COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

RANDY PRESSLEY, S/K/A 

 RANDY NICHOLAS PRESSLEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3019-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JANUARY 13, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 

 Emil P. Moschella for appellant. 

 John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Randy Nicholas Pressley (appellant) appeals his sentence for 

attempted robbery and one count of use of a firearm in the 

commission of a felony. He contends that the trial court erred 

in believing that it lacked the discretion to sentence him as a 

juvenile. We find no error in the court's decision and affirm. 

 We limit our discussion of the facts and arguments to those 

which are strictly relevant to our decision. When appellant was 

seventeen years old, he used an air rifle to attempt to rob two 

men. The Commonwealth filed petitions in the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court charging appellant with one 

count each of attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the 

commission of a felony. After waiving a transfer hearing, 

appellant was transferred to circuit court where he was indicted 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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by a grand jury for the same crimes. Appellant subsequently 

pleaded guilty to both counts. 

 A Presentence Investigation Report prepared on October 8, 

1996, describes appellant as eighteen years old and the upcoming 

sentencing as "his first adult felony sentencing event." Prior 

to the sentencing hearing, appellant filed a memorandum arguing 

that he may and should be sentenced as a juvenile because he had 

not committed a "violent juvenile felony" which would require he 

be sentenced as an adult. 

 Appellant was sentenced on November 8, 1996, one month and 

three days after his eighteenth birthday. At the sentencing 

hearing, the Commonwealth argued that the minimum mandatory 

three-year sentence applied whether appellant was treated as a 

juvenile or an adult, but that the court should impose a longer 

sentence. The court sentenced appellant to five years 

incarceration for attempted robbery, with four years and six 

months suspended, and three years incarceration for use of a 

firearm during a felony. 

 Under the relevant provisions of Title 16.1, it is clear 

that the circuit court had the authority to sentence appellant 

either as a juvenile or as an adult.1

 In appellant's Memorandum 

 1Code § 16.1-272 provides in relevant part: 

 Power of circuit court over juvenile 

offender. A. In any case in which a 

juvenile is indicted, the offense for which 

he is indicted and all ancillary charges 

shall be tried in the same manner as provided 

for in the trial of adults, except as 
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re Sentencing submitted for the court's consideration, the 

appellant asked the court to consider imposing a sentence under 

Code § 16.1-272(A). He also asked the court to consider other 

sentencing provisions of Title 16.1, including Code §§ 16.1-278.8 

and 16.1-284.1. After considering the Memorandum and the 

argument of both counsel, the trial court declined to sentence 

appellant under the juvenile code, stating: 

 Mr. Pressley, your counsel has made a very 

 otherwise provided with regard to 

sentencing. . . . 

 1. If a juvenile is convicted of a 

violent juvenile felony, the sentence for 

that offense and for all ancillary crimes 

shall be fixed by the court in the same 

manner as provided for adults, but the 

sentence may be suspended conditioned upon 

successful completion of such terms and 

conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile 

court upon disposition of a delinquency case. 

 2. If the juvenile is convicted of any 

other felony, the court may sentence or 

commit the juvenile offender in accordance 

with the criminal laws of this Commonwealth 

or may in its discretion deal with the 

juvenile in the manner prescribed in this 

chapter for the hearing and disposition of 

cases in the juvenile court, including, but 

not limited to, commitment under 

§ 16.1-285.1. 

 Code § 16.1-284 provides: 

 When adult sentenced for juvenile offense. 

When the juvenile court sentences an adult 

who has committed, before attaining the age 

of eighteen, an offense which would be a 

crime if committed by an adult, the court may 

impose the penalties which are authorized to 

be imposed on adults for such violations, not 

to exceed the punishment for a Class 1 

misdemeanor for a single offense or multiple 

offenses. 
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strong argument for treatment under the 

Youthful Offender Act but one of the 

exclusions of the Youthful Offender Act is 

for violent felonies and that's where this 

falls. I can not treat you as a juvenile. 

 On appeal, the appellant concludes from these statements by 

the court that it erroneously failed to properly exercise its 

discretion, contending inter alia, that the court did not believe 

it had the authority to do so. We disagree. 

 Appellant first contends that the court erred in concluding 

it could not sentence appellant as a juvenile under Code 

§ 16.1-269.1, because of his "violent felony." Appellant 

correctly points out that neither of his offenses of conviction, 

attempted armed robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of 

a felony, is enumerated as a "violent juvenile felony" under Code 

§ 16.1-269.1. However, as is argued by the Commonwealth, the 

court's reference to "violent felony" does not ineluctably lead 

to the conclusion that it was referring to the "violent juvenile 

felony" provision of Code § 16.1-269.1 when it stated its 

findings. Indeed, the record, taken as a whole, supports the 

conclusion that the court had before it and gave consideration to 

all the relevant factors under the juvenile sentencing provisions 

in determining whether appellant was more properly sentenced 

under the criminal law applicable to adults or that governing the 

disposition of juveniles, and that, in announcing its finding, it 

was not particularly addressing the requirements for sentencing 

under Code § 16.1-269.1. In the absence of clear evidence to the 
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contrary, "we presume that a trial judge . . . properly applied 

the law." Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 133, 380 S.E.2d 

8, 12 (1989) (citing Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 

978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977)). Viewing the evidence in the 

record before us as a whole, we find it insufficient to rebut 

this presumption. 

 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.