2021 IL App (1st) 191535-U 

 FOURTH DIVISION

June 24, 2021 

No. 1-19-1535 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

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IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF,

JASON M. ANDERSON, 

Petitioner, 

v.

VIKKI L. ANDERSON, 

Respondent-Appellee,

and

ELFREDA DOCKERY,

Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

No. 18 D 630077

Honorable 

Sharon O. Johnson, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lampkin and Martin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Affirming the denial of an attorney fee petition under section 508 of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2018)) where 

the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees sought were unreasonable 

and unnecessary given the lack of complexity of the case. 
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¶ 2 Elfreda Dockery (Dockery), respondent Vikki Anderson’s former attorney, appeals the 

order of the circuit court of Cook County denying her petition for attorney fees pursuant to 

section 508(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508(c) 

(West 2018)). On appeal, Dockery maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

denied the petition due to the court’s incorrect determinations that (1) the divorce was 

uncontested and (2) the fees charged were not reasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On December 19, 2017, Vikki Anderson (Vikki) met with Dockery to discuss retaining 

her to file a petition for dissolution of marriage from Jason Anderson (Jason). As a result of that 

meeting, Vikki and Dockery entered into a “Fee Agreement” which provided that Dockery 

would be employed “as my lawyer to draft, file and represent me on an uncontested divorce.” 

The agreement defined “uncontested” as follows: “For the matter to be uncontested, all of the 

following must occur: (1) all paperwork must be signed by Client’s spouse, 2) the signed 

documents must be returned to Counsel no later than 14 days after the Petition for Dissolution of 

Marriage has been filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, and 3) only one court appearance by 

Counsel.” If the matter were to become contested, Vikki agreed to pay $250 for each hour of 

work performed by Dockery beginning upon receipt of the signed agreement. Vikki signed the 

agreement and paid Dockery $825.

¶ 5 Thereafter, on January 25, 2018, Jason (through his counsel) filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage in the circuit court. Jason attempted to serve Vikki with summons 

through the sheriff but was unsuccessful and so a process server was appointed. Numerous 

emails between Vikki and Dockery indicated that Vikki requested Dockery accept service of the 

petition on her behalf. Dockery instructed Vikki to wait to be served. Vikki was served with the 
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summons and petition on April 11, 2018. On April 19, 2018, Dockery filed her appearance, 

answer, and a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage on Vikki’s behalf.

¶ 6 On May 2, 2018, the parties appeared in court for Jason’s petition for temporary 

maintenance. Dockery was not present but had previously informed Jason’s counsel of her 

expected absence and requested he obtain a briefing schedule on the motion. A briefing schedule 

was entered on the motion and the matter was continued.

¶ 7 On June 1, 2018, Vikki terminated Dockery’s services. As a result, Dockery filed a 

motion to withdraw, which was granted on June 27, 2018. This same day, both Vikki and Jason 

were granted leave to represent themselves in the dissolution proceedings. In requesting leave to 

file a pro se appearance, Vikki alerted the circuit court to the fact she and Jason felt their 

respective attorneys had used their uncontested divorce as a way to make money by requesting 

unnecessary documents and paperwork and pursuing frivolous motions. 

¶ 8 Dockery then filed a petition for attorney fees pursuant to section 508(c) of the Act. In 

the motion, Dockery asserted that while Vikki had already paid her $2497.50, Vikki still owed a 

remaining balance of $3181.45 for the services rendered in the contested dissolution of the 

marriage proceeding. Attached to the petition were copies of the fee agreement and her billing 

statements. The initial billing statement which was forwarded to Vikki included services 

performed between December 2017 and April 2018. This statement indicated that Dockery 

provided approximately 10 hours of professional services for a total of $2497.50 with costs of 

$9.52. These fees primarily pertained to communications with Vikki regarding service of 

process of the petition and other client communications. The billing statement further indicated 

that Dockery was in receipt of Jason’s petition on February 5, 2018, and that she made one 

phone call to Jason’s counsel on February 16, 2018. Dockery also billed for drafting a 
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counterpetition, answer, and appearance and for filing said documents in the circuit court. She 

further billed for drafting a notice of filing, interrogatories, and production requests and filing 

those documents with the clerk’s office. Vikki had previously paid Dockery $2497.50. 

¶ 9 The May 2018 billing statement indicated Dockery provided 13.15 hours of professional 

services for an amount of $3177.50 with costs of $3.95 for a total of $3181.45. This amount 

remained unpaid at the time the fee petition was presented. The $3181.45 fee represented billing 

for drafting documents, responding to emails, and drafting a response to the petition for 

temporary maintenance, and lastly for reviewing Vikki’s answers to the interrogatories.

¶ 10 Vikki filed a written response to the fee petition in which she disputed the charges and 

argued they were unreasonable given the fact she and Jason agreed to get divorced.1

 She further 

argued that she should be returned $1445, the amount paid to Dockery in excess of the $825 flat 

fee.

¶ 11 The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Dockery’s fee petition with Vikki 

and Dockery both testifying. Dockery testified that she has been a licensed attorney since 1989 

and has “done quite a few domestic relations matters including parentage matters.” She entered 

into the fee agreement with Vikki and informed her that if it became contested, she would be 

billed at $250 an hour. According to Dockery, Vikki did not fill out her paperwork in a timely 

fashion, so Jason ended up filing first. At that point, the dissolution proceedings became 

contested, but she was still hoping to resolve the matter in a short period of time. Dockery 

further testified that “initially, I was not going to charge her for anything beyond that. But when 

it kept going on and on, that’s when I did go and send her a bill for the *** work that I had 

1 While this matter was being briefed, Vikki and Jason (both proceeding pro se) obtained 

a judgment of dissolution of marriage in September 2018.
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performed.” Regarding the legal services performed beginning in May 2018 on, Dockery 

testified that Vikki “had difficulty answering the standard interrogatories and the production 

requests and the financial affidavits.” This required Dockery to review Vikki’s answers and 

make the necessary changes.

¶ 12 Vikki testified that she and Jason agreed to divorce in 2017 and that their divorce was 

uncontested. According to Vikki, they obtained counsel to assist with paperwork and make sure 

the divorce was done properly. When she met with Dockery in December 2017, Dockery 

indicated that she would assist Vikki in obtaining an uncontested divorce and so she signed the 

fee agreement. Thereafter, Jason filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and Dockery began 

providing legal services that she did not request, such as drafting interrogatories. Vikki also 

contacted Dockery on numerous occasions requesting Dockery accept service of process of the 

petition. Vikki strenuously maintained she did not want to engage in discovery or other litigation 

tactics that prolonged the dissolution proceedings. Vikki also testified that Dockery never 

appeared in court on her behalf during the proceedings except to withdraw as counsel. 

According to Vikki, “[Dockery] did not provide the service I hired her for, and she went out of 

her way to create extra additional work for herself and for me, and then charged me for it without 

letting me know.” In addition, Vikki testified that while Dockery was racking up billable hours, 

she and Jason had already agreed to the division of their assets and that she would pay him 

$1600 a month in maintenance for a certain number of years.

¶ 13 After considering the testimony and evidence, the circuit court denied Dockery’s fee 

petition. In doing so, the circuit court first found that Vikki and Dockery had entered into a legal 

services agreement. This agreement provided that if the divorce were uncontested, it would be a 

fee of $825 and if it were contested, Vikki would be billed at a rate of $250 an hour. The circuit 
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court further found that, upon reviewing the invoice, it was “troubled” by the fact that Dockery 

was retained in December 2017, but nothing was filed in the circuit court on Vikki’s behalf until 

April 2018. In particular, the circuit court noted that there were at least three entries which

indicated an appearance was drafted, but not filed. The circuit court expressed further concern at 

the fact that the appearance was not filed earlier, particularly where Dockery was aware that the 

divorce was uncontested. The circuit court also noted the lengthy period of time it took for Vikki 

to be served process. The court noted that the only reason Jason’s counsel sought a special 

process server to have Vikki served was due to the fact she had not voluntarily filed her 

appearance, which could have been done immediately. Regarding the parties’ financial 

affidavits, the circuit court observed that these were not exchanged until four months after the 

petition was filed. In the court’s view, this was a matter that “certainly could have been resolved 

sooner than it was” and the court did not “find justification for the four-month delay between the 

time [Dockery was] retained and the time that [Dockery] filed the appearance.” This resulted in 

time and money being unnecessarily spent in an uncontested divorce.

¶ 14 Regarding the payment of fees, the court found Vikki had already paid an extra $1445, 

which was more than the agreed upon fee for the uncontested divorce. The circuit court denied 

the request for additional fees in the case ($3181.45) and found that many of those fees could 

have been avoided and noted there were no court appearances made by Dockery.

¶ 15 Dockery filed a motion to reconsider the denial of her fee petition. In the motion, 

Dockery maintained that she was entitled to the $3181.45 as the dissolution proceedings had 

become contested and under the terms of the fee agreement, she was to be paid $250 an hour for 

her work on the case. Dockery also presented what she deemed to be newly discovered 

evidence—the testimony of Jason’s counsel. According to Dockery, Jason’s counsel testified at 
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his own fee petition hearing that the divorce was contested from its inception. Counsel testified 

that Jason did not know Vikki’s address and when he telephoned Vikki to obtain her address to 

serve her with the petition for dissolution, she refused to provide it to him. He also testified that 

the parties had not agreed on the provisions for temporary maintenance and therefore he had to 

file a petition for temporary maintenance with the circuit court. Dockery further argued that the 

motion to reconsider should be granted because the court misapplied section 508 of the Act

because her fees were reasonable and necessary.

¶ 16 In response, Vikki maintained the same position she had taken at the evidentiary hearing, 

that Dockery’s fees were unreasonable and much of the work was unnecessary in light of the 

complexity involved in the case. 

¶ 17 After hearing the arguments of Dockery and Vikki, the circuit court denied the motion to 

reconsider. First, the circuit court found the newly discovered evidence was not dispositive and 

would not have changed the outcome of its prior ruling. Second, the circuit court found it did not 

misapply the law and reiterated that it found the attorney fees charged were not necessary or 

reasonable given the procedural history of the case and considering the lack of complexity 

involved in the matter. This appeal followed.

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 As a preliminary matter, we observe that no appellee’s brief has been filed in this case. 

We will nevertheless address the merits of this appeal under the principles set forth in First 

Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). Under 

Talandis, in the absence of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court should address an appeal on the 

merits where the record is simple, and the claimed errors are such that the court may easily 

decide the issues raised by the appellant. Id.; In re Marriage of Earlywine, 2013 IL 114779, ¶ 
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11. 

¶ 20 Dockery argues on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied her 

fee petition and motion to reconsider. Specifically, Dockery maintains that the circuit court 

incorrectly determined her fees to be unreasonable as the court improperly found the dissolution 

proceedings to be uncontested and therefore the services she provided were not necessary. 

Dockery further asserts that the circuit court failed to enforce the terms of the fee agreement and 

did not consider any of the six factors set forth in Patel v. Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 

112571, ¶ 103, when denying the petition. We first discuss our standard of review. 

¶ 21 Section 508 of the Act sets forth the circumstances under which the trial court may award 

necessary attorney fees to a party to a marital dissolution. In re Marriage of Ahmad, 198 Ill.

App. 3d 15, 18 (1990); 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2018). “The attorneys for the litigants in a 

dissolution proceeding are considered as parties in interest in an action for attorney’s fees to the 

extent that while such fees are generally awarded to the client, they properly ‘belong’ to the 

attorney.” In re Marriage of Baltzer, 150 Ill. App. 3d 890, 893 (1986). Thus, as a party in 

interest, the attorney has standing in such cases to pursue an action for fees himself. In re 

Marriage of Cozzi-DiGiovanni & DiGiovanni, 2014 IL App (1st) 130109, ¶ 35. Section 508(c), 

which provides that the court may order that the award of attorney fees be paid directly to the 

attorney, promotes judicial economy by eliminating the need for an attorney to bring a separate 

suit to collect fees from his client. In re Marriage of Birt, 159 Ill. App. 3d 281, 283-84 (1987); 

see In re Marriage of Baniak, 2011 IL App (1st) 092017, ¶ 11. 

¶ 22 The circuit court has broad discretion to determine the reasonableness of the attorney 

fees. An appropriate attorney fee consists of reasonable charges for reasonable services. In re 

Marriage of Shinn, 313 Ill. App. 3d 317, 323 (2000). In determining whether the fees charged 
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are reasonable, the trial court considers not only the number of hours the attorney spent on the 

case but the following factors as well: (1) skill and standing of the attorney; (2) the difficulty of 

the issues; (3) the amount and importance of the subject matter in the field of family law; (4) the 

degree of responsibility involved in the management of the case; (5) the usual and customary 

charge in the community; and (6) the benefits to the client. Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, 

¶ 103. The fees allowed should compensate for the services rendered and be fair to both the 

attorney seeking them and the party required to pay them. In re Marriage of Malec, 205 Ill. App.

3d 273, 285 (1990). The most important of the factors is the amount of time spent on the case, 

but the time charged for must be necessary to handle the matter involved. Id. The burden of 

proof is on the attorney seeking the fees to establish the value of his services. Shinn, 313 Ill.

App. 3d at 323. The circuit court may base its determination on the evidence presented and its 

own knowledge of the case. See id. at 325.

¶ 23 A circuit court’s determination to award fees is a matter of discretion and will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Nesbitt, 377 Ill. App. 3d 649, 656 

(2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, 

unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court. 

Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009). 

¶ 24 We first address Dockery’s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

found the dissolution proceedings were uncontested. This argument is simply not based on the 

record. The circuit court was aware that the matter was contested. This is particularly evident 

where the circuit court denied Vikki’s request to return the funds in excess of the initial $825 

retainer. Indeed, the circuit court found the additional $1445 Vikki had previously paid was 

reasonable in light of the fact Dockery engaged in discovery and assisted with Vikki’s financial 
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affidavit. 

¶ 25 Dockery next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it found her fees to 

be unreasonable and unnecessary; however, based on the record, we cannot say that the circuit 

court’s determination was improper. We also cannot say that the circuit court did not consider 

the factors set forth in Patel. See Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 103. We observe that the 

Patel factors are not required by statute but are part of our common law. See 750 ILCS 5/508 

(West 2018). Accordingly, they serve as a guide for the circuit court to use when considering an 

attorney fee petition. These factors are not all-inclusive, and Dockery fails to provide us with 

any citation to authority that the circuit court is required to list its findings as to each of these 

factors when rendering its determination. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Our 

review of the record reveals that, based on the evidence provided along with the testimony of 

counsel, the circuit court was aware of the skill and standing of Dockery as an attorney, the 

importance of the subject matter in the field of family law, and the usual and customary charge in 

the community. The remaining factors—the difficulty of the issues, the degree of responsibility 

involved in the management of the case, and the benefits to the client—were expressly addressed 

by the court in its ruling. The circuit court found the case was not complex and we agree. The

pleadings contained in the record were basic as was the response to the motion for temporary 

maintenance. The degree of responsibility in managing this case was minimal, as Vikki and 

Jason agreed to obtain a divorce as quickly as possible. In addition, this was not a case that 

involved complex issues such as the division of extensive assets or child custody—the parties 

had no children. Finally, the benefits to the client in the fees sought by Dockery were minimal at 

best. The May 2018 billing statement, for which Dockery sought $3181.45, consisted primarily 

of email and telephone communications with her client. She did not make a court appearance,
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nor did she speak at length with opposing counsel. Moreover, the record suggests that the 

interrogatories she prepared (and which involved many of those client communications) were not 

necessary to the case at that time. See Malec, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 285 (the most important factor 

is that the time charged for must be necessary to handle the matter involved). 

¶ 26 In sum, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 

$3181.45 in fees sought by Dockery were unreasonable and unnecessary given the nature of the 

case. Based on our resolution, we need not address Dockery’s argument that the trial court erred 

in denying her motion to reconsider. 

¶ 27 CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 29 Affirmed.