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******************************************************FREDERICK CORNELIUS v. LINDA ARNOLD,

TAX ASSESSOR TOWN OF FARMINGTON

(AC 38011)
Keller, Mullins and Norcott, Js. Argued February 11—officially released October 4, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Hon. Arnold W. Aronson, judge trial referee.)
Frederick Cornelius, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
DuncanJ. Forsyth, withwhomwereKellyC. McKeon and, on the brief, Michael C. Collins, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion MULLINS, J. The self-representedplaintiff, Frederick Cornelius, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Linda Arnold, the tax
assessor of the town of Farmington. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) his action for relief from wrongful assessment was untimely because he commenced the action beyond the one year time limitation set forth in General Statutes § 12-119,1 and (2) he failedto establish
agenuine issue ofmaterialfact asto whetheracontinuing course of conduct tolled that time limitation. We disagree with both claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history inform
our review. On January 29, 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action by service of a summons and two count complaint on the defendant. In count one of the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged the following. On October 1, 2011, he was the owner of a parcel of real property located at 1509 Farmington Avenue in Farmington (property).2 On that date, the defendant valued the property at $238,714 and assessed the property at a value of $167,100. The assessment, on which the tax laid on the property was computed, ‘‘was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding duties of the assessor established under

. . . General Statutes §§ 12-62 and/or 12-55.’’3
The defendant pleaded the time limitation set forth in § 12-119asaspecialdefense, allegingthattheplaintiff had not commenced the action within one year of the October 1, 2011 assessment he challenged. The defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment on the basis of the special defense. The plaintiff objected, arguing that his action was timely pursuant to § 12-119
as properly read or, in the alternative, that a continuing
course of conduct had tolled the limitations period.4 Bymemorandum ofdecision, the trial courtrendered summary judgment as to count one. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The court concluded that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s failure to bring the appeal, as alleged in count one, withinthe oneyearperiodstartingwithOctober 1, 2011, supports the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.’’5 The court further concluded that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue offact as to whether the defendant had engaged in an illegal course of conduct that would have tolled the limitations period in § 12- 119. This appeal followed. Additional facts will follow
as necessary. On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the court improperly rendered summaryjudgment for two principal reasons. First, he claims that his commencement of the action on January 29, 2013, was timely because theOctober 1, 2011 date ofthe allegedly illegal assessment ofthe property was not the ‘‘date as ofwhich the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation,’’ on whichthe oneyearlimitationsperiodin § 12-119begins. Second, he claims that whether a continuing course of conduct tolled the limitations period was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. ‘‘Summary judgment may be granted where the [claim] [is] barred by the statute oflimitations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flanneryv. SingerAsset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 310, 94 A.3d 553 (2014). ‘‘The question of whether a claim is barred by the statute oflimitations is aquestion oflaw overwhich
we exercise plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 661, 127 A.3d 257 (2015). ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] providesthatsummaryjudgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter oflaw.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . [T]he scope of
our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . ‘‘[I]n the context of a motion for summaryjudgment based on a statute of limitations special defense, a defendant typically meets its initial burden of showing the absence ofa genuine issue ofmaterial fact by demonstrating that the action had commenced outside of the statutory limitation period.

. . . When the plaintiff asserts that the limitations period has been tolled by
an equitable exception to the statute oflimitations, the burden normally shifts to the plaintiff to establish a disputed issue ofmaterial fact in avoidance ofthe statute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Flanneryv. SingerAssetFinance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 309–10.
I
The plaintifffirst claims that summaryjudgment was improper because he commenced his action within the
one year limitation period in § 12-119, as that statute properly is read. He argues that the ‘‘date as of which the property is last evaluated for purposes oftaxation’’ within the meaning of § 12-119 is the date on which the assessment is ‘‘finalized’’ because ‘‘the evaluation process is ongoing.’’ Because the date of finalization will vary according to the circumstances of a given case, he argues, the statute is ambiguous and must be read in his favor. He also contends that the limitations period is directory rather than mandatory or subject toa balancing ofthe equities, and that an action pursuant to § 12-119 does not exclude the pursuit ofother equitable remedies not subject to the time limitation. We are not persuaded. ‘‘The legislature, in creating the municipal taxation scheme, placedprecise statutes oflimitationsovermost substantive taxpayer claims.’’ National CSS, Inc. v. Stamford, 195 Conn. 587, 594, 489 A.2d 1034 (1985) (citing, among other statutes, § 12-119). ‘‘It is well settled that, ifthe owner ofthe [property] at the [time] of the [assessment] in question

. . . want[s] to challenge the [assessment], [he is] required to follow the appropriate statutoryprocedures, eitherby (1) timely appealing from the [assessment] to the city’s board of assessment appeals pursuantto General Statutes §§ 12- 111 and 12-112, and from there by timely appealing to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a,
or (2) timely bringing a direct action pursuant to

. . . § 12-119. [A] taxpayerwho has failedto utilize the available statutory remedies [may not] assert

. . . that the tax has not been properly assessed.

. . . The rationale forthisruleistheneedonthepartofthegovernmentfor fiscal certainty. A municipality, like any governmental entity, needs to know with reasonable certainty what its tax base is for each fiscal year, so that it responsibly
can prepare a budget for that year.

. . . Public policy requires, therefore, that taxes that have not been challenged timely cannot be the subject ofperpetual litigation, atanytime,tosuittheconvenience ofthetaxpayer.

. . . Ataxpayerwho has not sought redress in an appropriate manner is foreclosed from continuing litigation outside [those] statutes.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury

v. DanaInvestment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 12–15, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).
A
The plaintiff first argues that the reference in § 12- 119 to the ‘‘date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation’’ is ambiguous because, under the circumstances of a given case, that date maybe either (1) January31 followingthe October 1 assessment date, in the event that the assessor conducts an interim assessment of the property; see General Statutes § 12-55 (b); (2) May 1 following the assessment date, in the event that the assessment is appealed to the board of assessment appeals; see General Statutes § 12-111; or (3) August 1 following the assessment date, the date on which taxes become due, because ‘‘[p]ayment finalizes the [assessment] process

. . . .’’ He argues that we must resolve this ambiguity in his favor and conclude that he timely commenced the present action. We disagree. ‘‘[I]fthere is no ambiguity in the language of [a] statute, it does not become ambiguous merely because the parties contend for different meanings.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Hardt v. Watertown, 95 Conn. App. 52, 57, 895 A.2d 846 (2006), aff’d, 281 Conn. 600, 917 A.2d 26 (2007). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself andits relationship to otherstatutes. If, afterexamining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013). Section 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed that

. . . a tax laid on property was computed
on an assessment which, under all the circumstances,
was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining thevaluation ofsuchproperty, the owner thereof

. . . may

. . . make application for relief to the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated. Such application maybe made within one year from the date as ofwhich the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation

. . . .’’
In seeking to determine the meaning of the phrase ‘‘the date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes oftaxation’’; General Statutes § 12-119; as applied to the facts of this case, ‘‘we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of the language and the purpose of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford

v. Jacobelli, 317 Conn. 863, 871, 120 A.3d 500 (2015). Our appellate courts uniformlyhave held that ‘‘the date
asofwhichthepropertywaslastevaluatedforpurposes of taxation’’ refers to the assessment date.6 As our Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘property [is] assessed for purposes of taxation on October 1 of each year. The claim that

. . . property ha[s] been wrongfully or excessively assessed [may be] appealed

. . . by direct action to the court within one year from the date when thepropertywas lastevaluatedforpurposes oftaxation pursuant to § 12-119.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Norwich v. Lebanon, 193 Conn. 342, 346–48, 477 A.2d 115 (1984);
see also Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 122 n.10, 617 A.2d 433 (1992) (‘‘[o]ur decision today

. . . requires that a declaratory judgment action that is predicated
on the substantive rights of § 12-119 be brought within
one year of the date of assessment’’). Likewise, in Grace N’ Vessels of Christ Ministries,Inc. v. Danbury, 53 Conn. App. 866, 870, 733 A.2d 283 (1999), this court stated that ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] application to the trial court challenged, inter alia, the October 1, 1992, and October 1, 1993 assessments [of the property]. Because [the plaintiff] filed the application7 on August 3, 1995, more than one yearfrom either ofthose dates and, therefore, beyondthe time limitationpermitted in § 12-119, the trial court correctly determinedthat its claims

. . . are time barred.’’ (Footnote added.) Accordingly, under the foregoing authorities, the plaintiffhadoneyearfromthe assessment date ofOctober 1, 2011, to commence his action. He failed to do
so. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s challenge to the 2011 assessment ofhis property, which he commenced on January 29, 2013, fell outside the one year limitation on bringing an action pursuant to § 12-119.
The plaintiff relies on the cases ofInterlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 253 Conn. 531, 754 A.2d 153 (2000), and Wiele

v. Board ofAssessment Appeals, 119 Conn. App. 544, 988A.2d889 (2010), forthepropositionthatthe application of a one year time limit to a claim of an illegal assessment is improper. These cases, however, are factually distinguishable from the present case. In Interlude, Inc., the court concluded that § 12-119
was entirely inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim of an illegal assessment because the plaintiffdid not own the subject property on the date of assessment. Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, supra, 253 Conn. 539. Because § 12-119 didnotapply, the courtleftforanotherdaythe question of what statute of limitations would apply under those circumstances

. Id., 540 n.12. Here, by contrast, there is no dispute as to the plaintiff’s ownership ofthe property on October 1, 2011, the date of the challenged assessment. In Interlude, Inc., the court’s conclusion that § 12-119was entirelyinapplicable defeatstheplaintiff’s reliance on that case to argue that our Supreme Court ‘‘has

. . . expressed significant reservations regardingtheproperapplicationofanystatute oflimitations when a claim for an illegal assessment is brought under§ 12-119.’’ (Emphasis altered.) Indeed, the court inInterlude, Inc., notedthat‘‘theentirerange ofmunicipal taxing statutes

. . . make[s] clear that the assessment date is the foundation ofmunicipal taxing power. Thus, it is necessaryto considerthe date ofassessment
as the appropriate date

. . . forpurposes ofvaluation of taxable property

. . . . General Statutes § 12-119.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Interlude, Inc., v. Skurat, supra, 538–39.
In Wiele, this court declined to apply the limitations periodin § 12-119tobaraclaim ofanillegal assessment because the plaintiff in that case, who had moved out of state, lacked notice of the assessment until many years after the assessment had been conducted. Wielev. Board ofAssessmentAppeals, supra, 119 Conn. App. 547, 554–55. Under such circumstances, this court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to determine whetherthe lack ofnotice would support an argumentthatthelimitationsperiodshouldbeequitably tolled. Id., 555. Here, there is no claim that the plaintiff lacked notice of the 2011 assessment he now challenges. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s attempt to argue that the limitations period should be tolled in this case; see part II of this opinion; there was no reason here,
as there was in Wiele, for the court to decline to apply the limitations period.
Pursuant to our appellate courts’ uniform understanding of ‘‘the date as ofwhich the property was last evaluated’’ to refer to the assessment date, the time limitation set forth in § 12-119, as applied to the facts ofthe present case, required the plaintiffto commence the present action within one year of the October 1, 2011 assessment that he alleged was illegal. This he did not do.
Theplaintiffnevertheless arguesthatthelegislature’s choice of this broadly worded phrase requires us to conclude that it intended to provide a more temporally expansive understanding ofthe evaluation process that may encompass January 31, May 1, or August 1 as the date of evaluation. We disagree. As to the first ofthese proposed dates, we acknowledge that § 12-55, which mandates the publication of the taxable grand list on or before January 31, allows the assessor to ‘‘increase
or decrease the valuation of any property’’ prior to taking the required oath upon the grand list; General Statutes § 12-55 (b); and, as a result, ‘‘an assessor has the authority under § 12-55 to conduct an interim assessment of property

. . . .’’ Kasica v. Columbia, supra, 309 Conn. 97. Nevertheless, we interpretthe relevant statutory language as applied to the facts of the present case; id., 93 (‘‘we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of [the] case’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); and, here, there was absolutely no evidence before the trial court that any such interim assessment occurred. Indeed, the plaintiff expressly alleges in the application for reliefthat it was the October 1, 2011 assessment that was illegal.
As to the latter two dates, neither reasonably can be interpreted as constituting the ‘‘date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-119. The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[i]f the valuation of a property can be changed under § 12-111 until May 1 ofthe following year due to
a decision of the board of assessment appeals, then clearly, the [property] is still being ‘evaluated’ inApril.’’ We cannot reasonably interpret the statutory scheme, however, to contemplate that the evaluation process is still ongoing afteranappealhasbeentakentotheboardof assessment appeals pursuant to § 12-111.8
The plaintiff also argues that payment of taxes by the due date of August 1 ‘‘finalizes the process’’ of evaluation. In support of this argument, he relies on a Supreme Court case discussing a prior version of § 12- 119, which could be ‘‘invoked up to the expiration of
one year, not from the making of the assessment but from the time when the tax became due

. . . .’’ Cohn

v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 702–703, 37A.2d 237 (1944). As we have noted, however, the numerous appellate decisions to have considered the presentversion ofthe statute uniformly have interpreted its time limitation to commence on the date of assessment. See Wilson v. Kelley, supra, 224 Conn. 122 n.10; Norwich v. Lebanon, supra, 193 Conn. 346–48; Grace N’ Vessels of Christ Ministries, Inc. v. Danbury, supra, 53 Conn. App. 870;
see also Crystal Lake Clean WaterPreservation Assn.

v. Ellington, 53 Conn. App. 142, 151, 728 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 920, 738 A.2d 654 (1999); Farmington v. Dowling, 26 Conn. App. 545, 552, 602 A.2d 1047 (1992), appeal dismissed, 224 Conn. 592, 619 A.2d 852 (1993) (certification improvidently granted). For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s alternative interpretations of the relevant language are either factually inapplicable or legally incorrect.
Because the plain meaning of ‘‘the date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation’’providedtheplaintiffwithoneyearfromthe October 1, 2011 assessment in which to commence the present actionpursuantto § 12-119, there is no ambiguity to resolve in the plaintiff’s favor. ‘‘Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, we are confined to the intention expressed in the actual words used and
we will not search out any further intention of the legislature not expressed in the statute.

. . . In the absence ofambiguityit is unnecessaryto resortto principlesofstatutoryconstructionsuchastheresolutionof ambiguity in favor ofthe taxpayer.’’ (Citation omitted.) Harris Data Communications, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 194, 198, 438 A.2d 1178 (1981); see Stratford v. Jacobelli, supra, 317 Conn. 874–75 (declining to apply
canon of statutory construction resolving ambiguity in favor of taxpayer where taxpayer failed to advance other reasonable interpretation of statute in question).
B
In the alternative, the plaintiff contends that the one year limitation on bringing an action pursuant to § 12- 119 is ‘‘clearly directory,’’ subject to a balancing ofthe equities that must be resolved in his favor, or that the reliefprovidedby § 12-119is ‘‘cumulative andnotexclusive of equitable remedies’’ not subject to the statute’s
one year time limitation. We are not persuaded. First, the plaintiff argues that the time limitation in § 12-119 is directory, not mandatory, because it pro-vides that an application for relief ‘‘may’’ be brought within a year of the date as of which the property
was last evaluated for taxation purposes. We decline to consider this argument because it is inadequately briefed. The plaintiff notes that the statute employs the word may, which ‘‘ ‘ordinarily does not connote a command,’ ’’ as our Supreme Court noted in Lostritto

v. CommunityActionAgency ofNew Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 20, 848 A.2d 418 (2004); nevertheless, he fails to examine the context in which the word may is employed, proceedinginsteadto aconclusoryassertion that § 12-119 must, therefore, be permissive. ‘‘Although
we are solicitous of the rights of self-represented litigants

. . . this court is not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Midland Funding, LLC

v. Mitchell-James, 163 Conn. App. 648, 649 n.1, 137A.3d 1 (2016). In any event, we note thatthe commencement of an application for relief from an illegal assessment beyond the one year limitations period in § 12-119, as long as it is specially pleaded, as the defendant has done here, provides abasis foracourtto denythe relief provided for in the statute. See L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167 Conn. 509, 510–11, 513, 356 A.2d 144 (1975). Second, the plaintiff argues that the one year limitation is subject to a balancing of equities that tips in his favor. We disagree. It is not a court’s role to balance the equities to determine whether to apply a statute of limitations in a given case, for, in determining whether toimposeatimelimitationonaparticulartypeofaction,
our legislature already has balanced the relevant equities and determined the point in time at which they weigh in favor of finality. ‘‘The purposes of statutes of limitation[s] include finality, repose and avoidance of stale claims and stale evidence.

. . . These statutes represent a legislative judgment about the balance of equities in a situation involving a tardy assertion of otherwise valid rights: [t]he theory is that even if one has ajust claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defendwithintheperiod oflimitation andthat the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail overthe rightto prosecute them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Iacurci v. Sax, 313 Conn. 786, 806–807, 99A.3d 1145 (2014); see alsoDanburyv. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 15 (time limitations
on taxpayer challenges recognize municipal interest in fiscal certainty). Third, the plaintiff argues that the remedy provided by § 12-119is ‘‘cumulativeandnotexclusiveofequitable remedies, andapartymayelecttoproceedundereither
or both.’’ On the contrary, ‘‘as [§ 12-119] was clearly intendedtotake theplace ofthe remedyin equitybased
on an overvaluation ofthe property and as all the relief
can be obtained under it which could be afforded by equity, it precludes a resort to equity generally in sucha case as the one before us.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 706, 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also CrystalLake Clean WaterPreservation Assn. v. Ellington, supra, 53 Conn. App. 150 (‘‘a taxpayer may not [additionally seek a common law remedy] in an attemptto circumventthe time restraints of § 12-119 if it would undermine the purpose of the statute’’).
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant’s continuing course of conduct tolled the one year limitations period in § 12-119. He argues that he created a genuine issue of material fact by submitting evidence that, although the parties ‘‘engaged in a continuing course of conduct to establishapropervaluationfortheproperty,’’thedefendant did not provide a response to his request to revise the 2011 assessment that ‘‘at any time may have remedied the conflict and removed the need for a lawsuit

. . . .’’ We disagree.
As previously noted, a plaintiff may avoid summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds by creating
an issue of fact as to whether an equitable exception tothe statute applies.Flanneryv. SingerAssetFinance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 310 (‘‘burdennormallyshifts to the plaintiffto establish a disputed issue ofmaterial fact’’ regarding equitable exception to statute oflimitations); Wielev.Boardof AssessmentAppeals, supra, 119 Conn. App. 551 (‘‘thelimitationin § 12-119isprocedural and personal rather than jurisdictional and, therefore, susceptible to equitable doctrines’’). ‘‘In certain circumstances

. . . we have recognized the applicability of the continuing course ofconduct doctrine to toll a statute of limitations.

. . . [W]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.’’9 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flannery v. SingerAssetFinance Co., LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 311. ‘‘[I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuing
course ofconductthatmaytollthe statute oflimitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission ofthe original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)Brusbyv.MetropolitanDistrict, supra, 160 Conn. App. 662. ‘‘The continuing course of conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff has discovered the harm

. . . .’’ Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff did not and, indeed, could not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of this doctrine because the verycourse of conduct on which he sought to rely demonstrates that he already had discovered the harm upon which he sued—namely, the allegedly illegal 2011 assessment of the property. Before the trial court, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘[o]n October 26, 2011, [he] initiated an informal effort to have the assessment reduced,’’ which ‘‘continuedperiodically [until] December 5, 2012

. . . when the effort became more formalized. The plaintiff’s request to revise the assessment to reflect the nonexistence ofthe structure created a duty
on the part ofthe defendant to

. . . at least respond to the plaintiff’s legitimate concern. The defendant never responded to the plaintiff’s request.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Consequently, he argued, ‘‘[t]he equitable doctrine of continuing course of conduct tolled the inception of any applicable statute oflimitations until at least January 13, 2013

. . . which was the last occurring conduct outside ofthis action.’’ The evidencebywhichtheplaintiff attempted to demonstrate a continuing course of conduct indicated that in October, 2011, he had sought to reduce the assessment by notifying the defendant of the removal of a house from the property several months prior, and that the parties had met on January 10, 2013, to discuss the assessment of the property.10
The evidence presented to the trial court in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment demonstrates, insum, that afterinitiallychallengingthe 2011 assessment onOctober26 ofthatyear, theplaintiff waited more than one year before attempting again to challenge the assessment, in December, 2012. See footnote 10 of this opinion. This evidence, which unequivocally indicates the plaintiff’s awareness ofand disagreement with the 2011 assessment, utterly fails to implicate the continuing course of conduct doctrine. Here, the plaintiff clearly had discovered the harm upon which he sued; he simply waited too long to do
so. As we previously have noted in this opinion, there
were two avenues by which the plaintiff could have challenged the validity of the 2011 assessment of the property: he could have filed a timely appeal to the board of assessment appeals, and, from there, a timely appealtothe SuperiorCourt; seeGeneralStatutes §§ 12- 111 and 12-117a; or he could have filed a timely appeal pursuant to § 12-119 directly to the Superior Court. See Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 12–15. He elected to engage in periodic ‘‘informal’’ efforts to have the assessment reduced instead ofcommencing the present action under § 12-119. He offers
no authority for the assertion that these efforts created
aduty onthepart ofthe defendantto engage innegotiations regarding the assessment, and, indeed, the defendant was under no such duty. The plaintiff’s attempts to negotiate a lower assessment were not a substitute for timely resorting to the existing procedure for challengingthe assessment’slegality. ‘‘[A] taxpayerwhohas failed to utilize the available statutory remedies [maynot] assert

. . . that the tax has not been properly assessed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., supra, 14–15.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed

. . . that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof

. . . prior to the payment ofsuch tax, may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for reliefto the [S]uperior [C]ourt for thejudicial district in which such town or city is situated. Such application may be made within one year from the date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation and shall be served and returned in the

same manner as is required in the case of a summons in a civil action, and the pendency of such application shall not suspend action upon the tax against the applicant. In all such actions, the Superior Court shall have power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form

as tojustice and equity appertains, and costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If such assessment is reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes in accordance with the judgment of said court.’’ Thus, ‘‘[i]n a tax appeal taken pursuant to § 12-119, the plaintiff must prove that the assessment was (a) manifestly excessive and (b)

. . . could nothavebeenarrivedat exceptbydisregardingtheprovisions ofthe statutes for determining the valuation of the property.

. . . [The plaintiff] must [set forth] allegations beyond the mere claim that the assessor overvalued the property.

. . . The focus of § 12-119 is whether the assessment is illegal.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 308 Conn. 87, 105, 61 A.3d 461 (2013).

2 In count two, the plaintiff appealed, pursuant to General Statutes § 12- 117a, from the action of the Farmington Board of Assessment Appeals reducingthe October 1, 2012 assessment ofthe propertyto $70,630. Because count two remained pending in the trial court, the plaintiff’s initial appeal to this court was dismissed for lack of a final judgment. Before filing the present appeal, the plaintiffwithdrew count two, rendering the trial court’s judgmentfinal. SeeAnnecharicov.Patterson, 38 Conn. App. 338, 339–40, 660 A.2d880 (1995). Accordingly, onlycount oneis atissue inthepresentappeal.
3 General Statutes § 12-62 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Commencing October 1, 2006, each town shall implement a revaluation not later than the first day ofOctober that follows, by five years, the October first assessment date on which the town’s previous revaluation became effective

. . . . The town shall use assessments derived from each such revaluation for the purpose of levying property taxes for the assessment year in which such revaluation is effective and for each assessment year that follows until the ensuing revaluation becomes effective. ‘‘(2) When conducting a revaluation, an assessor shall use generally accepted mass appraisal methods

. . . . Prior to the completion of each revaluation, the assessor shall conduct a field review. Except in a town that has a single assessor, the members ofthe board of assessors shall approve, by majority vote, all valuations established for a revaluation.

. . .’’ General Statutes § 12-55 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) On or before the thirty-first day of January of each year, except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the assessors orboard ofassessors shall publish the grand listfortheirrespectivetowns. Eachsuchgrandlistshallcontainthe assessed values ofall property in the town

. . . for the assessment year commencing

on the October first immediately preceding. The assessor or board ofassessors shall lodge the grand list for public inspection, in the office of the

assessor on or before said thirty-first day of January, or on or before the day otherwise specificallyprovided by law forthe completion ofsuch grand list.

. . . ‘‘(b)

. . . The assessor or board of assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of any property as reflected in the last-preceding grand list,

or the valuation as stated in any personal property declaration or report received pursuant to this chapter.

. . .’’

4 The plaintiff appended three exhibits to his objection: (1) a residentialproperty card for the property bearing a handwritten note that ‘‘10/26/11

owner came in [and] said house was torn down a few months ago. No permits were taken out as of 1/31/12. Building Dept. will not write a letter’’; (2) a December 5, 2012 letter from the plaintiffto the defendant requesting ‘‘all information regarding the 2007 property revaluation’’; and (3) aJanuary 16, 2013 letter from the plaintiffto the defendant purporting to memorialize

a January 10, 2013 meeting between the parties.
5 The court incorrectly identified February 4, 2013, the date on which the plaintifffiled the complaint in the Superior Court, as the date ofthe action’s commencement. An application for relief from wrongful assessment is not commenceduntilitis ‘‘servedandreturnedinthe samemannerasisrequired in the case of a summons in a civil action

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12- 119; see GeneralStatutes § 52-45a(civilactioncommencedbylegalprocess); cf. ChestnutPointRealty, LLCv. East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 565, 573–74, 119 A.3d 1229 (construing identical language in General Statutes § 12-117a, which provides that tax appeal ‘‘shall be

. . . served and returned in the

same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil action,’’ to require service ofprocess for commencement oftax appeal), cert. granted, 319 Conn. 928, 125A.3d203 (2015). Because we concludethatthe limitations periodin § 12-119 expiredbeforeJanuary29, 2013, the date onwhichprocess
was served, any error was not material to the court’s determination that the plaintiff’s action was untimely.
6 General Statutes § 12-62aprovides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Each municipality

. . . shall establish a uniform assessment date of October first. ‘‘(b) Each such municipality shall assess all property for purposes of the local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy per cent ofpresent true and actual value, as determined under section 12-63.

. . .’’

7 See footnote 5 of this opinion.
8 Indeed, to appeal to the board of assessment appeals pursuant to § 12- 111, aperson already must be aggrieved by an act ofthe assessor, including, for example, the valuation of his property for taxation purposes. Section 12-111 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

. . . claiming to be aggrievedbythe doings ofthe assessors ofsuchtown may appeal therefrom to the board of assessment appeals.

. . . Such board may equalize and adjust the grand list of such town and may increase or decrease the assessment of any taxable property or interest therein

. . . .’’

9 Ourappellatecourtspreviouslyhavenotconsideredwhetherthe continuing course of conduct doctrine may toll the limitations period in § 12-119. The plaintiff relies on Wiele to argue that the doctrine may provide an exceptiontothe limitationsperiodin § 12-119. In Wiele, this courtsuggested, but did not decide, that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to toll the limitations period in § 12-119 where the property owner did not have notice of the challenged assessment. See Wiele v. Board ofAssessment Appeals, supra, 119 Conn. App. 553, 555. In the present case, because we conclude that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, we need not address the continuing course of conduct doctrine’s applicability to the limitations period in § 12-119.
10 TheJanuary 16, 2013 letterfromtheplaintifftothe defendantpurporting to memorialize the meeting reads in relevant part that ‘‘the following are the salient points as I understood them: ‘‘1. Although you profess a personal willingness to address the issues of theassessmentforthisproperty, youindicatedthatyouareunabletoaddress them because no relief is available because the issues are not a result of any ‘mistake’ but rather are the result of ‘judgment.’

. . . ‘‘4. You indicated that the information you provided to me in your e-mail

on December6, 2012, inresponseto myrequestforinformation ofDecember 5, 2012, contains alltheinformationand correspondence available and ‘there is nothing else than what has already been provided.’ ‘‘If this is not an accurate representation of our conversation, or if there is any relevant information that I have not included, please advise any necessary corrections or additions at your earliest opportunity. ‘‘Sincerely, ‘‘[The plaintiff].’’