Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 57355

TSA appreciates the privacy risk 

inherent in any airline prescreening 

program in which passenger name 

record information is provided to the 

Federal Government for use in 

conducting the prescreening. However, 

TSA also recognizes that the risk is 

necessary for ensuring the security of 

our air transportation system. TSA 

believes it has taken action to mitigate 

any privacy risk by designing its next 

generation passenger prescreening 

program to accommodate concerns 

expressed by privacy advocates, foreign 

counterparts and others. 

First, under the Secure Flight testing 

phase, TSA will not require air carriers 

to collect any additional information 

from their passengers than is already 

collected by such carriers and 

maintained in passenger name records. 

Testing of the Secure Flight program 

will compare only existing PNR record 

information against names in the TSDB 

in order to determine how effectively 

existing PNR information can be 

compared against such names, how 

many instances of false positive matches 

occur, and what, if any additional 

limited data, would be most effective in 

reducing the number of such false 

positive hits. TSA envisions that 

carriers may be required to collect full 

passenger name and possibly one other 

element of information under a fully 

implemented operational Secure Flight 

program. However, TSA will not make 

such determination until the initial test 

phase results can be assessed and an 

additional Privacy Impact Assessment is 

published. 

Second, the Secure Flight program 

will permit TSA to take on sole 

responsibility for conducting passenger 

name comparisons against a 

consolidated TSDB watch list, rather 

than continuing to require multiple 

individual air carriers to conduct such 

comparisons. TSA will be able to apply 

improved prescreening procedures, 

including more consistent analytical 

procedures, for identifying actual name 

matches and for resolving false positive 

name matches prior to a passengers’

arrival at an airport, than can currently 

be applied by the individual air carriers 

that currently administer the watch list 

comparisons. TSA expects that the 

number of individuals currently 

subjected to automatic secondary 

screening will be reduced under an 

implemented Secure Flight program. 

Third, Secure Flight will mitigate 

impact on personal privacy because of 

its limited purpose and anticipated 

limited retention period. Secure Flight 

will focus screening efforts only on 

identifying individuals known or 

reasonably suspected to be terrorists or 

engaged in terrorist activity, rather than 

on other law enforcement purposes. In 

addition, Secure Flight will only be 

applied to passengers on U.S. domestic 

flights. Passengers on international 

flights will continue to be prescreened 

using APIS (Advanced Passenger 

Information System data—information 

from the machine readable portion of an 

individual’s passport) provided to U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection for this 

purpose. Passengers on international 

flights will not be subject to duplicative 

information provision requirements or 

overlapping screening procedures. TSA 

also anticipates that passenger 

information will be held for a relatively 

limited amount of time after completion 

of a passenger’s itinerary. TSA’s 

prescreening efforts will be as narrow as 

reasonable to accommodate privacy 

concerns, including access to redress 

mechanisms, but as robust as necessary 

to accomplish its security mission. 

TSA believes that the Secure Flight 

program will represent a vast 

improvement in security by permitting 

TSA to identify individuals known or 

reasonably suspected to be engaged in 

terrorism or terrorism related activity. 

However, because Secure Flight may be 

rendered less effective if passengerprovided information is not accurate or 

correct, TSA does seek to identify the 

most appropriate means to identify 

when passenger information is incorrect 

or inaccurate. For this reason, TSA will 

use PNR information obtained for 

testing of the Secure Flight program to 

conduct a separate test of the use of 

commercial data to identify such 

inaccurate or incorrect passenger 

information. TSA recognizes that this 

may raise privacy and civil liberties 

concerns. TSA’s testing of commercial 

data use will therefore involve the 

following: 

(a) TSA will only test the use of 

commercial data 

(b) TSA does not assume that the 

result of comparison of passenger 

information to commercial data is 

determinative of information accuracy 

or the intent of the person who provided 

the passenger information.

(c) Such testing of commercial data 

will be governed by stringent data 

security and privacy protections, 

including contractual prohibitions on 

commercial entities’ maintenance or use 

of airline-provided PNR information for 

any purposes other than testing under 

TSA parameters; strict firewalls between 

the government and commercial data 

providers; real-time auditing procedures 

to determine when data within the 

Secure Flights system has been accessed 

and by whom; strict rules prohibiting 

the accessing or use of commercially 

held personal data by TSA; 

(d) Assessment of test results prior to 

any operational use of commercial data 

in TSA programs and determination that 

its use is effective in identifying 

incorrect or inaccurate information does 

not result in disparate treatment of any 

class of individuals, and that data 

security protections and privacy 

protections are robust and effective. 

TSA also recognizes that there is a 

privacy risk inherent in the design of 

any new system which could result 

from design mistakes. By testing the 

proposed Secure Flight program, TSA 

will have the opportunity to correct any 

privacy-related design mistakes before 

the program becomes fully operational, 

ensuring a better program. TSA is 

purposely testing the Secure Flight 

system, in fact, and will be carefully 

scrutinizing the performance of the 

system during the test phase—and 

conducting further analysis upon 

completion—to determine the 

effectiveness of Secure Flight both for 

passenger prescreening as well as for 

protecting the privacy of the data on 

which the program is based. By layering 

on top of the program design strict rules 

for oversight and training of personnel 

handling the data as well as strong 

system auditing to detect potential 

abuse and a carefully planned and 

executed redress process, TSA intends 

to make sure that privacy is an integral 

part of this overall effort. TSA’s efforts 

will not only be thoroughly examined 

internally, including review by the TSA 

Privacy Officer, but also will be 

reviewed by the DHS Chief Privacy 

Officer before a final program is 

designed. In this process, TSA will 

carefully review constructive feedback it 

receives from the public on this 

important program.

Issued in Arlington, VA, on September 21, 

2004. 

Lisa S. Dean, 

Privacy Officer.

[FR Doc. 04–21477 Filed 9–21–04; 12:58 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Office of the Secretary 

Notice of Establishment

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of Establishment of Great 

Sand Dunes National Park. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Public Law 106–

530 (114 Stat. 2529, 16 U.S.C. 410hhh–

2), the Great Sand Dunes National Park 

and Preserve Act of 2000, on September 

57356 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 

13, 2004, I made the following 

determination establishing the Great 

Sand Dunes National Park in Saguache 

and Alamosa counties in southern 

Colorado: 

Whereas, the Great Sand Dunes 

National Monument was established for 

‘‘the preservation of the great sand 

dunes’’ on March 17, 1932; 

Whereas, the great sand dunes ‘‘an 

ancient landscape sculpted by the 

relentless forces of wind and water—

offer breath-taking beauty, rare plant 

and animal life, and rich geological and 

cultural history; 

Whereas, Congress, in the Great Sand 

Dunes National Park and Preserve Act, 

authored by Senator Wayne Allard, 

Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, and 

Representative Scott McInnis of 

Colorado, inspired by the people of the 

San Luis Valley, sought to provide longterm protection of the area and ensure 

opportunities for visitors to enjoy its 

splendor; 

Whereas, Congress authorized the 

Secretary of the Interior to designate the 

existing national monument and 

additional lands as a national park once 

sufficient land with a sufficient 

diversity of resources was acquired; 

Whereas, the National Park Service 

now has assumed management for 

31,000 acres adjacent to the monument 

as provided by the Act; 

Whereas, the Director of the National 

Park Service recommends that the Great 

Sand Dunes National Monument, 

together with additional lands, be 

designated a national park; 

Therefore, having determined that the 

United States has acquired sufficient 

land having a sufficient diversity of 

resources to warrant designation of the 

land as a national park, by the authority 

vested in me under Section 4 of the 

Great Sand Dunes National Park and 

Preserve Act (114 Stat. 2529), and with 

the approval of President George W. 

Bush, I do hereby designate the existing 

Great Sand Dunes National Monument, 

together with additional lands cited in 

said Act, as the Great Sand Dunes 

National Park. 

Pursuant to section 5(b) of Public Law 

106–530 (16 U.S.C. 410hhh–3(b)), as 

soon as practicable, a map and legal 

description of the Great Sand Dunes 

National Park will be on file and 

available for public inspection at the 

address below.

DATES: This action is effective upon 

publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Steve Chaney, Superintendent, Great 

Sand Dunes National Park & Preserve, 

11500 Hwy 150, Mosca, Colorado 

81146–9798.

Dated: September 16, 2004. 

Gale A. Norton, 

Secretary of the Interior.

[FR Doc. 04–21473 Filed 9–23–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4312–CL–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Fish and Wildlife Service 

Draft Revised Recovery Plan for the 

Ne ̄ne ̄ or Hawaiian Goose (Branta 

sandvicensis)

AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Interior.

ACTION: Notice of document availability 

for review and comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service (we) announces the availability 

of the Draft Revised Recovery Plan for 

the Ne ̄ne ̄ or Hawaiian Goose (Branta 

sandvicensis) for public review and 

comment.

DATES: Comments on the draft revised 

recovery plan must be received on or 

before November 23, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Hard copies of the draft 

revised recovery plan will be available 

for inspection, by appointment, during 

normal business hours at the following 

location: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Pacific Islands Fish and Wildlife Office, 

300 Ala Moana Boulevard, Room 3–122, 

Box 50088, Honolulu, Hawaii 96850 

(telephone: 808–792–9400; facsimile: 

808–792–9580). Requests for copies of 

the draft revised recovery plan and 

written comments and materials 

regarding this plan should be addressed 

to the Field Supervisor at the above 

Honolulu address. This plan is currently 

available on the World Wide Web at 

http://endangered.fws.gov/recovery/

index.html#plans.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. 

Ann Marshall, Fish and Wildlife 

Biologist, or Dr. Eric VanderWerf, Fish 

and Wildlife Biologist, at the above 

address and telephone number.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Recovery of endangered or threatened 

animals and plants is a primary goal of 

our endangered species program and the 

Endangered Species Act (Act) (16 U.S.C. 

1531 et seq.). Recovery means 

improvement of the status of listed 

species to the point at which listing is 

no longer appropriate under the criteria 

set out in section 4(a)(1) of the Act. 

Recovery plans describe actions 

considered necessary for the 

conservation of the species, establish 

criteria for downlisting or delisting 

listed species, and estimate time and 

cost for implementing the measures 

needed for recovery. 

The Act requires the development of 

a recovery plan for a listed species 

unless such a plan would not promote 

the conservation of the species. Section 

4(f) of the Act requires that public 

notice and an opportunity for public 

review and comment be provided 

during recovery plan development. We 

will consider all information presented 

during the public comment period on 

each new or revised recovery plan. 

Substantive technical comments may 

result in changes to a recovery plan. 

Substantive comments regarding 

recovery plan implementation may not 

necessarily result in changes to a 

recovery plan, but will be forwarded to 

appropriate Federal or other entities so 

that they can take these comments into 

account during the course of 

implementing recovery actions. 

Individual responses to comments will 

not be provided. 

The ne ̄ne ̄ is endemic to the Hawaiian 

Islands and is listed as endangered by 

the Federal government and by the State 

of Hawaii. Currently, there are wild 

populations on the islands of Hawaii, 

Maui, and Kauai comprised of 

approximately 350, 250, and 620 

individuals, respectively. In addition, 

11 captive-bred ne ̄ne ̄ were released on 

the island of Molokai in December 2001 

and an additional 13 ne ̄ne ̄ were released 

on Molokai in 2002 as part of a Safe 

Harbor Agreement. 

Ne ̄ne ̄ are currently found at elevations 

ranging from sea level to almost 2,500 

meters (8,000 feet) in a variety of 

habitats including nonnative grasslands 

(such as golf courses, pastures, and rural 

areas); sparsely vegetated high elevation 

lava flows; cinder deserts; native alpine 

grasslands and shrublands; open native 

and non-native alpine shrublandwoodland community interfaces; midelevation native and non-native 

shrubland; and early successional 

cinderfall. This distribution has been 

determined largely by the locations of 

release sites of captive-bred ne ̄ne ̄. 

Limiting factors affecting ne ̄ne ̄ recovery 

include predation by introduced 

mammals, insufficient nutritional 

resources for both breeding females and 

goslings, limited availability of suitable 

habitat, human-caused disturbance and 

mortality, behavioral problems 

associated with small populations sizes 

and captive-bred birds, genetic 

homogeneity and expression of 

deleterious recessive genes, and 

possibly avian disease. 

Recovery objectives for the ne ̄ne ̄ are to 

restore and maintain self-sustaining 

populations on the islands of Hawaii,