ORSON D. MUNN III ET AL. v. THE

HOTCHKISS SCHOOL

(SC 19525)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald and Espinosa, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a student at the defendant private boarding school, brought

a negligence action in federal court to recover damages resulting from

injuries that she sustained after she had contracted tick-borne encephalitis on an educational trip to China organized by the defendant. Prior to

the trip, one of the defendant’s employees, who served as the director

of the defendant’s international programs and who provided the students

who were traveling to China with information about the trip, viewed

on the website for the United States Center for Disease Control and

Prevention information concerning travel to China. That information

included a warning that tick-borne encephalitis occurred in the forested

region of China where the students would be traveling and an instruction

to travelers that the disease could be prevented by taking certain precautions to protect against insect bites. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had been negligent by, inter alia, failing to warn students going on

the trip and their parents of the risk of exposure to tick-borne encephalitis, and by failing to ensure that the students took protective measures

against insect bites to prevent contracting that disease. During the trip,

the students visited a certain mountain in an area of China where the

website had reported that tick-borne encephalitis was present, and the

defendant did not warn the students to take precautions to protect

against insect bites. After the group of students ascended the mountain,

the plaintiff and a small group of other students became lost in the

woods when they were allowed to descend the mountain by themselves.

The plaintiffreceived insect bites and, ten days later, began to experience

the first symptoms of tick-borne encephalitis. She subsequently became

partially paralyzed and semicomatose, but, thereafter, her condition

stabilized and improved. As a result of her illness, the plaintiff cannot

speak, has limited dexterity in her hands that prevents her from typing,

and has limited control over her facial muscles causing her to drool, to

have difficulty eating and swallowing, and to exhibit socially inappropriate facial expressions. Furthermore, although the plaintiff remains intelligent, she has compromised brain functioning that inhibits her ability

to utilize that intelligence. The jury awarded the plaintiff $41.75 million

in damages, of which $31.5 million constituted noneconomic damages,

and the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

rendered judgment thereon for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which concluded that there was

sufficient evidence presented attrial forthe jury to find that the plaintiff’s

illness was foreseeable. The Second Circuit then certified questions to

this court as to whether Connecticut public policy supported imposing

a duty on a school to warn about or to protect against the foreseeable

risk of a serious insect-borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad

and whether the noneconomic portion of the damages award warranted

a remittitur. Held:

1. The public policy of Connecticut does not preclude imposing a duty on

a school to warn about or to protect against the risk of a serious insectborne disease when organizing a trip abroad, as it is widely recognized

that schools generally are obligated to exercise reasonable care to protect students in their charge from foreseeable harms, and there was no

compelling reason to create an exception in this case for foreseeable

serious insect-borne diseases: the normal expectations of the participants in a school sponsored educational trip abroad involving minor

children supported the imposition of a duty on the defendant to warn

about and to protect against serious insect-borne diseases in the areas

to be visited on the trip, as trip participants naturally would expect that

a school will give appropriate warnings and use ordinary care with

respect to serious insect-borne diseases in the particular areas to be

visited; furthermore, the recognition that a school’s general duty to
protect its students includes the responsibility to take reasonable measures to warn about and to protect against serious insect-borne diseases

will not have a chilling effect on educational travel but will promote

safety by ensuring that unnecessary risks are eliminated or reduced by

appropriate warnings and protective measures; moreover, this court

was skeptical that the recognition of this duty would lead to a substantial

increase in litigation, as such a duty afforded students only the opportunity to prove negligence and did not create a new cause of action, but

was one specific aspect of the already well established general duty of

schools to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of minors

over whom they have assumed custody; in addition, contrary to the

defendant’s claim that there should be no duty to warn or to protect in

the circumstances of this case because the probability of the plaintiff

contracting tick-borne encephalitis was remote, the rarity of tick-borne

encephalitis was not relevant to this court’s public policy analysis and

should be weighed by the fact finder when determining foreseeability.

2. The jury award to the plaintiff fell within the necessarily uncertain limits

of just damages and did not warrant a remittitur: there was no allegation

that the jury was prejudiced, incompetent or otherwise compromised,

the District Court concluded that the jury was not motivated by undue

sympathy, and only in the most rarest of circumstances should the size

of the verdict alone warrant a remittitur; furthermore, the District Court,

which was in a position to evaluate the testimony firsthand, did not

improperly assess of the plaintiff’s injuries as uniquely cruel, as she

had completely lost the ability to have meaningful communication and

interaction with people, and, given her long life expectancy and the fact

that the physical effects of her injuries will worsen as she ages, her

psychological condition will deteriorate over time; moreover, it would

serve no useful purpose for this court to compare this verdict and this

plaintiff’s injuries to the verdicts and injuries in other cases, as the

question of damages is one peculiarly within the province of the fact

finder, and, in the absence of evident mistakes or partiality, this court

deferred to the jury’s judgment.

(Two justices concurring separately in two opinions)

Argued March 27—officially released August 11, 2017*

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff Cara L. Munn as a result of the

defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief,

brought to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut and tried to the jury before

Underhill, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs;

thereafter, the court, Underhill, J., denied the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, motion

for a new trial and motion to alter the judgment, and,

pursuant to the parties’ stipulation on collateral source

reduction,rendered an amended judgment forthe plaintiffs, from which the defendant appealed to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Walker,

Lynch and Lohier, Js., which certified certain questions

of law to this court.

Antonio Ponvert III, with whom was Alinor C. Sterling, for the appellant (defendant).

Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Karen L. Dowd,

Jeffrey R. Babbin and, on the brief, Kenneth J. Bartschi

and Aaron S. Bayer, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Renee W. Dwyer and Brian M. Paice filed a brief for

American Camp Association, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

Frank J. Silvestri, Jr., filed a brief for National Association of Independent Schools et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The issues in this case, which comes

to us on certification from the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199b (d),1 are:(1) Does Connecticut public

policy support imposing a duty on a school to warn

about or protect against the risk of a serious insectborne disease when it organizes a trip abroad? (2) If so,

does a damages award of approximately $41.5 million,

$31.5 million of which are noneconomic damages, warrant a remittitur? We answer the first question in the

affirmative and the second question in the negative.

The following facts, which find support in the record

certified by the Second Circuit, and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of the certified issues.2

The defendant, The Hotchkiss School, is a private

boarding school located in Lakeville. At the time of

the events underlying this appeal, the plaintiff, Cara L.

Munn,3 was a student there. In June and July of 2007,

the plaintiff, who recently had turned fifteen years old

and completed herfreshman year, joined other students

and faculty of the school on an educationaltrip toChina.

In July, she contracted tick-borne encephalitis, a viral

infectious disease that attacks the central nervous system, as a result of being bitten by an infected tick during

a hike on Mount Panshan, which is located in a forested

area approximately sixty miles from Tianjin, a city in

northeastern China. As a result of contracting tickborne encephalitis, the plaintiff suffered permanent

brain damage that has impacted severely the course of

her life.

In 2009, the plaintiff filed a diversity action in the

United States District Court forthe District of Connecticut, alleging that the defendant had been negligent by,

inter alia, failing to warn students and their parents of

the risk of exposure to insect-borne diseases and failing

to ensure that the students took protective measures

against insect bites prior to visiting Mount Panshan.

The case was tried to a jury in March, 2013. The jury

returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, and it awarded

her $10.25 million in economic damages and $31.5 million in noneconomic damages. The award was then

reduced pursuant to a stipulated collateral source

reduction.

The defendantthereafter challenged the verdict, moving for judgment as a matter of law; see Fed. R. Civ. P.

50 (b); or, alternatively, for a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59. The District Court rejected each of the claims

the defendant made in support of those motions, including that the plaintiff’s infection with tick-borne encephalitis was unforeseeable, that public policy precluded

the imposition of a legal duty on the defendant and that

the noneconomic portion of the damages award was

excessive as a matter of law. The defendant appealed
from the District Court’s judgment to the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals, challenging its determinations on

each of those claims. The Second Circuit agreed with

the plaintiff that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to find that her illness was

foreseeable; Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 795 F.3d 324,

330 (2d Cir. 2015); but, finding insufficient guidance in

existing Connecticut law, certified to this court the

issues of whether Connecticut public policy supports

the imposition of a duty on a school to warn about or to

protect against the foreseeable risk of a serious insectborne disease when organizing a trip abroad and, if

so, whether the jury’s damages award, particularly the

noneconomic portion, warranted a remittitur. Id., 337.

I

We first consider whether Connecticut public policy

supports the imposition of a duty on a school to warn

about or protect against the foreseeable risk of a serious

insect-borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad.

Because it is widely recognized that schools generally

are obligated to exercise reasonable care to protect

students in their charge from foreseeable dangers, and

there is no compelling reason to create an exception for

foreseeable serious insect-borne diseases, we conclude

that the imposition of such a duty is not contrary to

Connecticut public policy and, accordingly, answer the

first certified question in the affirmative.

The following additional facts that the jury reasonably could have found in support of its verdict are

relevant. In the spring of 2007, Jean Yu, the director of

the defendant’s Chinese language and culture program

and the leader of the trip, and David Thompson, the

director of the defendant’s international programs, provided the students who would be traveling to China

with information about the trip. A list of places that

the students would be visiting included ‘‘Mount Pan’’4

as part of a Tianjin city tour. A subsequently distributed

itinerary again listed ‘‘Mount Pan’’ as part of a city tour.

The itinerary did not describe ‘‘Mount Pan’’ or indicate

that the students would be visiting a forested area during the trip, which otherwise took place in urban or

suburban settings.

The students and parents also received some written

medical advice for the trip in an e-mail including a

hyperlink to a United States Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC) website that erroneously

directed users to the page addressing Central America,

rather than the one addressing China. The same document, as well as a generic predeparture manual produced by Thompson’s office, indicated that the

defendant’s infirmary could serve as a travel clinic,

although the infirmary was not qualified to provide

travel related medical advice. Finally, a packing list

provided to the students going on the China trip

included ‘‘[b]ug spray or lotion (or bug spray wipes),’’
but that item was listed only under the heading ‘‘Miscellaneous Items,’’ along with other, seemingly optional

things like ‘‘[t]ravel umbrella’’ and ‘‘[m]usical instrument.’’ None of the foregoing documents provided any

warning about insect-borne illnesses, although other

health and medical issues, such as immunizations, prescriptions and sexually transmitted diseases, were discussed.

Prior to the trip, Thompson viewed the page on the

CDC website directed at travelers to China. In its discussion of diseases found in the area, the page stated that

‘‘[tick borne] encephalitis occurs in forested regions

in northeastern China and in South Korea. Protecting

yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to

prevent these diseases.’’ A section that followed, captioned ‘‘Prevent Insect Bites,’’ instructed travelers to

use insect repellent containing the chemical compound

DEET and to wear long sleeves and long pants when

outdoors. At trial, Thompson admitted seeing this information at the time of the trip, and, although he initially

contended to the contrary, he subsequently agreed that

Tianjin is in northeastern China. Other travel information sources generally available at the time also

reported that tick-borne encephalitis was present in

northeastern China. See footnote 7 of this opinion. No

one on behalf of the defendant, including Thompson,

warned students or their parents about the presence

of tick-borne encephalitis in forested regions of northeastern China or the need to protect against it.5

The students visited Mount Panshan about two weeks

into the trip as part of a weekend excursion outside of

Tianjin’s city center. Evidence submitted at trial demonstrated that Mount Panshan is a forested peak adjacent

to other smaller foothills, surrounded by an exurban

landscape.6 No one warned the students to wear clothing that would protect them against insect bites or to

apply insect repellent before the trek up the mountain.

The group ascended Mount Panshan together on a

paved pathway, dressed in shorts and T-shirts or tank

tops, but split up for the descent. Most students, teachers and chaperones rode a cable car down the mountain.

The plaintiff and two or three other students, however,

were permitted to walk down the mountain by themselves. On the way down, the plaintiff and her cohorts

left the paved pathway and became lost, walking on

narrow dirt trails, among trees and through brush

before eventually rejoining the rest of the group. Along

the way, the plaintiff received many insect bites and

soon developed an itchy welt. Ten days later, she began

to experience the first symptoms of tick-borne encephalitis.

We turn to the first certified question, which concerns

the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. ‘‘Duty is a legal

conclusion about relationships between individuals,

made after the fact, and imperative to a negligence
cause of action. The nature of the duty, and the specific

persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the

circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual. . . . Although it has been said that no universal

test for [duty] ever has been formulated . . . our

threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific

harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the

defendant. The ultimate test of the existence of the duty

to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may

result if it is not exercised. . . . By that [it] is not meant

that one charged with negligence must be found actually

to have foreseen the probability of harm or that the

particular injury [that] resulted was foreseeable . . . .

[T]he test for the existence of a legal duty entails (1)

a determination of whether an ordinary person in the

defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew

or should have known, would anticipate that harm of

the general nature of that suffered was likely to result,

and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy

analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for

its negligent conduct should extend to the particular

consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320, 328–29, 107 A.3d 381 (2015).7

The second prong of the analysis is necessary

because ‘‘[a] simple conclusion that the harm to the

plaintiff was foreseeable . . . cannot by itself mandate

a determination that a legal duty exists. Many harms

are quite literally foreseeable, yetfor pragmatic reasons,

no recovery is allowed. . . . A further inquiry must be

made, for we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in

itself . . . but is only an expression of the sum total

of those considerations of policy [that] lead the law to

say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. . . . The

final step in the duty inquiry, then, is to make a determination of the fundamental policy of the law, as to

whether the defendant’s responsibility should extend

to such results. . . . [I]n considering whether public

policy suggests the imposition of a duty, we . . . consider the following four factors: (1) the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review;

(2) the public policy of encouraging participation in the

activity, while weighing the safety of the participants;

(3) the avoidance of increased litigation; and (4) the

decisions of other jurisdictions. . . . [This] totality of

the circumstances rule . . . is most consistent with the

public policy goals of our legal system, as well as the

general tenor of our [tort] jurisprudence.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 336–37.

Before turning to the public policy analysis, we pause

to examine the broader legal framework that encompasses the specific certified issue. Although the law of

negligence typically does notimpose a duty on one party

to act affirmatively in furtherance of the protection of

another, there are certain exceptions to that general

proposition. See generally 2 Restatement(Third), Torts,
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §§ 37 through

44 (2012). One exception applies when there is a ‘‘special relationship’’ between those parties; id., § 40, pp.

39–40; and one example of such a special relationship

that has received wide recognition, along with a concomitant duty to protect, is the relationship between

schools and their students. See id., § 40 (b) (5), p. 40;

see also, e.g, Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn. Supp. 527,

543, 696 A.2d 1063 (1995); Boisson v. Arizona Board of

Regents, 236 Ariz. 619, 622–23, 343 P.3d 931 (App. 2015),

review denied, Arizona Supreme Court, Docket No. CV15-0121 (December 1, 2015); Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P.2d 360,

87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970); Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist

Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1206 (Del. 2015); District

of Columbia v. Royal, 465 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C. 1983);

Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1982); Doe

Parents No. 1 v. State Dept. of Education, 100 Haw.

34, 74, 58 P.3d 545 (2002); Bellman v. Cedar Falls, 617

N.W.2d 11, 21 (Iowa 2000); Beshears v. Unified School

District No. 305, 261Kan. 555, 563, 930 P.2d 1376 (1997);

Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of Education, 113 S.W.3d

145, 148 (Ky. 2003); Prier v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 351

So. 2d 265, 268 (La. App.), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 1042,

1045 (La. 1977); Eisel v. Board of Education, 324 Md.

376, 384, 597 A.2d 447 (1991); Brown v. Knight, 362

Mass. 350, 352, 285 N.E.2d 790 (1972); Henderson v.

Simpson County Public School District, 847 So. 2d 856,

857 (Miss. 2003); Graham v. Montana State University,

235 Mont. 284, 289, 767 P.2d 301 (1988); A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 0001, 280 Neb. 205, 216, 784

N.W.2d 907 (2010); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717,

662 A.2d 272 (1995); Mirand v. New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44,

49, 637 N.E.2d 263, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1994); Fazzolari v.

Portland School District No. 1J, 303 Or. 1, 19, 734 P.2d

1326 (1987); Christensen v. Royal School District No.

160, 156 Wn. 2d 62, 70, 124 P.3d 283 (2005); cf. General

Statutes § 10-220 (a) (4) (‘‘[e]ach local or regional board

of education . . . shall provide an appropriate learning

environment for all its students which includes . . . a

safe school setting’’).

As to the rationale for imposing an affirmative duty

to protect in this context, ‘‘[t]he relationship between

a school and its students parallels aspects of several

other special relationships—it is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor who opens [its] premises

to a significant public population, and it acts partially

in the place of parents.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Monroe v. Basis School, Inc., 234 Ariz. 155, 157,

318 P.3d 871 (App. 2014). As a general matter, ‘‘[o]ne

. . . who voluntarily takes the custody of another

under circumstances such as to deprive the other of

his normal opportunities for protection is under [a duty

to protect the other against unreasonable risk of physical harm].’’ 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 314A (4),

p. 118 (1965). At heart, ‘‘the duty [to protect] derives
from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical

custody and control over its students, effectively takes

the place of parents and guardians . . . .’’ Mirand v.

New York, supra, 84 N.Y.2d 49; see also 2 Restatement

(Second), supra, § 320, comment (b), p. 131 (‘‘[A] child

while in school is deprived of the protection of his

parents or guardian. Therefore, the actor who takes

custody . . . of a child is properly required to give

him the protection which the custody or the manner

in which it is taken has deprived him.’’).8

‘‘[T]he scope of the duty imposed by the studentschool relationship is not limitless. . . . [T]he duty is

tied to expected activities within the relationship.

Therefore, in the student-school relationship, the duty

of care is bounded by geography and time, encompassing risks such as those that occur while the student

is at school or otherwise under the school’s control.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Boisson v. Arizona Board of Regents, supra, 236 Ariz.

623; see also Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548, 579, 148

A.3d 1011 (2016) (rejecting, in public school immunity

context, per se rule that would exempt school officials

from liability for harm sustained during off campus

school activities, such as educational field trips, and

noting that ‘‘[p]arents who have relinquished control

and custody of their children to the school rightly

expect that the school will exercise reasonable care,

as long as their children remain under the school’s

custody and control’’); Concepcion v. Archdiocese of

Miami, 693 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. App. 1997) (‘‘a duty

of supervision has been found for student injuries

occurring [on school] premises as well as [off school]

premises for school-related activities’’). Outside of on

campus occurrences during the regular school day,

courts have found the duty applicable in such settings

as school bus rides; see Todd M. v. Richard L., supra,

44 Conn. Supp. 527, 543; Doe v. DeSoto Parish School

Board, 907 So. 2d 275, 283 (La. App. 2005), cert. denied,

924 So. 2d 167 (La. 2006); athletic events; see Limones

v. School District, 161 So. 3d 384, 391 (Fla. 2015);

Wagenblast v. Odessa School District No. 105-157-

166J, 110 Wn. 2d 845, 856, 758 P.2d 968 (1988); field

trips; see Bellman v. Cedar Falls, supra, 617 N.W.2d

15, 17; off campus picnics; see Brown v. Knight, supra,

362 Mass. 350, 352; and off campus ‘‘[w]orkday’’ activities; Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wn. App. 231, 234–35,

238–39, 115 P.3d 342 (2005); but not applicable to off

campus occurrences that are unconnected with any

school programming. See, e.g., Boisson v. Arizona

Board of Regents, supra, 621, 624–25 (no duty to supervise college students’ independently organized excursion to Mount Everest during study abroad trip to

China); Concepcion v. Archdiocese of Miami, supra,

1105 (no duty to prevent after school fight that occurred

on public sidewalk outside of school gates); Anderson

v. Shaughnessy, 526 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Minn. 1995) (no
duty to prevent harm once student disembarked school

bus safely at scheduled destination).

The potential harms to be protected against vary

widely. They have included physical and sexual assaults

by strangers, other students or school employees; see

Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra,

2 Cal. 3d 745–46; Rupp v. Bryant, supra, 417 So. 2d

660; Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dept. of Education,

supra, 100 Haw. 42; Doe v. DeSoto Parish School Board,

supra, 907 So. 2d 277; A.W. v. Lancaster County School

District 0001, supra, 280 Neb. 206; Marquay v. Eno,

supra, 139 N.H. 711; Mirand v. New York, supra, 84

N.Y.2d 47; Fazzolari v. Portland School District No.

1J, supra, 303 Or. 3; student suicide; Eisel v. Board of

Education, supra, 324 Md. 377; accidents caused by

students’ drunk driving; Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of

Education, supra, 113 S.W.3d 147; physical hazards;

see District of Columbia v. Royal, supra, 465 A.2d 368

(partially disassembled fence); Bellman v. Cedar Falls,

supra, 617 N.W.2d 15 (inadequately supervised golf

cart); Prier v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., supra, 351 So. 2d

267 (trash burner); Brown v. Knight, supra, 362 Mass.

350 (open fireplace); Travis v. Bohannon, supra, 128

Wn. App. 235–36 (hydraulic wood splitter); and aggravation of injuries suffered in a spontaneous medical emergency during a soccer game.9 Limones v. School

District, supra, 161 So. 3d 387.

Regarding the scope of the duty, standard negligence

principles apply, within the context of the facts and

circumstances of the particular case. ‘‘While [a] school

is not an insurer of the safety of its students, it is obligated to exercise such care over students in its charge

that a parent of ordinary prudence would exercise

under comparable circumstances . . . .’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) David v.

New York, 40 App. Div. 3d 572, 573, 835 N.Y.S.2d 377

(2007). The duty a school owes ‘‘to students and their

parents is, on a general level, a duty to take whatever

precautions are necessary reasonably to ensure the

safety and welfare of the children entrusted to its custody and control against harm that the [school] anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate.’’ Doe Parents

No. 1 v. State Dept. of Education, supra, 100 Haw. 80.

What the duty quintessentially entails is ‘‘to exercise

reasonable care in ensuring that students are educated

in a safe environment free from any unreasonable risks

of harm.’’Id., 81; see also Henderson v. SimpsonCounty

Public School District, supra, 847 So. 2d 857 (‘‘schools

have the responsibility to use ordinary care and to take

reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students’’). The degree of care required will vary depending

on the particular risk at issue, the ages of the students

in the school’s custody and all of the attendant circumstances. Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District,

supra, 2 Cal. 3d 748; Doe v. DeSoto Parish School Board,

supra, 907 So. 2d 281; Prier v. Horace Mann. Ins. Co.,
supra, 351 So. 2d 268; see also Haynes v. Middletown,

314 Conn. 303, 314–15, 101 A.3d 249 (2014) (recognizing

that school’s duty to protect extends to high school

students).10

In light of the foregoing authorities, it is beyond dispute that, as a general matter, a school having custody

of minor children has an obligation to use reasonable

care to protect those children from foreseeable harms

during school sponsored activities, including educational trips abroad. The question we must consider,

then, is whether there is something unique and/or compelling about foreseeable insect-borne diseases that

should excuse schools that are organizing educational

trips abroad from exercising reasonable care to minimize the possibility that the minors entrusted to their

custody will contract such diseases. Stated otherwise,

does Connecticut public policy mandate that, when it

comes to foreseeable insect-borne diseases, there

should be an exception to the general rule that schools

must refrain from negligently exposing minor students,

whom they have agreed to supervise in the absence of

their parents, to foreseeable dangers? To answer that

question, we begin by considering the first public policy

factor, the normal expectations of the participants in

an educational trip abroad.

As this case amply demonstrates, insect-borne diseases can pose significant threats to human health.

When insect-borne diseases present serious risks, they

become the subject of government warnings11 and

media attention.12 The reason for the provision of such

information is clear: people are interested in having it.

When a particular disease is brought to an individual’s

attention, he or she can learn about the disease’s prevalence, the areas in which the disease is endemic,

whether there is a vaccine available and, if not, what

other measures may be effective to prevent it. Furthermore, he or she can become aware of the symptoms

of the disease, the damage to one’s health that the

disease might cause, and whether and how the disease,

if contracted, may be treated. With all of this information in hand, the individual can make educated choices

about whether to travel to an area where the disease

is present and, if so, what protective measures should

be taken, in light of the individual’s particular tolerance

to risk.

Many measures are available to protect against

insect-borne diseases. They include staying away from

areas where the insects at issue are known to proliferate, using an appropriate insect repellent, pretreating

clothing or gear with the insecticide permethrin, covering exposed skin with clothing and/or hats, showering

soon after coming indoors, sleeping in screened areas

or with a bed net, and, in the case of ticks, checking

one’s body thoroughly to find them before they can

attach. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
‘‘Avoid Bug Bites,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/

travel/page/avoid-bug-bites (last visited August 7, 2017),

‘‘Diseases Spread by Ticks,’’ available at https://

wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/diseases-spread-by-ticks

(last visited August 7, 2017). With some insect-borne

diseases, preventive medicines or vaccinations are

available. If an insect-borne disease is contracted, early

recognition of symptoms can ensure that treatment is

sought promptly, which, in some instances, could make

a difference in the ultimate outcome.

Information directed at travelers about insect-borne

diseases, and the measures to protect against them, is

not hard to come by. It is freely available on the travel

pages published by the CDC;13 see footnote 11 of this

opinion; and, further, on websites maintained by other

foreign governments.14 Additionally, as the evidence in

this case demonstrated, there are many commercially

produced publications that track and compile information for travelers about insect-borne diseases and the

areas in which they are endemic.

In light of the foregoing, we believe that the normal

expectations of participants in a school sponsored educational trip abroad, involving minor children, are that

the organizer of the trip would take reasonable measures to warn the participants and their parents about

the serious insect-borne diseases that are present in

the areas to be visited and to protect the children from

those diseases. School personnel who are organizing

an educational trip abroad typically will have superior

knowledge of travel planning in general, and the trip

itinerary in particular, and, as explained previously,

have a general responsibility to protect the minors in

their charge while they are away from the custody of

their parents. Given the potential dangers posed by

serious insect-borne diseases, the existence of methods

by which to avoid such diseases and the availability of

useful information about them, trip participants naturally would expect the organizer of the trip to pass

along appropriate warnings and to use ordinary care

to minimize the disease risks posed by the insects in

the particular areas to be visited. Trip organizers, for

their part, likely would agree that reasonable protective

measures, tailored to the risk, are doable and appropriate.15 Accordingly, we conclude that the first factor

of the public policy analysis supports the imposition of

a duty on a school organizing a trip abroad to warn

about, and to protect against, serious insect-borne

diseases.

We turn next to the second and third factors of the

analysis, namely, the public policy of encouraging participation in the activity at issue, while weighing the

safety of the participants, and the avoidance of

increased litigation. We recognize, as we must, that

there are many benefits to international educational

travel, and that it undeniably is the public policy of
Connecticut to promote such travel. See General Statutes § 10-27 (a) (‘‘[i]t shall be the policy of the state to

encourage its students, teachers, administrators and

educational policy makers to participate in international studies, international exchange programs and

other activities that advance cultural awareness and

promote mutual understanding and respect for the citizens of other countries’’). We disagree, however, that

recognizing that a school’s general duty to protect its

students includes the responsibility to take reasonable

measures to warn about, and to protect against, serious

insect-borne disease risks will have a chilling effect on

such travel.16 Rather, it should have the salutary effect of

promoting safety by ensuring that appropriate warnings

are given and appropriate protective measures are

taken. Compare Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra,

315 Conn. 340–41 (recognizing duty of landlord to keep

common area of property, where children are known

to play, free of construction debris is likely to prompt

responsible behavior because maintaining common

areas is neither costly nor time-consuming; complete

sanitization is not required, only ‘‘reasonable steps to

protect against foreseeable injuries to children’’), with

Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641,

659, 126 A.3d 569 (2015) (declining to recognize duty

that ‘‘fail[ed] to provide a corresponding increase in

safety’’). Travel, of course, will always entail certain

risks, some of which cannot be eliminated or reduced.

The elimination of unnecessary risks, i.e., those that

can be minimized with little effort, however, should

encourage, rather than dampen, enthusiasm for traveling abroad. Cf. Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area,

Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 703, 849 A.2d 813 (2004) (recognizing that skiers had duty of care to fellow skiers because

‘‘requiring skiers to participate in the reasonable manner prescribed by the rules of the sport actually will

promote participation in the sport of skiing’’ by remedying harms and protecting safety). For risks that cannot

be fully neutralized, appropriate warnings likely will

suffice to satisfy the duty of care. See 1 Restatement

(Third), supra, § 18, comment (h), p. 210. We emphasize

that the duty to warn and protect does not amount to

an absolute guaranty of safety, nor will it require, in

every instance, that every possible precautionary measure be taken. Rather, the scope of the duty necessarily

will vary, depending on the risk posed by the particular

insect-borne illness at issue, the ages of the participants

in the school sponsored trip, and all of the attendant

circumstances.

In regard to the potential for increased litigation, we

are skeptical that recognition of a school’s duty to warn

about, or protect against, a serious insect-borne illness

when organizing an educational trip abroad will lead

to a flood of similar actions. Our research has disclosed

a dearth of claims with fact patterns similar to the

present case, perhaps because the incidence of students
contracting serious insect-borne diseases while on educational trips abroad, when appropriate protective measures are taken, is relatively uncommon. Again,

information about insect-borne diseases, and the methods to protect against them, is readily available to travel

professionals in a number of resources. See footnotes

11 and 13 of this opinion.

Additionally, the mere recognition of a legal duty

by no means creates an open and shut case for every

potential plaintiff who may contract an insect-borne

disease while on an educational trip abroad. ‘‘A cause

of action in negligence is comprised of four elements:

duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. O &

G Industries, Inc., supra, 319 Conn. 649. Thus, recognition of a duty affords students who contract insectborne diseases on educational trips abroad only an

opportunity to prove that the disease at issue was foreseeable, that the school failed to appropriately warn of

the danger of the disease and/or to take reasonable

precautionary measures and that such failure was a

substantial cause of the illness. As always, principles of

comparative negligence will apply. Vendrella v. Astriab

Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 325, 87 A.3d

546 (2014). In the case of public institutions, discretionary act immunity may be invoked. See General Statutes

§ 52-557n (a) (2) (B). It is pure speculation, therefore,

that our holding today will open the floodgates to let

loose a wave of future litigants who inevitably will prevail. Cf. Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 315

Conn. 339–40 (imposing duty is not tantamount to

imposing strict liability; it merely affords plaintiff

‘‘opportunity to prove to a jury that [her] injuries were

foreseeable, thatthe defendant failed to take reasonable

steps to avoid them, and that this failure was a substantial factor in bringing about those injuries’’); see also

Doe v. DeSoto Parish School Board, supra, 907 So. 2d

281 (‘‘before a school board can be found to have

breached the duty to adequately supervise the safety

of students, the risk of unreasonable injury must be

foreseeable, constructively or actually known, and preventable if a requisite degree of supervision had been

exercised’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Prier

v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., supra, 351 So. 2d 268 (‘‘[A]

teacher is not liable in damages unless it is shown that

he or she, by exercising the degree of supervision

required by the circumstances, might have prevented

the act which caused the damage, and did not do so.

It also is essential to recovery that there be proof of

negligence in failing to provide the required supervision

and proof of a causal connection between that lack of

supervision and the accident.’’); Henderson v. Simpson

County Public School District, supra, 847 So. 2d 857

(although ‘‘[p]ublic schools have the responsibility to

use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students thereby providing
a safe school environment . . . [t]here is no liability

predicated on lack orinsufficiency of supervision where

the event in connection with which the injury occurred

is not reasonably foreseeable’’ [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Mirand v. New York,

supra, 84 N.Y.2d 50 (‘‘[e]ven if a breach of the duty of

supervision is established, the inquiry is not ended;

the question arises whether such negligence was the

proximate cause of the injuries sustained’’).17

Notably, in several of the cases that we have cited

herein in support of the general principle that a school

has a duty to protect the students in its custody, the

plaintiffs ultimately did not prevail due to their inability

to satisfy other elements of their negligence claims.

See, e.g., Prier v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., supra, 351 So.

2d 268–69 (although school had duty to protect child

from foreseeable injuries, duty was not breached when

trash burner that caused injury was not inherently dangerous and had been used without incident for forty

years); Graham v. Montana State University, supra,

235 Mont. 289 (although defendant university had duty

to supervise minor student attending summer program,

it was not liable for her injuries sustained in motorcycle

accident because proximate cause of injuries was negligence of another student who was operating motorcycle); David v. New York, supra, 40 App. Div. 3d 573–74

(although defendant school had duty to adequately

supervise students on hayride, that duty was not

breached because student-teacher ratio was adequate

and there was no prior indication of hazard).

As we previously have explained, increased litigation

may result in those cases in which, by holding that a

duty exists, we effectively are ‘‘recognizing a new cause

of action or otherwise breaking new ground . . . .’’

Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 315 Conn. 340;

see, e.g., Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc., supra,

319 Conn. 659–60 (declining to hold that construction

companies owe duty of care to workers on job site who

lose work and thereby suffer purely economic harm due

to accident caused by companies’ negligence, because

expanding companies’ liability to encompass such

claims likely would increase greatly pool of potential

claimants); Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 614, 50

A.3d 802 (2012) (declining to extend doctor’s duty to

warn patient that medical condition could impair driving ability to third party injured in accident caused by

patient ‘‘because it would open the door to an entirely

new category of claims against health care providers

. . . thereby greatly expanding [their] liability . . .

and creating an additional burden on the courts,’’ ultimately ‘‘driving up health care costs’’). Such is not the

case here. Rather, the duty to warn students about,

and to protect them against, foreseeable insect-borne

diseases is but one specific aspect of the already well

established general duty of schools to take reasonable

measures to ensure the safety of the minors over whom
they have assumed custody. We conclude that the second and third public policy factors support the imposition of a duty on a school to warn about, and protect

against, the risk of serious insect-borne diseases when

organizing a trip abroad.

We turn to the final public policy factor, the decisions

of other jurisdictions. Our research has not disclosed

any decision that truly is analogous to the present one.

We have reviewed the cases cited by the parties and

the amici in addressing this factor and find them to be

largely unhelpful. The cases on which the plaintiff relies

involve very different types of injuries and therefore

provide support only for the general proposition that

schools taking custody of minor children are responsible for their protection and care. See, e.g., Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory School, Inc., 199 Or. App. 352, 359,

111 P.3d 762 (sexual assault by parent and resultant

emotional harm), rev. denied, 339 Or. 406, 122 P.3d 64

(2005); see also Bellman v. Cedar Falls, supra, 617

N.W.2d 15 (child killed when struck by golf cart commandeered by kindergarteners). Cases seemingly

favoring the defense, because they absolve defendants

of liability for injuries caused to others by insects, concern claims brought by adult plaintiffs under theories

of premises liability, a substantially different context.

See, e.g., Riley v. Champion International Corp., 973

F. Supp. 634, 642–43 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Belhumeur v.

Zilm, 157 N.H. 233, 236–38, 949 A.2d 162 (2008). In

addition, many of the cited cases turn on the issue of

foreseeability, a question which, as we have explained,

is not before us.18 See, e.g., Rodgers v. La Quinta Motor

Inn, 316 Ark. 644, 647, 873 S.W.2d 551 (1994); Butcher

v. Gay, 29 Cal. App. 4th 388, 400–401, 404, 34 Cal. Rptr.

2d 771 (1994); Rhodes v. B. C. Moore & Sons, Inc., 153

Ga. App. 106, 107, 264 S.E.2d 500 (1980); David v. New

York, supra, 40 App. Div. 3d 574. For these reasons, we

conclude that the fourth public policy factor in the

present case is essentially neutral.

The defendant insists that there should be no duty

to warn or to protect in the circumstances of this case

because the chances of the plaintiff contracting tickborne encephalitis were remote. Although, in a given

case, the rarity of a particular illness should be weighed

by the jury when determining whether its contraction

was foreseeable, or whether the warnings given and

protective measures taken by a school satisfied the duty

of care, it is not relevant to a public policy analysis,

which should be undertaken by a court without reference to the facts of a particular case.19

Although the question of whetherthe defendant properly was proven to be negligent is not before us, we

close with the following observation. Although we agree

that tick-borne encephalitis is not a widespread illness,

when it strikes, the results can be devastating. At the

same time, some of the measures one might take to
protect against it are simple and straightforward—covering exposed skin, applying insectrepellent containing

DEET,20 closely checking one’s body for ticks and/or

avoiding the woods in areas where the disease is known

to be endemic. The case thus brings to mind the riskbenefit calculus articulated long ago by Judge Learned

Hand to determine whether, in given circumstances,

reasonable care has been exercised. Pursuant to that

formulation, both the likelihood and the gravity of

potential harm should be taken into consideration, as

well as the burden of taking adequate precautions to

prevent that harm from occurring. See United States

v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).

In short, ‘‘[g]iven a balancing approach to negligence,

even if the likelihood of harm stemming from the actor’s

conduct is small, the actor can be negligent if the severity of the possible harm is great and the burden of

precautions is limited.’’ 1 Restatement (Third), supra,

§ 3, comment (f), p. 31; see also 3 F. Harper et al.,

Harper, James & Grey on Torts (3d Ed. 2007) § 16.9

(2), p. 523 (‘‘[i]f the harm that may be foreseen is great,

conduct that threatens it may be negligent even though

the statistical probability of its happening is very slight

indeed’’); 3 F. Harper et al., supra, § 16.9 (3), p. 528

(‘‘the law imposes liability for failure to take precautions, even against remote risks, if the cost of the precautions would be relatively low’’). When schools are

fulfilling their duty to supervise students in their custody, these admonitions should be taken into account.

In sum, we conclude that the public policy of Connecticut does not preclude imposing a duty on a school

to warn about or to protect against the risk of a serious

insect-borne disease when organizing a trip abroad. For

that reason, we answer the first certified question in

the affirmative.

II

We turn to the second certified question, whether the

damages award of approximately $41.5 million, which

included noneconomic damages of $31.5 million, warranted a remittitur. We conclude that the award,

although sizeable, fell within the necessarily uncertain

limits of just damages. Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the negative.

The following procedural history is relevant. After

the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and

awarded damages of approximately $41.5 million, $31.5

million of which were awarded for pain and suffering,

the defendant challenged the award, seeking a remittitur of the noneconomic portion. The defendant did not

claim that there was any jury impropriety but, rather,

contended that the award was excessive as a matter of

law. The District Court, in a comprehensive memorandum of decision, rejected this claim and declined to

order a remittitur. The following additional facts are

recounted in that court’s decision.
Ten days after visiting Mount Panshan, while still in

China, the plaintiff began to suffer from a headache, a

fever and wooziness. She grew disoriented and was

taken to a local hospital. When her condition rapidly

deteriorated, the local hospital transferred her to a

Beijing hospital. After the plaintiff’s parents were contacted, they flew from New York, where the family

resides, to Beijing. When they arrived, the plaintiff was

partially paralyzed and could not speak; thereafter, she

became semicomatose.21 The plaintiff’s parents then

had her airlifted to New York, where she was admitted

to New York-Presbyterian Hospital.

After a week in the hospital and a month at a rehabilitation facility, the plaintiff’s condition stabilized and

improved, but she remains permanently disabled. Most

markedly, she cannot speak, but can only utter soft,

monosyllabic, childlike sounds. The plaintiff has limited

dexterity in her hands, particularly in her fingers, which

are too stiff to bend easily. This inhibits the fine motor

skills necessary to facilitate typing. The plaintiff also

has limited control over her facial muscles, causing her

to drool, to have difficulty eating and swallowing, and

to exhibit socially inappropriate facial expressions.

The plaintiff has compromised brain functioning, particularly in the area of executive function, which makes

it difficult for her to construct multistep solutions to

everyday problems. As a consequence, she scores low

on tests that gauge problem solving ability. Although

her verbal comprehension scores remain at preinjury

levels—in the ninety-sixth percentile—herreading comprehension and math comprehension scores have fallen

to the third and first percentiles, respectively. Her

scores on perceptual reasoning also are low, in the

twelfth percentile. In short, although she remains an

intelligent person, she has difficulty using her intelligence.

As the District Court explained, however, the plaintiff

‘‘is in other ways normal. She still experiences the world

much the same way as a person without a brain injury

might—she understands what happens around her, she

reads, she writes, she feels, she has opinions, and she

dreams about her future.’’ With assistance and accommodations, the plaintiff was able to finish high school

and, at the time of trial, was enrolled in college.

The District Court commented extensively on the

evidence of the plaintiff’s suffering, characterizing her

condition as ‘‘a perfect storm of symptoms that, taken

together, magnify individual deficits into a debilitating

and humiliating disability.’’ It explained: ‘‘[The plaintiff]

cannot talk. . . . She cannot communicate through

sign . . . nor can she type quickly enough to allow a

computer to generate audible words at a natural

speed—it takes her a long time to produce a short

phrase.22

. . . [The plaintiff] is not only mute; she can-
not have a sustained or rewarding social exchange with

another person. [The plaintiff] cannot loosen her facial

muscles enough to register her emotions accurately.

. . . She cannot tighten her muscles when they slacken,

which means she often drools so profusely that strangers stare at her in public places. . . . [The plaintiff]

always looks like she is flashing a wide-eyed smile, and

she sometimes wears wrist bands to mop her saliva.

Her facial expressions alternately alienate or disgust

the people she attempts to befriend. [The plaintiff] lacks

cognitive skills; in particular, she has limited executive

function . . . [b]ut she also has retained much of her

raw, preinjury intelligence. . . . [The plaintiff’s] cognitive injuries are greater than simply being unable to

work through complex problems—she perceives the

right solution but cannot implement it. As the [plaintiff’s] counsel described, [the plaintiff] ‘is like a worldclass sprinter forced to live in a box for the next 66

years,’ ’’ i.e., the plaintiff’s life expectancy at the time

of her injury. (Citations omitted; footnote added.)

In the District Court’s view, the ‘‘evidence supported

the theory that [the plaintiff’s] injuries are uniquely

cruel.’’ The court recounted testimony from both of the

plaintiff’s parents, and from other witnesses, that she

had no friends or social life and lived an isolated existence, with her only social contact being online. It noted

the plaintiff’s belief, to which she had testified, that she

will never date or have a family, but,rather, will become

an ‘‘old spinster.’’ The court further summarized the

expert testimony, stating ‘‘that it would be difficult for

[the plaintiff] to perform the basic tasks necessary to

manage her own life, let alone ensure the growth, health

and safety of a child.’’

Describing the emotional effect of her circumstances,

the District Court explained that her ‘‘solitude stings

her acutely,’’ that she had contemplated suicide and

that she feels shame when strangers gawk at her in

restaurants as she struggles to eat, in a manner

described by her father as childlike. It noted expert

testimony that the plaintiff was at future risk for depression as her life became less structured. The court continued: ‘‘[The plaintiff’s] heart broke when a boy that

she dated prior to her trip to China dumped her and

posted cutting remarks about her on Facebook. . . .

She rages when people assume that she suffers from

severe mental retardation, and she cannot correct that

impression. . . . Perversely, [the plaintiff] is arguably

in a more emotionally compromised position than

some people with more profound cognitive impairments because they may have the odd blessing of not

understanding the depth of others’ rejection of them.

Thus, according to witnesses, [the plaintiff] lives in a

peculiar hell: she knows what she has lost, cannot find

cathartic expression for that loss and is treated as if

she has lost far more. Because she has a normal life

expectancy, she may suffer alone in this state for the
next sixty-plus years.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

added.)

The District Court also addressed the plaintiff’s physical pain and suffering, namely, her endurance of ‘‘a

grueling illness and recovery,’’ which at its worst had

her paralyzed and semicomatose. For a period of time,

the plaintiff had to be fed through a feeding tube that

she described as ‘‘so painful . . . like swallowing pool

water three times a day.’’ The plaintiff spent weeks

in rehabilitation relearning basic tasks. She remains

physically limited in many ways, including an impeded

ability to use her arms, hands and legs due to extreme

muscle tightness and stiffness. Moreover, the evidence

at trial was that, given the nature of her brain injury,

she would not be making any further meaningful

improvement.

In sum, the District Court stated, ‘‘[w]itnesses’

accounts and [the court’s] own courtroom observations

of [the plaintiff’s] emotional and physical suffering

depict a miserable life.’’ Although the court allowed

that the plaintiff had retained some abilities and had

partaken in some positive experiences since her illness,

‘‘the issue here is not whether [the plaintiff] might cobble together fulfilling moments during her life, [but]

whether the jury reasonably could have found that she

rarely will be able to do so, and, thus, fairly awarded

[the plaintiff] a large amount of money to compensate

her for that loss.’’ In the court’s view, the plaintiff had

‘‘provided the jury with more than enough evidence to

reach that pessimistic conclusion.’’

The District Court rejected the defendant’s claim that

the jury’s award was simply excessive as a matter of

law, noting the defendant’s concession that there was

no evidence ‘‘that the [jurors had] ignored the law, acted

out of punitive animus toward the defendant or otherwise failed to fulfill their duties responsibly.’’ Rather,

the jury ‘‘struck [the court] as [diligent] attentive, serious, and dedicated.’’ The court surveyed some cases

in which large damages awards had been rendered,

concluding that the injuries at issue in those cases,

when considered together, provided a fair benchmark

and an assurance that the award in this case was not

excessive. Specifically, when the plaintiff’s award and

those from the case law were broken down into annual

rates of compensation, on the basis of each injured

party’s remaining life expectancy, the plaintiff’s award

actually fell on the lower end of the resulting range

of values.

The District Court concluded by propounding unanswerable questions: ‘‘What is the price of relying on

your parents to find you a prom date? . . . How much

money replaces the loss of the joy you felt when playing

the piano? . . . Can you calculate the cost of missing

your teenage years, of never maturing socially and emotionally beyond the age of fifteen?’’ (Citations omitted.)
It thereafter upheld the award as falling within the range

of reasonable verdicts.

We turn to the applicable law. In Connecticut, ‘‘the

proper standard of review of a trial court’s decision to

grant or deny a motion to set aside a verdict as excessive

as a matter of law is that of an abuse of discretion.

. . . Accordingly, the ruling of the [District] [C]ourt on

the motion to set aside the verdict as excessive is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saleh v.

Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 282, 32 A.3d 318

(2011). Additionally, where, as here, a trial court and

a jury have concurred in their determination that a

particular damages award is appropriate, that circumstance provides ‘‘a persuasive argument for sustaining

the action of the court on the motion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 30,

301 A.2d 249 (1972); see also Camp v. Booth, 160 Conn.

10, 12, 273 A.2d 714 (1970) (‘‘[t]he refusal of the trial

court to disturb the jury’s determination adds support

to the propriety of the verdict’’).

The reason for such a deferential standard is clear.

‘‘Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual

issues resolved by the jury. . . . This right embraces

the determination of damages when there is room for

a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded

persons as to the amount that should be awarded. . . .

This right is one obviously immovable limitation on the

legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since

the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right

to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a

reasonable difference of opinion among fairminded

men passed upon by the jury and not by the court.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 138, 540

A.2d 666 (1988). Accordingly, ‘‘we consistently have

held that a court should exercise its authority to order

a remittitur rarely—only in the most exceptional of

circumstances’’; Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, supra,

303 Conn. 280; and where the court can articulate ‘‘very

clear, definite and satisfactory reasons . . . for such

interference.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

283.

‘‘Proper compensation cannot be computed by a

mathematical formula, and there is no iron-clad rule

for the assessment of damages.’’ Campbell v. Gould,

194 Conn. 35, 40, 478 A.2d 596 (1984). ‘‘In determining

whether to order remittitur, the trial court is required

to review the evidence in the light most favorable to

sustaining the verdict. . . . Upon completing that

review, the court should not interfere with the jury’s

determination except when the verdict is plainly excessive or exorbitant. . . . The ultimate test which must

be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether
the jury’s award falls somewhere within the necessarily

uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of

the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel

the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. . . . The court’s

broad power to order a remittitur should be exercised

only when it is manifest that the jury [has] included

items of damage which are contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court’s explicit and

unchallenged instructions.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking,

LLC, supra, 303 Conn. 281. This court has upheld a

remittitur order only when we ‘‘have laid before us a

very clear and striking case of indubitable wrong, so

clear and striking as to indicate the influence of undue

sympathy, prejudice or corruption on the verdict.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 283.

In regard to the type of damages at issue, this court

has ‘‘long held that the loss of life’s enjoyments is compensable in personal injury and wrongful death cases.’’

Mather v. Griffin Hospital, supra, 207 Conn. 150. ‘‘Damages may be awarded for pain and suffering, past, present and future, resulting from the injuries so long as

the evidence affords a basis for a reasonable estimate

by the trier of fact of the amount.’’ Vajda v. Tusla, 214

Conn. 523, 532, 572 A.2d 998 (1990). ‘‘[A]lthough it is

difficult to measure emotional distress in terms of

money, [a]n award of damages for pain and suffering

is peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhatia v.

Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 420, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008). Such

is also the case with ‘‘compensation for activities in

which the plaintiff engaged, prior to [her] injury, which,

as a result of that injury, are now foreclosed to [her].’’

Jerz v. Humphrey, 160 Conn. 219, 223, 276 A.2d 884

(1971). Those damages lie in an ‘‘extremely uncertain

area . . . one in which it is quite impossible to assign

values with any precision,’’ and, therefore, are best left

to a jury. Id.

Giving due consideration to the foregoing principles

and the District Court’s view of the evidence, we conclude that the noneconomic damages awarded in this

tragic case, although clearly generous, fall within the

acceptable range of just compensation. Although no

formulaic process of review applies, we will make a

few observations. First, there is no allegation that the

jury in this case was prejudiced, incompetent or otherwise compromised, but only that its verdict was improperly large. In only the rarest of circumstances should

the size of a verdict, standing alone, warrant setting

aside that verdict. We do not believe such circumstances are present here. Importantly, the District

Court’s careful and thorough review of the verdict, and

its ultimate decision to let it stand, provided an

important check against any claim of undue sympathy.

In upholding the verdict, the judge, who was in a posi-
tion to evaluate the testimony firsthand and is guided

by his oath, training and role as an impartial arbiter,

concluded that such sympathy was not present. Second,

the plaintiff in this case was very young and, despite

her injuries, retained a long life expectancy. Accordingly, the period of time over which she is expected to

suffer—sixty-six years—is an extensive one. Further,

the evidence at trial suggested that the physical effects

of her injuries will worsen as she ages and that her

psychological condition will deteriorate as the structure

characteristic to a young life abates. Additionally, the

plaintiff eventually will lose the support of her parents

which, by all accounts, was crucial to her recovery and

relatively high functioning. Third, we see no fault in the

District Court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s particular

set of injuries as uniquely cruel. Through the combination of an inability to speak, control her facial expressions and move her fingers effectively, she has

completely lost the ability to have meaningful communication and interaction with other people. Although one

can certainly conceive of physical injuries more

extreme than those suffered by the plaintiff, it is the

destruction of the plaintiff’s ability to connect with

other people, along with her full awareness of the situation, that makes her suffering stand out. Similarly, a

loss of the executive brain function that allows one to

access and use intelligence, while at the same time

retaining such intelligence, is particularly frustrating.

Finally, the plaintiff’s mother testified about her passions in life and her dreams, prior to her injury, which

included sports, playing the piano and learning to speak

foreign languages. The destructive effect of her injuries

on these enjoyments and aspirations is painfully

apparent.

The defendant invites us to examine the verdicts

returned by other juries in other cases and to engage

in an exercise of comparing which plaintiff’s injuries

are worse. We decline this invitation.23 As we previously

have explained, ‘‘[n]o one life is like any other, and the

damages for the destruction of one furnish no fixed

standard for others.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 658, 368 A.2d

172 (1976); see also Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608,

618, 353 A.2d 770 (1974). Consequently, ‘‘[i]t serves no

useful purpose to compare a verdict in one personal

injury case with the verdicts in other personal injury

cases. . . . The question is one peculiarly within the

province of the jury. Juries may differ widely in the

conclusions which they reach in what may be apparently similar cases, and, in fact, in any given case one

jury may arrive at a result substantially different from

that of another jury.’’ (Citations omitted.) Birgel v.

Heintz, supra, 163 Conn. 34. In the absence of evident

mistakes or partiality, however, we defer to the jury’s

judgment, as the District Court did here. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the second certified question
in the negative.

We answer the first certified question, ‘‘Yes.’’

We answer the second certified question, ‘‘No.’’

No costs shall be taxed in this court to either the

plaintiffs or the defendant.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* August 11, 2017, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 51-199b (d) provides: ‘‘The Supreme Court may answer

a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States or by the

highest court of another state or of a tribe, ifthe answer may be determinative

of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and if there is no

controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this

state.’’

2 For a more complete discussion of the underlying facts, see Munn v.

Hotchkiss School, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D. Conn. 2014).

3 Cara L. Munn’s parents, Orson D. Munn III and Christine Munn, also

were named as plaintiffs in this matter due to their incurrence of substantial

expenses, on her behalf, which they sought to recoup. For simplicity, we

refer hereinafter to Cara L. Munn alone as the plaintiff.

4 Throughout the record, Mount Panshan is referred to variously as ‘‘Mount

Pan,’’ ‘‘Mt. Pan’’ and ‘‘Panshan mountain.’’

5 A printout of the page addressing China on the CDC website, quoted

previously, was introduced as a defense exhibit at trial. On appeal to the

Second Circuit, the defendant argued that the jury could not rely on it as

evidence of foreseeability because it is dated August 1, 2007, i.e., just after

the school trip. That court rejected the defendant’s attempt to discredit its

own exhibit in favor of another CDC advisory dated May 23, 2007, which

did not mention tick-borne encephalitis, because the May advisory was not

part of the trial record. Additionally, the court reasoned that, ‘‘while the

August 1, 2007 advisory postdates the trip, it is possible that a similar

advisory was on the website before, which would explain Thompson’s testimony about seeing the advisory. Neither party presented evidence about

what was posted on the CDC website when the trip actually occurred, and

we will not disturb the jury’s assessment of the evidence and its finding of

reasonable foreseeability.’’

Before this court, the defendant again suggests that its own trial exhibit,

as well as Thompson’s testimony that he had seen the contents of that

exhibit prior to the trip, is not reliable evidence. Because a determination

of the competence of the evidence in this case is well beyond the scope of

the certified questions, we must accept the conclusion of the Second Circuit

that the jury properly relied upon that evidence.

6 As the District Court explained, an exurban landscape is ‘‘a traditionally

rural community with growing housing density created by commuters to

the cities.’’

7 We pause to emphasize that we are called upon to undertake the second

determination only. The jury in this case determined, on the evidence presented at trial, that the plaintiff’s infection with tick-borne encephalitis, or

harm of that general nature, was foreseeable, and both the District Court

and the Second Circuit have upheld that finding. See Vendrella v. Astriab

Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 331–32, 87 A.3d 546 (2014) (unless

fair and reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion, foreseeability

is question of fact for jury). Specifically, in addition to the page addressing

China on the CDC website that discussed tick-borne encephalitis in forested

areas in northeastern China, which Thompson acknowledged seeing in

advance of the trip, there also were in evidence: a CDC page directed at

east Asia generally, dated April 23, 2007, which warned of the risk of several

other insect-borne diseases; a British health advisory that warned of tickborne encephalitis ‘‘in forested regions of China and Japan’’; and expert

testimony, as summarized by the District Court, that, ‘‘according to travel

medicine reports routinely consulted by doctors and commercial trip planners in 2007,rural China was an endemic region for [tick-borne encephalitis],

Japanese encephalitis, and Lyme disease.’’

Throughout its brief, the defendant emphasizes the remoteness of the

risk of contracting tick-borne encephalitis. Although that factor is relevant

to the duty analysis, it mainly informs the issue of foreseeability. We agree

with the District Court that the public policy aspect of the duty analysis
does not afford the defendant a new opportunity to relitigate the issue of

foreseeability. See 1 Restatement (Third), Torts, Liability for Physical and

Emotional Harm § 7, comment (j), pp. 82–83 (2010) (disapproving of use of

foreseeability in judicial determinations of whether, for policy reasons, no

duty should exist); see also A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 0001,

280 Neb. 205, 212–16, 784 N.W.2d 907 (2010) (explaining why courts should

not consider factual issue of foreseeability when making determinations of

legal duty).

8 This court has recognized that children outside of their parents’ supervision require special protection. See, e.g., Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn.

101, 106, 708 A.2d 937 (1998) (school officials are not immune from liability

to child injured in unsupervised hallway), overruled in part by Haynes v.

Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 316, 101 A.3d 249 (2014). In determining duty,

we also have recognized the limited capacity of children to fully appreciate

risks. See Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 315 Conn. 333 (‘‘[a]s to

the care required of others in relation to children, the . . . propensity of

children [to disregard dangerous conditions] has been taken into consideration in evaluating the negligence of these others’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]).

9 We cite these examples merely to demonstrate the range of circumstances in which the duty may apply, and not to suggest that we necessarily

would extend the duty to all of the circumstances enumerated.

10 One court has observed that, although high school students may require

less rigorous and intrusive methods of supervision than younger children,

‘‘adolescent high school students are not adults and should not be expected

to exhibit that degree of discretion, judgment, and concern for the safety

of themselves and others which we associate with full maturity.’’ Dailey v.

Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 2 Cal. 3d 748.

11 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘‘African TickBite Fever,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/african-tickbite-fever (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to sub-Saharan

Africa and West Indies of African tick-bite fever), ‘‘African Trypanosomiasis

(African Sleeping Sickness),’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/african-sleeping-sickness-african-trypansosomiasis (last visited

August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to sub-Saharan Africa of African trypanosomiasis spread by tsetse flies), ‘‘Chagas Disease (American Trypanosomiasis),’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/chagas-diseaseamerican-trypanosomiasis (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers

to Mexico, Central America and South America of Chagas disease spread

by triatomine bugs), ‘‘Chikungunya,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/

travel/diseases/chikungunya (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers

to Africa, Asia, parts of Central and South America, and islands in Indian

Ocean, western and South Pacific, and Caribbean of chikungunya spread by

mosquitoes), ‘‘Dengue,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/

dengue (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to tropical and subtropical regions of dengue spread by mosquitoes); ‘‘Japanese Encephalitis,’’

available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/japanese-encephalitis

(last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to certain areas of Asia of

Japanese encephalitis spread by mosquitoes), ‘‘Malaria,’’ available at https://

wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/malaria (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to Africa, Central and South America, parts of Caribbean, Asia,

eastern Europe and south Pacific of malaria spread by mosquitoes), ‘‘Murray

Valley Encephalitis Virus,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/murray-valley-encephalitis-virus (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning

travelers to New Guinea and certain areas of Australia of Murray Valley

encephalitis spread by mosquitoes), ‘‘Plague,’’ available at https://

wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/plague-bubonic-pneumonic-septicemic

(last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to Africa, central Asia, Indian

subcontinent, northern South America and parts of southwestern United

States of three types plague spread by fleas), ‘‘Rift Valley Fever,’’ available

at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/rift-river-valley (last visited August

7, 2017) (warning travelers to Africa of Rift Valley fever spread by mosquitoes), ‘‘Ross River Virus Disease,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/

diseases/ross-river-virus-disease (last visited August 7, 2017)(warning travelers to Australia and Papua New Guinea of Ross River virus disease spread by

mosquitoes), ‘‘Tick-borne Encephalitis,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/

travel/diseases/tickborne-encephalitis (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning

travelers to Europe and Asia of tick-borne encephalitis), ‘‘West Nile Virus,’’

available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/west-nile-virus (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to Africa, Europe, Middle East,
portions of Asia, and North America of West Nile virus spread by mosquitoes), ‘‘Yellow Fever,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/

yellow-fever (last visited August 7, 2017) (warning travelers to certain parts

of South America and Africa of yellow fever spread by mosquitoes), and

‘‘Zika,’’ available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/zika (last visited

August 7, 2017)(generally warning of Zika spread by mosquitoes). In addition

to providing a warning, all of the CDC notices contain a section detailing

what travelers can do to prevent each disease.

12 See, e.g., L. Alvarez & P. Belluck, ‘‘Pregnant Women Advised to Avoid

Travel to Active Zika Zone in Miami Beach,’’ The New York Times, August 19,

2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/science/5-zika-caseswere-transmitted-in-miami-beach-florida-governor-says.html?_r=0 (last visited August 7, 2017); S. Scutti, ‘‘Experts warn of increases in tick-borne

Powassan virus,’’ CNN, May 3, 2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/

05/03/health/powassan-tick-virus/ (last visited August 7, 2017); R. Ferris,

‘‘One sign that 2017 will be a bad year for Lyme disease,’’ CNBC, March

6, 2017, available at www.cnbc.com/2017/03/06/one-sign-that-2017-will-be-abad-year-for-lyme-disease.html (last visited August 7, 2017); R. Dawood,

‘‘Tick-borne encephalitis threat in central Europe,’’ The Telegraph, June

27, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/2202634/

Tick-borne-encephalitis-threat-in-central-Europe.html (last visited August

7, 2017).

13 There was a consensus among the witnesses at trial that the CDC is a

standard and primary source used by travel professionals to determine the

risks present in a particular area when planning a trip to that area. The

defendant’s expert David Freedman, a physician who is certified in infectious

diseases, tropical and travel medicine, and epidemiology, testified that ‘‘the

CDC is the [source] that would be regarded as the standard for [travel

medicine advice] . . . . The CDC are our national guidelines for travel

medicine.’’ Thompson agreed: ‘‘The standard [sources] that we reference

are the CDC, that’s the first and foremost . . . .’’ McKenzie, too, stated that

in evaluating travel related health risks ‘‘the obvious and primary [sources]

in the [United States] would be the CDC and the State Department.’’

14 See, e.g., Travel Health Pro, ‘‘Diseases in Brief,’’ available at https://

travelhealthpro.org.uk/diseases (last visited August 7, 2017) (travel health

website established under United Kingdom Department of Health).

15 In the present case, the defendant essentially has admitted as much.

As the DistrictCourtrecounted, ‘‘[a]t trial, Head of School Malcolm McKenzie

testified that the school has an unquestionable duty to protect the kids from

dangerous conditions and injuries wherever it can. . . . McKenzie further

testified that the school warns students of the risk of malaria [when organizing trips] in tropical regions . . . and it requires students to take steps to

prevent infection. . . . Thompson also affirmed that the school had a duty

to determine if there were disease risks on the [China] trip and, specifically,

to protect [the plaintiff] against [insect-borne] disease.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.)Relatedly,the defendant’s travel materials

addressed the need for immunizations and other medical issues. There was

also ample evidence at trial that the defendant took measures to warn

students against the risk of Lyme disease, another tick-borne illness, at its

Lakeville campus, and to protect them against that risk. The school’s

approach is undoubtedly correct. See 2 Restatement(Second), supra, § 314A,

comment (d), p. 119 (‘‘[t]he duty to protect the other [in custody] against

unreasonable risk of harm extends to risks . . . arising from forces of

nature or animals’’).

16 In fact, the sizeable verdict in this case, and the District Court’s refusal

to set it aside on the basis that no such duty existed, has not caused

the defendant to cease offering its international travel programs. Rather,

according to the defendant’s website, nearly one quarter of its students still

participate in these programs annually. See The Hotchkiss School, ‘‘Travel

Programs,’’ available at https://www.hotchkiss.org/academics/travel-programs (last visited August 7, 2017).

The defendant contends that this case already has spurred additional,

unwarranted litigation, drawing our attention to an action that was filed by

the plaintiff’s attorney on behalf of another minor who contracted Lyme

disease while at camp. See Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., United

States District Court, Docket No. 3:13-CV-01458 (SRU) (D. Conn. 2013). That

case apparently has been terminated with a confidential settlement. In the

absence of any information as to the facts of the matter or the terms of its

settlement, we decline to speculate as to its import, if indeed there is any.

17 The facts of this case are illustrative. The plaintiff did not prevail simply
because of the existence of a legal duty; rather, she produced compelling

evidence that the contraction of tick-borne encephalitis on Mount Panshan

was foreseeable; see footnote 7 of this opinion; and that the defendant’s

various failures to exercise reasonable care caused her to contract that

illness. In regard to those failures, we find the District Court’s observations

to be apt: ‘‘The school assumes that if public policy allows the [plaintiff] to

bring these claims, it could only avoid liability if it chose the most extreme

prophylaxis, [b]ut that is not necessarily the case. Here, [the defendant]

made no attempt to warn students about insects or to protect students

against insect-borne disease. This is not a case where the school provided

students with simple, accurate advice about the risk of insect-borne disease

and then a quick, gentle reminder to apply bug spray before hiking. The

jury may well have found for the defendant had [it] taken those two precautions but not instructed its teachers to apply the [bug] spray onto students’

skin or failed to insist that students wear long sleeves and long pants. Too

much went wrong in the spring and summer of 2007 for this case to resolve

the question of the minimum amount of care required for a school to discharge its duty to protect students from insect-borne disease on school trips

abroad.’’ (Emphasis added.) We note in this regard that the third public

policy factor does not require the minimization of litigation at all costs,

but rather, ‘‘focuses upon the diminishment of an inappropriate flood of

litigation.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area,

Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 703. Nevertheless, if the recognition of a duty of

care encourages potential defendants to exercise reasonable care and take

protective measures, ‘‘litigation is unlikely to increase; it may even decrease.’’

Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 120, 869 A.2d

179 (2005).

18 See footnote 7 of this opinion.

19 ‘‘[T]he Restatement (Third) [supra] explains that because the extent of

foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the case, courts should

leave such determinations to the trier of fact unless no reasonable person

could differ on the matter. Indeed, foreseeability determinations are particularly fact dependent and case specific, representing a [factual] judgment

about a course of events . . . that one often makes outside any legal context. So, by incorporating foreseeability into the analysis of [public policy],

a court transforms a factual question into a legal issue and expands the

authority of judges at the expense of juries or triers of fact.

‘‘That is especially peculiar because decisions of foreseeability are not

particularly legal, in the sense that they do not require special training,

expertise, or instruction, nor do they require considering far-reaching policy

concerns. Rather, deciding what is reasonably foreseeable involves common

sense, common experience, and application of the standards and behavioral

norms of the community—matters that have long been understood to be

uniquely the province of the finder of fact.’’ (Footnotes omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 0001,

supra, 280 Neb. 212.

20 Stuart Rose, a physician with expertise in travel medicine who provided

expert testimony for the plaintiff, testified that he, like any competent travel

medicine practitioner, would give the same advice as that published on the

CDC website to protect against tick bites and that DEET based insect

repellents, when properly applied, are 80 to 100 percent effective against

ticks. In Rose’s opinion, if the plaintiff had employed tick protection measures, she would not have contracted tick-borne encephalitis. The jury apparently credited this testimony.

21 At trial, the plaintiff’s mother described her condition in the Beijing

hospital: ‘‘[S]he was curled up and had her arms like this . . . looking up

to the ceiling and totally like she was retarded and in shock and couldn’t

move and [was] frozen. . . . She couldn’t speak. She couldn’t move. Her

eyes were rolled up, almost behind her head. It was just the [most] horrific

picture a mother could ever, ever imagine seeing.’’ Because the plaintiff’s

condition was yet to be diagnosed, and her doctors feared that it was

contagious, her parents were not allowed to touch her.

22 At trial, the plaintiff testified by typing answers to questions into a

machine, which would convert the written answers into a computer generated voice.

23 Notably, however, the noneconomic damages award in this case is not

the largest verdict of its kind in Connecticut. See D’Attilo v. Viscarello,

Docket No. UWY-CV-05-4010135-S, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury (May 25, 2011) (awarding $50 million in noneconomic damages for

forty-three years of expected pain and suffering), available at 2011 WL
2489003 (West’s Jury Verdict and Settlement Summary 2015).