Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Allenbaugh v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,

2016 IL App (3d) 150284WC

Appellate Court 

Caption

JASON ALLENBAUGH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE CITY OF

PEORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondents-Appellees.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-15-0284WC

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to publish 

allowed

Opinion filed

June 15, 2016

July 12, 2016

July 12, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 14-MR-716; the 

Hon. James Mack, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Stephen P. Kelly, of Peoria, for appellant.

Boyd O. Roberts III and Kenneth M. Snodgrass, Jr., both of 

Hasselberg, Grebe, Snodgrass, Urban & Wentworth, of Peoria, for 

appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Harris, and Stewart 

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 I. INTRODUCTION 

¶ 2 Claimant, Jason Allenbaugh, appeals a decision of the circuit court of Peoria County 

confirming a decision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) 

denying his claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 

et seq. (West 2012)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Claimant is a police officer employed by the City of Peoria (respondent). He is a patrol 

officer and typically works second shift, reporting at 2:45 p.m. His job requires him to be 

driving for at least 65% and up to 75% of a shift. On March 5, 2013, claimant was ordered to 

report at 8 a.m. for mandatory training. The training was to take place at police headquarters 

and at the Expo Gardens Opera House. Claimant was en route to police headquarters. It was 

snowing, and there was ice and slush on the road. An oncoming vehicle crossed the center line 

and struck the left front side of claimant’s truck. Claimant was forced into a ditch and struck 

several trees, sustaining neck and back injuries. 

¶ 5 The arbitrator found claimant had sustained a work-related injury. He found that claimant 

was a patrol officer who typically worked second shift. He was ordered to perform mandatory 

training outside his usual duty hours. He was directed to bring various items of police gear to 

the training session. He left his house to attend training at 7:45 a.m. on March 5, 2013. The 

roads were hazardous that day. A third party, who was driving too fast for the hazardous 

conditions, ran into claimant’s truck. Claimant was not at fault. According to claimant and the 

officer who responded to the accident, police officers were on duty 24 hours per day. Based on 

these facts (and without explaining the legal basis for his ruling), the arbitrator found that 

claimant sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 

¶ 6 The Commission reversed. It noted claimant’s testimony that he believed he was on duty at 

all times and was required to respond to unlawful acts occurring in his presence; however, it 

further noted that at the time of the accident, claimant was not responding to unlawful conduct 

and was not responding to an emergency. It further cited the testimony of Assistant Chief of 

Police Jerry Mitchell that claimant was not on duty at all times and had no general obligation to 

intervene if he observed unlawful behavior while off duty. Respondent did employ people on 

an on-call basis, but claimant was not assigned to such duty. Mitchell did agree that claimant 

was required to report crimes he observed while not on duty. 

¶ 7 The Commission then found that the mere fact that the training claimant was required to 

attend occurred outside his usual duty hours was not sufficient to avoid the general rule that an 

“employee’s trip to and from work is the product of his own decision as to where he wants to 

live, a matter in which his employer ordinarily has no interest.” It noted claimant was not 

required to drive any particular route and that “he was not performing any activities of 
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employment at the time of the accident.” It agreed that, in other cases, police officers had been 

compensated while commuting where their employer retained control over them; however, this 

was not the case here. The Commission stated that the traveling-employee doctrine did not 

apply where claimant was simply driving his personal vehicle to his normal workplace. The 

dissenting commissioner believed that the traveling-employee doctrine applied because 

claimant was not commuting to his normal shift and the roads were hazardous. The circuit 

court of Peoria County confirmed, and this appeal followed. 

¶ 8 III. ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 On appeal, claimant advances two main arguments. First, he asserts that respondent 

maintained sufficient control over him that he remained within the scope of his employment at 

the time of the accident in accordance with City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm’n, 244 Ill. 

App. 3d 408 (1993). Second, he contends that he was a traveling employee when the accident 

occurred. Generally, whether a claimant’s injury arose out of and occurred in the course of 

employment is a question of fact, and review is conducted using the manifest-weight standard. 

Kemp v. Industrial Comm’n, 264 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1110 (1994). However, where, as here, the 

material facts are undisputed and susceptible to but a single inference, review is de novo. 

Johnson v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2011 IL App (2d) 100418WC, ¶ 17. 

¶ 10 A. Control

¶ 11 Claimant first argues respondent maintained sufficient control over him that he was within 

the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See City of Springfield, 244 Ill. App. 

3d at 411. Plaintiff relies heavily on City of Springfield. In that case, a police officer was 

injured in an automobile accident while returning to the police station from lunch. The officer 

was a sergeant in the detective bureau and was assigned an unmarked police car for 24 hours 

per day. The officer was required to monitor the radio while using the car at all times, and he 

was to respond to any calls he received, even if he was off duty. He drove the car home to eat 

lunch on most days, and on the day of the accident, he was returning to work from lunch when 

a motorist ran a stop sign and collided with him. The officer was also given a beeper to 

facilitate responding to calls. He could do whatever he wanted during his lunch break. At the 

time of the accident, he was not responding to a call or emergency situation.

¶ 12 Claimant contends that City of Springfield controls here. He argues that respondent 

maintained similar control over him as the respondent did over the officer in City of 

Springfield. In response, he points out that he was “ordered to report to the police station in a 

winter storm” and that the “roads were dangerous.” While the officer in City of Springfield 

presumably was required to return to work after lunch just as claimant was ordered—and 

hence required—to attend training, the City of Springfield court made no mention of the 

officer’s obligation to return to the stationhouse after lunch in announcing its holding. See id. 

Indeed, it seems to us that all employees are required to go to work. Thus, we fail to see how 

the fact that claimant was going someplace he was required to go for work distinguishes his 

situation from normal commuting. Claimant cites nothing to support the proposition that one’s 

obligation to go to the place where one works supports an inference that one is within the scope 

of employment while commuting. Claimant states he would have been subject to discipline if 

he missed the training session; this is simply another way of saying he was ordered to attend 

and that attendance was mandatory. Claimant also asserts he was required to drive in 
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hazardous weather, but he does not explain how this renders his situation different from typical 

commuting. 

¶ 13 Claimant relies on the fact that the training session was outside his usual hours of 

employment. We note that in City of Springfield, the officer was injured during his customary 

lunch break. Accordingly, City of Springfield sheds no light on this aspect of the instant 

situation. Claimant cites no other case where such a fact was given weight in finding an 

employee to be within the scope of his employment while commuting. Claimant points out 

that, per departmental directive, he was ordered to bring several items of equipment with him. 

It is true that the City of Springfield court relied on the fact that the officer had a radio (that was 

required to be on at all times) and a beeper with him at the time of the accident. However, in 

City of Springfield, the court mentioned that equipment because it allowed the respondent to 

maintain control over the officer while he was otherwise off duty. In claimant’s case, he was 

required to bring to training his nightstick, gun belt, handcuffs and key, tazer, holster, and 

training uniform. Unlike a radio and beeper, none of these items allowed respondent to 

maintain control over claimant. Therefore, City of Springfield is distinguishable on this basis. 

¶ 14 In sum, City of Springfield provides no meaningful support for claimant’s position, and he 

identifies no other authorities where the facts he seeks to rely on were given weight in 

assessing whether an employee remained within the scope of employment while otherwise 

commuting. 

¶ 15 B. Traveling Employee 

¶ 16 Next, claimant contends that he was a traveling employee at the time of the accident. Of 

course, accidents that occur when an employee is traveling to and from work do not generally 

arise out of or occur in the course of employment. The Venture—Newberg-Perini v. Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 115728, ¶ 16. However, if the employee is 

classified as a “traveling employee,” an exception exists. Id. ¶ 17. A traveling employee is an 

employee whose job duties require him or her to travel away from the employer’s premises. Id. 

For a traveling employee, any act the employee is directed to perform by the employer, any act 

the employee has a common-law duty to perform, and any act that the employee can 

reasonably be expected to perform are all compensable. Id. ¶ 18. Commuting is not 

encompassed by the doctrine. See Pryor v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 

App (2d) 130874WC, ¶ 22 (“An injury suffered by a traveling employee is compensable under 

the Act if the injury occurs while the employee is traveling for work, i.e., during a work-related 

trip. However, the work-related trip at issue must be more than a regular commute from the 

employee’s home to the employer’s premises.”).

¶ 17 Claimant argues that he is required to drive for much of his usual shift. However, that is not 

what claimant was doing at the time he was injured, and he cites no authority that holds that 

where an employee regularly drives as part of his duties, his or her commute is brought within 

the scope of the employment. Our research has uncovered no support for this proposition as 

well. Claimant then contends that he was required to travel to the police station and then to the 

Expo Gardens on the day he was injured. While true, it is undisputed that at the time he was 

injured, he was driving from his home to the police station. Finally, claimant again asserts that 

respondent required him to drive in hazardous conditions. We fail to see how this distinguishes 

claimant’s situation from that of any other commuter in the northern half of this country.
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¶ 18 Indeed, claimant cites no case where an employee has been found to be within the scope of 

employment on similar facts. The Commission observed, “We do not believe that the traveling 

employee doctrine should be extended to include any claimant who is involved in an accident 

on the way to their normal workplace, driving their personal vehicle without any additional 

compensation and not performing any duties incidental to their employment when the only 

basis for finding so is a department order that the claimant’s regular work shift was different 

for that particular day.” We agree with the Commission.

¶ 19 IV. CONCLUSION 

¶ 20 In light of the foregoing, the order of the circuit court of Peoria County confirming the 

decision of the Commission is affirmed. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.