FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 07-10135 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-04-02351-JMR

ERNEST CRAIGHEAD,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 12, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed August 21, 2008

Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges,

and Frederic Block,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

*The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

11325
COUNSEL

Celeste Corlett, Assistant United States Attorney, United

States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona,

for plaintiffs-appellee. 

Steven D. West, Tucson, Arizona, for the defendant-appellant.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 

The home occupies a special place in the pantheon of constitutional rights. Under the First Amendment, the “State has

no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what

books he may read or what films he may watch.” Stanley v.

Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). The Second Amendment

prohibits a federal “ban on handgun possession in the home.”

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ___ (2008), slip

op. 64. The Third Amendment forbids quartering soldiers “in

any house” in time of peace “without the consent of the

Owner.” U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches or seizures in our “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. amend. IV. The

question presented in this case is one of first impression in our

court: under what circumstances under the Fifth Amendment

does an interrogation by law enforcement officers in the suspect’s own home turn the home into such a police-dominated

atmosphere that the interrogation becomes custodial in nature

and requires Miranda warnings? 

Appellant Ernest D. Craighead appeals his conviction following entry of a conditional guilty plea for transportation,

11330 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
shipping, and possession of child pornography. A search of

Craighead’s home computer system revealed numerous movies and images depicting child pornography. On appeal, as his

plea agreement permits, he renews his argument that he is

entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), because the affidavit used to

obtain the warrant for this search depended on misleading

statements and omissions. Craighead also renews his argument that his confession to having downloaded and stored

child pornography on his computer system should be suppressed because the interrogation in his home was custodial

and he was not read his Miranda rights. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm

the district court’s ruling that Craighead was not entitled to a

Franks hearing because Craighead did not properly allege that

any specific portion of the warrant was actually false or misleading. On the Miranda question, we reverse the district

court’s ruling that the interrogation in Craighead’s home was

not custodial and that Miranda warnings were not required.

Craighead’s self-incriminating statements should have been

suppressed. We remand for further proceedings. 

I

A

Craighead first came to the FBI’s attention in 2004. At that

time, Craighead was an electronic warfare technician in the

U.S. Air Force. On July 13, Special Agent Robin Andrews

(“SA Andrews”), a seventeen-year FBI veteran, logged onto

the LimeWire peer-to-peer file-sharing network to conduct

undercover surveillance of child pornography distribution.

Using LimeWire, SA Andrews entered a search term that she

knew was associated with graphic files depicting child pornography. Her search revealed that a computer using IP

address 68.0.185.111 was sharing files that, by their titles,

appeared related to child pornography. SA Andrews downUNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11331
loaded two of these images, and confirmed that they depicted

prepubescent females in sexually explicit positions. She

attempted to download a third image but received the message, “Waiting for Busy Host.” SA Andrews knew from experience that this message indicates that the server will not

permit the download because demand for the image has overloaded its capacity to supply it. 

Using a publicly-accessible online database, SA Andrews

determined that IP address 68.0.185.111 was owned by Cox

Communications. By administrative subpoena to Cox Communications, SA Andrews learned that IP address

68.0.185.111 was assigned to Ernest Craighead’s residence in

base housing on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson,

Arizona. The subpoena listed Craighead’s address and telephone number. SA Andrews then corroborated the name,

address, and telephone number by running a driver’s licence

check, querying the County Clerk’s Office, and contacting the

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”). On July

26, 2004, SA Andrews swore out an affidavit for a search

warrant. The warrant was authorized the same day by Magistrate Judge Glenda Edmonds. 

The search warrant for Craighead’s residence on the Air

Force base was executed at approximately 8:40 A.M. on July

27, 2004. Eight law enforcement officers, representing three

different agencies, went to Craighead’s residence: five FBI

agents, a detective from the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, and two members from the OSI. All of these law

enforcement officers were armed; some of them unholstered

their firearms in Craighead’s presence during the search. All

of the FBI agents were wearing flak jackets or “raid vests.”

Two non-agents accompanied the law enforcement officers:

an FBI evidence control clerk, and Air Force Sergeant Mike

Ramsey, who the government later represented was present

for Craighead’s “emotional support.” 

11332 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
At the hearing on Craighead’s motion to suppress, SA

Andrews testified that while other officers executed the search

warrant, she introduced herself to Craighead as Robin

Andrews from the FBI. She also introduced Jeff Englander,

the detective from Pima County. She told Craighead that the

two of them would like to talk with him about the search warrant. She told him that he was not under arrest, that any statement he might make would be voluntary, and that he would

not be arrested that day regardless of what information he provided. SA Andrews also testified that she told Craighead that

he was free to leave.1

SA Andrews and Detective Englander then directed Craighead to a storage room at the back of his house, “where [they]

could have a private conversation.” SA Andrews did not

handcuff Craighead at any point while escorting him to the

storage room nor during the interview that followed. As SA

Andrews described the storage room, it was cluttered with

boxes. She could not recall whether Craighead sat on a box,

or whether he sat on a chair grabbed from the kitchen. SA

Andrews squatted on the ground, taking notes. Detective

Englander stood leaning against the wall near the exit, with

his back to the door. Detective Englander wore a flak jacket

and a sidearm. SA Andrews testified that they shut the door

“for privacy.” Although Sergeant Ramsey had ostensibly been

brought along to provide emotional support for Craighead, he

was not permitted to accompany Craighead into the storage

room. SA Andrews testified that this was because he was

“non-law enforcement” and therefore would “never” be permitted to be present during an FBI interview. 

The interview lasted approximately twenty to thirty minutes. SA Andrews testified that it was her practice to tell interviewees that they are “free to leave” at the beginning of each

1Craighead denied that he was told he was free to leave. The district

court, however, found SA Andrews’ testimony credible, and thus found

that SA Andrews did tell Craighead he was free to leave. 

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11333
interview, even if she has already told them this when escorting them to the interview location. However, she could not

recall whether she actually repeated this statement to Craighead after they entered the back storage room and she closed

the door. During the interview, SA Andrews did not make any

threats or promises to induce Craighead to speak. She did not

use any force. She did not read Craighead the Miranda warnings. 

Craighead testified that he felt that he was not free to leave

because he “would have either had to have moved [Detective

Englander] or asked him to move.” He also testified that the

“prevailing mood of the morning” left him with the impression that he was not free to leave. He knew there were members of three different law enforcement agencies present in his

home: the FBI, the Pima County Sheriff’s Department, and

the Air Force OSI. He believed that even if SA Andrews permitted him to leave, members of the other two law enforcement agencies would not. He was concerned that the agencies

had not coordinated and so members of the other agencies

might not know that SA Andrews had authorized him to

leave. Similarly, he was unsure if he needed permission from

all three agencies to leave, or if the Air Force investigators

believed that he needed such permission. 

Craighead also testified that he was unaware during the

interview that Sergeant Ramsey had been invited to provide

emotional support. Rather, as Craighead explained, Sergeant

Ramsey was his “first sergeant,” a superior with authority

over him. Craighead assumed Sergeant Ramsey was required

to be there by Air Force regulation. It was not until after

everyone had left his house that he had a moment to speak

with Sergeant Ramsey and discover the reason for Sergeant

Ramsey’s presence. 

During the interview, Craighead admitted that he downloaded child pornography using LimeWire, that he stored

child pornography on his computer, and that he had saved

11334 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
some to a disk. Craighead was not arrested at the end of the

interview. He was never arrested at any time prior to his conviction; he appeared in court by summons only. 

The search resulted in the seizure of the hard drive and

loose storage media (compact discs and 3.5-inch floppy diskettes) from Craighead’s computer. The FBI computer forensics expert located sixteen movies of various lengths depicting

child pornography on the hard drive of Craighead’s computer.

The movies were found in a folder titled “PTHC,” which the

FBI expert testified based on his experience stands for “PreTeen Hard Core.” The loose storage media contained fifteen

images and three movies depicting child pornography. The

two files that SA Andrews had downloaded on July 13, 2004,

were not located on Craighead’s computer. The FBI expert

was able to locate on the computer multiple exact references

to the file name of the first file downloaded by the FBI—a file

name consisting of a long string of explicit words related to

child pornography. Neither the image itself nor references to

the file name of the second file were located. 

B

In November 2004, Craighead was indicted for Transportation and Shipping of Child Pornography, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and (b)(1); and Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and

(b)(2). 

In February 2006, Craighead filed a Motion to Suppress

Evidence Illegally Seized, arguing that he was entitled to a

Franks hearing because SA Andrews’ search warrant affidavit

contained false and unreliable information. Oral argument on

the motion was held on April 6, 2006 and again on July 6,

2006. Craighead’s claim was based on the fact that SA

Andrews observed that the files named in her warrant affidavit were available from a computer at Craighead’s IP address,

yet these particular files were never found on Craighead’s

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11335
computer system. Craighead’s claim was that someone else

could have hacked into his computer and downloaded the

named files. Craighead provided an affidavit by his forensic

computer expert, Tami Loerhs, which provided general information regarding the widespread risks of computer hacking,

IP spoofing, internet hijacking, and internet theft. Loerhs

averred that she had performed an examination of Craighead’s

computer, and could not locate the two downloaded files. 

The district court denied the request for a Franks hearing,

ruling that Craighead did not satisfy his burden of proof as to

any alleged falseness in SA Andrews’ affidavit. The court reasoned that the theory that someone had hacked into Craighead’s computer, even if credible, would be relevant to

Craighead’s guilt or innocence of the criminal charges, not to

the truthfulness of SA Andrews’ affidavit. 

On the same day that Craighead filed his motion for a

Franks hearing, he also filed a Motion to Suppress Statements

Taken in Violation of Miranda. After hearing testimony and

oral argument, the district court held that the interrogation in

Craighead’s home was not custodial and therefore that

Miranda warnings were not required. 

On August 7, 2006, Craighead entered a conditional guilty

plea to both counts in the indictment, while preserving the

right to appeal his Franks claim and his Miranda claim.

Craighead was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release for life. 

II

[1] We first consider Craighead’s claim that the district

court erroneously denied him an evidentiary hearing under

Franks when Craighead alleged falsity in the affidavit used to

secure a search warrant for his house. A defendant is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing if he “makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intention11336 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
ally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by

the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false

statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. To justify a hearing, a defendant

must make specific allegations, allege a deliberate falsehood

or reckless disregard for the truth, and accompany such a

claim with a detailed offer of proof. United States v. Kiser,

716 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1983). We review a district

court’s refusal to conduct a Franks hearing de novo. United

States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 716 (9th Cir. 2004). 

[2] We affirm the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing

on the ground that Craighead failed to properly allege anything that was false or misleading in SA Andrews’ affidavit.2

See 438 U.S. at 171. Craighead first points to SA Andrews’

statement in paragraph 32 of the affidavit that “[t]wo files

from IP address 68.0.185.11 were downloaded by your affiant.” He contends that this statement impermissibly suggests

that the files were downloaded from his computer, when they

were never located on his computer. Craighead’s claim lacks

merit because the statement does not suggest that the files

were downloaded from his computer. The statement communicates only that SA Andrews downloaded two files that were

listed as available for download from IP address

68.0.185.111. SA Andrews does not aver that the files were

found on Craighead’s computer. 

[3] Craighead next argues that SA Andrews impermissibly

omitted any statements from her affidavit relating to IP spoof2We assume for purposes of this appeal that Craighead is correct that

the district court erroneously considered Craighead’s confession and the

fact that child pornography was eventually found on Craighead’s computer as a basis for denying the Franks hearing. We assume without deciding that the evidence obtained from a fruitful search may not be used to

cure an affidavit based on deliberately or recklessly false or misleading

statements. We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground the

record supports, United States v. Lehman, 792 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.

1986), and therefore we affirm for the reasons stated above. 

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11337
ing, internet hijacking, and internet theory. His theory, apparently, is that had SA Andrews included this information, the

magistrate judge would have understood the possibility that,

despite the IP address connection, the files may not have originated on Craighead’s computer. It is true that “deliberate or

reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead” can be

grounds for a Franks hearing. United States v. Stanert, 762

F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the omission rule

does not require an affiant to provide general information

about every possible theory, no matter how unlikely, that

would controvert the affiant’s good-faith belief that probable

cause existed for the search. SA Andrews did not commit a

misleading omission by failing to omit from her affidavit general knowledge about computer hacking that might support

how, hypothetically, Craighead may not have downloaded to

his own computer the files that SA Andrews downloaded

from Craighead’s IP address. See United States v. Kelley, 482

F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an affidavit’s

failure to raise the possibility that emails containing child pornography could have been unsolicited spam was not a misleading omission); cf. United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 638

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court’s failure to consider theories such as spamming or automated bulk downloading that might support the unlikely possibility that the suspect

did not actually transmit 19 images of child pornography himself did not constitute error in a probable cause determination). 

[4] Finally, Craighead points to SA Andrews’ statements

about what files were available to download via LimeWire

and which files were actually downloaded. In paragraph 32 of

the warrant affidavit, SA Andrews stated that she ran a search

and “viewed the results of the search and observed multiple

files available to be viewed and downloaded by others at IP

address 68.0.185.111” and that she downloaded two of these

files. In paragraph 33, SA Andrews stated that “[n]umerous

other files were also available for downloading from IP

address 68.0.185.111” and then listed seven of those file11338 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
names as a “sampling.” Craighead argues that SA Andrews

impermissibly failed to state that the filenames shown in paragraph 33 were merely text in a search results window and that

it was not possible to know whether these files actually

existed unless SA Andrews had successfully downloaded

them. This argument lacks merit. SA Andrews’ statements in

these two paragraphs communicate only that her search indicated that numerous files were available for download from

the listed IP address. None of SA Andrews’ statements in

paragraphs 32 and 33 amount to an averment, express or

implied, that she knew that all of the files whose names

appeared in the search results window actually existed on

Craighead’s computer. On the contrary, in paragraph 34, SA

Andrews expressly stated that she attempted to download one

of the files listed in paragraph 33 but was unable to do so

because the server was overloaded. Nowhere did she indicate

that she had attempted to download or otherwise verify the

location of the other files whose names she listed in paragraph

33. 

[5] Craighead did not point to one specific statement in the

affidavit that was false or misleading. Therefore, he did not

meet his burden to demonstrate cause for a Franks hearing.

Because he failed to allege a false or misleading statement,

we do not reach the issues of whether these statements were

made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth or

whether they were necessary to the finding of probable cause.

See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56; United States v. Bennett, 219

F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm the district court’s

denial of a Franks hearing. 

III

We turn to Craighead’s claim that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress on the ground that Craighead was not given the Miranda warnings to which he was

entitled. We review a denial of a motion to suppress and

whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to Miranda

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11339
warnings de novo. United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048,

1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). We review the underlying factual findings for clear error. Id. Where testimony is taken, we

give special deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. See United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1110

(9th Cir. 1998). 

A

[6] The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . .

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court adopted prophylactic procedural

measures to guarantee that a suspect is advised of his Fifth

Amendment rights before custodial interrogations. 384 U.S.

436, 444-45 (1966). These protections are constitutional in

nature. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

The parties agree that Craighead was interrogated but not

given Miranda warnings. Therefore, the only issue before us

is whether Craighead was in custody at the time of his interrogation. 

In cases such as this in which the suspect has not formally

been taken into police custody, a suspect is nevertheless considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda if the suspect

has been “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

way.” 384 U.S. at 444. To determine whether the suspect was

in custody, we first examine the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516

U.S. 99, 112 (1995). We then ask whether a reasonable person

in those circumstances would “have felt he or she was not at

liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id.; see also

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 & n.35 (1984).

Accordingly, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, we must decide whether a reasonable person in

Craighead’s position would have felt deprived of his freedom

of action in any significant way, such that he would not have

felt free to terminate the interrogation. 

11340 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
Applying this standard to an interrogation conducted within

the home presents some analytical challenges, however, and

presents an issue on which our court thus far has said little.

The usual inquiry into whether the suspect reasonably

believed he could “leave” the interrogation does not quite

capture the uniqueness of an interrogation conducted within

the suspect’s home. “Home,” said Robert Frost, “is the place

where, when you go there, they have to take you in.” Robert

Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT

FROST 38 (Edward C. Latham ed., 1967). If a reasonable person is interrogated inside his own home and is told he is “free

to leave,” where will he go? The library? The police station?

He is already in the most constitutionally protected place on

earth. To be “free” to leave is a hollow right if the one place

the suspect cannot go is his own home. Cf. Crawford, 372

F.3d at 1060 (holding that an interrogation at an FBI office

was not custodial because, inter alia, the defendant was told

he was free to leave and “was, in fact, returned home at the

end of the interview”). Similarly, a reasonable person interrogated inside his own home may have a different understanding of whether he is truly free “to terminate the interrogation”

if his home is crawling with law enforcement agents conducting a warrant-approved search. He may not feel that he can

successfully terminate the interrogation if he knows that he

cannot empty his home of his interrogators until they have

completed their search. We must, therefore, consider how to

apply the traditional Miranda inquiry to an in-home interrogation. 

[7] An interrogation conducted within the suspect’s home

is not per se custodial. See Beckwith v. United States, 425

U.S. 341, 342-43, 347 (1976). On the contrary, courts have

generally been much less likely to find that an interrogation

in the suspect’s home was custodial in nature. United States

v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994); 2 WAYNE R.

LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e) (3d ed. 2007). The element of compulsion that concerned the Court in Miranda is

less likely to be present where the suspect is in familiar surUNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11341
roundings. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969).

Nevertheless, an interrogation in the suspect’s home may be

found to be custodial under certain circumstances. See id. at

325-26 (holding that an interrogation was custodial where

four police officers arrived at the suspect’s home, entered the

bedroom, and behaved as though the suspect was not free to

leave while he was questioned). 

[8] Miranda held that warnings were required when the

person being interrogated was “in custody at the station or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

way.” 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). The Court held that certain

essential salient features made situations in which the suspect

was “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action” similar to

those in which the suspect was taken into custody at the

police station, id., specifically, “incommunicado interrogation

of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” Id. at 445

(stating that the salient feature was that the suspect was “cut

off from the outside world”). Drawing on this reasoning,

when applying Miranda to the task of sorting a non-custodial

in-home interrogation from a custodial one, our analysis considers the extent to which the circumstances of the interrogation turned the otherwise comfortable and familiar

surroundings of the home into a “police-dominated atmosphere.” 

Our approach of using the “police-dominated atmosphere”

as the benchmark for custodial interrogations in locations outside of the police station is consistent with the Supreme

Court’s adaptations of Miranda to these types of locations.

See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39 (holding that Miranda

warnings are not required at an ordinary traffic stop because

the atmosphere there “is substantially less ‘police dominated’

than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in

Miranda itself”). This approach has also been taken by our

sister circuits that have considered whether an in-home interrogation was “custodial” under Miranda. See, e.g., United

States v. Revels, 510 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2007) (con11342 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
cluding that the suspect’s home had become a “policedominated environment” because “the facts belie any conclusion that [the suspect’s] home, on the morning of the questioning at issue, was the traditional comfortable environment

that we normally would consider a neutral location for questioning.”); United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36, 40 (1st

Cir. 2007) (finding suspect was in custody although interrogated in his home because of the “level of physical control

that the agents exercised over” the suspect); Sprosty v.

Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (“More important

than the familiarity of the surroundings where [the suspect]

was being held is the degree to which the police dominated

the scene.”); United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1354-55

(8th Cir. 1990) (“Questioning which occurs in the suspect’s

own home may provide a margin of comfort, but . . . the setting of the interrogation is not so important to the inquiry as

the question of police domination of that setting.”). 

B

[9] The determination of whether an in-home interrogation

was custodial “is necessarily fact intensive.” United States v.

Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993). Although our

opinion today “should not be interpreted as an exhaustive pronouncement,” id., reviewing the facts of Craighead’s case and

the relevant factors identified by our sister circuits, we conclude that several factors are relevant to whether the circumstances of Craighead’s interrogation effected a policedominated atmosphere: (1) the number of law enforcement

personnel and whether they were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any point restrained, either by physical force or by

threats; (3) whether the suspect was isolated from others; and

(4) whether the suspect was informed that he was free to leave

or terminate the interview, and the context in which any such

statements were made.3 We address each factor in turn.

3Other circuits have identified various lists of relevant factors for determining when an in-home interrogation is custodial. See, e.g., Revels, 510

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11343
1

[10] First, we consider the number of law enforcement personnel and whether they were armed. When a large number

of law enforcement personnel enter a suspect’s home, they

may fill the home such that there are no police-free rooms or

spaces to which the suspect may retreat should he wish to terminate the interrogation. Similarly, when the number of law

enforcement personnel far outnumber the suspect, the suspect

may reasonably believe that, should he attempt to leave, he

will be stopped by one of the many officers he will encounter

on the way out. The suspect may also believe that the large

number of officers was brought for the purpose of preventing

his departure. In addition, if the suspect sees the officers

unholstering their weapons within his home, the suspect may

reasonably believe that his home is no longer safe from the

threat of police force. In short, the presence of a large number

of visibly armed law enforcement officers goes a long way

towards making the suspect’s home a police-dominated atmosphere. See Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d at 38, 40 (finding that the

presence of eight officers in the home, one of whom unholstered his gun, contributed to a police-dominated environF.3d at 1275 (listing: whether the atmosphere was police dominated;

whether the nature and length of the officers’ questioning was accusatory

or coercive; and whether the suspect was informed that statements were

voluntary and she was free to leave); Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d at 39 (listing:

whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings; the number

of law enforcement officers present; whether the suspect was restrained;

and the character of the interrogation); Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 641 (listing:

whether “and to what extent” the suspect was informed that questioning

was voluntary; whether police have employed subterfuge; the degree to

which the interrogation is “police dominated”; whether the suspect was

restrained; whether the suspect could reasonably believe he could terminate the interrogation and leave); Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1348-49 (listing:

purpose, place, and length of interrogation; whether the suspect was

informed that he was free to leave; whether the suspect was restrained;

whether the suspect initiated contact; whether strong arm tactics were

employed; whether the atmosphere was police-dominated; whether the

suspect was arrested at the termination of questioning). 

11344 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
ment); Revels, 510 F.3d at 1270 (seven officers from two

different agencies); Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 638, 642 (five officers,

one of whom was visibly armed and in uniform, who surrounded the suspect in two police cars). 

[11] Here, eight law enforcement officers, representing

three different law enforcement agencies, entered Craighead’s

home. They were accompanied by two others, one of whom

was Craighead’s Air Force superior. All of the law enforcement personnel were armed, some wore protective gear, and

some of them unholstered their firearms in Craighead’s presence. The fact that the personnel represented three different

law enforcement agencies was particularly relevant to Craighead’s understanding of events. He testified that he was

unclear as to whether the agencies were acting in coordination. The presence of the different agencies led him to doubt

whether SA Andrews spoke for all of the agencies (or if she

was required to) when she informed him that his statements

were voluntary and that he was free to leave. A reasonable

person in Craighead’s position would feel that his home was

dominated by law enforcement agents and that they had come

prepared for a confrontation. 

2

[12] Second, we consider whether the suspect was at any

point restrained, either by physical force or by threats. When

law enforcement agents restrain the ability of the suspect to

move—particularly through physical restraints, but also

through threats or intimidation—a suspect may reasonably

feel he is subject to police domination within his own home

and thus not free to leave or terminate the interrogation.

Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325, 327 (finding custody where four

officers entered the suspect’s bedroom and acted as though he

was “not free to leave,” but did not actually handcuff or physically subdue the suspect); Revels, 510 F.3d at 1276-77 (finding that handcuffing of suspect upon entry into her home by

law enforcement contributed to a custodial environment);

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11345
Sprosty, 79 F.3d at 642-43 (finding that police officers’ use of

their police cars to block the suspect’s driveway to prevent his

departure, and their standing so as to block the suspect’s exit

path from his home, contributed to a custodial environment);

Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1350 (discussing restraint as a factor).

Restraint amounting to custody may also be inferred where

law enforcement officers permit the suspect to move around

the house for brief periods but insist on escorting and monitoring him at all times. See Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d at 40 (finding an interrogation custodial where the suspect was escorted

by agents on the three occasions that he was permitted to

leave the interrogation space, including while he used the

bathroom); Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1350-51 (“We realize that the

likely effect on a suspect of being placed under guard during

questioning, or told to remain in the sight of interrogating

officials, is to associate these restraints with a formal arrest.”)

[13] Craighead was not handcuffed or physically restrained.

However, he was escorted to a back storage room and the

door was closed behind him. Craighead testified that Detective Englander appeared to him to be leaning with his back to

the door in such a way as to block Craighead’s exit from the

room. Detective Englander wore a flack jacket or “raid vest,”

and was visibly armed. Detective Englander did not participate in the interrogation by asking questions; he stood silent

with his back to the door facing the suspect. Craighead testified that he did not feel he had the freedom to leave the storage room because, in order to get to the room’s only door, he

“would have either had to have moved the police detective or

asked him to move.” While perhaps not everyone in this circumstance would have felt restrained, it was certainly objectively reasonable for Craighead to believe he was under

guard. When viewed in their totality, these facts demonstrate

that Craighead’s freedom of action was restrained in a way

that increased the likelihood that Craighead would succumb

to police pressure to incriminate himself. See Miranda, 384

U.S. at 467. 

11346 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
[14] At the evidentiary hearing on the Miranda issue, the

government made much of the fact that Craighead was taller

and larger in physical stature than both Detective Englander

and SA Andrews. The government’s argument appears to be

that, because he was so much bigger, Craighead would not

have felt intimidated or guarded by the two agents during the

interview. This reasoning is untenable. When we consider

whether a suspect would feel free to leave or terminate the

interrogation, we do not presume that the suspect is considering accomplishing these goals by force. Miranda’s conception

of “custody” does not depend on whether the suspect reasonably believes he can overpower his interrogators. On the contrary, we presume that citizens accord officers of the law

respect no matter what their relative sizes. Indeed, Craighead

testified that even though he was taller and heavier than

Detective Englander, he found him to be “physically intimidating” because “[h]e represents law enforcement,” and, we

would add, he was armed. Far from accepting the government’s invitation to discount these statements due to Craighead’s size, we laud Craighead’s instinct to afford respect and

deference to an officer of the law. 

[15] We understand that in many cases, when law enforcement agents conduct an in-home interrogation while conducting a lawful search of the home, physical control of the

suspect will be necessary to preserve evidence and protect the

safety of the agents. The fact that these precautions may be

necessary to the success of the lawful search does not lessen

their tendency to make a reasonable person believe he is in

custody. We agree with the First Circuit that:

If the government is correct that the agents’ actions

were necessary for evidence preservation and officer

safety, then it could have chosen to postpone the

interrogation until a non-custodial moment, or to

Mirandize [the suspect]. Either step would have protected both the defendant’s constitutional rights and

the officers’ legitimate law enforcement needs. 

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11347
Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d at 40. 

3

[16] Third, we consider whether the suspect was isolated

from others. The Supreme Court highlighted isolation from

the outside world as perhaps the crucial factor that would tend

to lead a suspect to feel compelled to provide selfincriminating statements. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-46, 449-

50; see also id. at 448 (raising the concern that interrogations

conducted in private are difficult to monitor for abusive techniques and have been associated with past practices of unlawful interrogation). “A frequently recurring example of police

domination concerns the removal of the suspect from the

presence of family, friends, or colleagues who might lend

moral support during the questioning and deter a suspect from

making inculpatory statements . . . .” Griffin, 922 F.2d at

1352; see also Revels, 510 F.3d at 1275; Sprosty, 79 F.3d at

641. In this case, Sergeant Ramsey was specifically asked to

accompany the law enforcement agents to Craighead’s home

to provide “emotional support” for Craighead. Yet, SA

Andrews did not permit Sergeant Ramsey to accompany

Craighead into the dark recess of the back storage room where

the interrogation took place. The fact that Craighead did not

even realize that Sergeant Ramsey was there to provide emotional support only underscores this point; he might have discovered Sergeant Ramsey was there to offer emotional

support if SA Andrews had in fact permitted Sergeant Ramsey to accompany Craighead into the storage room and provide such support. 

[17] SA Andrews testified that Sergeant Ramsey was not

permitted to remain with Craighead because he was “non-law

enforcement” and therefore would never be permitted to be

present during an FBI interview. The record does not present

evidence of any policy, formal or otherwise, to this effect.

Moreover, the record does not indicate whether such a policy,

if it exists, is directed to all interrogations or only interroga11348 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
tions conducted after Miranda warnings are given. If such a

policy does exist, the fact that the FBI may choose to exclude

all “non-law enforcement” individuals from all of its interrogations does not make the interrogations less custodial in

nature. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was explicit that

the law enforcement technique of isolating the suspect from

family and friends is one of the distinguishing features of a

custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-46,

448-50. Moreover, the fact that the FBI excluded non-law

enforcement reinforces our understanding that the FBI controlled Craighead’s environment; it is difficult to see how

Craighead was free to leave if he was, apparently, not free to

invite others into the storage room of his own house. The FBI

may exclude whomever it chooses from an interrogation;

Miranda requires that if the FBI isolates the suspect, and the

suspect does not reasonably believe he is free to leave, warnings must be given. 

4

[18] Fourth, we consider whether the suspect was informed

that questioning was voluntary and that he was free to leave

or terminate the interview. If a law enforcement officer

informs the suspect that he is not under arrest, that statements

are voluntary, and that he is free to leave at any time, this

communication greatly reduces the chance that a suspect will

reasonably believe he is in custody. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349.

SA Andrews told Craighead that he was not under arrest and

that he would not be arrested that day regardless of what

information he provided. She told Craighead his statements

were voluntary. She also told Craighead that he was free to

leave, although she could not recall whether she told him this

once she had escorted him to the back storage room and

closed the door, or whether she told him this when she first

introduced herself to him in the living room. The fact that SA

Andrews made these statements weighs against a finding of

custody. 

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11349
[19] The mere recitation of the statement that the suspect

is free to leave or terminate the interview, however, does not

render an interrogation non-custodial per se. We must consider the delivery of these statements within the context of the

scene as a whole. See United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-

68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that an interrogation

was custodial even though the interrogating FBI agents told

the suspect that he was free to leave or terminate the interview

at any time because the suspect was questioned in a closed

FBI car for over an hour while police investigators searched

the house). The Miranda test for custody does not ask

whether the suspect was told that he was free to leave; the test

asks whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she

was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”

Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added). 

[20] Although our past cases have not considered in-home

interrogations, they are instructive on how to interpret an

agent’s statement that a suspect is free to leave in the context

of where the statement was given. In Crawford, the suspect

was questioned at an FBI office, which is of course far more

like a police station than a home in terms of comfort and

familiarity. The agent repeated more than once during the

interview that the suspect was not under arrest and was free

to leave. We found that the interrogation was not custodial:

“Being aware of the freedom to depart, and in fact departing

after questioning at a law enforcement office, suggest that the

questioning was noncustodial.” Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1060.

Particularly relevant was that the suspect “returned home at

the end of the interview, without being arrested.” Id. In Lee,

however, the suspect was questioned in a closed FBI car

parked in front of his own home by two agents for over an

hour. 699 F.2d at 468. As the car was parked in front of Lee’s

home, it was possible he had his home in sight during the

entire interview. Nevertheless, we held that “considering the

totality of the circumstances a reasonable person could conclude that Lee reasonably might feel he was not free to

decline the agent’s request that he be interviewed.” Id. Partic11350 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD
ularly relevant was the fact that “police investigators were in

and around his house.” Id. These cases read together suggest

that an agent’s statement that a suspect is free to leave may

have more or less resonance with the suspect depending on

whether he can leave the interrogation site and retreat to the

safety of his home or whether his home is in fact the locus of

police activity. 

[21] Here, several facts lead us to conclude that Craighead

could have reasonably believed he was not free to leave, notwithstanding that SA Andrews told him he was. Most importantly, Craighead testified that the presence of agents from

three different law enforcement agencies left him with doubt

as to whether SA Andrews had the authority to pronounce

him free to leave. He believed that even if the FBI permitted

him to leave the storage room, he might be confronted by

members of the other two agencies and forbidden to leave the

house. Before he could leave the room, Craighead would have

had to deal with Detective Englander, who appeared to be

guarding the door to the storage room. 

[22] Finally, we consider SA Andrews’ statements that

Craighead was free to leave in the context of the physical

characteristics of the interview location. An interview conducted in a suspect’s kitchen, living room, or bedroom might

allow the suspect to take comfort in the familiar surroundings

of the home and decrease the sensation of being isolated in a

police-dominated atmosphere. Here, SA Andrews escorted the

suspect to a storage room in back of the house. The room was

unfurnished. SA Andrews testified that she herself was squatting on the floor, and that Craighead was probably sitting on

a box or a chair grabbed from another room. The room had

a single door. In front of the door stood an armed detective

wearing a raid vest. Beyond the door were six more officers

searching his house. Craighead testified that he did not want

to leave his house entirely, because he did not want to leave

the officers alone with his belongings and did not want to

leave his dog unattended. Although SA Andrews had told him

UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD 11351
he was “free to leave” and that his statements were voluntary,

a reasonable person in Craighead’s position would not have

actually “felt” he was free to leave. Thompson, 516 U.S. at

112. 

5

[23] Considering the totality of the circumstances as analyzed under the four factors listed above, we find that the fact

that SA Andrews told Craighead that he was free to leave

weighs in favor of finding he was not in custody, but the other

three factors lead us to the conclusion that Craighead was in

custody for purposes of Miranda. Craighead’s home had

become a police-dominated atmosphere. Escorted to a storage

room in his own home, sitting on a box, and observing an

armed guard by the door, Craighead reasonably believed that

there was simply nowhere for him to go. 

IV

The search of Craighead’s home was lawful. Craighead did

not allege any specific portion of the warrant affidavit that

was actually false or misleading. We affirm the district court’s

ruling that Craighead was not entitled to a Franks hearing. 

[24] The interrogation within Craighead’s home was custodial, and Miranda warnings were required. Because the warnings were not given, Craighead’s self-incriminating

statements should have been suppressed. We therefore reverse

this portion of the district court’s order and remand for further

proceedings. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED. 

11352 UNITED STATES v. CRAIGHEAD