U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

26–661 PDF 2017

S. HRG. 112–981 

REVIEW OF THE NRC’S NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR 

AND NUCLEAR SAFETY 

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California (ex officio) 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

DECEMBER 15, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 3 

Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont ....................... 5 

Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee ................... 7 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 9 

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama ............................. 10 

Crapo, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho ..................................... 62 

Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 63 

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ............................ 64 

Boozman, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas ......................... 65 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................... 66 

WITNESSES 

Jaczko, Hon. Gregory B., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ...... 68 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 83 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 101 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 105 

Magwood, Hon. William D., IV, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .................................................................................................................. 140 

Responses to additional questions from: .........................................................

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 142 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 147 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 148 

Svinicki, Hon. Kristine L., Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................................................................................ 163 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 164 

Response to an additional question from Senator Carper ............................ 166 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 168 

Apostolakis, Hon. George, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................................................................................ 177 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 178 

Response to an additional question from Senator Carper ............................ 180 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 182 

Ostendorff, Hon. William C., Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .................................................................................................................. 192 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 193 

Response to an additional question from Senator Carper ............................ 197 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 199 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Statement from the Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

to the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, Committee on 

Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, The NRC Inspector 

General Report on the ‘‘NRC Chairman’s Unilateral Decision To Terminate 

NRC’S Review of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License Application,’’ 

June 14, 2011 ....................................................................................................... 263 

Page

IV 

The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, 2010 Rankings ............... 275 

The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, 2011 Rankings ............... 287 

(1) 

REVIEW OF THE NRC’S NEAR-TERM TASK 

FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 406, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer (Chairman of 

the full Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Inhofe, Carper, Lautenberg, Sanders, 

Udall, Vitter, Barrasso, Sessions, Crapo, Alexander, and Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. The Committee will come to order. Let me start 

off by saying Happy Holidays to everybody, Merry Christmas, 

Happy Hanukkah, whatever is your preference. We welcome you 

all here. 

Senator INHOFE. Does that mean we will be home for Christmas? 

Senator BOXER. If I had anything to say about it, absolutely. Absolutely. 

It is the responsibility of the Environment and Public Works 

Committee to conduct oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, and to ensure that the nuclear industry maintains 

the highest level of safety for the American people. Let me start, 

as I often do, by reading NRC’s mission statement. The mission of 

the NRC is to license and to regulate the nation’s civilian use of 

byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials in order to protect 

public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. 

Today is the fifth time the members of this Committee have 

gathered in this room to discuss nuclear safety following the 

Fukushima crisis in Japan in March. At each of those meetings, I 

have repeatedly asked the NRC to heed the wake-up call from 

Fukushima, to reevaluate the safety and security of nuclear plants 

in the United States, and to implement the recommendations of the 

Near-Term Task Force as soon as possible. 

In fact, at our last NRC hearing on August 2nd, four of you made 

the commitment to me and to this Committee that you would move 

forward on some or all of the Near-Term Task Force recommendaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
2 

tions within 90 days. To my great disappointment, that has not 

happened. Although Chairman Jaczko repeatedly asked you to 

keep your commitment to move expeditiously on safety, you are 

more than a month overdue on that commitment. It doesn’t appear 

to me that such action is set to occur any time soon, and I am 

hopeful maybe the Commission, all of you, especially the Chairman, could tell me if I am wrong on that. I would hope there is 

a date to act on those recommendations. 

Colleagues, less than a week after the Task Force delivered its 

report to the NRC, Chairman Jaczko laid out a road map to address the lessons learned from Fukushima. And he set a deadline 

of October 21st for action on those recommendations. He was 

proactive, because without a specific time table for these common 

sense safety measures, the NRC will not live up to its mandate, as 

we just saw, to require nuclear power plants to be safe and reliable. 

But instead of taking action, every Commissioner, except Chairman Jaczko, focused on delay in the form of a re-review. Guess 

what the result was? That re-review came to the same conclusions 

as the first review. So here we are on December 15th, and not one 

of those safety recommendations has been accepted and acted on. 

It is simply inexcusable. Slow walking needed reforms after a disaster like Fukushima, where widespread contamination has set 

back Japan immeasurably, must not be an option. 

Yesterday, instead of focusing on nuclear plant safety, a House 

committee conducted what I consider to be a witch hunt in an attempt to assassinate the character of a dedicated public servant. 

Frankly, I was shocked, and I was appalled. One of you Commissioners even said in written testimony that the Chairman was abusive to women. 

I asked my staff to check out this accusation. And let me tell you 

what they found. They found the opposite. In fact, that the Chairman, according to one respected female staffer, was, quoting her directly, the most fair person she has ever met. She went on to say, 

‘‘He treats everyone equally.’’ Other comments include: ‘‘He invites 

people to dissent, and I have never seen him mistreat others.’’ One 

woman said, ‘‘What I am floored by is the conduct of the other 

Commissioners.’’ 

Our nation is fortunate to have Greg sitting in the Chairman’s 

seat, because he is a proven leader. I believe that without his leadership on the Commission, the NRC might never have implemented 

the important safety recommendations made at the 9/11 terrorist 

attacks. It took 10 years. But it was the Chairman that made it 

happen finally. 

The NRC must focus on safety, and it must take action without 

delay if nuclear power is to maintain the public trust. I want to 

show you part of a New York Times editorial from July 23rd. ‘‘If 

nuclear power,’’ they write, ‘‘is to have a future in this country, 

Americans have to have confidence that regulators and the industry are learning the lessons of Fukushima and taking all steps necessary to ensure safety.’’ The American people’s faith in nuclear 

power was shaken by the Fukushima crisis. No matter what we 

may think, the polls show that their confidence was shaken. And 

the American public rightly expects the NRC to redouble its efforts 

3 

to ensure that our nuclear plants are the safest in the world. But 

that has not happened. 

And let me tell you what happens when people lose confidence 

in the NRC and the nuclear industry. Right now, there is a petition 

circulating in my State for a ballot initiative which would effectively shut down the two nuclear plants we have in California. You 

know all about those plants, because I have questioned you about 

them. As a matter of fact, I met one of the Commissioners there, 

and we went—we investigated. There is a lot of concern. In one 

case, tens of millions of people live within 50 miles. I shouldn’t say 

tens of millions, how many is it? I am sorry, 7.4 million live within 

50 miles of one of those plants, and the other one is about half a 

million people. 

So here is what happens. If the NRC doesn’t do its job, if the 

American people feel that they are not being protected, if the 

American people feel that all this is about is some battle as to who 

should be the Chairman and who is going to score political points, 

and you are distracted from what you have to do, you are going to 

see more of these moves across the country. And that would be 

very, very sad, because there are many old nuclear power plants 

that have similar characteristics as Fukushima. 

So I speak to you right from the heart like I did the last time 

when I say, can’t you stop this battling and talk to each other like 

human beings? What happened yesterday was a horrible setback, 

but it is not too late to recover from that. We should be focusing 

on the work that you have to do, not petty politics and personal 

ambition. 

So I hope going forward you will focus on safety. We will focus 

on safety. And stay away from the politics of personal destruction. 

I am happy to call on Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Well, Madam Chairman, I would almost use 

some of the same words you used when you say you were shocked 

and appalled at the apparent character assassination of one person. 

But I am appalled at the attempted assassination of the character 

of four people, four public servants. 

I remember in 1996, I chaired the Subcommittee. At that time 

we had gone several years without any oversight. We totally 

changed it. It has been doing very well since then. I was very proud 

of it. 

I have to say that I am just blown away by the numerous reports, and I say reports, of Chairman Jaczko’s intimidation and retaliation against senior staff, agency staff, in attempts to fundamentally undermine the collegial function of the Commission, 

and to perhaps, allegedly, for his own objectives in his efforts to 

withhold information from his fellow Commissioners. 

Now, what surprises me is that the White House appears to condone this behavior, dismissing it as management differences. Well, 

the management differences that we have here are serious. We 

have one Chairman who believes that bullying staff is acceptable 

in an effort to further his own agenda and four Commissioners who 

disagree. In 2006 the late Commissioner Ed McGaffigan—and I 

4 

think everyone remembers him, he is one who has been held in 

such high esteem, we lost him, unfortunately. But he made a statement, it was actually a speech to the NRC employees. I think it is 

appropriate to read that speech. 

He said, ‘‘You come to an institution, the NRC, that is routinely 

subject to baseless attacks by groups opposed to nuclear power, 

that call themselves nuclear watchdogs. These groups need to demonize the NRC, you and me, to fund themselves and their antinuclear agenda. When I arrived at NRC in 1996, I had spent two 

decades working on national security issues first as a foreign service officer then as an aide to Senator Jeff Bingaman. I did not 

know that I was a demon, but it didn’t take long for me to cast 

votes based on my scientific, technical, and policy judgment that we 

were not to the liking of the anti-nuclear zealots. And so I became 

a demon.’’ 

He went on to say—this incidentally, Madam Chairman, is the 

same year that I became Chairman of this Subcommittee, but anyway, he went on to say, and I am still quoting from his speech to 

his employees, ‘‘Honor often involves telling people, perhaps colleagues, perhaps supervisors, what they don’t want to hear. And it 

may make you enemies, but stories I could tell you from my own 

career would persuade you that you can afford such enemies, but 

you cannot afford to compromise your honor and your personal 

compass.’’ I think it is appropriate that we re-read his statement, 

probably the guy who has been held in the highest regard of any, 

certainly during the years I have been here. 

What we saw this weekend was an immediate, concerted, and 

very public attempt to demonize four public servants, whose only 

crime was to conduct themselves with honor, to seek assistance as 

a last resort from the White House to address problems they have 

not been able to resolve on their own and risking their professional 

reputations, they came forward, on behalf of the employees who 

now work in a hostile environment, employees who are forced to 

choose between what they believe is right and what Chairman 

Jaczko wants them to do. Chairman Jaczko’s actions simply can’t 

be ignored. 

However, the White House appears willing to ignore the warning 

of four Commissioners, resting on their statements that his actions 

haven’t impaired the Commission’s ability to execute its mission to 

protect public health and safety. Yet is the President waiting to act 

until this happens? After all that we have learned how can President Obama still believe that Mr. Jaczko remains the single best 

possible person to serve in this post? I don’t know what will have 

to happen to change his mind. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Chairman Boxer, for holding this hearing. Nuclear safety has historically been a bipartisan issue, and I believe the agency and the public are best 

served when that is the case. I believe events over the last week have once again 

shown that nuclear safety is bipartisan: in this case two Democrats and two Republicans. 

I am dismayed by the numerous reports of Chairman Jaczko’s intimidation and 

retaliation against senior agency staff, attempts to fundamentally undermine the 

5 

collegial function of the Commission to forward his own objectives, and his efforts 

to withhold information from his fellow Commissioners. However, I must say I am 

not surprised, given what I have learned through previous oversight hearings. 

What does surprise me is that the White House appears to condone such behavior, 

dismissing it as mere ‘‘management differences.’’ Well, the ‘‘management differences’’ we have here are serious: we have one Chairman who believes that bullying staff is acceptable in an effort to further his own agenda and four Commissioners who disagree. 

In 2006 the late Commissioner Ed McGaffigan, well known and admired by members of this Committee on both sides of the aisle, gave a speech to NRC employees 

about the importance of speaking the truth to those in power. Here is what he said: 

‘‘You come to an institution, NRC, that is routinely subject to baseless attacks by 

groups opposed to nuclear power that call themselves ‘nuclear watchdogs.’ These 

groups need to demonize NRC—you and me—to fund themselves and their anti-nuclear agenda. When I arrived at NRC in 1996, I had spent two decades working on 

national security issues first as a Foreign Service Officer, and then as an aide to 

Senator Jeff Bingaman (D–NM). I did not know that I was a demon, but it did not 

take long for me to cast votes, based on my scientific, technical, and policy judgment, that were not to the liking of the anti-nuclear zealots, and so I became a 

demon.’’ 

He went on to say: 

‘‘ ‘Honor’ often involves telling people—perhaps colleagues, perhaps supervisors— 

what they do not want to hear . . . And it may make you enemies. But stories I could 

tell you from my own career would persuade you that you can afford such enemies, 

but you cannot afford to compromise your honor, your personal compass.’’ 

What we saw this weekend was an immediate, concerted, and very public attempt 

to demonize four public servants whose only crime is to conduct themselves with 

honor; to seek assistance, as a last resort, from the White House to address problems they had not been able to resolve on their own. Risking their professional reputations, they came forward on behalf of the employees who now work in a hostile 

environment, employees who are forced to choose between what they believe is right 

and what Chairman Jaczko wants them to do. 

Chairman Jaczko’s actions simply can’t be ignored. However, the White House appears willing to ignore the warning of four Commissioners, resting on their statements that his actions haven’t impaired the Commission’s ability to execute its mission to protect public health and safety—yet. Is the President waiting to act until 

it does? After all that we’ve learned, how can President Obama still believe that Mr. 

Jaczko remains the single best possible person to serve in this post? What will it 

take for him to change his mind? 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Carper is going to pass at this time, and we will ask 

Senator Sanders for his statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I think many of us are not happy about what we are reading in 

terms of what is going on with the NRC, because your job is an 

enormously important job, and that is to protect the safety of the 

American people in our nuclear power plants. That is an enormous 

responsibility, given what we have seen recently in Japan. 

Clearly, the NRC has to be vigilant and rigorous in enforcing a 

safety regime that gives the American people confidence. And I will 

tell you, in my State, we have the same model nuclear reactor that 

melted down in Japan. And in my State, the people are not comforted. And they want to know that the NRC is doing everything 

it can to protect the safety of the American people. 

Now, the media has been reporting that we have a major personality conflict on the Commission. I don’t know if that is true or not. 

But I suspect that there is more going on here, other than personality conflicts. The media has also, at least some of the media, has 

6 

characterized, Madam Chair, what is going on as a ‘‘coup’’ attempted by several Commissioners to remove a Chairman, Mr. 

Jaczko, who in fact has been pushing for safety reform. 

I think what we may have here is a situation where some Commissioners did not understand the function of the Chairman and 

where some Commissioners have a philosophical disagreement with 

the Chairman on safety and transparency. But Madam Chair, what 

I hope we will look at today is go beyond personality conflicts and 

maybe understand some of the votes that have taken place, and in 

fact, why we don’t know some of the votes, because there is a lack 

of transparency at the NRC. 

On the point of administration of the Commission, it appears 

that the other Commissioners are upset about Chairman Jaczko’s 

management. But as White House Chief of Staff Bill Daley has 

noted, and this is an important point, Congress has structured the 

NRC to have a strong Chairman. And this has produced conflicts 

between the Chair and Commissioners dating back to 1999, long 

before Mr. Jaczko was Chairman. 

Madam Chair, I will tell you, when I was mayor of the city of 

Burlington, we used to have conflicts. I was the mayor, we had 

commissioners. And there was a disagreement about who had responsibility for what. But I think the record is pretty clear, the 

rules in terms of the NRC are clear and have been changed over 

the years to create a strong Chairman for the NRC. I think there 

may be some confusion about that, because I think we all know, 

President Carter submitted a reorganization plan to Congress in 

1980, following Three Mile Island, which clearly states, ‘‘The plan 

clarifies the duties of the Chairman as principal executive officer. 

In addition to directing the day to day operations of the agency, the 

Chairman will take charge of the Commission’s response to nuclear 

emergencies.’’ 

On the issue of transparency, Madam Chair, three Commissioners were confirmed by this Committee last year. When they 

were confirmed, they told this Committee that they supported the 

Chairman’s proposal to open up the NRC voting process to more 

transparency. Today, each NRC commissioner votes, as I understand it, by writing his or her own opinion behind closed doors, obscuring the process from public view, and making it difficult to 

know how a result is reached. In addition, it takes weeks, sometimes a month, after a vote is initiated for the public to learn the 

results. 

As far as I am aware, no progress has been made toward a more 

open and transparent public meeting process. Perhaps this is part 

of a philosophical difference. If so, we need to get into this issue 

of transparency and find out why some Commissioners oppose more 

openness. 

I can remember on a personal level, for the State of Vermont, a 

number of months ago, Vermont is right now engaged in a legal 

dispute in the courts with Entergy, a large energy company. And 

I asked the Commissioners to tell me, I had understood that there 

was a vote, that it was a 3 to 2 vote, where the NRC had urged— 

in my view, absolutely inappropriately—the Department of Justice 

to intervene. And I asked, tell me, how did you vote? I did not get 

7 

a clear answer. The people of Vermont want to know; did you vote 

for Entergy, did you not? 

I think in general we need more transparency. My understanding 

is that Chairman Jaczko is fighting for transparency. And some of 

you are not. That is not a personality difference, that is a philosophical difference, that is a political difference. 

On the primary issue, the NRC should be concerned with safety. 

We are approaching the 1-year anniversary of Fukushima in 

March. In the United States, we have 23 nuclear reactors with the 

same design as the plant that experienced at least a partial meltdown in Japan, including one in my own State, same model as 

Fukushima. Yet the NRC has not yet acted to implement all 12 

recommendations made by the task force of senior NRC staff to reform safety at U.S. plants. The Chairman has made very clear that 

he is ready to move on all 12 recommendations, but not all Commissioners, as I understand it, agree. 

The Union of Concerned Scientists points out that 48 reactors 

still do not comply with fire safety rules established in 1980 and 

amended in 2004, to ensure that fires do not threaten backup 

power systems that could prevent a meltdown in an emergency. 

Yet, Madam Chair, we have four Commissioners who, against the 

Chairman’s vote, voted to approve a delay for compliance through 

2014. That is not a personality difference. That is a point of view 

in terms of whether you are going to be aggressive, in my view, on 

safety or you are not. There was one person voting for that, it was 

Mr. Jaczko, four against it. Not a personality conflict, Madam 

Chair, a difference about what the function of the NRC is. 

Let me conclude by saying that these are just two of many instances I am aware of where Chairman Jaczko has been in the lone 

vote, or in the minority voting for stronger safety measures. So I 

hope that the debate today is not about personality. All of us want 

safety. Who is fighting for safety, who is not fighting for safety? 

This means that there is in fact a philosophical divide on the Commission, and that is OK. It does not mean that the Commission 

does not function. But we need to get to the bottom of what that 

divide is. 

Yet today, just as some of his fellow Commissioners apparently 

desire, instead of talking about safety, we are here talking about 

personality conflicts. I call on all members of the Commission to 

get back to doing their jobs, and their job is to protect the safety 

of our nuclear power plants and the well-being of the people of this 

country. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

According to arrival, next would be Senator Alexander. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Madam Chairman, and to the 

members of the Commission, welcome. 

I remember the hearing for three new members of the Commission, three appointees of President Obama and how pleased I was 

with the President’s appointments. Two were Democrats, one is a 

Republican, three of them sitting here, one a distinguished proVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
8 

fessor at MIT, one a person with broad experience as having actually operated reactors for the Navy, one with broad experience 

within the Energy Department. And it is not always that Republican and Democratic Presidents appoint such well-qualified people 

to positions. So I was very pleased by the President’s appointments. 

In the same way, I am extremely troubled by this extraordinary 

action of having four of the five members of the Commission actually write a letter to the Chief of Staff of the White House saying 

that the Chairman has undermined the ability of the Commission 

to function as prescribed by law and they are concerned about the 

health and safety and security of the American people. Some Senators have said we should be talking about safety, that is what this 

letter says. So they are concerned about safety. 

And in my experience in public life, which goes back 40 years, 

I have never seen anything like this before. I have never seen four 

well-respected members of a commission take it upon themselves 

to go to the White House, to the President with these kinds of concerns about the Chairman. Now, I know the Chairman very well, 

he has gone to Tennessee, and he has looked at our reactors in the 

TVA region. And I greatly appreciate that, and those have been 

good visits, and I have welcomed visits in my office. 

But I am deeply disturbed by this, and I don’t know all the answers. But I do know that we have a lot of work to do in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I was just making a short list, TVA 

is trying to restart the nuclear industry in Tennessee using reactors. Commissioner Jaczko, Commissioner Ostendorff have both 

been there to look at the reactors, make sure they are safe, to see 

what is going on. We appreciate that. 

In Georgia and South Carolina, new reactors are being built. 

There are two new designs pending before the Commission. I am 

hopeful that small modular reactors may be coming along in our 

country. We have 104 reactors operating every day, providing 20 

percent of all of our electricity, 70 percent of our clean electricity. 

We are trying to learn the lessons of Fukushima, which are pretty 

simple, really, what happened in Fukushima was a huge cyclone, 

hurricane, tidal wave. And the electricity that brings water to cool 

the rods didn’t work. That was the problem. 

And the NRC is working on ways to fix it. And already, as we 

have said many, many times, the gold standard for safety in the 

world for nuclear power is in the United States of America. There 

has never been, never been a death at a civilian nuclear reactor, 

and no one was even hurt at Three Mile Island. 

So I am very disturbed. And I am particularly disturbed because—and I would like to hear today what is going on. What is 

going on? I would like to get back to the issues. 

Of course the Chairman has more responsibility during an emergency. That is in the law. But here is also what the law says: ‘‘Each 

member of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have 

equal responsibility and authority in all of the decisions and actions of the Commission, and shall have full access to all information. The Chairman cannot withhold or delay providing information.’’ 

That is in the law. And it is important to know whether these 

distinguished members of the Commission feel that they can’t do 

9 

their jobs because they are not having equal access to information. 

Somebody is right here, and somebody is wrong. And we shouldn’t 

just be sloughing it off as a personality disorder. We should ask the 

Commissioners if they can resolve it themselves, that would be 

best. But apparently four of them, three appointed by President 

Obama, all of whom have distinguished reputations, have gone to 

this extraordinary length with a letter to the White House. 

So I hope, Mr. Chairman, for whom I have great respect, and the 

other members of the Commission, for whom I have great respect, 

I hope you can tell us what is going on, and I hope you yourselves 

can solve the problem and that we can focus not just on lessons 

from Fukushima, we know what happened at Fukushima, and we 

know what to do about it. Let’s focus on all the other issues we 

have so we can start producing more reliable, clean electricity. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony and an opportunity to 

ask questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Carper, do you still wish to wait? 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Senator Lautenberg, you are next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much. 

Madam Chairman, what we are seeing today is what happens 

when an agency that has traditionally been controlled by the industry it serves, it regulates, meets a Chairman that puts safety of the 

American people ahead of the interests of the industry. Chairman 

Jaczko is the first Chairman in history of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission that has not come from the industry. He is a scientist. 

He is running his agency based on science. And clearly, some powerful people don’t like his style. That is what I think it comes down 

to, and I would like to hear something about that shortly. 

After the accident at Fukushima, I sat down with Chairman 

Jaczko for more than an hour. I was impressed with the sharp 

focus in making sure our plants—and felt good about what was 

being done to make sure that our plants are safe and secure. In 

the months since that time, it seems to me he has done everything 

he can to move quickly to further improve our nuclear regulatory 

system. But that has meant taking on some entrenched and powerful interests. 

In July the NRC Near-Term Task Force proposed recommendations to improve nuclear safety after Fukushima. But the nuclear 

industry wants to delay or block some of the recommendations. According to a report released last week, even Chairman Jaczko’s fellow Commissioners tried to delay the creation of the Task Force, 

slowing down the release of those recommendations. 

But that wasn’t the first time the other members of the Commission conspired against safety measures. At least on eight occasions, 

the Chairman pursued safety improvements that were blocked by 

other Commissioners. Faced with delay tactics and other obstructions, Chairman Jaczko has used all of the legal tools available to 

him to improve nuclear safety, and it is no secret that nuclear comVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
10 

panies would rather have an NRC Chairman that lets industry 

write the rules. But that is not the way government is supposed 

to work. 

Make no mistake: after seeing the nuclear crisis that threatened 

Japan this year, the American people want to know that their Government is doing everything in its power as promptly as can be 

done to make sure that a nuclear nightmare doesn’t happen here. 

The American people want officials in Washington to stand up for 

them, not for the special interests. And in my belief, that is what 

Chairman Jaczko is doing. 

He served his country well, and I urge him to keep pushing forward. We need strong regulators who put the interest of the public 

above the interests of an industry and wake up every day looking 

for ways to make our country safer. Mr. Jaczko has committed to 

improving his work relationships with other Commissioners. And I 

hope that the NRC Commissioners will put this dispute behind 

them and get on with our tasks. Above all, our priority must be nuclear safety. 

The NRC’s Near-Term Task Force determined our country’s nuclear plants are safe. But a number of recommendations exist to 

make our plants safer. Our mission now must be to implement 

these recommendations quickly and completely. It is important to 

the people of New Jersey, my State, where four nuclear reactors 

provide our State with half of its electricity. In fact, one of the New 

Jersey reactors, the one located at Oyster Creek, is the nation’s oldest and shares the same design as the damaged reactors in Japan. 

In communities that are home to nuclear plants, people are 

counting on us to make sure that safety and security remain our 

highest priorities. And if there is a difference in style and demeanor, it seems to me that if that is the case, then perhaps we 

can air it in a private meeting, Madam Chairman. Let’s let it all 

hang out. 

I know one thing. I served in Europe in World War II. One of 

the most intemperate people that we had was General Patton. And 

guess what, he got it done. Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

And now we will turn to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

I don’t believe this is an issue, a disagreement over personality. 

I am confident that from what I have read in the record that the 

Chairman has violated the explicit rules of the Commission and 

has been abusive in his treatment of staff and other Commissioners. It is not safe to have a Chairman filter, screen, and alter 

reports. The Task Force that you have referred to is a task force 

he selected without the input of the other members and did not follow the procedures that the other members believed was appropriate. 

I strongly believe that the assumption of emergency powers after 

Fukushima was clearly in violation of law. I am looking at a letter 

and will offer for the record a letter written by Mr. Dale Klein, the 

former Chairman of this Commission, a Ph.D., he wrote that ‘‘I can 

11 

see no reason to invoke emergency powers, because nothing in the 

incident would have required a suspension of normal Commission 

procedures. More than that, I would say nothing in the incident 

would qualify legally, either.’’ 

But he goes on to say, ‘‘As I stated, I never declared emergency 

powers,’’ in the 4-years he was there, ‘‘and had I done so, I would 

have so stated in writing, would have called my fellow Commissioners and most importantly, solicited their support for my actions. Furthermore, I would have indicated when the authority was 

expected to end and would never have excluded my fellow Commissioners from the ops center as has been reported during the 

Fukushima event.’’ 

This is just unthinkable, Mr. Jaczko. This is why your Commissioners are concerned about your leadership. During the August 

hearing I asked Mr. Jaczko a series of questions about the emergency powers. I have since received a written report from Mr. 

Jaczko about his activities during that time. I find his report deficient. He did not answer the two most fundamental questions. One, 

why did he decide to exercise emergency power? Why did he feel 

like he couldn’t operate with the board in a normal way? The statute, section 3 of the 1980 Act, clearly states those powers are only 

available for an emergency ‘‘concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or regulated by the Commission.’’ Fukushima was 

not licensed nor regulated by the NRC. And he had no right, I believe, to execute those powers. 

And two, he did not address how he declared the use of powers. 

At our August 2nd meeting, Mr. Jaczko said a declaration was not 

necessary. He said it would just distract him from the work that 

he was doing. If you are going to take over and abrogate the responsibilities of the members of the Commission, I think the American public, talking about transparency, needs to know immediately 

that the normal procedures aren’t being followed. Beyond that, he 

provided only a brief report, just over 5 pages, and not the complete report of performance during the emergency declaration that 

is required. 

And the report was not timely. It was produced in September 

after we complained about it, and the emergency occurred in 

March. So his report does not set forth each action he took, or decision he made, pursuant to his assumed emergency powers, not 

even noticed to his fellow Commissioners. His report talks in vague 

generalities, and extraordinary use of emergency powers certainly 

would require a detailed explanation and report of the actions 

taken. 

It did not discuss the request for information that he and his 

staff received from the other Commissioners during this time—they 

requested information—or precisely how he sought to provide it. 

Commissioner Magwood clearly testified yesterday before the 

House that there have been situations where Mr. Jaczko failed to 

provide important information that Commissioners requested. The 

NRC’s executive director of operations also testified, ‘‘The Chairman influence the information and timing of information that is 

provided to the Commission.’’ 

Is that improving safety in America, that one man gets to decide 

what the duly lawfully constituted Commission receives as inforVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
12 

mation? This is in violation of section 2(c) of the Act that says, 

‘‘The Chairman shall be responsible for ensuring that the Commission is fully and currently informed about the matters within its 

functions.’’ 

If we don’t have that, if the Chairman is not willing to comply 

with that, he should not be Chairman. It is just that simple. It is 

logical, it is the right thing to do and it is required by explicit statutory acts. 

He has been an abusive person and created a workplace environment that has been very uneasy and troubling for a lot of people. 

I think that is an additional problem that we have here. So this 

behavior by the Chairman raises a high level of concern. I believe 

the testimony we hear today will show that to be the case. 

In any event, this is a sad commentary, and I am sorry we are 

having to have this hearing. I wish it were not so. It does seem to 

me, Madam Chairman, that from what I have seen, from the interviews conducted by the House staff, that virtually all the high level 

staff members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are very 

troubled by the leadership of the Chairman. 

I thank the Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Senator, I just want to make a couple of points. One is that this 

particular hearing was called well before any of this sniping began. 

And if you look at the title, it is Review the NRC’s Near-Term Task 

Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st 

Century. That is what this hearing is supposed to be about. 

But it is totally appropriate for people on both sides to comment 

on these other issues. I ask unanimous consent to place in the 

record two documents, one, the testimony of the General Counsel 

of the NRC, which refutes your claims, and second, the investigation by the Inspector General that refutes your charges as well, so 

that we will have what you said next to—let me just make that 

unanimous consent request, and then I will take yours. Is there objection? 

Hearing none. 

[The testimony of the General Counsel is unavailable for public 

review. The referenced information from the Inspector General follows:] 

13 


26661.001

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

OFFICE OF THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

MEMORANDUM TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555·0001 

June 6, 2011 

Chairman Jac:zko 

/~~.f~--.d 

Inspector 

HubertT. Bell 

General 

~ 

NRC CHAIRMAN'S UNILATERAL DECISION TO TERMINATE 

NRC'S REVIEW OF DOE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY 

LICENSE APPLICATION (OIG CASE NO. 11-05) 

This report conveys the results of an Office of the Inspector General (OIG), U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), investigation into an allegation that the NRC Chairman, Gregory 

Jaczko, unilaterally and improperly closed out the NRC's review of the Department of Energy's 

(DOE) Yucca Mountain repository license application while the Government was operating 

under a continuing resolution (CR) in iiscal year (FY) 2011. In addition, it was alleged that the 

Chairman was purposely preventing the Commission from completing its ruling on the Atomic 

Safety Licensing Board's (ASLB) decision to deny DOE's motion to withdraw its Yucca Mountain 

repository license application from NRC. During the course of this investigation, concerns were 

also raised about the Chairman's management style toward staff and Commissioners and 

whether his control of information prevents the other Commissioners from effectively fulfilling 

their statutory responsibility to address policy matters. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
14 


26661.002

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

OIG's investigation examined whether the Chairman exceeded his authority in directing the 

NRC staff to close out the Yucca Mountain license application review during the CR period, the 

Commission's adjudicatory voting process, and the impact the Chairman's management style 

has on the collegial functioning of the NRC Commission. The investigation findings appear in 

section Ill of this report. 

I. BACKGROUND 

NRC Mission and Commission Structure 

NRC was established in 197 4 to ensure the safe use of civilian nuclear materials in the United 

States. NRC's regulatory mission covers nuclear reactors, nuclear materials, and nuclear 

waste. NRC is an independent regulatory agency headed by a five-member Commission. The 

Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 5-year terms, 

and their terms are staggered so that one Commissioner's term expires on June 30 each year. 

One member is designated by the President to be the Chairman, and no more than three 

Commissioners may be from the same political party._ This report uses the term Chairman to 

refer to the Commissioner appointed as Chairman, the term Commissioner to refer to the other 

members of the Commission, and the term Commission to refer to the entire body 

(Commissioners plus Chairman). 

In 1979, 5 years after NRC's creation, the most serious nuclear accident in U.S. history 

occurred at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. After the accident, 

President Jimmy Carter established the Kemeny Commission to examine and assess the 

events that led to the accident In addition, NRC organized its own review, known as the 

Rogovin study. Both the Kemeny Commission and Rogovin study recommended that a single 

administrator should head NRC. However, President Carter decided to maintain a Commission 

structure, and he submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 (Reorganization Plan) to 

Congress with the intent to 

... improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by giving the 

Chairman the powers he needs to ensure efficient and coherent management in a 

manner that preserves, in fact enhances, the commission form of organization. 1 

President Carter's main goals were to strengthen the Chairman's role to clarify where agency 

responsibility resided while retaining the diversity that a commission form of organization offers. 

On October 1, 1980, the Reorganization Plan, as amended, became effective. The 

Reorganization Plan is the statutory guidance by which the Commission operates. The plan 

articulates the role of the Chairman as it relates to executive powers and the Commissioners as 

1 This statement was made by President Carter when he presented the Reorganization Plan to Congress on March 

27, 1980. 

2 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
15 


26661.003

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

it relates to their policy role. Thus, the Commission's interpretation and implementation of the 

plan helps set the tone for how well the Commission members work together in a collegial 

fashion. 

Section 1 of the Reorganization Plan establishes the Commission's functions and the 

Chairman's functions. It designates the Commission as responsible for (1) policy formulation, 

(2) rulemaking, and (3) orders and adjudications. It also provides that at any time, the 

Commission may "determine by majority vote, in an area of doubt, whether any matter, action, 

question or area of inquiry pertains to one of these functions." 

Section 2 of the Reorganization Plan assigns the Chairman responsibility for all other functions, 

including (1) serving as official Commission spokesman, (2) serving as the Commission's 

principal executive officer responsible for developing policy planning and guidance for 

consideration by the Commission, (3) administrative functions of the Commission, (4) 

distribution of business among the offices of the Commission, (5) preparation of the 

Commission's budget estimate, and (6) the proposed distribution of appropriated funds 

according to major programs and purposes. The Reorganization Plan states that the Chairman 

determines the use and expenditure of funds of the Commission, "in accordance with the 

distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes approved by the 

Commission." 

The plan also states that the Chairman and the Executive Director for Operations (EDO), who 

reports to the Chairman, are responsible for insuring the Commission is fully and currently 

informed about matters within its functions. 

NRC's Internal Commission Procedures reiterate the Reorganization Plan provisions concerning 

the role of the Commission as a whole and the Chairman's individual role. The procedures 

state that each Commissioner, including the Chairman, has equal responsibility and authority in 

all Commission decisions and actions, has full and equal access to information pertaining to 

Commission responsibilities, and has one vote. The procedures note that one of the 

Commission's collegial functions is revision of budget estimates and determining the distribution 

of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes. 

The procedures also reiterate the Reorganization Plan's provision that the Commission may 

determine by majority vote, in any area of doubt, whether any matter, action, question, or area 

of inquiry pertains to policy formulation or any of the Commission's functions. OIG teamed-that 

Commissioners use a written form of communication, referred to as a Commission action 

memorandum (COM), to seek votes from the other Commissioners to determine whether a 

matter falls into the Commission's purview as opposed to that of the Chairman. A majority vote 

by the Commission is needed for them to address the matter as policy. 

3 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
16 


26661.004

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

In December 1999, OIG issued a report, Special Evaluation of the Role and Structure of NRC's 

Commission (OIG-99-E-09}, which identified that Commission members, from time to time, have 

different interpretations of the Reorganization Plan, which can adversely affect the 

Commission's collegiality.' 

Chairman Jaczko has been a Commissioner since January 2005 and Chairman since 

May 2009. His term runs through June 2013. 

U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy 

The current U.S. policy governing permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

radioactive waste is defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), 

and the Energy Policy Act of 1992. These acts specify that spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

radioactive waste will be disposed of underground, in a deep geologic repository. The NWPA 

names Yucca Mountain, a high ridge in the Nevada desert approximately 100 miles northwest of 

Las Vegas, as the single candidate site for this potential geologic repository. The NWPA 

specifically states that NRC "shall consider an application for a construction authorization for a 

repository" and "shall issue a final decision approving or disapproving the issuance of a 

construction authorization not later than 3 years after" the application is submitted. 

DOE, which is charged with constructing and operating the repository, submitted its license 

application for a repository to hold no more than 70,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste to NRC on June 3, 2008, and NRC formally accepted it for review in 

September 2008. NRC published its Notice of Hearing in the Federal Register on October 22, 

2008, starting the 3-year schedule set by Congress for NRC to reach a decision on whether to 

approve construction. If necessary, NRC may give notice to Congress of the need for an 

additional year to complete the review. 

NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel3 (ASLBP) is responsible for conducting 

hearings on a variety of legal and technical contentions regarding the Yucca Mountain license 

application. 

2 The special evaluation defined collegiality as the relationship between a group of associates or coworkers. 

where authority is vested in all of the members, as they work towards a common duty or role. The full report and 

NRC's response to the report may be accessed at b!lp:/twww nrc.gov/reading-rrn/doc-collectionsflnsp-gen/2000/. 

' The panel conducts all licensing and other hearings as directed by the Commission, primarily through individual 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (ASLBs) or single presiding officers appointed by either the Commission or the 

Chief Administrative Judge. The panel, which has no fixed number of positions, is composed of (1) administrative 

judges (full-time and part-time), who are lawyers, engineers, and scientists, and (2) administrative law judges (ALJs) 

who are lawyers. Administrative judges and ALJs serve as single presiding officers or on three-member boards, 

which generally are chaired by a lawyer, for a broad range of proceedings. 

4 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
17 


26661.005

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Continuing Resolutions (CR) 

A CR is a law that provides funding for Federal agencies, specific activities, or both to continue 

in operation when Congress and the President have not completed action on the regular 

appropriation acts by the beginning of the fiscal year. For the most part, CRs are temporary and 

intended by Congress to be stop-gap measures enacted to keep existing Federal programs 

functioning after the expiration of previous budget authority and until regular appropriation acts 

can be enacted. Unlike regular appropriation acts, CRs typically do not appropriate specified 

sums of money. Instead, they usually appropriate "such amounts as may be necessary'' for 

continuing projects or activities at a certain "rate for operations." An agency may determine the 

pattern of its obligations under a CR provided it operates under a plan that will keep it within the 

rate for operations limit set by the resolution. 

Office of Management and Budget (OMS) Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, and 

Execution of the Budget, provides guidance on operating under a CR. According to OMS 

Circular A-11, agencies should carefully review each CR to determine the formula provided and 

should keep in mind that the amount available under a CR is the product of negotiations among 

the various factions in Congress and the Administration. OMS Circular A-11 notes that 

agencies may not obligate funds under a CR that would impinge on final funding prerogatives of 

Congress. It also states that CRs usually include provisions directing agencies to execute 

programs using the most limited funding actions permitted in order to provide for continuing 

projects and activities. 

The Comptrdller General, head of the Government Accountability Office, has the legal authority 

to issue decisions and opinions on appropriations law. 

Chronology of Events 

In September 2008, NRC formally accepted DOE's license application to build a geologic 

repository at Yucca Mountain and embarked on its review process. According to the NWPA, 

NRC was to reach a decision concerning the viability of the site within 3 years of the license 

application acceptance date.• 

NRC planned, at the end of its technical review, to issue a safety evaluation report (SER) 

containing its findings on the repository design.5 The SER would determine whether the 

proposed facility would meet NRC regulations to protect public health and safety. NRC staff 

responsible for developing the SER decided to issue the SER in five volumes, and estimated• 

that Volume 1 (General Information) would be complete in August 2010, Volume 3 (Review of 

4 The NWPA additionally allows the NRC to extend the 3-year deadline by not more than 1 year. 

5 An SER summarizes the NRC staffs technical review and safety evaluation related to the anticipated effect of a 

proposed license application or licensing action on public health and safety. 

8 Dates reflect !he NRC staffs last official estimate, announced in March 2010. 

5 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
18 


26661.006

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Repository Safety After Permanent Closure) in November 2010, Volume 4 (Review of 

Administrative and Programmatic Requirements) in January 2011, and Volume 2 (Review of 

Repository Safety Before Permanent Closure) and Volume 5 (License Specifications and 

Conditions) in March 2011. 

On February 2, 2010, Energy Secretary Steven Chu noted during a Senate hearing that 

President Barack Obama's Administration would seek to immediately suspend licensing for the 

Yucca Mountain repository because it was "not a workable option." DOE's budget proposed 

zero funding for the project in FY 2011, which conveyed the Administration's intent to terminate 

the Yucca Mountain project. 

In February 2010, NRC published its FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, which also 

conveyed the Administration's intent concerning Yucca Mountain, stating: 

The Administration has indicated that it does not support developing a repository at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Consistent with that position, DOE may submit to the NRC a 

motion to withdraw or suspend its Yucca Mountain license application during FY 2010. 

The NRC Budget reflectsihat possibility. Upon the withdrawal or suspension of the 

licensing review, the NRC would begin an orderly closure of the technical review and 

adjudicatory activities and would document the work and insights gained from the 

review. 

NRC's FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification allotted $10 million for the Yucca Mountain 

repository to ·support work related to the orderly closure of the agency's Yucca Mountain 

licensing support activities." This amount was $19 million less than the $29 million appropriated 

for license application review activities in FY 2010. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted to the ASLB a motion to withdraw its Yucca Mountain license 

application. On June 29, 2010, the ASLB issued a decision that denied DOE's motion to 

withdraw, concluding that DOE lacks the authority to seek to withdraw the application. The 

ASLB grounded its decision in its interpretation of the NWPA, reasoning that Congress directed 

DOE to file the application and the NRC to consider the application and issue a final, meritsbased "decision approving or disapproving. 

On June 30, 2010, the Commission issued an order inviting hearing participants to file briefs as 

to whether the Commission should review, and reverse or uphold, the ASLB's decision, thus 

signifying the Commission's decision to review the ASLB's decision. 

6 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
19 


26661.007

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

On August 10, 2010, in accordance with NRC's process, the Office of Commission Appellate 

Adjudication (OCAAf submitted adjudicatory paper SECY-1 0...01 02, "U.S. Department of 

Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), Review of LBP-10-11, Docket No. 63-001-HLW,' to the 

Commission for its review and vote. Commissioners began casting their votes on 

SECY-10-0102 on August 25, 2010, and a majority of Commissioners had voted by September 

15, 2010. Chainnan Jaczko did not cast his final vote at that time. 

On September 30, 2010, Congress issued the first in a series of CRs, directing Federal 

agencies generally to spend money at FY 2010 levels, as necessary, to continue projects and 

activities that were conducted during FY 201 0. 

On October 4, 2010, the NRC Chief Financial OfFicer (CFO) and the EDO issued guidance to 

NRC stafF related to budget execution under the CR. The memorandum stated that offices were 

to commit, obligate, and expend funds for ongoing activities at FY 2010 levels, with the 

exception of the High-Level Waste Program. The memorandum stated that during the CR 

period, new work that was not authorized and funded in FY 2010 should not be started in 

FY 2011. With regard to the High-Level Waste Program, the memorandum directed staff to 

continue its activities on the Yucca Mountain license application in accordance with the 

Commission's decisions on the FY 2011 budget using available Nuclear Waste Fund resources 

during the CR period. 

In early October 2010, Chainnan Jaczko directed NRC staff working on the Yucca Mountain 

license application review to stop working on Volume 3 of the SER and proceed to orderly 

closure of the technical review. 

On October 29, 2010, Chainnan Jaczko voted on SECY-10-0102, completing the Commission's 

notational voting process on the Yucca Mountain matter; however, as of the date of this report, 

the Commission has not held an affinnation vote on the matter and the draft order continues to 

sit in deliberation before the Commission for affirmation. 

II. INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS 

A. DIG Review of CR Issue 

OIG teamed that the language in the EDO's and CFO's October 4, 2010, CR budget guidance 

memorandum directing stafF to follow FY 2011 budget guidance for High-Level Waste Program 

activities was based on instruction provided by the Chainnan's office and was used by the 

Chainnan to stop work on the SER and NRC's Yucca Mountain license application review. 

7 OCAA assists the Commission in its adjudicatory functions including the resolution of appeals 

from decisions of ASLBs; assistance includes analysis of adjudicatory matters and preparation of 

adjudicatory decisions consistent with Commission policy and guidance. 

7 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
20 


26661.008

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

While the Chairman told NRC senior officials that the CR budget guidance memorandum 

language had been reviewed and agreed to by his fellow Commissioners, one Commissioner 

was not informed of the language, two were provided some information but did not recognize 

the impact the memorandum would have on the SER, and one Commissioner disagreed with 

the language because he recognized the impact it would have on the SER. 

Furthermore, while all of the NRC Commissioners in February 2010 (Chairman Jaczko, 

Commissioner Kristine Svinicki, and former Chairman Dale Klein) agreed to the agency's 

FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, which specified criteria that needed to be met 

before the license application review process could be shut down, there is disagreement among 

current Commissioners and a former Chairman and agency officials as to (a) whether these 

criteria were met and (b) the Chairman's shutdown approach. 

NRC's Budgets for the High-Level Waste Repository Program 

NRC's budget documents reflect a significant funding reduction for the High-Level Waste 

Program between FY 2010 and FY 2011 and elimination of the program by FY 2012. OIG 

learned that each NRC budget proposal and subsequent passback appeal letter' to OMB for 

increased funding was voted on and approved by the Commission, although the Commission 

composition was different for each year. 

The Commission's FY 2010 performance budget request- which was voted on and approved 

by former Chairman Klein, then Commissioners Jaczko and Peter Lyons, and Commissioner 

Svinicki- sought $99.1 million for the program to support two concurrent processes associated 

with the "ongoing license review": (1) assess the technical merits of the repository design, and 

(2) support the adjudicatory hearing before the NRC ASLB convened to hear the technical and 

legal challenges posed by parties to the DOE license application. Subsequently, Congress 

appropriated $29 million to NRC for the High-Level Waste Program. 

For FY 2011, the Commission (Chairman Jaczko, Commissioner Svinicki, and then 

Commissioner Klein) requested $39.5 million to support the High-Level Waste Program. OMB 

responded with $10 million for the program. In December 2009, Chairman Jaczko sent NRC's 

FY 2011 passback letter of appeal to OMB. This letter, which had been approved by the 

Commission, stated that DOE: 

... is expected to submit to the NRC a motion to withdraw or suspend its Yucca 

Mountain license application before the end of FY 2010. Assuming this scenario, the 

$10 million provided in the FY 2011 pass-back would allow for us to start the process for 

an orderly disposition of the adjudicatory and technical review activities. Additional 

resources may be needed for an orderly disposition of activities beyond FY 2011, the 

amount dependent upon the timing of the motion. 

8 The passback appeal letter is also referred to as the reclama letter. 

8 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
21 


26661.009

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

NRC's FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, published in February 2010 after 

Commission approval, also referenced the possibility that DOE woula move to suspend or 

withdraw its license application and noted: 

Upon the withdrawal or suspension of the licensing review, the NRC would begin an 

orderly closure of the technical review and adjudicatory activities and would document 

the work and insights gained from the review. 

Although this document also stated that NRC had requested $10 million, including 32 FTE, to 

provide for licensing activities, the only activities described were those related to the orderly 

closure of the agency's Yucca Mountain licensing support activities. 

OIG noted differences between NRC's December 2009 passback letter of .appeal and the 

February 2010 Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2011 with regard to (1) proposed 

activities and (2) prerequisites to trigger those activities. While the NRC pass back appeal letter 

states that orderly disposition of the adjudicatory and technical review activities would be based 

upon a motion to withdraw or suspend, the Congressional Budget Justification states the orderly 

closure of the technical review and adjudicatory activities would be based on withdrawal or 

suspension of the licensing review. 

For FY 2012, the Commission (Chairman Jaczko and Commissioners Svinicki, William 

Ostendorff, William Magwood, and George Apostolakis) requested $4.0 million for the 

termination of all program activities. OMS, however, allocated no money to NRC for the HighLevel Waste Program, which is reflected in NRC's FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification. 

CR Budget Guidance Memorandum 

OIG reviewed the EDO's and CFO's October 4, 2010, CR budget guidance memorandum and 

four earlier versions that predated the final document. The final October 4, 2010 memorandum 

stated that NRC's FY 2011 budget request sustains agency programs at about the same level 

as FY 201 0, with the exception of the High-Level Waste Program and that offices should 

therefore proceed to commit, obligate, and expend funds for ongoing activities to effectively use 

available resources during the CR. The memorandum specified that, "During the CR period, 

new work that was not authorized and funded in FY 2010 should not be started in FY 2011." It 

also provided: 

With respect to the High-Level Waste Program, the CR legislation does not include 

specific restrictions on spending funds. Therefore, the staff should continue its activities 

on the Yucca Mountain license application in accordance with the Commission's 

decisions on the FY 2011 budget using available Nuclear Waste Fund resources during 

the CR. 

9 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
22 


26661.010

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

The first version of this memorandum- dated August 31, 2010, contained no mention of the 

Yucca Mountain repository license application review. Two later versions (dated September 13 

and September 14, 2010) directed that the agency would continue to conduct its Yucca 

Mountain license application review with any available FY 2010 carryover funds until exhausted, 

and made no reference to the FY 2011 budget. The first version reviewed by OIG that made 

mention of the FY 2011 budget was dated September 27,2010. This version directed staff to 

continue its activities on Yucca Mountain in accordance with the FY 2011 budget. 

Commissioner Ostendorff's COM 

OIG reviewed a COM prepared by Commissioner Ostendorff, titled, "Commission Direction on 

Staff Budget Guidance Under Fiscal Year (FY) Continuing Resolution." This document was 

submitted by Commissioner Ostendorff to the other Commissioners on October 6, 2010, in 

response to·the CR budget guidance memorandum sent from the EDO and CFO to the staff on 

October 4, 2010. The COM states that the direction given to staff in the October 4, 2010 

memorandum to continue its Yucca Mountain activities in accordance with FY 2011 budget 

guidance "is a significant policy matter that I believe warrants the Commission's attention, and 

which requires that the Commission give direction to the staff to avoid confusion on the 

Commission's intent for operation under the Continuing Resolution." Commissioner Ostendorff 

referred to a March 30, 2010 memorandum titled, "Plans for the High-Level Waste Repository 

Program," from the EDO to the Commission that conveyed the staff's intent to complete SER 

Volumes 1 and 3 no later than August and November 2010, respectively, and the staff's plan to 

continue to work on any remaining SER volumes until FY 2010 funds were exhausted. 

Commissioner Ostendorff said that the March 30, 2010 memorandum was provided to the 

Commission in the context of both the FY 2010 appropriation and the FY 2011 budget request 

and must, therefore, continue as standing guidance to staff. 

Commissioner Ostendorff wrote, "It is my view that whatever the ultimate disposition of the 

High-Level Waste Repository activity, complete SER documents are the best and most 

appropriate way in which to memorialize the Staff's work product." He proposed that the 

Commission take action no later than October 8, 2010, to direct staff to continue to work on the 

remaining SER volumes as stated in the March 30, 2010 memorandum, at the rate for 

operations appropriate given the proposed FY 2011 budget as augmented by reprogrammed 

funds remaining from FY 2010 appropriations. 

Memo from NRC General Counsel Regarding CR Budget Guidance Memorandum 

OIG also reviewed an October 15, 2010 memorandum from NRC's General Counsel to the 

Chairman and Commissioners, providing the General Counsel's views regarding the October 4, 

2010 CR budget guidance memorandum. The General Counsel concluded in the memorandum 

that focusing the agency's High-Level Waste Program activities during the CR period on 

activities related to the orderly closure of the Yucca Mountain review does not violate legal 

requirements or the principles of appropriations law. According to the General Counsel, the 

agency's guidance was appropriate for the following reasons: 

10 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
23 


26661.011

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

• The agency's proposed expenditures during the CR are consistent with the terms of the CR 

because they support and are within the scope of the continuing projects or activities 

conducted in the prior fiscal year; unless the CR contains more specific language, the 

phrase "projects or activities" generally refers to the total appropriation for the account, not 

to the specific activities contained as activities in a budget submission or committee report. 

While the Yucca Mountain license application may be on a different trajectory than in early 

fiscal years, it cannot be said that the agency is spending its High-Level Waste Program 

funds under the CR in a manner unrelated to its Yucca Mountain repository review or 

contrary to the express direction in the pertinent legislation. Even if activities under the 

EDO/CFO's guidance are of a more limited scope than in the previous fiscal year, it does not 

appear that such activities would irreversibly compromise or preclude NRC's ability to 

engage in a license application review if Congress were to increase NRC's High-Level 

Waste Program budget and direct a revival of the Yucca Mountain repository review. 

• Agencies are directed to act prudently in expending funds under a CR so as not to impinge 

on the final funding prerogatives of Congress. NRC requested an appropriation from the 

Nuclear Waste Fund for FY 2011 of $10 million, or about one-third of the FY 2010 

appropriation, and there was no indication from the Senate or House that the FY 2011 

budget would be increased. 

The General Counsel's memorandum also noted that there had also been some internal debate 

over whether final NRC action penmitting DOE to withdraw its application is a condition 

precedent to the orderly closure activities under the FY 2011 guidance reflected in the 

Commission's Congressional Budget Justification. Addressing this matter, the General Counsel 

wrote, "Considering the entire text of the NRC budget document and the context in which it was 

submitted, I do not believe such a conclusion necessarily follows." 

DIG Interviews of Agency Officials Related to CR Issue 

Interviews of NMSS, OEDO and OCFO Officials 

OIG learned, through interviews with Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), 

Office of the Executive Director for Operations (OEDO), and Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

(OCFO) officials, that during the summer of 2010, NRC managers responsible for NRC's HighLevel Waste Program anticipated there would be about $7 million in high-level waste funding left 

over (carryover) at the end of FY 2010. The managers were interested in seeking Commission 

feedback about what to do with the carryover funding in FY 2011, given that FY 2010 HighLevel Waste Program funding was for licensing review and FY 2011 High-Level Waste Program 

funding was for orderly shutdown of the High-Level Waste Program. Because a Commission 

decision was still pending concerning ASLB's denial of DOE's motion to withdraw its license 

application, the managers sought Commission feedback about how to proceed with the 

licensing review. 

11 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
24 


26661.012

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

OIG learned that the NMSS Director initially sought to write a paper for Commission review 

concerning the staffs plans for the carryover money; however, a decision was made instead to 

inform the Commission of the staffs plans via a CR budget guidance memorandum issued to 

staff from the EDO and CFO giving guidance on how to canry out programs and activities during 

the CR period. The Deputy Executive Director (DEDO) for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal 

and Compliance Programs initially proposed that the CR budget guidance memorandum direct 

High-Level Waste Program staff to use FY 2010 funds until they were exhausted to continue 

the license application review; language to this effect was included in early versions of the CR 

budget guidance memorandum. However, the Chairman's office asked to review the draft 

memorandum and subsequently provided direction to OEDO staff and the CFO that resulted in 

the official memorandum, issued on October 4, 2010, directing staff to continue its activities on 

the Yucca Mountain license application in accordance with the Commission's decisions on the 

FY 2011 budget. 

Interview of NMSS Director 

The NMSS Director9 told OIG that she had written a memorandum that she planned to present 

to the Commission in September .2010 conveying the staffs intent to complete Volume 3 of the 

SER with the remaining FY 2010 funding and the remaining SER volumes no later than the 2nd 

quarter of FY 2011 provided the availability of resources and the agency had not terminated the 

license application review. However, the DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal and 

Compliance Programs told her they did not need the memorandum and would handle the issue 

through guidance in the CR budget guidance memorandum. The DEDO initially told the NMSS 

Director that the CR guidance would be to use FY 2010 and FY 2011 funds to continue the 

review. However, the NM SS Director later learned that the direction from the Chairman was -to 

transition to closure upon entering the new fiscal year. The NMSS Director was concerned 

about whether the agency could use the FY 2010 canryover- which had been appropriated for 

license review- during FY 2011 for close-out activities. 

Interview of DEDO for Materials, Waste. Research. Tribal and Compliance Programs 

The DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal and Compliance Programs told OIG that in 

the absence of a Commission decision on the ASLB adjudicatory matter, he and the NMSS 

Director recognized the need to communicate to the Commission, and that the Commission 

needed to provide direction for the High-Level Waste Program. The DEDO told the NMSS 

Director he would rather communicate through the CR budget guidance memorandum than a 

paper because it would yield a quicker response. He thought that due to the diversity of views 

on the Commission, a memorandum simply to inform them would promptly be converted into a 

vote, and it was unlikely they would reach a decision within a month. The DEDO wanted to 

convey in the CR budget guidance memorandum that the staff would use FY 2010 carryover 

funds in FY 2011, which would yield a net of$17 million ($10 million from the FY 2011 budget 

9 The NMSS Director began wor1<ing in that position in May 2010. Prior to that, she was the Deputy Director for 

NMSS, and the DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal and Compliance Programs was the NMSS Director. 

12 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
25 


26661.013

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

and $7 million in FY 2010 carryover funds) to move ahead with license application review 

activities until they had a final decision from the Commission. This was the language the DEDO 

originally inserted into early draft versions of the CR budget guidance memorandum. However, 

after the CFO shared the memorandum with the Chairman's office, the Chairman's Policy 

Director said she thought the Chairman would not want this type of language in the 

memorandum because it would constitute a change in policy. The DEDO said he had not 

previously viewed the language in that way, but the Chairman's Policy Director conveyed that 

when the Commission last addressed the issue in the FY 2011 Congressional Budget 

Justification, the language was to close out the program. 

The DEDO said OEDO and OCFO staff subsequently worked with the Chairman's office to 

revise the language to reflect something like, " ... should continue to follow the established 

Commission policy." He thought the language ultimately used in the memorandum seemed 

.innocuous and did not indicate specifically that this meant 'close down the licensing process 

and commence the orderly closure of the program." He asked the Chairman's Policy Director 

why not be more explicit in the CR budget guidance memorandum to reflect what was intended, 

and the Chairman's Policy Director told him it was unnecessary because the CR budget 

guidance memorandum was pointing to the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, which 

already captured the intent in writing. The DEDO said he questioned both the .Chairman's 

Policy Director and the Chairman's Chief of Staff as to whether people would understand the 

connection. The DEDO told them the Congressional Budget Justification paragraph on the 

High-Level Waste Program could be read as 'entry conditions," providing that until the agency 

allowed 'withdrawal or suspension," it should continue the license application review. The 

Chairman's Policy Director and Chief of Staff responded that this was incorrect and that the 

budget justification language was background and set the context for the status of the program. 

They said the program's status was described in the workload paragraph of the Congressional 

Budget Justification, which reflects what the agency is going to use its resources and funding 

for. In this case, they said, this was closing down the program. 

The DEDO also said the Chairman's Chief of Staff told him that in anticipating the potential 

controversy that would ensue with the implementation of the CR budget guidance 

memorandum, the Chairman had consulted with the other Commissioners and that at least a 

majority of the Commission was supportive of moving forward with the orderly closure of the 

High-Level Waste Program. The DEDO also recalled a meeting with the Chairman during which 

the Chairman stated he would complete discussions with the other Commissioners before the 

end of September 2010, and then NRC would initiate an orderly closure of the High-Level 

Waste Program. 

Interview of the CFO 

The CFO told OIG that in August 2010 the staff began generating variations of the CR budget 

guidance memorandum. At one point, they were prepared to issue the memorandum at which 

time the Chairman asked to see it. Up until then, his office had not received any direction from 

the Chairman's office on the memorandum, and the CFO thought the Chairman just wanted to 

13 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
26 


26661.014

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

be informed about the document. He said that the Chairman's Policy Director e-m ailed him the 

paragraph on the High-Level Waste Program and he directed his staff to insert the language 

into the memorandum. He recalled that just before one of the Chairman's regularly scheduled 

meetings, the Chairman called the CFO, the General Counsel, and the EDO into his office and 

asked whether they were "all okay with this memorandum." The CFO said the Chairman said, 

"I'm going to talk to my other Commissioners, but I think there's a good chance that this might 

turn into a vote on Yucca Mountain." The CFO said he did not understand how the 

memorandum could tum into a vote on Yucca Mountain because, in his view, the memorandum 

was a financial budget execution memorandum and not intended to redirect the staff 

programmatically. He said he was surprised at the interpretation by the Commission that the 

memorandum was providing programmatic direction. The CFO recalled that on October 1, 

2010, Commissioner Ostendorff's Chief of Staff called him at home to tell him he had spoken 

with the Chairman's Chief of staff about the CR budget guidance memorandum and had 

problems with the paragraph concerning high-level waste. Later that evening, the Chairman's 

Chief of Staff called him at home and said the Chairman's office had clearance on all of the 

Commission offices to sign out the memorandum. The CFO said that after the issuance of the 

CR memorandum and the direction to initiate High-Level Waste Program close-out activities, he 

asked the Chairman if he had missed something during the meeting with the General Counsel 

and EDO. The Chairman explained that his intent was that the memorandum would result in a 

change in direction for the staff and they were going to go from issuing an SER to a NUREG.10 

The CFO later asked the Chairman's Policy Director whether the conditions regarding 

withdrawal or suspension reflected in the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification had been 

met. She replied that the conditions were met when DOE submitted its motion to withdraw its 

license application. 

Interview of the EDO 

The EDO said that initially there was no plan to include specific language about the High-Level 

Waste Program in the CR budget guidance memorandum. At the same time, he said, given the 

Administration's direction to withdraw DOE's Yucca Mountain license application, the staff 

understood the High-Level Waste Program was on a path to closure. The DEDO for Materials, 

Waste, Research, Tribal and Compliance Programs and he had asked to prepare a paper for 

the Commission describing how the staff would go about close-out and how much funding 

would be needed. The staff's intent was to use the $7 million in carryover funds for continuation 

of the technical review and the $10 million proposed for the FY 2011 budget for close-out 

activities. The EDO said that one of his primary responsibilities as EDO is to ensure the entire 

Commission is kept informed, and that a staff paper on the close-out plan would serve to inform 

the Commission and seek its input on the matter, which he felt was necessary. The EDO said 

the staff had never prepared any papers for the Commission discussing plans for the closure of 

the High-Level Waste Program in part because the NWPA required NRC to perform a quality 

10NRC NUREG documents communicate various types of information, including support for regulatory 

decisions, guidance for complying with regulations, results of task force investigations, results of 

contractor research programs, resolution of generic safety issues, and proceedings of conferences and 

workshops, 

14 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
27 


26661.015

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

review in a timely manner. According to the EDO, his mindset and that of the staff was to 

accomplish as much of the technical review as they could. He and the NMSS staff believed 

that even if DOE were to withdraw the application, or the facility was not permitted to operate, it 

would benefit the country for NRC to have completed the technical review. Furthermore, he felt 

that because there had not been a Commission decision on DOE's withdrawal request, they 

should continue the technical review. However, over a period of weeks and months and 

interaction with the Chainman's office, they received direction from the Chainman to address the 

High-Level Waste Program in the CR budget guidance memorandum. The EDO said he 

understood that the Chairman's intent, prior to issuance of the CR budget guidance 

memorandum, was to close out the license application review process. 

The EDO thought it would be okay to address the issue in the CR budget guidance 

memorandum because ~e believed the entire Commission would review the CR budget 

guidance memorandum. He thought the CR budget guidance memorandum would accomplish 

what needed to be done with regard to the High-Level Waste Program absent a paper from the 

staff. He believed that if the Commissioners decided the matter was a policy issue, they could 

vote on it. He said he expressed his concerns to1he Chairman that the Commission needed to 

see the memorandum, and the Chairman told him the memorandum would not be issued until 

he had spoken with the other Commissioners and all were on board with the memorandum 

language. Prior to the EDO and CFO signing the memorandum, the Chainman told the EDO 

that all four Commissioners were in agreement with the language, understood that they were 

going to close out the High-Level Waste Program, and authorized the issuance of the CR 

budget guidance memorandum. The EDO anticipated that the contentious issue for the 

Commission would be whether they would close out or continue the technical review. The CR 

budget guidance memorandum did not provide any direction on the issue, so the EDO felt it was 

okay to sign because on face value, it did not provide questionable direction. 

Interview of Commissioner Apostolakis 

Commissioner Apostolakis told OIG that before the October4, 2010 CR budget guidance 

memorandum was issued to the NRC staff, Chairman Jaczko advised him that he was prepared 

to aU1horize budget guidance under the CR process and wanted his support. During this 

conversation, which occurred on September 30, 2010, Chairman Jaczko asked Commissioner 

Apostolakis whether he would support him if a Commissioner challenged the CR guidance. 

Chairman Jaczko assured Commissioner Apostolakis that OGC advised him the planned CR 

guidance was appropriate. Chainman Jaczko requested that he respond to his question that 

same day. Commissioner Apostolakis told the Chainman that he did not see a problem but 

wanted to discuss the matter with his staff. Commissioner Aposto!akis told OIG that the CR 

guidance to the staff to follow the Commission's FY 2011 budget direction subject to funding 

conditions under the CR seemed innocuous. His understanding of a CR was that the agency 

would continue ongoing work from the previous year. 

15 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
28 


26661.016

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Following the September 30, 2010 discussion with Chairman Jaczko, Commissioner 

Apostolakis' staff received a copy of the paragraph that discussed the High-Level Waste 

Program in the CR budget guidance memorandum. He recalled that his staff showed him 

language from the Commission's FY 2011 budget request, which stated that the orderly 

transition would begin upon withdrawal of the license application or suspension of the licensing 

review. Commissioner Apostolakis advised that although Chairman Jaczko said he would ask 

the staff to conduct activities in accordance with the FY 2011 budget, this is not what he did. 

Commissioner Apostolakis stated that the FY 2011 budget reflected that if the proceedings were 

suspended, then the agency would proceed with close-out of the license application review. 

However, the proceedings were not suspended. The Chairman ignored the portion of the 

budget which referenced upon withdrawal or suspension and directed the staff to close out the 

High-Level Waste Program. Commissioner Apostolakis stated that Chairman Jaczko did not 

explain to him what the CR guidance would mean in practice. 

Commissioner Apostolakis said that he did not know from his initial discussion with Chairman 

Jaczko that the likely effect of the October 4, 2010 CR guidance was that SER Volume 3 would 

not be issued in November 2010 as originally scheduled. Members of his staff raised the 

prospect that the NRC staff would not complete SER Volume 3 and would work to incorporate 

Volume 3 in a NUREG report. He did not know what work was required to complete Volume 3. 

During the week of October 4, 2010, Chairman Jaczko sought Commissioner Apostolakis' 

support in opposing any challenge to the CR budget guidance memorandum based on 

Commissioner Ostendorff's October 6, 2010 COM. Commissioner Apostolakis told Chairman 

Jaczko he did not provide him with details of the practical impact of the CR guidance when the 

Chairman originally requested his support. Commissioner Apostolakis was concerned about 

preserving the staff's work product and he wanted the Commission to see the staff's plan for 

implementing the October 4, 2010 CR memorandum guidance. The Chairman told him that 

preserving the staff's work products, such as the draft SER Volume 3, in the internal agency 

records would not be a problem. However, the Chairman did not want to include regulatory 

conclusions in any public release of Volume 3. 

During the week of October 4, 201 0, Commissioner Apostolakis also discussed issues related to 

the budget guidance and Commissioner Ostendorff's COM with the Chairman and 

Commissioner Magwood. On October 7, 2010, Commissioner Apostolakis learned of a petition 

filed with the NRC Commission on behalf of Aiken County, SC, and the States of South Carolina 

and Washington, raising issues about the budget guidance and its relation to the adjudicatory 

High- Level Waste proceedings, from which he had recused himself. Based upon this action he 

decided he would not participate in voting on Commissioner Ostendorff's COM. 

Interview of Commissioner Magwood 

Commissioner Magwood told OIG that on September 28, 2010, during a regularly scheduled 

periodic meeting with Chairman Jaczko, the Chairman informed him that the NRC staff was 

developing a plan for operating under the CR passed by Congress and that this plan would 

16 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY -OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
29 


26661.017

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

move toward close-out of the High-Level Waste Program as anticipated by the Commission in 

the FY 2011 budget. According to Commissioner Magwood, the Chainnan said that the NRC 

staff drafted language regarding the High-Level Waste Program and the Chairman asked if he 

would review the language and let him know if he had any objection. Commissioner Magwood 

told the Chainnan that it would be appropriate to formulate a plan for moving forward and that 

he would review the draft guidance. He also told the Chairman that he would not support a 

"precipitous" tennination of the High-Level Waste Program. According to Commissioner 

Magwood, the Chairman assured him that1his was not his expectation. 

Commissioner Magwood told OIG that his staff reviewed the draft language on the High-Level 

Waste Program and compared it to the FY 2010 budget and FY 2011 guidance. His staff 

concluded that the language, which indicated that the staff should begin implementing the 

FY 2011 plan as reflected in the agency's Congressional Budget .Justification, was consistent 

with both Commission policy and Congressional actions to date. Commissioner Magwood said 

he thought it prudent to ensure that the NRC's rate of expenditures on the High-Level Waste 

Program remained within the $10-million ceiling. He instructed his staff to inform the 

Chairman's office that he would not object to the instruction in the draft CR budget guidance 

memorandum. 

Commissioner Magwood stated that after the October 4, 201 0, CR budget guidance 

memorandum was issued, he learned this memorandum was interpreted as requiring the staff to 

shut down its work on the Yucca Mountain license application, not issue SER Volume 3 as 

planned in November 2010, remove the findings from SER Volume 3, and issue the document 

as a technical evaluation report (TER). 

Commissioner Magwood said that after discussions with NRC senior staff members, he learned 

that what had been portrayed as guidance developed by senior agency staff had actually come 

from the Chairman. On October 7, 2010, he discussed concerns he had about Chainnan 

Jaczko's actions with the Chainnan. According to Commissioner Magwood, the Chainnan 

became very agitated and said that he would never have taken these actions had both 

Commissioners Apostolakis and Magwood not agreed to support the guidance. Commissioner 

Magwood said he objected to this statement quite strongly and that the Chairman never told him 

his plan had been to shut down the High-Level Waste Program and withhold publication of SER 

Volume 3. The Chairman responded to him, "You should have asked." Commissioner 

Magwood said that under the statutory framework, the Chainnan had an obligation to provide 

full and accurate information to Commissioners. 

After the staff was directed to stop working on the SER, Commissioner Magwood considered 

writing a COM to address this matter directly. He later found out that Commissioner Ostendorff 

felt strongly about the actions of the Chairman and was in the process of publishing a COM. He 

encouraged Commissioner Ostendorff to proceed and offered suggestions to the COM's 

development which was published on October 6, 2010. 

17 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
30 


26661.018

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

On October 8, 2010, Commissioner Magwood concluded that Commissioner Ostendorffs views 

and his were in agreement with regard to the Chairman's actions. However, based on 

subsequent motions filed by petitioners from Aiken County, SC, and South Carolina and 

Commissioner Apostolakis' recusal from the matter, he decided the best thing to do was to step 

back from the matter to examine the issues, particularly the legal issue. Therefore, he decided 

not to participate in response to Commissioner Ostendorffs COM. 

On November 12, 2010, Commissioner Magwood issued a COM to the Chairman and 

Commissioners pertaining to future activities of the High-Level Waste Program. As of the 

publication date of this report, this matter was still under deliberation by the Commission. 

Interview of Commissioner Ostendorff 

Commissioner Ostendorff told OIG that on September 30, 2010, his Chief of Staff told him that 

the Chairman was planning to issue guidance on the CR and that this guidance would include 

language that would effectively have the staff discontinue work on DOE's license application, 

specifically SER Volume 3. His office received a copy of the draft language in the CR budget 

guidance memorandum pertaining to the High-Level Waste Program from the Chairman's Chief 

of Staff on the evening of September 30. Commissioner Ostendorff said his Chief of Staff was 

informed that Commissioners Magwood and Apostolakis had already given their support to this 

guidance, so there was no point in his office making an issue of it since a majority had already 

agreed to the CR guidance. The Chairman's Chief of Staff told Commissioner Ostendorffs 

Chief of Staff that if Commissioner Ostendorff disagreed with the CR guidance, they should 

discuss a compromise on the Yucca Mountain adjudicatory matter. 

Commissioner Ostendorff stated that on October 1, 2010, Chairman Jaczko told him that the CR 

budget guidance memorandum would have the staff commence orderly closure of the Yucca 

Mountain license application review. Ostendorff told the Chairman that he disagreed with his 

direction, the direction was wrong, and he should not issue it. Chairman Jaczko told him he 

would consider his advice, and get back to him before he made a decision. Later that day, 

Chairman Jaczko informed him that he had decided to issue the guidance. Commissioner 

Ostendorff said he told the Chairman that he strongly disagreed with his decision. He said he 

asked Chairman Jaczko what he planned to do with respect to SER Volume 3. According to 

Commissioner Ostendorff, the Chairman told him that SER Volume 3 would not be issued in this 

current form, the staff's findings would be removed from the document, and a document would 

eventually be issued, possibly as a NUREG. 

Commissioner Ostendorff advised OIG that he disagreed with the CR guidance memorandum's 

direction to follow FY 2011 budget guidance because the conditions that would authorize 

"orderly closure" had not been met. According to Commissioner Ostendorff, the FY 2011 

budget request stated that such closure would not begin until "withdrawal or suspension of the 

licensing review." Since the issue of whether the license application may be withdrawn was 

currently before the Commission and a final decision had not been made, that condition clearly 

had not been met. 

18 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
31 


26661.019

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

On October 4, 2010, Commissioner Ostendorff related that he spoke with Commissioner 

Svinicki about the CR guidance memorandum, and explained his concerns on the matter and 

that he considered issuing a COM. Later that day he was informed that the EDO and CFO had 

published the CR budget guidance memorandum. 

On October 5, 2010, Commissioner Ostendorff directed his staff to prepare a COM tha! would 

raise the CR guidance issue as a policy matter for Commission consideration. He met 

separately with Commissioners Apostolakis and Magwood to discuss his concerns and explain 

his objections concerning the CR budget guidance memorandum. The feedback he received 

from both Commissioners was that they felt the memorandum's guidance on the High-Level 

Waste Program was wrong. Commissioner Ostendorff's COM was issued on October 6, and on 

October 8, he learned that Chainman Jaczko and Commissioners Apostolakis and Magwood 

decided not to participate. Only Commissioner Svinicki voted on the matter. 

Interview of Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Svinicki told OIG that on the morning of September 30, 2010, her staff learned 

that Chainman Jaczko was proposing to unilaterally issue guidance to the NRC staff on the use 

of funds for the High-Level Waste Program during the FY 2011 CR. The CR guidance would 

direct agency staff to follow the FY 2011 budget direction. 

Commissioner Svinicki stated that although she attended a regularly-scheduled periodic 

meeting on the afternoon of September 30 with Chairman Jaczko, neither she nor the Chairman 

raised the CR budget guidance memorandum. She did not raise the issue because she was not 

sure if the CR budget guidance memorandum was a rumor. Nevertheless, her legal counsel 

contacted the NRC General Counsel to question the legal basis for the purported CR guidance. 

Also during the afternoon of September 30, she learned from Commissioner Ostendorff that he 

was aware of the same rumor concerning the CR budget guidance memorandum. Both she 

and Commissioner Ostendorff agreed that the CR guidance was not appropriate. During the 

evening of September 30, Commissioner Ostendorff e-mailed her a copy of the CR guidance 

language, which was identical to the language included in the final October 4, 2010 CR budget 

guidance memorandum. Commissioner Svinicki said that Commissioner Ostendorffs staff was 

approached by the Chainman's Chief of Staff to discuss the CR budget guidance memorandum. 

Commissioner Ostendorff's staff specifically asked the Chainman's Chief of Staff if 

Commissioner Svinicki's office had been infonmed of the CR budget guidance memorandum. 

The Chainman's Chief of Staff replied that Commissioner Svinicki's office was already aware of 

the guidance because her staff had made inquiries to the General Counsel. 

While Commissioner Svinicki was on international travel from October 1 to 9, 2010, she learned 

that the CR budget guidance memorandum was officially issued on October 4. On October 5, 

her staff infonmed Chainman Jaczko's office that she objected to the CR guidance. 

19 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
32 


26661.020

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Commissioner Svinicki stated that she did not have any direct communication with Chairman 

Jaczko regarding this matter before the CR budget guidance memorandum was issued on 

October 4, 2010. She learned on October 1 that the Chairman's staff left two messages for her 

staff on the evening of September 30 and on October 1. After the CR budget guidance 

memorandum was issued, she questioned the CFO about his knowledge and involvement in the 

development of the memorandum. The CFO told her although he was out of the office during 

much of the memorandum's development, when he returned, he inquired about the status of the 

memorandum and was told by the Chairman's Policy Director that Chairman Jaczko was 

walking the guidance memorandum around to the Commissioners. 

Commissioner Svinicki said that in reviewing the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification 

and her vote on this budget, she noted that her vote contained specific edits to the narrative 

description of activities related to the High-Level Waste Program. Of note, she voted to change 

the language describing the commencement of orderly close-out of the high-level waste 

technical review from "Assuming withdrawal or suspension ... " to "Upon withdrawal or 

suspension ... ." The purpose of this edit was to make clear that orderly close-out of the HighLevel Waste Program would not begin unless and until the license application had been 

withdrawn or the technical review had been suspended. This edit was supported by the 

Commission at that time (Chairman Jaczko, then Commissioner Klein, and Commissioner 

Svinicki) and was incorporated into the final document. 

Commissioner Svinicki told OIG that when reviewing her vote on the FY 2011 budget in light of 

the events related to the October 4, 2010 CR budget guidance memorandum, she recalled a 

conversation she had with Chairman Jaczko regarding her January 201 0 vote. Shortly after she 

cast her vote, Chairman Jaczko requested to meet with her. During this meeting, Chairman 

Jaczko expressed his frustration that she had voted to edit language in the FY 2011 

Congressional Budget Justification document, deeming most of her edits insignificant. Further, 

Chairman Jaczko interpreted her edits to the language describing the High-Level Waste 

Program to indicate a belief on her part that he was at the NRC for the purpose of dismantling 

and terminating the Yucca Mountain program at the bidding of Senator Reid. Commissioner 

Svinicki said the Chairman was very animated and objected to this perceived accusation. She 

told Chairman Jaczko that none of her edits were intended as an accusation, but rather they 

were offered to improve the quality of the document on substantive matters. 

Commissioner Svinicki said that during the voting process on the appeal to OMB for the 

FY 2011 budget pass back, she had proposed edits to the passback appeal letter. However, the 

Chairman called her and advised that he was leaving the building in "8 minutes" and if she did 

not retract her vote edits on the passback appeal letter, he would leave and not submit the letter 

on behalf of the agency to OMB, which would cause the agency to absorb the funding 

reductions proposed by OMB. Given this ultimatum, she agreed to the edits of another 

Commissioner which were similar to hers. 

20 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
33 


26661.021

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Commissioner Svinicki told OIG that on October 14, 2010, she voted to approve Commissioner 

Ostendorff's COM because the FY 2010 budget direction governs during the CR, and even if 

that were not the case, the prerequisites in the FY 2011 budget under which "orderly closure" of 

high-level waste review activities would begin had not been satisfied. She objected to the 

Chairman's CR direction because the NRC Commission had not concluded action on the 

Commission's ongoing adjudicatory proceedings on the Yucca Mountain license application. 

She said the direction to NRC staff to stop the license application technical review could achieve 

the same practical result as overturning the ASLB's decision, effectively granting DOE's motion 

to withdraw. The proper vehicle for resolving the legal question of DOE's authority to withdraw 

the license application is through Commission action on the adjudicatory matter, and any 

direction on the use of funds during the CR, absent specific direction from Congress to the 

contrary, should not predetermine the outcome of the legal matter pending before the 

Commission. 

Interview of Fonmer Chairman Klein 11 

Former Chairman Klein recalled that he and Commissioner Svinicki wanted two things: first, to 

follow the NWPA's requirement that NRC evaluate DOE's license application and, second, to 

see a solution to the high-level waste issue. They felt strongly that the NRC staff needed to 

make a determination whether the Yucca Mountain site was acceptable or not, and they wanted 

to make sure the staff had the resources needed to make that determination. There was 

considerable uncertainty about the future of the High-Level Waste Program, and he and 

Commissioner Svinicki paid attention to the FY 2011 budget language to make sure it allowed 

NRC and the staff to fulfill these responsibilities. Even if there was a request to withdraw the 

license application, a determination had not, and has still not, been made as to whether or not it 

can be withdrawn. Former Chairman Klein said it was important to capture all the knowledge 

gained through the license application review and complete the work that staff had ongoing. For 

example, if they had an SER that was about to be finished, it should be finished. Former 

Chairman Klein felt strongly that until the license application was withdrawn legally and/or 

suspended legally, NRC needed to do as much as it could to evaluate the application. 

Interview of Chairman's Chief of Staff 

The Chainman's Chief of Staff told OIG that he had minimal involvement in the development and 

publication of the CR budget guidance memorandum and that the draft document was presented 

to the Chairman's office from the CFO's office. He said the Chairman's Policy Director provided 

guidance to the EDO and CFO regarding the memorandum on behalf of the Chairman and that it 

should follow established Commission policy and OMB Circular A-11. The Chairman spoke with 

Commissioners Ostendorff, Apostolakis, and Magwood about the CR budget guidance 

memorandum but did not talk to Commissioner Svinicki. 

"From July 2006to May 2009. Dale Klein was the NRC Chairman. From May 2009 until he resigned in March 2010, 

he served as a Commissioner. 

21 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
34 


26661.022

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

According to the Chainnan's Chief of Staff, the intent of the CR guidance was to provide a 

spending limit against the proposed FY 2011 budget, which OMB had directed. However, in the 

case of high-level waste, Congress did not provide specific direction on how to spend those funds, 

and NRC actually conveyed its spending intent to Congress through its Congressional Budget 

Justification and its reclama process. The intent was to spend $10 million, based on the 

President's budget, and the Commission's decision to proceed to close-out. The Commission 

knew that for the prior fiscal year, Congress had given NRC half of what it had requested, which 

conveyed that they were moving NRC toward close-out rather than ramping up the review. The 

Commission did not oppose OMS's proposed funding for the High-Level Waste Program for 

FY 2011, and the letter that NRC sent to OMB reflected that the Commission expected DOE to 

withdraw its license application and understood that the $1 0 million would be used for orderly 

close-out. The policy was set when the Commission voted on the passback appeal letter to OMB. 

Interview of the General Counsel 

The General Counsel told OIG that the direction given in the CR budget guidance memorandum 

was consistent with existing Commission budget guidance. He recognized some ambiguities, 

but believed on the whole the CR budget guidance memorandum was consistent with existing 

Commission budget guidance, and was appropriate to issue. Had the Commission disagreed 

with that, they could have voted to overturn it, or given some other direction. The General 

Counsel said that changing this direction would require a majority vote by the Commission and 

that focusing on close-out activities was a rational and lawful way to proceed. Moreover, closeout activities do not constitute new work under the CR. The CR budget guidance memorandum 

does not preclude NRC from resuming its licensing review if Congress decides to fully fund 

DOE and NRC. 

The General Counsel noted the wording difference between the OMB passback appeal letter 

and the NRC Congressional Budget Justification, indicating the OMB letter contained far less 

ambiguity concerning the conditions to begin close-out activities. He said the NRC's 

Congressional Budget Justification is an informative document that describes NRC's budget 

request but ultimately does not have any legal force and effect. Rather, it is the enacted budget 

that is appropriated by Congress that has authority. When the Congressional Budget 

Justification is not representative of the final appropriation, it is of somewhat limited value. 

Interview of Chainnan Jaczko 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG that he met with the General Counsel, EDO, and CFO about the 

language in the CR budget guidance memorandum. During this meeting, he asked them what 

they thought it meant. He asked if everyone understood that the language meant close-out of the 

program and whether they were in alignment. He specifically asked, "Does everybody understand 

what this means, and that this means close-out?" He recalled the EDO said, "I don't really 

understand what the big deal is with this." Chainnan Jaczko then told them he was going to talk to 

the Commission about the memorandum before he issued it. He said that 'there may be 

Commissioners who don't agree with this, and will try and make it a policy issue." He told OIG that 

22 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY -OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
35 


26661.023

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

the CR budget guidance memorandum was his decision and he wanted to talk directly to the 

Commissioners to explain it. He did not recall whether he informed the EDO that the discussions 

had occurred; however, he recalled telling the EDO that he could publish the memorandum. 

He told Commissioner Apostolakis that the memorandum would result in closing out the High-Level 

Waste Program and he was doing this under his authority. Chairman Jaczko explained that the 

other Commissioners could make an argument that this was a policy issue for the Commission, 

and he wanted his support if that happened. He specifically recalled coming back from the meeting 

with Commissioner Apostolakis with the impression that Commissioner Apostolakis did not 

understand what he meant. As a result, he asked his Chief of Staff to follow up with Commissioner 

Apostolakis' Chief of Staff to ensure his message was understood. 

He did not recall much of the conversation he had with Commissioner Magwood, but did recall he 

was clear that the CR budget memorandum guidance was to begin closing out the High-Level 

Waste Program. Commissioner Magwood's Chief of Staff subsequently contacted his office and 

related that "Commissioner Magwood was fine with how you're going to go forward with the 

memo." Chairman Jaczko stated at this point he decided to go forward and direct the CFO and 

EDO to publish the memorandum. Chairman Jaczko said that Commissioner Magwood may not 

have understood what the CR guidance meant and if he did not understand that was not his fault. 

He then spoke with Commissioner Ostendorf! about the CR budget guidance memorandum. 

Commissioner Ostendorf! immediately understood and was very unhappy about it. Chairman 

Jaczko spoke with Commissioner Ostendorf! twice on the matter during which Commissioner 

Ostendorf! urged him not to publish the memorandum. 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG that prior to the issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum, he 

had two meetings with the staff about moving to close-out, and that they would stop working on the 

SER. In doing so, they would capture the information and publish a TER, and they were not going 

to be reporting findings for a project that they were no longer working on formally for licensing 

review. According to the Chairman, this was the general understanding long before October 1. 

Chairman Jaczko related he had discussions with two Commissioners concerning the publication 

of the CR budget guidance memorandum and its result being to stop the publication of Volume 3 of 

the SER. He believed these discussions were subsequent to the memorandum's publication. 

During these discussions, the Commissioners asked what impact the CR budget guidance 

memorandum would have on the SER, and the Chairman responded that publishing the SER 

volumes was not something they were going to be doing as part of this close-out. Furthermore, he 

told OIG that if his colleagues did not understand, there was only so much he could do to explain. 

Chairman Jaczko related that these were heated, intense discussions, but his colleagues had 

given him a commitment to support him on the CR budget guidance memorandum. 

Chairman Jaczko said the intent of the budget was that when DOE submitted its motion to 

withdraw, the license application would be withdrawn. Therefore, submittal of the motion was 

the triggering factor and not the actual withdrawal. In hindsight, the language in the 

Congressional Budget Justification, given what has materialized in the adjudicatory process, 

23 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
36 


26661.024

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

appears to make it seem different that what it really meant. The intent as he understood it was 

that DOE would submit its motion to withdraw and that would be the agency's trigger to begin 

closing the program. That has always been his intent, and he could not read the budget any 

other way. Chairman Jaczko said that while the Commission composition has been different at 

various decisionmaking points during the FY 2010, FY 2011, and FY 2012 budget processes, in 

each case the Commission at the time has approved the budget documents currently in place. 

These budget documents show the agency's shift to program close-out, and include the 

FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, which the current Commission approved, and 

which reflects close-out of the program without conditioning it on a motion to withdraw. 

Chairman Jaczko said even if one read the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification to mean 

that the Commission should not have closed out the program at the beginning of FY 2011, 

waiting to see the completion of the motion to withdraw, he made the decision at the beginning 

of the fiscal year. He told the staff to "follow the guidance in the FY 2011 budget." 

Chairman Jaczko said he asked the General Counsel about the significance of the language 

(withdrawal or suspension) in the FY 2011 Congressional Budget Justification, and the General 

Counsel told him that one of the Commissioners had made the point that the document does not 

mean begin close-out. Chairman Jaczko asked the General Counsel whether that viewpoint 

was consistent with the General Counsel's interpretation of the budget, and the General 

Counsel said "no." Chairman Jaczko said the withdrawal or suspension language in the 

Congressional Budget Justification was odd and probably got inserted through the 

Commission's editing process. He clearly missed it and it was not the intent of what they were 

doing. According to Chairman Jaczko, the language was irrelevant because if a withdrawal 

request came in, there was no way the Commission would disapprove it, and in his mind it did 

not change the operative nature of what the budget did. Moreover, the Congressional Budget 

Justification had to get approved by OMB, which missed it. He commented that the passback 

letter to OMB laid out the trigger as being the withdrawal request, which put them on the path to 

close-out. 

He told OIG that the closure of the High-Level Waste Program was not an endeavor he 

accomplished through his executive authority over budget that he could not accomplish through the 

adjudicatory process. He commented that they were closing out the review in budget space, and 

that what was not understood was they had not resolved the adjudicatory matter. 

Coordination with U.S. Government Accountability Office 

OIG coordinated with the U.S. Government Accountability Office with regard to the allegation 

that the NRC Chairman had exceeded his authority during the CR period by stopping the review 

of the DOE license application for a geological repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. GAO 

declined to provide a formal legal opinion regarding this issue as it was too closely related to an 

authority matter rather than an appropriations matter. 

24 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
37 


26661.025

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Coordination with U.S. Office of Management and Budget 

OIG coordinated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMS) regarding how it was 

determined to appropriate $10 million for NRC's High-level Waste Program for FY 2011. OMB 

advised that it does not disclose this type of information in accordance with Circular A-11, 

paragraph 22.1, "Confidentiality of budget deliberations." 

B. OIG Review of SER Issue 

OIG learned that between April and May 2010, NMSS staff informed the Chairman that they 

were ahead of schedule with their work on the SER volumes, and they inquired whether they 

should attempt to issue the volumes at earlier dates than those which had been established in 

March 2010. The Chairman responded in a June 2010 memorandum that they should not 

expedite issuance of the reports, but should instead maintain the timeline that had been 

announced publicly in March 2010. According to that timeline, Volume 1 would be issued in 

August 2010, and Volume 3 in November 2010. Volume 1 of the SER was issued as 

scheduled; however, in October 2010, at the start of the new fiscal year, Chairman Jac:zko 

directed staff to stop working on all SER volumes. Subsequently, the Chairman gave direction 

to the staff to prepare a document for public release that captures the knowledge gained 

through the NRC's technical review of DOE's license application but would not contain any of 

the staff's findings and conclusions. 

NRC's Plans for Developing SER To Meet NWPA Review Requirements 

Completion of NRC's technical review of DOE's license application and subsequent issuance of 

the SER are governed by the schedule established in 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix D, which 

requires the SER be completed no later than 18 months following NRC's issuance of a Notice of 

Hearing regarding DOE's license application. The schedule in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix D, 

codifies an NWPA stipulation that NRC issue a decision approving or disapproving the issuance 

of a construction authorization no later than 3 years after the date of the submission of an 

application for authorization to construct a geologic repository. The NWPA additionally allowed 

NRC to extend the 3-year deadline by no more than 1 year. NRC published the Notice of 

Hearing in the Federal Register on October 22, 2008, starting the 3-year clock. The date 

corresponding to the 18-month deadline for issuance of the SER was Apri123, 2010. Originally, 

NRC planned to meet the April23, 2010 deadline to complete and issue the SER; however, due 

to budgetary constraints, NRC indicated in July 2009 that it would not be able to issue the SER 

in accordance with the 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix D, schedule. It was at this point that the 

agency announced the SER would be issued serially in five volumes. As of July 2009, Volume 

1 (General Information) was projected to be issued in March 2010, and Volume 3 (Review of 

Repository Safety after Permanent Closure) in September 2010; at the time, NRC was unable to 

estimate completion dates for the remaining three volumes. 

25 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
38 


26661.026

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

On January 27,2010, NRC revised its schedule regarding issuance of SER Volumes 1 and 3; 

SER Volume 1 was now scheduled to be issued in August 2010 and SER Volume 3 in 

November 2010. 

On March 30, 2010, the EDO sent a memorandum to the Commission informing the 

Commission of the staff's plans regarding the High-Level Waste Program, including its review of 

DOE's application, in light of the Administration's plan to terminate the Yucca Mountain 

repository program and DOE's March 3, 2010 request to withdraw its repository application. 

This memorandum proposed to the Commission that in light of the President's FY 2011 budget 

and assuming Congress provided no additional funding or direction to the contrary, the staff 

would continue the technical review of DOE's application and SER preparation until FY 2010 

funds were exhausted. The memorandum also informed the Commission that as of the end of 

February 2010, DOE had responded to all of NRC's requests for additional information and, at 

that time, the NRC staff had not identified a need for additional information from DOE to 

complete the SER volumes. The memorandum included a projected schedule for completion of 

all SER volumes. Volumes 1 and 3 were still on schedule to be issued in August and November 

2010, respectively, and all of the remaining volumes would be issued by the Elnd of March 2011. 

OIG learned that between May and June 2010, the Commission was informed that SER 

Volumes 1 and 3 were ahead of schedule; however, on June 11, 2010, Chairman Jaczko sent a 

memorandum to the EDO titled, 'Schedule for HLW SER," stating that the staff should not 

attempt to issue the volumes ahead of the projected schedule provided in the EDO's 

March 30, 2010 memorandum. The Chairman wrote: 

I believe it is in the best interests of the agency not to alter the schedule for the 

completion of SER volumes at this time, but instead to maintain the predictable schedule 

previously provided to the Commission in March 2010, regarding plans for the HighLevel Waste Repository Program. The agency's overall resources would be better 

utilized by maintaining the current schedule. Therefore, the information in Volume 1 of 

the SER should be finalized and presented no earlier than August 2010, and subsequent 

volumes consistent with and not earlier than the schedule provided to the Commission in 

March 2010. 

In accordance with the March 2010 schedule for SER volume publication, Volume 1 was issued 

on August 23, 2010. No additional volumes have been issued. 

Interviews of Senior Staff on SER Issue 

The NMSS Director said that prior to the Chairman's June 11, 2010 memorandum instructing 

staff to maintain the March 30, 2010 SER publication schedule, she had attended meetings with 

the Chairman, EDO, and DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal and Compliance 

Programs concerning the status of the staff's progression on the SER volumes. She said she 

informed the group that the staff was well ahead of schedule with regard to completing the SER. 

She said the group discussed the appropriateness of slowing down the work and that she and 

the EDO specifically indicated to the Chairman that it would be contrary to the agency's values 

26 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
39 


26661.027

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

of openness and transparency to do so. She recalled that the Chairman thanked them for their 

views and ended the discussion. The NMSS Director said she believed the motivation to slow 

down the work was related to the DOE's request to withdraw its license application and the 

formulation of the Blue Ribbon Commission to look at the national policy on waste. She had 

been told that if NRC were to publish the SER volumes, it would indicate that NRC was "out in 

front" of the Administration with regard to the disposal of high-level waste. The NMSS Director 

told DIG that she received SER Volume 1 for review, concurrence, and authorization to publish 

on June 24, 2010, and Volume 3 for review, concurrence, and authorization to publish on 

July 15, 2010. The NMSS Director believed that minimal resources were needed to complete 

the review process and issue Volume 3. She also commented that by September 30, 2010, 

NRC had all the information it needed from DOE to complete the SER. The NMSS Director 

recalled that prior to October 1, 2010, the DEDO directed that her staff would begin transition to 

closure on October 1. 

The DEDO for Materials, Waste, Research, Tribal and Compliance Programs told DIG that 

when they met with the Chairman in June 2010 to discuss the staff's progress on the SER, the 

Chairman already knew.that as of October 1, 2010, when the agency moved into the new fiscal 

year that he would be closing down the license application review. The DEDO said the reason 

that he and the NMSS Director went to meet with the Chairman was to inform him that they 

could publish the volumes ahead of the designated schedule if the Chairman preferred. 

However, the Chairman's preference was to stick to the original schedule. The DEDO said the 

practical effect of the Chairman's June memorandum was that it prevented the staff from issuing 

Volume 3 should it have been finalized prior to October 1. 

The Deputy Division Director for the Licensing and Inspection Directorate, Division of High-Level 

Waste Repository Safety, NMSS, told DIG that Volume 3 of the SER was nearly finished, minus 

the office director comments and concurrence and review by the Office of the General Counsel 

(OGC). In early October 2010, staff were in the process of resolving OGC comments on 

Volume 3. He and the Deputy Division Director for the Technical Review Directorate had 

personally reviewed Volume 3 and they were both comfortable with the insights gained from the 

information DOE had provided. The Deputy Division Director for the Licensing and Inspection 

Directorate said the direction to stop working on the SER came directly from the Chairman, who 

met with the NMSS staff in early October 2010. The Chairman explained that the budget drove 

his decision and that the NRC General Counsel agreed with his decision. The Chairman did not 

indicate for the staff to shut down in a way from which they could not recover. Instead, the 

Chairman conveyed that the shutdown should take place in a reversible manner so that, if 

needed, they could resume their review activities. 

The Deputy Division Director for the Licensing and Inspection Directorate also explained that an 

SER is a licensing product based on regulatory requirements, and a TER is a technical review 

without licensing requirements. He advised that a TER has scientific value, but little licensing 

value. 

27 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OJG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
40 


26661.028

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

The EDO told OIG that he had the impression that Volume 3 was ready for publication in late 

summer 2010. He recalled that it was around the period of the election and that they were 

going to wait until elections had concluded to publish the volume. He said the staff had advised 

the Chairman that the work on Volume 3 was done, and the Chainnan said to maintain the 

original schedule because earlier publication of the volume could be interpreted as trying to 

influence the decision on whether DOE was authorized to withdraw its license application. 

The Assistant General Counsel for High-Level Waste, Fuel Cycle & Nuclear Security, OGC, said 

that the completion status of Volume 3 was open to interpretation. She said that as of July 15, 

2010, Volume 3 had been provided to the NMSS Director and was reported to be substantially 

complete. However, the document was undergoing additional editing and fonnatting, including 

a final quality control check, to assure appropriate nomenclature, proper numbering, and 

sequencing, and other minor administrative changes that may be necessary to ensure 

completeness and accuracy. OGC had been asked to review the document and indicate, by 

August 25, 2010, whether they had any legal objections regarding the document. 

The Chairman's Chief of Staff recalled that when the Chainnan was informed by NMSS staff 

that they were ahead of schedule with regard to the SER volumes, the Chairman did not think it 

best to change the timing that had been publicly announced as to the publication dates. The 

Chief of Staff said that Volume 3 had not undergone senior management or General Counsel 

review and was a predecisional document. His understanding was that the NMSS Director had 

not completed her review of the document, and that as of the new fiscal year NRC had 

transitioned to a categorically different activity (close-out) for which $1 0 million had been 

allocated. Based on this transition, the agency needed to use the resources for that specific 

purpose. 

The General Counsel acknowledged that under the NWPA, the NRC was to determine up or 

down within 4 years from the DOE application acceptance date on the license application. 

However, many factors have come to bear, such as a non-willing applicant and an unfunded 

program. This is budget reality and he would argue this course is a prudent way; if Congress 

decided to fund this project, the agency is actually in a better position to resume than shutting it 

off all together. He did not believe that the Chainnan had put the Commission in jeopardy 

because Congress has not properly funded the program to meet its obligations. He further 

advised the activities and authorizations outlined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act are subject to 

appropriations. He stated that "unless Congress appropriates money, you can't do any of those 

things." 

lnteNiews of Commissioners on SER Issue 

Commissioner Ostendorff recalled Chairman Jaczko infonning him, during a routine periodic 

meeting on June 8, 2010, that the Chairman was considering whether to provide direction to 

NMSS to delay issuance of SER Volume 1, which was ready to be issued 2 months ahead of its 

scheduled issuance in August 2010. The Chainnan asked him for his thoughts on the matter 

and said he thought it would look "funny" for the SER to be issued in the middle of the ongoing 

28 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
41 


26661.029

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

high-level waste adjudication. The Chairman told Commissioner Ostendorff he was directing 

this action in his capacity as NRC's principal executive officer and that it was not a policy matter. 

Following the meeting, Commissioner Ostendorff called the Chairman to tell him he strongly 

disagreed with the Chairman's proposed course of action. Commissioner Ostendorffthought it 

was a "big mistake" to provide direction to the staff to slow down the SER review, and that it 

would look very bad for the Chairman to interfere with the staff's activities, particularly in light of 

the ongoing high-level waste adjudication. Commissioner Ostendorff cautioned the Chairman 

that he would likely have to deal with any accusations of tampering with the proceedings if word 

got out that he had provided such direction. 

Commissioner Ostendorff said that on June 11, 2010, during a routine periodic meeting with the 

General Counsel, he discussed his concerns with the Chairman's proposed direction on 

delaying issuance of SER Volume 1. The General Counsel told Commissioner Ostendorff that it 

was his opinion that the direction was not legally objectionable, but that he did not provide an 

opinion to the Chairman on the policy implications. The General Counsel told Commissioner 

Ostendorff that it was his experience that there were certain issues that the Chairman does not 

want to hear from him on. This conversation left him with the impression that there was possibly 

not an open environment for OGC to provide unfiltered advice to the Chairman without fear of 

retribution. 

Commissioner Ostendorff was aware that the draft SER Volume 3 had been sent to the NMSS 

Director for review in July 2010. On October 1, when the Chairman informed Commissioner 

Ostendorff of his plans to issue the CR budget guidance memorandum and to remove the 

findings from SER Volume 3 prior to issuance, the Commissioner expressed his concerns about 

not completing SER Volume 3 as previously planned by the staff. Commissioner Ostendorffs 

concerns included censoring staff technical work already completed and the fact that the actions 

directed to the staff were directly related to the outcome of the high-level waste adjudication that 

was currently before the Commission but had not yet been decided. 

Commissioner Svinicki advised OIG that she considered the issuance of the SER volumes to be 

a policy matter for Commission involvement, particularly in light of the Chairman's unilateral 

direction in June 2010 to direct agency staff to issue SER Volume 1 no earlier than the staff's 

scheduled date of August 2010. She recalled advising against that course of action when the 

Chairman informed her of his intent to issue that direction. According to Commissioner Svinicki, 

she voted to approve Commissioner Ostendorffs COM because she supported finalizing and 

issuing Volume 3. 

Commissioner Magwood advised that the Chairman's actions relative to Volume 3 of the SER 

may not, strictly speaking, be illegal from the perspective of appropriations and CR law, but his 

actions under the Commission's organic statutes present a different picture. Under the 

Commission's statutes and standing procedures, policy determinations are made by majority 

vote of the Commission, not by the unilateral action of the Chairman. According to the 

Commissioner, the Chairman's specific direction to the staff regarding implementation of the CR 

29 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
42 


26661.030

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

(e.g., the decision not to issue SER Volume 3 as planned and previously communicated to the 

Commission) was a significant policy shift, not merely administrative guidance, and therefore 

was not proper. 

Former Chairman Klein said that NRC is under a legal obligation to review DOE's application 

but he recognized that the agency needs the funding to complete the task. He recalled once 

making the point during a speech that guidance was needed from Congress on this matter. He 

thought it was inappropriate for Congress not to fund NRC for a law it had passed, and that the 

agency had to meet. He said because NRC had that law, and the requirement, but not the 

funds to carry it out, the agency needed relief. He said, "Either we needed to get the money to 

do it, or they needed to give us relief from it. And they have not given us relief from it." 

Interview of Chairman on SER Issue 

Chairman Jaczko told DIG that he did not want NRC to publish Volume 3 early because it could 

give an impression that the agency was trying to rush information out before it was actually 

complete, knowing the project was terminating. This would create challenges for NRC from a 

public communications perspective; it would look political if they moved forward in this way. He 

said that as Chairman, it is his responsibility to manage the agency's workload and worl<flow 

with regard to scheduling. Shortly after the CR budget guidance memorandum was published, 

he personally directed the staff that the agency would publish Volume 3 as a TER that would 

reflect where they were in the review process, but would not reflect NRC's findings. He said the 

staffs work on the SER would be preserved as an internal non-public document in ADAMS, the 

agency's document management system. Further, he never directed anyone to destroy or 

delete the document as the hearings have not ended. Chairman Jaczko said the agency has an 

obligation to preserve the document if hearings are to resume. 

Chairman Jaczko advised that his office had contacted several members of Congress who told 

them there was nothing illegal or wrong with what he was doing in relation to the CR guidance and 

it was perfectly consistent with appropriations. The commentary and correspondence he received 

reflecting congressional dismay against his actions were solely political in nature. The agency had 

a budget from OMB that reflected "do close-out" and Congress had not passed an appropriation 

which was how they indicate to agencies what to do with their funding. He told DIG that several 

times, Congress passed a CR and had the opportunity to specifically direct the agency not to 

proceed with close-out activities but that several CRs had been passed with no direction to NRC to 

do anything different. He related the fundamental obligation for the agency was to go with the 

lower values of what has been approved by the House and the Senate. This was reflected in OMB 

Circular A-11. The FY 2011 budget that was approved by the Senate and the House for NRC was 

$10 million for closure activities. Chairman Jaczko said that as the head of the agency, he was 

bound by the agency's budget. He also commented that the activities in the NWPA were subject to 

appropriations. For example, there are provisions in the NWPA that say NRC is supposed to finish 

its licensing review within 3 years. According to the Chairman, "that language is fairly meaningless 

30 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
43 


26661.031

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

because it has no enforcement mechanism. It does not say what happens if we miss that 

deadline. And clearly, based on the $29 million that we were getting in FY 2010, we were not 

going to meet the 3-year deadline." 

C. Commission Voting on ASLB Decisions 

OIG learned that the Office of the Secretary (SECY) did not enforce adherence to the 

Commission's adjudicatory voting process with regard to SECY-10-0102 and generally does not 

enforce the voting process to facilitate completion of adjudicatory matters. Although SECY staff 

attempt to enforce the process, their success is dependent on whether and how the Chairman 

and Commissioners respond to their attempts. According to NRC's General Counsel, the 

Commission's procedures are guidelines that have been developed based on practice but they 

are not requirements. 

Commission Procedures 

NRC's Jntemal Commission Procedures explain that Commission decisionmaking is 

accomplished through voting at scheduled Commission meetings, through notational voting on 

prescribed vote sheets, and by orally affirming a notational vote at an affirmation session. 

Appendixes 4 and 5 of the procedures address the basis for determining voting results and how 

to resolve a 2-2 vote. According to the procedures, votes from at least a quorum of three 

Commissioners are required to act, and action is based on the majority of those participating. 

As a general matter, requests for Commission action will be denied if the Commission vote is 

2-2. 

The Internal Commission Procedures also describe Commission voting on adjudicatory SECY 

papers12 such as SECY-10-0102 and for holding the subsequent affirmation session vote; 

however, they do not provide details or direction on the process that occurs between the 

completion of an adjudicatory SECY paper vote and the conduct of an affirmation vote on the 

matter. OIG learned about the latter process through an interview with a SECY Technical 

Advisor who tracks adjudicatory SECY papers for the Commission. 

According to the Internal Commission Procedures, Commissioners are expected to vote on 

adjudicatory SECY papers no later than 10 business days after receipt of the paper. The 

procedures state that when a majority of the Commission has voted, a request for an extension 

of time to vote beyond the 10 business day voting period or a request to delay the affirmation of 

the vote should be granted only by a majority of the Commission. Per the procedures, it is the 

Secretary of the Commission's responsibility to schedule a weekly affirmation session. It is also 

the Secretary's responsibility to, within 48 hours of the issuance of an adjudicatory SECY paper, 

12 The lntemal Commission Procedures state that written issue papers, referred to as SECY papers, are the "primary 

decision-making tool of the collegial Commission." These papers are submitted by the Office of the Executive 

Director for Operations, the Chief Financial Officer, or other office directors reporting directly to the Commission. 

31 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
44 


26661.032

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

notice the affirmation of the paper so that the affirmation will be held at the earliest available 

session following the close of the 1 0-day voting period unless a majority of the Commission has 

advised that the affirmation should be set fo~ a later date. Although the Internal Commission 

Procedures state that it is the Secretary's responsibility to schedule these sessions, they also 

state that in order for Commissioners to vote orally at meetings, the Chairman must call for the 

vote. 

A SECY Technical Advisor told OIG that although the procedures state that Commissioners are 

expected to vote within 10 days after the issuance of an adjudicatory SECY paper, in practice, 

the significant deadline in the process is the point at which the majority of Commissioners have 

voted. This is the point that the Technical Advisor tracks for adjudicatory SECY papers because 

at this point it is required that Commissioners who have not voted either submit a vote or 

request an extension to which a majority 'of other Commissioners must agree. The Technical 

Advisor said that he sends e-mail notices (addressed from the Secretary of the Commission) to 

the Commissioners who have not voted to request that they either vote or ask for an extension. 

If a Commissioner requests an extension, the Technical Advisor said he polls the other 

Commissioners to see if a majority agree to grant it. The Technical Advisor, who has been 

tracking Commission voting on adjudicatory matters for more than 20 years, could not recall any 

occasion where an extension request was denied by a Commissioner. 

The·Technical Advisor explained that after he has received all of the Commissioners' notational 

vote sheets on an adjudicatory SECY paper and the attached ASLB order, he drafts an 

affirmation notice that is high-level in nature and is used during the affirmation voting process. 

He said the affirmation notice simply provides the outcome of the vote; thus, when all 

Commissioners vote "aye" during the affirmation vote, they are voting to note their agreement 

with the language in the affirmation notice. in contrast, the vote sheets note whether a 

Commissioner is in favor of the order, against it, not participating, or abstaining and will 

sometimes include comments explaining why they are for or against, or suggesting modified 

language for the order. 

The Technical Advisor also explained that OCAA may need to revise the order before an 

affirmation vote can be held if Commissioners indicate in their notational vote sheets that 

revision is needed. The Technical Advisor said that OCAA works with lawyers in the 

Commissioner offices to make the modifications requested and obtain their concurrence on the 

updated language. The length of time it takes for OCAA to make the Commissioners' changes 

in the order and obtain their concurrence on the update varies, depending on the level of 

change needed. The Technical Advisor said an affirmation vote is not held until all of the 

Commissioners are satisfied with both the affirmation notice and the order. 

32 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
45 


26661.033

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

OIG Review of Commission Adherence to Procedures 

OIG reviewed the Commissioners' voting process associated with SECY-10-010213 and learned 

that the Internal Commission Procedures were not followed relative to voting deadline, 

extension requests, or polling of other Commissioners to determine whether they agree with 

extension requests. As noted in section l of this report, OCAA issued SECY-10-0102 to SECY 

on August 10, 2010, and Commissioners were asked to provide completed vote sheets and 

comments to SECY by August 25, 2010. The paper was to be scheduled for an affirmation vote 

at an open meeting once all votes were received. 

Despite the August 25, 2010 voting deadline, voting was not complete until Chairman Jaczko 

submitted his second vote (approximately 6 weeks after the majority of Commissioners had 

voted) on October 29, 2010. The voting process proceeded as follows: 

Commissioner and Action Date 

Commissioner Apostolakis announced he would August 10, 2010 

not participate 

Commissioner Svinicki voted August 25, 2010 

Chairman Jaczko provided initial vote August 25, 2010 

Commissioner Ostendorff voted August 26, 201 0 

Chairman Jaczko retracted initial vote August30,2010 

Commissioner Magwood voted September 15,2010 

Chairman Jaczko voted for second time October 29, 2010 

OIG reviewed SECY documents associated with SECY-10-0102 and learned that the 

Commission Secretary sent an August 27, 2010 e-mail notice advising Commissioner Magwood 

to vote or request an extension to vote, but the request was withdrawn after Chairman Jaczko 

retracted his first vote. This occurred after the first time the majority of Commissioners had 

voted. After Commissioner Magwood voted on September 15, 2010, now constituting a 

majority, the Secretary sent an e-mail to Chairman Jaczko requesting his vote or an extension 

request. The e-mail stipulated absent the Chairman providing a vote or request for an 

extension, which must be approved by a majority of the Commission, it would be presumed, in 

accordance with the Commission's rule of procedure, the Chairman would not be participating in 

the action. There were no additional documents indicating that the Secretary followed up with 

the Chairman or his office. However, OIG identified (1) a September 16, 2010 e-mail from the 

Chairman's Chief of Staff to the Chairman recommending that the Chairman never request an 

extension on the Yucca Mountain matter and (2) an October 6, 2010 e-mail from the Secretary 

to NRC's General Counsel stating that the Chairman's Chief of Staff had indicated that the 

Chairman would vote the following week. 

13 Because this remains an open adjudicatory matter before the Commission, OIG could only report matlers of 

process and not of substance. 

33 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
46 


26661.034

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

DIG reviewed 13 other adjudicatory SECY paper files 14 to asses~ whether Commission voting 

and polling procedures were followed in connection with these documents. DIG sought to 

determine whether (1) memoranda were sent to Commissioners reminding them to vote after a 

majority of Commissioners had voted, (2) Commissioners requested extensions or voted timely 

in response to the e-mail prompt, and (3) polling of other Commissioners occurred as 

warranted. DIG's review found that procedures were not followed in connection with 7 of the 13 

files reviewed. In three of the seven cases, memorandum prompts should have been sent after 

the majority voted, but were not. In three other cases, memorandum prompts were sent; 

however, extension requests and polling did not occur. In one case polling was initiated but not 

concluded. 

DIG also learned that 2 days after the Chairman voted on SECY-10-0102, the OCAA Director 

provided the Commission with a draft affirmation order detailing the status of the Commission's 

votes. Although the notational voting process associated with SECY-10-0102 was complete as 

of October 29, 2010, as of the date of this report the Commission has not held an affirmation 

vote on the matter and the draft order continues to sit in deliberation before the Commission for 

affirmation. 

DIG Interviews of Agency Officials Concerning Commission Procedures 

The Secretary told DIG that she uses a "voting notice document" to prompt Commissioners who 

have not yet voted on an adjudicatory matter after the majority has voted, and that she sent 

such a notice to the Chairman concerning SECY-10-0102 on September 16, 2010. She said 

that although the Chairman never formally responded to the notice with a request for an 

extension to vote on SECY-10-0102, he told her on several occasions that he planned to vote. 

She never documented these exchanges, and did not proceed with the polling of other 

Commissioners to see whether they agreed with the delay. She recalled having conversations 

with some of the Commissioner staff members prior to Chairman Jaczko's second vote wherein 

they asked her to draft an affirmation statement even though Chairman Jaczko had not yet 

voted. She did not do this because the Chairman had told her he would be participating in the 

matter and because, based on discussions with one Commissioner and several Commissioner 

staff members, she believed that not all of the Commissioners who had voted were ready to 

affirm their votes during an affirmation session. The Secretary also said that while the Internal 

Commission Procedures direct her to schedule affirmation votes at the earliest opportunity after 

the 10-day voting period, Chairman Jaczko has wanted to make sure that all Commissioners 

are ready to affirm their votes before an affirmation session is scheduled. 

The OCAA Director told DIG that in accordance with their process, following the Chairman's 

October 29, 2010 vote on SECY -10-01 02, she prepared a draft affirmation order for circulation 

via e-mail that indicated the status of the votes at the completion of the voting process. She 

circulated the draft via e-mail to all of the Commissioners on November 1, 2010, and was 

subsequently called to the Chairman's office, where an OGC attorney and the Secretary were 

14 Files corresponded with adjudicatory SECY papers issued between March 2008 and August 201 0. 

34 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
47 


26661.035

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

also present. The OCAA Director said the Chairman was animated and expressed displeasure 

that she had circulated the document. She told him she had done this as part of the normal 

process of circulating the draft decision. She was surprised and shaken up by the Chairman's 

manner and that he had never been angry with her before. The Chairman asked her something 

like, 'Do you think this was a helpful thing to do?" She responded that she thought it was and 

he told her he was working with the Commissioners to settle the matter and to "just stay out of 

it." In hindsight, the OCAA Director said the Chairman may have felt that in circulating the draft 

decision, she did not give the other Commissioners time to consider the content of the 

Chairman's vote. However, at the time, she thought she was doing the correct thing by being 

prompt with a matter that was of interest to the Commission. 

A majority of Commission staff members interviewed told OIG that with the exception of SECY10-0102, the Internal Commission Procedures are generally followed. All of the staff members 

were aware that the procedures directed extension requests to be made and that extensions 

needed majority Commission approvaL The Chairman's Chief of Staff acknowledged that 

although he was aware of the procedures concerning extension requests, he sent an e-mail to 

Chairman Jaczko recommending that the Chairman never ask for an extension to vote in 

connection with SECY-10-0102. A Commissioner's Chief of Staff asked the Secretary how her 

office would proceed given that a majority of the Commissioners had voted. The Secretary 

responded that she knew that one Commissioner would not proceed to affirmation before the 

Chairman voted, so she would not initiate measures to move the issue. According to this Chief 

of Staff, the Secretary was in a difficult position because she feared being 'chewed out" by the 

Chairman if she were to proceed to affirmation before he cast his vote. A Commissioner's Legal 

Advisor told OIG that the Chairman wanted matters pertaining to the affirmation to be decided 

prior to scheduling an affirmation session and that he would not support the Secretary in moving 

to affirmation until that time. 

The General Counsel told OIG that the Internal Commission Procedures should generally be 

followed, but that there are circumstances that require deviations, and the procedures 

themselves are not binding law. The procedures are a reflection of decisions among the 

Commissioners of how to handle and process certain matters, especially those matters 

identified in the Energy Reorganization Act and the Reorganization Plan. With regard to 

adjudicatory affirmation voting, the Commission needs to have a majority willing to go to 

affirmation. Normally, the Secretary would poll members to see if they were ready to go to 

affirmation; however, he said that if there is no consensus it is hard for the Secretary to go 

forward with a draft affirmation notice or order to reflect a consensus position. The General 

Counsel said that this is the situation with the high-level waste matter. He acknowledged that 

this matter has sat in abeyance with a draft affirmation order before the Commission since 

November 1, 2010. He said that as a theoretical matter, this could "rest in limbo" until NRC is 

posed with a forcing function, such as being party to litigation against the Government. He told 

OIG there have been matters previously before the Commission in appeal status that have gone 

unresolved for a year or longer. 

35 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY-OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
48 


26661.036

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Interviews of Commissioners Concerning Commission Procedures 

Commissioner Osteridorff told OIG he queried Chainman Jaczko about when he planned to vote 

on SECY-10-0102 during meetings he had with the Chairman on September 9, September 14, 

October 5, October 19, and October 27, 2010, and the Chairman always responded that he 

would vote. Commissioner Ostendorff said Chairman Jaczko offered different reasons for not 

voting. For example, Chainman Jaczko told him he was concerned that a 2-2 vote would leave 

the ASLB "in limbo." He also told Commissioner Ostendorffthat he would not take action until a 

majority of the Commission agreed to suspend the ASLB's adjudicatory proceedings. 

Commissioner Ostendorff disagreed with the Chairman's view that a 2-2 split could leave the 

matter unresolved. Rather, after discussions with OGC, OCAA, the Chief Administrative Judge 

of the ASLBP, and Commissioner Ostendorffs legal counsel, Commissioner Ostendorff 

concluded that based on the Internal CommissionProcedures, a 2-2 split would uphold the 

ASLB's decision. Commissioner Ostendorff communicated this view to the Chairman. 

Commissioner Svinicki said she believed it was important for the Commission to act on the 

adjudicatory matter to resolve the legal question of DOE's authority to withdraw. 

Commissioner Magwood advised that subsequent to the Chairman initially casting his vote on 

the matter, the Chainman allegedly withdrew his vote asserting he had done so as to afford 

Commissioner Magwood time to prepare a vote. Commissioner Magwood advised this 

representation was not accurate and he had not asked the Chainman to assist or to remove his 

vote on his behalf. 

Interview of Chairman Concerning Commission Procedures 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG he did not recall the e-mail from his Chief of Staff advising him not to 

request an extension to vote on SECY-10-0102, and that he did not realize that an extension 

was required on adjudicatory matters if a vote was not cast within a 1 0-day period. He said that 

the Commission does not always act in accordance with the procedures. For example, the 

procedures say that the Commission votes on matters within 10 days of receiving them. Yet, he 

noted, the Secretary waits until three people have voted to issue notices to other 

Commissioners that they need to act. He said the Commission procedures are a guideline, and 

not absolute rules. However, he said he did at one point talk to the Secretary, who told him that 

he needed to request an extension, but he responded that he was getting ready to vote and, 

furthermore, told the Secretary she needed to proceed however she wanted to proceed. 

Chainman Jaczko told OIG that while some people have an impression that he is purposely 

holding up the affirmation vote, this is not the case. Instead, the reason the Commission has 

not held an affirmation vote on the Yucca Mountain matter is that the Commission has not come 

to majority agreement on the affirmation notice. He said NRC's governing statute directs that 

Commission action is accomplished by majority vote. According to Chainman Jaczko, his 

practice is to go to affirmation once the Commission is in agreement about the language in the 

36 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
49 


26661.037

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- DIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

affirmation notice even though the procedures describe a process wherein the affirmation is 

scheduled once the votes are in. He said that has proven to be an embarrassing situation 

because "voting does not end the process. It's just the beginning of the process for us.' 

Chairman Jaczko advised that all of the Commissioners agreed to the practice of proceeding to 

affirmation only after everyone agrees to the affirmation notice and "there has really been little 

discussion." 

D. lnfonnatlon Flow/Work Environment 

During the course of the investigation, a number of interviewees conveyed their perception that 

Chairman Jaczko controls and restricts the information available to his fellow Commissioners 

and noted concerns about his interpersonal style. Senior officials, managers, and staff provided 

examples that they believed illustrated the Chairman's failure to share with his fellow 

Commissioners information needed to support their fully informed decisionmaking. Examples 

included the CR budget guidance memorandum described earlier in this report, the FY 2012 

budget process, the Commission agenda planning process, and the Chairman's involvement in 

determining what constitutes a policy versus an administrative matter. In addition, a number of 

interviewees described instances of behavior by the Chairman that they viewed as 

unprofessional or manipulative. Examples included the Chairman's use of foreign travel or 

threats to contact members of the Administration as means of persuading his fellow 

Commissioners to support him on issues, and displays of anger towards individuals whom he 

does not view as supportive. 

The Chairman defended his management style with regard to information flow as aligning with 

the division of Commission and Chairman responsibilities established by the Reorganization 

Plan and as necessary for efficiency and effectiveness. He acknowledged using forceful 

management techniques to accomplish his objectives but maintained that these techniques 

were necessary to facilitate the work of the Commission. 

The FY 2012 Budget Process 

OIG learned from Commissioner chiefs of staff and legal advisors that, historically, when the 

NRC Chairman presented hislher budget estimate to the other Commissioners, the Chairman 

included the staff's independently developed "Program Priorities and Considerations" document. 

This is a spreadsheet, prepared by staff, that presents each division's plans and priorities, 

which, historically, the Chairman has used to develop hislher budget proposal based on the 

staff's considerations. OIG learned that the FY 2012 process differed from past practice in that: 

1. The Chairman personally met with division directors regarding their funding and programs 

and provided direction and priorities for the agency. Subsequently, the staff formulated 

their requirements for funding and programs based on the Chairman's direction, which was 

then incorporated into the Chairman's budget estimate. 

37 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- DIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
50 


26661.038

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

2. The Chairman's budget estimate was submitted to the Commission for its consideration 

without fundamental supporting documents developed by the staff. 

The majority of Commissioner staff members and Commissioners indicated that this process 

caused problems in that the Commission could not assess the differences between the staffs 

projected needs and priorities and those of the Chairman. Furthermore, staff explained that the 

Chairman directed that if the Commissioners wanted to make inquiries to division directors 

regarding their funding needs and priorities, the requests needed to be funneled through the 

Chairman's office. Office responses, in turn, were submitted to the Chairman's office, and OIG 

learned that responses were either edited or not provided back to the requestor. OIG also 

learned that all of the Commissioner offices were able to obtain various versions of the 

'Program Priorities and Consideration Documents" through personal connections that 

Commissioner office staff had with NRC staff. However, the Commissioners remained unable 

to distinguish the staffs priorities from the Chainman's priorities due to the Chairman's process 

for developing the budget. 

The CFO told OIG that the Chairman's FY 2012 budget process, wherein the Chairman had 

meetings with staff to discuss priorities directly before the offices developed their priorities 

document, was much quicker than the previous budget process. However, he said, the problem 

was that the Chairman did not provide the staffs supporting documents to the Commission. 

The CFO said he raised this issue to the Chairman's Chief of Staff and conveyed that without 

the supporting documents it would be difficult for the Commission to decide on a budget. The 

Chairman's Chief of Staff responded that the Commission did not need that level of detail, that 

this was the Chairman's budget, and that all inquiries to the CFO from the Commission about 

the budget should be cleared with the Chairman prior to providing a response. 

The EDO told OIG that the Chairman did not want any differences between his budget and 

staff's budget and saw it as his budget proposal. The Chairman also wanted the opportunity to 

review and change any of the staffs responses to the Commissioners' questions. 

An OEDO manager told OIG that he was familiar with the issue of information from the staff to 

the Commission being edited by the Chairman before it was provided to the Commission. He 

said the Energy Reorganization Act addressed this issue and that it could be debated in two 

ways. One way would be to edit information provided by the staff, and the other is to be passive 

and just present what the staff has identified on a matter. He said he discussed this matter with 

the General Counsel, who said the Chairman had the authority to edit information that was to be 

provided to the Commission. The OEDO manager said the Chairman did not believe there 

should be two separate budget proposals (Chairman's budget and staff budget). He said the 

Chairman viewed himself as the head of the agency and felt that there should be just one 

budget- the staffs proposal reviewed by the Chairman- presented to the Commission for its 

consideration. 

38 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
51 


26661.039

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG that he was closely involved in the budget process as it is his 

responsibility to present the budget to the Commission and he was entitled to develop the 

budget however he wanted. He said he chose a method to help the staff shape a budget that 

would be more successful in getting through the Commission. He believes that this is what 

occurred with regard to the FY 2012 budget proposal. He said that the budget was presented 3 

weeks earlier than usual and went through the Commission with almost no real change. He 

said he had assumed he did not have to provide the Commission with the "Program 

Considerations and Priorities" documents, but had since learned from the General Counsel that 

he had been incorrect. He said he now understood that once the budget was developed and 

presented to the Commission, the Commissioners were entitled to some of the draft documents. 

Agenda Planning Process 

According to the Internal Commission Procedures, policy, rulemaking, and adjudicatory matters, 

as well as general information, are provided to the Commission for consideration in documents 

referred to as SECY papers. There are four categories of SECY papers. Commission meeting 

papers present a major issue on which collegial deliberation and vote at a Commission meeting, 

usually in a public session, is anticipated. Notation vote papers present an issue requiring 

consideration by the Commission or consultation with the Commission prior to action by the 

staff, but not requiring collegial deliberation among Commissioners or a formal vote in a 

meeting, thereby lending themselves to a written notation process. Affirmation papers convey 

Commission business that does not require deliberation among the Commissioners in a meeting 

mode, but must be voted on by the Commissioners in each others' presence. Information 

papers provide information on policy, rulemaking, or adjudicatory issues. These papers are 

purely informational and should not assume or request any action by the Commission. 

The Internal Commission Procedures also describe monthly agenda planning sessions during 

which the Commission reviews and approves the Chairman's proposed meeting agendas that 

he has developed with the SECY and representatives from OGC, EDO, and the Office of 

Congressional Affairs. The procedures state, "In recognition of the collegial process, an 

individual Commissioner's request that a meeting be scheduled will be granted unless a majority 

of the Commission disapproves the request." 

During this investigation, OIG learned that the process by which SECY papers are conceived by 

the staff and subsequently submitted for Commission consideration is subject to the Chairman's 

influence and allows him, in his role as principal executive officer, to influence information that 

staff develop for Commission review. 

OIG learned that the general practice for developing a SECY paper is as follows: 

Staff develop an issue that is either identified as a potential policy matter or of significant 

interest to the Commission for their consideration. 

39 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
52 


26661.040

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

• The Division Director may have periodic meetings with individual Commission members 

with regard to this information and may present the issue as an informal informational 

matter. 

Senior staff coordinate the matters identified by the staff with their designated DEDO 

who holds "alignment meetings" to determine whether this information is to be conveyed 

to the Commission and in what form. 

• If the alignment meeting consensus is to develop a paper, the paper is generated by 

staff and submitted to the EDO who provides a paper to SECY for tracking, and 

simultaneously tracks the paper in the EDO's system. 

• The paper topic is provided to the Commission for consideration at the Chairman's 

agenda planning session at which time the Commissioners vote to determine when they 

will address the paper. 

OIG learned that the Chairman, unlike the other Commission members, can direct the staff not 

to develop a paper for the Commission's review. Based on information learned during the 

periodic meetings or any other meetings, the Chairman sometimes directs the EDO not to 

develop a paper for Commission review. If other Commissioners disagree, they must prepare a 

COM and gain majority support to direct the staff to prepare a paper for Commission review. 

The EDO told OIG that the Chairman's staff track staff-generated papers and the Chairman 

decides what is considered a policy matter and whether he will inform the Commission of the 

matter. The EDO said the only way a Commissioner can influence when a staff paper is 

submitted or the timing of presentation to the Commission would be to prepare a COM and gain 

a majority on the matter to direct the staff. The EDO said the Chairman told him that he wanted 

to control the flow of policy issues to the Commission to enable them to be more efficient and 

effective by not overloading them so they could focus on certain issues. 

Several OEDO managers and managers of offices that report to the EDO told OIG of problems 

with information flow, while others said they were unaware of any incidents where information 

was not provided to the Commission. For example, one manager told OIG that the current 

approach to information flow to the Commission was not the best way, and the Chairman 

regulates the information to the extent he believes the Commission needs the information to 

make a decision. He said the Commission is "not working well at all today, unfortunately" and 

attributed this to the Chairman's interpretation of his role and responsibilities and the other 

Commissioners disagreeing with his interpretation. In addition, he said, there is so much 

distrust at the chief of staff level that the Commissioners often jump to conclusions about the 

Chairman's directions. In contrast, another manager believed the current Chairman has taken 

the initiative to better integrate the Commission's agenda through agenda planning. He said the 

Chairman has the view that there are policy matters and there are administrative matters and he 

believes the administrative matters should not go to the rest of the Commission. However, he 

40 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
53 


26661.041

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

acknowledged that the Chairman could incorrectly label something as administrative and not 

inform the Commission. He said the staff was sensitive to this and noted that with the CR 

budget guidance memorandum, a known controversial matter, the staff asked the Chairman if 

he was coordinating the matter with the other Commissioners. 

The majority of Commissioner chiefs of staff and legal advisors told OIG that the Chairman 

withholds information to the Commission by either suppressing papers or manipulating the 

agenda planning process because he controls the sequencing of papers to be presented to the 

Commission for vote. They said that this, in tum, causes papers to sit for weeks or months as 

the Chairman decides when information meetings are to be scheduled. Commissioner staff 

perceived this as an effort to control information available to the Commission as the Chairman's 

priorities often did not align with those of individual Commissioners. 

Commissioners Svinicki, Ostendorff, and Magwood told OIG that they sometimes learn of 

potential papers the staff intend to submit to the Commission during their periodic meetings with 

agency managers, but then the papers do not materialize. This makes them question whether 

they are sufficiently informed and aware of policy issues affecting the agency. In particular, the 

three Commissioners mentioned a paper on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

805 rule, 15 where there were indications the staff wanted to raise policy matters to the 

Commission, but were unable to do so as the Chairman had determined the matter was not a 

policy issue. One DEDO told OIG that the Chairman stated he did not want a paper on NFPA 

805 and as a result staff stopped working on the paper. 

Another example provided by two Commissioner staff members was a paper on the 

International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS),'" which the Chairman allegedly directed staff 

to stop preparing. 17 Commissioners told OIG that the distinction between policy issues and 

administrative actions was a subject of contention within the Commission. One Commissioner 

said that where disputes exist, the matters should be decided by the Commission; however, the 

Chairman has established a practice of categorizing a matter as "administrative" when it may 

have policy implications. The Commissioner noted that the CR budget guidance memorandum 

was a good example of this behavior. 

15 NRC regulation 10 CFR 50.48(c), otherwise known as NFPA 805, is a risk-informed, performance-based fire 

protection regulation adopted by the agency in 2004. Lessons learned by the NRC staff from their review of the two 

NFPA 805 pilot plant license amendment requests revealed that the NRC staff had underestimated the resources 

necessary to review NFPA 805 license amendment requests. The NRC staff anticipated receiving 251icense 

amendment requests by the end of June 2011 as a result of the cunrent Commission enforcement policy related to 

NFPA 805. Completing the reviews of such a large number of submittals would be a significant challenge to the 

agency. The NRC staff desired to propose an approach to the Commission to address the expected large number of 

submittals. 

16 The IRRS is an International Atomic Energy Agency peer review and appraisal service. At the 

Government's request, during October 2010, an international team of safety experts reviewed NRC's 

regulatory framework for safety regarding operating U.S. nuclear power plants and the effectiveness of 

regulatory functions implemented by the NRC. The IRRS team identified a number of good practices, and 

made suggestions and recommendations where improvements are desirable or necessary. 

17 Since OIG's interviews with the Commissioners, the staff submitted a paper on NFPA 805 to the Commission for 

review, and the Commissioners received a copy of the IRRS assessment. 

41 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
54 


26661.042

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

The Chainnan's Policy Director told OIG that she meets with the EDO and the Secretary of the 

Commission at least twice monthly to coordinate upcoming policy matters and open items 

before the Commission, the EDO, and SECY. The EDO maintains a tracking system for all 

open and upcoming policy items from staff, and that SECY maintains a separate tracking 

system for all matters before the Commission. She uses these coordination sessions to ensure 

that all matters are addressed and to ensure the Commission has been notified on all matters. 

She said that Chairman Jaczko is very transparent in keeping the other Commissioners 

informed on matters, including when he makes decisions from a non-policy, resources 

perspective. She cited the CR budget guidance memorandum as an example where the 

Chainnan held back issuing the memorandum until he had coordinated the guidance with the 

other Commissioners. 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG he decides what is and is not a policy matter by consulting with the 

General Counsel, his interpretations of his statutory authority, and consultations with the EDO. 

He said the statute notes that the Commissioners always have the option to raise a matter as· 

policy, which is why he consulted as he did with the other Commissioners on the CR budget 

guidance memorandum. He said he knew the Commission did not support the budget guidance 

for the High-Level Waste Program and that he wanted to be prepared for battle. He said he 

proceeded to line up the votes on the matter to ensure if it was addressed as a policy matter, his 

position would be supported. Chainnan Jaczko said the agenda planning process allows the 

Commission to decide by majority which direction to proceed. He said it is a tool for him to keep 

the agency's business moving and gives the Commission a more predictable and efficient way 

to manage its business. 

Chainnan Jaczko told OIG that it was within his authority to tell the staff to prepare or not prepare 

papers. With regard to NFPA 805, he said he never directed staff not to prepare a paper on the 

topic. He recalled the staff came to him and said they would not be able to complete the required 

number of license amendments applications for NFPA 805. Chainnan Jaczko told the staff they 

had been budgeted to complete the license amendments and they needed to figure out how to 

accomplish the task. As Chainnan, it was within his authority to execute the budget and manage 

the policy and workload of the agency. Consequently, he decided the issue would not be on the 

Commission's agenda. The staff later informed him that they were unable to conduct the 

application reviews, and that this would have enforcement discretion implications. As a result, he 

directed them to prepare a paper for the Commission because now this was a policy issue the 

Commission needed to work out. 

Foreign Travel 

NRC Management Directive (MD) 14.1, Official Temporary Duty Travel, assigns the Chainnan 

responsibility for approving official foreign travel for himself and the Commissioners. The 

handbook associated with MD 14.1 assigns approving officials responsibility to ensure that the 

travel is necessary to carry out NRC's mission and directs officials reviewing requests for official 

foreign travel at NRC's expense to "scrutinize the official purpose of the trip and the value of 

collateral purposes to ensure validity." 

42 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
55 


26661.043

OFFICIAL USE ONLY -OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

OIG learned the Chairman required different levels of justification from each Commissioner 

concerning their requests for foreign travel. For example, one Commissioner was required to 

provide written justification to the Chairman for international trips, while other Commissioners 

were granted approval by the Chairman based simply on verbal notification of the planned trip. 

Additionally, the Chairman used foreign travel as an incentive for supporting him on issues. 

Commissioner Svinicki said the Chairman has ambiguous approval criteria for foreign travel, 

which has made her reluctant to pursue trips. She said it is not worth her time and effort to 

develop a justification for a trip that she may be denied and because the Chairman does not 

provide an answer in a timely manner. For example, when requested by a host country to 

speak at conferences, she is unable to provide a timely response. She is now reluctant to 

pursue foreign travel because she is concerned about having to cancel depending on the 

Chairman's decision and the impact this has on her reputation. 

Commissioner Magwood relayed one example where Chairman Jaczko wanted Commissioner 

Magwood to withdraw his request for an additional staff member to support the Commission 

offices. He said the Chairman told him that if he pursued the request, he would withhold 

authorizations on Commissioner Magwood's foreign travel. 

Chairman Jaczko told OIG that as the Chairman of the agency he is responsible for managing 

the agency's workload and workflow, and in that respect he has overall management authority 

of the staff. He related that it was within his discretion to approve or not approve his colleague's 

foreign travel requests. As Chairman, he has tools that he uses to manage the agency, including 

the Commission, and to negotiate and get leverage. One such tool is his discretion to approve 

foreign travel. It was his responsibility to decide who best represented the agency and if he had 

colleagues who did not support him on votes, he was not likely to send them to represent him and 

the agency on international travel. Chairman Jaczko commented that there is nothing unethical or 

inappropriate about that and, in fact, it was his job, to make those difficult decisions. Further, he 

has never taken away anybody's international travel, or not signed a request for international traveL 

Interpersonal Interactions with Commissioners and Staff 

Commissioner staff members told OIG of incidents they perceived as unprofessional behavior 

by Chairman Jaczko toward their Commissioners or members of the staff. For example, staff 

mentioned the Chairman's behavior toward the OCAA Director when she circulated the draft 

order for SECY-10-0102 shortly after the Chairman submitted his vote. Several Commissioner 

staff members relayed incidents where the Chairman angrily confronted their Commissioner on 

issues; however, the Commissioners themselves did not relay such examples. Several current 

and former Commission staff members said the Chairman's behavior caused an intimidating 

work environment. A former Chairman told OIG that the Chairman often yelled at people and 

his tactics had a negative effect on people. He described the behavior as ruling by intimidation. 

The former Chairman said he verbally counseled Chairman Jaczko on his behavior on two 

occasions before leaving the agency. 

43 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
56 


26661.044

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

A number of NRC senior managers interviewed described examples of the Chairman losing his 

temper with them or stories they had heard about him losing his temper with others. Some 

characterized these incidents as disagreements on matters where the Chairman held a strong 

view and they were reluctant to characterize the Chairman's behavior as unprofessional; 

however, they said that if they had subordinates who displayed the same behaviors, they would 

not tolerate it. Conversely, other senior managers interviewed said they never witnessed any 

unprofessional behavior on the Chairman's part. 

Chairman Jaczko acknowledged that he sometimes loses his temper. He said he worked to 

control it and there are times when he has wished he has said or done things differently. He 

said he mainly loses his temper with the Commissioners, but acknowledged that there have 

been a few times when he has said some fairly strong things to the staff. He concluded that his 

behavior created an environment sometimes in which it is difficult for people to work with him, 

and he regretted that. 

Ill. FINDINGS 

1. OIG determined that Chairman Jaczko used a FY 2011 CR budget guidance 

memorandum to initiate NRC's FY 2011 plans to close out its Yucca Mountain license 

application review even though the FY 2011 budget had not yet been passed. The 

Chairman's decision to direct the staff to follow the FY 2011 budget guidance was 

supported by the NRC General Counsel and consistent with (1) the discretion within his 

budget execution authority under the Reorganization Plan, (2) OMB Circular A-11 

guidance to spend prudently during a CR period, (3) the Administration's decision to 

terminate the Yucca Mountain repository project, and (4) the Chairman's interpretation of 

the Commission's FY 2011 budget policy decisions, which articulated close-out 

activities. 

OIG determined that although the Chairman had the authority to direct staff to follow the 

FY 2011 budget guidance, he was not forthcoming with the other Commissioners about 

his intent to stop work on the SER as part of implementing close-out activities. This 

included stopping work on SER Volume 3 (Review of Repository Safety After Permanent 

Closure), which NRC staff believed to be near completion by the end of FY 2010. The 

Chairman anticipated that proceeding to close-out in this manner could be controversial 

and viewed as a policy decision for full Commission consideration. Therefore, prior to 

directing issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum, he strategically provided 

three of the four other Commissioners with varying amounts of information about his 

intention to proceed to closure and not complete SER Volume 3. He did not provide 

Commissioner Svinicki with any information about his intentions. Although two of the 

three Commissioners he spoke with did not fully understand the implications of the CR 

44 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
57 


26661.045

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

budget guidance memorandum, the Chairman told the EDO and the Chairman's Chief of 

Staff told the CFO, prior to their signing the memorandum, that all the Commissioners 

were informed and supported issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum. In 

fact, subsequent to the issuance of th.e CR budget guidance memorandum, a majority of 

Commissioners disagreed with the outcome of the memorandum, which was the 

Chairman's direction to stop work on SER Volume 3. Additionally, a majority of the 

Commissioners did not think the conditions to proceed to closure (i.e., withdrawal or 

suspension) had been met. 

OIG also determined that after Commissioner Ostendorff issued a COM to the 

Commission asking to direct the staff to continue its work on the SER, the Chairman 

communicated to Commissioners Magwood and Apostolakis that he expected their 

continued support. He told them that he would not have directed issuance of the CR 

budget guidance memorandum had they not committed to support him. Despite their 

view that they had not been fully informed about the Chairman's intent behind the CR 

budget guidance memorandum, Commissioners Apostolakis and Magwood elected not 

to participate in voting on the COM. Therefore, without a majority, the Commission was 

unable to move the matter from budget space, within the Chairman's purview, to policy 

space, within the Commission's purview. 

2. OIG determined that although the NWPA requires NRC to consider DOE's Yucca 

Mountain repository license application and issue a final decision approving or 

disapproving issuance of a construction authorization, there are various factors 

preventing the agency from meeting its statutory obligation. These factors include the 

Administration's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository project, decreasing 

appropriations to NRC for the High-Level Waste Program, and the Chairman's direction 

to stop working on the SER. 

3. OIG determined that although the Commission has internal procedures intended to 

facilitate collegial Commission decisionmaking based on majority rule, adjudicatory 

voting procedures are not consistently enforced. Furthermore, these written procedures 

do not provide details on the process that occurs between the completion of an 

adjudicatory SECY paper vote and the conduct of an affirmation vote on the matter. The 

lack of enforcement of and specificity in the Commission's written procedures, coupled 

with the Commission's practice not to move to affirmation until all Commissioners agree 

to the affirmation notice and order, allows matters to sit in abeyance without final 

Commission action. 

4. OIG determined that the Chairman controls information provided to the other 

Commissioners based on his interpretation of his statutory authority as Chairman versus 

the authority given to the Commission. Because he acts as the gatekeeper to determine 

what is a policy matter versus an administrative matter, and manages and controls 

45 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
58 


26661.046

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 

information available to the other Commissioners, they are uncertain as to whether they 

are adequately informed of policy matters that should be brought to their attention. 

Ultimately, however, all Commissioners have the ability to bring what they perceive as 

policy matters before the Commission by writing a COM and gaining majority 

Commission support. 

Please respond to this office on what, if any, action you intend to take in response to this report. 

cc: Commissioner Svinicki 

Commissioner Apostolakis 

Commissioner Magwood 

Commissioner Ostendorff 

46 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY- OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION 
59 

Senator BOXER. Senator, do you want to put something into the 

record? 

Senator SESSIONS. I would like to offer the letter of December 

15th from the Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Of course. We will put that in the record right 

next to the IG report and the General Counsel. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

60 


26661.203

December 15, 20!1 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

326 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington DC 20510 

Dear Senator Sessions; 

I am pleased to respond to your question on the need to invoke Emergency Powers at the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the Reorganization Plan of 1980. I served as 

Chairman from july 2006 until May 2009, during which time I never invoked Emergency 

Powers, even though the NRC Operations Center was activated into "monitoring" mode on 

several occasions. It was not unusual for the NRC Ops Center to be in monitoring mode 

during adverse weather conditions, particularly during hurricane season in the Gulf area, 

something I am sure you can appreciate. The Ops Center would remain in monitoring 

mode for the duration of the hurricane or weather event. 

Weather was not the only trigger. I recall one time when the Ops Center was activated 

when a wayward airplane was unresponsive to radio instruction, and whose flight path 

approached some of our power plants. While this particular incident was resolved, at no 

time would I have felt it necessary to suspend Commission procedures and invoke 

Emergency Powers. I would also point out that during every "monitoring mode" incident, 

one of my senior staff, as well as a senior staff member from each of the Commission 

offices, were expected to participate in all briefings and conference calls for the duration of 

the emergency. In this manner, I fulfilled my statutory obligation to keep the Commission 

fully informed on all current matters. 

Given a situation similar to the incident at Fukushima, l can see no reason to invoke 

Emergency Powers because nothing in the incident would have required a suspension to the 

normal Commission procedures. Moreover, I do not believe that suspending the law, which 

is what Emergency Powers allows, is something taken casually or in response to an incident 

in a foreign country that has little or no threat to the U.S. It is my understanding that former 

Chairman Richard Meserve declared Emergency Powers during 9/11 (a real crisis on 

American soil), but did so in consultation with his fellow Commissioners. Moreover, he 

understood the strength of providing five voices instead of one, and he assigned his fellow 

Commissioners duties to help coordinate the NRC response. Chairman Meserve exercised 

both leadership and a collegial approach. 
61 


26661.204

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

December !5, 20 ll 

Page 2 

As stated in the beginning, l never declared Emergency Powers and had I done so, I would 

have so stated in writing, would have called my fellow Commissioners, and most 

importantly, solicited their support for my actions. f-urthermore, l would have indicated 

when that authority was expected to end, and would never have excluded my fellow 

Commissioners from the Ops Center, as has been reported during the J7ukushima event. 

Please let me know if you need any additional information. 

Dale Klein, Ph.D., P.E. 

Associate Vice Chancellor for Research 

The University of Texas System 

601 Colorado Street, Room 302 

Austin, Texas 78701 
62 

Senator SESSIONS. I think, Chairman, I don’t necessarily agree 

with the summary analysis of that report as the Chairman expressed it. But I certainly don’t object to it being part of the record. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Thank you very much. And people 

can read both and make their decision. 

Senator, do you wish to go yet? No. 

We are going to go on with Senator Crapo. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE CRAPO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Senator CRAPO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I believe it goes without saying that all of us very disturbed by 

what is happening here. It seems to me that it is truly a remarkable circumstance when four members of a five-member Commission from both parties come forward with a letter to the President 

to state that they feel that the operation of the Commission on 

which they are serving is jeopardized. And then to see those four 

members vilified in what appears to be a retaliatory response, it 

just raises tremendous concern on my part about what is happening here. 

After these members of the Commission have raised their concerns, they have been accused of being controlled by others in their 

actions, they have been accused of trying to undermine the security 

and the safety of our nuclear operations in the United States. And 

they have been accused of trying to block transparency in the agency. 

These accusations are not minor. And it appears to me that it is 

something that we ought to look into in this Committee, because 

it is very disturbing. 

If you read the letter that was sent, these Commissioners said 

just the opposite, they expressed the concern that the NRC’s essential mission to protect the health, safety, and security of the American people are being adversely affected. It has been said that they 

have been trying to undermine a proper response to the Fukushima 

accident. They have made the point that they feel that the Chairman has attempted to intimidate the Advisory Committee on reactor safeguards, a legislatively chartered independent group of technical advisors, to prevent it from reviewing certain aspects of the 

NRC’s analysis of the Fukushima incident. We have very different 

versions of what is going on here. 

But the bottom line to me is that we have four members of a 

five-member Commission, and again, clearly from both parties, 

folks who have been appointed by the current President, President 

Obama, three of the four, I believe. And the accusations, in addition to those that I have mentioned, also are that apparently they 

don’t understand the law, and they don’t really have the authority 

to be concerned about the issues that they are raising, which I also 

find to be a remarkable response to the questions. 

As I understand it, the law says each member of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and 

authority in all decisions and actions of the Commission, shall have 

full access to all information relating to the performance of his or 

her duties and responsibilities and shall have one vote. And in a 

1980 review of the operation of the Commission, it was concluded 

63 

that the Chairman may not withhold or delay providing information requested by the Commission, individual members shall also 

have full access to all information in order to assure diverse views 

are properly informed. 

And this report goes on to say that the Commission’s functions, 

information relating to the Commission’s functions will be given to 

the Commissioners immediately and without any alteration. 

Now, I understand that there is an authority of the Chairman of 

the Commission to declare an emergency. And maybe we are going 

to get into battles over whether the Chairman of the Commission 

can simply eliminate the relevance of the other four members of 

the Commission by declaring an emergency. But it seems to me 

that we are getting into some pretty dangerous territory here, if we 

start, as a Committee, involving ourselves in an effort to personally 

attack and undermine the character of any of the members of this 

Commission. I think we ought to look into these facts and find out 

what has been happening and see whether we need to take any action in that regard. 

I am very disturbed by not only the dynamics of the fact that 

four members of the Commission have had to come forward with 

a letter to the President, and I think that everybody in America 

can see how remarkable it is that four people, four of the members 

of the Commission would deem it necessary to do that. I don’t 

think anyone would believe that they did this lightly. And then to 

see the retaliation that has occurred in response to it. It is truly 

disheartening. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Senator Carper is going to withhold, and we will turn to Senator 

Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I appreciate the opportunity to talk. 

I have great concerns. Ever since the nuclear disaster at 

Fukushima, the American people and the world at large have been 

discussing the need for improving nuclear safety. The American 

people want us to ensure that there will not be a repeat of the nuclear disaster we saw in Japan, not have a repeat here in the 

United States, that communities across America are safe from 

harm, and that the people around the country understand that the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission is tasked with protecting us. It is 

not a responsibility that should be taken lightly. 

The October 13th letter to the White House Chief of Staff William Daley from two Republican and two Democrat NRC Commissioners raises serious in my view about public safety. As noted in 

the press and the House Oversight hearing yesterday, the letters 

describe the Chairman’s actions and his behavior as ‘‘causing serious damage’’ to the NRC and are ‘‘creating a chilled work environment’’ at the agency. The letter states that the Chairman ‘‘intimidated and bullied senior staff to the degree that he has created,’’ 

he, he has created, ‘‘a high level of fear and anxiety resulting in 

a chilled work environment.’’ Most importantly, the letter states 

64 

that the ‘‘Commission no longer functions as effectively as it 

should.’’ 

Now, this is not the first time that this Committee has heard 

such charges. Before this Committee, earlier this year, I raised the 

issue of the June NRC Inspector General report. That report stated, ‘‘Several current and former Commission staff members said 

the Chairman’s behavior caused an intimidating work environment.’’ A former Chairman told the Office of Inspector General that 

the Chairman often yelled at people, and his tactics had a negative 

effect on people. He described the behavior as ruling by intimidation. That is on page 43 of the report. 

Are we to dismiss the Inspector General’s report where he states 

that there are a number of interviewees and several current and 

former NRC staff who echo what the four Commissioners who are 

here today with us have told the White House? Is nearly the entire 

NRC out to just get the Chairman? Or is there some truth to the 

concerns being raised by the many individuals who are trying to 

get this agency back on track? 

We must get back to the mission at hand and do the proper oversight to see that this agency gets back on track. We have four Commissioners here who say that the agency isn’t working as effectively as it should. That means this agency, tasked with protecting 

the American people, is not fulfilling its mission under this Chairman’s leadership. 

White House Chief of Staff Bill Daley said of the Chairman, ‘‘The 

Chairman apologized for the distraction caused by the present tensions and has taken responsibility for improving communication 

among the Commissioners.’’ Well, apologizing for causing a distraction for the Obama administration to me is not an apology. This 

is about public safety, and the Commissioner needs to apologize to 

the public for letting things get to this point. 

Bill Daley’s call to have all the Commissioners meet with a 

‘‘trusted third party to work everything out with the Chairman,’’ 

well, it ignores the claims made about verbal harassment to women 

and by others and the hostile work environment that the Commissioners and the staff have alleged. In no other workplace in this 

country would such charges be simply ignored, or would the accuser be told to work everything out with those who were making 

the accusations. The White House needs to do much more. 

So as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and 

Nuclear Safety, I ask the Chairman of the Subcommittee and the 

full Committee to hold additional hearings to investigate these 

claims and to find out how this agency has gotten off track and 

how we can get it back on the right track on behalf of the safety 

of the American people. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

We will next hear from Senator Vitter, followed by Senator Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to all of 

our witnesses. 

65 

I want to underscore in the strongest possible terms all of these 

concerns that have been voiced by my colleagues. We are in a time 

following the Japanese disaster, we are in one of the two most sensitive and important times regarding civilian nuclear safety in our 

lifetime. And the good news is, we don’t have a crisis situation in 

terms of our reactors, in terms of immediate safety concerns, in 

terms of the industry and the state of the industry and the state 

of our technology. 

But the bad news is, we do have a crisis of government and a 

crisis of leadership, as evidenced by this discussion and the leadership style of the Chairman. Again, I want to repeat because it is 

so important, that these concerns are coming from four other Commissioners, two Democrats, two Republicans, three appointed 

under President Obama. By definition, this is obviously not some 

purely partisan disagreement. And I think we need to take it extremely seriously, because nuclear safety is involved. And it has 

reached, unfortunately, I believe, a crisis of government and leadership in the person of the Chairman. 

I also strongly agree with my colleagues that first, this Committee should take a strong, active, aggressive role in fixing the 

problem. Because we owe it to our constituents. And second, we 

need to urge the President to get actively involved because in some 

sense only he and the White House can really truly fix this. I certainly agree with previous comments that the suggestion of bringing in some third party mediator type to deal with everyone is not 

getting truly and seriously involved. We need leadership here from 

the President and the White House to fix this really quickly. And 

I urge that as well. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

Senator Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and really quickly, 

in the interest of time, because I know we need to get to the panel. 

The purpose of the hearing today to discuss Fukushima and the 

aftermath, how we can prevent that from happening here, all of 

that is so important. But I think the real problem is, and I think 

that we would all agree that for whatever reason, the Commission 

is pretty dysfunctional. I haven’t been around here as long as some, 

but for me, in the past 10 years, this is probably kind of a unique 

thing. It shouldn’t be a partisan issue, and I don’t think it is a partisan issue in the sense that we have Democrats and Republicans 

serving on the Commission. The career staffers are having problems, I am sure there are Democrats and Republicans. But we really do have real problem. 

So I would very much like, we are charged with oversight, I 

would very much like for us to figure out whatever steps we need 

to do to help solve the problem. And like I say, I think that that 

really is very, very important. So for whatever reason we have a 

major problem here, at a time when this is one of the Commissions 

that is so important. After the aftermath, we have seen what happens with lax supervision. 

66 

And again, right now, we have a significant problem. I would 

hope that the Committee does its job in doing the oversight to get 

this figured out and to solve the problem. 

With that, I look forward to the testimony. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Now, Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Well, to our Commissioners, thank you all for 

joining us here today. I remember in listening to Senator Alexander’s comments, remember the first—I remember the day we had 

the hearing for the three nominees of President Obama, and just 

really being proud of the Administration, proud of the President for 

the selections that he had made and the nominees that he had sent 

to us that day. 

I remember the first time the five of you came before this Committee to testify and feeling proud to chair the Subcommittee that 

has jurisdiction over clean air and nuclear safety, and knowing 

that it is in your hands, the leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. And a year or 2 later, to be here today, to have, on 

the heels of the hearing in the House of Representatives yesterday 

and the assertions, the letters to the White House and my conversations with each and every one of you, I share in the dismay 

of my colleagues. 

As was said, and I will say it again, 20 percent of the electricity 

in this country comes from nuclear power. Because of the 104 nuclear power plants we have, we have less air pollution, we have 

less reliance on fossil fuels, we have greater energy independence, 

and frankly, a lot of jobs, good jobs, good paying jobs that help provide us the electricity we need to run this country and our economy. We need for this Commission to bring its A game to work 

every day, not just some of the time, all of the time. 

This Commission, you have heard me say more times than you 

probably want to remember, if it isn’t perfect, make it better. And 

there is a lot that you all do well. I don’t think the NRC is dysfunctional. But you are not bringing your A game. 

Frankly, where we serve on this side of the dais, the last several 

years, we have not brought our A game either. Sometimes I look 

at the U.S. Senate and I see wonderful people, smart people, bright 

people, good hearted people, dedicated people. And instead of getting a synergy out of this group in the Senate, sometimes we get 

just the opposite. To have a group of five people as talented and 

as dedicated and capable as you are and to not be able to work together any better than you are is just dismaying. 

I had the opportunity to chair the same Subcommittee that Jim 

Inhofe used to and George Voinovich used to chair. And Madam 

Chair, with your blessing and that of Senator Inhofe, I would hope 

that our Subcommittee could take a more active role in helping to 

get to the bottom of why this leadership of the NRC is unable to 

function better, to function more effectively and to be more collegial. 

In my own experience, I find that leadership is the key to everything I have ever been a part of. Senator Inhofe and I spent a lot 

67 

of years in the Navy, he in the submarine, me in an airplane looking for submarines. I know he knows a little bit about leadership, 

and I think I do, too. 

I know as a leader around here, when people are unhappy with 

me here, I literally go to their offices. I go to their offices. And if 

there is some way I have offended somebody and hurt somebody, 

I apologize. I don’t ask them to come to me, I don’t ignore them, 

I go to see them. There are things that leaders sometimes have to 

do in order to create that environment of cooperation. Then there 

are the skills that we learn in other ways in other times of our 

lives. I think our leader, our Commissioner, our Chair here, may 

need to learn some of those lessons. 

But this is a guy who has the potential for being a very fine, a 

very fine Chairman. And I want to make sure, as long as you are 

the Chairman, that that is the kind of Chairman you are going to 

be. We all want to do that. 

And let me just say, we have gone through an experience at 

Dover Air Force Base which in the last 4 years has been nominated 

to be the best Air Force Base in the world, throughout the last 4 

years, we have gone through an experience with the mortuary 

there where people weren’t doing their best job every day. Three 

people blew the whistle. Three people blew the whistle on what 

they thought was inappropriate behavior involving the remains and 

fragments of remains of our fallen heroes. 

What happened to them? They became demonized. They were, in 

one instance, two people were fired, and one person was put on administrative leave for months, because they told the truth. But we 

are not interested in—if these other four Commissioners are whistleblowers, I don’t want to be part of demonizing them. But I want 

to find out, I hope that in the context of this conversation today 

and the hearings and discussions, maybe a roundtable that follows, 

we can end up not with recrimination, not with finger pointing, not 

with political gamesmanship, but we could end up with a Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission that actually will do the three things that 

they are supposed to do every day, to protect the health of the 

American people, to protect their safety, to protect our security and 

make sure that there are 104 nuclear power plants and the ones 

that follow that operate as close to perfect as they possibly can. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Let me begin by welcoming back the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 

Commissioners to our Committee. I appreciate you taking the time to be before us 

today. 

Currently, this country has 104 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 States. 

Collectively, these nuclear power plants generate approximately 20 percent of our 

nation’s total electric consumption. 

The energy from these nuclear power plants has helped curb our reliance on dirty 

fossil fuels and has helped reduce our air pollution that damages health and causes 

global warming. 

Despite the benefits of nuclear power, we have also seen the damages nuclear 

power can cause if not properly regulated. 

The crisis at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi facility is a strong reminder that 

with nuclear energy, we can never be complacent when it comes to safety. Safety 

must always be our top priority. 

68 

As I often say, if it is not perfect, make it better. 

That is why I was pleased to see that quickly after the Fukushima crisis, the NRC 

decided to put together a task force to review its own practices to see if we could 

do better in the United States to protect safety. 

Today I look forward to hearing an update on the NRC Task Force recommendation, hearing what the Commissioners view as their top concerns, and hearing when 

we might see actions. 

I believe we all need to work together to make sure we incorporate the right lessons learned to keep our nuclear fleet safe into the future. I look forward to working 

with the NRC to ensure that happens. 

Speaking of working together, I would like to take a moment to talk about the 

interactions of the Commissioners. 

For over a decade, as a member of the Senate EPW Committee, I have worked 

closely with the men and women who have served on the NRC. 

As Chairman of the Subcommittee responsible for nuclear safety, I have been particularly interested in the effective operation of the NRC. 

I said many times that there have never been five better qualified people to serve 

as Commissioners than those who serve today. 

That is why I am so disappointed that the five Commissioners, each talented and 

capable in their own right, have been unable to work together as a cohesive body. 

During the past year I have sought to improve the tenor of relationships among 

the five current Commissioners of the NRC. 

While I am discouraged that those efforts have not been as successful as I would 

have hoped, I am confident that the NRC will continue its critical mission—ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation’s nuclear reactors now and in the future. 

Recent disagreements among Commissioners, while significant, have not impacted 

nuclear safety, nor should they. 

Moving forward, I will continue to encourage cooperation and collegiality among 

the Commission members and most importantly, that Congress provides the tools 

and resources the Commission needs to carry out its mission of protecting public 

safety through responsible nuclear regulation. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Now we turn to the Commissioners. And the way we have it, we 

have 5 minutes by the Chairman and each of you, if you would like 

to, can have up to 3 minutes each. 

So, Chairman, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, Chairman Carper, and Ranking Member Barrasso of the 

Subcommittee, and members of the Committee. 

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to update you on the NRC’s review of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and the 2011 accomplishments of the agency. 

Before I do provide these specific updates, I would like to take 

a moment to just make a few brief comments. As many of you have 

indicated, over the past several days, there has been a flurry of attention paid to the management of the NRC and the dynamics of 

the Commission. I regret that these internal matters have been elevated to a public forum, and I accept my share of responsibility for 

the situation. As I have indicated, I am committed to working with 

my colleagues to address these issues and better understand their 

concerns. 

I have great respect for the experience and expertise of my colleagues, and I committed to moving forward and working effectively with them to ensure the safety and security of nuclear power 

plants and nuclear materials in the United States. 

In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, the Commission established the Near-Term Task Force to spearhead our systematic 

69 

and methodical review of the NRC’s nuclear reactor safety program. Its members included some of the agency’s most experienced 

and expert staff, collectively having more than 135 years of regulatory experience. 

In conducting their review, the Task Force’s efforts were independent, but they had full access to the entire NRC staff, with 

more than 100 hours of briefings. They also spent thousands of 

hours reviewing agency products and information and consulted 

closely with the NRC site team in Japan. 

When we last appeared before you, the Task Force had submitted 

its report to the Commission for consideration. In its report, the 

Task Force outlined a comprehensive set of 12 recommendations 

that touch on a broad range of important issues, including the loss 

of electrical power, earthquakes, flooding, spent fuel pools, venting, 

and emergency preparedness. The Task Force’s recommendations 

have now undergone two additional reviews, one by the NRC staff 

more broadly and another by the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards. And we have benefited from the insights and perspectives of industry leaders, nuclear safety and environmental groups, 

and members of the public. 

The staff review endorsed nearly all of the Task Force’s recommendations and identified several additional issues for consideration. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards also endorsed all of the Task Force recommendations that it has had the 

chance to examine thus far, and also proposed some additional 

steps. 

The Commission has now directed the staff to begin implementing immediately, partially or fully, five of the safety recommendations from the Task Force and set goals of completing station blackout rulemaking within 24 to 30 months, and completing 

all actions in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima 

Daiichi within 5 years. And in addition, just this morning, the 

Commission has finalized its recommendations or comments on an 

additional set of prioritization recommendations made by the staff 

of the agency in regard to the remaining recommendations. 

In summary, with the benefit of our staff’s expertise, the ARCS’s 

advice and critical stakeholder input, the Commission is moving 

forward on these recommendations. I think we all agree that this 

past year has been an exceptionally challenging and productive 

year for the NRC. We are proud to have once again scored among 

the top tier of Federal agencies in the 2011 best places to work in 

the Federal Government rankings. And the agency scored No. 1 in 

all four major indices. 

The staff and the Commission have done an outstanding job in 

the past year. We had anticipated that 2011 would be busy, but unexpected issues, most notably Fukushima Daiichi, raised substantial new challenges. In spite of these challenges, the staff remained 

focused on our critical safety mission and ultimately kept the public health and safety at the forefront of all of its actions. 

With that, I will conclude my testimony and appreciate the opportunity to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:] 

70 


26661.047

Introduction 

WRITTEN STATEMENT 

BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

AND THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

December 15, 2011 

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member lnhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Barrasso. and Members of the Committee. we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

to update you on the NRC's review of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident and implic:ations 

for the domestic fleet of nuclear power reactors and the NRC's work as a regulator. When we 

last appeared before you, the agency's Near-Term Task Force ("Task Force") had submitted its 

report to the Commission for consideration. That report included a comprehensive set of 12 

recommendations- many with both short- and long-term elements- to increase safety and 

redefine what level of protection of public health is regarded as adequate. It also recommended 

additional study of some issues. In my testimony today. I would like to update you on where the 

NRC staff and Commission efforts currently stand. 

First, I would like to publicly thank the NRC staff for their excellent and tireless work. 

especially want to applaud the Task Force and the NRC Senior Management Steering 

Committee that Jed the development of papers to supplement the Task >=orce's outstanding 

work. The Commission benefits every day from tne NRC staffs efforts as we ali seek the best 

path forward following the events in Japan 
71 


26661.048

Commission Direction to Staff Following Task Force Recommendations 

On August 191

h the Commission directed the staff to provide us with a series of vote 

papers within 21 days, 45 days, and 18 months addressing different aspects of the Task Force 

recommendations. We have received the first two of these requested papers and held public 

Commission meetings with stakeholder and staff presentations to discuss them. 

Finally, we directed the staff to carry out these activities with the prompt engagement of 

stakeholders to review and assess the recommendations of the Task Force in a comprehensive 

and holistic manner for the purpose of providing the Commission with fully informed options and 

recommendations. We believe that the Commission meetings mentioned above, and other upfront stakeholder involvement that I will mention later, have been time well spent, and should 

result in the best safety decision&. 

NRC Staff Recommendations regarding Actions to be Taken without Delay 

On September 91h. staff submitted the 21-day pape~ that identified those Task i"orce 

recommendations that could, and, in the staffs judgment, should be implemented in part or in 

whole, without delay. In its paper. the staff agreed with the Task Force that none of its 12 

recommendations identified an imminent hazard to public health and safety, and also 

recognized that the agency does not have enough resources to initiate actions on all 

recommendations in the near term In completing its work on the 21-day report. the staff 

conducted a public meet1ng on August 31 and also received written stakeholder comments. 

The i:1dustry. the Federal Emergency Management Agency, a~c! nongovernmental participants 

agreed in concept with the recommendations discussed at the meeting, although various 

viewpoints emerged concerning the pace of implementation and associated regulatory vehicles. 

The staff paper identified five of the 12 Task Force recommendations as those that it 

believes should be implemented immediately in whole or in par:: however. in some cases. the 

staff paper proposed specif:c approaches and regulatory vehicles different tram what the NearTerm Task Force recommended. In general. the staffs approach to each recommendation 

2 
72 


26661.049

involves stakeholder engagement and implementation of the recommendation through the 

appropriate regulatory vehicle or vehicles. The five Task Force recommendations. as revised 

and presented by the staff, address issues related to seismic and flooding hazards, station 

blackout. B.S.b or mitigating strategies equipment. hardened vents for boiling water reactor 

containments, emergency response capabilities. and response to multi-unit events. The specific 

recommendations in the 21-day paper are as follows: 

Recommendation 2.1: Continue stakeholder interactions to discuss the technical 

basis and acceptance criteria for conducting a reevaluation of site-specific 

seismic hazards, and initiate stakeholder interaction to discuss application of 

current regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for new reactors to 

the reevaluation of flooding hazards at operating reactors. Develop and issue a 

request for information to licensees to (1) reevaluate site-specific seismic and 

flooding hazards. and (2) identify actions that have been taken or are planned to 

address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic and 

flooding hazards. Finally, evaluate licensee responses and take appropriate 

regulatory action to resolve those vulnerabilities. 

Recommendation 2.3: Develop and issue a request for information to licensees 

to (1) develop a methodology and acceptance criteria for seismic and flooding 

facility walk downs to be endorsed by the staff following interaction with external 

stakeholders, (2) perform seismic and flood protection walk downs to identify and 

address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of monitoring and 

maintenance for protective features. and (3) inform the NRC of the results of the 

walk downs and corrective actions taken or planned. 

Recommendation 4.1: Engage stakeholders in support of rulemaking activities to 

enhance the capability to maintain safety through a prolonged station blackout 

3 
73 


26661.050

These activities will include the development of the regulatory basis. a proposed 

rule. and implementing guidance. 

Recommendation 4.2: Develop and issue Orders to licensees to provide 

reasonable protection of the equipment used to satisfy the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.54(hh)(2) from the effects of external events, and to establish and 

maintain sufficient capacity to mitigate multiunit events. This will Include 

interaction with stakeholders to define acceptance criteria for reasonable 

protection of that equipment from design basis external hazards. 

Recommendation 5.1 · Develop and ISsue Orders to licensees with Boiling Water 

Reactor (BWR) Mark I primary containment designs to taf~e act1on to ensure 

reliable hardened wet well vents. This will include interactions with stakeholders 

to develop the technical bases and acceptance criteria for suitable design 

expectations for reliable hardened vents. 

Recommendation 8: Issue an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to 

engage stakeholders in rulemaking activities associated with the methodology for 

integration of onsite emergency response processes, procedures, training. and 

exercises. Interact with stakeholders to modify the emergency operating 

procedures (EOPs) generic technical guidelines in order to include guidance for 

severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) and extensive dama9e 

miti9ation guidelines (t:DMGs) in an integrated manner and to clarify command 

and control issues. as appropnate. 

Recommendations 9.3 and 94 Develop and issue a request for mformation to 

licensees. including a schedule for interactions with stakeholders. to (1) perform 

a staffing study to determine the required staff to fill ali necessary positions to 

respond to a muit1-unit event. (2) evaluate what ennancements would be needed 

4 
74 


26661.051

to power communication equipment necessary for licensee onsite and offsite 

communications during a prolonged station blackout event, and (3) inform the 

NRC of the results of the staffing study and any actions taken or planned in 

response to those results and to enhance communication equipment In 

addition, the staff also recommends that the NRC more closely monitor the 

industry's completion of the Emergency Response Data System (EROS) 

modernization initiative, schedule to be completed by June 2012, so that staff 

can use additional regulatory tools should licensees fail to meet their 

implementation schedules. 

The staff has concluded that the implementation of each recommendation noted above 

would improve safety at U.S. nuclear facilities. 

In addition to the review of the recommendations by the staff, the Advisory Committee 

for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) also has reviewed the recommendations that should be 

implemented without delay. As part of its review. the ACRS concluded that none of the 

recommendations will be negated, or rendered inappropriate, by the acquisition of new 

information. 

On Thursday, October 20, in response to the 21-day report, the Commission directed the 

agency's staff to begin immediately implementing these seven safety recommendations from 

the Task Force. These recommendations cover issues including the loss of all A/C electrical 

power at a reactor (station blackout). reviews of seismic and flooding hazards. emergency 

equipment and plant staff training. The staff was directed to utilize performance-based 

standards in any new or revised regulations. wherever oossible. The Commission also set a 

goal of completing station blackout rulemaking by 2014, and to strive for completion of all 

actions in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima within five years- by 2016. 

5 
75 


26661.052

Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned 

On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff submitted to the Commission the requested 45-day 

report recommending a prioritization of the 12 Task Force recommendations. This paper 

reflects both the results of a September 21'' public meeting with representatives of the nuclear 

industry to better understand their current plans and actions to address the lessons learned 

from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. and the continued review of the Task Force 

recommendations by the staff following submission of the 21-day paper. 

As a result of the staffs prioritization and assessment process, the Task Force 

recommendations were prioritized into three tiers. Tier 1 consrsts of those Task Force 

recommendations that the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for 

which sufficient resource flexibility. including availability of critical skill sets. exists. The staff 

recommended that this tier include all the actions identified in the 21-day paoer. plus two 

additional items that were identified as part of the staff's continuing review of the Task Force 

recommendations. Those two additional recommendations are: (1) the inciusion of Mark II 

containments in the staff's recommendation for reliable hardened vents associated with Task 

Force recommendation 5.1. and (2) the implementation of spent fuel pool instrumentation 

proposed in recommendation 7 .1. 

Tier 2 comprises those recommendations that could not be initiated in the near term due 

to factors that include the need for further technical assessment and alignment, dependence on 

Tier 1 issues, or availability of critical sKill sets. These include recommendations regarding 

spent fuel pool makeup capability, and most of the remaining portions of recommendation 9.3 

regarding emergency preparedness regulatory actions. 

Tier 3 includes those recommendations that require further staff study to support a 

regulatory action. have an associated shorter-term action that needs to be completed to inform 

the longer-term action. are dependerot on the availability of critical skill sets, or are dependent on 

the resolution of Task Force Recommendation #1, which deals with clarification of the regulatory 

6 
76 


26661.053

framework and is to be the subject of the 18-month paper requested in the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum. Tier 3 includes all of the items identified for long-term evaluation in the NearTerm Task Force report. All or parts of three other task force recommendations are included in 

this tier because they depend on evaluation or completion of other recommendations or on the 

availability of critical skill sets. 

The staff's 45-day paper also includes two other important components: schedules, 

milestones, and resources associated with Tier 1 and Tier 2 activities and the identification of a 

number of additional issues with a clear nexus to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event that may warrant 

regulatory action, but which were not included with the Near-Term Task Force 

recommendations. These new recommendations address potential safety issues such as spent 

fuel storage, instrumentation for seismic monitoring, and emergency planning. 

The Commission is currently considering the staff's recommendations in the 45-day 

report. The NRC staff has provided the Commission with additional important information 

related to the recommendations that the Task Force initially identified. With the benefit of our 

staff's experience and thoughtful consideration. the ACRS' advice. as well as critical stakeholder 

input, the Commission is now actively moving forward. The Commission looks forward to 

reaching a final decision on each of the recommendations in the coming weeks and we agree 

that the NRC should strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima 

accident within five years. We continue to welcome and encourage additional safety 

suggestions from our broad range of stakeholders. 

2011 Accomplishments 

In addition. I would like to take this opportunity to update you on the many important 

accomplishments the NRC has made this year. The year 2011 has been an exceptionally 

challenging and productive year for the NRC. The NRC staff has done an outstanding job over 

the past year under what have been. at times, challenging circumstances. The Commission 

7 
77 


26661.054

never loses sight of the fact that our effectiveness as a safety and security regulator depends 

first and foremost on the staff's hard work and dedication. 

Even with the pressures of the past year, the NRC once again scored among the top tier 

of Federal agencies in the 2011 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings. 

conducted by the Partnership for Public Service. The NRC scored number one in all four major 

indices, including leadership and knowledge management, results-oriented performance culture. 

talent management, and job satisfaction. These rankings were determined through an analysis 

of the 2011 Federal Employment Viewpoint Survey conducted by the Office of Personnel 

Management 

At the agency, we anticipated that this year would be busy, but several unexpected 

issues- most notably, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear emergency in Japan- raised substantial 

new challenges. Added to that, a spate of multiple natural disasters, including flooding in the 

Midwest in June: the earthquake on the East Coast in August: as well as hurricanes and 

tornadoes. created additional pressures. These natural disasters required close coordination 

with states, federal agencies and licensees. and involved the efforts and expertise of numerous 

staff at NRC s headquarters and regional offices 

During the past fiscal year, we have performed thousands of hours of inspections at 

nuclear power plants and materials sites. We have taken hundreds of enforcement actions, 

reviewed more than a thousand licensing acllons and tasks, and issued a number of proposed 

and final rules. We also issued a final Safety Culture Policy Statement, establishing for the first 

time the Commission's expectations for individuals and organizations involved in NRC-regulated 

activities to establish and maintain a positive safety culture proportionate to the safety and 

security significance of their activities. 

While many plants have performed very well this year. there are two plants in Column 

Four, on a five-column scale, of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix after experiencing 

issues that the NRC views as safety significant. There are aiso two plants in Column Three. 

8 
78 


26661.055

which indicates declining performance. The NRC has conducted a greater number of special 

inspections in the past year- 21 to date- than at any point in recent memory. 

These developments, of course, are concerning for the specific plants involved, but as a 

regulator, we must be on guard to the possibility that they could be indicative of broader issues 

for the industry. Also, there are currently two units in extended shutdowns. one, Fort Calhoun, 

due to circumstances related to external events and the other, Crystal River, due to problems 

resulting from maintenance activities. Additionally, two units at the North Anna plant, in Virginia, 

were in extended shutdown this year due to the East Coast earthquake in August. Neither the 

Crystal River nor North Anna extended shutdowns were the result of declining licensee 

performance, and, in its current assessment of industry trends, the NRC staff has not identified 

any statistically significant adverse trends. 

During the past year, we completed the safety and environmental reviews of the first two 

new reactor combined license applications for the Vogtle site in Georgia and the Summer site in 

South Carolina, and held mandatory hearings on both applications. We expect to make 

decisions on those applications within the next several weeks. We issued the final safety 

evaluation reports for the AP1 000 and ESBWR design certifications, and issued eight reactor 

license renewals. We successfully completed the review and approval of two pilot applications 

for transitioning to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, a risk-informed, 

performance-based standard for fire protection at nuclear power plants. and worked with 

stakeholders to establish a submittal and review schedule for 29 anticipated transition 

applications. 

We issued three new uranium recovery licenses, authorized the restart of one uranium 

recovery facility, and issued the license for the AREVA Eagle Rock centrifuge enrichment facility 

to be built in Idaho, the first such license approval issued in almost 5 years. And, in line with our 

responsibilities to ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials, we continued 

implementation of the License Tracking System and the National Source Tracking System. We 

9 
79 


26661.056

also issued a final policy on the protection of sealed radiation sources containing cesium-137 

chloride. which are used in blood irradiation. bio-medical and industrial research. and calibration 

of instrumentation and radiation measuring instruments. 

We also continued to focus on moving forward and resolving long-standing safety issues 

such as; Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191. concerning the potential for the blockage of boiling 

water reactors· suction strainers and pressurized water reactors' containment sump screens. 

due to debris accumulation; and Gl-199, the updates to seismic hazard estimates for the Central 

and Eastern United States. 

The NRC staff also completed the orderly close out of the Yucca Mountain high-level 

waste repository licensing program and the Department of Energy's license application. As part 

of this process. the staff conducted a comprehensive effort to collect and capture knowledge to 

ensure that the agency's many years of technical work are preserved. This included 

documenting the agency's review and other knowledge about the program through three 

technical evaluation reports, over 40 other topical reports. as well as videotaped interviews of 

technical staff. 

Cybersecurity is a serious concern for all agencies across the Federal government. In 

Fiscal Year 2011, we approved cybersecurity plans for all nuclear power plants and established 

an implementation plan to have all plants at a high level of cyber protection by the end of Fiscal 

Year 2012. 

Approximately 30 NUREGs- reports or brochures on regulatory decisions. research, 

investigations and other technical and administrative information -were published on a wide 

variety of topi(;S, such as degradation of core internals due to neutron irradiation and 

groundwater contamination. We sponsored the 23rd annual Regulatory information Conference 

for governmen .. , nuclear industry. international agencies, and other stakeholders to meet and 

discuss nuclear safety and security topics and significant regulatory actions. More than 3.000 

10 
80 


26661.057

individuals registered for the March 2011 conference. We also hosted the first Integrated 

Regulatory Review Service mission to the United States to assess our regulatory infrastructure 

against international safety standards and good practices. The mission was coordinated by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency and concluded that the NRC has a well-established 

national policy and strategy for nuclear safety. 

Transparency and openness are part of our formal NRC Organizational Values, and they 

are integral guiding principles in everything we do, both internally and externally. After the 

challenges we have faced over the past year, and the bright spotlight that has been shined on 

nuclear regulation, nuclear safety, and nuclear power plants by the Congress, the media and 

the public, the NRC continues to be accessible and open, and to make sure that all of our 

stakeholders understand what we are doing and why we are doing it 

The NRC has held many public meetings throughout the past year, noticing more than 

1,030 public meetings in Washington. D.C., and around the country, addressing a full range of 

NRC issues. During fiscal year 2011. my colleagues and I held 38 public Commission 

meetings, 10 closed commission meetings, and 14 sessions to set the Commission agenda and 

issued 92 staff requirements memoranda (SRMs) on substantive Commission voting matters. 

This was 30 more SRMs than we completed in Fiscal Year 2010. And of the 381 requests 

submitted to the NRC for information under the Freedom of Information Act we have closed out 

338. 

The NRC redesigned the agency's public website to improve navigation, content and 

accessibility, and substantially improved our web-based document management system to 

enable the public to more easily and quickly access all public documents. And, the agency has 

successfully begun to utilize new social media tools- including a public blog, Twitter and 

YouTube accounts- to enhance our outreach efforts. 

11 
81 


26661.058

As we have worked to fulfill our responsibilities for our safety and security mission, we 

have also been working to increase our effectiveness and efficiency as an agen::;y, We have 

more efficiently executed the appropriations that Congress has given us by successfully working 

to reduce our carryover funds this year. 

Construction of our new third headquarters building. Three White Flint North. is on 

schedule for opening in late 2012. One of the valuable lessons we learned after Three Mile 

Island was the importance of being co-located. The new building will allow headquarters staff to 

once again work in one central location to better support the agency's critical health and safety 

mission. 

None of the agency's many achievements during the past year could have happened 

without support from the entire NRC team-those working on the financing issues, the legal 

aspects. the personnel and administrative support. the technical side. and more. By no means 

does my testimony cover the full breadth of the agency's wide-ranging activities But these 

accomplishments are indicative of a well-functioning agency with a strong focus on our mission, 

and the staff's steadfast efforts, day-in and day-out to strengthen nuclear safety and security. 

We have many important issues on our plate right now-both internally to strengthen our 

organization and externally to continue ensuring the safety and security of our nation's nuclear 

facilities and materials. We cannot predict with any certainty all the issues that might arise in 

the upcoming year. That makes it all the more important that we prudently manage the 

resources entrusted to us by the American people, take full advantage of all the talents and 

expertise that our diverse team brings to the table. and keep our focus-first and foremost-on 

our safety and security mission. 

Chairman Boxer. Ranking Member lnhofe. Chairman Carper. Ranking Member 

Barrasso, and Members of the Commit1ee. this concludes my formal testimony today. On 

behalf of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and your 

12 
82 


26661.059

continued interest in our work on these important issues. We look forward to continuing to work 

with you to advance the NRC's important safety mission. We would be pleased to respond to 

any questions you may have. 

13 
83 


26661.060

Questions from Senator Boxer 

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER: 

I share your strong commitment to ensuring safety at our nation's 

nuclear power facilities. Can you specifically elaborate on what 

progress has been made by the NRC to begin implementing the Task 

Force recommendations as outlined in the staff prioritization and 

proposed schedule of October 3, 2011? 

As a result of recent legislative expectations and input it received from stakeholders, the NRC 

staff has accelerated the schedule originally proposed in the October 3, 2011, paper to the 

Commission (SECY-11-0137). In accordance with the new accelerated schedule, on 

February 17, 2012, the staff provided a notation vote paper to the Commission, SECY-12-0025, 

proposing orders on Tier 1 issues and requests for information to be issued to licensees before 

the first anniversary of Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent 

tsunami. SECY-12-0025 is publicly available and is currently under review by the Commission. 

The three orders drafted by the staff are consistent with the recommendations and prioritization 

in the October 3, 2011, paper. Specifically, two of the orders are proposed to be issued to all 

reactor licensees, including holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50, and a holder 

of a combined license (COL) under 10 CFR Part 52, regarding (1) development of strategies to 

mitigate beyond-design-basis natural phenomena that addresses both multi-unit events and 

reasonable protection of equipment identified under such strategies, and (2) installation of 

enhanced spent fuel pool instrumentation. The third order, pertaining to reliable containment 

vents, is proposed to be issued to licensees operating boiling water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I 

and Mark II containments. 

- 1 -
84 


26661.061

The NRC staff is also planning to issue a request for information, as described in the October 3, 

2011, paper. The request addresses seismic a11d flooding hazard reevaluations, seismic a11d 

floodl11g hazard walkdowns, a11d includes a request for lice11sees to assess their current 

communications system a11d equipme11t under co11ditions of 011site and offsite damage a11d 

prolo11ged statio11 blackout (SBO) a11d to perform a s!affi11g study to determi11e the number a11d 

qualificatio11s of staff required to fill all necessary positions 111 respo11se to a multi-unit event. 

Lice11sees are required to respond to the request for i11formation as provided i11 10 CFR 50.54(f) 

a11d Sectio11 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as ame11ded. 

The NRC staff's proposed impleme11tatio11 dates and projected actions for the proposed orders 

a11d requests for i11formation are as follows: 

1st Update October31, 2012 

Plan ._ february28, 2013 

Submitt:ed 

Periodic Every six months 

Updates 

Latest December31,2016 

Completion 

October 31, 2012 

Augusf31, 2013 

Every six months 

Prior to initial fuel 

load 

. 2. 

Constructio Permit 

Holde s 

August 31,.2012 

October 31, 2012 

August 31,, 2013 

Every six months 

Prior to receipt of 

operating license 
85 


26661.062

Milestone , 

' ' ' ' 

Guidance Issued 

Initial 

Response 

Licer~see Seismic 

Hazard Evaluations Due 

Licensee Flooding 

Hazard Evaluations Due 

Future Steps 

January 30, 2013 

SeptemberS, 2013 (CEUS) !March 9, 2015 {WUS) 

March 9, 2013- March 9, 2015 

(based on prioritization) 

Pending NRC evaluation and prioritization, with 

completionof evaluations for all facl!ltles bE!tween 

.October 2016 and April.2019 

Milestone' ' , ' 

' ' . \ \ 

Guidance Issued or 

Endorsed 

licensees Identify 

Walkdown Procedures 

To Be Used 

Licensees Provide 

Results of Walkdowns 

-May 2012 

Jllne 9, 2012 (flooding I I July 9, 2012 (seismic) 

1801 days after NRC endorsement of the walkdown 

procedure (-November 2P12) 

- 3-
86 


26661.063

Schedule Overview for 50.54(0 Letter on Enhanced EP Staffing and Communications: 

Milestone Operating Reactor~; Combined license , ' 

Holders, and Construction Permit Holder~ ' 

4.2 Guidance 

Issued or 

Endorsed 

licensee 

Responses 

August31, 2012 

June 9, 2012 (communications) 

June 9, 2012 (staffing items 3 through 6) 

October 31, 2012 {staffing items 1 and 2)* 

*Go ctays,atter issuance- of guidance .associated with,fiecomm<?ndation 4.2.order 

-4 
87 


26661.064

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER: 

At the hearing, you mentioned that five of the Task Force 

recommendations have majority support by the commission for 

implementation. Going forward, which recommendations have majority 

support? 

In its Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated December 16, 2011, the Commission 

approved the NRC staff's implementation plan for the eight Tier 1 activities outlined in 

SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima 

Lessons Learned," dated October 3, 2011. Some of these items will require further Commission 

review and approval before implementation. The eight Tier 1 items are: 

(1) NTTF Recommendation 2.1 -This will be a request for information from NRC licensees in 

accordance with 10 CFR § 50.54(f). Licensees will be asked to perform, and provide the results 

of, a reevaluation of the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites using current NRC 

requirements and guidance. 

(2) NTTF Recommendation 2.3- This will be a request for information from NRC licensees in 

accordance with 10 CFR § 50.54(f). Licensees will be requested to develop a methodology and 

acceptance criteria for the performance of on site seismic and flooding walkdowns, and complete 

the walkdowns within 180 days of the endorsement of the walkdown procedures. 

(3) NTTF Recommendation 4.1 -This rulemaking that addresses station blackouts (SBOs) is 

expected to be completed within 24-30 months. An advance notice of proposed rulemaking 

(ANPR) has been drafted by the NRC staff and is expected to be issued in early spring. 

-5-
88 


26661.065

(4) NTTF Recommendation 4.2- This will be addressed in an Order issued to all reactor 

licensees, including holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50, and a holder of a 

combined license (COL) under 10 CFR Part 52. These licensees will be required to develop 

strategies to mitigate beyond-design-basis natural phenomena that addresses both multi-unit 

events and reasonable protection of equipment identified under such strategies. 

(5) NTTF Recommendation 5.1 -This will be addressed in an Order issued to all reactor 

licensees operating boiling water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containments. These 

licensees will be required to have a reliable hardened vent to remove decay heat and maintain 

control of containment pressure within acceptable limits following beyond-design-basis events 

that result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability or prolonged SBO. 

(6) NTTF Recommendation 7.1- This will be addressed in an Order issued to all reactor 

licensees, including holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50, and holders of COLs 

under 10 CFR Part 52. These licensees will be required to have a reliable indication of the 

water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of pool 

water level conditions by trained personnel. 

(7) NTTF Recommendation 8- This will be addressed in a rulemaking that involves the 

integration of emergency procedures and is expected to be completed in 2016. The staff will 

publish an ANPR and seek stakeholder involvement during the rulemaking process. 

(8) NTTF Recommendation 9.3- This will be addressed in a request for information from NRC 

licensees in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.54(1). Licensees will be requested to assess their 

current communications system and equipment under conditions of ensile and offsite damage 

-6-
89 


26661.066

and prolonged SBO, and perform a staffing study to determine the number and qualifications of 

staff required to fill all necessary positions in response to a multi-unit event. 

- 7-
90 


26661.067

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER: 

The NRC Task Force recommended that every ten years, nuclear reactor 

safety standards should incorporate any new information on the 

strength of earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, or other natural 

disasters. Do you support this recommendation and when can we 

expect to see it completed? 

On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the NRC staff's proposed prioritization of 

this activity. The NRC staff is working to determine the required regulatory activities, estimated 

schedules, and associated resource impacts of this recommendation. In July 2012, the staff will 

provide the Commission with a proposed schedule for implementing this recommendation. 

This proposal was prioritized as a longer-term action because there are shorter-term actions 

that have more immediate benefits to public health and safety, and which need to be completed 

first, in order to effectively inform the longer-term actions. However, the staff does see the 

potential for safety improvement in the near-term associated with licensee's performing a 

reevaluation of the hazards at their sites. Thus, the staff is developing an approach and 

schedule for completing this associated near-term action. NRC will request licensees to: (1) 

reevaluate site-specific seismic and flooding hazards, (2) perform seismic and flood protection 

plant walk-downs, and (3) identify actions that have been taken or planned to address plantspecific issues associated with the updated hazards or identified during the plant walk-downs. 

Information received from these near-term actions will be used to further inform the 

Commission's position regarding the periodic reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards . 

. 8-
91 


26661.068

QUESTION 4. 

ANSWER: 

Similarly, the Task Force recommended that reactors have technologies 

that would prevent the sort of hydrogen explosions that we saw in 

Japan. Do you support this recommendation and when can we expect 

to see it completed? 

On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the NRC staff's proposed prioritization of 

this activity. The NRC staff is working to determine the required regulatory activities, estimated 

schedules, and associated resource impacts for the control and mitigation of hydrogen. In July 

2012, the staff will provide the Commission with a proposed schedule for implementing this 

recommendation. 

This action to evaluate the control and mitigation of hydrogen has been prioritized as a longerterm action because it (1) requires further staff study to support needed regulatory actions, and 

(2) the critical staff skill sets needed for this study are otherwise focused on the shorter-term 

activities associated with work on reliable hardened vents for Mark I and Mark II containments. 

-9-
92 


26661.069

QUESTION 5. 

ANSWER: 

Please cite and describe the legal authorities that relate to the 

responsibilities for scheduling Commission work, administering 

staff, and managing the day-to-day operations of the Commission. 

Title ll of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 USC 5841-5853, established the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission and set forth basic requirements for Commission and staff operations. 

For example, the Act created the Office of the Executive Director for Operations and organized 

several other staff offices. Many of the Act's operational guidelines were then amended and 

explained in greater detail by the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, 5 USC App. 1. 

In addition, the Commission issued rules at 10 CFR Part 1, which further outline the 

organization, authority, and duties of various agency offices. The agency has a set of publiclyavailable Management Directives (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmidoc-collections/managementdirectives/), that contain the agency's policies and procedures governing internal functions 

necessary for the agency to accomplish its regulatory mission. Finally, the Commission has 

adopted publicly-available Internal Commission Procedures (http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/policy-making/internal. html). 

- 10-
93 


26661.070

QUESTION 6. 

ANSWER: 

Please describe the impact of having the Task Force's safety 

recommendations designated as actions that are needed to ensure that 

nuclear power plants provide "adequate protection to the health and 

safety of the public .•. " under 10 C.F.R. § 50.109. Did the Task Force and 

the NRC staff who reviewed the Task Force recommendations 

determine that the recommendations are actions that are needed to 

ensure that nuclear power plants provide "adequate protection to the 

health and safety of the public ... " as described in 10 C.F.R. § 50.109? 

Do you think that the recommendations should be designated as 

actions that are needed to ensure that nuclear power plants provide 

"adequate protection to the health and safety of the public ... " as 

described in 10 C.F.R. § 50.109? 

Actions that are required based upon a finding of adequate protection need not be accompanied 

by a backfit analysis, which means the requirement does not have to be cost-justified. 

The Near Term Task Force (NTIF) concluded that the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident provided 

new insights regarding low-likelihood, high-consequence events that warrant enhancements to 

defense-in-depth on the basis of redefining the level of protection that is regarded as adequate. 

Similarly, the NRC staff in a paper to the Commission proposing a prioritization of the NTIF 

recommendations proposed to initiate actions on the recommendations under the premise of 

assuring or redefining the level of protection of public health and safety that should be regarded 

as adequate in accordance with the backfit rule. 

- 11 -
94 


26661.071

The three Orders drafted by the NRC staff and transmitted to the Commission for its 

consideration in SECY-12-0025 (February 12, 2012), stated that the actions required by each 

order would involve defining the level of adequate protection needed. The draft information 

request (under the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(f)) drafted by the staff and transmitted to the 

Commission in SECY-12-0025, stated that the requested information is needed to verify 

compliance with the facility's licensing basis and to determine if additional regulatory action is 

necessary. Such additional regulatory action, if any, may be justified as needed for adequate 

protection or may be cost-justified in accordance with the Backfit Rule. 

The Commission is still considering the staff's recommendations in SECY-12-0025. The 

Commission's decision on SECY-12-0025 will indicate whether it will approve the staff's 

recommendations that the Commission find that the orders are a matter of adequate protection. 

With respect to future actions, in votes on the prioritization paper where staff proposed to initiate 

actions on the recommendations under the premise of assuring or redefining the level of 

protection of public health and safety that should be regarded as adequate in accordance with 

the backfit rule, a majority of Commissioners indicated that they do not currently have sufficient 

information to make a determination whether any of the remaining NTTF recommendations 

should be determined to be a matter of adequate protection. 

- 12 -
95 


26661.072

QUESTION 7. 

ANSWER: 

Please provide an update of the NRC's assessment of the "cold 

shutdown" status of the TEPCO reactors in Fukushima, Japan? 

On December 16, 2011, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Nod a announced that the reactors 

at Fukushima Dai-ichi were in a stable, cold shut-down condition. This marked the end of Tokyo 

Power Electric Company's (TEPCO) Road map to Recovery of Fukushima Dai-ichi and started 

the Roadmap Towards Decommissioning. The NRC staff monitors the events at Fukushima 

Dai-ichi daily and agrees that the reactors are in a stable, cold shut-down condition, and that 

reliable and redundant means are available to maintain the reactors in their stable and cold 

condition. 

The NRC staff has also recently conferred with TEPCO and Government of Japan nuclear 

regulatory officials concerning the recent temperature anomalies noted on the Fukushima Daiichi, Unit 2 lower head. The NRC staff concurs with TEPCO's assessment that the indications 

are erroneous due to the degradation of isolated temperature indication circuitry. Redundant 

temperature indications support this conclusion. 

- 13-
96 


26661.073

QUESTION 8: 

ANSWER 

On October 19, 2011, the Commission approved a charter for the 

longer-term review of lessons learned from the Japanese 

earthquake and tsunami, and the Commission requested that the 

staff provide a status update every 6 months in the form of a paper. 

Will you agree to provide me with those update papers on the day 

that they are made available to the Commission? 

Yes, I will ensure that you are provided with the papers on the same day that they are made 

available to the Commission. 

• 14-
97 


26661.074

QUESTION 9: 

ANSWER 

In the August 2, 2011 hearing, I asked you whether you could move 

forward on the Task Force recommendations in 90 days, and four 

Commissioners said "yes" for some or all of the recommendations. 

However, the NRC had not taken any actions on any of the 

recommendations as of our December 15, 2011 hearing. 

a. Do you support conducting votes in public to increase public 

transparency and accountability? 

b. Do you support making your vote on all matters related to the 

Task Force recommendations available to the public on the day 

you vote to further increase transparency and accountability? 

a. I continue to support conducting votes in public to increase public transparency and 

accountability. In 2010, I proposed a new procedure for Commission voting, to replace 

the notation (written) voting. This plan called for public meetings, in which the 

Commission would discuss issues, exchange views, search for consensus and finally 

cast their votes. 

I believe voting in public meetings would have several advantages over the current 

system. First, it would be far more efficient, eliminating the unnecessary and repetitive 

steps that currently bog down the process and freeing Commission resources to pursue 

additional priorities. Second, public sessions would make the policymaking process 

more effective by facilitating collaboration among Commissioners. Collaboration 

requires the free flow of ideas and dialogue that occurs during face-to-face meetings. 

This discussion can identify areas of confusion and crystalli;::e points of disagreement, 

- 15-
98 


26661.075

enabling Commissioners to tackle them directly and to resolve them definitively. Third, 

deliberating and voting during public meetings would help ensure that the Commission 

conducts its business in a transparent and accountable manner that builds public 

confidence in the agency. Everyone will not always agree with the actions that the 

Commission takes, but the Commission can build long-term public credibility through 

processes that foster participation and greater understanding of its internal workings. 

Public meetings and public voting are the common practices of other federal agencies 

for just these reasons. 

b. I routinely release my votes to the public within two days after voting in order to provide 

my colleagues with an opportunity to review my vote and discuss it with me. I will 

commit to same day release on future Fukushima related items. 

- 16-
99 


26661.076

QUESTION 10: 

ANSWER 

To what extent do you think the swift implementation of the lessons 

learned from Fukushima is good for public support of, and 

confidence in the safety of, nuclear power? 

I believe swift implementation of the lessons learned from Fukushima is vital not only to public 

support and confidence, but also in ensuring our mission. The NRC's Near Term Task Force 

did an outstanding job in helping us to understand what nuclear safety requires in a postFukushima world. Now the Commission must diligently and expeditiously respond to these 

recommendations, and make the best decisions to ensure the continued safety of the public. 

There is much to be done, and certain recommendations require rules that may take months or 

years to develop, but we must move forward with the urgency called for by these safety issues. 

This is not the first time we have undertaken a significant reevaluation of what nuclear safety 

and security requires. Nearly a decade ago, we worked to overhaul and strengthen the security 

of the nation's nuclear plants in the aftermath of the September 111

h attacks. While we moved 

forward with short-term changes, it took the NRC and the industry almost 10 years to fully 

develop and implement that new framework. 

I believe a similar timeframe would be unacceptable for safety changes in response to the 

lessons learned from the Fukushima accident I have called for- and the Commission has 

committed to- implementing all Fukushima-related changes by 2016. Meeting this goal will 

require hard work, strong and decisive leadership from the Commission, and an even stronger 

commitment by our licensees to put safety first. But I believe that we are up to the task. This is 

not an NRC problem or a nuclear industry problem. This is an imperative for nuclear safety. The 

- 17-
100 


26661.077

American people are looking to everyone involved in nuclear safety-from the operators to the 

regulators-to do their part in continuing to protect the public . 

• 18 -
101 


26661.078

Questions from Senator Carper 

QUESTION 1. During the December 15th hearing, I asked Chairman Greg Jaczko if 

the day-to-day NRC staff work was being compromised with the staff 

working on the Fukushima recommendations and the recent unrest 

between the Commissioners. Specifically, I asked about the 

licensing process for new reactors and the relicensing process for 

our current reactors. Chairman Greg Jaczko responded that there 

may be some delays in the relicensing process for our current 

reactors due to resource constraints. 

Over the years, I have worked to ensure the NRC has the right 

amount of resources to do its job and ensure the Commission can 

protect public safety. 

a) Can you tell me how many staff were working on relicensing 

leading up to the Fukushima crisis and how many staff are 

working on relicensing today? 

b) How many additional staff are needed to ensure there are not any 

delays? 

c) In addition, I would like an update on all the relicense 

applications that are currently being reviewed by the NRCincluding a timeline for each reactor from the day the application 

was docketed by the NRC to the estimated day the application is 

expected to be finalized. 

- 19-
102 


26661.079

ANSWER. 

a. At the time of the Fukushima Event of March 11, 2011, 82 staff members were working on 

license renewal. Currently, 77 staff members are working on license renewal. Of the five staff 

member reduction, three of those were reassigned due to Fukushima support. There were also 

approximately 24 NRC staff members who were spending part of their time supporting license 

renewal reviews in March 2011. This number has remained steady over the last year. 

b. Currently no additional staff are necessary to ensure there are not any license renewal 

delays due to Fukushima impacts. The staff is working to minimize any schedule changes on 

license renewal reviews due to supporting Fukushima lessons learned activities. Additionally, 

the license renewal process provides for "timely renewal," which allows a plant that has 

submitted a renewal application--and has made a good-faith-effort to complete the process--to 

continue to operate while the staff completes the review. 

c. See the following table for a high-level summary of the current license renewal applications 

under review. Detailed information on each application and the corresponding review schedule 

can be found at the following website: 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactorsloperatingllicensing/renewal/applications.html 

- 20-
103 


26661.080

Scheduled SER Scheduled 

FSEIS Date Expected Plant Application Date Date (actual (actual dates in Completion Date 

dates in bold) bold) 

In Hearing 

Pilgrim 1/27/06 6/28/07 7/27107 

ProcessCompletion Date 

Unknown 

In Hearing 

Indian Point 4/30/07 8/11/09 12/03/10 ProcessUnits 2 & 3 Completion Date 

Unknown - TBD pending 

submittal of a 

repair plan to 

Crystal River 12/18/08 

~~~1 TBD address 

I 

containment 

concrete 

degradation ------ On hold at 

licensee's 

Diablo Canyon 11/24/09 I To be TBD request pending 

Units 1 & 2 supplemented as submittal of 

necessary updated seismic 

analysis 

Columbia 1/20/10 2/12 4/12 6/12 ··------- - ----- TBD pending 

submittal of 

Seabrook 6/1/10 TBD TBD acceptable 

responses on 

concrete 

degradation -- - TBD pending 

submittal of 

Oavis-Besse 8130/10 10/12 TBD updated analysis 

supporting 

environmental 

review ·- South Texas 

Project 10/28/10 10/12 10/12 2/13 

Units 1 & 2 -- ·--·----<·-··- Limerick 6/22/11 1/13 2/13 4/13 

Units 1 & 2 L --

21 -
104 


26661.081

Scheduled SER Scheduled 

FSEIS Date Expected Plant AQQlication Date Date {actual {actual dates in ComQietion Date dates in bold) bold) 

Grand Gulf 11/01111 4/13 7/13 9/13 -- Callaway 12/19/11 TBD TBD TBD 

. 22. 
105 


26661.082

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR INHOFE 

QUESTION 1: 

ANSWER. 

The Near-term Task Force stated that "continued operation and 

continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public 

health and safety." President Obama's Executive Order 13579, 

"Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies" states that 

"Wise regulatory decisions depend on public participation and on 

careful analysis of the likely consequences of regulation." However, 

you criticized your colleagues' desire for public participation 

following the Near-term Task Force report as a "preoccupation with 

process at the expense of nuclear safety." 

a. Please explain why President Obama's Executive Order does not 

apply in this situation. 

b. Please list any other Executive Orders that you believe you are 

justified in disregarding. 

The agency complies with Executive Orders that apply to it, and often voluntarily follows others. 

I fully support the principle that wise regulatory decisions are best made through informed public 

participation. 

- 23-
106 


26661.083

QUESTION 2: 

ANSWER. 

Please explain why, after repeatedly urging expeditious action on 

post-Fukushima recommendations and criticizing your colleagues 

for seeking public involvement, that you have been the last to vote 

in five of the seven related votes and second-to-last in a sixth, 

requesting nine separate extensions of voting time. 

I consider action on post-Fukushima recommendations to be the Commission's highest priority 

at this time. Therefore, it is crucial that the Commission acts in a timely, thoughtful and 

deliberate manner. My votes on post-Fukushima recommendations have been based on a 

thorough review of the underlying technical information, consideration of legal and policy 

implications, and have been further informed by my discussions with, and the votes of, my 

fellow Commissioners. 

- 24-
107 


26661.084

QUESTION 3: 

ANSWER 

During the hearing, Commissioners Ostendorff and Apostolakis 

discussed a situation where the Director of the Office of New 

Reactors recommendation on the date for effectiveness of a 

licensing action was NOT the option recommended in the paper 

presented to the Commission. 

a. Did you or your staff discuss the preferred option with the 

Executive Director or his staff in an effort to change the 

recommended option? 

b. If so, please provide a detailed explanation as to how your and 

your staffs actions are consistent with the law and Internal 

Commission Procedures. 

c. If not, please explain how the recommended option was 

changed. 

d. Have you referred this matter to the Inspector General? 

I discussed the matter with the Director of the Office of New Reactors and all of my actions were 

consistent with my statutory responsibilities as the principle executive officer of the Commission, 

and for developing policy planning and guidance. 

-25-
108 


26661.085

QUESTION 4: 

ANSWER. 

In your December 7, 2011, letter to Mr. William Daley, you wrote that 

the Commission's dysfunction arises from "the lack of 

understanding the current Commissioners have of their statutory 

roles at the agency." 

a. Have you attempted to lead the Commission in a discussion to 

resolve these differing role interpretations? 

b. In the revision to Internal Commission procedures issued on 

September 7, 2011, did you propose revisions to resolve this 

situation? 

c. Please provide all draft Staff Requirement Memorandums, all of 

your responses to each draft, all of your associated voting 

records, transcripts of meetings and other documents relevant to 

the revision of Internal Commission Procedures. ~SECY) 

As you note, the Commission recently revised the Internal Commission procedures. 

Unfortunately, voting on the procedures was initiated by my colleagues outside of our agenda 

planning process, where the Commissioners meet and collegially decide the priority and timing 

of voting matters, just as I was leaving to travel abroad on Commission business. Nevertheless, 

during the deliberative voting process that ensued, my office engaged in dialogue on the 

proposed changes with the other Commission offices and proposed edits accordingly. 

-26-
109 


26661.086

QUESTION 5: 

ANSWER. 

The NRC Inspector General r.eported this past June that you "said 

the Commission procedures are a guideline, and not absolute 

rules." However, the 1980 Reorganization Plan Section 2(c) states: 

"The Chairman as principal executive officer .•. shall be governed 

by the general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory 

decisions, findings, and determinations, including those for 

reorganization proposals, budget revisions, and distribution of 

appropriated funds, as the Commission may, by law, including this 

Plan, be authorized to make." 

a. Please specify which Commission procedures you believe a 

chairman is required to follow and which ones he can ignore. 

For each, please list the statutory basis that supersedes Section 

2(c) of the 1980 Reorganization Act. 

As Chairman, I fully appreciate and take my responsibilities under the Reorganization Plan very 

seriously. Our internal procedures are guidelines that describe how the Commission operates, 

and flexibility is sometimes required to ensure the Commission's business is carried out 

effectively. 

• 27. 
110 


26661.087

QUESTION 6. 

ANSWER. 

Please provide a copy of the then-Commission's response to the 

NRC Inspector General's 1999 report, "Special Evaluation of the 

Role and Structure of the NRC's Commission." 

The NRC Inspector General's 1999 Report is provided as Attachment 1. 

-28-
111 


26661.088

QUESTION 7. 

ANSWER. 

Please describe any limitations under the Sunshine Act that would 

limit or prohibit private meetings between all five commissioners 

and a third-party mediator. 

Meetings between the five Commissioners and a third-party mediator could potentially be held 

in private. However, as discussed below, the Sunshine Act limits what could be discussed at 

such meetings. 

Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S. C.§ 

552b) (Sunshine Act, or Act) prohibits a quorum of the Commission (i.e., three or more 

Commissioners) from meeting in private to deliberate "where such deliberations determine or 

result in the joint conduct or disposition of joint agency business." See§§ 552b(a)(2), (b), (c), 

and (e). There are, however, certain types of discussions involving a quorum of NRC 

Commissioners that would not implicate the Sunshine Act at all, making it unnecessary to 

assess the applicability of Sunshine Act exemptions or adhere to the Act's various procedural 

requirements for closed meetings. Such discussions are sometimes referred to as "nonSunshine Act discussions." The Supreme Court confirmed the permissibility of such 

discussions in FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc, 466 U.S. 463, 471 (1984), by 

recognizing that Congress had carefully crafted the Sunshine Act's "meeting" definition in 

§ 552b(a)(2) to exclude certain types of discussions from the Sunshine Act's reach. Under the 

Sunshine Act, if a discussion does not qualify as a "meeting" under the Act's definition, the Act's 

restrictions and procedures do not apply. 

In line with the ITT World decision, NRC's Sunshine Act implementing regulations define 

"meeting" to encompass only "discussions [that] are sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or 

-29-
112 


26661.089

issues as to cause or to be likely to cause the individual participating members to form 

reasonably firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the agency." 10 

C.F.R. § 9.101(c). In a Federal Register notice associated with this rule language, the NRC 

included "[h]ow well is the agency functioning" as an example of a potential non-Sunshine Act 

discussion topics, at least where the discussion stays at a "generalized 'big picture"' level. 

Government in the Sunshine Act Regulations: Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,941 (May 10, 1999). 

The Commission's Internal Commission Procedures, available online at 

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/policy-making/internal.html, further describe non-Sunshine Act 

discussions as "preliminary, informal, informational, or 'big picture."' Internal Commission 

Procedures at IV-9. 

Accordingly, a discussion between the five Commissioners and a mediator could presumably 

qualify as a non-Sunshine Act discussion, and thus be held in private, so long as the discussion 

focuses solely, and in a relatively generalized way, on the Commission's functioning as a 

collegial body and does not attempt to work towards resolution of specific items of business that 

are pending, or expected to be pending, before the agency. 

-30-
113 


26661.090

QUESTION 8: 

ANSWER. 

You said in testimony that you are committed to working to address 

your colleagues concerns. Please explain precisely what actions 

you have taken and plan to take and the dates by which you plan to 

take them. 

As Chairman, my focus is on a productive working relationship between Commissioners. This 

Commission brings a breadth of experience and expertise to bear on matters of nuclear safety 

and security. I have great respect for the experience and expertise of my colleagues, and I 

am committed to working effectively with them to continue fulfilling our critical safety and 

security mission. 

- 31 -
114 


26661.091

QUESTION 9: 

ANSWER. 

Do you believe harassment and intimidation are acceptable 

workplace practices at the NRC? 

a. If so, please describe the conditions and/or situations that would 

warrant such practices. 

b. If not, please describe what actions you plan to take to address 

the allegations of your harassment, intimidation, verbal abuse, 

and retaliation against agency professionals. 

Harassment and intimidation are never acceptable workplace practices and are not tolerated at 

the NRC. Our policy against harassment, which can be found on our website, makes this clear 

to all NRC employees. The policy specifies the processes by which employees can report 

harassment and by which a prompt, independent investigation is conducted. In addition to this 

policy, employees have a number of other avenues available to them, including our Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission process and union and administrative grievances, to seek 

redress from harassment. Importantly, all information that is disclosed during these processes is 

kept strictly confidential to protect the privacy of the individuals involved. 

-32-
115 


26661.092

QUESTION 10. 

ANSWER. 

Please provide a copy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

(NRC's) policy statement regarding harassment and intimidation of 

its employees, relevant definitions of such behavior and avenues for 

recourse by employees who have experienced such treatment 

NRC's Policy and Procedure for Preventing and Eliminating Harassing Conduct in the 

Workplace (NRC Harassment Policy) is provided as Attachment 2 .. 

- 33-
116 


26661.093

QUESTION 11: 

ANSWER 

When did you first become aware of each of the allegations of 

intimidation, bullying, harassing, and or retaliatory behavior 

discussed at our hearing or at the December 14 hearing before the 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee? Please list 

the date, the alleged incident, and the person from whom you 

learned of it? 

a. For each of these, did you refer the matter to the Inspector 

General? 

b. For those you did not, why not? 

c. Did you discuss any of these with Mr. William Daley, the White 

House Chief of Staff? Please list those that were the subject of 

discussions. 

The NRC keeps all information regarding such allegations confidential to protect the privacy of 

the individuals involved. 

-34 
117 


26661.094

QUESTION 12: In your December 7 letter to Mr. William Daley, you took 

responsibility for improving the level of the Commission's dialogue. 

One of your very first acts after penning that letter, merely three 

days later, was to have your Director of Public Affairs urge press 

reporters to read the report issued by Rep. Markey, "REGULATORY 

MELTDOWN: How Four Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners 

Conspired to Delay and Weaken Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Wake 

of Fukushima," This report is remarkable in its unflinching criticism 

of your colleagues, with whom you expressed such a keen desire to 

meet with and improve communications at our December 15 

hearing. Please answer the following questions: 

a. Did you or your staff direct the Director of Public Affairs to refer 

reporters to the Markey report? 

b. If so, who did and when? 

c. Please provide any emails, notes of conversations, or phone 

logs conveying such direction. 

d. Did you, or your staff, or the Director of Public Affairs gain 

approval of the full Commission that the Markey report 

accurately represented Commission policy? 

e. Considering that you are the official spokesman for the agency 

and the Director of Public Affairs is your direct responsibility, 

and given the fact that the Director of Public Affairs, contrary to 

his office's mission, actively advocated a report which you 

admitted undermines public confidence in the agency, have you 

taken, or do you plan to take, disciplinary action against him? 

- 35-
118 


26661.095

ANSWER 

f. Do you plan to apologize to your colleagues and the agency for 

the Director of Public Affairs' inappropriate actions? 

g. If you have not and will not take disciplinary action or apologize 

for the Director of Public Affairs' actions, then please tell me how 

his actions are consistent with your responsibility to improve 

communications among your colleagues and yourself. 

Neither I nor my staff directed the Director of Public Affairs to refer reporters to Congressman 

Markey's publicly available report. I have full faith and confidence in my Director of Public 

Affairs and, beyond that, do not consider it appropriate to discuss supervisory matters publicly. 

-36-
119 


26661.096

QUESTION 13: 

ANSWER. 

During the December 15 hearing, you testified, saying it was in the 

interest of candor that you might have to pull resources from license 

renewal efforts because of resource constraints. 

a. Had you discussed this possibility with the Executive Director, 

the Chief Financial Officer, or the Director of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation prior to making your statement on December 15? 

b. Please provide any documents or records on this matter 

including memos, e-mails, phone records, and any other relevant 

documents. 

c. Did you discuss this matter with your colleagues prior to your 

testimony before this Committee on December 151

h? 

d. If not, why not, in light of your commitment to improve 

communications with them? 

The resources required to perform the necessary Fukushima work during this fiscal year have 

and will come from a variety of sources throughout the agency. The staff continues to assess 

the resource needs to address the Fukushima lessons learned and where additional resources 

could be made available. A variety of possibilities have been discussed, including the possibility 

of moving resources from license renewals to address Fukushima work which was first raised to 

me by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

- 37" 
120 


26661.097

QUESTION 14. Please summarize all actions taken to re-evaluate the safety and 

security of nuclear power plants in the United States, and to implement 

the recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force's 90-day report. 

Please include a timetable of all relevant implementation dates for 

projected actions and those already taken. 

ANSWER. 

Consistent with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, the NRC 

is taking action as a result of lessons learned from the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 

power plant. In April 2011, the Commission established a senior-level task force known as the 

Near-Tenn Task Force (NTTF) to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis of potential 

lessons-learned. The report produced by the NTTF, SECY-11-0093, "Near Term Report and 

Recommendations for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan," dated July 12, 2011, 

identified twelve major recommendations with the potential to improve the safety of U.S. nuclear 

facilities. 

Consistent with Commission direction, the NRC staff is taking action on these NTTF 

recommendations. The NRC staff sought external stakeholder feedback in a public meeting on 

August 31. 2011, regarding the NTTF recommendations that stakeholders consider to be most 

important and that the NRC should undertake in the near-term. These recommendations were 

identified in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without 

Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report"), dated September 9, 2011. A Commission 

meeting was conducted on September 14, 2011, during which representatives from other 

Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and interested non-governmental 

organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's proposed near-term actions. 

- 38-
121 


26661.098

On October 18, 2011, the Commission directed the NRC staff to begin action without delay on 

those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement in the nearterm. The Commission directed that the NRC staff should strive to complete and implement the 

lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident within 5 years- by 2016. In addition, the 

Commission directed that the staff should designate the station blackout (SBO) rule making as a 

high-priority rule making with a goal of completion within 24-30 months of the October 18, 2011 

direction. 

The staff is implementing the Commission direction and has begun taking actions on those 

NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement without delay. In 

order to do this effectively, the staff pertormed an assessment of each NTTF recommendation 

to determine the required regulatory activities, an estimated schedule, and associated resource 

impacts. Once this information was attained, the staff began to prioritize the NTTF 

recommendations into three tiers: Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. To further inform the prioritization of 

the NTTF recommendations, the NRC staff conducted a public meeting with representatives of 

the nuclear industry on September 21, 2011, in order to better understand their current plans 

and actions to address the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. The NRC staff's 

proposed prioritization of all of the NTTF recommendations was submitted in a notation vote 

paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned") dated October 3, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted 

on October 11, 2011, during which representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the 

nuclear industry, and interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the 

NRC staff's proposed prioritization. 

-39-
122 


26661.099

SECY-11-0137 was reviewed by the Commission and on December 150 2011, the Commission 

approved the staff's recommended prioritizationo The Commission also listed the following staff 

requirements: 

1. Consult with the Commission via notation vote papers before issuing any orders that 

would lead to a change in the design basis of licensed plantso 

2. Inform the Commission 5 business days before issuing letters under 10 CFR § 50054(f) 

associated with the regulatory activities outlined in SECY-11-0137. 

3. Inform the Commission of the results of its review of six additional staff 

recommendations, that went beyond those prepared by the NTTF, but which the staff 

determined had a clear nexus to the Fukushima DaHchi event and may warrant 

additional action. This includes the results of the staff's consideration of filtration of 

containment vents in the context of the existing Tier 1 issues on hardened reliable vents 

for boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containmentso 

4. Inform the Commission of how the staff addressed Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) recommendations, dated November 8, 2011. 

5. Initiate a probablistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate potential 

enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and 

floods as part of Tier 1 activities described in SECY-11-0137. 

Most recently, in response to recent legislative expectations and input it received from 

stakeholders, the staff has accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY-11-0137, with 

-40-
123 


26661.100

a goal of issuing the Tier 1 orders and a request for information letter before the first anniversary 

of Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. As such, on 

February 17, 2012, the staff provided a notation vole paper to the Commission, SECY-12-0025 

to address Commission requirements and to communicate the staff's proposed orders and 

request for information. SECY-12-0025 is publicly available and is currently under review by the 

Commission. 

Relevant implementation dates and projected actions are as follows: 

' OmJir:ating 

' ,~eactors 

August 31; 2012 

October31, 2012 

Plan february ~8 2013 

Submitted 

Periodic Every six months 

Updates 

Latest December31, 2016 

Completion 

October 31, 2012 

Every six months 

Prior to initial fuel 

load 

-41-

October 31, 2012 

August 31,2013 

Every six months 

Priorto receiptof 

operating license 
124 


26661.101

Initial 

Response 

licensee Seismic 

Hazar<.! Evaluations Que 

Licensee Flooding 

Hazard Evaluations Due 

Future Steps 

January 30, 2013 

September9, 2013 (CEUS) I March9; 20:15 (WUS) 

March 9, 2013- March 9, 2015 

(based on prioritization) 

Pending NRC evaluation.and prioritization.,with 

completion of eva.lu. at .. ions f.o.r aU facilities beltween. I · October 20.16 and Apr:il2019 ----

M~_:--- ~~- --~-:c~ 

- - ' -- - -_ --~-

Guidance Issued or 

Endorsed 

licensees Identify 

Walkdown Procedures 

To Be Used 

Licensees Provide 

Result.s of Walkdowns 

-May 2012 

JIUne 9, 2012 ~flooding) I July 9, 2012 (seismic) 

1801 days after NRC endprsement of the walkdown 

procedure (-November 2012} 

·-------·--------

-42. 
125 


26661.102

Schedule Overview for 50.54(f) Letter on Enhanced EP Staffing and Communications: 

Mil~ ' ~ ~ ~!lll~"~~ 

~~ami~~HimMm 

-- ~ - -- ~-~ - - - - -- - ~ -- - - - -

October31, 2012 (staffing items.1 and 2)* 

* ' ·... . . . 60 days alter Issuance of guidance assocjated wit~ Recommendation 4.2 order 

-43-
126 


26661.103

ATTACHMENT 1 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Procedure for 

Preventing and Eliminating Harassing Conduct in the Workplace 

I. Purpose 

This Policy is intended to ensure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) takes 

appropriate action to accomplish the following: 

Prevent sexual harassment and other forms of harassing conduct based on race, 

color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, and 

retaliation for engaging in protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 

activity in the workplace; 

Ensure that employees, supervisors, and managers are aware of their rights and 

responsibilities in maintaining a work environment that is free from harassing 

conduct and the options available for reporting claims of harassing conduct; 

Provide an expedited, fair, and impartial process for reviewing allegations of 

harassing conduct as defined in this Policy; 

Correct harassing conduct, as defined in this Policy; and 

Administer corrective action, which may include disciplinary action, to any 

employee who violates this Policy. 

This Policy updates the agency's long-standing policy on the prevention of sexual 

harassment in the workplace. It is separate and apart from any collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA) or statutory complaint process, or other agency policy involving 

harassment [See Section X.] Furthermore, this Policy does not alter the right of an 

employee to report harassing conduct to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) or to 

file a complaint with the Office of Small Business and Civil Rights (SBCR). 

II. Authorities 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-16 (Title VII); the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 633a (ADEA); the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 791; Executive Order (E.O.) 11478, 

as amended by Executive Order 13087, May 28, 1998; Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission's (EEOC) Model EEO Programs Must Have An Effective Anti-Harassment 

Program (2005); EEOC's Manual Directive 715 (2003); EEOC's Enforcement Guidance: 

Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999); Faragher v. 

-44-
127 


26661.104

Boca Raton, 514 U.S. 775 (1996); and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 

(1996.) 

Ill. The Definition of Harassing Conduct 

For purposes of this Policy, harassing conduct is defined as any unwelcome verbal, 

visual, physical or other conduct based on race, color, religion, sex (whether or not of a 

sexual nature), national origin, age, disability, sexual orientation, or retaliation for 

participation in protected EEO activities. To constitute harassing conduct under this 

Policy, one of these two conditions must be present: 

IV. Policy 

A. The behavior reasonably can be considered to affect the work 

environment adversely; or 

B. An employment decision affecting the employee is based upon the 

employee's acceptance or rejection of such conduct 

Examples of unwelcome prohibited conduct under part A of the definition include, 

but are not limited to offensive remarks or comments; ridicule; offensive and 

derogatory words, phrases, epithets, or jokes; suggestive comments and 

unwelcome requests for sexual favors; exposure to offensive photographs, 

explicit drawings, cartoons, e-mails, or internet transmissions; touching; pinching; 

grabbing; gesturing; or stalking. 

Examples of unwelcome prohibited conduct under Part B of the definition include, 

but are not limited to promoting or not promoting an employee; or taking or not 

taking a personnel action affecting the employee's conditions of employment 

based on the employee accepting a date or sexual favor. 

It is the Policy of the NRC that harassing conduct by anyone in the workplace is 

unacceptable and will not be condoned. NRC will maintain a work environment free 

from the harassing conduct described above. The NRC has determined that the most 

effective way to maintain such a work environment is to inquire promptly into allegations 

of harassing conduct and, if proven true, treat the offense as misconduct, even if it is not 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute discriminatory harassment actionable under 

the civil rig his laws. 

The current EEO complaint process provides employees specific remedies for unlawful 

harassment that has already occurred. This NRC Policy, however, is focused on 

stopping harassing conduct at its earliest stage. A hostile environment that violates EEO 

law usually requires a showing of a pattern of offensive conduct. Under this Policy, 

however, the NRC will not wait, nor should the employee wait, for such a pattern to 

-45-
128 


26661.105

emerge. The NRC will, where possible, act to stop and correct harassing conduct before 

it becomes unlawful; that is, before it becomes so pervasive or severe as to create an 

unlawful hostile work environment. Accordingly, the NRC encourages all employees to 

report any incident of harassing conduct forbidden by this Policy immediately so that 

complaints can be resolved quickly and fairly. If the NRC is not made aware of 

harassing conduct, it cannot stop it. 

In addition, NRC will not tolerate retaliation against any employee who makes a good 

faith report of harassing conduct under this Policy or any other policy or procedure, or for 

assisting in any inquiry about such a report. Allegations of retaliation will be handled in 

accordance with the procedures outlined in this Policy. 

Allegations of harassing conduct will be addressed as promptly as possible. Employees 

found to have violated this Policy will be held accountable for their actions and may be 

appropriately disciplined in accordance with 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75. 

V. Roles and Responsibilities 

A. Agency Employees 

Each agency employee is responsible for creating and maintaining a work 

environment that is free from harassing conduct and is expected to do the 

following: 

1. Comply with the Policy; 

2. Attend a briefing on this Policy and Procedures; 

3. Refrain from exhibiting harassing conduct; 

4. Promptly report any incident of harassing conduct in accordance with the 

Procedures in Section VI.; and 

5. Cooperate with any inquiry conducted under this Policy. 

B. Managers and Supervisors 

In addition to the requirements in A. above, each agency manager and 

supervisor is responsible for the following activities: 

1. Handling allegations of harassing conduct promptly and appropriately in 

accordance with the procedures Section VII.; 

-46-
129 


26661.106

2. Implementing interim measures to protect alleged victims of harassing 

conduct pending the outcome of the inquiry and to ensure that further 

alleged misconduct does not occur; 

3. Administering appropriate corrective action, including disciplinary action, 

to employees who engage in harassing conduct or who do not carry out 

their responsibilities under this Policy; 

4. Taking action to prevent retaliation against individuals who make good 

faith reports of an allegation of harassing conduct or participate in any 

inquiry into an allegation of harassing conduct; and 

5. Consulting with the agency Designated Official (DO) with respect to all 

appropriate actions under items B. 1. through 4. above. 

C. Director, Office of Human Resources 

The Director, Office of Human Resources (OHR) is responsible for the following 

actions: 

1. Ensuring that employees are informed of this Policy and the procedures 

to follow in connection with reporting harassing conduct by disseminating 

this Policy statement periodically to all employees and posting it on the 

NRC intranet website; 

2. Ensuring that managers, supervisors, and employees are provided 

appropriate training on this Policy; 

3. Identifying the Designated Official (DO); and 

4. Ensuring that the identity of the DO is prominently displayed throughout 

the agency and on the NRC intra net and the identities of the Regional 

Personnel Officers are prominently displayed in the Regions. 

D. Agency Designated Official 

The agency's Designated Official (DO) is responsible for the following actions: 

1. Assisting the Director, OHR, in ensuring that employees are informed of 

this Policy and the procedures in connection with reporting harassing 

conduct; 

2. Receiving allegations of harassing conduct reported in accordance with 

Section VII., below; 

-47-
130 


26661.107

3 Determining whether an allegation falls within the jurisdiction of this Policy 

or otherwise interpreting and implementing this Policy; 

4. Referring allegations received under this Policy to the Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) for possible investigation; 

5. Conducting or overseeing prompt, fair, and impartial inquiries into any 

allegation of harassing conduct. If the OIG decides not to make an 

inquiry on a referral received under this Policy, the DO has the authority 

to determine who will conduct the inquiry into any allegation of harassing 

conduct, including him/herself; 

6. Advising managers and supervisors on implementing interim measures to 

protect alleged victims of harassing conduct pending the outcome of the 

inquiry and to ensure that further harassing conduct does not occur; 

7. Advising managers and supervisors on administering appropriate 

corrective action, including disciplinary action, to employees who engage 

in harassing conduct or who do not carry out their responsibilities under 

this Policy; 

8. Advising managers and supervisors on taking action to prevent retaliation 

against individuals who report alleged harassing conduct or participate in 

any inquiry into an allegation of harassing conduct; 

9. Deciding whether to arrange for mediation services to resolve a dispute 

arising under this Policy. Mediation services may be offered from a 

variety of sources including the DO, the Federal Mediation and 

Conciliation Serv1ce, Office of Small Business and Civil Rights (SBCR), a 

contract mediator, and the HHS Sharing Neutrals Program; 

10. Making the Director, SBCR aware of all allegations of harassing conduct 

under this Policy and actions taken to address such allegations; 

11. Providing technical assistance and support, to ensure compliance with 

this Policy; 

12. Maintaining records of all allegations of harassing conduct brought under 

this Policy in accordance with the Privacy Act 5 U.S. C. 552a; and 

13. Informing all persons reporting allegations that filing a report of harassing 

conduct under this Policy does not satisfy the requirements to initiate an 

-48-
131 


26661.108

EEO complaint, a Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) appeal or a 

grievance; nor does it delay the time limits for initiating those procedures. 

E. Regional Personnel Officer 

The Regional Personnel Officer (RPO) is responsible for the following actions: 

1. Assisting the Director, OHR, in ensuring that employees are infonned of 

this Policy and the procedures in connection with reporting harassing 

conduct; 

2. Receiving allegations of harassing conduct reported in accordance with 

Section VII.; 

3. Promptly advising the DO and the Regional Administrator of any 

allegations reported under this Policy; 

4. In coordination with the DO, conducting or overseeing prompt, fair and 

impartial inquiries into any allegation of harassing conduct; 

5. In coordination with the DO, advising managers and supervisors on 

implementing interim measures to protect alleged victims of harassing 

conduct pending the outcome of the inquiry and to ensure that further 

harassing conduct does not occur; 

6. In coordination with the DO, advising managers and supervisors on 

administering appropriate corrective action, including disciplinary action, 

to employees who engage in harassing conduct or who do not carry out 

their responsibilities under this Policy; 

7. In coordination with the DO, advising managers and supervisors on taking 

action to prevent retaliation against individuals who report alleged 

harassing conduct or participate in any inquiry in an allegation of 

harassing conduct; and 

8. Maintaining records of all allegations of harassing conduct brought under 

this Policy 1n accordance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S. C. 552a. 

F. Director, Office of Small Business and Civil Rights (SBCR) 

The Director, SBCR is responsible for the following actions: 

-49-
132 


26661.109

1. Processing any EEO complaint of discrimination filed under 29 CFR § 

1614; 

2. Providing technical assistance and support, to assure compliance with 

this Policy: 

3. Assisting the Director, OHR, in ensuring that employees are informed of 

this Policy and the procedures in connection with reporting harassing 

conduct; 

4. Assisting the Director, OHR, and DO in providing training under this 

Policy; and 

5. Informing the DO of allegations of harassing conduct, to the extent 

permitted by law and EEO regulation. 

G. Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

The OIG is responsible for: 

1. Cases referred from the DO: for allegations that it decides to investigate, 

OIG will conduct an appropriate inquiry; if substantiated, OIG will refer the 

findings of the inquiry to NRC management for appropriate action; 

2. Cases not referred from the DO: 

A. For allegations that it decides to investigate, the OIG will conduct 

an appropriate inquiry; if substantiated, the OIG will refer the 

findings of its inquiry to NRC management for appropriate action; 

B. For cases it decides not to investigate, the OIG will refer the 

matter to the DO for action, if any; and 

C. For record keeping purposes, at the end of any investigation, the 

OIG will report allegations of harassing conduct to the DO. 

3. For all cases in which the OIG conducts an inquiry into harassment 

allegations or misconduct, the OIG will report situations which it 

determines warrant prompt NRC management action to the DO. 

VI. Reporting Harassing Conduct 

The procedures for reporting harassing conduct are as follows: 

-50-
133 


26661.110

A. A headquarters employee who believes that he or she has been the subject of an 

incident of harassing conduct or who has witnessed harassing conduct and/or 

retaliation in violation of this Policy must report this matter to anyone in his/her 

management chain or to the DO; 

B. A regional employee who believes that he or she has been the subject of an 

incident of harassing conduct or who has witnessed harassing conduct and/or 

retaliation in violation of this Policy must report this matter to anyone in his or her 

chain of command, to the DO, or to the Regional Personnel Officer (RPO). The 

RPO is then responsible for reporting this matter to the DO; 

C. The employee reporting such conduct will be asked to provide details of the 

incident(s), including but not limited to: what occurred, when the incident(s) 

occurred; name of the alleged harasser and names of any witnesses. Once a 

report of harassing conduct is made under this Policy, the agency has a duty to 

conduct an appropriate inquiry, stop harassing conduct if found, and to take 

appropriate action, including disciplinary action; 

D. Nothing in this Policy is intended to discourage an employee from telling the 

alleged harasser to stop the harassing conduct; 

E. Nothing in this Policy is intended to require that an employee communicate with 

the alleged harasser; 

F. Nothing in this Policy affects the right of an individual to contact the OIG 

regarding alleged harassing behavior; nor does it affect the right of an individual 

to participate in the EEO complaint process, file an appeal with the MSPB, an 

agency administrative grievance, or for bargaining unit employees, initiate a 

grievance under the NRC-NTEU CBA. Filing a report of harassing conduct under 

this Policy does not satisfy the requirements associated with any complaint, 

appeal or other statutory or regulatory process that may apply, nor does it delay 

the time limits for initiating those procedures. Section X. provides further 

information on statutory and collective bargaining claims; and 

G. All information will be maintained in compliance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 

552a, as stated in Section IX. of this Policy. 

VII, Conducting an Inquiry 

A. A supervisor or manager who receives an allegation or witnessed harassing 

conduct shall immediately: 

1. Inform the DO of the allegation; 

-51 -
134 


26661.111

2. In consultation with the DO, take appropriate action to stop any potentially 

harassing conduct and prevent further alleged incidents while the 

allegations are being investigated, (i.e., providing appropriate interim 

measures): and 

3. Document the allegation received or witnesses and his/her efforts to 

address it. 

B. If the RPO receives an allegation of harassing conduct, he/she will promptly 

notify the DO and the Regional Administrator and provide further assistance as 

requested by the DO. 

C. When the DO receives an allegation of harassing conduct, either directly from the 

complainant; through a supervisor, manager, or RPO; or from other sources, the 

DO will take the following actions: 

1. Ensure that the OIG is immediately provided all pertinent information 

regarding the allegation; 

2. In the event that the OIG elects not to investigate the matter, the DO shall 

ensure that a prcmpt, vigorous, impartial and appropriate inquiry is 

conducted and designate the person(s) who will conduct such an inquiry. 

(This inquiry may be conducted by the DO, the supervisor, the RPO, an 

outside contractor, or any other impartial individual delegated this 

responsibility by the DO); and 

3. Contact appropriate agency officials in the alleged harasser's chain of 

command who are not involved in the allegations of harassment and 

recommend appropriate action to slop any harassing conduct and prevent 

further harassing conduct while the allegations are being addressed, (i.e., 

providing appropriate interim measures) 

D. The inquiry will consist of appropriate fact-finding in order to obtain the 

information relevant to the allegation. As part of the inquiry, the complaining 

employee may be interviewed regarding the basis of the allegations. 

Additionally, the alleged harasser as well as other witnesses who may have 

knowledge of the circumstances of the allegations may also be interviewed. The 

determination as to the appropriate steps to be followed during the inquiry will be 

determined by the person conducting the inquiry with oversight by the DO. All 

individuals contacted in the course of an inquiry will be advised that any 

retaliation or reprisal against an individual who is an alleged target of harassing 

conduct, who has made a complaint under this Policy, or who has provided 

information in connection with a complaint, constitutes a separate violation of this 

-52-
135 


26661.112

Policy. The inquiry will be completed promptly absent extenuating 

circumstances. 

E. An inquiry is a neutral, fact-finding process needed to determine whether 

harassing conduct has occurred. An inquiry shall not, in and of itself, be 

construed as evidence that the allegations of harassing conduct are true. 

F. When an inquiry by management discloses new, significant information regarding 

allegations of misconduct by management or employees, the OIG will be notified 

of these additional facts and provided an opportunity to assume jurisdiction over 

the matter. However, this is not intended to preclude NRC management from 

taking appropriate immediate action to carry out its responsibilities to maintain a 

safe and orderly workplace or to otherwise protect agency interests associated 

with this Policy. 

G. Upon completion of the inquiry, the individual conducting the inquiry will prepare 

a written summary of the inquiry. The DO shall determine whether sworn 

declarations will be taken. The summary will be prepared promptly after 

completion of the inquiry. The summary, along with all of the documentation 

compiled during the inquiry, will be provided to the DO (if he/she did not conduct 

the inquiry) and generally the first level supervisor of the alleged harasser, unless 

such supervisor is involved in the allegation. In this situation, the summary and 

documentation will be provided to the lowest level supervisor/manager in the 

alleged harasser's chain of command who is not a subject of the inquiry. 

H. All information will be maintained on a confidential basis to the greatest extent 

possible and in compliance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, as slated in 

Section IX. of this Policy. 

VIII. Action To Be Taken Upon Completion Of The Inquiry 

A. Upon receipt of the report of inquiry, including summary and supporting 

documentation, the appropriate supervisor/manager will promptly evaluate all of 

the documentation and determine the appropriate action. This responsibility 

normally will rest with the first line supervisor of the employee alleged to have 

engaged in the harassing conduct, unless such supervisor is involved in the 

allegation. The supervisor/manager should consult with the OHR, including the 

DO, the servicing Labor and Employee Relations Specialist, and the Office of 

General Counsel as needed to determine the appropriate action. 

B. Where the inquiry establishes that an employee did engage in harassing conduct 

under this Policy, he/she will be subject to appropriate corrective action, 

disciplinary or otherwise, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75. 

-53-
136 


26661.113

C. Where the inquiry establishes that a supervisor or manager did not properly carry 

out the responsibilities under this Policy, he/she will be subject to appropriate 

corrective action, disciplinary or otherwise, in accordance with 5 U.S. C. Chapter 

75. 

D. The DO should notify SBCR and the OIG of the outcome of the agency inquiry, 

including whether the allegation was substantiated, what corrective action was 

taken; and any other action taken to address the matter. 

IX. Confidentiality 

The maintenance of records and disclosures of information from records shall be in 

complete compliance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. All information obtained 

under this Policy, including but not limited to, reports of harassing conduct, will be 

maintained confidentially to the greatest extent possible. Such information, however, 

may be required to be disclosed in connection with proceedings resulting from the 

harassing conduct, (e.g., disciplinary action). Further, information may need to be 

disclosed to those officials and employees within the agency with a need to know in 

order to carry out the purpose and intent of this Policy. 

X. Statutory and Collective Bargaining Claims 

This Policy is in addition to statutory and collective bargaining prohibitions [NRC-NTEU 

CBA, Article 2] against harassment and the procedures and remedies they provide for 

addressing unlawful harassment. Filing a report of harassing conduct under this Policy 

does not satisfy the requirements to initiate any complaint, appeal or other statutory or 

regulatory process that may apply, nor does it delay the time limits for initiating those 

procedures. An employee who chooses to pursue statutory or collective bargaining 

remedies for unlawful harassment must: 

1. Initiate the EEO complaint process pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.105 (available for 

all claims of unlawful harassment other than those based on sexual orientation) 

by contacting an EEO counselor in the SBCR within 45 calendar days from the 

date of the alleged harassment (or personnel action if one is involved); or 

2. File a grievance under the CBA, Article 51 or agency grievance procedure; or 

3. File an appeal to the MSPB within 30 days of an appealable action as defined in 

5 C.F.R. Section 1201.3.; 

4. If an employee pursues a claim of harassment through the formal EEO process 

(including EEO counseling), an MSPB appeal, a union grievance, or an 

administrative grievance, the agency official who receives the information about 

such a claim will promptly notify the DO, unless inconsistent with applicable 

-54-
137 


26661.114

requirements. Because the agency has an obligation to comply with the terms of 

this Policy regardless of whether a statutory or collective bargaining procedure 

has been invoked, the DO will promptly initiate an inquiry into the matter if an 

appropriate management official has not already done so. Similarly, the DO will 

provide the Office handling the statutory or collective bargaining claim the record 

of actions taken under this Policy. 

-55-
138 


26661.115

CH/\JRMAN 

MEMORANDUM TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, b. C. 20!:i!:i5 

January 13, 2000 

Huber18ell 

Inspector General 

Richard A. Meserve 

ATIACIJMI<NI' 2 

SPECIAL EVALUATION OF THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE 

OF THE NRC'S COMMISSION 

The Commission has reviewed the above-captioned repor1 and has requested that I 

forward some comments on it. 

We understand the considerable el!or1 that the Office of Inspector Genernl has inves.ted 

in preparing the report. The Commission has given serious consideration to the 

suggestions, as well as the supporting analysis and observatiom;. Moreover, although 

some formal and structured opportunity lor the Commission to review <'nd commt;ln! on 

a draft repo11, as is c<)mmon for O!G ilnd GAO audit reports, migl1t have hP-en " helpful 

step in improving the report, each of the Commissioners has asked me to relay their 

appreciation for the individual briefings that you have provided over the past month. 

The repo11 contains several suggestions that warrant careful examination. We 

perceive, however, that the report may not adequately reflect the reality that the 

Commission is a dynHmic institution which must adapt to changing circumstances. 

Thus, in the absence of some analysis of those circumstances, simple numerical 

comparisons with !he agency as it E1xisted in the en rly 1980s, or with agencies all of 

whose budgets ano smaUer than the NRC's and whose Commissioners' staffs consist 

almost entirely of attorneys, are not instructive. Moreover, the assessments of the 

Commission as if existed at the time ot the staff survey may no longer be accurate and 

may be of very limited applicability to so fundamental a subject as "the Evaluation of the 

Role and Structure of the NRC's Commission". As the report acl<now!edges, Congress 

created the agency as a Commission in order to assure that the independent viewpoints 

of five individuals are brought to bear in addressing the policy issues that confront us. 

The independence of euch of the Commissioners is thus a central value that Congress 

has sought to ensure. Given this basic _objective, we.believe that the Commission 

should not intrude on how each individual Commissioner decides to structure his or her 

personal staff or define "performance measures" to judge the peliormance of a 

Commissioner or the Commission itself. After all, the agency's goals and performance 

measures are not different from the Commission's. 

-56-
139 


26661.116

Although the report raises questions about how the Commission interacts, it fails to 

recognize that in 1998 the Commission undertook a review of its internal procedures. 

The resultant Internal Commission Procedures of June 30, 1998, sought to define the 

Commission's duties and responsibilities in accordance with the Energy Reorganization 

Act of 1974 and the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980. The report also suggests that 

the Commission should develop guidance as to when individual members can state 

their differing views on issues after the agency has announced an official position. We 

believe, however, that in performing the duty to pursue sound public policy, <each 

Commissioner must have the right to speak as his or her conscience directs. Indeed, 

we believe that we are more likely to reach bet1er decisions and to instill greater public 

confidence in those decisions if the commission follows a policy of openness, thereby 

demonstrating that each issue is and has been forthrightly confronted and explored. Of 

course. care must be taken to assure that independent views are not perceived to be 

agency positions. To our knowledge, Commissioners have made clear in most cases 

when they were stating positions that were their own rather than agency positions. 

Nonetheless, the preservation of the right for a Commissioner to speak out is the best 

way to assure the public that the NRC is prepared to address issues freely and openly. 

In sum, although there are some aspects of the report with which we disagree, we 

appreciate your efforts and take your suggestions very seriously. 

cc: Commissioner Dicus 

Commissioner Oiaz 

Commissioner McGaffigan 

Commissioner Merrifield 

-57-
140 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Magwood, do you have any comments? You have 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV, 

COMMISSIONER, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Chairmen 

Boxer and Carper, Ranking Members Inhofe and Barrasso. Thank 

you for the opportunity to speak with you again on this important 

topic. 

When we last appeared before this Committee on August 2nd, 

just a few weeks after the issuance of the Near-Term Task Force 

report, among others, Chairman Boxer emphasized the importance 

with which she viewed applying the lessons of Fukushima to this 

country’s nuclear infrastructure, and doing so as quickly as possible. We took your encouragement to heart and used it to challenge ourselves. 

Within 2 weeks of the last hearing, this Commission completed 

its first vote on the Task Force recommendations. We agreed 

unanimously to direct staff to begin immediately its engagement 

with stakeholders and to identify within 3 weeks those actions 

which could be implemented without delay, an approach that I actually suggested and my colleagues supported. 

This led to what we now call the 21-day paper, which the Commission adopted by mid-October. As a result of this decision, several key areas of work are already well underway. The NRC staff 

has held numerous meetings with industry, public interest group 

and other members of the public to formulate rulemakings, orders, 

and other regulatory tools that we needed to implement several of 

the higher priority Task Force recommendations. 

We have also recently finalized our guidance, as the Chairman 

mentioned a few minutes ago, to the staff on all actions that the 

agency will pursue over the coming years to respond to the lessons 

of Fukushima. 

Our work has benefited tremendously from stakeholder interactions. Areas that the Task Force had not raised in its report are 

now prominent elements of our analysis. We will, for example, consider the need for filtered vents for Mark I and Mark II 

containments. We will also consider the loss of ultimate heat sink 

in our agenda as well as review the pre-staging of potassium iodide 

beyond the 10-mile emergency planning zone. 

Fukushima provided some important insights regarding all of 

these issues, and we can use that knowledge to enhance our assurance of safety in the United States. We have also received valuable 

support from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

ACRS’s review of the Task Force report and the 21-day paper has 

highlighted several areas of concern on which we must focus. For 

example, ACRS highlighted the need to place high priority on new 

rulemaking to strengthen station blackout requirements. The 

ACRS’s continued strong involvement in this ongoing effort must 

be a hallmark of our response to Fukushima. 

The Commission has directed the staff to strive to complete and 

implement all lessons learned from Fukushima within 5 years. 

However, I believe that we must also approach this overall effort 

in a manner that recognizes some aspects of our response, such as 

141 

station blackout, have more safety import than others and should 

therefore be completed as quickly as possible. 

In the particular case of station blackout, Commissioner 

Ostendorff has provided a leading voice on the Commission to assure that this rulemaking is completed within 30 months. 

I believe we have met the challenge this Committee has laid before us and have made tremendous progress in a short period of 

time. That said, I also believe that we must assure that our focus 

on the lessons of Fukushima do not distract from the existing regulatory work that may have equal or greater safety benefit than 

some of the elements of our Fukushima response. It is vital that 

we prioritize our overall portfolio of work and assure that we place 

our resources on those tasks that provide the greatest safety benefit. 

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The responses of Mr. Magwood to questions for the record follow:] 

142 


26661.117

Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer 

Question 1 

The press has reported that you have stated that your work in the nuclear industry 

has had no influence on your service at the NRC, Including a quote of you saying 

"I haven't talked to Mr. [Alex] Flint in probably three or four years." 

a. Provide a list of all meetings that you or your staff have taken part in ... 

involving a former client of yours, an individual who Is employed by a 

former client of yours, or an individual who is employed by a business that 

is associated with a former client of yours, or with Mr. Flint. 

Please see attached table. Among those organizations listed, I have included 

Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, with which I worked in this company's 

capacity as the industrial partner for Japan's advanced liquid metal reactor 

program. 

Regarding Mr. Flint, I have not had occasion to meet with him since the end of 

my tenure at the Department of Energy, during which he was a staff member with 

the Senate Energy & Water Appropriations Subcommittee. 

b. For each such meeting that you or your staff have taken part in, provide the 

date of the meeting, the first and last names of the individuals involved In 

the meeting, who the individuals represented at the meeting, the topic of 

the meeting, the issues discussed during the meeting, and any decision or 

commitment that you or your staff have made related to the discussion. 

Please see attached table. However, please note that consistent with the ethics 

pledge required of all of President Obama's appointees, I am prohibited from 

engaging in any particular, substantive decisions regarding my former clients. 

When possible, I include my legal advisor in meetings with industry to assure the 

strict adherence to all ethics requirements. As such, my meetings and 

interactions with former clients have been for the purpose of exchanging 

information. and have not resulted in any policy or regulatory decisions or 

commitments. 

c. Provide all documents ... that you have related to such meeting and any 

decision or commitment that you or your staff have made related to the 

meeting. 

The relevant documents are attached. Please note, however, that because 

these meetings were not related to any specific policy or regulatory decision 
143 


26661.118

many of them were informal in nature As a result, my office files do not include 

documents related to every meeting. 

d. Have you ever met with an individual who is a former client of yours, a 

representative of a former client of yours, an individual who is employed by 

a business that is associated with a former client of yours outside of the 

NRC building? 

i. If you have been involved in any such meeting, have you noted 

each such meeting on your calendar? 

In keeping with a commitment I made to Chairman Boxer during my 

confirmation hearing, I voluntarily maintain my calendar on lhe NRC's 

public website in order to provide the public with an extra measure of 

transparency. As I note on the calendar, I publish all meetings and visits 

with external stakeholders such as utilities and non-governrnental 

organizations. However I do not publicly post meetings with domestic or 

international governmental entities. Therefore, meetings I have had with 

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), a research organization within the 

Japanese government for which I was an advisor in the area of liquid 

metal reactor research and development, are not generally noted on my 

public calendar. Other than JAEA, my public calendar prov.des a 

complete account of my meetings with former clients. 

ii. Have you ever failed to note such a meeting on your ca,lendar? 

Please see the response to Question 1.d.i. above. 

iii. Provide a list of each such meeting that you have not m>ted on your 

calendar but that you have taken part in, provide the date of the 

meeting, the first and last names of the individuals involved in the 

meeting, the topic of the meeting, the issues discussed during the 

meeting, a summary of the meeting, and any decision or 

commitment that you have made related to the discussion. 

This 1nformat1on IS provided in response to question 1.b abo)ve 

iv. Provide all documents ... that you have related to such meeting. 

The relevant documents are attached. 
144 


26661.119

Question 2 

On October 19, 2011, the Commission approved a charter for the longer-term 

review of lessons learned from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the 

Commission requested that the staff provide a status update every 6 months in 

the form of a paper. Will you agree to provide me with those update papers on the 

day that they are made available to the Commission? 

Question 3 

The most recent six month update paper was provided to the Commission on 

February 17, 2012. After a brief review by the Commission to ensure that the 

paper was of the scope and quality expected and to ensure that the Commission 

was cognizant of all issues raised in the paper in anticipation of potential 

questions and inquiries, on the following business day, I approved release of the 

paper to the general public. The paper was actually released on, Wednesday 

February 22, 2012. The staff subsequently notified the Commission that there 

was an error in the paper. That error was corrected and the corrected version 

was released. I support the application of this approach for all future updates. 

In the August 2, 2011 hearing, I asked you whether you could move forward on the 

Task Force recommendations in 90 days, and four Commissioners said "yes" for 

some or all of the recommendations. However, the NRC had not taken actions on 

any of the recommendations as of our December 15, 2011 hearing. 

a. Do you support conducting votes in public to increase public transparency 

and accountability? 

The Near Term Task Force report was transmitted to the Commission on July 12, 

2011. In my vote on the Report -logged on July 19'"- I advocated that within 20 

days, the Executive Director of Operations should provide the Commission with a 

notation vote paper that identifies those Task Force recommendations that can, 

and in staff's judgment, should be implemented without further delay. The final 

SRM directed the staff to provide such a notation vote paper within 21 days of 

the SRM. I continue to believe that this approach enabled the agency to move 

forward in the swiftest practical fashion. 

The staff paper regarding the Task Force recommendations was provided to the 

Commission on September 9'" .. I was the first member of the Commission to 

vote on this matter and logged a vote on September 14'" to approve the staff's 

recommendations. 

Regarding the voting process. I believe that our approach is highly transparent 

and open. I have found that the Commission and the agency as a whole is 
145 


26661.120

committed to making decisions in as open a manner as possible, consistent with 

the need to maintain a decision-making process that allows a free '"xchange of 

ideas and fosters well-consrdered decisrons. The Commission's notation voting 

process allows each Commissioner to consider input from the staff. the ACRS, 

and relevant stakeholders; to conduct discussions with other Commissioners: 

and, when necessary, to engage in independent research before coming to a 

conclusion on any voting matter. 

In particular, the notation voting process allows Commissioners, if I hey choose, 

to provide draft votes to colleagues to facilitate a detailed exchango of ideas. In 

my personal experience, it is not unusual to find that my views on a particular 

matter are influenced by the insights of my colleagues on the Commission, each 

of whom bring unique experience to each subject. 

When I have finalized my views on a given matter, my conclusions are then 

documented in wnting, and can be, and often are, accompanied by a detailed 

written explanation of the reasoning behind my decision. After the entire 

Commiss1on has voted, our votes form the basis for developing guidance to the 

staff, transmitted via a document know as a Staff Requirements ME!morandum 

(SRM). Except in cases of papers related to sensitive informat1on, the 

Commission's entire detailed voting record (including both the Commissioners' 

votes on the staff papers and documents related to development of the SRM) is 

released to the public I believe that this process appropriately allows for public 

involvement, provides the Commissioners the necessary time to d€1velop 

carefully considered, reasoned, and well-supported positions, and provides the 

public information about the voting process. That said, I am open to suggestions 

to improve transparency that do not impair the quality of the decisions we reach. 

Our procedures do allow for public voting of what we term "red band" papers. 

However, as defined in our Internal Commission Procedures, use of this type of 

paper "indicates an issue that lends itself to brief discussion, deliberation, and 

possible vote at a Commission meeting." While I agree that these t.ypes of votes 

could be useful in some circumstances, because these voting sessions are 

intended to include only brief deliberation and discussiOn, they are not well-suited 

for the complex issues like those related to the post-Fukushima actions. 

a. Do you support making your vote on all matters related to the Task Force 

recommendations available to the public on the day you vote to further 

increase transparency and accountability? 

The Commission never publicly releases votes related to certain sensitive issues. 

such as securrty, and does not release votes related to the Commission's 

adjudicatory process. However, for votes that would eventually be released 
146 


26661.121

Question 4 

under our normal procedures, such as those related to the Task Force 

recommendations, I have no objections to the early release of my votes. 

To what extent do you think the swift implementation of lessons learned from 

Fukushima is good for public support of, and confidence in the safety of, nuclear 

power? 

I think it is essential. While it would certainly do more harm than good to public 

confidence were we to act precipitously and be obligated to make corrections in 

the following months and years, I believe that the public expects and deserves a 

swift, reasonable response from our agency. I have and continue to urge action 

that is consistent with moving forward in a deliberate, well-thought out manner to 

implement carefully considered safety improvements that reflect public 

stakeholder participation and ACRS review. For that reason, I am pleased that 

the staff has set a realistic schedule for implementation of the lessons learned 

from Fukushima. 
147 


26661.122

Question from Senator Tom Carper 

Question 1 

During the December 15th hearing, I asked Chairman Greg Jaczko if the day-to· 

day NRC staff work was being compromised with the staff working on the 

Fukushima recommendations and the recent unrest between the Commissioners. 

Specifically, I asked about the licensing process for new reactors and the 

relicensing process for our current reactors. Chairman Greg Jaczko responded 

that there may be some delays in the relicensing process for our current reactors 

due to resource constraints. 

Over the years. I have worked to ensure the NRC has the right amount of resources to 

do its job and ensure the Commission can protect public safety. 

a. Can you tell me how many staff were working on relicensing leading up to 

the Fukushima crisis and how many staff are working on relicensing 

today? 

At the time of the Fukushima Event of March 11. 2011, 82 staff members were 

working on relicensing. Currently 77 staff members are working on relicensing. 

Of the five staff member reduction. three of those were reassigned due to 

FukLlshima support There were also approximately 24 NRC staff members who 

were spending part of their time supporting license renewal reviews in March 

2011. This number has remained steady over the last year. 

b. How many additional staff are needed to ensure there are not any delays? 

I am unable to provide an answer at this time. The Commission recently 

received from the staff the updated FY 12 Cwrrent Estimate Budget and Shortfall 

List. Deliberation and voting has not been completed. Once this process is 

complete, we may have sufficient information to respond to this qwestion. 

c. In addition, I would like an update on all the relicense applications that are 

currently being reviewed by the NRC -including a timeline for each reactor 

from the day the application was docketed by the NRC to the estimated day 

the application is expected to be finalized. 

For a high-level summary of the current license renewal applications under 

review - detailed information on each application and the corresponding review 

schedule can be found on the following website: 

b.t!JT //www. nrc.qov/reactors/operatinq/licensinq!renewallapplications html 

1. 
148 


26661.123

Questions from Senator James lnhofe 

Question 1 

In the hearing, it was alleged that at our last NRC hearing on August 2, four of you 

made a commitment to this committee that you would move forward on some or 

all of the Near-term Task Force recommendations within 90 days, but that you had 

failed to do so. Please explain whether you believe you have met that 90-day 

commitment. 

Soon after receiving the Near-term Task Force report, the Commission asked staff to 

identify the most urgent actions that should be carried out in implementing the task 

force's recommendations. I was the first Commissioner to vote on this matter and 

logged my vote on September 9, 2011. I worked with my colleagues to complete 

negotiations on this matter as quickly as possible and final action on this matter was 

concluded on October 18, 2011. The Commission authorized the staff "to implement 

without delay the Near-Term Task Force recommendations" staff identified as high 

priority. Further the Commission ordered staff to "strive to complete and implement the 

lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five year- by 2016." 

In addition, as part of this vote, the Commission ordered staff to launch a new 

rulemaking to revise our Station Blackout (SBO) regulations and set a target to complete 

this work within 30 months. 

While significant work continued through to the present time, I believe the Commission 

kept its commitment to the Committee with this October 18 guidance to the staff. 

Further, the Commission provided guidance on the balance of the Near-term Task 

Force recommendations on December 15, 2011. 

Question 2 

In the hearing you were criticized for stalling progress on post-Fukushima safety 

improvements by requesting a "re-review" of the Near-term Task Force 90-day 

report. Please describe the benefits of the broader staff review, the ACRS review, 

and stakeholder involvement that you would not have seen if the Commission had 

simply acted merely on the 90-day report. 

The assessment of the Task Force recommendations by the broader staff was not a "rereview" of the task force recommendations. The process established by the 

Commission was designed to use the Task Force recommendations as a starting point 

and engage all stakeholders and the ACRS in an assessment of how best to move 

forward. This process was invaluable and has allowed the agency's planned response 

to reach today's highly-developed stage. 
149 


26661.124

While expert, the Task Force consisted of a very small group of people working in a brief 

period of time. They had no opportunity or ability to recommend the highly specific 

actions that are now pending before the Commission. 

In addition, not all issues were adequately covered by the Task Force. The 

Commission's chosen process allowed for the discussion of all hazards facing nuclear 

plants-not just seismic and flooding as highlighted by the Task Force-as well as many 

issues vital to safety such as the potential for loss of the ultimate heat sink and the need 

to review our current approach to the distribution of potassium iodide. 

Had we not proceeded in the open, methodical manner advanced by a majority of the 

Commission, many safety issues would have been left unaddressed and the opportunity 

for meaningful stakeholder participation would have been lost. 

Question 3 

In Mr. William Daley's December 12, 2011, letter to you, he urged you to improve 

your internal communications. Is Mr. Daley's assessment a full and accurate 

depiction of the leadership dynamics at the Commission? If not, why not? 

As public servants and the stewards of Federal resources, my fellow Commissioners 

and I felt a strong obligation to bring our serious concerns regarding the leadership and 

management of our agency to the White House Having done so, we can only leave it to 

those officials to consider our report of the situation and take actions they deem 

appropriate. I am satisfied that we received a fair and complete hearing of our views 

and that senior While House officials understand our concerns and the motivations that 

lead to our October 13 letter. 

With respect to Mr. Daley's response, you note that he urged the Commission to 

improve its internal communications. While I agree that internal communication is an 

area of potential improvement, it is quite clear that the leadership issues we raised in our 

letter to the Chief of Staff go far beyond concerns about internal communications. In that 

respect, I believe Mr. Daley's response was broader than this one specific concern. It is 

my reading of his letter that the White House continues to monitor the situation and 

anticipates the results of ongoing inquiries by the NRC Inspector General. l think it's 

appropriate that the White House would like to obtain this additional input before closing 

the rnatter one way or another. 
150 


26661.125

Question 4 

Please describe any limitations under the Sunshine Act that would limit or prohibit 

private meetings between all five commissioners and a third-party mediator. 

Meetings between the five Commissioners and a third-party mediator could potentially 

be held in private. As discussed below, however, the Sunshine Act limits what could be 

discussed at such meetings. 

Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 

U.S.C. § 552b) (Sunshine Act, or Act) prohibits a quorum of the Commission (i.e., three 

or more Commissioners) from meeting in private to deliberate "where such deliberations 

determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of joint agency business." See§§ 

552b(a)(2), (b), (c), and (e). There are, however. certain types of discussions involving a 

quorum of NRC Commissioners that would not implicate the Sunshine Act at all, making 

it unnecessary to assess the applicability of Sunshine Act exemptions or adhere to the 

Act's various procedural requirements for closed meetings. Such discussions are 

sometimes referred to as "non-Sunshine Act discussions." The Supreme Court 

confirmed the permissibility of such discussions in FCC v. ITT World Communications, 

Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 471 (1984), by recognizing that Congress had carefully crafted the 

Sunshine Act's "meeting" definition in § 552b(a)(2) to exclude certain types of 

discussions from the Sunshine Act's reach. Under the Sunshine Act. if a discussion does 

not qualify as a "meeting" under the Act's definition, the Act's restrictions and procedures 

do not apply. 

In line with the ITT World decision, NRC's Sunshine Act implementing regulations define 

"meeting" to encompass only "discussions [that] are sufficiently focused on discrete 

proposals or issues as to cause or to be likely to cause the individual participating 

members to form reasonably firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise 

before the agency." 10 C.F.R. § 9. 101(c). In a Federal Register notice associated with 

this rule language, the NRC included "[h]ow wei! is the agency functioning" as an 

example of a potential non-Sunshine Act discussion topic, at least where the discussion 

stays at a "generalized 'big picture"' level. Government in the Sunshine Act Regulations: 

Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg 24,941 (May 10, 1999). The Commission's Internal 

Commission Procedures, available online at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/policymaking/internal.ht!Jlj, further describe non-Sunshine Act discussions as "preliminary, 

informal, informational, or 'big picture."' Internal Commission Procedures at IV-9. 

Accordingly, a discussion between the five Commissioners and a mediator could 

presumably qualify as a non-Sunshine Act discussion. and thus be held in private, so 

long as the discussion focuses solely, and in a relatively generali~ed way, on the 

Commission's functioning as a collegial body and does not attempt to work towards 

resolvtion of specific items of business that are pending, or expected to be pending, 
151 


26661.126

before the agency. Under the Internal Commission Procedures, the General Counsel 

and the Secretary of the Commission are required to attend any non-Sunshine Act 

discussions, but the Commission may waive this provision by majority vote. Internal 

Commission Procedures at IV-9. 

To the extent that a meeting between the five Commissioners and a mediator might 

benefit from getting into the specifics of pending or expected NRC business, the 

meeting-or, at least, the portions of the meeting that address these items of businesswould likely need to fit within one or more of the ten Sunshine Act exemptions listed in § 

552b(c) in order to be closed to the public. This would in general be a fact-specific, caseby-case determination based on the particular nature of the anticipated discussions. See 

§ 552(d)(1 ). Closure of meetings pursuant to Sunshine Act exemptions requires 

satisfaction of certain procedural requirements specified in the Act. These include 

requirements that a majority of the Commission vote in favor of closure, that advance 

notice be given to the public, that the NRC General Counsel certify that the meeting may 

be properly closed, and that records of the discussion be created and maintained. See 

§§ 552b(d), (e), and (f). 

All that said, I should clarify that I do not believe that the behavioral and leadership 

issues we raised in our October 13 letter and in subsequent Congressional testimony 

are mailers that can be remediated through a mediation process. Such a process might 

assist with communications issues or interpretations of law and procedure, but I feel the 

Commission is able to discuss these issues internally. Unfortunately, such concerns are 

trivial in contrast to the issues we highlighted in our letter and in testimony. 

Question 5 

During the December 15 hearing, a number of alleged incidents of harassment, 

intimidation, bullying, and retaliation were discussed. Did you discuss these 

matters with Mr. Daly? Please list those that you did discuss. 

I consider my discussions with the White House to have been conducted in confidence. 

I do not, therefore, think it appropriate to discuss the specific details of those 

interactions. However, I think it is fair to say that the comments I provided to the 

Committee at the December 15 hearing were substantially similar to the input I provided 

the White House staff. 

Question 6 

Please explain why a chilled work environment is detrimental to nuclear safety. 

It is an essential element of a successful nuclear safety culture that all personnel feel 

they have the ability to raise issues, voice concerns, and ask questions without fear of 

reprisal. As a nuclear regulator, NRC would be very concerned should a l1censee exhibit 
152 


26661.127

behavior or practices that inhibited the ability of its staff to speak freely about issues of 

safety importance. Trained, experienced individuals are the first and last line of defense 

in assuring the safety of all nuclear operations. If they are prevented from speaking 

freely when they have concerns or questions, safety is compromised. 

In the same manner, we at the NRC encourage all of our staff and managers to maintain 

an open collaborative work environment Such an environment encourages 

collaborative problem solving and decision-making by placing value on diverse views, 

alternative approaches, critical thinking, unbiased evaluations, and honest feedback on 

how decisions are made. This type of approach enhances safety because, even when 

alternative views are not adopted, considering all perspectives enhances a regulator's 

ability to make the best safety-related decisions possible. 

In contrast, a chilled work environment is one in which individuals are uncomfortable 

bringing up minority or opposing viewpoints. This robs decision-makers of information 

that may be crucial to developing a carefully considered, nuanced position that is fully 

protective of public health and safety. Moreover, in a chilled work environment, 

individuals may be reluctant not only to share differing opinions but also to identify 

factual or technical errors. This could have a disastrous impact on public health and 

safety. 

Question 7 

Please explain why it is critical for Commissioners to receive the best 

professional opinions from agency staff, unfiltered and unrestrained. 

The Commission discharges the agency's rulemaking, adjudicatory, and policyformulation functions The Commission structure was designed to take into account the 

diverse viewpoints of all Commissioners and to, through the voting process and 

consensus building, reach the best conclusions possible. However, the benefits of 

varied Commission viewpoints are significantly dimmed if those viewpoints are not 

based on the best available information. 

While Commissioners can, of course, base their opinions on their own experience and 

research and meetings and interactions with outside stakeholders such as other 

governmental entities, industry representatives, and non-governmental organizations, 

the NRC's greatest asset is its well-qualified, experienced staff of experts. These 

experts should be relied upon to give unbiased, technically- and factually-sound counsel, 

advice, and recommendations reflecting what they believe to be the best course of 

action. They should, when advising the Commission, feel free to disagree with or 

contradict any Commissioner or Commissioners, if they feel that doing so is necessary 

to provide the best counseL 
153 


26661.128

If they are unable to provide their honest advice to the Commission or if their views are 

altered or filtered to promote one agenda or other, then the decisions made by the 

Commission are not as well-informed as they might be otherwise and pub.lic safety could 

be compromised. 

Question 8 

Please describe all situations where you are concerned that information was 

withheld from the Commission, delayed, or altered prior to transmittal to the 

Commission. Please describe any actions inconsistent with Internal Commission 

Procedures. 

I would like to provide a full account in response to this question, but it would be 

impracticable to do so. In the last year, it has become more or less routine for staff 

information to be altered, delayed, or blocked from the Commission. For example, just 

within the last few weeks, staff was instructed to withhold information about the 

Commission's own internal finances. 

However, I can point to a few salient instances that raised concerns that vital information 

related to important policy matters was withheld from the Commission or was delayed or 

altered prior to transmitlal to the Commission. A very notable example relates to the 

Near Term Task Force Report provided to the Commission regarding potential actions to 

be taken in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Staff provided the Commission with an 

advance copy of a transmittal memo which had been signed by the EDO which provided 

his usual detailed discussion regarding the senior staff's recommended next steps. This 

discussion culminated in a recommendation from the senior staff that therE> may be value 

in evaluating the entire body of recommendations iri a holistic manner. 

However, to the Commission's surprise, that advance copy was withdrawn and a new 

version of the memo was provided. The new version was a two-paragraph rnerno that 

simply transmitted the Task Force report without any input from the agency's senior 

managers. It is my understanding that withdrawal of the advanced copy of the 

memorandum was undertaken at the direction of the Chairman. In fact, we later learned 

that the Chairman's staff-and not the EDO-actually wrote the final version of the 

memo t11at was transmitted to the Commission. This action was not consistent with the 

Commission's procedures. 

Perhaps even more troubling, we later discovered that earlier versions of the original 

staff memo offered even more perspective from the staff. For example, one of the 

earlier versions stated the staff intended io provide the Commission with a roadmap of 

its planned approach for obtaining stakeholder input on the Task Force's 

recommendations, analyzing stakeholder input, and providing the Commission feedback 

on each of the recommendations, while transitioning from the near-term to longer-term 

review by July 15, 2011. That earlier version went on to say the staff intended to solicit 
154 


26661.129

input in a manner that will ensure broad stakeholder feedback is received and evaluated. 

but not unnecessarily delay decision making of near-term actions on the Task Force's 

recommendations. This information would have been extraordinarily valuable to the 

Commission's consideration of the task from report. Unfortunately, these earlier editions 

were modified at the direction of the Chairman and this information was excised. 

It is inconsistent with the intent of NRC's governing statute for one member of the 

Commission- even the Chairman- to modify recommendations and information 

provided by the NRC staff. 

A second notable example is related to the policy issue associated with fire protection at 

nuclear power plants. In late 2010, I was told by a member of the senior staff that the 

agency's approach to receiving applications from industry to risk-inform fire protection 

programs at nuclear power plants was proving to be unworkable and staff was 

developing a notation vote paper to request Commission direction on a revised strategy. 

I later asked the Chairman what progress the staff had made developing this paper and 

the Chairman said there was no paper. Several weeks passed and no progress had 

been made to resolve this critical fire safety issue. In order to clarify the situation, 

another Commissioner and I requested a briefing from the staff to understand the details 

of the problem and what the staff thought should be done. However, just before this 

briefing began, the Chairman dispatched a manager to stop the briefing. Evidently, the 

Chairman had seen a copy of the staff's briefing and didn't want the information 

presented to us. 

We refused to stop the briefing, but the attempt to prevent us from obtaining staff input 

was very disturbing. Minutes after the failed attempt to stop the briefing, the Chairman 

announced that staff would provide the Commission with a paper to address the fire 

protection issue. 

Question 9 

When did you first learn of Chairman Jaczko's prospective proposal to cut resources 

to license renewals? 

a. Did he discuss these with you prior to the December 6 press briefing 

and/or the December 15 hearing? 

b. Since the December 15 hearing has he provided you with any information 

on this matter? 

I have received no information from the Chairman about cutting resources for license 

renewals. The Commission's established policy is to continue review of all license 

renewal applications. To the degree that that policy direction has been altered, the 

Commission has not been notified or consulted. 
155 


26661.130

Question 10 

Please summarize all actions taken to re-evaluate the safety and security of 

nuclear plants in the United States, and to implement the recommendations of the 

Near-term Task Force's 90-day report. Please include a timetable of all relevant 

implementation dates for projected actions and those already taken. 

Consister~t with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, 

the NRC is taking action as a result of the ever~ts at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plar~t. In April 2011, the Commission established a senior-level task force known 

as the Near··Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct both a short· and long-term analysis of 

potential lessons-learned. The report produced by the NTIF, SECY-11-0093, "Near 

Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan," 

dated July 12, 2011 (Ager~cy wide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML 11186A950); identified twelve major recommendations with 

the potential to improve the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities 

The NTIF recommendations serve as the foundation of the agencies actions. The NRC 

staff sought external stakeholder feedback in a public meeting on August 31, 2011, 

regarding I he NTIF recommendations that stakeholders consider to be most important 

and that the NRC should undertake in the near-term. These recommendations were 

identified in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken 

Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report") dated September 9, 2011. A 

Commission meeting was conducted on September 14, 2011, during which 

representatives from other Federal and stale agencies, the nuclear industry, and 

interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's 

proposed near-term actions. 

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) provided their views on the 

NTTF recommendations on October 13, 2011. Their views were quite comprehensive 

including: 

Expand NTTF Recommendation 2.1 to include an update of the guidance 

for external flooding 

Expand Recommendation 2.3 to assure the walkdowns address severe 

storms as well as seismic and flooding events 

Expand Recommendation 4,1 to include issuance of an advanced notice 

of proposed rulemaking and requiring licensees to provide an assessment 

of capabilities to cope with an extended station blackout {SBO) 

Apply actions related to Recommendation 5.1 to BWR plants with Mark II 

Containments 
156 


26661.131

Consider Performance Based Criteria to mitigate and manage an 

extended SBO as an alternative to specific copmg times 

Expand Recommendation 6 to include a requirement for BWR plants with 

Mark I and Mark II containments to implement combustible gas control 

measures m reactor buildings; additionally expand Recommendation 6 to 

include an assessment of the vulnerabilities introduced by shared 

ventilation systems. 

Many of the recommendations from the ACRS were included in the Commission's 

direction to the staff. 

On October 18th, the Commission responded to the staff's recommendations with Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be 

taken Without Delay from the Near Term Task Force Report" (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML 112911571) to initiative action without delay on those NTTF recommendations with 

the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near-term. In that SRM, the 

Commission directed that the NRC should strive to complete and implement the lessonslearned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident within 5 years (by 2016). In addition, the 

Commission directed that the staff should designate the station blackout (SBO) 

rule making as a high-priority rulemaking with a goal of completion within 24 to 30 

months. 

The staff implemented the Commission direction outlined in SRM- SECY-11-0124 and 

focused on those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety 

improvement In order to do thrs effectively, the staff performed an assessment of each 

NTTF recommendation to determine the required regulatory activities, an estimated 

schedule, and associated resource impacts. Once this information was developed, the 

staff prioritized the NTIF recommendations (and other actions that emerged from 

stakeholder and ACRS engagement) into three tiers based on safety importance, \he 

availability of resources to complete the work, and the completeness of relevant 

technical information. Our efforts have since focused on the items of highest safety 

significance, collected under the "Tier 1" banner. 

To further inform the prioritization of the NTIF recommendations, the NRC staff 

conducted a public meeting with representatives of our licensees on September 21, 

2011, in order to better understand industry's current plans and actions to address the 

lessons-learned from the Fukushima Daiichi event. The NRC staff's proposed 

prioritization of all of the NTTF recommendations was submitted in a notation vote paper 

(SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned") dated October 3, 2011 {ADAMS Accession No. 

ML 11272A111 ). A Commission meeting was conducted on October 11, 2011, during 

whtch representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and 
157 


26661.132

interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NR.C statf's 

proposed prioritization. 

Again the AC RS provided their views on the staff's proposed prioritization in a letter 

dated November 8, 2011 The ACRS advised the Commission that the staff's three tier 

approach and criteria for prioritization of the Near Term Task Force recommendations 

were appropriate. The ACRS provided various additional recommendations including: 

Rulemaking activities related to strengthening of Station Bl<tck Out 

mitigation capability shoukt be expedited. 

Tier 1 recommendations should be expanded to include NTTF 

recommendations 1.a through 1.g and 2.a through 2.d from the ACRS's 

October 1310 report. 

Recommendation 10.2 regarding evaluation of the command and control 

structure and qualifications of decision makers should be initiated in 

parallel with Tier 1 activities related to integration of onsite emergency 

actions. 

Tier 2 recommendations should be expanded to include the additional 

actions regarding enhancement of selected reactor and containment 

instrumentation and the need to proactively engage in efforts to capture 

and analyze data from the Fukushima event 

Recommendation 7.1-2- Develop and issue orders to licensees to 

provide reliable Spent Fuel Pool instrumentation should be reconsidered. 

Schedules for SFP instrumentation improvements and othel' modifications 

to SFPs should be tnformed by quantification of the contribution made by 

SFPs to overall plant risk. 

SECY-11-0137 was reviewed by the Commission and in a December 15, ;'011, SRM for 

SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in RE,sponse to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned," (ADAMS Accession No. ML 113490055) the Commission 

approved the staff's recommended prioritization, subject to direction provicled in SRM- . 

SECY -11-0124. The Commission also provided the following guidance in SRM-SECY11-0137 
158 


26661.133

Consult with the Commission via notation vote papers before issuing any 

orders that would lead to a change in the design basis of licensed plants 

Inform the Commission 5 business days before issuing letters under 10 

CFR § 50.54(f) associated with the regulatory activities outlined in SECY11-0137. 

Inform the Commission of the results of its review of six additional staff 

recommendations, that went beyond those prepared by the NTIF but 

which the staff determined had a clear nexus to the Fukushima Daiichi 

event and may warrant additional action. This includes the results of the 

staff's consideration of filtration of containment vents in the context of the 

existing Tier 1 issues on hardened reliable vents for boiling water reactor 

(BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments. 

Inform the Commission of how the staff addressed Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards ACRS recommendations, dated November 8, 

2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 11311A264). 

Initiate a probabilistic risk assessment {PRA) methodology to evaluate 

potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically 

induced fires and floods as part of Tier 1 activities described in SECY-11-

0137. 

Most recently, in response to the recent legislation (the December 2011 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law (PL) 112-74)) and input it received from 

stakeholders, the staff has proposed an acceleration of the schedule originally proposed 

in SECY-11-0137, with a goal of issuing the Tier 1 orders and a request for information 

letter before the first anniversary of the Great Tohoku Earthquake. As such, the staff 

provided to the Commission a notation vote paper (SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders 

and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons-Learned from Japan's March 11, 

2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami'') {ADAMS Accession No. ML 12039A 1 03) 

dated February 17,2012, to address requirements stated In SRM-SECY-11-0137, and to 

communicate the staffs proposed orders and request for information. SECY-12-0025 is 

currently under review by the Commission. 

As reflected in SECY 12-0025, the staff has completed significant work {thanks in great 

part to the comprehensive stakeholder engagement ordered by the Commission) and 

proposed a scl1edule of implementation as follows: 
159 


26661.134

Proposed Schedule for 50.54(f) Letter on Seismic and Flooding Reevaluations 

-~-i!~i!,>ne -==---=~-=====~__Qe.~r:_'!ting Reactors ancl Cc10struction Permit Holders _ 

Guidance Issued November 30, 2012 

J6iliaiRS5Poii5e-~----- ~b~..?.r 3o, 2o13 .-=:======--=--- ucensee Seismic Hazard September 9, 2013 (Central and Eastern United States/ 

_E;_valuations Due ----····--·--·-- March 9, 2015 (Western United St!J.~~----·-·--·-·· Licensee Flooding Hazard Between March 9, 2013 and March 9, 2015 (based on 

Evaluations 0_1:1_~-- . ..P.[(oritiz<!li<J.DL _____ .. -·-

Future Steps Pending NRC evaluation and prioritization, with completion 

of evaluations for all facilities between October 2016 and 

Proposed Schedule for 50.54(f) Letter on Seismic and Flooding Walkdowns 

Milestone 

Guidance" Issued/Endorsed 

Licensees Identity walkctownF'roce'dl.ires!o 

__ be Used 

Licensees Provide Results of Walkdowns 180 days after NRC endorsement of the 

walkdown pro~ci~re.J..November 2012) 

Proposed Schedule for 50.54(f) Letter on 

Enhanced Emergency Preparedness 

Staffing and Communications (covering multiunit events) 

26661.135

Date i Organization NRC Participants Non-NRC l Topics/Issues j 

1 J- . . . . Participants . , Discussed . . '"'"'"'w .g 

May 12, 2010 1 M1tsub1sh1 Nuclear William D. K1yosh1 Yamauchr, ! General Courtesy V1SI! 1 NRC 

Energy Systems Magwood, IV; MNES; Keith 1 i Headqua

Margaret J. Bupp, Paulson, MNES ! i 

6, 2010 

Legal Counsel ! I 

Federation of William D. 1 lchiro Maeda, Comparison of ,-Tokyo, Ja

Electric Power Magwood, IV; I FEPC; Toshiya regulatory structure in 

Companies of Margaret J. Bupp I Takaki, FEPC; United States and 

\ Japan I Kazuhiko Kusakari, Japan; comparison of 

l FEPC; Yoshihiro nuclear energy , I 

! ) Tomioka, FEPC; i Shigeru Kimura, 

I FEPC 

September 9-10, Japan Atomic William D. Please see list of 

2010 Energy Agency Magwood, IV; participants below' 

Margaret J. Bupp 

I 

I I 

I I 

development in United I 

State and Japan I 

i 

Attendance at Third 

International 

Consultants' Meeting, 

Sponsored by Japan 

Atomic Energy Agency 

(Theme: International 

1 

Harmonization of 

\ of 

1 Toward Global I Deployment) 

eactors 

' Tokyo, J

'International Consultants (Presenting Participants): Jacques Bouchard, Commissariat a l'energie atomique (France); Yoichi Fuji-ie, Toky

Institute of Technology (Japan); Chang Sun Kang, Seoul University (Korea); Baldev Raj, Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (India

China Institute of Atomic Energy (China). Experts from Japan: Hiroshi Endo, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization; Yoshio Kani. To

Univeristy: Koji Morita, Kyushu University; Hirotake Moriyama. Kyoto University; Masaki Saito, Tokyo Institute of Technology; Akira Yama

Osaka University; Shigenobu Kubo, Mitsubishi FBR Systems. Participants from JAEA: Shigeo Nomura, Satoru Kondo, Yutaka Sagayama

Kazumi Aoto, Masakazu lchimiya, Masaki Morishita, Shoji Kotake, Mr. Mizuno, Mr. feda, Ryodai Nakai, lkken Sato, Hiraki Hayafune, Tsut

Okubo, Yoshiharu Tobita, Tak.aaki Sakai, Toru Suzuki. Yasushi Okano, Satoshi Fujita, Hidemasa Yamane, Shin Kikuchi. Other Participa

Yeong It Kim, KAERI; Takuya Kitabata, JAEA. Secretariat (ail JAEA): Takas hi Namba, Koji Sato, Shinichi Toyama, Shigeaki Yonezawa, 

Usui. Satok.o Kurihara. 

26661.136

! October 1, 2010 Mitsubishi Electric William D. I Gil Remely, 1 Tour of Mitsubishi I Warrenda

i Power Products Magwood, IV; . Mitsubishi Power 1 Electric Power (Not a former client, Patrice M. Bubar, I j Products, Inc.; Kenji Products APWR ~ ""'"' 23, 2011 but associated with Chief of Staff I Mashio, MNES; Tim Simulator I MNES) 1 Clouser, Luminant I Federation of William D. Tai lnada, FEPC Potential effects of I Washingt

Electric Power Magwood, IV Fukushima accident on I 

Companies of nuclear industry in 

Japan Japan and worldwide j I March 30, 2011 Marubeni Group William D. Richard Straebel, Potential effects of NRC 

i Magwood, IV; Marubeni; Shuichi Fukushima accident on Headqua

I Margaret J. Bupp Ohashi, Marubeni; nuclear industry in Fumiya Kokubu, Japan and worldwide 

i Marubeni; Takashi 

Imamura, Marubeni; 

i Wataru lkushima, 

j Marubeni; 

I Shinichiro Uemiya, l I I Marubeni 

1 June 22, 2011 Mitsubishi Nuclear William D. i Frank P. Gillespie, USAPWR NRC 

I Energy Systems Magwood, IV; ; MNES; Kiyoshi 

I 

Headqua

I Margaret J. Bupp j Yamauchi, MNES; 

I i ~kl~~ s 

i August 24, 2011 Federation of William D. ada, FEPC Impact of Fukushima Rockville

Electric Power i Magwood, IV on Japanese Nuclear 

Companies of I I Industry Japan ; 

January 18, 2012 Federation of ! William D. I Yasuyuki Fushimi, i Discussion of steps Tokyo, Ja

I 

Electric Power 1 Magwood, IV; FEPC; Yoshihiro I needed to improve 

I 1 Companies of I Patrice M. Bubar; Tomioka, FEPC; ! safety oversight of 

I 

26661.137

I January 19,2~ .-TEPCO i William D. Various Officials Visit to Fukushima Fukushima

I 

I Magwood, IV; and Staff Daiichi Nuclear Power Japan I Patrice M. Bubar; Plant 

Commissioner 

William c. 

Ostendorff; Ho K. 

l Nieh, Chief of Staff . to Commissioner 

[ I Ostendorff 

! February 8, 2012 Federation of j William D. Takeshi Fujii, FEPC Impact of Fukushima 'Rockville, 

! Electric Power 1 Magwood, IV I on Japanese Nuclear l Companies of I Industry L ---- I I Japan ·- --------- I ------~~-·-~"·---·~ - J ___________ L__ - 
163 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Ms. Svinicki. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, 

COMMISSIONER, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear you today on the topic of the review of the NRC’s Fukushima 

response activities. 

I join Chairman Jaczko in thanking the NRC staff for their tireless work and unflagging efforts. As he has described, the NearTerm Task Force recommendations touch on a broad range of important safety areas, including the loss of power due to earthquakes, flooding, or other natural disasters to issues related to 

spent fuel pools and further scrutiny of emergency preparedness 

activities. 

The Task Force’s recommendations include proposed new requirements for nuclear power plants to reevaluate and upgrade 

their seismic and flooding protection, to strengthen their ability to 

deal with the prolonged loss of power, and to develop emergency 

plans that specifically contemplate the possibility of events involving multiple reactors. The Task Force’s recommendations have now 

undergone review by the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards. The agency’s broad set of stakeholders have 

also been engaged through multiple public meetings. 

Through these efforts, we have benefited from the insights and 

perspectives of industry leaders, nuclear safety and environmental 

groups, and the public. In several public meetings, the Commission 

itself has heard directly from a diverse array of these stakeholders 

and plans to continue to do so during the coming year. I believe 

that all of these efforts have strengthened the NRC’s activities in 

response to the Fukushima events. 

Additionally, as the NRC acquires more information about the 

accident, we will assess the impact of such information on actions 

already underway and determine whether additional actions are 

needed. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations has released a 

special report on the nuclear accident at the Fukushima plant 

which provides a detailed time line of events after the earthquake 

and tsunami in Japan. The Commissions’ longer-term review activities will evaluate emergent information such as this report as 

it becomes available, identify any additional recommended actions 

and assess, any impacts on actions underway. 

In addition to commending the NRC staff for their hard work, I 

would also like to acknowledge the extraordinary efforts of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in having responded 

quickly to the Commission’s request and all of the agency stakeholders who have participated in our public meetings to date. I believe their sustained involvement will further strengthen our activities as we move ahead. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The responses of Ms. Svinicki to questions for the record follow:] 

164 


26661.138

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Svinicki 

Questions from: 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

1) On October 19, 2011, the Commission approved a charter for the longer-term review of 

lessons learned from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the Commission 

requested that the staff provide a status update evel)' 6 months in the form of a paper. Will 

you agree to provide me with those update papers on the day that they are made available 

to the Commission? 

Yes. I will support Commission direction to the NRC staff that these update papers should 

be provided to the Committee on the day that they are provided to the Commission. 

2) In the August 2, 2011 hearing, I asked you whether you could move forward on the Task 

Force recommendations in 90 days, and four Commissioners said "yes" for some or all of 

the recommendations. h'owever, the NRC had not taken actions on any of the 

recommendations as of our December 15, 2011 hearing. 

a) Do you support conducting votes in public to increase public transparency and 

accountability? 

I support the Commission's notation voting process. Under this process, the Office of 

the Secretary of the Commission publicly releases Commissioner votes on policy 

matters (posting them on the NRC's public website) after Commission action on a voting 

paper has concluded. Also posted on the website is the direction to NRC staff resulting 

from the voting process. called a "Staff Requirements Memorandum." Together, these 

documents provide the individual view of each Commissioner (the vote) and the 

collective. majority outcome of the deliberative process (the resulting direction to the 

NRC staff). 

b) Do you support making your vote on all matters related to the Task Force 

recommendations available to the public on the day you vote to further increase 

transparency and accountability? 

Regarding my vote on notation voting paper SECY-12-0025, "Proposed Orders and 

Request for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, 

Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,' I released my vote to the public on March 2, 

2012, the same day it was cast. I assess the merits of early release of my votes on a 

case by case basis. In general, votes on policy papers are made public on the agency's 

website concurrent with the conclusion of the voting process and issuance of the staff 

requirements memorandum resulting from the vote. 

Enclosure 
165 


26661.139

2 

3) To what extent do you think the swift implementation of the lessons learned from Fukushima 

is good for public support of, and confidence in the safety of, nuclear power? 

The swiftness of the NRC's implementation of the lessons learned from Fukushima is but 

one factor that weighs on !he public's confidence in the NRC as a nuclear safety regulator. 

In addition, the process that the NRC follows in developing and acting on these lessons 

learned must be scrutable, thorough, and disciplined. If the public assesses that the NRC's 

process contains these elements, it is likely that public confidence will be reinforced. 
166 


26661.140

3 

Senator Tom Carper 

1) During the December 151

h hearing, I asked Chairman Greg Jaczko if the day-to-day NRC 

staff work was being compromised with the staff working on the Fukushima 

recommendations and the recent unrest between the Commissioners. Specifically, I asked 

about the licensing process for new reactors and the relicensing process for our current 

reactors. Chairman Greg Jaczko responded that there may be some delays in the 

relicensing process for our current reactors due to resource constraints. 

Over the years, I have worked to ensure the NRC has the right amount of resources to do its 

job and ensure the Commission can protect public safety. Can you tell me how many staff 

are working on relicensing leading up to the Fukushima crisis and how many staff are 

working on relicensing today? How many additional staff are needed to ensure there are 

not any delays? 

In addition, I would like an update on all the relicense applications that are currently being 

reviewed by the NRC- including a timeline for each reactor from the day the application 

was docketed by the NRC to the estimated day the application is expected to be finalized. 

The following information was provided to each member of the Commission by the NRC 

staff, in response to your inquiry. Although I have no independent estimate of the resources 

committed or required, the staff reports that, at the time of the Fukushima Event of March 

11, 2011, 82 staff members were working on license renewal reviews. Currently, 77 staff 

members are working on license renewal reviews. Of the five staff member reduction, three 

of those were reassigned due to Fukushima support. There were also approximately 24 

NRC staff members who were spending part of their time supporting license renewal 

reviews in March 2011. This number has remained steady over the last year. 

Currently, no additional staff is necessary to ensure there are not any license renewal 

delays due to Fukushima impacts. The staff is working to minimize any schedule changes 

on license renewal reviews due to supporting Fukushima lessons learned activities. 

Additionally, the license renewal process provides for "timely renewal," which allows a plant 

that has submitted a renewal application- and has made a good-faith-effort to complete the 

process to continue to operate while the staff completes the review. 

See the following table for a high-level summary of the current license renewal applications 

under review. Detailed information on each application and the corresponding review 

schedule can be found on the following website: 

http://www. nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications. html 
167 


26661.141

Pilgrim 

4 

Scheduled SER 

Application Date Date (actual 

dates in bold) 

1/27/06 6/28/07 

i 

Scheduled 

FSEIS Date 

(actual dates in 

bold) 

7127107 

Expected 

Completion Date 

In Hearing 

ProcessCompletion Date 

i

l Unknown f--------r---------t------!------------j---;-,-,-;----:--·- 11 1 In Hearing 

Indian Point 

Units 2 & 3 4/30/07 

~----------+----·---;!---

Crystal River 12/18/08 

8/11/09 12/03/10 I Process-

!

. 1 Completion Date 

' Unknown 

1 TBD pending-

! submittal of a 

· repair plan to 

TBD TBD I address 

containment 

I concrete 

i degradation 

~---------·--~-----------4----~, - ::lOOho"''"''"' 

Diablo Canyon 11124109 To be I TBD submittal of 

Units 1 & 2 supplemented as I updated seiSmiC 

~--:::-:---;-;-----~---:-:::::::-:-=--·-4--....:.:.n.:.ec:::e=:-:s;.:s,:::a.:.:ryc__t _ _ --~nalys1s Columbia 1/20/10 2/12 4/12 6/12 

-------+---------- --------- 1 1 TBD pend1ng 

I TB~- ~~~ c=~~1:o ' -i TBD pending 

I 

t

[ TBD 

1

1,, up~~~;;~~~~~:sis 8/30/10 10/12 supporting 

I environmental 

1-~s-o-~-tr:-jT~e~-x-a_s_tl-~ --~~- 10/12 ~- r::~e~-- Units 1 & 2 

10128110 

I I 

,___Limerick 6/22/11 1/13 

Units 1 & 2 I 

Grand Gulf 11/01/11 4/13 i 7/13 1-~C-a~lla-w~a~y--+--,2-/~19_/_1c-1--~i' ---r=s~D~--+--~T~BD~---+----~T~B~D:---~ 

Seabrook 6/1/10 TBD 

Davis-Besse 

2/13 

., -------;:9:-;/1;-::3;-----

4/13 
168 


26661.142

5 

Senator James lnhofe 

1) In the hearing, it was alleged that at our last NRC hearing on August 2, four of you made a 

commitment to this committee that you would move forward on some or all of the Near-term 

Task Force recommendations within 90 days, but that you had failed to do so. Please 

explain what you had done prior to November 2 and what you have done since, and whether 

you believe you have met that 90-day commitment. 

The Commission met its 90-day commitment to move forward on some or all of the NearTerm Task Force (NTTF) recommendations. Specifically, on October 18, 2011, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to begin action without delay on those NTTF 

recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near-term. This 

direction was provided in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0124, 

"Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near Term Task Force Report" 

In that SRM, the Commission directed that the NRC should strive to complete and 

implement the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident within 5 years- by 

2016. In addition. the Commission directed the staff to proceed with the station blackout 

rulemaking as a high-priority, with a goal of completion within 24-30 months. 

Since November 2, 2011, the Commission has approved the staff's recommended 

prioritization of the recommendations. several of which could be implemented without undue 

delay. These particular recommendations pertain to the ability of plants to cope with 

seismic, flooding, and other externally initiated events, mitigating strategies for beyond 

design basis events, the installation of reliable hardened containment vents for boiling water 

reactors of similar vintage and design as the Fukushima reactors, additional instrumentation 

for spent fuel pools, and enhanced staffing and communications capabilities for emergency 

preparedness. The NRC has begun implementing many of these recommendations to 

enhance U.S. nuclear plant safety. On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff submitted for 

Commission consideration a set of orders and requests for information directed at the NRC's 

nuclear power plant licensees. As of March 5, 2012, the Commission is completing its 

review of this paper. 

2) In the hearing you were criticized for stalling progress on post-Fukushima safety 

improvements by requesting a "re-review" the Near-term Task Force 90-day report. Please 

describe the benefits of the broader staff review, the ACRS review, and stakeholder 

involvement that you would not have seen if the Commission and simply acted merely on 

the 90-day reporl. 

The broader staff review. the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) review, 

and the stakeholder involvement have strengthened the Commission's deliberations by 

providing valuable input and perspectives on the NTTF recommendations, and identifying 

other issues In the Staff Requirements Memorandum for SECY -11-0093, "Near-Term 

Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan," issued 

on August 19, 2011, the Commission directed the staff to engage promptly with 

stakeholders to review and assess the recommendations of the Near-Tenn Task Force in a 

comprehensive and holistic manner for the purpose of providing the Commission with fullyinformed options and recommendations. The staff was instructed to remain open to 

strategies and proposals presented by stakeholders, expert staff members, and others as it 

continues to examine information emerging from Japan since the conclusion of the NTTF 

review, and as it provides its recommendations to the Commission. The Commission also 
169 


26661.143

6 

directed that the ACRS formally review all Task Force recommendations and the staff's 

evaluation and recommended prioritization of the Task Force recommendations, and 

document its review in letter reports to the Commission. 

This direction to the NRC staff initiated a series of interactions that continue to this day and 

will remain ongoing in the future as the agency and its stakeholders address lessons 

learned from the Fukushima accident. The Commission and staff have held numerous 

public meetings that have included stakeholder participation, and several comment letters 

also have been submitted to the NRC. The Commission and the staff have publicly 

engaged the ACRS, as well. These interactions have resulted in the identification of 

additional recommendations warranting further consideration and have provided valuable 

insights regarding how the agency should best proceed in addressing the recommendations. 

These insights have affected the staff's proposed scope and path forward on each 

recommendation. As a result, the agency is proceeding with greater efficiency and surety in 

implementing the recommendations than it would have without this input. 

3) In Mr. William Daley's December 12, 2011, letter to you, he urged you to improve your 

internal communications. Is Mr. Daley's assessment a full and accurate depiction of the 

leadership dynamics at the Commission? If not, why not? 

Respectfully, I disagree with elements of Mr. Daley's assessment of the dynamics at the 

Commission. I do not agree that the current environment at the Commission is rooted in the 

structure of the NRC or in disagreements over policy matters. I believe that the Commission 

structure has served the agency well for decades, and that previous Commissions have 

functioned successfully under this structure. I also believe that the present tensions extend 

beyond differences on policy matters, because substantive disagreements on policy matters 

routinely exist in Commissions and Boards, as a nature of their structure. Instead, I believe 

that the current tensions at the Commission are rooted more fundamentally in Chairman 

Jaczko's interpretation of his statutory authority, as well as his conduct towarrJ his 

Commissioner colleagues and the NRC staff. 

4) Please describe any limitations under the Sunshine Act that would limit or prohibit pn'vate 

meetings between all five commissioners and a third-party mediator. 

The Government in the Sunshine Act precludes (with certain exceptions) non·public 

meetings of a quorum of the Commission where deliberations determine or result in the joint 

conduct or disposition of official agency business. A non-public meeting of all five 

Commissioners and a third-party mediator that ventured into deliberations resulting in the 

disposition of official agency business would be impermissible, unless otherwise excepted 

by law. NRC's Sunshine Act implementing regulations define "meeting" to encompass only 

"discussions [that] are sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or issues as to cause or to 

be likely to cause the individual participating members to form reasonably firm positions 

regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the agency." 10 C.F.R. § 9.101(c). 

Accordingly, a discussion between the five Commissioners and a mediator could 

presumably qualify as a non-Sunshine Act discussion, and thus be held in private, so long 

as the discussion focuses solely, and in a relatively generalized way, on the Commission's 

functioning as a collegial body and does not attempt to work towards resolution of specific 

items of business that are pending, or expected to be pending, before the agency. 
170 


26661.144

7 

5) During the December 15 hearing, a number of alleged incidents of harassment, intimidation, 

bullying, and retaliation were discussed. Did you discuss these matters with Mr. Daley? 

Please list those that you did discuss. 

Mr. Daley's office promptly acknowledged receipt of the October 13, 2011 letter signed by 

four Commissioners and provided me with an opportunity for a meeting with Mr. Daley to 

discuss its contents. I appreciated these communications, which were confined to the 

matters outlined in the letter. 

6) Please explain why a chilled work environment is detrimental to nuclear safety 

A chilled work environment at the NRC is detrimental to nuclear safety because it inhibits the 

NRC staff's willingness and ability to raise safety concerns to NRC management and to the 

Commission. Under Section 4(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, any "officer or 

employee under the Commission may communicate directly to the Commission, or to any 

member of the Commission, whenever in the view of such officer or employee a critical 

problem or public health and safety or common defense and security is not being properly 

addressed." The legislative history of this provision states that "This subsection reinforces 

the NRC's open door policy with respect to bringing to Commission attention issues which 

affect the safety of nuclear reactors." S. Rep. 96-790 at 21. 

7) Please explain why it is critical for Commissioners to receive the best professional opinions 

from agency staff, unfiltered and unrestrained. 

It is imperative that the Commission receive the NRC staff's independent advice, and that 

recommendations purporting to represent the staff's positions are in fact so, because the 

Commission structure of governance is premised on the ability of each Commissioner to 

have full access to information pertaining to the Commission's functions. For example, the 

legislative history of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 states that "[ijndividual members of 

the Commission shall also have full access to all information in order to assure that diverse 

views of the members are properly informed ... " H.R. Rep. 96-1043, at 10. The legislative 

history also makes clear that "[d]irection of the EDO by the Chairman is not intended to 

prevent the EDO from independently preparing recommendations on matters which have 

been delegated to him" (S. Rep. 96-790 at 13); "information transmitted to the Chairman by 

the [EDO] relating to the Commission's functions will be given to the Commissioners 

immediately and without any alteration. The Chairman serves in this capacity only as a 

conduit for information to centralize the collection and forwarding of information to the 

Commission" (/d. at 20), and; the statutory framework for information sharing is not "to be 

used to justify a Chairman's decision to withhold information from, or delay giving 

information to, the Commissioners'' (fd.) 

8) Please describe all situations where you are concerned that information was withheld from 

the Commission, delayed, or altered prior to transmittal to the Commission Please describe 

any actions inconsistent with Internal Commission Procedures. 

I do not believe that the Commission has been kept fully and currently informed of 

information pertaining to the agency's lessons-learned from the events at Fukushima. One 

particular example is with respect to the NRC staffs ability to bring forth its independent 

recommendation on a Commission voting paper regarding the agency's response to the 

events at Fukushima (SECY -11-0093). Based on information provided by senior agency 
171 


26661.145

6 

staff. my understanding is that the NRC staff's original recommendation contained in that 

paper was removed at the direction of Chairman Jaczko. Any practice whereby the staff is 

hindered from providing the Commission with its independent advice and recommendations 

effectively curtails the Commission's access to full and timely information. Furthermore, the 

Internal Commission Procedures state that "[c]opies of draft and final SECY papers or 

COMSECYs delivered to the Chairman shall be delivered simultaneously to the other 

Commissioners." (Internal Commission Procedures at p. 11-1. July 5, 2011). 

Another example is with respect to the Chairman's unilateral shut-down of the technical 

review for the Yucca Mountain repository license application. As the Inspector General 

documented in his June 6, 2011 report (OIG Case No. 11-05), the EDO stated that he 

inquired of the Chairman whether the other Commissioners supported the Chairman's 

continuing resolution (CR) budget guidance memorandum that would close out the license 

application review process. The EDO told OIG that the Chairman told him "that all four 

Commissioners were in agreement with the memorandum's language, understood that they 

were going to close out the High-Level Waste Program, and authorized the issuance of the 

CR budget guidance memorandum." However, the Inspector General found that the 

Chairman "strategically provided three of the four other Commissioners with varying 

amounts of information about his intention to proceed to closure" and that "[the Chairman] 

did not provide Commissioner Svinicki with any information about his intentions." 

Perhaps most significantly, when discussing the Chairman's remarks to the senior staff at 

the October 5, 2011 Senior Leadership Meeting, the EDO described them to me by saying, 

"We were pretty much instructed to leave our brains at home." Hearing this characterization 

was yet another factor causing me to question whether the NRC staff is operating in an 

environment that fosters the staff providing the Commission unadulterated and independent 

advice. 

In addition to these examples, the Inspector General's June 6, 2011 report found that 

Chairman Jaczko controls information provided to other Commissioners based on his 

interpretation of his statutory authority. OIG found that because Chairman Jaczko "acts as 

the gatekeeper to determine what is a policy matter versus an administrative matter, and 

manages and controls information available to the other Commissioners, they are uncertain 

as to whether they are adequately informed of policy matters that should be brought to their 

attention." 

9) When did you first learn of Chairman Jaczko's prospective proposal to cut resources to 

license renewals? 

a) Did he discuss these with you prior to the December 6 press briefing and/or the 

December 15 hearing? 

No. I recall that I learned of his views in the trade press articles subsequent to his 

December 6 press briefing. 

b) Since the December 15 hearing has he provided you with any information on this 

matter? 

No, however, the NRC received its final Fiscal Year 2012 appropriations in December, 

2011 and continues to evaluate any resulting impacts or adjustments to current year 

budget execution and/or Fiscal Year 2013 planning. 
172 


26661.146

9 

10) Please summarize all actions taken to re-evaluate the safety and security of nuclear plants 

in the United States, and to implement the recommendations of tile Near-term Task Force's 

90-day report. Please include a timetable of all relevant implementation dates for projected 

actions and those already taken 

The following information was compiled by NRC staff in response to your inquiry: 

Consistent with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, the 

NRC is taking action as a result of lessons-learned from the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. In April 2011, the Commission established a senior-level team 

known as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis 

of potential lessons-learned. The report produced by the NTTF, SECY-11-0093, "Near Term 

Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan," dated July 

12, 2011, identified twelve broad recommendations with the potential to enhance the safety 

of U.S. nuclear facilities. 

Consistent with Commission direction, the NRC staff is taking action on these NTTF 

recommendations. The NRC staff sought external stakeholder feedback in a public meeting 

on August 31, 2011, regarding the NTTF recommendations that stakeholders consider to be 

most important and that the NRC should undertake in the near-term. These 

recommendations were identified in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0124, "Recommended 

Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report") dated 

September 9, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted on September 14, 2011, during 

which representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and 

interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staffs 

proposed near-term actions. 

On October 18, 2011, the Commission directed the NRC staff to begin action without delay 

on those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement in the 

near-term. The Commission directed that the NRC should strive to complete and implement 

the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident within 5 years by 2016. In 

addition, the Commission directed that the staff should designate the station blackout 

rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking, with a goal of completion within 24-30 months of 

the October 18, 2011 direction. 

The staff is implementing the Commission direction and has begun taking actions on those 

NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement without delay. In 

order to do this effectively, the staff performed an assessment of each NTTF 

recommendation to determine the required regulatory activities, an estimated schedule. and 

associated resource impacts. Once this information was attained, the staff began to 

prioritize the NTTF recommendations into three tiers: Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. To further 

inform the prioritization of the NTTF recommendations, the NRC staff conducted a public 

meeting with representatives of the nuclear industry on September 21, 2011, in order to 

better understand their current plans and actions to address the lessons-learned from the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi event. The NRC staff's proposed prioritization of all of the NTTF 

recommendations was submitted in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of 

Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned") dated 

October 3, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted on October 11, 2011, during which 

representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and interested 

non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's proposed 

prioritization. 
173 


26661.147

10 

SECY-11-0137 was reviewed by the Commission and, in a December 15, 2011 SRM for 

SECY-11-0137, the Commission approved the staffs recommended prioritization The 

Commission also listed the following staff requirements: 

1. Consult with the Commission via notation vote papers before issuing any orders that 

would lead to a change in the design basis of licensed plants. 

2. Inform the Commission 5 business days before issuing letters under 10 CFR § 50.54(f) 

associated with the regulatory activities outlined in SECY-11-0137. 

3. Inform the Commission of the results of its review of six additional staff 

recommendations, that went beyond those prepared by the NTTF, but which the staff 

determined had a clear nexus to the Fukushima Oai-ichi event and may warrant 

additional action. This includes the results of the staff's consideration of filtration of 

containment vents in the context of the existing Tier 1 issues on hardened reliable vents 

for boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments. 

4. Inform the Commission of how the staff addressed the Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) recommendations dated November 8, 2011. 

5. Initiate a probablistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate potential 

enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and 

floods as part of Tier 1 activities described in SECY-11-0137. 

Most recently, in response to recent legislative expectations and input received from 

stakeholders, the staff has accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY -11-0137, 

with a goal of issuing the Tier 1 orders and a request for information letter before the first 

anniversary of Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. 

As such, on February 17, 2012, the staff provided a notation vote paper to the Commission. 

SECY-12-0025, to address Commission requirements and to communicate the staff's 

proposed orders and requests for information. SECY-12-0025 is publicly available and is 

under review by the Commission. 
174 


26661.148

11 

Relevant implementation dates and projected actions are as follows: 
175 


26661.149

Licensees 

Walkdown Procedures 

To Be Used 

12 

-May2012 

walkdown 
176 


26661.150

13 
177 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Yes, Hon. George Apostolakis. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, 

COMMISSIONER, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and members of the 

Committee, good morning. 

I had hoped to testify today on the progress that we at the NRC 

have made on the Near-Term Task Force recommendations. Recently, however, some of my fellow Commissioners and I have been 

accused of conspiring to weaken the NRC response by deliberately 

delaying the implementation of these recommendations. I regret 

that I have to address such an accusation. 

The fact is that we have acted methodically and expeditiously. I 

find it deeply offensive that ill motives are ascribed to us. 

Nuclear safety matters are technically complex. This is one of the 

reasons that there is an independent five-member commission. Decisions on nuclear safety matters should not be made without careful deliberation. Such deliberation includes the technical evaluations by NRC senior management, the views of the statutory Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, public meetings, and inputs from external stakeholders. This open and transparent process 

could be followed in the case of Fukushima because of the Task 

Force conclusion that the continued operation of U.S. nuclear 

power plants and continued licensing activities did not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. 

As a result of this process, the technical basis for implementing 

the Task Force recommendations has been strengthened and additional technical issues for consideration have been identified. In 

particular, review of the recommendations by senior NRC staff 

members identified additional issues such as filtration of containment vents and loss of the ultimate heat sink. The ACRS made recommendations related to seismic and flood evaluations. 

Finally, public stakeholders made contributions on issues such as 

the distribution of potassium iodide following an accident and offered perspectives on the process of issuing orders. 

I would now like to highlight Recommendation 1 as presenting 

an enormous challenge. The Task Force recommends that the Commission establish a regulatory framework for adequate protection 

that appropriately balances defense in depth and risk considerations. This translates to a significant restructuring of the NRC 

regulatory framework. 

The Commission wisely directed the staff to pursue Recommendation 1 separately. This decision has enabled the NRC 

staff to begin working on those recommendations that can provide 

the most immediate safety benefit without delay. 

I am pleased with the progress the Commission has made as well 

as the fact that the process for reaching decisions has been transparent and methodical. Thank you very much. 

[The responses of Mr. Apostolakis to questions for the record follow:] 

178 


26661.151

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'1 Century" 

Questions from: Senator Barbara Boxer 

1. On October 19, 2011, the Commission approved a charter for the longer-term review of 

lessons learned from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the Commission 

requested that the staff provide a status update every 6 months in the form of a paper. 

Will you agree to provide me with those update papers on the day that they are made 

available to the Commission? 

Answer: In principle, I do not object to providing the update papers to you on the day they are 

submitted to the Commission. With respect to early release (before the normal 10-day period) 

of Commission papers. a majority vote would be needed. 

2. In the August 2, 2011 hearing, I asked you whether you could move forward on the Task 

Force recommendations in 90 days, and four Commissioners said "yes" for some or all 

cf the recommendations. However, the NRC f1ad not taken actions on any of the 

recommendations as of our December 15, 2011 hearing. 

a) Do you support conducting votes in public to increase public transparency and 

accountability? 

Answer: The Commission votes in public affirmation sessions on final rules and adjudicatory 

orders. There is a variety of ways voting could be conducted. Currently, the Commission 

conducts voting in writing on matters other than final rules and adjudications. Commission 

votes in these cases are generally not simple up-or-down decisions: they usually include 

extensive comments supporting, rejecting, or modifying the staff's proposals for various 

reasons. During this process, I benefit from the opportunity to consult with my staff and from 

thoughtful reflection on new information and other Commissioners' written votes. The resulting 

written votes provide well reasoned policy positions that explain a Commissioner's view in 

considerable detail. They, therefore. support formal accountability through a well documented 

legacy of information for the public and other stakeholders. The voting record becomes publicly 

available following Commission decisions. Apart from the voting process, the Commission 

regularly holds public meetings on key regulatory programs and policy issues. 

I support considering ways to enhance the transparency and accountability of Commission 

voting processes. However, I would not want to lose the benefits of the current process. 

b) Do you support making your vote on all matters related to the Task Force 

recommendations available to the public on the day you vote to further increase 

transparency and accountability? 

Answer: As l stated above, I support considering ways to enhance the transparency and 

accountability of Commission voting processes. l agree that, in some ways, making a vote 

public on the day a Commissioner votes could further increase transparency. However, I would 

not want to lose the benefits of the current processes. Transparency and accountability are 
179 


26661.152

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21 51 Century" 

both served by the present process because the votes are made public after the final 

Commission decision. An individual Commissioner may choose to make his or her vote public 

earlier. On the other hand, releasing individual Commissioner's votes prior to the completion of 

voting by all Commissioners and before the development of the majority position could be 

counterproductive to collegial deliberation. In addition, if individual Commissioners release their 

votes publicly before this deliberation is completed. the Commissioners may be subject to 

undue external attempts to influence the final decision. 

3. To what extent do you think the swift implementation of the lessons learned from 

Fukushima is good for public support of, and confidence in the safE>ty of. nuclear power? 

Answer: I agree that public support and confidence in the safety of nuclear power relies to a 

large degree on the NRC's ability to rapidly determine the necessary regulatory actions. Swift 

action has been taken by the Commission in response to Fukushima by establishing the NearTerm Task Force and deciding how to disposition its recommendations. The complexity of 

some of the issues identified by the Task Force present technical challenges to the staff and 

industry that will take some time to be resolved, if we are to implement effectively the lessons 

learned from Fukushima. Careful implementation contributes to regulatory stability. The longterm validity of regulatory actions bolsters public confidence. 

2 
180 


26661.153

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'1 Century" 

Questions from: Senator Tom Carper 

1. During the December 151" hearing, I asked Chairman Greg Jaczko if the day-to-day NRC 

staff work was being compromised with the staff working on the Fukushima 

recommendations and the recent unrest between the Commissioners. Specifically, I asked 

about the licensing process for new reactors and the re!icensing process for our current 

reactors. Chairman Greg Jaczko responded that there may be some delays in the 

re/icensing process for our current reactors due to resource constraints. 

Over the years. I have worked to ensure the NRC has the right amount of resources to do its 

job and ensure the Commission can protect public safety Can you tell me how many staff 

were working on relicensing leading up to the Fukushima crisis and how many staff are 

working on relicensing today? How many additional staff are needed to ensure there are not 

any delays? 

In addition. I would like an update on all the reiicense applications that are currently being 

reviewed by tile NRC- including a timeline for each reactor from the day the application was 

docketed by the NRC to the estimated day the application is expected to be finalized. 

According to the NRC staff, at the time of the Fukushima event of March 11, 2011, 82 staff 

members were working on license renewaL Currently 77 staff members are working on license 

renewaL Of the five staff member reduction, three were reassigned due to Fukushima related 

work. There were also approximately 24 staff members who were spending part of their time 

supporting license renewal reviews in March 2011. This number has remained steady aver the 

last year. The Commission has approved the FY 2013 budget with sufficient resources for 

licensing reviews to prevent potential delays. 

Please refer to the following staff table for a high-level summary of the current license renewal 

applications under review. Detailed information on each application and the corresponding 

review schedule can be found on the following website: 

3 
181 


26661.154

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'1 Century" 

Scheduled SER Scheduled FSEIS Expected Plant Application Date Date (actual Date (actual 

dates in bold) dates in bold) Completion Date 

J 

jln Hearing 

Pilgrim 1/27106 

! 6128107 7/27/07 I Process 

--------···----- ..... f ~:~:;:_""' In Hearing 

Indian Point Un1ts 4/30107 8/11/09 12/03110 Process 

2&3 Completion Date 

Unknown 1--------- -- -- TBD pending 

submittal of a 

repair plan to 

Crystal River 12118108 TBD TBD address 

I t:= ~radation ::;~:''"' __ 

I 6/2/11 i On hold pending 

Diablo Canyon 

I 

11/24/09 

To be I submittal of 

Uf11ts 1 & 2 supplemented as _ updated seismic 

i necessary _J_analysis 

Columbia 1/20/10 I 2/12 ' 4112 i 611~-

I I TBD pend1ng 

I ~ su bmitta! of 

Seabraok 611/10 j_ TBD TBD 1 acc:eptable 

I I 

responses on 

I ' concrete I 

I j degradation ---- ·-·!-----" ···-··· 

I ! TBD pendmg 

I I submittal of 

Davis-Besse 10112 TBD updated analysis 

supporting 

i environmental 

review 

South Texas 

ProJeCt 10112 10112 2113 

Units 1 & 2 ~--------- """ """""""""" --------- Limerick 6/22111 1/13 2/13 4/13 

Units 1 & 2 

Grand Gulf 11/01/11---- -~~-- 4113 """ ---~--, ---9/13- -- --1'8~-c------------- Callaway 12/19/11 TBD TBD 

4 
182 


26661.155

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'' Century" 

Questions from: Senator James lnhofe 

1. In the hearing. it was alleged that at our last NRC hearing on August 2, four of you made a commitment to this committee that you would move forward on some or all of the Near-term 

Task Force recommendations within 90 days, but that you had failed to do so. Please 

explain what you had done prior to November 2 and what you have done since, and whether 

you believe you have met that 90-day commitment. 

Ans'.'LEl.r: During the August 2nd hearing, I agreed with Chairman Jaczko's goal that we should 

disposition the recommendations within 90 days. ! cast my initial vote on the actions to be taken 

without delay (Tier 1 recommendations) on September 15, 2011 The Commission's decision 

on this action was issued on October 18, 2011. I cast my vote to disposition the Tier 1 and Tier 

2 Task Force recommendations on November 14, 2011. The Commission's decision was 

finalized on December 15, 2011. 

2. In the hearing you were criticized for stalling progress on post-Fukushima safety 

improvements by requesting a "re-review" the Near-term Task Force 9Q-day report. Please 

describe t/Je benefits of 1/Je broader staff review, the A CRS review. and stakeholder 

involvement that you would not have seen if the Commission had simply acted merely on 

the 9Q-day report. 

Answer: I favored following normal Commission processes for management review and 

stakeholder input. This was possible in this case because of the Near-Tenm Task Force 

finding that there was no imminent risk to U.S. plants. The Steering Committee 

identified actions to be implemented without delay and prioritized the Task Force 

recommendations. Some recommendations were prioritized as shorter-term actions 

that have more immediate benefits to public health and safety, and which needed to be 

completed first, in order to effectively inform the longer-term actions. The Commission's 

decision to conduct a broader staff review allowed for valuable interactions with external 

stakeholders and resulted in additional issues being identified for Steering Committee 

consideration. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards evaluated the Task 

Force recommendations and provided their independent advice to the Commission. 

These reviews, in fact resulted in additional recommendations for consideration. 

3. In Mr. William Daley's December 12, 2011, letter to you. he urged you to improve your 

internal communications. Is Mr. Daley's assessment a full and accurate depiction of the 

leadership dynamics at the Commission? If not. why not? 

Answer: The variety of issues raised in our letter was not the result of inadequacles in internal 

communications. 

4. Please describe any limitations under the Sunshine Act that would limit or prohibit private 

meetings between all five commissioners and a third-party mediator. 

5 
183 


26661.156

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations tor Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'1 Century" 

Answer: The NRC's Office of the General Counsel advises me that meetings between the five 

Commissioners and a third-party mediator could potentially be held in private. However. as 

discussed below, the Sunshine Act limits what could be discussed at such meetings. 

Subject to certain enumerated exceptions. the Government in the Sunshine Act {5 U.S.C. § 

552b) (Sunshine Act, or Act) prohibits a quorum of the Commission (i.e., three or more 

Commissioners) from meeting in private to deliberate "where such deliberations determine or 

result in the joint conduct or disposition of joint agency business." See§§ 552b(a)(2), (b), (c). 

and (e). There are, however, certain types of discussions involving a quorum of NRC 

Commissioners that would not implicate the Sunshine Act at all, making it unnecessary to 

assess the applicability of Sunshine Act exemptions or adhere to the Act's various procedural 

requirements for closed meetings. Such discussions are sometimes referred to as ''nonSunshine Act discussions." The Supreme Court confirmed the permissibility of such 

discussions in FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 471 (1984). by 

recognizing that Congress had carefully crafted the Sunshine Act's "meeting" definition in § 

552b(a)(2) to exclude certain types of discussions from the Sunshine Act's reach. Under the 

Sunshine Act, if a discussion does not qualify as a "meeting" under the Act's definition, the Act's 

restrictions and procedures do not apply. 

In line with the ITT World decision, NRC's Sunshine Act implementing regulations define 

"meeting" to encompass only "discussions [that] are sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or 

issues as to cause or to be likely to cause the individual participating members to form 

reasonably firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the agency." 10 

C.F.R § 9.101(c). In a Federal Register notice associated with this rule language, the NRC 

included "[h]ow well is the agency functioning" as an example of a potential non-Sunshine Act 

discussion topic, at least where the discussion stays at a "generalized 'big picture'" level. 

Government in the Sunshine Act Regulations: Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,941 (May 10. 1999). 

The Commission's Internal Commission Procedures, available online at 

httg:llwwvv.nrc.gov/abo\.lt-nrclpolic:t-making/inlemal.hjmJ. further describe non-Sunshine Act 

discussions as "preliminary, informal, informational, or 'big picture."' Internal Commission 

Procedures at IV-9. 

Accordingly, a discussion between the five Commissioners and a mediator could presumably 

qualify as a non-Sunshine Act discussion, and thus be held in private, so long as the discussion 

focuses solely, and in a relatively generalized way, on the Commission's functioning as a 

collegial body and does not attempt to work towards resolution of specific items of business that 

are pending, or expected to be pending, before the agency. Under the Internal Commission 

Procedures, the General Counsel and the Secretary of the Commission are required to attend 

any non-Sunshine Act discussions, but the Commission may waive this provision by majority 

vote. Internal Commission Procedures at IV-9. 

To the extent that a meeting between the five Commissioners and a mediator might benefit from 

getting into the specifics of pending or expected NRC business, the meeting-or, at least, the 

portions of the meeting that address these items of business-would likely need to fit within one 

or more of the ten Sunshine Act exemptions listed in§ 552b(c) in order to be closed to the 

6 
184 


26661.157

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review ofthe NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21st Century" 

public. This would in general be a fact-specific. case-by-case determination based on the 

particular nature of the anticipated discussions. See§ 552(d)(1 ). Closure of meetings pursuant 

to Sunshine Act exemptions requires satisfaction of certain procedural requirements specified in 

the Act These include requirements that a majority of the Commission vote in favor of closure, 

that advance notice be given to the public, that the NRC General Counsel certify that the 

meeting may be properly closed, and that records of the discussion be created and maintained. 

See§§ 552b(d), (e), and (f). 

5. During the December 15 hearing, a number of alleged incidents of harassment, intimidation, 

bullying, and retaliation were discussed Did you discuss these matters with Mr. Daley? 

Please list those that you did discuss. 

Answer: During my discussion with Mr. Daley, I described a report that a manager had been 

humiliated in a briefing that occurred a week after we sent our memo to the Chairman and our 

October 13, 2011 letter to the White House. I had received a number of reports of instances in 

which the Chairman yelled and lost his temper with senior staff. I had also experienced several 

incidents in which the Chairman reacted intemperately because of my disagreement or possible 

disagreement with his position. 

6. Please explain why a chilled work environment is detrimental to nuclear safety 

Answer: A chilled work environment can inhibit the staff from sending their frank and 

independent opinions and recommendations to the Commission. A chilled work environment 

could lead to staff members being afraid to raise issues or delaying the submission of 

information that they believe goes against the Chairman's policy preferences. It is important for 

the Commissioners to consider alternative approaches and diverse views. Having all 

perspectives improves our ability to make the best regulatory decisions. An Open Collaborative 

Work Environment is, in fact, a key component of the NRC's internal safety culture. 

7. Please explain why it is critical for Commissioners to receive the best professional opinions 

from agency staff, unfiltered and unrestrained 

Answer: The staff's efforts to develop options and recommendations on a wide variety of 

nuclear safety and policy issues for the Commission to decide is often the result of analysis, 

significant interactions with stakeholders, and management review. If the staff's final 

recommendations were changed to reflect certain policy preferences before submittal to the 

Commission, the Commission's decisions will not be based on the opinions from staff and the 

final decisions may not be optimal and could result in different implications for nuclear safety. 

8. Please describe all situations where you are concerned that information was withheld from 

the Commission, delayed, or altered prior to transmittal to the Commission Please describe 

any actions inconsistent with Internal Commission Procedures. 

7 
185 


26661.158

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21" Century" 

Answer: Mr. Borchardt stated in his response to a question during the December 14, 201 'I 

hearing that "there have been papers and some budget submissions that have been altered at 

the Chairman's direction." Timing of the submission of papers has also been an issue. An 

example is the staffs preparation of a policy paper for the Commission outlining potential 

alternatives relating to the process for issuing a combined license (COL). I learned during a 

periodic meeting with the Office Director that the Chairman had ordered the staff to change their 

recommendation and present the Chairman's policy preference as the staff's recommendation. 

The staff prepared a policy paper to provide the Commission the Fukushima Task Force report. 

That paper conformed to the standard format and substance of policy papers, including staff 

analysis and recommendations. An advance copy of this paper was distributed to the 

Commission on July 12, 2011. Shortly after receiving the advance copy, tt1e Chairman called to 

explain that he was pulling the advance copy because the paper needed to be corrected. The 

new document that was provided to the Commission for a vote was simply a two-paragraph 

paper transmitting the task force report and did not include the staffs recommendations. 

9. When did you first learn of Chairman Jaczko's prospective proposal to cut resources to 

license renewals? 

Answer: I learned about the statements the Chairman made citing "resource limitations" as a 

reason that the Agency may delay nuclear plant license renewals and power uprates from the 

NRC news clips on December 8, 2011 (Nuclear Street article "NRC Requests Less Funding For 

2012 Amid Plant Relicensing Delays"). The Chairman also mentioned this in response to a 

question from Senator Carper during the December EPW hearing, where he stated: ''if we have 

resource constraints as result of the Fukushima activities, we may look at license renewal as an 

area to pull resources." 

I was aware of the Chairman's June 24, 2011, Budget Proposal for fiscal year (FY) 2013 in 

which he proposed reducing performance metric targets for all licensing actions, including 

license renewals. The Chairman also proposed to decrease the number of licensing actions 

completed per year in FY 2013. In its August 19, 2011 decision, the Commission did not agree 

to delay or decrease licensing actions and voted to retain the agency's existing licensing 

metrics. 

a) Did he discuss these with you prior to the December 6 press briefing and/or the 

December 15 hearing? 

Answer: 1 don't recall. 

b) Since the December 15 hearing has he provided you witl7 any information on this 

matter? 

Answer: No. 

8 
186 


26661.159

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21st Century" 

10. You have commented several times that the Fukushima accident was neither unthinkable 

nor unforeseen. Please elaborate and explain why those facts are important in considering 

regulatory actions in the U.S. 

Answer: Many people have referred to the events at Fukushima as unthinkable or unforeseen 

and imply that we should focus on protecting nuclear plants from unimaginable events. 

However, there is evidence that the historical record of tsunamis had not been used properly to 

determine the design basis at Fukushima Dai-ichi and, consequently, the protection of the 

plants was not sufficient. In addition, the location of safety-significant equipment was less than 

optimal with respect to protection against flooding, which a simple risk assessment would have 

revealed. Finally, as the Japanese government reported to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, the regulatory authority was not sufficiently independent. 

The accident was not of extremely low probability, i.e., it was not "unthinkable" or "unforeseen." 

Preliminary estimates of the frequency of the sequence of events range from 1 in 1000 years 

and upwards. These frequencies are intolerably high in the nuclear safety arena. These 

observations suggest that we should be mindful of striking a proper balance between confirming 

the correctness of the design basis and expanding the design basis of U.S. plants. 

Although the public has an understandable sense of urgency, thoughtful analysis and 

deliberation should not suffer as a result of a technically unjustifiable heightened sense of 

urgency resulting from failure to acknowledge that significant mistakes contributed to the 

accident. Not every lesson learned from Fukushima is necessarily of higher priority than 

ongoing work on existing safety issues, e.g., fire protection. This is one of the reasons that I 

favored sending the Near-Term Task Force recommendations to the Steering Committee for 

assessment and evaluation in consultation with stakeholders, including the ACRS. 

11, In the hearing you stated that agency staff have come to you and said "What's in the report 

is not what we think." Please provide detailed examples. 

Answer: The example I was referring to during the hearing was the staff's preparation of a 

policy paper for the Commission outlining potential alternatives relating to the process for 

issuing a combined license (COL). I learned during a periodic meeting with the Office Director 

that the Chairman had ordered the staff to change their recommendation and present the 

Chairman's policy preference as the staff's recommendation. 

12. Please summarize all actions taken to re-evaluate the safety and security of nuclear plants 

in the United States, and to implement the recommendations of the Near-term Task Force's 

90-day report. Please include a timetable of all relevant implementation dates for projected 

actions and those already taken. 

Answer: Consistent with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, 

the NRC is taking action as a result of the events at the Fukushima Oai-ichi nuclear power plant. 

9 
187 


26661.160

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21•• Century" 

In April 2011, the Commission established a senior-level task force known as the Near-Term 

Task Force (NTIF) to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis of potential lessons learned. 

The report produced by the NTIF, SECY-11-0093, "Near Term Report and Recommendations 

for Agency Actions following the Events in Japan,'' dated July 12, 2011 {Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 11186A950); identified twelve 

maJor recommendations with the potential to improve the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities 

The NRC is taking action on these NTIF recommendations. The NRC staff sought ex1ernal 

stakeholder feedback in a public meeting on August 31. 2011. regarding the NTIF 

recommendations that stakeholders consider to be most important and that the NRC should 

undertake in the near-term. These recommendations were identified in a notation vote paper 

(SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task 

Force Report") dated September 9, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted on 

September 14, 2011, during which representatives from other Federal and state agencies. the 

nuclear industry, and interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the 

NRC staff's proposed near-tenrn actions. 

On October 18. 2011, the Commission directed the NRC staff in Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM)- SECY -11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from 

the Near Term Task Force Report,' (ADAMS Accession No. ML 112911571) to begin action 

without delay on those NTIF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety 

improvement in the near-term. In that SRM. the Commission directed that the NRC should 

strive to complete and implement the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 

within 5 years- by 2016. In addition. the Commission directed that the staff should designate 

the station blackout (SBO) rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking with a goal of completion 

within 24-30 months ofthe October 18.2011 SRM. 

The staff has implemented the Commission direction outlined in SRM- SECY-11-0124 and has 

begun taking actions on those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety 

improvement without delay. In order to do this effectively, the staff performed an assessment of 

each NTIF recommendation to determine the required regulatory activities, an estimated 

schedule, and associated resource impacts. Once this information was attained, the staff began 

to prioritize the NTIF recommendations into three tiers: Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. To further 

inform the prioritization of the NTIF recommendations, the NRC staff conducted a public 

meeting with representatives of the nuclear industry on September 21. 2011, in cider to better 

understand their current plans and actions to address the lessons-learned from the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi event. The NRC staffs proposed prioritization of all of the NTTF recommendations was 

submitted in a notation vote paper (SECY -11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to 

be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned") dated October 3, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 11272A111). A Commission meeting was conducted on October 11, 2011. 

during which representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and 

interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staffs proposed 

prioritization. 

10 
188 


26661.161

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21 51 Century" 

SECY-11-0137 was reviewed by the Commission and in a December 15, 2011, SRM for SECY11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima 

Lessons Learned," (ADAMS Accession No. ML 113490055) the Commission approved the 

staff's recommended prioritization, subject to direction provided in SRM-SECY-11-0124. The 

Commission also listed the following staff requirements in SRM-SECY-11-0137: 

1. Consult with the Commission via notation vote papers before issuing any orders that 

would lead to a change in the design basis of licensed plants. 

2. Inform the Commission 5 business days before issuing letters under 10 CFR § 50.54(f) 

associated with the regulatory activities outlined in SECY-11-0137. 

3. lnfom1 the Commission of the results of its review of six additional staff 

recommendations. that went beyond those prepared by the NTTF but which the staff 

determined had a clear nexus to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event and may warrant 

additional action. This includes the results of the staff's consideration of filtration of 

containment vents in the context of the existing Tier 1 issues on hardened reliable vents 

for boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments. 

4. Inform the Commission of how the staff addressed Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) recommendations, dated November 8. 2011 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML11311A264) 

5. Initiate a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate potential 

enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and 

floods as part of Tier 1 activities described in SECY-11-0137. 

Most recently, in response to the recent legislation (the December 2011 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law {PL) 112-74)) and input it received from stakeholders, the 

staff has accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY-11-0137, with a goal of issuing 

the Tier 1 orders and a request for information letter before the first anniversary of Japan's 

March 11, 2011, Great T6hoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. As such, the staff has 

drafted a notation vote paper (SECY -12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information 

in Response to Lessons-Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T6hoku Earthquake and 

Tsunami") {ADAMS Accession No. ML 12039A1 03) dated February 17, 2012, to address 

requirements stated in SRM-SECY-11-0137, and to communicate the staffs proposed orders 

and request for information. SECY-12-0025 is currently under review by the Commission. 

11 
189 


26661.162

Commissioner George Apostolalds 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatoey Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21"1 Century" 

The following information was provided by the NRC staff. 

Relevant implementation dates and projected actions are as follows: 

Schedule Overview for Orders: 

12 
190 


26661.163

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21"' Century" 

Schedule Overview for 50. 54(f) Letter on Seismic and Flooding Reevaluations: 

Schedule Overview for 50.54(f) Letter on Seismic and Flooding Walkdowns: 

13 
191 


26661.164

Commissioner George Apostolakis 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Responses to Questions for the Record from 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing on: 

"Review of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor 

Safety in the 21'1 Century" 

Schedule Overview for 50.54(f) Letter on Enhanced EP Staffing and Communications: 

14 
192 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

And finally, last but not least, Hon. William Ostendorff. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, 

COMMISSIONER, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the Committee, for the chance to be before 

you today. 

It has been nearly 4 months since our last appearance before this 

Committee. I am pleased to say to you today, the Commission has 

provided clear direction to the NRC staff on an appropriate path 

for dispositioning the Near-Term Task Force recommendations and 

for approving regulatory actions that can be implemented without 

delay. 

Since I last appeared before you in August, I continue to take 

steps to enhance my own understanding of these issues by looking 

at measures in place at U.S. nuclear power plants to deal with beyond design basis events and natural hazards. In October Commissioner Magwood and I visited Diablo Canyon and San Onofre nuclear power plants in California. During the visits to these facilities, we looked at seismic hazards, tsunami protection walls, and 

emergency preparedness. 

While in California, Commissioner Magwood and I also took the 

opportunity to meet with the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, 

the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors, and State emergency officials to listen to their feedback and hear their concerns. 

I have also recently traveled to the Wolf Creek plant in Kansas and 

the D.C. Cook plant in Michigan to look at measures in place for 

station blackout. 

Because of the importance of the NRC’s post-Fukushima actions, 

the Commission has set an ambitious schedule for a series of voting 

papers related to the NRC staff’s review of the Near-Term Task 

Force recommendations. Over the last 20 months as a Commissioner, I have developed a great appreciation and respect for the 

competence and professionalism of the NRC staff. Their input to 

the Commission’s decision process is vitally important, which is 

why I voted to ensure that their technical expertise has been provided to the Commission for our decisionmaking. The three 

Fukushima-related votes I have cast since our last meeting here 

with you in August have been shaped in large part by their insight. 

I join Commissioner Apostolakis in addressing recent reports in 

the media that we have been accused of slow walking and not taking steps for nuclear safety. I share Commissioner Apostolakis’ 

statement of offense at those statements. These statements are inaccurate, they are misleading. We are not dealing with simple go 

or no-go decisions. These are complicated, highly technical matters 

requiring focused consideration and responsible decisionmaking. 

The senior level steering committee that we have as a Commission chartered has provided us with logical recommendations and 

prioritization of actions. I am pleased to tell all the members of this 

Committee that I am personally confident and pleased with where 

the Commission is making these decisions. I appreciate and respect 

the Committee’s oversight role, and I look forward to your questions. 

193 

[The responses of Mr. Ostendorff to questions for the record follow:] 


26661.165
194 


26661.166

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

2. In the August 2, 2011 hearing, I asked whether you could move forward on the Task Force 

recommendations in 90 days, and four Commissioners said "yes" for some or all of the 

recommendations. However, the NRC had not taken actions on any of the recommendations as 

of our December 15, 2011 hearing. 

a. Do you support conducting votes in public to increase public transparency and 

accountability? 

b. Do you support making your vote on all matters related to the Task Force 

recommendations available to the public on the day you vote to further increase 

transparency and accountability? 

Regarding my actions related to the Fukushima Near Term Task Force recommendations, I 

believe that I have acted in a timely and responsible manner. Below is a list of all papers that 

the Commission has acted on arising from the Task Force, along with the date in which I voted. 

SECY-11-0093- July 12, 2011- Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency 

Actions Following Events in Japan 

o I voted on July 27,2011. 

SECY-11-0117- August 26, 2011 -Proposed Charter for the Longer-Term Review of 

Lessons Learned from the March 11, 2011, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami 

o I voted on August 31, 2011. 

SECY-11-0124- September 9, 2011 -Recommended Actions to be Taken without 

Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report 

o I voted on September 16, 2011. 

SECY-11-0137- October 3, 2011 -Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken 

in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned 

o I voted on October 31, 2011. 

a. I am committed to making decisions in as open a manner as possible, consistent with 

the need to maintain a decision-making process that allows a free exchange of ideas 

and fosters well-considered decisions. I believe that our current voting process already 

provides adequate public transparency and accountability. 

The Commission's current procedures allow for the Commission's decision-making 

process to be thoroughly documented through a written voting record called the notation 

voting process. The written voting record is typically made publicly available. This 

process has served the Commission well over the years, and provides several major 

advantages. First, it gives each Commissioner an opportunity to explain his or her 

rationale behind each vote. The notation voting process also records the decisionmaking for historical reference, which is an invaluable tool in maintaining regulatory 

stability. Finally, the notation voting process also provides each Commissioner the 

Enclosure 

Page 2 of 20 
195 


26661.167

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

opportunity to carefully and thoroughly analyze the highly-technical issues that are 

typically before the Commission. 

b. I support making my vote on all matters related to the Task Force recommendations 

public according to the process outlined in the current Internal Commission Procedures. 

The Commission's procedures provide for the release of voting records following closure 

of the voting process, as well as the release of individual votes prior to the closure of the 

voting process. 

Enclosure 

Page 3 of 20 
196 


26661.168

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

3. To what extent do you think the swift implementation of the lessons learned from Fukushima 

is good for public support of, and confidence in the safety of, nuclear power? 

I believe that timely and thoughtful regulatory actions help to build public trust and confidence in 

the regulator. That said, nuclear safety matters are technically complex. Decisions on nuclear 

safety rnatters must be made with careful deliberation with as much transparency as possible. 

Enclosure 

Page 4 of 20 
197 


26661.169

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Thomas R. Carper 

1. During the December 15th hearing, I asked Chairman Greg Jaczko if the day-to-day NRC staff 

work was being compromised with the staff working on the Fukushima recommendations and 

the recent unrest between the Commissions. Specifically, I asked about the licensing process 

for new reactors and the relicensing process for our current reactors. Chainnan Greg Jaczko 

responded that there may be some delays in the relicensing process for our current reactors 

due to resource constraints. 

Over the years, I have worked to ensure the NRC has the right amount of resources to do its job 

and ensure the Commission can protect public safety. Can you tell me how many staff were 

working on relicensing leading up to the Fukushima crisis and how many staff are working on 

relicensing today? How many additional staff are needed to ensure there are not any delays? 

In addition, I would like an update on all the relicense applications that are currently being 

reviewed by the NRC - including a timeline for each reactor from the day the application was 

docketed by the NRC to the estimated day the application is expected to be finalized. 

At the time of the Fukushima Event of March 11, 2011, 82 staff members were working on 

relicensing on a full time basis. Currently 77 staff members are working full-time on relicensing. 

Of the five staff member reduction, three of those were reassigned due to Fukushima support. 

There were also approximately 24 additional NRC staff members who were spending part of 

their time supporting license renewal reviews in March 2011. This number has remained steady 

over the last year. 

Currently, no additional staff are necessary to ensure there are not any license renewal delays 

due to Fukushima impacts. This is due to delays unrelated to Fukushima stemming from 

technical and environmental aspects of the license renewal reviews, as well as a general 

reduction in the number of license renewal applications expected over the next few years. 

However, impacts due to Fukushima may change over time and we cannot estimate those 

future impacts on license renewal. 

The following table presents a high-level summary of the current license renewal applications 

under review. More detailed information on each application and the corresponding review 

schedule can be found on the following website: 

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html 

Enclosure 

Page 5 of 20 
198 


26661.170

Pilgrim 

Indian Point 

Units 2 & 3 

Crystal River 

Diablo Canyon 

Units 1 & 2 

Seabrook 

Davis-Besse 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

1/27/06 

4/30/07 

12/18/08 

11/24/09 

6/1/10 

8/30110 

10/28/10 

6/28/07 

8/11/09 

TBD 

612/11 

To be 

supplemented as 

TBD 

10/12 

10/12 

Enclosure 

Page 6 of 20 

7127107 

12103/10 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

TBD 

10/12 

In Hearing 

ProcessCompletion Date 

In Hearing 

ProcessCompletion Date 

Unknown 

TBD pending 

submittal of a 

repair plan to 

address 

containment 

concrete 

On hold pending 

submittal of 

updated seismic 

responses on 

concrete 

submittal of 

updated analysis 

supporting 

environmental 

2/13 
199 


26661.171

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

1. In the hearing, it was alleged that at our last NRC hearing on August 2, four of you made a 

commitment to this committee that you would move forward on some or all of the Near-term 

Task Force recommendations within 90 days, but that you had failed to do so. Please explain 

what you had done prior to November 2 and what you have done since, and whether you 

believe you have met that 90-day commitment. 

Regarding my actions related to the Fukushima Near Term Task Force recommendations prior 

to November 2, 2011, I believe that I acted in a timely and responsible manner. Below is a list of 

all papers that the Commission has acted on arising from the Task Force, along with the date in 

which I voted. 

SECY-11-0093- July 12, 2011- Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency 

Actions Following Events in Japan 

o I voted on July 27, 2011. 

SECY-11-0117- August 26, 2011 -Proposed Charter for the Longer-Term Review of 

Lessons Learned from the March 11, 2011, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami 

o I voted on August 31, 2011. 

SECY-11-0124- September 9, 2011- Recommended Actions to be Taken without 

Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report 

o I voted on September 16, 2011. 

SECY-11-0137- October 3, 2011- Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken 

in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned 

o I voted on October 31, 2011. 

Since November 2, 2011, the Commission has completed voting on SECY-11-0137, 

"Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons 

Learned." In a December 15, 2011 Staff Requirements Memorandum, the Commission 

approved staff action on all remaining Task Force recommendations (except one that the 

Commission concluded does not have immediate safety implications and will be reviewed over 

the longer term). The Commission also approved moving forward with analyzing several 

additional issues the task force had not recommended. At least one such issue is near the top of 

the agency's action list. 

On February 17, 2012, the staff transmitted to the Commission SECY -12-0025, "Proposed 

Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 

2011, Great T6hoku Earthquake and Tsunami." I intend to act on this matter promptly. 

Enclosure 

Page 7 of 20 
200 


26661.172

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

2. In the hearing you were criticized for stalling progress on post-Fukushima safety 

improvements by requesting a "re-review" [of] the Near-term Task Force 90-day report. Please 

describe the benefits of the broader staff review, the ACRS review, and stakeholder involvement 

that you would not have seen if the Commission had acted merely on the 90-day report. 

Consistent with the NRC's Principles of Good Regulation, the Commission sought broader staff 

review, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) review, and stakeholder 

involvement, which has provided the Commission with substantial benefits. For example, based 

in part on the numerous public meetings with all stakeholders, the nuclear industry has begun to 

move forward voluntarily to address several areas of safety significance. Also, because of the 

agency's interactions with stakeholders, we identified several additional issues the task force 

had not recommended. At least one such issue is near the top of the agency's action list. 

I have appreciated the insights and comments provided by interested parties outside the 

Agency. These discussions have helped me gain a broader understanding of local concerns, 

industry capabilities, scientific and engineering considerations, and national priorities. I continue 

to look forward to further input from all our external stakeholders. Further, I have greatly 

benefited from the input provided by the ACRS throughout our review process. I have found the 

ACRS's reviews to be very insightful and illustrative of the significant value, expertise, and 

experience that the ACRS has to offer the Commission. 

The reply of Mr. Ostendorff to Senator lnhofe's question #3 is not available to the public. 

Enclosure 

Page 8 of 20 
201 


26661.173

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15,2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

4. Please describe any limitations under the Sunshine Act that would limit or prohibit meetings 

between all five commissioners and a third-party mediator. 

Meetings between the five Commissioners and a third-party mediator could potentially be held 

in private. As discussed below, however, the Sunshine Act limits what could be discussed at 

such meetings. 

Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 

§ 552b) (Sunshine Act, or Act) prohibits a quorurn of the Cornrnission (i.e., three or rnore 

Commissioners) frorn rneeting in private to deliberate "where such deliberations determine or 

result in the joint conduct or disposition of joint agency business." There are, however, certain 

types of discussions involving a quorurn of NRC Commissioners that would not implicate the 

Sunshine Act at all, rnaking it unnecessary to assess the applicability of Sunshine Act 

exemptions or adhere to the Act's various procedural requirements for closed rneetings. Such 

discussions are sornetirnes referred to as "non-Sunshine Act discussions." The Suprerne Court 

confirmed the permissibility of such discussions in FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 

U.S. 463, 471 (1984), by recognizing that Congress had carefully crafted the Sunshine Act's 

"rneeting" definition to exclude certain types of discussions from the Sunshine Act's reach. 

Under the Sunshine Act, if a discussion does not qualify as a "rneeting" under the Act's 

definition, the Act's restrictions and procedures do not apply. 

In line with the ITT World decision, NRC's Sunshine Act implementing regulations define 

"meeting" to encompass only "discussions [that] are sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or 

issues as to cause or to be likely to cause the individual participating rnernbers to form 

reasonably firm positions regarding rnatters pending or likely to arise before the agency." In a 

Federal Register notice associated with this rule language, the NRC included "[h)ow well is the 

agency functioning" as an exarnple of a potential non-Sunshine Act discussion topic, at least 

where the discussion stays at a "generalized 'big picture"' level. The Cornrnission's Internal 

Corn mission Procedures further describe non-Sunshine Act discussions as "preliminary, 

informal, informational, or 'big picture."' 

Accordingly, a discussion between the five Commissioners and a mediator could presumably 

qualify as a non-Sunshine Act discussion, and thus be held in private, so long as the discussion 

focuses solely, and in a relatively generalized way, on the Commission's functioning as a 

collegial body and does not attempt to work towards resolution of specific items of business that 

are pending, or expected to be pending, before the agency. Under the Internal Commission 

Procedures, the General Counsel and the Secretary of the Commission are required to attend 

any non-Sunshine Act discussions, but the Cornrnission may waive this provision by majority 

vote. 

To the extent that a meeting between the five Commissioners and a mediator rnight benefit from 

getting into the specifics of pending or expected NRC business, the rneeting-or, at least, the 

portions of the meeting that address these iterns of business-would likely need to fit within one 

Enclosure 

Page 10 of 20 
202 


26661.174

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

or more of the ten Sunshine Act exemptions in order to be closed to the public. This would in 

general be a fact-specific, case-by-case determination based on the particular nature of the 

anticipated discussions. Closure of meetings pursuant to Sunshine Act exemptions requires 

satisfaction of certain procedural requirements specified in the Act These include requirements 

that a majority of the Commission vote in favor of closure, that advance notice be given to the 

public, that the NRC General Counsel certify that the meeting may be properly closed, and that 

records of the discussion be created and maintained. 

The reply of Mr. Ostendorff to Senator lnhofe's question #5 is not available to the public. 

Enclosure 

Page 11 of 20 
203 


26661.175

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

6. Please explain why a chilled work environment is detrimental to nuclear safety. 

An ineffective safety culture can produce a chilled work environment, where employees are 

afraid to speak up and raise safety concerns for fear of retaliation. A chilled work environment is 

detrimental to nuclear safety for a nurnber of reasons. One in particular is that, as a practical 

rnatter, the NRC, even with its rnany on-site and special inspectors, can only review a fraction of 

licensee activities. Because of this, the NRC has placed a high value on ensuring that the 

thousands of nuclear industry employees feel free to raise potential regulatory and safety 

concerns to the licensee and/or the NRC without fear of retaliation. If employees feel chilled, 

and are thus fearful of raising safety concerns either to their ernployer or the NRC, an untold 

nurnber of potential regulatory and safety concerns will go unreported, thus allowing the 

problems to continue unresolved. That is an unacceptable situation. 

Just as with the regulated industry, a chilled work environment at the Nation's civilian nuclear 

safety regulator cannot be tolerated because it adversely affects our agency's ability to carry out 

our safety rnission. Specifically, a chilled work environment is harmful to the NRC because it 

undermines the ability of our employees to voice concerns or differing views. The NRC needs to 

rnake its safety decisions based on technical, objective evidence, and the professional staffs 

recommendations based on that evidence. If the Commission does not receive candid, frank 

recornrnendations frorn the professional staff, we cannot be effective decision-rnakers. 

Enclosure 

Page 13 of 20 
204 


26661.176

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

7. Please explain why it is critical for Commissioners to receive the best professional opinions 

from agency staff, unfiltered and unrestrained. 

As a Commissioner, I need assurance that whenever I receive a technical, legal, or policy 

matter for decision-making, that that matter represents the unfiltered best judgments of the staff. 

Without that, I cannot be an effective decision-maker. 

At the NRC, we champion our staff's ability to always provide their best professional opinions. 

In fact, it is NRC policy to maintain a working environment that encourages employees to make 

known their best professional judgments even though they may differ from the prevailing staff 

view or disagree with a management decision. 

The reply of Mr. Ostendorff to Senator lnhofe's question #8 is not available to the public. 

Enclosure 

Page 14 of 20 
205 


26661.177

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

9. When did you first learn of Chairman Jaczko's prospective proposal to cut resources to 

license renewals? 

a. Did he discuss these with you prior to the December 6 press briefing and/or the 

December 15 hearing? 

b. Since the December 15 hearing has he provided you with any information on this 

matter? 

I first heard about Chairman Jaczko's prospective proposal to cut resources to license renewals 

when reading media reports in the days following the Chairman's December 6, 2011, press 

briefing. 

a. No, the Chairman did not discuss his proposal prior to the December 6, 2011, press 

briefing. 

b. No. 

Enclosure 

Page 16 of 20 
206 


26661.178

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

10. Please summarize all actions taken to re-evaluate the safety and security of nuclear plants 

in the United States, and to implement the recommendations of the Near-term Task Force's 90-

day report. Please include a timetable of all relevant implementation dates for projected actions 

and those already taken. 

Consistent with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, the NRC 

is taking action as a result of the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant In April 

2011, the Commission established a senior-level task force known as the Near-Term Task 

Force (NTTF) to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis of potential lessons-learned. The 

report produced by the NTTF, SECY-11-0093, "Near Term Report and Recommendations for 

Agency Actions following the Events in Japan," dated July 12, 2011 (Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 11186A950), identified twelve 

major recommendations with the potential to improve the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities 

The NRC is taking action on these NTTF recommendations. The NRC staff sought external 

stakeholder feedback in a public meeting on August 31, 2011, regarding the NTTF 

recommendations that stakeholders consider to be most important and that the NRC should 

undertake in the near-term. These recommendations were identified in a notation vote paper 

(SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task 

Force Report") (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML 11245A 127 and ML 11245A 144) dated September 

9, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted on September 14, 2011, during which 

representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and interested nongovernmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staffs proposed near-term 

actions. 

On October 18, 2011, the Commission directed the NRC staff in Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM)- SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from 

the Near Term Task Force Report," (ADAMS Accession No. ML 112911571) to begin action 

without delay on those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety 

improvement in the near-term. In that SRM, the Commission directed that the NRC should strive 

to complete and implement the lessons-learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident within 5 

years- by 2016. In addition, the Commission directed that the staff should designate the station 

blackout (SBO) rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking with a goal of completion within 24-30 

months of the October 18, 2011, SRM. 

The staff has implemented the Commission direction outlined in SRM-SECY-11-0124 and has 

begun taking actions on those NTTF recommendations with the greatest potential for safety 

improvement without delay. In order to do this effectively, the staff performed an assessment of 

each NTTF recommendation to determine the required regulatory activities, an estimated 

schedule, and associated resource impacts. Once this information was attained, the staff began 

to prioritize the NTTF recommendations into three tiers: Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. To further 

inform the prioritization of the NTTF recommendations, the NRC staff conducted a public 

meeting with representatives of the nuclear industry on September 21, 2011, in order to better 

Enclosure 

Page 17 of 20 
207 


26661.179

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

understand their current plans and actions to address the lessons-learned from the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi event. The NRC staff's proposed prioritization of all of the NTTF recommendations was 

submitted in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to 

be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned") dated October 3, 2011 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML 11272A111). A Commission meeting was conducted on October 11, 2011, 

during which representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and 

interested non-governmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's proposed 

prioritization. 

SECY-11-0137 was reviewed by the Commission and in a December 15, 2011, SRM for SECY11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima 

Lessons Learned," (ADAMS Accession No. ML 113490055) the Commission approved the 

staff's recommended prioritization, subject to direction provided in SRM-SECY-11-0124. The 

Commission also listed the following staff requirements in SRM-SECY-11-0137: 

1. Consult with the Commission via notation vote papers before issuing any orders that 

would lead to a change in the design basis of licensed plants. 

2. Inform the Commission 5 business days before issuing letters under 10 CFR § 50.54(f) 

associated with the regulatory activities outlined in SECY -11-0137. 

3. Inform the Commission of the results of its review of six additional staff 

recommendations, that went beyond those prepared by the NTTF but which the staff 

determined had a clear nexus to the Fukushima Dai-ichi event and may warrant 

additional action. This includes the results of the staff's consideration of filtration of 

containment vents in the context of the existing Tier 1 issues on hardened reliable vents 

for boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments. 

4. Inform the Commission of how the staff addressed Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS) recommendations, dated November 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML 11311A264). 

5. Initiate a probablistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate potential 

enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and 

floods as part of Tier 1 activities described in SECY-11-0137. 

Most recently, in response to the recent legislation (the December 2011 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law (PL) 112-74)) and input it received from stakeholders, the 

staff has accelerated the schedule originally proposed in SECY-11-0137, with a goal of issuing 

the Tier 1 orders and a request for information letter before the first anniversary of Japan's 

March 11, 2011, Great T6hoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. As such, the staff has 

drafted a notation vote paper (SECY -12-0025, "Proposed Orders and Requests for Information 

in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T6hoku Earthquake and 

Tsunami") (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12039A103) dated February 17, 2012, to address 

requirements stated in SRM-SECY-11-0137, and to communicate the staff's proposed orders 

and request for information. SECY-12-0025 is currently under review by the Commission. 

Relevant implementation dates and projected actions are as follows: 

Enclosure 

Page 18 of 20 
208 


26661.180

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Enclosure 

Page 19 of 20 
209 


26661.181

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

December 15, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Enclosure 

Page 20 of 20 
210 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

I am addressing this statement to all of us here as Senators, because I think there is a reason that the public approval of the Congress is 9 percent, and most of that 9 percent probably are our families, and if we don’t get home by Christmas, they will leave us, too. 

But I think a lot about why. And one of the things I come up 

with is that people look at us and they see us involved in personal 

attacks, us, rather than dealing with the policy. There is nothing 

wrong with having a policy dispute. We have them here, and I 

think we do very well. 

In this case, I am very disappointed with my colleagues on the 

other side. Because I think that this hearing, they would almost try 

to turn it into what Chairman Issa did yesterday, rather than look 

at the issues that you all addressed, frankly, happily, today. Good 

for you. The safety questions. 

So here is the thing. Our Committee is charged with ensuring 

that you do your job to make certain that our nuclear plants are 

as safe as they can be. And we all know that. 

And I will tell you, as long as I am Chairman, because some people sort of asked, they want to have some more hearings on this 

personnel matter. I am going to be clear, and maybe you can get 

another Chairman, I hope not, I hope you trust me enough, but I 

have to say that I will not allow this Committee to conduct witch 

hunts against anybody. Anybody. That is not what our function is. 

And I would also say in reference to whistleblowing—and I mentioned this to Senator Carper—when I look at the nuclear industry 

over the years, because I have watched it over the years, we have 

had very interesting experiences with nuclear power in California. 

In most communities, they have decided they would rather go another way, and in some communities they have embraced it. But 

I will tell you this: the whistleblowers are the ones that blow the 

whistle on safety problems. They are not the whistleblowers who 

blow the whistle on someone they don’t like, or they think is this 

or that. So being a whistleblower is in the eye of the beholder. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, since we are supposed to be talking about 

safety issues, I want to ask you this question. I got a commitment 

from four out of the five that in 90 days you would vote on these. 

Mr. Ostendorff said, well, it is very complicated and took longer. 

OK. When are you planning to have a meeting where you are going 

to vote on these recommendations following Fukushima? What is 

your plan? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, we won’t at this point. We have taken them 

kind of piecemeal and looked at them in various ways. And the way 

the Commission functions, we don’t have meetings to actually vote 

on activities. 

Senator BOXER. OK. So when will you begin, do you vote on the 

various recommendations? Let me put it that way. 

Mr. JACZKO. In general, I would say what we have voted on is 

the process to have the staff begin looking at the recommendations. 

But I would say in the first vote that I cast, I endorsed all the recommendations. I think in bits and pieces, the Commission has 

looked at various of the recommendations. But I wouldn’t say we 

211 

have kind of given a clear up or down vote on each of the recommendations yet. 

Senator BOXER. So in your opinion, as Chairman, how many of 

those recommendations is there majority support for going forward? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would probably, the clearest are the ones for which 

we have said are short-term recommendations. And those, it is basically five of the recommendations, I would say at this point there 

is majority support to move forward on. 

Senator BOXER. Would you and your fellow Commissioners send 

a letter to Senator Inhofe and myself outlining which five those 

would be? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Now I am going to ask about certain of 

those. According to experts, including the Institute of Nuclear 

Power Operations, the loss of electricity, as Senator Alexander has 

said, triggered the meltdown at the Fukushima plants, because it 

prevented the reactors from being properly cooled. To address an 

extended loss of power, the Task Force recommended that nuclear 

plants demonstrate they can run essential cooling and monitoring 

systems for up to 72 hours without being connected to the electricity grid. 

Mr. Magwood, starting from you, yes or no, do you agree with 

that recommendation? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think that the recommendation, the thrust of 

the recommendation is correct. The specifics are the problem that 

I had with it. Seventy-two hours may or may not be the right number. So we started the process to find out how to approach that, 

and we have already launched that. Staff is already working 

with—— 

Senator BOXER. So do you support having a system running for 

a period of time without being hooked up? Do you support that recommendation? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. How about you, Ms. Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I believe this is Recommendation 4.1, and I did 

vote in support of beginning that activity. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

You, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. You, sir? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. You, sir? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Chairman Boxer, I voted on this on September 

16th, and also posited that this should be a high priority decisionmaking within 24 to 30 months. The majority of the Commission 

has concurred in that additional amplification to move this as a 

high priority rulemaking. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. That is encouraging. 

Mr. Chairman, would you send me a letter, would you respond 

to questions I have about two other recommendations? One is recommending that reactors have technologies that would prevent the 

sort of hydrogen explosions that we saw in Japan, and the other 

has to do with—and this is very important to my State—recVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00215 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
212 

ommend that every 10 years nuclear reactor safety standards 

should incorporate any new information on the strengths of earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, or other natural disasters. 

So if you could let me know your view, and please confer with 

the others to make sure you adequately represent theirs. 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. 

Senator BOXER. Chairman, a non-partisan, non-profit organization called the Partnership for Public Service conducts an annual 

survey of more than 250,000 employees to rank the best places to 

work in the Federal Government. In the last 2 years, the NRC’s 

employees have ranked the Commission as No. 1 or No. 2. You 

must be very pleased. It doesn’t seem to indicate that you are the 

kind of person that runs around terrorizing people. Could you respond to how you felt when you felt you were rated that way? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I was very pleased. I think that is a strong 

statement from the staff of the agency that they have confidence 

in the leadership and confidence in the organization itself. And 

they have confidence in themselves. I think there is a very strong 

statement in support. 

Senator BOXER. OK. And Mr. Chairman, you have been attacked 

mightily from a lot of people from this dais about your character, 

your leadership, in a way that I think is wrong, harsh, and that 

is a nice way of saying what I think about it. I think it is wrong. 

And I want to quote from a conversation that you had with the 

NRC staff regarding your expectations concerning their view on the 

Task Force recommendations. This is what you said: ‘‘I welcome 

your non-concurrences. I am not telling you to non-concur, I am not 

telling you to think any different than what you think. I welcome 

what you think. But there just needs to be a reason, and you need 

to be able to articulate it. Because this Task Force deserves to 

know that, I deserve to know that, the Commission deserves to 

know that, the American people deserve to know that.’’ And you 

said, ‘‘Does everybody understand that?’’ 

And I put this out there, because these are your words. This is 

what you told your staff. And it is what I would hope most leaders 

would do, which is to say to the staff, as a lot of us do, I hope, and 

I believe we do, tell us the truth, tell us what you think. We might 

not want to hear it, and we are going to get upset, but I need to 

know from you. 

And is that what your style of leadership has continually been, 

to tell people to tell you the truth, but to know that they have to 

back it up with facts? 

Mr. JACZKO. That is the way I like to lead. And I do challenge 

people to defend and support their views. I think that makes us 

stronger, it makes us better to understand. I can appreciate how 

sometimes people may find that challenging sometimes, and difficult. If I ever do that in a way that causes somebody to feel uncomfortable, I always want to know and would immediately address that and correct it. 

I think we have very good staff at the agency. But I think what 

we deal with is a very important subject matter. And it is important to get to the bottom of issues and to pursue them to their fullest. 

213 

Senator BOXER. I agree, because as I said, I think the future of 

nuclear power is at stake, when I look at my own State and the 

angst of the people who live near those nuclear plants. They are 

very worried. And they will be a lot less worried, Commissioners, 

if you really step up to the plate on these recommendations. And 

if you don’t step up to the plate, and it is slow walked for any reason, if I insult anybody, I don’t mean to, but if it is slow walked, 

they are going to take matters into their hands, and they are going 

to take the ultimate protection, which is, you know what, we are 

done with these old plants. And people don’t want that to happen. 

So it is really a lot of responsibility you have, not only to protect 

the people, but for the future of this industry. 

Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is my intention to stay here for the entire hearing, however, 

I will be participating in a colloquy on the Senate Armed Services 

Committee with the Chairman and will have to leave for a short 

while, if called. 

Let me just say, Chairman Jaczko, that when you were first 

talked about and discussed in this position, I was at a deluge of 

people coming to me and saying he should not, you should not be 

in this position, because you are bringing your agenda in. And I remember talking to you about that at confirmation hearings, right 

here and in my office, privately. And I became convinced that they 

were wrong. And now I am convinced that they were right, and I 

was wrong. 

Now, I am going to ask you a series of questions, and I can do 

it in the time that I have, they are only yes or no questions. I don’t 

want any long elaboration on this, because these are very specific. 

And when you hear them, you will understand. 

First of all, in your letter to Mr. Daley—we are talking about the 

White House, you wrote, ‘‘As Chairman of our collegial body, I take 

responsibility for improving the level of our dialogue.’’ Is that true, 

yes or no? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. The NRC’s Office of Public Affairs, that is the 

OPA, reports directly to you. This came with the reorganization 

that we have talked about from up here. So they report directly to 

you, is that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 

Senator INHOFE. So Eliot Brenner, the Director of that office, reports directly to you? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 

Senator INHOFE. Here is what the NRC Web site says about the 

OPA. It says, the OPA, that is the Office of Public Affairs, manages 

and directs the agency’s public affairs program, providing advice to 

agency officials and developing key strategies that contribute to increasing public confidence. This includes keeping top management 

informed of public interest in and news coverage of NRC’s regulatory activities, as well as providing timely, clear, and accurate information on NRC activities to the public and the media through 

news releases, fact sheets, brochures, interviews, Web postings, 

and videos. 

214 

Now, I say this because I think we can all agree that is what is 

supposed to be happening. And yet, some of you may be aware that 

last Friday evening, Representative Markey, who I guess was your 

boss at one time, released a report entitled, and I will read the title 

of it, Regulatory Meltdown: How Four Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners Conspired—and that is you four—Conspired to Delay and 

Weaken Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Wake of Fukushima. Representative Markey, your former boss, said in a statement about 

the report, this is in this report, ‘‘The actions of these four Commissioners since the Fukushima nuclear disaster has caused a regulatory meltdown that has left America’s nuclear fleet and the general public at risk. Instead of doing what they have been sworn to 

do, these four Commissioners have attempted a coup on the Chairman and have abdicated their responsibility to the American public 

to assure the safety of America’s nuclear energy.’’ That is in this 

report. 

I have an e-mail here, and I am going to ask that it be made a 

part of the record—— 

Senator BOXER. Without objection. 

Senator INHOFE [continuing]. An e-mail that was sent by Eliot 

Brenner, the Director of Public Affairs at the NRC, to a reporter. 

Now, since that, my staff has contacted other reporters. Three others have confirmed this. I have to conclude that all reporters were 

contacted by Eliot Brenner to receive similar information on this email. And I would like to have a redacted version of this inserted 

into the record, which I have already done. I will read a portion 

of this e-mail. 

Now, this is Eliot Brenner talking to reporters. ‘‘As we approach 

the Wednesday hearing,’’ that is the hearing yesterday, ‘‘it would 

be a useful exercise,’’ reporters, ‘‘to read two things: the 1980 reorganization plan, with an emphasis on the roles and responsibilities 

of the Commissioners and the Director and the Chairman, and also 

the Markey report. I got deep into the Markey thing and found it 

quite interesting.’’ This was instructions to the reporters covering 

yesterday’s meetings to read this report up here, which was about 

the four Commissioners. 

I would say, Chairman Jaczko, do you believe Representative 

Markey’s report is an accurate characterization of the NRC’s activities? Do you believe that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I certainly think it is based on e-mails from 

my colleagues, and I was deeply disturbed when I saw the content 

of many of those e-mails. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you believe that this increases public confidence? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, I don’t, and I think it is unfortunate that some 

of the communications that were going on with my colleagues, unbeknownst to me, were happening. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, you have answered the question, it does 

not increase public confidence. No, it doesn’t, I agree with you on 

that. 

I can’t tell you how stunned and appalled I am, and I will use 

the same characterizations, I suppose, as the Chairman, although 

I am on the other side of this. The idea that an official spokesman 

for the agency would encourage the media to read a report that is 

215 

clearly designed to denigrate four Commissioners, to attack the 

agency’s credibility, and to undermine public confidence, I think it 

is reprehensible. I have to echo some of the statements that were 

made by my colleagues who have served on this Committee. I have 

never seen anything like that, on this Committee or any other. 

Chairman Jaczko, when you committed to Mr. Daley to improve 

the level of dialogue with your colleagues, did he know you were 

going to use your authority as the agency’s official spokesman to 

encourage media interest in a report that denigrates and personally attacks your colleagues? 

Mr. JACZKO. I never discussed these with Mr. Daley. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh, you didn’t talk about this report? Were you 

aware that this report was being made by Mr. Markey? 

Mr. JACZKO. I was aware that he had requested e-mails from my 

colleagues, and I saw the report after it was completed. 

Senator INHOFE. So you were a part of that, then? 

Mr. JACZKO. No. I was not a part of that. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh, you weren’t? He didn’t ask you any questions? 

Mr. JACZKO. The only questions that were asked of my staff or 

myself had to do with e-mails that I had provided. 

Senator INHOFE. That is fine. You were aware of the report and 

the content of the report. 

Now, in your letter to Mr. Daley, you wrote, ‘‘I continue to be unbelievably proud of the NRC staff and their single-minded focus on 

the agency’s mission.’’ These staff that you are so proud of, are they 

the same ones that Representative Markey attacked, saying they 

conspired with the four Commissioners to delay the release of and 

alter the NRC Near-Term Task Force report on Fukushima? 

Mr. JACZKO. I am not going to comment. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, these are senior staff. 

Mr. JACZKO. It is Congressman Markey’s report, and it is really 

probably more appropriate to ask him about his statements. 

Senator INHOFE. Now, some of your supporters may say, well, it 

is not illegal, and they may be correct. A lot of things are not illegal, but it is still not right. And I think you owe an apology to your 

colleagues and the 4,000 men and women at the NRC. 

Now, in your letter to Mr. Daley you wrote, ‘‘I assure you that 

I come to work every day to do my job better than the day before.’’ 

Let me suggest to you, sir, that you reached a depth on Saturday, 

December 10th, that no NRC Chairman has ever reached during 

my time on this Committee. I think when you read the report, and 

you see that the person who answers to you, Mr. Chairman, is the 

one who is responsible for sending out the statement from this 

Committee, and it is one where he is saying, you need to read this 

report by Representative Markey who is targeting these four Commissioners on each side of you, that it is just totally unreasonable 

that this could be happening. 

The fact that he reports directly to you brings you into it, and 

I hold you just as responsible as I hold Mr. Brenner. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

216 


26661.182

-------- Original Message --------

Subject~ 

Date:~-IJ~c.ZO!~---

Frorn.:Bjrjeinn~c~r~,E~-l~iojti<IEiliio~t.~B~reininieir@Riinlrc~.g~o~v~>~~IIIIIIIIIIIJ Tot 

These are the documents I have been sharing and I wanted to be sure you had them. As we 

approach the Wednesday hearing, it would be a useful exercise to read two things: the 1980 

reorganization plan with an emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of commissioners v a chairman 

and also the deep into the Markey thing and found it quite interesting. 

Eliot 

From: Pace, Patti 

Sent: Friday, December 09, 2011 5:51 PM 

To: Batkin, Joshua; Brenner, Eliot 

Subject: Materials 
217 

Senator BOXER. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Chairman, Chairman Jaczko, in your testimony you mentioned that the Commission has agreed to move forward on, I think 

seven recommendations, maybe fewer, maybe you said five. Could 

you just give us a time line of when you believe those recommendations will be implemented by staff and completed by the Commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is not clear at this point, the staff has not fully 

developed time lines for completion. The last information I received 

was that for the orders on some of those near-term wouldn’t probably be done until May or June. I indicated to the staff that that 

was unacceptable, that was too much time and we need to figure 

out how to accelerate that time table. 

Some of the letters that are so-called referred to as 50–50 4(f) letters which are essentially requests for information would likely be 

done a little bit sooner. But I think we have taken probably too 

long to get to the point where we can actually get down and start 

having the staff do their work to really engage directly with the licensees. I would have hoped that we are farther along at this point, 

but we are where we are. 

Senator CARPER. Just to follow up, I believe the Commission has 

stated that it hoped to complete and implement all the lessons 

learned from the Fukushima accident within 5 years. I think that 

would be by 2016. Based on the progress so far, do you think the 

NRC is likely to meet that goal? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think it is difficult to say. I think at this point, 

we haven’t really laid out a really clear enough path, I think, to 

get to those 5 years. So certainly given that everybody has expressed an interest in doing it, I am hopeful that we will be able 

to accomplish it. But I am not sure that I see a plan yet that will 

get us there in 5 years. 

Senator CARPER. If I could, Commissioner Svinicki, do you agree 

with those time lines? Do you believe that the NRC will meet 

them? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with Chairman Jaczko that there are not 

the detailed time lines yet. With that you could have a better degree of assessing whether or not it could be done within 5 years. 

But I still think that it is a reasonable target. 

Senator CARPER. All right, thank you. 

Some of my colleagues, maybe even the Commission in the 

course of this questioning and testimony have alluded to, talked 

about the powers of the Chairman. And the powers of the Chairman I think were found to be, after the Three Mile Island accident, 

were found to be not clearly delineated. There are some who felt 

that the Chair, while the Chair would be the first among equals, 

but that the powers of the Chair were not as clearly delineated as 

they should have been. 

My understanding of history is because of that belief, after the 

Three Mile Island accident the Chairman was granted, I think by 

the urging of President Carter, was granted powers for emergencies 

and for day to day authorities. And not every Chairman has elected 

to fully use those powers. My understanding is that Chairman 

218 

Jaczko has decided to use those powers, where others have chosen 

not to. 

I think back on the times in my own life, maybe other colleagues 

here can as well, when we had the authority, when I was Governor, 

when I was a naval officer, we had the authority to do a certain 

thing and chose to do something just a little differently because of 

the interest in building a team, cooperation, and civility. I would 

just ask that as you go forward that you keep that in mind, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The other thing I want to say is a question. A colleague of ours, 

Blanche Lincoln, whom Senator Boozman succeeds, a dearly beloved colleague from Arkansas, said during her re-election campaign last year, she used to say—I am sure the Chair remembers 

this—she used to say, what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger. 

And I can’t imagine that you are going through right now, yesterday or today, is something that you will remember fondly. But it 

is not going to kill you. It may make you stronger. 

My question is, will it make you a better leader? Will it make 

you a better chair? If so, how? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, as I indicated yesterday, some of these things 

that are a concern of my colleagues I found out about yesterday. 

And I have offered to reach out and talk to them and for us to meet 

as a group to discuss these issues and better understand where my 

interpretation of the statute or where any of my actions have been, 

caused concern on their part. I think if they are willing to engage 

in that dialogue, I think that will invariably make—it will make 

the Commission stronger, which I think in the end my leadership 

is defined by how well the Commission functions. 

But I will say that I, in the end, I am committed to safety. I 

would always prefer a Commission in which we all agree, in which 

there are no conflicts and there are no disagreements. I don’t think 

that is realistic, and I think where we have to continue to work is 

to figure out a way to disagree without their being personal accusations or things of that nature. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Let me conclude if I can, then. In about 

less than an hour, the Chaplain of the Senate, Barry Black, will 

convene a Bible study group. He does this every Thursday at 

around 12:30 or so. And it is something that maybe seven or eight 

of those of us who need the most help show up. And he reminds 

us almost every week, as leaders in this country, that we are supposed to be humble, that we should practice and act as remembering and trying to challenge us with humility. He reminds us 

that we are servants, we are not to be served, we are servants, and 

we need to keep that in mind. 

And most of all, he reminds us to treat others the way we want 

to be treated. He describes the Golden Rule as the Cliff Notes of 

the New Testament. That is good advice for everybody on this side 

of the dais, and it is certainly good advice for the people who are 

sitting at this table, every one of you and particularly the Chairman. I would ask that you take that to heart as we try to every 

week. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

We will turn now, as I am looking at this chart here, to Senator 

Alexander. 

219 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, do you believe the 104 civilian nuclear reactors 

in the United States are operating safely? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, we have varying degrees, I think, of operation. 

Just a day or so ago the staff did indicate, we placed one of our 

plants in what is called manual chapter 0350, which is a very 

strong statement by the agency that we have real concerns about 

the safe operation of that facility. It is currently not operating, it 

is shut down. 

So with the exception of that facility, all the plants are otherwise 

operating safely, with varying levels, I think, of successful performance. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you. And that includes the 23 boiling 

water reactors that are like the reactor that was in Fukushima? 

Mr. JACZKO. Right now, again, we have, all of those plants are 

generally operating within our safe levels. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Trying to understand the discussion about 

recommendations, do you agree that some of the recommendations 

are different from others, and there ought to be a priority in addressing them? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the way I look at priorities is I try and step 

back and figure out constraints. Because you prioritize in a situation where you have constraints. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, I am just asking, is it appropriate to 

put some ahead of others? 

Mr. JACZKO. If there are resource constraints, yes, I think in 

principle we would act on all of these immediately and with the 

same level of dispatch. 

Senator ALEXANDER. By acting, you don’t mean complete your 

work on them, you mean set up a process to deal with them? Is 

that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, no, I think by acting on them I mean getting 

us to the point where plants are making modifications. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Apostolakis said Recommendation No. 

1 was technical and complex and would take a good deal of time 

to complete. Is he wrong about that? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t agree that that one will. It is more of a philosophical description about what we do with those events that are 

considered beyond design basis events. I think what the Task Force 

was really saying is that over the years, we have dealt with those 

types of events in our regulatory framework. We have just never 

given them a label. And to some extent, they were saying we 

should give that a label and call these so-called extended beyond 

design basis events. This is something many other of our regulatory counterparts in other countries do. It is not really that novel 

of a concept. I think it is something that we can move forward on. 

But from a practical standpoint, it is not necessarily changing 

any of the decisions at the plants. 

Senator ALEXANDER. According to United States Code 5841, it 

says, ‘‘Each member of the Commission shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions of the Commission, 

shall have full access to all information.’’ Can you think—have you 

provided each member of the Commission full access to all information? 

220 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. And I would note, Senator, that that is 

from the 74, I believe from the 74 energy—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. It is still the law, though, right? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct, but there was an Energy Reorganization 

Act. 

Senator ALEXANDER. No, but it didn’t change that law, did it? 

Mr. JACZKO. It did change that provision, Senator. It changed the 

information provision statute. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I will follow that up with 

you. If you are right, I will accept your point. I think you are 

wrong. 

Mr. JACZKO. We have our general counsel here, too. He may be 

helpful in that. 

Senator ALEXANDER. How about the testimony in 1980 that the 

Chairman may not withhold or delay providing information requested by the Commission, individual members shall also have 

full access to information? Is that still—— 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct, and I would note, and I think probably 

where there is the need for continued dialogue is, the end of that 

provision states for ensuring that the Commission is fully and currently informed about matters within its functions. So that is, I 

think, where the tension exists at the Commission. Clearly, all information can’t be provided to the Commission. I mean, I don’t get 

access to all information within the agency. So what I have tried 

to do, which was one of the recommendations of the Inspector General in 1999, was to institute a more rigorous agenda planning 

process. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I am going to save 30 seconds here for myself, if I may, so I don’t go over my time. I thought Senator Carper’s advice was pretty good about leadership. I have made some 

mistakes in my life, many times, and sometimes I have gone to the 

office of my Senate colleagues where I thought they have been unreasonable. And I have listened to them, and I have found in some 

cases I might have been. At least it provided a way to move forward. 

It is an extraordinary event when four members of the Commission, three appointed by the current President, say that they are 

not able to do their jobs because of the way you are doing your job. 

And Madam Chairman, I would hope you would reconsider your 

thought that this Committee, whose job is oversight, should not 

keep an eye on this. Senator Carper is a fair minded individual, 

and I would think that it is our responsibility to watch this, but 

your responsibility to straighten it out. And I think that starts with 

the Chairman, and I hope that happens. 

Senator BOXER. Well, since you asked me, what I said was, we 

are not going to have witch hunt. What I said was, we are going 

to absolutely continue this. I am going to have hearings every 3 

months and bring the Commissioners back so we can keep track of 

this. Because when we hear from the Chairman, and I didn’t hear 

anybody else dissent, that we are not on track to get these recommendations done, and that is the senior staff at the NRC, 135 

years of experience, we are not on track to do this in 5 years, and 

that is a problem. So absolutely, we will have hearing and people 

can ask whatever questions they want. 

221 

But I am not going to be holding a hearing like Chairman Issa 

did to delve into personnel matters and to delve into character assassination of anybody. Because I don’t think that is appropriate 

at all. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I don’t think anyone on this Committee has 

suggested that we would like to participate in that, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Well, that is good. I am glad. Then we are all 

in agreement. It is all going to be good. 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Let me begin by commenting on something. Senator Inhofe spent 

a bit of time criticizing an employee of the NRC for suggesting that 

reporters read a report published by Congressman Markey, a veteran member of the House and certainly in my view, one of the environmental leaders of the Congress. I would suggest that there is 

probably no member of this Committee, or no member of the U.S. 

Congress, who himself or herself or a staff member has not suggested to reporters to read something, a document coming from the 

U.S. Congress. 

Now, Senator Inhofe may not like that report. He is entitled to 

his opinion. But to criticize somebody working for the agency to 

say, read something published by a member of the U.S. Congress, 

that doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me respond, since he mentioned my name. 

Senator BOXER. All right, let’s freeze the time. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. The statement that I read, and listen carefully, 

I ask my good friend, this is what the Markey report said, and this 

is what the employees that you referred to asked the reporters to 

read before yesterday’s Commission. He said, the actions of these 

four Commissioners since the Fukushima nuclear disaster has 

caused a regulatory meltdown that has left America’s nuclear fleet 

and general public at risk. Instead of doing what they have been 

sworn to do, talking about these four, these four Commissioners 

have attempted a coup on the Chairman and have abdicated their 

responsibility to the American public to assure the safety of American’s nuclear power. 

I am not going to ask you if you think that is appropriate, I don’t 

think there is anyone who would think that is an appropriate thing 

for them to go to the media to try to have them believe something 

before a hearing takes place. 

Senator SANDERS. In all due respect—— 

Senator BOXER. Go ahead, Senator. 

Senator SANDERS. Senator Inhofe, I think you and your staff 

have asked reporters to look at some situations, information on 

global warming that many of us think are beyond comprehension. 

You are entitled to your views. Ed Markey is entitled to his views. 

You may disagree with them, you have every right in the world to 

disagree with them. 

All I am saying is, I don’t see anything outrageous or wrong with 

somebody saying, here is a report published by a member of the 

U.S. Congress. I understand you don’t agree with it, maybe I agree 

with it, I don’t—I don’t know, I haven’t ready it. But I don’t think 

that is a subject for much criticism. 

222 

Let me get back to, if I might, Madam Chair, just where I wanted to go. I want to get back to the point here that I think underneath a lot of what we are hearing today is philosophical disagreements about the role of the NRC in terms of nuclear safety. And 

I do not criticize the integrity or the honesty of anyone. People are 

entitled to have different points of view on this Committee. Senator 

Sessions and I are old friends, we like each other. We disagree, correct? Doesn’t mean to say I don’t think he is a decent and good person. 

But let me get back to—let me ask Chairman Jaczko a question. 

As I understand it, please correct me if I am wrong, there are 48 

reactors in this country who still do not comply with fire safety 

rules established in 1980 and amended in 2004 to ensure that fires 

do not threaten backup power systems that could prevent a meltdown in an emergency. This year, as I understand it, four Commissioners voted to approve a delay for compliance until 2014. You, 

Mr. Chairman, did not. Can you tell us why you did not and where 

your differences of opinion are with the other four members? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think the big difference was really in whether or 

not we should ignore enforcement process for those plants that 

were not moving forward with the new provisions. I felt that after 

all of these years, if plants weren’t going to move to our new regulatory system, they should be subject to having their violations 

counted in our enforcement process. If they had areas in which 

their fire protection programs weren’t meeting our standards, those 

needed to be processed through our normal enforcement. I felt that 

that would be a strong way to encourage plants to ultimately get 

to complying with this new regulation. 

The other area where I think there was strong disagreement is, 

I believe at this point that this new regulatory structure or program which is I think much better for safety should be mandatory, 

that we really shouldn’t be in the business of giving licensees the 

option of pursuing a new regulation. It really should be mandatory 

and something that they have to comply with. That way, I think 

we would actually get to the business of adopting these requirements. 

Senator SANDERS. Let me ask you another question. After the 

tragedy at Fukushima, as I understand it, senior NRC staff made 

12 recommendations for improving the safety of nuclear power 

plants in the United States. As I understand it, you asked your colleagues to make a final decision about what changes the NRC 

should make so that action could be taken. As I understand it, a 

majority of the Commission instead asked for the staff to provide 

even more information, some of which could take years to develop 

before making any decisions. Why did you vote one way and a majority vote another way on that issue? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think, again, I can’t why the others did. I 

felt that I had enough information at that point to endorse the recommendations. I also provided the Commission a plan for how we 

could solicit additional stakeholder input before we made a final 

decision and how we could solicit additional input from the staff, 

as well as from our Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

And the plan was designed to get us all of that information, so that 

we could make a final decision in 90 days. 

223 

But I felt a responsibility, having helped establish that Task 

Force with the Commission’s concurrence, I felt a responsibility to 

support their recommendations. They worked very hard, their recommendations have withstood all the other reviews and demonstrated that they were a solid set of recommendations. So I was 

comfortable taking that, I thought it was a statement of my leadership of the agency to endorse those recommendations at that time. 

Senator SANDERS. All right. 

Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. I thank you, Senator. 

We now turn to Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, and Senator Carper, thank you for 

your wise advice to all of us. 

Let me ask this. Former Chairman Meserve, when he declared 

emergency powers after 9/11, declared it openly that he was doing 

so. He did so in consultation with his fellow Commissioners, and 

he assigned his fellow Commissioners specific duties and tasks so 

they were fully involved in all aspects of this. 

Commissioner Ostendorff, you have a distinguished military 

record. Would it be fair to say that, I think it would be fair to say, 

you know a thing or two about crisis management. Were you aware 

and did the Chairman make any formal announcement that emergency powers had been exercised when he was doing so? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Sessions, I along with other Commissions did receive, and I think Chairman Jaczko’s comments about 

providing briefings to Commissioners early on, I agree with the 

Chairman’s characterization. We were receiving briefings, and I 

think the information flow as to what was happening in Japan was 

appropriate. 

That said, I did not think that we had the clarity of whether or 

not there had been an emergency power declaration. I did discuss 

this in a one on one meeting with Chairman Jaczko March 31st 

and expressed some concerns that there is a lack of clarity here. 

Senator SESSIONS. As a military person, when somebody assumes 

command of a situation, altering the normal chain of command, 

that should be crystal clear, should it not? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. From my experience, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Chairman Jaczko, do you believe that under 

the Reorganization Act of 1980 the Chairman is allowed to withhold or delay providing information requested by other members? 

Mr. JACZKO. There is certain information that in particular, the 

question has been on budget information, that as the Chairman 

formulates and develops that information that that is not provided 

to the Commission. That has been established in our Commission 

procedures. So there are areas in which there is information that 

is not provided to the Commission. If there is ever an area of 

doubt, the Commission has the opportunity to, as a voting matter, 

to specifically state that they wish to get the information, and the 

information is provided. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the statute—I believe Senator Alexander 

is correct—is still in effect. I hope you understand that. And it says 

each member, including the Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions, and shall have full access to 

all information. Do you agree with that, or do you think you are 

224 

not bound by that, the Chairman can decide what he wants to reveal to the other members and screen information going to the 

other members? 

Mr. JACZKO. As I said, the 1980 Reorganization Act indicates 

that the Commission is to be kept currently and fully informed 

about information within its functions. So there is some information within the Commission, within the agency, that was not within a function of the Commission. And that information is not routinely provided to the Commission. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I don’t agree. I believe you are misinterpreting the plain statute. I don’t know why you would deny equal 

voting members any budget information. Are there any other information or data that you think you have a right to deny the other 

members? 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could just add that, certainly, when it 

comes to voting matters, I am always providing information to the 

Commission. As my colleagues have stated now I think twice in 

front of congressional hearings, they have had all the information 

they have needed in order to carry out their voting responsibilities. 

So where I think again there are some areas where we can continue to work and better understand the situation is in those areas 

that are not routinely within the functions of the Commission. And 

providing that information has sometimes been an area of dispute 

and disagreement. And that is where I want to continue to better 

have a dialogue. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think the problem with the dispute is 

that you don’t acknowledge you have a full duty to immediately respond to the inquiries of your Commissioners and share with them 

any information you have on any matter related to the Commission. And if you don’t acknowledge that, then I think we have a 

real problem. I don’t believe it is a personality problem. 

I believe it is a question about management according to the law 

of the United States. Isn’t it true that the Inspector General on 

June 6th in his report found that you control information, that you 

act as a gatekeeper for information that goes to the Commissioners? 

Mr. JACZKO. I do not believe the Inspector General made that as 

a finding. I believe the Inspector General indicated that staff had 

made those comments. But it was not a specific finding, I believe, 

of the Inspector General. I would have to check to the record, 

though. I can get back to you on that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just ask the other members of the 

Commission. Do they have concerns that the Chairman—— 

Senator BOXER. Time is out. We will have another round of questions. 

We move along to Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to ask the Chairman—— 

Senator BOXER. Chairman Jaczko, you can correct the record, if 

you wish, after Senator Lautenberg finishes. 

Mr. JACZKO. I apologize. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I just didn’t want anything to be not heard 

or misunderstood. You faced some criticism for pushing the Commission to act so quickly to make and implement recommendations 

225 

for improving nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. Why were you so insistent that the NRC move quickly on 

these recommendations, being challenged and cloaked in what I 

think is a little bit indirect language? Was it too hasty? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I didn’t think it was too hasty. We had asked 

the Task Force to complete their work within 90 days. And the 

bulk of the work was done then, because of the report that they 

issued. It was a very thorough and very readable report, had done 

a tremendous amount of research and investigation to get to the 

conclusion. So I thought it was reasonable that the Commission 

could review that information and respond to it within about the 

same amount of time, in 90 days. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because I am reading from the Markey report, from the committee report that says the four Commissioners 

attempted to delay and otherwise impede the creation of the NRC 

Near-Term Task Force. They conspired with—it goes on to make an 

accusation here that, I give it to you without my confirmation— 

that is, conspired with each other and other senior NRC staff to 

delay the release of or after the NRC Near-Term Task Force report 

on Fukushima. So this policy difference, can you imagine why it is 

that they thought that more time could be employed and not rush 

this thing along? But then you wanted the Commissioners—Mr. 

Magwood, do you want to respond to that? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Certainly, thank you, Senator. As I recall, there 

was never really any discussion about delaying the formation of the 

Task Force. I think we were all very supportive of it, and it happened very quickly. Regarding the issuance of the Near-Term Task 

Force report, the only discussion that I ever recall about delaying 

it was to provide a couple of days for the Commission to actually 

read the report before it went public. Because obviously we were 

going to be approached with questions. 

So the only conversation I ever had with any other Commissioner 

was whether it made sense to release the report the day it became 

available, versus giving us a couple of days to read it, so we would 

understand it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So is that where the, one of the most serious criticisms lay, and that is that is there is a couple of days difference? Do you think that the Chairman was hasty in moving to 

get the report done? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No, of course not. No. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because it is characterized as a blemish, 

and I don’t really understand why that is. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I didn’t understand that, either. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. While I am chatting with you, Commissioner Magwood, when you were nominated to the NRC, more than 

100 environmental groups wrote a letter opposing your appointment, saying Mr. Magwood’s background, experience, and apparently key interests are in the realm of nuclear power’s promotion, 

not its regulation to protect the public health, safety, and the environment. And when you were being sworn in, the NRC report says 

that, makes note of the fact that you have a distinguished career 

in the nuclear field, public service. But it does also point out that 

you served 4 years as its associate director, the Office of Nuclear 

Energy, the associate director for technology and programs. It is a 

226 

fairly high comfort level with the industry, and I just wonder 

whether they were of help to you in trying to move schedules along 

and things of that nature. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No, actually my role at DOE was principally associated with advanced research, advanced technology. So I actually spent most of my time working with national laboratories, universities. We obviously had some programs that engaged with the 

industry. But it really wasn’t the principal area of work that we 

had. We had one very important program, Nuclear Power 2010, but 

outside of that, my industry interactions were actually pretty limited. We worked really close with international partners on advanced technology, research cooperation. 

Senator BOXER. Sorry, Senator. We are going to have another 

round, but we have to move. I am so sorry to interrupt both my 

friends on either side of the aisle, but we just need to move. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Today, New York Times, Leader of Nuclear Agency Hears Litany 

of Objections; Washington Post, Fellow NRC Members Accuse 

Chairman of Bullying Tactics; Madam Chairman, I would like to 

introduce both of those. 

Senator BOXER. Sure. 

[The referenced information was not received at time of print.] 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

The New York Times article, first paragraph, ‘‘In exchanges that 

ranged from merely testy to caustic, four members of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission told a House Committee on Wednesday 

that their Chairman had withheld information from them, berated 

the agency’s professional staff, reduced female employees to tears 

with abusive comments, and created a chilled atmosphere that was 

hurting the agency’s ability to function.’’ 

So I ask the Chairman, in the hearing yesterday, Commissioner 

Magwood alluded to three career women at the NRC who ‘‘were 

brought to tears’’ and who felt humiliated by your actions. I think 

these are the same incidents that Commissioner Svinicki called 

outbursts of rage by you. The Democrat Ranking Member Cummings of that Committee yesterday said that he was concerned as 

a father of two daughters about hearing about these incidents. His 

exact words were ‘‘It concerns me.’’ He asked you whether the allegations were true. I don’t think that your answers were clear. 

Well, I have two daughters, and I want to know also. Are these 

allegations true? Yes or no. 

Mr. JACZKO. No. I was shocked, and I was, I have to say mortified, to hear those statements. I have a wife, I have a sister who 

had a daughter just about 12 days ago. And I have interacted and 

worked with a tremendous number of people at the agency, including a large number of women. And I have never intentionally berated, threatened, bullied, or intimidated any member of the staff. 

I can at times, as I have said, be passionate, be intense in my 

questioning. And if that has ever, ever led to an emotional reaction 

by somebody, I would want to know that, and I would address it 

immediately. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

227 

Commissioner Magwood, at yesterday’s hearing you spoke about 

a growing cancer of a chilled work environment because of the 

Chairman. You talked about verbal abuse, screaming, pointed language toward women by the Chairman. The White House is recommending that a third party mediator should try to work things out 

between the Commission and the Chairman. 

Based on your long experience, is that the type of solution that 

the private sector would do to respond to charges of harassment 

and a hostile work environment? Meaning, shall we bring the accuser and the accused together and say, work it out? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think in the private sector, likely not. But this 

isn’t the private sector, so I recognize that the solution space is 

more complex. And I should say, though, whatever happens going 

forward it is my determination that I will continue to serve my role 

as a Commissioner the best I can under the circumstances. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, yesterday Congressman Chaffetz of Utah asked a 

simple question, whether you did anything wrong. I think Congressman Labrador asked the same question. I didn’t feel that 

there was really a clear answer to those. That is a simple question. 

Are any of the charges made against you from the four other Commissioner or from the NRC staff true? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, my experience has been that there is not a 

chilled work environment. I interact with staff on a daily basis, 

they tell me their views frankly and candidly. So I have not seen 

a situation in which people are afraid to raise their views with me. 

As I said, I can be passionate, I can be intense. I am committed 

to the safety job that I have. And if that has ever been misconstrued or misinterpreted, I want to know that immediately, so 

that I can address it and assure people that it is simply not the 

case. 

But I would note that I have had for 2 and a half years the same 

core group of senior managers. I have had over 15 or more staff 

working in my personal office, 10 of whom at this time are women. 

None of them has ever expressed any concern to me, and I think 

they very much enjoy working for me. 

Senator BARRASSO. Just to all the other Commissioners, I think 

Commissioner Ostendorff, yesterday you testified you believe you 

had fulfilled your oath of office by signing a letter to the White 

House expressing your serious concerns about the chilled work environment at the NRC. To the Commissioners, did all of you believe 

that you signed the letter to the White House agreeing at the time 

you were fulfilling your oath of office to the American people by 

signing the letter? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. Commissioner. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Commissioner. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BARRASSO. Commissioner. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. I agree. Thank you for fulfilling 

your oath of office. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

228 

We will now turn to Senator Sanders. Oh, I am so sorry. Senator 

Udall. 

Senator Sanders, you will be the next Democrat. I will waive my 

time. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Boxer. 

The New York Times article that was just read talked about 

withholding information. Has the Commission received all the necessary information to implement the Task Force recommendations? 

And if not, what additional information is needed? It seems to me 

there is a simple answer to that. Maybe I will just start here. Have 

you received all the necessary information that you have needed in 

order to act upon these Task Force recommendations? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I believe so. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, Senator. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, with one exception. And this was noticed 

in our letter to the White House, that the original SECY paper 

110093 presented to the Commission on July 12th of 2011 did not 

contain the detailed staff recommendations that were originally 

part of the staff recommendations as to how to proceed. 

Senator UDALL. Have you received those now? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We received those, there were a number of different versions of these. That paper was sent to the Commission 

then withdrawn very shortly after that. Other than that particular 

piece, I do believe, Senator, I have received information I have 

needed for this report. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could just add. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, go ahead. 

Mr. JACZKO. That is one of the areas that my colleagues have expressed concern about. I would note that there was a paper that 

was provided. It did not contain any specific recommendations, and 

moreover, in my discussions with senior staff, I felt actually it 

mischaracterized the position of the staff, because the entire staff 

had not yet been fully consulted about and sought and had their 

views sought about the recommendations. 

So I felt it was not properly characterizing the situation. I actually notified all of my colleagues in person that I was going to have 

that paper withdrawn and replaced with just a straight cover 

memo transmitting the recommendations. 

At that time, none of my colleagues expressed an objection to 

that course of action or expressed any concern about that course of 

action. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Chairman Jaczko, the NRC’s Near-Term Task Force issued 12 

recommendations for U.S. nuclear plant safety to be improved. And 

it is my understanding that the Commission has directed immediate implementation of 7 of the 12 Near-Term recommendations 

and did that on October 20th. When you look at the recommendations, they are very concrete things. I just pick out a few here: 

order plants to evaluate and upgrade the necessary seismic and 

flooding protection, strengthen station blackout mitigation, order 

reliable hardened vents in boiling water reactor facilities, enhance 

229 

the capabilities and instrumentation of spent fuel pools, which we 

know are a concern out there. 

Have these recommendations been fully implemented? What has 

been done on the ground at this point? And mind you, everybody 

should know that March 11th was when the incident took place. 

We are approaching an anniversary here in a couple of months. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, we really haven’t done much yet on the 

ground, from a direct regulatory perspective. The industry, to their 

credit, has begun to do some of those things on their own. At a 

meeting, actually, with one of our advisory committees just a few 

weeks ago, in fairly direct terms, in terms I had heard from a 

chairman of that advisory committee, he stated pretty much that 

we had spent the last 8 months doing a lot of talking and it was 

time to get down to doing some actual work. And I think that was 

a good wake-up call for the Commission, that we really need to get 

on with the business of getting these recommendations into the 

plants and getting changes made in the plants. 

So I think we are at that point now, where we can begin that. 

But we still have some work to do to get there. 

Senator UDALL. When do you think that will happen? What is 

your sense of the timing right now? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, as I said, the most near-term has to do with 

the series of orders and what the staff has told me at this point 

is that they were targeting for May or June. I have told them that 

they need to go back and re-think that and come up with a tighter 

timeframe. So I haven’t heard yet what the result of that is. But 

I expect it to be sooner than May or June. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thanks so much. 

Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned, as I stated, about some, 

many, of these specific suggestions that have come up. And you 

had an exchange with my colleague, Senator Barrasso, a minute 

ago, and I want to revisit it. I am not asking about your intention. 

I am asking, did you ever have an exchange with staff that led to, 

that involved staff breaking down in tears? 

Mr. JACZKO. Not in my presence, no. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Did you have such an exchange that led to 

their breaking down in tears shortly thereafter outside of your 

presence? 

Mr. JACZKO. I—I only learned of the possibility of these events 

in the last several days, prior to the hearing yesterday. 

Senator VITTER. OK. So you have learned of that. And how many 

instances have you learned of? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, all I know is what has been stated by the 

Commissioners in the hearing. I have not had any staff come to me 

and specifically tell me that there has been a problem. I would welcome that, and if there had been—— 

Senator VITTER. Well, if they were driven to tears, you might understand why they may not approach you. 

Does this learning of this information concern you? 

230 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. As I said, if I have ever done anything 

to cause—— 

Senator VITTER. What are you going to do about those specific instances? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would be more than happy to, to discuss it 

with the individuals if they want and remedy in whatever way is 

appropriate. But again, I have not been—— 

Senator VITTER. What do you plan on doing in terms of your future behavior in light of these specific instances? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I certainly would want to understand what in 

my approach led to that, and of course I would not take any kind 

of action that could lead to a reaction like that inappropriately. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Let me ask the other four Commissioners, 

without naming names of staff, do you know of such instances? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I had a—I am not going to name the 

individual, I am aware of three senior executive service females 

who have been yelled at by the Chairman and one of them has told 

me directly that she was utterly humiliated by that interaction. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I have not had a personal experience of this 

happening. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am aware of these events. 

Senator VITTER. Commissioner, how many events are you aware 

of? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am aware of three events. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. As I discussed yesterday, certainly there are 

three of them, I have had personal contact with the women involved and talked with them about the incidents. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Mr. Chairman, my guess is these women 

don’t want to have a conversation with you, for obvious reasons. So 

in light of that, what are you prepared to do about this in terms 

of those events and maybe even more importantly in terms of future behavior? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, again, without knowing more specifics, I—it is 

hard for me, it is certainly something I would be happy to talk to 

my colleagues about, and they can perhaps give me some more specifics about what caused the, what caused the concern. And of 

course I will do whatever I need to do to address it. 

Senator VITTER. And right now, you have no guess what caused 

this reaction? 

Mr. JACZKO. You know, as I said, there are times in which I can 

question people intensely, and that is something that I am aware 

of in my style that—— 

Senator VITTER. Do you plan to change that style? 

Mr. JACZKO. I work on it every day to do it and to do it better. 

Senator VITTER. Let me ask the other four Commissioners, in 

terms of instances of not receiving requested information, can you 

outline any instances of where you requested certain information, 

budget, anything else, and didn’t receive adequate information in 

your opinion? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I have already mentioned the withdrawal of 

the SECY paper, and the Chairman appropriately acknowledged 

that I discussed that with him and he discussed it with his colleagues. I did not agree with how he handled that. I did not agree 

231 

with his characterization of the staff’s viewpoints in that paper for 

SECY 110093. I have had concerns on provision of other information to the Commission with respect to a paper that came up in August that I do not believe recommended the staff’s best recommendation as to how we should proceed with respect to alternative licensing periods for the Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant. 

Senator VITTER. Any other Commissioners? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I received a paper recently that I cannot name 

what it does, because it is in front of the Commission. But it had 

four options. And the recommendation was to go with Option D. 

And then I learned from the staff that the staff really thought and 

would have recommended Option B, but they were pressured to 

change that. 

Senator VITTER. Can I just follow through on that? 

Senator BOXER. No, I am holding everybody. There is another— 

I am holding everybody to their time. 

Senator VITTER. I would like him to finish answering my previous question. That is the norm around here. 

Senator BOXER. Well, excuse me. We changed it, and I have cut 

off Democratic Senators and Republican Senators because we are 

running out of time, the Commissioners and us. So we are going 

to move on. But there is going to be another round. 

Senator VITTER. Madam Chair, that all happened after the question up was finished. 

Senator BOXER. No, it isn’t true. I cut off right in the middle of 

an answer, because we don’t have the time. But we are going to 

have another 5 minutes apiece. 

Senator VITTER. Well, we had better make the time for this. We 

had better make the time for this. 

Senator BOXER. Senator, I will sit here as long as you want. I 

will sit here as long as you want. I am a fair person. We are going 

to have a second round. And I am giving up my slot to Senator 

Sanders. And I will take mine at the end. 

Senator SANDERS. I am not comfortable with the direction in 

which this questioning is going, and I think the door was opened 

by Mr. Barrasso. I think we are asking Chairman Jaczko to comment on issues that he is not even aware of. We are into this beating of your wife business. 

But the door has been opened. It was opened by Mr. Barrasso, 

the door was opened by Senator Vitter. So I am going to ask Mr. 

Magwood a question. I think Senator Barrasso quoted from the 

New York Times. Let me quote from Huffington Post, one of the 

larger online news publications in the country. And this is what 

the Huffington Post says on December 12th, 2011: ‘‘Bill Magwood, 

the man at the center of an effort to overthrow the Chairman of 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and his most likely successor 

if the move is successful, served as a consultant for TEPCO, the 

Japanese company that owns the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, 

according to information provided by Magwood as part of his nomination and confirmation process, which is obtained by the Huffington Post.’’ 

Another comment in the Huffington Post piece, ‘‘When Magwood 

was nominated by President Obama in 2009 to become a Commissioner, nearly 100 environmental groups, along with the Project on 

232 

Government Oversight, urged his defeat in the Senate, arguing 

that he was too close to the industry to be tasked with regulating 

it.’’ 

Further quotes, ‘‘Since joining the body, Magwood has coordinated with the two Republicans and the other Democrat on the 

panel to delay and water down new safety reforms pushed by 

Jaczko, according to the e-mails made public by Markey. Following 

the Fukushima disaster, Jaczko has made a major effort to increase safety standards, an effort that is being closely watched by 

international regulators and nuclear companies across the globe.’’ 

Let me ask, and again, I am not comfortable in doing this, but 

I think after hearing Mr. Barrasso and Mr. Vitter, we have to ask 

some questions as well. And that is, Mr. Magwood, this article suggests that if for whatever reason Mr. Jaczko was forced from his 

job that you are ready to take it over. Are you prepared to tell us, 

as a member of the Commission, that is not the case? That if for 

whatever reason Mr. Jaczko left his job, that you would not take 

the position of Chairman of the NRC? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. As I mentioned yesterday when I was asked the 

question about whether the Chairman should be removed, I gave 

the opinion that, my role and my responsibility was to provide 

truthful information as I saw it. It is not to make personnel decisions. So I am not going to make a recommendation. 

Senator SANDERS. That wasn’t my question, Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. And similarly, I wouldn’t make a recommendation or make a comment about what my role would be either. 

Senator SANDERS. Well, that is an interesting point. It is an interesting point, because according to the Huffington, I am not saying it is right or wrong. According to the Huffington Post, you have 

been involved in a ‘‘coup’’ to get rid of Mr. Jaczko. I don’t know if 

that is true or not. According to this publication, you may be, if he 

is gone, in line to become the Chairman. I am asking you a simple 

question: will you tell us that you, that that is not true and that 

you would not accept the Chairmanship if Mr. Jaczko left? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Let me first say that I don’t think that my characterization as a coup leader is any way correct. 

Senator SANDERS. OK, fair enough. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think that we work—we talked a lot about 

sending this letter to the White House. It was a mutual decision 

among the four of us. I don’t think there was a coup leader. 

Why I have been singled out, I can only guess. But let me just 

say that I am not even the senior Democrat on the Commission 

after Mr. Jaczko. So why people point the finger at me, I don’t 

know. 

Senator SANDERS. But see, you didn’t answer my question. I am 

not saying I agree or disagree with what the Huffington Post 

wrote. I am not saying that. I am just, as Mr. Barrasso did, I am 

quoting from a publication. You didn’t answer my question, though. 

And my question was, if Mr. Jaczko, as a result of political pressure, was forced out of his job, will you tell us now as a member 

of the Commission, who some suggest, I am not suggesting it, were 

involved in that action, are you telling us now that no, you are not 

interested in becoming Chairman to replace Mr. Jaczko? 

233 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Let me say I have ever really expressed much interest in being Chairman. I think it is a very time consuming and 

very difficult job. I hadn’t exactly come on the Commission with 

that in mind. But I also won’t sit here and tell you that if the 

President asked me to serve a role like that, I would turn it down. 

I am not going to say that. 

Senator SANDERS. Madam Chairman, I find that is a very interesting remark. Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. OK, I was going to suggest that the President 

would be making that decision anyway, and I seriously doubt he 

would—anyway. Let me just real quickly, Mr. Jaczko, I understand 

the NRC Inspector General reports directly to the Chairman, is 

that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. I am sorry? 

Senator INHOFE. That the NRC Inspector General, the Inspector 

General reports directly to the Chairman. That is you. 

Mr. JACZKO. It is a very loose reporting relationship. 

Senator INHOFE. OK, but that is what I understand from the 

1980 changes that are there. I assume you would say yes. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, again, with all due respect—— 

Senator INHOFE. I don’t want to take a lot of time on it. At any 

time, did you seek to influence the Inspector General in any way 

or delay his investigation? 

Mr. JACZKO. No. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Ostendorff, I understand, and I know the 

process here, but I think you will have to explain it, I understand 

that a new reactor applicant sent a letter to the NRC asking that 

the agency waive an administrative delay between approval of a 

new plant license and its effective date. I also understand that the 

NRC staff presented that paper to the Commission, recommending 

retention of the delay. Is that correct? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Senator INHOFE. Now, that delay really inures to the benefit of 

the applicant, to give them time. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Let me explain it. I think it also will help clarify the Senator Vitter question we were trying to get to when time 

ran out. The paper that Commissioner Apostolakis was referring to 

with respect to the staff recommendation being different from what 

we thought it was going to be, based on our discussion with the office director, we are talking about the same paper. And the staff 

had told us that there was no nuclear safety issue at all involved 

in the process once this basically Federal Register notice is transmitted from the NRC down to the Office of Management and Budget. 

Hence, it was the office director’s recommendation at that point 

in time that the effective date of this rule be tied to the time period 

of transmission to OMB. And that was the recommendation that 

Commissioner Apostolakis and I were referring to. 

Senator INHOFE. OK, so both the Director of Nuclear Reactors 

agreed with the statement you just now made? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. This was the Director of the Office of New Reactors. 

234 

Senator INHOFE. New Reactors, that is correct. New Reactors. 

And does this administrative delay have any safety implications? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. No, sir, it does not. 

Senator INHOFE. If I understand it correctly, Chairman Jaczko— 

no, I will go ahead and yield my last couple minutes to Senator Vitter, because he wanted to get the remainder of his answer. 

Senator VITTER. I appreciate that very much. Picking up on the 

information flow issue, Mr. Chairman, does the whole Commission 

not vote on a budget or budget issues? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, at a high level, yes, it does. 

Senator VITTER. OK, so I don’t understand your previous comment that budget information, detailed budget information should 

not be provided, certainly upon request, to Commissioners. 

Mr. JACZKO. They are, based on the statutory history, the Chairman is solely responsible for preparation of the budget. 

Senator VITTER. This is a voting matter. Wouldn’t it be reasonable for any budget matter information requested by a Commissioner when they are voting on the budget for that Commissioner 

to be able to get it, which apparently he or she can’t? 

Mr. JACZKO. Actually, that is not true. This year, last year’s 

budget there was, I think, a misunderstanding on my part about 

how information was provided, when the budget was transmitted. 

So actually this year with the budget submittal, I provided all previous drafts, versions, documents related to the development of the 

budget. That was actually provided to each Commission office when 

they received the budget to begin their deliberations. 

Senator VITTER. So what was the instance when they asked you 

for budget information, and it wasn’t provided? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t recall what the instance was. But they are 

provided all information about the budget. The budget itself is a 

large document. 

Senator VITTER. And any request they make about budget issues, 

that request will be honored timely in terms of information? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, again, the issue there is really more about timing. I think there has been a tradition to, you know, budget development is, as we say, a sausage making process. So there has, I 

think, been a tradition to give the Chairman an opportunity to 

kind of do some of the sausage making, and then present that ultimately to the Commission. 

Senator VITTER. Could I ask the other Commissioners to chime 

in about issues they think still exist here, if any? Anyone. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could say, I think this was—— 

Senator VITTER. I would like to move on. 

Mr. JACZKO. Sure. 

Senator VITTER. First of all, if they are not getting information 

timely, I think that is in many cases the same thing as not getting 

information. Time is of the essence. 

Mr. Ostendorff, were you going to say something? 

Senator BOXER. We will have time in the next round. 

Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Just a quick question for Dr. Apostolakis and 

Commissioner Ostendorff. It is my understanding that the NRC 

staff also recommended that the Commission quickly act on the implementation of spent fuel instrumentation. I believe that these acVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00238 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
235 

tions would ensure that we can monitor water levels in the spent 

fuel pools at our reactors, which was an issue during the 

Fukushima crisis. 

For some reason, that recommendation was not included in the 

recent actions approved by the Commission. Could you both just 

very quickly explain why? Very quickly. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. It was not included in the ones that were supposed to be acted upon without delay, I believe. 

Mr. JACZKO. Subsequently, it was. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Subsequently, it was, yes, that was, I am a bit 

confused. It is included. 

Senator CARPER. Is it? And Commissioner Ostendorff, is that 

your understanding? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I was looking at the SECY 110137, 

which has the prioritization of the Fukushima Task Force actions. 

It has a Tier 1, 2, and 3 approach. The staff, upon their review by 

the steering committee, did add spent fuel pool instrumentation to 

that list. And that has been approved by the Commission. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks very much for that clarification. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. May I make a comment, Senator? 

Senator CARPER. Yes, very briefly, please. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. This is a good example of how competent people have different views. I was talking over dinner actually with 

some members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

And they said, why do you want to do that? It doesn’t improve safety. Now, receiving information of course is always a good thing. But 

again, if we think in terms of the constraints, in terms of resources 

and so on, as the Chairman mentioned earlier, they didn’t feel that 

this was of paramount importance and had to be done without 

delay. Eventually, we said yes, do it. 

But I think it is an example of how competent people can have 

different views. I was very surprised when they told me that. 

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks very much. 

May I ask a question of the Chairman, let me ask Commissioner 

Svinicki and then Commissioner Magwood, please. With the work 

on Fukushima reported and the reported discord between our Commissioners, has the day to day staff work been compromised? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am not aware of a compromise of the staff’s efforts. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. Magwood, please. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Not that I am aware of. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

And let me just ask of the Chairman, where is the Commission 

on the licensing process of potentially new reactors and the relicensing process of current reactors, please? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the, for new reactor licensing, that is under 

deliberation by the Commission, we have a final decision on the 

AP1000 design currently in front of the Commission, and then we 

also have in front of the Commission possible actions on licenses 

for Vogtle and for the Summer sites. License renewal is continuing 

apace. We have a number of hearings ongoing for license renewal 

cases which are either in front of the Commission or in front of our 

236 

licensing boards, and then the routine staff actions with regard to 

license renewals is ongoing. 

In the interest of candor, this may be an area in which, if we 

have resource constraints as a result of the Fukushima activities, 

we may look at license renewal as an area to pool resources. If that 

were to be the case, I don’t anticipate it would have a real impact 

on any of the license renewals, because many of them come well 

in advance of the time that they need their actual approvals, if 

they were to be granted. 

Senator CARPER. Do any of the other Commissioners want to add 

to what the Chairman has just said in this last question? Anybody. 

OK. And the other thing I would say, I want to go back to actually comments of Senator Alexander. He used to be a Governor, 

Senator Alexander was also an aide a long time ago, to Senator 

Baker, Howard Baker. Not everybody knows that. He was president of the University of Tennessee, chairman of the National Governors Association. And he and I said almost the same thing, there 

have been times when we have offended people. Sometimes we 

didn’t know it, and in some cases we did. What he and I have done 

for years, in all the roles we played, as we have literally personally 

gone to the person who was offended and said, if I have done something to offend you, I apologize. Literally. In some cases I wasn’t 

sure I should apologize, but I have done that routinely. And the 

door has always been open to let me in. 

And I just want to say to the other Commissioners, when this 

man calls you and says, I would like to come and sit in your office 

and to talk with you, close your door and just have a good heart 

to heart, have the door open, have a good discussion, and give him 

a shot. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, when they do, make the 

most of it. Thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Inhofe would be next, and help me out here, is it Senator 

Sessions next? 

Thank you, sir. Go ahead. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would like to pursue the report issue, and 

the issue of the Chairman’s—the allegation that the Chairman 

feels it is appropriate to be a gatekeeper with regard to information 

that gets to the other members of the board. Because I think that 

is pretty important with regard to the integrity of everything that 

you do, I believe as board members you have a right to insist on 

that. 

When asked about that yesterday by Chairman Issa, Mr. Jaczko, 

this was the question: ‘‘Is it true that any information that you 

have has ever been withheld on your request?’’’ And he replied, 

‘‘Not that I am aware of. I work every day to ensure that the Commission has the information it needs.’’ 

I guess I would ask Mr. Ostendorff, don’t you think that the 

Commission, that the Chairman is not entitled to decide the information that you need, that you are entitled to have the information 

that the Commission and its staff has? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Sessions, I think it is, in order for us 

to fulfill our responsibilities on voting on matters that come before 

us, we need to have the full information and the full views, 

237 

uninfluenced by the senior staff—the senior staff, as uninfluenced 

by any other office. And we provided a few examples of those, and 

I know it has been a concern of ours. And that was a key factor 

that led to us writing this letter, when we do not believe that our 

senior staff, and I have talked to a bunch of them, and I think my 

other colleagues have as well, they do not feel they can always 

present their views that might be different from those of the Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. So when you ask for a staff report and evaluation about an issue, you weigh their recommendation very seriously, as you make your decision? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir, as I said in my opening statement 

today, I think the prioritization efforts from Fukushima are perhaps one of the key efforts that manifest the need to hear from 

staff. In my view, not all the safety recommendations made by the 

Fukushima Task Force had equal safety significance. Some were 

really, really important. The station blackout example I mentioned 

earlier is really important to do quickly. And I think the value— 

and I think Commissioner Apostolakis alluded to this—the value of 

hearing from staff their unfiltered, uninfluenced recommendations 

was, where can we get the biggest bang for the buck in the shortest 

period of time with respect to safety enhancements. 

Senator SESSIONS. The report that you got on that, and the information from staff, was it unfiltered or filtered, in your opinion? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We had concerns. 

Senator SESSIONS. You had a concern about it? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We had concerns with respect to the draw of 

the SECY paper back in July, that forwarded the Near-Term Task 

Force report that appeared, that did remove from the Commission 

recommendations from the staff as to how to go about moving forward with external stakeholder engagement and prioritization. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Apostolakis, do you agree that you have 

concerns in that area, that the staff reports are not getting to you 

unfiltered on occasion? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I do, because there have been occasions where 

the staff comes indirectly and says, what is in the report is not 

what we think. And that doesn’t happen every day, I don’t want 

to give you the impression that this is a widespread thing. But in 

some instances, it has happened. And that is certainly not a 

healthy situation, it seems to me. 

Senator SESSIONS. Commissioner Svinicki, do you share the same 

concern? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. I rely upon the staff providing their independent recommendations, and I have had concerns that I have not 

had their views in an unvarnished form. 

Senator SESSIONS. And Commissioner Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I think the experiences my colleagues have 

talked about, I have seen the same thing, either staff telling us 

after the fact that papers didn’t represent their views, or that there 

was a paper they would like to present but they can’t get it to us. 

We have had those conversations many times. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are any of you aware of the incident in the 

Issa report where it alleges that the Chairman became shaking 

angry and accused the deputy executive director of operations of 

238 

being less than honest when a vote paper already significantly altered to conform to the Chairman’s vision did not conform to his 

desires, interests, or views? Do you know what incident that might 

be referring to? 

Are you familiar with another incident cited from the Issa review 

that the Chairman used his supervising authority—time is up, you 

are right. 

Senator BOXER. We will have another round. We will stay here 

as long as we can. 

OK, we are going to move to Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Is there a difference among the Commissioners in how quickly 

the Task Force should implement Task Force recommendations? 

Anybody able to answer that? What kind of a timeframe? What 

kind of rush gets put on these things? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I will take the first shot at that, Senator. I think 

that, from conversations I have had, I think we are pretty much 

on the same wave length. I think our understanding is pretty common. We want to move forward as aggressively as practical. And 

I think we have been moving through the issues as quickly as we 

can. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. As quickly as we can, OK, thank you. 

Do you want to volunteer? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with Commissioner Magwood, Senator. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, and I do believe that the goal of completing everything in 5 years is a good one. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, if I may also respond, I know Chairman Jaczko at a prior Committee hearing has been public about a 

5-year goal. I think all five of us agree that that is an appropriate 

goal, and I think we support that. I would like to note that SECY 

paper 110137, dated the 3rd of October, 2011, is a 51-page paper 

provided to the Commission by Bill Borchardt, our Executive Director for Operations, and it has a fairly detailed plan. It doesn’t have 

exact every single date in there. But it has a plan to move forward 

in a number of different areas, I think, to do this in a very responsible, responsive time period. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Why is it felt that the Commissioners 

wanted to delay the Task Force report on Fukushima? I want to 

ask you this question. We have heard about the scoldings that took 

place, and that is not nice. I ran a company that now has 45,000 

employees, and I was CEO. Sometimes, I’ll be darned if I didn’t 

lose my head and scold somebody. But I had the job for a long time. 

So I would ask you, and I will go in order, sir, with you, is Chairman Jaczko unfit or incompetent to serve in his capacity? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Lautenberg, I would say that my experience with Chairman Jaczko is that he is an extraordinarily 

bright, competent individual. I have never questioned his commitment to the mission of the NRC nor to nuclear safety. That said, 

I have had significant reservations with how he conducts himself, 

with his colleagues, with NRC staff. He and I have had some frank 

discussions in these areas. There have been some real concerns. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I don’t think I can add to that. I agree with Commissioner Ostendorff’s comment. 

239 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Restate it for me, please. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, I think that I actually admire the Chairman’s grasp of regulatory policy and technical issues. We have had 

conversations over the last year and a half which I think have 

demonstrated that. Again, however, as Commissioner Ostendorff 

mentioned, there are other issues, which I think have quite frankly 

overwhelmed those positive attributes and created a lot of problems 

for us. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is pretty heavy hollering to say it 

overwhelms. You both admire his skills and his knowledge. 

And Ms. Svinicki, do you think he is competent, that Chairman 

Jaczko is competent? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I joined in the letter to the White House because 

I shared the significant concerns of my colleagues. But these decisions ultimately rest in the hands of others, and I leave them to 

judge whether these events—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So you have no opinion about it. 

Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. As I said yesterday, yes, he can do a great job. 

There are two things he has to correct: control his temper and do 

not impede the flow of information to the Commissioners, which he 

doesn’t do all the time. But sometimes it happens. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, everybody kind of thinks that Chairman 

Jaczko is competent, and that he has to be careful about hollering 

at people, as I understand it. With this job, it seems like a pretty 

sketchy kind of appraisal. 

Senator BOXER. I am sorry to interrupt you, but I am going to 

be fair here, and we are going to move to Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, the House Ranking Member yesterday on the 

Oversight and Government Reform Committee warned that internal disagreements among the Commissioners should not become 

what you described as a weapon of mass distraction from the issue 

of focusing on nuclear safety. And I want to focus on nuclear safety 

as do people on both sides of the aisle here. 

So when employees—Commissioners within an agency are expected to execute the mission of protecting the public from nuclear 

disasters, is investigating allegations of hostile work environment, 

outbursts of abusive rage, threats to the viability of the Commission’s structure, it is just a weapon of mass distraction that we 

should ignore and move on, or is this something you think we 

should actually investigate? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I always welcome congressional oversight, and 

I think it is healthy for us as an organization to have that. I welcome these issues, if there are challenges, and I want to address 

them. I have said that repeatedly. As I said, I have indicated I 

think it would be a good opportunity to sit down with my colleagues and talk about some of these issues. That is actually something I proposed about a year ago with my colleagues, that we have 

a meeting, we sit down, we work through some of these issues. And 

there was not an interest on all of my colleagues to want to do 

that. But I continue and am committed to having a better dialogue 

and to understanding where I am exercising my authorities in a 

240 

way that is leaving them to feel like they are not getting full access 

to information. Because I do feel like I am working to provide that. 

And you know, I would just say thought that there is a tremendous amount of information that comes to Commission offices. 

There is a tremendous amount of information within the agency as 

a whole. And in fact, our Commission procedures do specifically 

state that when there are resources challenges and when there are 

multiple requests for information from Commission offices, that has 

to be balanced somewhere within the resource needs of the agency. 

And that is ultimately the responsibility of the Chairman. 

Senator BARRASSO. Let me just reclaim my time. 

Commissioner Magwood, at yesterday’s hearing you spoke of misleading reports and a smear campaign against the four Commissioners who wrote to the White House expressing concerns about 

the hostile work environment. You stated that you do not intend 

this tactic to succeed. Are there things you would like to respond 

to in terms of any attacks, any that you would like to respond to 

today? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, I appreciate that. It was rather disturbing 

to see some of these reports in the media, focusing on my background. As I think I mentioned to Senator Sanders’ comment, my 

background is one that focused largely on research and development. I don’t see myself as a voice or representative of the industry 

by any stretch. As a matter of fact, a lot of people in the industry 

have never really been happy with me, because they see me as an 

internationalist and someone who is much more focused on the 

vast technology than day to day problems. 

I did do some—I did have a consulting business after I left DOE. 

I did two rather small reports for TEPCO on policy level issues 

that have nothing to do with the work of the NRC. One was on— 

actually, I take that back, one was actually on emergency planning. 

So these aren’t things that influence me today, they aren’t things 

I think about. I don’t have any relationships with people in the industry which I consider to be inappropriate. So I just found these 

allegations in the press to be really irresponsible. The larger allegations against my colleagues that we are somehow under the control 

of the industry I just thought was completely outrageous. 

Senator BARRASSO. I appreciate it. Thank you for your clarification. 

Commissioner Ostendorff, your testimony during the House hearing stated that the White House Chief of Staff Daley has 

mischaracterized the situation. Can you just elaborate further on 

what you mean? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir. I said that intentionally yesterday, because I was very concerned at the letter we received Monday night. 

I in great candor would tell this Committee, and I think it is obvious to everybody, this is an unprecedented action the four of us 

took. This is not something we just decided on the spur of the moment one afternoon to say, let’s go do this. This was the culmination of many months where we have been frustrated, we have seen 

things that are happening that are wrong. We have an obligation 

to the American people to stand up and be counted. That is what 

we did. 

241 

I feel like Mr. Daley’s response to us, with all due respect to his 

position as White House Chief of Staff, it is not about lack of communication among the Commissioners, it is not about internal disagreements, it is about, from my standpoint, it is more about doing 

damage to the agency, and it is about me as a Commissioner and 

my other colleagues who signed the letter receiving direct reports 

from senior career executives about the hostile environment at the 

NRC. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Ostendorff. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Mr. Magwood, you said it was disturbing to see reports in the 

media about yourself. Do you think it was disturbing to the Chairman to see what you said about him in terms of his relationships 

with staff? Do you think it was disturbing to him? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I am sure it was. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, let’s say it was disturbing to you, it 

was disturbing to him. 

Now, Senator Vitter opened up the issue of treatment of women. 

So I am going to take that up, because what is said here reminds 

me of the days—oh gosh, am I dating myself, of Joe McCarthy. I 

have in my pocket a list of three people who said this, and they 

are anti-American. I know of one incident, and I know of three. 

Well, let me tell you, that is outrageous character assassination. 

And so what we did is we went over and we talked to several 

women to find out, anecdotally, if what you are saying is universally true. So one respected woman said, female staffer, that the 

Chairman is the most fair person, those are her words, the most 

fair person she had ever met. She went on to say, ‘‘He treats everyone equally.’’ Another said, ‘‘He invites people to dissent, and I 

have never seen him mistreat others.’’ One woman said, ‘‘What I 

am floored by is the conduct of the other Commissioners.’’ 

So let’s put this thing to bed here. I have to be honest with everybody, there are times when I am intense when I talk to my 

staff. Please, I hope they understand. I get intense. I care, I challenge. So let’s not be holier than thou. Because that is something 

that is hard for people to take. 

Now, Senator Barrasso proved that there is a witch hunt going 

on against the Chairman. Why do I say that? Because he puts into 

the record the reports from yesterday’s hearing, which was a witch 

hunt. And then he quotes from the reports of the witch hunt. And 

he puts them in the record. And that is what it was. 

You know, Mr. Chairman, when you are in public life, any one 

of us could tell you that anyone can say anything about you, and 

Mr. Magwood, he is finding that out, too. So I am sorry, I am really 

sorry about this. And I think what it is about is something entirely 

different. I think it is about how fast we are going to move on safety at our nuclear power plants. 

There are a lot of people that don’t want to move expeditiously. 

That is not a fact unknown. All you have to do is look at what happened after 9/11. It took 10 years. And without the Chairman’s 

leadership, when he was sitting on the Commission then, moving 

forward, we never would have gotten it done. And it is life and 

death stuff. 

242 

And who is on the side of the staff? I will tell you who is on the 

side of the staff. It is my understanding that in September, with 

Chairman Jaczko’s leadership, the senior NRC staff endorsed action without delay. In a statement they said the staff believes that 

all the Task Force’s recommendations, if adopted, would enhance 

safety, and the staff agrees with moving forward with each of these 

recommendations. 

Now, the Commission is slow walking the staff and then blaming 

the Chairman for changing the recommendations. These people 

have 135 years of experience. And I have to say, Mr. Magwood, 

when we last saw each other, it wasn’t the most pleasant. I am 

sorry if it is not so pleasant. I asked you the following question on 

June 16th: Will you assure me that the Task Force report containing the recommendations is delivered to my office and Senator 

Inhofe’s office on the day it is delivered to the Commission. We 

asked everybody. You said yes. 

I have an e-mail from July 5th I will place in the record, without 

objection, that shows your chief of staff suggested you had ‘‘wiggle 

room’’ in whether to meet this commitment, and asked if she could 

contact other offices. And you wrote back, it is appropriate to discuss this with other chiefs of staff to see what they are thinking. 

I don’t know why you felt you needed wiggle room from turning 

over a report to the Ranking Member and myself. I mean, there are 

other examples of this which I will put in the record. 

[The referenced information is unavailable for public review.] 

Senator BOXER. So I think this is all about safety, all dressed up 

as something else. And I have to tell you, if I go back to my State’s 

areas where they have nuclear power, they have old plants there, 

millions of people live nearby, they wouldn’t be happy if a Chairman was strong or maybe a little bit intense with a staff member. 

But they want the Chairman and every one of you to make their 

nuclear power plants safe. 

And with that, I will call on Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Commissioner Ostendorff, I want to get back to one important instance in terms of the flow of information. I understand that in the 

Vogtle matter, the staff recommendation was different than you expected. Why was that, and did the direct of the New Reactors program explain the change? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, on August 10th, I had a routine periodic with Mike Johnson, who is the Office Director for the New Reactor Office, which has about 500, 600 people in there. Maybe it is 

about 500 people. And he and I, he had discussed this upcoming 

paper that we were going to be receiving in about 2 weeks with respect to this timing of the license effectiveness. And he told me 

that he recommended that the effectiveness be concurrent with the 

date the NRC sent the Federal Register notice to the Office of Management and Budget. And we discussed it at great length, that 

there was no public safety, nuclear safety issue at all. I had a briefing with another Commissioner on this topic. 

So I was surprised when August 25th, 15 days later, comes 

around and the recommendation in that paper was not what I 

thought it was going to be, but it was rather to keep the status 

quo. This is the same paper that Commissioner Apostolakis reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:00 Sep 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00246 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\26661.TXT SONYA
243 

ferred to. We were surprised. What I heard was there was an interchange between the Chairman and Mike Johnson about this issue 

and that at the Chairman’s request, the recommendation was 

changed. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Apostolakis, could you comment briefly on 

the incident as well? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Commissioner Ostendorff just gave you more 

details than I am aware of. But I was informed that what we received was not the staff’s original recommendation. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Mr. Chairman, in your letter to Mr. Daley, 

it is 16 paragraphs long, and the second to last paragraph you used 

the word apologize once. But I read it about 10 times, and I am 

still unclear what you apologized for. What did you apologize for? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I am deeply disappointed that the, some of 

these internal concerns are being made public. I take great pride 

in my job as Chairman. And part of that job is ensuring that my 

colleagues fully trust and are willing to work with me. Clearly, I 

have some work to do in that area, and I am committed to improving that situation. 

A lot has been made of this particular paper. And I think to put 

it in perspective—— 

Senator VITTER. Can I go back to the apology again? 

Mr. JACZKO. Please. 

Senator VITTER. The letter says something like you apologize for 

this being a distraction. That strikes me in politics as a classic nonapology apology. What are you apologizing for? I think it is important to be clear. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I am very sorry if this is distracting us from 

nuclear safety. That is our fundamental job. And any—— 

Senator VITTER. Besides apologizing for the distraction, do you 

plan on apologizing to anyone any time soon about anything else? 

Mr. JACZKO. I absolutely intend to talk to my colleagues, either 

individually or as a group, understand their concerns, and based on 

that discussion I intend to do whatever is appropriate to remedy 

the situation. 

Senator VITTER. OK. A while ago when Senator Inhofe was asking questions, he asked, do you agree with the bottom line of the 

Markey report. And I believe your answer was yes, based on emails you have seen from your fellow Commissioners. That is a 

pretty bold answer, so I just want to make sure—— 

Mr. JACZKO. I am sorry, that was not my answer, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Well, do you agree with the bottom line of 

the Markey report, which I would characterize as follows, that all 

of this hubbub from your Commissioners is really a coup attempt, 

and it is all about slow walking safety? 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, I am not going to comment on any Congressman’s conclusions or recommendations. 

Senator VITTER. My question is about what you think. Do you 

agree with that characterization? 

Mr. JACZKO. I was very disappointed to see the content of many 

of those e-mails. Those were clearly conversations that were going 

on without my office’s knowledge. I don’t think that is in the spirit 

of the openness in which we pride ourselves as a Commission. And 

244 

I think it is clearly indicative of a need for better communication 

among Commissioners. 

So I was very disappointed when I saw a lot of those e-mails. 

Senator VITTER. Well, unless you want to clarify, I will take that 

as a yes, then. I find that pretty staggering. 

Do you think any or all of your four other Commissioners hold 

nuclear safety in a lower priority than you do? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, I think we all have—— 

Senator BOXER. You will have to wrap it up. 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe we all have different interpretations of 

what safety means. That is why we have a Commission. 

Senator BOXER. I will have to ask you to stop it at that point. 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. This has been a very interesting hearing. I 

think there are two issues. No. 1, obviously the issue that is of concern to the people of the United States of America is that we make 

sure that our nuclear plants are as safe as they possibly can be. 

There is a lot of concern, especially since Fukushima, about the 

safety of nuclear power in this country. And I suspect that what 

we have here among five intelligent people, all of whom I am absolutely convinced are concerned about nuclear safety, is perhaps a 

difference of opinion as to how aggressively and rapidly one moves 

forward. And I suspect there are differences of opinion and now in 

some cases are being cloaked as personality differences or personal 

attacks against the Chairman. 

So I would say for a start, Madam Chair, my suspicion is, looking 

at some of the votes that have been cast, there are differences of 

opinion among intelligent people. 

But the second issue that does concern me is some of the personal attacks that have been made against Mr. Jaczko. He has 

been asked to respond to charges of which he is not aware. As I 

understand it, Mr. Jaczko, there is a charge that you have intimidated, brought to tears some of your employees. You have indicated 

to this Committee, I gather, that you are not aware of that, is that 

correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. That is correct. I learned of it within several days 

or a week. 

Senator SANDERS. And you have been charged with having a 

temper. So let me just ask my fellow Commissioners, again, Mr. 

Jaczko is being forced to respond to something he is not aware of. 

But just out of curiosity, Mr. Magwood, have you ever lost your 

temper before other people that you work with? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No. 

Senator SANDERS. Wow. That is interesting. 

Ms. Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I tend to get quieter if I get upset, as opposed to 

getting loud. Some people are like that. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Apostolakis, any chance that you may 

have upset somebody in the course of your discussions? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Ostendorff, any chance? 

245 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I remember one significant incident, when I 

was in command of a submarine, and I recognized that and immediately apologized in front of the entire people that witnessed it. 

Senator SANDERS. And maybe I should ask my member, my comembers of the Senate, who in their long careers I am sure never, 

under any instance, I see Jeff Sessions shake his head, ever said 

anything that they were feeling badly about to any of their staff 

members. The answer is, I have no idea what kind of workplace 

Mr. Jaczko has and what goes on at the NRC, that somebody who 

is aggressive, who is trying to do a job, may have in some ways 

hurt the feelings of other people. I suspect it is possible. I suspect 

that in all of our lives, unlike Mr. Magwood, I have lost my temper. 

And I suspect I have inadvertently hurt people’s feelings. 

So I would say that I think the issue that we have to focus on 

is that everybody on your NRC, everybody up here has to do everything that we can to make certain that the people of the United 

States of America understand that nuclear power in this country 

is as safe as it possibly can be. And with that, Madam Chair, that 

is about all that I have to say. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Well, I just don’t believe that our problem here is policy difference. Our Chairman said she thought this was about moving expeditiously and about safety and that the four Commissioners 

didn’t agree with that as a matter of policy, and that this explains 

your criticism of the Chairman in your letter to the President. 

Let me ask each of you, Mr. Magwood, is that the reason for your 

writing the letter, that you disagreed about moving expeditiously 

to ensure safety? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No. Not at all. As a matter of act, the Commission has taken an initial action on all the Task Force recommendations except for one, the first one, at this point, and actually has 

added to the agenda beyond what the Task Force has contemplated. So I feel that we have moved forward very aggressively 

and very comprehensively. 

Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Svinicki, do you agree that this is a complaint you have made only about moving faster for safety? 

Ms. SVINICKI. No, I don’t agree with that characterization. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. No. The letter has nothing to do with 

Fukushima. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I agree with my colleagues. This is nothing to 

do about moving forward on Fukushima. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think I didn’t get to complete my question 

about the Issa report interviewed staff, and it was reported that 

the Chairman used his supervisory authority to berate and compel 

staff to withdraw a voting paper that included a suggestion that 

was contrary to his preferred course of action. 

You have talked about that in general, Mr. Ostendorff. Are you 

aware of that concern? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, this dealt with this, this was referenced in our letter to the White House, the withdrawal of the 

246 

original staff-recommended 5 pages on SECY paper 110093, which 

had detailed recommendations, presented quite frankly, by Mr. 

Borchardt and his deputy, Marty Rigilio, as to how to move forward with Fukushima recommendations. That paper was withdrawn and replaced by a cover sheet. 

Senator SESSIONS. And that denied you and the Commission 

members important information as you were seeking to make a decision? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I would say that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Or could have had that effect if you hadn’t 

otherwise—— 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I am sorry, excuse me, sir? 

Senator SESSIONS. It could have had that effect? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, it could have. 

Senator SESSIONS. One of the allegations is that the Chairman 

used his, introduced political considerations as part of his discussions with Democratic appointees. 

Are you aware of, Mr. Magwood, of any instance in which you 

were urged, for political loyalty or other reasons, to vote one way 

or another on an issue? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think I would like to not answer that question 

right now, Senator. I would like to perhaps get back to you for the 

record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Fair enough. 

And Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. A long time ago, once, there was a hint that 

I should act in a certain way. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, and Madam Chairman, I will ask about 

the incidence of abuse of women. 

Mr. Magwood, your chief of staff, Patrice Bubar, stated, ‘‘Sometimes the tactics of the Chairman used are threatening and intimidating.’’ I understand that Ms. Bubar is a recipient of the President’s Meritorious Rank Award and Distinguished Career Service 

Award. Do you have any reason to question her comments about 

her dealings with the Chairman? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No, I don’t. But I also don’t think that she has 

had any personal experience in that direction. 

Senator SESSIONS. Madam Chairman, thank you for allowing this 

full hearing, and we have had some disagreements. I would urge 

the majority, Madam Chairman, to understand that I believe this 

does—is divorced from policy differences. I think it really is a matter of the lawful operation of a Commission which has to depend 

on the reports and advice they get, and be able to be sure of the 

judgment of the Chairman in declaring an emergency in which he 

then becomes the sole authority of the Commission. It is very real, 

and I thank the Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I just want to say before my good friend 

leaves, and he is my good friend, that the Chairman checked with 

the General Counsel immediately before taking on any of his powers. And within 6, 7 days of Fukushima, and I will put it in the 

record, without objection, he got a letter back explaining exactly 

what he was permitted to do. So I really think a lot of this is non— 

that is why I think this is really about culture at an agency, the 

safety issues. 

247 

Here is another, this is really interesting, I think you will find 

it fascinating. At the same time these Commissioners were exchanging e-mails and doing all that they did and plotting their letter or whatever they did to send to the White House, against the 

Chairman, there was a confidential survey of all the employees in 

every Federal agency. This is what happened. This is supposed to 

be a man without leadership? This is supposed to be man who is 

cruel to his staff? Listen to what happened. 

On the issue of effective leadership, the NRC was rated 1 out of 

the 30 agencies. On the issue of fairness, 1 out of the 30 agencies. 

The issue of fairness of supervisors, 1 out of 30. On the issue of 

family friendly culture, and benefits, 1 out of 30. While colleagues 

on the other side make it sound like you don’t really care about 

people’s feelings, your agency came out on top. Work-life balance, 

1 out of 30. 

So why is it that I think this is really, well, a diversion is a nice 

way to put it, it is the way the Chairman put it. I think it is a subterfuge for something else. And Mr. Magwood, I have to tell you, 

it is very disturbing to me, you did have opposition from 100 

groups of enviros. I wound up voting for you because you came before us and you said, I firmly believe that maintaining uncompromisingly high levels of safety is the first and most important job 

of any organization that handles nuclear material. That is what 

you said. And you had every single big player in industry support 

you. So don’t say that you didn’t, because I have the list. And I will 

put them in the record, because they are all in the Nuclear Energy 

Institute. 

[The referenced information follows:] 

248 


26661.183

News Release 

Nuclear Energy Institute FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 

• Contact:202.739.8000 

• For Release:October 13, 2009 

Industry Welcomes Wlite House's Intent to Nominate Apostolakis, Magwood to NRC 

WASHINGTON, D. C.-The Obama Administration announced on Friday its intent to nominate George Aposto!akls and 

WH!iam Magwood to serve as commissioners on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Following is a statement by 

Tony Pietrangelo, NEI's senior vice president and chief nuclear officer, on the announcement of the planned nominations: 

"The administration's nominees to serve on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are qualified leaders on nuclear 

technology issues and have the breadth of experience necessary for an agency that effectively oversees the nation's 

commercia! nuclear industry. 

''The industry is particularly pleased that the NRC will be fully staffed at the commissioner leveL The NRC operated at its 

best when there is a collegial dialogue on the issues among the full complement of commissioners. 

"The industry's first priority is operating 104 reactors safely and reliably. As the industry proceeds with the license 

applications for new reactors, uranium enrichment fadhties and other commercial nuclear energy facilities, it is critically 

important that the NRC ensures the stability and predictability of the regulatory process. 

"It is also vital that the NRC effectively meets the challenge of incorporating thousands of new staff at a time when it is 

reviewing more permits than in the past Mo decades. Accomplishing the knowledge transfer among its staff and 

promoting regulatory stability and predictability is necessary for the NRC to continue to be an effective regulator and 

provide the oversight that has helped achieve the safest and most reliable nuclear energy program in the world." 
249 


26661.184

Nuclear Energy Institute Executive Leadership, Committees and Member Roster 

NEI Board of Directors 

•• Mr. William D. Johnson 

(Chairman) 

Chi'Jirman, President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Progress Energy 

~ •• Mr. John F. Young 

(Vice Chairman) 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Energy Future Holdings 

+ Mr. Marvin s. Fertel 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Nuclear Energy Institute 

Mr. Nicholas K. Akins 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

American Electric Power 

••Mr. Anthony J, Alexander 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

FirstEnergy Corp. 

Mr. Gerard M. Anderson 

Chairman, President 

and Chjef Executive Officer 

DTE Energy Company 

Mr. Mark H. Ayers 

President 

Building and Construction 

Trades Department, AFL~OO 

+TMr. Henry B. Barron 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Conste!!atlon Energy Nuclear Group1 LLC 

Mr. Warner L. Baxter 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Ameren Missouri 

••Mr. Donald E. Brandt 

Chairman of the Board, President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Ptnnade West Capital Corporation 

AsofDecembf>i20ll 

• Executive Committee Member 

T Audit Cmnm1ttee Member 

• Organ1zat1on and CompensatiOn Committee Member 

• Nominatmg Committee Member 

•• Dr. Aris S. Candris 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Westinghouse Electric Company 

Mr. Alasdair I. Cathcart 

President 

Bechtel Power Corporation 

•• Mr. David A. Christian 

Chief Executive Officer, Generation 

Dominion Generation 

••Mr. Christopher M. Crane 

President and Chief Operating Officer 

Exe!on Corporation 

••Mr. Anthony F. Earley, Jr. 

Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, 

and President 

PG&E Corporation 

Mr. Benjamin G. S. Fowke, III 

Chairman, President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Xcel Energy 

•• Mr. W. Gary Gates 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Omaha Public Power District 

Mr. Timothy Gitzel 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Cameco Corporation 

Mr. Edward D. Halpin 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

STP Nuclear Operating Company 

+•Mr. Lewis Hay, III 

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 

NextEra Energy, Inc. 

Mr. Greg Hempfling 

Senior Vice President 

and General Manager 

Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company 

Mr. Edwin D. Hill 

Internijtfonal President 

International Brotherhood 

of Electrical Workers 

Mr. William P. Hite 

General President 

United Association of Journeymen 

and Apprentices of the Plumbing 

and Pipe Fitting Industry of the 

United States and Canada 

Dr. Raymond J. Juzaitis 

Department Head and Professor 

Department of Nuclear Engineering 

Texas A&M University 

+.-Mr. Thomas D. Kilgore 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Tennessee Valley Authority 

••Mr. Stephen E. Kuczynski 

Chairman, President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company 

Mr. William Levis 

President and Chief Operating Officer 

PSEG Power LLC 

Mr. Ronald L. Litzinger 

President 

Southern California Edison Company 

Mr. Ganpat Mani 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

ConverDyn 

Mr. Kevin B. Marsh 

Chairman, President and Chief Executive 

Officer 

SCANA Corporation 

Mr. Michael P. McMahon 

President 

Day & Zimmermann ECM 

Mr. Christorer M. Mowry 

President 

Babcock & Wilcox Nudear Energy1 Inc. 
250 


26661.185

Mr. George Nash 

Group General Manager, 

President, Power 

URS Corporation 

Mr. Patrick L. Pope 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Nebraska Public Power District 

Mr. Clarence L. Ray, Jr. 

Chief Executive Officer 

Shaw Power Group 

Ms. Caroline A. Red a 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy 

Mr. Mark E. Reddemann 

Chief Executive Officer 

Energy Northwest 

Mr. Michael W. Rencheck 

Chief Operating Officer 

AREVA Inc. 

Mr. K. Keith Roe 

Chairman, President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Burns and Roe Enterprises Inc. 

+'f'Mr. James E. Rogers, Jr. 

Chairman1 President 

and Chief Executive Officer 

Duke Energy Corporation 

Mr. Kirk s. Schnoebelen 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Urenco, Inc. 

Dr. Kris P. Singh 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Holtec International 

••Mr. Richard J. Smith 

President, Entergy Wholesale Commodities 

Entergy Corporation 

Mr. William H. Spence 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

PPL Corporation 

Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 

Corporation 

Mr. George D. Turner 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

American Nuclear Insurers 

Mr. Chris Tye 

Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power 

Fluor Corporation 

Mr. John K. Welch 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

USEC Inc. 

Mr. Alan W. Wendorf 

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 

Sargent & Lundy, LLC 

Mr. Kiyoshi Yamauchi 

President and Chief ExecuUve Officer 

Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc. 

Ex Officio Members 

Mr. Mark Crisson 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

American Public Power Association 

Mr. James 0. Ellis, Jr. 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

Mr. Glenn English 

Chief Executive Officer 

National Rural Electric Cooperative 

Association 

Michael W. Howard, Ph.D., P.E. 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Electric Power Research Institute 

Mr. Thomas R. Kuhn 

President 

Edison Electric Institute 

Mr. David B. Ripsom 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited 

NEI Senior Management 

Mr. Marvin S. Fertel 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Mr. Alex Flint 

Senior Vice President 

Governmental Affairs Division 

Ellen C. Ginsberg, Esq. 

Vice Presiderrt, General Counsel 

and Secretary 

Legal Divtsion 

Mr. Alexander Marion 

Vice President/ Nuclear Operations 

Nuclear Generation Division 

Mr. Richard J. Myers 

Vice President 

Policy Development, Planning 

and Supplier Programs Division 

Mr. J. Scott Peterson 

Senior Vice Prec;ident 

Communications Division 

Mr. Anthony R. Pietrangelo 

Senior Vice Prec;ident 

and Chief Nuclear Officer 

Nuclear Generation Division 

Ms. Phyllis M. Rich 

Senior Vice President 

and Chief ~='inancial Officer 

Member Relations and Corporate 

Services Division 

Ms. Lisa I. Steward 

Assistant Secretary and Senior Director 

Member Relations and Corporate 

Services D1vision 

Mr. Douglas J. Walters 

Vice President, Regulatory Affairs 

Nuclear Generation Division 
251 


26661.186

Communications 

Chair: 

Mr. John F. Young 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Energy Future Holdings 

NEI Staff Contact: 

Mr. J. Scott Peterson 

Governmental Affairs 

Chair: 

Ms. Beverly K. Marshall 

Vice President, 

Federal Governmental Affairs 

Duke Energy Corporation 

NEJ Staff Contact: 

Mr. Alex Flint 

New Plants (NPOC) 

Chair: 

Mr. Stephen A. Byrne 

Senior Vice President 

SCANA Corporation 

NEI Staff Contact: 

Mr. Douglas J. Walters 

Nuclear Strategic Issues 

Chair: 

Mr. Dennis L. K-oehl 

Senior Vice President 

and Chief Nuclear Officer 

Xcel Energy 

NEI Staff Contact: 

Mr. Anthony R. Pietrangelo 

Suppliers 

Chair: 

Dr. Aris s. Candris 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Westinghouse Electric Company 

NEI Staff Contact: 

Mr. Richard J. Myers 

Executive Task Forces 

Fuel Supply 

Chair: 

Mr. Adam C. Heflin 

Chief Nuclear Officer 

Ameren Missouri 

Fukushima Response 

Chair: 

Mr. Charles G. Pardee 

Chief Operating Officer 

Exelon Generation COmpany, LLC 

Security 

Chair: 

Mr. Henry B. Barron 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group 

Standing Committees 

Facility Operations 

Governmental Affairs 

Lawyers Committee and Steering 

Committee 

Nuclear Fuel Suppliers 

Nuclear Sector Coordinating Council 

Radionudides and Radiopharmaceuticals 

Suppliers 

Utility Fuel 

Issue Task Forces 

Buried Piping Integrity 

Circuit Failures 

Closing the Fuel Cycle 

Combined Operating License 

Construction Inspection Program 

Cyber Security 

Decommissioned Site 

Dry cask Storage 

Dry Cask Vendor 

Emergency Planning Security Drill 

Emergency Preparedness Regulatory 

Emergency Preparedness Rulemaking 

Energy Education Center 

Enrichment Regulatory Framework 

Environmental 

Export Controls 

Fedcorp 

Fire PRA 

Grid Reliability 

Infrastructure 

Joint Information System 

License Renewal 

Licensing Action 

MTEP 

Maintenance Rule 

Materials 

Medium Voltage Inaccessible Cable 

NEI 99-01 

NFPA 805 

NUREG 0654 Supplement 3 PAR 

New Plant Aircraft Impact 

New Plant Communications I 

Governmental Outreach 

New Plant Finance 

New Plant Legislative 

New Plant Licensed Operator 

New Plant Quallty Assurance 

New Plant Security 

New Plant Seismic 

Nuclear Talent Task Force 

PRA Peer Review 

Personnel Access Data System 

Radiation Protection Dosimetry 

and Recordkeeping 

Radiation Safety 

Reactor Oversight Process 

Risk Applications 

Risk-Informed lSI 

Risk-Informed Technical Specifications 

Safety Culture Assessment 

Security Force-on-Force 

Security Frequently Asked Questions 

Security Response Evaluation Program 

Security Standards 

Seismic 

Small Reactor Legislative 

Small Modular Reactor Licensing 

Social Media 

Social Media f Emergency Response 

State Governmental Affairs 

Steam Generator 

Sump Performance 

Trade Advocacy 

Transportation 

Used Fuel Fukushima Response 

Used Nuclear Fuel Communications 

Work Hours 

Yucca Mountain Licensing 

Working Groups 

Buried Piping Integrity 

Digital I&C and Human Factors 

Emergency Preparedness and 

Event Communication 

Fire Protection 

Integrated Used Nuclear Fuel Management 

New Plant 

Regulatory Process 

Security 

Small Modular Reactor 

Work Fon:::e 
252 


26661.187

NEI Member Roster 

3M Corporation 

Abu Dhabi Polytechnic 

Accenture 

Aiken Technical College 

Alion Science and Technology 

Allen University 

Altamaha Technical College 

Altran Solutions 

Ameren Corporation 

American Electric Power 

Indiana Michigan Power 

American Nuclear Insurers 

American Substance Abuse Professionals 

Aon Risk Services 

Appendix R Solutions1 Inc. 

ARfYA 

AREVA, Inc. 

AREVA NP 

ARfYA NC 

Canberra, Inc. 

Transnuclear, Inc. 

Argonne National Laboratory 

Arizona Public Service Company 

(Pinnacle West capital Corporation] 

El Paso Electric Company 

Los Angeles Department of Water 

& Power 

Public Service Company of New Mexico 

Salt River Project 

Southern California Edison Company 

Southern Wlifornia Public Power 

Authority 

Arizona State University 

Assodated Electric Cooperative, Inc, 

ATB Riva Calzoni SpA 

Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan 

Auburn University 

Augusta Technical College 

Automated Engineering Services 

BKW Energie AG 

The Babcock & Wilcox Company 

[McDermott lnternational1 Inc,] 

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 

Balch & Bingham 

Bartlett Holdings, Inc. 

Bartlett Nuclear, Inc. 

Bartlett Services, Inc, 

Deltak Manufacturing Company, Inc. 

EXCEL Modular Scaffold & Leasing Corp, 

SUN Technical Services, Inc. 

Team One Mechanical Services, LLC 

Battelle Memorial Institute 

Key: 

Member Company [Parent} 

Subsidiary 

Non-Operatmg Ormer 

Brookhaven National Laboratory 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

Bechtel Power Corporation 

Bismarck State College 

Black & Veatch 

Booz Allen Hamilton 

Brazosport College 

Brigham Young University 

Brown, Werner & Brothers LLP 

Bruce Power 

Building and Construction Trades 

Department1 AFL ·CIO 

Burns and Roe Group 

CB&I 

CH2M Hill 

CTLGroup 

California Institute of Technology 

Cameco Corporation 

Power Resources1 Inc. 

cape Fear Community College 

Carnegie~Mellon University 

The Catholic University of America 

Central Research Institute of Electric 

Power Industry 

Certrec Corporation 

Chattanooga State Tectmical 

Community College 

Chubu Electric Power Company, Inc. 

Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness 

Clemson University 

College of Southern Maryland 

Colorado State University 

Columbia Basin College 

Columbia University 

Comision Federal de Electricidad 

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 

Company 

Constellation Energy 

Long Island Power Authority 

ConverDyn 

Cornell University 

Curtiss Wright Flow Control Company 

Dairy!and Power Cooperative 

Genoa Fuel Tech 

Dakota County Technical College 

David Ramendick Consulting 

Day, Berry & Howard LLP 

Day & Zimmermann Power Services 

Delaware County Community College 

The Detroit Edison Company [DTE 

Energy Company] 

DevonWay, Inc. 

Dickstein Shapiro LLP 

Dominion Generation [Dominion 

Resources Inc] 

Central Vermont Public Service 

Corporation 

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale 

Electric Company 

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative 

Virginia Electric & Power Company 

Duane Morris LLP 

Duke Energy Corporation 

North Carolina Municipal Power Agency 

North carolina Electric Membership 

Corporation 

Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 

Duke University 

EDF 

Edgen Murray Corporation 

Ed low Intem~tional Company 

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation 

Enercon Services, Inc. 

Energy Industries of Ohio 

Energy Nortrwest 

Bonneville Power Administration 

Energy Resources International, Inc. 

Engineering Planning 

and Management, Inc. 

Entergy Operations, Inc. [Entergy 

Corporation] 

Entergy Arkansas, Inc. 

Entergy Gulf States, Inc, 

Entergy Louisiana, Inc. 

Entergy Mississippi, Inc. 

Entergy New Orleans, Inc. 

Entergy Nuclear Operations1 Inc. 

TLG Services, Inc. 

South Mississippi Electric Power 

Association 

System Energy Resources 

EP Consulting, !.LC 

ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc. 

EXCEL Services Corporation 

Epsilon Systems Solutions, Inc. 

Eskom Holdings Limited 

Estrella Nountain Community College 

Excelsior College 

Exelon Corporation 

MidAmerican Energy Company 

PSEG Power LLC 

Exponent, Inc. 

Exponent Engineering, Inc. 

The Federation of Electric Power 

Companies of Japan 

FirstEnergy Corp. 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating 

Company 

Ohio Edison Company 

Pennsylvania Power Company 

The Toledo Edison Company 

Florence Darlington Technical College 

Fluor Corporation 

Ruor Daniel, Inc. 

Foro de Ia Industria Nuclear Espafiola 

Francis Marion University 
253 


26661.188

Fuji Electric Corp. of America 

Gaston College 

GE Healthcare 

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy 

GZA GeoEnv!ronmental, Inc. 

General Atomics 

Rio Grande Resources Corporation 

Sequoyah Fuels Corporation 

Sorrento Electronics 

General Dynamics 

Electric Boat 

Georgia Institute of Technology 

Globe Nuclear Services and Supply 

GNSS1 Limited 

Goodwin Procter LLP 

Greenberg Traurig, LLP 

Harkins Cunningham LLP 

Harvard School of Public Health 

Hinds Community College 

Hitachi, Ltd. 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Holtec International 

Honeywell 

Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 

Huntington Ingalls Industries 

Newport News Industrial 

Hunton & Williams 

Hyperion Power Generation1 Inc. 

Purple Mountain Ventures, Inc. 

Saint Blackwell, Inc. 

lEA of Japan Co., Ltd. 

IEM1 Inc. 

ITOCHU Corporation 

Idaho National Laboratory 

Idaho State University 

Indian River State College 

Infrastructure Defense Technologies LLC 

International Access Corporation 

International Brotherhood of 

Electrical Workers 

International Isotopes Idaho1 Inc. 

International Technology and Trade 

Associates, Inc. 

Iowa State University of Science 

and Technology 

Ironworker Management Progressive 

Cooperative Trust 

Japan Atomic Energy Agency 

The Japan Atomic Power Company 

Japan Bank for International Cooperation 

Japan Electric Power Information Center 

Japan NUS Co., ltd. 

Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization 

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute 

Jones Day 

KEPCO Engineering & Construction 

Company 

KLD Associates, Inc. 

KLD Engineering, P.C. 

K & L Gates LLP 

The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. 

Kansas State University 

Kiewit Corporation 

Kleinsorg Group Risk Services, LLC 

Kontek Industries 

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company 

Ktech Corporation 

Kyushu Electric Power Company, Inc, 

Lakeland Community College 

Lake Michigan College 

Lakeshore Technical College 

LeBlond and Associates, LLC 

Lightbridge Corporation 

Linn State Technical College 

Livingstone College 

lockheed Martin Corporation 

Loeb & Loeb 

Longenecker & Associates 

Luminant Power [Energy Future Holdings] 

CP Nuclear Power 

luzerne County Community College 

MACTEC, Inc. 

MACTEC Engineering 

and Consulting, Inc. 

MACTEC Development Corporation 

MCR Performance Solutions, LLC 

MPR Associates, Inc. 

Madison Area Technical College 

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 

Maracor Software & Engineering, Inc. 

Marubeni America Corporation 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Massachusetts Malit!me Academy 

McMaster University 

Mercer Thompson, LLC 

Metal Trades Department, AFL-00 

Miami Dade College 

Michigan Technological University 

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP 

Miller & Chevalier Chartered 

Mississippi State University 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 

Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc. 

Energis Company 

Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 

Model Performance, LLC 

Monroe County Community College 

Morgan, lewis & Beckius LLP 

NAC International 

NUKEM, Inc. 

National Defense Industrial Association 

National Tsing Hua University 

National University of Singapore 

Nebraska Public Power District 

Neutron Energy, Inc. 

New Mexico Institute of Mining 

and Technology 

New Mexico Junior College 

New York Nuclear Corporation 

NextEra Energy1 Inc. 

Florida Power & Ught Company 

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC 

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC 

Central Iowa Power Cooperative 

Corn Belt Power Cooperative 

Aorida Municipal Power Agency 

Hudson Light & Power Department 

Massachuse.tts Municipal Wholesale 

Electric Company 

Orlando Utilities Commission 

Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant 

Next Generation Nuclear Plant 

Industry Alliance 

Nexus Technical Services Corporation 

NitroSecurity 

Nordostschweizerische Krafl:werke A. G. 

North Carolina State University 

Northeast Alabama Community College 

Northern Michigan University 

Northrop Grumman 

Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited 

Nuclear Power Institute 

NuScale Power, Inc. 

OECD Nudear Energy Agency 

Oak Ridge Associated Universities 

Ohio State University 

Omaha Public Power District 

Onondaga Community College 

Ontario Power Generation Inc. 

Operations Support Services1 Inc. 

Oregon State University 

Owl Computing Technologies1 Inc. 

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 

PPL Corporation 

Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. 

PSEG Nuclear LLC [Public Service Electric 

and Gas Company] 

Public Service Enterprise Group 

Exelon Corporation 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company 

Paladin Energy ltd. 

PaR Systems, Inc. 

Parsons Commercial Technology 

Paul C. Rizzo Associates 

Pegasus Global Ho!dings1 Inc. 

Pennsylvania State University 

Pfllsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 

Polytechnic University of Puerto Rico 

Powertech Uranium Corp. 

Precision Components Corporation 

Preferred Ucensing Services, Inc. 
254 


26661.189

Progress Energy 

City of Alachua 

City of Bushnell 

City of Ocala 

Gainesville Regional Utilities 

Kissimmee Utility Authority 

Leesburg Electric Department 

North Carolina Eastern Municipal 

Power Agency 

Orlando UtiHties Commission 

Seminole Electric Cooperative 

Utilities Commission New Smyrna 

Beach 

Purdue University 

Reliability and Safety Consulting 

Engineers, Inc. 

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 

Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center 

Rice University 

Rio Tinto Uranium Limited 

Rol!s~Royce pic 

SCHOn North America, Inc. 

S.M. Stoller Corporation 

STP Nuclear Operating Company 

Austin Energy 

CPS Energy 

NRG Energy 

Sacramento Municipal Utility District 

Salem Community College 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Sandmeyer Steel Company 

Sargent & Lundy, LLC 

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC 

Scot Forge Company 

ScottMadden, Inc. 

Shaw Power Group 

Sheet Metal Workers' International 

Association 

Signal Equities, LLC 

Sound & Sea Technology 

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 

[SCANA Corporation] 

Santee Cooper 

South Carolina State University 

Southeast Community College 

Southern california Edison Company 

[Edison International] 

Anaheim Public Utilities Department 

Riverside Public UtHities 

San Diego Gas & Electric Company 

Southern l!!inois University 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company 

[Southern Company] 

Gulf Power Company 

Mississippi Power Company 

Savannah Electric Power Company 

Alabama Power Company 

City of Dalton 

Georgia Power Company 

Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia 

Oglethorpe Power Corporation 

St. Cloud Technical College 

Stanford University 

Stevenson & Associates 

Vibration Engineering Consultants 

Strathmore Minerals Corp. 

Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. 

Sumitomo Corporation 

Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP 

TENAM Corporation 

TW Metals - Nuclear Materials Solutions 

Taiwan Power Company 

Talisman International, LLC 

Techsnabexport 

Tennessee Valley Authority 

Texas A&M University 

Thomas Edison State College 

Three Rivers Community College 

Tigris Uranium Corp. 

Titan Uranium Inc. 

The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. 

Toshiba America Nuclear Energy 

Corporation 

Total Protection Services carollnas, LLC 

Trade Tech 

TradeTech Energy LLC 

Transport Logistics International 

Trl·En Corporation 

Troutman Sanders, LLP 

Turner Industries Group, l.L.C. 

UNESA 

Asociaci6n Nuclear Asc6~Vande!l6s II, 

A.l.E. 

Central Nuclear de Cofrentes 

Central Nuclear de Jose Cabrera 

Central Nuclear de Santa Maria de 

Garoiia 

Centrales Nudeares Almaraz~ Trillo 

En des a 

HidroeiE!ctrica del cantilbrico 

Iberdrola 

Nuclenor 

UniOn Fenosa 

URS Corporation 

Washington TRU Solutions LLC 

USEC Inc. 

U.S. Naval Academy 

United Association of Journeymen and 

Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe 

Fitting Industry of the United States 

and Canada 

United States Energy Association, Inc, 

University of Alabama 

University of Alberta 

University of Antofagasta, Chile 

University of Arizona 

University of Bologna 

University of Ca!lfornia 

University of Cincinnati 

University of Colorado 

University of Denver 

University of Detroit 

University of Florida 

University of Idaho 

University of Illinois 

University of Maryland 

University of Massachusetts 

University of Michigan 

University of Missouri 

University of Nevada, Las Vegas 

University of New Mexico 

University of North Texas 

University of Notre Dame 

University of Pittsburgh 

University of Rhode Island 

University of South carolina 

The University of Tennessee 

University of Texas at Austin 

University of Texas of the Permian Basin 

The University of the District of Columbia 

The University of Tokyo 

University of Virginia 

University of Washington 

University of Wisconsin 

Ur-Energy Inc. 

Uranium Energy Corp 

Uranium One 

Energy Metals Corporation 

Uranium Resources, Inc. 

Urenco Inc. 

Louisiana Energy Services 

National Enrichment Facility 

Utility Workers Union of America 

The Ux Cons;..~tting Company, LLC 

Vanderbilt University 

The Victoria College 

Virginia Polytechnic Institute 

Virginia Urar;ium, Inc 

Wallace Cornmunity College Dothan 

Washington .3tate University 

West Kentucky Community 

and Techn1cal College 

Westchester Community College 

Westerman Companies, Inc, 

Westinghouse Electric Company 

Fauske & Associates 1 Inc. 

PCI Energy Services, Inc. 

PaR NuclE,ar,. Inc. 

Scientific Ecology Group, Inc. 

Wharton County Junior College 

Winston & Strawn LLP 

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 

Kansas Gty Power & Light Company 

Kansas Electric Power 

Cooperative 

Kansas G3s & Electric Company 

Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
255 


26661.190

WorleyParsons Group, Inc. 

Polestar Applied Technology 

Xcel Energy 

Yankee Atomic Power Company 

Zachry Nuclear, Inc. 

Zachry Nuclear Engmeenng, Inc. 
256 

Senator BOXER. But let me just say this. Why I am so troubled, 

I sent the NRC a letter emphasizing ‘‘the importance of transparency’’ and urging the NRC to act promptly—those are my 

words—to implement the Task Force recommendations. That was 

a letter I sent to all of you. By the way, you haven’t done it, and 

it is a nightmare for me to think that this is going to take 10 years, 

just like the other Commission took. And that is a disaster, but we 

will talk more about that. 

But I have a document showing that 1 day after I sent this letter, your chief of staff—your chief of staff—wrote to you saying ‘‘Attached is a letter from Boxer on the Task Force Report. I don’t 

know if Inhofe plans on sending a counter-letter.’’ And then you replied, ‘‘It would be nice if someone did.’’ 

Why do you need a counter-letter to a straightforward letter that 

says, will you be transparent and will you act promptly? Why did 

you feel the need to want a counter-letter to my very open letter? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. To be honest, I actually don’t remember that exchange. But let me say that there was never, in my view, there was 

never any possibility or any question that we were going to release 

a Task Force report very quickly. As I mentioned earlier, it was 

really a conversation about whether to release it immediately or 

wait a couple of days to give the Commission a chance to read the 

report. 

Senator BOXER. OK, well, wait a minute. I am going to send this 

over to you, it is your e-mail. Would you send this over to Mr. 

Magwood? 

That is not right. If you come before us to get our votes, and I 

have to stand up to 100 environmental groups that frankly, I respect, and say, you know what, he convinced me. And then you 

have to get a counter-letter from my good friend, an adversary on 

certain issues, Senator Inhofe, when all I am asking for is transparency and quick action, it is extremely disturbing. So that is why 

I say, this isn’t a court of law. I think we proved, I believe—now, 

of course I bring to bear a certain prejudice about my own arguments and that of Senators Sanders, Lautenberg, and the others. 

I admit it. 

But I think we proved today that this can’t possibly be about 

what you four say, because your own staff rates this agency high 

in leadership and family friendliness. So it is not about that. It is 

not about grabbing power, because your General Counsel told you 

exactly what to do. And the IG, although there was lots in the report that was disturbing, it was mostly the charges, his findings 

never found that you did anything improper. 

And you yourself have said if it is a matter of my style, I am 

willing to change it. 

So let’s move on from here, and I am happy to call on Senator 

Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, do you think that these other Commissioners who 

are with you have a lower commitment to safety than you do? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think I—I have worked on the Commission for a 

long time, and I think all Commissioners come with different ideas 

of what safety is. It really gets to a question of, in effect, how safe 

is safe enough. And I think my voting record shows that I tend to 

257 

be more—I don’t know what the right word is here, perhaps conservative—when it comes to safety decisions in the sense that I am 

willing to perhaps require more of licensees than my colleagues 

are, or that varies by issue to issue. So it is hard to say that generically there is a kind of a way to categorize it. 

But in some cases I do tend to take positions that I think are 

more restrictive on licensees, is probably the best way I put it. 

Senator BARRASSO. Because I am looking at the letter that you 

sent 8 days ago to Bill Daley, White House Chief of Staff. It says, 

unfortunately, you say, all too often when faced with tough policy 

calls, a majority of this current Commission, these four people, has 

taken an approach that is not as protective of public health and 

safety as I believe is necessary. So that says to me that you truly 

don’t believe that they have the same commitment to public safety 

as you do, at least as I read your words right here. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, I think that really is a reflection of our voting records. We have disagreements on policy, and I don’t have a 

problem with those differences on policy. But I think if you look at 

our voting records, there are some differences in our take on the 

approach to safety and what is appropriate for safety. 

Senator BARRASSO. To the other four Commissioners, given everything that has happened, given your repeated attempts to solve 

the problem internally, I guess I have to ask, do you have the confidence that the Chairman’s behavior is going to change? And I 

have a couple of minutes left, is there anything else that any of the 

four of you who signed this letter would like to add? Why don’t we 

start with Mr. Magwood and work our way down. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I don’t think I have anything further to add. I am 

skeptical that change will occur. One can always hope, but skepticism is quite high. 

Senator BARRASSO. Ms. Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I don’t have anything additional to add. I would 

just add as a personal matter, it is not in my nature to completely 

give up on people. I just don’t approach relationships that way. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I am hoping he will. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. This is an extraordinarily difficult issue. And 

I know that the four of us have done what we think is right, that 

we have had grave concerns and felt an obligation, because of damage we saw being done at the agency. I take the Chairman at his 

word, what he said today, that if he is committed to changing his 

way of doing business and behavior, then I will listen to his proposed changes. But I will just tell you that if we had great confidence that things were going to change, we would not have sent 

the letter to the White House when we did. 

Senator BARRASSO. And when I read this article, when I read 

this letter that the Chairman does not believe, and he could insert 

any of your names, because he said all of you, the majority of this 

current Commission has taken an approach that is not as protective of public health and safety as I believe is necessary for public 

health and safety in the country, do you believe you take positions 

that are necessary and are protective of public health and safety 

in this country? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, I do. 

258 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Absolutely, yes. 

Senator BARRASSO. Ms. Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. I think it is just important to reiterate, and 

make sure we have it in the record, that after all of the attacks 

about the ‘‘hostile work environment’’ that in the major surveys 

that are done of various Government agencies, in terms of being 

the best places to work, time after time, on issue after issue, the 

NRC comes out to be No. 1 and No. 2 out of 30 or 31 agencies. That 

is pretty good. And I would congratulate the leadership of the NRC, 

Mr. Jaczko and others, for making that happen. 

There is an issue that has concerned me for a while, and that 

is, when members of the Senate have to vote, we go down to the 

table, we say yes, we say no. In 2 seconds, the whole world knows 

how we vote. But you guys have a much more obscure and complicated process. And it concerns me very much. 

So I am going to ask you a very, very simple question. To increase accountability, so the American people know how you are 

addressing and voting on very, very important issues, will each of 

you commit to conduct votes in public where people can see for 

themselves how you fulfill your responsibility to protect public 

health and safety? Start off with Mr. Magwood then move on down 

the line. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I have to be honest, Senator, I am not sure I understand the question. We do vote in public to affirm our decisions. 

Which, if you can be—— 

Senator SANDERS. You do not—I mean, when we vote, we go 

down, and we say yes or no. There is an issue. Sometimes you vote 

and people don’t know about it for weeks later. Sometimes your 

votes, as I understand it, are cloaked in reports that you make. 

That is an unusual way to do democracy. 

So what I am simply asking is, will you commit to us to conduct 

votes in public where people can see for themselves how you vote? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Let me just commit to follow up with you later, 

Senator. I would be happy to visit with you, because I am still not 

sure I understand exactly what the—— 

Senator SANDERS. I just don’t think it is an awfully complicated 

question. People would think we would pretty silly if we go down 

and vote this afternoon but nobody knows how we vote, and maybe 

2 weeks later, Senator Sessions or Bernie Sanders issues a report 

describing how we voted. People want to know, did you vote yes, 

did you vote no. That is my question. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Senator, I know Chairman Jaczko has a practice 

of releasing his votes, I think within 2 days or something, of casting his votes. If that is the sort of thing you are talking about, that 

is certainly something I would be willing to consider. 

Senator SANDERS. Willing to consider. 

259 

Commissioner Svinicki. 

Ms. SVINICKI. My understanding is the NRC’s notation voting 

process is similar to that used at many boards and commissions. 

When a decision is arrived at, our votes are posted to the NRC Web 

site and made public. A fundamentally different voting system of 

just yes or no would be a real departure from the way we vote now, 

which is to vote on complicated, 100-page reports. We often vote 

with a lot of commentary, and then we arrive at a majority decision. 

Senator SANDERS. I believe that—well, I will tell you that sometimes we vote on 1,000-page reports, but we still have to, we do it, 

and 3 seconds later we get telephone calls telling us, from angry 

constituents, as to why we voted the way we voted. And I am asking you—you are right, I am asking you, are you going to change, 

will you support changing that way? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I support, the process that we use now I think allows us to consider the complexity of these issues. It has been used 

since the beginning of the agency. 

Senator SANDERS. I understand. But in all due respect, Commissioner, some of the issues that we have to deal with are fairly complex as well. 

Chairman Jaczko. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, I believe actually we should return to some of 

the practices that were undertaken by the Commission in the past. 

In the past, the Commission conducted its actual deliberations on 

voting in public meetings, and actually conducted the actual process of voting in public meetings. So the notation voting process was 

introduced, I believe, in the 1980s, by a particular Chairman. And 

it has been refined over the years. But I think a return back to an 

actual voting session, where we get in a room, we say yes or no, 

we deliberate, discuss, if we need to edit or modify positions, we 

do it all in public, simultaneously rather than the process we use 

currently. 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. There is great value in the notation vote, voting process we have now. There are very intense deliberations in 

my office with my staff and all that. And I don’t want to lose that. 

I am all for public information, public votes and so on, as long as 

I don’t lose that. 

I am not sure deliberating in public is as easy as the Chairman 

presents it, but I am willing to listen. But the vote is public. The 

votes now are public. They are delayed sometimes. But they are 

public, except in adjudicatory matters. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Sanders, I am looking at my vote here 

that I cast July 27th on the Fukushima Task Force report. It is a 

5-page, single-spaced vote. It was made public a couple of weeks 

after it was cast. 

So I would say that the notation voting process we currently undergo is fulsome, it provides a very full explanation of our positions. It is transparent. 

260 

Senator SANDERS. I am not quite clear. What does that mean, a 

5-page vote? You voted yes or no, then you gave an explanation as 

to why you voted. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Sir, I worked as the Counsel for the House 

Armed Services Committee. I have seen many votes in the Senate 

and the House. I understand that most of those are yes or no votes. 

We have a different process, as the Chairman alluded to here, that 

deals with notation votes that explain our positions. These are complicated matters. These are public record. 

Senator SANDERS. I believe, I do, I appreciate that they are complicated matters. Virtually everything that the United States does 

is enormously complicated. But to the end of the day, to the degree 

that we can bring forward transparency, Mr. Apostolakis, everybody agrees here. There should be fulsome debate. Fulsome debate. 

And take as much time as you can to argue with each other, work 

out compromises, to do what you do. 

But I think to the degree that that can be done under public 

scrutiny and that your votes are made public on the day that you 

make them, I can’t see why that is not a positive thing. 

Madam Chair, thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Well, yes. Do any of my colleagues on the other 

side wish to make a closing comment before I close? 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say thank you, Madam Chairman. You have been here, you have let us have our questions, and 

we have had a healthy debate. We disagree a lot on the motivations and how this thing happened. I would just express my appreciation for those members who felt it necessary to raise with the 

White House the problems that you saw. I believe you did that 

with integrity, with interest for the Government, and I believe 

there is a factual basis that has been well-established to justify 

your concerns. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. 

Senator Barrasso, do you want to make a comment? 

Senator BARRASSO. Yes, Madam Chairman, I would. We have 

four members of the Commission who are here, two Republican, 

two Democrat. All unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate. 

Three appointed by President Obama. It is historic to sign a letter 

like this. And it is courageous. And I want to thank you for your 

commitment to public safety and to public service, and I am grateful that you are all members of this Commission. Thank you for 

being here with us today. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

I want to thank all of the Commissioners for being here. I want 

to say to the Chairman, you are one strong, good man. You are a 

good man. And as I look at the history of nuclear power in this 

country, the people who are calling for safety get pounded. And I 

get back to that, because there is just no proof to what my colleagues are saying about your leadership, when just at the time 

that they are writing letters complaining and all this and that, you 

are being rated by your own staff and your own employees as 1 out 

of 30 on effective leadership in terms of the way you run the place. 

261 

I am disturbed at what has gone on. And I had hints of this the 

last time we met. And I urged you at that time, please, all of you, 

sit down and do what is right for the country. A lot of us took our 

chances when we voted for you, OK? On both sides of the aisle. 

Both sides of the aisle. Because this agency is not about partisanship, it is about safety of the highest degree. Because look at what 

happened at Fukushima. God forbid something like that ever happen. It stood that country on its head, and whether it ever recovers 

from it, history will note. But it will never be the same. 

So we are not dealing with some harmless waste material here. 

You know that. You are all smart on this. 

So I am going to ask you each one question. And before, you 

must answer yes or no. It is not a hard question. I am going to 

send you a letter with Senator Sanders and others, hopefully on 

both sides, I don’t know, I will have to circulate it. It is going to 

ask each of you individually, of the 12 recommendations made by 

the staff, the Task Force, which do you feel can be accomplished 

within a time table of 90 days, 6 months, a year. We will give you 

some chance to explain. And I am going to ask you today if you 

would answer that letter to the best of your ability. If you don’t 

know, that is unfortunate. You should know at this point. 

But my fear is, we are going to wait 10 years to get this done. 

And my people at home, they may shut down the nuclear plants 

with an initiative. They need to know that you, we are doing our 

job. So that letter, I think, is very important. 

Now, you have said yes to me on other occasions and haven’t exactly lived up. So before you answer it, if you feel you can’t answer 

that letter, say no. 

So will you please respond to me? And I will share it with all 

members of the Committee on both sides of the aisle, on which of 

the 12 recommendations you think could be done within 90 days, 

6 months and a timeframe, your best analytical answer, for each 

of those. 

I will start with you, Mr. Magwood. Will you answer that letter? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. Yes, Chairman, I will. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. By done, you mean implemented at the plants? 

Senator BOXER. No, a decision to send, your decision to send out 

the order to the plants. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, I will answer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I couldn’t be happier. I have a great suggestion. Why don’t you guys go out and celebrate the holidays together? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. I will buy. I will buy. Honestly. And I just feel 

you are all so smart, let’s get on the same team, and let’s do what 

is right for the country. 

Thank you very much. We stand adjourned. 

262 

[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 

263 


26661.191

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

BY THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

TO THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

THE NRC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE 

"NRC CHAIRMAN'S UNILATERAL DECISION TO TERMINATE NRC'S REVIEW OF 

DOE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY LICENSE APPLICATION" 

JUNE 14, 2011 
264 


26661.192

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today. 

I am accompanied today by Mr. Joseph McMillan, Assistant Inspector General for 

Investigations, and Ms. Rossana Raspa, Senior Level Assistant for Investigative Operations. 

As you know, the mission of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is to assist NRC by ensuring integrity, efficiency, and accountability in the 

agency's programs that regulate the civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear 

material in a manner that adequately protects public health and safety and the environment, 

while promoting the Nation's common defense and security. Specifically, OIG supports NRC by 

carrying out its mandate to (1) independently and objectively conduct and supervise audits and 

investigations related to NRC programs and operations; (2) prevent and detect fraud. waste, 

and abuse; and (3) promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in NRC programs and 

operations. OIG also keeps the NRC Chairman and members of Congress fully and currently 

informed about problems, recommends corrective actions, and monitors NRC's progress in 

implementing those actions. My fiscal year 2012 budget request is $10.860 million and 58 fulltime employees, which is consistent with my FY 2011 appropriation. 

Background 

To perform these activities, OIG employs auditors, analysts, criminal investigators, technical 

experts, legal counsel, and support personnel. OIG also uses private sector contractors to audit 

the NRC's financial statements as mandated by the Chief Financial Officers Act and for other 

audit, investigative, and information technology technical support services. 

2 
265 


26661.193

To fulfill our audit mission, OIG conducts performance, financial, and contract audits. 

Performance audits focus on NRC administrative and program operations and evaluate the 

effectiveness and efficiency with which managerial responsibilities are conducted and whether 

the programs achieve intended results. Financial audits attest to the reasonableness of NRC's 

financial statements. Contract audits evaluate the cost of goods and services that NRC 

procured from commercial enterprises. In addition, the audit staff prepare evaluation reports 

that present OIG perspectives or information on specific topics. 

OIG's investigative program carries out its mission by performing investigations relating to the 

integrity of NRC programs and operations. Most OIG investigations focus on allegations of 

fraud, waste, and abuse and violations of law or misconduct by NRC employees and 

contractors. Additionally, OIG investigates allegations of irregularities or abuses in NRC 

programs and operations with special emphasis on those activities that could adversely impact 

public health and safety. Periodically, the investigative staff conducts event inquiries, which 

yield investigative reports documenting the examination of events or agency regulatory actions 

that do not specifically involve individual misconduct. Instead, these reports identify staff 

actions that contributed to the occurrence of an event. 

Allegation 

OIG recently issued a report conveying the results of an investigation into an allegation that the 

NRC Chairman: 

(1) unilaterally and improperly closed out NRC's review of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) 

Yucca Mountain repository application while the Government was operating under a continuing 

resolution (CR) during FY 2011, and (2) was purposely preventing the Commission from 

3 
266 


26661.194

completing its ruling on the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's decision to deny DOE's motion to 

withdraw its Yucca Mountain repository license application from NRC. 

The investigation also looked into concerns that were raised about the Chairman's management 

style toward staff and Commissioners and whether his control of information prevents the other 

Commissioners from effectively fulfilling their statutory responsibility to address policy matters. 

Background and Chronology 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the Energy Policy Act of '1992 specify 

that spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will be disposed of underground, in a 

deep geologic repository. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act names Yucca Mountain as the single 

candidate site for this potential repository. The act specifically states that NRC will "consider an 

application for a construction authorization for a repository" and "shall issue a final decision 

approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction authorization not later than 3 years 

after" the application is submitted. 

DOE, which is charged with constructing and operating the repository, submitted its license 

application on June 3, 2008, and NRC formally accepted it for review in September 2008. This 

started the 3-year schedule set by Congress for NRC to reach a decision on whether to approve 

construction. NRC planned, at the end of its technical review, to issue a safety evaluation report 

(SER) containing its findings on the repository design. The SER would determine whether the 

proposed facility would meet NRC regulations to protect public health and safety. NRC staff 

decided to issue the SER in five volumes, and in March 2010 estimated that all volumes could 

be completed by March 2011. 

4 
267 


26661.195

In February 2010, the Energy Secretary noted during a Senate hearing that the Administration 

would seek to immediately suspend licensing for the Yucca Mountain repository because it was 

not a workable option. In March 2010, DOE submitted to the NRC Atomic Safety Licensing 

Board a motion to withdraw its Yucca Mountain License Application. On June 29, 2010, the 

Atomic Safety Licensing Board issued a decision that denied DOE's motion to withdraw, 

concluding that DOE lacked the authority to withdraw the application. The Commission decided 

to review the board's decision and, in accordance with NRC's process, on August 10, 2010, the 

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication submitted adjudicatory SECY paper SECY -10-

0102 on the Yucca Mountain matter to the Commission for its consideration. 

On September 30, 2010, Congress issued the first in a series of CRs directing Federal agencies 

generally to spend money at FY 2010 levels, as necessary, to continue projects and activities 

that were conducted during FY 2010. 

On October 4, 2010, the NRC Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Executive Director for 

Operations (EDO) issued guidance to staff related to budget execution under the CR period. 

The memorandum stated that offices were to commit, obligate, and expend funds for ongoing 

activities at FY 2010 levels, with the exception of the High-Level Waste Program. With regard 

to the High-Level Waste Program, the memorandum directed staff to continue its activities on 

the Yucca Mountain license application during the CR period in accordance with the 

Commission's decisions on the FY 2011 budget. The Commission's decisions on the FY 2011 

budget are reflected in the agency's Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2011, which 

allotted $10 million for the Yucca Mountain repository to "support work related to the orderly 

closure of the agency's Yucca Mountain licensing support activities." 

5 
268 


26661.196

Shortly after the issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum. Chairman Jaczko directed 

staff working on the Yucca Mountain license application review to stop working on the SER and 

proceed to orderly closure of the technical review. 

Investigation Results 

CR Budget Guidance Memorandum 

OIG examined the circumstances surrounding the development of the EDO's and CFO's 

October 4, 2010, CR budget memorandum and learned that the language directin(j staff to 

follow FY 2011 budget guidance for High-Level Waste Program activities was based on 

instruction provided by the Chairman's office. The final language differed from earlier drafts of 

the memorandum prepared by the EDO's and CFO's offices. Earlier drafts of the memorandum 

either contained no mention of the Yucca Mountain license application review or directed that 

the agency would continue its review with any available FY 2010 carryover funds until 

exhausted. 

OIG found that Chairman Jaczko used the FY 2011 CR budget guidance memorandum to 

initiate NRC's FY 2011 plans to close out its Yucca Mountain license application review even 

though the FY 2011 budget had not yet been passed. The Chairman's decision to direct the 

staff to follow the FY 2011 budget guidance was supported by the NRC General Counsel and 

consistent with the discretion within the Chairman's budget execution authority under the 

Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980 (Reorganization Plan). The Reorganization Plan states that 

the Chairman determines the use and expenditure of funds of the Commission in accordance 

with the distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes approved 

by the Commission. Chairman Jaczko's decision was also consistent with OMS Circular A-11 

guidance to spend prudently during a CR period in a manner that does not impinge on final 

funding prerogatives of Congress. coupled with the Administration's decision to terminate the 

6 
269 


26661.197

Yucca Mountain repository project. The Chairman's decision was also consistent with his 

interpretation of the Commission's FY 2011 budget policy decisions, which articulated close-out 

activities for the High-Level Waste Program. 

OIG also found that although the Chairman had the authority to direct staff to follow the FY 2011 

budget guidance, he was not forthcoming with the other Commissioners about his intent to stop 

work on the SER as part of implementing close-out activities. This included stopping work on 

SER Volume 3 ("Review of Repository Safety After Permanent Closure"), which NRC staff 

believed to be near completion by the end of FY 2010. OIG learned that the Chairman 

anticipated that proceeding to close-out in this manner could be controversial and viewed as a 

policy decision for full Commission consideration. Therefore, prior to directing issuance of the 

CR budget guidance rnernorandum, he strategically provided three of the four other 

Commissioners with varying amounts of information about his intention to proceed to closure 

and not complete SER Volume 3. He did not provide Commissioner Svinicki with any 

information about his intentions. Although two of the three Commissioners he spoke with did 

not fully understand the implications of the CR budget guidance memorandum, the Chairman 

told the EDO prior to his signing the memorandum that all the Commissioners were informed 

and supported issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum, and the Chairman's Chief of 

Staff told the CFO that he had clearance from the Commission offices to issue the 

memorandum. In fact, subsequent to the issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum, a 

majority of Commissioners disagreed with the outcome of the memorandum, which was the 

Chairman's direction to stop work on SER Volume 3. 

Additionally, a majority of the Commissioners did not think the conditions to proceed to closure 

had been met. These conditions were articulated in the FY 2011 Congressional Budget 

Justification as "upon the withdrawal or suspension of the licensing review," the NRC would 

7 
270 


26661.198

begin an orderly closure of the technical review and adjudicatory activities and would document 

the work and insights gained from the review. 

OIG also learned that on October 6, 2010, Commissioner Ostendorff wrote a Commission action 

memorandum, or COM, to the other Commissioners seeking the Commission's involvement in 

the Chairman's direction to staff to stop working on the SER Commissioner Ostendorff 

proposed that the Commission direct staff to continue to work on the remaining SER volumes at 

the rate for operations appropriate given the proposed FY 2011 budget as augmented by 

reprogrammed funds remaining from FY 2010 appropriations. In accordance with Commission 

procedures, Commissioner Ostendorff needed a majority of the Commission to support his 

proposal in order for it to become guidance for the staff. However, after the Commissioner 

issued his memorandum, Chairman Jaczko communicated to Commissioners Magwood and 

Apostolakis that he expected their continued support. He told both Commissioners that he 

would not have directed issuance of the CR budget guidance memorandum had they not 

committed to support him. Despite their view that they had not been fully informed about the 

Chairman's intent behind the CR budget guidance memorandum, Commissioners Magwood 

and Apostolakis elected not to participate in voting on Commissioner Ostendorff's COM. 

Therefore, without a majority, the Commission was unable to move the matter from budget 

space, within the Chairman's purview, to policy space, within the Commission's purview. 

SER Issue 

As part of this investigation, OIG reviewed circumstances related to development and issuance 

of the SER schedule and volumes. OIG learned that between April and May 2010, Office of 

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards staff informed the Chairman that they were ahead of 

schedule with their work on the SER volumes, and they asked whether they should attempt to 

issue the volumes at earlier dates than those that had been established in March 2010. The 

8 
271 


26661.199

Chairman responded in a June 2010 memorandum that they should not expedite issuance of 

the volumes, but should instead maintain the timeline that had been provided to the 

Commission in March 2010. According to that timeline, Volume 1 would be issued in August 

2010, and Volume 3 in November 2010. Volume 1 of the SER was issued as scheduled; 

however, in October 2010, at the start of the new fiscal year, Chairman Jaczko directed staff to 

stop working on the remaining SER volumes. Subsequently, the Chairman gave direction to the 

staff to prepare a document for public release that captures the knowledge gained through the 

NRC's technical review of DOE's license application but would not contain any of the staff's 

findings or conclusions. 

OIG found that the Chairman's decision to direct staff to stop working on the SER contributes to 

NRC's inability to meet its statutory obligation under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to consider 

DOE's Yucca Mountain repository license application and issue a final decision approving or 

disapproving issuance of a construction authorization. Other factors preventing the agency from 

meeting its statutory obligation are the Administration's decision to terminate the Yucca 

Mountain repository project and decreasing appropriations to NRC for the High-Level Waste 

Program. 

Adjudicatory Voting Process 

Because the outcome of the Commission's vote SECY -10-0102 remains an open adjudicatory 

matter before the Commission, OIG could not assess the substantive reasons that are 

preventing this matter from finalization. However, OIG reviewed the Commission's adjudicatory 

SECY paper voting process and assessed the level to which the Commission adhered to its 

process with regard to SECY-10-0102 and with adjudicatory SECY papers in general. 

9 
272 


26661.200

OIG learned that the Commission has written internal procedures intended to facilitate 

Commission decisionmaking based on majority rule. For example, Commissioners are 

expected to vote on adjudicatory SECY papers within 10 business days of receiving the paper. 

Once a majority of the Commission has voted, those who have not voted are expected to submit 

a request for an extension, which must, in turn, be approved by a majority of the Commission. 

The written procedures do not provide details on the process that occurs between the 

completion of an adjudicatory SECY paper vote and the conduct of an affirmation vote. 

However, OIG learned that, in practice, an affirmation vote is not held until all of the 

Commissioners are satisfied with the affirmation notice and order describing the outcome of the 

adjudicatory vote. 

OIG learned that the Office of the Secretary did not enforce adherence to the Commission's 

adjudicatory voting process with regard to SECY-10-0102 and generally does not enforce the 

voting process to facilitate completion of adjudicatory matters. With regard to SECY-10-0102, 

although all participating Commissioners had voted by September 15, 2010, the Chairman did 

not vote until October 29, 2010. He never requested an extension to vote, therefore, the other 

Commissioners were not polled to see if they agreed with the delay. OIG also learned that 

although the Commission was provided a draft affirmation order detailing the status of the 

Commission's votes 2 days after the Chairman voted, as of the date of OIG's repo1i, the 

Commission had not held an affirmation vote on the matter, and the draft order continued to sit 

in deliberation before the Commission for affirmation. 

OIG found that the lack of enforcement of and specificity in the Commission's written 

procedures, coupled with the Commission's practice not to move to affirmation until all 

Commissioners agree to the affirmation notice and order, allows matters to sit in abeyance 

10 
273 


26661.201

without final Commission action. 

Information Flow/Work Environment 

During the course of the investigation, a number of interviewees conveyed their perception that 

Chairman Jaczko controls and restricts the information available to his fellow Commissioners 

and noted concerns about his interpersonal style. Senior officials, managers, and staff provided 

examples that they believed illustrated the Chairman's failure to share with his fellow 

Commissioners information needed to support their fully informed decisionmaking. Examples 

included the CR budget guidance memorandum described earlier and the FY 2012 budget 

process, wherein the Chairman presented his FY 2012 budget proposal to the Commission 

without supporting documentation from the staff to allow Commissioners to assess how the 

Chairman's proposal aligns with the staffs budget requests. Previous Chairmen have provided 

this supporting documentation to the Commission along with their budget proposals to facilitate 

Commission decisionmaking related to the budget. Chairman Jaczko said his intent in FY 2012 

was to help the staff shape a budget that would be more successful in getting through the 

Commission. Although he believes this is what occurred with the FY 2012 budget, he has since 

learned from the General Counsel that after his budget was developed and presented to the 

Commission, the Commissioners were entitled to some ofthe draft documents. 

Other examples cited to illustrate the Chairman's control of information included the 

Commission agenda planning process and the Chairman's involvement in determining what 

constitutes a policy versus an administrative matter. In addition, a number of interviewees 

described instances of behavior by the Chairman that they viewed as unprofessional or 

manipulative. 

11 
274 


26661.202

The Chairman defended his management style with regard to information flow as aligning with 

the division of Commission and Chairman responsibilities established by the Reorganization 

Plan and as necessary for efficiency and effectiveness. He acknowledged using forceful 

management techniques to accomplish his objectives but maintained that these techniques 

were necessary to facilitate the work of the Commission. 

OIG found that the Chairman controls information provided to the other Commissioners based 

on his interpretation of his statutory authority as Chairman versus the authority given to the 

Commission. Because he acts as the gatekeeper to determine what is a policy matter versus 

an administrative matter, and manages and controls information available to the other 

Commissioners, they are uncertain as to whether they are adequately informed of policy matters 

that should be brought to their attention. Ultimately, OIG notes, that all Commissioners have the 

ability to address any issue they perceive as a policy matter before the Commission by writing a 

Commission action memorandum to the full Commission and gaining a majority of the 

Commission's support. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. this concludes my report to you on my 

office's investigation. I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time. 

12 
275 


26661.205
276 


26661.206

!?.lEST PLACES TO WORK 01 

The 2010 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government ran kings offer 

the most comprehensive assessment of how federal employees perceive 

their jobs and agencies, providing unvarnished insights into issues ranging from leadership and pay to teamwork and work-life balance. 

The rankings, representing the first in-depth look at the views of federal employees during the Obama administration, reveal good newsan increase in the overall satisfaction with the government workplace. 

But this positive response is leavened by a wide diYergence of opinions 

about the capability of leadership and the conditions at individual agencies and departments. 

The Best Places g(wernm<:nt-wide employee satisfaction score for 2010 

reached an all-time high of 65 out of 100, representing a 2.7 percent increase from 2009 and a 7.4 percent jump from 2003 when our ranking·s 

were first published. 

A high level of satisfaction and employee commitment translates into 

better organizational performance and government effectiveness. When 

these conditions exist, employees often have a sense of personal accomplishment, believe their talents are well used, that they can develop professionally and are encouraged to innovate. 

For the third consecutive time, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

ranked first and the Government Accountability Office placed a close 

second in the Best Places list of 32 large agencies. Perhaps as noteworthy, both agencies improved their scores even though they were already 

top-ranked. If either had simply maintained their 2009 index score, they 

would have dropped down the list. suggesting that to stand still is to fall 

back when it comes to employee satisfaction and commitment. 

At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest-rated large agency in 2010 

is the National Archives and Records Administration, which was second 

from the bottom in 2009 and dropped a notch this year even though it 

showed a slight improvement. Tied for last place is the Department of 
277 


26661.207

Housing and Urban Development, which lost ground as other agencies 

improved. 

This year, the most improved large federal agencies were the Department of Transportation, which raised its standing among employees by 

15.8 percent, and the Department of the Treasury, which increased its 

score by 8.2 percent. On the flip side, the Securities and Exchange Commission dropped by 6.4 percent-the second snrvey in a row that employees downgraded the financial regulator. 

Although some federal agencies are lagging behind, the improvement 

by 68 percent of federal organizations demonstrates that a determined 

focus on good management can have a relatively quick and significant 

impact in the workplace. 

While many factors are involved in shaping how employees view their 

workplace, the 2010 survey for the fifth time in a row showed the primary driver in the federal space is effective leadership, and in particular, senior leadership. 1\vo other key factors influencing· satisfaction revealed by the analysis were a belief by employees that their skills were 

well-suited to their agency's mission, and a satisfaction with pay, 

Employees in the private sector, meanwhile, continued to be more satisfied with their jobs, organizations and supervisors than their counterparts in the federal government. But the attitudes of !ederal employees 

regarding these three work-related areas are improving, perhaps a reflection of better government manag·emcnt and the economic realities 

of today's difficult job market. 

The Best Places rankings and detailed analysis are based on data from 

the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey that was conducted by the Office of Personnel Management during February and March of 2010. The 

mnkings provide a benchmark to measure agency progress, to identify 

signs of trouble, and to spur our government to improve the way it manages its most important asset-its people. 
278 


26661.208

The Best Places to Work lN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2010 
279 


26661.209
280 


26661.210

111e Best Places to Work IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2010 
281 


26661.211
282 


26661.212

The Best Places to \X!ork JN THE FFDrRAl GOVE-RNMENT 2010 
283 


26661.213
284 


26661.214
285 


26661.215

The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government'' rankings-the most 

comprehensive and authoritative rating of employee satisfaction and 

commitment in the federal government-are produced by the Partnership for Public Service and American University's Institute for the Study 

of Public Policy Implementation (ISPPI). 

The Partnership for Public Service is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization working to revitalize our federal government by inspiring a new 

generation to serve and by transforming the way government works. 

The Partnership's workshops, webinars and resources can help you turn 

your Best Places data into workforce solutions that drive real results. To 

learn more, visit ourpublicservice.org. 

ISPPI at American University conducts research and facilitates dialog·ue 

among stakeholders in the public policy implementation process: members of Congress, political appointees, career executives, union leaders, 

academics and consultants. ISPPI along with American University's 

Key Executive Leadership Programs focuses on increasing leadership 

capacity among public sector leaders. ISPPI is part of the American University's School of Public Affairs which offers education on the graduate, undergraduate and executive levels in public administration, public 

policy, political science, organization development and justice. To learn 

more, visit american.edu/spa/isppi. 

METHODOLOGY 

The Best Places ran kings arc based on the Ol!ice of Personnel Management's 2010 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, which included responses from more than 263,000 civil servants. Working with the global 

management consulting firm Hay Group, the Partnership for Public Service and the Institute for the Study of Public Policy Implementation created a statistical model to transform these raw survey data into an overall 

measure of workplace satisfaction and commitment, and 10 workplace 

environment indices. This information was then used to calculate the 

results for each org-anization. Stnall agencies are those independent 

agencies that have at least 100 but less than 2,000 full-time, permanent 

employees, Large agencies are those independent agencies or Cabinet 

departments with 2,000 or more full-time, permanent employees. Finally, statistical analysis was performed to determine the relationship between the workplace dimensions and the overall Best Places index score. 

The Government Accountability Office, the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, the Intelligence Community, the Smithsonian Institution, 

the Congressional Budget Offtce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps 

and the Army Audit Agency did not participate in the 20!0 OPM survey. 

In order to participate in Best Places, these organizations conducted a 

comparable survey that included the three index questions. The survey 

needed to be administered during the same time frame, and have a 50 

percent response rate. These organizations are not ranked on any of the 

workplace dimension categories, Only GAO participates in the demographic rankings. 

The Best Places to Work IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2010 
286 


26661.216
287 


26661.217
288 


26661.218

BEST PlACES TO WORK 

The 2011 Best Places to Work in tile Federal Government"' rankings offer 

the most comprehensive assessment of how federal employees perceive 

their jobs and agencies, providing insights into issues ranging from leadership and pay to teamwork and work/life balance. The rankings provide a roadmap for building a more engaged workforce and, ultimately, 

more effective organizations. 

The 2011 results show a decline in government-wide employee satisfaction and commitment from 65 to 64 out of 100, compared to 2010. The 

1.5 percent drop is not as steep as one might have expected given the difficult economic and political climate that has led to a federal pay freeze, 

the national discussion around reduced worker benefits, threats of government shutdowns and the certainty of sig11ificant agency budget cuts. 

In fact, the government-wide score of 64 is still 5.7 percent higher than 

the score in 2003, when our rankings were first published. 

The new rankings show improvement in worker satisfaction scores by 

only 31 percent of federal organizations, compared with 68 percent last 

year, demonstrating that 2011 was a challenging year for most agencies. 

At the same time, the rise in employee satisfaction at some agencies suggests that a determined focus on good leadership can have a positive 

workplace impact even in tough times. 

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ranked number one 

on this year's Best Places list of 33 large agencies, moving up two slots 

from 2010. The FDIC unseated the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

which ranked second this year after holding the top spot three times in 

a row. Third place went to the Government Accountability Office, which 

ranked second in 2010. 

At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest-rated large agency for the 

second consecutive year was the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The Department of Housing and Urban Development 

ranked second from the bottom after being tied for last in 2010, while 

the Department of Homeland Security placed third from the bottom. All 

three saw their employee satisfaction scores drop. 
289 


26661.219

In addition to having the highest satisfaction and commitment score, the 

FDIC was also the most improved large federal agency, registering an increase of 8.5 percent compared to 2010. It was followed by the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), which jumped from 14th to 9th place in 

the ran kings and raised its standing among employees by 5.3 percent. In 

contrast, NARA recorded a 7.1 percent decrease in employee satisfaction, 

the biggest drop among large agencies, and was followed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with a 5.9 percent decline. This is 

the third consecutive that employees gave the SEC lower marks, sinking 

the financial regulator from 3rd place in 2007 to 27th place today. 

While many factors are involved in shaping how employees view their 

workplace, the 20ll survey for the sixth time in a row showed the primary element that drives worker satisfaction in the federal space is effective leadership, and in particular, senior leadership. Two other key 

factors influencing satisfaction, revealed by our analysis, were a belief 

hy employees that their skills were well-suited to their agency's mission, 

and a satisfaction with pay. In 2011, leadership continued to receive low 

scores from employees, with a government-wide score of 54.9 out of100. 

Satisfaction with pay declined 6.1 percent to 59.1, while workers gave 

high marks (78.6) for the link between skills and mission. 

Meanwhile according to Hay Group, employees in the private sector continued to he more satisfied with their jobs, organizations and supervisors 

than their counterparts in the federal government. While worker satisfaction declined in 2011 for both federal employees and workers in large 

private companies, the drop-off was slightly less for the private sector. 

The Best Places rankings are based on data from the Federal Employee 

Viewpoint Survey conducted by OPM from April4 through May 31,2011. 

More than 266,000 employees responded to the survey. The rankings 

also incorporate survey data from eight additional agencies and the Intelligence Community. Most importantly, they serve as a benchmark to 

measure agency progress, to identifY signs of trouble and to spur our 

government leaders to improve the way they manage their most important asset-their employees. 
290 


26661.220

The Best Places to Work IN TH£ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2011 
291 


26661.221
292 


26661.222

The Best Places to Work !N THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2011 
293 


26661.223
294 


26661.224

1he Best Places to Work IN THE I=EOERLl.L GOVERNMENT 20!1 
295 


26661.225
296 


26661.226
297 


26661.227

ABOUT BEST PLACES TO WORK 

The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government" rankings-the most 

comprehensive and authoritative rating of employee satisfaction and 

commitment in the federal government-are produced by the Partnership for Public Service and made possible with the generous support of 

Deloitte and Hay Group. 

The Partnership for Public Service is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization working to revitalize our federal government by inspiring a new 

generation to serve and by transforming the way government works. 

The Partnership's workshops, webinars and resources can help you turn 

your Best Places data into workforce solutions that drive real results. To 

learn more, visit bestplacestoworkorg. 

Deloittc Consulting LLP is one of the world's largest management consulting providers. More than 6,600 professionals are dedicated to serving federal clients with wide-ranging missions. Deloitte brings a deep 

understanding of government requirements, processes, and systems-as 

well as insights into the workforce and technology issues that affect 

day-to-day operations. By drawing on industry-leading practices across 

government and business, Deloitte applies a mix of private-sector perspective and public-sector experience to help federal agencies in their 

efforts to address today's biggest challenges while building a stronger 

foundation for tomorrow. To learn more, visit deloitte.com/federal. 

Hay Group is a global human resources consulting finn specializing in 

employee and customer survey research, leadership development, compensation, change management, and benefits and compensation. Hay 

Group consults with more than 7,000 clients throughout the world, ineluding more than SO percent of the firms in the Fortune 1000. In the 

public sector, Hay Group clients include virtually all branches and departments of the federal government, and hundreds of state and local 

government agencies. To learn more, visit haygroup.com/us. 

METHODOLOGY 

The vast majority of the data used to develop the Best Places to Work in 

the Federal Government ranldngs was collected by the Office of Personnel 

Management's (OPM) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). The 

FEVS was conducted April4 through May 31, 2011, and administered online to 540,727 full-time, permanent executive branch employees. The 

survey was completed by 266,376 federal workers, for a response rate of 

49.3 percent. Participating agencies comprise 97 percent of the executive branch workforce. The rankings also include responses from nearly 

10,000 additional employees at eight agencies who were surveyed at the 

same time and had a response rate of more than SO percent. In addition, 

the rankings incorporate responses from employees of the Intelligence 

Community, which conducted its own similar surveys, but did not report 

the number of respondents due to classification restrictions. 

Large agencies listed in the rankings are those organizations with more 

than 2,000 full-time permanent employees. Small agencies are those 

with at least 100, but fewer than 2,000 full-time, permanent employees. 

The Best Places to Work IN THF. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2011 
298 

Æ 


26661.228