15-3274 

Duckett v. Foxx 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on 

the 28th day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

 Circuit Judges, 

_____________________________________ 

GEORGE J. DUCKETT, 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 15-3274 

ANTHONY FOXX, 

 Defendant – Appellee. 

_____________________________________ 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: GEORGE J. DUCKETT, pro se, Jamaica Estates, N.Y. 

For Defendant-Appellee: RACHEL BALABAN, Assistant United States Attorney (Varuni 

Nelson, on the brief), for Robert L. Capers, United States 

Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y. 

 

Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

New York (Garaufis, J.), entered August 17, 2015. 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant George Duckett, pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Anthony Fox, Secretary of Transportation, on 

Duckett’s claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 

seq. His complaint alleged that his employer, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), 

discriminated against him on the basis of his age and race when it did not promote him and instead 

chose another employee for the same position. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, bearing in mind that 

summary judgment is appropriate “only ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Kirkland v. 

Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). All 

ambiguities must be resolved, and all reasonable inferences drawn, in favor of the non-movant. 

Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). 

 Title VII and ADEA claims are governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in 

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Kirkland, 760 F.3d at 225 (Title 

VII); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2010) (ADEA). In order 

to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote in violation of Title VII or the 

ADEA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for 

the promotion for which he applied, (3) he was denied the promotion, and (4) the denial occurred 
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under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on a basis forbidden by Title VII 

or the ADEA. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000) (Title VII); see 

Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 386 (2d Cir. 2000) (ADEA). If the 

plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, and the employer presents a legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reason for its actions, it is the plaintiff’s burden to present evidence that the 

employer’s reason is mere pretext. See Howley, 217 F.3d at 150; Mauro, 208 F.3d at 387–88. 

 The district court here properly granted summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee 

because Duckett did not establish that the FAA’s failure to promote him occurred under 

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Duckett argues that because, in his 

view, the 17-question test the FAA used to choose who to promote was not a valid measure of 

competency and did not address his specific area of expertise, it was designed to mask the FAA’s 

true discriminatory motive. The test, however, consisted of questions relevant to the position at 

issue—Aviation Safety Engineer (Damage Tolerance Technical Specialist)—as fifteen of its 

questions (a) were based on a training workshop on fatigue and damage tolerance that both 

Duckett and the employee the FAA ultimately promoted had attended, and (b) concerned subjects 

covered by standard textbooks in the field. Duckett otherwise failed to demonstrate that the test, 

which the FAA ultimately administered verbally, violated any specific provision of the FAA’s 

Human Resources Policy Manual, that any such violation suggested discrimination, or that any 

other circumstances of the promotion process implied the existence of a discriminatory motive. 

Further, even if Duckett had established a prima facie case, he proffered no evidence to 

rebut the FAA’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him, namely the fact that 

he was not the highest scorer on the promotion test. See Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 
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94 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Evidence that [a] reason is false . . . is central to establishing pretext . . . .”). 

Duckett conceded both that he did not score as well as the employee who was ultimately promoted, 

and that he was not otherwise more qualified for the position than that employee. See Tex. Dep’t 

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (“[T]he employer has discretion to choose 

among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.”). 

We have considered all of Duckett’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk