1

SANDIA REPORT

SAND2014-2607

Unlimited Release

Printed April 2014

Cooperative Measures to Support the Indo-Pak 

Agreement on Reducing Risk from Accidents 

Relating to Nuclear Weapons

Sitakanta Mishra

Research Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, 

New Delhi, India

Mansoor Ahmed

Lecturer, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies,

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad, Pakistan

Prepared by

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, New Mexico - 87185 and Livermore, California - 94550

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly 

owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
2

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SAND2014-2607

Unlimited Release

Printed April 2014

Cooperative Measures to Support the Indo-Pak 

Agreement on Reducing Risk from Accidents 

Relating to Nuclear Weapons

Sitakanta Mishra and Mansoor Ahmed

Visiting Research Scholars

Cooperative Monitoring Center

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-MS1373

Abstract

In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to 

Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two 

countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures 

that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear 

holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of 

a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to 

explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. 

This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear 

force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in 

place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and 

control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges 

posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic 

forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for 

cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.
4

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and

do not necessarily reflect the position of their respective institutions

or Sandia National Laboratories.
5

Acknowledgements

At the outset, we wish to thank Kent Biringer, Manager of the Cooperative Monitoring Center, 

Sandia National Laboratories, for providing us with a truly enabling and encouraging 

environment to conduct research. We are particularly grateful to Adriane Littlefield for her 

consistent support, guidance and inspiration throughout which helped us to formulate, 

streamline, and consolidate this study. We are also indebted to the generous feedback and advice 

extended by Geoffery Forden, Amir H. Mohagheghi, Eric Wallace, Faraj Ghanbari, David 

Betsill, and Ben Bonin. 
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................5

Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................ 10

1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 13

2.0 THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT........................................................................................................ 15

2.1 Nuclear Force Management......................................................................................................... 15

2.2 Protecting Warheads .................................................................................................................... 16

2.3 Material Protection ....................................................................................................................... 17

2.4 Command and Control .................................................................................................................. 19

2.5 Protection during Movement....................................................................................................... 21

2.6 Personnel Reliability..................................................................................................................... 22

3. ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEW NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS ................................................ 24

3.1. Concern for TNWs ......................................................................................................................... 24

3.2. Concern for Sea-based Assets...................................................................................................... 24

3.3. Expanding Cruise Missile Inventory .......................................................................................... 25

3.4. Expanding Fissile Material Production..................................................................................... 25

4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENTS ..................................................................................................... 26

4.1. Global Experience ......................................................................................................................... 26

4.2. Local Incidents .............................................................................................................................. 27

5. ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT....................................................................................................... 28

5.1. Responsibilities and Obligations................................................................................................ 28

5.2. Scope for Cooperative Measures................................................................................................. 28

6. FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIVE MEASURES.............................................................................. 29

6.1. Stepping Stone............................................................................................................................... 29

6.2. A Framework for Possible Cooperation..................................................................................... 30

6.2.1. Issue Area One ...................................................................................................................... 32

6.2.2. Issue Area Two...................................................................................................................... 36

6.2.3. Issue Area Three................................................................................................................... 41

7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................ 44

8. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 45

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................................ 46

APPENDIX 1: Agreement Text.................................................................................................................. 49
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS .......................................................................................................................... 51

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Structure of Indian Nuclear Command & Control ............................................................... 19

Figure 2: Pakistan’s National Command Authority .............................................................................. 20

Figure 3: Tasks for Track 2 ...................................................................................................................... 30

Figure 4: The Framework ........................................................................................................................ 31

Figure 5: Areas of Possible Cooperation................................................................................................. 31

Figure 6: Tasks in Issue Area One ........................................................................................................... 32

Figure 7: Tasks in Issue Area Two ........................................................................................................... 36

Figure 8: Tasks in Issue Area Three ........................................................................................................ 42
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Acronyms

AAT Assessment and Advisory Team

AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

AST Aerial Survey Team

BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

BT Bioassay Team

C&C Command and Control

CARMS Compact Aerial Radiation Monitoring System

CBMs Confidence Building Measures

CISF Central Industrial Security Force

CMG Crisis Management Group

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

DAE Department of Atomic Energy

DGMO Director General of Military Operations

DRDO Defence Research and Development Organization

ECR Emergency Communication Room

ERC Emergency Response Centres

ERT Emergency Response Teams

ESD Environmental Sensing Devices

FMT Field Monitoring Team

HRP Human Reliability Program

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IERMON Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network

MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle

MPC&A Material Protection Control and Accounting

MT Medical Team

NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan)

NCA Nuclear Command Authority (India)

NCBMs Nuclear Confidence Building Measures

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NEMS Nuclear Emergency Management System

NESCOM National Engineering and Scientific Commission

NIM Nuclear Information Management

NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.

NRECC National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre

NSAP Nuclear Security Action Plan

NUMAC Nuclear Material Accounting & Control

PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PAL Permissive Action Links
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PRNA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

QIA Quick Impact Assessment

RCA Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training in 

Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia

SASA Strategic Armament Safety Authority

SECDIV Strategic Export Control Division

SFC Strategic Forces Command

SPD Strategic Plans Division

SPS Strategy Programme Staff

SRT Source Recovery Team

TNWs Tactical Nuclear Weapons

WHO World Health Organization
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The India-Pakistan Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear 

Weapons, signed in 2007, is a landmark nuclear confidence building measure (NCBM) despite a 

history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries. This agreement 

rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear 

weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. 

Given their close geographical proximity, a nuclear-related accident on either side would likely 

result in a trans-boundary release of radiation, affecting the other side. More importantly, a 

nuclear weapons-related accident on one side could also be misinterpreted by the other as a 

deliberate or unauthorized use and may result in inadvertent escalation. . Recognizing the risk, 

the Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed in 

the Lahore Declaration of 1999 to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or 

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons...with a view to elaborating measures for confidence 

building.”

In February 2012, India and Pakistan extended the 2007 Agreement for another five years and 

reportedly “discussed proposals for additional measures in areas where two countries could make 

forward movement.” There is, however, no public information available on the implementation 

of or any further developments in this regard, thus the impetus for the current study. Based on the 

mandate in Article 1 of the Agreement – “to maintain and improve...existing national measures 

... to guard against accidents related to nuclear weapons” – this study first considers the strategic 

landscape of nuclear South Asia and examines the context and possible areas of cooperation in 

the field of nuclear safety, security, information management, communications, etc. 

As per open source information, nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan are stored in a 

disassembled state (not on hair-trigger alert), with the fissile core kept separate from the physics 

package and the delivery systems. Moreover, the number of warheads in both countries put 

together constitutes only a fraction of the global inventory. Therefore, the magnitude and extent 

of Cold War dangers cannot be extrapolated or compared to the South Asian context. The 

assumption that India and Pakistan will always keep their weapons in the basement cannot be 

assured. In terms of protecting the warheads, India and Pakistan are believed to have developed 

their own Permissive Action Link (PAL) mechanisms to block critical arming signals intended to 

prevent unauthorized use. Nonetheless, during a crisis situation, the assembly of dispersed 

components would come under extreme stress, which would demand very high managerial and 

material safety and security competencies. In the decade following overt nuclearization, India 

and Pakistan are known to have developed their own command and control systems, strategic 

force management mechanisms, and deployment structures. Given that there is always room for 

improvement, as a myriad of possibilities such as design errors and component malfunctions can 
11

potentially lead to accidents. Both countries are also having laid down comprehensive measures 

to protect nuclear materials during movement and storage along with stringent personnel 

reliability programs. Unfortunately, personnel are also not immune to mental illness, 

subordination, or invulnerable to a bad actor’s influence, etc. The few reported instances of 

personnel misconduct in India, and the history of Khan’s clandestine proliferation network have 

highlighted the utmost significance of eternal vigilance. Moreover, a number of new nuclear 

developments in South Asia such as the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, sea-based 

assets, short-range nuclear capable missiles, expanding fissile material production capacities, etc. 

have accident implications. The imperative, therefore, is to ponder over these issues bilaterally. 

The 2007 India-Pakistan Agreement is certainly a realization by both countries regarding the 

probability of an accident taking place, the risks involved in the event of such an accident, and 

the countries’ duties in such a scenario. The Agreement is farsighted, as it unambiguously 

bestows responsibilities on both countries “to guard against accidents related to nuclear 

weapons” under their jurisdiction or control. The two countries are obliged to notify each other 

only of such accidents that may result in international, trans-boundary release or have security 

implications. 

However, certain provisions in the agreement appear to be open-ended, leaving ample scope for 

follow up measures. For example, Article 3(i) prescribes that “each Party shall act in such a 

manner as to reduce the possibilities of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party.” To 

eradicate chances of misinterpretation, both Parties must first devise certain mechanisms and 

interact at successive intervals to cooperate on less sensitive issues relating to nuclear weapons 

safety and security. Article 3(ii) enumerates that “in case of likely impact of the accident on the 

other Party, the first Party shall inform the other Party forthwith with relevant information.” This 

necessitates an institutional mechanism to decide what specific information needs to be obtained. 

In pursuance of the information obtained, the measures to be undertaken have to be ascertained 

as well. Lastly, Article 4 says that in addition to using the hotline links between the two Foreign 

Secretaries and Directors-General Military Operations (DGMOs) for information sharing, “the 

Parties may also make use of any other communication channels...” It would be prudent, 

therefore, to identify or put in place alternative information management and communication 

sharing mechanisms to better facilitate the process. 

In view of the foregoing, this study attempts to suggest a framework of cooperative measures for 

consideration. Since both countries have acknowledged the “nuclear dimension of the security 

environment” and “their responsibilities,” a few follow-up measures within the purview of this 

agreement would further strengthen the nuclear CBM process. The study identifies mainly three 

broad areas – emergency response, extending nuclear CBMs already at work, and an appraisal of 

past nuclear related accidents elsewhere – to explore possible cooperation by initiating a process 

of periodic dialogue among working groups, coordinating agencies of both countries, and 
12

facilitating exchange of views on different issue areas to promote the ethos stipulated in the 

Agreement. This study recommends the establishment of a Track 2 initiative, involving scholars, 

experts, think tanks, journalists, environmentalists, retired scientists and government officials; 

initiate a collaborative study on nuclear weapons-related incidents and safety-security aspects by 

centers of excellence to undertake joint studies; initiate a dialogue on feasibility of establishing 

specialized communication links; examination of models of advanced countries in emergency 

management and response; strengthen medical response capabilities of both countries; create a 

collaborative framework for a nuclear information management system, among other measures. 

This study acknowledges the fact that some of the suggested measures may not be feasible or 

agreeable by the two parties at this juncture; however, keeping in mind the sensitivities of the 

issue and future implications, an attempt has been made only to explore potential areas of further 

cooperation within the ambit of the Agreement in force.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has evoked a sense of awe for various reasons, 

the most prominent being the fact that India and Pakistan are de-facto nuclear weapon states with 

a history of conflict and competition. So far, both countries have largely refrained from 

escalation, nor has there been any incident involving nuclear weapons – intentional or 

inadvertent – on either side, that could lead to catastrophe; however, being cognizant of the 

consequences of such an event taking place, both countries have adopted two nuclear-related 

confidence building measures (NCBMs), in addition to other CBMs. The first is the agreement 

on “the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities,”1 which entered into 

force in December 1990. This agreement is considered largely successful in its objectives. The 

second agreement, signed in 2007, pertains to “Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to 

Nuclear Weapons,”2 which bestows onus on both countries “to notify each other immediately in 

the event of any accident (which may result in an international, trans-boundary release) relating 

to nuclear weapons, under their respective jurisdiction or control...” (Article 2). This second 

agreement is simply referred to as “the Agreement” throughout this report. The full text of the 

Agreement is given in Appendix 1.

The necessity of such agreements was driven by the complex regional security situation, marked 

by mutual mistrust and the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. The apprehension that 

each other’s nuclear facilities could be targeted during a crisis or a conflict situation led them to 

agree to the non-attack agreement in December 1988, which stipulates the yearly exchange of the 

list of their respective nuclear facilities. This practice is being consistently followed, each 

January, since 1990. Notwithstanding the fact that both countries might not have exchanged or 

declared the complete list of their respective classified facilities each year, the initiative has been 

an effective effort in restoring some trust in the Indo-Pak nuclear discourse. 

The 2007 agreement on “Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” did not 

come about in a vacuum, however. Since overt nuclearization in 1998, both countries have been 

engaged in the process of expanding their strategic nuclear forces, establishing command and 

control structures, and diversifying their means of delivery. Given their close geographical 

proximity, a nuclear-related accident on either side would likely result in a trans-boundary 

release of radiation, affecting the other side. More importantly, a nuclear weapons-related 

accident on either side could be misinterpreted by the other as a deliberate or unauthorized use 

and may result in the outbreak of a nuclear war. Recognizing the risk, the Indian Prime Minister 

 

1

“Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities,” 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/nucl.htm

2

.“Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of India on Reducing the Risk from 

Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons,, New Delhi, February 21, 2007 in India’s Foreign Relations– 2007, 

http://www.mea.gov.in/images/main_2007.pdf, p.1379.
14

A.B. Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed in the Lahore Declaration of 

1999 to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear 

weapons...with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building.”3

In February 2012, India and Pakistan extended the 2007 Agreement for another five years and 

reportedly “discussed proposals for additional measures in areas where two countries could make 

forward movement.”4There is, however, no public information available on the implementation 

of or any further developments in this regard, thus the impetus for the current study.

1.1 The Current Study

This study focuses on identifying possible cooperative measures to support the Agreement 

between India and Pakistan on reducing risks from nuclear weapons accidents. Keeping in mind 

the sensitivities of the issue, an attempt is made only to explore potential areas of cooperation 

within the ambit of the Agreement in force and draw inferences from nuclear weapons related 

accidents/incidents elsewhere. This study in no way intends to equate the incidents that have 

happened in other countries or regions with the India-Pakistan scenario. Rather, it takes into 

account the specificities of the South Asian strategic environment and emerging trends thereof.

Considering the mandate in Article 1 of the Agreement – “to maintain and improve...existing 

national measures including organizational and technical arrangements, to guard against 

accidents related to nuclear weapons” – the sections that follow examine the context and propose 

possible areas of cooperation in the field of nuclear safety, security, information management, 

communications, etc. Constrained by the culture of secrecy in nuclear issues and lack of 

availability of any precedent of nuclear weapons accidents and consequent joint measures, this 

analysis is based purely on open source information, mainly to identify measures that may help 

both countries in “reducing risk.”

 

3

“Lahore Declaration,” http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

4

“India, Pak Agree to Extend Nuclear Risk Reduction Pact for 5 Years,” The Hindu, February 21, 2012.
15

2.0 THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT

India, the first country in South Asia to go nuclear as early as 1974, has adopted a doctrinal 

posture of ‘no-first-use’ but ‘second-strike’ capability with “punitive retaliation...to inflict 

damage unacceptable to the aggressor.”5Pakistan, on the other hand, has reserved the option of 

first-use as “the last resort...if Pakistan is threatened with extinction.” 6 Both countries are 

steadily acquiring the force levels perceived to be sufficient for achieving a credible, minimum 

deterrent. India is in the process of developing its third leg of the nuclear triad, and Pakistan is 

also in the process of adding a third leg of the triad, along with the introduction of 

tactical/battlefield nuclear weapons (TNWs). This process of evolution may take a decade at best 

to complete. Therefore, we can assume that the South Asian deterrent force postures are in their 

formative phase, and it is an opportune time to propose CBMs related to the Agreement.

2.1 Nuclear Force Management

As per open source information, nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan are stored in a 

disassembled state (not on hair-trigger alert), with the fissile core kept separate from the physics 

package and the delivery systems. With regard to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, Samar 

Mubarakmand, former Member (Technical), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and 

head of the nuclear test team in 1998, states that, “The weight of a launchable nuclear warhead is 

between 25 and 30 tons [combined delivery system], which is assembled only at the eleventh 

hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four 

different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn't need to be launched, then it is never available in 

assembled form."7

According to Raj Chengappa, the former Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had asked 

A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then scientific advisor to the Minister of Defence and the chairman of the 

Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to establish a command and control 

system on the following four principles: (1) the nuclear core should be stored at several strategic 

sites across the country and not just at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Trombay; (2) 

arrangements should be made for mating the core with its assembly in the shortest possible time 

when the need arises; (3) it should be ensured that the command to trigger the bomb remains 

 

5

“Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” August 17, 1999, 

http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine

6

Former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf quoted as having said this in an interview published in April 

2002 in the German magazine, Der Spiegel; Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Security and 

Survivability,” http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Pakistans_Nuclear_Posture-Security_and_Survivability.pdf

7

“Pakistan refutes Saudi Funding, Weapons Claims,” November 09, 2013, 

http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=122467
16

strictly under civilian control; and (4) the overall system should be so designed that at least three 

agencies have to combine their efforts if the bomb has to be prepared for a launch.8

Moreover, the quantity of warheads in both countries put together constitutes only a fraction of 

the global inventory. The magnitude and nature of dangers associated with ready arsenals, akin 

to that of the Cold War, therefore, cannot be extrapolated or compared to the South Asian 

context. Nonetheless, the assumption that India and Pakistan will always keep their bombs in the 

basement cannot be assured. According to Christopher Clary, there were several instances when 

both countries are alleged to have assembled nuclear devices and moved toward greater 

peacetime readiness;9Pakistan has (in 1999 and 2002) indicated its inclination to use nuclear 

weapons (without using the term ‘nuclear weapon’) to deter India from crossing the threshold.10

2.2 Protecting Warheads

It is assumed that both India and Pakistan have already taken and are continuously striving for 

extra measures to achieve the maximum level of safety and security of their nuclear inventory. 

They have developed their own Permissive Action Link (PAL) mechanisms to block critical 

arming signals specifically designed to prevent unauthorized use. According to Raj Chengappa, 

“a series of half a dozen safety locks” ensure that Indian nuclear warheads can explode only 

when desired.11 “It could be assumed that these safety locks are based on PAL technologies.”

12

With regard to the reliability and safety mechanism of the Pakistan’s warheads, the former head 

of PAEC’s Directorate of Technical Development (responsible for the manufacture and testing of 

nuclear devices), Muhmmad Hafeez Qureshi, claimed that “the [nuclear] device had the entire 

characteristics and safeguards of a weapon produced by any of the five nuclear weapon states.13” 

According to Samar Mubarakmand, “the [nuclear] device would activate only in the enemy 

territory when the pilot has entered the code and once he has safely left Pakistani territory. If for 

any reason there is an accidental drop on Pakistani territory, the device would drop like dead 

weight.”14 Although, even if it does not lead to a chain reaction or trigger the fissile core, free 

 

8 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper 

Collins Publishers India, 2000), p. 391.

9 Christopher Clary, “Lift the Lid off Nuclear Secrecy,” Business Line (The Hindu), July 15, 2013.

Shalini Chawla, “Challenges of Securing Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 

http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Issue%20Briefs/2013/14%20Feb%202013%20-%20Shalini%20Chawla.pdf

10 Chengappa, op cit, pp. 383, 429.

11Gurmeet Kanwal, “Safety and Security of India's N-Weapons,” http://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr-1.01.htm

12 Ibid.

13 Hafeez Qureshi quoted in Long Road to Chagai (Islamabad: Print Wise Publications, 1999), p. 85.

14 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 

2012), p.186.
17

falling may lead to the detonation of the conventional high explosives15 and the possible 

dispersal of radioactive material.

Nonetheless, international security observers and experts believe that increasing numbers of 

strategic nuclear forces in South Asia makes safety, security, and control issues far more 

problematic. Specifically, the requirement to keep warheads and delivery systems separate for 

reasons of security and control could add to design and maintenance problems.16 According to 

Verghese Koithara, if India’s missiles are to be deployed in a genuinely mobile manner, then the 

multi-channel system of nuclear weapons control can be very cumbersome. More importantly, as 

India’s current missile force is primarily land mobile and thus requires decentralized operations, 

it can be prone to logistic and security challenges.

17 Though, according to experts from DRDO, 

“adequate safety provisions are made through electromechanical devices” like safety arming and 

detonation mechanisms of guided missiles “to prevent accidental initiation.”

18

In the same manner, if Pakistan relies on silo-based and road mobile survivability methods for its 

strategic forces, given its comparatively small geographical expanse, safe-keeping of its 

components necessitates the utmost technical sophistication. It is expected that the 

Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs), which monitor the environment to sense whether the 

weapon should be armed during acceleration in flight or free fall, have been incorporated in both 

countries. According to sources, these and other relevant best practices are being developed to 

prevent security breaches while selecting strategic sites, material storage, missile silos, and 

movement of sensitive material in Pakistan.19

2.3 Material Protection

Perceptibly, both countries are aware of the fact that if at any point they are compelled to use 

nuclear weapons, it would have to be a single-strike (initiating or retaliatory) option as there may 

not be a second chance. Therefore, they might have to use all the weapons at their disposal at 

once, in a massive first or second strike, whichever the case may be. This precludes the 

possibility of a flexible response or a trip-wire, akin to the Cold War models. Thus, in a warlike 

situation, the assembly of dispersed components would come under extreme stress, which would 

demand very high managerial and material safety and security competencies. 

 

15 Dr. Samar Mubarakmand's Interview with Geo TV, http://www.pakdef.org/forum/topic/8015-dr-samarmubarakmands-interview-with-geo-tv/, March 05, 2004.

16 Verghese Koithara, Making India’s Nuclear Forces, New Delhi: Routledge, 2012, p. 127.

17 Ibid.

18 TV Karthikeyan, AK Kapoor, Guided Missiles, http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/data/Guided%20Missiles.pdf, p. 16.

19 Zafar Ali, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and Threats of Terrorism: How Grave is the Danger?,” 

http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PakistanNuclearAssets-070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf
18

India has a comprehensive material protection control and accounting (MPC&A) system, 

comprising three basic elements: the legislative and regulatory framework, an integrated physical 

protection program for facilities and materials, and a comprehensive “Nuclear Material 

Accounting & Control” (NUMAC). There are facility-specific NUMAC arrangements. There is 

also an Inventory Information and Control and Data Management Section and a Control

Laboratory.

20 A Senior Coordination Committee is assigned to review NUMAC reports and 

initiate actions as needed. The Strategic Armament Safety Authority (SASA) of the Nuclear 

Command Authority (NCA) is assigned the responsibility to review and update storage and 

transfer procedures for nuclear armaments, including the submarine-based component.

The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) initiated the Nuclear Security Action Plan 

(NSAP) in July 2006, under which it envisioned developing a sustainable system in nuclear 

security with the establishment of adequate response and recovery capabilities.21 Pakistan’s 

sensitive material control and accounting system is believed to have been derived from modern 

training, possibly modelled on the US national laboratory procedures.22 Since its inception, the 

Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is the Secretariat of Pakistan’s National Command 

Authority, has been responsible for conducting audits on all nuclear inventories and 

implementing regular and surprise inspections at facilities. 

Moreover, both countries have adhered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

guideline INFCIRC/225 and put in place all domestic arrangements in this regard. Both India 

and Pakistan have taken measures to implement the obligations set by UN Security Council 

Resolution 1540,23 and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).24 In view of the scope of 

existing mechanisms and procedures in place in both countries, one can presume that these 

would continue to be adequate, given that their nuclear material and weapon inventories are in an 

expanding mode.

 

20 Statement by K. Raghuraman of India’s Department of Atomic Energy. Christopher Eldridge, “Protection, 

Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials International Challenges and National Programs,” National Academy 

of Sciences, 2006, pp. 39-41. 

21 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, “Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP)," http://www.pnra.org/nsap.asp

22 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth from Reality,” Arms Control Today, 

July/August 2009.

23 Jennifer M. Gibson and Sarah Shirazyan, “The UN Security Council Resolution 1540: An Overview of 

Extraterritorial Controls Over Non-State WMD Proliferation,” NAPSNet Special Reports, February 14, 2012, 

http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-un-security-council-resolution-1540-an-overview-ofextraterritorial-controls-over-non-state-wmd-proliferation/

24 IAEA, “Convention on Nuclear Safety,”

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nuclearsafety_status.pdf
19

2.4 Command and Control

Both India and Pakistan are known to have developed their respective nuclear Command and 

Control Systems (C&C), strategic force management mechanisms, and deployment structure 

over the past fifteen years. As a matter of fact, the design of the warheads and missiles, and the 

wide range of associated equipment and systems, must be capable of safe and reliable operation 

for effective performance of the C&C. It is expected that both India and Pakistan have adopted 

best practices in these areas in relation to their specific requirements. 

In the case of India, the Prime Minister, as the head of the Cabinet, exercises ultimate control 

over all nuclear weapons, though the President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Indian 

Armed Forces. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is designated 

as the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in charge of India’s nuclear deterrent. 

Figure 1: Structure of Indian Nuclear Command & Control

Political Council

Chairman – PM

Members – DM, EAM, FM, HM

Chairman, COSC

C-in-C SFC

Army

(Missiles)

Navy

(SSBNs)

Air Force

(Bombers)

Nuclear Command Authority

Chairman – Prime Minister

Alternate NCA

Executive Council

Chairman – NSA

Members – Cabinet Secy, 3 

Chiefs, Secys Home, EA, DP, 

DAE, Finance, RAW, IB, 

NTRO, SA to DM, PSA to 

GOI

NSC 

Secretariat

NSAB

(Nuclear use decision)

(Nuclear use decision)

Source: Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, New Delhi: KW Publisher, 2010, p. 166. 

The NCA is advised by the National Security Council (NSC) and supported by the Strategy 

Programme Staff (SPS) constituting representatives from the three defence services, science, and 

technology establishments and other experts from related domains, including the Ministry of 

External Affairs. The SASA that functions directly under the NCA is responsible for all matters 

relating to the safety and security of India’s nuclear and delivery assets at all locations. In terms 

of preparedness, efficiency of response systems in possible escalatory scenarios, and surprise 
20

attack scenarios, regular drills are conducted. Specialized units have also been deployed for 

operation in a nuclearized environment.25

In Pakistan’s case, Samar Mubarakmand states that Pakistan has “adopted the world’s most

advanced command and control system.”26 The safety, security, and management of all nuclear 

facilities, materials, infrastructure, and personnel is the responsibility of Pakistan’s NCA through 

the SPD, which exercises central responsibility for the security and physical protection of all 

nuclear facilities. It has a Security Division comprised of over 20,000 specially trained military 

personnel that provide physical protection to nuclear plants, materials, facilities, and sites

throughout the length and breadth of the country.

Figure 2: Pakistan’s National Command Authority

Source: http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=291&rid=6 27

 

25 Shyam Saran, “India’s Nuclear Weapons not for National Pride,” http://ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/tribune9may%202013.pdf

26 Samar Mubarakmand's Interview with Geo TV, http://www.pakdef.org/forum/topic/8015-dr-samarmubarakmands-interview-with-geo-tv/, March 05, 2004.

27 The Prime Minister heads the NCA as Chairman instead of the President. There is no Vice Chairman per the NCA 

Bill 2009 passed by the Pakistani Parliament as NCA Law in 2010. 

Pakistan National Assembly NCA Act 2010: http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf

Prime Minister

Chairman
21

According to the former Director-General of SPD, Lt. Gen (retd.) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, 

Pakistan’s multilayered physical protection system for the nuclear program is based on 5Ds: 

Deter; Detection; Delay; Defence; and Destruction. Naeem Ahmed Salik, former Director, Arms 

Control and Disarmament Directorate of SPD, asserts that Pakistan’s physical security 

architecture, based on multilayered perimeter security, is an integral element of all nuclear 

installations, civilian or military.28 The SPD’s Security Division also has a Quick Reaction Force 

and a Site Protection Force to ensure physical security of the nuclear sites and facilities. 

There is always room for improvement, as a myriad of possibilities, such as design errors and 

component malfunctions can lead to accidents. Therefore, risk models on nuclear weapon 

accidents should not be based on zero assumption, since one cannot envision all contingencies 

and situations in which complex systems can fail, and there can be no “absolute safety.” Also, 

security measures can become obsolete as time passes. Nuclear and missile security involves an 

intricate inter-relationship between personnel, information management, organizational 

coordination, safety, and security components. A decision to deploy in a confrontational situation 

further adds to the complexity of challenges and increases chances of mismanagement in all 

these respects. Moreover, “the excessive secrecy and compartmentalism attendant on a covert 

nuclear force means that unsafe procedures could go unnoticed.”29

2.5 Protection during Movement

As both countries’ nuclear weapons are claimed to be in disassembled state and are 

geographically dispersed, ensuring transportation security is crucial. However, specific 

information regarding transportation security of nuclear weapon components in both countries is 

shrouded in secrecy. The information discussed in this section pertains to security arrangements

during transportation of radioactive materials and related components in the civilian nuclear 

sector. Pakistan has formulated specific “Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive 

Material” (PAK/916) that provides guidance for the safe transport of such materials so that the 

workers, consignors, carriers, consignees, the public, and the environment can be protected from 

the harmful effects of radiation during transport of radioactive material.30 The “Regulations on 

 

28 Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control 

Today, December 2007, www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo

29 Gregory F. Giles, “Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals,” The Washington Quarterly, 1993, Spring, 

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/98/Giles%20Safeguarding%20Undeclared%20Nuclear%20Arsena

ls.pdf, p. 4.

30 “Transportation of Radioactive Material by Road in Pakistan,” PNRA-RG-916.01, April 2007, 

http://www.pnra.org/guidelines/RG-916%2001.pdf
22

Radiation Protection” (PAK/904) 2004 has laid down procedures to prevent loss, theft, damage,

and any unauthorized transfer or access to the sources.31

In the case of India, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has stipulated a Safety Guide 

on the security of radioactive materials during transport (AERB/NRF-TS/ SG-10) that prescribes 

the rules, regulations, and standard procedures to be followed in the packaging, shipment, and 

protective measures to be arranged for ensuring safety in the movement of radioactive material 

through the public domain.32 Different security levels are specified for different materials 

(Category 1 to 5) depending upon the degree of fissile characteristics and the dangers involved.

Moreover, India has adhered to the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 that prescribes guidelines for the

physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

33

Both India and Pakistan have acceded to the policies set forth by the Convention on Physical 

Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM, 1980), which bestows legal obligation on States 

Parties “to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as 

transport.”

34 Although, Pakistan has not yet ratified the amended CPPNM (2005)35 it is 

“considering ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and was actively conducting a 

review to meet its various requirements.”36

To further enhance their capabilities, Pakistan’s and India’s participation in multilateral programs

to learn best practices on physical protection of material should be encouraged. In light of the 

aforementioned regulation and steps taken, it is also presumed that civilian and military related 

nuclear materials in both countries are covered by equally stringent procedures, mechanisms, and 

regulations for their protection, safety, control, and transportation.

2.6 Personnel Reliability

One of the most challenging problems for the security of nuclear weapons, materials, and 

information is the people who work in and manage the nuclear weapons complex. Both countries 

have elaborate personnel reliability programs in place to ensure that a “mad major” scenario does 

not occur.

 

31 “Regulations on Radiation Protection (PAK/904),” October 05, 2004, 

http://www.pnra.org/legal_basis/RP%20Regulations%20PAK-904.pdf

32 AERB, “Security of Radioactive Material during Transport,” AERB Safety Guide No. AERB/NRF-TS/SG-10, 

January 2008, http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/PUBLICATIONS/CODESGUIDES/sg-10.pdf

33 IAEA, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities”, 

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r5c.pdf

34 IAEA, “The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material” (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, 1980, amended in 

2005), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml

35 IAEA, “Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” September 16, 2013, 

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf

36 “US termed Pakistan nuclear security as exemplary: Nawaz,” The News, March 25, 2014. 

http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-142278-US-termed-Pakistan-nucler-security-as-exemplary:-Nawaz-.
23

India has maintained a stringent personnel reliability framework in all its nuclear-related 

institutions, prescribing a code of ethics and conduct to be followed. Besides the defence

establishments’ own mechanisms and procedures of scrutiny of their own staff and the Strategic 

Forces Command’s (SFC) own standard operating procedures, the intelligence agencies and 

police network are part of the mechanism to ensure the integrity of the scientists or civilian staff 

employed in this sector. The AERB has developed a formal code of professional ethical values 

for the adherence of employees.37 Accordingly, officials shall be guided by the principle to (1) 

maintain a high level of professional competence; (2) maintain a high level of honesty and 

integrity, and be principled and consistent in application of regulations. A number of procedures 

and schemes are implemented to constantly evaluate and monitor reliability standards, emotional 

behavior, belief patterns, engagements, and to maintain the morale of the employees. Only those 

persons who demonstrate reliability are certified to perform specified duties associated with 

nuclear weapons. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and DRDO have their own 

personnel screening program to prevent potentially dangerous individuals from having access to 

nuclear materials. 

The discovery of the A.Q. Khan covert and illicit nuclear technology proliferation network 

revealed serious weaknesses in Pakistan’s nuclear management; however, since 2004, Pakistan 

has instituted elaborate export controls to prevent the recurrence of unauthorized export of 

sensitive nuclear materials or technology. Pakistan has also greatly improved its supervisory 

procedures for military and scientific manpower involved in the country’s strategic programmes 

and is consciously striving to ensure that such an event would never occur, again. A 

comprehensive scheme of the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and the Human Reliability 

Program (HRP) for military and civilian personnel respectively is now in place. The SPD 

thoroughly screens, monitors, and grants overall approval of key personnel and also retains 

information on all retired personnel. Any individual assigned to a strategic project or a sensitive 

task now undergoes a security clearance by multiple intelligence agencies and the SPD has 

instituted a “cradle to grave” monitoring of all critical personnel. Reportedly, many lessons have 

been learned and adapted from the U.S. personnel reliability program.38

Unfortunately, personnel are not immune to illness, subordination, or invulnerable to a bad 

actor’s influence, etc. The few reported instances of personnel misconduct in India, and the 

history of Khan’s clandestine proliferation network bring home the fact that eternal vigilance is 

of the utmost importance for ensuring strict nuclear security and personnel reliability. 

 

37 AERB, “Code of Ethics,” http://www.aerb.gov.in/t/publications/ethics.pdf

38 Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” 

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/Luongo
24

3. ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS OF NEW NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

Currently, two significant, nuclear weapons-related developments are visible on the horizon in 

South Asia. Pakistan has reportedly miniaturized nuclear weapons and developed Tactical or 

battlefield Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). Safeguarding deployed TNWs, which are much smaller in 

size, is indeed a challenge. India, on the other hand, is preparing its third leg of the nuclear triad 

– INS Arihant, the first 6,000-ton submarine with a 83MW pressurized light-water reactor 

onboard, is being readied for extensive sea-trials. First, both these issues involve very complex 

technology and delicate processes in terms of ensuring their safety and security. Second, the 

increasing number of warheads, their storage, maintenance, and dispersal involve additional 

responsibilities and risks.

3.1. Concern for TNWs

Generally speaking, the smaller the nuclear weapon and its means of delivery, the more 

susceptible it is to loss of central control. The very nature of the TNWs, and the fact that they 

need to be deployed on the battlefields or stored close to the battlefield and away from the 

central command and control chain, substantially increases the risks of “accidental, unauthorized 

or mistaken use.”39 However, Pakistan maintains that it will continue to exercise centralized 

control over any battlefield nuclear weapons during possible deployment. It is also asserted that

these weapons won’t need to be deployed prematurely or unnecessarily exposed to security risks 

or to the enemy, due to the relatively short distances between the storage sites and potential 

deployment areas (given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth).40 Any deployment of battlefield 

nuclear weapons by Pakistan would be done following the decision of the NCA during a crisis 

when the collapse of the conventional forces would be imminent, and it would be used as a 

weapon of last resort – the first among several other nuclear weapon systems in the country’s 

arsenal.41

3.2. Concern for Sea-based Assets

The maintenance and management of nuclear-propelled and nuclear-armed submarines are 

significantly more complex than conventional submarines because of the need for reactor 

maintenance and nuclear warheads onboard. Nuclear-propelled submarines armed with nuclear 

weapons are designed to stay hidden for long durations, can travel much longer than 

conventional boats, and their locations are a necessary secret. This may pose serious problems 

 

39 Samuel R. Berger, Steve Andreasen, “The Final Failure,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2011.

40 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Overcoming Nuclear Dangers,” Adelphi Paper 443, (London: International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, March 2014), p.90. https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2014-

de9e/overcoming-pakistan-nuclear-dangers-7ef0.

41 Ibid.
25

for any search-and-rescue team in case of an accident at sea. There are many reported instances 

of accidents or near misses involving atomic warheads, known as Broken Arrows by the

erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States, which involved incidents at sea.42 Still, India is 

conscious of the nuclear safety requirements related to its Arihant-class nuclear power 

submarines and has built a Soviet-designed facility called the Special Safety Service at 

Vishakhapatnam to monitor the health of people working on the submarines and detect any 

radiation leaks.43

3.3. Expanding Cruise Missile Inventory

A cursory look at the missile tests during the last decade would reveal that both countries have 

increasingly prioritized their cruise missile programs in addition to ballistic missiles. Two of 

Pakistan’s cruise missiles (Babur and Raad) are known to be nuclear capable, and logically, it 

would acquire supersonic versions of them soon, while a naval version of the Babur is believed 

to be under development.44 At the same time, India’s cruise missile program is on the path to 

becoming more robust with the ambition to acquire hypersonic versions of them. One perceived 

strategic implication of the expanding inventory of (nuclear-capable) cruise missiles is that it will 

impact strategic stability in the region seriously, but these might be seen as stabilizing by the 

other party in the face of growing missile defenses. Nonetheless, the deployment of land attack 

cruise missiles (LACMs) on survivable submarines or mobile platforms, obviously provides an 

assured means of surviving counterforce attacks; however, being a counterforce weapon 

platform, cruise missiles can obscure the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons, 

thereby complicating nuclear signaling by creating a degree of uncertainty in the type and nature 

of the incoming warhead and whether it is conventional or nuclear. Therefore, cruise missile 

proliferation in South Asia coupled with the acquisition and induction of possible missile 

defenses necessitates revisiting the contours of deterrence stability, nuclear accidents, and 

possible military-CBMs.

3.4. Expanding Fissile Material Production

Fissile Material production in India and Pakistan has witnessed an upward trend since 1998, 

primarily due to the requirements for operationalization of their respective nuclear deterrents. 

Both countries are believed to be developing strategic triads for greater survivability and 

 

42 Andrew Rosenthal, “Dozens of Atomic Warheads Lost in Sea by Superpowers, Study Says,” New York Times, 

June 07, 1989. “MoD Disclose 11 Safety Incidents at Nuclear Submarine Bases,” Sunday Herald, October 27, 2013.

43 “The Indian SSN Project: An Open Literature Analysis,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/sub/ssn/part01.htm

Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” Non-Proliferation Papers 

No. 19 (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2012).

44 Ibid.
26

effectiveness of their nuclear forces. They have also added nuclear fuel cycle and fissile material 

production facilities to their existing infrastructure, and this trend is likely to continue for the 

foreseeable future; however, doing so would generate additional responsibilities for nuclear 

material safety, accounting, and security, which both countries are expected to be aware of, given 

that this vertical nuclear expansion is central to their respective force goals. 

4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENTS

The intention here is not to draw any parallel of the Cold War experience to the India and 

Pakistan scenario. Rather, the aim is to highlight the bitter experiences of other nations in the 

management of nuclear weapons that “involves the unpredictability of circumstances and human 

behaviour”45 interacting with complex and sophisticated military technologies. Therefore, it 

would be useful to study instances involving nuclear accidents or Broken Arrow incidents of 

other countries and draw lessons cooperatively, in the spirit of the 2007 Agreement.

4.1. Global Experience

It is believed that there were at least 230 accidents involving aircraft, missiles, and ships that had 

some kind of nuclear mission of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom

between 1950 and 1980.46 The US Department of Defense “Narrative Summaries of Accidents 

Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1950-1980” describes the circumstance surrounding 32 

accidents involving nuclear weapons. Only two accidents, those at Palomares and Thule, resulted 

in a widespread dispersal of nuclear materials.47 Accidents in the US have been detailed in Eric 

Schlosser’s work, Command and Control.

48 One source lists over 25 serious nuclear facility 

incidents in the erstwhile Soviet Union. 

 

45 Ashton B Carter, et al., (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1987, p. 3.

46 Shaun Gregory and Alistair Edwards, “The Hidden Cost of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents 1950-1980,” 

Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1989. For accidents relating to US nuclear forces see Jaya Tiwari and 

Cleve J. Gray, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents,” CDI Center for Nuclear Information, 

http://tybeebombsquad.com/Accidents/accidents.htm

47 U.S. Department of Defense, “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1950-1980,” 

http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/635.pdf, p. i.

48 Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, 

New York: The Penguin Press, 2013.
27

4.2. Local Incidents

Instances of nuclear weapons related accidents or incidents in India or Pakistan, if any, are not 

known. Both India and Pakistan have had relatively limited experience with nuclear weapon 

design, testing, and mating with delivery systems. Their armed forces have had even more 

limited experience with nuclear weapons in the field. However, the no first use policy of India, 

and “first-use as the last resort” policy of Pakistan reduce the chances of accidental use.

Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to assume that they have not confronted difficulties in 

managing the safety and security of their nuclear inventory.

In India, a number of industrial accidents/incidents have occurred within nuclear facilities – the 

Narora reactor fire incident in March 1993, the collapse of containment dome in Kaiga reactor 

during construction in 1994, and the flooding of the Kakrapar reactor site in June 1994. These 

incidents are of course industrial accidents, and corrective measures have been administered on 

the basis of the lessons learned. In the case of Pakistan, at least three earthquakes in northern 

Punjab destroyed thousands of centrifuges in the Kahuta enrichment plant in 1981,49 and two 

more in 1983 and 1986.50 There were unconfirmed reports of earthquake damage in 2005 as 

well.51 Other incidents involved leakage of heavy water from KANUPP in 1989,

52 and a reported 

cylinder explosion incident at the Khushab heavy water plant in 2008.53 Though, none of the 

above-mentioned incidents involved any nuclear materials or nuclear weapons.

 

49 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

50 Ibid., p. 160.

51 Adrian Levy and Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons

(New York: Walker & Company, 2007) p. 100. 

52 “Spokesman On Leak,” Islamabad Domestic Service, May 141989; Nuclear Developments, 1June 1989, p. 21; in 

NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, June 1, 1989, www.nti.org.

53 “Two killed in gas leak at Khushab plant,” Dawn, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/09-Apr-2008/twokilled-in-gas-leak-at-khushab-plant.
28

5. ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT

The 2007 India-Pakistan Agreement is certainly a realization by both countries regarding the 

probability of such an accident taking place, the risks involved in the event of such an accident, 

and the countries’ duties in such a scenario. Through this agreement, both countries have 

outlined the parameters of “responsibility,” concepts, and the redlines to be adhered to in the 

management of their respective nuclear deterrents.

5.1. Responsibilities and Obligations

The Agreement is farsighted, as it unambiguously bestows responsibilities on both countries “to 

guard against accidents related to nuclear weapons” under their jurisdiction or control (Articles 

1 and 2). This also encompasses the future nuclear inventory of both countries. Article 2, 

however, clarifies that they are obliged to notify each other only of such accidents that may result 

in international, trans-boundary release or have security implications. In addition, the 

“information obtained on the accident cannot be disclosed to a third Party without prior consent 

of the other Party...” (Article 5).

5.2. Scope for Cooperative Measures

Certain provisions in the agreement seem open-ended, leaving ample scope for follow up 

measures. For example, Article 3(i) prescribes that “each Party shall act in such a manner as to 

reduce the possibilities of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party.” To eradicate the 

chances of misinterpretation, both Parties must first devise certain mechanisms and interact at

successive intervals to cooperate on less sensitive issues relating to nuclear weapons safety and 

security. Article 3(ii) enumerates that “in case of likely impact of the accident on the other Party, 

the first Party shall inform the other Party forthwith with relevant information.” This necessitates 

an institutional mechanism to decide what specific information needs to be obtained. In 

pursuance of the information obtained, the measures to be undertaken have to be ascertained as 

well. Lastly, Article 4 says that in addition to using the hotline links between the two Foreign 

Secretaries and Directors-General Military Operations (DGMOs) for information sharing, “the 

Parties may also make use of any other communication channels....” It would be prudent, 

therefore, to identify or put in place alternative information management and communication 

sharing mechanisms to better facilitate the process. 

This study attempts to suggest a framework of cooperative measures for consideration. Since 

both countries have acknowledged the “nuclear dimension of the security environment” and 

“their responsibilities,” a few follow-up measures within the purview of this agreement would 

further strengthen the nuclear CBM process.
29

6. FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIVE MEASURES

India and Pakistan seldom subscribe to each other’s apprehensions on the safety and security of 

their respective nuclear arsenals and strategic forces. Rather, they are confident of their 

respective mechanisms in place and have strived to maintain the safekeeping of their nuclear 

arsenals. It is presumed that the overriding motivation for signing of such an agreement was, 

first, to show the world that both countries are responsible nuclear powers, and secondly, to spell 

out redlines and concepts of accidents relating to nuclear weapons in South Asia.

Theoretically, the sources of an imagined nuclear weapon accident would be the lack of 

understanding of the exigencies of doctrines on force postures, laxity in rule implementation, and 

lack of or weak security culture. Therefore, any framework for additional cooperative measures 

to promote this Agreement should take into account these issue areas. Natural disasters and nonstate terrorism events are not in the purview of this study, as the Agreement is focused on 

avoiding “accidents” – unintentional or inadvertent. It is the sole responsibility of both states to 

guard against, and put in place, “national measures” to prevent misuse of “nuclear weapons 

under its control.” As the Agreement is silent on the definition of ‘nuclear weapons accident’, it 

is suggested that both parties must arrive at a working definition first. The US Department of 

Defense defines an “accident involving nuclear weapons” as: 

An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons components that 

results in any of the following: accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use; 

nuclear detonation; non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or 

radioactive weapon component; radioactive contamination; seizure, theft, or loss of a 

nuclear weapon or radioactive nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning; public 

hazard, actual or implied.54

6.1. Stepping Stone

At the outset, a public debate on the imperatives of such an approach needs to be generated in 

both countries. This first suggests a targeted, Track 2 initiative involving relevant scholars and 

experts, think tanks, journalists, environmentalists, scientists (if possible), retired officials, and 

students from both sides to discuss and suggest modalities to move forward. The Ottawa 

Dialogue has made a number of recommendations on nuclear, missiles, and regional security 

issues.55 Nevertheless, intensive debate and deliberations are warranted, particularly on the 

provisions of this Agreement, regarding potential areas of vulnerability, communication links, 

 

54 U.S. Department of Defense, n. 44, p. iii.

55 “Ottawa Dialogue Makes Further Recommendations for India-Pakistan Nuclear Agreements,” December 22, 

2011, 

http://ssms.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/vfs/.horde/newsfeed/000301_001324577320_Copenhagen_ENG%20(2).pdf
30

and transparency measures on nuclear safety and security (Fig.3). Outcome of such initiatives 

should be conveyed to both the governments for consideration.

Figure 3: Tasks for Track 2

6.2. A Framework for Possible Cooperation

Based on the examination (in the “South Asian Context” section) of the regional security 

discourse, nuclear force management, and the evolving nuclear weapons policies of the two 

countries, the subsequent sections attempt to delineate a framework of cooperative measures 

(Fig. 4). It identifies mainly three broad areas – emergency response, extending nuclear CBMs 

already at work, and a study of the past nuclear-related accidents elsewhere – to explore possible 

cooperation by initiating a process of periodic dialogue amongst working groups, coordinating 

agencies of both countries, and deliberation on different issue areas to promote the ethos 

stipulated in the Agreement. 
31

Figure 4: The Framework

Issues like nuclear force management and new nuclear weapons related developments are 

comparatively more sensitive than other areas like emergency response, past events, and nuclear 

CBMs. Understanding the fact that both countries will be hesitant to discuss sensitive and 

secretive areas, this study proposes to start with less sensitive areas at the outset. 

Figure 5: Areas of Possible Cooperation

1

• Study on Accidents in South Asia & Elsewhere

2

• Explore Possibilities to Extend Nuclear-Related CBMs

3

• Study on Capabilities to Handle Nuclear Emergencies
32

6.2.1. Issue Area One

To begin, we suggest initiating a collaborative study on nuclear-weapons related incidents and 

safety-security aspects, initially focusing on the accidents that have occurred in other countries. 

The objective is to draw lessons from, and develop common understanding of, the matter. 

The glimmer of hope is the fact that even after the nuclear tests in 1998, Indian and Pakistani 

representatives have worked collaboratively on nuclear safety issues within the Regional 

Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and 

Technology in Asia, and the Pacific (RCA) framework of the IAEA.56 In 1998, within the 

framework of the RCA, China, India, the Republic of Korea, and Pakistan collaboratively 

developed the “Regional Asia Reference Book on Good Operational Safety Management” of 

nuclear power plants.57 Later on, subject to each other’s approval, a collaborative study can be 

undertaken to analyze vulnerabilities in South Asia.

Figure 6: Tasks in Issue Area One

For this cooperation to commence, each side first needs to nominate respective Centres of 

Excellence for possible collaboration and joint studies. In the case of India, the Bhabha Atomic 

Research Centre (BARC) of DAE located in Mumbai would be the appropriate agency for such 

collaboration. In the case of Pakistan, the National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination 

Centre (NRECC) at the PNRA in Islamabad “is the National Warning Point (NWP) and 

operational facility for response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies happening 

domestically or abroad.”58

 

56 “The Regional Cooperative Agreement,” 

http://www.aea.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=300&Itemid=257&lang=en

57 IAEA, Annual Report 1998, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Anrep/Anrep98.

58 NRECC, http://www.pnra.org/nrecc.asp
33

In India and Pakistan, due to the deep sense of nuclear nationalism, public discussions and 

debates on anything “nuclear” are highly charged – more so after the Fukushima nuclear disaster 

in Japan. A number of misperceptions on nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and radiological matters 

persist in South Asia, which discourages open discussion and debate, though the situation in 

India is relatively better. One reason is the general lack of public understanding of basic nuclear 

technology and the distinction between nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and other peaceful uses 

of atomic energy. Another is the presence of the anti-nuclear lobby in both countries, and any 

nuclear-related discussion – even on civil nuclear energy – has the potential of being influenced 

or affected by such nuclear pessimists. This, in turn, discourages openness and debate on nuclear 

weapon-related issues; however, in the wake of a crisis, a lack of understanding of issues related 

to nuclear and radiological safety, and how to cope with emergencies would eventually result in 

chaos and disarray. As a less sensitive area, both countries might be willing to plan for a 

collaborative framework and experiment to devise a nuclear information management (NIM) 

system, shaped according to their respective national characteristics. For this concept to initiate, 

the governments of India and Pakistan need to work toward creating mutually understood 

nuclear information management infrastructures. In this area, the collaborating agencies of both 

countries may study and draw lessons from systems and experiences of other countries, 

especially on the “social acceptance” of nuclear technology. This endeavour may include public 

information systems, academia, and social organizations to examine how much or what nuclear 

information can be shared for public consumption. 

As a crucial part of the proposed framework, both countries may take steps to “promote 

incremental progress in nuclear transparency, [and] nuclear-related information.”59 This study

acknowledges the fact that serious concerns of policy-makers exist on both sides who are 

opposed to greater nuclear transparency due to a sense of mutual mistrust. Therefore, why should 

India and Pakistan agree to increase nuclear transparency to any extent? The answer is, “for both 

countries to strike a balance between nuclear ambiguity and nuclear transparency for better crisis 

management.”

60 Here, the suggestion is not out of the box; at the first stage, an expansion of 

existing Indian and Pakistani multilateral treaty arrangements that require the sharing of nuclear 

information with international, regional, and bilateral entities can initiate a process of greater 

nuclear transparency. The table below shows existing information-sharing obligations of India 

and Pakistan under various multilateral treaty arrangements that could provide a framework to 

adopt for this Agreement.

 

59 Gaurav Rajen and Kent Biringer, “Nuclear-Related Agreements and Cooperation in South Asia,” Disarmament 

Diplomacy, Issue No. 55, March 2001, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd55/55rajen.htm

60 Ibid.
34

Table 1: Nuclear-related Agreements Involving India or Pakistan

India Pakistan

Treaty/ Convention/ Agreement Date of 

Signature

Date of 

Accession

Date of 

Signature

Date of 

Accession

Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against 

Nuclear Installations and Facilities 12/31/1988 1/1/1991 12/31/1988 1/1/1991

The Antarctic Treaty 8/19/1983

Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste 9/21/1990 9/21/1990

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 

Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 9/29/1986 2/28/1988 10/12/1989

Convention Concerning the Protection of 

Workers Against Ionizing Radiation 11/17/1976

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 

Accident 9/26/1986 2/28/1988 10/12/1989

Convention on the Liability of Operators of 

Nuclear Ships 5/25/1962

Not 

applicable -

not in force

Convention on Nuclear Safety 9/20/1994 9/20/1994 9/30/1997

Convention on the Prevention of Marine 

Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 

Matter

4/8/1995

Food and Agriculture Organization/ United 

Nations - nuclear projects 10/1964 10/1964

Lahore Memorandum of Understanding 2/21/1999 2/21/1999

International Convention for the Safety of Life 

at Sea 6/16/1976 4/10/1985

Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, 

Development and Training in Nuclear Science 

and Technology in Asia and the Pacific

6/7/1972 6/7/1972 9/6/1974 9/6/1974

Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA Various 

times

Various 

times

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 

Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 

Bodies

3/3/1967 1/18/1982 9/12/1967 4/8/1968
35

India Pakistan

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 

Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 8/8/1963 10/10/1963 7/14/1963 3/3/1988

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement 

of Nuclear Weapons and Other WMD on the 

Seabed and the Ocean Floor

7/20/1973

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 12/10/1982 7/29/1995 12/10/1982

Source: Gaurav Rajen and Kent Biringer, “Nuclear-Related Agreements and Cooperation in South Asia,”

Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 55, March 2001.

The aforementioned information exchange in the context of the Agreement could also be 

facilitated through an equivalent and mutually understood information management 

infrastructure in each country; all such information can eventually be hosted in dedicated, nodal 

agencies created on each side. These nodal agencies (part of the structure in Issue Area Two and 

explained in a subsequent section) may consist of personnel from the scientific community, 

defence establishments, foreign affairs, civic bodies, disaster management agencies, and other 

security agencies to spearhead emergency response in times of emergency and in specific 

locations.

From an Indian perspective, it is important to acknowledge the fact that India adheres to a 

second-strike nuclear posture that relies on secrecy and has to keep internal safety and security 

measures away from scrutiny, mainly to ensure survivability of its arsenal; however, “as its 

nuclear weapon status (though de facto) has now achieved greater international acceptance, India 

may afford to be transparent about the steps it takes to prioritize nuclear weapons safety. India’s 

deterrent [triad] is still in the making, any transparency initiative will have to be limited and 

certainly on India’s terms or comfort level, and confidence in reliability and survivability of its 

own capability.”61

Nonetheless, a certain level of ambiguity in South Asian nuclear discourse is viewed as a 

stabilizing factor, but “unconstrained ambiguity will jeopardize the verifiability and effectiveness 

of future nuclear-related agreements India and Pakistan may negotiate, as well as those they have 

already acceded to.”62 Limited transparency is also necessary for management of crises and longterm, regional stability. In reciprocation to India’s transparency initiative, Pakistan can also come 

up with similar initiatives.

 

61 Email interaction by Sitakanta Mishra with Manpreet Sethi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New 

Delhi, on 14 November 2013.

62 Gaurav Rajen, op cit.
36

In summary, the three aspects of Issue Area One – collaborative study, nuclear information 

management, and transparency measures – can be coordinated by the centers of excellence 

identified in each side to initiate the collaboration. 

6.2.2. Issue Area Two

The most important and potential area of cooperation in this framework is the capability of both 

countries to handle nuclear weapons emergencies, if they ever arise. Both countries are known to 

have developed their own national infrastructure, mechanisms, and plans of action to contain or 

deal with a nuclear disaster. Of course, there is always opportunity for adopting global best 

practices, to which both countries are open.

Figure 7: Tasks in Issue Area Two

In India, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), in charge of providing security to nuclear 

installations, is equipped with the necessary ability to deploy specially trained teams in case of a 

nuclear emergency. Four companies of the CISF have been stationed with specialized training in 

four regional locations as First Responders – the Ghaziabad unit (Uttar Pradesh) to cater to Delhi 

and other northern areas, the Ranchi unit (Bihar) to cater to the eastern areas, the Kota unit 

(Rajasthan) for the western, and the Chennai unit (Tamil Nadu) for the southern part of the 

country.63 A Crisis Management Group (CMG) has been set up under the Crisis Management 

Plan and the DAE functions as the nodal authority with respect to nuclear/radiological 

emergencies in the public domain. In addition, the National Disaster Management Authority 

(NDMA) has drawn up a National Plan, State Plans, and District Plans in coordination with 

respective authorities.64

 

63 Sitakanta Mishra, The Challenge of Nuclear Terror (New Delhi: K W Publishers, 2008).

64 National Disaster Management Authority, Government of India, “National Disaster Management Guidelines: 

Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies,” 2009, 

http://ndma.gov.in/ndma/guidelines/Management+of+Nuclear+&+Radiological+Emergencies.pdf
37

Located in various parts of India, there are 22 Emergency Response Centers (ERCs), with skilled 

Emergency Response Teams (ERT) comprising the Aerial Survey Team (AST), Field 

Monitoring Team (FMT), Source Recovery Team (SRT), Assessment and Advisory Team 

(AAT), Medical Team (MT), and Bioassay Team (BT). They form an extensive network 

monitored by BARC (Mumbai) as the nodal agency. In case of any such event, an urgent 

response would be extended after conducting a Quick Impact Assessment (QIA) through Impact 

Assessment Software (IAS), specially developed in BARC to predict the impact. As per the 

arrangement, the ERC nearest to the site of such an incident will be activated by the centralized 

Emergency Communication Room (ECR – Mumbai) of the DAE CMG, on receipt of 

confirmation. The CMG coordinates between various state and central agencies to facilitate an 

effective response to such emergencies. During the past few years, the first-responders – custom 

officials, police, fire brigade personnel, and paramilitary forces – are being trained to handle 

radiological emergencies. State of the art monitoring systems and methodology are also 

developed and kept in readiness in various parts of the country.65

Pakistan has established a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence “that conducts specialized 

courses in nuclear security, physical protection, and personnel reliability.” The Center can be 

used as a regional and international hub for training.66 In addition, it has also developed a strong 

radiation emergency response mechanism. Its Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) 

is designed to cater to nuclear and radiological emergencies. The NEMS also has a Nuclear and 

Radiological Emergency Support Center (NURESC), which is ready to respond to any 

emergency at any time.67 The Radiation Monitoring Portal monitors are also being deployed at 

important exit and entry points in the country to prevent any illicit nuclear or radioactive material 

trafficking. Pakistan already has a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that 

functions in the office of the Prime Minister. Capacity building of the NDMA to handle such 

potential situations in conjunction with the SPD/PNRA and other specialized departments might 

be a useful starting point to generate know-how and training on the issue for the country’s civil 

departments.

This gives the impression that both countries have developed and remained in readiness with 

their respective mechanisms and standard operating procedures to deal with any unforeseen 

nuclear contingencies, and they are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent; however, as no such incident has happened yet in either country, they have no practical 

experience in dealing with such a situation. Only through simulation and training exercises in 

artificial scenarios, or Design Basis Threat simulation exercises, can the concerned agencies and 

 

65 Mishra, 2008, op cit.

66 Addressing the International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna in July 2013, Ambassador Masood Khan.

67 “Pakistan National Statement at the Nuclear Security Summit,” Seoul, 26-27 March 2012, 

http://pgstest.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/pakistan-national-statement2.pdf
38

departments prepare themselves to deal with a nuclear disaster. Also, all such preparedness is 

essentially designed to manage contingencies that may occur within their respective borders. In 

fact, dealing with a nuclear contingency occurring in the neighboring country presents a different 

set of scenario requirements and mechanisms. This Agreement, therefore, expressly states in 

Article 2 that “the Parties shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident 

relating to nuclear weapons,” and “the first Party shall inform the other Party forthwith relevant 

information” so “as to reduce possibilities of its actions being misinterpreted by the other party” 

in Article 3. This raises four sets of issues: (a) notification through which channel? (b) 

notification to which agency? (c) notification of what specific information? and (d) what type of 

emergency response – unilateral or cooperative? 

This study recommends the establishment of working groups on these issue areas involving 

experts from both sides to take charge of, or suggest additional measures to be undertaken in 

regard to consequence responsibilities. 

As far as a communication link is concerned, Article 4 of the Agreement mentions, “Parties shall 

make use of the hotline links between the two Foreign Secretaries and DGMOs or any other 

appropriate communication link as mutually agreed upon...for transmission of, or request for, 

urgent information...” It also mentions, “...the Parties may also make use of any other 

communication channels, including diplomatic channels depending upon the urgency of the 

situation.” Under the Lahore MoU, upgrading and improvement of these channels of 

communication were agreed upon and has been implemented as well. Agreement to shift the 

DGMO hotline to the fiber optic link was formalized during the expert-level meeting in New 

Delhi in August 2005 and has since been implemented.68 If the two existing communication 

channels (Foreign Secretaries and DGMOs) are assigned the task of managing communication 

for and during nuclear weapons-related disasters or accidents, at the very least, a disaster 

management expert, a nuclear scientist, or an individual with technical expertise must be 

attached to both these offices to guide what information to seek or what technical detail is 

required to start its own course of action. 

This is specifically to address the issue of deciding what type of technical information is required 

and at what stage during such a crisis. For that matter, both countries may start to reexamine the 

IAEA Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986) on which they have serious 

reservations.69 The purpose is to refer to Article 5 of the Convention, where a clear set of 

 

68 Jawed Naqvi, “Accord on Nuke Hotlines, Missile Tests with India,” Dawn, August 7, 2005.

69 IAEA, “Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,” INFCIRC/335, 

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc335.shtml, November 18, 1986. India, though 

has ratified on 28 January 1988, considers the Convention “inherent with serious defects in as much as it 

differentiates between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states,” and does “not cover all accidents.”

Pakistan, on the other hand, has acceded to it on September 11, 1989, but “does not consider itself bound by the 

provisions of submission of disputes to arbitration” or to the International Court of Justice at the request of any party 

to such dispute. “Declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto,” 

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna_reserv.pdf, July 28, 2011.
39

parameters on essential information required have been delineated. For example, each state party 

shall provide the date, time, exact location, and nature of the nuclear accident; the facility or 

activity involved; the assumed or established cause, and the foreseeable development of the 

nuclear accident, etc. 

Depending upon the gravity of the situation and information required, the necessity may arise to 

arrange face-to-face consultations or discussions. This is especially true for obtaining and using 

the information provided for analyses, which requires a dedicated nodal agency comprising 

technical as well as disaster management officials and decision-making authorities to officially 

obtain, consult, analyze, and act upon the information received. This nodal agency can be the 

link between the country of origin of the accident and the authorities in charge of emergency 

response on the other side. Therefore, a dedicated communication channel, which this study 

proposes, may be considered linking the two nodal agencies on each side for information sharing 

and further, necessary action. A single agency serving as a point of contact for sharing nuclearrelated information could make it easier to block all information flows in a situation of 

worsening relations, and a specialized, information-sharing infrastructure would further facilitate 

the transfer of more useful and relevant information for cooperative disaster management and 

emergency response, if required.

The arena of nuclear emergency response provides ample opportunity for cooperation if both 

countries are desirous. As any trans-boundary release of radiation demands cooperative 

responses to address the likely impact, it is warranted that both countries identify some areas of 

cooperation within their comfort level. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention on 

Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986), India and 

Pakistan are obliged to “cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt 

assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its 

consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive 

releases.”70 Also, under this Convention, they “may agree on bilateral or multilateral 

arrangements...for preventing or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of 

a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.” Therefore, it would be prudent for both countries 

to identify potential areas of cooperation in advance, perhaps through a working group consisting 

of experts from both countries. 

One potential area of collaborative work would be environmental sampling around the affected 

area through aerial surveys for deciding further courses of action. For better estimation of the 

consequences of an accident, joint studies on the atmospheric dispersion modeling, and 

probabilistic consequence analysis of the plume and wind are essential for any emergency 

 

70 IAEA, “Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,” INFCIRC/336, 

November 18, 1986, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc336.shtml
40

response to begin with. However, it would be unrealistic to suggest both countries to collaborate 

in this sensitive area at this stage. India has developed a sophisticated Aerial Gamma 

Spectrometry System (AGSS) for online assessment of radiological impact, which can be 

mounted on helicopters flying over the affected area. Other technologies, like the Compact 

Aerial Radiation Monitoring System (CARMS) for remote aerial radiation monitoring, and 

Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network (IERMON),71 satellite imagery-mapping of a 

“contaminated area” can be of great use in such emergencies, depending upon everyone’s 

comfort level and willingness. Subject to mutual approval, both countries can study models of 

other countries, like the US, France, the UK, or Germany – all more experienced in this area. 

Moreover, both countries may approach the US through a formal, trilateral understanding among 

them through IAEA or otherwise to observe nuclear weapons accident and emergency response 

exercises conducted in the US. 

The most crucial area, having wide scope for cooperation between India and Pakistan, could be 

the fielding of medical response to a nuclear emergency. A situation may occur where both 

countries have to carry out integrated diagnostic and dosimetric responsibility in the affected 

area, if the situation involves a trans-boundary release. This necessitates comprehensive medical 

preparedness, both at incident site and hospitals. In both countries, only a handful of medical 

centers are equipped with radiation-related hazards treatment.72

Therefore, a working group consisting of medical personnel from both countries can plan for 

developing comprehensive response capabilities and operational readiness of responders (both 

health and non-health service providers) in a contaminated environment and supported by R&D 

and technological efforts. As a common ground to begin with, the working group can use the 

IAEA-WHO Generic Procedures for Medical Response during a Nuclear or Radiological 

Emergency (2005) as a guide.73 The plan may include a study of advanced Decontamination 

Room, Dust-Filtered Nuclear Ward, Radioactive Bio-Waste Disposal Methods, Study of 

Chromosomal Aberration, Hematology Laboratory with Cell Separator for Granulocyte 

Concentrate, Bone Marrow Bank, Bone Marrow Transfusion, and Stem Cell Harvesting 

techniques, etc.74

 

71 C.K.G. Nair, et al., “National Network for Early Detection of Nuclear Emergency: 

Indian Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network (IERMON),” 

http://nidm.gov.in/idmc2/PDF/Abstracts/Nuclear.pdf

72Muhammad Ahmed Siddiqui, et al., “Pakistan: The New Target of Terrorism: Are Karachi’s Emergency Medical 

Response Systems Adequately Prepared?,” Journal of Pakistan Medical Association, Vol. 59, No. 7, July 2009, pp. 

441-45, http://www.jpma.org.pk/PdfDownload/1741.pdf

73 IAEA-WHO, “Generic Procedures for Medical Response during a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency,” April 

2005, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/EPR-MEDICAL-2005_web.pdf

74 Rajesh Arora, et al., “Medical Radiation Countermeasures for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies: Current 

Status and Future Perspectives,” Journal of Pharmacy & BioAllied Sciences, July-September 2010, 2(3), pp. 202–

212, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148625/#ref1
41

Besides preparedness, periodic training programmes can be arranged between medical and 

paramedical officials of both countries. India’s BARC has a 292-bed hospital with advanced 

facilities to experiment and take care of all kinds of radiation emergencies.75 In Pakistan, the 

NRECC of the PNRA is equipped with handling such emergencies.76 It would be prudent for 

both countries to explore and adopt international best practices in this field. The Radiation 

Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) managed by the US Department of 

Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)77 specializes in medical 

aspects of managing radiation emergencies can be a model studied by joint delegations from 

India and Pakistan. It is unreasonable to suggest that they start collaborating in all these areas at 

once; however, the scope for joint work on all these areas is enormous as well as noncontroversial.

6.2.3. Issue Area Three

The less talked about facts, but potentially having serious implications on South Asian nuclear 

weapons discourse, are the nuclear and radiological issues at sea and the spread of sophisticated 

cruise missiles, short-range systems, and missile defenses. As a logical corollary of the concern 

for the safe-keeping of nuclear weapons, management of delivery vehicles and the trend in their 

spread is equally important. With the gradual evolution of South Asian nuclear 

arsenals/deterrents naval nuclearization would be more pronounced. 

The Agreement in its preamble expresses “the need for adopting measures aimed at promoting a 

stable environment of peace and security between the two countries.” Undoubtedly, the nuclear 

dimension of the security environment has added utmost responsibility to mend fences on the 

current bilateral contentious issues. Being cognizant of the new nuclear developments in South 

Asia, we assume that sea-related nuclear and radiation issues and the lack of prior notification of 

cruise missile tests are potentially the two most contentious areas that need serious attention. 

This study, therefore, proposes dialogues for exploring options for bilateral cooperation in these 

areas.

 

75 B.J. Shankar, “Radiological Emergency Medical Preparedness in India,” 8th Coordination Meeting of World 

Health Organization Collaborating Centres in Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network, 

REMPAN (WHO, 2002), http://helid.digicollection.org/en/p/printable.html

76 http://www.pnra.org/nrecc.asp

77 “Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS),” orise.orau.gov/reacts/work-with-us.aspz
42

Figure 8: Tasks in Issue Area Three

As far as radiological issues at sea are concerned, the South Asian Seas Action Plan78– to which 

India and Pakistan are signatories – encourages and provides a framework for collaboration. The 

action plan suggests the establishment of a coordinated regional marine pollution monitoring 

program for collaboration among regional scientists and technicians as well as their institutions.

This is based on inter-comparable methods, for the study of the various processes occurring in 

the coastal areas and open-ocean of the region. As a confidence building measure within the 

framework of the SAS Action Plan, India and Pakistan may like to take steps in sharing data on 

environmental and effluent releases from two civilian nuclear power plants located on the 

shoreline of the Arabian Sea – TAPS and KANUPP – as a starting point.

79

The BARC in India has initiated two projects in the marine pollution area. One involves the use 

of radiotracers in the Hoogli estuary near Calcutta. The other BARC marine research project is in 

cooperation with the MS Swaminathan Research Foundation in India and involves the use of 

“Nuclear and Biotechnological Tools in Coastal Systems Research.” Given this interest in the 

marine coastal environment, the BARC could be a suitable partner for supporting the South 

Asian Seas Action Plan.80 Secondly, the South Asian Seas Action Plan can be linked to the RCA 

where Indian and Pakistani representatives have already collaborated on nuclear safety issues. 

India, while readying its third leg of its deterrent, must also highlight the fact that it is a 

responsible member of the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships81 (signed 

May 25, 1962) and has also acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 

 

78 “Action Plan for the Protection and Management of the Marine and Coastal 

Environment of the South Asian Seas, Region,” http://www.sacep.org/pdf/SAS%20Action%20Plan.pdf

79 Gaurav Rajen, op cit.

80 Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, RCA Annual Report, 1998, 

http://www.barc.ernet.in/webpages/rca_india/annual_report.html.

81 “Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,” 

http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=1962-

LiabilityOperatorsNuclearShips.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_html
43

nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor 

and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty)82 on July 20, 1973.

The second, and an evolving element in South Asian nuclear weapons discourse, is the spread of 

sophisticated dual-capable cruise and short-range missiles. Ballistic missiles and nuclear 

weapons do indeed remain a great concern, but they are not the only issue that South Asia is 

experiencing. Given the specificities of South Asian security architecture, the presence of cruise 

missiles, along with ballistic missiles, emerging triads, and missile defences makes the 

environment more complex. Having the ability to carry nuclear, chemical, and biological 

payloads, cruise missiles (with prior-notification of their flight tests) should be treated the same 

way ballistic missiles are treated in South Asian regional security architecture. To date, these 

delivery systems are not included in any CBMs between India and Pakistan, even though 

Pakistan made a proposal in this regard a few years ago.

Moreover, the changing calculus of nuclear deterrence caused by the improving accuracy and 

diversification of missile delivery systems in South Asia, and the increasingly blurred line 

between nuclear and conventional forces has made the regional security situation precarious. 

Therefore, a critical assessment of nuclear stability in the context of short-range, nuclear-capable 

systems, cruise missiles, sea-based nuclear forces, MIRVs, and missile defenses is particularly 

noteworthy. It is to examine if there are any tactical, strategic, or logical reasons as to why India 

and Pakistan cannot come together to agree upon a CBM addressing these threats. Of course, 

China is a major factor in India’s nuclear and military strategy. Therefore, any dialogue with 

Pakistan in these respects has to accommodate India’s concerns with China.

 

82 “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on 

the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty),” http://www.undocuments.net/seabed.htm
44

7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Declaratory guidelines alone do not suffice to prevent, respond, and mitigate the risks. 

Implementation of the agreed upon rules, in addition to putting in place necessary infrastructure 

beforehand, is essential as a disaster does not occur with prior notice. Therefore, both countries 

must realize the drawbacks of not taking the initiative to the next level. This study has suggested 

a few steps in the form of an overarching framework which are summarized below.

1. Establish a targeted Track 2 initiative involving scholars, experts, think tanks, journalists, 

environmentalists, scientists, government officials (serving, if possible, and retired) in

their private capacity, and students from both sides to discuss the imperatives of carrying 

forward the Agreement and suggesting modalities to move forward.

2. Initiate a collaborative study on nuclear weapons-related incidents and safety-security 

aspects, initially focusing on the accidents that happened in other countries to draw 

lessons from, and develop a common understanding of the matter.

3. Nominate respective centers of excellence for possible collaboration and joint studies. 

India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) of the DAE and Pakistan’s National 

Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC) of the PNRA would be the 

ideal candidates.

4. Create a collaborative framework for a nuclear information management (NIM) system, 

shaped according to their respective national characteristics and sensitivities to address 

misperceptions and misunderstandings while promoting openness on nuclear issues.

5. Set up of working groups to examine and discuss issues like specialized communication 

links, types of technical information required, schedules of interaction, and a composition 

of nodal agencies to act upon the information received.

6. Conduct joint studies on the atmospheric dispersion modeling and probabilistic 

consequence analysis of the plume and wind pattern for effective management of any 

emergency response. In this regard, study of models of countries like the US, France, the 

UK, or Germany is advised. Both India and Pakistan may approach the US through 

formal, trilateral understanding or through IAEA, to be observers in the nuclear weapons 

accident emergency response exercises. 

7. Strengthen medical response capabilities of both countries through a collaborative 

approach and adoption of global best practices. Periodic training programs can be 

arranged between medical and paramedical officials of both countries– bilaterally or in 

collaboration with advanced countries.

8. Initiate a dialogue on sea-related radiation issues and possibly sharing of data on 

environmental release and effluent from coastal nuclear reactors. Also to initiate a 
45

dialogue to explore options for bilateral cooperation in the areas of cruise and short-range 

missile as well as missile defences, subject to each other’s comfort level.

9. Undertake follow-on joint studies on all of these areas to work out in greater details.

8. CONCLUSION

Constrained by secrecy and unavailability of information, an attempt is made to analyze the

South Asian nuclear weapons discourse and their safety-security management. A number of 

CBM proposals are also borrowed from various writings and assimilated into this framework. 

Some of the proposals may not sound feasible and acceptable to both countries for various 

reasons; however, the intention is to identify potential areas for cooperation to promote the 

Agreement. 

This study acknowledges that more comprehensive joint studies need to be performed on all of 

these issue areas before any actual development can take place. It is therefore recommended that

follow-on studies be initiated to work out in greater details. In the meantime, bringing all these 

issues to the both governments’ notice and targeting public debate on all these issues needs to be 

initiated in both countries by engaging the media, scholars, and academia. This report, as a 

precursor, aims to generate opinions and sustained debate in this direction.
46

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49

APPENDIX 1: Agreement Text

Indo-Pak Agreement on Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons

The Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of Republic of India, hereinafter 

referred to as the Parties:

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lahore on 21 February 1999 between the two 

countries;

Recognizing that both Parties have national measures including Command and Control structures to guard 

against accidents related to nuclear weapons;

Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their 

responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the objective of global and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament;

Conscious of the need for adopting measures aimed at promoting a stable environment of peace and 

security between the two countries; Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Party shall maintain and improve, as it deems necessary, existing national measures including 

organizational and technical arrangements, to guard against accidents related to nuclear weapons under its 

control.

Article 2

The Parties shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident relating to nuclear weapons, 

under their respective jurisdiction or control, which could create the risk of a radioactive fallout, with 

adverse consequences for both sides, or create the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two 

countries. In the event of such an accident the Party within whose jurisdiction or control the accident has 

taken place will immediately take necessary measures to minimize the radiological consequences of such 

an accident.

The obligation of a Party to notify shall be in respect of only such accidents which may result in an 

international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance or have security 

implication for the other Party.

Article 3

In the event of occurrence of an accident of the type referred to in Article-2 of this Agreement:

(i) Each Party shall act in such a manner as to reduce the possibilities of its actions being misinterpreted 

by the other Party;

(ii) In case of likely impact of the accident on the other party, the first Party shall inform the other Party 

forthwith with relevant information.

Article 4

The Parties shall make use of the hotline links between the two Foreign Secretaries and DGMOs or any 

other appropriate communication link as mutually agreed upon between their Governments for 

transmission of, or request for, urgent information in situations relating to the implementation of this 

Agreement. The Parties may also make use of any other communication channels, including diplomatic 

channels depending upon the urgency of the situation.
50

Article 5

Information obtained by a Party pursuant to this Agreement shall not be disclosed to a third Party without 

the prior consent of the other Party except where it concerns environment, public health or safety.

Article 6

This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under existing international 

agreements to which they are a Party.

Article 7

The Parties may hold consultations, as mutually agreed upon, to review the implementation of the 

provisions of this Agreement as well as to consider possible amendments aimed at furthering the 

objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures that shall 

be agreed upon.

Article 8

This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years. Upon agreement by the Parties, the 

Agreement may be extended for successive periods of five years at a time. A Party may withdraw from 

this Agreement by giving six months written notice to the other indicating its intention to terminate the 

Agreement.

In witness whereof the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have 

signed this Agreement.

Done at New Delhi on ................. in two originals, in English language, each text being equally 

authentic.

K.C. Singh

Additional Foreign Secretary

For Government of the

Republic of India

Tariq Osman Hyder

Additional Foreign Secretary

For Government of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan
51

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Sitakanta Mishra is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi (India), and 

the Associate Editor of Indian Foreign Affairs Journal (New Delhi), published by Association of Indian 

Diplomats. Dr. Mishra has also worked with the Indian Puguwash for several years, and he is currently an 

associate member.

He received his Ph.D. in South Asian Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi in 

2011, and his Ph.D. thesis is entitled “Role of Political Parties in Formulating India’s Nuclear Weapons 

Policy.” He also holds an MPhil degree from JNU on “Nuclear Factor in India’s Foreign Policy” and a 

Master’s degree in International Relations. 

Dr. Mishra has authored two books: The Challenge of Nuclear Terror (2008), and Cruise Missiles: 

Evolution, Proliferation and Future (2011). His third book, Defence Beyond Design, is under print. To his 

credit, he has many other national and international publications related to South Asian affairs, nuclear 

energy, nuclear safety-security, missiles, and India’s defense and foreign policy.

Dr. Mansoor Ahmed is a Lecturer in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS), Quaid-iAzam University (QAU) in Islamabad, Pakistan since January 2011. Before joining the academia, he 

served in the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service as a civil servant from July 2003 to January 2011. His 

last assignment was Deputy Director, Audit (Defense Services) in the Office of the Auditor-General of 

Pakistan, Islamabad. He was also Research Assistant to Brig. (retired) Feroz Hassan Khan for the book 

project: Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012) from 2006-

2012.

He received a Ph.D. in International Relations from QAU in 2012, and his Ph.D. thesis is entitled 

“Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Security, Politics and Technology” and focuses on the interplay of 

bureaucratic-politics within Pakistan’s nuclear establishment and its impact on the evolution of the 

country’s nuclear program. He also holds an M.Sc. in International Relations and an M.Phil. in Defense 

and Strategic Studies from QAU. Dr. Ahmed has also served on the faculty of the Department of Strategic 

and Nuclear Studies, National Defense University, Islamabad from 2009-2011. 

He has been engaged in different Track-II dialogues and initiatives on arms control and nuclear issues in 

South Asia. His research interests include various aspects of Pakistan's nuclear program and policy, fissile 

materials, and nuclear non-proliferation and arms control issues with special reference to South Asia. He 

has national and international publications to his credit related to strategic stability and nuclear learning in 

South Asia, Pakistan’s nuclear emergence, evolving force postures and emerging military technologies, 

and safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. 
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Distribution

TBD

1 MS0899 Technical Library 9536 (electronic copy)
53