PEACEW RKS

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AND SECURITY FORCES

Ali A. Jalali

[ [

mission, challenges, and sustainability
Cover photo: An Afghan National Army soldier listens 

during a training event hosted by the ISAF 

[International Security Assistance Force]. Nate Derrick/

Shutterstock.com. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the 

author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 115. First published 2016.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-601-8

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

This report examines the development of the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), their current structure and capacity, and their challenges in securing long-term financial and operational sustainability. The 

report also explores how the ANDSF can more effectively 

operate on a nonconventional battlefield and deal with 

emerging new threats of violent extremism—both alone 

and as part of a larger regional and global coalition. The 

information is based on field research and interviews 

conducted by the author in Afghanistan in 2015. 

About the Author

Ali A. Jalali is a distinguished professor at the Near 

East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National 

Defense University and recently served as a senior expert 

on Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace. A former 

interior minister of Afghanistan (January 2003–October 

2005), Jalali also worked for more than twenty years as 

a broadcast executive in the Pashto, Dari, and Persian 

languages at the Voice of America in Washington, DC.
PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 115

CONTENTS

Introduction ... 5

Foundation of the ANDSF ... 5

International Support ... 7

 ANDSF and the Government’s Legitimacy ... 11

Size and Structure of the ANDSF ... 14

Current Capability Gaps ... 17

The Way Forward ... 25

[From inception, the Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces have experienced shifting political and security 

conditions that have impacted their size, structure, mission, 

and capacity.]

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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Summary

■ From inception, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have 

experienced shifting political and security conditions that have impacted their size, 

structure, mission, and capacity. 

■ The ANDSF have long been dependent on U.S. financial and operational assistance, as 

well as support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are expected to remain 

dependent on foreign aid for many years.

■ Although well-designed on paper, the ANDSF’s command and control structure does not 

function as intended. The structure is bureaucratically heavy at the top and weak at the 

bottom. Political interference and the circumventing of formal command levels often 

prevent the carrying out of established procedures, plans, and unit functions. 

■ Coordination across the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and National 

Directorate of Security forces in the field is dangerously lacking. The nature of shared 

decision making within the National Unity Government has led to delays in appointments, 

thus inhibiting the ability of Afghan security ministries and their forces to effectively 

exercise command and control. 

■ The ANDSF continue to experience major logistics, air power, and intelligence shortfalls, 

undermining their operational posture and the combat effectiveness of their troops. 

■ To avoid overextension and improve the space-to-force ratio, Afghan leadership may want 

to change the ANDSF operational posture from being defensive to offensive. This would 

mean prioritizing some areas and leaving other areas for local forces to cover. Remote, hardto-reach locations would only be watched and hit where the enemy shows concentration. 

■ Given that the Taliban and other anti-Afghan government insurgents have operational 

and logistic infrastructure in Pakistan, the country has significant control and influence 

over them and can therefore play a key role in reducing the level of violence in Afghanistan.

■ Afghanistan’s long-term security strategy needs to focus on reducing threat levels through 

political settlement and building indigenous security capacity to respond to emerging threats.

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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Introduction

On January 1, 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) took 

over full security responsibility in Afghanistan, after the United States officially concluded 

Operation Enduring Freedom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ended the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The follow-on, NATO-led Resolute 

Support (RS) mission provides further training, guidance, and assistance to Afghan security 

forces and institutions. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan transitioned to Operation Freedom’s 

Sentinel, contributing to both the NATO’s RS mission and continuing U.S. counterterrorism 

efforts against the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also 

known as DAISH).1 In a revision of the initial White House plan to withdraw most U.S. 

troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, President Barack Obama decided to maintain 

the current troop level (9,800) for at least another year and to reduce only to a baseline of 

5,500 afterward. It is expected that the level and strength of the residual military presence in 

Afghanistan in future years will be revisited this spring under the new RS commander, General 

John Nicholson. Regardless, the impact of U.S. forces in Afghanistan depends less on their 

numbers and more on their assigned mission and rules of engagement. 

The ANDSF faced an upsurge of insurgent attacks in 2015 and largely held their own, albeit 

with a higher casualty rate. The ANDSF are expected to face continued security threats and 

violence at least in the immediate future, while international military and financial assistance 

dwindles. The rise of new threats of violent extremism in the region, including from local 

supporters of ISIS, may turn the Afghanistan-Pakistan region into a hub for global terrorism. 

The ultimate goal for the United States and ANDSF should be building and sustaining 

indigenous defense and security capacity sufficient to deal with existing and emerging threats 

in the region. This involves not only generating and maintaining adequate forces but also 

ensuring the ANDSF’s financial sustainability, operational effectiveness, and ability to thwart 

adaptive enemies in primarily nonconventional combat.

Foundation of the ANDSF

Few reconstruction tasks have proved more difficult than building the capacity of indigenous 

security forces during war. Stabilization requires curbing the ability and desire of former 

combatants to renew violence and transforming militia structures into formal state institutions. 

This involves replacing war machines with a credible legal and political system, reestablishing 

public confidence in state institutions, and shifting from a culture of violent opposition to 

a peaceful competition for power and influence. It is a multifaceted process of “breaking” 

and “making.” Breaking the war machines in the postconflict period is a prerequisite for 

sustaining peace. However, failure to create attractive alternatives for former militia fighters 

can lead to instability, renewal of violence, and proliferation of criminal activity and banditry. 

Deactivating the war machines is an immediate need; making them obsolete is a long-term 

goal. Therefore, the process must include making the use of war machines irrelevant. This 

can be achieved by creating national capacity to transform war-instigated structures into 

peacebuilding institutions.

Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, has suffered institutional, economic, 

social, and political destruction during a long period of war and violence. Numerous factional 

militias and nonstate armed groups emerged as a result of foreign intervention (1979–89) and 

civil war (1992–2001)—some with extensive foreign links. The breakdown of central authority 

The ultimate goal for the 

United States and ANDSF 

should be building and 

sustaining indigenous 

defense and security 

capacity sufficient to deal 

with existing and emerging 

threats in the region. 
6 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

over more than two decades of conflict and violence stimulated a sociopolitical transformation 

in Afghanistan, which became dominated by nonstate patronage networks operating under 

the leadership of regional commanders who often invoked ethnic references to legitimize their 

leadership. The country became politically fragmented, economically bankrupt, and socially 

atomized, leading to a vortex of proxy wars waged by regional powers vying for influence. 

Other challenges that emerged included a lack of basic infrastructure, low economic capability, 

corruption, and illiteracy. 

The 2001 military invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies was not 

initiated to fix the failed Afghan state through military action and stability operations. Had the 

9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States not happened, a U.S. intervention into Afghanistan 

would have been unlikely. The U.S.-led military invasion targeted one side of the civil war 

(Taliban regime) and its in-country support network (al-Qaeda), in close alliance with the 

second party (anti-Taliban militias) in the civil war. In contrast to the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. operation was launched with minimum American and allied 

ground troops supporting the local anti-Taliban militia forces (represented mainly by the 

Northern Alliance).2

The fall of the Taliban regime was celebrated as the end of the conflict, but combat 

conditions lingered. On May 1, 2003, U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced 

that major combat in Afghanistan was over.3 This determination was mostly motivated by 

American political considerations rather than the situation on the ground. The authority of 

the central administration in Kabul hardly extended beyond the capital. In the next two years, 

clashes continued between local commanders, stemming from old rivalries or the desire to 

control or consolidate more territory. Standoffs between the Kabul-appointed governors of 

Paktia and rebel forces kept the region unstable.4 In the north, forces loyal to Uzbek General 

Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of the Junbish Mili Islami (National Islamic Movement) 

party, and militia units controlled by Tajik Commander Atta Mohammad clashed in several 

provinces. In the west, ethnic differences and rival claims for control of the Shindand District 

led to recurring skirmishes between militias loyal to the Herat strongman Ismail Khan and 

those supporting the local Pashtun leader Amanullah Noorzai. 

Enlisting militia commanders and warlords as coalition allies in fighting terrorism hindered 

the development of formal democratic institutions. The Bonn Agreement of 2001 stipulated 

that “upon the official transfer of power, all Mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups 

in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be 

reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.”5

These rival factional militias were integrated into the government system but continued to 

respond only to their faction leaders, often instigating turf battles at the expense of public 

security. The U.S. military’s aid and reliance on these groups in the counterterrorism effort 

empowered them at the expense of formal state institutions. In December 2002, former 

president Hamid Karzai issued a decree banning political leaders from taking part in military 

activity.6 However, he had little power to implement his decree so long as international actors 

were not interested in getting involved in intra-Afghan disputes and were more focused on 

fighting “terrorists.” 

The co-option of the resurrected anti-Taliban Afghan militia forces in the campaign 

empowered them after the fall of the Taliban regime, which was removed from power but 

not decisively defeated or reconciled. Nor was al-Qaeda fully defeated, although its leadership 

and network were driven out of Afghanistan across the border into difficult-to-access tribal 
USIP.ORG 7

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

areas of Pakistan. As conflict conditions endured, the south and east eventually exploded 

into a full-fledged insurgency. Ultimately, the fall of the Taliban regime was not a transition 

from war to peace or from a conflict to postconflict situation but rather a new phase in the 

long-standing conflict. 

The international effort to build post-Taliban state institutions in Afghanistan has today 

become one of the longest and costliest reconstruction projects in history. By the end of 2015, 

the United States alone had appropriated more than $113 billion dollars—of which more 

than 60 percent was invested in standing up the ANDSF.7 In the past fourteen years, the 

ANDSF have come a long way, transforming from an odd assortment of factional militias into 

a collection of modern security institutions with professional capacity and loyalty to a unified 

state. But despite significant investments, international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan 

have focused primarily on immediate tactical issues at the expense of long-term priorities. 

Building the army took precedence over constructing rule of law institutions, including the 

police, regardless of their key role in a postconflict environment. The emerging police forces 

were organized as a paramilitary force, primarily intended to fight armed spoilers and protect 

the government rather than serve the public. Since the military intervention was deemed over, 

there has been an acute shortage of donor institutional capacity and resources for stability 

operations. Reintegration of former combatants has been a major challenge due to decreased 

and incremental funding, thus driving marginalized armed men to renew violence. 

The initial false assumption that the conflict was over had a profound effect on the 

establishment and development of Afghanistan security forces. Planning for their size and 

capacity was based on an assessment of short-term political and security conditions that 

ignored the potential of strategic changes in the area, such as an upsurge in insurgency and 

activity of nonstate armed groups, as well as the dynamics of ongoing conflict. 

International Support

Unlike some other international postconflict stability operations, no major international 

peacekeeping forces were deployed in Afghanistan. The U.S.-led coalition military forces were 

narrowly focused on fighting terrorism, while the U.N.-mandated ISAF was deployed only 

in Kabul, with a limited mandate and limited numbers. The wartime militias, which were 

integrated into the security forces of the interim administration, were ethnically divided and 

loyal to their factional leaders. The donor community’s goal was to build new Afghanistan 

security forces that would be nationally respected; professionally capable; ethnically balanced; 

democratically accountable; and organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs 

of the country. Building such national institutions became part of the Security Sector Reform 

(SSR) program. 

Formally established in April 2002 at a security donors conference in Geneva, the SSR 

program consisted of five pillars, each supported by a different donor state: military reform 

(United States); police reform (Germany); the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

of ex-combatants (Japan); judicial reform (Italy); and counternarcotics (UK). While all these 

pillars of reform and development were interconnected, they were pursued by different actors 

with varying levels of commitment, resources, priorities, and procedures. This stove-piping 

approach inevitably precluded a holistic approach to building state institutions and reform. 

The lack of coordination—both between donor states and between those states’ implementing 

agencies—further hindered progress. This problem was compounded by insufficient donor 

investment in the initial stages; the political influence of nonstate armed groups and patronage 

In the past fourteen years, 

the ANDSF have come a 

long way, transforming 

from an odd assortment 

of factional militias into 

a collection of modern 

security institutions with 

professional capacity and 

loyalty to a unified state. 

But despite significant 

investments, international 

peacekeeping forces in 

Afghanistan have 

focused primarily on 

immediate tactical issues 

at the expense of longterm priorities. 
8 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

networks; inadequate reform in the ministries of defense and interior; and the absence of a 

committed third-party military force to facilitate the process. 

The planned size and professional capacity of the Afghan security forces were not 

proportioned to the requirement of their mission to fight terrorism and insurgency while 

providing space for statebuilding and development. Nor was it attuned to the threat 

environment. The SSR program planned to build a 70,000-man Afghan National Army 

(ANA) and 62,000-man Afghan National Police (ANP) force, which took many years to 

accomplish. By 2005, the ANA and ANP could hardly field more than 60,000 poorly trained 

and lightly armed troops and policemen. They were no match to the threats faced by the vast 

majority of Afghan citizens, which included terrorists and insurgents, militia commanders, 

drug traffickers, corrupt provincial and district administrators, and government incompetence.

Like in many other postconflict projects, the focus was more on building the army than 

the police. The focus on fighting terrorism and insurgency forced Operation Enduring 

Freedom to place its highest priority on rebuilding the armed forces, taking attention away 

from developing the police, which was badly in need of rebuilding. This subordinated justice 

to security considerations and turned the police into a tool primarily used in combating 

insurgency, instead of protecting law and justice. The national police had virtually ceased to 

exist after years of a devastating civil war. The ANP effort, and the reconstruction effort more 

broadly, faced a dearth of human resources; sparse or nonexistent equipment and infrastructure; 

politicized ethnic differences that impede the impartial administration of justice; corruption 

and organized criminal activity; and the lack of a public service ethics and public administrative 

structures that can help foster professionalism and accountability. 

The German-led effort to create a new professional civilian-led officer corps for the police 

ran into two major hurdles. First, the underresourced, long-term training program was not 

able to produce sufficient numbers in a short time to meet immediate needs. The deployment 

of police across the country made it difficult to train policemen as single units, like army 

battalions, and then deploy them where they were needed. Police needed to be recruited, 

trained, deployed, and coached at the same time. The urgency to fill the ranks often reduced 

this process into a recruit-and-deploy practice. Second, local power brokers seized the title of 

police commanders, many of whom had questionable backgrounds including human rights 

abuses and drug trafficking linkages. Political decisions to reintegrate “demobilized” former 

factional combatants into the police force further undermined the ANP’s development. In 

most cases, former factional commanders who were appointed to (or seized command of) 

the police loaded their offices with their unqualified supporters and corrupt cronies. The 

dominance of local loyalty and links with corrupt networks, along with poor training and low 

pay, contributed to endemic corruption in the police force. 

To augment the German-led effort, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs launched a massive, short-term training program 

in 2003, which helped train up to 40,000 patrolmen and police officers in basic skills in a 

one-to-three-week program at police training centers, which were established in the capital 

and six regional centers. Meanwhile, Germany continued its multiyear training of senior 

police officials. With the upsurge of insurgency in Afghanistan and the heavy involvement 

of the ANP in the counterinsurgency fight, the lead role in the U.S. police training effort 

was taken over by the Department of Defense in April 2005, while Germany’s traditional 

policing program was augmented by the combined European Police Program (Europol). In 
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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

both cases, the ANP transformed mostly into a paramilitary force, fighting on the front lines 

of the counterinsurgency and sustaining the heaviest casualties. 

The U.S.-led effort to build the ANA was also slow, marred by problems in attracting recruits 

and by the lack of support from the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which was dominated by the 

Minister of Defense and Northern Alliance commander General Mohammad Qasim Fahim’s 

Panjsheri clique (which saw a strong military loyal to the state as a threat to its parochial 

power).8 A plan for forming the army, drafted by a government commission and released by 

the MOD in October 2002, was criticized by Karzai and his foreign backers as an attempt to 

perpetuate the dominance of factional militias in the ANA. The plan awarded the militiamen 

command over military units when they reenlisted in the ANA.9

The so-called “Long War” strategic approach to the “global war on terror,” which 

dominated U.S. military thinking in the early 2000s, promoted a comprehensive and enduring 

long-term military engagement in areas threatened by international terror.10 Along this line, 

the presumption of an open-ended presence of international forces in Afghanistan with 

the expectation of no strong armed opposition tempered the urgency and pace of building 

indigenous security forces. The situation led to the chronic dependency of the ANDSF on 

international forces for enablers, including air cover; fire support; air and ground mobility; 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and command and control. The 

dependency continued to limit the ANDSF’s combat effectiveness. 

In early 2006, just months before the sudden upsurge of insurgency in the south, the 

Pentagon hoped, against Kabul’s objections, to cut the planned end-strength of the ANA to 

50,000 troops, citing Afghanistan’s inability to pay for a larger army and “current intelligence” 

about the size of the Taliban and other potential threats.11 The eventual increase in number of 

troops came as a reaction to rising security threats rather than a deliberately thought-out plan 

or a long-term vision. 

The growth of the insurgency in Afghanistan has outpaced the expansion of foreign 

and national security forces. For several years, both the U.S.-led coalition forces (conducting 

counterterrorism operations) and the ISAF (providing security assistance to the indigenous 

forces) operated with a light footprint and defined security in different terms. From 2002 

to 2003, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom 

ranged from 10,000 to 12,000 and then increased to about 16,000 in 2004. Four thousand 

more troops were added in 2005. During this period, the size of ISAF forces increased from 

5,000 in 2002 to about 9,000. At the end of the Bonn process and the upsurge of insurgency 

in 2006, about 10,000 coalition troops came under command of the ISAF, while the number 

of American troops fluctuated between 25,000 and 30,000 through 2006 and 2007. The 

Afghanistan Compact, adopted in 2006 to establish post-Bonn benchmarks for political, 

economic, and security development, was not backed up by adequate military force at the time 

that the Taliban-led insurgency intensified. In the first half of 2008, the number of U.S. troops 

in Afghanistan increased substantially from 21,643 to 48,250. The ISAF commander, David 

McKiernan, who took over in June 2008, requested 30,000 more troops to blunt the Taliban 

insurgency. Before the end of the Bush administration, 17,000 more troops were authorized for 

deployment into Afghanistan but were not deployed until February 2009.12

A serious international effort to develop the ANDSF did not begin until 2009. The ensuing 

military surge undertaken in the first year of the Obama administration—which raised the 

level of the ISAF to more than 140,000 (including 100,000 U.S. service members)—and a new 

population-centered stabilization strategy represented the first serious counterinsurgency effort 

The growth of the 

insurgency in Afghanistan 

has outpaced the 

expansion of foreign and 

national security forces. 
10 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

in the nine-year war. The military surge slowed the momentum of the Taliban in key areas. 

Further, significant progress in building up the ANDSF allowed the gradual shift of security 

responsibility to Afghanistan as the United States reduced its military presence beginning 

in July 2011 and withdrew the surge troops by the end of 2012. By that time, the ANDSF 

reached its new authorized level of 352,000, with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) numbering 

an additional 12,000. A counterinsurgency campaign, however, required patience and time to 

succeed. The surge troops took about six months to deploy, and they began withdrawing in July 

2011—about one year after their full deployment. Political pressure and financial constraints 

in donor countries eroded support for an extended counterinsurgency effort, leading to a 

drawdown of U.S. forces at the end of 2014. 

The accelerated development of the ANA and ANP and rush to expand the number of 

units and men during the surge period overshadowed the need for their professional growth 

and solid institutional capacity building. No serious measures were taken to strengthen the 

ANDSF’s professional capacity and eliminate their habitual dependency on international 

forces. The race to add battalions and police units as part of the exit strategy left the ANDSF 

with limited maneuverability, fire power, aviation support, intelligence capacity, logistic capacity, 

and command and control aptitude. These limitations are now recognized as major liabilities. 

Plainly, the main goal of the security transition was meeting the deadline set for the exit strategy 

rather than building a self-reliant indigenous defense and security operation. Consequently, in 

spite of its major achievements under extremely trying conditions, the ANDSF continues to 

depend on international assistance in the short term, as well as full financial backing for at least 

another ten years. The rise of new extremist violence in Afghanistan may require additional 

resources that cannot be provided by Afghanistan. 

Obama’s October 2015 decision to maintain U.S. forces in Afghanistan at current levels for 

at least another year and to reduce only to a baseline of 5,500 military personnel based in Kabul 

and Bagram, in addition to a limited presence in the east and south of Afghanistan, recognizes 

that the ANDSF will require more time and assistance to develop into a capable independent 

force. Whether the presence of a baseline 5,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan can make a major 

difference is hard to determine since there are other domestic and regional factors that affect 

the situation. However, the absence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will definitely have an adverse 

impact on regional stability. Their presence sends a strong message to friends and foes that 

Afghanistan is not going to be abandoned. 

However, the effect of U.S. forces in Afghanistan depends less on their numbers and more 

on their assigned mission and rules of engagement. NATO partners saw their combat role end 

in 2014, even as they continue to support Afghan combat troops who are often engaged in 

fighting. U.S. forces, in partnership with the ANDSF, continue to conduct counterterrorism 

operations against al-Qaeda and its facilitator networks. Based on their new rules of 

engagement, U.S. forces only take action against non-al-Qaeda groups (including the Taliban) 

if they pose a direct threat to U.S. and coalition forces or provide direct support to al-Qaeda. 

But, as part of the continued tactical-level training and assistance mission, U.S. and 

coalition forces may accompany Afghan counterparts on missions in an advisory role. U.S. 

forces may also provide combat enabler support, such as close air support. Similarly, U.S. forces 

are also permitted to provide combat enabler support to Afghan-only missions under limited 

circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects to the campaign. The recent Taliban 

attacks in the Kunduz and Helmand provinces showed that without direct air support from 

U.S. forces, the Taliban would have overrun and controlled several key areas. This requires a 

In spite of its major 

achievements under 

extremely trying 

conditions, the ANDSF 

continues to depend on 

international assistance in 

the short term, as well as 

full financial backing for at 

least another ten years.
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AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

review of the rules of engagement to allow greater and more flexible support from U.S. forces 

until the ANDSF narrow their capability gaps—an effort that may take at least five years given 

the current level of international assistance. 

The ultimate goal is to bolster Afghanistan’s indigenous capacity to defend itself through 

addressing their gaps, particularly in five key functional areas: leadership, combined arms 

integration, command and control, training, and sustainment. This may take longer than the 

assumed life of the NATO RS mission (set to end in 2017). Follow-on assistance to the ANDSF 

may be required for at least five more years and a NATO-Afghanistan counterterrorism 

partnership for ten years. The nature of NATO’s involvement beyond the RS mission is 

expected to be defined at the next NATO summit in Warsaw. The U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral 

Security Agreement (BSA) commits the United States “to assist ANDSF in developing 

capabilities required to provide security for all Afghans,” which includes “upgrading ANDSF 

transportation and logistics systems; developing intelligence sharing capabilities; strengthening 

Afghanistan’s Air Force capabilities; conducting combined military exercises; and other 

activities as may be agreed.” The BSA also obligates the United States “to seek funds on a 

yearly basis to support the training, equipping, advising, and sustaining of ANDSF, so that 

Afghanistan can independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats, 

and help ensure that terrorists never again encroach on Afghan soil and threaten Afghanistan, 

the region, and the world.”13 These commitments require long-term U.S. assistance. 

ANDSF and the Government’s Legitimacy

The ANDSF are highly respected by the majority of Afghans. The most recent survey of the 

Afghan people by the Asia Foundation indicates a high level of public confidence in the ANA 

(80.8 percent) and ANP (70 percent).14 The multiethnic forces show strong commitment 

to the mission, which they see as a legitimate duty and a patriotic cause worth fighting for. 

However, they do not want to get killed because of poor leadership and inadequate fighting 

equipment and means.

Institutionally, the ANDSF’s legitimacy derives from the legitimacy of the government—a 

legal authority that instills a sense of devotion, loyalty, and resilience into state institutions 

including the army and police. This emanates not only from the government’s representation 

of and political and legal acceptance by its constituencies but also from its effectiveness. That 

includes the ability to maintain “state monopoly on the use of legitimate force in its territory,” 

to provide security and deliver services, and to uphold the rule of law and affirm economic 

prosperity. Rule of law is at the heart of any government’s legitimacy and a prerequisite for 

human security that involves the protection and empowerment of citizens. And yet, in the 

recent past, the inability of government in Afghanistan to deliver services and exert influence 

throughout the country began to erode its “structural legitimacy,” which, in the words of Max 

Weber, is obtainable only when rules, supported by institutions to enforce them, underpin 

popular acceptance of government.15

During the past fourteen years, the structural legitimacy of the Afghan government 

has suffered from a lack of capacity, particularly at the subnational level, where government 

authority is contested by local patronage networks. The vacuum created by the absence of 

central government influence is filled by insurgents, militia commanders, and local criminal 

gangs—all of whom undermine human security, local governance, democratic values, and the 

delivery of basic services. However, the government still enjoys public support, given that the 

perceivable alternative is the Taliban and other violent extremists. Further, strong international 
12 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

support of the Afghan state also contributes to its legitimacy by raising citizens’ hopes for 

its survival. 

The political transition in Afghanistan in 2014 presented new challenges to the legitimacy 

of the government, which was threatened by disputes over the results of the presidential election 

of 2014. The issue of fraudulent votes drove the process to the brink of delegitimization and 

potential civil disturbances. The confusion undermined public trust in democracy, slowed 

down the economy, and had other negative effects, including the deterioration of security and 

stagnation in government functions. The tension was eventually defused tactically by a U.S.-

mediated, power-sharing deal under the rubric of a National Unity Government (NUG), in 

which the winner, Ashraf Ghani, was announced as president and the runner-up, Abdullah 

Abdullah, assumed the office of the chief executive as a “second among equals” (pending the 

legitimization of the post as prime minister through possible constitutional amendments in 

two years). 

Power-sharing arrangements do not have a good track record in Afghanistan’s recent history. 

The key challenge has been how to reconcile the competing demands of maintaining unity and 

governing effectively in the face of the shared authority of the two leaders. For example, it has 

been particularly difficult to appoint key government officials and reconcile the diverse political 

programs of the two main components of the NUG. The problem of reconciling frictions 

in a duumvirate system has been exacerbated by the lack of a solid constitutional basis for 

the arrangement. 

If legitimacy could not be derived through elections, it now has to be secured through 

government performance and meeting citizens’ expectations. This means that numerous 

structural obstacles in the agreement must be overcome, and Afghan elites need to generate 

a sufficient spirit of compromise and cooperation to begin the actual process of governing. It 

requires a strong, unified commitment to reforms and cooperative decision making on the 

basis of a unified national agenda. However, it is hard to achieve this under the current deal, 

because both election campaigns were directed more toward winning rather than promoting a 

clear governing agenda. Both Ghani and Abdullah depended on borrowed constituencies and 

co-opted odd bedfellows with extremely different visions, interests, and concerns—and with 

high expectation of reward for their support in the election. Only when the choices of the two 

teams are politically and professionally integrated into a unified governance body will there be 

hope for a viable and effective NUG. 

The record of the government’s first full year in office (2014–15) is not impressive. 

Ultimately, the NUG failed on both counts: It failed to integrate the two camps into a unified 

governing body and it failed to win support of the population through becoming effective. 

Despite pledges to crack down on corruption and reform the government, the actual steps 

taken have been cosmetic, haphazard, and tactical at best. Although President Ghani took 

steps to implement some reforms and crack down on corruption, his actions were mostly at the 

lower level, tactical in nature, and failed to bring fundamental changes and improve governance 

and efficiency. Because of the influence of an odd assortment of self-interested political allies 

of the elected leaders, the government has become gridlocked and has lost significant support 

of the citizens. Meanwhile, security has deteriorated, the economy has taken a down turn, and 

the government has not been able to form a complete cabinet and appoint capable persons to 

key positions. The institutional fragmentation of power and shared authority of Ghani and 

Abdullah to appoint key positions—along with their diverging interests and political allies—

impedes reform, stagnates governance, and hampers response to emerging issues. The latest 

The institutional 

fragmentation of power 

and shared authority of 

Ghani and Abdullah to 

appoint key positions—

along with their diverging 

interests and political 

allies—impedes reform, 

stagnates governance, 

and hampers response to 

emerging issues.
USIP.ORG 13

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Asia Foundation annual survey of the Afghan people indicate that optimism about the future 

of the country has dropped to the lowest level recorded over the past ten years.16

The fractured political structure strongly affects the professional capacity of the ANDSF. 

Interference of politicians, top government officials, and power brokers in managing promotions 

within the force not only undermines the professional effectiveness of the army and police as 

they face a brutal war but also undermines morale and motivation to fight.17 The situation 

encourages corruption, where incompetent officers and commanders can gain their posts 

through bribery or political influence. The most challenging issue is the rush of political elites 

to extend their patronage networks through posting their cohorts in key security positions 

at the expense of winning the war. With the rise of the insurgency, some power brokers 

have managed to remobilize and rearm their militias under the guise of local anti-Taliban 

militia or the ALP. These forces in certain areas have been involved in pillage and abuse of the 

population, further undermining legitimacy of the state. The destabilizing effects of the rapidly 

expanding insurgencies in the north, northeast, and west only amplify this cascading process 

by providing a conducive environment for crime. All of these factors, coupled with insurgencyrelated violence in the south and southeast and the inability of security forces to counter local 

criminals and drug lords, has led to a tremendous loss of public confidence. 

These problems notwithstanding, the legitimacy of the Afghan government is helped by 

strong international backing, particularly U.S. support of the NUG, and compromises by the 

political elite to maintain unity albeit at the expense of effectiveness. The absence of a viable 

alternative is another element of public acceptance of the NUG. A majority of Afghans continue 

to see the armed opposition as an undesirable choice. But this situation can change, either as 

a result of fading international support or continued ineffectiveness of the NUG, particularly 

its failure to improve security, fight corruption, ensure economic recovery, and address growing 

unemployment. A recent Afghan government study claims that youth constitute 63 percent 

of the country’s population, and over the next five years, four million of them will attain 

employment age. The study adds that this many jobs should also be created during the period, 

but employment has been declining the past few years.18

Economic decline and rising unemployment have prompted an exodus of tens of thousands 

of Afghans fleeing violence and lack of opportunities at home. According to a recent report 

by the International Organization for Migration, Afghan emigrants seeking refuge in Europe 

constitute 20 percent of the recent wave of more than one million refugees from the Middle 

East heading to Europe,19 making them the second largest national group after the Syrians. 

Many of these Afghans are young, educated professionals who benefited from education and 

job opportunities provided by the presence of the international community during the past 

fourteen years.20 Their departure deals a major blow to the capacity and human capital built at 

a high cost over the last decade. 

One key challenge facing the NUG is the timely convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga 

to establish constitutional legality for the power-sharing arrangement. The political deal that 

created this government was originally for a two-year period that is set to expire in September 

2016. Under the terms of that deal, the government was supposed to implement electoral reforms 

and hold district council and parliamentary elections to allow a Constitutional Loya Jirga to be 

convened. However, the reform process has stalled; the current term of parliament has expired 

without new elections being held, and district boundaries have not been drawn. Therefore, 

convening the Constitutional Loya Jirga on time, before the mandate of the NUG expires, is 

hardly feasible. The situation may lead to a constitutional crisis with uncertain consequences. 
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

During a visit to Kabul in April, Secretary of State John Kerry stressed that the unity 

government’s tenure would continue for a full five years from the 2014 elections, remarks 

which were endorsed by government officials but challenged by opposition figures. Discussions 

among the political class in Kabul are increasingly turning toward alternative means of securing 

political order, such as holding early presidential elections in the hopes that a single figure 

with authority might emerge and holding a “traditional” Loya Jirga—a representative national 

assembly but not one that is convened according to the explicit conditions in the constitution. 

Neither solution is optimal, but either may win a large following if the NUG fails to take 

bold steps to win the trust of the people through bringing positive changes in the way it 

governs. To enhance morale and the professional loyalties of the ANDSF, structured measures 

need to be established to fight corruption and nepotism, and action must be taken to provide 

for job security, merit promotion, monetary incentives, family benefits, and depoliticization 

of appointments. Whatever the reason, the government’s waning popularity, and for some its 

legitimacy, could jeopardize the sustainability of the ANDSF and lead to its fragmentation 

along ethnic, regional, and factional lines.

Size and Structure of the ANDSF

In military counterinsurgency doctrine, the rule of thumb in determining the size of the 

security force is one soldier per fifty residents in an area.21 Using such norms, military leaders 

in Afghanistan called for up to half a million soldiers and policemen to pacify Afghanistan’s 

estimated population of twenty-five million. Although there is no military solution to the 

insurgency, the absence of adequate military forces to provide a security cover for the 

development and establishment of good governance has hindered stabilization efforts. The 

current authorized strength of the ANDSF is 195,000 for the ANA (including 7,800 Afghan 

Air Force personnel) and 157,000 for ANP. Additionally, the ALP are authorized an additional 

30,000 personnel.22

The ANA is organized into one division and six regional corps, plus Special Forces units 

and the Air Force.23 Each corps typically comprises three to four infantry brigades and various 

specialty battalions. In addition, two Mobile Strike Force brigades (with wheeled mediumarmored vehicles) provide an additional seven Mobile Strike Force battalions based in Kabul 

and Kandahar. These formations are capable of rapid deployment in offensive operations. 

Organized and trained as a light infantry force, the ANA has developed in recent years from 

an infantry-centric force to a fully fledged army that comprises both fighting elements and 

enabling capabilities, including combat, intelligence, military police, medical, aviation, and 

logistics support. ANA soldiers are well-trained and well-organized but need enablers to 

support their combat action. Apart from small arms, the support weapons available to ANA 

units include only light- and medium-range mortars, the SPG-9 recoilless gun, and 122 

howitzers. The ISAF and NATO Training Mission had argued that heavy equipment was 

counterproductive in fighting a counterinsurgency;24 but the ANA has been trained to fight 

with strong ISAF air support, which is no longer available.

As of the end of 2015, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) had a total of ninety-one aircraft, 

including helicopters (1 Mi-35 gunship, 49 Mi-17, 10 MD-530, and 3 Cheetah) and fixed 

wing transport planes (4 C-130 and 24 C-208). To provide tactical air support, Afghanistan 

is acquiring twenty A-29 Super Tucano turboprop aircraft from the United States, which will 

be fully operational in 2017. However, the AAF is not expected to acquire more sophisticated 

combat aircraft in the near future. In addition to combat support, the AAF provides air assets 

To enhance morale and 

the professional loyalties 

of the ANDSF, structured 

measures need to be 

established to fight 

corruption and nepotism, 

and action must be taken 

to provide for job security, 

merit promotion, monetary 

incentives, family benefits, 

and depoliticization 

of appointments.
USIP.ORG 15

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief, human remains return, air interdiction, and aerial 

escort. The AAF is headquartered in Kabul and has three wings based in Kabul, Kandahar, 

and Shindand. Additionally, there are air detachments in Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, Shorab 

(Helmand), Gardez, and Herat. A Special Mission Wing (SMW) was stood up on July 18, 

2015, in support of ANA Special Operations Command. It includes an additional thirty 

special Mi-17 helicopters and thirteen (eighteen planned) fixed wing PC-12 airframes with 

ISR capability. 

About 10,000 ANA Special Forces personnel are grouped into ten battalions, geographically 

dispersed across Afghanistan. At least one special operations battalion operates in each corps 

area of responsibility. All these battalions come under the command of the ANA Special 

Operations Command. Among the maneuver units, the ANA and ANP special forces are 

the most capable and agile units for fighting the insurgency. They are specialized light infantry 

units that can conduct raids, direct action, and reconnaissance in support of counterinsurgency 

operations; and they can execute a strategic response for the Afghan government. They are 

considered the most elite fighting forces of the ANDSF. But because of their “lightness,” they 

still depend on international forces for firepower, close air support, air mobility, intelligence, 

and operational and strategic logistics support. 

The ANP, initially organized as a security force, is shifting from a mostly paramilitary 

force to a more sophisticated multipurpose institution that can undertake law enforcement, 

public protection, civil order, and criminal investigation efforts. However, because of the 

ongoing insurgency and ANA’s low space-to-force ratio, most ANP units are employed as 

counterinsurgency forces complimenting the ANA. Among them, the Police Special Forces 

(Qeta’at-i-Khas) are often used unsparingly for complex combat missions, frequently without 

the ANA, and sustain heavy casualties.25 The ANP has four main pillars, which include 

approximately 100,000 Afghan Uniformed Police; 16,000 Afghan Civil Order Police; 

23,000 Afghan Border Police (ABP) deployed in six operational zones; and 2,000 Afghan 

Anti-Crime Police. Additionally, the ANP has three national mission special units (totaling 

more than 5,000 personnel), including the Crisis Response Unit 222, Commando Force 333, 

and Afghan Territorial Force 444. These units operate across the country. Further, thirtythree provincial special units directly support the provincial chiefs of police. There is also a 

nationwide Investigative and Surveillance Unit. Three other units include the ALP, the Afghan 

Public Protection Force, and the Counternarcotic Police. 

Indications are that none of the ANDSF units are up to the authorized strength. The 

number of personnel actively serving in the ANA, ANP, and ALP is difficult to determine, 

because thousands of “ghost” soldiers and “ghost” police officers are believed to be counted 

in the rosters. Due to attrition and other factors, the actual on-hand ANDSF force level 

fluctuated between about 91 and 92 percent of authorized levels during the first six months 

of 2015.26 The rise of violence during the summer further dropped the number of servicemen 

on duty. A recent survey in fifteen Afghan provinces suggests that there are up to 130,000 

ghost servicemen on the payroll in the ANDSF.27 Although the government has dismissed the 

report as highly exaggerated, it has acknowledged the problem of ghost soldiers. In November 

2015, Ghani ordered a thorough inventory of armed forces personnel and their equipment. 

According to a U.S. source in Kabul, the number of servicemen in the ANA at that time was 

about 170,000, which is 25,000 short of the authorized strength.28 The gap within the ALP 

is much wider. Because a significant number of ANA and ANP troops are usually assigned 

to noncombat duties, including serving as bodyguards of senior officers and security details of 
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

senior government officials, the actual number of troops in the field further shrinks. This cuts 

the number of combat forces in the field and overexerts certain units who remain for long 

periods in the combat zone with no chance to go on leave. The situation causes exhaustion and 

low morale, which takes a heavy toll on combat capability. 

To boost public protection capacity, the ISAF and Afghan government created the ALP 

force (with up to 30,000 men) in 2012. They are tasked with securing public installations, 

preventing armed opposition infiltration, and providing favorable space for governance and 

development. Formed locally in threatened areas, the ALP is only meant to perform guard 

duties, not conduct law enforcement activity. The police officers are recruited, trained, paid, and 

controlled by provincial and district police departments in close consultation with and vetted 

by local shuras. They serve where they live and use their weapons to defend the local populace.29

The ALP has expanded rapidly in the rural areas of twenty-nine of Afghanistan’s thirty-four 

provinces, with an overall authorized number of 30,000. With the rise of violence across the 

country, the ALP has become a frontline fighting force, suffering the highest casualties in 

proportion to its size. 

If properly selected and closely controlled, ALP village guards can help; otherwise, 

the program could add to problems caused by existing illegal armed groups. The ALP has 

contributed to security in areas where its members could be recruited from local villages and 

tribes, where they serve and are accountable to their local communities. In other places where 

the ALP is organized and led by local militia leaders and patronage networks, the armed 

men become engaged in predatory acts—abusing the population—and in many locations, they 

worsen security. In some areas in the north, militias raised by and loyal to local strongmen 

have been registered as ALP with the political support of top government officials in Kabul. 

Such contingents rarely answer to provincial officials and act as they please. They often prey 

upon the local population whom they are supposed to protect. Their predatory behavior causes 

public resentment, paving the way for the insurgents to make inroads into the communities. 

In such areas, the ALP program has not improved security and even exacerbated the conflict 

in a number of districts. The main reason for Taliban inroads in the northern provinces since 

2010 is attributed to the abusive behavior of local commanders formed under the anti-Taliban 

uprising movement.

Various safeguards have been established for ALP management and recruitment, but they 

are rarely implemented. Although ALP units are supposed to be under the control of district 

and provincial police chiefs, who report to the head of the Afghan Uniformed Police in the 

Ministry of Interior (MOI), the isolated locations of the ALP’s deployment and the absence of 

effective mechanisms for registering and responding to complaints about the ALP contribute 

to command and control problems. This is usually associated with ALP units that have ties 

to factional militia leaders, often in places where Afghan power brokers want control of drug 

routes or other strategic territory. They freely abuse the system thanks to the support and 

influence of some top government officials. In such cases, the ALP is more of an instrument of 

corruption and instability than an element of security.30

The absence of systematic control has left the program vulnerable to abuse and misuse. 

In some areas, up to 70 percent of the ALP authorized strength comprise ghost policemen 

or unfilled positions. The real number of the ALP is believed to be half the official count.31 A 

recent survey by the RS mission indicated that up to 4,000 ALP members are not on active 

duty but rather serve as bodyguards of local influential figures or engage in other nonactive 

services.32 All these shortfalls notwithstanding, the Afghan government plans (as of early 2016) 

In some areas, up to 

70 percent of the ALP 

authorized strength 

comprise ghost policemen 

or unfilled positions. The 

real number of the ALP 

is believed to be half 

the official count.
USIP.ORG 17

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

to request an expansion of the ALP to 45,000. Unless the current ALP program is reformed, 

though, any expansion will be a waste of resources. Reforms should include disbanding the 

militias posing as ALP and other ineffective units, supporting functional units, and filling the 

existing gaps in accountability of the ALP program. 

Current Capability Gaps

The ANDSF continue to face capability gaps in combat and combat enablers, as well as shortfalls 

in logistics and other services. The gaps can be classified under several interconnected areas: 

• Force generation and retention

• Leadership, command, and control

• Intelligence, susrveillance, and reconnaissance

• Air support and mobility

• Operational capacity 

• Logistics and supply 

Force Generation and Retention

One major factor affecting the sustainability of the ANDSF is the high rate of attrition within 

the rank and file of the ANA and ANP (attrition rarely affects officers and noncommissioned 

officers). Attrition was estimated between 4,000 and 5,00033 per month during the early 

summer of 2015 and increased slightly during the following months. The ANDSF’s overall 

attrition rates in 2015 averaged 2 percent per month. The RS mission estimates that ANDSF 

casualties were approximately 59 percent higher in the first half of 2015 compared with 

the same period the previous year.34 The ANP and ALP suffered the majority of ANDSF 

casualties, because they are often deployed in remote and isolated posts while not sufficiently 

armed or well-trained. 

If present rates continue, attrition will pose challenges to creating a professional force. 

Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, chief of ISAF’s Joint Command, said in a November 

2014 briefing that unless the rate of losses goes down, the force level will not be sustainable in 

the long term.35 The attrition is mostly caused by combat casualties, desertion, absent without 

leave (AWOL), refusal to reenlist, and sometimes a limited volunteer pool from which to 

recruit. While policies exist to prevent personnel from going AWOL, they are often unenforced, 

and commanders frequently welcome absent personnel back without exercising any formal 

discipline.36 General John Campbell, at the time the ISAF commander, did not dispute the 

claim of a loss of about 20,000 troops and police to combat deaths and desertions in 2014 

but asserted that it “hasn’t had a severe impact on their readiness.”37 Campbell later stated at 

a meeting in Washington in August 2015 that poor leadership, fatigue, lack of training, and 

hunger were driving the high attrition rate within the Afghan security forces.38 

Rates of desertion differ between regions and time of year but are highest during fighting 

season and in the most insecure or remote areas. The main reasons cited for desertion include 

poor leadership, insufficient and untimely pay, difficulties accessing pay, the absence or 

misunderstanding of leave policies, constant combat deployments with little or no leave or 

training rotations, the lack of casualty care, and inadequate living and working conditions. 

With the rise of violence across the country in 2015 and the high operational tempo, the 

regular cycle of force generation, field deployment, and rest and recovery of the combat troops 

Rates of desertion differ 

between regions and time 

of year but are highest 

during fighting season and 

in the most insecure or 

remote areas.
18 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

has been interrupted. Troops who normally took turns being in training, deploying in the 

field, and going on leave were forced to stay in the field for longer periods, causing fatigue and 

undermining morale.39 Delays in evacuation of the wounded, who die because of a long wait, 

also contribute to poor morale and desertion. There are reports that, in many cases, servicemen 

on leave do not return to duty, either because of insecurity or at the request of their families, 

who are intimidated by the insurgents.40 Other reasons for desertion cited by Afghan sources 

include corrupt procurement practices, theft of essential supplies by some commanders that 

cause dangerous shortages in combat units, and delays in supply of ammunition and fuel to 

remote posts. 

In 1988, the Afghan army suffered an attrition rate slightly higher than the ANA in 2011 

(annually, 36.6 percent in 1988 versus 34.2 percent in 2011).41 But in the 1980s, replacement 

draftees were conscripts, press-ganged into the service and often hard to retain in the ranks. 

Today, the availability of volunteers for ANA recruitment has so far offset the negative impact 

of the losses, but problems still remain. Attrition significantly raises the cost of training and 

development of the ANDSF and impedes combat readiness. The cycle of recruiting, training, 

posting, and deploying soldiers and policemen has rarely been a regular process, coordinated 

in time and location. Recruitment during the fighting season has traditionally been slower, 

leading to the loss of trained cadres when they are most needed, with little time for recruitment 

and replacement. And the pressing need to recruit and assign men to units leaves limited time 

for predeployment training. This is particularly an ongoing problem in the ANP, where recruits 

are often assigned to units without basic training.42

According to a Pentagon report, over the course of 2014, the ANA did not recruit at a level 

sufficient enough to outpace attrition, resulting in a decline in strength. In November 2014, the 

ANA increased its monthly recruiting targets and began work on a fourteen-month recruiting 

and training surge plan. Since then, the ANA’s strength has increased steadily. Current 

recruiting goals are ambitious though, averaging approximately 5,000 new recruits per month. 

It was reported that recruiting in early 2015 was well below the target.43 In recent months, 

the RS mission helped introduce measures to enhance the sustainability of the ANDSF by 

planning recruitment as a continuous process throughout the year.44

Professional training of the recruits is further hindered by illiteracy (over 60 percent of 

them are illiterate, coming mostly from rural areas). Few educated, urban Afghans volunteer 

to serve in the ranks of the ANA. A five-year literacy program, costing about $200 million, 

was set up in 2009 to educate 100 percent of the recruits up to the first grade reading level and 

50 percent of them to the third grade level. However, by 2014, more than half of soldiers and 

police officers were still unable to read.45 The urgent need for field deployment often caused the 

recruits to be sent out without training. For example, between July 2012 and February 2013, 

about 45 percent of ANP recruits were sent to the field without receiving any literacy training. 

There are also reports of lax vetting of police recruits and their lack of proper training before 

they are posted and deployed. The gaps created by police casualties are filled by readily available 

unemployed volunteers, which include some drug addicts. 

Leadership, Command, and Control

The command and control structure of the ANDSF looks good on paper, but the system is 

bureaucratically heavy at the top and weak at the bottom. In the words of one senior Afghan 

general, the “force has an inflated head and skinny legs.”46 Political interference by official and 

Attrition significantly 

raises the cost of training 

and development of the 

ANDSF and impedes 

combat readiness.
USIP.ORG 19

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

unofficial power brokers and the circumvention of formal command levels disrupts established 

procedures, plans, and normal unit functions. The coordination and operational cohesiveness 

of the ANA, ANP, and National Directorate of Security (NDS) forces in the field are 

dangerously lacking. The multilayered command and control system slows communication 

and the implementation of decisions made both at the top and the bottom (up through the 

chain of command). Joint cooperation cells established at the corps headquarters (bringing 

together the ANA corps commander, provincial police chiefs, ABP, and NDS) function 

in a stove-piped fashion, with no effective cooperation. The same pattern of dysfunction 

exists in provincial centers and at battalion and company levels in the districts (army, police, 

ABP, and NDS).47

Concerned about the incompetence of key command personnel and rampant corruption, 

Ghani spent considerable time at the beginning of his term removing and appointing 

tactical-level ANDSF officials, bypassing formal institutions. This practice not only hindered 

the development of ANDSF institutions but also dealt a heavy blow to state authority and 

public confidence. The nature of shared decision making within the NUG has led to delays in 

appointments, which has had a negative impact on the ability of the Afghan security ministries 

and their forces to exercise command and control effectively. It took the government more 

than seven months to fill dozens of senior positions in the MOD, which were vacant after the 

retirement of general officers. The delay in naming the Minister of Defense contributed to the 

tendency of incumbent leaders to evade making tough decisions pending the appointment of 

permanent leaders. 

In 2015, the government restored six ANP zonal commands, plus Kabul; these commands 

place a single commander in charge of all police forces within a zone, which encompasses 

several provinces. Such an arrangement added an unnecessary layer to the chain of command, 

which failed in the past and was consequently phased out. A better policy may be to integrate 

the security elements into the structure of the provincial government instead of making the 

provincial police chief report to more than one superior. In January 2015, another security body, 

the Kabul Garrison Joint Command, was established by a presidential decree to coordinate 

cross-ministerial security in the capital. Such a garrison may function well in the provincial 

cities, but in the capital—where the security ministries, the ANDSF joint command and 

coordination bodies, and the National Security Council are engaged in joint effort—it is hard 

for a subordinate body to coordinate cross-ministerial security.

Moving the directorate of local government from its well-entrenched and effective 

coordinating role at the MOI and making it a separate administrative unit weakened the 

coordination and functional relationship between the provincial governors and provincial 

police chiefs. This decision was made several years back for political reasons ahead of the 2009 

presidential election. 

The lack of competent leadership in key positions at different levels of the ANDSF 

remains a critical issue. The deficiency is not due to a dearth of well-trained, experienced, 

and talented officers but is instead due to a poor system of appointment and promotion. 

Nepotism, political favoritism, bribery and corruption, and political pressure for ethnic balance 

and patronage all shape senior position appointments. Finally, overlapping functions, a lack of 

clarity in vertical and horizontal functional relations, the multilayered chain of command, and 

poor oversight and accountability contribute to gaps in the command and control system. A 

comprehensive approach to address them would decisively improve the capacity, effectiveness, 

and sustainability of the ANDSF. 

Nepotism, political 

favoritism, bribery and 

corruption, and political 

pressure for ethnic 

balance and patronage 

all shape senior position 

appointments.
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Intelligence gaps are caused by the uneven development of Afghanistan intelligence institutions, 

lack of professional capacity, dearth of means for ISR, poor coordination among different 

intelligence and reconnaissance elements, and failure to operationalize acquired intelligence 

in a timely and coordinated way. In addition to the NDS, several intelligence entities have 

been formed and organized within the structure of the ANDSF, including the Assistant 

Ministry of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate, and 

the MOI Directorate of Police Intelligence. These entitites were created at different times for 

distinct purposes by separate institutions with divergent political preferences. They have been 

supported and aided by different donors and trained using various methods and means. Thus, 

they have developed unevenly and adopted different professional cultures.

The NDS is still strongly influenced by the legacy of its past, when it was formed based 

on the KGB model during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The NDS 

became an intelligence agency with the authority to arrest and detain suspects and conduct 

combat operations. While such activities contribute to kinetic actions in counterinsurgency 

operations, they strongly influence the agency’s main role as a national intelligence agency. 

Further, the situation puts the agency in competition with the ANDSF for scoring political 

points by carrying out special operations. Such competition fosters a reluctance to share 

tactical and operational intelligence with other parts of the government and poor coordination 

across agencies. 

Within the ANDSF, there are no clear lines of responsibility regarding the division of labor 

and how intelligence is shared. The confusion is particularly prevalent in relations between the 

MOD Department of Intelligence and the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate.48

Several coordinating bodies have been established to bring the intelligence organizations 

onto the same page. The new National Threat Intelligence Center at the General Staff brings 

together representatives of the MOD, MOI, and NDS for information sharing and joint 

intelligence assessments.49 However, most respected authorities are not convinced that the 

intelligence sharing is done wholly or in a timely manner. Although similar mechanisms are in 

place at the lower levels, including the army corps/police zones, they are not fully functional or 

effective either. For example, the NDS claimed that it had warned the ANDSF and provincial 

government in advance of the Taliban plan to attack and capture Kunduz in September 2015, 

but still every unit was taken by surprise. The National Threat Intelligence Center creates 

increased possibilities for cooperation among the MOD, MOI, and NDS. Having these 

three entities work side-by-side and share intelligence is a major step forward in Afghan 

intelligence development.50

Currently, the ANDSF depend on limited equipment to collect intelligence and target 

insurgents. These include the Wolfhound radio direction finding system that targets VHF and 

UHF radio bands and surveillance aerostat blimps and towers that can detect threat activity 

and lead to effective countermeasures. The ANA is expected to acquire a few more aerostats 

and ISR drones in 2016, but most international assets have been withdrawn from Afghanistan 

since the end of combat operations. Further, closing additional bases in Afghanistan will affect 

the ability of U.S. forces to conduct certain types of counterterrorism operations given the 

constraints of specific ISR collection platforms. As noted earlier, the SMW supporting the 

operation of the Special Forces is equipped with ISR means onboard its fixed-wing PC-12 

aircraft. However, the availability of trained air crew and the capacity for technical sustainability 

are still limited. 

The National Threat 

Intelligence Center creates 

increased possibilities for 

cooperation among the 

MOD, MOI, and NDS. 

Having these three entities 

work side-by-side and 

share intelligence is a major 

step forward in Afghan 

intelligence development.
USIP.ORG 21

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

To narrow the capability gap in intelligence, structural changes should be made to draw 

a clearer distinction between intelligence, security, and combat action. The NDS should 

become a professional, civilianized intelligence agency. This reform may require restructuring 

the agency to establish a clear distinction between intelligence gathering and paramilitary 

covert operations. Therefore, the NDS should undergo fundamental structural and procedural 

reform to focus on national-level strategic requirements. The intelligence elements of the 

MOD and MOI should focus on situational intelligence that supports decision making at 

the departmental, operational, and tactical levels. This requires unity of effort in the collection, 

processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information 

concerning the actual and potential hostile forces in the area of operation. This means that 

the intelligence institutions should focus on these tasks and not duplicate the tasks assigned 

to army and police units. Meanwhile, the RS mission and its successor need to focus on the 

development of intelligence capabilities within the ANDSF through, for example, training, 

the provision of ISR means, and greater involvement in the operational planning process for 

the next five years. 

Air Support and Mobility

Quick movement by land and air can serve as a force multiplier for the ANA and ANP, which 

are often overstretched. The ANDSF’s current airlift capacity is insufficient to quickly move 

reinforcements to the battle areas, mount airborne raids on enemy concentrations, deliver 

emergency supplies to isolated posts, or evacuate wounded personnel to medical facilities 

and retrieve the bodies of killed servicemen. This undermines the agility of combat troops to 

act faster than the enemy. Mounting surprise (night) raids, one of the most effective tactics 

in counterinsurgency operations, largely depends on airlift capability and close combat air 

support of the raiding forces. Although the SMW supports the ANA Special Operations 

Command, long delays in replacing crashed Mi-17 helicopters undermine sustainability of 

the operation. 

The gaps in aviation support not only undermine combat effectiveness and agility of the 

army and police units but also take a toll on troop morale and confidence. The ANDSF, 

which have operated under cover of coalition direct air support for years, have developed the 

perception that counterinsurgency war requires direct air support at all times. In the absence 

of air cover, there is less motivation for deployed forces to take bold action against the enemy 

in the open. Some isolated security posts on major highways and other key locations are 

seen as reluctant to move outside of the wire for fear of getting overwhelmed by the enemy, 

particularly at night. This lack of action provides the insurgents with freedom of action to 

block major roads even in areas not far from security posts. Further, due to the topography 

and security environment of Afghanistan, aviation support remains a key enabler, helping 

to deny freedom of movement and safe haven in remote areas to insurgents, terrorists, and 

drug trafficking networks. As the Afghan Air Force will take years to build, the ANDSF 

will require international aviation support for an extended period. Recently, the gaps in air 

power led the United States to provide air support to the ANDSF beyond 2014.51 The recent 

ANDSF operation to recapture the provincial city of Kunduz (October 2015), which was 

briefly overrun by the Taliban, succeeded largely with the help of close air support provided 

by U.S. forces. In Helmand Province, U.S. direct air support and assistance from Special 

Operation Forces enabled the ANDSF to contain the insurgents trying to overrun a number 

of district centers.52

Due to the topography 

and security environment 

of Afghanistan, aviation 

support remains a key 

enabler, helping to deny 

freedom of movement 

and safe haven in remote 

areas to insurgents, 

terrorists, and drug 

trafficking networks.
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

Operational Capacity

The ANDSF’s low space-to-force ratio results in an overextension of forces, impeding 

operational capability and tactical agility and often precluding the holding of areas cleared 

of enemy forces. ANDSF operations primarily consist of covering population areas through 

a network of security posts, launching large-scale sweeping operations to clear extended areas 

from insurgents and destroy their infrastructure, and mounting raids on enemy fixed targets.

While the insurgents act with tactical agility, choosing the time and place for hitting 

individual government posts, the ANDSF are mainly deployed in small security posts across 

extended areas, with little tactical cooperation between them and often with no immediately 

available quick reaction forces to join the battle. During the 2015 fighting season, the network 

of isolated ANA and ANP security posts suffered heavily; each post of ten to fifteen men was 

attacked by often dozens of well-armed militants. The Afghan Uniform Police particularly 

suffered in this regard, because they are often deployed in small teams in remote areas 

without adequate combat means, supplies, and training.53 In some cases, control of the area 

is contested by local strongmen connected to influential officials in Kabul. According to a 

Pentagon assessment, as of September 2015, the ANP devoted more than half of its total end 

strength of approximately 147,000 to checkpoints and fixed sites.54 ANP leaders are reluctant 

to consolidate due to civilian demand for police presence in all communities. The absence of 

checkpoints even in areas that cannot be guarded against insurgents is often perceived as giving 

up space to the Taliban. 

The deployment of ANA and ANP units to a wide network of fixed security posts and 

checkpoints thwarts maneuverability and impedes force concentration against the enemy at 

the right time and place. By October 21, 2015, the ANA had reduced their total number of 

checkpoints and fixed sites by almost 40 percent when compared to the first half of 2015 but 

still had an estimated 53,000 personnel stationed at those sites. Consequently, major sweeping 

counterinsurgency operations have to be conducted by forces brought temporarily to the 

affected areas, as described earlier. 

The ANDSF show a high level of professional effectiveness when they take initiative and 

act aggressively against insurgents. Special Forces’ surprise raids on enemy targets, ambushes 

by ANA and ANP units, and long-range patrolling constantly result in decisive tactical 

achievements. This suggests that the ANDSF should maximize the use of such methods. With 

the development of the ANA and ANP Special Security Operation Forces (ASSF) and their 

ISR and airlift capability, the ANDSF are improving their ability to wage a far more effective 

counterinsurgency. Establishment of the SMW to support air-assault operations by ANA and 

ANP’s ASSF provide tactical agility in combat actions. The SMW conducts day and night airassault and ISR missions. Its thirty specially equipped Mi-17 helicopters provide the ASSF 

with medium airlift, personal transport, casualty evacuation, and quick reaction force capability. 

The units’ fixed-wing PC-12 aircraft with ISR capability (more than a dozen) support special 

forces operations to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks. The SMW has three 

operational squadrons (two based in Kabul and one in Kandahar). 

According to a Pentagon assessment, the ASSF have proved to be among the best 

special operations forces in the region. Working together, commando units and the SMW 

are consistently running unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and 

facilitators.55 Challenges remain in sustainment, SMW force generation, and targeting. In the 

first six months of 2015, the ANDSF Special Forces and commando units conducted more 

than 2,800 independent operations, accounting for 82 percent of all ANDSF missions. More 

While the insurgents 

act with tactical agility, 

choosing the time and 

place for hitting individual 

government posts, 

the ANDSF are mainly 

deployed in small security 

posts across extended 

areas, with little tactical 

cooperation between 

them and often with no 

immediately available 

quick reaction forces to 

join the battle.
USIP.ORG 23

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

than 92 percent of all missions by special security forces were Afghan-led. Commando units 

now conduct night raids independently, using their own intelligence to drive their operations. 

The SMW is also executing long-range, full-mission profiles in low illumination. 

To avoid overextension and improve the space-to-force ratio, Afghan leaders should 

consider changing the ANDSF operational posture from being defensive to offensive. The 

ANDSF will need to demonstrate resiliency and steady improvement to achieve more than a 

stalemate against the insurgency across the country. Remote, hard-to-reach locations that are 

difficult to hold should be only watched and hit where the enemy shows concentration. Instead 

of holding every district and village, a watch-hit-degrade strategy needs to be adopted. The 

number of committed insurgents in Afghanistan is estimated to be ten times less than that of 

the ANDSF, and the latter are better trained and equipped than insurgent forces. The enemy’s 

advantages are its agility and choice of time and space to hit government targets. Meanwhile, 

the use of ANA and ANP special operation raids should be increased. However, all these 

tactical adjustments will not be fully effective unless other capability gaps are narrowed (in 

maneuvering and mobility, aviation support, and intelligence). 

During the Soviet occupation (1979–89) in Afghanistan, the level of Soviet troops was 

only enough for partial occupation and part-time control of selected territories. Most of the 

Soviet forces’ success in driving the mujahideen from their strongholds was temporary, as the 

mujahideen returned as soon as the Soviet columns left the area. There was “clearing” without 

“holding.” The low space-to-force ratio precluded holding the areas overrun by attacking 

forces.56 However, the Soviets often used their technological edge as a force multiplier to offset 

the low ratio. Air supplying their isolated garrisons and the centers of subnational government 

during years of continued sieges by the mujahideen helped maintain control of key locations. 

Constant and reliable air supply, and often unchallenged air support and bombing, helped the 

Soviets’ encircled military bases to withstand the mujahideen’s attacks. 

Logistics and Supply

Logistics continue to be a major challenge for the ANDSF, undermining the combat 

effectiveness and operational posture of soldiers and police. Delays in supply and service 

provision take a heavy toll on troop combat agility, often forcing ANDSF units into an 

immobile defensive posture. The ANDSF have long been dependent on U.S. forces for logistics 

support and have not been able to develop a self-reliant support system. 

The ANDSF’s military logistics and maintenance systems can handle basic supply and 

distribution functions, but the ANDSF need coalition assistance to improve their distribution 

capacity. Existing systems are largely manual and paper-based and often require the 

intervention of senior officers to resolve relatively minor issues. The MOD’s ability to manage 

supply and distribution outside of Kabul varies considerably, with ineffectual controls, poor 

consumption reporting, and little visibility below the regional and corps levels. The ministry’s 

procurement system requires significant coalition support for major procurement initiatives. 

The absence of effective internal control processes increases the risk of poor management and 

corrupt practices, which deprives the ANDSF of vital resources and could lead to a reduction 

in international contributions over time. Continued financial support from the international 

community depends on a transparent and accountable resource management process that 

enables oversight by third-party organizations. 

The national-level Central Supply Depot is the primary supply depot for the ANA, 

responsible for issuing, shipping, receiving, storing, and replenishing supply items, except for 

Delays in supply and 

service provision take 

a heavy toll on troop 

combat agility, often 

forcing ANDSF units 

into an immobile 

defensive posture.
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

rations, POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants), and ammunition, which are handled by separate 

organizations that report to NATO’s Logistic Command. The depot serves seven regional 

maintenance and supply facilities called regional logistics supply centers. The centers are 

located at each corps command and allow for more complex maintenance tasks than those 

performed at the unit level. 

Units are obligated to send supply and resupply requests up the support chain through a 

cumbersome bureaucratic system. The process requires approval from regional and national 

levels and takes an average of ninety days. According to Pentagon sources, supply shortages 

in operational units are most commonly the result of the ANDSF’s underdeveloped logistics 

system, rather than actual supply shortages within the system as a whole. Warehouse managers 

are often “unaware of inbound shipments, and units in the field may lack the ability to 

requisition necessary items. Since the supply and demand signals do not match, supplies can 

sit in warehouses unsorted.”57

Food provision is contracted independently by brigades and other entities, who receive 

supplies at major garrisons and bases. Units deployed in remote areas receive supplies 

intermittently or use cash provided by contractors to purchase their food, which constrains 

local resources. This system contributes to desertion and makes it difficult for troops to 

withstand long periods of isolation. This system also applies to ammunition and fuel. Although 

ammunition storage exists at the brigade headquaters level, the ANA does not have a regular 

indigenous ammunition supply system, depending instead on provisions air-transported 

monthly by NATO. Fuel for operational support is widely wasted because of corruption or 

significantly delayed, rendering combat vehicles inoperable for a time. According to Afghan 

MOD leadership, the ineffective distribution of fuel and other supplies among ANA units is 

the main reason for shortages of POL and other material.58

Technical maintenance and repair is one of the weakest points in the logistics system. The 

ANA maintains a ground-wheeled fleet of more than 48,000 vehicles. For many years, army 

and police vehicles have been serviced by high-priced contractors who would junk thousands of 

slightly damaged vehicles to offset the high repair costs. Consequently, today, tens of thousands 

of repairable vehicles are junked across the country. The Central Workshop in Kabul (Fabrikae-Harbi) has recently been restored and is responsible for repairing and rebuilding equipment 

to a serviceable condition, but it does not have the capacity to meet the increasing demand for 

repairs.59 The workshop is able to send mobile maintenance teams across the country to repair 

weapons and vehicles; however, the operation is often hindered by the lack of parts, inefficient 

requisition processes, and poor communication with the Central Supply Depot.

Given the ANDSF’s constant engagement in combat and expected damages to hardware, an 

organic system of technical and repair support needs to be reestablished. In the past, the ANA 

had organic technical support units at different levels of command. Routine maintenance was 

conducted by battalions, while light and medium repairs were done at the regiment/brigade 

workshops and divisional maintenance units. The Kabul Pul-e-Charkhi central plant had the 

capacity to conduct major repairs and overhauls. 

The AAF faces difficulties with sustaining its maintenance capability at all bases across 

Afghanistan. With the exception of the Mi-35, which will likely exit service in the near future, 

all AAF aircraft platforms will require varying degrees of contract logistics support through 

at least 2023. Additionally, as coalition advisers decrease in number, the ability for AAF to 

order parts and sustain its systems will be a challenge, as it currently lacks the planning and 
USIP.ORG 25

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

discipline required to keep its fleet up and running. Maintenance support within the Kabul 

area is sufficient due to adequate coalition and contract logistics support.60

ANDSF Funding 

The United States has provided nearly $14 billion worth of equipment to the ANDSF and 

another $9 billion for building their infrastructure. 

The ANDSF are expected to remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. At the 

2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, international donors agreed to fund an initial force level of 

228,500 personnel, subject to periodic reviews based on security conditions and other factors, 

at an annual estimated cost of $4.1 billion. However, based on assessments of the difficulty of 

securing Afghanistan, the decision was reversed at a subsequent NATO meeting on February 

21, 2013.61 At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, international donors affirmed pledges to 

provide $1 billion annually to supplement U.S. funding, with the Afghan government pledging 

$500 million annually to support its security requirement. The anticipated fiscal year 2015 cost 

for the current ANDSF structure is $5.4 billion, which is expected to decrease to $5 billion in 

2016.62 Equipment and infrastructure costs are estimated at about $800 million per year for at 

least five years, assuming current usage remains constant.63

During Ghani’s visit to Washington in March 2015, the United States reaffirmed that it 

would seek continued funding for 352,000 ANDSF troops at least through 2017; the United 

States has requested a slightly lower amount ($3.8 billion) for 2016, while U.S. partners have 

pledged $1.25 billion annually for 2015–17 and Afghanistan has pledged $500 million for 

2015. It is not expected that Afghanistan will be able to fund its armed forces from domestic 

revenue after 2017.64

The level of future funding will depend on additional donor commitments, the level of 

the threat, the amount of domestic revenue, and the possibility of downsizing the ANDSF. 

Political settlement of the conflict is the key factor in securing the ANDSF’s financial 

sustainability by reducing the need for maintaining a large force and drastically cutting the cost 

of security operations. However, the cost of downsizing the security forces and reintegrating 

former combatants would require some funds for the following three to five years. A sharp 

cut in foreign aid while the conflict continues will have a drastic impact on maintaining the 

integrity of the ANDSF, as it may take years before domestic revenues are sufficient to cover 

security costs. The International Monetary Fund has concluded that the Afghan government 

will be incapable of paying ANDSF costs until at least 2023.65 In December 2015, a NATO 

ministerial meeting indicated that the alliance may fund the ANDSF for the next five years. A 

joint statement issued after the meeting confirmed that at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 

July 2016, international support and partnership with Afghanistan will be renewed until 2020, 

in parallel to the security-related efforts pursued under the NATO framework.

The Way Forward

The ANDSF’s mission has evolved over the past fourteen years, along with changing security 

conditions. The ANDSF were established to stabilize the country following years of conflict, 

as well as support the development of democratic institutions to counteract entrenched 

postconflict criminality, including warlord- and drug-related crime. However, over the years, 

the ANDSF gradually got pulled into counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, 
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

as the resurgent Taliban and their foreign supporters exploited the light footprint of foreign 

forces, the slow development of the ANDSF, and the weakness of the Afghan government. 

Although the NATO combat mission ended and international military assistance declined 

at the outset of 2015, the ANDSF held their own and foiled the Taliban’s repeated effort to 

overrun key areas. Despite challenges, the ANDSF proved their resolve to fight and learn 

from their mistakes. The ANDSF have been able to reverse Taliban inroads into some remote 

district centers, albeit with high costs in lives and materials. The fall of Kunduz to the Taliban 

on September 28, 2015, following a brief resistance, marked the changing nature of the 

insurgency, which took the ANDSF by surprise. Although the Afghan forces, with the help 

of U.S. air strikes, reestablished control over the city after two weeks of fierce fighting, the 

situation revealed serious gaps in the structural cohesiveness of the NUG at the local level and 

in the ANDSF’s operational command and control system.

The ANDSF continue to face threats from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist 

networks—including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network, and emerging local affiliates 

of ISIS—which continue to attempt to assert their authority and prominence in isolated 

pockets across the country. The convergence of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks is 

pervasive and endangers Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from opium trafficking continues to 

sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, there has been a recent 

increase in extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks in some areas of the 

country. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas remain an extremist safe haven providing 

sanctuary for various groups, including regional militant groups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba 

and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight 

insurgents in Afghanistan and violent extremists in the region is essential to regional security 

and the stability of both countries. A belated Pakistani military crackdown on terrorists in the 

bordering areas pushed many extremists across the border into Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015, 

causing an upsurge of violence in Afghanistan.

In the short term, the ANDSF do not have to defeat the Taliban, but they need to support 

the state’s survival and strengthening to ensure peace and stability. The longer the state survives, 

the less likely an overthrow of the government becomes; sustainability of the state may sway 

insurgents and their foreign supporters, particularly in Pakistan, to opt for political settlement 

of the conflict. 

The long-term security strategy needs to focus on two sets of mutually reinforcing measures. 

One set should be directed toward reducing the threat level. This can be achieved through interlinked actions, including a rapid improvement in government performance, strengthening of 

the rule of law, successful reconciliation and reintegration of less ideologically zealous fighters, 

and regional cooperation. 

Pakistan can play a key role in reducing the level of violence in Afghanistan if it chooses to. 

The presence of operational and logistic infrastructure of the Taliban and other anti-Afghan 

government insurgents, including the Haqqani network and the Hekmatyar militant group, 

provides Pakistan the opportunity to exert a significant level of control and influence over 

them. In March 2016, in an unusually candid admission, Sartaj Aziz, adviser to the Pakistan 

Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, said that Islamabad has considerable influence over the 

Taliban because its leaders live in the country with their families and benefit from medical 

services there.66 Although Pakistan may ultimately see the return of the Taliban to power in 

Afghanistan as neither possible nor desirable, it uses its control and influence over them as a 

leverage to secure its regional geopolitical interests through influence in Afghanistan. While a 

In the short term, the 

ANDSF do not have to 

defeat the Taliban, but 

they need to support 

the state’s survival and 

strengthening to ensure 

peace and stability.
USIP.ORG 27

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

U.S. ally in fighting terrorism and extremism, Pakistan views the challenge in the context of its 

regional interests, including its geopolitical vision of Afghanistan as a zone of strategic depth 

in its long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir. Pakistan has made repeated attempts 

in recent times to help install a pliable, subordinate regime in Kabul, including the Taliban 

government (1996–2001). Pakistan’s recent military operation against violent extremists in 

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas targeted the militants that fight against the Pakistan 

government, leaving the Haqqani network and other Taliban groups that fight in Afghanistan 

mostly untouched. In the words of U.S. congressman Ed Royce, “Pakistani governments 

have come and gone, but Pakistan has remained a terrorist haven, with its security services 

supporting what it considers to be ‘good’ Islamist terrorist groups. These ‘good’ groups—under 

Pakistan’s calculus—destabilize Afghanistan and threaten neighboring India.”67

There are indications that Pakistan, in a recent policy shift, no longer distinguishes between 

good and bad Taliban, and, therefore, to defeat the Tehreek-e-Taliban, they must also fight 

the Afghan Taliban.68 This is good news, but actions rather than rhetoric are now needed. The 

most unsettling perception entertained by some Pakistani circles is the notion that Pakistani 

army and intelligence have the ability to manage the crisis in Afghanistan, allowing them to 

prevent rivals from gaining ascendency without the conflict blowing back against Pakistan. 

They may be able to do this in the short term, but eventually such a dangerous approach will 

be destructive to Pakistan. 

Ghani has taken steps to improve relations with Pakistan and form joint efforts to deal 

with the security challenges in Afghanistan and the region. He proposed a step-by-step 

approach, beginning with a Pakistani effort to end the undeclared war between the two 

states through limiting the ability of the Taliban based in Pakistan to continue violence in 

a friendly neighboring country (Afghanistan). Following such an act of confidence building, 

the Afghan leader offered to normalize bilateral relations and address the issues of concern 

to Pakistan. Pakistan responded with a different roadmap, suggesting that all of Islamabad’s 

political, security, and intelligence demands be settled as an inclusive package addressing all 

issues at once—a controversial demand that proved to be a nonstarter in Kabul. After some 

initial improvements in relations—as demonstrated by Islamabad’s assistance in hosting the 

first direct talks between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives in Murree, 

Pakistan, on July 7, 2015—the relationship suffered a major setback. The setback was caused 

by rising mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad following the announcement of the death of 

the Taliban leader Mullah Omer, who had died more than two years previously in Karachi, 

leading to Kabul’s suspicions of Pakistani cover up. Furthermore, the upsurge of violence in 

Afghanistan by the new Pakistan-based leadership of the Taliban and failure of Pakistan to 

stop public gatherings and free movement of the Taliban on its soil added to the mistrust. 

Rising concerns over continued instability and the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan have created a new regional dynamism among major powers, including China and 

the United States, to support the peace process. However, even if begun today, it will take 

several years before the process leads to a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict. The 

recent division within the insurgents’ ranks lowers the prospects for achieving a legitimate, 

inclusive, and sustainable peace deal in the short run. However, if the division leads to the 

movement’s fragmentation, chances for making separate local deals with insurgent groups 

may improve. In any case, the role of Pakistan, which controls or influences several groups, 

continues to be crucial in limiting the Taliban’s capacity and encouraging them to hold peace 

talks with Kabul. 

The role of Pakistan, which 

controls or influences 

several groups, continues 

to be crucial in limiting 

the Taliban’s capacity and 

encouraging them to hold 

peace talks with Kabul.
28 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

Meanwhile, the second set of simultaneous measures must include further building Afghan 

capacity to govern and provide security. Closing the gaps in the ANDSF’s capabilities, building 

an indigenous capacity for efficient and effective service delivery and economic development, 

fighting corruption, and strengthening the rule of law are the most viable long-term strategies 

to secure Afghanistan and the region’s stability. As prospects for political settlement in the 

immediate future dwindle, regional countries and those beyond—including China, India, 

Russia, and the Central Asian states, which fear violence spreading across the region and 

Afghanistan once again becoming the hub of violent extremist forces—are increasingly 

interested in assisting the ANDSF to build its counterterrorism capability. 

The ANDSF have long been dependent on U.S. support of their operations. The fastpaced numerical force generation of the ANDSF during the transition period left little time 

to develop capabilities that need more time and elaborate infrastructures (e.g., the air force, 

intelligence, and logistics). The size and professional capacity of the security forces have been 

evolving according to the changing ANDSF mission and emerging threats. The current size of 

the ANDSF (352,000) is adequate to fulfill their mission, but success hinges on forces being 

maintained at their authorized levels and international support being received at least until 

2018. The level of further funding will depend on additional donor commitments, the threat 

level, the amount of domestic revenue, and the possibility of downsizing the ANDSF. Political 

settlement of the conflict will be the key factor in the ANDSF’s financial sustainability, because 

such a settlement will reduce the need for maintaining a large force and drastically cut the cost 

of security operations. 

Obama’s decision in October 2015 to maintain U.S. forces in Afghanistan at current levels 

for at least another year and to reduce only to a baseline of 5,500 military personnel recognizes 

that the ANDSF will require more time and assistance to develop into a capable independent 

force. Whether the presence of 5,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan can make a major difference 

is hard to determine because there are other domestic and regional factors at play. However, 

the absence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan would definitely have an adverse impact on regional 

stability. The effect of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan depends less on their numbers and more 

on their assigned mission and rules of engagement.

Closing the gaps in the 

ANDSF’s capabilities, 

building an indigenous 

capacity for efficient 

and effective service 

delivery and economic 

development, fighting 

corruption, and 

strengthening the rule of 

law are the most viable 

long-term strategies to 

secure Afghanistan and 

the region’s stability.
USIP.ORG 29

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

Notes

1. DAISH is the abbreviation of the Arabic name, Dawlat Islamia fi Iraq and Sham.

2. The Northern Alliance was a grouping of predominantly Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara factions that waged a 

long war against the Taliban.

3. “Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan,” CNN, Thursday, May 1, 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/

WORLD/asiapcf/central/05/01/afghan.combat/. 

4. In spring 1983, I [author] had to dispatch a strong contingent of police to help install the newly appointed 

governor and the police chief of the Paktia Province in the face of pushback from local warlords and thugs.

5. “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001, Article V, www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghanagree.htm.

6. “Karzai Moves to Rein In Warlords,” BBC News, December 16, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_

asia/2580217.stm. 

7. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2016), 49 and others.

8. David Buchbinder, “Afghans Ask: Whose Army Is It?” Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 2002, www.

csmonitor.com/2002/1017/p06s01-wosc.html. 

9. Afghan Ministry of Defense, “Assassat-i Sakhtar-i-Tashkilati Ordu-i-Mili wa Jamawari Asleha” (The 

Principles of Organizational Structure of the National Army and Arms Collection), Kabul, October 2002.

10. Ehsan Ahrari, “U.S. Digs for ‘Long War,’” Asia Times, February 9, 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/

Middle_East/HB09Ak01.html. 

11. Vance Serchuk, “Don’t Undercut the Afghan Army,” Washington Post, June 2, 2006, www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060101533.html. 

12. Ian S. Levingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Also Selected Data on Pakistan (Washington, 

DC: Brookings, 2012), www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index/

index20151130.pdf?la=en. 

13. Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United 

States of America (English text), signed in Kabul on September 30, 2014.

14. Sayed Masood Sadat, Christina Satkowski, Renard Sexton, Shamim Sarabi, Sandy Feinzig, Shahim Kabuli, 

Charlotte Maxwell-Jones, and Zachary Warren, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2015 (San 

Francisco, CA: The Asia Foundation, 2015), 7.

15. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 

130–32, cited in James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins 

Publishers, 1990), 38.

16. Sadat et al., A Survey of the Afghan People, 6.

17. Interviews with several generals of the MOD and MOI and officers of the 201, 203, and 207 corps and 

Special Forces, Kabul, April–August 2015.

18. Naheed Bashardost, “4 Million Jobs Need to Be Created in Next 5 Years: Study,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 

August 9, 2015, www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/08/09/4-million-jobs-need-be-created-next-5-years-study. 

19. Jamey Keaten, “IOM: Over 1 Million Refugees, Migrants Enter Europe in 2015,” Associated Press, 

December 22, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/54d7240c4a534c4999b504a1ec9782fa/iom-migrantarrivals-europe-tops-1-million-2015. 

20. Interviews with several young professionals who planned to leave for Europe, Kabul, August 6–14, 2015.

21. Headquarters of the Department of the Army and Headquarters of the Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 

(Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Department of the Army, 2006), 1–13.

22. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: 

DOD, December 2015), 36, 64, 73, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225_Report_

Dec_2015_-_Final_20151210.pdf. 

23. This includes the 111th Capital Division, 201st Corps (East), 203rd Corps (Southeast), 205th Corps 

(South), 207th Corps (West), 209th Corps (North), and 215th Corps (Southwest). The Special Forces are 

grouped into two types of Special Brigades and other small units. The Air Force is organized in three Air 

Wings based at the Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand air bases, with detachments in Mazar-i-Sharif and 

Jalalabad, Shurab (Helmand), Gardez, and Herat. 

24. Antonio Giustozzi with Peter Quentin, The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges Beyond Financial 

Aspects (Kabul: Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, 2014), 10.

25. Interview with police Lieutenant General Hadi Khalid, Kabul, August 2015.

26. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: DOD, June 2015), 38, 

https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/June_1225_Report_Final1.pdf. 
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 115

27. Azadi Radio (RFERL), “The Arg ‘Palace’ Rejected the Existence of 130,000 Ghost Soldiers and 

Policemen” (English translation), Dari News, October 25, 2015.

28. Conversation with General John Campbell and his staff, Kabul, November 2, 2015.

29. Interview with Afghan government officials in charge of the transition and police reform, Kabul, May 2011.

30. International Crisis Group, The Future of Afghan Local Police, Asia Report no. 268 (Brussels: International 

Crisis Group, 2015), 10. 

31. Ibid, 13.

32. Interview with RS mission officials, Kabul, November 2015.

33. Conversation with a major general of the Afghan General Staff, Washington, April 2015.

34. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 41.

35. Ben Watson, “As End Looms, US Warns Afghan Troops Taking ‘Unsustainable Casualties’,” Defense One, 

November 5, 2014, www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/11/end-looms-us-warns-afghan-troops-takingunsustainable-casualties/98297/. 

36. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 27.

37. Richard Sisk, “Campbell: Afghan Army Improving Despite More Deaths and Desertions,” Military.com, 

March 4, 2015, www.military.com/daily-news/2015/03/04/campbell-afghan-army-improving-despitemore-deaths-and.html. 

38. General John Campbell speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, August 5, 2015.

39. Interview with General Campbell, Kabul, November 2015.

40. Interviews with community leaders from the Faryab and Nangarhar provinces, Kabul, February–April 2015.

41. Guistozzi and Quentin, The Afghan National Army, 10. 

42. Interview with police Lieutenant General Hadi Khalid, Kabul, August 2015.

43. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 61.

44. Conversation with Matt Sherman, foreign policy adviser to General Campbell, RS mission, Washington, 

August 3, 2015.

45. Heath Druzin, “Watchdog: $200 Million Literacy Program Misses Mark in Afghanistan,” Stars and 

Stripes, January 28, 2014, www.stripes.com/news/watchdog-200-million-literacy-program-misses-markin-afghanistan-1.264431. 

46. Interview with General Salem Hasas, Kabul, January 29, 2015.

47. Interviews with several ANA and ANP senior officials, Kabul, April and August 2015.

48. Interview with a general of the MOD Intelligence Department, Kabul, August 11, 2015.

49. Interview with chief of the Intelligence for the General Staff, General Manan Farahi, Kabul August 12, 

2015.

50. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 18.

51. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, 2015), 35.

52. Interview with Afghan and RS officials, Kabul, November 2015.

53. Interview with the MOI uniform police chief, Kabul, January 2015.

54. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 28.

55. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 10.

56. In 1986, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the chief of general staff of the Soviet Army, told the Politburo that 

“there is no single piece of land in the country (Afghanistan) which has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. 

Nevertheless, the majority of the territory remains in the hands of rebels.” See “The Soviet Union and 

Afghanistan 1878–1989: Documents,” 180, cited in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World 

was Going Our Way—The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 412.

57. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 42.

58. Interview with Massoum Stanakzai, acting Afghan defense minister, Kabul, August 12, 2015.

59. Interview with two generals from the MOD and MOI, Kabul, April 2015. 

60. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 56.

61. Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 32.

62. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 34.

63. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 40.

64. To cover the 2015 cost of the ANDSF ($5.4 billion), the United States is providing $4.1 billion ($2.9 billion 

for the MOD and $1.2 billion for the MOI) through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). Of the 

$4.1 billion provided by the ASFF, approximately $2.0 billion is provided “on-budget” ($1.5 billion for the 

MOD and $0.5 billion for the MOI), which includes ANA salaries and incentive pay and fuel costs; and 

$2.1 billion is provided “off-budget.” The remaining $1.3 billion of ANDSF costs are funded by 
USIP.ORG 31

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

international donors ($923 million for ANA salaries, information technology, aviation training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan government ($411 million, primarily for food and 

subsistence).

65. Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk 

New Waste,” Special Report 5 (Arlington, VA: CWC, 2011), 3.

66. Abubakar Siddique, “Aziz Admits Pakistan Housing Afghan Taliban Leaders,” Dawn, March 3, 2016, 

www.dawn.com/news/1243093. 

67. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Hearing on the Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” Chairman 

Royce opening remarks, December 16, 2015.

68. Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “Pakistan: No More ‘Good Taliban’?” The Diplomat, January 19, 2016, http://

thediplomat.com/2015/01/pakistan-no-more-good-taliban/.

 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Nancy Lindborg

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, 

D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University 

Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice

In the past fourteen years, the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces (ANDSF) have come a long way, 

transforming from an odd assortment of factional militias 

into a collection of modern security institutions with 

professional capacity and increasing loyalty to a unified 

state. However, while strongly committed to their mission 

and highly respected by the majority of Afghans, the 

ANDSF continue to depend on foreign assistance to fill 

gaps in certain key areas (e.g., logistics, air power, and 

intelligence). This report assesses the structure and 

capacity of the ANDSF, as well as the broader conditions 

needed for their long-term financial and operational 

sustainability. Political settlement of the conflict and a 

reduction in the threat level both from within and outside 

Afghanistan will be essential to reaching this goal. 

Other USIP Publications

■ The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Assessing the Threat by Casey Garret Johnson, 

Masood Karokhail, and Rahmatullah Amiri (Peace Brief, April 2016)

■ Resources over Reform in Afghanistan by Anna Larson and Noah Coburn 

(Special Report, February 2016)

■ Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: The Prospect of Reviving Taliban Talks by 

Moeed Yusuf (Peace Brief, December 2015)

■ Ten Years in Afghanistan’s Pech Valley by Wesley Morgan (Special Report, 

September 2015)

■ Ashraf Ghani’s Pakistan Outreach: Fighting Against the Odds by Moeed Yusuf 

and Scott Smith (Special Report, June 2015)

PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 115

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE., NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

@ usip