2024 IL 129054

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 129054) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

JESSICA A. LOGAN, Appellant.

Opinion filed March 21, 2024.

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien

concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Holder White took no part in the decision. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Macon County, the defendant, 

Jessica Logan, was convicted of the first degree murder of her 19-month-old son, 

J.C., and sentenced to 33 years in prison. Prior to trial, Logan filed a motion to 

suppress a video of a reenactment of J.C.’s death on the ground that the police 
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should have admonished her under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The 

trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the video was admitted into evidence 

and published to the jury during the State’s case-in-chief. The appellate court 

affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the reenactment was not custodial. 

2022 IL App (4th) 210492, ¶ 83. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

judgment of the appellate court, but for a different reason than that upon which the 

appellate court relied. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On November 25, 2019, the State charged Logan by information with three 

counts of first degree murder. The information alleged that on or between October 

6 and 7, 2019, Logan knowingly asphyxiated J.C., thereby causing his death. See 

720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2018). 

¶ 4 Prior to trial, Logan filed a motion to suppress an October 17, 2019, video 

recording of her reenactment of her discovery of J.C.’s body. In the motion, Logan 

alleged that, following J.C.’s death and prior to her arrest on October 23, 2019, both 

the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and detectives from the 

Decatur Police Department told her “that she would need to perform a reenactment 

of the events that transpired the night of J.C.’s death.” She alleged that, “[o]n 

numerous occasions, she was told by DCFS investigator, Leandra Tate, that she 

would be required to participate in said reenactment.” On the date of the 

reenactment, Logan arrived at her home with Hope Taylor (J.C.’s biological 

grandmother) and Logan’s four-year-old son. Upon their arrival, they were met by 

two DCFS investigators and three Decatur police officers. Logan alleged that all 

three police officers “were wearing vests indicating that they were police officers, 

they all wore badges around their necks indicating that they were police officers 

and they all had firearms that were in plain view.” 

¶ 5 Logan alleged that Taylor and Logan’s four-year-old son “were told that they 

would not be allowed to enter the home with [Logan] while the reenactment 

occurred and that they would need to remain outside.” She alleged that no one told 

her at any point that the reenactment was voluntary or optional. She also alleged 

that she was not given Miranda warnings before or during the reenactment. Logan 

alleged that the detectives and DCFS investigators kept her at the apartment for 
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well over an hour. She alleged that the “reenactment” portion of the encounter 

lasted only five or six minutes, while the remaining time was dedicated to asking 

her interrogatory questions unrelated to the reenactment. According to the motion, 

the police officers then asked Logan for consent to search her home, to which she 

agreed. 

¶ 6 Logan alleged that the circumstances surrounding the reenactment constituted 

a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda and her fifth amendment right 

against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., amend. V). On these grounds, Logan 

requested that the trial court “suppress any and all statements made by [Logan], 

including any and all video recordings of said reenactment/interview.” 

¶ 7 In response to the motion to suppress, the State argued that the reenactment and 

questioning on October 17, 2019, did not constitute a custodial interrogation 

because the circumstances showed that Logan was not in custody. According to the 

State, the reenactment bore no indicia of a formal arrest, and Logan voluntarily 

participated in the reenactment and never asked to leave the premises during the 

time in question. The State alleged, therefore, that Miranda warnings were not 

required. 

¶ 8 On October 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. 

Prior to hearing testimony, the judge informed the parties that he had reviewed the 

pleadings and watched the video of the reenactment. The video was admitted into 

evidence. The defense then called Tate as its first witness. 

¶ 9 Tate, a DCFS investigator in Decatur, Illinois, testified that she was assigned to 

investigate J.C.’s death. Tate testified that she met with Logan several times during 

her investigation. She testified that, in one of her conversations with Logan, she 

“basically told [Logan], you know, we need to do a reenactment. We do that in 

all of our own child death cases. It will be a detective, at least myself and her, 

where it will be videotaped, and we need to do the reenactment so we can move 

forward on the investigation.” 

In response to defense counsel’s question as to whether Logan indicated that she 

did not want to do the reenactment, Tate gave the following testimony: 
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“A. I don’t recall her saying that she—I know that she was upset about that. 

She was worried about having to go back into the apartment, and emotionally 

she was not looking forward to that at all. She didn’t really want to do it, but 

there was no—there was no saying no. She didn’t refuse to do it, if that’s what 

you’re asking.

 Q. Right. But she said she didn’t want to do it. 

A. Yeah, in a way of saying I don’t really want to because I’m not—you 

know, I don’t really want to have to do this because, you know, I don’t want to 

have to go back in the apartment. Her son passed away there. She was very 

upset.” 

¶ 10 Tate testified that both she and Detective Matthews “set up” the reenactment 

but Matthews determined the time and place. Tate testified that she attended the 

reenactment in her official capacity as a DCFS investigator. On cross-examination 

by the State, Tate testified that Detective Matthews and another police officer 

questioned Logan during the reenactment. Tate said she did not recall whether she 

asked Logan any questions. She testified that she brought Ashley Moffett, another 

DCFS investigator, to the reenactment for “learning purposes” because Moffett had 

never been to a reenactment. In response to the State’s question asking whether 

Tate informed Logan of the reason for the reenactment, Tate testified: 

“I told her that that’s just a process for DCFS and for criminal investigation that 

both parties would need the reenactment, you know, to be able to better 

understand what happened in her home that night, you know, so it was best to 

get this done so we can move forward in the investigation for both DCFS and 

for criminal.” 

¶ 11 Hope Taylor testified that she had known Logan for six or seven years, that she 

was a “mother figure” to her, and that Logan called her “Mom.” Taylor testified 

that J.C. was her biological grandson. She testified that Logan had an individualized 

education plan (IEP) and attended special education classes during high school. 

According to Taylor, Logan’s IEP granted her special accommodations for 

learning, including unlimited time for taking tests and having test questions 

explained to her. 
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¶ 12 Taylor testified that, after J.C.’s death, Logan and her four-year-old son moved 

in with her. She stated that she and Logan returned to Logan’s apartment only once 

to pack up some belongings. Taylor testified that she was present for a conversation 

between Tate and Logan prior to the reenactment. She testified that Tate told Logan 

“that she would have to do it, and that is normal procedure in a child’s death.” 

According to Taylor, Tate told them that Detective Matthews would set up the 

reenactment. Taylor testified that she accompanied Logan and her son to Logan’s 

former apartment on October 17, 2019. When they arrived, Taylor saw two or three 

police cars. Taylor testified that five law enforcement officers were present, 

including Tate, a DCFS trainee, Detective Matthews, and two other police officers. 

The police officers were wearing badges. Taylor testified that, when she attempted 

to follow the officers into the apartment, Detective Matthews “kind of just put his 

hand out and said, ‘I think it’s best to stay out.’ ” Taylor said “okay” and stayed 

outside with her grandson. Taylor testified that she was outside for approximately 

45 minutes before Logan and the others came out. 

¶ 13 The defense then called Logan to the stand. She testified that she had had an 

IEP since elementary school because “I have a reading problem and I don’t 

comprehend what’s being said.” Logan testified that, when Tate told her about the 

reenactment, she “didn’t feel like I had a choice” whether to attend it. She testified 

that, when Matthews called her to set up the date and time for the reenactment, he 

told her it was “standard procedure.” She testified that she felt upset when she 

arrived at her former apartment because she did not want to “replay the moment” 

of her child’s death. On cross-examination, Logan testified that she unlocked the 

door of her apartment for the officers to enter it. She testified that she consented to 

a search of her apartment and her cell phone. Logan testified that she did not try to 

leave during the reenactment or tell the officers that she wanted to stop. 

¶ 14 The State called Detective Eric Matthews, who testified that he had worked for 

the Decatur Police Department since 2005. He testified that he was assigned as the 

lead detective in the investigation of J.C.’s death. He stated that Dr. Scott Denton 

conducted an autopsy of J.C.’s body on October 7, 2019. According to Detective 

Matthews, Dr. Denton was unable to determine the cause of death based on the 

autopsy. Detective Matthews testified that Dr. Denton “requested additional 

information and further investigation into the incident, including wanting a 

reenactment done of the incident.” Detective Matthews said he subsequently 
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scheduled a reenactment with Logan. He testified that the reenactment did not occur 

until October 17, 2019, because he had difficulty locating a toddler-sized 

mannequin to be used in the reenactment. Detective Matthews testified that, in his 

conversation with Logan, he “explained to her about the request from Dr. Denton 

to have a reenactment. I asked her if she would be willing to participate in that and 

she said that she would.” Detective Matthews denied telling Logan that she was 

required to do the reenactment. He testified that he asked Detective Jeremy 

Appenzeller to be present to record the reenactment. He testified that Sergeant 

Carroll 1 was present because he was overseeing the investigation. Detective 

Matthews testified that Tate asked to attend the reenactment because DCFS was 

conducting a “parallel investigation” into J.C.’s death. 

¶ 15 According to Detective Matthews, he and the other officers wore “dress shirts 

and dress pants and shoes” at the reenactment and had their badges with them. He 

testified that he asked Taylor “if she would mind staying outside with the child so 

that we wouldn’t have any distractions while we were doing the reenactment 

inside.” Taylor agreed and stayed outside. Detective Matthews testified that Logan 

did not indicate that she did not want to participate in the reenactment. The 

reenactment took place in J.C.’s bedroom. Detective Matthews stated that he was 

the only person who questioned Logan during the reenactment. He testified that 

Detective Appenzeller was operating the video camera, Sergeant Carroll was “in 

and out of the room,” and Tate was “in the room for most of the time, kind of 

standing back by the doorway.” Detective Matthews testified that the reason he did 

not give Logan Miranda warnings was because “she wasn’t in custody or under 

arrest.” He stated that Logan agreed to let the officers search her house and her cell 

phone. Detective Matthews testified that Logan did not ask to stop or leave and that 

the officers did not make any threats or promises to her. 

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Detective Matthews testified that he considered Logan 

to be a suspect in J.C.’s death prior to the reenactment. Thereafter, the trial judge 

questioned Detective Matthews, and the following colloquy occurred: 

 “Q. You actually did the reenactment in this case based on your initial 

conversation with Dr. Denton, correct? 

1Sergeant Carroll’s first name does not appear in the record.
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A. Correct.

Q. And that’s because Dr. Denton was uncertain regarding some of his 

initial findings. Is that a fair statement?

 A. I believe so. 

Q. Okay. Do you do these reenactments in all child death cases?

 A. No. 

 Q. Okay. You did it here because of Dr. Denton’s request. 

A. Correct.

 Q. I’ll be frank, I’m a little bit troubled by the process. 

Prior to the reenactment, did anybody ever say to [Logan]—now, I 

understand that she was cooperative and so on—that your responses here could 

potentially be used against you in a DCFS and/or a murder investigation? 

A. I can’t speak to the DCFS, but I didn’t make those statements to her about 

the death investigation. 

 Q. Again, because she had not been arrested, and in your mind she was not 

in custody. 

A. Correct.

Q. Have you ever done one of these reenactments before this case?

A. Yes.

 Q. Okay. 

A. Several.

Q. In several cases where there’s uncertainties and you’re not quite sure 

what occurred?

 A. Yes.” 
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¶ 17 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied the motion to 

suppress. The court found that Miranda was not triggered because the reenactment 

was not custodial; therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. The court made 

the following factual findings in support of the conclusion that Logan was not in 

custody: 

“[I]t occurred at the defendant’s residence with her mother figure really right 

outside the residence. I don’t have any problem with the police officer keeping 

the mom figure outside of the residence because the other child was there. The 

defendant voluntarily agreed to the interview and voluntarily traveled there. 

The interview itself was about 31 minutes. The defendant did not appear to be 

in any type of emotional distress during the course of the interview. There was 

no showing of force during the course of the interview, no guns displayed, no 

badges displayed. At least as far as I could see, Detective Matthews was really 

very low key and polite as he tends to be. There apparently were three officers 

present, but it was only Detective Matthews that was conducting the 

questioning. Again, the mood of the interview was not accusatory, it was low 

key. He asked straightforward, albeit not forced, questions. There [were] no 

physical restraints, no handcuffs, no being told you can’t leave the room or 

residence or anything of that nature. 

 In terms of the defendant’s mental state to the Court, she appeared to be of 

average intelligence. As [the assistant state’s attorney] points out, she’s 25, held 

a job, graduated from high school and took care of two children by herself in 

her own home. She spoke well during the course of the interview. I believe she 

may have some type of reading disability, but I did not note any type of 

intelligence disability.

And, finally, she was allowed to leave the house at the conclusion of the 

interview, was not arrested until six days later, six days later, and, finally, at the 

conclusion of the interview, she also voluntarily agreed to a consent search of 

her phone and the residence.

So, again, those are the factors I deem to be important. I do not believe it 

was a custodial interrogation, although, again, I am somewhat troubled by the 

process.” 
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¶ 18 The jury trial began on June 7, 2021. At trial, Decatur police officer Joseph 

Sawyer testified that he and his partner responded to Logan’s apartment in the early 

morning hours of October 7, 2019. When they arrived, he saw Logan and Taylor, 

who was holding J.C. Officer Sawyer observed that J.C. was unresponsive, was 

cold to the touch, and had foam coming out of one of his nostrils. Both Logan and 

Taylor were crying and appeared to be upset. The responding personnel from the 

fire department determined that J.C. was deceased and did not perform lifesaving 

measures. Officer Sawyer testified that he examined the doors and windows and 

found no signs of forced entry into the apartment. He then interviewed Logan. 

¶ 19 According to Officer Sawyer’s testimony, Logan stated that she put J.C. to bed 

at approximately 8 p.m. the previous night and had planned to wake up at 12 a.m. 

and 2 a.m. to administer breathing treatments to J.C. Logan stated that J.C. had had 

pneumonia a couple of times and needed breathing treatments when he had a cold. 

The breathing treatments consisted of albuterol administered through a nebulizer. 

Logan stated that she had been administering breathing treatments to J.C. twice 

nightly for the past four nights. Logan told Officer Sawyer that she kept the 

albuterol in a hall closet. When he asked to see the albuterol, Logan retrieved a box 

from the closet, but the box was empty. Officer Sawyer testified that his partner 

conducted a search of the apartment, including the trash cans, but did not find any 

albuterol. Officer Sawyer also testified to his opinion that Logan appeared to be 

upset but “it seemed *** forced,” and “she mimicked, in my opinion, the sound of 

crying.” 

¶ 20 The State entered into the record several photographs of Logan’s apartment, 

which were shown to the jury. An audio recording of Logan’s 911 call was entered 

into evidence and played for the jury. On the recording, Logan told the 911 

dispatcher that she performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on J.C. The State then 

resumed its direct examination of Officer Sawyer. He testified that Logan told him 

that she performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and chest compressions on J.C. 

He also testified that Logan told him she called Taylor before she called 911. 

¶ 21 Decatur police officer Justin Closen testified that he was Officer Sawyer’s 

backup officer who responded to the scene. He testified that he conducted a search 

of Logan’s apartment but did not find any vials of albuterol anywhere in the 
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apartment. Officer Closen testified that the trash can in the kitchen was full but that 

it did not contain any empty vials. 

¶ 22 Decatur police officer James Calloway testified that he was trained in extracting 

data from cell phones. He testified that, on October 16, 2019, he conducted a search 

of Logan’s cell phone, first using software to extract the data, then using other 

software to analyze the data. The extracted data included Internetsearches that were 

conducted on the cell phone. Officer Calloway concluded from the data extraction 

that a search of the phrase “how do you suffocate” was done on Logan’s cell phone 

on October 6, 2019, at 8:04 a.m. Officer Calloway testified that he served a search 

warrant to Google, requesting data associated with Logan’s e-mail address. He 

testified that the data he received from Google matched the data from the cell phone

extraction that showed a search for the phrase “how do you suffocate” on October 

6, 2019. On cross-examination, Officer Calloway testified that he was not able to 

determine whether anyone had clicked on the link to the Google search results. He 

testified that Logan’s cell phone records indicated that a call to 911 was made on 

October 7, 2019, at 3:18 a.m., and a call to Taylor was made approximately one 

minute earlier. 

¶ 23 Dr. Scott Denton, a forensic pathologist at the McLean County Coroner’s Office 

in Bloomington, Illinois, testified that he performed an autopsy of J.C.’s body on 

October 7, 2019, at 8 a.m. The autopsy revealed no broken bones or fractures. J.C. 

was wearing a diaper that was “fairly clean.” Dr. Denton testified that J.C. appeared 

healthy and well developed and was in the seventy-fifth percentile for height at age 

19 months. He testified that J.C. had “white edema foam,” i.e., fluid from the lungs, 

coming out of his nose. Dr. Denton testified that his further examination showed 

more edema foam in J.C.’s mouth, which usually indicated “some form of asphyxia 

or lack of oxygen in the blood, either from congestive heart failure, drowning or 

asphyxia, things of that nature.” 

¶ 24 Dr. Denton testified that he observed petechial hemorrhages, or petechia, on 

J.C.’s eyelids, neck, and both sides of his face. Dr. Denton explained that petechia 

are “fine red dots on the skin where capillaries have burst,” indicating compression 

of the veins. He explained that the petechia indicated that pressure was applied 

either to J.C.’s face or to his body below the neck. Dr. Denton further testified that 

he observed “pressure blanching” on J.C.’s nose and chin, where the skin had 
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turned white. He opined that the pressure blanching was caused by something 

pressing on J.C.’s nose and chin. Dr. Denton testified that he did not see any 

petechia on J.C.’s chest or abdomen. In his internal examination, Dr. Denton 

observed a large amount of white edema foam and fluid in J.C.’s lungs, which 

indicated asphyxia. J.C. had cerebral edema, or swelling of his brain, which also 

indicated asphyxia. Dr. Denton testified that all these findings, taken together, were 

“very indicative of asphyxia and some kind of compression to [J.C.’s] face.” 

¶ 25 Dr. Denton further testified that he looked at J.C.’s airways and observed that 

the airways were open and clear. Dr. Denton tested all of J.C.’s organs for 

microscopic bacteria and viruses, including influenza A and B. All the tests were 

negative. Dr. Denton testified that he could not find any evidence of wheezing or 

breathing problems. Following the autopsy, Dr. Denton informed the police that 

J.C.’s death resulted from asphyxia, possibly caused by suffocation, but that the 

exact cause of death was open and pending further studies and investigation. Dr. 

Denton testified that he asked authorities to perform a child death investigation, or 

“doll reenactment.” He testified that such a reenactment was “standard practice” in 

all child or infant deaths. Dr. Denton testified that the reenactment was 

subsequently performed, after which he viewed the recording. Dr. Denton gave the 

following testimony about the recording of the reenactment: 

“A. The reenactment looked like the doll was placed face down on a bed. 

There was a comforter and there was a fitted bedsheet. And it looked like the 

fitted—the corner of the fitted bedsheet was over the head and then the 

comforter was over [the] body and [J.C.] was face down in the reenactment.

 Q. And you—you watched the video? 

A. I did.

 Q. And what—did that video provide you with any information that you 

could use in coming to any conclusions? 

A. Um—probably the most important thing is that um—one of the—one of 

the information I was given was possibly entanglement in bed sheets or there 

was an entanglement. Well, first of all in a 19 month old that’s very difficult. I 
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don’t—I’ve never heard of a 19 month old getting entangled and then dying in 

bed sheets, especially a large 19 month, who’s at 75th percentile. 

And then, so the reenactment showed me that, basically, he was face down. 

There was a comforter. There was a corner of a bed sheet. And that to me did 

not account for his death. They could not have killed him in that position that 

was shown on the video. 

 Q. Did you, ultimately, were you able to conclude what the cause of death 

was?

A. I did. So, based on everything I put together, and then I went to the 

medical records too, so I got—I asked the coroner to provide me medical 

records. He provided me what he could. I went through all the medical records 

for [J.C.] And I came to cause of death as asphyxia due to smothering and 

compression of the neck. 

 Q. And is that opinion within a reasonable degree of medical and scientific 

certainty?

A. Yes.” 

¶ 26 Dr. Denton testified that he was not able to determine exactly how J.C. 

suffocated, but he explained that there were two possibilities: 

“He could be face down and being pushed downward with compression of the 

neck and the back of the head, which will account for all the findings I saw. 

He could also be face up with something called soft suffocation, which 

either can be a folded up comforter or a pillow that can be pushed down on the 

person’s face. But either one of those is possible and I can’t say which one is 

more likely.” 

¶ 27 Dr. Denton testified that he ruled out the following possible causes of J.C.’s 

death based on a lack of physical evidence: strangulation, drowning, choking on an 

object, an allergic reaction, or someone physically pinching J.C.’s nose or mouth 

shut. Dr. Denton concluded that J.C.’s four-year-old brother could not have 

suffocated J.C. because he would not have had the strength to do it. 
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¶ 28 Detective Matthews testified that he obtained recordings of telephone calls that 

were made between Logan and Shawneen Comage, J.C.’s father, who was 

incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Detective Matthews then 

gave the following testimony regarding the reenactment that occurred on October 

17, 2019: 

“Q. What was the next thing you had done in the course of your 

investigation? 

A. I obtained a toddler size mannequin for use in the reenactment with 

Jessica Logan. Then I contacted her by phone and asked her to perform the 

reenactment at her apartment and she agreed.” 

The court entered into evidence the recording of the reenactment, which consisted 

of two compact discs, and the recording was played for the jury. In the video, Logan 

demonstrated the position in which she found J.C.’s body by placing the mannequin 

face down on the bed with a corner of the fitted sheet pulled over its head. Detective 

Matthews then testified that Logan stated during the reenactment that she did not 

perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation or cardiopulmonary resuscitation on J.C. He 

further testified that he searched the apartment after the reenactment and did not 

find any albuterol. 

¶ 29 Angela King, a pediatric nurse practitioner at Crossings Healthcare, testified 

that she had treated J.C. since September 2018. She testified that J.C. had several 

instances of bronchiolitis in 2018, including one caused by respiratory syncytial 

virus (RSV). King stated that she last refilled J.C.’s prescription for albuterol in 

January 2019. She testified that she had seen J.C. on September 9, 2019, for a wellchild examination. King testified that J.C. presented for his examination with a sore 

throat and a cough, but no runny or stuffy nose, and his lungs were clear. She 

testified that she had reviewed J.C.’s medical records from other medical facilities, 

which indicated that J.C. had had at least one pneumonia infection. 

¶ 30 The State next presented a written stipulation agreed to by the parties. It stated 

that Rachel Niemerg would testify that (1) on August 2, 2019, Logan took out a 

personal loan in the amount of $1075 from the Cash Store; (2) the loan required 

repayments of $202.57 to be deposited automatically from Logan’s bank account 

every two weeks; (3) the Cash Store received a “ ‘return’ ” from Logan’s bank 
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indicating that payment had been declined for the first, second, fourth, and fifth 

repayment dates; (4) Logan came to the Cash Store on September 12, 2019, and 

made a partial payment of $100; (5) Niemerg and the previous store manager called 

Logan and left her multiple messages in an attempt to work out repayment; 

(6) Logan made appointments to pay in person at the Cash Store on August 15, 

September 3, September 6, September 20, September 27, October 4, and October 

11, 2019, but she did not appear at those appointments; and (7) one day, Logan 

came into the store to make a partial payment using a card but the card was declined. 

The State published several voicemail messages from the Cash Store that were 

extracted from Logan’s cell phone. 

¶ 31 The State next published 12 portions of recorded telephone calls between Logan 

and Comage, J.C.’s incarcerated father, that took place between May 8 and October 

2, 2019. In the recordings, Logan told Comage, among other things, that she had 

several hundred dollars in unpaid bills and did not know how she was going to pay 

them. She stated that her bank account was “overdrawn,” and she did not know how 

she was going to repay her $1000 loan, of which she sent Comage a $400 portion. 

In a telephone call with Comage on September 3, 2019, Logan stated that she had 

been “stressing” about how she was going to pay her bills totaling several hundred 

dollars, which included J.C.’s life insurance premium. Comage told her that he 

could send funds to cover the life insurance premium because “that’s the main thing 

that needs to be paid.” Logan said she would “figure something out.” In a telephone 

call on September 12, 2019, Logan told Comage that she “literally broke down” 

due to her unpaid bills and was unable to pay her rent. The recorded telephone calls 

also included multiple statements by Comage asking Logan to send him money. 

¶ 32 The last witness in the State’s case was Patrick Delatte, an owner of an 

American Family Insurance agency. He testified that in December 2018, Logan 

contacted him to take out a life insurance policy for J.C. The policy went into effect 

on December 14, 2018. Delatte testified that the policy was a whole life insurance 

policy in the amount of $25,000. The premiums were $35 per month, and there 

were no lapses in the policy. He testified that, on the morning of October 7, 2019, 

Logan called him “to let us know that the child had passed away and to turn in the 

life insurance claim.” On cross-examination, Delatte testified that he simply 

reported J.C.’s death to American Family Insurance, and he had no knowledge 

about whether the claim was paid out. The State then rested its case. 
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¶ 33 The defense called Michael Day, the Macon County Coroner, as its first 

witness. Day testified that he informed Logan that there were funeral homes in the 

area that could help with J.C.’s funeral. He testified that Logan told him that they 

did not need to worry about that. He testified that he learned from Logan’s family 

that they would seek out a distant cousin who worked for a funeral home to help 

with the funeral. 

¶ 34 Taylor testified that she “took in” Logan after Logan’s mother died, about eight 

years ago, to help “get her on the right track” and make sure she graduated from 

high school. Taylor testified that, after her son was incarcerated, she helped Logan 

by babysitting her children and offering transportation. She also helped Logan 

financially, paying for groceries or things that Logan or the children needed. Taylor 

testified that, on the evening before J.C. died, she picked up Logan and the children 

and took them to Walmart so that Logan could buy socks for the children. Taylor 

stated that, shortly after 3 a.m. the next morning, Logan called her and told her that, 

when she woke up to give J.C. his breathing treatment, she found that J.C. was not 

breathing. Taylor testified that she told Logan to hang up and call 911. Taylor then 

went to Logan’s apartment. Taylor testified that she later told Logan to call the 

insurance company because Taylor thought they needed the life insurance money 

to pay for the funeral. She testified that correspondence from the insurance 

company was mailed to her house. According to Taylor, she gave the 

correspondence to Logan, who put it on the dresser in the bedroom where she was 

staying. Taylor testified that Logan never opened the envelope. She testified that 

Logan never asked for, nor did she receive, any monetary compensation from the 

insurance company. 

¶ 35 Logan, who took the stand in her own defense, testified that she was diagnosed 

with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and began receiving Social Security 

disability benefits when she was five years old. She testified that she attended 

special education classes and had trouble reading and comprehending written 

words. Logan stated that her mother passed away when she was a freshman in high 

school. After graduating from high school in 2012, Logan attended Richland 

Community College, but she stopped attending after she suffered a miscarriage and 

never received a degree. Logan testified that she moved in with Taylor when she 

was 17 years old. Logan testified that when her older son was two months old, 

Taylor purchased life insurance policies for both Logan and her son. After J.C. was 
- 16 - 

born, Taylor offered to buy a life insurance policy for J.C., but Logan refused the 

offer and purchased the policy herself. She testified that she did so because she 

“wanted some type of responsibility.” 

¶ 36 Logan testified that on October 6, 2019, she put her children to bed at 

approximately 8:30 p.m. She stated that, before putting them to bed, she prepared 

J.C.’s 12 a.m. breathing treatment by loading a tube of albuterol into the nebulizer 

machine. Logan testified that she had recurring alarms set for 12 a.m. and 3 a.m. to 

administer breathing treatments to J.C., as she had done the previous three or four 

nights. She stated that the albuterol treatments were prescribed to be given “as 

needed.” Logan testified that she slept through her 12 a.m. alarm and woke up at 3 

a.m. She testified that she found J.C. lying in his bed on his stomach and that his 

body was “cold and hard” and “stiff.” She testified that she thought there was 

nothing she could do, so she did not try to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 

She picked up J.C., went to get her cell phone, and called Taylor. Logan testified 

that she called Taylor before calling 911 because she was “in shock” and 

“panicked.” She stated that she “knew he was already gone” because J.C.’s body 

felt like her mother’s body after her mother died of cancer. 

¶ 37 Logan testified that after the coroner had taken J.C.’s body away on the morning 

of October 7, 2019, she went with Taylor to Taylor’s house. She said other family 

members were gathered at the house and they were discussing how J.C. could have 

passed away. She testified that Taylor’s daughter mentioned the word 

“suffocation,” so she searched Google on her cell phone for the phrase “how do 

you suffocate.” She testified that she never clicked on the link. Logan testified that 

she was concerned about how she was going to pay for J.C.’s funeral. She said she 

called American Family Insurance about J.C.’s life insurance policy because she 

was concerned about funeral expenses. Later, she learned that the funeral would be 

free of charge due to J.C.’s age. Logan testified that she subsequently received a 

packet in the mail from American Family Insurance, but she never opened the 

packet. She testified that she did not want the insurance money because it was not 

going to bring her son back. 

¶ 38 Logan testified that on October 17, 2019, she received a call from Detective 

Matthews asking her to meet him and Tate at her house to do a reenactment. She 

agreed to do the reenactment, which, in her mind, meant replaying the moment in 
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her head of how she found J.C. on the night he died. She testified that she felt 

“emotional” and “didn’t really feel up to it” at the time of the reenactment. She 

testified that she consented to a search of her apartment and her cell phone because 

she had nothing to hide. 

¶ 39 On cross-examination, Logan denied making any searches on her cell phone on 

October 6, 2019. She testified that she had no explanation for why the search for 

“how do you suffocate” was recorded as occurring on October 6, 2019. She testified 

that she never missed a payment for J.C.’s life insurance premium because it was 

“an important bill” that was for her child. 

¶ 40 After Logan’s testimony, the defense rested its case. Following closing 

arguments, the jury convicted Logan of first degree murder. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced her to 33 years in prison. 

¶ 41 Logan filed a posttrial motion requesting a new trial or, alternatively, a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion presented two grounds: (1) the 

State failed to prove Logan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the trial court 

erred in not allowing Leandra Tate, the investigator assigned to the DCFS case, to 

testify about any opinions she may have had that were relevant to the criminal case. 

The trial court denied the posttrial motion. 

¶ 42 On appeal, Logan argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress evidence, where no law enforcement officer admonished her as to her fifth 

amendment rights prior to the reenactment, and she was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel. 

¶ 43 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 2022 IL App (4th) 

210492. On the first issue, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the 

circumstances surrounding the reenactment were “troubling.” Id. ¶¶ 83-85. 

Nevertheless, after weighing various factors, the court concluded that a reasonable 

person who was innocent of any crime would have believed she could terminate the 

encounter and leave. Id. ¶¶ 76-83. The court therefore held that the trial court 

correctly ruled that Logan was not in custody during the reenactment and the 

officers were not required to give her Miranda warnings. Id. ¶¶ 83, 86. 
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¶ 44 Next, the appellate court addressed, and rejected, Logan’s claims that her 

defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Id. ¶¶ 87-144. Logan argued, 

among other things, that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue in the 

motion to suppress that her statements and actions during the reenactment were 

involuntary in violation of the fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) and that 

she was seized in violation of the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV). 2022 

IL App (4th) 210492, ¶¶ 87-108. The appellate court held that these ineffective 

assistance claims lacked merit because, based on the relevant factors, Logan’s 

recorded statements were voluntary under the fifth amendment (id. ¶ 98) and she 

was not subject to a seizure under the fourth amendment (id. ¶ 108). 

¶ 45 This court allowed Logan’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. 

Oct. 1, 2021). 

¶ 46 ANALYSIS

¶ 47 In this court, Logan argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress because she was in custody during the reenactment and should have 

received Miranda warnings. She also argues that her trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to (1) raise a claim that the reenactment video 

violated her fifth amendment rights, (2) raise a claim that the reenactment video 

violated her fourth amendment rights, and (3) request the redaction of exhibits to 

ensure the jury did not hear irrelevant, prejudicial statements that she made during 

the reenactment video and in recorded telephone calls.

 

¶ 48 I. Miranda violation

¶ 49 A. Forfeiture 

¶ 50 Before proceeding to the merits, we note that Logan forfeited her Miranda 

argument by failing to raise it in her posttrial motion. See People v. McCarty, 223 

Ill. 2d 109, 122 (2006) (“In general, the failure to raise an issue in a posttrial motion 

results in the forfeiture of that issue on appeal.”). Where a defendant fails to comply 

with the requirement to preserve an error in a posttrial motion, a reviewing court 

may not review the issue unless it (1) alleges a constitutional violation, 
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(2) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, or (3) amounts to plain error. People 

v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988). Logan contends that, at the time of her trial, 

an alleged Miranda violation was considered “constitutional” in nature. Therefore, 

her Miranda claim is subject to harmless error review despite not being preserved 

in her posttrial motion. We disagree. 

¶ 51 The relevant case law clearly holds that a Miranda violation itself is not a 

constitutional violation. In People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 353 (1992), this court 

held that “Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights, but are simply 

prophylactic measures designed to safeguard a suspect’s fifth amendment rights.”

Id. (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 

U.S. 298 (1985)). The United States Supreme Court also has held that a violation 

of Miranda is not a violation of a constitutional right. See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 

134, 150 (2022) (“In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a 

violation of the Constitution, and therefore such a violation does not constitute ‘the 

deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 

¶ 52 Logan argues, however, that at the time of her trial in June 2021, a claim 

alleging a Miranda violation was “arguably” constitutional, based on Dickerson v. 

United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court 

expressly stated that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule.” 2 Logan also 

argues that her counsel reasonably could have believed, based on Dickerson, that 

the Miranda issue was sufficiently preserved by Logan’s pretrial motion to 

suppress; therefore, this court should not treat the claim as forfeited. These 

arguments are not well taken. As the Court explained in Vega, Miranda and its 

progeny “make clear that Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules. Those rules, 

to be sure, are ‘constitutionally based,’ Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 440, but they are 

prophylactic rules nonetheless.” Vega, 597 U.S. at 142. Consequently, Logan’s 

2At issue in Dickerson was a federal statute that prescribed that statements made during a 

custodial interrogation were inadmissible only if they were made involuntarily, regardless of 

whether Miranda warnings were given. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. The Court held that “Miranda, 

being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, 

and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.” Id. Therefore, the Court held, Miranda and its 

progeny continued to “govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation 

in both state and federal courts.” Id. 
- 20 - 

arguments that her Miranda claim was not forfeited or can be reviewed as a 

violation of a constitutional right are unfounded. 

¶ 53 Logan argues, alternatively, that the trial court’s denial of her motion to 

suppress amounts to plain error. Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court 

may address a forfeited claim in two circumstances: 

“(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely 

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the 

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or 

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of 

the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, 

regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 

117094, ¶ 48. 

The first step in applying the plain error doctrine is to determine whether error 

occurred. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶¶ 38-39. 

¶ 54 B. Standard of Review

¶ 55 In determining whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress, we 

accord great deference to its findings of fact and credibility determinations. People 

v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). We will reverse the trial court’s factual 

findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “We review 

de novo, however, the ultimate question posed by the legal challenge to the trial 

court’s ruling on a suppression motion.” Id. It is appropriate to consider the 

testimony adduced at trial as well as at the suppression hearing in making this 

determination. Id. 

¶ 56 C. Custodial Interrogation Under Miranda 

¶ 57 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person 

*** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. 

Const., amend. V. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth 

amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied not only in court but in any 

place a person faces custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court 
- 21 - 

defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. To protect this right, the Court held 

that the prosecution may not use statements made by a defendant during a custodial 

interrogation, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, unless those statements are 

accompanied by certain procedural safeguards, now known familiarly as “Miranda 

warnings”: 

“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 

remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 

him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 

appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the 

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he 

indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult 

with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the 

individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be 

interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have 

answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not 

deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he 

has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.” Id. at 

444-45. 

¶ 58 The purpose of Miranda warnings is to “ensure that the accused is aware of his 

substantive constitutional right not to incriminate himself and to provide him with 

the opportunity to exercise that right.” Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 348. A statement taken 

in violation of Miranda may not be admitted as substantive evidence in the 

prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 350. This “Miranda exclusionary rule *** applies 

even if the defendant’s constitutional rights under the fifth amendment were not 

violated.” Id. at 352. Therefore, although a statement taken in violation of Miranda

is prohibited from being used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, it is not subject to 

the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine unless the statement was not voluntary 

within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. at 352-54. 

¶ 59 The determination of whether a person is “in custody,” necessitating that 

Miranda warnings be given, involves “ ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries ***: first, what 

were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those 
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circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505-06 

(2003) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). The second 

inquiry is an objective one. In re D.L.H., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 50. It asks “what a 

reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been 

in the defendant’s shoes.” Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506. 

¶ 60 The following nonexclusive factors are relevant in determining whether an 

interrogation took place in a custodial setting: 

“the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the number 

of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence 

of family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest 

procedure, such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or 

fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of 

questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.” 

Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150. 

An officer’s belief in the individual’s guilt is relevant only to the extent that “the 

officer’s views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under 

interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position 

would perceive his or her freedom to leave.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 

325 (1994). Other factors that courts have deemed relevant to the custody analysis 

include “whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free 

to refrain from answering questions” and “the degree of police control over the 

environment in which the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the 

suspect’s freedom of movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly 

curtailed.” Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996). No single factor is 

dispositive, and a court should consider the totality of the circumstances, weighing 

all relevant factors, before determining whether a person was in custody. People v. 

Wyma, 2020 IL App (1st) 170786, ¶ 57. 

¶ 61 After reviewing the video of the reenactment and the testimony at the 

suppression hearing and trial, we conclude under the specific circumstances of this 

case that Logan was subjected to a custodial interrogation. At the outset, we find 

that the reenactment constituted an interrogation, a fact the parties do not dispute. 

An “interrogation,” for purposes of Miranda, “refers both to express questioning 
- 23 - 

and to any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally 

accompanying arrest and custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely 

to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 

382, 391-92 (1995). The video confirms that Detective Matthews questioned Logan 

about the circumstances surrounding J.C.’s death for nearly the entire duration of 

the reenactment. Thus, an interrogation took place. 

¶ 62 Turning to the custody issue, we find the following factors support the 

conclusion that the interrogation was custodial. First, Detective Matthews chose the 

date and location for the reenactment, selecting a place where Logan did not want 

to go because it was personally upsetting for her. The reenactment took place in 

Logan’s former apartment in the room where J.C. had died. Logan was no longer 

living in the apartment. She had moved in with Taylor after J.C.’s death and had 

only been back to her apartment once to retrieve some belongings. Logan testified 

that she was “emotional” and felt upset when she arrived at the location of the 

reenactment because she did not want to “replay the moment” of her child’s death. 

Tate corroborated Logan’s testimony, testifying that Logan was “very upset” and 

“worried about having to go back into the apartment, and emotionally *** was not 

looking forward to that at all.” 

¶ 63 Another factor that weighs in favor of finding custody is that Logan was told 

that she “had” to participate in the reenactment and was not informed that her 

participation was optional. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d 116, 127 (1990) 

(holding that the language used by authorities to summon the defendant for 

questioning was “more of an imperative than a request,” contributing to the 

conclusion that the defendant was in custody). Logan testified that she “didn’t feel 

like I had a choice” whether to attend the reenactment. Taylor testified that Tate 

told Logan “that she would have to do it, and that is normal procedure in a child’s 

death.” Tate testified that she told Logan, “we need to do a reenactment. We do that 

in all of our own child death cases. *** [W]e need to do the reenactment so we can 

move forward on the investigation.” Tate further testified that Logan “didn’t really 

want to do it, but there was no *** saying no.” There was no testimony that anyone 

told Logan she did not have to participate in the reenactment. 

¶ 64 Next, Logan was not informed that she was free to leave the interrogation or 

refuse to answer Detective Matthews’s questions. “[W]hether the suspect was 
- 24 - 

informed that he was free to leave and that answering the interrogator’s questions 

was voluntary” is a relevant factor in determining whether an interrogation was 

custodial. United States v. Anaya, 715 F. Supp. 2d 916, 946-47 (D. S.D. 2010); see 

Brown, 136 Ill. 2d at 126 (finding custody where the defendant was not informed 

that he could leave if he so desired or that he was not being held). Furthermore, 

Logan testified that, after the reenactment was finished, she was “allowed to leave” 

the apartment. This evidence suggests that Logan did not leave of her own volition 

but left only when the police officers released her from their custody. 

¶ 65 A key factor in our custody analysis is the number of law enforcement officers 

and authority figures who were present during the interrogation. The evidence 

shows that three police officers and two DCFS investigators were present in the 

apartment. The video and testimony indicate that at least two officers and one 

DCFS investigator were in the bedroom with Logan during the reenactment. 

Detective Matthews conducted the questioning, while another detective operated 

the video camera. The fact that Logan was questioned in the presence of three police

officers, as well as two DCFS investigators, weighs in favor of finding that she was 

in custody for purposes of Miranda. 

¶ 66 Moreover, the evidence that Taylor, Logan’s “mother figure,” was kept outside 

during the interrogation adds further weight to our custody determination. See 

United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990) (“A frequently 

recurring example of police domination concerns the removal of the suspect from 

the presence of family, friends, or colleagues who might lend moral support during 

the questioning and deter a suspect from making inculpatory statements, an 

established interrogation practice noted by the Miranda [C]ourt.”). The evidence 

shows that Taylor attempted to follow Logan and the officers into the apartment 

but was stopped by Detective Matthews and asked to wait outside. Taylor was not 

allowed to enter the apartment or be present during the reenactment. As a result, 

Logan was separated from the family member who had accompanied her and was 

alone in the apartment with five authority figures, including police officers and 

DCFS investigators. Although we agree with the trial court that it was rational for 

Detective Matthews to ask Taylor to wait outside with Logan’s four-year-old son, 

this factor still bears on the question of whether a reasonable person in these 

circumstances would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. See 

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 505-06, 508. 
- 25 - 

¶ 67 A related factor that we find relevant to our custody analysis is the degree of 

control the police exerted over the interrogation surroundings. “An interrogation 

which occurs in an atmosphere dominated by the police *** is more likely to be 

viewed as custodial than one which does not.” Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1351-52. 

Circumstances that evince police domination include “whether the police assume 

control of the interrogation site and ‘dictate the course of conduct followed by the 

[suspect]’ or other persons present at the scene.” Id. at 1352 (quoting United States 

v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1980)). The evidence shows that Detective 

Matthews exerted a high degree of control over the circumstances of the 

reenactment and the interrogation. He chose the location, date, and time for the 

reenactment. He directed Taylor to wait outside. During the reenactment, Detective 

Matthews, another officer, and a DCFS investigator stood inside the bedroom while 

Logan sat on J.C.’s bed or stood beside it. Detective Matthews gave Logan a 

toddler-sized doll and directed her actions in recreating J.C.’s death. He instructed 

her to place the doll in J.C.’s bed in the same position in which Logan found J.C. 

on the morning of his death. He instructed Logan to use the doll to demonstrate 

how she held J.C. after finding his body. He also directed Logan to use the doll and 

the nebulizer machine to demonstrate how she usually administered breathing 

treatments to J.C. Detective Matthews questioned Logan continuously throughout 

the reenactment. When Detective Matthews finished questioning Logan, he asked 

her to sign a written waiver allowing the police to search the apartment. The 

recording ended at that point, indicating that the formal interrogation had 

concluded. The videotaping of the event contributed to the atmosphere of formality 

and police control over the scene, including the interrogation. 

¶ 68 We take note of the trial court’s factual findings that (1) Logan agreed to 

participate in the reenactment and traveled there voluntarily; (2) the interrogation 

was of relatively short duration; (3) there was no showing of force or physical 

restraint by the officers; (4) the mood of the interview was straightforward and not 

openly accusatory; (5) Logan’s age, intelligence, and mental makeup did not bear 

on the custody analysis; and (6) Logan was allowed to leave the apartment at the 

conclusion of the reenactment and interrogation. While we do not find that any of 

these facts were against the manifest weight of the evidence, we disagree with the 

trial court’s conclusion based on these factors that Logan was not in custody. 
- 26 - 

¶ 69 Although this is a close case, we find that the evidence that Logan was told she 

“had” to participate in the reenactment and was not told she was free to leave or 

that she had an option not to participate, in combination with the police exerting a 

high degree of control over the surroundings, barring a family member from the 

apartment, and interrogating Logan by herself in the presence of five law 

enforcement agents while the proceedings were being videotaped, would have led 

a reasonable person in Logan’s shoes to believe she was not at liberty to end the 

interrogation and leave. See In re D.L.H., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 51. Based on the 

totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Logan was in custody during the 

reenactment and interrogation, and the police were required to advise her of her 

Miranda rights prior to interrogating her. Accordingly, we hold that Logan’s 

motion to suppress should have been allowed and the trial court erred in admitting 

the recording of the reenactment into evidence at her trial.

¶ 70 D. First Prong Plain Error 

¶ 71 Logan argues that the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress amounted to 

plain error pursuant to the first prong of the plain error doctrine. Under the first 

plain error prong, a forfeited error is reviewable “where a clear or obvious error 

occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to 

tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the 

error.” Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48. If a defendant satisfies this standard, the 

error is “actually prejudicial,” not merely presumptively prejudicial. People v. 

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 193 (2005). To determine whether the evidence at trial was 

closely balanced, we “must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a 

qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case.” People 

v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53. 

¶ 72 Dr. Denton testified to his findings based on an autopsy of J.C.’s body that he 

conducted on October 7, 2019. He testified that J.C. had cerebral edema and white 

edema foam inside his nose, mouth, and lungs, which indicated that J.C. had been 

asphyxiated. He testified that J.C. had petechia on his eyelids, face, and neck and 

pressure blanching on his nose and chin. Dr. Denton testified that the petechia and 

pressure blanching were indicative of compression having been applied to J.C.’s 

face. He testified that the physical findings ruled out a bacterial or viral infection, 
- 27 - 

strangulation, drowning, choking, an allergic reaction, or someone pinching J.C.’s 

mouth or nose shut, as the cause of J.C.’s death. Dr. Denton concluded, within a 

reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, that the cause of J.C.’s death 

was “asphyxia due to smothering and compression of the neck,” either from 

downward pressure applied to him while he was face down or pressure applied by 

a comforter or pillow while he was face up. Dr. Denton concluded that J.C.’s fouryear-old brother could not have suffocated him because he would not have been 

strong enough to do it. 

¶ 73 Logan testified that she had been administering albuterol to J.C. for several days 

prior to his death and was planning to administer two albuterol treatments to J.C. 

in the early morning hours of October 7, 2019. The police officers who searched 

the apartment testified, however, that they did not find any albuterol vials in the 

apartment. 

¶ 74 Officer Calloway testified that he extracted and analyzed data from Logan’s 

cell phone and found that a Google search of the phrase “how do you suffocate” 

had been conducted on her cell phone on October 6, 2019, at 8:04 a.m., before J.C. 

died. Officer Calloway obtained data from Google through a search warrant that 

confirmed the content, date, and time of the Google search. Logan admitted 

searching the phrase “how do you suffocate” on her cell phone, but she testified 

that she conducted the search on October 7, 2019, after J.C. died. Logan testified 

that she could not explain why the data extraction results showed that the search 

occurred on October 6, 2019. 

¶ 75 The State introduced evidence that Logan was having financial problems for at 

least several months prior to J.C.’s death. The evidence showed that Logan had 

taken out a personal loan from the Cash Store on August 2, 2019, in the amount of 

$1075, which she had not repaid according to her agreement. In recorded telephone 

calls with Comage, Logan stated that she was worried about her unpaid bills, which 

amounted to several hundred dollars, and she was having trouble paying her rent. 

During the telephone calls, Comage repeatedly asked Logan to send him money in 

prison. Logan and Comage discussed the monthly premiums for J.C.’s life 

insurance policy in a telephone call on September 3, 2019. In that call, Comage 

stated that the life insurance premium was “the main thing that needs to be paid,” 

and Logan responded that she would “figure something out.” 
- 28 - 

¶ 76 Patrick DeLatte testified that Logan had purchased a life insurance policy for 

J.C. in December 2018, when J.C. was approximately nine months old. He testified 

that the policy premiums were $35 per month and there were no lapses in the policy. 

DeLatte testified that Logan called him on the morning of October 7, 2019, to 

inform him of J.C.’s death and “to turn in the insurance claim.” Logan testified that 

she purchased the life insurance policy for J.C. because Taylor had purchased a 

policy for Logan’s older son and Logan wanted to take responsibility for her child. 

Logan testified that she never missed paying the monthly premium because it was 

an “important bill” that was for her child. Both Logan and Taylor testified that 

Logan received paperwork from the insurance company in the mail but never 

opened it. 

¶ 77 Considering the totality of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the 

evidence in this case was not closely balanced but was overwhelmingly in favor of 

guilt. The State presented substantial, compelling circumstantial evidence of 

Logan’s guilt that the defense, for the most part, did not refute. Thus, we hold that 

the appellate court did not err in affirming the trial court’s judgment, although the 

appellate court did so on a different ground. 

¶ 78 E. Second-Prong Plain Error 

¶ 79 Logan argues, alternatively, that the Miranda violation amounted to secondprong plain error, “where a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so 

serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the 

integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” 

Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48. Second-prong plain errors equate to “structural 

errors,” or errors that “affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather 

than mere errors in the trial process itself.” People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶¶ 28-

29. Structural errors are subject to automatic reversal only in a limited class of 

cases, which include “a complete denial of counsel, denial of self-representation at 

trial, trial before a biased judge, denial of a public trial, racial discrimination in the 

selection of a grand jury, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction.” Id. 

¶ 80 Logan contends that the Miranda violation in this case seriously affected the 

fairness and integrity of her trial because “the record supports many troubling 

inferences about law enforcement’s actions in obtaining the reenactment video.” 
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She relies on United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 2004)

(discussing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)), where the court held that the 

admission of a confession resulting from a “deliberate” two-step interrogation 

technique, “in which Miranda warnings are intentionally withheld until after the 

suspect confesses,” is an error that seriously affects the fairness and integrity of a 

trial. The present case is distinguishable from Stewart in that there was no evidence 

that the police intentionally used an interrogation technique specifically designed 

to evade Miranda. Logan cites no other authorities to support her claim that a 

violation of Miranda constitutes a structural error that undermines the integrity of 

the judicial process. Generally, a Miranda claim that has been properly preserved 

is subject to harmless error review. See, e.g., People v. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d 349, 355-

56 (1985); People v. Wilson, 2020 IL App (1st) 162430, ¶ 57; United States v. Lee, 

413 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2005). An error that is amenable to harmless error 

analysis is not a structural error. See People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 37. 

Accordingly, Logan’s argument that the Miranda violation in this case amounts to 

second-prong plain error is without merit.

¶ 81 II. Ineffective Assistance

¶ 82 Logan next argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to include arguments based on the fifth and fourth amendments in her motion 

to suppress and failing to request redactions of certain exhibits. We address claims 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel according to the standard set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, 

¶ 23. Under Strickland, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

“More specifically, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a 

‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
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¶ 83 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35. 

The failure to satisfy either of the prongs is fatal to the claim. Id. Accordingly, if a 

reviewing court determines that the defendant has failed to prove prejudice, the 

court need not address the deficient performance prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; 

People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010). 

¶ 84 Logan contends that her counsel was ineffective for failing to argue a fifth 

amendment violation in her motion to suppress. The fifth amendment prohibits the 

use of compelled or involuntary statements. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 357. “The test 

for voluntariness is ‘whether the defendant made the statement freely, voluntarily, 

and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will 

was overcome at the time he or she confessed.’ ” Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160 (quoting 

People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996)). Compelled or involuntary 

statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment are barred from being used 

at trial, “not as a means of deterring unlawful police conduct, but because such 

statements are regarded as inherently untrustworthy and, thus, not probative.” 

Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 352. A violation of the fifth amendment is subject to the “fruit 

of the poisonous tree” doctrine. See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 

1099, 1113 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). 

“[T]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only where the police violate 

a defendant’s constitutional rights, for example, by conducting an 

unconstitutional search, arrest or interrogation. The constitutional violation is 

termed the ‘poisonous tree’ and any evidence which the State obtains by 

exploitation of that constitutional violation is subject to suppression as the 

‘fruit’ of that poisonous tree.” Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 351. 

¶ 85 We need not reach the question of whether defense counsel’s performance was 

deficient for failing to raise a fifth amendment violation because we find that Logan 

cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Logan argues that a successful fifth 

amendment challenge would have required the trial court to suppress not only the 

reenactment video but also the portions of Dr. Denton’s testimony that were derived 

from the reenactment video as fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if this evidence 

were excluded, however, it would not have changed the outcome of the trial, as the 

remaining evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Dr. Denton’s testimony that, in his 
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opinion, the only possible cause of J.C.’s death was asphyxia caused by smothering 

was primarily based on his autopsy findings, not the reenactment video. The only 

portions of his testimony that referred to the reenactment were his opinions that 

J.C.’s death occurred on the bed, based on Logan’s statement that she found J.C.’s 

body there, and that J.C.’s death could not have resulted from becoming entangled 

in bed sheets as Logan demonstrated in the video. Had those portions been 

excluded, Dr. Denton’s testimony that in his opinion J.C. died from being 

smothered, based on the edema fluid, petechia, and pressure blanching on his body, 

would have been admitted. His testimony that J.C.’s older brother could not have 

smothered him also would have been admitted. This evidence of guilt, along with 

the evidence concerning the Google search and life insurance policy, ample 

evidence of a financial motive, and a lack of evidence that anyone other than Logan 

could have smothered J.C., was overwhelming. Consequently, Logan has not 

established a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. 

¶ 86 The same prejudice analysis applies to Logan’s argument that her trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to allege that the reenactment was the 

product of an illegal seizure under the fourth amendment. See U.S. Const., amend. 

IV (“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”). As we 

have explained, Logan cannot satisfy the prejudice prong under Strickland because 

the evidence of her guilt was overwhelming, even if the reenactment video and the 

testimony relying on the reenactment video had been suppressed by the trial court. 

¶ 87 Logan’s final argument is that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

request the redaction of exhibits to ensure the jury did not hear irrelevant, overly 

prejudicial statements. First, she argues that counsel should have sought redaction 

of her statement during the reenactment video “that she took J.C. to the hospital 

when he was about two months old because he had a bump on his head, at which 

point, ‘DCFS got called’ and they created a ‘safety plan,’ ” despite later dropping 

the case. Logan further contends that counsel “failed to ensure the recorded 

telephone calls between [herself] and J.C.’s father only contained evidence relevant 

to motive or some other proper purpose.” Logan asserts that counsel’s failure to 

seek redaction of portions of the recordings in which she could be heard yelling at 
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her children was objectively unreasonable because they lacked “any probative 

value on the question of whether [she] committed the charged offense.” 

¶ 88 We reject this argument for substantially the same reason as the arguments 

concerning the fifth and fourth amendments. Assuming Logan’s trial counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, none of the 

defendant’s suggested piecemeal redactions had a reasonable probability of 

changing the outcome of the trial, because the remaining evidence of Logan’s guilt 

was overwhelming. 

¶ 89 CONCLUSION

¶ 90 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, albeit 

on different grounds than those put forward by the appellate court in affirming the 

judgment of the circuit court. Although we find that a Miranda violation occurred 

in this case, we hold that it did not amount to plain error because it was not a 

structural error and the evidence of guilt presented at trial was not closely balanced.

¶ 91 Judgments affirmed.

¶ 92 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of 

this case.