IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1097

Filed September 22, 2021

WILLIAM JOSEPH REINSBACH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

GREAT LAKES COOPERATIVE and NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson, 

Judge.

William Reinsbach appeals from a district court order enforcing a decision 

of the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. AFFIRMED.

Mark S. Soldat of Mark S. Soldat, PLC, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Jeffrey W. Lanz of Huber, Book, Lanz, & McConkey PLLC, West Des 

Moines, for appellees.

Heard by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

William Reinsbach appeals from a district court judgment entered pursuant 

to Iowa Code section 86.42 (2019) to enforce a decision of the Iowa Workers’ 

Compensation Commissioner. Reinsbach contends the district court went beyond 

construing the commissioner’s ruling and improperly modified the ruling. Finding 

no error of law, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This court summarized the background facts in a prior appeal:

William Reinsbach sustained an injury to his lower back 

arising out of and in the scope of his employment on April 15, 2005. 

Conservative care was given, but on May 1, 2006, while in physical 

therapy for this work injury, Reinsbach sustained an additional injury. 

Reinsbach’s workers’ compensation claim based on the 2005 injury 

was settled through an agreement for settlement, approved by the 

commissioner on February 14, 2008, setting his permanent partial 

disability rate at [fifteen percent] body as a whole and noting 

Reinsbach would be entitled to future medical care for the injury. 

When Reinsbach’s pain continued, he filed a review-reopening 

petition, and he eventually underwent three back surgeries with a

fourth surgery recommended as of the date of the review-reopening 

hearing on January 18, 2012.

The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner issued his 

decision in the review-reopening case on February 29, 2012, 

concluding Reinsbach proved his condition had deteriorated since 

the settlement and his ongoing treatment was causally related to his 

work injury. The decision also ordered Great Lakes Cooperative and 

Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance (employer) to pay for the medical 

bills Reinsbach had incurred to that point. The issue of the extent of

Reinsbach’s entitlement to temporary and permanent disability 

benefits was bifurcated for a later determination in light of his ongoing 

treatment. The deputy’s decision was appealed within the agency, 

and another deputy, sitting by designation of the commissioner, [on 

May 13, 2013,] affirmed the initial ruling and specifically ordered the 

employer to pay the costs of the action, which included the expense

of two independent medical examinations (IMEs) by Dr. Kuhnlein.

The employer filed a petition for [judicial] review, challenging 

the substantial evidence to support the agency’s determination that 

Reinsbach’s current condition was causally related to his work injury 
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and challenging the agency’s assessment of the cost of the IMEs as 

hearing costs under Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.33(6).

Reinsbach v. Great Lakes Coop., No. 14-0467, 2015 WL 4158767, at *1 (Iowa Ct. 

App. July 9, 2015). 

On appeal, we upheld the finding Reinsbach’s current condition was 

causally related to his work injury, but reversed the portion of the district court’s 

decision affirming the assessment of the costs of IMEs to the employer. Id. at *1–

2. We remanded with directions that the agency determine what portion of the 

costs of Dr. Kunlein’s IMEs was associated with the preparation of the written 

report. Id.

On October 18, 2019, Reinsbach filed with the district court a request for 

entry of judgment to enforce the commissioner’s May 3, 2013 ruling, which stated 

in relevant part:

Claimant asserts that although the hearing deputy found the 

requested medical expenses causally related to the original injury 

and awarded them, he failed to address the issue of authorization 

and whether or not unauthorized care was helpful to claimant. 

Claimant raises this issue only to anticipate such an issue on appeal. 

First, as claimant admits, defendants essentially ended their medical 

treatment of claimant after the last payment of fees to Dr. Fiala in 

early 2009. They have not paid for or authorized any other care since 

that time and have denied responsibility for claimant’s condition after

they ended care. Consequently, the issue of authorization is moot. 

Due to defendants’ denial of liability for the condition and withdrawal 

of authorization for care, they lost the right to choose the medical 

care for this condition. . . . 

The deputy found that the expenses he awarded were for 

reasonable and necessary treatment of the April 15, 2005 work 

injury. I agree. Such a finding is sufficient to award the expenses 

without a specific finding that the care was beneficial. . . . 

Claimant complains that the hearing deputy did not issue a 

specific award of medical expenses, despite asking that claimant 

re-submit his request for medical expenses showing the specific 

amounts paid by him and others. I agree that the hearing deputy did 

not do so. A specific award will be issued in this appeal decision. 
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Claimant is entitled to an order of reimbursement if he has paid those 

expenses. Otherwise, claimant is entitled only to an order directing 

the responsible defendants to make such payments directly to the 

provider. . . .

Claimant complains that the hearing deputy did not address 

the issue of alternate care. I agree the hearing deputy did not do so. 

However, by sustaining the finding the medical expenses to date are 

reasonable and necessary treatment of the work injury, it follows that 

since claimant has not completed that treatment that claimant is still 

in need of reasonable and necessary treatment. Continued 

treatment by David H. Strothman, M.D., and the Institute for Low 

Back and Neck Care shall be awarded in this decision.

ORDER

The following is ordered in addition to the orders contained in 

the review reopening decision of February 29, 2012:

1. Defendants shall reimburse claimant in the amount of 

seven thousand five hundred eleven and 53/100 dollars ($7,511.53) 

for his transportation expenses and eight thousand six hundred 

ninety-nine and 62/100 dollars ($8,699.62) for his out-of-pocket

medical expenses. Defendants shall reimburse claimant’s attorney 

the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00) for his advancement of 

medical expenses. Defendants shall pay providers directly or hold 

claimant harmless from the remainder of the requested medical 

expenses of two hundred sixty-five thousand one hundred forty-one

and 45/100 dollars ($265,141.45), including one thousand eight 

hundred eighty-eight and 80/100 dollars ($1,888.80) or any other any 

unpaid charges by Siouxland Surgery Center and seven hundred 

dollars ($700.00) and any other remaining charges by Dr. Fiala.

2. Defendants shall provide to claimant all future care and 

treatment modalities for his back condition recommended by David 

H. Strothman, M.D., and the Institute for Low Back and Neck Care.

Reinsbach submitted a proposed judgment, which states, in part:

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJU[D]GED, AND 

DECREED that the respondents shall provide William J. Reinsbach 

all future care and treatment modalities for his back recommended 

by David H. Strothman and the Institute for Low Back and Neck Care.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 

that Great Lakes Cooperative and Nationwide Agribusiness, jointly 

and severally, shall authorize and pay for all future care and 

treatment modalities so recommended.

The employer argued entry of judgment was not appropriate because “the 

monetary portion of the award has been satisfied” but, in the event the court did 
5

enter judgment for future medical treatment, the court “should construe the 

commissioner’s decision in accordance with Iowa Code section 85.27, and order[ ] 

Respondents to provide all causally related, reasonable, and necessary care for 

Petitioner’s 04/15/2005 work-related back condition.”

On August 4, 2020, the district court entered judgment “pursuant to Iowa 

Code section 86.42 as follows”:

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that, subject to the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 85, 

the Respondents shall provide Petitioner William J. Reinsbach all 

reasonable and necessary future care and treatment modalities for 

his back condition recommended by David H. Strothman, M.D., and 

the Institute for Low Back and Neck Care.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 

that Respondents Great Lakes Cooperative and Nationwide 

Agribusiness, jointly and severally, shall authorize and pay for all said 

reasonable and necessary future care and treatment modalities so 

recommended.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 

that the court costs of these Iowa Code Section 86.42 proceedings 

are taxed against the Respondents.

Reinsbach appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the permissible scope of a district court judgment under Iowa 

Code section 86.42 for errors of law. See Rethamel v. Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 

628 (Iowa 2004) (Rethamel I).

III. Discussion.

Workers’ compensation is “purely statutory.” Downs v. A & H Constr. Ltd.,

481 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Iowa 1992). In reviewing workers’ compensation claims, 

we are cognizant of “the underlying purpose of the workers’ compensation 

statute—‘to benefit workers and their dependents insofar as the statute permits.’” 
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Heartland Specialty Foods v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 397, 402 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) 

(citation omitted).

Workers’ compensation benefit determinations by the commissioner may 

be enforced via Iowa Code section 86.42, which provides:

Any party in interest may present a file-stamped copy of an order or 

decision of the [workers’ compensation] commissioner, . . . and all 

papers in connection therewith, to the district court where judicial 

review of the agency action may be commenced. The court shall 

render a decree or judgment and cause the clerk to notify the parties. 

The decree or judgment . . . has the same effect and in all 

proceedings in relation thereto is the same as though rendered in a 

suit duly heard and determined by the court.

In Rethamel I, our supreme court observed “a district court is bound to enter 

judgment in conformance with the workers’ compensation award.” 679 N.W.2d at 

628. Quoting a legal encyclopedia, the court stated, “The court has no power to 

change the award, it cannot review, or reverse or modify the award, or construe

the statute. In rendering judgment thereon the court can construe the award.” Id.

(citation omitted). In that case, the supreme court concluded the district court had 

erred in taking additional evidence and expanding on the commissioner’s award. 

Id. at 629.

The Rethamel case returned to the supreme court on the employer’s appeal 

following remand, and the court again explored section 86.42 and the district’s 

authority under that section. Rethamel v. Havey, 715 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 2006) 

(Rethamel II).

The district court’s role at the time of entry of judgment is 

limited to “construing” the commissioner’s decision. According to 

Black’s Law Dictionary, “construe” means “[t]o analyze and explain 

the meaning of (a sentence or passage).” Therefore, the district 

court’s role in entry of judgment is limited to analyzing and explaining 

the meaning of the commissioner’s written award decision.
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Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 

Reinsbach contends the district court erred in entering judgment, objecting 

to phrases italicized here:

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that, subject to the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 85, 

the Respondents shall provide Petitioner William J. Reinsbach all 

reasonable and necessary future care and treatment modalities for 

his back condition recommended by David H. Strothman, M.D., and 

the Institute for Low Back and Neck Care.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 

that Respondents Great Lakes Cooperative and Nationwide 

Agribusiness, jointly and severally, shall authorize and pay for all said 

reasonable and necessary future care and treatment modalities so 

recommended.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 

that the court costs of these Iowa Code Section 86.42 proceedings 

are taxed against the Respondents.

Reinsbach contends the use of the words “subject to the provisions of Iowa Code 

chapter 85” creates ambiguity rather than meaning. As for the words “reasonable 

and necessary,” he asserts they are “superfluous and create uncertainty.”

The first assertion is puzzling inasmuch as all workers’ compensation 

benefits are subject to the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 85. The addition did 

not create any ambiguity.

Concerning the claim the phrase “reasonable and necessary” is 

“superfluous,” i.e., “[b]eing beyond what is required or sufficient,”1 Reinsbach 

concedes the terms are implied by the commissioner’s ruling. The commissioner’s 

written award decision goes beyond implying the terms, specifically providing, “[B]y 

sustaining the finding the medical expenses to date are reasonable and necessary 

 

1 Superfluous, The American Heritage College Dictionary (4th ed. 2004).
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treatment of the work injury, it follows that since claimant has not completed that 

treatment that claimant is still in need of reasonable and necessary treatment.”

The commissioner then ordered the employer “shall provide to claimant all future 

care and treatment modalities for his back condition recommended by David H. 

Strothman, M.D., and the Institute for Low Back and Neck Care.” 

Reinsbach’s proposed judgment language copied the decretal language of 

the commissioner’s ruling, but omitted the “reasonable and necessary” limitation 

recognized by the commissioner.2 “[T]he district court’s role in entry of judgment 

is limited to analyzing and explaining the meaning of the commissioner’s written 

award decision.” Id. The language in the district court judgment properly 

construes the commissioner’s written decision. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 

2

Indeed, Reinsbach’s proposed language might well be read to modify the 

commissioner’s ruling by not recognizing the “reasonable and necessary” 

limitation.