1 In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ NO. 09 -20- 00 2 93 -CV

__________________ GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK , Appellant
V.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 284 th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 20 -02-0 2039

- CV

__________________________________________________________________ OPINION
At issue in th is appeal is whether the Uniform Condominium Act
makes an agreement to settle a subrogation claim , which the Act require s
to be waived , enforceable

. 1 On cross - motion for summary judgment, t he

1 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82. 111(d) (requiring the insurer to waive it s right to subrogation under the policy against a unit owner); id

. § 82.004 (prohibiting persons from varying the requirements of Chapter 82 by agreement “[e]xcept as expressly provided by this chapter” [])

.2 trial court refused to enforce the agreement and rendered a take

- nothing judgment against the plaintiff who sued the defendant to enforce a settlement agreement of an insurance subrogation claim the Act required
the i nsurance company that brought the suit to waive

. Finding no error, we affirm. Background
The Fire
Dana and Donna Evans own a unit at T he Shore , a high

- rise condominium in Austin, Texas. In May 2019, a n accidental fire , which investigators determined originated in the Evanses ’ unit , damaged property in several units and in the common areas on several floors of
The Shore

. 2 The duties of the entity responsible for managing The Shore , duties that include obtaining insurance against risks of loss like fires, are

2 In general , t he Declaration filed of record for The Shore create d a separate ownership interest for the property that each u nit owner kept in side the walls of the owner’s u nit . That said, the owner of a unit also
own s an undivided interest in the Common Elements

. The Declaration define d the Common Elements broadly to mean “ [a]ll po r tions of the Condominium, including both the General C ommon E lements and L imited Common E lements, and including the R esidential Unit’s interest in the Master Common E lements but excluding the Units.”3 created by filing a document referred to as a declaration in the real property records of the county where the condominium is built

. 3 A limited partnership formed T he Shore in 2006 , dedicat ing the property to be used
as a condominium by filing a “Condominium Declaration” (the Declaration) in the real

- property records of Travis County , Texas

. Under
the Declaration , the purchase rs of units at The Shore bec a me members
of T he Shore Condominium Association, I nc
. ( the Association )

. Under the Declaration, the Association is responsible for manag ing the
Assoc i ation ’ s affairs. The owners of the unit s must pay A ssociation dues , which are used among other things to purchase insur ance to cover the
property at The Shore . T o comply with that obligation , the Association bought an insurance policy from Great American Insurance Company of
New York , which insured the property The Shore was required to insure
under the Uniform Condominium Act against the risk of loss from fires, less the policy ’s deductible. After the May 2019 fire, Great American paid the claims presented to it that were covered under its policy from the fire

. The claims Great
American paid came from owners of units who had property damaged in

3 Id . §§ 82.051(a), .111.4 their units, including the Evanses. Great American also paid to repair damages that occurred to property in the common areas of the floors damaged in the fire. In the areas outside the units, the owners of the
units hold an undivided interest, which The Shore’s Declaration defines

as Common Elements

. 4
The Declaration also required the Evanses to obtain insurance on the property in their unit. And the Declaration required them to obtain “insurance covering damage to other Units or property located therein, the cause of which originates from such Owner’s Unit.” To comply with their obligations under the Declaration, t he Evanses bought a condomini um policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

. Nationwide’s policy covered the Evanses for up to $300,000 per occurrence for their negligent “ownership, maintenance or use of real or personal property[.]”
The S ettlement
Great American’s settlement is tied to an email dated December 16, 2019, that its attorney Chris Surber, sent Nationwide’s adjuster, Ross Ver Helst. In the email, Great American offered “to resolve any and all

4 See n
. 2.5 claims and causes of action it has or may have against Dana and Donna Evans arising out of and related to the [May 2019] fire for the total
amount of $373,212.93 or Dana and Donna Evans ’ insurance policy liability limit, whichever is less. ” 5 On January 16, 2020, Ver Helst
sent Surber an email and responded to his settlement demand : Chris, this is confirmation that we are accepting your demand for the damages to The [Shore] Condominium Association for the remainder of our insured ’ s liability limit. We have previously settled subrogation claims for two of the condo unit owners and have remaining liability limit [s] of $266,540.25 of our insured ’ s $300,000 liability policy limit. 6

5 See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(a) (requiring the unit owners association, to maintain property insurance on the insurable common elements if that insurance is reasonably available); § 82.111(b) (when the building contains units with “horizontal boundaries described in the declaration,” the unit owners association must maintain insurance when it is reasonably available that “include[s] the units,” but the insurance “need not include improvement and betterments installed by unit owners”). 6 Sur b er’s demand le tter and Ver Helst’s emails refer to the condominium association responsible for managing The Shore as “The Waterfront Master Condominium Association.” The Clerk’s Record, however, shows that as of May 2019 the correct legal name for the condominium where the fire occurred is The Shore’s Condominium Owner’s Association , Inc . The Clerk’s Record includes a corrective amendment, which shows The Waterfront Master Condominium Association, Inc. became The Shore Condominium Association, Inc. in 2006. In August 201 9, an endorsement was added to Great American’s policy naming “The Shore Condominium Association” as a named insured under Great American’s policy, with the name change retroactive to the policy’s inception. For clarity and t o avoid confusion , we have c hos en to6 On receiv ing Ver Hel s t’s email, Surber sent Ver Helst the following
email : My client accepts your offer of $266,540.25. Please make the check payable to “Gauntt, Koen, Binney & Kidd LLP as trustee for Great American Insurance Company of New York” and mail the same to my attention at the below address. A copy of my firm’s W9 is attac hed. If you require a release, please send the same as soon as you can. Finally, can you tell me if you paid the other condo owners 100% of their claim, based on a pro rata basis, etc? On January 17, 2019, Dana Evans sent Ver Helst the following
email : I do not believe that the Great American Insurance Co. of New York has the right to a claim against my policy

. The Texas Property Code Sec. 82.111 requires condominium associations to maintain an insurance policy covering the building, common elements and the units, except for improvements and betterments in the individual units. The Code also requires that each unit
owner must be insured by the policy against liability arising out of the person’s ownership of the common elements or membership in the association as required by the association declarations (subsection (d)(1)). This would appear to limit any liability that I would have
use The Shore Condominium Association when referring to the entity in charge of the condominium based on the documents in the Clerk’s Record that show that was the entity ’s legal name of record when the fire occurred in May 2019.7 relating to damages to common elements of the building. In addition, the Association insurance policy must waive the right to subrogation against a unit owner (subsection (d)(2)). Finally, if the unit owner has insurance covering the same loss, the association insurance is primary (subsection (d)(4)). If a unit owner is partly or wholly responsible for a loss, the association may assess the
owner for the amount of the association insurance policy deductible and any costs exceeding the insurance limits (section (l)). This recovery is not available to the insurance company.
The Shore Condominium Declarations Section VI, subsection 6.1.c. requires that insurance purchased by the Association or an Owner must waive the right to subrogation against any member or owner of the association.
The Great American Insurance Co. of New York insurance policy for The Shore Condominium Association complies with the requirements of the Texas Property Code. It provides coverage for the building except for improvements and betterments and appliances installed in individual units (Building and Personal Property Coverage Form page 36, and Texas Condominium Association Coverage Amendment page 100). Under the Texas Condominium Association Coverage Amendment, the policy specifically waives the right to recover against any unit owner (page 101). The deductible for any loss is $25,000 (page 109). This amount would be recoverable by The Shore Condominium Association, through their trustee, and not by Great American Insurance Co. of New York. Based on this information, I do not see how Great American Insurance Company of New York can make a claim against me for any losses that they insure under the Association policy. My liability for the deductible amount should be paid to the Association Trustee. I am responsible for damage to property of other owners not8 covered under the Association policy, and I expect that to be covered under liability section of my policy with Nationwide Mutual.
Please explain to me how I have this wrong. 7 After Northwestern received Dana’s email, it didn’t fund the
settlement or send Great American any releases. In February 2020, Great American sued Nationwide alleging that Nationwide accepted and
then breached the agreement it made with Great American to s ettle Great American’s subrogation claim. Nationwide answered and filed a counterclaim . In its counterclaim, Nationwide alleged that assuming an agreement to settle did occur , which it denied, the agreement was illegal
and unenforceable as a matter of publ ic policy under the Uniform
Condominium Act. In the alternative, Nationwide claimed the settlement
resulted from a mutual mistake

. It asked the court based on its claims of
mistake to set the settlement aside

. The parties sought to resolve the claims and defenses raised in their pleadings in a series of six dispositive motions: (1) Great American’s

7 Dana Evans learn ed in a telephone call with Ver Helst on January 16 that Great American had threatened to sue the Evanses if Northwestern refused to pay the amount Great American demanded to settle the subrogation claim that it represented to Ver Helst it had against the Evanses

.9 Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ( Nationwide’s Breach of Contract Claim); (2) Great American ’s Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgmen t ( Nationwide’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment and Motion to Dismiss for L ack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction ) ; (3) Nationwide’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ( Great American’s Breach of Contract Claim ) ; (4) Nationwide’s
Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ( Great American’s Claims for Declaratory Relief ) ; (5) Great American’s Amended Traditional Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (Nationwide’s Breach of Contract Claim); and (6) Great American’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss

. In October 2020, the trial court ruled on the se motions , incorporating its rulings in a Final Judgment. Great American complains the trial court erred in granting Nationwide’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on it s breach of

c ontract c la im. Based on that ruling, the trial court ordered Great
Amer ican to “take nothing on its claims and causes of action against Defendant Nationwide[.]” The trial court made its take

- nothing judgment
final by including language of finality in its judgment. Th e last two10 sentence s of the judgment state : “A ll relief not granted is denied. This
J udgment is final as to all claims and parties and is appealable. ” 8 After the trial court signed the judgment, Great American moved
for a new trial

. T he trial court later overruled the motion and Great American appealed

. Standard of Review
We review summary judgments de novo

. 9 “ To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show no
material fact issues exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. ” 10 We take as true all evidence favorable to the respondent, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of
the non

- movant. 11 “ When both parties move for summary judgment and
the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, . . . we review both

8 See Bella Palma, LLC v. Young , 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (“A trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.”). 9 Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin , 645 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 2022). 10 Id .; Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). 11 Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003).11 sides ’ summary judgment evidence and render the judgment the trial
court should have rendered. ” 12 In its motion for summary judgment, Northwestern relied on more than one theory to support its claim that it was entitled to summary judgment. When the trial court ruled on Northwestern’s motion, it did not explain the theory on which it decided to grant Northwestern’s
motion. Since the court did not specify the grounds on which it granted
the motion, we must affirm the trial court’s “ summary judgment if any of the grounds asserted are meritorious. ” 13 Analysis Great American raises three issues in its brief. In issue one, Great American argues that its settlement with Northwestern doesn’t violate public policy under the Uniform Condominium Act because the legislature didn’t intend to prevent parties from settlin g disputes under Chapter 82 . In issue two, Great American argues the trial court erred in granting Northwestern’s motion because the evidence conclusively

12 Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp

. , 615 S.W.3d 144, 147

- 48 (Tex. 2020). 13 Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC , 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (T ex. 2017).12 proved the parties agreed to settle and their agreement is enforceable
under Texas law

. In issue three, Great American argues the trial court erred in granting the motion based on Northwestern’s argument that
Great American failed to comply with a condition precedent to Northwestern’s policy before Great American filed suit

. We note that b ot h parties have cited the Uniform Condominium Act throughout their briefs. 14 For convenience, we will address Great American’s argument that the settlement doesn’t violate public policy
first

. And when addressing th is argument, which Great American relied

on in the first two issues of its brief, we will assume without deciding that the representative s of Northwestern and Great American had full knowledge of all the facts needed to reach a binding agreement when they exchanged the emails that resulted in the settlement that led to the dispute

. 15 With these assumptions, we are left with two question s of law:

14 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 82.0 0 1

- .164 (West 201 4 & Supp. 2022) (the Uniform Condominium Act or the UCA). Although the legislature has amended various sections of the UCA after the May 2019 fire, there are no changes in the statute relevant to Great American’s appeal. For that reason, we cite the current version of the statute in the opinion. 15 Northwestern disputes that Ver Helst had full knowledge of all the relevant facts

. But his knowledge is not relevant if the Un iform Condominium Act prevents the courts from enforcing the agreement even13 (1) Does the Uniform Condominium Act apply to a condominium owners association’s insurance company? (2) If so, did the Texas legislature intend to prevent parties from using settlement agreements under
circumstances that involve the insurance the Uniform Condominium Act requires condominiums to carry as a device to avoid the limitations and prohibitions in Property Code section 82.111? 16
Does the Uniform Condominium Ac t Apply to Great American? Just like any other individual or entity, insurance companies are
free to settle doubtful and disputed claims and “ may contract as they wish so long as the agreement reached does not violate positive law or offend public policy. ” 17 Still, the “freedom of c ontract is not unbounded.” 18

“ W hen a contractual arrangement is inconsonant with public policy expressed in a regulatory statute, preservation of contractual freedom and its ‘indispensable partner’

— contract enforcement

— must yield.” 19

when the parties know all the relevant facts needed to allow parties to reach a binding settlement. 16 Id . § 81.111 (Insurance). 17 Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White , 490 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tex. 2016). 18 Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP , 246 S.W.3d 653, 664 (Tex. 2008). 19 White, 490 S.W.3d at 490.14 Great American argues that nothing in the Act prohibited Great American “from making a subrogation claim against Nationwide” or Northwestern from “accepting Great American’s” demand. Great American also claims the Uniform Condominium Act doesn’t apply to
i nsurers who sell insurance to condominium associations, suggesting its
reach is limited to condominium owners’ associations and to the owners of the units in condominiums. As Great American sees it, its settlement with Northwestern “conferred a new, indepe ndent right to Great American upon which Great American could recover without aid, or assistance of the allegedly illegal policy or right/claim, especially considering the fact that the settlement included the Association’s
deductible.” In response to Nort hwestern’s argument claiming Great
American waived its rights of subrogation under Chapter 82 and its policy , Great American suggests that Northwestern should have raised
that claim in response to Great American’s settlement demand . Great
American conclude s Northwestern lost its right to raise that claim after

agree ing to the settlement.15 S tarting with the Act, we note the Act regulates how condominiums created since January 1, 1994 , are regulated and managed

. 20 Given the inherent complexit ies involved in carving real estate up into separately and commonly owned parts, the UCA establishes baseline rules that apply the creation, development , and management of condominiums

. 21
The insurance coverage condominiums mus t carry is just one of the areas where the legislature became involved in the business of regulati ng and

manag ing condominiums under the Act

. 22 And when a condominium
includes units with horizontal boundaries described in the declaration
filed of record , the legislature said the condominium owner’s association

must obtain a policy , if reasonably available , that includes the property
in an owner ’ s unit , except for the “improvements and betterments ” that
the unit owner installed

. 23

20 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 82.001, .051, .055, .101

- .116

. 21 Id . §§ 82.001

- . 164

. 22 Id . § 82.111(d). 23 Id . § 82.111(b). T he Declarat ion for The Shore state s the physical boundaries of the units are “depicted on the “Map[.]” The Declaration defines “Map” as “the plats and plans described as Exhibit ‘B’ attached to the Declarations

. ” However, the Clerk’s Record does not contain the plats and plans exhibit that the documents filed of record in Travis County reference as an attachment to the Declaration , Exhibit B. Still, the definition of “Map” in The Shore’s Declaration states Exhibit B incudes a16 In addition to the above, the Uniform Condominium Act contains
additional requirements obligat ing the Association to obtain insurance coverage for the property of The Shore. U nder Property Code section 82.111(d), t he Association had to obtain a policy (1) nam ing each unit owner as an insured, (2) waiv ing the carrier’s right to subrogation against
each unit owner, (3) provid ing that no act or omission of a unit owner

— unless acting within the unit owner’s authority for t he Association

— would void the Associati on’s policy, and (4) making the Association’s policy the primary policy should a unit owner obtain insurance that also

cover ed their loss. 24 No one has argued that a policy meeting the requirements of Property Code section 82.111 was n’t reasonably available when the Association bought the policy insur ing The Shore against the losses that

were caused by the May 2019 fire. Indeed, the evidence shows Great
American treated the individual unit owners, including the Evanses, as
insureds under its policy as it paid claims as they were presented by unit

“survey plat of the Property and dimensional drawing s that horizontally and vertically identity and describe the Units and the Common Elements.” 24 Id . § 82.111(d).17 owners for the property covered by the policy in the units damaged by the
fire. While Great American argues the legislature didn’t intend Chapter 82 to apply to insurance companies, the language of the statute shows i t s argument lacks merit. For instance, Property Code section 82.111(g) provides that “[t]he insurer issuing the policy may not cancel or refuse to renew it less than 30 days after written notice of the proposed
cancellation o r nonrenewal has been mailed to the association.” 25 And
when a claim is submitted that i s payable for damages to the Common Elements of the condominium under a policy purchased by the Association, “[t]he insurance proceeds for that loss shall be payable to an insurance trustee designated by the association for that purpose[.]” 26 All in all, Property Code section 82.111 represents a tightly regulated
scheme that designates the insurance condominiums built after January 1, 1994 , must carry

. 27 Thus, it’s clea r from the language in the statute that the legislature
inten ded section 82.111 to apply to insurer s that sell condominium

25 Id . § 82.111(g). 26 Id . § 82.111(e). 27 Id . §§ 82.111, .111(d).18 polic ies to condominium associations subject to Chapter 82. 28 W hen a “statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the language according to its common meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic
aids.” 29 We reject Great American’s argument that Chapter 82 does n’t apply to Great American

. The summary - judgment evidence shows Great
American sold an insurance policy to a condominium owner’s association
that is required to carry a policy that contains the coverage required by Property Code section 82.111(d)

. 30 Great American concedes its coverage did comply with the Act, and based on our review of the policy , w e agree the provisions in the policy include a waiver of subrogation against those
who own units in The Shore

. 31 Does Chapter 82 Render the Settlement Unenforce a ble ? Great American argues Chapter 82 doesn’t reach its agreement. But the language of Chapter 82 prohibits parties from using any device

28 Id . § 82.111. 29 State v. Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006)

. 30 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(d). 31 See Great American Policy Endorsement SB 87 66 Texas

— Condominium Association Coverage Amendments, I V

. Select Business Policy Conditions, Loss Conditions[

— Amendments, Waiver of Rights of Re covery] ; Condominium Declaration For The Shore, A Condominium, Article VI, Insurance, Section 6.1(c).19 except as expressly provided by Chapter 82 from evading the Chapter’s limitations or prohibitions. 32 The section of the Property Code restricting the freedom of parties to freely contract around the provisions in Chapter
82 states: Except as expressly provide d by this chapter, provisions of this chapter may not be varied by agreement, and rights conferred by this chapte r may not be waived. A person may not act under a power of attorney or use any other device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of this chapter or the declaration [filed of record for the condominium]

. 33 To be sure, t he legislature used “except as pr ovided” in many of the
sections of Chapter 82

. 34 But we find it significant that it didn’t provide for any exceptions in Property Code section 82.111(a)

- (d) , the subsections of Chapter 82 that create the rules prescribing the insurance coverage for
condomi nium owners associations like the one responsible for managing
The Shore. 35 To be sure, section 82.004 applies to persons and that term isn’t
defined in the Uniform Condominium Act

. 36 Still, we must assume that

32 Id . § 82.004. 33 Id

. 34 Id . §§ 82. 102(f), . 103(a), .107(a)

- (d), .170, .111(i), .112(d), .113(d), .114(j), .117, .151(a), .152(a), .157(a), .007(b), .067(a), .068(f)

. 35 Id . § 82.111(a)

- (d). 36 See id

. § 82.003 (Definitions).20 the legislature intended for courts to interpret the word person to include corporation s since the legislature define d person to include corporations in the Code Construction Act, an Act that applies to defining the words the legislature didn’t specifically define in the Uniform Condominium
Act. 37 A careful examination of the Act’s structure reveals that if insurance coverage is reasonably available to a condominium required to cover the risks listed in section 82.111(a)

- (d), the condominium owners
association and its insu rer cannot waive the requirements. No one has claimed that insurance covering those risks was not reasonabl y available
to The Shore. Thus , as a person subject to restrictions and prohibitions of section 82.111 and 82.004, Great American could not use any “device to evade the limitations or prohibitions” of the waiver of subrogation required in section 82.111(d). 38 Faced with the language of the statute , Great American still argues that enforcing its arm’s

- length agreement with Northwestern outweighs
Northwestern’s public policy argument that its settlement should be
declared void as a matter of public policy despite the policy preference

37 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § § 311.00 2, 311.00 5(2) ( “‘Person’ includes corporati on, organization, . . . and any other legal entity

. ” ). 38 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § § 82.004 , .111, .111(d).21 the legislature expressed prohibiting parties from using any device to
evade the limitations of Chapter 82. According to Great American, enforcing settlement s and allowing parties to settle claims is more important than allowing it to use the settlement in the manner they used
it here. Northwestern responds that enforcing the settlement offends public policy because enforcing the agreement would allow Great
American to collect on a subrogation claim that both doesn’t exist under
its policy and to collect on a subrogation claim the legislature required it

to waive

. 39
Great American cites several cases to support its argument that the
trial court erred in holding its settlement with Northwestern was

un enforceable . The cases it cites, however, may be distinguished on their
facts. For example, Great American relies heavily on Jistel v. Tiffany
Trail Owners Association , Inc orporated , 215 S.W.3d 474, 482 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2006, no pet.) to support its claim that Nationwide can’t rely on section 82.004 t o avoid the terms of its agreement to fund the settlement based on the $ 266,540 term on which the parties agreed

. 40

39 See n.31. 40 Jistel v. Tiffany Trail Owners Ass ’ n , Inc

. , 215 S.W.3d 474, 4 77

- 78 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2006, no pet.)

.22 But unlike here, t he parties involved in the lawsuit in Jistel were the unit owner and the condominium association . T he question before the Eastland Court of Appeals was whether Chapter 82 allowed the parties
to settle a claim Larry Jistel, as the plaintiff, filed after suing Tiffany
Trail to repair his unit on a claim against Tiffany Trail Condominium
Association under Property Code section 82.107

. 41 Under s ection 82.107 ,

a condominium owner’s association is “responsible for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements” of the condominium. 42
In s ection 82.107 , the legislature provide d room for a condominium
association to alter the maintenance, repair , and replacement requirements

. But in section 82.111 , the provision that mandates the insurance coverage condominiums must carry, the legislature did not provide room allowing co ndominiums to alter the insurance coverage the legislature required

. 43 To boil it down, the Eastland Court of Appeals didn’t address a
settlement based on a claim waived under section 82.111 , a section where the legislature didn’t allow variances from the insurance coverage the

41 Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107(a). 42 Jistel , 215 S.W.3d at 482 ; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107(a). 43 Compare Tex. Prop. Code A nn. § 82.107 (a)

- (d) , with § 82.111.23 legislature required condominiums to have

. 44 And unlike section 82.107, which applies to the maintenance and repair obligations of condominium
associations , section 8 2 .111, which governs a condominium association’s insurance obligations, doesn’t allow the association or its insurer the right to vary or waive the rights conferred on unit owners in section 82.111 including the waiver of subrogation provision, section
82.1 11(d)(2). 45
The other cases Great American relies on in its brief are also distinguishable

. N one of them involve statutory provisions like the ones in Property Code sections 82.004 and 82.111. 46

44 Jistel , 215 S.W.3d at 482

- 83 ; Compare Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107 , with id . § 82.111. 45 Compare Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107 , with id . §§ 82.111, .111(d)(2). 46 (1) Hartford Fire I ns. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry . Co ., 239 S.W. 919, 923 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, holding approved, judgm’t adop ted); (2) Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tabor , 230 S.W. 397, 399 (1921); (3) De Leon v. Trevino & Bro s
. , 49 Tex. 88, 91

- 92 (1878) ; (4) Plano Parkway Office Condos. v . Bever Props. , LLC , 246 S.W.3d 188, 195 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); (5) Beyers v. Roberts , 199 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); (6) Associated Milk Producers v. Nelson , 624 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.) ; (7) Markman v . Gaitz , 499 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); (8) Castilleja v. Camero , 402 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. App.―Corpus Christi 1966), aff’d , 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967); (9) City of Garland v. Tex. Power & Light24 Since the te x t in section 82.004 and 82.111 is clear , it “is determinative of legislative intent unless the plain meaning of the

statu t e’s words would produce an absurd result.” 47 T he text of the statute required Great American to waive its subrogation rights, which left it with no right to sue the Evanses in an effort to shift the loss es th at fell on its policy to the Evanses and their insurer, Northwestern. For that reason, voiding Great American’s settlement with Northwestern doesn’t
strike us as absurd or unfair.
Conclusion
We hold the trial court did not err in granting Northwestern’s motion for summary judgment. The summary

- judgment evidence conclusively established that Great American waived its subrogation claim against the Evanses , 48 and that under an endorsement to Great American’s policy , Great American ’s policy is the primary policy that was

C o ., 295 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Dallas 1956, no writ); (10) Fred Miller Brewing C o
. v. Coonrod , 230 S.W. 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.

— San Antonio 1921, writ ref’d). 47 Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. Wichita Cty

. , 5 4 8 S.W.3d 498, 492 (Tex. 2018). 48 See n.31

.25 required to respond to the damages that resulted from the fire at The
Shore

. 49 We overrule Great American’s first two issues. 50 T he trial court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED

.

_________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice Submitted on May 12, 2022 Opinion Delivered February 9, 2023
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ

.

49 See Great American Policy Endorsement SB 87 66 Texas — Condominium Association Coverage Amendments, I V. Select Business Policy Conditions, Loss Conditions ( making Great American’s policy primary when a unit owner has other insurance that covers the loss ) ; Cond ominium Declaration For The Shore, A Condominium, Article VI, Insurance, Section 6.2(a) (iii) ; see also Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111 (d) (4). 50 We need not reach Great American’s third issue since we have affirmed the summary judgment on Northwestern’s claim the settlement is unenforceable against it under Chapter 82. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1

.