Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1557 | December 5, 2018 Page 1 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark F. James

Anderson Agostino & Keller, PC

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joshua Sage,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 5, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1557

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1708-MR-11

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1557 | December 5, 2018 Page 2 of 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Joshua Sage (Sage), appeals his conviction for two 

Counts of felony murder, Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(3)(B); 35-48-4-1.1.

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] Sage presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

his statement made to police while he was hospitalized for 

injuries sustained during the offenses; and 

(2) Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove the 

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the days preceding August 2, 2017, Jermon Gavin (JG) contacted Ron 

Snyder (Snyder) to arrange the purchase of a large amount of 

methamphetamine. Snyder, in turn, contacted Sage, who agreed to supply 

approximately one and one-half pounds of methamphetamine to sell to JG. 

Sage was to deliver the drugs to Snyder’s home located in the 2100 block of 

Frederickson Street in South Bend, Indiana. Sage did not feel at ease about the 

deal with JG from the beginning, and he knew that it was necessary for his 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1557 | December 5, 2018 Page 3 of 15

personal safety to be armed when dealing in such a large quantity of 

methamphetamine. Sage carried a Sig Sauer handgun. He also arranged for 

his brother, Robert Brady (Brady), to accompany him to Snyder’s home to 

“have [his] back.” (Exhibit 135, Exh. Vol. I, Clip 3 at 10:30-:33). Sage 

provided his brother with a Smith and Wesson handgun. 

[5] During the evening of August 2, 2017, Sage and Brady brought the 

methamphetamine to Snyder’s home. There were at least nine other people 

present at Snyder’s home that evening, including Alyssa Sanchez (Izzy). Sage 

transported the methamphetamine in a plastic grocery bag in which he also 

stowed his own “bowl” used for smoking meth. (Transcript Vol. 3, p. 76). 

Upon arriving, Sage and Brady went to the basement of Snyder’s home, where 

they consumed methamphetamine. Either Brady or Sage armed Snyder with a 

handgun. 

[6] Unbeknownst to them, JG and his associates, Jesus Pedraza (Jesse) and Benito 

Pedraza (Benny), had decided to steal the methamphetamine, so they armed 

themselves with handguns prior to going to Snyder’s home. As part of their

plan, they dropped off Damon Bethel (Bethel), who was also carrying a 

handgun, in an alley near Snyder’s home. JG and the Pedraza brothers arrived 

at Snyder’s home shortly before midnight. While Benny remained in their car 

parked across the street from Snyder’s home, JG, Jesse, Sage, Brady and Snyder 

convened in the attached garage of Snyder’s home, leaving the garage door 

open looking out onto Frederickson Street. Sage produced the 

methamphetamine for JG and Jesse to sample, inspect, and weigh. As the 
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methamphetamine deal unfolded, Anton James (James), pulled up in a white 

SUV in front of Snyder’s home. James had come to the home to sell Izzy 

marijuana. Although James was known to Snyder and others at Snyder’s 

home, he was not a participant in the methamphetamine deal. Sage saw the 

SUV pull up outside, and it made him nervous. 

[7] Jesse eventually left the garage and telephoned JG’s cell phone to inform JG 

that he intended to go through with the theft of the methamphetamine. As JG 

withdrew from the garage, Bethel ran in with his gun drawn, demanding the 

methamphetamine. According to Sage, Bethel did not await a response before 

firing on Sage. A fusillade of gunfire ensued as Sage and Brady exchanged 

shots with JG and Bethel. In addition, when the firing started, Benny emerged 

from their parked car and paused to fire into the white SUV before directing 

additional shots into the garage. James sped away with Izzy in the SUV but 

crashed the SUV two blocks away. James perished in his SUV from a bullet 

which struck his aorta. Back in the garage, Sage and Brady had both shot 

Bethel, who died lying face down in the garage. Sage was shot four times. Law 

enforcement arrived quickly. A total of fifty-one shell casings were recovered 

from the scene. Sage had fired his handgun at least fourteen times. 

[8] On August 7, 2017, investigators attempted to interview Sage, but he invoked 

his right to counsel and did not consent to be interviewed. On August 8, 2017, 

while Sage was still hospitalized, the State filed an Information, charging Sage 

with two Counts of felony murder, one Count of dealing in methamphetamine, 

and one Count of attempted dealing in methamphetamine. On August 12, 
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2017, Sage communicated to the officer guarding him that he wished to speak 

to investigators. While being treated for his injuries, Sage had received pain 

medications, including fentanyl and morphine. Sage last received fentanyl on 

August 5, 2017. Although fentanyl is a strong medication, its effects dissipate 

rapidly. On August 13, 2017, Sage received a final, low dose of morphine at 

2:58 a.m. Sage also received a dose of Narco, which is a blend of Tylenol, 

acetaminophen, and hydrocodone, at 9:07 a.m. Sage was being administered 

Narco to transition him from morphine in preparation for his discharge from 

the hospital. Narco is a medication that is prescribed for outpatient use that 

may be taken without hindrance to daily function. The registered nurse 

charged with administering Sage his medication found him to be lucid, 

cognizant, and alert on August 13, 2017. The medication nurse did not note 

that Sage was experiencing any cognitive or memory issues that day. 

[9] On August 13, 2017, Detectives Timothy Wiley (Detective Wiley) and Gery 

Mullins (Detective Mullins) went to the hospital to interview Sage, as per 

Sage’s request. Before interviewing him and according to their usual practice, 

the officers contacted Sage’s medication nurse who informed them that she had 

no concerns about Sage’s ability to speak with them. The interview, which was 

videotaped, began at 12:50 p.m. Detective Wiley read Sage a waiver of 

attorney rights form that provided that Sage had previously requested an 

attorney, now wished to waive his right to an attorney, had initiated the 

interview, and had requested to make a statement. Sage confirmed that those 

provisions were true and signed the waiver of attorney form. Detective Mullins 
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then provided Sage with his Miranda advisements and asked Sage if he had any 

questions, to which Sage responded, “No, I understand.” (Exhibit 135, Exh. 

Vol. I, Clip 1 at 2:57-3:01). Detective Mullins read Sage a waiver of his 

Miranda rights, and Sage confirmed to Detective Mullins that the provisions of 

the waiver were true before signing the form. 

[10] At the beginning of the interview, Detective Mullins asked Sage to explain to 

them what happened, and Sage spoke largely uninterrupted about the drug deal 

and shootings for approximately five minutes. Sage provided detailed physical 

descriptions of JG, Jesse, and Bethel, and their movements during the offenses. 

Sage admitted that he shot at Bethel with the Sig Sauer handgun and that he 

was probably the person who killed him. Sage also thought it was possible that 

he had fired in the direction of the open garage door. Throughout the 

interview, Sage responded to the detectives’ questions, and he asked the 

detectives questions of his own. Sage provided the detectives with his address 

and his cell phone number. The interview concluded at 1:42 p.m. On August 

14, 2017, Sage was discharged from the hospital into police custody. 

[11] On January 22, 2018, Sage filed a motion to suppress his August 13, 2017, 

statement, arguing that his injuries and the medications he received could 

“affect a person’s ability to give a free, voluntary and knowing statement.” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 13). On May 4, 2018, the trial court held a hearing 

on Sage’s motion to suppress. The trial court denied Sage’s motion the same 

day, finding that Sage had signed valid waivers of his right to an attorney and to 
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his Miranda rights, that he was lucid during the interview, and that he 

understood what was being asked of him. 

[12] Sage’s jury trial took place May 14, 2018, through May 17, 2018. Sage’s 

counsel objected to the admission of Sage’s August 13, 2017, statement on the 

same grounds raised in the previously-denied motion to suppress. The jury 

found Sage guilty of the four charged offenses. On June 20, 2018, the trial court 

entered judgment of conviction on the two felony murder convictions only and 

sentenced Sage to two concurrent terms of fifty-five years. 

[13] Sage now appeals. Additional facts will be added as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Voluntariness of Statement

[14] Sage contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 

We note that, because this appeal follows the admission of Sage’s statement at 

trial, the issue on appeal is better framed as whether the trial court erred when it 

admitted the challenged statement at trial. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 

(Ind. 2014). As a general rule, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the 

admissibility of evidence. Id. We review for an abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion and reverse only when the admission of the challenged evidence is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error 

affects a party’s substantial rights. Id. 

[15] Sage argues that his “rights to due process were violated because the officers did 

not verify that his statements were knowing and voluntary because they did not 
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ascertain if he was under the influence or otherwise thinking clearly.”1

 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 7). We take this to be a challenge to the voluntariness of his 

August 13, 2017, statement. Sage argued in his motion to suppress, which 

formed the basis for his objection to the admission of the statement at trial, that 

his statement was involuntary under Article 1, Section 14, of the Indiana 

Constitution. Under Indiana law, the State is required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that a statement is voluntary. Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 

18 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied. When evaluating the voluntariness of a statement, 

the trial court considers the “totality of the circumstances, including any 

element of police coercion; the length, location, and continuity of the 

interrogation; and the maturity, education, physical condition, and mental 

health of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind. 

2009)) (internal citations omitted). We review the trial court’s determination of 

voluntariness as a sufficiency of the evidence issue. Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence, and we will affirm if the trial court’s finding of voluntariness is 

supported by substantial evidence. Id. 

[16] Here, as was noted by his medication nurse, Sage was lucid, cognizant, and 

alert the day he made his statement. He was not experiencing any memory or 

 

1

 Inasmuch as Sage attempts to argue that he did not validly waive his right to counsel or that the procedural 

safeguards required for a valid guilty plea should be applied to the giving of a statement to police, we note 

that Sage did not raise these arguments in his motion to suppress or at trial. Arguments raised for the first 

time on appeal are waived. See Leatherman v. State, 101 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“[A] party 

may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial 

court. In such circumstances the argument is waived.”). As such, we decline to address those arguments.
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cognitive issues. Detectives Wiley and Mullins spoke with the medication 

nurse before interviewing Sage to confirm that he was able to speak with them. 

Detective Mullins read to Sage a waiver of his right to an attorney and a waiver 

of his Miranda rights which Sage indicated he understood before signing. The 

interview itself was conducted informally in a conversational tone and lasted 

approximately one hour. Under the totality of these circumstances, we 

conclude, as did the trial court, that Sage’s statement was voluntary. 

[17] Sage contends that his statement was not voluntary because of his injuries, the 

medication he was receiving, and what he characterizes as his “poor”

recollection. (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). However, Sage’s conclusory statements 

that these factors affected his ability to give a voluntary statement enjoy little 

evidentiary support in the record. By August 13, 2017, when he gave his 

statement, Sage had recuperated sufficiently that he was to be discharged from 

the hospital the following day. Sage had received a low dose of morphine at 

2:58 a.m. that day and a low dose of Narco at 9:07 a.m, but there is simply no 

indication in the record that these medications affected Sage’s awareness, 

ability to understand his rights, or his ability to recollect events. As pointed out 

by the State, in order for intoxication to render a statement involuntary, a 

defendant must be unaware of what he is saying. Wilkes, 917 N.E.2d at 680. 

Sage does not argue on appeal that he was unaware of what he was saying 

when he spoke with the detectives. Indeed, Sage spoke coherently and 

extemporaneously throughout the interview, responded appropriately to the 

detective’s questions, and accurately recollected many details of the offenses. 
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Because we conclude that Sage provided a voluntary statement, we find no 

abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting his statement at trial. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18] Sage challenges the evidence supporting his two convictions for felony murder. 

When we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is not our role as an 

appellate court to assess witness credibility or to weigh the evidence. Id. We 

will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

[19] Felony murder occurs when a person kills another human being while 

committing or attempting to commit dealing in methamphetamine. Ind. Code 

§§ 35-42-1-1(3)(B); 35-48-4-1.1. Here, the evidence showed that Sage brought 

one and one-half pounds of methamphetamine to Snyder’s home on August 2, 

2017, in order to sell it to JG, a gun battle ensued when one of JG’s 

confederates, Bethel, attempted to rob Sage, and that Bethel and James died of 

gunshot wounds sustained in the exchange of gunfire between the would-be 

sellers and the would-be buyers. Nevertheless, Sage challenges the evidence 

supporting his convictions for killing both Bethel and James. 

[20] Sage contends that the evidence does not support his conviction for killing 

Bethel because Sage was acting in self-defense when he shot Bethel. However, 

we agree with the State that self-defense was not available to Sage. Under 
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Indiana law, a person is not justified in using force in the defense of self if that 

person is committing a crime. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(1). However, the mere 

fact that a defendant is committing a crime at the time he is allegedly defending 

himself does not, standing alone, deprive the defendant of the defense of selfdefense. Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 2001). “Rather, there must 

be an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation.” 

Id. 

[21] Here, Sage’s act of dealing methamphetamine, the underlying felony of the 

felony murder charge, drew Bethel and his confederates to Snyder’s garage to 

attempt to rob Sage, and a gun battle ensued in which Sage shot and killed 

Bethel. Thus, there was a direct and immediate causal connection between the 

crime Sage was committing and the ensuing confrontation. Sage, who does not 

address the statutory limitation on self-defense in his Appellant’s Brief, cannot 

feasibly argue otherwise. Because Sage’s only challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction for murdering Bethel was that he acted in 

self-defense, which was not available to him as a defense, we conclude that the 

State proved Sage’s conviction for Bethel’s death beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[22] Sage’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for 

murdering James is that it “was not reasonably foreseeable that Anton James 

would be killed.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). Our supreme court has recognized 

that the language of the murder statute “does not restrict the felony murder 

provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer, but may also apply 

equally when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon 
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contributes to the death of any person.” Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 126 

(Ind. 1999) (emphasis added). For purposes of felony murder liability, “it 

matters not whether the death caused is that of the intended victim, a passerby[,] 

or even a co-perpetrator.” Forney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 934, 938-39 (Ind. 2001)

(emphasis added). A person who commits or attempts to commit one of the 

felonies designated in the murder statute is criminally liable for a death of 

another during the commission of the crime if the defendant reasonably should 

have “foreseen that the commission of or attempt to commit the contemplated 

felony would likely create a situation which would expose another to the 

danger of death.” Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. On review, we must determine 

whether the defendant’s conduct caused or contributed to the victim’s death or 

set in motion a series of events that could have reasonably be expected and did 

result in death. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d 644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 

denied. 

[23] We find the case of Sheckles v. State, 684 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. 

denied, to be instructive. Sheckles attempted to collect a loan by force inside a 

bar where other patrons were present, thereby committing an attempted 

robbery. Id. at 203. When his plan went awry, Sheckles engaged in a gun 

battle with the bartender, and one of the bar’s patrons was shot and killed. Id. 

The court held that Sheckles had created a dangerous situation in which

intervention by a nonparticipant to the underlying felony, the bartender, was 

reasonably foreseeable and that he had exposed the victim to circumstances 

which posed a substantial likelihood of fatal injury. Id. at 205. The court held 
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that Sheckles was criminally responsible for the death of the bystander, 

regardless of who fired the shot. Id. 

[24] Here, Sage created a dangerous situation by arming himself, Brady, and Snyder 

in order to deal a large quantity of methamphetamine. Sage went to Snyder’s 

home, which was in an area of South Bend that Snyder characterized at trial as 

rife with shootings and robberies, to deal the methamphetamine. The home 

was also located in a residential neighborhood with other houses close by,

which increased the likelihood that cars would pass by the garage where the 

methamphetamine deal was taking place. Indeed, in the moments immediately 

preceding and following the offenses, three other cars apart from James’ SUV 

passed in front of Snyder’s home. Sage’s act of dealing methamphetamine from 

Snyder’s garage set in motion the robbery attempt which led to the gunfire that 

killed James. Benny was in the act of returning fire in Sage’s direction when he 

paused to shoot into James’ vehicle. The foreseeability of James’ death was 

more overt than the Sheckles victim because Benny, who the State argued at trial

actually shot James, was an accomplice along with JG, Jesse, and Bethel in the 

methamphetamine deal gone bad and not simply a nonparticipant. 

[25] In addition, Sage was subjectively aware that the situation was dangerous; he 

had asked his brother Brady to come along on the deal in order to “have [his] 

back” because Sage knew it was necessary to protect yourself when dealing in 

such large quantities of methamphetamine. (Exh. 135, Exh. Vol. I, Clip 3 at 

10:30-:33). Contrary to his assertion on appeal, Sage was aware of the fact that 

James’s SUV was stopped in front of the home before the gun battle broke out, 
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which he related in his statement made him nervous. As a result, it was not 

only reasonably foreseeable that gunfire might breakout at the drug deal, but it 

was foreseeable to Sage that the driver of the SUV stopped out front might be 

shot when Sage began firing. It made no difference that it was Benny who shot 

James. Sheckles, 684 N.E.2d at 205. 

[26] Sage likens his case to Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972 (Ind. 2015), in which our 

supreme court reversed Layman’s felony murder conviction based on evidence 

that Layman, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, had entered a home 

intending to commit a theft but was unarmed and engaged in no violent or 

threatening conduct before the homeowner shot one of Layman’s accomplices. 

Id. at 979. The court held that, under those circumstances, nothing about 

Layman’s conduct was the mediate or immediate cause of his accomplice’s 

death. Id. at 979-80. This case is readily distinguishable in that Sage and his 

cohorts were all armed, and, thus, violence was contemplated as part and parcel 

of the methamphetamine deal. 

[27] Although other facts may present a more difficult call on the foreseeability of a 

bystander’s death, the instant case does not present us with the outer limits of 

felony murder liability for the death of a bystander/nonparticipant in the 

underlying felony. Because James’ death was the foreseeable result of Sage’s 

methamphetamine dealing, we conclude that the State proved that Sage killed 

James while committing the alleged felony. 
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CONCLUSION

[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its 

discretion when it admitted Sage’s voluntary confession into evidence. In 

addition, we conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Sage killed Bethel and James during the commission of the offense of dealing in 

methamphetamine. 

[29] Affirmed. 

[30] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur