Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 17-56 Audit Report

Salary Support: State and USAID Need to 

Address SIGAR’s Prior Recommendations for 

Safeguarding Payments for Afghan Government 

Employees and Embedded Technical Advisors

SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support

SIGAR

JULY

2017 
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

SIGAR first reported on salary support paid by 

the Department of State (State) and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) 

to the Afghan government in October 2010. At 

that time, SIGAR concluded that weaknesses 

in hiring, promoting, and paying Afghan 

recipients of salary support had put the U.S. 

government’s and other donors’ salary 

support funding at risk of waste, misuse, or 

corruption.

Based on that conclusion, SIGAR made 10 

recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to 

Afghanistan—with implementing actions to be 

conducted by State and USAID—to ensure that 

the necessary internal controls were put in 

place to safeguard U.S. funding for salary 

support, and to improve the long-term 

sustainability and capacity of the Afghan 

government. The ambassador initially 

concurred with all the recommendations and 

agreed to take actions.

The objective of this follow-up audit was to

determine the extent to which State and 

USAID addressed SIGAR’s prior

recommendations, and, if not, whether 

additional actions should be taken. SIGAR 

considered a recommendation to be fully 

addressed if State and USAID took 

appropriate action to implement it for their 

respective agency.

For the purposes of this report, SIGAR defined 

salary support as payments made for the 

salaries or benefits of Afghan government 

employees and technical advisors embedded 

within the Afghan ministries. To maintain 

continuity with the scope of the prior audit, 

SIGAR limited its review to salary support 

State and USAID provided through bilateral 

assistance to Afghan government employees 

and embedded technical advisors in 

nonsecurity ministries.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

After nearly 7 years, most of the recommendations SIGAR made in its 

October 2010 report on salary support have not been fully addressed 

by State and USAID. SIGAR reviewed the 10 recommendations from its 

2010 report, and determined that State did not fully address 8 

recommendations and USAID did not fully address 5. By not fully 

addressing these recommendations, State and USAID continue to 

provide salary support to Afghan government employees and 

embedded technical advisors, respectively, without implementing 

safeguards designed to ensure that the funds are used as intended.

State fully addressed two recommendations: (1) to use a standardized 

salary scale for its salary support, and (2) to require that U.S.-funded 

positions within the Afghan government are on its official list of 

approved staff positions. USAID also fully addressed two 

recommendations: (1) to use a standardized salary scale for its salary 

support, and (2) to identify its existing and planned salary support and 

determine whether it aligns with the agency’s guidance and strategic 

goals. 

State has not fully addressed SIGAR’s eight prior recommendations to: 

1. Establish principles and reporting requirements for salary 

support that facilitate a transition to Afghan responsibility.

2. Define key salary support-related terms to facilitate 

information sharing and transparency.

3. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point for U.S. 

agencies for salary support requests and monitoring. 

4. Issue salary support guidance that includes priorities, 

coordination mechanisms, and standardized salary ranges. 

5. Identify the extent of existing and planned salary support and 

whether it is in line with issued guidance and strategic goals. 

6. Conduct a risk assessment of Afghan government payroll and 

human resources systems used for salary support, and 

institute requirements to mitigate identified weaknesses.

7. Develop a mechanism to detect when employees receive 

multiple salary payments. 

8. Require that recipients of salary support be paid electronically, 

if appropriate financial controls exist. 

For example, State provided funds for salary support through Afghan 

government payroll systems, but did not conduct any risk assessments 

of those systems to ensure that they were able to account for those 

funds. Additionally, although State acknowledges that using electronic 

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 17-56 AUDIT REPORT

July 2017

Salary Support: State and USAID Need to Address SIGAR’s Prior 

Recommendations for Safeguarding Payments for Afghan 

Government Employees and Embedded Technical Advisors 
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

SIGAR is repeating prior recommendations that have not been not fully addressed, with modifications to account for 

actions taken by State and USAID since the 2010 report. 

To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on long-term sustainability and capacity development, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

1. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to collectively 

establish principles and reporting requirements that guide how and under what conditions donors may provide 

salary support in a way that facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility. 

2. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to collectively 

define key terms, such as “salary support,” “salary supplement,” “technical advisor,” and other related terms, to 

facilitate information sharing and improve transparency over donor salary support. 

To ensure State’s and USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals, and is 

consistently applied across the agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination 

with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for 

Afghanistan:

3. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point to respond to requests for salary support and reconcile salary 

support provided by the agencies. 

To ensure USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is consistently applied, 

SIGAR recommends that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

4. Issue guidance that includes interagency salary support coordination mechanisms. 

To ensure State’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is consistently applied, 

SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

5. Issue guidance that includes salary support priorities, interagency coordination mechanisms, and standardized 

salary ranges. 

payments is a best practice, it does not have a policy in place requiring their use for salary support when feasible.

USAID has not fully addressed SIGAR’s five prior recommendations to: 

1. Establish principles and reporting requirements for salary support that facilitate a transition to Afghan

responsibility. 

2. Define key salary support-related terms to facilitate information sharing and transparency. 

3. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point for U.S. agencies for salary support requests and monitoring. 

4. Issue salary support guidance that includes priorities, coordination mechanisms, and standardized salary ranges. 

5. Require that recipients of salary support be paid electronically, if appropriate financial controls exist. 

For example, although USAID guidance discusses its technical assistance priorities and includes standardized salary 

ranges, it does not have guidance that would help facilitate coordination with State. In addition, like State, USAID does not 

include requirements for electronic payments in all of its active awards through which it provides salary support for 

embedded technical advisors.

Without these safeguards, State and USAID increase the risk that these funds may be used inefficiently, misused, or 

wasted.
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.

6. Identify the full extent of planned salary support, and determine whether that support aligns with this guidance and 

U.S. strategic goals and objectives. 

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs: 

7. Conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government’s payroll and human resources systems and procedures 

used to disburse State-funded salary support to identify weaknesses in the systems, and institute conditions or 

requirements to address those weaknesses. 

8. Work with the Ministry of Finance, in coordination with other donors, to develop a mechanism to detect when 

Afghan government employees receive multiple salary payments. 

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State and USAID funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends 

that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

9. Require salary support recipients to be paid electronically when appropriate financial controls exist. 

SIGAR received written comments on a draft of this report from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs and the USAID Mission for Afghanistan. State neither agreed nor disagreed with the eight 

recommendations directed to it. According to State, it stopped providing salary support to certain Afghan government 

employees under a project implemented by the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia 

and the Pacific in December 2016, and will reconsider the recommendations if it chooses to provide support again through 

future projects. The department did not indicate whether it will provide salary support again in the future, but stated that it 

would reevaluate SIGAR’s recommendations should it consider doing so for any of its future projects. Because State may 

provide salary support again, SIGAR maintains that the recommendations should be addressed to ensure that mechanisms 

to coordinate and account for salary support are in place when they are needed. Accordingly, all eight recommendations will 

remain open.

USAID concurred with four of the five recommendations directed to it, but did not concur with the recommendation to 

designate a representative to serve as a focal point to respond to requests for salary support and monitor salary support 

provided by the agencies. In its response, USAID stated that it was not feasible for a representative to serve as a focal point 

to respond to requests for support and monitor other agencies’ salary support, or for a focal point to approve salary support

requests across multiple projects. However, SIGAR is neither recommending that USAID monitor other agencies’ salary 

support, nor that the designated focal point serve as the approving authority for salary support requests. Instead, SIGAR is 

recommending only that USAID and State designate a focal point to ensure that both agencies are aware of the salary 

support they provide and to respond to any requests for salary support they receive. SIGAR continues to believe this 

recommendation is reasonable and needed. Therefore, the recommendation was revised to clarify SIGAR’s intention and 

will remain open until USAID provides evidence that a focal point has been identified, or some other action has been taken 

to correct the problem and appropriate coordination mechanisms are in place.

 

 
July 25, 2017 

The Honorable Rex W. Tillerson

Secretary of State

The Honorable William R. Brownfield

Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and

 Law Enforcement Affairs 

Mr. Wade Warren

Acting Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

The Honorable Hugo Llorens 

Special Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan

Mr. Herbert B. Smith

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s follow-up audit of the Department of State’s (State) and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development’s (USAID) salary support for Afghan government employees and 

technical advisors embedded within the government. We focused on the agencies’ salary support efforts since 

our October 2010 audit report on the subject and assessed the extent to which they addressed the 10 

recommendations included in that report. 

We are repeating prior recommendations that State and USAID have not fully addressed, with modifications to 

account for actions they have taken since our 2010 report.

To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on long-term sustainability and capacity development, 

we recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

1. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to 

collectively establish principles and reporting requirements that guide how and under what conditions 

donors may provide salary support in a way that facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility.

2. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to 

collectively define key terms, such as “salary support,” “salary supplement,” “technical advisor,” and 

other related terms, to facilitate information sharing and improve transparency over donor salary 

support.

To ensure State’s and USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is 

consistently applied across the agencies, we recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in 

coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the 

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

3. Designate a focal point to respond to requests for salary support and reconcile salary support provided 

by the agencies. 
To ensure USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is 

consistently applied, we recommend that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

4. Issue guidance that includes interagency salary support coordination mechanisms.

To ensure State’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is consistently 

applied, we recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

5. Issue guidance that includes salary support priorities, interagency coordination mechanisms, and 

standardized salary ranges.

6. Identify the full extent of planned salary support, and determine whether that support aligns with this 

guidance and U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State funding for salary support, we recommend that 

the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

7. Conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government’s payroll and human resources systems and 

procedures used to disburse State-funded salary support to identify weaknesses in the systems, and 

institute conditions or requirements to address those weaknesses.

8. Work with the Ministry of Finance, in coordination with other donors, to develop a mechanism to 

detect when Afghan government employees receive multiple salary payments.

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State and USAID funding for salary support, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

9. Require salary support recipients to be paid electronically when appropriate financial controls exist.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission for Afghanistan, which are reproduced in appendices V and VI, 

respectively. State neither agreed nor disagreed with the eight recommendations directed to it. USAID 

concurred with four of the recommendations directed to it and did not concur with one. Additionally, State and 

USAID provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110‐181, as amended, and the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended, and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

John F. Sopko

Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background.................................................................................................................................................................. 2

State Did Not Fully Address Eight Prior SIGAR Recommendations, and USAID Did Not Fully Address Five 

Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................................... 4

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................................11

Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................11

Agency Comments .....................................................................................................................................................13

Scope and Methodology .......................................................................................................................15

Department of State Projects Providing Salary Support Since 2010................................................16

U.S. Agency for International Development Active Awards Providing Salary Support.....................18

Recommendations from Prior SIGAR Audit of U.S. Salary Support ..................................................23

Comments from Department of State................................................................................................. 26

Comments from U.S. Agency for International Development ...........................................................29

Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................................................36

TABLES

Status of SIGAR’s 2010 Audit Recommendations by Agency ................................................................... 5

State Projects Providing Salary Support Since 2010...............................................................................16

USAID Active Awards Providing Salary Support, as of September 2016 ................................................18

Overview of Recommendations from SIGAR’s Prior Audit of U.S. Salary Support ..................................23
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page vii

ABBREVIATIONS

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

CBR Capacity Building for Results Facility

Colombo Plan Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development 

in Asia and the Pacific

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOPH Ministry of Public Health

NTA National Technical Assistance

PAS Public Affairs Section

State U.S. Department of State

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 1 

The Afghan government relies on financial assistance from the United States and other international donors. In 

some cases, this assistance helps pay salaries and benefits for government employees. Referred to as “salary 

support,” these payments are designed to help the Afghan government attract and retain skilled workers by 

offering compensation competitive with salaries international donors offer their employees. In addition, donors 

may pay the salaries of technical advisors who, for some assistance projects, are embedded within the Afghan 

ministries to build capacity by training and mentoring their employees.1 For the purposes of this report, we also 

refer to these payments as salary support. Since 2010, the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) have spent at least $27.8 million on salary support for Afghan government 

employees and embedded technical advisors for Afghan ministries and offices not in the security sector.

We issued our first audit report on U.S. agencies’ oversight of salary support payments in October 2010.2 We 

concluded that the weaknesses identified in hiring, promoting, and paying Afghan recipients of salary support 

put the U.S. government’s and other donors’ funding for salary support at risk of waste, misuse, and

corruption. We also noted that U.S. and Afghan officials attributed a greater risk of corruption within the Afghan 

government, in part, to a lack of oversight of donor salary support funds. To address these concerns, we made 

10 recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, who directs and coordinates State and USAID 

offices and personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. These recommendations were designed to help ensure 

that the necessary internal controls were put in place to safeguard U.S. funding for salary support and improve 

the long-term sustainability and capacity of the Afghan government. 

In its comments on a draft of that report, the embassy—on State’s and USAID’s behalf—concurred with all 10 

recommendations. We closed one recommendation as implemented in September 2012 and in June 2013 

closed the remaining nine as unimplemented due to State’s and USAID’s lack of action. We also intended to 

reexamine these issues in future audit work, given our ongoing concerns about the vulnerability of providing 

U.S. salary support without adequate safeguards in place.

The objective of this follow-up audit was to determine the extent to which State and USAID addressed our prior

recommendations, and, if not, whether additional actions should be taken. We reviewed all 10 of the previous 

recommendations regardless of whether they were closed as implemented or unimplemented. To maintain 

continuity with the scope of our prior audit, we limited our review to salary support State and USAID provided 

through bilateral assistance to Afghan government employees and embedded technical advisors in nonsecurity 

ministries.3

To accomplish this objective, we reviewed State and USAID award documents, agreements, and written 

responses concerning their salary support activities, as well as additional data they provided.4 We also 

reviewed responses from the embassy in response to our recommendation follow-up for the 2010 audit. We 

 

1 We also examined salary support to technical advisors in our 2010 report. Although we referred to these individuals as 

“technical advisors” in that report, we refer to them as “embedded technical advisors” in this report.

2 SIGAR, Actions Needed to Mitigate Inconsistencies in and Lack of Safeguards over U.S. Salary Support to Afghan 

Government Employees and Technical Advisors, SIGAR Audit 11-5, October 29, 2010. 

3 USAID also provides direct assistance for salary support through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which also 

receives funding from other international donors. The World Bank administers this fund and is responsible for managing 

and overseeing it on the donors’ behalf. We are currently conducting an audit of U.S. contributions to the ARTF and have 

previously reported on this topic (see SIGAR, The World Bank and the Afghan Government Have Established Mechanisms 

to Monitor and Account for Funds Contributed to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but Some Limitations and 

Challenges Should Be Addressed, SIGAR Audit 11-14, July 22, 2011). We examined salary support to the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces in prior audits (see SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal 

Oversight of Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR 15-54-AR, April 23, 2015; and SIGAR, Afghan National Police: More than 

$300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary Payments Is Based on Partially Verified or Reconciled Data, SIGAR 15-26-AR, 

January 7, 2015).

4 According to USAID’s Automated Directives System, Chapter 201, “Program Cycle Operational Policy,” an award is a “form 

of implementing mechanism through which USAID transfers funds to an implementing partner, generally selected through a 

competitive process resulting in a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement.”
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 2 

interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the 

USAID Mission for Afghanistan, and the Afghan government’s Independent Administrative Reform and Civil 

Service Commission regarding salary support provided by the U.S. government and international donors. We 

conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan, from May 2015 to July 2017, in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I has a more detailed discussion of our 

scope and methodology.

BACKGROUND

To help the Afghan government retain personnel, international donors provide salary support payments to 

various ministries. These payments may be included as part of a larger assistance project and can include 

salary supplements, through which a donor augments an individual employee’s base pay. In addition to 

providing salary support for Afghan government employees, some donor projects pay the salaries of embedded 

technical advisors. In some instances, these advisors not only trained and mentored government employees, 

but also performed governmental functions.

In our 2010 report on our audit of State’s and USAID’s use of salary support in Afghanistan, our key findings 

were that: 

• The full extent of U.S. and donor salary support to Afghan government employees and embedded 

technical advisors was unknown, and donors perpetuated a lack of transparency by underreporting 

salary support. 

• State and USAID inconsistently identified and applied salary support due to a lack of unified 

interagency guidance, including a process for centrally managing salary support data. 

• Donors’ practices of paying higher salaries than the Afghan government, funding positions outside the 

government’s planning and budgeting process, and lack of coordination undermined the long-term 

development of the government’s capacity and ability to attract and retain skilled employees. 

• Weaknesses in the Afghan government’s ability to track and pay salaries electronically increased the 

risk that U.S. salary support funds could be mismanaged or abused.

Since 2010, State and USAID together have spent at least $27.8 million on salary support for Afghan 

government employees and embedded technical advisors in nonsecurity ministries. According to State, of this 

amount, it spent almost $5.8 million on salary support through two projects funded by INL, two projects funded 

by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul’s Public Affairs Section (PAS) through the Economic Support Fund, and an 

undetermined number of projects PAS managed and paid for with public diplomacy funds through State’s 

Diplomatic and Consular Programs budget.5 Appendix II provides details about these State projects.

According to INL officials, State only provided salary support to Afghan government employees through a 

project implemented by the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the 

Pacific (Colombo Plan), a regional intergovernmental organization.6 State began providing salary support 

through this project in January 2015. As part of the project, INL paid a portion of the salaries for certain drug 

treatment center employees in Afghanistan because the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) could not afford to 

pay them. According to State’s responses to our requests for information, the department had no other

 

5 The Economic Support Fund is dedicated to promoting economic or political stability in regions where the United States 

has special security interests. Public diplomacy funds are used to support U.S. foreign policy and national interests by 

influencing foreign populations and strengthening the relationship between them and the U.S. public and government. One 

method State uses to spend public diplomacy funds is its Diplomatic and Consular Programs budget, which pays for 

groundwork and support activities conducted by diplomatic posts abroad. PAS refused to provide information beyond the 

total amount spent, about its projects that provide salary support to Afghan government employees and are paid for with 

public diplomacy funds. PAS stated erroneously that these projects were not within our oversight mandate. 

6 The project aims to strengthen the operation and service delivery of drug treatment and rehabilitation centers in 

Afghanistan.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 3 

projects funding salary support for Afghan government employees or embedded technical advisors.7 In its June 

2017 comments on a draft of this report, INL stated that it ended salary support to the project in December

2016 because the MOPH received sufficient funding from the Afghan government to cover the salaries of all 

drug treatment center clinical staff.8 However, in its comments, State has not said whether it will provide salary 

support again in the future. 

In its responses to our request for information, USAID stated that it no longer directly provides salary support, 

including salary supplements, to Afghan government employees. Instead, USAID said that it supports 

employees through its contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which funds salary 

support to Afghan government employees through its Capacity Building for Results Facility (CBR) project.

However, USAID continues to provide salary support for embedded technical advisors. According to agency 

data, it spent more than $22 million on this support through 21 awards that were active as of September 

2016.9 Appendix III provides details about these awards. We could not determine the full extent of salary 

support the agency has provided since 2010 because USAID officials could not readily provide data regarding 

funds spent on salary support for its closed awards. The officials told us the agency’s agreements with public 

international organizations prevent it from requiring them to report certain information upon request, such as 

data about the embedded technical advisors these organizations may fund.

Summary of SIGAR’s Prior Recommendations to Improve the Salary Support

Process

In our 2010 report, we made 10 recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, to be implemented 

by State and USAID. To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on long-term sustainability and 

capacity development, we recommended that the ambassador coordinate with other international donors and 

the Afghan government through formal coordination mechanisms to collectively:

1. Establish principles, including reporting requirements, to guide how and under what conditions donors 

may provide salary support in a way that facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility.

2. Define key terms, such as salary support, salary supplement, technical advisor, and other related 

terms, to facilitate information sharing and improve transparency over donor salary support.

3. Develop and utilize a standardized salary scale that is more closely aligned with Afghan governmentapproved scales for salaries and salary supplements.

To ensure that U.S. salary support was strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals, and is 

consistently applied across U.S. agencies, we recommended that the ambassador:

4. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point for requests for salary support and monitor salary 

support provided by U.S. agencies.

5. Issue guidance that includes priorities, coordination mechanisms, and standardized salary ranges.

6. Identify the full extent of existing and planned U.S. salary support, and determine whether that support 

is in line with this guidance and U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. funding for salary support, we recommended that 

the ambassador:

 

7 INL also provides salary support to recipients in the security sector, but this was outside our scope.

8 INL’s comments are reproduced in appendix V.

9 These 21 active awards are expected to end between November 2016 and June 2020.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 4 

7. Require verification that positions funded by U.S. agencies are on the tashkil or are planned to be 

transferred on to the tashkil.10

8. Conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government payroll and human resources systems and 

procedures used to disburse salary support in order to determine weaknesses in the systems, and 

institute conditions or requirements to mitigate those risks.

9. Work with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), in conjunction with other donors, to develop a mechanism to 

detect when employees receive multiple salary payments.

10. Require that recipients of U.S. salary support be paid electronically, if appropriate financial controls 

exist.

Appendix IV lists all 10 recommendations, whether the ambassador concurred, their status, and our findings 

regarding their current applicability.

STATE DID NOT FULLY ADDRESS EIGHT PRIOR SIGAR RECOMMENDATIONS, 

AND USAID DID NOT FULLY ADDRESS FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

In comments on a draft of our October 2010 report, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan concurred with all 10 

of our prior recommendations. However, in December 2012, the embassy’s Coordinating Director for 

Development and Economic Assistance told us the embassy no longer agreed with recommendations 3, 5, 6, 

and 10, stating that they were no longer applicable or feasible to implement.11

We reviewed each recommendation to determine whether it is still applicable and actionable. We determined 

that all 10 recommendations are applicable to State because the department has not eliminated the 

possibility of resuming salary support in the future. Because USAID only funds salary support for embedded 

technical advisors, we determined that 7 of the 10 recommendations are applicable to the agency, while 

recommendations 7, 8, and 9 are no longer applicable.

We considered a recommendation to be fully addressed if State and USAID took appropriate action to 

implement it for their respective agency. Based on our assessment, we found that State had not fully 

addressed 8 of the 10 applicable recommendations and USAID had not fully addressed 5 of the 7 applicable 

recommendations. Table 1 shows the status of the 2010 recommendations for State and USAID.

 

10 The tashkil is the Afghan government’s official list of authorized staff positions.

11 The embassy’s Coordinating Directorate for Development and Economic Affairs provided the response to our 2010 

report on behalf of the ambassador and served as SIGAR’s point of contact for recommendation follow-up. The directorate 

provided oversight and direction for all civilian assistance from the U.S. government to Afghanistan, including the USAID 

mission.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 5 

Status of SIGAR’s 2010 Audit Recommendations by Agency

Recommendation (Abridged) Status for State Status for USAID

1 Establish principles and reporting requirements for salary support that 

facilitate a transition to Afghan responsibility. 

2 Define key salary support-related terms to facilitate informationsharing and transparency. 

3 Develop and utilize a standardized salary scale more closely aligned 

with Afghan government-approved salary scales. 

4 Designate a representative to serve as a focal point for U.S. agencies 

for salary support requests and monitoring. 

5 Issue salary support guidance that includes priorities, coordination 

mechanisms, and standardized salary ranges. 

6 Identify the extent of existing and planned salary support, and whether 

it is in line with issued guidance and strategic goals. 

7 Require verification that U.S.-funded positions are on or are planned to 

be transferred on to the Afghan government’s tashkil.

8 Conduct a risk assessment of Afghan government payroll and human 

resources systems used for salary support, and institute requirements 

to mitigate identified weaknesses. 

9 Develop a mechanism to detect when employees receive multiple 

salary payments. 

10 Require that recipients of salary support be paid electronically, if 

appropriate financial controls exist. 

Recommendation remains applicable and is addressed. 

Recommendation remains applicable but is not addressed. 

Recommendation is no longer applicable. 

Source: SIGAR analysis of information provided by State and USAID

Recommendation 1: Establish Principles and Reporting Requirements for Salary 

Support that Facilitate a Transition to Afghan Responsibility

Neither State nor USAID has fully addressed recommendation 1. In its response to our request for information 

concerning how it has addressed the recommendation, State said embassy officials participate in discussions 

with international donors about the ARTF-funded CBR project, which provides salary support for Afghan 

government employees. According to State’s response, the CBR project is the main mechanism for donors to

coordinate salary support principles and reporting requirements. However, the salary support State funded

does not flow through the CBR project. The department’s response did not explain how the CBR-related 

discussions and any decisions made regarding that project affect salary support provided through other 

projects and funding mechanisms in Afghanistan, such as State’s previous funding through the Colombo Plan

of salary support for drug treatment center employees.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 6 

USAID has not coordinated with international donors to establish salary support principles. In a written 

response to us, the mission said it discusses salary support with international donors through regular aid 

coordination meetings. It also cited efforts to align salaries among international donors that culminated, in 

part, with the Afghan government approving salary scale and implementation guidelines for national technical 

assistance (NTA). The NTA guidelines are intended to (1) align Afghan technical assistance salary scales among 

donors, (2) ensure that the scales are transparent and fiscally sustainable, and (3) strengthen the 

government’s hiring ability. Additionally, the guidelines established a framework for coordination, data 

reporting, and oversight mechanisms that the Afghan government can use to monitor donors’ use of technical 

assistance, the salary scales they use, and their compliance with the guidelines. For example, the guidelines 

include provisions to establish a supervisory committee that would include representatives of international

donors and the Afghan government, receive regular data on technical assistance, establish a technical 

assistance contract database, and revise the salary scale if needed.

USAID Mission for Afghanistan officials told us the agency is implementing only the salary scale portion of the 

NTA guidelines, and in July 2016, the mission directed its implementing partners to use the NTA salary scale 

when hiring or renewing contracts for local staff working on agency-funded projects. One USAID official told us 

the Afghan government had not yet formed the supervisory committee that would allow for implementation of 

the coordination, data reporting, and oversight mechanisms in the guidelines. Although the mission officials 

said USAID implemented the NTA salary scale, they could not provide any supporting documentation of USAID

discussing its salary support efforts with other international donors. 

Beyond USAID’s July 2016 directive, neither USAID nor State has comprehensive policies that specifically 

govern all aspects of their salary support for Afghan government employees or embedded technical advisors. 

USAID does have a policy discouraging the use of salary supplements for foreign government employees.12

Issued in 1988 and codified in the agency’s acquisition regulations, the policy allows exceptions when paying 

supplements is deemed necessary for achieving program objectives. As previously noted, the agency no longer 

provides salary supplements to Afghan government employees.

In 2010, we found that unclear reporting instructions contributed to confusion among U.S. and other 

international donor officials about the type of information they were expected to report to the Afghan 

government when it asked for an overview of salary support data. By not establishing common salary support 

principles and reporting requirements, State and USAID continue to risk inadvertently reporting inaccurate or 

unwanted data when coordinating salary support with other donors or the Afghan government. Furthermore, 

this makes it difficult to plan to transfer responsibility for salary payments to the Afghan government.

Recommendation 2: Define Key Salary Support-Related Terms to Facilitate 

Information Sharing and Transparency

Neither State nor USAID has fully addressed recommendation 2. In its written response to our request for 

information on how it had addressed the recommendation, State referred to embassy officials participating in 

discussions about the CBR project. According to State, the project is also the main forum for defining terms 

related to salary support in Afghanistan. However, as with its response to recommendation 1, State did not 

explain how CBR-related discussions and any resulting definitions regarding that project’s activities affect 

State’s salary support provided outside of the CBR. 

USAID stated that it discussed salary support-related definitions with international donors, and mission officials 

told us they have an informal understanding of what those definitions are. Although the agency’s 1988 salary 

supplement policy includes a definition of “salary supplement,” USAID could not produce any evidence of its 

representatives discussing this or other salary support-related definitions with international donors, or any 

documentation of agreed-upon definitions that resulted from those discussions.

 

12 USAID Acquisition Regulation 731.205-71, “Salary Supplements for Host Government Employees.”
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 7 

We previously reported that use of varying definitions contributed to confusion among U.S. and international 

officials when reporting salary support information to the Afghan government. Although USAID mission officials 

said they have an informal understanding of salary support definitions, the high annual turnover of staff at the 

mission could result in any informal consensus about salary support definitions not lasting beyond the tenure 

of current officials.13 By not using common definitions of salary support-related terms, State and USAID 

continue to risk inadvertently reporting inaccurate or unwanted data.

Recommendation 3: Develop and Utilize a Standardized Salary Scale More Closely 

Aligned with Afghan Government-Approved Salary Scales

Since our 2010 report, State and USAID have fully addressed recommendation 3. We found that both State 

and USAID took action to fully address the recommendation, even though in December 2012 the embassy 

informed us that it no longer agreed with this recommendation. Its reasoning was that aligning U.S.-funded pay 

scales with the Afghan government’s scales could derail prior project successes by local staff taking jobs with 

international donors that pay more.

Despite this, State provided salary support through the Colombo Plan to the Afghan government, which then 

paid the salaries of individuals on the tashkil. According to State, all of these salaries are paid in accordance 

with the Afghan government’s NTA salary scale. Similarly, as previously discussed, USAID instructed its 

implementing partners in July 2016 to use a standardized salary scale that aligns with the NTA salary scale 

when hiring or renewing the contracts of local staff working on USAID-funded projects. 

We noted in our 2010 report that donors’ use of salary scales above the Afghan government-approved rates 

could weaken government institutions by limiting the government’s ability to recruit qualified personnel. By 

taking action to mitigate this negative effect of donor salary support, State and USAID may help the Afghan 

government decrease its turnover rate, which was high when we released our prior report due to employees 

leaving for more lucrative jobs with international donors.

Recommendation 4: Designate a Representative to Serve as a Focal Point for U.S. 

Agencies for Salary Support Requests and Monitoring

State and USAID have not fully addressed recommendation 4. We closed this recommendation as 

implemented in September 2012 because the embassy told us it had formed a working group—comprised of 

senior officials, including representatives from USAID, INL, and PAS—that focused on salary support-related 

issues. In May 2016, USAID said this working group still existed, but State said a month later that the group no 

longer met. In March 2017, State said INL and USAID hold regular meetings to coordinate their program 

activities, but did not provide any documentation to show that participants discussed salary support. By not 

coordinating their salary support with each other, there is a risk State and USAID salary support funds are not

provided consistently or fully monitored. 

Recommendation 5: Issue Salary Support Guidance that Includes Priorities, 

Coordination Mechanisms, and Standardized Salary Ranges

USAID has addressed two of the three parts of recommendation 5, while State has not addressed any parts of 

the recommendation. After initially agreeing with the recommendation, in December 2012 the embassy 

 

13 In December 2015, the Government Accountability Office reported that most U.S. employees at the embassy are 

assigned there for just 1 year, causing substantial turnover each year. Because of this turnover, the office found that 

institutional knowledge among staff regarding their roles could be limited. See Government Accountability Office, 

Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff, GAO-16-

100, December 3, 2015.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 8 

informed us that it no longer agreed, stating that a single policy for all U.S. salary support would not be 

appropriate because each agency faced different challenges and goals.

We asked State what actions it took to address the recommendation since our prior report. In its June 2016 

response, State wrote that the department looks to USAID’s 1988 salary supplement guidance as a model for 

its own salary support activities. In its March 2017 response, State clarified that it does not officially require its 

staff to follow USAID’s guidance because the department is withdrawing from most of its salary support efforts.

However, we determined that USAID’s salary supplement guidance is not relevant for this recommendation 

because it does not discuss priorities, coordination mechanisms, or standardized salary scales. In addition, 

State’s most recent salary support funded portions of Afghan government employees’ base salaries and were

not salary supplements, which the USAID policy defines as payments that increase an employee’s base salary.

We found that USAID, unlike State, took action that addressed parts of the recommendation: to issue salary 

support guidance that includes priorities and standardized salary ranges. USAID identified the mission’s 

priorities for providing technical assistance in The USAID/Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015–2018.14

Additionally, the agency instructed its implementing partners, through its July 2016 directive, to use a 

standardized salary scale that aligns with the Afghan government’s NTA scale. USAID’s actions did not fully 

address the second part of the recommendation to issue guidance about interagency coordination 

mechanisms because the working group that would have achieved this—the one established in response to 

recommendation 4—no longer meets.

By providing salary support without guidance that defines priorities, coordination mechanisms, and 

standardized salary ranges, State risks providing any future salary support inconsistently and without clear 

goals for that assistance. Similarly, without guidance for an interagency coordination mechanism, USAID may 

be providing salary support in ways that are inconsistent with, or even duplicative of, salary support projects

provided by other agencies. 

Recommendation 6: Identify the Extent of Existing and Planned Salary Support, and 

Whether It Is in Line with Issued Guidance and Strategic Goals

State has addressed one of the two parts of recommendation 6, while USAID has fully addressed it. After 

initially agreeing with the recommendation, in December 2012 the embassy informed us it no longer agreed. It

stated that because the unified guidance referenced in recommendation 5 would not be appropriate, it would 

not be possible to determine whether agencies provided salary support in accordance with that guidance.

Despite this, in February 2017, State did identify its existing salary support. Additionally, it noted a month later 

that it was in the process of finalizing a document that would discuss the salary support it planned to provide in 

the future.

We determined that USAID took action to address recommendation 6 by identifying the extent of its existing 

salary support for embedded technical advisors in response to our inquiries, and its planned areas of future 

support in The USAID/Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015–2018, which also discusses how that support fits 

into the mission’s overall assistance strategy for this period.

By not developing guidance as part of recommendation 5 and determining whether its planned use of salary 

support aligns with that guidance, State risks making future salary support payments without the benefit of 

clear priorities and standard policies. This creates a broader risk that its future salary support may not align

with U.S. strategic goals and objectives. In contrast, USAID’s actions may ensure that its future salary support 

helps achieve these goals.

 

14 The 2015–2018 transition plan discusses how the USAID Mission for Afghanistan plans to address three development 

objectives: (1) expanding sustainable, agriculture-led economic growth; (2) maintaining and enhancing gains in health, 

education, and empowering women; and (3) improving the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government. See 

USAID, The USAID/Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015–2018, August 2, 2016.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 9 

Recommendation 7: Require Verification that U.S.-Funded Positions Are On or 

Planned to Be Transferred On to the Afghan Government’s Tashkil

State has fully addressed recommendation 7, and it is no longer applicable to USAID. In its June 2016 

response to our request for information about how it addressed the recommendation, State told us that it 

requires the Afghan government positions it funds to be either on the tashkil or planned to be transferred on to 

the tashkil. However, the department did not provide us with any documentation to support its assertion. 

Despite this lack of documentation, State addressed the recommendation in December 2016 when it 

determined that the positions for all of its current salary support recipients were on the tashkil.

USAID only provides salary support for embedded technical advisors and no longer directly funds Afghan 

government employees’ salaries. As a result, there is no longer a need for USAID to verify that any positions are 

on or planned to be on the tashkil.

We previously reported that by funding positions not authorized on the tashkil, agencies might be paying for 

positions the government does not need and cannot afford to pay for on its own. By taking action to address 

the recommendation, State may help mitigate this potential negative effect of its salary support.

Recommendation 8: Conduct a Risk Assessment of Afghan Government Payroll and 

Human Resources Systems Used for Salary Support, and Institute Requirements to 

Mitigate Identified Weaknesses

State has not fully addressed recommendation 8, and it is no longer applicable to USAID. In a February 2017 

response to us, State said its salary support efforts channeled funds from INL to the MOF and MOPH via its 

implementing partner. The ministries then distributed the funds to individuals with positions on the tashkil. 

However, in April 2017 INL told us it has not conducted a risk assessment of the Afghan government’s payroll 

and human resources systems.

According to USAID, all of its salary support for embedded technical advisors is provided through off-budget 

projects, which are not managed or paid for through Afghan government systems. The salary support USAID 

provides to Afghan government employees through the ARTF is managed by the World Bank. As a result, as it 

specifically relates to salary support, there is no longer a need for USAID to conduct risk assessments of 

Afghan government payroll and human resources systems because they are not being used to provide USAIDfunded salary support.15

In January 2014, we reported that USAID’s contracted assessments of the MOF and MOPH led the agency to 

conclude that the ministries’ systems and internal controls could not safeguard U.S. or other donor funds.16 In 

addition, the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee reported in June 2016 

that the MOPH continues to lack the capacity to manage donor funds.17 As a result, by not conducting a risk 

assessment of the Afghan government systems used to disburse its salary support funds, State continues to 

place those funds at risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.

 

15 USAID may still need to assess these systems for other purposes, as noted in our 2014 audit of the agency’s 

assessments of various Afghan ministries (see SIGAR, Direct Assistance: USAID Has taken Positive Action to Assess Afghan 

Ministries’ Ability to Manage Donor Funds, but Concerns Remain, SIGAR 14-32-AR, January 30, 2014). 

16 SIGAR, Direct Assistance, SIGAR 14-32-AR.

17 The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee is an independent agency comprised of 

anticorruption experts selected by the Afghan government and the international community to develop anticorruption 

recommendations, and monitor and evaluate anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan. For its assessment of the MOPH, see 

Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment in the 

Afghan Ministry of Public Health, June 4, 2016.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 10 

Recommendation 9: Develop a Mechanism to Detect When Employees Receive 

Multiple Salary Payments

State has not fully addressed recommendation 9, and it is no longer applicable to USAID. When we asked State 

how it addressed the recommendation, the department referred us again to the CBR project as the main forum 

for developing a mechanism to detect Afghan government employees receiving multiple salary payments. 

However, similar to its responses to recommendations 1 and 2, State did not provide documentation regarding 

how the CBR mechanism would work for salary support that is not provided through the project, like the 

department’s previous support provided through the Colombo Plan. Because USAID no longer provides salary 

support directly to Afghan government employees, the agency would not benefit from a mechanism to detect 

when those employees receive multiple salary payments.

We previously reported that the MOF did not compare donor salary support data, meaning that the Afghan 

government could not detect when recipients received multiple salary payments. Without a mechanism to 

detect payments from multiple sources to an employee for the same job, State continues to risk providing 

duplicative salary payments, resulting in a waste of funds.

Recommendation 10: Require that Recipients of Salary Support Be Paid 

Electronically if Appropriate Financial Controls Exist

Neither State nor USAID has fully addressed recommendation 10. Although it initially concurred with the 

recommendation, the embassy in Kabul informed us in December 2012 that it no longer agreed with it, stating

that electronic payment technology was not feasible throughout Afghanistan and not all Afghans had the skills 

and knowledge needed to fully use such systems. Instead, the embassy said it would continue to advocate for 

implementing and expanding electronic payment technology. 

However, the embassy’s objection to this recommendation was unwarranted because we recommended the 

use of electronic payments “if appropriate financial controls exist.” We did not recommend that the embassy 

require mandatory use of electronic payments in all regions of Afghanistan or for all salary support recipients. 

When we asked State for its current policy on the use of electronic payment systems, the department told us 

that it decides on a contract-by-contract basis whether to provide payments electronically, but noted that using 

such systems “is generally considered to be a best practice.”

During our fieldwork for this audit, we asked USAID about its use of electronic payments. The agency stated 

that it is now working with the Afghan government to develop “mobile money” systems, in which a user 

transfers funds via a text-message-based system on a mobile phone. In addition, in August 2014 USAID issued 

guidance to its acquisition staff—including its contracting officers, agreement officers, and activity managers—

that “electronic payment systems are a sound and preferred business practice” and should be the default 

method of payment for all awards.18 The guidance included language for contracting and agreement officers to 

insert into contracts and cooperative agreements. However, according to the agency, this is not a formal policy.

In April 2017, the mission told us it includes the electronic payment guidance as a special provision in its 

acquisition awards. To verify this and determine the extent to which the agency is applying its 2014 electronic 

payment guidance, we reviewed files for the 21 awards through which USAID funds salary support for 

embedded technical advisors.19 We found that: 

 

18 USAID Procurement Executive Bulletin 2014-06, Guidance for Electronic Payments under USAID Awards, August 6, 

2014. 

19 We reviewed all USAID awards with salary support components that were active as of September 2016. These awards 

began between July 2009 and July 2016, and are expected to end between November 2016 and June 2020. We did not 

review awards closed before then because, as previously discussed, USAID told us it could not readily provide data related 

to them because it does not track salary support funds as a distinct component of its projects. In addition, we did not 

review awards to public international organizations that may have included salary support components because, according 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 11 

• Thirteen awards required or encouraged paying individuals through electronic payment systems. Eight 

of these 13 also included clauses that require implementers to pay individuals in accordance with 

their established policies.

• Three awards did not require or encourage the use of electronic payments but did require

implementers to pay individuals in accordance with their established policies.

• The five remaining awards did not specify any payment delivery requirements.

As we have previously reported, not using electronic salary payments can lead to opportunities for fraud and 

corruption, as well as a lack of accountability.20 By not requiring electronic salary support payments when 

feasible, both State and USAID continue to risk salary support payments being stolen and misused. 

CONCLUSION

Since we issued our 2010 report, State and USAID have continued to provide salary support. By not fully 

addressing most of the recommendations in that report, which were designed to mitigate some of the potential 

negative effects of donor salary support, the agencies risk providing it, for example, without first establishing 

principles and reporting requirements to guide how and under what conditions international donors should 

provide salary support. This could lead to miscommunication and a lack of transparency among donors and the 

Afghan government. Similarly, by not taking the recommended actions to ensure that their salary support 

efforts are targeted and consistently applied, State and USAID risk funding salary support in program areas 

that do not align with U.S. strategic goals and objectives. Additionally, by not fully addressing our 

recommendations aimed at enhancing safeguards and accountability over U.S. salary support funds, State and 

USAID increase the risk that weaknesses within the U.S. and Afghan systems that handle those funds could 

lead to abuse. 

Although our 2010 recommendations were directed to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan—the individual 

charged with directing and coordinating personnel and activities at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan—the 

implementing agencies are State and USAID. Timely actions in response to audit recommendations can 

improve the efficiency of agency operations and ensure that there is better accountability for U.S. 

reconstruction funds. Delays in addressing recommendations may limit their effectiveness and increase the 

risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of these funds. However, despite a delay of almost 7 years, State and USAID 

have the opportunity to fully address these recommendations, which could improve the effectiveness and 

accountability of salary support to Afghan government employees and embedded technical advisors. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the effectiveness and accountability of State’s and USAID’s salary support funds, and to ensure 

that the agencies address the weaknesses we previously identified in their use of these funds, we are 

repeating our prior recommendations that State and USAID have not fully addressed, with modifications to 

account for actions they have taken since we issued our 2010 report.

To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on long-term sustainability and capacity development, 

SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

 

to USAID officials, the agency’s agreements with these organizations prevent it from requiring them to report certain data 

upon request, such as data about the embedded technical advisors they may fund.

20 See, for example, SIGAR, Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support,

Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3-AR, October 16, 2015; and SIGAR, Afghan National Police, SIGAR 15-26-AR,January 

7, 2015. 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 12 

1. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to 

collectively establish principles and reporting requirements that guide how and under what conditions 

donors may provide salary support in a way that facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility. 

2. Coordinate with other international donors and the Afghan government through formal mechanisms to 

collectively define key terms, such as “salary support,” “salary supplement,” “technical advisor,” and 

other related terms, to facilitate information sharing and improve transparency over donor salary 

support. 

To ensure State’s and USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals, and 

is consistently applied across the agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in 

coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the 

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

3. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point to respond to requests for salary support and 

reconcile salary support provided by the agencies. 

To ensure USAID’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals, and is 

consistently applied, SIGAR recommends that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

4. Issue guidance that includes interagency salary support coordination mechanisms. 

To ensure State’s salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals, and is consistently 

applied, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant 

Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

5. Issue guidance that includes salary support priorities, interagency coordination mechanisms, and 

standardized salary ranges. 

6. Identify the full extent of planned salary support, and determine whether that support aligns with this 

guidance and U.S. strategic goals and objectives. 

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends 

that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

7. Conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government’s payroll and human resources systems and 

procedures used to disburse State-funded salary support to identify weaknesses in the systems, and 

institute conditions or requirements to address those weaknesses. 

8. Work with the MOF, in coordination with other donors, to develop a mechanism to detect when Afghan 

government employees receive multiple salary payments. 

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over State and USAID funding for salary support, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

9. Require salary support recipients to be paid electronically when appropriate financial controls exist. 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 13 

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to State and USAID for review and comment. We received written comments 

from INL and the USAID Mission for Afghanistan, which are reproduced in appendices V and VI, respectively. 

State and USAID also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

State Comments

State neither agreed nor disagreed with the eight recommendations directed to it. According to State, it 

terminated its salary support to certain Afghan government employees provided under a project implemented 

by the Colombo Plan in December 2016 when the Afghan government was able to cover all relevant salary 

costs. The department did not indicate whether it will provide salary support again in the future, but stated that 

it would reevaluate our recommendations should it consider doing so for any of its future projects. Because 

State may provide salary support again, we maintain that our recommendations should be addressed so that 

mechanisms to coordinate and account for salary support are in place when they are needed. Accordingly, all 

eight recommendations will remain open.

USAID Comments

USAID concurred with four of the recommendations directed to it and did not concur with one. USAID concurred 

with our first, second, fourth, and ninth recommendations and asked that all be closed based on actions it has 

already taken. While we are encouraged by USAID’s concurrences, we disagree with the agency’s requests to 

close these recommendations because it has not yet provided us with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 

it has fully addressed them. 

Regarding our first recommendation, the agency stated that it already coordinates closely with the 

international donor community through meetings associated with the management of the ARTF, which USAID 

stated is the single largest activity in Afghanistan providing salary support for Afghan government employees. 

However, as we note in our report, USAID has not provided us with any documentation demonstrating that it 

has worked with international donors—within or outside the ARTF structure—to collectively establish principles 

and reporting requirements to guide the provision of salary support for Afghan government employees or 

embedded technical advisors. Accordingly, the recommendation will remain open.

For our second recommendation, the agency stated that it does not and is not planning to provide salary 

support or supplements at this time. However, USAID has not ruled out providing salary support to government 

employees again in the future, and its comments do not discuss the fact that it continues to provide salary 

support for embedded technical advisors. Similar to our first recommendation, USAID has not provided us with 

any documentation demonstrating that it has addressed the recommendation. 

Regarding our fourth recommendation, the agency described its efforts to coordinate with its implementing 

partners and the international donor community, but it did not discuss its efforts to implement interagency 

coordination mechanisms, which, as we state in our report, is the reason why we still consider this issue from 

our 2010 report to be not addressed. Therefore, we revised our recommendation to specify that the guidance 

include interagency coordination mechanisms. This recommendation will remain open until USAID provides

documentation that it has issued guidance for interagency coordination of salary support.

Finally, USAID concurred with our ninth recommendation and stated that all USAID acquisition instruments 

require electronic payments where applicable. However, as we note in our report, the agency does not consider 

this a formal policy, and several of its ongoing projects with salary support components do not include these 

provisions in their award documents. We continue to believe that formally requiring—and using—electronic 

payments when feasible could help prevent fraud and corruption. Therefore, the recommendation will remain 

open.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 14 

USAID did not concur with our third recommendation. The agency stated that it participates in coordination 

meetings with other U.S. agencies and referred to its response to recommendation 2 for details. However, that 

response only discusses its meetings with the international donor community and the Afghan government, and 

does not describe how USAID coordinates with other U.S. agencies. USAID’s comments also stated that it does 

not currently provide salary support. Although the agency no longer provides salary support for Afghan 

government employees, it continues to fund ongoing support for technical advisors embedded within the 

government. In addition, USAID stated that it believes having a focal point to approve salary support requests 

does not make sense because it limits oversight and creates confusion. Additionally, USAID stated that it is 

beyond its mandate to monitor salary support provided by other agencies. 

However, our recommendation does not suggest that the designated focal point serve as the approving 

authority for salary support requests. Instead, to facilitate interagency coordination and transparency, and to 

prevent potential duplication of salary support efforts, we are recommending only that USAID and State 

designate a focal point to ensure that they are aware of the salary support they provide and to respond to any 

requests for salary support they receive. We continue to believe this recommendation is reasonable and 

needed. Therefore, the recommendation was revised to clarify SIGAR’s intention and will remain open until 

USAID provides evidence that a focal point has been identified or some other action has been taken to correct 

the problem, and appropriate coordination mechanisms are in place. 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 15 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

This follow-up audit examined Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) salary support provided from October 2010 through September 2016. The objective of this audit was 

to determine the extent to which State and USAID addressed the 10 recommendations we made in our 

October 2010 report on salary support, and if not, whether additional actions should be taken.21 To maintain 

continuity with the scope of our prior audit, we limited our review to salary support State and USAID provided 

through bilateral assistance to Afghan government employees and embedded technical advisors in nonsecurity 

ministries. We considered a recommendation to be fully addressed if State and USAID took action to 

implement it for their respective agency. For the purposes of this report, we defined salary support as 

payments made for the salaries and benefits of Afghan government employees and technical advisors 

embedded within the Afghan ministries to build capacity by training and mentoring their employees. 

To determine the extent to which State and USAID addressed the recommendations from our 2010 audit, we 

reviewed data and documentation the agencies provided on their projects that included salary support for 

Afghan government employees and embedded technical advisors. State refused to provide us with information 

beyond total funding amounts for salary support it provided through its public diplomacy efforts, citing its belief 

that these funds were outside of our mandate to examine. Consequently, although we disagree with this 

assertion, we could not review several salary support-related activities for which State obligated $581,855. 

USAID informed us that it does not—and is not required to—track salary support funds as a distinct component 

of its projects and therefore could not readily provide data regarding funds spent on salary support for its 

closed awards. Due to this limitation, we only reviewed data on salary support funds the agency spent under 

21 awards that were active as of September 2016. We did not review salary support the agency may have 

provided through its agreements with public international organizations because USAID could not provide data 

about the embedded technical advisors these organizations may fund. As a result, we were unable to

determine the full extent of salary support USAID provided since October 2010.

Additionally, we reviewed information and documentation the agencies provided during the course of this audit 

on their implementation of our prior recommendations, as well as information and documentation the U.S. 

Embassy in Kabul previously provided during our recommendation follow-up efforts for the 2010 audit. We 

reviewed State’s agreements, awards, and memorandums of understanding through which the department 

provides salary support. We also reviewed USAID’s cooperative agreements, contracts, task orders, and related 

documentation for the agency’s active awards that provide salary support. In addition, we reviewed the USAID 

Mission for Afghanistan’s development strategy and its salary support-related mission orders and directives. 

Finally, we interviewed officials from State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

and the USAID Mission for Afghanistan regarding their respective agency’s salary support, and officials from 

the Afghan government’s Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission regarding salary 

support provided by the U.S. government and other international donors.

We did not use or rely on computer-processed data for purposes of our audit objective. We assessed internal 

controls to determine whether State and USAID took action to address weaknesses in their salary support 

funding identified in our 2010 report. The results of our assessment are included in the body of this report. 

We conducted our audit work in Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan, from May 2015 through July 2017, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. SIGAR conducted this audit 

under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended.

 

21 SIGAR, Salary Support, SIGAR Audit 11-5. 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 16 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROJECTS PROVIDING SALARY SUPPORT SINCE 2010

Since we issued our prior report on U.S. salary support in October 2010, the Department of State (State) provided salary support through at least four projects 

funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul’s Public Affairs Section (PAS) (see table 2). 

Collectively, these projects provided almost $5.2 million in salary support. PAS obligated an additional $581,855 for salary support under projects paid for by 

funds allocated for public diplomacy efforts, but State refused to provide additional details about those projects.

State Projects Providing Salary Support Since 2010

Office Award Number(s) Project Implementing 

Partner Purpose of Project Period of Performance

Total Project 

Funding ($)a 

Funding for Salary 

Support ($)a 

PAS S-AF-200-10-GR217 

S-AF-200-11-GR172 

S-AF-200-12-CA002 

Government Media 

Information Center 

Support Grant

Government Media 

Information Center

To facilitate the permanent 

establishment of the Government 

Media Information Center as the 

Afghan government’s nerve 

center for communication 

improvements, and to lay a 

strong foundation for the buildout 

of the Afghan Government 

Information Service, including 

through allowing the Government 

Media Information Center to 

increase its staff and open five 

new provincial offices.

September 2010 

– June 2012b

$6,197,942 $1,631,572 

PAS S-AF-200-11-CA002 Capacity Building 

for the Ministry of 

Information and 

Culture

Foundation for 

Culture and Civil 

Society

To encourage a better 

understanding of cultural 

approaches to develop and 

contribute to the elaboration of 

culture policy in Afghanistan, and 

to build capacity at the Ministry of 

Information and Culture through 

the recruitment and employment 

of three advisors to work within 

the ministry.

December 2010 

– August 2012

294,075 225,823 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 17 

INL n/ac Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics Capacity 

Building Program

Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics

To mentor Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics staff and develop their 

capacity to assume responsibility 

for and effectively manage the 

ministry's programs, particularly 

INL-funded counter-narcotics 

projects.

March 2011 – 

September 2015

2,839,700d 1,957,220 

INL n/ae Assistance to 

Specialized 

Treatment 

Facilities for Drug 

Dependents in 

Afghanistan

The Colombo Plan 

for Cooperative 

Economic and 

Social 

Development in 

Asia and the Pacific

To strengthen the operation and 

service delivery of the residential, 

home-based, and outpatient 

treatment and rehabilitation 

facilities for drug dependents in 

Afghanistan.

January 2015 – 

October 2017

8,189,120 1,356,607f

PAS Not providedg Not providedg Not providedg Not providedg Not providedg Not providedg 581,855 

Totals $17,520,837h $5,753,077 

Source: State

Notes:

a Total project and salary support funding amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

b The U.S. Agency for International Development provided salary support for the center from 2008 through 2010, when the program was transferred to State.

c State implemented the program through memorandums of understanding between INL and the ministry.

d The total funding amount is based on the maximum funds made available under the three memorandums of understanding between INL and the ministry.

e State implemented the program through letters of agreement between INL and the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific.

f The total funding for salary support amount is as of December 2016.

g State refused to provide any information other than total public diplomacy funds obligated for salary support, citing its belief that these funds are outside of our mandate. We 

disagree with this assertion. However, the matter remained unresolved at the time we issued this report.

h The total funding amount does not include the total for projects funded through public diplomacy efforts because State refused to give us this information.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 18 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVE AWARDS PROVIDING SALARY SUPPORT

As of September 2016, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided salary support through at least 21 active awards (see table 3). These 

projects have collectively provided more than $22 million in salary support since they began.

USAID Active Awards Providing Salary Support, as of September 2016

Award 

Number Project Implementing Partner Purpose Period of Performance

Total 

Estimated 

Cost ($)

Total Funds 

Disbursed ($)

Funds Spent 

for Salary 

Support ($)

AID-306-A-00-

09-00522 

Afghanistan Electoral 

Reform and Civic 

Advocacy

Democracy 

International

To foster innovations in governance 

and to support reform of the Afghan 

electoral system by improving 

transparency and enabling dialogue 

on political events and the 

performance of election institutions.

July 2009 – 

June 2017

$51,302,682 $41,195,996 $0a

AID-306-EDH-I00-08-00027 Afghan Engineering 

Support Program

Tetra Tech To provide resident architectural and 

engineering services in the 

transportation, vertical structures, 

energy, and water and sanitation 

sectors.

November 

2009 – 

November 

2016 

97,000,000 89,474,083 166,611 

AID-306-A-00-

10-00512 

Commercial 

Horticulture and 

Agriculture Marketing 

Program

Roots of Peace To stimulate growth in Afghanistan's 

agricultural sector, create jobs, 

improve livelihoods, and boost the 

economy through increasing the yield 

and quality of high value crops and 

increasing Afghan exports to 

wholesale markets and supermarkets.

February 

2010 – 

December 

2019 

61,294,444 45,296,184 0b 

AID-306-A-00-

11-00532 

Strengthening 

Pharmaceutical 

Systems

Management 

Sciences for 

Health

To increase the availability and use of 

quality medicines and pharmaceutical 

commodities in Afghanistan by 

improving the capacity of the Ministry 

of Public Health, distributing essential 

August 2011 

– July 2017

34,399,936 30,080,836 374,679 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 19 

medicines, and providing technical 

assistance in pharmaceutical 

management.

AID-306-C-12-

00007 

Afghanistan 

Workforce 

Development 

Program

Creative 

Associates

To support key growth opportunities in 

construction, information and 

communications technology, mining, 

public-private partnerships, and 

business management, including 

through strengthening the labor pool 

in major economic areas by providing 

technical and business education, 

training, job placement, and support 

services.

April 2012 – 

June 2018

44,919,458 32,192,844 82,915 

AID-306-A-13-

00001 

Ministry of Women's 

Affairs Organizational 

Restructuring and 

Empowerment

The Asia 

Foundation

To help the Ministry of Women's 

Affairs advance its policy mandate, 

gender equality, and empowerment in 

Afghanistan by strengthening ties 

between it and other Afghan ministries 

to incorporate gender mainstreaming 

in those ministries' own policy 

development.

December 

2012 – 

December 

2016 

14,182,944 10,050,758 317,790 

AID-306-TO13-00003 Mining Investment 

and Development for 

Afghanistan 

Sustainability

ECC Water and 

Power LLC

To assist in responsibly developing 

Afghanistan's mining industry by 

improving the Afghan government's 

ability to plan, design, and implement 

mining concessions through 

transparent tender processes.

March 2013 – 

March 2017

38,718,320 30,783,644 352,802c 

AID-306-A-13-

00008 

Kandahar Food Zone International 

Relief and 

Development 

To help rural farmers in Kandahar 

earn legitimate incomes by identifying 

and addressing the root causes and 

sources of instability that lead to 

opium poppy cultivation, including 

through building the capacity of the 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics to 

July 2013 – 

August 2018

45,402,467 27,504,000 136,126 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 20 

manage its own alternative livelihood 

programs.

AID-306-C-13-

00018 

Regional Agriculture 

Development 

Program (South)

Chemonics 

International

To promote inclusive and sustainable 

economic growth for rural Afghans in 

Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and 

Uruzgan provinces, including through 

supporting farmers and small- and 

medium-scale agribusinesses to 

improve production, processing, and 

commodity sales.

October 2013 

– October 

2018 

125,075,172 69,312,140 351,875 

AID-306-TO13-00009 Afghanistan Trade 

and Revenue Project

Chemonics 

International

To improve the integration of regional 

trade by developing cross-border 

transit agreements and improving 

economic growth and stability in the 

region.

November 

2013 – 

November

2017 

77,754,267 51,976,297 11,114,160 

AID-306-A-14-

00010 

Capacity Building and 

Change Management 

Program II

Volunteers for 

Economic 

Growth Alliance

To strengthen managerial and 

institutional capacity in the Ministry of 

Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.

July 2014 – 

July 2017

19,999,989 15,718,958 1,998,358 

AID-306-C-14-

00011 

Technical Assistance 

Provided to the 

Ministry of Public 

Works

Amec Foster 

Wheeler 

Environment and 

Infrastructure

To strengthen the technical knowledge 

and skills of the Ministry of Public 

Works regarding transportation 

infrastructure management

August 2014 

– August 

2017 

25,486,058 17,251,241 212,951 

AID-306-TO14-00031 Women's Leadership 

Development 

Tetra Tech/ARD To enable Afghanistan's most talented 

young women to become future 

leaders in government, business, and 

civil society through the development 

of high school and post-secondary 

curricula, as well as development of 

mentorship and scholarship programs.

September 

2014 – 

September 

2019 

41,959,377 13,530,698 0d 

AID-306-A-15-

00001 

Afghanistan 

Agriculture Extension 

Project II

University of 

California, Davis

To improve delivery of effective 

government services to rural clientele 

by strengthening cooperation among 

October 2014 

– September 

2017 

20,229,771 13,794,094 1,371,313 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 21 

government agencies working in the 

agriculture sector. 

AID-306-C-14-

00016 

Strong Hubs for 

Afghan Hope and 

Resilience

Development 

Alternatives

To create well-governed and fiscally 

sustainable municipalities.

November 

2014 – 

November 

2017 

73,499,999 24,745,436 4,839,851 

AID-306-C-15-

00005 

Initiative to 

Strengthen Local 

Administration

Tetra Tech/ARD To improve Afghan provincial 

governance in the areas of fiscal and 

development planning, citizen 

representation, and enhanced public 

service delivery.

February 

2015 – 

January 2020

62,364,687 10,822,018 574,675 

AID-306-TO15-00044 Women in 

Government

Chemonics 

International

To advance and empower Afghan 

women by fostering professional 

development opportunities for female 

high school and university graduates 

interested in working for government 

institutions at the national and 

subnational levels.

April 2015 – 

April 2020

37,997,644 5,544,373 0e

AID-306-TO15-00065 Afghanistan Public 

Financial 

Management

Chemonics 

International

To help achieve fiscal sustainability by 

providing advisory services and 

training support to the Ministry of 

Finance to enhance their capacity to 

generate more revenue and improve 

planning, execution, and monitoring of 

the national budget.

July 2015 – 

July 2018

22,130,033 5,501,049 62,376 

AID-306-T-15-

00005 

Strengthening Peace 

Building, Conflict 

Resolution, and 

Governance in 

Afghanistan

U.S. Institute for 

Peace

To support peacebuilding efforts in 

Afghanistan through policy research, 

provision of grants to Afghan civil 

society organizations, and technical 

assistance to strengthen the 

legitimacy of Afghan government 

institutions.

July 2015 – 

June 2020

16,353,063 3,742,864 82,487 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 22 

AID-306-TO15-00062 Women in Economy Development 

Alternatives

To enable Afghan women to increase 

their leadership in the economy and to 

help women-owned businesses grow.

July 2015 – 

June 2020

71,571,543 8,357,231 2,426 

AID-306-C-16-

00010 

Engineering Support 

Program

Tetra Tech To provide resident architectural and 

engineering services to improve 

infrastructure related to energy, 

transportation, water and sanitation, 

health, education, and agriculture, 

while also training Afghan government 

staff and national power utility 

technicians.

July 2016 – 

July 2019

125,000,000 3,416,461 5,641 

Totals $1,106,641,854 $550,291,204 $22,047,036 

Source: USAID

Notes: All amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar. Listed amounts for total estimated costs and total funds disbursed are as of September 30, 2016. Listed amounts for 

activity funds spent for salary support are as of September 26, 2016, unless otherwise noted. Information about awards to public international organizations is not listed 

because USAID was unable to provide data about the embedded technical advisors these organizations may fund.

a According to USAID, the Afghanistan Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy activity will provide salary support for five technical advisors embedded in Afghan government 

agencies beginning in October 2016.

b According to USAID, the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program will provide salary support for one technical advisor embedded in an Afghan government 

agency beginning in 2017.

c Total funds spent for salary support under the Mining Investment and Development for Afghanistan Sustainability activity were as of September 30, 2016.

d According to USAID, the Women’s Leadership Development activity will provide salary support for one technical advisor embedded in an Afghan government agency beginning 

in 2017.

e According to USAID, the Women in Government activity will provide salary support for 24 technical advisors embedded in Afghan government agencies beginning at the end of 

September 2016 and for 48 technical advisors embedded in 2017 and 2018.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 23 

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PRIOR SIGAR AUDIT OF U.S. SALARY SUPPORT

In our October 2010 audit report, we made 10 recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, to be implemented by the Department of State (State) 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Table 4 lists each recommendation, whether the U.S. Embassy in Kabul concurred, the 

recommendation’s status, our determination of whether the recommendation remains applicable, and, if so, whether it has been fully addressed.

Overview of Recommendationsfrom SIGAR’s Prior Audit of U.S. Salary Support

Recommendation Response Closure Status Recommendation Applicability and 

Status

1 To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on longterm sustainability and capacity development, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador coordinate with other 

international donors and the Afghan government through formal 

coordination mechanisms to collectively establish principles, 

including reporting requirements, to guide how and under what 

conditions donors may provide salary support in a way that 

facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility.

Concur Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID, but not fully addressed

2 To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on longterm sustainability and capacity development, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador coordinate with other 

international donors and the Afghan government through formal 

coordination mechanisms to collectively define key terms such 

as salary support, salary supplement, technical advisor, and 

other related terms to facilitate information sharing and improve 

transparency over donor salary support.

Concur Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID, but not fully addressed

3 To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on longterm sustainability and capacity development, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador coordinate with other 

international donors and the Afghan government through formal 

coordination mechanisms to collectively develop and utilize a 

standardized salary scale that is more closely aligned with 

Afghan government-approved scales for salaries and salary 

supplements.

Concura Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State and fully addressed

Applicable for USAID and fully addressed
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 24 

4 To ensure U.S. salary support is strategically targeted toward 

prioritized needs and goals and is consistently applied across 

U.S. agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador 

designate a representative to serve as a focal point for requests 

for salary support and monitor salary support provided by U.S. 

agencies. 

Concur Closed as implementedb Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID, but not fully addressed

5 To ensure U.S. salary support is strategically targeted toward 

prioritized needs and goals and is consistently applied across 

U.S. agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador 

issue guidance that includes priorities, coordination 

mechanisms, and standardized salary ranges.

Concurc Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID, but not fully addressed

6 To ensure U.S. salary support is strategically targeted toward 

prioritized needs and goals and is consistently applied across 

U.S. agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador 

identify the full extent of existing and planned U.S. salary 

support and determine whether that support is in line with this 

guidance and U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

Concurc Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID and fully addressed

7 To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. 

funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador require verification that positions funded by U.S. 

agencies are on the tashkil or are planned to be transferred on

to the tashkil.

Concur Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State and fully addressed

No longer applicable for USAID

8 To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. 

funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan 

government payroll and human resources systems and 

procedures used to disburse salary support in order to 

determine weaknesses in the systems and institute conditions 

or requirements to mitigate those risks.

Concur Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

No longer applicable for USAID

9 To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. 

funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador work with the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction 

Concur Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

No longer applicable for USAID
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 25 

with other donors, to develop a mechanism to detect when 

employees receive multiple salary payments.

10 To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. 

funding for salary support, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador require that recipients of U.S. salary support be 

paid electronically, if appropriate financial controls exist.

Concurd Closed as unimplemented and in 

anticipation of future audit work

Applicable for State, but not fully addressed

Applicable for USAID, but not fully addressed

Sources: SIGAR analysis of information provided by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, State, and USAID

Notes:

a In its December 2012 response to our recommendation follow-up efforts, the embassy stated that aligning its pay scales with the Afghan government’s scales could derail 

successes from past efforts. The response noted that because the government’s pay scales were not competitive with those of other donors or the private sector, a sudden 

reduction of salaries would cause an exodus of staff from U.S. technical assistance programs to jobs with other donors.

b In a July 2011 response to our recommendation follow-up efforts, the embassy stated that it established a working group to address salary support issues. In September 

2012, we used the formation of this group as evidence to close this recommendation as implemented. During our fieldwork for this audit, USAID noted in May 2016 that the 

group still existed, but State indicated a month later that the group no longer meets. 

c The December 2012 response stated that unified guidance was no longer appropriate. The response noted that because each agency faced different challenges and goals 

for its programs, a single policy for all U.S. agencies would not be useful. 

d The December 2012 response stated that requiring all salary support recipients to be paid electronically was not technically feasible throughout Afghanistan and that not all 

Afghans had the literacy or technical skills to fully use electronic payments. However, the response also noted that the embassy would continue to advocate for expanding the 

implementation of electronic payment systems.
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 26 

COMMENTS FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 27 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 28 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 29 

COMMENTS FROM U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT

 

SIGAR Comment 1
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 30 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 31 

SIGAR Comment 2
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 32 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 33 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 34 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 35 

SIGAR Response to USAID Comments

SIGAR Comment 1. Although USAID states that it does not define salary support to include technical advisors 

employed by its implementing partners, the scope of our report included salary support to both government 

employees and embedded technical advisors. As we note in several locations within our report—and in the 

draft report we sent to USAID for review and comment—we defined salary support as payments made for the 

salaries and benefits of Afghan government employees and technical advisors embedded within the ministries

to build capacity by training and mentoring government employees.

SIGAR Comment 2. USAID stated that it believes having a focal point to approve salary support requests does 

not make sense because it limits oversight and creates confusion. Additionally, USAID stated that it is beyond 

its mandate to monitor salary support provided by other agencies. However, our recommendation does not 

suggest that the designated focal point serve as the approving authority for salary support requests. Instead, to 

facilitate interagency coordination and transparency, and to prevent potential duplication of salary support 

efforts, we are recommending only that USAID and State designate a focal point to ensure that they are aware 

of the salary support they provide and to respond to any requests for salary support they receive. We continue 

to believe this recommendation is reasonable and needed. Therefore, the recommendation was revised to 

clarify the intent of SIGAR’s recommendation. 
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 36 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Jeffrey Brown, Senior Audit Manager

Daniel Tessler, Analyst-in-Charge

Annalise Latting, Program Analyst

Robert Vainshtein, Program Analyst

The following staff provided additional support:

Parker Laite, Senior Program Analyst

JaNelle Thompson, Auditor
SIGAR 17-56-AR/State and USAID Salary Support Page 37 

This performance audit was conducted 

under project code SIGAR-109A. 
Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

Public Affairs

SIGAR’s Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate 

and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes; 

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. 

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web 

site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publicly released reports, 

testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. 

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of 

fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR’s 

hotline: 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud 

• Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil 

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 

Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-545-5974

• Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202