1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. Criminal Action No. 19-132 (JDB)

FRANCIS ENGLES,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is a motion by defendant Francis Engles seeking compassionate release 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Engles contends that his age and health conditions heighten 

his risk of dying from COVID-19 and that this constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason 

warranting a reduction of his sentence. The government opposes Engles’s motion, principally on 

the ground that he is vaccinated against COVID-19. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

concludes that Engles has not demonstrated the existence of an extraordinary and compelling 

reason. Accordingly, the Court will deny his motion. 

Background 

Between August 2015 and February 2017, defendant Francis Engles engaged in a scheme 

to defraud the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“the VA”) by systematically 

overbilling the VA’s Vocational Rehabilitation & Employment program. See, e.g., Indictment 

[ECF No. 1] ¶ 17. As co-owner and operator of Engles Security Training School, Engles charged 

the VA more for veteran enrollees than he would non-veterans, and he repeatedly submitted false 

documents overstating the amount of instruction veterans were receiving. See id. ¶¶ 3, 19–25. In 
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the end, Engles collected more than $337,000 from the VA over the course of the scheme. 

Statement of Offense [ECF No. 17] ¶ 48. 

On April 18, 2019, Engles was indicted on fourteen counts of wire fraud and six counts of 

making fraudulent statements to the United States government. See Indictment at 11–15. Engles 

pled guilty to one count of wire fraud on December 17, 2019, Min. Entry, Dec. 17, 2019; Plea 

Agreement [ECF No. 18] at 1, and, after multiple pandemic-related postponements, this Court 

sentenced Engles to thirty months’ incarceration on June 14, 2021, Min. Entry, June 14, 2021; 

Judgment [ECF No. 35] at 2. Engles reported to FCI Fort Dix in New Jersey to begin serving his 

sentence one month later. See Mot. for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) [ECF No. 37] (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1. On January 24, 2022, the Court received by 

mail a motion for compassionate release submitted by Engles pro se.

1

 See generally Def.’s Mot. 

The government filed its opposition to Engles’s motion on March 9, 2022, see generally Gov’t’s 

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. [ECF No. 39] (“Gov’t Opp’n”), and the Court has received no reply 

submission from Engles. The motion is now ripe for decision. 

Legal Standard

Under the First Step Act of 2018, a court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment 

if, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are 

applicable,” the court concludes that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 

reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).2

 The court must make “two essential determinations” 

before granting a motion for compassionate release: first, “whether there are extraordinary and 

1 The motion was docketed by order of the Court on February 3, 2022. See Def’s Mot at 1.

2 Defendants must also exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a motion for compassionate 

release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see generally United States v. Douglas, Crim. No. 10-171-4 (JDB), 2020 WL 

5816244, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2020). The parties agree that Engles has satisfied that requirement here. See

Def.’s Mot. at 2; Gov’t Opp’n at 2–3. 
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compelling reasons for the reduction,” and second, if so, “whether . . . section 3553(a)’s purposes 

of punishment require maintenance of the original prison term.” United States v. Johnson, 464 F. 

Supp. 3d 22, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2020). “As the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of 

establishing that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. 

Long, Crim. A. No. 10-171-1 (JDB), 2021 WL 3792949, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2021) (citation 

omitted). That burden is substantial: “Cutting short a duly authorized prison sentence is, in the 

statute’s own words, an ‘extraordinary’ step to take, and it requires a justification which is more 

than sympathetic and indeed nothing short of ‘compelling.’” United States v. Shabazz, Crim. A. 

No. 17-43 (JDB), 2021 WL 4306129, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2021). 

Analysis 

In his motion for compassionate release, Engles relies principally on the threat posed by

COVID-19. Engles is 65 years old and suffers from Type 2 diabetes, congestive heart failure, and 

hypertension. See Def.’s Mot. at 4; Gov’t Opp’n at 3 (conceding that Engles’s medical records 

“reveal that the defendant . . . presents with hypertension and diabetes and a reported history of 

congestive heart failure”); see also Gov’t Ex. A [ECF No. 41] at 22–23. And as he notes in his 

motion, “[a]ll three of these conditions are listed as contributory co-morbidities leading to 

potentially severe consequences, including death if [he] should contract Covid-19.” Def.’s Mot. 

at 4; see also People with Certain Medical Conditions, CDC, 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medicalconditions.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2022). Indeed, this Court has previously recognized that an 

inmate’s “high blood pressure and type 2 diabetes likely do heighten his risk of serious 

consequences from COVID-19” and that “early in the pandemic, this combination of conditions 

could qualify as ‘extraordinary and compelling’ in some cases.” United States v. Morales, Crim. 
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A. No. 06-248-4 (JDB), 2021 WL 4622461, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2021) (citing Johnson, 464 F. 

Supp. 3d at 36–39, and United States v. Lacy, No. 15-cr-30038, 2020 WL 2093363, at *6 (C.D. 

Ill. May 1, 2020)). 

However, as this Court also noted in Morales, “it is no longer early in the pandemic,” and 

merely suffering from medical conditions linked to heightened COVID-19 risk is not sufficient on 

its own to warrant compassionate release. 2021 WL 4622461, at *5. Instead, courts must also 

consider the defendant’s vaccination status and the prevalence of COVID-19 at his site of 

incarceration. Id. at *5–6; see also, e.g., United States v. Battle, No. 21-2151, 2021 WL 4550925, 

at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 5, 2021) (affirming denial of compassionate release because “infection rates 

were near zero in [defendant’s] place of confinement, and [defendant] was completely vaccinated, 

giving him significant protection against reinfection” (footnote omitted)). 

Both of these factors weigh strongly against compassionate release in this case. Engles is 

fully vaccinated against COVID-19, see Gov’t Ex. A at 72 (Engles’s vaccine card showing that he 

has received two doses of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine),

3 and it is now well-established that 

“[v]accines reduce the risk of COVID-19, including the risk of severe illness and death among 

people who are fully vaccinated,” COVID-19 Vaccines Work, CDC,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/effectiveness/work.html (last updated Dec. 

23, 2021). Indeed, the World Health Organization has noted that the Pfizer vaccine Engles 

received “has an efficacy of 95% against symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection.” The Pfizer 

BioNTech (BNT162b2) COVID-19 Vaccine: What You Need to Know, World Health Org. (Jan. 

3 The government represents that Engles received a booster dose in December 2021, but it provides no 

evidence for that assertion. See Gov’t Opp’n at 11. The Court is unable to verify the accuracy of that claim and will 

not consider it here. 
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21, 2022), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-can-take-the-pfizerbiontech-covid-19--vaccine-what-you-need-to-know. 

As many judges in this District and around the country have noted, “the remarkable 

effectiveness of these vaccines raises an extremely high bar to establishing extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for a sentence reduction based on the risk of contracting COVID-19.” United 

States v. Clark, Crim. No. 10-0133 (PLF), 2021 WL 5630795, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2021)

(collecting cases from this District); accord Morales, 2021 WL 4622461, at *6 (noting that “[t]his 

substantial protection against COVID—and especially against life-threatening courses of the 

disease—seriously undermines [defendant’s] purported ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for 

release” and collecting additional cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 751 

(6th Cir. 2021) (“[Defendant’s] access to the COVID-19 vaccine substantially undermines his 

request for a sentence reduction. . . . After all, with access to the vaccine, an inmate largely faces 

the same risk from COVID-19 as those who are not incarcerated.” (internal citation omitted)). 

Engles fails to grapple with the fact that his vaccination reduces the risk posed by COVID-19—

other than his unfortunately common COVID risk factors,4 Engles has not shown why, in light of 

his vaccination, COVID-19 still poses an “extraordinary and compelling” threat to his health

should he remain incarcerated. 

Moreover, although FCI Fort Dix has undoubtedly been hit hard by previous waves of 

COVID infections, it is presently COVID-free. The Bureau of Prisons reports that zero inmates 

or staff at FCI Fort Dix are currently positive for COVID-19, see COVID-19 Cases, Fed. Bureau 

of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022), and the CDC 

4 Cf. Facts About Hypertension, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/bloodpressure/facts.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 

2021) (“Nearly half of adults in the United States (47%, or 116 million) have hypertension . . . .”); Type 2 Diabetes, 

CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/basics/type2.html (last updated December 16, 2021) (“More than 37 million 

Americans have diabetes (about 1 in 10), and approximately 90–95% of them have type 2 diabetes.”). 
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characterizes the surrounding county’s “community level” as “low,” COVID-19 by County, CDC, 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/covid-by-county.html (last updated Apr. 

7, 2022) (data for Burlington County, New Jersey). Moreover, the Bureau of Prisons reports that 

it has completed 2,749 inmate inoculations at Fort Dix, see COVID-19 Vaccine Implementation, 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022), compared 

to a current total population at the facility of 3,235,5 see FCI Fort Dix, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/ftd/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). FCI Fort Dix’s nearzero rate of transmission and its vaccination rate comparable to the country as a whole6 thus further 

undermine Engles’s claim of extraordinary and compelling circumstances. 

Engles’s impressive collection of other cases in which inmates at FCI Fort Dix received 

compassionate release due to COVID-19 runs aground on the same shoal. See Def.’s Mot. at 11–

13. All thirteen of the cases he cites date from before vaccines were widely available. As noted 

above, having received (or refused) a vaccine against COVID-19 fundamentally changes the 

compassionate release analysis, such that the cases Engles cites have little to no bearing on his 

motion. Indeed, courts now routinely deny requests for compassionate release by fully vaccinated 

inmates at Fort Dix.7 There is simply insufficient evidence that Engles is at greater risk from 

5 This does not necessarily mean that 2,749 of the facility’s 3,235 occupants are fully vaccinated (an 

impressive percentage of 85%), as the recipients of some of those inoculations may have been released and some 

unvaccinated inmates may have been admitted since the distribution of vaccines. Nonetheless, it is clear that a 

substantial majority of inmates at Fort Dix have been vaccinated. See also Gov’t Opp’n at 6 (noting that, as of March 

9, “BOP has fully vaccinated . . . 2,631 inmates (which is 71% of the current inmate population)” at Fort Dix). 

6 See COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CDC, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#vaccinations_vacc-total-admin-rate-total (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (stating that 75.6% of adults age 18 or 

older are fully vaccinated). 

7 See, e.g., United States v. Scalea, No. 21-2631, 2022 WL 795425, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2022) (affirming 

denial of compassionate release because defendant was fully vaccinated, “his preexisting medical conditions . . . did 

not place [him] at greater risk of severe illness should he be reinfected[] given the effectiveness of his vaccine,” and 

there were “few to no positive cases at [Fort Dix]”); United States v. Schwarzkopf, No. 21-CR-117 (EK), 2022 WL 

706508, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2022) (“Mr. Schwarzkopf is fully vaccinated, and COVID-19 rates are (thankfully) 

subsiding rapidly. Though the facility at which he resides has struggled (along with the prison system generally) to 

manage the pandemic at times, there is no current indication that [Fort Dix] is unable to manage Mr. Schwarzkopf’s 

risk profile effectively.” (footnote omitted)); Clark, 2021 WL 5630795, at *4 (“In light of Mr. Clark’s vaccination 
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COVID-19 at Fort Dix than he would be if he were released into the community. Accordingly, in 

light of his vaccination status and the low levels of transmission at his site of incarceration, the 

Court cannot conclude that Engles’s age and health conditions put him at such a high risk of 

COVID-19 that compassionate release is warranted.8

Engles makes two other identifiable arguments in support of his release. These arguments 

take the form of a narrative history of COVID-19 at FCI Fort Dix, describing how each wave of 

the pandemic hit the facility and, invariably, how the staff botched its response. See Def.’s Mot. 

at 6–11. Interspersed throughout this narrative are various complaints about conditions at the 

facility, including difficulties in receiving prompt medical treatment, the existence of black mold 

in the showers, and an opossum “liv[ing] in a wall in the kitchen near the food storage locker.” Id.

at 6; see also id. at 10. Neither his allegations regarding FCI Fort Dix’s handling of the pandemic 

nor his complaints about the facility’s conditions warrant compassionate release. 

First of all, Engles did not arrive at FCI Fort Dix until July 2021, see Def.’s Mot. at 1, well 

after the events he relates in his motion. He was thus neither subjected to nor did he witness the 

alleged failings on which he now relies. Engles thus appears to ask the Court to infer from his 

allegations of past incompetence that, in the future, staff at FCI Fort Dix might again respond 

improperly to pandemic conditions and subject Engles to a heightened risk of infection and death 

from COVID. The Court does not find such a tenuous inference warranted, and even if it did, it is 

not persuaded that the possibility of sub-optimal COVID response in the future constitutes an 

status and the current COVID-19 case rates and vaccination rates at FCI Fort Dix, the Court concludes that Mr. Clark

has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.”).

8 The government asserts that Engles is scheduled to be released to home confinement “at the end of March,” 

a development which “should moot many of his arguments.” Gov’t Opp’n at 21. But the government provides no 

support or documentation for this assertion and fails to even specify a date on which the motion would allegedly 

become moot. The Court thus has no basis to assess this claim and will not consider it, especially since the Court 

would deny the motion regardless.
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extraordinary and compelling reason warranting release now. And of course, this sets to the side 

the fact that, whatever struggles FCI Fort Dix may have had in dealing with earlier waves of the 

pandemic, it now seems to have hit upon a winning strategy for preventing COVID-19 infections. 

Moreover, Engles’s allegations regarding the conditions at FCI Fort Dix, even assuming 

their truth, are applicable to every one of the more than 3,000 inmates at FCI Fort Dix (and likely 

to thousands more prisoners incarcerated at facilities with similar issues). As a consequence, 

without a showing of how these conditions specifically threaten Engles, they cannot support his 

compassionate release. Compassionate release is a safety valve designed to ameliorate 

extraordinary individual hardships caused by incarceration. See, e.g., Shabazz, 2021 WL 4306129, 

at *6 (“Compassionate release is a mechanism built on the recognition that some consequences of 

incarceration are so serious as to justify release . . . . But this mechanism is for only the most 

exceptional cases.”). And by their very terms, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons must be 

“most unusual, far from common, and having little or no precedent.” United States v. Hunter, 12 

F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary: Unabridged 807 (1971)). The Court simply sees no evidence that delays 

in medical appointments and a marsupial visit pose the kind of threat to Engles warranting the 

“extraordinary step” of “[c]utting short a duly authorized prison sentence.” Shabazz, 2021 WL 

4306129, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Engles has thus failed to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warranting a reduction in his sentence. The Court therefore need not address the 

application of § 3553(a) to his case: “an inmate may not be granted compassionate release without 

a finding of an extraordinary and compelling reason, no matter how the § 3553(a) factors shake 
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out.” Shabazz, 2021 WL 4306129, at *6. Upon consideration of [37] defendant’s motion for 

compassionate release, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant’s motion is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

 JOHN D. BATES 

 United States District Judge

Dated: April 8, 2022