COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CHARLES MAYLAND LIMBRICK 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2568-99-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 DECEMBER 12, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

 William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 

 Michael R. McCarthy (Jarrell, Hicks, Sasser & 

McCarthy, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Charles Mayland Limbrick was indicted and tried for 

statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91 and grand 

larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95 for his part in breaking 

and entering seventeen manufactured mobile homes. The mobile 

homes were on display and serving as models on a mobile home 

sales lot located in Spotsylvania County. Limbrick stole 

appliances and furniture from nine of the homes. Following a 

jury trial, while the jury was deliberating, but before 

returning its verdicts, Limbrick pled guilty to single counts of 
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statutory burglary and grand larceny, and the court accepted his 

guilty pleas pursuant to the holding in North Carolina v. 

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). On appeal of the statutory burglary 

conviction, Limbrick attempts to raise two issues: (1) whether 

the trial court erred, prior to his pleading guilty, in denying 

his motion to strike the evidence as to statutory burglary 

because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the mobile homes 

were permanently affixed to realty, and (2) whether the trial 

court erred, prior to his pleading guilty, in refusing to 

instruct the jury that, as to statutory burglary, they must find 

the mobile homes were permanently affixed to the realty. 

 Because a defendant who has entered an Alford plea may, on 

appeal, only challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court, 

Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412-13, 533 S.E.2d 651, 

653 (2000), the dispositive issue is whether Limbrick's two 

questions presented on appeal raise a jurisdictional issue. We 

find that neither of the two questions raises a jurisdictional 

issue, but rather raises questions of alleged trial error. 

Because Limbrick waived his right to appeal any claims of trial 

error by pleading guilty, we dismiss the appeal and we do not 

decide whether the trial judge correctly construed the elemental 

requirements of Code § 18.2-91 or correctly instructed the jury 

as to the elements of the offense. 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 At trial, Limbrick pled not guilty to one count of 

statutory burglary and one count of grand larceny and elected to 

be tried by a jury. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, 

Limbrick moved to strike the evidence as to the burglary charge, 

arguing that in order to be convicted of a violation of Code 

§ 18.2-91, the Commonwealth must prove that the manufactured 

mobile homes were affixed to the realty and the Commonwealth had 

failed to prove that fact. The trial judge denied the motion, 

ruling that the 1985 amendment to Code § 18.2-90, by 

specifically designating "manufactured home" as a structure 

subject to burglary, abolished the requirement that a 

manufactured home be affixed to realty in order to constitute a 

violation under Code § 18.2-91. In accordance with that same 

ruling, the trial judge denied Limbrick's proffered jury 

instruction on statutory burglary that contained a requirement 

that the "manufactured home" must be permanently affixed to 

realty in order to be the subject of statutory burglary. 

 After Limbrick entered his Alford plea, but prior to 

sentencing, he filed a motion to set aside the statutory 

burglary conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding 

that Limbrick's plea "was accepted by the Court" and that the 

plea barred his "ability to raise this or any non-jurisdictional 

issue." Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Limbrick and 

entered the conviction order. 
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ANALYSIS

 Under an Alford plea, a defendant 

maintains innocence while entering a plea of 

guilty because the defendant concludes that 

his interests require entry of a guilty plea 

and the record before the court contains 

strong evidence of actual guilt . . . . 

Guilty pleas must be rooted in fact before 

they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts 

treat Alford pleas as having the same 

preclusive effect as a guilty plea. 

Perry, 33 Va. App. at 412, 533 S.E.2d at 652-53 (citations 

omitted). A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty "is a 

waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional . . . . 

Where a conviction is rendered upon such a plea and the 

punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free 

of jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to appeal." Dowell 

v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1148, 408 S.E.2d 263, 265 

(1991) (internal quotation and citation omitted), aff'd on reh'g 

en banc, 14 Va. App. 58, 414 S.E.2d 440 (1992); see also Clauson 

v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 282, 294, 511 S.E.2d 449, 455 

(1999) (holding that a plea of nolo contendere, like a guilty 

plea, constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all 

non-jurisdictional issues). 

 Limbrick attempts to frame his claims as raising 

jurisdictional issues by asserting that he entered an Alford

plea only after the trial court refused to properly instruct the 

jury regarding the applicable law defining the basic elements of 

the offense of statutory burglary. He reasons that his plea was 
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not a knowing and voluntary plea because he entered it only 

because the trial court had "misinformed [him] regarding the 

law" and the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty. 

 "The term 'subject matter jurisdiction' refers to the power 

granted to the courts by constitution or statute to hear specified 

classes of cases." Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 409, 527 

S.E.2d 415, 417 (2000) (citation omitted). There is a 

distinction, however, between subject matter jurisdiction and the 

authority of a court to exercise that power in a particular case. 

See Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431, 437, 527 S.E.2d 406, 409 

(2000). 

[Subject matter jurisdiction] cannot be 

waived and any judgment rendered without it 

is void ab initio. Moreover, lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised 

at any time, in any manner, before any 

court, or by the court itself." In 

contrast, "[a] court's authority to exercise 

its subject matter jurisdiction over a case 

may be restricted by a failure to comply 

with statutory requirements that are 

mandatory in nature and, thus, are 

prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of 

that jurisdiction." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 Code § 17.1-513 provides that the circuit courts "shall 

. . . have original jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies 

and of presentments, informations and indictments for 

misdemeanors." Here, it is clear that the circuit court had 

subject matter jurisdiction over the charged offense, a 

violation of Code § 18.2-91. In this case, we also find that 
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the court had authority to exercise that jurisdiction. 

Moreover, we find unavailing any argument that the circuit court 

lacked authority to exercise that jurisdiction in the present 

case because the elements the Commonwealth was required to prove 

did not constitute an offense under the statute. 

 Here, Limbrick was charged with a violation of Code 

§ 18.2-91, statutory burglary, and he was informed of the 

elements the Commonwealth was required to prove in order to 

sustain a conviction. To the extent the trial court may have 

erroneously interpreted the statutory elements of the offense, 

such an error may provide a basis to appeal, but such an error 

does not divest the court of jurisdiction. See generally

Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 250-51, 402 S.E.2d 678, 

680-81 (1991) (holding that the court's failure to inform the 

jury of a material element of the offense charged and the 

failure of the Commonwealth to produce evidence relating to that 

element was reversible error). See also Campbell v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 991-95, 421 S.E.2d 652, 654-56 

(1992) (en banc) (holding that failure of the trial court to 

instruct the jury as to an essential element of the offense was 

a trial court error that could be considered on appeal for "good 

cause" despite the fact that no contemporaneous objection was 

made as required by Rule 5A:18), aff'd in part on other grounds, 

246 Va. 174, 431 S.E.2d 648 (1993). 
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 Limbrick entered an Alford plea as to one count of statutory 

burglary in order to be sentenced by the trial judge and to avoid 

the possibility that the jury would impose a harsher sentence. 

After obtaining the benefit of entering a guilty plea, Limbrick 

now seeks to challenge on appeal those trial court rulings and 

alleged errors that occurred during the jury trial proceedings 

which were superceded by the guilty plea. "Where a conviction is 

rendered upon . . . a [guilty] plea and the punishment fixed by 

law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free of jurisdictional 

defect, there is nothing to appeal." Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 

196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969). Because Limbrick voluntarily 

and knowingly entered an Alford plea, he is precluded from 

challenging the alleged trial errors. See generally Allen v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 726, 732, 501 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1998) 

(finding that defendant, who amended his plea during trial after 

he testified, does not waive any trial rights, but rather fully 

exercises them). The proper avenue for Limbrick to have 

challenged the alleged trial errors would have been to proceed 

with trial, obtain verdicts from the jury, and challenge the 

alleged errors on appeal. 

 Limbrick entered his Alford plea knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently. Before entering his plea, Limbrick was 

informed by the trial judge of the elements of the offense under 

Code § 18.2-91, as construed by the judge, that the Commonwealth 

was required to prove and of the evidence against him. That 
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became the law of the case. If the trial court erred by failing 

to properly instruct the jury or by erroneously construing the 

elements of the offense as defined by Code §§ 18.2-90 and 

18.2-91, Limbrick's remedy was to proceed to final judgment and 

appeal the trial court's ruling. By pleading guilty under 

Alford, Limbrick waived his right to challenge whether the trial 

court erroneously instructed the jury and misinformed him as to 

the elements of the offense. Accordingly, we decline to consider 

these non-jurisdictional issues on appeal.

 We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. 

Appeal dismissed.