial 

institutions from processing transactions for Iranian entities, even when such a "transfer 

was by order of a non-Iranian foreign bank from its own account in a domestic bank to an 

account held by a domestic bank for a non-Iranian foreign bank."59 Congress could also 

state that it is prohibited for a U.S. financial institution to provide dollars for offshore 

clearing facilities if any party in the financial chain is an Iranian entity. The tem1ination 

of this prohibition could be linked to a presidential certification that Iran is no longer 

supp01iing terrorism and developing ballistic missile capabilities. 

Recommendation 2: Congress could also require the Treasury Department to report on 

all financial institutions involved in giving Iran direct or indirect access to the U.S. dollar, 

with details on institutions, trm1sactions, counterpmiies, and mechanisms. Any financial 

institution or offshore large value payment system that provides dollar-clearing services 

in transactions involving an Iranian party should be liable for sanctions. 

Treasury FAQs about Permitted Business with Iran 

In October 2016, the Obama administration found yet another way beyond the JCPOA to quietly 

ease sanctions on Iran.c'o Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its 

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and significantly eased restrictions on transactions between 

Iran and non-U.S. banks and companies 61 

In addition to the change regarding dollarized transactions as discussed above, the new guidance 

also stipulated that it is not necessarily prohibited for foreign companies to do business with a 

non-sanctioned entity that is minority-owned or -controlled by an entity on its sanctions list. 

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the key driver of proliferation, terrorism, and 

human rights abuses for the Iranian regime, maintains a pervasive role in the Iranian economy 

but often keeps its ownership of companies under 50 percent to avoid sanctions. 62 In effect, the 

Obama administration green-lighted business with companies in which the Guard has a 

significant business interest below the 50-percent threshold. 

Cnrrently, Treasury uses the 50-percent threshold to detcnnine IRGC ownership (or ownership 

by any other designated entity); however a 25-percent threshold would better reflect global 

standards and Treasury's own regulations and recommendations regarding beneficial ownership, 

those who "own, control, and profit from companies."63 Foreign companies are able to do 

business with companies owned by the IRGC if those companies arc not explicitly designated on 

Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals list. The threshold for "shadow SDNs" is similarly set 

at 50 percent. 64 

Recommendation: Congress should require the Treasury Department to lower the 

threshold for designation to the 25-perccnt beneficial ownership threshold rather than 

majority ownership. This change should also be reflected in Treasury's "shadow SDN" 

guidance. Under new criteria, many additional IRGC-controlled entities (and companies 

owned by sanctioned persons) would be eligible for designation, and foreign companies 

would shun business with Iranian partners with !RGC connections. Lowering the 

threshold would also generate greater public scrutiny and enhanced due diligence and 

auditing by the private sector. Additionally, Congress and the administration should 

clarifY ambiguities in the law that allow business with IRGC companies not designated 

by the U.S. govemment as agents or affiliates of the IRGC.65 

Obama's Treasury Department's updated guidance also took a weak stance on the qnestion of 

know your customer's customer (KYCC), a hotly debated topic in the world of corporate 

compliance. According to the new guidance, "OFAC does not expect a non-U.S. financial 

institution to repeat the due diligence its customers have pcrfonned on an Iranian cnstomer 

unless the non-U.S. financial institution has reason to believe that those processes are 

insufficient." The new Treasury guidance thus lowers the compliance requirements for global 

banks doing business with companies that may have significant ties to illicit actors in Iran. In 

effect, unless a non-U.S. linancial institution has a specific reason to believe that a customer's 

clients are sanctioned, it can process transactions and provide banking services. Given the United 

States' history of leading the global efforts to ensure the international financial system is not 

abused by terrorists, money launderers, and weapons proliferators, this is a significant weakening 

of the intemational KYCC principles. 

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Recommendation: The Trump administration should issue new F AQs or make an 

announcement revoking these changes to the FAQs- which have no legal standing and 

are mere statements of how an administration interprets regulations. Congress should 

encourage the Trump administration to take such steps immediately. 

IRAN'S ONGOING MALIGN ACTIVITIES 

ln spite or perhaps because of the significant sanctions relief received, Iran's destabilizing 

and malign activities have accelerated since the announcement of the JCPOA in July 20I5. 

Ballistic Missiles 

Between July 20I5 and February 2017, Iran tested as many as 14 ballistic missiles, according to 

a comprehensive study by my FDD colleague Behnam Ben Taleblu,66 and reportedly tested 

another two short-range ballistic missiles in early March67 These tests violate the UN Security 

Council resolution endorsing the nuclear deal. Lamentably, the JCPOA tails to address Iran's 

ballistic missiles despite the U.S. intelligence community's assessment that ballistic missiles 

would be Iran's preferred delivery vehicle for a nuclear bomb60 

Under the Trump administration, Treasury has issued designations under proliferation and 

terrorism authoritics,69 and the State Department "also designated companies for violating the 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.' 0 While these arc important first steps and an 

indication that the Trump administration seeks to enforce U.S. sanctions against Iran, Congress 

can take a leadership role in crafting policies to create additional pressure on the Iranian regime 

to change its behavior. 

A bipartisan groupo( senators and representatives introduced two important pieces of legislation 

at the end of March. '

1 Among other measures, the Senate bill imposes secondary sanctions on 

any individual or entity found to be financing or supporting Iran's ballistic missile development. 

The House bill also imposes ballistic missile sanctions, and requires the president to issue a 

report to Congress on Iranian and foreign individuals and companies that arc part of Iran's global 

supply chain. This report would likely serve as the basis for additional sanctions. 

Recommendation: Congress should require the administration to report on the link 

between the global supply chain and the sectors of Iran's economy that contribute 

directly or indirectly to the development of the country's ballistic missile program. Much 

of this information is available through open source material. Indeed, FDD's research has 

revealed that supply chains in the metallurgy and mining; chemicals, petrochemicals, and 

energy; construction; automotive; and electronic, telecommunication, and computer 

science sectors arc invoh,ed in Iran's ballistic missile programn 

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 73 

Last month, the Trump administration was reportcdl/4 contemplating whether to designate 

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization. 75 a State 

Department listing that includes Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic State, and other groups. The 

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United States has for the past three decades officially delineated Iran as the leading sponsor of 

terrorism76 In 2007, a number of Democratic and Republican politicians, including thenSenators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, cosponsored a bill known as the Iran CounterProliferation Act that called on the George W. Bush administration to report on its efforts to 

designate the Revolutionary Guard as a Foreign Terrorist Organization78 But the bill did not 

pass. 

From the IRGC's inception in 1979, terrorism has been its defining feature. The 125,000-strong 

force has always been commanded by violent, religious ideologues79 During the 1980s, the 

IRGC conducted vicious campaigns against all forms of dissent, as well as against ethnic 

minorities, especially the Kurds and the Baluchis. Throughout the 1990s, the group attacked the 

Iranian refom1 movement and became even more feared than Iran's intelligence ministry, which 

had a reputation for human rights abuses. In 1999, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei unleashed the 

IRGC to crush student protests- a move that President Hassan Rouhani, then the secretary of the 

Supreme National Security Council, had passionately supported. go In the summer of 2009, the 

Guard also squashed the pro-democracy Green Revolution, arresting thousands and torturing 

hundredss 1 Over the years, the IRGC has also overseen a terror apparatus that has assassinated 

intellectuals, journalists, dissident politicians, and literary fignres abroad. 

Yet it is !ROC's terrorism abroad that has garnered the most attention. In the early 1980s, it 

combined various Lebanese Shiite groups to forn1 Hezbollah, now Iran's most dependable and 

lethal proxy. At Iran's behest, Hezbollah bombed a U.S. Marine compound in Beirut in 1983, 

killing 238 U.S. service members. Since then, the Guard has continuously trained and arn1ed 

non-Iranian Shiite radicals, often dispatching them against Americans. The 1996 Khobar Tower 

bombing in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American service members, was an Iranian-directed 

proxy attack. 82 Since 2003. Iranian-supplied munitions and Iranian-trained paramilitary forces 

have killed and maimed U.S. troops in Iraq.83 

In 20 ll, the Revolutionary Guard attempted to conducted its first attack on U.S. soil by 

assassinating the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, at a restaurant in 

Washington: D.C. 84 Then-Attorney General Eric Holder declared that the failed plot was 

"directed and approved by elements of the Iranian government, and, specifically by the senior 

members of the Qods Force," which is an arm of the IRGC. 85 An Iranian agent pleaded guilty to 

the crime and has been sentenced to 25 years in prison-'6 

In Syria, the Guard has been instrumental in preserving the regime of President Bashar ai-Assad. 

Under the direction ofiRGC General Hossein Hamadani, recently killed in battle, Syrian militias 

modeled after Hezbollah entered the battle. 87 It can be said that Assad's war crimes arc also the 

IRGC's war crimes since the IRGC directed military operations, carried out by either Shiite 

militias or Assad's forces, explicitly aimed at slaughtering civilians. But the Islamic Republic 

was not punished for these atrocities at any point during the first six years of the war. It seemed, 

at the time, that President Obama was focused on brokcring his Iran nuclear deal and thus 

wanted to avoid at all costs a collision with Iran and its Shiite militias. 

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The Trump administration must know that it cannot stabilize the Middle East without first 

weakening the IRGC. And to do that, it should target the group's financial empire. The IRGC 

has become Iran's "most powerful economic actor," according to the U.S. Trcasury88 

If President Trump faces opposition to designating the IRGC as an FTO, he can use Executive 

Order 13224, signed by President Bush in 2001, which gives the administration the authority to 

freeze the assets of individuals or groups that either carry out terrorist acts or arc plam1ing them. 

Indeed, the new Senate bill mandates sanctions on the IRGC in its entirety pursuant to Executive 

Order 13224. President Trump should comply and shut the Guard out of the global financial and 

commercial markets. Bush used this authority in 2007 to block the assets of the Quds Force after 

it provided material support to Hezbollah, the Taliban, and three Palestinian terrorist groups 89 

Targeting only the Quds Force, however, did not go far enough. As the war in Syria 

demonstrates, the Quds Force is not a separate entity but an integral part of the IRGC. Quds 

Force and Revolutionary Guard units operate as one, with personnel routinely rotating back and 

forth within a unified command structure.9

° Further, the Quds Force plays only a small role in the 

IRGC's vast business ventures, which it uses to fund its terrorist activities. 

The United States has designated the IRGC under nonproliferation and human rights 

authorities,91 demonstrating a willingness to label the entire organization for these illicit 

activities. But these sanctions do not specifically target the role of the Guard in supporting 

terrorism. Sanctions are designed to address the underlying illicit conduct in order to change 

behavior. And there is clear evidence of the IRGC's role in conducting and supporting terrorist 

activities. The Trump administration should not accept the argument that this designation under 

Executive 13224 will provoke the IRGC to threaten or commit more acts of terrorism if it is 

designated. To do so would hold American policy hostage to any terrorist organization issuing 

these threats. 

Designating the IRGC for terrorism also should pave the way for designating thousands of 

business entities 0\Vncd or controlled by the IRGC and would likely draw greater international 

attention in the global financial and business community to the terrorism financing risks involved 

in transactions with Iran, This would further squeeze the Guard financially, since it would 

highlight the risks for European and Asian corporations looking to do business worth billions of 

dollars in sectors the Guard controls. This is particularly important now, because the EU 1villlift 

its nuclear sanctions on alllRGC entities by October 2023, pursuant to the JCPOA. 

Designating the IRGC for terrorism would not violate the JCPOA - despite protests by Iran to 

the contrary. Washington should proactively explain that if the nuclear deal falls apart as a result 

of this designation, the blame falls squarely on Iran both for its decision to walk away from the 

agreement and for its terrorism support in the first place. To tame the Islamic Republic, the 

United States must diminish the Guard's power. Labeling it a terrorist group is just one way to 

begin that process. 

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Recommendation 1: Executive Order 13324 should be applied against the IRGC in its 

entirety. Congress should encourage the administration to significantly expand the 

number of IRGC designations from the current 60 to include the thousands of front 

companies operated by the Guard. 

Recommendation 2: Congress should require that the Treasury Department create an 

"IRGC Watch List" of entities that do not meet the threshold for designation but have 

demonstrable connections to the IRGC. As the IRGC continues to evolve, and as its 

influence and control in the Iranian economy becomes increasingly sophisticated and 

hidden, enforcement of IRGC-related sanctions must also evolve. The criteria for 

inclusion on the IRGC Watch List should be flexible to account for the IRGC's usc of 

deceptive business practices. 

Iran Air's Continued Illicit Activities 

The JCPOA lifted sanctions against Iran's state-owned airline, Iran Air, despite a lack of 

evidence that the airline had ceased the illicit conduct for which it had been sanctioned in the 

first place. In 201 I, Washington designated lran Air for providing material support and services 

to the IRGC and Iran's Ministry of Defense. At the time, Treasury noted, "Rockets or missiles 

have been transported via Iran Air passenger aircraft, and IRGC officers occasionally take 

control over Iran Air flights carrying speciallRGC-relatcd cargo ... carried aboard a commercial 

Iran Air aircraft, including to Syria.'m 

When the previous administration was asked why sanctions on Iran Air were lifted, State 

Department Spokesman John Kirby did not argue that Iran Air's behavior had changed,Y3 or that 

the IRGC is no longer using the airline to ship weapons to Syria. Instead, he said merely that the 

administration was comfOJiable with its decision, though he was "not at liberty to go into the 

reasons behind" the dc-listing.94 

Based on open source research, my FDD colleague Emanuele Ottolcnghi has concluded that 

betv<een January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day) and March 30, 2017, Iranian airlines have 

flown at least 690 flights from Iran to Syria, including 114 on Iran Air. 95 The use of deceptive 

practices - turning off tracking signals, using false tail numbers, or listing fabricated itineraries 90 

-indicates that these tlights were likely part oflran's efforts to arm the Syrian government. I am 

confident, based on my sourcing, that in the past few months, Iran Air has transported hundreds 

of thousands of kilograms of missiles and katyusha rockets and hundreds of fighters to Syria and 

Yemen. 

[ran Air also is unlikely to retain all of the aircraft it is now set to purchase from Western 

companies (since its current fleet is only 36 planes97 but it has signed preliminary contracts for 

nearly 200), and instead likely will transfer, resell, or lease them to sanctioned airlines, including 

Mahan Air, which the U.S. government designated for supporting the IRGC's terrorism 

activitics.n 

Despite these concems, Boeing and Airbus sales to Iran continue apace. These deals should not 

be allowed to proceed. The licenses should be immediately suspended, pending a thorough 

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investigation into Iran Air's conduct. lf the investigation detem1ines that Iran Air is engaged in 

illicit activities, the licenses should be canceled and Iran Air re-designated. Sales of new aircraft 

to Iran should only move forward once Iran has demonstrated that it will no longer usc civilian 

aircraft for malign purposes and that none of the aircraft will end up in the hands of sanctioned 

entities. 

Recommendation 1: Congress should require the administration to investigate 

suspicious flights to detennine whether or not Iran Air is engaged in illegal and illicit 

conduct supporting Iran's malign activities in Syria, Yemen, and throughout the region. If 

the IRGC or other designated entities have used Iran Air to ship weapons andior fighters 

to Syria, Iran Air should face new sanctions. And any licenses for aircraft sales should be 

revoked. 

Recommendation 2: Representatives and Senators should send letters to Boeing, Airbus, 

and other manufacturers reminding them that they will incur significant reputational and 

legal risks if the TRGC uses their planes to aid the Syrian and Y emcni war effort. 

Additionally, Congress could remind these companies and the banks or aircraft leasing 

firms financing the deals that if Iran Air is re-sanctioned, they will likely be left holding 

the tab. 

Recommendation 3: Congress should require the president to certifY that none of Iran's 

commercial planes are being used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation enduse. The certification could then include at least a five-year waiting period, after which 

new planes could be sold only on a trial basis, with only a small number of planes 

delivered per year with full payment made by Iran in cash at the time of delivery. 

Recommendation 4: Congress should also expand sanctions against entities that are 

aiding the IRGC's efforts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere by authorizing sanctions 

against any foreign company providing replacement parts, dual-use items, financial 

services, and ground services to airlines involved in weapons shipments. Currently, 

Mahan Air flies routes to major European destinations, and the companies involved in 

servicing those planes are likely violating U.S. laws. Congressional efforts to expand 

sanctions should severely limit Mahan's ability to operate. 

Illicit Activities by Previous(v Designated Iranian Entities 

The ongoing illicit activities of Iran Air are indicative of a greater problem with the JCPOA. The 

deal lifted sanctions on numerous Iranian entities without providing evidence that the companies 

and individuals in question had changed their behavior. As the Tmmp administration conducts a 

review of U.S.-Iran policy, Congress should request the intelligence community to reassess the 

de-listing of entities whose illicit behavior has not changed. 

Two further examples arc: 

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Bank Sepah 

When Treasury sanctioned Bank Sepah in 2007, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and 

Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey called the bank the "financial linchpin of Iran's missile 

procurement network," noting that the bank "has actively assisted Iran's pursuit of missiles 

capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.''99 The nuclear agreement, however, lifted U.S. 

sanctions on the bank despite Obama administration promises that the JCPOA would only lift 

''nuclear" sanctions. Levey. now the chief legal oflicer of HSBC, noted the contradiction: "One 

of the narratives was that the missile sanctions were not lifted .... I never did understand what 

that meant with Bank Sepah not being sanctioned.'' 100 

The lifting of sanctions on Bank Sepah occurred under troubling circumstances. In January 2016, 

the Obama administration reportedly signed a secret agreement with Iran101 to support the lifting 

of UN sanctions against Bank Scpah and its London branch in exchange for the release of U.S. 

hostages held in Iran - part of a larger package of concessions to Iran. 102 Under the nuclear 

agreement, the UN and European Union were not slated to lift sanctions on Bank Sepah until 

2023. 1113 As a result, the Iranian negotiating team scored a hat trick: It convinced the P5+ l 

negotiators not to include ballistic missile restrictions in the nuclear agreement and at the same 

time to lift sanctions on entities - including Bank Sepah involved in ballistic missile 

procurement. 104 No less importantly, Tehran successfully weakened United Nations restrictions 

on its ballistic missile development. 105 

Now, the bank can operate freely in Europe, bolstering an already thriving illicit procurement 

network. Iran's efforts to illegally acquire nuclear and unconventional weapons technology were 

robust in 2015, according to Gem1any's domestic intelligence agency, and its "already 

considerable procurement efforts" for its "ambitious missile technology program" increased 

further. 106 Now that Iran's preferred missile-financing bank is back in business, these efforts 

could multiply. 

Recommendation 1: Congress should request a report from the Trump administration 

and the intelligence community to determine whether the bank is still involved in Iran's 

missile procurement network, and if not, which financial institution(s) has stepped in to 

fill the gap. Any financial institution involved in Iran's ballistic missile development and 

illicit procurement should be immediately sanctioned. 

Execution of Imam Khomeini 's Order (EIKO) 

The JCPOA sanctions relief is also benefitting the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's financial 

empire - a "shadowy network of off-the-books front companies," according to the U.S. 

Treasury. 107 The network, headed by an organization known as the Execution of Imam 

Khomeini's Order (EIKO) or Setad, is reportedly worth at least $95 billioniOB When Treasury 

designated the organization and its subsidiaries in June 2013, the department noted that the 

purpose of EIKO was "to generate and control massive, off-the-books investments, shielded 

trom the view of the Iranian people and intemational regnlators." 109 Despite the fact that the 

sanctions were unrelated to fran's illicit nuclear program, the U.S. lifted the sanctions as part of 

the nuclear agreement. 

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The supreme leader, the JRGC, and the ruling elite in Iran have enriched themselves at the 

expense of the Iranian people. As then-Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser noted, 

this type of corruption "stifles economic development, impairs democratic institutions, erodes 

public trust, and impairs international cooperation . . . [and] creates space for criminals to 

flourish."' 10 In Iran, these criminals are not only traditional thugs, but are also state-sponsored 

human rights violators. 

Recommendation 1: Congress should request an intelligence assessment of EIKO to 

determine its involvement in systemic corruption in Iran. If the organization has indeed 

not re!om1ed its illicit financial conduct, Congress could require the administration toredesignate EIKO under anti-money laundering and klcptocracy authorities. 

Recommendation 2: Last session, Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accoumability Act, which (among measures targeting human rights violators) authorizes 

sanctions against government officials and their associates responsible for significant 

comlption.lll Congress should request a report from the intelligence community naming 

all EIKO managers. The relevant congressional committees should require the president 

to assess whether these individuals should be sanctioned under Global Magnitsky. 

ONGOING SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 

Nearly two years after the announcement of the JCPOA, the Iranian regime continues to repress 

its people. Far from ushering a new era of freedom, there has been no meaningful change in the 

regime's deplorable human rights record, according to Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, who served as the 

United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of 

Iran during and after the JCPOA negotiations. 112 

When President Rouhani was elected in June 2013, there was a widespread, but incorrect, 

assumption that he wonld shepherd in an era of greater freedoms in Iran. Instead, even in the 

wake of the nuclear deal, the human rights situation has deteriorated even further. The Islamic 

Republic continues to commit serious human rights abuses. Just last month, the new Special 

Rapporteur Asma Jahangir presented the latest report before the UN Human Rights Council and 

painted a bleak picture. 113 In her report, Jahangir noted that the use of the death penalty, 

including for juvenile offenders is "very high:" human rights activists and journalists are being 

"arrested, detained and prosecuted for the peaceful exercise of their profession or of their 

legitimate rights to freedoms of expression and association;" and minority communities continue 

"to face persistent discrimination and persccution.'' 114 Meanwhile, Iran continues to hold hostage 

U.S., Canadian, British, and other dual nationals. 

Despite this behavior, Tehran wants the nuclear agreement to wipe clean its record of systemic 

hnman rights abuses. It hopes that businesses seeking to enter the Iranian market will ignore this 

repression. But the world must hold Iran accountable. Sadly, Washington's most recent human 

rights designations took place in 2014, and at the time, the Obama administration only 

designated one individual and two entities. 115 Congress and the Trump administration have an 

oppmiunity, and a moral obligation, to change the direction of U.S. human rights policy on Iran. 

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Recommendation 1: Congress should impose human rights sanctions on state organs 

responsible for institutionalized human rights abuses, as well as individuals who work for 

these state organs. Expanding the designation list to include the people, companies, and 

state institutions like prisons and military bases (many of which are controlled by the 

IRGC) at which abuses like torture and arbitrary detention occur will help cut off the 

sources of revenue that facilitate and embolden Iran's vast system of domestic repression. 

Recommendation 2: Congress shonld also consider the creation of a new authority to 

designate an entity, or even an entire country, as a "jurisdiction of human rights concern." 

Using the model of Section 311 of the USA PATRlOT Act, the finding would carry 

regulatory implications in the United States but would also send a strong signal to foreign 

companies and banks, even if they are not directly affected by the finding. The goal of 

this policy would be to encourage the private sector to sever ties with institutions that 

perpetrate human rights abuses. 

Recommendation 3: Congress should work with the Trump administration to link any 

further sanctions relief concessions to Iran with an improvement in Tehran's atrocious 

human rights record. During the Cold War, Western negotiators linked certain anns 

control agreements with the Soviet Union to demands for Moscow's adherence to the 

civil rights portion of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. By contrast, the JCPOA did not require 

Tehran to make any improvements in its human rights record. This is a mistake: It would 

be much easier to monitor Iran's nuclear program in a relatively freer and more 

transparent Iran. 

CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE IRAN PLAN 

To address the continued Iranian threat, Congress and the new administration need to treat Iran 

in the way that Ronald Regan treated the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, President Reagan 

instructed his National Security Council to develop a comprehensive strategy to undermine the 

Soviet Union. The Trump National Security Council needs a similar plan, one that uses both 

covert and overt economic, financial, political, diplomatic, cyber, and military power to subvert 

and roll back the Iranian threat. 

Iran's Supreme Leader Khamcnci has alluded to his regime being "on the edge of a cliff' as a 

result of the 2009 democratic uprisings. 116 President Trump should create the distinct impression 

that America will help the millions ofiranians who despise the regime to push it over that edge. 

In addition, as discussed above, the Trump administration, with assistance from Congress, needs 

to reinvigorate the sanctions regime aimed at Iran's support for terrorism, ballistic-missile 

development, human-rights abuses, war crimes, and destabilizing activities in the Middle East. 

These sanctions need to target, in particular, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which 

controls strategic areas of Iran's economy. The new bipartisan legislation introduced in the 

House and Senate is a good start in rebuilding peaceful tools of leverage targeting Iran's 

continued illicit conduct, 

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Foreign diplomats may balk, but these sanctions are fully compliant with the nuclear deal. As 

President Barack Obama stated in August 2015, "We will continue to have sanctions in place on 

Iran's support for terrorism and violation of human rights. We will continue to insist upon the 

release of Americans detained unjustly." 117 This comment was reiterated by Obama's secretary 

of state and acting under secretary of Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence who said, 

"The United States will oppose Iran's destabilizing policies with every national security tool 

available," and, "We will be aggressively countering the array of Iran's other malign activities. 

The JCPOA in no way limits our ability to do so, and we have made our posture clear to both 

Iran and to our partners:·llR When the Trump administration implements stricter sanctions, 

international banks and companies will think twice about working with IRGC companies, 

especially if doing so might mean losing access to the U.S. market 

With regard to the nuclear deal, the Trump administration needs to rigorously enforce the 

agreement by using the Joint Commission, the Procurement Channel, and strict interpretations of 

the tem1s of the agreement But as discussed, a sole focus on enforcement presents a bedeviling 

paradox: The greater the focus on enforcement, the higher the likelihood Iran will emerge with 

nuclear weapons. As a result of the sunset provisions, the JCPOA provides Iran with patient 

pathways to nuclear weapons capability. 

The Trump administration should work with Congress to design a statutory architecture that 

freezes the Iranian nuclear program where it is today and impose new crippling sanctions if it 

expands in any way that drops nuclear breakout time to less than one year. To achieve this, 

advanced centrifuge research, development, and deployment levels, for example, need to be 

significantly constrained. There is no compelling reason for Iran to have a breakont time to a 

nuclear bomb ofless than one year. 

The Trump administration also needs to put Iran on notice that the U.S. will usc force to counter 

Iranian aggression. Sanctions without the credible threat of military action will always be 

insufficient to change the regime's calculus. 

While applying pressure on the regime, the administration should make it clear to the Chinese, 

Europeans, and Russians that Washington is prepared to negotiate a follow-on agreement that 

addresses the fatal flaws of the original deaL Tehran, still struggling to attract foreign investment 

because of its continued malign activities, can benefit trom such an offer if it is prepared to come 

back to the table and halt its subversive behavior. 

Thank yon for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to yonr questions. 

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!Jemorrr"'ck·s. July I, 2016. ~-)l.!.i-h...:i_lJL!_!lL~~~ 

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December 15, 2015. (!Dl12_:~'!\ .. :\ -~~ . ..:..~dS~L!Dll~!_~l..':-. i:t.._·~~h!:.:;_lrd-ai..:n:c:---1<\-L' k)·"'-'-=-~·~l~}.:J!~\~~~c:tr-acti~i!~>-lll,> 

L-L-j_!l(J:':-.:(\9) 

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boo~l-innian-nuck~tr-chcatin:L.) 

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July 22, 2015. \'l.''E--".'.'.."CJ!.).l!JQ.1£EQI1J2'..'..C...l'c~~..'!I.'!l!!.!l'~C£."~12.'2~'i'2I!:J.'l::!!il!l~'2ll'.:.'-'='1.'.".'!.'2!J2:l'.:.'C2.:: 

~~~~~~;-'~;;;;:~~~~~~~¥/;;,;i;;r~~~~~~~~~):Shrinking Reserves: Estimating the 

Value of Tehran's Foreign Assets," Founda!ionfOr Defense (~j'Democracies and Roubini Global Economics, 

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reconnected to SWIFT network after four-year hiatus.'' Reuters, February 17, 2016. 

(!mp: /\\ \' \\ .rcutcr~.c~.lm ·artJclc·u:--iran-lxmk:--~\\'Jl\-idl..SKCi\'0\ ·o l FD); 07 Mark Dubowitz, Annie Fixler, and Rachel Ziemba. "Don't Buy the Spin: Iran is Getting Economic Relief," 

(~(Democracies and Roubini Global Economics, June 2016. 

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and Rachel Ziemba, "Early 

Democracies, January 9, 2016. (b_t~~~~~Jl');k:!lQ<:.@Slc'2D;_l1_'Sst!il::illl.s<ldie~8.2±!C:"lt!IO'!l'!'ll:.SS:0."c!2l'-'.: 

r~.·cm cf\ ): Jennifer Hsieh, Rachel Economy: 

Growing," Fozmdationfor Dt/ense a_{ Democracies and Rvubini Glohal Economics, October 2014. 

(http: , WW\\ .dc!Cnddcmocn.1CY.On2 l't'll\cnvup!o<td~ publi;.·atinns Rnt.biniFDDRcport Oc! l..f.pdl); Jennifer Hsieh, 

Rachel Ziemba, and Mark Dubowitz, "Iran's Economy Will Slow but Continue to Grow Under Cheaper Oil and 

Current Sanctions," Foundation for Defense c~{Democracies and Rouhini Global Economics, february 2015. 

(http: \\ \\_~<J_~l\:ndJcmncrac\'.!..\r~ (lmtcnt uploadu?uhlicmii.'lh RoublmFDDRcp('ri rEB l5.pdl) 

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General Assembly, September 2007. 

Protecting Pennsylvania's Investments 

lci.!i:..can.(.'lilll PA t>:\t SB928 .::!009) 

29. 

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Plan of Action. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Supporters of Iran's Ballistic 

Missile Program and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Qods Force,'' February 3. 2017. 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ··Treasury Supporters of Iran's Ballistic .Missile 

Program and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force," February 3. 2017. 

(hltp:-;: '.\\ W\\·.tn .. 'asun·.rrtJ\ "P!Te>:-,-c(.'Jl!cr pn.:~s~r.:-lt'a:-..._·~ P;l~cs <te>OOU-1-.a"p.\.) 

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4

s U.S. Department of State, Press Release~ ''Jran, North Korea, and Syria Nonpro1iferation Act Sanctions," March 

24. 2017. (hHp~: \\ \\W.~W.Il'.!.!O\' J pa 'prs. ps·:::o 17·03<!.690~-Lhtm) 

49 The Financial Action Task Force, Public Statement, "Public Statement- 24 June 2016," June 24,2016. 

Force, "lntemationa1 Standards on 

Terrorism and Proliferation," February 2012, 

'!:"'"-'"'-"-.'!':''".'!'-~!":'"-"""'-"!':!'''2_~illW.'.'~~'!!.'"'-"~~..G:"::'-'US3~':":'l'2'S!.'!.t!'S2'.'U.'Q.IJ; U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Announces Key and Legislation to Counter Money Laundering and 

Corruption. Combat Tax Evasion," May 5, 2016. (http:-::: \\\\ \"- .tn.·a:-.urv .!2.0\' ·prc~:--ccntcr prc'\s-

="':·""L"-""'-CJ.C=.-'-"="" Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, U.S. Department of 

Enforcement Network, 81 Federal 29398, May 11,2016. 

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64 Adapted from Eric B. Lorber. "Securing American Interests: A New Era of Economic PO\vcr," Foundation for 

Defense ofDemocracies, February 2017, pages 21-22. 

(http:·\\\\'\\ .dcfL·nddcmocr~lC\'.oru c,mtcnt·upl(l;!d:-; document:-:. CS!F S~..:curim.: Ar~1crican lntcn:-a:-:.pdl) 6

-" Adapted from Eric B. Lorber, "Securing American lnlcrests: A Ne'v Era of Economic Power," Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies, February 2017, pages 21-22. 

of' Democracies. Febnlaf)' 9. 2017. 

Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Stalementfor the Record 

Submitted /o Senate Armed SeJTices Commi/tee, 9, 2016. page 8. (hH!l~.,; \\ '" \\·.~nl!_C_J_: 

Jerrold D. Green. Brian Nichiporuk, 

Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nalisi, R. Bohandy, "The Rise of the Pasdaran Assessing the Domestic 

Roles of Iran's Islamic Re\·o!utionary Guards Corps," RAND, 2009. 

June 16,2013. 

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Xl U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Fact Sheet: New Executive Order Targeting Iranian Officials 

Responsible For Or Comphcit In Serious Human Rights Abuses," September 29,2010. 

Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to 

Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States," October II, 2011. 

IJ.lt!.l'c>~~:'O:JIS;~~~c.J!.C£.'_":!:':'ll.':.t:,l2[';:'~I.':.!~~J.l!l_g£U>!li~!!c!S0_); U.S. Department of Justice, Press 

Ambassador to the United States," 

Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals 77wt Reshaped the Middle East, 

(New York: Random House, 2016), page 138. 6 U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, "Manssor Arhabslar Sentenced in Nevi' York City Federal Court to 25 

Years in Prison for Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the 

United States:· May 30.2013. 

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, ''Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals 

for Proliferation Activities and for Terrorism," October 25, 2007. (http: ~(J(Ll.: 

=====:....c.==='-=-"-C..~""-=~="''' U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Fact Sheet: New 

Responsible For Or In Serious Human Rights Abuses," 

Emanuele Ottolcnghi, Sanctions against Iran: Iran's Aviation 

Sector," Testimony before the AfonelmT Policy and Trade Subcommittee and the Terrorism and Illicit Finance 

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Sohrab Ahmari, "The Mullahs' Syrian Airlift Gets a Boost," The Wall Street Jouma/, December 15,2016. 

(https: \\ \\·w.w::oJ.i.:<)!l1 articks thc-mullah~~.-,\Ti~m:airlil!~uct.c..-a~lwu~t-1 4~ l S.39.3~~2); Bill Coffin, ''Is the Iranian 

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accessed July 5. 2016. (http:·\\ ww .iranair.it l'llU.li~h 11rol'ik.shtm1) 9

s U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release, "Treasury Designates Iranian Commercial Airline Linked to 

for Terrorism,'" October 12,2011. (http:..: _l';_~~:_~L~~-l.'>~lr\'.~(i\ :l:·L·:--s-c::ntcT pn .. ·s~-

Department Press Release, "Iran's Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury Sepah Facilitating 

Iran's \Veapons Program," January 9. 2007. (http:< \\ \\'\\ .trca~urv .f:n\' ·1rc-..~-ccnt~..:r,'Prcss1~<i';,'~::::'.~';":;~-::;:;',:=~:,, of The lr'an Wars: Spy Garnes, Bank Battles, and Secret Deals That Reshaped the 

ofDernocracies, October 6, 2016. 

Transfcned $13 Billion Mon.: ln Cash to Iran After Initial Payment." The 

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human rights in the Islamic Republic of iran:· March 2017. 

(hHp:,-,\\ \\ \\'.0h~.:br.nn:: El\: ;<en ~E\ cnts P<E!t::-. DJsnl;.l\"0:<..'\\ :--.a~n\ '.'1\"c\\ ;;,.J D 21 J 76& Land 0:-:: E) 

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114 United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rappotieur on the situation of human rights in the 

Islamic Republic oflran," AIHRC/34/40, March 30, 2017, page I. 

(http:'\\ W\\ .ohchr.nrg· E~ Cuumric~ AsiaR~. . .'~.don PaQc:> lRlndc.\.aSt~A) 

ll 5 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Iranian Official for Human Rights Abuses," 

May 23, 2014. (https:: \n\ \\ .trcasur\'.i.:O\ vr<.:s~-ccntcr nrc:-.s-rckas\..'S ·Vat!cs·i!:::;4ll.asnx); u.s. Department of the 

Treasury. Press Release. "Treasury Designates Additional Individuals and Entities Under Iran-related Authorities," 

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win in securing \'Otcs for Iran nuclear deal." Reuters, September 2, 

(~~~~-'vw.rcutcrs.CL)J1l ;lrtick··us~ir~m-nuch.·ar~congrc~~-idUSKCl\'OR2 J L6.20 J 50002); Adam Szubin, 

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rck·:LSCS~JlCJf.!l':- jJDJ-l~~) 

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55 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Takeyh, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, for inviting me. And it’s a privilege to be here with my co-panelists. 

I actually come with good news. The Islamic Republic is at an 

impasse. It is an ideological experiment born in the 20th century 

that has managed to crawl into this century, but this journey will 

end and the theocratic dictatorship will join their radical counterparts in the dustbin of history. 

In some ways, Iran today resembles the Soviet Union of the 

1970s, a bloated state that avoids reforms and eventually brought 

about its own collapse. The foremost function of U.S. policy, therefore, is to continuously weaken the wobbly foundations of the clerical regime by pressing it both internally and in the region. 

The theme of today in Washington today, these days, is to push 

back on Iran. I think it is important to remember that pushing 

back on Iran must begin in Iran itself. The summer of 2009 and 

the rise of the green revolution will always be recalled as a watershed moment after which things are not the same. No less than Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has confessed that the movement 

brought Iran, quote, to the edge of the cliff. General Mohammad 

Jafari, the Commander of the Guards, has suggested that the 

Green Movement was a greater danger for the system and the Islamic revolution, and we went to the brink of the overthrow and 

the sedition. Sedition is the pejorative term they use for the Green 

Movement. The regime’s security services proved unreliable, dissension spread within the Guards, a number of commanders had 

to be dismissed, the ruling elites, which had perfected the strategy 

of staging counter-demonstrations, failed to do so for 6 months. 

The Islamic Republic was never and is never a typical totalitarian state. Its electoral processes and institutions provided the 

public at least with a veneer, an impression of democratic representation. That republican element of the regime evaporated in 2009, 

and with it vanishes legitimacy. 

The task of American diplomacy is, as Mr. Dubowitz suggested, 

is similar to that as Ronald Reagan facing the Soviet Union, not 

just negotiate or renegotiate a better arms control agreement, but 

devise a comprehensive strategy that undermines the regime. As 

the administration at that time did with Solidarity in Poland and 

other such organizations, we should find a way of establishing ties 

with opposition movements within Iran. 

Given the Islamic Republic’s cruelty and corruption, the opposition spans the entire social spectrum. The Iranians have given up, 

not just on the Islamic Republic, but on religious observance itself, 

as most mosques are empty during most Shia commemoration 

days. Three decades of theocratic rule has transformed Iran into 

one of the most secular nations in the Middle East. The middle 

class, the working poor are equally hard pressed by the regime’s incompetence and corruption. Even some of the senior members of 

the clergy are beginning to recognize the toll that politics has taken 

on religion. America has ready allies in Iran and must make an effort to empower them. 


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56 

Economic sanctions, in my view, are a critical part of any strategy of pressuring Iran. The experience of the past few years has 

shown that the United States and its partners have real capacity 

to shrink Iran’s economy. The fewer resources that the regime has 

at its disposal, the less capable it is of sustaining a cadre whose 

loyalty today is purchased, and the guardians of the revolution are 

well aware of that. Once deprived of money, the state will find it 

difficult to fund patronage networks that are essential to its rule 

and its imperial ventures. 

For Iran’s leadership to yield to international norms, all the 

walls around them have to close in, so it is important to stress its 

economy, divide the society, but also to push back on its influence 

in the Middle East, as was mentioned before. By contesting Iran’s 

gains, Washington can pose additional costs on the regime and contribute to regional stability. Iran’s leaders believe that the vitality 

of the revolution mandate its exports, and it is that export that 

must be negated as means of undermining that revolution. 

The best arena to push back on Iran, I think, still remains in the 

Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked into the regional conflict. 

We should assist all Gulf allies. Iraq, as was mentioned, is also a 

place where the United States can potentially have steady allies if 

it rehabilitates that country’s institutions and the military. Iraq 

cannot be whole and free so long as Iran interferes in its affairs. 

A commitment by the United States to Iraq will go far to diminishing its ties to Iran. 

Some in Washington believe that the Iran problem is secondary 

to violent jihadists. For all their achievement, those movements do 

not yet possess the resources and capability of a large sophisticated 

state. It must be noted that the Iranian regime was the original 

Islamic revolutionary state. Its successes inspired a wave of radicals across the Middle East. At the most basic level, this is a confrontation between a super power and a second rate autocracy, and 

therefore, we should emulate Ronald Reagan’s famous injunction in 

dealing with them: We win, they lose. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:] 


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Assessing the Iran Deal 

Ray Takeyh 

l-iasi/1 J Suhbcgh Senior Fc/!oH .for .~diddle f':_"(lst 5'nHlic.';, Council on Pon_'ign R(1otions· 

Bct<xe the 

Subcommittee on National Security of 

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

AprilS, 2017 

The Islamic Republic is at an impasse. An ideological experiment hom in a century of so many such radical postulations 

has managed to crawl into this epoch. But its journey is likely to end, and the theocratic dictatorship will join its radical 

counterparts in the dustbin of history. In some Iran resembles the Soviet Union of the 1970s, a bloated state that 

eschewed refonns and eventually brought about own The foremost function of U.S. policy 1110\'ing fonvard is 

to continuously weaken the \vobbly foundations of the regime by pressing it both internally and in the region. 

The faded history of the Cold War tends to focus little on So\iet premier Alexei Kosygin. In the mid-1960s, Kosygin 

pressed for econmnic refom1s that involved loosening state controls. This \Vas the China model before China embarked on 

it in the !at~ 1970s. Kosygin's enterprising efforts were ultimately obstructed by an aging Politburo led by Leonid 

Brezhncv. The Smiet Union chose to rely on oil wealth, -..:vhich seemed a smart decision amid the ptice hikes that 

followed the .. Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s. But once oil markets went from boom to bust, the Kremlin had a 

problem it could neither mitigate nor resolve: Failure to sustain the Kosygin refonns v.rhich vmuld have been cushioned by 

the rising state revenues meant that Mikhail Gorbachev·s belated efforts had no chance of succeeding. 

the Soviet Union also made some costly foreign-policy decisions in the 1970s. The 

resources in areas peripheral to core Soviet security concems, such as Africa and 

lmper·ialiisrn was tempting, but it was also costly. Eventually, those imperial impulses led Moscmv to the 

invasion 1u;~""""""'' a disastrous decision that further bled Russia. A combination of economic mismanagement and 

imperial mi>:ad·vcntunos contributed much to the Soviet Union's demise. 

The Soviet Cnion·s past is the Islamic Republic's presence. and 

celebrated in the West for his pragmatic approach to state planning and mr.,rn:onc•nar 

Rouhani is making a series of mistakes that could imperil the state he seeks to revive. 

evidence that he intends to embark on structural changes necessary to resolve fran's 

Inflation and unemployment plague Iran, vvhilc rampant corruption remains unaddressed. Russia's 

Communist leaders, Rouhani appears to hope that sanctions relief, access to global financial markets, and ramped-up oil 

sales will prove sufficient. Ironically. it is lran·s reactionary Supreme Leader Ali Khamenci who is actively calling for 

development oflocal industries and markets, as opposed to the sorts of short-term remedies that appear attractive to Iran's 

president and his modemist aides. 

Like the Soviet Union of the l970s, Iran has embarked on an imperial mission whose costs are more obvious than its 

benefits. The billions that Iran spends to sustain Bashar al~Assad in Syria and the lavish sums it invests in terrorist 

organizations such as Hczbollah may offer regional S\vay. but further burden the Islamic Republic's depleted 

economy. No policy has been more destructi\'c to lran·s its unrelenting toward Israel. The 

t\:vo states have neither in dispute nor a long history of animosity, yet an ideologically driven Republic 

has made assaulting the state one of its principal obsessions. This has led Iran to partner with unsavOiy actors, 

alienate much of the international community, and distress a public that has no stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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Still, in Iran's miscalculations lies an opportunity for the United States to deal effectively with one its most important 

adversaries. The task at hand is to use all of America's coercive tools to press for genuine change in Iran. 

Containment Begins at Home 

The Islamic Republic's relentless expansionism stems in part from the belief that its revolution can be consolidated at 

home only if it is exported abroad. This was after all, a revolution without borders. Moreover, threats from the 

outside have always been a convenient Guards and other state instruments to seek to justify 

their brutality. Thousands of executions theocratic state testify to the oppressive nature of the 

regime and to its overriding goal of shoring up lts rule at home, particularly by eliminating the threat that emanates from 

its own people. 

Today, the theocratic state is ruled by clerical ideologues who claim to know the mind of God, For them, the Islamic 

Republic is not merely a nation~state, it is a combatant in a struggle betv<'een good and evil, at home and abroad-a battle 

waged fOr moral redemption and genuine emancipation from the political and cultural tentacles of a profane \Vest. The 

rnu!lah"s internationalist vision has to have an antagonist and the lJnited States and its allies, particularly Israel, are it. 

Still, in the 1990s, it looked as if the Islamic Republic \VOuld fol10\~r the trajectory of other revolutionaty states and 

gradually dispem;e with its The rise of the refon11 movement led by enterprising intellectuals who 

2 

sought to hamwnize religious nom1s led to hopes of a different future. The election of Muhammad 

Khatami in 1997 was the culmination to connect the refonners to the larger public. The so-called Tehran Spring 

led to the 1ise of civil society groups, critical media and a victories by leaders committed to genuine 

change. And then came the counter-reaction. eye of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the 

conservatives struck back. The clerical oversight bodies parliamentary legislation, the judiciary closed refonnist 

newspapers and groups assassinated and tcn·orized others. To the detriment of the Islamic 

Republic. the of evolutionary change through the use of Iran's OV"l1 constitutional provisions died. 

The summer of 2009 will always be recalled as a watershed moment, after which things would never be the same. In June 

of that year, the presidential election that retumed to power by the vote presented the 

theocratic state \Yith the most consequential crisis of its life-time. The Movement exploded on the scene was a 

coalition of disenchanted clerics. restive youth, disenfranchised svomen and elemcms of the middle class. 

The regime managed to contTol of the streets through brutal violence its own citizens, shmv trials in which 

regime loyalists to fantastic crimes, and continued repression. Hmvevcr, the essential link between the state and 

society were severed. 

No less than Khamenei has the movement nearly brought about the collapse of the In a speech 

in 2013. leader Ali admitted that the Green Movement brought the regime to the of the cliff.'' 

General Jaffari, the commander of the Guards. has simllarly described the post~election period 

for the system and the Islamic revolution'' the lran~lraq War. '·We went to the brink ofoverthrO\v 

in this sedition, stated. The regime·s security services unreliable. Dissension spread even within the 

bJUards. Khamcnei had to dismiss several commanders. had perfected the strategy large 

pro-regime demonstrations, dared not bring its out for more than six months. 

became an occasion for protest. The Islamic never a typical totalitarian state, as electoral procedures and 

elected institutions provided the public wirh at of democratic representation. That republican element of 

the regime provided it with a veneer in 2009 that legitimacy vanished. 

The task of Anwrican diplomacy is sirni1ar to the one that Ronald Reagan faced with the Soviet Union: not just 

renegotiating a better anns~control 3!:,-'Teement but devising a comprehensive policy that undennines the theocratic regime. 

In this regard. there is as powerful as the presidential bully pulpit. Reagan's denunciations of Communist rule did 

much to galvanize the and undem1ine the Soviet empire. Dissidents in jail and others laboring under the Soviet 

took hea11 from an \Vho championed their cause. Banack Ohama chose the opposite course 

remained silent as protesters in called on America to support their cause. His administration was the one that 

paid scant attention to Iran's human rights abuses. As president, Trump should study Reagan's old speeches and emulate 

his powerful rhetoric. 
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As it did with Solidarity in Poland, the United States should find a way of establishing ties with forces of opposition 

\Vithin Iran. Given the Islamic Republic's cruelty and corruption, the opposition spans the entire social spectrum. The 

Iranians have given up not just on the Islamic Republic, but even on religious observance, as mosques go empty during 

most Shia commemorations. Three decades of theocratlc rule has transfom1ed Iran into one of the most secular nations in 

the 'vorld. The middle class and the working poor are equally hard pressed by the regime's incompetence and corruption. 

Even the senior ayatollahs are beginning to realize the toll that has taken on Shia Islam by its entanglement with politics. 

Americas has ready allies in Iran and must make an effort to empower those \Vho share its values. 

Economic sanctions arc a critical aspect of any policy of pressuring the Islamic Republic. The experience of the past few 

years has shmvn that the United States has a real capacity to shrink !ran's and bring it to the brink of collapse. 

The fe\'ver resources the regime has at its disposal, the less capable it is a cadre whose loyalty is purchased. 

The guardians of the revolution are well aware of their unreliability of their coercive services: the govemment had 

difficulty in repressing the Green Movement or mobilizing counter-demonstrations in the summer of2009. Designating 

the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization and imposing financial sanctions could go a long way toward 

crippling Iran·s economy. Once deprived of money, the mullahs will find it difficult to fund the patronage netv-.'orks that 

are essential to their rule and their imperial ventures. 

By generating such pressures, it is hoped that the Islamic Republic begins negotiating with the opposition elements. This 

\Vi1l involve releasing political prisoners, allowing those barred from public service to stand as candidates for public 

office, and ceasing its attacks on civil society groups such as trade unions and professional syndicates. The rulers ofiran 

will only embark on such activities if they are suhject to sustained intcmational pressure and condemnation. Iran should 

be held as accountable for its dismal human rights record. as its nuclear infractions or support for tenorism. 

Pushing hack in the Region 

For the recalcitrant mullahs to yield to international norms, all the walls around them have to close in. So as it stresses 

Iran's economy and divides its society, the United States should also push back against its influence in the Middle East. 

By contesting Iran·s gains, Washington can impose additional costs on the regime and contribute to regional 

Iran's leaders believe that the vitality of their revolution mandates its export And it is that export that must be as 

means ofundennining the revolution. 

An essential insight of any such policy is to dispense with the false notion that Iran and America ha\'e a common enemy 

in the Islamic State (ISIS) or other radical Sunni terrorist organizations. Beneath Iran's expressions of concern about the 

rise of ISIS is a more cynical strategy. Iran today is using ISIS' ascendance in the Middle East to consolidate its power. 

The theocracy is now the key all keeping Iraqi Shias and Alawite Bashar al-i\ssad's regime standing against well-anned 

and tenacious Sunni Jihadists. In those battles, Iran \:viii to make sure the Sunnis don't conquer the Shia 

portions of Iraq and Assad's enclave in Syria. but no more. in ISIS' wake. Tehran will strengthen its own 

Shia militias. It is important to stress the fact that Sunni radicalism is the necessary by-product ofiran·s Shia chauvinism. 

Destroying the Islamic States requires diminishing the tides of Sunni militancy, which in tum necessitates tempering 

!ran·s regional ambitions. 

The best arena in which to achieve the objective of pushing back on Iran is in the Persian Gulf region. The Gulf 

sheikdoms, led by Saudi Arabia, are already locked into a region~widc rivalry with Iran. The Sunni states have taken it 

upon themselves to contest Iran's gains in the Gulf and the Levant. ·washington should not only buttress these efforts but 

press all Arab states to embark on a serious attempt to lessen their commercial and diplomatic ties to Tehran. The price of 

American guardianship is fOr Sunni Arab states to do their part in resisting the rising Shia pov·:er of Iran. 

Getting the Gulf states to agree to take common action has always been difficult The United States should help the Gulf 

states no only as they battle Iranian proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but also as they deal \Vith a range of other 

challenges. These include protecting themselves against lran·s efforts to undermine their internal security. defending their 

economic infrastructure (such as oil and gas platfom1s, water-desalinization plants, and tourist sites), and preventing Iran 

from interdicting their energy exports along key transit routes. 
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4 

To confront Iran, the Gulf states wiJJ need capabilities commensurate with the challenge. In particular, the United States 

should consider supplying them with systems that defend against guided rockets and mortars, such as the Centurion c-ram. 

i\nd in the long-run, the Gulf states have the financial resources, even at reduced oil prices, to invest in the next 

generation of missile defense technologies, such as directed-energy weapons, which would diminish Iran·s ability to 

attack them. 

The countries in the region with fonnidable special~forces capabilities, such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, 

should use that advantage to help some of the more vulnerable countries, such as Bahrain, deal with their internal security 

problems-arrangements that Washington could help hroker. lran·s adversaries could even develop a subset of special 

forces capable of operating inside Iran to cxploi( the grie·vances of various ethnic minotitlcs. The goal would be to make 

Iran think twice about its campaign of regional subversion by dcmonstraring that two can play that game. 

The Gulf states need to fwther reduce Iran's to chock off oil exports by blocking the Strait of Ilonnuz. 

the should also take steps to increase those pipelines capacity. 

such as missiles to take down lran·s aircraft and Jand~attack cruise 

missiles to destroy its cruise mlssiles. And they should augment that effort with the undersea capabilities needed 

for a campaign against Iran's surface naval assets, including its many small boats. 

Even in a disorderly l\1iddle East, there are opportunities to forge new constructive alliances. The enmity that Saudi 

Arabia and Israel share toward Iran should be the basis for bringing these two countries closer together. Instead of 

lecturing the Saudis to share the Middle East with Iran and hectoring Israelis about settlements, the United Should focus 

on imaginatiYe ways of institutionalizing the nascent that is already taking place between Riyadh and 

Jerusalem. The U.S. should press hoth countries intelligence sharing and perhaps force complementary 

trade ties, with Saudi oil exchanged for Israeli products. History rarely offers opportunitk'S to realign the 

politics of the Middle East: a truculent Tran has this chance, 

and rancor, is the US-Israeli relationship. One of the most 

ties with Israel damages its in the Middle East. To be 

in should put some distance between the only 

the region. on Iran to have Israel as one of its core elements. The fact is that the 

Republic respects fears its integration in the Middle East. An Israel closely tied to the United States 

enhances our deterrent power. And an Israel that is mending fences \Vith Sunni Arab states the anti~Iran 

alliance and further isolates the theocracy in the region. America's task should not to distant 

bring all elements of its anti-Iran coalition together. 

Although today Iraq seems like a that most Iraqi leaders want to Iraq 

was once the seat of Arab The Shia leaders in lraq take advice 

and money for the simple reason that councils and abandoned by the American 

sm,en><wvcr. Iraqis understand that Iran exercised a pemlcious influenct• in their country, further accentuating its 

divides as a means of ensuring Iranian influence. Iraq cannot be whole and free so long as Iran interferes in its 

affairs. A commitment by the United States to once more rehabilitate and bureaucracy can go a 

toward diminishing its ties to Tehran. No Iraqi Arab wants to be Shia Persians. Once 

itself of Iranian dominance, it may yet find a path back to the Arab world and once more serve as a barrier to 

power. 

At a practica11evel, Washington should also push Baghdad to govern more inclusively, so that the central government is 

seen as benefiting Sunnis and Kurds, and just the Shias. It shou]d make an outreach to the Sunni tribes on a scale 

to \vhat took place during the 2007 of U.S. troops.. And it should militmy assistance to Kurds 

the Sunni tribal forces, intensify the ISIS in both Iraq and and embed U.S. personnel in the 

Iraqi. military at lower levels than it currently does. U.S. presence in need not entail a massive combat 

force there, but it would mean a thus a greater risk Again, the price 

U.S. involvement should be a on the part of local actors to press back against Tehran and its 
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The tragedy of Syria is that, as the Obama administration stood aloof and preoccupied itself with useless intemational 

summits, Iran and Russia possibly succeeded in Assad Dynasty. The Syrian army, buttressed by Iran's 

Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah terrorists, and airpower, is poised to control most of the population centers. 

This hardly ends the civil war, but the attempt to unseat Iran's client in Damascus will take considerable effort and 

commitment by the United States and its Sunni allies. For both and humanitarian reasons, we should embrace 

this task. Pushing back on Iran means harassing its Syrian proxy. At least, as the opposition strengthens, Iran will 

have to face the dilemma of sinking more resources and n1en into a quagmire or cutting its losses, as the Soviet Union was 

forced to do ln Afghanistan. 

As regime as dangerous to U.S. interest as the Islamic Republic requires a comprehensive strategy to counter it This 

means exploiting all of Iran's vulnerabilities: increasing the costs of its foreign adventures, weakening its economy, and 

supporting its domestic discontents. Pursuing that strategy will take time, but eventually, it will put the Un-ited States in a 

position to impose tenns on Iran. We should seek to compel Iran to cease its regional subversion, not create power 

vacuums that encourage it. And we should move human rights up the agenda. not look the other way as Iran's leaders 

oppress their people. 

Some in Washington believe that Iran problem importance to the United States compared to \'iolcnt 

Jihadists. For all their achievements, those radical movements the resources and capabilities of a large, 

sophisticated state. It must be noted that the Iranian regime was Islamic revolutionary state. Its successes 

inspired a wave of radicals across the Middle East. At its most basic level, the confrontation between the United States 

and Iran is a conflict between the world's sole superpo\ver and a second~rate autocracy. Washington does not need to 

settle for hopes that theocrats with no interest in relaxing their grip will somehow become moderates. A detem1ined policy 

of pressure would speed the day when the Iranian people replace a regime that has made their lives miserable. And in the 

interim, it would reduce the threat of a triumphant regime posed to the Middle East and the \vorld beyond. 
62 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Walsh, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D. 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of 

the committee, it’s an honor to be here today to discuss the implementation of the nuclear agreement with Iran and our P5+1 international partners. 

Let me begin first by looking at Iran’s compliance with the 

JCPOA. The JCPOA is a nuclear agreement. It’s not an agreement 

on regional relations, human rights, or other issues, and it’s a nuclear agreement for good reason. Denying Iran nuclear weapons is 

the uncontested single most important American objective in the 

Gulf. Yes, Iran supports policies that run contrary to American interests, but the only thing worse than an Iran that does bad things 

is an Iran that does bad things and has nuclear weapons. 

It’s also worth noting, as I have explained in past testimony, that 

the JCPOA is arguably the strongest multilateral nonproliferation 

agreement negotiated in the nuclear age. No country has been subjected to the kind of intrusive inspection and verification embodied 

in this agreement. Today, IAEA has more inspectors on the ground 

in Iran than ever before. 

To assess Iran’s compliance, I use a variety of metrics. One, 

Iran’s implementation of specific provisions. Did Iran remove 98 

percent of its uranium stockpile? Yes. Did Iran dismantle twothirds of its centrifuges? Yes. Did it destroy the calandria of the 

Arak reactor? Yes. Time does not permit me to go through the 

whole list, but I think you get the idea. 

Next, I look at, two, assessments by others. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. intelligence community, our European partners, including Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, 

have all concluded that Iran is in compliance with its obligations. 

The Israeli military, for its part, has changed its threat assessment 

as a result of the nuclear agreement. 

Let me turn now to Iran’s regional activities. Iran’s regional activities pose problems for U.S. interests in the region, but by way 

of context, few countries in the Middle East have been shy about 

meddling in the affairs of their neighbors. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 

Turkey, and Egypt, for example, have all recently intervened in 

other countries, directly or through proxies. Moreover, these practices have been a prominent feature in the region for decades. 

Now, none of this means that Iran’s unwanted behavior should 

be simply accepted; it shouldn’t. What it does suggest, however, is 

that regional meddling is not new, it is unlikely to go away any 

time soon by any of the players, and it should be judged in context 

and not in isolation. In short, this is the Middle East, and it has 

been like this for a very long time. But when it comes to Iran, ambition is one thing, capability is another. 

And even when one looks at the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, it’s pretty 

clear who has the upper hand. In this competition, the Kingdom is 

supported by the Gulf Emirates, Pakistan, Egypt, and the U.S., 

among others. The Iranian side is poor and weak by comparison. 

It includes Lebanon, a weak state, Syria, in the middle of a civil 

war, and possibly Iraq, although I doubt that for the long-term, but 


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63 

is also fighting a war on its own territory. Saudi Arabia alone, 

without counting its many allies, is far wealthier than Iran and 

outspends its rival on defense. 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that 

Saudi Arabia spends almost four times as much on its military as 

Iran. It goes on to conclude that, quote, Saudi Arabian Armed 

Forces remain the best equipped of all of the states in the region 

except Israel. So while Iran may have aspirations of hegemony, it 

lacks the economic and military capabilities to achieve that status, 

particularly in a region where Sunnis vastly outnumber the Shia. 

Terrorism. Iran is said to be the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world, though some experts would instead point to 

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Critics of the agreement have suggested that it would free resources that Iran would use for increased terror activity. As my past testimony explains, there are 

reasons to doubt this. In addition, I went back and tested the proposition using the University of Maryland’s global terrorism database. I examined terror attacks for all four groups that Iran has 

supported in the past. The results are striking and surprising. 

First, terror attacks by the most active groups are all significantly down from their historic highs. More tellingly, attacks are 

all down beginning around 2013, 2014, that is to say, with the 

JPOA and the JCPOA. Now, one will have to keep an eye on this 

to see if it changes, but to date, the data is clear: the rise in terror 

attacks by Iranian-backed groups predicted by critics simply did 

not happen. 

Ballistic missiles. Under the Security Council resolution, Iran 

has, quote, called upon not to carry out ballistic missile tests of nuclear-capable missiles. To be clear, the language in the resolution 

does not mandate that Iran end missile tests, and the resolution 

actually provides for missile technology transfers in the agreement. 

Since the time its cities were attacked by ballistic missiles by Iraq 

during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has viewed missiles as a defense 

need, not surprisingly, and has achieved virtual self-sufficiency in 

that program. Sanctions cannot change that reality. Only a reduction of regional tensions can do that, but until then, the U.S. has 

other options at its disposal. 

In conclusion, I believe that Congress has an important role to 

play in the JCPOA’s implementation, and I stand ready to work 

with this committee to make sure we achieve our common goal and 

our first priority: ensuring that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons. 

Thank you very much. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:] 


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Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

Subcommittee on National Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

"'Assessing the Iran Deal"' 

Wednesday, Ap1il 5, 2017 

Statement of Dr. Jim Walsh 

MIT Security Studies Program 

Mr. Chainnan, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee: 

It is an honor to be with you today to discuss the status of the nuclear agreement with Iran and 

our PS+ I international partners. 1 Congressional leadership is one reason we have a historic and 

unprecedented nuclear agreement, and continued oversight by Congress will be required if the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is to achieve its objective of preventing Iran fi·om 

acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

I come to today's hearing as someone who has provided assessments to Republican and 

Democratic presidents, as well as to Republican and Democratic Members of Congress, as they 

have wrestled with these policy challenges. I have studied Iran, its nuclear program, its role in 

the region, sanctions, and terrorism for more than 15 years. I have written extensively on Iran 

and its foreign policy, and have had the honor to share my views in testimony before Congress 

on a number of occasions. 2 

1

I would like to thank the many people who suggested thoughts or otherwise supported my 

testimony, including Angela Nichols, Daryl Kimball. Edward Levine, William Luers, Iris Bieri, 

Aria Rivero, the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Max Walsh, and Coric Walsh. 

My testimony and comments are mine alone, however, and are not intended to represent the 

views of the MIT Security Studies Program or individuals I have consulted in the preparation of 

this testimony. 2 Sec, for example, Jim Walsh "Rivals, Adversaries, and Partners: Iran and Iraq in the Middle 

East,'' In Iran and Its Neighbors, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017: Jim Walsh, editor, 

Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control, Vols. 37-41, Dobbs Fen·y, N.Y: 

Oceana Law Publications; Jim Walsh. "Nuclear Regimes and Nuclear Terrorism," Testimony 

before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the 

Senate Govermnental Affairs Committee, Multilateral Non-proliferation Regimes, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Technologies and the War on Terrorism. February 12,2002, pp. 1-12; Jim 

Walsh, "Evaluating Key Components of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action With Iran,'· 

Written statement for the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States 

Senate, June 25, 2015, Washington, DC: US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-26. 
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In my testimony today, I want to directly address the two issues raised by this hearing. 3 

I) Iran· s compliance with the JCPOA 

2) Iran's regional behavior 

My summary judgment is that Iran has complied with its obligations under the JPOA and the 

JCPOA for all 3 years. lt is my assessment that Iran engages in a number of objectionable 

policies in the region. but that a) its profile in is often exaggerated and mischaracterized, b) many 

if not most states in the region also engage in these same activities, and c) these practices have 

been a prominent feature of regional relations in the Middle East for decades. I conclude that the 

JCPOA is accomplishing the single most important Ame1ican national interest in the Gulf, 

namely preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, 1 find that Iran· s 

problematic behavior outside the JCPOA does not present an imminent, unusuaL or significant 

threat to US interests, nor is it outside the ability of the United States and its pminers to constrain 

and counter Iran· s unwelcome activities. 

I. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA 

Before reviewing Iran's performance under the JCPOA. it makes sense first establish a context 

for assessment. The JCPOA is a nuclear agreement. It is not an agreement on regional relations, 

human rights, or other issues. And it is a nuclear agreement for a good reason: denying Iran 

nuclear weapons is the uncontested, single most important American objective in the Gulf Iran 

suppmis policies that run contrary to American interests and the interests of our allies, but the 

only thing worse than an Iran that does bad things is an Iran that does bad things and has nuclear 

weapons. 

It is also worth noting, as I have explained in previous testimony, that the JCPOA is arguably the 

strongest multi-lateral nonproliferation agreement negotiated in nuclear age4 The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). the comerstone of the nonproliferation regime, does not come close. 

No country has been subjected to the kind of intrusive inspection and verification regime 

embodied in the JCPOA. Today. the IAEA has more inspectors on the ground than ever before. 

One measure of the value of the agreement is to compare where we are today to where we would 

be in the absence of the JCPOA The chart below forecasts those alternative futures for the 

production of20?,·;, enriched uranium. once the single biggest concern about Iran's nuclear 

3 "Witness Invitation Letter fi'om the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to Jim 

Walsh." March 31. 2017. 4 See. f(lr example. Jim Walsh. "Comments on the Recently the Recently Negotiated Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action:· Invited comments for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

United States Senate, August 1 2015. Washington, DC: US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-6; Jim 

Walsh, ''Iran Terror Financing and the Tax Code." Written statement for the House Committee 

on Ways and Means, Oversight Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 

November 4, 2015. Washington, DC: US Congress, 2015, pp. 1-10. 
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activities, but broadly representative of a variety of measures from 

stockpiles to research and development of advanced centrifuge designs. 

centrifuges to LEU 

To assess Iran's compliance or non-compliance with the JCPOA, l use four metrics: l) whether it 

has implemented the provisions of the agreement, 2) assessments by the US and other 

governments and 3) the nature or quality of the compliance (e.g .. affirmative versus slow 

and begrudging), and 4) whether any to the agreement has made use of its rights under the 

agreement to make a fom1al claim 

This simple but straightforward approach of evaluation on specific actions Iran is 

obligated to have carried out. Below is a list of some of the more important requirements under 

the agreement and Iran's response. 

Did Iran remove 98% of its LEU stockpile? Yes. 

Did Iran dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges'' Yes. 

Did Iran destroy the calandria of the Arak reactor? Yes. 

Did Iran cap its level of emichment to 3.67%'> Yes. 

Did Iran convert the Fordow underground facility? Yes. 

Did Iran submit to 24/7 lAEA inspection of its sensitive facilities? Yes. 

Is Iran reprocessing plutonium? No. 

Based on my own of these aud other Iranian actions, I conclude that Iran has complied 

with its obligations the JCPOA. Moreover, this has been tme notjust for a year under the 

JCPOA but rather a full 3 years going back to the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As a 

Ali Vaez, ''Key Features of Iran's Nuclear Program." International Crisis Group. 

10,2015. 

program/ 
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consequence, one can say with high confidence that Iran cannot, under these conditions, build a 

nuclear weapon. 

Of course, this is just one analyst's judgment. This conclusion would be strengthened. if 

assessments by others an·ived at a similar result and weakened. if these evaluations arrived at a 

different finding. Accordingly, we consider a second metric for assessment. 

2) Assessments by others 

This committee is not alone in wanting to detennine if Iran has complied with its obligations. 

The other signatories to the agreement as well as those not party to the JCPOA (e.g .. Israel) have 

a strong stake in whether Iran is abiding by the terms of the JCPOA and the associated lJN 

Security Council Resolution. 

Perhaps first among the interested observers is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

which has responsibility for much of the fonnal verification of the JCPOA. The IAEA has 

conducted quarterly and sometimes monthly reviews of Iran's compliance and has judged in 

every one of its repm1s that Iran has met its obligations6 

Similarly, when questioned in Congressional hearings, representatives from the US intelligence 

community reported that Iran has complied with the nuclear agreement. Moreover, American 

intelligence officials judge that if Iran were not in compliance. \vc would know: "the 

international community is well postured to quickly detect changes to Iran's declared nuclear 

f:1cilities.''7 

These same conclusions have been affinned by our European partners in the agreement, 

including Britain, France, Germany, and the EU8 For example, the High Representative of the 

EU for Foreign AITairs and Security Policy recently remarked that, "So far. as I said. both 

through the 1/\E/\'sj reports- i!Yc of them- and through th.: Joint Commission Assessments 

that looks at all the different elements llffull wmpliancc in good Elith by all actors of the 

.ICPOA, we haw akays assessed together that there is full compliance in all sides by all 

actors:·9 

Pariicularly interesting are the views offered by the Israeli military. Statements by Israeli Chief 

of the General StatT Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, who commands the Israeli Defense 

Forces (IDF). suggested that the .ICPOA had the effect of reordering Israel's defense priorities. a 

6 For the latest 1/\EA report. sec IAEA. "Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of 

Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (201 5).'' GOV/201711 0, 

February 24, 2017. 7 James R. Clapper. ·'Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 

Community, Senate Anned Services Committee, February 9. 2016. p. 8. 
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result reflected in Israel's 2016 National Intelligence Estimatc. 10 Indeed, a report by the RAND 

Corporation observed that "Israeli analysts who favored the nuclear agreement and those who 

opposed it largely assess the prospects for Iranian compliance with the JCPOA to be high."ll 

In short. every official assessment offered to date supports the conclusion that Iran is complying 

with its obligations under the JCPOA. 

3) The nature or guality of Iran's compliance 

The United States and intemational community have years of experience enforcing 

nonproliferation agreements. Some countries have been affirmative and forthcoming in their 

implementation of their obligations; others have stonewalled and stalled. The poster child for the 

latter approach was Saddam Hussein and Iraq, where lJN inspectors were under constant 

pressure from a regime that was detem1ined to hinder the implementation of CN mandates. Iran 

has not followed the Saddam Hussein model. Instead, Iran moved swiftly to fulfill its 

obligations. And when disputes over implementation have arisen, as one would expect with a 

complex agreement of more than 100 pages, the parties have been able to quickly resolve them 

and move forward. 

4) Fonnal claims of non-compliance 

Under the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, the parties to the agreement and the IAEA have the 

prerogative to go to the UNSC and declare that Iran is in breach of its obligations. Such a 

declaration would trigger the snap back sanctions provisions and process. To date, no country 

has made such a claim, and that includes the Trump administration. Indeed, I am not aware that 

any of the groups represented at this hearing -FFD, UN ANI, or ISIS- have called on the US 

govemment to make such a declaration, and given the arguments they have made in the past, I 

presume they would not be "self-deterred'' from urging such a move if they believed that Iran 

was in compliance. 

In shmi, my analysis finds that Iran has complied with its obligations and that this conclusion is 

broadly consistent with the judgments made by a wide anay of govemments and intemational 

observers. Moreover, no party to the agreement has gone to the UNSC or even threatened to go 

to the l;'N to claim that Iran is in material breach of its obligations. 

Ill. Iran's Regional Activities 

The Context: Iranian Aspirations and the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry 

Iran's regional activities pose a number of problems for US interests in the region, as well as for 

the interests of our allies and partners. Before reviewing Iran's regional behavior, it would be 

helpful to step back and look at the policy and historical context. 

10 Graham Allison. "Is Iran Still Israel's Top Threat?," The Atlantic, March 8, 2016. 

https:l/www. theatlantic.comiintemational/ archive/20 16/03/iran-nuclear-deal-israel/4 727 67 I 11 Kaye, Dalia Dassa. Israel's iran Policies After the Nuclear Deal. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2016, p. 7. https:!/www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE207.html. 
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First, it is wmth noting that Iran is not the first country to enter into a nuclear agreement but then 

continue with regional activities that were contrary to US interests. Anns control agreement 

with the Soviet Union did not end Moscow's foreign adventurism, nor did the nonproliferation 

agreement with Libya stop Colonel Gadafi fl·om his anti-Israel rhetoric and policies. 

Nevertheless, these agreements are considered to have bolstered the security of the US and its 

allies. And certainly in the absence of these nuclear agreements, both countries would have 

engaged in the same behavior. regardless. 

Second, few countries in the Middle East have been shy about meddling in the affairs of their 

neighbors. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey took early and aggressive steps to suppm1 insurgent 

groups in Syria, including those that had extremist tendencies or were associated with known 

terror organizations. Saudi Arabia and its allies are currently waging a way in Yemen that has 

had hon·ific consequences for the civilian population, and the Wall Street Joumal has repmtcd 

that Saudi-backed forces have fought alongside and in cooperation with AI Qacda. 12 And not to 

be left out, Egypt has intervened in Libyan conflict. 

Moreover, these practices have been a prominent feature in the region for decades. In Egypt 

under Nasser, Cairo intervened in Y cmen, took over Syria, and hatched any number of coup 

attempts against Iraq and other rivals. Iran and Iraq, patiicularly under the Shah and Saddam 

Hussein respectively. engaged in countless attempts to put pressure on each other though the use 

of proxies and propaganda. Saddam Hussein also invaded Kuwait. It would be easier to name 

the countries in the region that have not meddled in the affairs of their neighbors than to name all 

the ones who have. 

None of this is to suggest that Iran's unwanted behavior should simply be accepted. It shouldn't. 

The US has a variety of foreign policy tools it can use to minimize and counter such activity, as 

it has had to do for years. What is docs suggest, however, is that this behavior is not new, it is 

unlikely to go away any time soon. and that it should be judged in context and not isolation. In 

shoti, this is the Middle East, and it has been like this a long time. 

The Islamic Republic's attempts at regional mischief are tied to two larger currents in Iranian 

foreign policy: its view of itself as a country that should be a hegemon in Southwest Asia and 

more impotiantly, the increasingly destructive rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran has 

long thought of itself as deserving a privileged status. but the Cll!Tent Saudi-Iranian rivalry has its 

roots in more recent events, in particular the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 2003 War in Iraq. 

Iran's ambition to be the regional hegemon is one part ambition. one part humiliation from 

having been dominated by foreign powers, and one part religious identity, as it is the central 

Shi'ite Muslim country in a region where Sunni Muslims predominate. Long before the Iranian 

revolution, the Shah of Iran had hoped to become the leading state in the region. Iranians 

sometimes wistfully refer Cyms the Great and the Persian Empire and express shame at what has 

befallen them since. They arc the Rodney Dangerfield of the Middle East. feeling like they don't 

12 Maria Abi-Habib and Mohammed Al-Kibsi. ··Qaeda Fights on Same Side as Saudi-Backed 

Militias in Yemen, Wall Street Joumal, July 16, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/al-qaedafights-on -same-side-as-saudi -backed-mi li ti as-in-yem en-14 3 7 0 8 7 06 7 
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get any respect, and clearly there is a ethnic dimension to this, as some Iranians feel a sense of 

superiority over their Arab neighbors and stew at the notion that the wealthy Gulf kingdoms have 

surpassed them economically and politically. Still ambition is one thing, capability is another. 

Indeed when one looks at the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. it's pretty clear who has stronger position. In 

this competition, the Kingdom is supported by the Gulf emirates, Pakistan, Egypt, and the US, 

among others. The Iranian "side" is poor and weak by comparison. It includes Lebanon (a weak 

state). Syria (in the middle of a civil war) and possibly Iraq (also at war on its own tenitory). 

though my own guess is that if Iraq ever gets its act together. a resumption of the Iran-Iraq 

rivalry may well follow. Saudi Arabia alone, without counting its many allies is far wealthier 

than Iran and far outspends its rival on defense. The most recent figures from the respected 

International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that Saudi Arabia spends roughly $60b a year 

on its military compared to approximately $!6b in Iran. That is a ratio of 3. 75-l. That bears 

repeating. Saudi Arabia spends nearlv four times as much on its military as Iran. IISS goes on 

to conclude that "Saudi Arabian armed forces remain the best equipped of all the states in the 

region except lsracl." 13 

So while Iran may have the aspirations of a hegemon, it lacks the economic and military 

capabilities to achieve that status, particularly in a region where Su!11lis vastly outnumber the 

Sh'ia. 

Iran in the Region: Aggressor. Defender, or Both? 

!ran is involved in the intemal affairs of a number of countries in the region, but the situations 

vary considerably. 

In Iraq, it is playing defense. Having been in1·itcd by the Iraqi govemment, Iran is fighting ISIS, 

as the US is doing as well. Iran no doubt hopes that its assistance to Iraq will win it friends and 

influence there. hut the historical record of Iranian intervention into Iraqi affairs is not a pretty 

one. The more Iran attempts to wield influence. the more average Iraqi's hold it responsible if 

things tum out poorly. Worse yet for the Iranians, they arc their own worst enemy. Their sense 

of superiority over Arabs and their lack of a deft touch ollen alienates Iraqis, who rest:nt the 

high-handed foreigners. This cycle has played out repeatedly in Iraqi domestic politics since 

2003. 14 It is also worth remembering that quite a number of Iraqi Shi'ite Arabs killed a lot of 

Iranian Shi'itc Persians during the bloody Iran-Iraq War. lt remains to he seen whether religion 

or ethnicity and nationalism will prove to be the stronger force. but in any case. Iraq's non-trivial 

Sunni population will get a say. 

In Syria, Iran is again on defense, fighting on behalf of one of its few allies in the region, Assad. 

My personal view is that Assad is a war criminal who should be tried for crimes against 

humanity. but as a scholar ofintemational relations. it certainly docs not surprise me that states 

come to the defense of their allies for reasons of national interest. That is the way states behave. 

The good news is that Iran is finally having to pay costs for its alliance. Prior to this, the 

13 !ISS, The Mi!itm:v Balance. 2017, (London: l!SS), 2017, p. 401 14 Jim Walsh "Rivals. Adversaries. and Partners: Iran and Iraq in the Middle East." In fran and 

Its Neighbors, London: Palgravc Macmillan. 2017. 
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relationship was all benefits and no real costs to speak of. In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic 

Republic is spending blood and treasure, and at least in Syria, it will likely do some for years to 

come. This is blood and treasure that once spent cannot be recouped and used elsewhere for 

other purposes. 

In Lebanon, Iran's role is more straightforwardly an attempt to extend its influence, especially 

tJu·ough Hezbolah and other Shi'ite groups. Its influential role in Lebanese affairs is bad for the 

region and especially bad for Israel. 

Y cmen and Bahrain are the other two countries where Iran is involved, but the relationship here 

involves neither the costly defense of an ally nor selt~interested meddling for its own purposes. 

Iran sees itself as both the defender of the Shia and a rival to Saudi Arabia. Both elements 

undergird Iran's involvement with these countries. But unlike the countries discussed above. 

neither Yemen nor Bahrain is a vital interest to Iran. and in neither case is it "all in.'' What's 

more, in both countries there are particular histories and interests that both precede and 

supersede Iran's role. Iran or no Iran, the Houthis would be fighting their fellow countrymen, as 

they have for decades now. It is a complex cauldron ofHouthi grievance, the lingering 

machinations of a fom1er dictator, a rather robust AI Qaeda presence, and Saudi insecurity. 

In Bahrain, the situation is different, insofar as it is a case of a majority population (Shi'a) being 

ruled by a Sunni autocrat and what has been, at least until recently, a largely indigenous and 

peaceful attempt by Bahraini's to advance their political rights. Iran has largely stayed away 

from direct involvement in this fight, and the locals certainly do not want to be discredited by 

colluding with a foreign capital like Tehran. \Vhethcr reports of anns shipments to Bahrain 

prove both true and significant remains to be seen, but it would be a very negative development. 

So while Yemen and Bahrain represent different situations, they both represent an interestthough not a vital interest- to h·an as well as a way to pressure or strike back at the Saudis. 

Reducing the Regional Conflicts 

It is in the interest of the US reduce the intensity if not see an end the many conflicts in the 

region. Cont1icts lead to instability, migration and intemal population movements, civilian 

casualties, and weak states. These weak states are unable to police their own territory and thus 

become havens ior violent extremists. 

Sanctions are not likely to have much impact when a country's vital interests are on the line. 15 So 

what can the US and other in the region do'' Two areas stand out from the rest: l) degrading and 

destroying ISIS and 2) tuming down the volume on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. This latter 

objective will require both reassuring Saudi Arabia but also pushing for a political aJTangemcnt 

that can set boundaries and thus end some of the most pernicious aspects of the competition 

between these two rivals. Absent a ne\\' political understanding between the two rivals. it will be 

very difficult to stop the bloodshed and chaos. Iran and Saudi Arabia do not have to be friends; 

15 For a review of the social science research on sanctions effectiveness, see Jim Walsh and John 

Park. "Stopping Nmth Korea. Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences:· 

MIT Security Studies Program, August 2016, pp. 1-64 

<https://drive.google.com/lile/d/OB _ph0c6i87C _ eGhCOGRhUVFaU28/view> 
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they need rules of the road and mutually agreed limits that benefit both parties. Such 

anangements have been worked out before between rivals in the regional. though they are hard 

to sustain over time. At a minimum, the US should not stand in the way of a political solution, 

and ideally it should encourage one. 

In the end, there will probably be conflict in the Middle East for at least the foreseeable future. 

Inter-state meddling is not a new phenomenon in the region; it has a long and rich history. But it 

can be marginally worse or marginally better, and it is in American interests to see the latter. 

The conflicts also serve as a reminder why the top priority for the region must that Iran or others 

do not acquire nuclear weapons. Instability and conflict may persist for some time, but it will be 

a less dangerous state of affairs if the panics do not have the ultimate weapon. 

IV. Terrorism 

One aspect of regional relations not yet discussed is tenorism. Iran has been called the largest 

state sponsor of terrorism in the world, though some experts would instead point to Pakistan and 

Saudi Arabia as peer competitors in this regard. Iran has supported a number of non-state actors 

that have been designated by various governments as tenor organizations. These include most 

centrally Hezbollah, as well as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Iran's relations with these groups have waxed and 

waned over time, but the advent of the JCPOA led some to suggest that the agreement would free 

resources that Iran could put into increased tenor activity. As my previous testimony explains, 

there are strong reasons to doubt this, but rather than repeat those arguments. I thought I would 

go back and do something that had not been done: taking a look at the actual data. Using the 

University of Maryland's database for terror incidents. I went and looked at tetTor attacks by all 

four groups over time. The results suggest that terror attacks by these groups have, in most 

cases, actually declined in number since the JPOA. The full tables are contained in an appendix, 

but here are the charts documenting attacks for each of the four groups. 

Hczbol!ah 16 

42': 

Hamas 17 

16https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Rcsults.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=b&casualti 

es _ max=&dtp2=all&success=yes&perpetrator=407 &ob=GTDID&od=desc&page= 1 &count= 10 

O#results-tablc 
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100 ~ 

so: 

.AI5.J 60, 

20': 

I I I I I 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad18 

Liberation of Palestine-General Command 

Two features are striking. First, terror attacks by the t!n·ee most active groups are all generally 

down from the historic highs compared with previous years. Second. and perhaps more telling, 

attacks are all down beginning around 2013-2014, i.e., with the JPOA and JCPOA. One will 

have to keep an eye on this to see if this changes over time, but to date the data is pretty clear. 

1 7 https: I /www. start. umd. edu/ gtdl search/Results. aspx? expanded=no&casual ties_ type=&easualti es 

_ max=&success=yes&perpetratm= 3 99&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page= 3 &count= I OOIIresultstable 

18https:l/www .sta1i. umd.edu/gtd/search!Results.aspx')expanded=no&casualties _type=&casualties 

_ max=&success=yes&perpetratot= 30214&ob=GTD ID&od~desc&page=2&count= 1 OO#resultstable 
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The rise in terror attacks by Iranian backed groups predicted by JCPOA critics simply did not 

happen. 

V. Ballistic Missiles 19 

.. The issue of Iran's missile development was discussed at the hearing, and it might be useful to 

describe Iran's missile program and place it in a proper context. 

Iran has had a committed program of ballistic missile development for years, and possesses one 

of the larger and more advanced programs in the region. StilL Israel's missiles are more 

advanced. as are some of the Gulf states' tactical missile programs and missile defense 

initiatives20 

Iran's interest in ballistic missiles is not surprising given the ''War of the Cities .. during the IranIraq War, when Saddam Hussein lobbed missiles and other munitions at Iranian urban areas in an 

attempt to demoralize the population. In addition. Iran's defense planners likely view ballistic 

missiles as an instrument of asymmetric deterrence. given Iran's poor air power capabilities and 

its limited capacity to project conventional military force. Put anther way, Iran may think of 

ballistic missiles as a useful, if not completely effective, deteiTent to air and missile attacks on 

Iranian territory. 

In none of the UN Security Council resolutions is there a requirement that Iran abandon its 

missile program. The pre-Iran agreement UN Security Council resolutions, notably Resolution 

1929 required that governments refrain from the transfer of missile technology to Iran until such 

time as it entered into negotiations on its nuclear program21 These missile-related sanctions, 

together with restrictions on the sale of conventional weapons were --like economic sanctions-- a 

punishment for Iran's nuclear program. with the implied expectation that they would be removed 

after Iran resolved the nuclear dispute. In other words, the missile sanctions were not about 

missiles per se but rather important only as it related to Iran's nuclear program. The one 

exception in this case was any ballistic missile development that might be dinxt~v related to 

nuclear weapons as a delivery platfonn. 

Under UNSCR 2231, which implements the JCPOA, the moratorium on missile technology 

transfers is extended for eight years and Iran is called upon not to can·y out ballistic missile tests 

19 This section is taken from my testimony from before the House Ways and Means Committee. 

Jim Walsh. "Supplemental Remarks on Iran Terror Financing and the Tax Code:' Written 

statement for the House Committee on Ways and Means, Oversight Subcommittee, United States 

House of Representatives. 18 November 2015, Washington, DC: US Congress, 2015, pp. 1-9. 20 Michael Elleman, "Gulf 1: Iran's Power in the Air.'' The Iran Primer, Michael Ellcman's Blog, 

United Institute of Peace, March 11, 2013, 

hllp: 1

1 inmprimcr.usip.or!!. blo!! all~ \lichad ~20Eileman; Anthony H. Cordesman, ''The Iran 

Nuclear Agreement and Iranian Missile Developments,'' CSIS, July 22,2015, 

http:/lcsis.org/publicationliran-nuclear-agreement-and-iranian-missile-developments 

21 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1929 (2010), June 9, 2010, 

https://www.iaea.org/sitcs/default/files/unsc _res 1929-201 O.pdf 
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of nuclear capable missiles22 The concept of·'nuclear capable .. is a murky one, insofar as any 

missile could, in theory, carry a nuclear payload if the country had the capacity to produce a 

sufficiently small warhead. (For its part, the US during the Cold War produced nuclear 

warheads that could be fired from a bazooka -- the Davy Crockett) But the resolution also 

pcnnits missile technology transfers during this eight-year period on a case-by-case basis. 

Iran, for its part, docs not believe that the international community has the right to restrict its 

missile program outside of its direct relevance to nuclear weapons, and it did not agree to those 

provisions in UNSCR 2231 (thus the language that Iran is "called upon .... "). As such it is not 

bound in the legal sense23 

When it comes to assessments of! ran's ballistic missiles, one sometimes reads breathless 

warnings about Iranian capabilities and its "ICBM program ... One should treat these assessments 

with skepticism. Iran has never flight-tested an ICBM. Its missile program continues to grapple 

with issues of accuracy, and while it has made progress over the years, recent assessments point 

to delays and challenges24 To be sure. it is a well established and now a largely indigenous 

program. but its trajectory points to incremental progress over time. Recently, Adm. Bill 

Gortney, head ofU.S. Northem Command, testified that it would be years before Iran would be 

able to flight-test an ICBM, and that US assessments were pushing back the estimated projected 

progress in Iran's long-range missile efforts.25" 

VI. Conclusion 

I thank the Conm1ittee for providing me the opportunity to address these issues. Conceptual 

clarity and a reliance on facts and evidence rather than assertion and speculation will be 

important, as we navigate the future. 

As I indicated, the JCPOA is arguably the most robust multi-lateralnonproliferation agreement 

ever negotiated in the 70-year history of the nuclear age. It will require wisdom, pmdcnce, and 

the support of intemational partners to see that the agreement is successfully realized. 

I believe that Congress has an important role to play in the JCPOA's implementation. On the 

12 United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2231 (2015), July 20, 2015, 

http://www. un.org/ en!sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow /RES223l E.pdf 23 My thanks to longtime SFRC and SSCI staffer Ed Levine for his help in decoding this 

language. 

24 Greg Thielmann, ''Addressing Iran's Ballistic Missiles in the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution," 

Anns Control Association, Issue Briefs, Volume 7, Issue 8, July 27, 2015, 

http: www.annscomrol.om Issue-Briefs· 2015-07-2 7 1Addrcssing- lrans-Ballistic-:v!issiles-in-theJCPOA-and-U0JSC-Reo;l'lution: Barbara Salvin, •·sanctions, Sabotage, Science Delay Iran's 

Missile Program, Allvfonitor, December 17, 2014. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/ originals/20 14/ 12/iran-missile-development -slow .htmlii 25 Jason Shennan. "Senior Military Officer Says Iranian ICBM Threat Delayed until Later this 

Decade at 'Earliest','' l11side Defense, November 10,2015, http://insidedcfense.com/dailynews/senior-military-officer-says-iranian-icbm-threat-delayed-until-latcr-decade-earliest 

Inside Defense 
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other hand, rash or shortsighted actions by the legislative or executive branches could undennine 

the US position and leave Iran free to pursue its nuclear program. I stand ready to work with the 

Committee to make sure we achieve our common goal and first priority: insuring that Iran never 

acquires nuclear weapons. 
77 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

General Barbero, you mentioned, which we don’t mention 

enough, I think, the number of U.S. troops that were killed at the 

hands of Iran while we were in Iraq. And by my estimate, it was 

definitely hundreds and may have been over a thousand. Do you 

agree that those numbers are accurate? 

General BARBERO. I agree, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And these are attacks that are directed by, in 

many cases, Iran’s Quds Force, correct? 

General BARBERO. They were active in equipping, training, and 

directing these attacks. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And has there ever been any type of remorse or 

anything, Iran take responsibility, this deal, anything for all the 

American deaths? 

General BARBERO. Absolutely not. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Now, Iran is pursuing this ballistic missile program. What type of a threat does that pose to the United States 

and how should we respond to it? 

General BARBERO. Well, I’m not the expert on ballistic missiles, 

but as a leader in the Middle East just described, the combination, 

the continued advancing of certain related technology, such as their 

centrifuge, and linking them with the long-range ballistic missile 

program is not good for the United States in the future, and that 

this deal is further described as zero nukes today, 100 nukes tomorrow. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Dubowitz, 2231 has restrictions on ballistic 

missile activity. It talked about missiles designed to be capable of 

delivering nuclear weapons. How do you define a nuclear-capable 

missile? Is there a difference between that and conventional? Because what you’ll hear people who defend Iran will say is, yeah, 

they did this ballistic missile, but that’s not necessarily anything 

having to do with nuclear. They’re just testing missiles. 

So how do you make that distinction, or do you? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I think the key point, there are missiles 

that are capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and many of 

Iran’s missiles already are capable of delivering a warhead. And 

certainly Iran has a very active long-range ballistic missile program and an ICBM program that they are working on, not only by 

themselves, but always important to remember the extensive cooperation between Iran and North Korea on missiles and the long 

progress that North Korea has made on their ICBM program. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And so what—is there a different purpose that 

would be reasonable for this ballistic missile program other than 

to deliver a nuclear payload? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, there’s certainly no reason to have an 

ICBM, unless you’re interested in delivering a nuclear payload. 

And the long-range ballistic missile program that Iran has is getting more sophisticated, more lethal, ranges are increasing. And it 

is absolutely clear, as you know, Secretary Kerry testified to the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2015, that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 was designed to prohibit Iran from 

testing and developing those missiles. 


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78 

Mr. DESANTIS. So how close is Iran, in your estimation, right 

now to developing an ICBM that could reach the United States? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, according to open source information, it’s 

not imminent and still may be years away, but it’s important to remember that the way Iran has structured and architected this nuclear deal is that there are multiple pathways. And what Mr. 

Walsh is not telling you is he—it’s not the status quo today, it’s the 

trajectory, it’s Iran’s trajectory on the nuclear side because of sunset provisions to an industrial size nuclear enrichment program; 

it’s the trajectory on missiles, to a long-range ballistic missile program with an ICBM; and it’s the economic trajectory, where they’ll 

continue to fortify their economy against our ability to use economic pressure. It’s the trajectory; it’s the patient pathway to nuclear weapons capability, long-range ballistic missiles and an 

ICBM. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So the lifting of sanctions, has that helped to 

boost the ballistic missile program? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. The lifting of sanctions has helped to boost all of 

Iran’s malign activities, because Iran is now—has resources that 

are available to it. The $100 billion in frozen oil money that was 

released, access to oil markets, the lifting of sector-based sanctions 

on key strategic sectors of the economy. Iran in 2013 was 4 to 6 

months away from a severe balance to payments crisis. They were 

ready to collapse. So they were making very, very painful budgetary decisions at the time. Those decisions are a lot less painful 

when their economy is growing at 7, 8 percent, as it is today, inflation is down to single digits, and Iran’s foreign exchange reserves 

are at least five or six times greater. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So can additional sanctions imposed by Congress 

help rein in the ballistic missile program, and if so, how should 

they be targeted? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congress needs to design a secondary sanctions 

regime that’s predicated on Iran’s ballistic missile malign activity, 

it needs to designate key entities that are in the ballistic missile 

supply chain, both foreign and domestic, and it needs to provide 

punishing sanctions against any foreign entity or any foreign bank 

that does business with any Iranian entity in support of that ballistic missile program. We are a long way from that, but I think 

the legislation that was introduced in the House and the Senate begins that process. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And, finally, my last question. Mr. Takeyh, you 

talked about Iran, really this regime is on unstable foundations. 

You mentioned the 2009 Green Movement. What does this administration need to do to kind of further erode some of these foundations so that the Iranian people could have a better pathway forward? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, I do think that it’s very important to focus as 

much on human rights infractions as it is on nuclear infractions 

and terrorism. Iran is also member of various international bodies 

and has to adhere to international conventions on human rights behavior, which it is egregiously in violation of. I would actually support a sanctions regime along the lines of Mark that actually targeted human rights and human rights abuses that are ongoing in 

the country so there will be actual punishment. 


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As I mentioned, our task is to continuously weaken the regime’s 

coercive power and the regime itself. That actually now relies on 

the transactional relationship with its cadre. It essentially gives 

them money as enforcers. If it has less money, it has less capacity 

for enforcement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thanks. My time’s expired. 

I’ll now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walsh, thank you for your testimony. I’m going to give you 

a couple of comparisons. We have a situation with Pakistan where 

they have nuclear weapons; not only that, they’re fixated on India, 

they have mobile nuclear weapon capacities. So they keep—as a 

matter of defense, they keep moving their nuclear weapons around 

to avoid any first strike vulnerabilities. In the meantime, the 

Taliban and various warlords in those areas, they’re not on the 

eastern border of Pakistan, they’re more on the western part that 

is controlled, in large part, by the Taliban. And then we have 

North Korea that has nuclear weapons capacity already and highly 

unstable leadership, to say the least. 

What is greater risk right now? Is it North Korea that has nuclear weapons and, you know, like I say, a very unstable—I’m 

being generous here—a very unstable leader, Pakistan that has nuclear weapons and is moving them back and forth, or Iran that is 

stuck in a freeze here. 

And just—I just want to go through the checklist here. Did Iran 

remove 98 percent of its lightly enriched uranium stockpile? Yes, 

it did. Did Iran dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges? Yes, it did. 

That’s all been verified. Did Iran destroy the calandria at the Arak 

reactor? Yes. Our inspectors were there. They filled it with concrete. It cannot be used. That was a big step. That was a lot of research and effort on their part. Did Iran cap its level of enrichment 

to 3.67 percent? Yes. Did Iran convert the Fordow underground facility? Yes, it did, mid-construction. Did Iran submit to 24/7 International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of its sensitive facilities? Yes, it did. And is it reprocessing plutonium? No, it is not. 

So, again, what’s the greatest danger here? 

Mr. WALSH. Yeah. Number one by far, I think—first of all, India, 

Pakistan, and North Korea are in a class by themselves in terms 

of nuclear danger. They’re nuclear weapon states. You can only 

have a nuclear war if you have nuclear weapons. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. 

Mr. WALSH. And, frankly, the India-Pakistan situation has deteriorated recently. Even though it doesn’t get as much play as this 

other stuff, I think it’s far more serious. And then I worry about 

North Korea, having been to North Korea and studied it for years. 

I don’t think Kim Jong-un is going to start a war on purpose, because he knows he’s going to lose, but I fear that we’re one dead 

fisherman away from some crisis that escalates. Because everyone 

is leaning forward, it’s a very escalatory environment. 

Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon. It’s not going to have one 

for 15 years. I, frankly, think it’s going to be a lot longer than that. 

I don’t think these things compare. 

And let me say, within the region, you know, Iran is not 10 feet 

tall. It’s not the Soviet Union. It’s not even the most powerful counVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:42 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26555.TXT APRIL

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try in its own region. By my estimation, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia are all far stronger by GDP, military expenditures, quality of 

weapons. It’s—if it’s fourth, it’s lucky. 

Mr. LYNCH. Let me ask you, recently President Trump tweeted 

out, this was his tweet: ‘‘Iran has been formally put on notice for 

firing a ballistic missile,’’ close quote. Is there—is there a—is there 

a legal or defense terminology to being put on notice? Is there any 

technical thing that I’m missing there? 

Mr. WALSH. I—it’s not my job to interpret the tweets of the 

President. It certainly doesn’t add up to a policy. 

Listen, most of the experts you’ve talked to, Michael Elleman, 

who’s a missile expert, others, they’ll say that the program is largely indigenous. Its purpose is asymmetric deterrence. It fears an attack by another state. It has no ICBM program, I’m going to have 

to disagree with my good friend, Mark. And if you look at my testimony, there are footnotes to that effect. 

It hasn’t flight tested an ICBM. You can’t have an ICBM program if you haven’t flight tested a missile. So I think that’s a missile program. I wish they didn’t have missiles, I wish no one had 

missiles, but I don’t think sanctions are going to somehow change 

the defense needs. 

Mr. LYNCH. I have to reclaim my time. And I appreciate your remarks. And also ballistic missile control is an aspirational statement within the agreement; it’s not a requirement. 

Mr. WALSH. Right. 

Mr. LYNCH. Just yesterday, North Korea, a nation, again, with 

dangerous nuclear weapons, fired a ballistic missile that was just 

the latest in a series of test firings. Here’s what Secretary Tillerson 

said: ‘‘North Korea launched yet another immediate-range ballistic 

missile. The United States has spoken enough about North Korea. 

We have no further comment,’’ close quote. 

So, you know, there are some dangers out there, but I don’t think 

giving Iran back the ability to develop nuclear weapons is the way 

to go. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General Barbero, it’s great to see you. I guess my first question, 

I’m a little taken aback that Iran does not present a significant imminent, unusual threat to U.S. interests. How would you characterize Iran as a threat? Do you agree with that statement? 

General BARBERO. I don’t agree with that, Congressman. You 

know, Iran’s actions have been diametrically opposed to U.S. interests in the region, and they’re acting on those and executing a 

strategy. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And in one of your capacities, you took a lot of interest in explosively formed projectiles, IEDs, and the destruction 

that they caused on U.S. soldiers in theater. Who was behind most 

of the EFPs? 

General BARBERO. These were copper plates that were used and 

designed for one purpose: to burn through American armor, and 


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they were used exclusively targeting American vehicles and forces, 

causing, you know, casualties across the board. 

There is intelligence that forensically links and tracks these 

plates back to their factories in Iran by lots, and we’re now starting 

to see the same type of plates in Bahrain being used by the Iranian 

proxies there. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And so I just—you know, we’ve stood on the same 

turf together on some very dark days, and I—I just kind of take— 

you know, I’m taken aback that Iran is not an imminent, unusual, 

or significant threat, or somehow because the neighborhood is a 

bad neighborhood, that they are justified in their criminal activity. 

I think that that is absurd. 

Mr. Walsh, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So 

they promised that they wouldn’t proliferate nuclear weapons. Why 

didn’t we just leave it at that? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, we didn’t leave it at that, sir. We have extensive safeguards arrangements that have grown more intrusive over 

time and now have been expanded again under the JCPOA. We— 

normally, we don’t take people at their word. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, in your initial testimony, you talked about 

that this was the best safeguard to prevent them from the quick 

track of developing nuclear weapons, but they signed the nonproliferation treaty, so why didn’t we just take them at their word? 

We’re taking them at their word now. Why isn’t their word good 

enough by them signing the treaty? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, we’ve never taken any country at its word on 

nonproliferation. As I said, we have safeguards agreements that 

came with the NPT and we have verification measures in Iraq. I 

mean, we have 24/7 electronic monitoring of their most sensitive 

nuclear facilities. Their—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Unless they’re military, right? The IAEA is not 

granted access to military—— 

Mr. WALSH. That’s not true, sir. Under the additional protocol, 

they are absolutely granted—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Under the protocols they are. How is that access 

going with them? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I know of no instances in which the IAEA has 

demanded access to a military site and not received it. Now, if they 

did, they are—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. You stated in your testimony, sir, that they were 

denied access, but that they were given, as I read the testimony, 

because I realize that we didn’t have time to go through all of it, 

but they were given assurances from the Iranian Government that 

everything was okay at those facilities. So we’re taking them at 

their word, yes or no? 

Mr. WALSH. I think that’s David’s testimony, not mine. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Oh, David. My apologies, Mr. Walsh. Is it still 

true? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, under the agreement, the IAEA both under the 

initial protocol and the agreement has access to it. And if they feel 

that they are not getting satisfaction, then they’re able to take that 

directly to the U.N. Security Council and U.S. snapback sanctions. 

And by the way, the U.S. has its own intelligence community, the 

Israelis have an intelligence community, the Russians have an inVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:42 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\26555.TXT APRIL

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telligence community. If they find that—if they think that there’s 

cheating, I’m pretty sure you’re going to see a file before the U.N. 

Security—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, we’re already seeing evidence of a lot of 

cheating, which is why we’re all ready for a little snapback. 

And, I guess, two things with regard—ballistic missile tests not 

being part of a threat, and yet you are one of the most accurate 

writers of the dangers and the imminent threat of North Korea. 

Why are we even concerned that they launched a missile yesterday? Shouldn’t—I mean, if missiles don’t really matter, why are we 

concerned about North Korea’s missiles? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I think we’re worried about North Korea’s missiles because they’re going to mate a nuclear weapon to them. 

That’s not going to happen in the case of Iran because we have the 

JCPOA. I also—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Can they at the end of 10 years? They can do 

whatever they like. It’s wide open. 

Mr. WALSH. It’s not 10 years. And some of the restrictions of the 

JCPOA go in perpetuity, they last forever. Like, they’re not bringing the calandria back, right? That’s destroyed forever. Some of the 

restrictions go for 20 years, 25 years. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, in my remaining time, Mr. Chairman, I just 

want to make the statement that as far as Iran just being part of 

the—you know, its bad neighborhood, no one is a greater 

proliferator of terrorism than Iran. They’ve killed more Americans 

since 1979 than any other state. We have seen repeated attacks. 

General Joseph Votel, commander of CENTCOM: Iran poses the 

most significant threat to the central region and to our national interests and the interests of our partners and allies. 

We’ve seen the Director of National Intelligence 2016 report: Iran 

presents an enduring threat to U.S. national interests because of 

its support to regional terrorism. 

And I would argue that any dropoff in terrorist activity, Mr. 

Chairman, has not been because of goodwill of the JCPOA; it’s been 

because they’re fighting in Yemen and Syria and in militias in 

Iraq. 

Hopefully, we’ll get a round two. And I appreciate your indulgence. I’m out of time. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Walsh, what would you say, I mean, with the Syria deal, 

with the chemical weapons? The administration heralded it, they’re 

gone. Even the Israelis said, oh, it was good. Well, it turned out 

not to be the case. And so we—and I agree with you, there are 

Israelis you talk to, and they think that from what they can tell, 

they may have been in check, but we don’t know what we don’t 

know, and that’s what I’m concerned about. In Syria, a lot of people 

thought that that had been taken care of, and obviously, tragically 

this week we found out it didn’t. 

Mr. WALSH. Yeah. I think it’s way easier to produce a chemical 

weapon, which is basically just using industrial chemicals and 

weaponizing it, than to make a nuclear weapon and a miniaturized 

warhead. They’re just in terms of the capacity required, you know, 

night and day. 


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So I think it was a good thing to get all that agent out. Had we 

struck Syria, we might have sent a weak deterrent message, but 

all that agent would have been there. We got a lot of it out, but 

they went back to making it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. All right. 

And I will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for this hearing, and Ranking Member Lynch. 

First, I want to say thank you to General Barbero and also to 

his colleague and fellow soldier, my colleague, Mr. Russell, for your 

service. And let me tell you, listening to both of you is very powerful, because you were on the receiving end of a lot of malign behavior from Iran. So how can I express my appreciation for that, we 

all are. But I know that you also appreciate that this is about a 

policy that is important to the U.S. and its allies. 

And the question for me on this whole Iran nuclear deal was not 

whether I was going to turn a blind eye to what you experienced, 

it was whether in the longrun the region would be safer with a malign but nonnuclear Iran than with a malign and nuclear Iran. And 

we had a lot of debate here and will continue to have disagreement 

about whether the Iran deal was a good deal or a bad deal, but 

where we’re at now is we have a deal, and I share the concern 

about wanting it to be enforced. 

The concern I have is that some folks who are of the view that 

it was a bad deal, from my perspective, may go too far in using enforcement arguments as a way to try to unravel it, but that’s a— 

that’s in the eye of the beholder. I think we’re all in agreement 

that we have to enforce this deal. 

One of the questions I have, you know, President Trump, as you 

know, thought it was a terrible deal, he said that during the campaign. But the budget that he’s proposing is going to significantly 

cut State Department funding. I saw that General Mattis said that 

we need State Department funding, because the less money they 

get, the more I have to ask for for ammunition. But that’s going 

to directly affect the boots on the ground of the IAEA. 

And I’ll just ask you, General Barbero, I know you oppose the 

agreement, but do you think it would jeopardize our capacity to 

monitor and enforce if we have a significantly reduced budget for 

the enforcement agency? 

General BARBERO. Well, I think it would damage our abilities to 

monitor this deal. But if I could, Congressman, you know, this is 

not—hopefully, do not come across as an old soldier who is bitter 

about what happened. 

Mr. WELCH. I didn’t hear that. 

General BARBERO. But this is about American national interests—— 

Mr. WELCH. Right. 

General BARBERO. —and currently in the region, and what I here 

from leaders, where are—where is the United States? This is a 

zero-nukes-today-100-nukes-tomorrow deal. This is a postponement, not a cessation. And we should look—we should not sacrifice 

other American interests in the region at the expense of this deal. 

And it seems from the capitals there that America has pulled back 


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and American leadership is lacking in confronting this real, and in 

some cases, existential threat to our friends and allies in the region. 

Mr. WELCH. A lot of people agree with what you just said. But, 

you know, if we’re honest with ourselves, this is a tough situation. 

It’s not like there’s a definitive answer. And a lot of times, the 

American people want a military response, partly because they 

trust the military, and partly because when something really bad 

happens, they want a definitive action that is going to make it go 

away. But we saw it with our engagement in the Middle East, and 

I think President Trump talked about this during the campaign, 

that some of those decisions didn’t work out the way it was hoped. 

You know, we did nation building in Afghanistan and Iraq; it didn’t 

work. We aided people in Libya, and it was a mess. And we stayed 

out of Syria, and that’s a mess. 

So I’m just asking all of you, even with your point of view, which 

is I think different than mine, to acknowledge that there is not an 

easy call for the President, whether it was Obama or it’s Trump. 

General BARBERO. If I could go further? 

Mr. WELCH. Sure. 

General BARBERO. I agree. This is not an easy challenge, but the 

argument is not to, you know, reinvade and 100,000 troops and do 

nothing. There are plenty of actions we could take. Sanctions, declare the IRGC a terrorist—a foreign terrorist organization, which 

they clearly are. Go after the financing of the IRGC and their—— 

Mr. WELCH. I note that Mr. Lynch is very active in the financing. 

General BARBERO. —and work with our allies in the region. 

General Jones, Jim Jones, former national security adviser, 

SACEUR, said let’s lead the way in formulating a NATO-like defense agreement and body within the Gulf—with the Gulf States 

and Saudi Arabia. I think they’re ready for that. So there’s a number of things we can do. 

Mr. WELCH. My time is up. But thank you, General. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have a procedural vote, but I’m not going to stop the hearing 

for it, so members can go and come back. We’re going to keep it 

going, because I think it’s just one vote and done. These are not 

our actual votes that we had scheduled at 4 o’clock. And I don’t 

want to have to adjourn twice in 30 minutes. 

So with that, I will now recognize Mr. Comer for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is for Mr. Albright and Mr. Dubowitz. Are the joint 

comprehensive plan of actions current, inspection and transparency 

measures sufficient to verify Iran is abiding by its terms? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In theory, the international inspectors have tremendous rights of access. It’s given by what’s called the comprehensive safeguards agreement. Unfortunately, Iran’s policy is to 

deny access to military sites, and it has done so on multiple occasions. And even in the example of the Parchin site, which was finally accessed by the IA, it only got one visit, and it got partial access. 

If you take bans in the JCPOA against nuclear weapons development activities inside Iran, those need inspections of military sites. 


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And they are not—those military inspections or the visits to the 

military sites are not happening. 

So I would say that parts of the JCPOA are not verified. Parts 

of it have not been tested yet, that in the sense that the IA is going 

to ask to go to military sites, and the expectation is that Iran is 

going to say no, because that’s been its policy. So I think that the 

bottom line is, is that parts of the JCPOA are unverified, parts are 

untested. The parts that are well verified are the declared sites. 

Mr. Walsh referred to those as sensitive. They’re the known 

sites. And so those have been verified quite a bit, but the IA is still 

unable to answer the basic question: Does Iran have undeclared 

nuclear activities? It still does not know the answer to that question. And when it tries to do that, it very well could be there’s 

going to be a major confrontation with Iran over access. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I mean, I agree. I mean, Supreme Leader 

Ali Khamenei, quote, ‘‘Inspection of our military sites is out of the 

question.’’ Foreign Minister Zarif before the Iranian parliament: 

We’ve successfully achieved the goal of preventing IAEA access to 

military facilities. Ali Velayati, an adviser to Khamenei, quote, 

‘‘Entry into our military sites is absolutely forbidden.’’ 

And Mr. Albright mentioned Parchin. Remember, the IAEA 

didn’t get physical inspection of the Parchin military site. It got 

self-inspection, where the Iranians were providing samples. Interestingly enough, even when providing samples to the IAEA and not 

letting them in through the gates, naturally, manmade uranium 

particles were actually discovered. 

The IAEA should have insisted, under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, for a follow-on physical inspection. They did not. 

So now you have to the Parchin precedence, which is—you know, 

it’s not the name of some Robert Ludlum novel. It is what the Iranians will invoke the next time we want to go into their military 

sites. They’ll say, you’re not getting in. And maybe at the end of 

the day they’ll let in another self-inspection. 

But I think as Mr. Albright, as my colleague, Dr. Olli Heinonen 

has said, it is insufficient. And unless you get into these sites, into 

these small sites, you’re not going to be able to confirm whether 

there are weaponization activities taking place. 

Mr. COMER. Mr. Dubowitz, let me ask you this: How did updates 

to the Department of Treasury’s OFAC frequently asked questions 

weaken sanctions on Iran? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So in three major ways. One, it provided explicit 

permission for Iran to use dollars outside of the U.S. financial system and clear dollars in offshore dollar clearing facilities. Again, 

that was a concession not negotiated by Iran as part of the JCPOA. 

Second, it weakened the restrictions on doing business with the 

Revolutionary Guards in providing more—more of a space for foreign companies to do business with entities where they were not 

majority controlled by the IRGC. 

And third, it lowered the know-your-customers customer due diligence requirements, which had been a longstanding feature of U.S. 

anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism laws. 

Again, all three concessions unilaterally given by the Obama administration in exchange for nothing from Iran and not part of the 

JCPOA’s explicit text, as far as I can find. 


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Mr. COMER. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

Do we have—I guess the Dems have left the building. Let me 

just—we’re going to go out for votes. 

But, Mr. Albright, you pointed out Iran is basically doing serial 

violations, but they’re doing it kind of up to the point before it 

would lead to an actual response. And that’s concerning, because 

it seems like they can get away with a lot bit by bit. 

What would it take for them to do—to engage in conduct that 

would actually lead to snapback sanctions? Because my sense is 

that a lot of the Europeans, who are a part of the deal, don’t have 

a lot of appetite for that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In fact, it’s actually—even though it appears to 

have been a very strong part of the deal, it’s actually one of the 

problems of the deal, is that if the IA, let’s say, really gets aggressive and asks to go to the military sites, it has a list that it would 

like to look at for various reasons, it has to worry that it will bring 

down the entire deal. 

And so I think part of the challenge for the Trump administration is to—how to enforce this deal more effectively within the context of the deal. And I think the Europeans would actually be interested. 

I mean, there’s a whole range of issues that are on the table in 

these discussions among the P5+1 where Iran is, I would say, violating the deal. It’s on heavy water. It’s on centrifuge research and 

development. It’s on—it is on the IA ability to do its inspections. 

I mentioned section T on weaponization bans. I mean, they do need 

to verify that this—this part of the JCPOA is being agreed—abided 

by by Iran. 

So I think the mechanisms will probably be in the joint commission within the procurement working group, but I think a critical 

thing would be for the Trump administration to make it very clear 

that it is going to—it is going to enforce this deal strictly, and it’s 

no longer going to tolerate, essentially, what is Iranian games to 

push the limits of the deal and at the same time get compensation 

for those. It could be in the form of money for sales of heavy water 

or in terms of uranium imports. It’s short on uranium, and it has 

been able to use the deal to increase its uranium supply. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So given some of the deficiencies that you’ve outlined, I think it’s really good stuff. I mean, is it—is it correct to say 

for certain we know Iran is—that this deal has worked? I mean, 

it seems to me that even if some of the areas that people discussed, 

even if you take that at face value, there’s still stuff we don’t know. 

So can we definitively say that the deal has worked? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think you can say that the deal has accomplished certain objectives. And Mr. Lynch went through—went 

through several of them, and those are important. But will the deal 

succeed in preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons? I think 

that’s a very open question, and it’s a worrisome question given the 

current trajectory of this deal. 

And I think it really is a time to get much tougher on Iran and 

to make sure that it’s going to abide by it, and that—and that, in 

addition—and Mark discussed this—we have to fix the weaknesses 


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in the deal, particularly in the long term. And that—and that—but 

we first have to get the deal in order, strictly enforce it, and then 

we have to start looking at how do you improve this deal to make 

sure that Iran does not have a huge nuclear weapons capability 

that starts to grow in year 10. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thank you. 

We—I was actually wrong about we’re going to do the rest of the 

votes for the day. We’re—the members have left because of that, 

so I know we had others who wanted to participate. 

I think it was a very informative panel. I want to thank you guys 

for coming, offering your views, and answering the questions. 

And clearly, this is going to be an issue that this administration 

is going to deal with and that we in the Congress are going to have 

to deal with in one form or another. 

So with that, the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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Responses to Questions for the Record 

National Security Hearing, 5 April2017: Assessing the Iran Deal 

Michael D. Barbero, LTG (Ret) US Army 

1. How can the United States balance its opposition to Iranian influence 

throughout the Middle East with its fight against ISIS? 

These missions are not competing for the same assets or capabilities. The mission 

to defeat ISIS is largely reliant on American advisors and trainers and airpower 

and other kinetic systems for precision attacks on ISIS leadership and capabilities. 

The mission to oppose Iranian influence will largely require American "soft 

power." American leadership to support our allies in the region, intelligence on 

Iranian assets and operation and enforcing existing sanctions and other actions to 

limit Iranian malign activities will not rely on the same capabilities that are 

directly engaged in the fight against ISIS. We can, and must, focus on both 

threats. 

2. How significant of a role does Iran play in supporting the Assad regime in 

Syria? 

Iran plays a direct role in support the Assad regime through direct aid and use of 

proxy forces. The main Iranian proxy force supporting Assad is Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah had been an active participant in the war in Syria. 

Speaking in late May 2014, Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah declared that the 

battle in Syria was Hezbollah's fight: "We will continue along the road, bear the 

responsibilities and the sacrifices. This battle is ours, and I promise you victory." To 

that end, Hezbollah went "ali-in" fighting alongside Assad regime loyalists and 

Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen against Syrian rebels. The commitment of 

Hezbollah into the Syrian conflict is a clear indication of the enormous power that 

Iran holds over Hezbollah. 

3. What impact has Iranian support had upon Hezbollah and its involvement 

in Syria? 

Hezbollah is a proxy force of Iran, its leaders and commanders answer to the 

command of the Supreme Leader of Iran. Hezbollah relies on Iran for almost all 
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aspects of its support- military, budgetary and all other forms of support come 

from Iran. 

4. How does President Trump's Tomahawk missile strike on Syria's Shayrat 

Airbase affect Iran? How are Iran and other countries in the Middle East 

responding to the strike? 

This strike has received significant notice by Iran and almost every country in the 

Region. They perceive it as a significant shift in American policy, and our friends 

in the Region are encouraged that this is an indication of the return of American 

leadership to the Region. 

5. You mentioned that other countries in the Middle East believe the U.S. has 

not done enough to confront the Iranian threat. How should the U.S. 

respond to Iranian provocations such as ballistic missile tests and naval 

aggression in order to deter further belligerence? 

First, he United States should work with our Allies in the Region to develop a 

coherent strategy to confront the Iranian threat. Our Regional allies see Iran as 

the primary threat to their existence and are eager to partner with America to 

"push back" against Iranian aggression. We must clearly articulate American 

interests in the Region, in relation to this Iranian threat, and then act to protect 

and pursue these American interests. Second, the United States must work with 

our European allies to cut off financing to Iran and its proxy forces. Third, we 

must support our allies which are in direct confrontation with Iranian proxy forces 

and organizations: Israel's confrontation with Hezbollah; Saudi Arabia's 

confrontation with Houthi forces; and Iraq's attempts to restrain and control 

Iranian Shiite militias. Finally, when our forces are threatened by provocative 

actions by Iranian forces we must send a clear and unmistakable message that we 

will not tolerate provocative actions. 
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Questions for Mr. David Albright 

President 

Institute for Science and International Security 

Questions from Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

AprilS, 2017, Hearing: "Assessing the Iran Deal" 

1. Iran has explicitly violated the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action's 

(JCPOA) 130 metric ton cap on heavy water twice. Why is this significant? And, was 

Iran penalized in any way for these violations? 

On two occasions, Iran had more than its heavy water limit of 130 metric tons inside Iran, as has 

been noted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its quarterly reports on Iran. 

Since Iran continues to make heavy water, it is expected to once again have more than 130 

metric tons of heavy water, potentially violating the cap again. Iran received no penalty for these 

two violations, and in fact, the Obama administration sought to downplay their significance. 

However, the violations were significant because they allowed Iran to push the envelope of 

compliance, undermining efforts to ensure that the JCPOA is adequately verified. These 

violations sent a signal to Iran that the United States will tolerate low level cheating. These 

violations also indirectly affirmed Iran's operation of its Arak heavy water production plant, 

which is unnecessary for civilian purposes and could contribute importantly to a breakout if the 

JCPOA fails. 

2. Is the interpretation of the 130 metric ton heavy water cap argued by Iran's Ambassador 

to the IAEA Reza Najafi during a recent IAEA Board Meeting valid? 

Iran recently argued that the 130 metric tons cap is not binding. In early March 2017, Iran 

stated: "Nothing in the JCPOA requires Iran to ship out the excess Heavy Water which is made 

available to the international market but has not yet found an actual buyer to which the heavy 

water needs to be delivered (holding in original)." 1 In essence Iran is fallaciously reinterpreting 

the JCPOA to state that it can exceed the 130 metric tons cap, as long as it states that it is seeking 

an international buyer for the excess. The Trump administration should look at Iran's recent 

statement as both a compliance issue and an attempt to extort more heavy water sales. It should 

make clear at the Joint Commission and publicly that Iran is simply wrong to continue its 

practice of exceeding the 130 metric ton cap and any overage will be seen as a violation of the 

JCPOA, which will result in penalties for Iran. In addition, the United States should seek to 

block any sale of Iranian heavy water on the international market as unnecessary and an 

undeserved reward for multiple violations of this limit. 

Moreover, the United States should view the heavy water cap as including all heavy water under 

Iran's control, whether inside or outside Iran. Any re-transfer of heavy water under Iranian 

control that resides abroad should be subject to the approval of the Procurement Working Group. 

1 Communication dated 3 March 2017 received.from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic o.f!ranto the 

Agency regarding the report of the Director General on verification and monitoring in Iran, INFCIRC/915, March 

16, 2017. https:l/www.iaea.org/sitesidefault!file,l!:PJillllicalionsLqocuments!infcircs/2017/infcircJJ :j,pQ.f 
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3. Did Iran choose to violate the heavy water cap intentionally? 

As Iran was approaching its second violation, it was warned by the IAEA that the cap would 

soon be breached. Instead of stopping heavy water production or blending down some heavy 

water into normal water, Iran knowingly violated the 130 metric tons cap. 

4. When Iran exports heavy water docs it abide by the international rules nuclear suppliers 

are expected to comply with? 

Iran does not have an export control system. Under the JCPOA, Iran pledged only that it 

"intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established 

standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology (emphasis added)." Iran 

is also not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and therefore its exports are not 

considered by this body. Despite these facts, the heavy water exports were given legitimacy 

since they were made on a case by case basis with NSG member states, the United States and 

Russia. Iran should not be allowed to operate as though it is a legitimate nuclear supplier before 

it has fulfilled its commitments under the JCPOA, implemented an effective export control 

system, halted its practices of illicitly procuring nuclear-related goods from abroad, and shown 

that it is an international law abiding supplier. 

5. One of the hearing witnesses included a chart in their written testimony claiming that Iran 

has no 20% enriched uranium. ls this claim accurate? 

No, this statement is false but it is a common tactic used by strident proponents of the JCPOA to 

make the deal look like it accomplishes more than it in fact does. According to the IAEA, Iran 

possesses many tens of kilograms of20 percent enriched uranium that is used as fuel in the 

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Periodically, Iran also imports such enriched uranium from 

amounts previously exported under the JCPOA in order to add to its stock ofTRR fuel. Some of 

this enriched uranium could be important in a breakout to nuclear weapons in reducing the time 

needed to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. 

6. After you released your report detailing how Iran was secretly granted exemptions to the 

JCPOA, the State Department maintained that there were "no exceptions" to the deal. In 

light of the IAEA' s subsequent publication of these exemptions, were these denials 

misleading? 

Yes, the Obama administration deliberately misled the public about these exemptions to the 

JCPOA. It used duplicitous wording and omissions in its statements about the facts and findings 

in our report. The Obama administration's press officials, White House Press Secretary Josh 

Earnest and State Department Spokesman John Kirby, refused to address the central issues of our 

report, namely that there were exemptions to the JCPOA including those involving low enriched 

uranium (LEU) and hot cells. Kirby repeated several times that there were no "exceptions" to the 

deal that would impact Iran's commitments. The administration provided some insight into its 

thinking on the LEU exemption. Kirby stated that the limits applied to "usable" low enriched 

uranium, which can be further enriched for nuclear weapons. His framing implied that certain 

2 
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LEU need not be counted and thus could be ignored. This same philosophy is evident in the 

false statement that Iran does not have any 20 percent emiched uranium (see question 5). 

7. Why are these secret exemptions troubling? Would Iran have been out of compliance 

with the terms of the JCPOA on Implementation Day without receiving them? 

Our central claim was that the exemptions were necessary for Iran to comply with the JCPOA on 

Implementation Day. Had the Joint Commission not reached decisions granting these 

exemptions, Iran would have violated the JCPOA. Several of these exemptions should not have 

been made and reflected major concessions to Iran on heavy water stocks, hot cells, and low 

enriched uranium. In addition, they set negative precedents that will need to be reversed by the 

Trump administration. 

In addition, the manner in which these exemptions were allowed reflected a misguided approach 

to Iranian threats to violate the JCPOA. Ultimately, each exemption represented an Iranian 

refusal to take the actions necessary to come into compliance with the conditions of the JCPOA. 

Although some exemptions may have been justified, overall, too many were granted. A 

damaging pattern that developed during the Obama administration was that Iran would create a 

crisis over a potential violation, the United States and allies would have to find a "solution:· and 

Iran would cynically demand compensation as part of that solution. Throughout this process, 

Iran has demanded an unjustified amount of secrecy from the P5+ 1 and the IAEA, hiding many 

of its activities from governments and the public and thereby more easily accomplishing its 

deceptive and brazen goals. 

8. How is Iran allegedly conducting prohibited mechanical testing of centrifuges under the 

guise of allowed "quality assurance" activity and how should the U.S. respond? 

One of the more pressing compliance areas involves Iran's centrifuge R&D program. There are 

allegations that Iran is exploiting allowed ''quality assurance" criteria at Kalaye Electric for 

centrifuge rotor assembly to conduct additional mechanical testing of centrifuges beyond that 

allowed under the JCPOA. 

Iran is also operating IR-6 centrifuges in excess of the limit of"roughly 10" allowed, choosing to 

interpret this condition as allowing 13-15 to operate. A limit of 10 plus or minus one IR-6 

centrifuge is a more appropriate interpretation. 

9. What are the dangers of setting precedents which allow Iran to commit violations of, 

have exemptions from, and exploit loopholes in the terms of the JCPOA? 

The most immediate danger is that Iran continues to expand in scope and number its nuclear 

activities that are in violation of the JCPOA. These activities allow Iran to develop capabilities 

that will allow for a more rapid surge in its nuclear program if the deal fails and that will allow 

for a more successful sneak out or breakout to nuclear weapons. 

During the last decade. Iran has typically engaged in incremental violations of its safeguards 

agreement. Today, it is applying the same strategy to the JCPOA. Stopping these violations and 

3 
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enforcing stricter interpretations ofthe provisions of the deal, even though a violation may be 

minor, must be a priority if the deal is to continue. 

Iran continues to state that it will not allow the IAEA access to military sites. As a result, 

portions of the JCPOA are unverified, and Iran is laying the basis to create no-go zones for the 

inspectors. If successfuL Iran could easily cheat on the major limitations aimed at blocking all of 

Iran's paths to nuclear weapons. 

10. Does the IAEA have 24/7 access to all Iranian sites of concern, as supporters of the deal 

have claimed? 

No. This claim is another common misnomer about the verification of the JCPOA. Although 

this claim is often put forward by supporters of the JCPOA, it is not true. The IAEA has wideranging access to certain declared sites, such as the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants and 

centrifuge rotor assembly and testing facilities. However, the IAEA docs not know the locations 

of all, or have 24/7 access, to all of Iran's centrifuge manufacturing facilities, and recently the 

head of the Atomic Energy Organization oflran stated that Iran has initiated "mass production" 

of several advanced centrifuges, in particular the IR-2, IR-4, and IR-6.2 Such a statement 

deserves careful scrutiny as to where all these components are being made and in what number. 

It also deserves scrutiny as to whether the IAEA can verify or disprove Salehi's statement. The 

mass production of these centrifuges (or their components). particularly the IR-2, would greatly 

expand Iran's ability to sneak-out or breakout to nuclear weapons or surge the size of its 

centrifuge plants if the deal fails. The IAEA also does not have regular, let alone 24/7, access, to 

military sites relevant to verif)ling section T, annex I, of the JCPOA, which contains bans on 

Iranian nuclear weaponization activities, namely activities which could contribute to the design 

and development of a nuclear explosive deviee 3 In fact, the IAEA has reportedly not accessed 

any military sites since Implementation Day, and Iran has stated that its policy is to deny access 

to military sites. As such, the JCPOA is not being verified in key ways. directly contradicting 

the claim that the inspectors have 24/7 access. 

II. What kinds of efforts have you seen Iran engage in to illicitly procure goods it can use to 

advance its nuclear program? 

2 "AEO! Chief underscores Nuclear Progress." Financial Tribune, April I 0. 2017. 

https ://financialtribune .com/artie lcs/national/621 53/aeoi-chief-underscores-n uc lear -progress 3 Section T, Annex I, JCPOA: 

ACTIVITIES WfiiCH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OFA NUCLEAR 

EXPLOSIVE DEVICE 

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear 

explosive device: 

82. r Designing. developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices, 

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation S}'Sfems 

suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes 

and subject to monitoring 

82.3. Designing, developinK, fahricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, 

framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable jiJr the development l!f a nuclear explosive device, 

unless approved by the Joint Commission/or non-nuclear purposes and subject to moniwring 

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating. acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or 

speciali=ed materials for explosively driven neutron sources. 

4 
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Iran uses a wide range of methods to seek goods illegally abroad for it nuclear, missile, and 

conventional arms program, including from the United States. It has widespread procurement 

networks where agents operate from other countries to pose as legitimate end users, or they work 

with trading companies and pay large sums of money to have these companies act as the end 

users of the goods, where once received, they are then illicitly shipped to Iran. Iranian president 

Rouhani and other high level officials have openly stated that they do not intend to comply with 

provisions under UN Resolution 2231, which instituted the JCPOA, that prohibits Iran from 

importing military or missile related goods. There are also indications that Iran tests the system 

set up by the JCPOA to regulate its nuclear-related imports for its remaining nuclear activities. 

One weakness of the JCPOA is that the onus is on suppliers to seek approval for such exports to 

Iran. 

12. The JCPOA includes a provision stating that the agreement's parties commit to "refrain 

from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would 

undermine its successful implementation." Are Iran's actions consistent with the letter, 

spirit, and intent of the JCPOA? 

No, in fact, they undermine the letter, spirit, and intent of the JCPOA. Iran should be seeking to 

demonstrate that it is now willing to abide by international laws and norms against nuclear 

proliferation. Taken together, the above questions and answers indicate that Iran is still willing 

to push the envelope of agreed restrictions and violate the JCPOA's nuclear limitations. 

5 
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Questions for Mr. Mark Oubowitz 

Chief Executive Officer 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Questions from Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

April 5, 2017, Hearing: "Assessing the Iran Deal" 

1. How would you evaluate Iran's level of compliance with the terms of the JCPOA? 

Iran is engaged in incremental non-compliance of the JCPOA, which combined, are egregious 

violations of the nuclear agreement. Since January 2016 when the deal was implemented, Iran 

has undertaken the following activities which are inconsistent with its commitments under the 

agreement: 

• Centrifuge research and development: Iran is reportedly conducting mechanical testing at 

Kalaye Electric beyond what is allowed under the JCPOA; operating more IR-6 

centrifuges than permitted under the agreement; and building excess centrilt1ge rotor 

tubes. 1 Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi stated last 

month that Iran has initiated "mass production'' of several advanced centrifuges, which 

would be a violation of the JCPOA2 The IAEA has not yet verified or disproved this 

statement. The mass production of these centrifuges or their components would 

significantly expand Iran's ability to sneak-out or breakout to nuclear weapons. 

• Heavy water: Iran is violating the cap on its heavy water production. Iran is storing 

excess heavy water in Oman, which means that this stockpile remains in Iran's 

possession3 Additionally. even within the country. Iran has twice produced and 

stockpiled more heavy water than permitted under the deal. The second time, the IAEA 

warned Iran that it would soon exceed the limit. but rather than halting production, Iran 

purposely violated the limit and has since begun arguing that the JCPOA ·s cap is not 

binding4 Based on current production rates, Iran is expected to again exceed the cap in 

May or June. 

• Exemptions: The Obama administration and its international partners provided Iran with 

an exemption to the JCPOA restrictions on its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stocks by not 

1 David Albright, "Assessing the Iran Deal: Examining Non-Compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231," Testimony House Government Oversight and 

Reform Subcommittee on National Security, April 5, 2017. (http://isiS-QDl!ne.org\~9Jlj_~enccsld~WiJihousesubcom m i ttee-testi mony-q f-david-a lbri ght -on~a.~~~~i n g-iran-n U£le__g_r-de) 2 Jenna Lifhits, "Is Iran Pushing the Envelope on Its Nuclear Deal?," The Wecklv Standard, April 18. 2017. 

(!:illJ2;i/;v;~\V.weeklv;;tand!!rd.comiis-irau.::Qushing-the-cn~.ecQn-its-nucleJlr:.dealiartic_[E:/20076.li)) 

3 Olli Heinonen. "Concerns about a Reduction of Transparency in IAEA Reporting on Iran's Nuclear Program," 

Foundation/or Dejense ()/Democracies, November 28.2016, page 5. 

(http:ilwww.defenddcmocracv .org·'coDtcJ]l!uploads1dogJfll!'Jlls'11281 !U.6EA Menm ... Qlli_£cLD 4 David Albright. "Assessing the Iran Deal: Examining Non-Compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 ;·Testimony House Government Oversight and 

Reform Subcommittee on National Security, April\ 2017. (!:illJ2:1!isis-online.org'conf~rences/d~tai]/housesubcQm JTI ittee-testi tnonv-o f-da vid-a lbx_i ght -on-as~-r~;ii_n g-iran-nuclear-de) 
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counting enriched uranium in waste products5 This allowance went beyond any 

commitment or obligation under the JCPOA and is a possible violation. Moreover, after 

initial reports in the summer of2016 that Iran had more than its allowed amount of 

enriched uranium, the IAEA changed its reporting on the amount of LEU in Iran's 

enriched uranium conversion plant, lowering the total amount to below the allowed 

threshold. The above exemption is only one of a number of concerning exemptions Iran 

may have received6 Congress and the administration should get clarity on the 

implications of these exemptions and address them appropriately. 

• IAEA Access: Since the announcement of the JCPOA, Iran has denied IAEA inspectors 

direct, physical access to facilities at which the Agency believed nuclear weapons 

activities previously occurred. Iran insisted that the IAEA conduct its inspection of the 

Parchin military facility using remote monitoring, and Iran denied the agency any access 

to Sharif University. Under the JCPOA and the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the 

IAEA has the right to visit any facility - military or civilian - in order to conduct its 

investigations, but Iran is trying to set a precedent denying this access. 

• Possible Military Dimensions: Finally, Iran did not provide the IAEA with full answers to 

outstanding questions about the possible military dimensions of its program. The IAEA's 

December 2015 report noted that Iran did not provide information, did not answer 

questions, or was otherwise uncooperative. Y ct the IAEA closed the file anyway, 

breaking protocol, apparently under political pressure. 

This list of violations does not include Iran's ballistic missile development, which violates UN 

Security Council Resolution 2231 which endorsed the JCPOA. Moreover, it does not include 

Iran's arms shipments to militant groups in the region, activities which also violate 2231. 

2. In your written testimony you suggested that Iran may pursue a clandestine "sneak-out" 

pathway to develop a nuclear weapon at a facility not disclosed to the IAEA. How likely do 

you believe this scenario is and what led you to conclude this might be feasible? 

Unfortunately, my colleagues and I at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies assess this to 

be a highly likely scenario. While the JCPOA does increase the level of IAEA monitoring of 

Iran's nuclear program relative to the pre-deal era, it docs very little to provide assurances about 

past activities Iran had undertaken at facilities the IAEA will not be inspecting. Put differently, 

the JCPOA offers enhanced monitoring of the known facilities involved in Iran's nuclear 

program, but docs not provide inspections and assessments on the unknown and/or covert 

elements of Iran's nuclear program. Moreover, Iran requires advance notification of inspections, 

negating the element of surprise and increasing the likelihood that Iran can conceal illicit 

activity. 

This is a problem because the Islamic Republic resurrected the late Shah's nuclear program amid 

the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, and according to a former president of Iran, considered nuclear 

'Jonathan Landay. "U.S., others agreed 'secret' exemptions for Iran after nuclear deal: think tank," Reuters, 

September I, 20 16. (h!!J;>:/!VY!V~J~\!t~~£Qilli'li!Icle/us-iran-nuclear-exemptions-exclusivc-idUS_l5,~.illJ]3 LA) 6 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, ·'JCPOA Exemptions Revealed," Institute for Science and International 

Security, September I, 2016. (http://isis-online.org!uploads/isisreportsidocuments/JCPOA Exemptions Revealed I Sept2016 Finall.pdt) 
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weapons for deterrence purposes. Given the initial military motivation for a nuclear weapon as 

well as the covert nature of the program for 18 years, absent a full accounting and a nonpoliticized closure to the "possible military dimensions'' file, 7 the U.S. will have a hard time 

assessing through national technical means and IAEA inspections what sites are still active and 

where wcaponization related studies are taking place. 

This challenge is compounded by Iran's insistence (to which the P5+ I appears to have 

unfortunately acquiesced) that military sites will not be inspected. Iran's insistence that the lAEA 

only conduct remote inspections of the Parchin military facility where the IAEA suspects 

weaponization activities occmTed. The Agency's inability to conduct follow-up inspections to 

address inconsistencics8 should not be permitted to set a precedent. 

When asked to evaluate the verification and inspection regime in the JCPOA on a scale of 1 to 

I 0, former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Dr. Olli Heinonen explained the 

difference between verification at declared facilities, inspection of undeclared but suspicious 

sites, and detection ofweaponization activities: 

"A rating of seven to eight for declared facilities, the way I see it. And why it is not 

higher is because there is this dispute settlement process .... But then if you ask me to 

give the rating for this access to suspected sites, undeclared sites. I don't think that! 

would give more than five, if we use this rating. And then if you ask my opinion with 

other possibilities to find these computer codes and someone using them. and there is 

actually even not really an inspection procedure for that, I think it's a zero. It's not even 

one.''9 

Finally. the JCPOA allows Iran to conduct research and development on advanced centrifuges 

and begin deploying them in less than ten years. Advanced centrifuges enrich uranium at higher 

rates meaning that Iran needs fewer of them to enrich to weapons-grade. If Iran decides to violate 

the JCPOA and conduct covert nuclear activities. in an easy-to-hide facility, Iran can use a small 

number of advanced centrifuges to sneak-out. 

In short, the JCPOA does not guarantee against a secret parallel route to the bomb. 

3. During the hearing, one of the witnesses claimed that Iranian support for terrorism has 

decreased since the .Joint Plan of Action and .Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (.JCPOA). 

Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not? 

7 "The Possible Military Dimensions of! ran's Nuclear Program," fran Task Force, December 2015. 

(bl!Q;i/taskforceoniran.org/pdf!Jhc PMDs of lran%E2%80%99s ]\luclear ProgramJ2Q_f); Olli Heinonen, "Next 

Steps in the Implementation of the JCPOA," Foundation/or Defense of'Democracies, December 8, 2015. 

(!~t~~w.defe.D,di!emQfL3.f.Y.:Qf_g/~!?1edia-hit/n~xt-steps-in-the-implementation-of-the-h::~) 

8 Olli Heinonen, '·Uranium Particles at Parchin Indicate Possible Undeclared Iranian Nuclear Activities," 

FoundationjiJr Defense()( Democracies, July I, 2016. (!Jttp:l/www.defi;Jlddemocracy.org/mt;dia-hit!QIIi-heinQnen Ill.[anium-particles-at-parchin-indicate-possible-undeclared-irani®-nucle.?r.:fli) 

9 Olli Heinonen, Transcript, Hearing bef(Jre the House Financial ._\~ervices Task Force to lnvestixate Terrorism 

Financing. July 22. 2015. (~ttp;;:/ sy_IY\\.l1g_O_\Cfll'f11cor~/n<:"!2 #'/artlfl.~/N.&..YP!illllill.LJ<:.J)) 
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Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, according to the U.S. government. 

Iran's support for terrorism throughout the region has increased since the announcement of the 

JCPOA. For example, the latest State Department report on terrorism, issued under the Obama 

administration in June 2016, noted, "In 2015, Iran increased its assistance to Iraqi Shia terrorist 

groups." 10 The Iranian terror threat is broader than proxies driving suicide trucks into buildings. 

It is the instrumentalization of terror as a political weapon, and the fear that such militias and 

proxy forces can have. 

Those who argue that Iran's support for terrorism has decreased often only look at specific 

terrorist incidents rather than the broader context of Iran's regional destabilization. For example, 

those who make this claim seem to overlook the terrorist attacks of Iranian-backed groups in 

Bahrain. In March, the State Department designated two Bahraini terrorists backed by Iran, one 

of whom lives in Qom. Furthermore, the statistics that these experts often cite not only exclude 

the activities ofHezbollah and the Shiite militias in Syria but also discount the activities of the 

IRGC Quds Force (which the U.S. has designated for terrorism) as well as Iran's support for the 

Houthi militants in Yemen. 

4. According to Foundation for Defense of Democracies' analysis, Iran has launched up to 

14 ballistic missiles since it agreed to the JCPOA, through February 2017. Do these 

launches violate the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231? 

In short, yes, Iran's ballistic missile launches violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. As a 

reminder, the number 14 was arrived at through a review and aggregation of English- and 

Persian-language open-source material on missile launches between July 2015 and February 

20 I 7. 11 It only focuses on ballistic missiles (as opposed to cruise missiles, which can also serve 

as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons) and bypasses the MTCR metric of"nuclear 

capability." This is because according to the former Director of National Intelligence James 

Clapper, Iran's ballistic missiles arc assessed as being "inherently capable of carrying WMD." 12 

Regarding the UN resolution, the language pertaining to ballistic missiles in UNSCR 2231 

(which enshrines the JCPOA) is nowhere as strong as UNSCR 1929. But even with that, it does 

"call" on Iran not to test such weapons. During the congressional debate on the Iran deal and in 

the months that followed, Obama administration officials stated that the language change did not 

diminish the ban on Iran's ballistic missiles development. 13 

" 1 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terron:>m 2015, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, 

June 2016. (Q.UJl.s;/bll_ww.s\;l_\<;:_.govij:clirls;crti20fii.ill~JO.htm) 

11 Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Iranian Ballistic Missile Tests Since the Nuclear Deal." Foundationfi"· Defense ol 

Democracies, February 6, 20!7. 

(h!Jll://www.defenddcm<!cra£LQig~cont~ntiilll!2.i!>b'>."Q.Qs:u•ncJll.:;f1Q2lU.l-'hn~n.Lful!.!lstic MissiiUlQ_f) 12 James R. Clapper, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,'" Statement for the Record 

Submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016. page 8. (h!lru;;,'/}ywwcarmed: 

srrvices.sma_k&gyjimoln1_edialdoc;~2-09-I6JJ.ciD 

11 For example, when asked by Senator Bob Corker specifically about the "calls upon•· language and if the ballistic 

missile tests would violate UNSCR 2231, the Department of State Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear 

Implementation Ambassador Stephen Mull confirmed that a test would violate the resolution. "The Status of JCPOA 

Implementation and Related Issues," Hearing h~fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. December I 7, 2015. 

(h1!!2'>.!l''ww. fog,jgnc;;g Q(~v /}J,~ri ngs/the-statu>-o fjcpgit.:l.rrm let:rr~!ll'!l]QD::.<md :rcla\f.d..:is.>l!.C§: I. 2 I 71 5) 
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Additionally, in response to Iran's ballistic missile tests, then-UN Secretary General Ban Kimoon said certain missile launches in 2016 were "not consistent with the constructive spirit" of 

the accord. Iran worked hard to gel the word ''designed" into the clause in the UN resolution, 

permitting the regime to claim Tehran has no intention of designing its ballistic missiles to carry 

unconventional payloads. This is a loophole entirely derived from an Iranian negotiating victory. 

As my colleague Behnam Ben Talcblu previously stressed. "Creative Iranian interpretations of 

its missile force and the new resolution should not be permitted to stand unchallenged for the 

next decade." 14 

5. Does Iran have an ICBM program and, if so, what kind of threat does it present to the 

U.S.? 

Iran appears to have clements of an ICBM program. Although assessments by the U.S. 

intelligence community and outside experts have rolled back Iran's ICBM test date from the 

mid-late 1990s to 2020 at the earliest, Iran retains the political and security motivations for such 

a weapon. Worse, U.S. government reporting emphasizes a long-standing concern that Iran may 

use technologies related to its satellite launch vehicles as a ·'test bed" for an eventual ICBM 

capability. 

Earlier this year, a new report alleged that. through North Korea. Iran is continuing its nuclear 

activities in violation of the JCPOA. 15 Given the extensive ties between Iran and North Korea on 

issues related to ballistic missile development, this report deserves careful consideration. 

Specifically regarding missile cooperation. a February 2016 Congressional Research Service 

report described the relationship between the two countries as '"significant and meaningful." 16 

The relationship is believed to date back to the 1979 Revolution, and Iranian officials have made 

public reference to bilateral deals and their trips to North Korea in the 1980s. The relationship is 

believed to have ultimately resulted in Iran·s liquid-propelled Shahab-3, a nuclear-capable 

medium-range ballistic missile. According to missile experts, the Shahab-3 is based on the North 

Korean NoDong-/\, and has served as the basis (after a domestic upgrade that grew the body of 

the Shahab) for Iran's tirst series of space-launch vehicles that would be used to propel satellites 

into outer space. 

The DPRK-Iran missile relationship does not end with the Shahab. In January 2016- one day 

after the implementation of the JCPOA the U.S. Treasury Depm1ment sanctioned a key 

individual working for Iran's military industrial complex who ''has worked directly with North 

Korean officials in Iran from UN- and U.S.-designated Korea Mining Development Trading 

Corporation (KOMID)." 17 The Treasury Department also cited that previously, "Iranian missile 

14 Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Missing the Point on Iran's Ballistic Missiles." War on the Rocks, April 28. 2017. 

(!:IJ!Q~;_L~~'!LQntherocks. com/20 1 7/04 im iss im!-the-pQJ.Dl-:9JJ: irafl~hElU st ic-m iss i les/) 

"Refacl Ofek and Dany Shoham. "Iran Is Progressing Towards Nuclear Weapons Via North Korea:• The BeginSadat Center for StrateKiC Studies, February 28, 2017. (https:/lbesacenter.QJ:.&'p~rw~s.:lLves-papcrs/iran-progressin_g_: 

I}JJ~Jc_{li~:W_eapons-via-north-kore~D 

16 PaulK. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, "Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and 

Nuclear Cooperation,·· Congressional Research Sen•ice, February 26. 2016. 

(hliJ2S: '/fas.org/sgp/crs/t1.\ckeiR43480.pQ_f) 17 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Press Release. "Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile 

Procurement for [ran,'' January 17, 2016. (bliP~: ,'\y~y.JIT"~surv.gov/press-c~r)1nil?r~~~::releases/~;{UQ12_f_,_a~Q_~) 
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technicians ... traveled to North Korea to work on an 80-ton rocket booster being developed by 

the North Korean government." 

Iran has made key long-term investments in its missile and rocket forces for purposes of security, 

status, and deterrence. It has also done the same with its satellite industry, which provides Iran 

with a "scientific" cover for an IBCM program. There is a widespread consensus in Washington 

surrounding Iran's habitual use and abuse of dual-use goods and definitions for military 

purposes. 

Should Iran develop long-range rockets that can be staged on one another and be propelled by 

solid-fuel, and should Iran make strides in its re-entry vehicle technology in the realm of heat 

shields and ablation processes, this would constitute a significant threat to U.S. interests around 

the world. First and foremost, Iran would likely use a long-range missile capability to threaten 

Europe. Coupled with a nuclear weapon that could be developed via a covert pathway, an ICBM 

could even be used to threaten the U.S. homeland and/or deter any potential military action 

against Iran or its allies and proxies around the globe. An Iranian ICBM may very well be an 

eventuality ifiran's satellite launches and ballistic missile progress continue to go unchecked. 

6. What can Congress do to help restrict Iran's ability to launch ballistic missiles in the 

future? 

Under the Trump administration. Treasury has issued designations under proliferation and 

terrorism authorities, 18 and the State Department also designated companies for violating the 

Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 19 While these arc important first steps and an 

indication that the Trump administration seeks to enforce U.S. sanctions against Iran. Congress 

can take a leadership role in crafting policies to create additional pressure on the Iranian regime 

to change its behavior. 

A bipartisan group of senators and representatives introduced two important pieces of legislation 

at the end ofMareh which deserve strong consideration. Among other measures, the Senate bill 

imposes secondary sanctions on any individual or entity found to be financing or supporting 

Iran's ballistic missile development. The House bill also imposes ballistic missile sanctions, and 

requires the president to issue a report to Congress on Iranian and foreign individuals and 

companies that are part oflran's global supply chain. This report would likely serve as the basis 

for additional sanctions. 

Congress should also require the administration to report on the link between the global supply 

chain and the sectors of Iran's economy that contribute directly or indirectly to the development 

of the country's ballistic missile program. Much of this information is available through open 

source material. Indeed, FDD's research has revealed that supply chains in the metallurgy and 

mining; chemicals, petrochemicals. and energy; construction; automotive; and electronic, 

18 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Supporters oflran's Ballistic Missile 

Program and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Qods Force," February 3, 2017. 

(b.\!Q0 /www. treasurv. gov lpress-center/press-releases/Pages/ <l_,QQQ4_._asp~) 

19 U.S. Department of State, Press Release, "Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act Sanctions," March 

24, 2017. (!Jttps:/lwww.state.gov/r/paiprs/ps/20 17 IQ3/269084.htm) 
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telecommunication, and computer science sectors are involved in Iran's ballistic missile 

program.20 This report should serve as the basis for sectoral sanctions imposing secondary 

sanctions on any foreign company conducting business with Iranian entities in designated 

sectors. 

7. How significant of a role does Iran play in supporting the Assad regime in Syria? 

The Assad regime would not have remained in power without support from the Iranian regime. 

Tehran perceives the Syrian war as an existential cont1ict that threatens is supply line to 

Lebanese Hezbollah and very survival of the regime itself. lt has thus gone to great lengths to 

prevent the overthrow of Assad. 

Since the announcement of the JCPOA and Iran's receipt of significant sanctions relief, the 

regime has escalated its military involvement in the Syrian war in support of Assad. It has 

deployed thousands of its own regular ground forces the first in the country's history since the 

end of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980's- and Shiite proxies drawn from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Iraq and Lebanon.21 Iran is estimated to command 20,000 - 30,000 foreign and Iranian fighters in 

Syria22 Iran also convinced Russia to escalate its military involvement in Syria, with IRGC Quds 

Force commander Qassem Soleimani traveling to Moscow in July 2015 to devise a plan with his 

Russian countcrparts.23 Finally, Iran is complicit in the war crimes of the Assad regime, 

including massacres of civilians and its use of chemical weapons24 

8. How closely do Iranian forces cooperate with the Syrian military? 

Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Shiite militias closely coordinate and cooperate with the 

Syrian military. Iran is part of the military command center with Syria and Russia that make the 

highest decision. Iranian military advisers and regular forces and Shiite militias fight alongside 

the Syrian military- whatever is I eli of it- and pro-Assad Syrian militias25 

9. What impact has Iran had upon Hezbollah and its involvement in Syria? 

20 Saeed Ghasseminejad, ''Iran's Ballistic Missile Program and Economic Sanctions,'' Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, March 17.2016. 

HH.tQ~li\\!_}Y.Y\'. de~!ld_demQf.fEf-Y. Qt&~£2.D!f.'tt~!.lfRIP~ds 1 d.Q.~.UJ)lCJlt;d}a 11 istjs;-'M issij~-~!lnct ions. p~J) 21 Amir Toumaj, "Array ofpro~Syrian government forces advances in Aleppo," The Long War Journal, December 

9, 2016. (http://ww_w .Jon °\\;·arjournal.org/arch ivcs/20 16,-·_ I_,_;_:'£_ITI!.Y_-Of-p.rp.:~!.1:g9yernment:f9fCCS-ad'{f!TICC-inilkJlJl!UlliJ2); Amir Toumaj. "Iranian military involvement in the battle for Aleppo." The Long War Journal, August 

3, 20 16. (h.!illiL!Y~W .long\varjourJlal.on.r:J!.[chivcs120 16~0-~ir!l!lian-mt)j~1rv-inyQ!.Y£..mcnt-in-t}l_g-battlc- t0r-

?1Cpl1QllllJ2) 

22 "Iran commands 25,000 Shi'ite fighters in Syria: Israeli official," Reuters, November 3, 2016. 

(ffitpjhYww. r~JJJcrs.com/ artie le •us-m i;lel!St -cris is-s yr l<!c_Lsrae 1-id .lLSKfl N 12 Y .LYJ;.) 

B Max Peck, "Doubling Down on Damascus: Iran's Military Surge to Save the Assad Regime,'' FoundationjiJr 

Defense o(Democracies. January 2016. 

{tlJ1!2;ii:~~::\\~\V.defefl4democracY.Qrg,~content/up{o_a.cis/documents/Doubling Do~vn on Damascus.pdf) 14 Benjamin Weinthal. "How Iran Enables Syria's Chemical Warfare Against Civilians,'' The .Jerusalem Post. April 

17. 20 17. (!illJl;:"www.jpQ;;!.&Qm/Middlc:East!How-lran:etJillJ.Ics-Syr@s-chcmLc.el-warfa_rc-against-cLvil ians-4~~HQ) 5 Amir Toumaj, "Array ofpro-Syrian government forces advances in Aleppo,'' The Long War Journal_ December 

9, 20 l6. (http://vvww .1orlg~arjouqlaLQr~'g.rchiy~;i!.'2JtJ fl 1 l2~~~!rnW.:9l::ru=9-svrian-gove.rnm~nt:.£Qices-advancc-inaleppo.php) 
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llezbollah is the most successful export oflran's Islamic revolution, and the brightest star in its 

constellation of proxies. According to some Israeli estimates, Iran provides Hezbollah with as 

much as $900 million annually26 

It is best not to think of Hezbollah as an independent entity that is a client of Iran, but as a 

regiment of the IRGC. It has always functioned as an extension of Tehran, and from its outset 

swore loyalty to whomever would occupy the office of Supreme Leader. Iran's impact on all of 

Hezbollah's decisions is ncar-absolute, and that includes involvement in Syria. Hezbollah is an 

Iranian extension in Lebanon and not an authentic Lebanese movement and therefore needs 

Assad- a critical ally of Iran in the region- as l-Iezbollah's "umbilical cord" to its Iranian 

patrons, allowing the passage of funds and weapons to the group. Assad's hold on power thus 

allows Iran to perpetuate the exportation of its revolution. Iran is therefore rumored to have 

ordered Hezbollah to enter the fray of the Syrian civil war to help prop up AssadP 

I 0. What lessons can be learned from the apparent failure of the 2013 international 

agreement for the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons? 

The Assad regime's continued use of chemical weapons against innocent civilian populations 

reveals inherent weaknesses of international agreements with authoritarian regimes. Generally, 

the United States should not delegate its national security priorities to international bodies 

(OPCW in the case of Syria and the IAEA in the case of Iran) that inherently lack their own 

enforcement powers. When the authoritarian regime inevitably incrementally or egregiously 

violates its commitments, the United States is then dependent on the agreement from states like 

Russia, which have their own calculations and interests sometimes at odds with U.S. interests, in 

order to hold the authoritarian regime accountable. 

Moreover, if the United States is going to use international agreements on issues as important as 

arms control and nonproliferation, these agreements must have strong verification mechanisms. 

Unfortunately, the JCPOA fails to provide the IAEA with anywhere-anytime access to all 

suspicious sites, documents, and personnel. Instead, the JCPOA creates a 24-day delay between a 

request for access and the physical access if indeed the IAEA can even get physical access, 

which was not the case when the IAEA inspected the Parchin facility. Twenty-four days is 

enough time to "sanitize" small, suspected sites 28 Iran is also likely to have developed 

contingency plans to respond to IAEA demands to visit these sites. According to Dr. Heinonen, 

26 Yaakov Katz, "Security and Defense: The fly in the spider web0 " The Jerusalem Post (Israel), July I, 2011. 

(bttp://www.jpost.com/Defense/Securitv-and-Defense-The-tlv-in-the-spider-wcb ). In 2013, Reuters reported: "A 

regional security official with access to current intelligence assessments put Hczbollahts annual income at between 

$800 million and $1 billion, with 70-90 percent coming !Tom Iran, the amount partly depending on the price of oil.'' 

Samia Nakhoul, "Special Report: Hczbollah gambles all in Syria," Reuters, September 26,2013. 

(http://www .reuters.com/artic le/us-syria-hezbo llah-specia !-report -id USB RE98 POA 120 13 0926) 27 Ariel Ben Solomon, "Report: Nasrallah Secretly Visited Iran to Discuss Syria War," The Jerusalem Post, June 27. 

2017. (http:/iwww.jpost.com/Middlc-East/Report-Nasrallah-secretlv-visited-lran-to-discuss-Svria-war-3180 13); 

Mona Alami, ''Hczbollah in the fight in Syria to win, backed by Iran;· USA Today, June 6, 2013. 

(https://www.usatoday.com/storvlnewslworld/20 13/06/06/hezbQ.lli!)l-syria/23946171) 28 Bill Gertz, ·'Ex-lAEA Leader: 24-Day Inspection Delay Will Boost Iranian Nuclear Cheating,'' The Washington 

Free Beacon, July 21,2015. (http:"frcebeacon.co_f11;naJional:securitv/exiaea-leader-24-dav-[fl?~Q!1-deln~!:: 

boost-iran ian-n uc learcheat ingJ 
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Tehran may only need two days to remove nuclear equipment from a small facility29 and remove 

any traces of uranium, which even environmental sampling may be unable to 

detect. He notes: "Time for 'scrubbing' takes on special salience in nuclear-related developments 

without nuclear material present. Some of the past concealment events carried out by Iran in 

2003 left no traces to be detected through environmental sampling.''30 

Finally, the failure of the Syrian chemical weapons agreement reveals that it is not enough to 

eliminate current stockpiles, an agreement must also rollback existing capabilities to prevent the 

authoritarian regime from covertly producing more material. 

11. You discussed how Iran Air regularly flies to Syria, as other Iranian airlines do such as 

Mahan Air, which remains sanctioned for activities including ferrying Iranian military 

support to Syria. Did the U.S. confirm that Iran Air is no longer engaged in these 

activities? 

The JCPOA lifted sanctions against Iran's state-owned airline, Iran Air, despite a lack of 

evidence that the airline had ceased the illicit conduct for which it had been sanctioned in the 

first place. In 2011, Washington designated Iran Air for providing material support and services 

to the IRGC and Iran's Ministry of Defense. At the time, Treasury noted, "Rockets or missiles 

have been transported via Iran Air passenger aircraft, and IRGC officers occasionally take 

control over Iran Air flights carrying special!RGC-related cargo ... carried aboard a commercial 

Iran Air aircraft, including to Syria.''31 

When the previous administration was asked why sanctions on Iran Air were lifted. State 

Department Spokesman John Kirby did not argue that Iran Air's behavior had changed,32 or that 

the IRGC is no longer using the airline to ship weapons to Syria. Instead, he said merely that the 

administration was comfortable with its decision, though he was ·'not at liberty to go into the 

reasons behind" the de-listing33 

12. Boeing and Airbus have reached agreements to supply Iran Air with a combined total 

of over 200 airplanes. Are you concerned these sales will support Iran's malign activities? 

Iran Air is unlikely to retain all of the aircraft it is now set to purchase from Western companies. 

Its current fleet is only 36 planes.34 but it has signed preliminary contracts for nearly 200. 

Instead, Iran Air likely will transfer, resell. or lease excess aircraft to sanctioned airlines, 

29 Michael R. Gordon, "Provision in Iran Accord Is Challenged by Some Nuclear '' The Netv York Times, 

July 22, 2015. \'!''V~'"'"" ''Y"",l!,YJJJ!!C>,ccl"'!!~'"''l"L~~ 

somc-nuc!ear~exoert?.JHm..D 

30 Olli Heinonen, ''The Iran Nuclear Deal and its Impact on Terrorism Financing,'' Testimony Before the House 

Financial Services Committee, Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, July 22, 2015. 

(h_li_p~ <fi [E=tJl._c ialsqvices._house. gov ··ca lcndar"events in g lc .aspx ?E vem1J-2:::~J2.231J) 

31 U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial Entities;• June 23. 

20 ll. ([IJ!I2s://wvv·'1:.tre<!:5_urv.gov/pn;~__£nter/press-rc!cases/Pages/tg! 2! 7 .. a~p0;) 

"Boeing's historic deal with Iran rests on shaky foundations:· Associated Press, June 23, 2016. 

(htll? :/,~:-.yw\~.: foxl}g:~:Y~~ ~-Q_I].'us/20 16/06<23/boeino-hi storic-deal-\vith-iran-r.ests-on-sha kv-f oundat ior]~ltm 1) 33 John Kirby, ''Daily Press Briefing," U.S Department of State, June 23, 2016" 

(http:! /www"state"govlrlpa/prsidpb!ZQ.L(!/0612590 15 "htm) 

''"Profile," fran Air, accessed May 8, 2017. (bttrr;.L\\~~vv"ign~iLi!l<;mJi'illiP!:2lli~ht.ml) 
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including Mahan Air, which the U.S. government designated for supporting the IRGC's 

terrorism. 

Moreover, Iran Air itself is likely to use the aircraft for malign activities in support of the Syrian 

airlift. While much oflran's assistance to the Assad regime is hard to track, its airlifts can be 

viewed openly, through flight tracking websites and software, even as the airline uses deceptive 

practices turning otTtracking signals. using false tail numbers, or listing fabricated itineraries 

when flying these routes. Based on open source research, my FDD colleague Emanuele 

Ottolenghi has concluded that between January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day) and March 30. 

2017. Iranian airlines have flown at least 690 flights from Iran to Syria. including 114 on Iran 

Air and 231 on Mahan. The following information is a summary of the testimony he provided on 

this topic before the House Committee on Financial Services on April 435 

The bulk of the transport of materials, weapons. and personnel from Iran to Syria occurs on 

commercial aircraft. During the same period from January 2016 to March 2017, the Iranian air 

force only flew six trips to Syria. Based on the following information, it is clear that the frequent 

flights between Tehran and Damascus on commercial aircraft are in fact a key part of Iran's 

support for the Assad regime. 

• Syria is a war zone with little tourism or commerce, yet an average of II flights per week 

land in Damascus from Iran. 

• Iran Air flight 697 Hies from Tehran to Damascus twice a week. but a ticket cannot be 

purchased on Iran Air's booking website or through travel agencies. Indeed. the airline 

does not include Damascus among its destinations from Tehran. 

• Moreover, flight 697 periodically makes a stopover in Abadan. an IRGC logistical hub. 

The U.S. intelligence community should review this publicly available data and its classified 

information about Iran Air's activities and determine whether - as it appears from public 

reporting- that the airline is an active participant in Iran's support for the Assad regime. If so. 

the airline should be sanctioned under Executive Order 13224 for terrorism and under Syria 

executive orders. Treasury should then revoke the licenses it granted to Boeing and Airbus. 

13. Boeing recently announced it reached a $3 billion deal with Iran Aseman Airlines. Do 

you have concerns over this agreement as well? 

Boeing's announced deal with Aseman Airlines is deeply troubling given the connection 

between the airline's CEO and the IRGC. The following information is drawn fi·om the work of 

my colleagues Emanuele Ottolcnghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad36 

35 Emanuele Ottolenghi. ·'Increasing the Effectiveness of non-Nuclear Sanctions against Iran: Iran's Aviation 

Sector,'' Testimon:v before the A1onetm~v Policy and Trade Subcomrnittee and the Terrorism and Illicit Finance 

Subcommittee oft he House Commiltee on Financial ~)~ervices, April4, 2017. 

(httrs://financialservices.house.gov!uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-ba 19-wstatc-cottolenghi.:20 170404.pdD 36 Emanuele Ottolenghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad. "CEO of iranian Airline to Buy Boeing Jets Has Ties to IRGC," 

Real Clear Dejimse. April24, 2017. 

(h!!IE~l~y~w.rcalcleardefense.com/artic!es/20 17/04/24/ceo of iranian airline tg_QJ.IY boeing iq_t~.JHL)_~.ies to ir~ 

_j_l 1233.html"ult'L>) 
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CEO Hossein Alaei is a senior member of the IRGC (which remains under U.S. sanctions) and 

served as commander of the IRGC Navy. During his tenure in that position, the IRGC Navy 

targeted commercial and military vessels- including U.S.-owned commercial and Navy vesselsduring the so-called Tanker War. Additionally, Alaei served as the director of Iran's Aviation 

Industries Organization (a subsidiary of the Ministry of Defense) which was designated by the 

Treasury Department in 2013 and by the EU for involvement in Iran's military program and 

proliferation. 37 

14. Do the Department of the Treasury's recent change to the ownership standard rules 

violate any legal prohibitions against doing business with the IRGC? 

Exactly one year ago, Treasury issued final rules regarding customer due diligence and 

recommended that Congress pass legislation on beneficial ownership.38 These are important 

issues tor financial transparency and integrity, unrelated to the Iran nuclear deal and remaining 

non-nuclear sanctions. 

Separately, under the Obama administration, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued 

guidance and F AQs about the implementation of the nuclear deal and related sanctions relief. 

These FAQs troublingly appeared to case restrictions on the enforcement of U.S. sanctions 

banning transactions with the IRGC. In short, Treasury stated that transactions with entities 

minority-owned by designated persons may not be sanctionable, that banks do not necessarily 

need to do due diligence on their customers' customers, and that foreign financial institutions can 

do dollarized transactions with Iranian entities provided the dollars do not touch the United 

States. Combined, these measures significantly eased restrictions on transactions between Iran 

and non-U.S. banks and companies. 

Congress should request clarification from the Treasury Department on its F AQs and should 

urge the Trump administration to rescind the guidance until it has completed its review ofU.S.-

Jran policy. 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, "Additional Treasury and State Designations Targeting Networks 

Linked to Iranian WMD Proliferation and Sanctions Evasion." December 12,2013. 

(bJ1I2~:/ lwww. treasury. gov~'i~fcnter!Qill..§..-:I_tj~ses 1PageshJ_12_41 .asp;s) 38 U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Announces Key Regulations and Legislation to Counter Money 

Laundering and Corruption. Combat Tax Evasion,'' May 5, 2016. (1:!!.\m;: '/www.treasury.gov/p!]ess-centerlpressr_e.leases1Pages/jl0451 dliPx) 
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Questions for Ray Takeyh, Ph.D. 

Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow tor Middle East Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Questions from Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

April 5, 2017, Hearing: ''Assessing the Iran Deal" 

I. How significant a role docs Iran play in supporting the Assad government in Syria? 

Iran is critical to the survival and stability of the Assad regime. Through Shia militias and 

Hezbollah forces that it has deployed. it now constitutes 75% of Assad's ground forces. The 

Revolutionary Guards are also active in Syria in tcrn1s of logistics. planning and directing 

military operations. 

2. What actions can the U.S. take to support forces of opposition to the Iranian government 

within the country? 

The United States has a great deal of ability to influence the developments in Iran. By tailoring 

our broadcasting services to challenge the regime's legitimacy and directly aiding internal forces 

of dissent, we can press for Iran· s democratization. 

3. What are the implications of Ebrahim Raisi's candidacy for the presidency oflran? 

Ebra!Jim Raisi is one of the most notorious figures in Iran today. In his role in the judiciary over 

the past three decades, he has been responsible tor some of the regime's most important 

atrocities. From his service on the "death commission" of the 1980s to his active role in 

repression of the Green Movement in 2009, he is an unsavory figure much detested by the 

public.