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PROTECTING AMERICA FROM THE 

THREAT OF ISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 26, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Policy Director 

DAVID S. LUCKEY, Director of Homeland Security 

ELIZABETH E. MCWHORTER, Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

HARLAN C. GEER, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 14 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 17 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 19 

Senator Booker ................................................................................................. 24 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 37 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 38 

WITNESS 

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2016 

Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 5 

Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator of Counterterrorism, Bureau of 

Counterrorism, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 6 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Mayorkas, Hon. Alejandro N.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Siberell, Justin: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

APPENDIX 

Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy Report on Countering Violent 

Extremism ............................................................................................................ 53 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record 

Mr. Mayorkas .................................................................................................... 65 

Mr. Siberell ....................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

PROTECTING AMERICA FROM THE 

THREAT OF ISIS 

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. This hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for taking the time 

to appear here today and for submitting your thoughtful testimonies. We are looking forward to the answers to our questions. 

When I took over as Chairman of this Committee, working with 

Senator Carper, who, by the way—— 

Senator CARPER. A bloodless coup. It was a bloodless coup. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, he is looking pretty good, having just 

spent 4 days traveling with the President to Vietnam and just getting back yesterday. So, he got a good night’s sleep. I appreciate 

that. 

But, one of the first things we did is we developed a mission 

statement for the Committee—pretty simple: to enhance the economic and national security of America. Then, on the Homeland 

Security side of the Committee, we established four basic priorities: 

Border security: we have held, I think, 18 hearings on some aspect of our unsecured border. 

Cybersecurity: we passed the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2016—a good measure. 

Protecting our critical infrastructure, particularly, our electrical 

grid, from a kinetic terrorist attack, a cyber attack, electromagnetic 

pulses (EMP), and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD). 

And then, finally, what can we do, as a Nation, to protect our 

homeland against Islamic terrorists and other violent extremists? 

So, this hearing is really about that last priority—addressing Islamic terror and trying to secure our homeland and keep it safe. 

Not an easy task. 

For every last one of these hearings, the goal is, primarily, to lay 

out a reality, as best we can, so that we can identify—define the 

problem—admit we have it, so we can actually work toward some 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

common-sense solutions, recognizing, in this realm, the solutions 

are very difficult and it is going to take quite some time to, finally, 

in the end, defeat Islamic terror. 

I just want to lay out a couple of facts that have been developed 

by staff—recognizing again these are estimates. There is nothing 

hard and fast, but it just gives us some indication of what we are 

dealing with here, when we are talking about the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Apparently, the monthly revenues of ISIS have dropped from $80 million per month, which would be a little less than $1 billion per 

year, to about $56 million per month, about $672 million a year. 

Still, some pretty significant revenue in the hands of barbarians. 

There have been 12 confirmed cases of the use of a mustard 

agent. Three other cases are suspected, both in Syria and Iraq. 

That ought to concern everybody. 

More than 42,900 foreign fighters have entered the conflict 

zone—about 7,400 Westerners. ISIS has trained at least 400 fighters to target Europe with its external operation. 

At least eight of the Paris plotters were foreign fighters returning from Syria. The same network behind the Paris attacks and the 

Brussels attacks—it is the same network that was behind the Paris 

attacks and the Brussels suicide bombings. In total, there were 162 

victims. 

There were 1.8 million illegal border crossings into the European 

Union (EU) in 2015. The previous year, in 2014, there were 

280,000. So, you can just see that, as things degrade in Syria and 

Iraq, it is putting enormous pressure on European Union States. 

ISIS has 43 affiliates—according to some reports—supporting 

groups, globally. So, the fact that ISIS has a territory—has established this caliphate—other Islamic terror groups are beginning to 

pledge their loyalty. So, ISIS continues to metastasize. Until we finally do defeat them, they are going to continue to inspire. They 

are going to continue to metastasize and continue to be a real and 

growing threat. 

So, again, I think we have to take this seriously. We will continue to explore this. I am really looking forward to the testimonies 

from representatives from the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and the Department of State (DOS). 

With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper, after I ask consent to enter my written statement in the record.1

Senator CARPER. I think that is a great idea. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for pulling this together. I want to say to the Secretary and to Justin, thank you 

very much for joining us today. It is an important hearing and a 

timely one as well. 

Our thoughts and prayers continue to be with the people of Belgium and the people of France, who have not only endured losses 

from terror attacks in their capital cities, but also have endured 

the recent tragedy involving the crash of the EgyptAir flight that 

departed from Paris’ Charles De Gaulle Airport earlier this month. 
3 

While we are still learning the facts surrounding the loss of the 

EgyptAir flight, this tragedy reminds us that securing our homeland is likely to remain an ongoing challenge for some time to 

come—and our efforts must adapt as groups, like ISIS, evolve their 

tactics. 

The Chairman has alluded to some of the progress that is being 

made, on the battlefield and in other ways, with respect to ISIS— 

and it is a big coalition: 60 nations. It is beginning to work and we 

are providing, I think, good leadership. It is going slower than we 

would like, but real progress is being made—not only in terms of 

regaining land, but in reducing their capacity to be successful in 

that part of the world, in taking away their money, and in limiting 

their ability to finance their operations. 

But, securing our borders and our immigration system is, obviously, a key element of keeping us safe—and we have focused quite 

a bit on those topics as of late, as you know. Hearings on the Syrian refugee program, the security of the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP), and the thoroughness of all visa screening efforts bear witness to our focus. We found that the Syrian refugee screening process takes upwards of 2 years and that DHS has enhanced the security of the Visa Waiver Program—not once, not twice, but three 

times in the last 18 months—and this Committee has focused a lot 

of time and energy on that as well. And, our government also deploys special visa teams abroad to help consular officers detect 

fraud. 

Securing our borders, however, is only half of the battle. We 

could shut down all travel and immigration to this country and still 

not be safe from terrorist threats. That is because, as Peter Bergen 

testified, in November—I believe right here in this room—and this 

is a quote from him, ‘‘Every person who has been killed by a jihadi 

terrorist in this country since the attacks on September 11, 2001 

(9/11) has been killed by an American citizen or resident.’’ 

Let me say that again: ‘‘Every person who has been killed by a 

jihadi terrorist in this country since 9/11 has been killed by an 

American citizen or resident.’’ 

The people who carried out those attacks were not foreign students, they were not tourists, and they were not even refugees. 

They were Americans. And, in many cases, they had spent much 

of their lives in this country—in the United States. 

For instance, the Tsarnaev brothers spent nearly a decade in the 

United States before carrying out the Boston Marathon bombing. 

Major Nidal Hassan was born and raised in America and was serving in the U.S. Army when he committed the Fort Hood attack. 

Syed Farooq spent most of his life in California before he and his 

wife committed the San Bernardino massacre. Unfortunately, ISIS 

knows all too well that the best way to attack America is to have 

Americans do it for you. That is why ISIS has put an emphasis on 

using social media and the Internet to radicalize Americans at 

home. 

In order to counter homegrown terrorist attacks, we have to do 

our best to make sure that, when ISIS makes its recruitment pitch 

to Americans, their twisted message falls on deaf ears. But, if ISIS 

is successful at radicalizing Americans, we must also be vigilant in 
4 

ensuring, to the best of our ability, that we can stop almost every 

terrorist attack well before an attack can be carried out. 

Let me be clear. The Department of Homeland Security—and 

other agencies—are not alone in tackling the threat of homegrown 

terrorism. Congress must help. Indeed, all Americans must help. 

We can start by taking action to keep weapons—whether they are 

explosives, dirty bomb materials, or guns—out of the hands of terrorists here. We also need to improve the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect homegrown terrorism plots 

by helping them work through their challenges on encryption. And, 

finally, we need to give our Federal agencies the tools they need 

to help prevent our young people from falling prey to ISIS’ online 

propaganda. 

Late last year, I authored, with some of our colleagues here, legislation to empower the Department of Homeland Security to tackle 

this challenge. This legislation would create an office at the Department of Homeland Security tasked with working with community groups, families—especially young people—and religious leaders to develop community-based solutions for stopping the recruitment of young Americans into ISIS. Our legislation was reported 

out of Committee earlier this year. It was also included in the Department of Homeland Security Accountability Act of 2016, which 

we approved just yesterday. We need to get this bill enacted into 

law as soon as possible, so that we can further help our communities resist ISIS’ recruitment efforts. 

Secretary Mayorkas and Mr. Siberell, I want to commend you 

and your Departments for the work that you do to protect our people, in this country, from terrorist attacks, both at home and 

abroad. We stand ready to work with you both—and your colleagues both—to make sure that your Departments have the resources that you need to combat these threats. 

We welcome your testimonies. We appreciate your hard work, the 

leadership that you are providing, and your selfless devotion to our 

country. God bless you. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will both rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I do. 

Mr. SIBERELL. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Ali Mayorkas. Mr. Mayorkas is the Deputy 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Previously, he 

served as the Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), at DHS. A lot of acronyms in this business. He was a partner in a law firm and the youngest United 

States Attorney to serve the Nation when he was confirmed by the 

Senate, in 1998, as the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of 

California. In that capacity, he also served as the Vice Chair of the 

Attorney General’s (AG) Advisory Subcommittee (AGAC) on Civil 

Rights and was a member of the Subcommittee on Ethics in Government. Mr. Mayorkas. 
5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mayorkas appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,1

DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the priorities and the key actions of our 

Department of Homeland Security to address the terrorist threats 

to our Nation, particularly, following the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant’s (ISIL) November 2015 and March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris. I will be brief in my remarks and defer 

to my written testimony, submitted this past Tuesday, so that I can 

focus on the questions you may pose. 

As I articulated in my earlier submission, the threats we face 

today are more complex and decentralized than they were a decade 

ago. We are in a new phase in the global terrorist threat. We have 

moved from a world of terrorist-directed attacks to a world that increasingly includes the threat of terrorist-inspired attacks—one in 

which the attacker may never have come face-to-face with a member of a terrorist organization but is, instead, inspired by the messages and propaganda of ISIL. By their nature, such inspired attacks are harder for intelligence and law enforcement to detect and 

could occur with little or no notice—presenting a more complex security challenge. 

Confronting the world of both terrorist-directed and terrorist-inspired attacks, our Department of Homeland Security has focused 

our resources and efforts in four areas, in order to counter the diverse and evolving threats we face: aviation security, border security, countering violent extremism (CVE), and information sharing 

and support. In each of these areas, we have strengthened—and 

continue to strengthen—our programs and processes. And, we are 

executing critical initiatives to better respond to the dynamic 

threat landscape across the world. 

We have strengthened our screening protocols at domestic airports and established security enhancements at foreign airports 

that are the last points of departure to the United States. We are 

continually refining our risk-based strategy and our layered approach to border security, extending our zone of security to interdict threats as far outward from our homeland as possible. We are 

leveraging all available advance passenger and manifest data, intelligence, law enforcement information, and open source information. 

We have strengthened the Visa Waiver Program in coordination 

with the Department of State and Congress. All individuals traveling as part of the Visa Waiver Program are subject to rigorous 

screening before departure to the United States—and throughout 

the travel continuum. The Visa Waiver Program significantly enhances our Nation’s security and law enforcement partnerships 

with participating countries and we continue to work with our 

international partners to strengthen our information sharing and 

to increase our joint presence at Europol. 
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Siberell appears in the Appendix on page 47. 

We have strengthened our information-sharing efforts and close 

partnerships with State, local, and tribal law enforcement—our key 

first responders throughout our Nation. 

Finally, we have strengthened our relationships with communities across the country and with agencies across the government 

through our Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) and the 

Countering Violent Extremism Task Force. We are working in close 

collaboration to develop guidance, resources, best practices, and 

training to protect communities from violent extremism. 

I would like to thank this Committee for endorsing the Secretary’s key ‘‘Unity-of-Effort’’ priority. Strengthening and maturing 

the Department is an ongoing process. We rely on this Committee 

to work with us—legislating the joint task forces—and having the 

Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans—the office that 

leads our countering violent extremism efforts—is critical to ensuring the Department of Homeland Security is able to pursue key 

mission priorities. 

On behalf of our Department, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman—and the Committee—for your support of our Department. I 

am very proud to work alongside 240,000 men and women who 

work each day to protect our homeland. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Mayorkas. 

Our next witness is Justin Siberell. Mr. Siberell is Acting Coordinator of Counterterrorism (CT) in the Bureau of Counterterrorism 

at the U.S. Department of State. He joined the State Department 

Foreign Service in March 1993 and joined the CT Bureau in July 

2012. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service (SFS) 

with the rank of Minister Counselor. Before joining the Counterterrorism Bureau, Mr. Siberell was Principal Officer in Dubai, United 

Arab Emirates. In Washington, he completed tours in the State Department Operations Center and the Executive Secretariat. Mr. 

Siberell. 

TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN SIBERELL,1 ACTING COORDINATOR OF 

COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SIBERELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of 

the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. The Department of State is working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. Government Agencies 

to counter ISIL and to keep America safe. 

Mr. Chairman, we face an evolving terrorist threat environment 

that is increasingly dispersed and adaptive. This new reality requires that we strengthen partnerships globally, including with our 

European partners. I would like to describe some of the steps we 

are taking to do just that. I have submitted a longer statement for 

the record. 

In partnership with a broad coalition of countries across the 

globe, we have made progress in degrading the capabilities of 

transnational terrorist groups. In particular, the U.S.-led Global 
7 

Coalition to Counter ISIL has made important progress in reducing 

ISIL’s control of territory in Iraq and Syria as well as constricting 

the funds and foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) available to it. At the 

same time, terrorist groups continue to exploit instability along 

with weak or non-existent governance, sectarian conflict, and porous borders, in key regions of the world, to extend their reach, terrorize civilians, and attract and mobilize new recruits. 

In the face of increased military pressure, ISIL, al-Qaeda, and 

both groups’ branches and adherents have pursued mass casualty 

attacks against symbolic targets and public spaces. Terrorist attacks in Bamako, Beirut, Brussels, Jakarta, Paris, San Bernardino, 

and elsewhere demonstrate that these groups remain resilient and 

determined to continue targeting innocent civilians. 

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State is working to address 

and to mitigate the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and 

other radicalized individuals around the world, particularly in Europe. We are working with partners to increase information sharing, augment border security, and strengthen legal regimes in 

order to enable more effective counterterrorism efforts. 

This engagement has yielded positive results: 45 countries with 

whom we have engaged have either passed new laws or updated 

existing laws to address the threat caused by foreign terrorist 

fighters. The United States now has in place agreements with 55 

international partners to strengthen efforts to identify, track, and 

deter the travel of suspected terrorists. We have provided support 

to the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) to enhance 

its role in serving as a focal point for sharing critical FTF identity 

data with countries around the world. Fifty-eight countries and the 

United Nations (U.N.) now contribute foreign terrorist fighters’ profiles to INTERPOL. 

Many of these actions were guided by the requirements upon 

member States that were identified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, a landmark document developed by the United States 

and agreed to, unanimously, by Security Council members in September 2014. 

We continue to work with DHS and our 38 Visa Waiver Program 

partners to strengthen our vital security and counterterrorism 

partnership, including by implementing changes contained in the 

Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015. The Visa Waiver Program gives us unprecedented 

leverage to hold our partners to the highest standards of security 

in issuing passports and screening travelers—and it is vital to the 

security of the homeland as well as to the security of our closest 

allies. 

We have increased our engagement with our European partners 

in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. Earlier this year, we deployed Foreign Fighter Surge Teams, 

composed of experts from across the U.S. interagency counterterrorism community, to several European countries, including Belgium and Greece. These interagency teams are working with partners to identify concrete areas for tightening cooperation in order 

to identify, disrupt, arrest, and prosecute suspected foreign terrorist fighters. 
8 

The Department of State is strengthening our international partners’ border security through the development and the deployment 

of the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) as well as by working 

with the Department of Homeland Security to deploy key technologies to assist governments with more effectively identifying and 

targeting suspect travelers. These programs provide a highly valuable capability to countries for strengthening border controls 

through enhanced technology and training. 

Effective border security is one of the most essential tools governments possess to deny terrorists the space and the freedom to plot 

and carry out attacks. And, our efforts, in this regard, are aimed 

at ensuring our international partners will adopt and implement 

the effective procedures and technology to enhance our collective 

security. 

We are also increasing our focus on identifying and preventing 

the spread of violent extremism—to stop the radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of individuals to engage in terrorist attacks. 

Yesterday, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released the first ever joint strategy on countering violent extremism, which articulates an expanded effort to better understand and address the drivers of 

radicalization and to disrupt the recruitment into terrorist groups. 

Mr. Chairman, there is no greater priority than keeping America 

safe from the threat of terrorism. The Department of State works 

in close partnership every day with our colleagues at DHS and in 

other government Agencies to counter the threat posed to the 

United States by terrorist groups, like ISIL. We greatly appreciate 

Congress’ interest and support of our efforts. 

I look forward to your questions and our discussion today. Thank 

you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Siberell. 

Mr. Mayorkas, obviously, the headlines nowadays are about the 

long lines at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), so 

I do want to talk a little bit about that. We did have a briefing by 

Admiral Peter Neffenger in the Senate Commerce Committee. I 

just want your assessment of what is causing that. What is the root 

cause of lines as long as 3 hours when getting through, for example, Chicago O’Hare International Airport? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. If I can, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 

the opportunity. Let me separate Chicago O’Hare and the 3-hour 

lines that were experienced about a week ago, because, quite frankly, that was error on our part. That was a failure to address, with 

appropriate staffing, a very predictable surge at a peak time of 

travel. So, that was an aberration, if you will, with respect to the 

Agency’s failure to address what it was ready for. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, we can separate Chicago O’Hare, but 

there are problems at other airports. So, let us talk about the problem in its totality. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. So, we would identify, I think, three general factors, if I may—and they have arisen over the course of quite some 

time. 

First, and very importantly, we have enhanced security measures 

at our airports in response to an Inspector General’s (IGs) report 

that was published last year. That Inspector General’s report iden-
9 

tified certain deficiencies in the Agency’s protocols. And, we have 

since executed a 10-point plan, directed by the Secretary, to address those deficiencies. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Let me stop you right there. Do you 

have a metric, in terms of what those enhanced security measures 

mean—in terms of throughput? Do we have the average number of 

passenger throughput, versus what it was, and versus what it is 

today? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. So, I would have to report back to you on that, 

Mr. Chairman. I do not have that at my—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I would ask for that be submitted afterwards. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Most certainly. 

Second, over a number of years, the staffing at TSA dropped 

considerably. And, it dropped at a time—and this is the third factor—when there was an increase in travel volume. And so, I would 

say that those three factors, together: enhanced security,—which 

we will, of course, not compromise—an increase in travel volume, 

and a reduction in the staffing of our personnel. And, we are addressing all three of those very vigorously. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, talk about the staffing, because we have 

also had representatives from U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) that are having a hard time with staffing. I will tell you 

that, in Wisconsin, there is not one manufacturer that can hire 

enough people, so just talk about the staffing. Is it a budget-related 

issue? Is it the fact that we are simply not able to attract and recruit enough people? Is it an attrition problem? Are people leaving 

for certain reasons? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. There are multiple factors. And I appreciate the 

opportunity to explain—and I should, first, thank you and your colleagues for a $34 million reprogramming that allowed us to hire 

additional personnel on a very short term basis, to convert parttime personnel to full-time, and also to pay overtime, so that we 

can be ready for the summer surge in volume. 

There was a purposeful effort to reduce staffing over a number 

of years and to move to a risk-based methodology that relied on 

TSA PreCheck and other throughput accelerators, to include ‘‘Managed Inclusion’’—a program that we have since eliminated, both 

following the Inspector General’s report and also under Administrator Neffenger’s leadership and assessment of the security imperative. We have suffered attrition because of the pay that TSA employees receive and because many of them are part-time looking for 

full-time opportunities. And, there are better opportunities, in what 

can be a transitional workforce, by virtue of that part-time status. 

So, there are multiple reasons—and we are talking each and 

every one of those. We are converting quite a number of part-time 

positions to full-time positions. We are taking a look at the pay 

structure, which, of course, we would need to partner with Congress to alter. The TSA employees are not on a general schedule 

(GS) pay schedule. 

We are also taking a look at the staffing models that we employ. 

For example, we have skilled screeners—airport screeners—performing functions that do not necessarily require those talents. 

And, we want to move those talents to where they are needed and 
10 

to employ people—divestiture officers—those that communicate to 

passengers in line that they need not take off their shoes if they 

are in a TSA PreCheck line—but, if they are not, they need to take 

off their shoes, their coats, etc. 

Chairman JOHNSON. San Francisco is contracting with a private 

firm to do the TSA security, correct? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Yes, it is. 

Chairman JOHNSON. How many other airports are using that 

same model? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I know there are others. I do not have the exact 

number. Our ability to staff the security at airports is a voluntary—it is a partnership with the local airport. It is a voluntary 

relationship. But, what I think is critical, from a security perspective, is that, even if it is a private company, they must, of course, 

maintain security protocols according to our standards. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, the question I had is this: with those 

private sector contracted companies, are there the same long lines 

at those airports? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. San Francisco International Airport is a major 

hub that does have some wait time issues. They are not as acute 

as some of our top airports. And, I should say, it is the top airports, 

at peak times, that create the wait time phenomenon. And, we are 

focused, therefore, on the top 20 airports, at the peak times, and 

surging staffing accordingly. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We are going to have Admiral Neffenger 

here, I think on June 6th or 7th, so I will get into greater detail 

with him. I know he has been doing a top-to-bottom assessment of 

this. You talked about a layered approach toward border security. 

I want to talk a little bit about a layered approach to airport security as well. We had a very interesting hearing, ‘‘Dogs of DHS.’’ I 

am a big proponent of K–9 units. There is no technology that even 

comes close to the ability of the nose of a dog. Can you just talk 

a little bit about it? It has been a year under Admiral Neffenger. 

He has been doing this basic assessment. How close are we to a 

reengineering of airport security? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral 

Neffenger is a phenomenal leader—and I use that adjective advisedly. The assessment is underway, but the changes are underway as well. Admiral Neffenger has not waited to complete the assessment before implementing the reforms that are already identified as needed. 

You mentioned canines. We have deployed additional canines 

and are looking to deploy more. They are, in fact, an extraordinarily effective tool, both from a security perspective and, critically, from a throughput perspective, because individuals who pass 

the canine review, if you will, can go through expedited screening 

just as though they had enrolled in and had succeeded in being approved for TSA PreCheck. So, the canine deployments—from a 

risk-based approach—reengineering the TSA PreCheck process— 

maximizing the marketing of the TSA PreCheck. It is a security 

imperative. It is also a throughput advantage. 

We went, last year, from a daily average of 3,000 enrollees into 

TSA PreCheck to now, where we are close to an average daily enrollment of 15,000. I think 2 days ago we reached the 16,000 mark. 
11 

So, those are two examples of the reforms that he has instituted 

while the assessment is underway—not waiting until it is completed. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Well, thank you. Just so you know, I 

will be highly supportive of beefing up and increasing the use of 

K–9 units. I think that is one of the best things we can do, in terms 

of a layered approach. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I had not planned 

to address TSA, but it is something that I think we are all interested in. I flew back in from Hanoi, Vietnam, came back in through 

San Francisco, California, connected yesterday morning, and landed at Dulles, in Virginia. What I witnessed in travel there—and 

earlier in the month of May and in April—most folks on this Committee have TSA PreCheck and that is how we get through airports. And, time and again, I went quickly through TSA PreChecks 

and saw long lines of people waiting who were not TSA PreCheck 

folks. I know, in talking with Admiral Neffenger several times in 

the last 2 weeks, one of the things that we have to do—it is a collective responsibility, but we have to get more people in these 

trusted traveler programs. And, the numbers that you just cited— 

we are up to 16,000 per week, where, previously, TSA was at 5,000 

a week in sign-ups—we have tripled that. That is very good. We 

want to continue to do that. 

TSA used to have a marketing program. They used a paid media 

program. They have not used that for a while and I think they are 

ramping that up to get the message out again. A pretty good television (TV) commercial—or put it online—people waiting for it 

could be like 10, 20, 30, or 40 minutes to get through regular 

checks, while people are zipping by going through TSA PreCheck. 

That is just a great commercial—very easy to understand. 

But, the problem we have at TSA—they have a tough job. They 

have all kinds of people wanting to get through the security, get 

on their planes, and go someplace. And, by the same token, we 

have to make sure that nobody gets through that is going to create 

mischief or mayhem on an airplane. There is a tension that we 

have to deal with. 

You have a terrific leader. I do not know who figured out we 

should ask Admiral Neffenger to be the head of TSA, but you have 

a great leader—and some of the problems they had in Chicago, that 

you have mentioned, were management problems. They knew the 

folks were coming. They should have known. They should have 

staffed for it. And, it was a failure of leadership in that instance— 

and the leadership, I understand, has been changed—and that is 

good. 

At London’s Heathrow Airport, they are doing some very interesting things, as you know, in terms of modernizing the procedures 

you go through for the security checks. And, I understand that 

Delta Air Lines is funding a couple of lanes—21st Century lanes 

down at Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport—and 

that is good. We want to encourage other airlines to do the same 

kind of thing. But, I am told the processing time for people going 

through TSA—rather, through regular checks, is about 25 percent. 

Jeh Johnson, our Homeland Security Secretary, sent a letter, I 

think, to Fortune 100 companies asking them to consider paying 
12 

for TSA participation for their employees—particularly, the ones 

that are more senior. And, that is something I would urge us to do 

on our own. We all have Fortune 100—we have Fortune 500 companies in our States. Why do we not, as Members of our Committee, send them a copy of Jeh Johnson’s letter with a cover letter 

of our own saying, ‘‘This is what Secretary Johnson has asked 100 

companies to do. Why do you not consider doing the same thing as 

well? ’’ And, the private sector pilots—the Chairman has mentioned 

this. There were a number of pilots that we had the private sector 

in—I do not know, a half dozen or more airports around the country—where the private sector is actually doing this. I think there 

is an authorization for, maybe, three more of those. 

The last thing I would say is just regarding leadership. Leadership is the most implement element in any organization I have 

ever been a part of—whether it is this organization or the ones 

that you all are a part of. And, at the State Department and at 

DHS, we need strong leadership. And, you have a great leader in 

Admiral Neffenger—and we look forward to having him here before 

the Committee. 

That is not what I wanted to talk about, but it is timely—and 

it is important. 

I just want to say that the people at TSA—when I go through 

TSA, I thank the people who work there. If they are doing a good 

job, I thank them. I cannot tell you how many times people have 

said to me, ‘‘Nobody has ever thanked me. Nobody has ever 

thanked me before.’’ I tell them who I am and what I do—and people appreciate that. Two of the most important words you can say, 

when people are doing a good job, are just, ‘‘Thank you.’’ 

As you know, Secretary Mayorkas, we have had a number of 

hearings here on VWP. People are concerned that VWP is the soft 

underbelly. They do not understand how it has morphed from a 

travel facilitation program, years ago, to one that enables us to get 

more information out of the 38 countries that we partner with. 

Would you just take a minute to briefly mention some of the ways 

we have tightened up VWP to make sure that we have all of the 

information—more and more information that has value to protect 

us—and, at the same time, we protect our security. Thank you. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Carper. 

With respect to the Visa Waiver Program, I would answer the 

question in two parts. 

One is with respect to the individual traveler. An individual traveler who seeks to avail himself or herself of the Visa Waiver Program must, of course, submit an application beforehand—and we 

have strengthened that application to capture more data, so we 

know more about the individual traveler before they arrive in the 

United States. We added, in fact, 22 additional fields to the application. And, those additional fields have, in fact, elicited data that 

has been very material to our security determinations—whether to 

allow a Visa Waiver Program applicant to arrive here in the United 

States under that program. So, from the analysis and the assessment of the individual traveler, we have strengthened the application form in very significant ways. 

And, then, for a country to qualify as a Visa Waiver Program 

country, there are, of course, statutory requirements that are very 
13 

critical to our homeland security mission—and there are additional 

requirements that we, ourselves, have imposed—and Secretary 

Johnson has strengthened those requirements. The participating 

country must have a visa refusal rate that is under a particular 

percentage in order to ensure that they are not a source of visa 

fraud. We have critical homeland security and law enforcement 

partnership agreements that a country must sign and must implement in order to qualify as a Visa Waiver Program country. And, 

we use the Visa Waiver Program as a mechanism to drive better 

cooperation and better information sharing with key international 

partners. 

And so, from both a micro and a macro perspective, the Visa 

Waiver Program actually enhances our homeland security. 

Senator CARPER. Great. Thank you. I have one last quick question. In the 2016 omnibus appropriations bill, we provided the Department of Homeland Security with, I think, about $10 million for 

grants to counter violent extremism—and $10 million is not a lot 

of money. It sounds like it is, but it is not. How is DHS going to 

ensure that it has ample resources to effectively deal with this 

threat? How can we help further? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Senator. The challenge of 

violent extremism is one of our top priorities. The Secretary has 

made it one of his top five priorities. We created the Office for 

Community Partnerships to strengthen our efforts in this critical 

mission area. And, the name is actually very significant because, 

what we used to do, frankly, is we used to have discrete lines of 

effort throughout the Department—separate Agencies and separate 

offices had very important and very effective work underway, but 

we were not united in our effort. And, we were not necessarily 

aligned in our allocation of resources. And, under the Secretary’s 

umbrella initiative of ‘‘Unity of Effort,’’ we brought all of those resources and all of those efforts together in the Office for Community Partnerships. 

And, the name is important because, ultimately, the community, 

itself, is the most effective means of countering violent extremism. 

And, what we do is we equip, we assist, we train, and we empower 

local communities in the struggle. And, under George Selim’s leadership, we are going to allocate the $10 million—for which we are 

very thankful—in a grant program that the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) will administer. We are tapping into 

FEMA’s grantmaking expertise to administer—to ensure that we 

employ those funds as effectively and as usefully as possible. In 

fact, we are engaging with stakeholders now to ensure that the 

plans that we develop are, in fact, the plans that the communities, 

themselves, believe are most prudent and most effective. 

It is a very difficult challenge. ISIL is extraordinarily sophisticated and extraordinarily focused on its propaganda internationally, including its very able use of social media in its effort to 

radicalize individuals here in our homeland. And so, we have to 

counter that message—as you have alluded to earlier—and we cannot do it, of course, as a government, alone. We need to partner, 

not only with communities, but also with the private sector—and 

we are working with technology companies, students, universities, 

and colleges to really engage in countering violent extremism mes-
14 

sages in a peer-to-peer (P2P) format, which we think is the most 

effective way to proceed. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you for all of that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding another hearing on a critical topic. 

I will say, we have not made much progress. And, with all due 

respect to what we just heard about some of the new approaches 

that are being taken, I think it is hard for us to sit here this morning and say that ISIS is, in fact, being contained, which is what 

the Administration has said on occasion. Of course, ISIS is also 

called the ‘‘Junior Varsity (JV) team’’ and ISIS was called ‘‘a bunch 

of guys in a truck.’’ I think that was all misleading rhetoric. And, 

sadly, if you look at what has happened, you have to say that ISIS 

continues to grow. It continues to grow in a lot of respects. One, 

is a destabilizing effect on the Middle East—well beyond Syria 

now. Obviously, we are once again trying to retake Fallujah, Iraq. 

We have more and more military assets going into Iraq after precipitously pulling out of Iraq. 

I think you have to also say they have further destabilized Europe. The Chairman talked about the number of refugees that have 

moved to Europe—many illegally—and we see what has happened, 

obviously, with the attacks in Paris and Belgium. But, it goes well 

beyond that. 

ISIS also poses a greater threat to the United States, based on 

everything that we are hearing in public testimony. I assume you 

two would not disagree with that—that it is a greater threat, 

today, than it was the last time we held a hearing. Their ability 

to reach out to people continues to grow. When you look at what 

is happening on the Internet and the real social media communication that is going on—we are losing the battle. 

And so, my only concern about the back and forth this morning— 

and I have a lot of respect for Mr. Mayorkas, as he knows, and, 

Mr. Siberell, I do not know you, but it looks like you have a good 

background and that you are doing your best. But, I think there 

is not a sense of urgency here. And, I think, it is right that we have 

passed some legislation here, out of this Committee, that can be 

helpful. It is correct that we did provide some more funds for some 

of these important uses, but I would say on all three levels—as I 

see them, one is the military level—really going after ISIS, particularly, in Syria and Iraq. I do not believe we are doing what we 

should be doing to be more aggressive and to be able to eliminate 

their ability to attack us, attack Europe, and attack other places. 

Second, on the border security front, we continue to have gaps. 

As the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director told us, in 

this Committee, we have serious gaps in intelligence, in terms of 

being able to know who the Syrian refugees are who are coming 

to this country—and yet, they are coming. 

And then, finally, I think, perhaps, the most important area—the 

one we have not yet been able to figure out—is this—what I would 

call, ‘‘counterterrorism communication,’’ to put it broadly—and, 
15 

specifically, online. I looked at some recent data. We are facing a 

very effective online opponent. They have a very slick narrative. 

When we are asked to look at some of the ISIS propaganda online, we tend to see the stuff that has to do with violence and extremism. Here is a report that we received recently. A single month 

this summer, 52 percent of the nearly 900 propaganda messages 

that ISIS sent out were focused on quality-of-life issues; 37 percent 

hit military themes; and only 2 percent touched on brutality or violence. 

So, they are sophisticated. They are reaching out to alienated 

youth in the West and elsewhere. We see this. I mean, I do not 

think we can say that there are fewer jihadists going to the Middle 

East, can we? I think it is increasing. The number of foreign fighters is increasing. 

So, I guess what I would ask this morning is, what are we doing 

to respond to this increased capability they have—to the urgency 

of this problem? What would you say is the most important thing 

we should be doing? 

I noticed, Mr. Siberell, you talked about the Global Engagement 

Center (GEC) at the State Department. We have talked about the 

CVE effort at the Department of Homeland Security. We have 

talked about the Office for Community Partnerships. You talked 

about Director George Selim this morning. I know these are nascent groups. They are all about a year old—or less, I think, at the 

State Department. I assume the State Department started this 

new group because the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) was not working well and had not provided 

the kind of counter-messaging that you had hoped. 

Are you all working together? I think it is great that there is a 

‘‘Unity of Effort’’ initiative now at the Department of Homeland Security. Is there unity of effort, in terms of our government? And, 

would you say—maybe, I will ask you, Mr. Siberell, first. Would 

you say that we are effectively countering the messaging we have 

talked about this morning? 

Mr. SIBERELL. Thank you, Senator. The coordination within our 

government, on this issue, is definitely strengthening. It is a major 

challenge. I would agree with you that ISIL’s use of propaganda— 

the use of social media and the Internet—to propagate their message and to use the Internet as a very effective tool to recruit new 

members really has been unprecedented. And, it is not something 

that we have seen used as effectively by any other group, previously. 

I think their message has been blunted. That narrative of victory 

that they relied upon so successfully in their early period of recruitment—if you think of the 2014 and early 2015 era—there have 

been significant losses that ISIL has suffered. That narrative of 

victory has been blunted somewhat. They are not delivering effectively on governance. And, you noted the statistics on—they are focused—52 percent of their messaging is on quality of life. Well, 

they have suffered in their ability to provide that quality of life. 

And, the Global Engagement Center is a new effort. It is intended 

to build broad networks, globally, to coordinate messaging 

against—— 

Senator PORTMAN. How long has it been up and running? 
16 

1The information provided by Mr. Siberell appears in the Appendix on page 87. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Just since earlier this year. There was a new Executive Order (EO) that authorized the establishment of the Global 

Engagement Center. 

Senator PORTMAN. Do we still have the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications? 

Mr. SIBERELL. No. 

Senator PORTMAN. And, why not? 

Mr. SIBERELL. It has been folded into the Global Engagement 

Center. 

Senator PORTMAN. So, you are suggesting that their narrative is 

less compelling now because they have had fewer victories and because they cannot focus as much on quality-of-life issues? Does this 

mean there are fewer foreign fighters that are being drawn to the 

Middle East? 

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, the cumulative number of foreign fighters is 

something we have—is unprecedented. That is something we have 

never seen in any previous—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me restate the question. Are you saying 

that it is effective, in terms of what we are actually all looking for, 

which is fewer foreign fighters—fewer of these, let us say, alienated 

youth from Western countries, particularly, being drawn to the 

Middle East? Is that happening? 

Mr. SIBERELL. We believe there has been a decrease in the number of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict, yes. 

Senator PORTMAN. So, you think there is a decrease in the number of foreign fighters? 

Mr. SIBERELL. Yes. 

Senator PORTMAN. Can you give me any information on that, in 

a follow-up communication, as to why you think that and what 

your numbers are based on? 

Mr. SIBERELL. I would be happy to do that. These are numbers 

and conclusions that also come out of our intelligence community 

(IC)—their observations of less force strength of ISIL—— 

Senator PORTMAN. But, you would disagree with me this morning? You think that we are turning the tide? You think that there 

are fewer foreign fighters coming into the Middle East and, therefore, posing less of a risk to the United States? 

Mr. SIBERELL. I think that there has been a decrease in foreignfighter entry into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but there has been an increase in other places—Libya, as an example. There are other 

places where ISIL does continue to attract new adherents—new followers. They continue, as you pointed out, to associate themselves 

with existing insurgencies—and that is a problem. It is not something that is localized in Iraq and Syria. As you have noted, it is 

a global phenomenon that we have to confront around the world— 

not simply in one single place—as difficult as that is. 

Senator PORTMAN. I think it would be misleading, based on other 

Administration officials, who have testified in public—I am not 

talking about our classified briefings—to say that we are making 

progress—to say that it is decreasing, but I would love to see your 

statistics on that and where you got them.1

Mr. SIBERELL. OK. 
17 

1The Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy Report on Countering Violent Extremism appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

Senator PORTMAN. So, Secretary Mayorkas, would you say that 

DHS is communicating directly and coordinating with this new 

Global Engagement Center? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, I am not particularly familiar with that 

aspect of our communication—on the international front. My focus 

has been domestically, countering the violent extremist messaging 

of ISIL as it is targeted to the homeland. I would have to defer to 

my experts in the international arena to—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, my time has expired. I have to—thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me. I guess, what I would say is 

that this Committee would be very interested in knowing what the 

level of coordination is between the State Department and DHS. 

Let us face it, social media is not subject to boundaries. And so, the 

people you are trying to address in those communities are the same 

people who are hearing this message overseas. And, I would hope 

that we could have better communication, within our government, 

with the ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ initiative. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate our witnesses testifying today on this very important topic. 

Certainly, I think it is always important to remember that ISIS 

is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Muslims. And, 

we have to actively engage the Muslim community, both abroad as 

well as the Muslim community in our own States—and in this 

country. 

As a Senator from Michigan, I am blessed to represent a very vibrant Arab-American, Muslim community in Michigan. Some of the 

most patriotic individuals that I have ever met are part of that 

community. And, certainly, they need to be a part of any solution 

to counter the radical extremism that we see coming from ISIS and 

the recruitment efforts that are occurring in our communities. 

Mr. Siberell, I understand—or, in fact, I have a copy of a new 

report1 that just came out, I believe just yesterday, on the Department of State and USAID’s joint strategy on countering violent extremism. For the panel, could you summarize what you think are 

the key parts of this new strategy? And, how does it differ from the 

past? And, why do we believe that this will be more successful than 

anything we have done in the past? 

Mr. SIBERELL. Thank you, Senator, for the question. Yesterday, 

we did release the joint Department of State-USAID CVE strategy. 

It is the first time the State Department and USAID have released 

such a strategy. What it gets at, is the essential determination and 

conclusion that our effort in confronting violent extremism—terrorism, globally—needs to be more comprehensive. We need to 

scale up our efforts to better understand the drivers and the roots 

of the radicalization that is leading to recruitment into these terrorist groups—that is enabling these groups to continue to recruit, 

identify, and attract new members, despite the fact that they offer 
18 

only misery, death, and destruction in the communities that they 

control. 

We understand that we have had significant success in blunting 

the capabilities of groups over time and, certainly, great success 

through intelligence, military, and law enforcement efforts in removing terrorist leadership. Yet, these groups continue to attract 

new followers. 

So, this strategy is an acknowledgment of the fact that our approach—and when I say ‘‘our,’’ it is the United States working in 

partnership with countries around the globe—needs to be expanded 

to better understand what is driving people to be attracted to the 

ideology that these groups propagate as well as what can be done 

to address those factors in a more effective fashion. So, it lays out 

a series of strategic objectives, the first of which is to invest more 

seriously in research itself—better understanding these drivers and 

the factors leading to radicalization. 

It then discusses the importance of building international understanding of the effective measures that can be adopted by governments at the national and subnational levels. It addresses the importance of orienting some of our capacity building and development efforts toward those drivers, beginning to blunt the 

radicalization process, and also helping countries to deal with those 

who may have been radicalized—to deradicalize and to be provided 

off-ramps, effectively, for joining up with these organizations. 

It also addresses the importance of effective counter-narratives. 

That is an area where we are investing—and the Global Engagement Center will be leading in that effort. And, the Global Engagement Center—just to address the Senator’s earlier question—it is 

an interagency organization housed at the State Department, but 

with representation from across the Federal Government. 

And then, finally, the strategy addresses the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration efforts—and these are for efforts related to those who have, for instance, entered into the detention 

system—the prison system—and what governments can do to better reintegrate those—or rehabilitate those—who have renounced 

violence. 

So, the strategy, we believe, provides us a strong framework to 

more coherently implement policies and programs around the world 

to develop this more comprehensive approach, which we believe is 

merited. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. And, that is an overview of what is 

happening overseas. Mr. Mayorkas, if you could, please talk a little 

bit about what is happening in our local communities, as I mentioned at the outset of my time, in the vibrant Arab-American, 

Muslim communities that we have here in the United States and, 

in particular, in Michigan. I know your Department has engaged 

with the community on a regular basis. Secretary Johnson has 

been in the community as well. Could you give us an assessment 

of where we are, how important those efforts are, and what we 

should expect in the future? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Senator. Secretary Johnson has actually visited and engaged with quite a number of communities across the country. I visited Detroit a number of years 

ago, in my prior capacity at USCIS, for the very same purpose, 
19 

from a different perspective, at that time. And, I have also, of 

course, visited Minneapolis, Boston, and New York. 

Our efforts in the community are absolutely vital and one of the 

things that we are very focused on, as a Department—and, quite 

frankly, across the government—is actually being in the community, finding, identifying, empowering, and equipping local, trusted 

voices to be the critical messengers in the battle to counter violent 

extremism—whether they be faith leaders, educators, parents, civic 

leaders, or the like. 

Our Office for Community Partnerships equips local communities 

with tools—with toolkits and messages—and also helps them identify the symptoms of an individual on the path to radicalization. 

Across the Administration, we created the interagency CVE Task 

Force to make sure that the ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ initiative is not only 

accomplished within the Department of Homeland Security, but 

across the government. And so, we have harnessed the resources 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and other Agencies that are focused on the 

security and safety of the American people. We work in the communities—with the communities—partnering with them to really amplify the voices and really employ the tools to reach the people who 

are on the path to radicalization. 

Senator PETERS. In the number of communities that you mentioned—and others that I know you have been involved in—what 

have you found the reaction from those communities to be? Have 

they been active and willing partners? And, do you consider them 

strong allies in your efforts? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. We very much consider them very strong allies. 

They, themselves, share the concern, not only for the safety of the 

Nation, but for the safety of their respective communities. No one— 

no parent wants to lose a child to violent extremism. No parent 

wants to see a child travel to a conflict zone and join a terrorist 

organization. No responsible parent, of course. And so, they are 

close allies. We have brought leaders from communities across the 

country into the Department of Homeland Security—into our offices to understand their perspectives, to better understand the 

sensitivities, and to, frankly, learn from them how we can best 

partner together. 

We do not, of course, have a monopoly on the best ideas and how 

to both work with and impact the communities that we are trying 

to reach. And so, it is very much a collaborative effort. It is very 

much a partnership with those communities. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you. My time has expired. I appreciate 

the efforts of both of you. Thank you. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Secretary Mayorkas, when we have a VWP application, is that 

application cross-checked with both our ‘‘terrorist watchlist’’ and 

our ‘‘no-fly list? ’’ 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, yes, that application—the data in that 

application is run through multiple databases. And, I should say, 
20 

the Visa Waiver Program traveler is vetted at a number of different points—— 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. So, you have the ‘‘terrorist watchlist,’’ and 

the ‘‘no-fly list.’’ I assume there is our FBI criminal database—the 

recordskeeping process for our criminal records. What other databases? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. It is the ‘‘terrorist watchlist,’’ and the ‘‘no-fly 

list,’’ our law enforcement databases, which you have identified, 

and also other intelligence databases. And, I can certainly provide—subsequent to this hearing—greater specificity on which of 

those databases are checked. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. But, it is a full complement of databases. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, here is my question. When we look at the 

attacks that happened in Paris, first, and then, subsequently, in 

Brussels, my question is this: We know that many of the European 

countries, and, in particular, four countries—the United Kingdom 

(U.K.), Germany, France, and Belgium—have actually received 

some of the greatest numbers of foreign fighters that have gone 

back and forth between either Iraq or Syria. And, my question is 

pretty straightforward: Those that we know were involved in the 

Paris attacks—or the Brussels attacks—were any of those individuals not on our ‘‘terrorist watchlist’’ or our ‘‘no-fly list’’—which is 

a smaller subset of the ‘‘terrorist watchlist’’—or our other databases? Do you know the answer to that? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I do not. I would defer to our experts and I will, 

certainly, follow up with you, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, this is a really important question. And, the 

reason I think it is a really important question is that we are only 

as good as the information that we have. And, we can add additional questions on the VWP checklist, but we do not do an in-person interview with those that apply for the Visa Waiver Program, 

correct? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. We do not do a consular interview. That is correct. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. I mean, it is a pretty large program, with 

38 countries involved. So, we are not doing an in-person interview. 

We have added some additional questions, but it is really what 

comes in and what goes out that is the most important, in terms 

of how well we are doing. So, I think it is really important for this 

Committee to understand whether any of the individuals that we 

know were involved in Paris—that have been identified in Brussels—were they on the ‘‘terrorist watchlist? ’’ Were they in any of 

our other databases? If not, then we better understand why not. 

And, we better understand, as we look at the countries of origin— 

that we see if there are gaps in our information sharing. And, the 

reason I ask this is because it has been pretty widely publicized, 

for example, that Belgium had very serious issues with their law 

enforcement capability, as we know that information was shared 

from countries, like Turkey, about at least one of the individuals 

involved in the attacks—and that information was not acted upon. 

And so, would you agree with me that this is pretty important for 

us to understand? Because, the program is only as good as the information we have, in terms of how this vetting happens. 
21 

Mr. MAYORKAS. If I may, Senator, this is absolutely an important 

issue. Whether or not an individual is on a ‘‘no-fly list’’ is not necessarily dispositive of whether or not our security vetting would 

prevent an individual that would pose a threat or danger to the 

United States from traveling here. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I would agree, but if they are not on the 

‘‘terrorist watchlist,’’ which is a broader list than the ‘‘no-fly list— 

the ‘‘no-fly list’’ is a subset of the ‘‘terrorist watchlist’’—and if they 

are not at least on the ‘‘terrorist watchlist,’’ if they are not in our 

FBI database, or if they are not in some of these other databases 

that we, obviously, cannot discuss here—if they are nowhere, it is 

a lot less likely that we are going to discover them. Would you 

agree with me on that? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, not necessarily. I would—— 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Tell me why you think we are going to discover them. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. If I may—and I will keep it specific to the Visa 

Waiver Program. The application that a traveler must complete is 

a very comprehensive application. In fact, in our effort to strengthen the Visa Waiver Program, that application has become even 

more comprehensive. And so, we have picked up data for an individual traveler, who is not, necessarily, in our databases, but we 

have picked up data about that traveler and that has revealed information that has enabled us to deny that individual the ability 

to travel based on—— 

Senator AYOTTE. So, let me ask you this: How many VWP applications are there? How many are in the program? How many people? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I would have to get you that data. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, I think it is important to understand how 

much individual investigating is done on each of those applications. 

So, in other words, when I get an application, if I am an investigator, how much follow-up work is done on each application? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, what I would appreciate is the opportunity to have our experts brief you in a classified setting as to how 

we address the extraordinary amount of information we receive on 

those applications. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. So, this is just what I am trying to get at 

here. We know that there were deficiencies in Belgium. I know that 

the Secretary is looking at countries of concern, but information 

sharing is the critical piece here in order for us to protect our citizens—whether they are in the Visa Waiver Program or not. But, 

in particular, with this category of individuals, because they do not 

have to take the extra step to get a visa. And, I think it is important, whether it is in a classified setting or not, that we understand 

whether, of the individuals that were involved in Brussels and in 

Paris, were any of them in any of our intelligence databases, first? 

Second, how many folks do we actually have in this Visa Waiver 

Program? 

Third, for on a hard-copy application, on how many of those do 

we have the opportunity to, actually, individually investigate aspects of that application? 

So, that is why the lists become important and that is why the 

intelligence databases become important, because, presumably, 
22 

with the numbers, we cannot individually investigate each application. So, what worries me is that you have a significant, obviously, 

number of foreign fighters that have returned to these European 

countries—and the sharing of information with our allies is critical. 

It is also the critical piece that determines how effective our Visa 

Waiver Program is. 

So, I know my time is up, but I hope that we will have an opportunity to really break this down, so we can fully understand how 

thorough the vetting is for this program. Thank you. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Mr. Chairman, may I seek your indulgence 

to—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure, because I am going to seek your indulgence next. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. This is a very important point. Allow me to make 

a number of points. 

First, we vet every single Visa Waiver Program traveler’s application. Every single one. One—— 

Senator AYOTTE. And, what does that vetting involve? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. That involves checking against our databases— 

not only the name of the individual, but also pinging against our 

databases and our extensive holdings—all of the information that 

we collect through that application. And so, sometimes the information that is of secondary importance, if you will—not necessarily 

pertinent to the individual, but pertinent to other individuals’ identities, whom we identify on the application, has proven to be quite 

material in our security vetting. And, I could explore this further 

with you in a different, classified setting. That is the first point. 

Two, the ease with which an individual might travel from one 

European country to another, by way of example, is very different 

than the ease with which—or the difficulty with which someone 

might travel from a European country to the United States. Our 

security protocols at last-point-of-departure airports are extraordinarily robust—and we have multiple layers of security. And so, 

the travel from one foreign country to another is not to be viewed 

as synonymous with the ability of an individual to travel from one 

foreign country to the United States, specifically. 

Third, there is a difference between a refugee, to give a particular example, being processed across a border, from one European country to another, and what we consider and what we employ in our security vetting. The difference between the processing 

of an individual—the capturing of the biographic information—and 

allowing that individual to travel through within the European 

zone, ultimately, to resettle there, is a very different process than 

our multi-tiered, rigorous screening process for refugees here in the 

United States. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. Well, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your 

description, but that is why I want to know how many folks are 

in the database—or not. And, second, the refugee issue is, obviously, a separate issue than the situation of ‘‘I am a citizen of Belgium, I am in the Visa Waiver Program.’’ I am not necessarily— 

unless we know someone has been back and forth and how good 

our information is—it is really important. So, I would also like to 

know how much we are able to get—given the volume—I would 
23 

like to know what the volume is and how much follow-up work we 

are actually able to do, if we do not have someone on a database. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, I do not normally interject myself into the conversation like this, but I would like to ask for just 

30 seconds to say something that I think is pertinent. We have not 

talked a lot about the preclearance program. I hope, at some point, 

we will have an opportunity to do that. We are trying to grow that. 

The idea behind preclearance is that it pushes out our borders further and further into other places, so that folks that are coming 

through preclearance in other countries have interviews and have 

their biometrics taken there. 

And, the other thing is that everybody that comes through via 

the VWP, when you get to this country, we collect—if I am not mistaken—their biometrics. They are all fingerprinted. The program 

has gotten better and better and better as time has gone by. Is it 

perfect? No. Can we do better? Yes. We have to continue to improve 

it. But, a lot of work is being done and I think we need to acknowledge that. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I want to quickly chime in. From what 

I know—and without giving you my rationale—I believe the greatest threat we have, in terms of risk factors, stems from foreign 

fighters—or ISIS operatives—coming to America and threatening 

the homeland. And, the least risky is the United States Refugee 

Admissions Program (USRAP) because, with proper vetting, we can 

really reduce risks there, with the number we are bringing in. So, 

that is the lowest risk. 

Then, I would say the Visa Waiver Program is the next highest 

risk. 

But, I think our greatest risk is from foreign fighters or ISIS 

operatives going through Africa, into Central America, and coming 

up through our completely porous border. 

So, that is my ranking in terms of risk assessment: the lowest 

risk: USRAP; the next highest risk: the Visa Waiver Program; the 

highest risk: coming through our porous border. I just want your 

rankings, Mr. Mayorkas and Mr. Siberell. Just the ranking. No rationale. We will talk about it later in my questioning. What do you 

think is the ranking, from the lowest risk to the highest risk? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I have not ranked them. I would want to think 

about that. I think all of the avenues—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. That is fine. Think about it, because I 

will come back to it in my questioning. 

Mr. Siberell, do you have a quick answer to that? 

Mr. SIBERELL. I do not have a relative ranking of that either. I 

would say that, with the Visa Waiver Program, as I think we have 

discussed previously, this is a program that enables us to have— 

and provides us leverage—huge leverage over the Visa Waiver Program partners to require improvements and the strengthening of 

their own processes. And so, therefore, it is effectively a border security program. It is very strong. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Again, I am a supporter of that. I 

think, honestly, the ranking is kind of obvious, but think about it 
24 

and I will come back to you in my questioning. I do not want to 

take any more of Senator Booker’s questioning time. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER 

Senator BOOKER. Gentlemen, thank you very much for the incredibly difficult work you have done—and do—every day—the 

service you render to our country. I am grateful to you both. 

There were really colossal and consequential intelligence failures 

on the part of our European allies that allowed some of these horrific attacks to take place. For instance, we understand now that 

there were a lot of gaps in the ability of EU member countries to 

collect information about people who traveled to fight with ISIS in 

Syria, Iraq, and, now, even Libya—even some of the countries, 

themselves—and we now know that Belgium has a lot of problems, 

internally, as a Federal system divided by language, geography, 

and culture. There are eight different security agencies, three languages, and seven parliaments. In Brussels, a city of 1.2 million 

people, there are 19 communes, each with its own mayor and administration. Their Muslim communities are very different than 

ours, in Europe, in that our Muslim Americans define themselves 

as Americans and feel very integrated into society. European Muslims do not have that. There are a lot of challenges for our European allies. 

Within the EU, General Michael Hayden has said that EU member States share more with the United States, which is a good 

thing, than with each other. But, this allows challenges and problems in Europe, I imagine, to fester and to explode—as we have 

seen. Information sharing among EU member States, today, is 

often compared with where we were pre-9/11, which involves a lot 

of overlapping, stovepiped security entities. 

And so, I would just like to, for a second, look at what has happened, since the Belgium attack, with our European allies—and to 

see if they are starting to really change their procedures and their 

policies. And, do you believe that there is really political buy-in for 

sharing across borders in European countries around counterterrorism? Is there adequate coordination going on—information sharing and the like? Either of you may respond. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. I am happy to jump in first, Senator. Thank you 

very much. So, the issue of information sharing is critical—as I 

identified in my opening remarks—of course, critical to homeland 

security, in terms of the sharing of information with us. And, it 

very well may be true that they share more information with us 

than they do with each other, because we demand that information 

in order for travelers to arrive here in the United States, either 

through the Visa Waiver Program or otherwise. They have, in fact, 

advanced considerably in the sharing of information, understanding the imperative post-Paris and post-Brussels—and I can 

cite some specific examples. 

We are very encouraged that the European Union passed a passenger name record (PNR) agreement for the collection and sharing 

of passenger name record data—information that is a critical snapshot of who the individual is—well in advance of the travel within 

the European territory. That is one example. 
25 

Two, they have really empowered and equipped Europol as a central repository of information and cooperation—really a coordination hub—of which we participate, considerably, in the collection, 

the dissemination, and the sharing of information. They now have 

the European Counterterrorism Centre (ECTC) in Europol. They 

have the European Migrant Smuggling Centre in Europol—and 

that is serving as a great hub. I think they are making tremendous 

advances in the collection and the sharing of information. They 

have a ways to go. They do not necessarily collect and share passenger name record information with each other. They are marshaling through privacy and other interests that have served as a 

challenge in the past. I think the EU PNR agreement is, frankly, 

a milestone in that effort and I would defer to my colleague for any 

other comments. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, I would agree with all of that. I think that 

there is political will now, within Europe, for improving their own 

systems, integrating watchlists, beginning to collect PNR data, and 

to use that effectively, as Secretary Mayorkas noted. I think that 

this political will is there today. It is somewhat late in coming, but 

it is a result of the fact that they have large numbers, as we all 

know, of foreign terrorist fighters that have gone off to Syria. This 

has been a crisis for some time. The Paris and Brussels attacks 

really brought this home. We have seen, certainly, a change in the 

way that they are approaching these issues—a greater willingness 

and understanding that they need to improve their systems and a 

greater openness to work more closely with us—even more closely 

than they had been, which was already close. 

Senator BOOKER. So, after the 9/11 attacks, we created the fusion 

centers, which I think have been really effective, having seen them 

as a local official and, now, as a U.S. Senator. You are mentioning 

things like Europol, but are they really replicating what has been 

successful here, in terms of the fusion centers that we are using? 

Are we seeing them move rapidly, as we did, in that direction? 

Mr. SIBERELL. What we have seen them do—and I will also defer 

to Secretary Mayorkas—is to lay out the series of steps that they 

need to take to better integrate their systems. I think the aspiration is for, ultimately, a unified list, like we have developed since 

9/11. But, in the meantime, what they need to do is to build better 

integration between their lists and to ensure that you can have a 

single point of search against all of their holdings. And, that is an 

area where we can help them—and we are prepared to provide 

them technical assistance as they work through that project. 

Senator BOOKER. And so, on that point, the House just recently 

passed H.R. 4314, the Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance 

Act of 2016, to accelerate our role in supporting them. And, I guess 

my question is: there is a lot that we have learned, a lot of resources that we have, and a lot of technology that we have developed. How can our systems better help them improve their capabilities? Are there things that we should be doing to help share 

those best practices and to provide that kind of technology—that 

this body here should be acting on with great, deliberate urgency? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, I would say, absolutely, yes—and we 

are. And, let me, if I can, give you a bottom line to your question, 

which is that I think they are improving in the sharing of informa-
26 

tion. They are on the right path. They are not where we need them 

to be. But, we are working to make sure that they are. 

I am actually joining the Attorney General and others, such as 

General Francis Taylor, the leader of our Intelligence and Analysis 

Office, who is here today. We are going to Europe, on Tuesday, to 

address the very issue that you raise. 

We have offered our technological advances in this area, the Secure Real Time Platform, the Automated Targeting System (ATS), 

and the Global Enrollment System (GES). We have offered those 

critical instruments that we, ourselves, have developed and, of 

course, avail ourselves of in order to assist them in this imperative—this security imperative. 

Senator BOOKER. Great. And, I do not have time to go into this 

line of questioning, but I just want to reiterate, in terms of CVE 

efforts, there is a problem with government-run CVE efforts, because they are delegitimized—really the ‘‘kiss of death’’, when it 

comes to our involvement in countering a lot of the messaging that 

was brought up in earlier questioning. And, I just want to encourage the efforts that I am seeing, which are going on and that are 

allowing a thousand flowers to bloom—that are more authentic 

voices. And, one of the most authentic voices—and I will just say 

this in conclusion—is former foreign fighters, who, themselves, 

have been disillusioned with the toxicity, the hatred, and what they 

have seen and experienced. Often, they are very persuasive as a 

buffer—or an antidote—to the toxins that are being spewed by 

ISIS. I just would like to say that and to encourage you. I was very 

happy about the State Department and USAID unveiling the joint 

strategy, but I am just hoping that we are investing substantively 

in CVE—and I said this to Secretary Johnson. CVE should not 

mean law enforcement. It should really mean these other efforts 

that are going on, which are empowering local communities, helping to elevate authentic voices, and really doing the things that actually work to counter violent extremism. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, we could not agree more. And, that is 

the ethic that we are, frankly, executing. It is not our voice that 

is going to move the mountain of this challenge but, rather, the 

voices in the community. 

I attended an extraordinary, quite frankly, peer-to-peer challenge, where students from all over the world competed in developing countermessaging programs. It came from students and it 

was focused on reaching students. Facebook was a critical partner 

in that endeavor. We are working with technology companies, so 

that they serve as platforms for these flowers to bloom. We are 

working with philanthropic organizations (CBOs), the communitybased organizations, faith leaders, teachers, schools, parents, and 

peers—most critically. And, you have identified an extraordinarily 

powerful voice: those who once were on the wrong path and have 

realized the grave problems of their prior ways. 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you, sir, that is music to my ears. And, 

as a Jersey boy, it is almost like Bruce Springsteen music to my 

ears. Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ernst. 
27 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you for joining us today. 

First, I want to start with a comment, because we have had a 

lot of great discussion this morning, I think, in regards to ISIS 

propaganda and, actually, combating that. I know Senator Portman 

mentioned earlier in his comments that we really need that governmentwide coordination in our efforts to combat propaganda as well 

as, I think, to work in the communities. And, I share those concerns. I think all of us do. And, I have joined with Chairman Johnson and Senator Booker to introduce a bill that would require the 

President to combat terrorists’ use of social media. That is where 

we see so much of this coming out of, so I do hope that we are able 

to move that bill forward in the Senate—and I just want to thank 

both of you for partnering on that. And, we do have a lot of folks 

that are concerned. We hope to work very well with you as we 

move through a number of these processes. 

Then, Deputy Secretary, if I could start with you, please. I understand the benefits of the Visa Waiver Program. I know that we 

have it, but, still, there are some security concerns—as Senator 

Ayotte was echoing some of those—but we have 38 countries that 

participate in that, from what I understand. Is that correct? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Yes. 

Senator ERNST. And, are all of them meeting the necessary requirements as they go through the vetting? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, thank you very much. The requirements 

are a prerequisite to joining the Visa Waiver Program and to remaining in the Visa Waiver Program. We have strengthened that 

under Secretary Johnson’s leadership. 

If, in fact, a country—if we determine or assess that a country 

is falling short of its obligations under the Visa Waiver Program, 

then we develop a remediation plan with a timeline and strict requirements in order to ensure that no traveler that is arriving in 

the United States poses a threat to the United States. We have, in 

fact, employed that mechanism when a country has fallen short. 

And so, we are quite rigorous in the requirements of the Visa 

Waiver Program. 

Senator ERNST. Are there any countries not meeting the requirements right now? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Senator, there are. We have them on programs 

and any further details I would be happy to share with you in a 

different setting. 

Senator ERNST. Certainly. I appreciate that, because that is 

something that I think the public is concerned about, as we have 

a number of countries involved in this. And, the public really does 

not know what is being followed up on, so, I think, as long as we 

stay on top of that—if it is regular that they are meeting their security requirements—how do we check that? How do we know 

that? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Yes. I should say this underscores one of the critical benefits of the Visa Waiver Program, which is that we do have 

this leverage with another country—a country that wishes to remain in the program. We use it as a tool to ensure compliance with 

extraordinarily stringent obligations that serve the security of our 
28 

homeland. It is a perfect example how the Visa Waiver Program 

serves as a tool of security, rather than otherwise. 

I do wish the name was changed because the term ‘‘waiver’’ suggests some sort of relaxation of a security requirement when, in 

fact, the opposite is true. Not only do we capture an enormous 

amount of information about the individual traveler wishing to 

avail himself or herself of the program, but we also use the program—and other nations’ desires to participate in it—as a driver 

of information sharing, information collection, and greater security 

partnership with the United States. It really dovetails with the 

question that Senator Booker posed, with respect to how a European country does with its security mechanisms. Perhaps, they do 

better with us than they do with each other by virtue of their participation in the Visa Waiver Program and their desire to avail 

themselves of that program. 

Senator ERNST. OK. Thank you. I appreciate that explanation. 

Mr. Siberell, media reports indicate that we sent a Foreign 

Fighter Surge Team to Brussels a month before the attacks there. 

And, what challenges prevented us and the Belgian authorities 

from preventing the attacks? And, additionally, is our Foreign 

Fighter Surge Team still on the ground there? If you could answer 

that first, please. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Thank you, Senator. The Foreign Fighter Surge 

Team that was deployed to Brussels—I should first say that that 

followed on cooperation that we have had undergoing, with the European countries, since 2013, when the problem of individuals traveling to Syria first manifested itself. This is before ISIL was a factor—when it was Al-Nusra and the other al-Qaeda-affiliated 

groups. So, we have had a long-standing dialogue with our European partners on these issues. 

After the Paris attacks, we had discussions within the government to determine what other things we can do now to push our 

European partners to a heightened level of cooperation. Are there 

gaps that we can identify? So, we put together interagency teams 

that went out to Brussels and had a dialogue that was quite mature and open. The Belgian Government is open to these consultations—and across issues like document integrity, passport issuance 

integrity, and targeted screening—techniques that we have developed—that DHS, in particular, has developed—helping to instruct 

the Belgians on those new techniques—better integration of 

watchlists and improved information sharing—all of these areas 

were identified in the work plan of that Foreign Fighter Surge 

Team. 

So, the Foreign Fighter Surge Team made an initial visit, as a 

group, to identify where we would have expanded cooperation—and 

they are ongoing, actually. So, there is a work plan that has been 

developed and we are continuing to send individuals back and 

forth. In fact, we have Belgians also coming to the United States. 

It is an elevated partnership, effectively. 

Senator ERNST. OK. Was there anything that could have been 

done by our Foreign Fighter Surge Team to assist before that attack happened? Is there any way we could have helped to close up 

that gap? 
29 

Mr. SIBERELL. I am not aware of any specific piece of information 

that would have been provided or revealed by our Foreign Fighter 

Surge Team members prior to the attack. 

Senator ERNST. OK. And, I am going to jump to the Iraqi Kurds, 

for just a moment, as well. As you know, the Iraqi Kurdish forces 

are one of our critical partners—if not the most critical partner we 

have in the fight against ISIS. And, I understand that the Administration just allocated—or designated $415 million in financial assistance to the Iraqi Kurdish forces. Can you provide the Committee with additional details on where the assistance will come 

from, who it will be going to, and what purpose it will be for? 

Mr. SIBERELL. Senator, I think I will have to take that question 

back and get you an answer. From the counterterrorism perspective, I would agree with you that the Iraqi Kurdish forces have 

been among our closest partners and, in coordination with the Government of Iraq, have provided a critical counter to ISIL, pushing 

ISIL out of considerable areas that they encroached upon, including 

in northern Iraq. And, the Kurds continue to play a critical role 

with us in the coalition to confront ISIL. But, I will have to get you 

an answer on that. 

Senator ERNST. I would certainly appreciate that. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, today. I, certainly, appreciate your time and efforts. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ernst. 

Mr. Siberell, in Mr. Mayorkas’ opening statement, he talked 

about how ISIS has gone from directing activity to inspiring it. I 

would agree that al-Qaeda directed and that brand of Islamic terror was a centralized operation that directed activity. But, my take 

on ISIS is that their method of using social media has been to inspire. Outside of their caliphate—their territory—they are inspiring. But, what concerns me is their progression. They are now beginning to direct. Is it not true that there are reports that they had 

a hand in directing the Brussels attack—that they have heard different names for this—but we will call it an ‘‘external operations 

unit’’ beginning to direct. So, they have gone beyond just inspiring, 

to having this ‘‘external operations unit’’ and starting to direct attacks. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Senator, I think you have pointed out the essential difference and why ISIL poses a new kind of challenge than alQaeda had previously. Al-Qaeda was made up, effectively, of clandestine cells—individuals who had to become a member, had to be 

vetted, effectively, by the organization, and then were operating in 

a clandestine manner—secretly, in a number of locations around 

the world, in which they devised plots and challenged the security 

of our partners, globally. 

ISIL works using a completely different model. They do have, obviously, this core of individuals concentrated in Iraq and Syria. 

They have a very disciplined military structure to pursue their efforts there. But, at the same time, they make use of the Internet— 

social media—to inspire others—individuals who may not actually 

have become members of the group, but who can act on their behalf. And, that also reflects the difference in time we have, from 

when al-Qaeda was at its height, to where ISIL is, today, with the 
30 

Internet and social media—having access to those platforms in a 

way that al-Qaeda was never successful in using. 

But, if I could just answer your question. It is true, yes, that 

ISIL has identified—we know they have identified, among the foreign fighter cadre, those with skills that could be useful in infiltrating back into their home countries to carry out plots. So, the 

‘‘external operations network’’ that ISIL has developed is a very 

real danger. And, we have been working against it and have had 

some success in doing so. But, it is absolutely the case that they 

have also not only trained operatives, but that they have trained 

individuals to inspire attacks using social media—deliberately—including using individuals in the United States. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, we may be nibbling around the edges. 

We may have started to take back some of that territory in Iraq. 

But, they are growing, they are evolving, they are metastasizing, 

and they are starting to send out their operatives—let us face it, 

through the refugee flow, the enormous—the 1.8 million refugees 

flowing into Europe. And, I am going to go back to, again, my question, because I think the answer is quite obvious. The refugee program, literally, we can assure that whatever the number is— 

10,000—those refugees that might be let into this country should 

pose no risk. You set up criteria—women and children or relatives 

of Syrian-American citizens that have the financial capability to 

support them. Again, taking 10,000 out of 4 million displaced refugees—we can make sure that we take no risks with those refugees. 

The same is true with the Visa Waiver Program. I agree, I think 

it is—combined with preclearance, we can really reduce the risks. 

So, in the order of what concerns me regarding, potentially, ISIS 

operatives coming to this country—the least concern I have is the 

refugee program and then, next, is VWP. By far, my greatest concern is our porous Southern border. Correct? I mean, when we were 

down in Central America, I heard a new term—a new acronym: 

special-interest aliens (SIA). So, is that not true? And, does that 

not also point to the fact that we have to secure our border? 

Mr. Siberell, you first. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Well, I would defer to Secretary Mayorkas on the 

Southern border issues. I think those are three categories of concern and we have to ensure that our border security measures are 

effective in preventing any of those categories of individuals from 

threatening the American people. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I will also point out that, certainly, from 

what I have witnessed, ISIS is very strategic. You do not take your 

foreign force and take over vast territory in Iraq without really 

having been very strategic. And, as we watch them dangerously 

evolve, I am highly concerned. Mr. Mayorkas. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of 

all, we are very focused on special-interest aliens—individuals from 

designated countries that seek to enter the United States illegally. 

We are extraordinarily focused on that. We may not agree, today, 

Mr. Chairman, on the level of security on the Southwest border. 

That border, in our estimation, is more secure than it has been in 

a long time. 

One of the primary areas of concern—— 
31 

Chairman JOHNSON. Let me just stop you right there, in terms 

of the actual numbers. OK? Unaccompanied alien children (UACs) 

from Central America—let me get it here—in 2014—the enormous 

surge—year-to-date (YTD), through April, which is the last number 

we have, we had 25,500 unaccompanied children. As of April 2016, 

we are at 25,359. We are at the exact same level, year-to-date, of 

unaccompanied children. 

In terms of family units, we are ahead. And, in terms of the total 

number of apprehensions on the border, in 2014, year-to-date, we 

were at 261,000. Last year, at the same point in time, we were 

down to 182. Right now, we are at 223. So, again, I do not see improvement, in terms of the security of our border. It just has not 

improved. And, it represents an enormous risk. 

I will let you finish. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of 

all, the unaccompanied children and the family units pose a unique 

challenge because, by and large, those individuals, fleeing the three 

Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, do not seek to evade law enforcement. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Again, I really do not want you discussing that because it really has nothing to do with ISIS. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. OK. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I was just pointing out that fact, in terms 

of lax security on our border. If you want to talk about the numbers I did—the total apprehensions, which are pretty much on par 

with where we were in 2014. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. And, 2014 was far different—and far lower— 

than in prior years. But, if I may, getting to the point of how we 

ensure the security of the border—and, specifically, with respect to 

the terrorist threat—one of the challenges in the smuggling of individuals, is the transnational criminal organizations (TOCs) and 

their participation in the smuggling of individuals. We have no evidence that suggests that they are willing participants in the smuggling of individuals who are members of terrorist organizations. In 

fact, we have quite the opposite—that they wish no part in the 

overt smuggling—participation in the smuggling of terrorists. And, 

perhaps, it is—and it would make sense that it is—for fear that 

they would bring the even greater force of the United States to 

bear on their organizations. 

The question is: Are there low-level individuals in these organizations who, unwittingly, may be smuggling an individual in, from 

one of these countries, who is, in fact, a terrorist? And, we are very 

focused on that. Our law enforcement officers—our Border Patrol 

agents—are extraordinarily focused on that and we have not observed any increasing concern. But, that does not suggest that we 

have not increased our vigilance. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to return to the last part of the conversation. I want 

to go back to what—I quoted Peter Bergen just a moment ago. I 

will ask my staff to find that quote for me. 

We have been down to the border—down in Central America— 

and, as we know, the reason why those people—kids and families— 
32 

are coming up here is because they live hellacious lives. It is dangerous. There is a lack of hope and a lack of opportunity. And, the 

Chairman has put his finger on the root cause in earlier conversations we have had here. And, that is our insatiable demand for 

drugs. And, we send money and guns down to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador and they send drugs. And, the gangs and 

the folks that get our money and guns use them to make life miserable for folks. If we lived down there and we had kids, we would 

probably want to come up here as well. 

So, anyway, it is a ‘‘needle in a haystack’’ problem. I think of the 

border as a ‘‘needle in a haystack’’ problem. We can find ways to 

make the needles bigger—and we do that with force multipliers— 

not just for Border Patrol, but force multipliers in the air, on the 

ground, and so forth. But, we also need to make the haystack a lot 

smaller. And, part of that is the work that we are doing in partnership with these three Central American countries. It is their 

version of Plan Colombia, the partnership that they have established and that we are helping to support. 

I told the Chairman a few minutes ago that I thought he asked 

a number of important questions, but one of them was to kind of 

rank the order of the threat. And, he said, I think, wisely, that 

these people—these guys would be stupid to bed down for 2 years 

in a refugee program—and a most toughly vetted program, I think, 

for people coming to this country—and for the outside chance they 

would ever get here after 2 years. They are not going to do that. 

VWP will make that more and more difficult. We need to continue 

to tighten that. Preclearance—we need to grow that—and some of 

the other things that we have talked about. 

But, I want to go back to what Peter Bergen said right here, in 

this room, when he was testifying—I think it was last November. 

In his words: ‘‘Every person who has been killed by a jihadi terrorist in this country, since 9/11, has been killed by an American 

citizen or resident.’’ Has been killed by an American citizen or resident. And, our focus, wisely, needs to be on how we reach out to 

folks in this country and make sure that they do not become 

radicalized. And, we cannot do it by ourselves. We need great partnerships. We need to grow those partnerships and to work with 

families and organizations—faith leaders and so forth—and continue to work there. We need to fund it and to make that program 

as effective as we can. 

I have talked to folks in other countries to see why they are so 

challenged in Europe by some of the folks in their Muslim community—and they have had incredible migration. We have had, relatively, little, but they have had incredibly large numbers—millions of people—going from Syria and other places into Europe. 

And, a lot of times, when they get to those countries, they are not 

very warmly welcomed and they end up leading isolated lives in 

communities by themselves—blocked off. And, they perceive that 

they are not welcome there and that there is not much hope or opportunity. And, they are very susceptible to radicalization. 

One of the keys to our tamping down on those threats, here— 

they are not gone, because people still get radicalized here—but we 

want people, when they come from Syria or when they come from 

these other countries, where they are fleeing horror—once we make 
33 

sure they are not a threat—we want them to feel a part of this 

country and a part of the ‘‘American Dream.’’ And, to the extent 

that we can continue to keep that alive, we will provide, probably, 

a lot more safety and security for our people than by doing a lot 

of the other things that we are talking about here today. 

Senator Portman asked some questions about ISIS’ campaign 

success and so forth. I just asked my staff to pull out really quickly, 

some metrics—we like metrics here. And, I just wanted to hit a 

couple of bullet points. 

ISIS’ recent losses have been severe. They have lost about 40 

percent of the territory that they once held in Iraq. Coalition forces 

have killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters and 20 key ISIS leaders, in recent months, including ISIS’ chief propagandist and executioner. Just over a week ago, American forces carried out a strike, 

you may recall, that led to the deaths of ISIS’ finance chief and second in command, simultaneously, which enhanced the capabilities 

of the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. As we know, Iraqi forces recaptured Ramadi from ISIS in January of this year. Campaigns to 

seize the ISIS strongholds of Mosul and Fallujah are well underway. 

In May 2016—this month—the FBI Director James Comey said 

that the rate at which Americans are joining ISIS has dropped precipitously in the last 9 months. In 2014, 6 to 10 Americans were 

leaving to join ISIS. I believe that was every month. Today, it is 

down to about one per month. 

In May 2016, ISIS announced that ISIL control 14 percent of 

Iraqi territory. That is down from about 40 percent. The U.S. 

Treasury Department also estimates that, due to the combination 

of falling oil prices, smuggling interdiction, and coalition air 

strikes, ISIS’ oil revenues, which feed their efforts, are down to as 

low as $250 million per year. That is about half of what they used 

to be. 

Are we done? Is it time to spike the football? No. Is what we are 

doing working? Yes. And, we need to continue to do more of that— 

find out what works and do more of that. 

I have a couple of questions and I would just ask for short answers. Mr. Siberell, can you describe for us the kinds of improvements that the Foreign Fighter Surge Team is helping the Belgians 

to implement? Additionally, is there the possibility for these teams 

to be deployed to other countries in Europe? Just very briefly. 

Mr. SIBERELL. Yes, the increased and enhanced information sharing, integration of watchlists, and risk-based traveler screening— 

techniques that we have developed, in the United States, that 

would be helpful to the Belgians and other governments—and we 

are looking to deploy those in other European countries. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Ali, in your testimony, you 

referenced a method by which homegrown extremists support ISIS 

missions through online hacking. I think you called it ‘‘doxing.’’ 

Can you just explain, in a little more detail, how this works and 

how the Department can help to counter this threat? Thank you. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. ‘‘Doxing’’ 

is the practice of taking the name and whatever information is 

available about an individual and publishing the name and that information and identifying that individual as a potential target of 
34 

terrorism. And so, ISIL and other terrorist organizations will, essentially, ‘‘dox’’—will take, for example, information about military 

personnel that they pick off of a website—and they will publish it. 

And, they will identify those individuals as potential targets. 

Senator CARPER. Good. And, one last question for you, Ali. How 

would we, with respect to soft targets—protecting soft targets—how 

would we increase the security of traditionally unsecured areas, let 

us say, of an airport? And, how would we do so in a way that does 

not further encumber the wait times for air travelers? And, could 

you just share with us, maybe, a step or two that DHS has taken 

towards that goal, please? 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you, Senator. So, soft targets have been 

an area of our focus for quite some time—the airports, specifically—even before Brussels. As a matter of fact, I visited Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) a little over a month ago. I met 

with the leaders of airport security there to talk about how they 

secure the perimeter. This was post-Brussels, but they had started 

long before. They had visited Israel, which has a great deal of experience in airport security as a place of mass assembly—and they 

have instituted quite a number of safeguards. The equipment at 

the airport and the manner in which the airport was both designed 

and built very much had security in mind. 

We worked through our National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). 

Senator CARPER. I like ‘‘DHS.’’ 

Mr. MAYORKAS. As do I. [Laughter.] 

That organization, under the leadership of Caitlin Durkovich, in 

our critical infrastructure arena, has worked with mall operators, 

theater owners, restaurant owners, and throughout the private sector, to ensure that they are properly trained and properly equipped 

to respond as soft targets to a potential mass casualty event. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. Thank you both for 

being here today. Thank you for your work and for your commitment and devotion to our country as well as your leadership in 

your respective Departments. This has been a good hearing. This 

is a threat that is going to be around facing us, in this country and 

around the world, for, maybe, as long as we are going to be 

around—and, certainly, for as far as the eye can see. Have we figured out, entirely, how to deal with it? No. These guys change their 

tactics and, over time, we have to change what we are doing in response. I think we are doing a lot of smart stuff—some of the smart 

things that we need to do. And, when I went back, Mr. Chairman, 

over to Vietnam earlier this week—and I was talking to a number 

of folks in that country, where we have a much better partnership 

than I would have ever imagined when I was a naval flight officer 

(NFO) over there during the Vietnam War. But, the spirit of working together, almost as a team, in many respects, is pretty amazing, given our history there. But, I used this phrase and I think 

it, probably, is germane here as well. What I said to the Vietnamese was, ‘‘If you want to go fast, travel alone. If you want to 

go far, travel together.’’ ‘‘If you want to go far, travel together.’’ 

And, that is really what we are trying to do here—not just in our 

country—and the Congress, the Executive Branch, the military, 

and so forth—Homeland Security—but all across the world. Folks 
35 

know this is a cancer on our planet. And, we have to deal with it. 

But, if we go together, work together, and pull together, we will go 

a long way—and we need to. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. MAYORKAS. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. Unfortunately, 

what you are saying is true—that we are going to be living with 

this for quite some time. And, it is unfortunate. We are, certainly, 

old enough to remember what the world felt like before global Islamic terror raised its ugly head and started slaughtering people. 

It is a reality that I wish did not exist, but it is one that does 

exist. I think this hearing—as I mentioned to the witnesses beforehand, the purpose of every hearing—the goal of every hearing is to 

deepen our understanding and to lay out the realities—whether, we 

like them or not, we have to face them. And, that is kind of what 

I have been trying to point out. Here is the reality of the situation—not whether we like it, but we have to face it, so we can actually deal with it, effectively. 

Again, I certainly appreciate the witnesses’ time, your thoughtful 

answers to our questions, and we will keep working forward. This 

is going to be a long struggle. But, we will shorten it if we actually 

admit we have the problem and face it the way we have to: as a 

committed coalition of the willing—of the civilized portions of the 

world, because this is an attack on civilization and it has to be defeated. 

So, with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days 

until June 10 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(37) 

A P P E N D I X 
38 

Statement of Ranking Member Tom Carper 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

Thursday, May 26,2016 

As prepared for delivery: 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to examine how our government is working to 

keep Americans safe in light of the recent terror attacks we've seen around the world. Our 

thoughts and prayers continue to be with the people of Belgium and France, who have not only 

endured losses from terror attacks in their capital cities, but also the recent tragedy involving the 

disappearance of the EgyptAir flight that departed from Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris. 

While we are stillleaming the facts surrounding the loss of the EgyptAir flight, this tragedy 

reminds us that securing our homeland is likely to remain an ongoing challenge for some time to 

come. Our efforts must adapt as groups like ISIS evolve their tactics. 

Securing our borders and our immigration system is obviously a key element of keeping us safe, 

and we've focused quite a bit on those topics of late. Hearings on the Syrian refugee program, 

the security of the visa waiver program, and the thoroughness of all visa screening efforts bear 

witness to our focus. We found that the Syrian refugee screening process takes upwards of two 

years, that DHS has enhanced the security of the Visa Waiver program three times in the past 18 

months, and that our government deploys special visa teams abroad to help consular officers 

detect fraud. 

Securing our borders, however, is only half the battle. We could shut down all travel and 

immigration to this country and still not be safe from terrorist threats. That's because--as Peter 

Bergen testified in November-'every person who's been killed by ajihadi terrorists in this 

country since 9/11 has been killed by an American citizen or resident.' The people who carried 

out these attacks weren't foreign students, tourists or refugees. They were American citizens or 

legal residents. And in many cases, they had spent much of their lives in the United States. 

For instance, the Tsamaev brothers spent nearly a decade in the United States before carrying out 

the Boston Marathon bombing. Major Nidal Hassan was born and raised in America and was 

serving in the U.S. Army when he committed the Fort Hood attack. Syed Farooq spent most of 

his life in California before he and his wife committed the San Bernardino massacre. 

Unfortunately, ISIS knows all too well that the best way to attack America is to have Americans 

do it for you. That's why ISIS has put an emphasis on using social media and the internet to 

radicalize Americans here at home. 

In order to counter homegrown terrorist attacks, we have to do our best to make sure that, when 

ISIS makes its recruitment pitch to Americans, their twisted message falls on deaf ears. But if 

ISIS is successful at radicalizing Americans, we must also be vigilant in ensuring-to the best of 

our ability-that we can stop almost any terrorist plot well before an attack can be carried out. 

Let me be clear. DHS and other agencies are not alone in tackling the threat of homegrown 

terrorism. Congress must help. Indeed, all Americans must help. We can start by taking action to 
39 

keep weapons-whether they are explosives, dirty bomb materials, or guns--out of the hands of 

terrorists. We also need to improve the ability of our Jaw enforcement and intelligence agencies 

to detect homegrown terrorism plots by helping them work through their challenges on 

encryption. Finally, we need to give our federal agencies the tools they need to help prevent our 

young people from falling prey to ISIS's online propaganda. 

Late last year, I authored legislation to empower the Department of Homeland Security to tackle 

this challenge. This bill would create an office at DHS tasked with working with community 

groups, families--especially young people-and religious leaders to develop community-based 

solutions for stopping the recruitment of young Americans into ISIS. My bill was reported out of 

committee earlier this year. It was also included in the DHS Accountability Act we approved 

yesterday. We need to get this bill enacted into law as soon as possible so that we can further 

help our communities resist ISIS's recruitment efforts. 

Secretary Mayorkas and Mr. Siberell, I want to commend you and your departments for the work 

you do to protect Americans from terrorist attacks at home and abroad. We stand ready to work 

with you both to make sure that your Departments have the resources you need to combat these 

threats. Thank you both for your testimony. Thank you even more for your leadership and for 

your selfless devotion to serving this country of ours. We look forward to a very productive 

hearing. 
40 

Statement for the Record 

The Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas 

Deputy Secretary 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Before the 

United States Senate 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

Regarding 

"Steps Taken by the Department of Homeland Security to Mitigate the Threat 

to the Homeland from ISIS and Mfiliated Terrorist Groups and our Response 

in the Wake of the Brussels Terror Attacks" 

May26, 2016 
41 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss priorities and key actions of the 

Department of Homeland Security to address terrorist threats to our Nation, particularly 

following the Islamic State oflraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) November 2015 and March 2016 

terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. 

The threats we face today are more complex and decentralized than they were a decade ago. As 

Secretary Johnson has said, we are in a new phase in the global terrorist threat. We have moved 

from a world of terrorist-directed attacks to a world that increasingly includes the threat of 

terrorist-inspired attacks, one in which the attacker may never have come face-to-face with a 

member of a terrorist organization who lives among us and radicalizes, inspired perhaps by the 

messages and propaganda ISIL disseminates through its use of social media. By their nature, 

such inspired attacks are harder for intelligence and law enforcement to detect and could occur 

with little or no notice, presenting a more complex security challenge. 

Lone offenders who tend to have few contacts or outward indicators that allow for early 

identification pose the most likely threat of violence in the Homeland today. ISIL is actively 

trying to inspire such individuals. The group consistently releases high-quality English-language 

videos and magazines promoting its alleged caliphate and calling for supporters in the West to 

pursue attacks in their homelands. The group's supporters are also "doxing" individualsgathering personal information through open source research and sometimes through hackingand then publically disseminating the information and calling for attacks against these 

individuals. ISIL uses social media to publicly post this data, which has included names and 

addresses of U.S. military, law enforcement, and government personnel. Similarly, Al-Qa'ida is 

working to inspire potential followers in the West. Earlier this month the group's Yemen-based 

affiliate, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), released its latest issue of Inspire 

magazine, which promotes "professional assassinations" in the United States and provides a 

range of bomb-making tips. 

Working effectively with state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners is the key to 

countering the threat from individuals who are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations. We 

define these individuals as "homegrown violent extremists." During the past two years, 

homegrown violent extremists have been inspired primarily by ISIL due to the group's robust 

English-language propaganda campaign, perceived military successes in Syria and Iraq and 

attacks in other countries, and the unique lure of the group's alleged caliphate. In 2014, the 

Federal Bureau oflnvestigation arrested approximately one dozen U.S.-based ISIL supporters. 

In 2015, that number increased to approximately five dozen. The majority of arrests were for 

attempting to travel overseas to join ISIL or for pursuing Homeland plotting on ISIL's behalf. 

While homegrown violent extremists present the most likely terrorist threat today, we remain 

concerned about potential plots emanating from overseas. As the horrific attacks in Paris and 

Brussels made clear, Syria and Iraq-based ISIL members are involved in operations targeting 

Western nations. We continue to assess that complex, coordinated operations similar to ISIL's 

attacks in Paris and Brussels are more likely to occur in Western Europe than in the United 

States, due to the geographic proximity of Europe to Syria and Iraq and Europe's larger number 
42 

of returning foreign fighters. Nonetheless, the group's leadership wants to launch attacks in the 

home countries of its perceived Western adversaries. 

Secretary Johnson focused our resources in four areas in order to counter the diverse and 

evolving terrorist threats we face: 

1. Aviation security; 

2. Border security; 

3. Countering violent extremism; and, 

4. Information sharing and support. 

I will identify several of our initial initiatives in each of these priority areas. 

Aviation Security 

Securing commercial aviation and protecting the traveling public is a key priority of ours. The 

threats are diverse, including the attempt to smuggle explosives or weapons on board aircraft, 

ground-based attacks, and hijacking. We have strengthened our screening protocols at domestic 

airports to ensure that operatives or threatening objects do not enter the secure area of the 

airports. Transportation Security Administration's Peter Neffenger has implemented a robust 

security enhancement plan, including the more focused training ofTSA personnel, the 

elimination of the managed inclusion program, and the deployment of additional canine teams. 

After a December 2014 airport insider threat incident at Hartfield-Jackson-Atlanta airport, our 

Department asked the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to recommend adjustments to 

defend against aviation employees who might seek to bypass security to smuggle weapons or 

explosives into an airport's secure area. In response to the Committee's subsequent report, TSA 

is reducing the number of access points to airports' secure areas, coordinating with the FBI to 

conduct real-time recurrent criminal background checks of employees with secure area access, 

and encouraging airport employees to report suspicious activity. 

Security enhancements also have been undertaken in foreign airports, particularly in airports that 

are last points of departure to the United States. Since July 2014 our Department has required 

enhanced screening at select overseas airports. The United Kingdom and other countries have 

followed suit with similar security enhancements, and the European Union recently passed 

legislation to enhance passenger screening. We continue to expand our aviation security training 

to foreign partners, sharing best practices and also loaning equipment to better ensure the 

effectiveness of passenger screening. 

The sharing of information with international partners is a critical security measure to address the 

challenges that international travel presents. We have strengthened our sharing agreements and 

protocols with foreign partners and are continuing to work closely with law enforcement and 

intelligence community partners to screen for watchlisted terrorist subjects. 

Our work continues. Earlier this year TSA directed a nationwide vulnerability assessment of 

airports, in collaboration with airport operators and stakeholders. These assessments were 
43 

completed last month and we are now further enhancing security with localized mitigation plans 

designed to address specific local vulnerabilities. This collaborative approach has been embraced 

by our stakeholders and is delivering enhanced airport security nationwide. 

Border Security 

In response to the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist groups potentially trying to gain access 

to the Homeland, U.S. Customs and Border Protection is continually refining its risk-based 

strategy and layered approach to border security, extending our zone of security to interdict 

threats as far outward from the Homeland as possible to interdict threats before they ever reach 

the United States. 

Operating at 328 official ports of entry across the Nation, CBP processes nearly one million 

travelers each day. Approximately, 30 percent of these travelers-more than I 00 million per 

year-arrive via commercial aviation. 

To mitigate the potential threat offoreign fighters who attempt to travel to and from Syria, CBP 

leverages all available advance passenger and manifest data, including Passenger Name Records, 

Advanced Passenger Information System data, previous entry information, intelligence, law 

enforcement information, and open source information, to detect foreign fighters and others who 

pose a potential threat to the United States. Equally important, CBP works in close partnership 

with carriers and its international counterparts to prevent passengers who may pose a security 

threat, or who are otherwise inadmissible, from boarding flights to the United States. 

Another key part ofCBP's efforts involves the screening of individuals traveling to the United 

States under the Visa Waiver Program. Over the last 18 months, DHS, in coordination with the 

Department of State and Congress, has initiated a series of changes to the Visa Waiver Program 

to strengthen its security and ensure that the program's requirements are commensurate with the 

growing threat from foreign fighters, especially those who are nationals of Visa Waiver Program 

countries. 

In November 2014, CBP introduced additional data fields to the Electronic System for Travel 

Authorization (ESTA) application that Visa Waiver Program travelers must complete before 

boarding a plane or ship to the United States. These enhancements have strengthened the 

security of the Visa Waiver Program. 

On August 6, 2015, DHS introduced further security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program, 

requiring member countries to enhance traveler vetting, data collection, and information sharing; 

use INTERPOL's Stolen and Lost Travel Document database; and, cooperate in the screening of 

refugees and asylum seekers. The August 2015 enhancements also introduced a requirement for 

all Visa Waiver Program travelers to use electronic passports (e-passports) for travel to the 

United States, improving our ability to verify the identity of the individual using the passport. 

In December 2015, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2015 codified many of these enhancements into law and established new travel and dual 

nationality restrictions for Visa Waiver Program applicants. As a result, DHS implemented new 
44 

ESTA questions regarding an individual's presence in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, and dual 

nationality with Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria, to improve the security of the Visa Waiver Program 

and the protection of our borders. 

Between the ports of entry, along our Southwest, Northern, and coastal borders, CBP extends our 

zone of security past our physical borders by using actionable information developed through 

integrated domestic and international partnerships. CBP works in collaboration with other DHS 

components and our interagency and international partners to monitor networks and patterns of 

illicit activity and to detect and effectively counter threats along and approaching our borders. 

Countering Violent Extremism 

Countering violent extremism is a critical component of the effort to counter the threat of 

homegrown violent extremists motivated by a variety of ideologies. In September 2015 our 

Department established the Office for Community Partnerships. Since its inception, the Office 

for Community Partnerships has worked to enhance existing relationships with communities 

across the country; build new relationships with the technology, marketing, and philanthropic 

sectors; and, find innovative ways to support those who are discouraging violent extremism. 

Advancing countering violent extremism efforts also requires working in a unified and 

coordinated way across the U.S. Government. In January 2016, we established the countering 

violent extremism Task Force in partnership with other departments and agencies. Currently, 

our Department chairs and hosts this Task Force which includes a Deputy Director from the 

Department of Justice. The Task Force will synchronize and integrate whole-of-government 

countering violent extremism programs and activities, leverage new efforts, conduct ongoing 

strategic planning, and assess and evaluate other countering violent extremism programs and 

activities. 

The Office for Community Partnerships and the Task Force are focused on working with 

stakeholders to prevent terrorist groups from radicalizing individuals to violence. Countering 

violent extremism stakeholders include federal, state, and local governments and law 

enforcement, civic and faith leaders, educators, social service organizations, mental health 

providers and the private sector. To achieve this, we are partnering with and empowering 

communities by providing them a wide range of resources to challenge violent extremism. Our 

efforts are a federally driven and locally implemented network of programs and resources aimed 

at applying tailored approaches to today's threats throughout the country. 

Secretary Johnson has personally met with community members in 12 major cities across the 

country and intends to meet with many more. I have also personally met with community 

members in Boston and Minneapolis where, along with Los Angeles, the Department has worked 

with members of those communities to facilitate the development of countering violent 

extremism prevention frameworks. 

To ensure that countering violent extremism efforts are adequately funded, the Office for 

Community Partnerships will soon send a formal notification to the public of an opportunity to 
45 

request part of the new appropriation of$10 million in funding for developing local countering 

violent extremism efforts. Specifically, this funding will facilitate the development of programs 

and curricula for law enforcement, community organizations, educators, and others to help them 

prevent violent extremism of all kinds. Providing federal funding at this level on a competitive 

basis for the specific purpose of supporting local work to counter violent extremism represents 

the emphasis we place on these important efforts. 

Information Sharing and Support 

The rapid exchange of information and intelligence is critical to protecting the Homeland, and 

our efforts in this arena have come a long way since the September 11th attacks. Today, state and 

local law enforcement organizations instantly run suspect names against counterterrorism 

databases, and we have drastically shortened the time it takes to share information about 

incidents as they occur. 

The Department is committed to sharing classified and unclassified information about recent 

events and threats as quickly as possible so that our state and local partners have the information 

needed to protect their communities. We are also incorporating the information we and our state 

and local partners collect every day, including law enforcement information, into our analysis 

and providing that information to the intelligence community. We do so while protecting privacy 

and civil liberties, by ensuring our information sharing agreements are subject to a 

comprehensive departmental-level governance framework that examines the recipient's 

authorities, approved usages, controlled access, audit features, dissemination limitations, and 

ultimately, retention or disposition requirements. 

To advance these efforts, we are developing the DHS Data Framework, which provides a 

common information technology platform to improve our ability to use data to support multiple 

DHS missions. This program will alleviate the stove-piped information technology systems we 

currently deploy across our Department, enabling more controlled, effective, and efficient use 

and sharing of homeland security-related information across our Department and, as appropriate, 

the U.S. Government, all while protecting privacy. 

Enhancing our information sharing and security partnerships extends beyond our borders. We 

view expanding partnerships abroad as key to our mission of securing the Homeland. Our 

Department is increasing counterterrorism information sharing with our international partners 

and is supporting the establishment of the European Counterterrorism Center by sharing best 

practices. We continue to work with our allies to vet fingerprints against our data holdings and 

those of other U.S. agencies to identify fraud or criminal or terrorist ties, and to rapidly share 

information with international partners after incidents occur. 

The Department is working with the European Union and European Union-member states on 

information integration and sharing, investigations, border controls, and enhancing the European 

Union's ability to collect, analyze, and share Passenger Name Record data. On this note, we are 

pleased with the recently passed European Union directive regarding Passenger Name Record 

data. 
46 

Since the tragic attacks in Paris and Brussels, we have engaged closely with our French and 

Belgian partners to improve information sharing and to share many of the lessons that the United 

States has learned over the past decade. The threat to Europe extends beyond these two 

countries; European citizens from a number of countries have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join 

terrorist groups and learn terrorist tactics and techniques. As a result, we are working with a 

range of other European nations to sign additional information sharing agreements and improve 

border protection. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, thank you again 

for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you today on the critical issue of Homeland 

security. I look forward to answering your questions. 
47 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Joint Statement of 

Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Justin Siberell 

U.S. Department of State 

& 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security& Governmental Affairs 

Hearing: "Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May26,2016 

Chainnan Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the 

Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. The 

Department of State is working closely with Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and other U.S. government agencies to counter the Islamic State oflraq and 

the Levant (ISIL or Da'esh) and keep America safe. This morning, I'd like to 

briefly describe the evolving threat environment, particularly those threats 

confronting our European partners, and the steps that we are taking to counter 

these evolving threats. 

Evolving Terrorist Threat Landscape 

As this Committee knows, the United States faces a fluid and fast-changing 

terrorist threat environment. The international community has made progress in 

degrading terrorist safe havens. In particular, the U.S.-led coalition to counter ISIL 

has made significant strides in reducing ISIL's control of territory in Iraq and 

Syria, as well as the finances and foreign terrorist fighters available to it. At the 

same time, continued instability in key regions of the world, along with weak or 

non-existent governance, sectarian conflict, porous borders, and widespread online 

presence provide terrorist groups like ISIL the opportunity to expand their 

influence, terrorize civilians, attract and mobilize new recruits, and threaten partner 

countries. 

In the face of increased military pressure, ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and both groups' 

branches and adherents have pursued mass-casualty attacks against symbolic 

targets and public spaces. Terrorist attacks in Bamako, Beirut, Brussels, Jakarta, 

Paris, and elsewhere demonstrate that these groups remain resilient and continue to 

target innocent civilians. We contend that ISIL attacked Brussels on March 22, in 

an effort to assert a narrative of victory in the face of steady losses of territory in 

Iraq and Syria and generate persistent violence and fear in the West. 

The United States and our partners around the world face significant new 

challenges as we and they seek to contend with the return of foreign terrorist 

UNCLASSIFIED 
48 

UNCLASSIFIED 

-2-

fighters from Iraq and Syria to their home countries. Evolutions in technology that 

enable terrorist groups to recruit adherents and inspire attacks using publiclyaccessible platforms and applications are another challenge. We will release the 

annual Country Reports on Terrorism soon, which will describe these and other 

trends in greater detail. 

Promoting U.S. Homeland Security 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), and other domestic law enforcement agencies are in the lead 

on countering terrorist threats against the United States. The Department of State 

and our embassies work closely with these agencies to strengthen cooperation and 

information sharing with foreign countries and to prevent foreign terrorists from 

traveling to the United States. As this Committee knows, we have taken steps over 

the past year to enhance the screening of all potential travelers to the United States, 

including through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). 

The VWP itself helps reinforce some of our strongest counterterrorism 

partnerships and serves as an incentive to other governments to adhere to the 

strongest possible security standards. Watchlisting, screening, and intelligence 

gathering are some of our best tools for countering the threat of foreign terrorist 

travel and we use these tools every day in collaboration with our VWP partners. 

The VWP is not a free pass to travel to the United States. All travelers 

coming to the United States undergo checks for ties to terrorism and are subject to 

multiple layers of security- regardless of whether they have a visa or come in 

through the VWP. Our VWP partners must uphold strict security standards such as 

sharing information on known and suspected terrorists and reporting lost and stolen 

passports to INTERPOL. We use VWP benefits to encourage greater information 

sharing and more systemic screening by our allies, and these requirements give our 

partners the impetus to tighten security in ways that can be politically challenging. 

The 38 countries that are part of the VWP include many of our closest allies 

and they are proud of their status. VWP membership is so prized that many 

countries that are not currently members nonetheless complete program 

requirements, including strengthening security and information-sharing, in the 

hope of joining. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
49 

UNCLASSIFIED 

-3-

Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighter Transit 

The Department of State is working to address and mitigate the threat posed 

by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) around the world, particularly in Europe. We 

are working with partners to put in place the fundamental reforms necessary to 

address this threat, which include increased information sharing, augmented border 

security, and strengthened legal regimes. 

We are now seeing a reduction in flows ofFTFs to Iraq and Syria. We 

attribute the reduction in FTF flows to a range of factors, including military gains 

by the Counter-ISIL Coalition and proactive steps by governments to strengthen 

and enforce border security, counter-facilitation, and counter-recruitment efforts. 

In line with the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in 2014 

which we helped to orchestrate, approximately 45 partner countries have passed 

new laws or updated existing laws to address FTFs. Through our diplomatic 

efforts, the United States continues to establish information-sharing arrangements, 

and we now have in place agreements with 55 international partners to assist 

efforts to identifY, track, and deter the travel of suspected terrorists. We also 

supported INTERPOL to enhance its ability to share critical FTF identity data with 

countries around the world. Fifty-eight countries, and the United Nations, now 

contribute FTF profiles to INTERPOL. At least 35 countries have reported 

arresting FTFs, and 12 have successfully prosecuted at least one foreign terrorist 

fighter. Turkey, a critical geographic chokepoint in the flow ofFTFs to and from 

Syria and Iraq has also increased detentions, arrests, and prosecution of suspected 

FTFs, and has taken important steps to improve the security of its 

border. Information sharing remains critical to preventing terrorist travel and we 

applaud the April11 passage and signing of the EU Passenger Name Record 

Directive. 

In particular, we have ramped up our engagement with European partners 

significantly in the aftermath of the Paris and Brussels attacks. This year, to 

supplement the close cooperation that we already enjoyed with a number of 

partners, including France, we deployed U.S. interagency Foreign Fighter Surge 

Teams to several European countries, including Belgium and Greece. These 

interagency teams work with partners to identifY concrete areas to tighten 

cooperation to identifY, disrupt, arrest, and prosecute suspected FTFs. We are 

partnering with these governments in areas including: strengthening information 

sharing on known and suspected terrorists, increasing effective traveler screening, 

and building comprehensive financial investigations. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
50 

UNCLASSIFIED 

-4-

We also continue to maintain consistent dialogue with our EU partners about 

necessary EU reforms that will strengthen our partners' abilities to identifY and 

disrupt FTF travel. We have been pleased with actions taken in recent months by 

the EU and member states to better address vulnerabilities, including the passage 

of the EU Passenger Name Record Directive, something we have advocated in 

favor of for many years. We also know the EU is undertaking significant efforts to 

better coordinate EU and national-level law enforcement databases and 

watchlists. We continue to stress to member states the need to populate existing 

systems with high quality data, and we support the EU's efforts to increase the 

interoperability of systems. All of these steps are aimed at ensuring that 

appropriate border security and law enforcement officials have access to the right 

information at the right time to identifY and disrupt FTF travel. 

Expanding CT Partnerships and Capacity 

President Obama has called for the United States to develop more effective 

partnerships around the world to confront, disrupt, and defeat the global threat 

from terrorism, especially threats from ISIL. Through our diplomacy and our 

capacity-building assistance, the Department of State is leading efforts to build 

these partnerships. 

The success of counterterrorism efforts in countries around the world 

depends upon capable civilian partners. As in our domestic experience, police, 

investigators, and prosecutors are on the frontlines of preventing and responding to 

asymmetric attacks by terrorist groups abroad, especially attacks on so-called soft 

targets. Border and aviation security officials are working to stop foreign terrorist 

fighters, transfer of materiel, and terrorist threats. Moreover, local law 

enforcement, prison officials, and community leaders are on the frontlines to 

prevent and counter radicalization and recruitment to violence in their 

communities. The Department of State is leading efforts in these areas to build 

capacity and cooperation among these civilian actors. 

We appreciate Congress' appropriation of$175 million for the 

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) in Fiscal Year 2016, and we ask for 

Congress' continued support for CTPF in FY 2017. With these and other 

Department of State resources, we are building deeper counterterrorism 

partnerships with the governments most critical to confronting ISIL, its branches, 

and other forms of terrorism from the Sahel to Southeast Asia. We are 

strengthening the ability of key law enforcement and criminal justice sector actors 

UNCLASSIFIED 
51 

UNCLASSIFIED 

-5-

to more effectively disrupt terrorist threats in their countries and address factors 

that make communities susceptible to violent extremism. We are working with 

governments and communities in vulnerable locations across the globe to reverse 

support of violent extremism. Adequate resources are critical to implement the 

whole-of-government approaches necessary to defeat ISIL, al-Qa'ida, and other 

groups that threaten American lives and interests. 

The Department is actively engaged in supporting partner nations to counter 

the spread ofiSIL's affiliates and networks. For example, we have increased 

engagement with our North African partners to address the ISIL branch and other 

terrorist groups in Libya. We plan to significantly expand support for Tunisia as it 

copes with threats emanating from Libya. We are also providing significant 

support to countries in the Lake Chad Basin region as they contend with the threat 

posed by Boko Haram, which declared its allegiance to ISIL in 2015. For 

example, we are training law enforcement from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and 

Nigeria on skills for conducting border security operations and preventing and 

responding to terrorist attacks, especially attacks involving improvised explosive 

devices. We also continue to build the capacity of partner countries to counter 

threats posed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, especially al-Shabaab, al-Qa'ida in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and alQa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). We are also working with multilateral 

institutions such as the United Nations, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, 

INTERPOL, and many others to help build partner capacities and improve 

international cooperation. 

For FY 2017, we have also requested additional funding for our Terrorist 

Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides a highly valuable capability for 

countries to strengthen border controls through enhanced technology and training. 

When terrorists attempt to cross an international border, they open themselves up 

to the risk of apprehension. There is no excuse for governments to not enforce 

effective border controls; many of our partners are attuned to this challenge and are 

eager for U.S. advice and engagement to improve their own systems. The TIP 

program provides critical funding and technical expertise to help countries to 

screen passengers at airports, seaports, and major land border ports of entry. 

Through this program, we provide and train countries with Personal Identification 

Secure Comparison and Evaluation Systems (PISCES), a proven technology. We 

have implemented PISCES in more than 20 countries around the world, and hope 

to grow that number over the coming year. 

Countering Violent Extremism 

UNCLASSIFIED 
52 

UNCLASSIFIED 

-6-

Finally, we have significantly increased our focus on identifYing and 

preventing the spread of violent extremism- to stop the radicalization, recruitment, 

and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist 

activities and empower communities to help themselves confront ISIL and other 

threats. The attacks in Paris and elsewhere have demonstrated the ability of ISIL 

to inspire radicalization to violence through its messaging, including on the 

Internet. The Department of State has enhanced our Countering Violent 

Extremism (CVE) efforts, including through expanded engagement with key 

countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia; with our domestic 

colleagues on the CVE Task Force; and with sub-national leaders, including local 

mayors and civil society, for instance through the Strong Cities Network. 

We are working very closely with USAID and the newly-established 

interagency Global Engagement Center (GEC) to advance our CVE efforts. In 

collaboration with the GEC, the Department of State and US AID have requested 

additional resources for CVE programming in Fiscal Year 2017 - including as part 

of CTPF -to expand partnerships with government, non-governmental, local 

communities, and civil society actors who can help address key factors that drive 

radicalization and support within communities for extremist organizations, 

including violent extremist messaging and narratives and the recruitment and 

mobilization to violence. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, there is no greater priority than keeping America safe from 

the threat of terrorism. The terrorism threat landscape remains dynamic, and we 

must continue to enhance and adapt our efforts to stay ahead of emerging threats. 

The Department of State is committed to working closely with DHS and other U.S. 

government agencies to counter the threat posed to the United States by ISIL, its 

adherents, and other terrorist actors. We greatly appreciate Congress' interest and 

support for our efforts. I look forward to your questions and our discussion. 

Thank you. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
53 

Department of State & USAID 

Joint Strategy on 

Countering Violent Extremism 
54 

Threats from violent extremism increasingly undermine security and development around the globe. From Afghanistan to Nigeria, terrorists seek to expand their reach and resonance by exploiting ongoing conflicts and insurgency, 

joining forces with criminal networks, establishing safe havens in weak and repressive states, and propagating 

hatred via social media. Even as we work to defeat and degrade the most virulent terrorist group-Da'esh-and 

restrain the wanton murder, slavery, and violence it spreads, we know that 

its defeat on the battlefield is not enough. 

At the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, President Obama called 

upon a !I nations to do more to counter violent extremism. At the World 

Economic Forum last year, I called on the international community, including 

the public and private sectors, to pursue more local solutions to this global 

challenge. We hosted a White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism 

{CVE) which brought together government, private sector, and civil society 

leaders, sparking a range of new initiatives and regional meetings from 

Astana to Olso, from Nairobi to Nouakchott. We brought this movement 

back to the United Nations in September at the 70th General Assembly 

and presented a broad-based action agenda. Building on this momentum, 

the UN Secretary General presented his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 

Extremism, embracing the "whole of society" approach that must underpin 

our common effort. 

Today we take another step forward. The Department of State and USAID 

have produced a proactive international strategy recognizing immediate needs, utilizing our strengths, and demonstrating our will to comprehensively address the challenge of violent extremism, including the root causes, 

Together, we are building organizational structures needed to pursue a more aggressive and integrated approach 

to this challenge. This is a generational struggle, but we must begin now. 

Carrying forth the work of the White House CVE Summit agenda, this strategy recognizes the need to foster and 

empower a broad-based coalition of government and non-governmental actors to address this scourge and project 

a positive vision. Our strategic CVE approach positions the United States to work with partners around the globe 

to address an evolving threat and prevent new violent extremists from emerging. We will prevail by working to~ 

gether; indeed, there are roles for everyone, from religious leaders to government staff to academics, civil society, 

NGOs, and the private sector. 

With our CVE strategy, we will deepen our understanding of the underlying dynamics feeding violent extremism 

and integrate a variety of efforts to blunt the spread and erode the appeal of violent extremism. We will mobilize 

the full range of America's diplomatic and development tools and power to meet this challenge. We will seek 

additional resources from Congress to expand these efforts. And we will approach our task in a measurable and 

accountable way-through effective stewardship of American tax dollars to strengthen our national security, while 

promoting our values. 

Our challenge is dynamic, but we know the power of the international community to make progress when we 

come together. We also know that while violent extremist ideology may be appealing to a small subset of the 

global population, it is an unsustainable and irreconcilable worldviewthat the overwhelming majority of the world 

rejects, By marshalling our values, our partnerships, and our resources, we will expose the lies of violent extremist 

ideology and provide a positive vision forward. Together, we can, and we must, send a dear signa! that our future 

will not be defined by the agenda of terrorists, 
55 

The spread of violent extremism and terrorism pose 

significant challenges for U.S. national security. Violent extremists speaking a variety of languages, born 

of many races and ethnic groups, and belonging to 

diverse religions continue to recruit, radicalize, and 

mobilize people especially young people- to engage in terrorist acts. Their actions not only increase 

threats against the United States and our allies, but 

also undermine our efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, foster sustainable development, protect human 

rights, promote the rule of law and expand prosperity. 

While the drivers of violent extremism vary across 

individuals, communities, and regions, there is commonality in the ideology and narratives employed by 

terrorist groups. Of particular concern, over the past 

two years, Da'esh has attracted tens of thousands of 

individuals from around the world to travel to Syria 

and Iraq to join their fight; while some have died or 

become disillusioned, others have become hardened 

in their commitment to violence. Terrorist groups such 

as ai-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, ai-Shabaab, and 

Boko Haram have also propagated violent extremism 

amidst regional conflicts and state collapse. Meanwhile, individuals have been inspired by violent extremist messages and ideology to establish affiliated 

cells and plot violent acts within their home countries. 

The United States National Security Strategy (2015) 

calls for a sustainable approach to combat the persistent threat of terrorism. The United States will con~ 

tinue to take measures and engage in collective action 

with responsible partners to disrupt threats against 

the United States and our a!lles. At the same time, 

effectively addressing these threats requires simul~ 

taneous and complementary efforts to counter and 

prevent the spread of violent extremism. This includes 

efforts to address the specific societal dynamics and 

drivers of radicalization to violence and counter the 

ideology, messaging, and recruitment methods that 

extremist groups and propagandists employ to at~ 

tract new recruits and foment violence. It also requires 

proactive efforts to prevent support for violent extremism in areas where the threat is more nascent. 

In February 2015, President Obama hosted a summit 

of government and non-governmental leaders from 

over 60 countries to mobilize a global effort to counLeaders from around the world participate in the White House CVE Summit in February 2015. 
56 

ter and prevent the spread of violent extremism; it is 

an approach involving governments (national and local), multilateral bodies (international and regional), 

and non-government partners (civil society and the 

private sector). The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and the subsequent 

process, which included a series of regional CVE summits, generated a broad-based, multi-stakeholder CVE 

action agenda and new initiatives that were presented 

at the September 2015 Leaders' Summit to Counter 

Da'esh and Violent Extremism. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the United Nations presented his 

Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to the 

UN General Assembly in January 2016, which reaffirmed and expanded upon the CVE Summit's agenda. 

A comprehensive approach to address the drivers of 

violent extremism is critical to advancing the United 

States' national security and overall foreign policy goals. 

Reflecting this realization, the 201S QDDR states that 

the Department of State {State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USA I D) will work to enhance, 

refine, and elevate ongoing CVE efforts, particularly 

those focused on prevention. State and USA!D have different tools, approaches, and expertise to contribute to 

these efforts. USA! D's policy, The Development Response 

to Violent Extremism and Insurgency, will continue to 

provide a broad framework for using development tools 

to prevent violent extremism. This strategy, which is 

consistent with USAID's policy, provides a more explicit 

guide for how State and USAID will work jointly and will 

leverage the range of available diplomatic and development resources to have a demonstrable impact to 

prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism. 

DEFJI'llll'li.GANttUNQERSIANQLI'li.G . .CVE 

For the purposes of this strategy, CVE refers to proactive 

actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to 

address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist 

recruitment and radicalization to violence. This includes 

both disrupting the tactics used by violent extremists 

to attract new recruits to violence and building specific 

alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in 

targeted communities and populations to reduce the 

risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence. CVE 

can be a targeted component of larger efforts to promote good governance and the rule of law, respect for 

human rights, and sustainable, inclusive development 

Violent extremism is not necessarily tied to a particular 

religion, ideology, or set of political beliefs, although 

there is consistency in the extreme ideology propagated 

and exploited by various terrorist organizations including Da'esh over recent years to justify their violence. In 

line with the U.S. National Strategy on Counterterrorism (2011), this strategy is principally concerned with 

countering strands of violent extremism that fuel over~ 

seas threats against U.S. persons, allies, and interests. 

To be effective, CVE efforts must be guided by ongoing 

research and analysis of the context, drivers, and most 

effective interventions against violent extremism. The 

nature and range of possible drivers of violent extrem~ 

ism can vary significantly from individual psychological 

factors to community and sectarian divisions and conflicts. Actions by states can serve as drivers of violent 

extremism, including state-sanctioned violence and 

heavy-handed tactics by security actors, corruption, 

systematic denial of fair trial guarantees, discriminatory 

governance practices, state propagation of religious 

and/or ethnic intolerance. State repression of cultural 

and religious expression, especially when seen as targeting a specific religion or sect, or when perceived as so 

entrenched that only extreme responses could make 

change a real possibility, can also serve as a driver of 

violent extremism. As evidenced in Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere, violent conflicts and the breakdown of the rule of 

law can fuel and enable the spread of violent extremism. 

In many environments where the risk of violent extremism is high, development has failed to take root, governance is weak, access to education and training is limited, 

economic opportunities are few, and unemployment is 

high. USAID will partner with State to bring to bear its 

development knowledge, the analytic tools to diagnose 

state fragility and economic vulnerability, and insights 

borne of over 55 years of work in the developing world, 
57 

Children in Chad react to a participatory theater performance as part of a USAID program to counter violent extremism. 

DESIRED END STATES OF 

JOINISTRATE(iY~ 

1. Violent extremist groups and individu~ 

a!s who would threaten U.S. citizens, our allies, and our interests are unable to attract 

new recruits or garner support for their 

operations in specific communities; and 

2. Governments, multilateral organizations, 

and communities have the collective capacity to prevent and counter individuals and 

groups from becoming radicalized to violence. 

1. Expand international political will, partner~ 

ships, and expertise to better understand the 

drivers of violent extremism and mobilize 

effective interventions. The White House CVE 

Summit process highlighted the need to deepen 

international understanding of violent extremism and mobilize global, regional, national, and 

local action involving governments and nongovernmental actors to counter it. Building on 

that momentum, State will continue to promote 

international efforts to elevate the importance of 

CVE, alongside security-based counterterrorism 

measures, refine our understanding of the drivers of violent extremism, and expand the tools 

for effective CVE interventions, particularly at the 

local level. State and USAID wHI support efforts 

by multilateral bodies and networks- indud~ 

ing the United Nations, Global Counterterrorism 

Forum (GCTF), the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), Hedayah, the 

Strong Cities Network (SCN), and the RESOLVE 

Network- to strengthen international CVE cooperation, understanding, and practice. USA!D 

will also work to deepen CVE cooperation with 

multilateral and bilateral development part-
58 

ners, including the UN Development Program 

(UNDP), the World Bank, European Commission 

Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). 

2. Encourage and assist partner governments to 

adopt more effective policies and approaches 

to prevent and counter the spread of violent 

extremism, including changing unhelpful 

practices where necessary. Through enhanced 

diplomatic engagement and targeted technical 

support- using research to shape these efforts 

where possible- State and USAID will work with 

partner governments (both national and local) 

to develop strategies, policies, and programs to 

reduce the appeal and spread of violent extremism. The UN Secretary General's Plan of Action 

to Prevent Violent Extremism calls for member 

states to develop national plans of action to 

address local drivers of violent extremism, involving a wide range of government and nongovernmental actors. State will work with multilateral bodies and other relevant partners to 

leverage existing and develop new guidance for 

the implementation of effective national plans. 

As governments increase their understanding 

and commitment to CVE, they may determine 

that changes need to be made to some of their 

specific policies and approaches to security, human rights, gender, education, and development 

to reduce potential drivers of violent extremism. 

Multilateral organizations, such as UN Education, 

Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 

UNDP, the International Organization on Migration and others, are also important avenues 

through which we can assist governments in 

developing effective plans of action. In addition 

to encouraging and assisting governments in 

this area, State will also encourage countries 

to address the influence of individuals and institutions in their countries that are involved in 

propagating violent extremist ideology abroad. 

3. Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development1 to reduce 

specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support 

for violent extremism in identifiable areas 

or put particular segments of populations 

at high risk of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment to violence. Violent extremists mobillze people by capitalizing on the 

grievances of those who feel underrepresented, 

marginalized, and left behind or who are seeking a larger purpose as well as on structural 

dynamics that deny them equal participation 

in society, fair economic opportunity, and/or 

equal justice. Indeed, in today's terrorist landscape, terrorist groups often thrive in areas with 

limited or abusive governance, weak rule of law, 

high degrees of violence and corruption, and 

limited economic opportunity, and where civil 

society has limited agency or space to operate. 

While these structural problems often require 

broad and long-term solutions, intermediary 

and targeted steps can be taken to counter 

the appeal and spread of violent extremism. 

Working closely together, State and USAID will 

use foreign assistance tools, to include development programs, that target identified drivers of 

violent extremism in specific geographic areas 

or for particular segments of a population and 

build local capacity and strengthen community resilience to counter violent extremist radicalization and recruitment. USAID will design 

and implement programs aimed at increasing 

access to opportunity, improving local and national governance, promoting cooperation and 

dialogue, expanding the positive opportunities 

for youth in society, and mitigating conflict so 

as to improve the conditions and reduce the 

vulnerability of local communities to violent 

extremists. At the same time, State and USAlD 

will work together to ensure that U.S. security 

assistance programming does not inadvertently exacerbate drivers of violent extremism 

by enabling or giving the appearance of endorsing weak or abusive governance practices. 

4. Empower and amplify locally credible voices 

that can change the perception of violent ex~ 

tremistgroups and their ideology among key 

demographic segments. Violent extremists, 

especially Da'esh, have adopted effective onand off-line propaganda strategies to radicalize 

and recruit individuals to violence. Employing 

public diplomacy and development tools, State 

and USAID will work to identify, create the space 

for, and build the capacity of locally influential 

voices across a range of engagement platforms 

to promote alternate visions, challenge violent 

extremist propaganda and dissuade individuals from traveling to conflict zones. A mix of 

short- and long-term strategies will be required, 

depending on target audience and desired outcomes. The interagency Global Engagement 
59 

Center (GEC), based at State, will lead efforts to 

coordinate, synchronize, empower, and enable 

partners' efforts, both government and nongovernmental, to conduct effective communications campaigns to counter violent extremist 

groups, including Da'esh and ai-Qa1da, The GEC 

wl!! also coordinate, with other agencies, asappropriate, the U.S. government's work with the 

private sector to counter the communicationsrelated radicalization to violence and recruitment activities of international terrorist organizations and other violent extremists abroad. 

5. Strengthen the capabilities of government 

and non-governmental actors to isolate, in~ 

tervene with, and promote the rehabilitation 

and reintegration of individuals caught in 

the cycle of radicalization to violence. Violent extremist radicalization can be cyclical in 

that individuals become radicalized, undertake 

violent acts, and then proceed to radicalize and 

entice new recruits within their communities 

and/or networks to violence. The cycle of violent 

extremist radicalization can be self-perpetuating if societies do not put in place "off-ramp" 

mechanisms to address it In collaboration with 

relevant multilateral and bilateral partners, State 

will expand programs to help governments and 

civil society develop effective strategies and 

build community-based structures to (1) identify 

and prevent susceptible individuals from being 

drawn further into the cycle, and (2) assess and 

monitor the risk posed by violent extremist offenders, including in prisons, and support their 

rehabilitation and reintegration back into society, as appropriate. This includes specialized programs to build the capacity of police, gendarmerie, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, and other 

criminal justice sector officials to address the life 

cycle of radicalization to violence in their work. 

WAYS AND MEANS TO ACHIEVE 

URATEGLC~OBJECTIYES~··· 

State and USAID will seek to advance all five of the above 

strategic objectives by utilizing and integrating the U.S. 

government's various diplomacy, strategic communications, rule of law, and development resources and tools. 

Specifically, State and USAID will pursue the following: 

1, Enhancing CVE Diplomacy: State and USAID will focus and expand diplomatic efforts with governmental, multilateral, and 

non~governmental actors to promote CVE 

cooperation and advance this strategy. 

o Bilateral Diplomacy: State will expand 

and elevate CVE within our counterterror~ 

ism and broader diplomatic engagement 

with relevant partners, including key ones 

in the Middle East, South and Central Asia, 

and Africa. State will also utilize regular dip~ 

lomatic engagement with traditional allies, 

such as G7 countries, Australia, and European 

partners, to promote joint efforts to advance 

this strategy. USA!D will use its strategic 

dialogues with key donors, and multi~donor 

platforms to elevate CVE in development 

Students from Lahore University of Management Sciences are awarded the winners of the Peer-2-Peer {P2P) Challenging Violent Extremism 

competition, sponsored by the Department of State and Facebook, in January 2016. 
60 

o Regional and Multilateral Diplomacy: 

State and USAID will continue to shape 

efforts by the UN, GCTF, GCERF, Hedayah, 

and other multilateral as well as regional 

fora to promote good practices, tools, and 

cooperation on CVE. State and USAID will 

promote and support implementation of 

the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action 

to Prevent Violent Extremism, including 

through engagement with UNDP. UNESCO, 

and other UN agencies. State and USAID will 

also engage with the various multilateral development banks, Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 

other multilateral development partners to 

enhance cooperation on CVE assistance. 

o People-to-People and Public Diplomacy: 

Using people-to-people programs (e.g., the 

International Visitor Leadership Program 

and the Peer2Peer: Challenging Extremism 

Program) and other public diplomacy tools, 

State and USAID will expand engagement 

with sub-national authorities, especially 

cities, nongovernment organizations, faith 

leaders, the private sector, and civil society 

to promote CVE partnerships and initiatives. 

State will also support the SCN to bring together municipal and other sub-national officials to share CVE good practices and launch 

joint efforts. State and USA!D will support 

regional civil societyCVE platforms and other 

initiatives aimed at building the capacity of 

women, youth, religious, and other community leaders to advance CVE objectives. 

2. Focusing CVE Strategic Communications: 

Under the leadership of the interagency GEC, 

State will undertake a range of strategic communications efforts to counter violent extremism. Working with other international partners, 

State will support efforts by the Sawab Center 

in the United Arab Emirates and other national 

and regional hubs to counter online messaging 

by Da'esh and other violent extremist actors. 

State will also work through its public affairs 

networks and engagement overseas to promote CVE communications and partnerships. 

Specifically, the GEC will coordinate, integrate 

and synchronize U.S. government public communications, directed toward foreign audiences 

abroad, for the purposes of countering violent 

extremism. The GEC will identify and engage the 

best available talent and capabilities from the U.S. 

and global private sectors and elsewhere, includ~ 

ing through public-private partnerships, tocoun~ 

ter violent extremist narratives. The GEC will de~ 

ve!op and guide U.S. strategic counterterrorism 

narratives directed at foreign audiences abroad 

by using rigorous research and data analysis. 

3. Expanding Rule of Law and Development 

Programs to Advance CVE: In coordina~ 

tion with our diplomatic efforts and working 

closely with international partners, State and 

USAID will expand and target rule of law and 
61 

development programs to address specific 

drivers of violent extremism and enhance CVE 

partnerships. Starting in FY 2017, State and 

USAID will request additional resources from 

Congress for these programs. Resources will 

be focused on areas where they will have the 

greatest sustained impact, and programming 

will be guided by rigorous analysis of violent 

extremism drivers, but also seek to innovate 

and learn in order to ensure our toolkit is strong. 

Specifically, State and USAID will focus programs 

on building capacity in the following areas: 

Criminal Justice 

o law Enforcement: State and USAID will 

enhance programs to help law enforcement 

officials develop positive relationships, trust, 

improved administration of and access to 

justice, and effective communications with 

the communities most susceptible to violent 

extremism. State will assist law enforcement 

to implement new initiatives to advance 

CVE, especially to disrupt the life cycle of 

radicalization to violence and to bridge the 

governance gap between police and communities. This includes developing effective 

tools and strategies for police~community 

engagement, including the identification and engagement with at risk groups. 

o Justice Sector: State and USAID will develop 

and enhance programs that utilize the full 

range of criminal justice tools to counter 

violent extremism and promote rehabilitation and reintegration where appropriate. 

State will increase awareness and use of 

alternatives to detention and incarceration 

that would be appropriate for !ow-level, 

first-time, non-violent offenders, including 

juvenile justice programs. These types of 

programs provide opportunities for rehabilitation, reintegration, and disengagement 

from radicalization. State and USA!Dwil! also 

continue to pursue justice sector programs 

that help countries establish effective legislative frameworks that can protect civil and political rights and counter violent extremism. 

o Prisons: State will enhance programs to 

help countries identify and address prison 

settings where active recruitment is taking place and to establish opportunities 

for rehabilitation and reintegration. Specifically, State will design programs to help 

corrections officials recognize and counter 

recruitment of other prisoners to violent extremism in their facilities, and to implement 

evidence-based prison management practices that mitigate the risk posed by imprisoned 

violent extremists. State will assist prison 

officials to develop programs and partnerships with religious, legal, and community 

actors aimed at providing opportunities for 

rehabilitation and reintegration as part of 

the strategy to counter violent extremism. 

Development and Civil Society Strengthening 

o Local Governance and Community Resil~ 

ience: USAID will elevate efforts to build 

positive alternative paths and community resilience to counter violent extrem~ 

ism through improved local governance. 

USAID will promote peaceful solutions to 

grievances and frustrations that fuel violent 

extremism, such as supporting better dialogue between governments and citizens, 

non-violent approaches to prob!em~solving 

and expanding avenues for engagement in 

community decision-making. USAIO will 

work with communities to be proactive, 

and create bridges between groups and am~ 

plify community characteristics that guard 

against infiltration by violent extremists. 

o Educational Institutions and Service 

Providers: State and USAID will work with 

partner organizations and multHateral institutions to enhance programs that provide educational and social service providers in key countries with tools to address 

drivers of violent extremism. Specifically, 

USAID will seek to expand education and 

other social service interventions to address critical gaps and advance reforms 

that can counter violent extremism. 

o Civil Society and Private Sector: State 

and USAIO will enhance programs to 

empower civil society, promote broad 

community engagement, and expand private sector involvement for CVE. As vital 

partners in countering violent extremism, 

State and USAID will elevate their role with 

government partners and support their leadership and capacity development. State and 

USAID will emphasize work on youth, women, community and faith leaders, and the vic-
62 

tims of violent extremism. In addition, State 

and US AID will support efforts to network, 

train, and build the capacity of civil society 

actors to engage in CVE efforts, including 

partnering with national and local governments and promoting rehabilitation and 

reintegration. State and USAID will also fa~ 

d!itate innovative initiatives with the private 

sector and communities to break down drivers and build viable alternatives to violence. 

o Youth Engagement: State and US AID will 

expand and enhance programs targeting 

youth who are identified to be at high risk 

of radicalization and recruitment to violent 

extremism. State and USAID will support 

programs that build a sense of belonging, 

community and purpose. USAIDwill design 

programs to support youth empowerment, 

nurture networks, skills development, and 

civic and economic opportunities. State and 

USAID also will support programs that train 

and mobilize youth to serve as leaders in their 

communities and globally in the work ofCVE. 

o Women and Gender: State and USAID will 

expand programs that engage women as key 

stakeholders in preventing and countering 

violent extremism in their communities. 

Women's groups and individual women can 

play a critical role in identifying and addressing drivers of violent extremism in their families, communities, and broader society. State 

and USAID will ensure that these programs 

are informed by rigorous analysis of existing 

gender dynamics in communities and take 

into account the fact that women's perceptions of violence and security may be different than those of men in the community. 

4. Promoting Research and learning: State and 

USAID will increase support for efforts to understand overall trends of violent extremism and 

to identify and analyze the local geography, 

demography, and drivers of recruitment and 

radicalization to violent extremism: where the 

hotspots are; where and with whom terrorists 

are focusing their efforts; who is most susceptible; and why they may be motivated to join. 

State and USAID have developed assessment 

frameworks and programming guides related 

to conflict management and mitigation and 

political transition that are designed to identify 

and analyze issues related to violent extremism and radicalization to violence. Building on 

lield presence, State and USAID will promote 

research and learning as part of programs. State 

and USA!D will focus inquiries on what types 

of CVE interventions are most effective and 

on linkages with other development programming. State and USAID will support the new 

RESOLVE Network in its efforts to promote and 

enhance local research on both drivers and effective interventions. State and USAID will also 

coordinate with efforts by the domestic CVE 

Task Force, currently chaired by the Department of Homeland Security, to increase research 
63 

and !earning on CVE in the domestic context. 

5. Elevating CVE within Broader U.S. Foreign Policy: The United States will elevate CVE within U.S. 

counterterrorism and broader U.S. foreign policy 

decision-making and priority-setting. State and 

USAID will ensure that CVE considerations are 

taken into account as the United States determines measures to address immediate terrorism 

threats and pursues broader foreign policy challenges, including preventing conflict, promoting 

stability and peace in the Middle East North 

Africa, and South and Central Asia, fostering 

sustainable development, and strengthening alliances and security cooperation with key states. 

C.RITERIA. FO.R PRIORITIZATION 

To maximize these diplomatic, policy, and programmatic efforts and finite resources, State and USAID will 

set clear priorities for CVE engagement and assistance. 

Specifically, State and USAID will seek to focus engagement and assistance based on the following factors: 

Extent of Threat and Risk to U.S. Interests: 

We will prioritize CVE efforts to address radicalization and recruitment to violence by 

terrorist organizations that pose the highest 

level of threat and risk to the United States, 

U.S. persons, our allies, and other U.S. interests; 

Potential for Emergence and Expansion of 

Violent Extremism: In an effort to prevent the 

emergence of violent extremism, CVE programs 

will prioritize areas with evidence of a high risk 

of deepening or expanding support for violent 

extremism. This will especially include areas on 

the periphery of current terrorist safe havens, 

and outside those areas in the midst of conflict; 

Ability to Reinforce Political Will: CVEefforts 

will be prioritized where governments and/or 

sub-national and non-governmental leaders 

have demonstrated strong political will to ad~ 

dress drivers of violent extremism in a responsible manner, or where political will is lacking, but 

can be cultivated, and is determined to be essential to effectively counter violent extremism; and 

Prospects for CVE Results, Impact and Innovation: CVE efforts will be directed to countries 

and regions that can yield results, as well as be 

expanded, scaled up and/or made sustainable. 

We will also coordinate with and, when possible, 

leverage ongoing assistance by other donors. 

.MEAS.URING .. RESULISAND..EFF.E.CIS .... 

State and USAIDwill measure progress toward achieving 

this strategy's objectives, developing a results framework for measuring progress. CVE programs will be 

measured against dearly stated objectives that are 

linked to the strategic objectives described above and 
64 

accompanied by clear, we!l~developed and resourced 

monitoring and evaluation plans. To the extent possible, State and USAID will develop a set of common 

indicators to measure outputs and outcomes across 

CVE assistance programs, and will evaluate the longerterm effects of CVE programming. State and USAID 

will continue to learn from these efforts and ensure 

that future efforts are guided by both qualitative and 

quantitative monitoring information, evidence of results and effects, and where appropriate, innovation. 

The Secretary of State has directed the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism to guide 

and coordinate CVE policy, programs, and assistance 

for the Department. To reflect this expanded role, the 

Department is renaming the bureau and allocating 

additional staffing resources. Designating one bureau 

to lead these efforts will promote a more strategic, and 

ultimately accountable, approach to the U.S. government's efforts to counter violent extremism abroad, 

as well as to facilitate coordination with the GEC and 

the new domestic CVE Task Force. USAID, as outlined 

in the 2015 QDDR, is also establishing a CVE Secretariat staffed to coordinate and synchronize its efforts, 

A working group of core State, USAID, and interagency 

stakeholders will oversee and coordinate implementation of this strategy. Based on the above criteria on 

prioritization, the working group will agree upon a set 

of focus regions and countries for expanded, integrated 

CVE diplomatic engagement and programming by State 

and USAID. The working group will encourage and 

work with interested embassies and USAIO missions 

to develop integrated CVE plans for focus regions and 

countries, especially to promote coordinated efforts. 

This wl!l include ensuring programing is tied into the 

Integrated Country Strategies and the Country Development and Cooperation Strategies, as appropriate. 

For example, with approximately $19 million in anticipated Fiscal Year 2015 resources, State and USAID are 

pursuing a new initiative to design and implement 

CVE programming in East Africa through an integrated 

analysis and program design process. A joint State and 

USA!D team will design programs focused on the most 

vulnerable communities and key drivers of radicalization 

through fte!d-based assessments and carefully tailored, 

evidence-based approaches. State and USA!D will utilize 

lessons learned from this approach for other regions. 

Finally, in line with the above section on measuring 

results and effects, the working group will routinely 

assess progress toward implementation of this strategy, 

including assessing resource allocations. State and USAID will adapt implementation and make adjustments 

as required as the threat landscape and nature of violent 

extremism evolves. The working group wlll review this 

strategy every two years, and update as necessary. 
65 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

1 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May 26,2016 

Social Media Recruiting 

Protecting America from the Threat of!SIS 

The Honorable Rob Portman 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In your testimony, you mentioned the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 

Effort, headed by Director George Selim. I know they are nascent, about half a year old, 

but what capabilities \Viii this CVE effort bring to the table to counter-message ISIS 

propaganda? 

What can the Office of Community Partnerships do to prevent social media recruiting 

where ISIS casts a broad net then draws them into the Dark web? 

Response: Using reprogrammed Fiscal Year 2016 funding and work closely with the 

Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, DHS Office for Community Partnerships 

(OCP) is developing digital strategy and a dedicated team for communications and 

technology work related to CVE. OCP and the Task Force will build partnerships with 

the private sector to identify and amplify credible voices to counter violent narratives 

promoted by ISIL, domestic terrorists, and other violent extremists. OCP will host 

regional expos for tech and marketing sector leaders to meet directly with community 

members who can improve their online presence. These expos and the tools created by 

OCP will leverage the use of digital technologies to engage, empower, and connect CVE 

stakeholders, and support a communication narrative to counter violent extremism. 

Also, as terrorists continue to use the Internet to deliberately reach into our Homeland 

to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize the most vulnerable among us, engagement with 

private sector technology partners on this issue is paramount. 

Various departments and agencies have long engaged with a range of key technology 

companies to encourage efforts to counter ISIL and other groups online. For example, 

Secretary and Attorney General Lynch met with social media executives in San Francisco 

in January 2016 and with high-tech leaders in New York in November 2015. 

Additionally, the DHS Office for Community Partnerships and DOJ staff engaged with 

social media industry representatives during the "Madison Valley" meeting at the White 
66 

Question#: 1 

Topic: Social Media Recruiting 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

House on February 24, 2016. The goal of this meeting was to build a dialogue with 

technology companies to discuss ways to address terrorist use of the Internet. 

The DHS Office for Community Partnerships believes that the private sector, which 

created so many innovative technologies our society enjoys today, can help create tools 

to limit the ability of terrorists to abuse these technologies. The DHS Office for 

Community Partnerships applauds companies' efforts to thwart the tiny fraction of their 

users who seek to exploit technology for nefarious ends, and is encouraged by 

companies' acceleration and enhancement of such efforts. The DHS Office for 

Community Partnerships recognizes the critical role that the private sector and NGO 

groups can play in developing creative and effective solutions to counter terrorists' 

abuse of media platforms. Going forward, the DHS Office for Community Partnerships 

will continue to convene a wide range of stakeholders, including communities and civil 

society groups, technology companies, and content producers. We are encouraged by a 

number of initiatives currently underway, and commend those who see the common 

challenge posed by terrorism and are taking proactive steps toward combatting terrorist 

use of technology. 

As part of supporting efforts to challenge ISIL's use of the Internet, the Department is 

supporting the Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism (P2P) Contest, including the 

Facebook Global Challenge that occurred in February 2016. The objective of the P2P 

Global Challenge is to engage university students around the globe, while earning 

academic credit, to create and activate their own social media campaigns to challenge 

ideology and recruitment messaging propagated by ISIL and other violent extremists. 

Since its inception in Spring 2015, over 3,000 students representing 125 university teams 

from over 30 countries have participated in this unique program. DHS was pleased to 

support the P2P competition for the third consecutive semester in Spring 2016. There 

were nearly 50 teams competing in the Spring 2016 program, about half of which are in 

the United States. This initiative is a collaborative effort between DHS, the Department 

of State, the National Counterterrorism Center, other U.S. agencies, and the 

implementing partner, Ed Venture Partners. The Spring 2016 final competition was held 

on June 27, 2016 in Washington, DC. In January 2016, Facebookjoined P2P as a 

sponsor to help expand the program and maximize impact. For Fall2016, Facebook has 

offered to financially support an additional 100 international teams, and the Department 

of State will work with Facebook to manage this expansion. DHS recently partnered 

with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Colorado to hold its first statewide P2P competition. 

The Department is currently working with interagency partners, in coordination with the 

National Security Council staff, to scale up domestic P2P student designed campaigns 
67 

Question#: 1 

Topic: Social Media Recruiting 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

and projects. This will require additional funding, as well as support from government 

and private sector partners to transition viable projects to market. 
68 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of!SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURlTY (SENATE) 

Question: Recent events in Brussels and Amsterdam indicate that terrorists will continue 

to target transportation infrastructure due to their status as "soft targets." Former TSA 

Administrator John Pistole remarked, "Subway stations, rail stations, trains, buses, public 

transportation have always been soft targets." Since the start of the 21st century, we have 

witnessed 5 attacks on transportation infrastructure-9/11, Madrid, London, Arras, and 

Brussels. All of the above attacks have targeted the transportation sector, which is crucial 

to national and economic security. Unfortunately, a report from the Office of Inspector 

General for the Department of Homeland Security gives me great pause about the 

security of our passenger rail services. The OIG released a report on the 13th of this 

month, which highlighted TSA's lax enforcement of authorities designated to it by the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of2007 (Pub. L. 110-53). 

The report claims that "TSA has statutory authority to issue security directives to Amtrak 

based on emerging threats but does not fully enforce these directives." "As of Fiscal 

Year 2015, three key 9/11 Act passenger rail requirements -a regulation for rail carriers to 

complete security assessments, a regulation for rail security training, and a program for 

conducting background checks on rail employees-remain incomplete." 

What are you doing to correct TSA's deficiencies regarding its regulation of Amtrak and 

other passenger rail services? 

On the OIG Report's Highlights page, TSA cites the lengthy rulemaking process for not 

implementing the security regulations. However, it has been 8 or more years since the 

passage of the Act. Disregarding the rulemaking process, how do you justify the 

Department continued reliance on voluntary initiatives? 

Response: First and foremost, it is important to note that the Inspector General did not 

identify any specific vulnerabilities or weakness in the security of passenger railroads or 

public transportation systems as a result of its investigations. That said, completing the 

remaining September 11 Act requirements is, without question, a priority for the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administrator of TSA has made his 

commitment to seeing these mandates through to completion clear in communications 

with both Congress and his staff. It is important to recognize that seeking action through 

regulation is rarely an expeditious path and there are many steps in the rulemaking 

process beyond the control ofTSA that prevent establishment of firm timelines. 

Rulemaking is complex and deliberative, requiring rigorous quality standards. The 

process often results in significant revisions at various points in a rule's development. 

Before publishing a proposed or final rule, TSA must address comments provided during 
69 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of! SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

interagency review as coordinated by the Office of Management and Budget. TSA must 

also take careful account of public comments received on proposed rules, as well as the 

impact ofTSA's rules on regulated parties and the public. 

Meeting the impact analysis standards for the surface transportation rules required by the 

September 11 Act is particularly challenging. The potential cumulative impact of these 

regulations could be significant, as they require vulnerability assessments, security 

planning, and training program development as well as initial and recurrent training of all 

frontline employees and vetting of those employees. These requirements will affect 

large, national systems, medium sized communities and operators, and even small 

operations. They will affect a system of transportation that is, unlike aviation, intended 

to be open and easily accessible. The regulations must find the right balance between a 

complex and evolving terrorist threat and an inherently open and diverse transportation 

system. 

I want to make clear that there is not a lack of security in the absence of these regulations. 

TSA has pursued rulemaking while simultaneously working with stakeholders to harden 

the target. As discussed below, numerous programs and measures have been initiated 

and implemented to protect surface transportation hubs and systems- many of which 

have been designed to complement and build on other Federal safety and security 

regulations and programs. 1 Owner/operators of high-risk systems, such as Amtrak, have 

consistently adopted recommendations made by TSA to enhance security. As noted 

above, the Inspector General did not identify any specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in 

the security of passenger railroads or public transportation systems. 

Based on the likelihood of continued voluntary compliance by stakeholders, TSA 

believes the security landscape for higher-risk surface transportation providers has been 

enhanced and will not be profoundly changed by future regulatory requirements. The 

following summarizes the current status of these rulemakings. 

• Security Training: The proposed rule to meet the security training requirements has 

been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review under Executive 

Order 12,866. 

1 Since its creation, TSA has developed its programs and partnerships upon the baseline of safety and 

security-related programs of the Department of Transportation (DOT). These include 49 CFR part 659 (the 

Federal Transit Administration's requirements for State Safety Oversight for Rail Fixed Guideway 

Systems) and 49 CFR part 239 (the Federal Railroad Administration's regulations for Passenger Train 

Emergency Preparedness). All railroads (freight and passenger) and rail transit systems must also comply 

with TSA's regulations at 49 CFR part 1580- which require security coordinators, reporting of significant 

security incidents to TSA, and chain of custody requirements for Rail Security-Sensitive Materials 

(RSSM). 
70 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• Vulnerability Assessments and Security Planning (V ASP): TSA intends to issue an 

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit sufficient data 

regarding the security measures industry currently employs as well as the potential 

impact of regulations on operations. This data is necessary conduct a robust analysis 

of the existing baseline of persons potentially affected by a proposed rule. This 

analysis will help us minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of the policy we 

will ultimately propose. 

• Employee Vetting: TSA intends to address the vetting requirements (threat 

assessment and immigration check) through a rulemaking to be published in sequence 

with the other surface security-related rulemakings (the rulemaking for security 

training will set the applicability and structure for all the other related rulemakings ). 

TSA has already satisfied the requirements of Sections 1414 and 1522 of the 

September 11 Act, having published an Interim Final Rule on False Statements 

Regarding Security Background Checks (see 73 FR 44665) and issued various 

guidance documents (see, e.g., TSA's February 2007 updates to its recommended 

security action items for the highest-risk freight railroads, and background check 

practices published by the American Public Transportation Association in 

conjunction with TSA in 2011). TSA intends for all future rulemakings, including 

the surface employee vetting rule described above, to be consistent with the standards 

articulated in Sections 1414 and 1522. 

Although TSA must still publish regulations that fully accomplish the requirements of the 

September 11 Act, there is substantial progress on a range of operational improvements 

to security and prevention/response capabilities to enhance the security of the rail sector 

consistent with the intent of the September 11 Act. TSA's confidence reflects both its 

regular interaction with the industry and the assessments it conducts, most notably 

through the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. 

While assessments through the BASE program are voluntary, the program has proven to 

be an effective method for maintaining awareness of the current security baseline and 

enhancing that baseline through voluntary cooperation. This voluntary assessment 

program focuses on efforts to implement the 17 Security and Emergency Management 

Action Items for Transit Systems (SAis).2 The structure of the BASE for transit systems 

has been similarly implemented for other surface modes. TSA has conducted over 430 

BASE assessments on mass transit and passenger rail systems since the program began in 

2006. As discussed below, TSA has used results of the BASE program to prioritize 

2 The 17 SA Is were jointly developed by TSA and the Federal Transit Administration in consultation with 

the industry. More information on this program can be found at: 

https :I /transit -safety. fta.dot. gov I securityisecurityin itiativesl Action! temsl defau 1~. 
71 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURlTY (SENATE) 

resources to address deficiencies in low-scoring areas across the Nation and adjust 

resources provided to passenger rail systems. This has raised the level of security in the 

public transportation and passenger rail environment, minimizing the need for regulatory 

requirements to mitigate vulnerabilities and risk. In a recent report to Congress, TSA 

provided additional validation for its assessment results. See Security Incident Response 

for Surface Transportation Systems: Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress (Mach 25, 

20 16) (fulfilling requirements of Section 7 of the Gerardo Hernandez Airport security Act 

of2015 (Pub. Law. 114-50) to verify passenger transportation agencies and providers of 

high-risk facilities have plans to respond to active shooters, acts of terrorism, or other 

security-related incidents that target passengers). 

The following highlights other initiatives, programs, and partnerships that have 

significantly enhanced the baseline of security for passenger railroads and public 

transportation. 

• Funding for Security Enhancements: Between Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 

2015, almost $200 million was awarded through the Transit Security Grant Program 

(TSGP), Amtrak grant program, and the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program 

(IBSGP/OTRB) specifically for security training and planning efforts between Fiscal 

Year 2008 and Fiscal Year 2011, and over $11 million was awarded through the 

Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP) for security training and planning. 

TSA's assessments indicate that this funding has resulted in a significant 

improvement. In addition, TSA's First ObserverTM security domain awareness 

program delivers web-based training to highway professionals, including over-theroad bus operators, encouraging frontline workers to "Observe, Assess and Report" 

suspicious activities. Approximately 100,000 highway professionals have been 

trained on the First ObserverTM Program. 

• Visible Interrnodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams and RAILSAFE: TSA 

deploys VIPR teams across the United States, in close coordination with local security 

and law enforcement officials, to augment the security of transportation systems. In 

the rail environment, TSA VIPR teams participate in the Regional Alliance Including 

Local, State & Federal Efforts (RAILSAFE) Program, sponsored by Amtrak. These 

joint U.S. and Canadian events include participation of law enforcement officers from 

federal, state, and local authorities, as well as from rail and transit agencies who are 

deployed at passenger rail and transit stations and along the rights-of-way to visibly 

exercise counterterrorism and incident response capabilities on specified dates (usually 

tied to a National Special Security Event). On average, each RAILSAFE event 

includes simultaneous participations by 255 agencies in 42 states, involving 1,600 

police and other personnel. 
72 

Question#: 2 

Topic: Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of! SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

• National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP): TSA's NEDCTP 

supports Explosives Detection K9 Teams for airports, mass transit systems, and cargo 

facilities. This includes teams for passenger rail systems. These teams are currently 

deployed to 13 of the top 25 passenger rail systems (based on ridership) as well as five 

AMTRAK locations. The use of highly trained explosives detection canine teams is 

also a proven deterrent to terrorism directed towards passenger rail systems. 

• Passenger Rail Anti-Terrorism Teams: Through TSGP grant funding, dedicated teams 

are available to support counter-terrorism activities, to include high visibility 

activities, Explosives Detection K9 patrols, covert surveillance, station inspections, 

behavioral detection, directed patrols, and other unpredictable activities. 

• Random Baggage Screening/Mobile Screening Team: Passenger rail agencies have 

built a mobile screening capability by conducting random screening of passengers' 

bags across their network. Examples of high-risk passenger rail systems that conduct 

random baggage screening include: the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Amtrak, New York Police 

Department (Transit Bureau), New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 

and Chicago Police Department (for the Chicago Transit Authority). In addition, TSA 

has provided personnel and equipment to support random baggage screening 

operations for passenger rail agencies. 

• Intelligence and Information Sharing: TSA regularly communicates and exchanges 

intelligence and information with transit and rail operators domestically and 

internationally through a variety of regularized forums. Some examples include: 

- Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group which is representative of26 

entities, including the largest U.S. public transportation systems, Canada, and the 

United Kingdom; 

- Monthly industry-wide information sharing calls; 

- Information dissemination through the Public Transportation Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center; and 

- Participation in the annual Security and Emergency Management Roundtable, a 

significant event coordinated by TSA and industry engaging major transit systems 

nationwide to pursue security enhancement practices. The most recent roundtable 

occurred in June 2016, in Phoenix, Arizona. 

• Drills and Exercises: Mass Transit and Passenger rail systems routinely conduct 

security-related exercises and drills to test emergency response plans and capabilities. 

In addition, TSA provides exercises, training, and security planning tools to the 
73 

Question#: 2 

Topic; Passenger Rail Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of! SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURJTY (SENATE) 

passenger rail community through the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise 

Program and Exercise Information System programs. In Fiscal Year 2015, eight 

exercises were conducted that directly supported the passenger rail community. In 

Fiscal Year 2016, fourteen exercises are planned focusing on the passenger rail 

community. 

• American Public Transportation Association (APT A) Standards Program: TSA 

supports and participates in the APT A-led development of security standards for 

public transportation, including passenger rail systems. TSA's collaboration with 

APT A includes publication of seven standards in 2013 and 2014 that further enhanced 

the security baseline. For example, APTA published standards in 2011 for public 

transportation agencies and passenger railroads to conduct named-based background 

checks that reflect the requirements for the scope of background checks in section 

1414 of the September 11 Act, including redress. Aggregate BASE data for passenger 

railroads and public transportation agencies that have been assessed indicates the 

average score for conducting background investigations of employees and contractors 

has risen from 87 percent in Fiscal Year 2010 to 94 percent in Fiscal Year 2015. 
74 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

3 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May 26,2016 

Engagement with Muslim Community 

Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: On May 25, this committee passed the DHS Accountability Act which 

authorized the Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. 

How important is engagement by federal, state and local law enforcement with the 

Muslim community in the United States to our fight against homegrown extremism? 

Response: All communities are potentially at risk for terrorist attacks emanating from 

both domestic and international terrorist groups. Communities have partnered with DHS 

to seek federal resources for countering violent extremism, and the DHS Office for 

Community Partnerships has developed and will continue to develop products and 

services such as training, exercises, frameworks, and technical assistance to support all 

communities. The DHS Office for Community Partnerships does this through providing 

these resources to stakeholders in local government (including law enforcement), nonprofit community organizations, and influential community members, and continues to 

model best practices for replication elsewhere. 

Engagement is an important aspect of the Department's CVE efforts across communities. 

DHS Office for Community Partnerships works closely with other DHS Components to 

help build and support communities that are resilient to ISIL's message and recruitment 

efforts. Further, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties's (CRCL) 

community engagement program addresses grievances and explores community based 

solutions for communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by DHS 

activities, helping to build community resilience against homegrovm violent extremism 

by developing trust between law enforcement agencies and communities, while 

protecting civil rights and civil liberties. 
75 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Engagement with Muslim Community 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of!SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Active community engagement from all govermnent agencies undermines some of the 

key recruitment narratives used by violent extremist groups, including ISIL, al-Qa'ida, 

and their affiliates. 

Question: How often does DHS and state and local law enforcement work with Muslim 

communities in the U.S. to identifY individuals that might be in danger of being 

radicalized? 

Response: All communities are potentially at risk for terrorist attacks emanating from 

both domestic and international terrorist groups. Communities have partnered with DHS 

to seek federal resources for countering violent extremism, and the DHS Office for 

Community Partnerships has developed and will continue to develop products and 

services such as training, exercises, frameworks, and technical assistance to support all 

communities. The DHS Office for Community Partnerships does this through providing 

these resources to stakeholders in local government (including law enforcement), nonprofit community organizations, and influential community members, and continues to 

model best practices for replication elsewhere. The DHS Office for Community 

Partnerships also seeks to foster broad online CVE efforts, and has partnered with FEMA 

to announce a competitive grant program for communities seeking to address violent 

extremism. This grant program will provide vital funding to those communities taking 

action. 
76 

Question#: 4 

Topic: Disrupted Plots 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat oflSIS 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Without getting into classified information, have any plots been disrupted as a 

result ofDHS's and state and local law enforcement's engagement with Muslim 

communities in the U.S.? 

Response: There are two key unclassified examples: 1) In 2012, in Tampa, Florida, the 

Muslim community provided authorities information that helped disrupt a potential plot; 

and 2) In 2014, there was a community-led multi-sector intervention, which included 

clinical psychologists, faith based leaders, and community based advocacy organizations 

in Chicago, Illinois, that led to the reintegration of a young man who wanted to leave the 

United States and join ISIL. Additionally, multiple studies have been done by various 

academic institutions and NGO's about the identification of plots that have been 

disrupted due to partnership with community members since September 11. 
77 

Question#: 5 

Topic: Rhetoric 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How have those relationships been affected by some of the rhetoric we have 

been hearing recently regarding the Muslims, and, in particular, refugees? 

Response: The challenges we face span local, state, federal, and international borders. 

Engagement with diverse communities is centered on the key principle of not securitizing 

the relationship with American communities, rather on building bridges and trust through 

a commitment to protecting civil rights, civil liberties, and addressing grievances. The 

current rhetoric creates challenges to engage effectively and create trust with 

communities. At the local level, this rhetoric has a detrimental effect on public safety 

because it affects the ability of local officials and local law enforcement to reach out to 

communities, communicate effectively, and engender trust. Through our regular 

roundtables, communities have regularly expressed a heightened sense of vulnerability 

among individuals who are perceived to be of Muslim background. The Department of 

Homeland Security will stand with communities to push back against this violent 

rhetoric. 
78 

Question#: 6 

Topic: USCIS Transformation Program 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Right now our immigration system is mostly still paper-based. The U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Service's Transformation Program is supposed to create an 

interoperable system that tracks immigration applications and immigration benefits, and 

enables sharing of this information across agencies more quickly and easily. 

However, this project has now taken over a decade, is $1 billion over budget so far and 4 

years behind its initial approved baseline. I understand that USCIS has changed 

acquisition strategies entirely. 

Has anyone has been held accountable for this fiasco? 

Response: As is common with IT initiatives, course correction, by no fault of a specific 

individual, is often necessary. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has 

dedicated resources to re-baseline and move forward. 

Reasons for delays in USCIS' Transformation Program were discussed in depth with the 

Federal and DHS Chief Information Officers, as well as congressional oversight 

committee staff. We realized that, as with many government IT programs, relying on a 

single, large contract with one contractor was not working. We split the work between 

several contractors, who then had to compete for continued participation in the project. 

Continuous competition created the spark for innovation, and the vendors responded. We 

also streamlined our oversight processes. We simplified the technical design of the 

system, and have taken steps to deliver capability faster while reducing costs. We 

adopted industry best practices including agile development, open source technologies, 

and continuous delivery. This is the same approach used in leading technology 

companies such as Netflix, Amazon, and Etsy, and large companies like Target, 

Nordstrom, Disney, and Capital One. It is also the same approach that the President has 

tasked the U.S. Digital Service to provide when upgrading other sites across the entire 

Federal Government in order to best serve the public. 

During 2015, the Transformation Program deployed the capability to process the 

Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card (Form I-90) as the first release in the 

new architecture. Also during 2015, the program deployed the capability for processing 

green cards for new immigrants entering the United States as well as other high volume 

processing. In 2016, we have deployed capability to support processing Applications for 

Naturalization and those for Temporary Protected Status. Currently, the system that was 

rebuilt and redeployed in 2015 is capable of processing 31 percent of users, s workload. 
79 

Question#: 6 

Topic: USCIS Transformation Program 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

In addition, the program was re-baselined in April 2015. The re-baselining revamped the 

development schedule, adding four more years and $266 million. However, the full rebaselined costs required a 28-year life cycle cost estimate versus 17 years, adding an 

additional $725 million to the increased cost estimate. 

Question: How much is our paper-based system contributing to our vulnerability? 

Response: Before approving any applications, petitions or requests, whether filed on 

paper or electronically, USeiS runs many different background and security checks on 

individuals, dependents, and beneficiaries. Receiving the applications via paper does not 

alter this critical step in the process. Data from the applications is currently shared 

against robust data analytic capabilities to identify trends, imposters, or fraud. users 

also provides information to our law enforcement partners who assist with immigration 

enforcement. Improving national security and public safety through more robust 

electronic data capture and processing will allow users to have even more capability to 

run analytics against combinations of data that it previously could not in the paper 

process without a very labor and logistically intensive process. Further, having full 

records in a digital environment to include images of documents will enhance data 

sharing. 

Question: When is the expected completion date now? 

Response: The current plan is to complete development of capability to support 

processing all users workload electronically by the 2nd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. 
80 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

7 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 

From Senator Jon Tester 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May 26,2016 

Airport Security 

Protecting America from the Threat ofiSIS 

The Honorable Jon Tester 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: What actions should Congress take to tighten up airport security across the 

U.S.? How about transportation and cargo security in general? 

Response: Congressional support for the Transportation Security Administration's 

(TSA) efforts to improve security practices while meeting the challenge of recent and 

unprecedented growth in passenger volume has been vital. The rapid approval of two 

requests to realign funds from other TSA accounts to support checkpoint operations will 

allow the ongoing summer surge in passenger traffic to be managed within reasonable 

wait times, while maintaining security standards. 

Congress has also supported TSA's security efforts through the recent passage of Pub. L. 

114-190, the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of2016, which 

includes several provisions to enhance security in both public and sterile areas of airports 

and at airport security checkpoints. The Act also addresses cargo security through a 

provision authorizing TSA to evaluate foreign countries' air cargo security programs to 

determine whether such programs provide a level of security commensurate with the 

United States. 

Ongoing support from Congress is necessary as TSA works to ensure that future 

resources are aligned appropriately to meet increased passenger and baggage screening 

requirements for the next several years. At the same time, TSA is examining ways to 

make checkpoint screening more effective and efficient with technological and 

configuration improvements, while increasing the number of eligible passengers enrolled 

in TSA Prcvl®, and looks forward to working with Congress and other stakeholders to 

meet this challenge. 

Continued support for the Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget Request provides 

sufficient support for other activities, including efforts to ensure compliance with 
81 

Question#: 7 

Topic: Airport Security 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat ofiSIS 

Primary: The Honorable Jon Tester 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

domestic and international air cargo screening requirements, as TSA works with foreign 

partners to improve overseas security practices to meet international standards. 
82 

Question#: 8 

Topic: Actionable Intelligence Follow-up 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of!SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Jon Tester 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: According to some reports, U.S. and Turkish officials tried to get actionable 

intelligence to Belgian officials before the March 22 Brussels attacks, but Belgian 

officials were too slow to respond. 

What efforts can the U.S. undertake with European nations to ensure that actionable 

intelligence within the EU is being followed up on? 

Response: DHS is supporting the establishment of the European Counterterrorism Centre 

(ECTC) and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC), which EUROPOL 

recently stood up in part to improve information sharing among European partners. More 

specifically, DHS has deployed officers to work at ECTC and EMSC and responds to 

these organizations' requests for information. In addition, DHS is promoting the 

importance ofECTC and EMSC within the EU, encouraging European countries to share 

information with the Centers, which, in tum, will allow the Centers to share more 

information within the EU. At the same time, DHS continues to work through our 

officers embedded at Europol and our attaches in Europe to help European law 

enforcement. 

Moreover, following the Paris and Brussels attacks, DHS increased its engagement with 

European partners, building on the growing amount of support we provided in recent 

years. Specifically, we engaged France, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and others to 

offer assistance on topics such as passport security; fraudulent document detection; 

refugee and migrant screening; developing Advance Passenger Information and 

Passenger Name Record systems to screen air travelers; and aviation and border security. 

All of the above efforts are, in part, intended to help European governments share and 

take action on intelligence to prevent attacks. 
83 

Question#: 9 

Topic: Post-Attack Security Posture 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS 

Primary: The Honorable Jon Tester 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How have the French and the Belgians changed their security posture since the 

attacks? How is the U.S. helping them? 

Response: France and Belgium took affirmative steps to improve their security postures 

following the Paris and Brussels attacks. 

France has taken an assertive stance on counterterrorism and border security in the 

European Union, pushing to strengthen immigration and security controls on the 

Schengen Zone's external borders and collecting and analyzing Passenger Name Record 

information for flights to and within the EU. The French government also declared a 

state of emergency after the Paris attacks, which has now been extended four times, 

through the end of January 2017. Additionally, the French Parliament approved a series 

of legislative changes, providing French police greater authority to combat terrorism. For 

example, French police can now place someone returning from certain "terrorist theaters 

of operation" under house arrest for up to one month. 

Since the Brussels attacks, the Belgian government has focused on improving 

information sharing among its law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence entities, 

particularly relating to aviation security and countering violent extremism. Belgium is 

also making progress on developing its collection and analysis of Advance Passenger 

Information and Passenger Name Record data. 

France and Belgium also prioritized and increased information sharing through Europol 

and its newly-established European Counterterrorism Centre. Prior to the attacks, 

Brussels and Paris did not routinely share sensitive counterterrorism and intelligence 

information with all of their European partners. 

The U.S. Government, including DHS, is helping Belgium and France strengthen their 

counterterrorism and border security capabilities, technical assistance and training. For 

example, in February 2016, DHS sent CBP, ICE, and TSA representatives to Brussels, as 

part of an U.S. interagency team, to discuss increasing cooperation on passport security, 

PNR collection and analysis, screening and watchlisting practices, and vetting of 

migrants and refugees. The Belgians accepted these offers of assistance and we are now 

providing training and other forms of support on these issues. DHS is also helping 

France in a variety of areas, including aviation security, passport and visa fraud, 

passenger screening and targeting, and border management. 
84 

Question#: 

Topic: 

Hearing: 

Primary: 

Committee: 

10 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 

From Senator Heidi Heitkamp 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May 26,2016 

Degrade ISIS Financial Structure 

Protecting America from the Threat ofiSIS 

The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Over the last few months there have been news reports pointing to financial 

challenges that ISIS is having, which in tum is causing them to struggle in paying their 

fighters. Are we investigating the source of income for ISIS? 

If so, how is DHS working to degrade ISIS's financial structure? 

Response: Under the President's Counter-ISIL strategy, the Treasury Department leads 

efforts to disrupt ISIL's financial network. That said, DHS supports the identification 

and disruption ofiSIL financial networks through criminal investigations, to include 

investigations on illegal imports of cultural antiquities from Syria and Iraq, which is a 

source of income for ISIL. Additionally, DHS provides capacity building and training on 

bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, and online financial schemes for 

key foreign partners 
85 

Question#: II 

Topic: Observe ISIS Sympathizers 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat ofiSIS 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: One of the defining characteristics of the ISIS-related mobilization is the 

"extremely heterogeneous background of those involved." This characteristic makes it 

very challenging for federal agencies and law enforcement to observe ISIS sympathizers. 

What can be done to help your agency and other federal entities with this issue? 

Response: DHS recently created the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP), which 

was created to develop partnerships with communities across the U.S. and help them 

prevent acts of violent extremism. As OCP matures, it will be the prime source of 

leadership, innovation, and support within the Department for local partners, peers, and 

various sectors working to counter violent extremism. Currently, DHS and other federal 

partners also conduct research to identify indicators of radicalization to violence. And 

since December 2015, I&A has provided 47 briefings in 28 states to discuss the evolution 

of the Homegrown Violent Extremist phenomenon and how public safety personnel are 

positioned to identify pre-attack signposts and indicators. Overall, these efforts enhance 

our ability to identify potential homegrown violent extremists and intervene before an act 

of violence occurs. 
86 

Question#: 12 

Topic: No Prior Criminal History 

Hearing: Protecting America from the Threat of! SIS 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How do we detect terrorists that are so-called "clean skin", meaning terrorists 

who have no criminal history and could possess a valid passport? 

Response: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs a layered enforcement 

strategy to identify high risk travelers, both known and previously unknown, at every 

stage of the travel system. To achieve this, CBP uses cutting edge technology and 

analytical methodologies to review advance passenger and cargo data, previous border 

crossing information, EST A and visa application data, and intelligence, law enforcement 

and open source information to identify and mitigate travelers who may pose a risk. In 

addition, this information is matched against sophisticated targeting rules developed by 

CBP subject matter experts. Targeting rules, which are based on information from the 

Intelligence Community (IC) and law enforcement, identify potential high risk travelers 

based on, for example, travel patterns. All of these tools combined allow CBP to put the 

pieces of the "puzzle" together and apply additional scrutiny to travelers not previously 

identified by the IC, law enforcement, and international partners as individuals of 

concern. I would be more than happy to send my staff to provide further details on 

CBP's capabilities and methodologies in a closed setting. 
87 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Mr. Justin Siberell by 

Senator Rob Portman (#1) 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May26, 2016 

Following up on our exchange at the hearing, please provide statistics along with 

their source which support your assessment that the number of foreign fighters 

traveling to fight in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria, is decreasing. 

Answer: 

According to information from the U.S. Intelligence Community, since 

2011, nearly 40,000 Sunni fighters from more than 120 countries have traveled to 

Syria-including 6,900 with Western passports. Global efforts to counter foreign 

fighter flows are making progress, and we are seeing a drop in the number of 

fighters travelling to the conflict zones this year. In May during remarks at the 

International Special Operations Forces Convention, Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa Monaco reported the flow of 

foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria is down significantly over the last year-at 

least 50 percent from its peak of 2,000 a month. In early June during a statement 

delivered before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Central Intelligence 

Agency Director John Brennan noted fewer foreign fighters are travelling to Syria. 
88 

This decline in the numbers of foreign fighters is putting pressure on the 

Da'esh. The group is estimated to currently field 18,000-22,000 fighters, a 

decrease from the estimate of up to 33,000 that it was able to deploy in 2014. In 

addition, Da'esh has lost 47 percent of the territory it previously controlled in Iraq, 

a sharp reduction in the size of its self-declared caliphate. 

The observed decline in the numbers and rate of foreign fighters arriving in 

Syria and Iraq may be attributed to a range of factors, including military gains by 

the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and proactive steps by governments to 

strengthen and enforce border security, counter-facilitation and counterrecruitment efforts, such as: 

• The United States now has formal information-sharing arrangements with 55 

international partners to assist efforts to identify, track, and deter the travel 

of suspected terrorists. 

• 58 countries, plus the United Nations, now contribute foreign terrorist 

fighter (FTF) profiles to INTERPOL, and there has been a 500 percent 

increase in suspected FTF identities since September 2014. 

• 41 countries have passed new laws or updated existing legislation to more 

effectively identify and prosecute FTFs. 
89 

• 38 countries have reported arresting FTFs, and 30 have successfully brought 

charges in FTF cases. 

• Turkey- a critical geographic chokepoint in the flow ofFTFs- has 

increased its information sharing with international partners and has taken 

steps to improve border security. Turkey has increased detentions, arrests, 

and prosecution of suspected foreign terrorist fighters, deporting over 3,000 

known or suspected foreign terrorist fighters and banning nearly 50,000 

individuals from entry. Physical improvements along Turkey's border with 

Syria are also underway, with for example the installment of modular 

concrete walls, wire fencing, and border lighting. 

• Approximately 23 countries have developed national action plans to counter 

violent extremism and/or counterterrorism, and at least 11 have launched 

programs to counter FTF radicalization and recruitment in their countries 

(including deradicalization centers and hotlines). 

We rely on Intelligence Community (IC) assessments about the flow of 

FTFs and defer to IC analysis for additional details on the reasons for the decline 

ofFTFs traveling to the Middle East. 

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) oversees a broad Centerwide effort to track foreign fighters traveling to Syria, working closely with 

Intelligence Community partners. As part of this effort, NCTC aggregates 
90 

information on known or suspected terrorists traveling to Syria in the Terrorist 

Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). This effort has created a valuable forum 

for identifying, tracking, and sharing information with law enforcement, 

counterterrorism, screening, and watchlisting communities on known or suspected 

terrorists. 
91 

Question: 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Mr. Justin Siberell by 

Senator Rob Portman (#2) 

"Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS" 

May26,2016 

You indicated in your testimony that while the number of foreign fighters going to 

fight in Syria and Iraq is decreasing, hot spots in Africa, like Libya, have seen an 

increase in ISIS activity. Are there any statistics which indicate that foreign 

fighters are now traveling to these locations? 

Answer: 

We rely on Intelligence Community assessments and defer to them for more 

details - many of which are classified - on the flow of foreign fighters and 

geographic focus ofDa'esh activity. 

There are a number of indications Da'esh finds Libya an attractive operating 

environment. We remain concerned that as Da'esh feels pressure on its hold of 

territory in Iraq and Syria, Da'esh will try to expand its operations to other areas. 

Da'esh's Libya branch is among the best developed of the eight official branches 

outside of Syria and Iraq and the group has attempted to establish a state-like 

presence in Libya. 
92 

• Da' esh has controlled the central coastal town of Sirte since summer 2015, 

and is believed to have a presence in Tripoli, Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Derna, 

Sabratha, and other major towns and cities. 

• Da'esh has an estimated 3,000 to 6,500 fighters in Libya; those fighters are 

drawn from the local population in Libya and other countries. Da'esh has 

urged fighters in Africa to travel to Libya rather than heading to the Middle 

East given the current international pressure on foreign fighters trying to 

reach Syria and Iraq. 

We are working with the international community to support the 

Government ofNational Accord (GNA) in its efforts to respond to the terrorist 

threat posed by IS Da'esh IL, de-escalate the conflict in the country, and secure 

Libyan territory and borders. However, it will take time for the GNA to establish 

the security institutions and capacity to combat Da'esh, guard its borders, and fully 

protect its citizens. Action against Da'esh in Libya is required for the safety of 

Libyans, but also for the safety of their neighbors. Libya's porous borders and 

political and security vacuum have allowed Da'esh to plan and carry out terrorist 

attacks in Tunisia and Libya. 
93 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Rob Portman #3 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government Reform 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

You also mention the State Department's CVE efforts, including the Global 

Engagement Center. What capabilities does it have to counter-message ISIS 

propaganda and terrorist incubation? 

Answer: 

The Global Engagement Center's (GEC's) fact-based online engagement 

across social media platforms abroad in Arabic, Urdu, and Somali is aimed at 

contesting the space, refuting the violent extremist narratives, and influencing at 

risk audience while reducing Da'esh's recruitment efforts. GEC operates on 

Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, You Tube and other platforms to disseminate 

counter violent extremist messages. GEC's staff includes native speakers who 

leverage their language and cultural expertise to create tailored messages that 

resonate with vulnerable individuals and communicates to expose terrorist acts and 

undermine the propaganda from international terrorist organizations. 
94 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Rob Portman #4 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government Reform 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

What does the Federal Government need to do to get this right? I am happy to see 

that Michael Lumpkin was put in charge of the GEC. How can Congress ensure he 

succeeds? Is he getting enough funding? 

Answer: 

We have been under resourcing the counter-messaging effort for the past 

couple of years. To provide you some context, before Michael Lumpkin came 

onboard to lead the GEC in January of this year, the total budget for countering 

extremist propaganda abroad was less than $10 million annually. Meanwhile, in 

countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, we are spending hundreds of millions 

annually to kill Da'esh leaders, who are replaced months--sometimes only weeks--

after a strike occurs. 

However, the GEC is finally getting more funding to hire the right people 

and use digital analytics tools to gain traction in the information battlespace. This 

year the budget is approximately $15 million, and we are seeking roughly $21 

million in FY2017, and nearly $60 million in FY2018. We hope Congress will 
95 

support this badly-needed funding for the GEC, as they work to implement the new 

approach, one that is data-driven and leverages credible voices. 
96 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Jon Tester (#1) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Are State Department travel warnings sufficient to keep Americans secure when 

they travel overseas? 

Answer: 

While U.S. citizens ultimately make their own travel and safety decisions, 

the Department of State provides a wealth of information to help guide those 

decisions on our travel information website, www.travel.state.gov. Travel 

Warnings and Alerts provide information about credible, specific, and noncounterable security threats overseas to help U.S. citizens make educated decisions 

about whether to travel. The Department updates and shares Travel Warnings and 

Alerts as well as country information sheets and security messages with U.S. 

citizens. The information in our products is based on our best objective assessment 

of conditions in a given country from reports by our U.S. embassies and 

consulates, other Department of State bureaus, media outlets, and other foreign and 

U.S. government sources. We cannot prevent U.S. citizens from traveling, but our 

warnings provide clear notice of the dangerous situations and difficulties that 

travelers may encounter in certain countries, including security threats and crime. 

In addition to security, travel warnings and alerts also cover hurricane and typhoon 
97 

season, and time-limited events such as national elections in foreign countries that 

may spark crowds or demonstrations. 

We strongly encourage all U.S. citizen travelers to enroll in the Smart 

Traveler Enrollment Program, or STEP, so that they can receive up-to-date 

warnings and security messages as they travel. 
98 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Jon Tester (#2) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

How do you envision modeling risk in order to best alert Americans when they 

travel overseas? 

Answer: 

The Bureau of Consular Affairs works closely with the security and counterterrorism experts in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to evaluate threat 

information and weigh the risk to both private and official U.S. citizens. Based on 

their assessments and our obligations under the "No Double Standard" policy, 

Security Messages, Travel Warnings, and Travel Alerts are released to the 

American public as early as possible. We share a commitment to providing U.S. 

citizens focused and relevant information to make decisions regarding their 

personal safety with as much notice as feasible. 
99 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Jon Tester (#3) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

According to some reports, U.S. and Turkish officials tried to get actionable 

intelligence to Belgian officials before the March 22 Brussels attacks, but Belgian 

officials were too slow to respond. What efforts can the U.S. undertake with 

European nations to ensure that actionable intelligence within the EU is being 

followed up on? 

Answer: 

We are undertaking a number of efforts to ensure information is being 

shared and acted on within the EU, including working with member states to 

increase their capacity on border security, identity management, counter 

messaging, and information sharing. Through bilateral information sharing 

agreements, we are deepening transatlantic cooperation to counter the threat posed 

by foreign terrorist fighters. The United States continues to work with European 

partners to increase security at their borders and eliminate existing security 

vulnerabilities, enabling them to better identify, restrict, and report travel of 

suspected foreign terrorist fighters. 

The United States continues to urge EU countries to increase the sharing of 

terrorist identity and watchlisting information between their national and local law 

enforcement, between member states and the EU, and to use INTERPOL's 
100 

resources and screen passengers against its Foreign Terrorist Fighters database and 

its Stolen and Lost Travel Documents system. European Union member states 

cooperate to protect against terrorist threats and infiltration, and Turkey remains a 

partner in countering ISIL and minimizing foreign fighter flows. In turn, the EU is 

undertaking significant efforts to better coordinate EU and national-levellaw 

enforcement databases and watchlists and individual members are trying to 

increase their own internal information sharing between national and local law 

enforcement. 

The investigations that followed the attacks ofNovember 13,2015, in Paris 

and March 22, 2016, in Brussels revealed that one of the main challenges for 

effective and sustainable action to fight terrorism and organized crime is to ensure 

the more efficient and expedient exchange of information among member states' 

law enforcement authorities and with and between EU agencies. The EU Justice 

and Home Affairs Committee recently approved an ambitious roadmap to increase 

EU-wide information sharing and interoperability. The adoption of the roadmap is 

very significant; it lays out a plan for the EU to address critical gaps in information 

sharing to prevent the next Paris or Brussels-style attacks in Europe. We 

encouraged member states to endorse the roadmap and have offered technical 

assistance to the EU as it implements the provisions of the plan. 
101 

We have ramped up our counterterrorism engagement with European 

partners significantly in the aftermath of the Paris and Brussels attacks, and work 

closely with partners around the globe to counter the foreign fighter threat. We are 

partnering with these governments in areas including: strengthening informationsharing on known and suspected terrorists, increasing effective traveler screening, 

and building comprehensive financial investigations. 

• The work of the interagency Foreign Fighter Surge Teams (FFSTs) in 

several European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and Greece) 

is helping to strengthen partner capacity over the long-term to identify, 

disrupt, arrest and prosecute suspected foreign terrorist fighters and improve 

our collective global capacity to counter this threat. Through our FFST 

initiative, we have identified concrete areas to increase Belgium's capacity 

to identify, disrupt, arrest, and prosecute suspected Foreign Terrorist 

Fighters. Work with this broader group of partners includes: 

o France: technical exchanges on aviation security and use of financial 

data to identify and monitor terrorists, and border officer exchanges. 

o Belgium: technical exchanges on passport security behavioral 

detection training, and migrant screening. 

o Greece: training on investigative tools to counter terrorism finance, 

migrant screening, and aviation security training. 
102 

o Italy: migrant screening, and plans to conduct technical exchanges 

on APIIPNR and terrorist use of the internet. 

For more information on the intelligence relationship with our European 

partners, we defer to our Intelligence Community colleagues. 
103 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Jon Tester (#4) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

How have the French and the Belgians changed their security posture since the 

attacks? How is the U.S. helping them? 

Answer: 

Approximately seven months after ISIL's November 13 terrorist attacks in 

Paris, French investigators continue to dismantle the terror network that killed 130 

people and injured 350 others. Furthermore, the French government, deeply 

concerned over security at this summer's Union of European Football Associations 

(UEF A) Euro 2016 soccer tournament and the Tour de France, has secured 

Parliamentary support to extend the current national state of emergency through 

July 26. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced on May 9 a 

comprehensive national plan to combat violent extremism that includes 

"deradicalization centers" and numerous other new measures. In addition, the 

French National Assembly and Senate met on May 16 to reconcile versions of the 

draft bill "against crime, terrorism and its financing," allowing judges to approve 

prosecutorial demands for video surveillance and computer data collection. Until 
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now, such measures were reserved strictly for investigating judges in the 

framework of judicial investigations. 

The U.S. bilateral relationship with France is stronger and more productive 

than it has been in decades; we share common objectives and work closely on 

countering terrorism and violent extremism. We have ramped up our already close 

counterterrorism partnership in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, and have 

increased interagency coordination in a number of specific areas. For example, 

throughout 2016, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration will continue 

engaging with France to improve "Last Point of Departure" (LPD) airport security. 

Such actions include: sharing threat-stream information and best practices as well 

as specific mitigation measures; inspecting French LPD airport air, cargo, and 

repair operations; liaising on civil aviation issues such as screening technology, 

behavior detection, canine programs, and "active shooter" preparation and 

response; assisting French efforts to develop risk assessment criteria and 

methodology; and partnering with France to improve aviation security in third 

countries. 

Separately, two French cities joined the Strong Cities Network (SCN), 

participating in the May 2016 SCN Global Summit held in Turkey. The purpose of 

the network is to connect cities, city-level practitioners, and the communities they 

represent through a series of workshops, trainings, and sustained city partnerships, 
105 

with the aim of responding to municipal-level countering violent extremism (CVE) 

needs. 

Turning to Belgium, through our FFST initiative, we have identified 

concrete areas to increase Belgium's capacity to identify, disrupt, arrest, and 

prosecute suspected Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). We are partnering with 

several European governments, including Belgium, in areas such as strengthening 

information-sharing on known and suspected terrorists, increasing effective 

traveler screening, and building comprehensive financial investigations. 

Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson met with Belgian Minister of 

Interior Jan Jambon in April. Discussion centered on the importance of effective 

information sharing in the aftermath of the March 22 attacks and opportunities for 

enhanced counterterrorism collaboration, including traveler and asylum seeker 

screening. Secretary Johnson reaffirmed DHS' commitment to share information 

routinely with Belgian partners. The two also discussed European efforts to 

strengthen immigration and security controls on the Schengen Zone's external 

borders and to collect and analyze Passenger Name Record data for flights to, and 

within, the European Union. 

We are also partnering with Belgium on a broader, preventive CVE agenda. 

The Belgian cities of Antwerp and Vilvoorde are SCN members, and both cities 

have sent delegations to the United States on CVE-focused exchanges. Notably, as 
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a direct result of the joint State Department/DRS led city-to-city exchange in 2014 

between Vilvoorde and Columbus, Ohio, the Vilvoorde police commissioner has 

mandated diversity training for the entire police force. Furthermore, this Vilvoorde 

delegation requested additional training on community policing for Vilvoorde city 

officials, police officers, and civil society members. The Vilvoorde mayor has 

reported that none of his city's residents have departed Vilvoorde to join ISIL in 

Syria or Iraq since May 2014, which Belgian officials attribute, in part, to this 

exchange program. 
107 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Heidi Heitkamp (#1) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May26, 2016 

Question: 

Over the last few months there have been news reports pointing to financial 

challenges that ISIS is having, which in tum is causing them to struggle in paying 

their fighters. Are we investigating the source of income for ISIS? 

a. If so, how is the State Department working to degrade ISIS' financial 

structure? 

Answer: 

The Department of State works closely with our interagency partners to 

track ISIL 's key sources of revenue. In 2015 ISIL earned at least $1 billion, mostly 

through the production and sale of energy resources and through extortion of the 

population in ISIL-controlled areas oflraq and Syria. ISIL likely made around 

$500 million in 2015 from oil and gas sales and about $350 million from extortion. 

In addition to those two large revenue streams, ISIL made at least several million 

from foreign donations in 2014 and in 2015, between $20 and $45 million from 

kidnapping for ransom in 2014 but less in 2015, and less than $10 million from 

trafficking in antiquities. 

The Department of State works closely with the Departments ofTreasury, 

Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community to 

coordinate efforts to disrupt ISIL's finances. Our most effective method of 
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supporting ISIL, and strengthen the UN implementation process. The United States 

continues to nominate and encourage other countries to nominate ISIL leaders and 

facilitators to the UN Security Council's 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and AI Qaida 

Sanctions List to disrupt ISIL's ability to raise and transfer funds. 

In a further effort to restrict ISIL's ability to utilize the international 

financial system, the Departments of State and Treasury have sanctioned a number 

of ISIL leaders, financiers, facilitators, and affiliates under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act and Executive Order 13224. The United States has designated ISIL 

and eight affiliates as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) or Specially 

Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) and designated several dozen ISIL leaders 

and key financiers and facilitators as SDGTs. These sanctions cut ISIL, its 

affiliates, and its financiers and facilitators offfrom the U.S. financial system and 

any transactions going through U.S. banks. 

The Department of State is also building partner capacity to counter terrorist 

financing in a variety ofways. The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) is working 

through a number of US. Departments and agencies, including the Departments of 

Justice and Treasury and the FBI, to help partner nations investigate and prosecute 

illicit financial transactions, both internally and beyond their respective boarders. 

The Department of State's Bureau oflntemational Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
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disrupting ISIL's revenues to date has been military airstrikes against ISILcontrolled oil and gas facilities and cash storage sites. Operation TIDAL WAVE 

II, launched in October 2015, targeted ISIL's entire oil and natural gas supply 

chain- oil fields, refineries, and tanker trucks. Coalition airstrikes against ISIL's 

cash storage sites have also reduced liquidity in ISIL-controlled territory in 

northern Iraq by at least tens of millions and possibly up to hundreds of millions of 

dollars. 

Kinetic efforts have complemented diplomatic efforts to build a coalition of 

countries to disrupt ISIL's finances. In March 2015, the United States established 

the Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG) to serve as the Global Coalition to 

Counter ISIL's working group on ISIL finance. The Department of State also 

conducts bilateral diplomatic engagement with key countries through our 

Diplomatic Missions in the Middle East and around the world. Our embassies 

consistently engage foreign government officials to promote counter-terrorist 

finance tools and provide capacity building. 

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations negotiated several UN Security 

Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) focused on ISIL and other terrorist finance threats. 

In 2015, we helped negotiate UNSCRs 2199 and 2253, which focus on terrorist 

financial support networks, strengthen the UN Security Council's ISIL and AI 

Qaeda Sanctions regime, expand listing criteria to make it easier to designate those 
110 

(INL) also funds capacity building programs to strengthen national financial 

systems against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

These initiatives to reduce ISIL's revenues have been quite effective. ISIL 

has had to cut salaries for its fighters and struggled to sustain its operations, 

leading many fighters to defect and leave the battlefield. ISIL's credibility in the 

eyes of its followers has been diminished, and the United States will continue to 

pressure ISIL financially to further weaken the terrorist organization. 
111 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Heidi Heitkamp (#2) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

One of the defining characteristics of the ISIS-related mobilization is the 

"extremely heterogeneous background of those involved." This characteristic 

makes it very challenging for federal agencies and law enforcement to observe 

ISIS sympathizers. What can be done to help your agency and other federal 

entities with this issue? 

Answer: 

ISIL, its affiliates, and other violent extremist organizations exploit a myriad 

of sociological motivators, political grievances, poor governance issues, and 

psychological and economic factors in order to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize to 

violence followers from countries around the world. To address this, we 

comprehensively address the challenge of violent extremism, including the root 

causes, by improving our understanding the dynamics feeding violent extremism, 

mobilizing and applying the full range of diplomatic and development tools and 

power to address the specific factors identified, and approaching the task in a 

measureable and accountable way. We must continue to capitalize on the 

momentum built by the White House Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 

Summit process and Secretary Kerry's efforts to institutionalize and enhance the 

Department's CVE efforts. 
112 

The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) released the Joint CVE Strategy in May 2016. The Strategy draws on the 

Department's and USAID's diplomacy and developmental expertise to outline a 

roadmap to reduce the ability of violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and 

mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that feed violent 

extremist recruitment and radicalization. The Strategy incorporates lessons learned 

from more than a decade ofUSAID experience in applying development assistance 

tools in response to violent extremism. Our strategy recognizes the need to 

embrace a whole of society approach - there are roles for everyone, and we will 

catalyze partnerships with governments, religious leaders, academics, civil society, 

NGOs, and the private sector. The Strategy identifies the following strategic 

objectives for implementation: 

l. Expand international political will, partnerships, and expertise to better 

understand the drivers of violent extremism and mobilize effective 

interventions. 

2. Encourage and assist partner governments to adopt more effective policies 

and approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism, 

including changing unhelpful practices where necessary. 

3. Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development 

assistance, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that 
113 

contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas 

or put particular segments of a population at high risk of violent extremist 

radicalization and recruitment to violence. 

4. Empower and amplify locally credible voices that can change the perception 

of violent extremist groups and their ideology among key demographic 

segments. 

5. Strengthen the capabilities of government and non-governmental actors to 

isolate, intervene with, and promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of 

individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence. 

The Strategy can be found at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c71650.htm. 
114 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Heidi Heitkamp (#3) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

How do we detect terrorists that are so-called "clean skin," meaning terrorists who 

have no criminal history and could possess a valid passport? 

Answer: 

If there is no derogatory information about a terrorist in our screening 

systems, then the primary way to identify such malefactors is to look at suspicious 

behavior and linkages. Through analysis of travel patterns, passenger reservations 

and travel information as well as background obtained during the Electronic Secure 

Travel Authorization (ESTA), passport and visa application processes, U.S. 

authorities may identify an individual with a possible nexus to terrorism, when the 

individuals had no directly attributed derogatory information. 

In any instance, identifying a potential terrorist threat through these means 

would effectively allow the U.S. to develop a terrorist identity file on an 

individual, and if enough derogatory information was then developed, the 

individual would be placed on the U.S. watchlist for screening and investigation 

purposes. For further details on U.S. screening and travel analysis programs, we 

respectfully refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. 
115 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Coordinator Justin Siberell by 

Senator Heidi Heitkamp (#4) 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

May 26,2016 

Question: 

What conversations is the State Department having on what we need to do to get at 

the root causes of terrorism? 

a. Is there another conversation that we need to have on poverty or access 

education that would help prevent the spread of terrorism? 

Answer: 

In May 2016, The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) released the Joint Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 

Strategy. The Strategy is both a reflection of recent internal State and StateUSAID conversations on CVE, as well as a framework to organize our CVE 

initiatives going forward. In accordance with the Strategy, a core group of 

stakeholders from both agencies meet regularly to coordinate implementation of 

the Strategy's following strategic objectives: 

6. Expand international political will, partnerships, and expertise to better 

understand the drivers of violent extremism and mobilize effective 

interventions. 
116 

7. Encourage and assist partner governments to adopt more effective policies 

and approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism, 

including changing unhelpful practices where necessary. 

8. Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development 

assistance, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that 

contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas 

or put particular segments of a population at high risk of violent extremist 

radicalization and recruitment to violence. 

9. Empower and amplifY locally credible voices that can change the perception 

of violent extremist groups and their ideology among key demographic 

segments. 

10. Strengthen the capabilities of government and non-governmental actors to 

isolate, intervene with, and promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of 

individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence. 

The Strategy can be found at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c71650.htm. 

As noted in the strategy, research is critical to understanding the root causes 

of terrorism or the drivers of radicalization and recruitment into violence. Current 

research indicates that there is not one specific reason that results in an individual 

being radicalized or recruited into violence, but rather it results from a myriad of 

sociological motivators, political grievances and poor governance issues, and 
117 

Æ 

psychological and economic factors. Department analysis has found that poverty 

and access to education and vocational training alone do not make individuals 

susceptible to violent extremism, but that lack of employment opportunities, 

human rights abuses by state security forces, systemic discrimination and 

marginalization of ethnic and religious groups, lure of radical ideology, and peer 

and kin networks together could factor in a person's pathway towards violent 

extremism.