WILTING IN THE 

KURDISH SUN

THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Kurdish flag waving in the wind above the Quru Gusik 

refugee camp, 20 kilometers east of Arbil, the capital of the 

autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. 

(Getty Images/Safin Hamed)

WILTING IN THE 

KURDISH SUN

THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

This report was prepared for the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 

between May and August 2016.

By Crispin M.I. Smith and Vartan Shadarevian

Commissioners

Thomas J. Reese, S.J.

Chair

Daniel Mark, Vice Chairman

James J. Zogby, Vice Chair (until May 14, 2017)

Kristina Arriaga de Bucholz

Tenzin Dorjee

Sandra Jolley

Clifford D. May

John Ruskay

Jackie Wolcott

Ambassador David N. Saperstein, ex officio, non-voting member (until January 20, 2017)

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

WHO WE ARE

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal 

government commission created by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the 

universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. 

USCIRF uses international standards to monitor violations of religious freedom or belief abroad and makes 

policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary 

of State, and Congress. USCIRF Commissioners are 

appointed by the President and Congressional leaders 

of both political parties. The Commission’s work is supported by a professional, nonpartisan staff of regional 

subject matter experts. USCIRF is separate from the 

State Department, although the Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom is a 

non-voting, ex officio Commissioner.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe or 

not believe as one’s conscience leads, and live out one’s 

beliefs openly, peacefully, and without fear. Freedom of 

religion or belief is an expansive right that includes the 

freedoms of thought, conscience, expression, association, and assembly. While religious freedom is America’s first freedom, it also is a core human right international law and treaty recognize; a necessary component 

of U.S. foreign policy and America’s commitment to 

defending democracy and freedom globally; and a vital 

element of national security, critical to ensuring a more 

peaceful, prosperous, and stable world.

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Professional Staff

Dwight Bashir, Director of Research and Policy

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of International Law and Policy

Judith E. Golub, Director of Congressional Affairs & Policy and Planning

John D. Lawrence, Director of Communications

Paul Liben, Executive Writer

Sahar Chaudhry, Senior Policy Analyst

Elise Goss-Alexander, Researcher

Andrew Kornbluth, Policy Analyst

Tiffany Lynch, Senior Policy Analyst

Tina L. Mufford, Senior Policy Analyst

Jomana Qaddour, Policy Analyst

Karen Banno, Office Manager

Roy Haskins, Manager of Finance and Administration

Travis Horne, Government and Media Relations Specialist

Eric Snee, Travel and Administration Specialist

This report, prepared between May and August 2016, 

was overseen by Jomana Qaddour, Policy Analyst at the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

At USCIRF, Jomana is a subject matter expert on religious freedom in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries 

in the Levant.
Table of Contents

Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Kurdistan Region of Iraq: General Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Summary - Implications for Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Kurdistan Region of Iraq Law and Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Economic Analysis of Religious Minority Welfare in Kurdistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Religious Groups and Ethno-Religious Minorities in the KRI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Religious Groups and Minorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Ethno-Religious Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Other Ethnic Groups and Minorities Affected by Issues of Religious Freedom in the KRI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

General Issues of Concern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Specific Issues of Concern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Appropriation of Christian Land. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Abuses Against the Shabak Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Appendix A - Kurdistan’s Draft Constitution and Minority Rights (selected articles). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Appendix B - Technical Appendix: Economic Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Data Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ ix

Acronyms

CPC Country of Particular Concern

ISIS Islamic State (Dawlat al-Islamiyya fil-‘Iraq wash-Sham)

DIS Danish Immigration Service

DRC Danish Refugee Council 

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IOM Institute of Migration

IRFA United States International Religious Freedom Act (1998)

ITF Iraqi Turkmen Front

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq

NDI National Democratic Institute (of Iraq)

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPU Nineveh Plains Protection Units

PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

PYD Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat)

UNHCR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USCIRF United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

YBS ̨ Sinjar Resistance Units (Yekîneyên Berxwedana S ̨engalê)

YPG People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel)

Zowaa Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zawa’a Demoqrataya Athuraya)

USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 1

Executive Summary

In recent years the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has 

been a haven for minorities fleeing the turmoil and 

sectarian violence in the south of Iraq. The KRI offers 

religious freedoms that are comparatively robust as 

compared to those of its regional neighbors. Even so, 

troubling issues related to discrimination and even 

violence targeting ethnic and religious minorities exist, 

exacerbated by the KRI’s strained resources and security situation. Such issues must not be disregarded just 

because of the security situation in Iraq, or because of 

the KRI’s successes as compared with the wider region.

The KRI is home to considerable religious and ethnic 

diversity. However, the disputed territories now controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are 

exceedingly diverse, with populations of Sunni Arabs, 

Sunni and Shi’a Turkmen, Assyrian Christians, Yezidis, 

Kaka’i, Shabak, and others. Within the KRI’s official borders, diversity is also increasing, as Zoroastrian leaders 

convert Kurds, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 

pour in, fleeing the fighting against the so-called Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In addition, over the last 

three years, Kurdish forces have been at the forefront of 

the fight against ISIS, and have retaken or occupied large 

swathes of land in the so-called “disputed territories.” 

Control of these territories is disputed between the KRG, 

and the federal government of Iraq in Baghdad.

Against this backdrop, the KRG must adapt to 

administering an increasingly diverse population, 

where previously it represented a more homogenous 

Sunni-Kurdish majority. A more inclusive administrative approach has presented mixed results. To protect 

and include minority religions and ethnicities, KRG 

policy has taken positive steps by introducing protective 

laws, appointing religious representatives, and attempting to diversify the Peshmerga. 

Nevertheless, in practice these policies are frequently ineffectual. While the KRI remains far more 

welcoming and tolerant to minorities than its regional 

neighbors, minorities complain of systemic biases 

leveled against them that prevent them from realizing 

rights or fully participating in society. Rule of law and 

law enforcement as it applies to non-Sunni Kurds can be 

arbitrary. Minorities continue to fear growing extremism in the majority population, which they believe could 

threaten them in the long term. Economic uncertainty, 

combined with political stagnation and a young Kurdish population, could become a breeding ground for 

extremism. To ensure religious freedoms do not erode 

over time, it will be important to strengthen protections 

and institutions that protect these freedoms. And, given 

the number of vulnerable communities residing in the 

KRI, potential causes and vectors for extremism must be 

monitored and addressed as a matter of urgency.

Alleged Kurdish policies in the disputed territories 

are also of concern. Kurdish authorities, parties, and 

security services have been accused of attempting to 

“Kurdify” more ethnically diverse parts of the disputed 

territories, possibly as part of KRG policy to boost retention of the disputed territories once Baghdad turns its 

attention to its territories now occupied by Peshmerga 

following battles with ISIS. Although officials deny such 

a policy exists, a growing number of NGOs, activists, 

and reports have detailed evidence of the destruction 

of properties and attempts to prevent IDPs returning to 

their homes. In addition, some minorities are precluded 

from aid or support, or are even targeted, if they do not 

support or are critical of local Kurdish parties. This may 

be part of a long-term strategy to entrench control of the 

disputed territories.

A number of specific issues affect minorities residing 

in the KRI or KRG controlled territories. The Yezidi, an 

ethno-religious group that suffered enormously at the 

hands of ISIS in 2014, have faced discriminatory practices 

from authorities in Sinjar. Within the KRI, Yezidi are pressured to identify as Kurds, and individuals who object or 

criticize Kurdish authorities are persecuted. Christians 

have faced land appropriations by Kurdish landowners, 

and when they have attempted to protest have collectively had their freedom of movement curtailed based on 

religion. Further, recent clashes between Peshmerga and 

Shi’a Turkmen militias in Tuz Khurmatu could risk spilling over into Kirkuk, or could draw Kurds into sectarian 

conflict in the disputed territories.

If the KRI was considered by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 

separately from the rest of Iraq, it would likely not meet 

the necessary standard to be designated a “country of 

particular concern” under the International Religious 

Freedom Act. Though violations of religious freedom do 

exist in the KRI, they are not systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious. However, Kurdistan might well be considered 
2 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

a so-called “tier 2” country, requiring close monitoring 

due to the nature and extent of violations of religious 

freedom engaged in or tolerated by its authorities.

The case of the KRI is of particular importance and 

urgency because of growing calls for independence 

from Baghdad. The Kurdish president has called for a 

referendum as soon as possible, although it is unlikely 

that this will be held in the immediate future. Should the 

KRI become independent in the near future, it will face 

economic uncertainty, hostile neighbors, and growing 

extremism — all while caring for an increasingly diverse 

population. By strengthening institutions and encouraging 

reforms to promote and protect religious freedoms and 

minority rights now, the KRI and its population will ensure 

that these rights and freedoms are deeply engrained in the 

makeup of any new nation and its social contract. On the 

other hand, allowing rights and freedoms to be eroded now 

risks setting a trend that will likely continue after independence. Minority religions remain in a precarious position, 

even in the KRI, and so special effort much be taken to 

preserve their freedoms and rights.

The United States and partners should encourage 

reforms and the strengthening of Kurdish institutions 

wherever possible, in the interest of creating a robust 

and permanent culture of religious freedom in anticipation of any possible moves towards creating a new state 

in the Middle East.

Methodology

This report was produced by researchers commissioned 

by the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom. The period of research began in May 

2016, and ran to the end of August 2016. Research was 

divided into a qualitative analysis of pre-existing data 

and sources, a period of in-region research and interviews, and a quantitative study of economic trends and 

developments in the different areas of the KRI. During 

this period detailed mappings of the religious and 

ethno-religious groupings residing in the areas being 

reported on were developed in order to inform the other 

areas of research.

Review of Pre-Existing Data

The research team began with a review of pre-existing 

materials in English, Arabic, and Kurdish. Themes, 

trends, and gaps in the information were identified for 

further research. Information about the various religious groups and ethnicities of the KRI and its disputed 

territories was collated to produce profiles of the groups 

and the major challenges each group was facing, and 

had faced in the last decade. Conversations were held 

with academics and experts specializing in Kurdistan 

and issues of religion and religious freedom, allowing 

researchers to identify further issues of concern and 

areas requiring additional research. 

In-Region Research

The in-region research took place through the month of 

July 2016. A researcher1 traveled to the Kurdistan Region 

of Iraq to meet and interview KRG and local government officials, religious leaders and political figures, 

and activists. The researcher was primarily based in 

Erbil and traveled Dohuk governorate, as well as to the 

disputed territories in the Nineveh plains and Kirkuk, to 

meet with individuals. Hard-to-reach individuals were 

interviewed by telephone or video call. Interviews were 

conducted by the researcher in English and Arabic. In 

addition, a sizable portion of interviews were conducted 

in Kurdish (Sorani and Kurmanji), the Yezidi language, 

and Syriac. Interpreters were used for these interviews. 

In total, 84 interviews were conducted. 

Quantitative Research

The team compiled a wide variety of sources to construct an ethno-religious mapping of Kurdistan. For 

additional details, see Appendix B. These sources and 

mappings were then combined with nighttime luminosity data to create estimates of the economic activity 

of ethno-religious groups in each area of Kurdistan, 

drawing on literature that points to the efficacy of satellite luminosity as a proxy for economic development. 

Finally, this was used to compile a database detailing 

economic growth for each community for which the 

team had data, on which statistical analysis was carried 

out to determine whether there are systemic disparities 

between Sunni Kurdish and minority communities, 

and whether the level of diversity in a particular region 

explained economic achievement.

Limitations

Time and budgetary constraints limited the number of 

interviews. As a result, political and religious leaders 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 3

and, in some cases, activists were focused on exclusively. These leaders may not always accurately reflect 

the views of the people they represent. Future surveys or 

polling of local populations would be valuable to build a 

fuller picture of the opinions of the population at large. 

Despite the small sample size, the interviews, when 

taken along with the extensive research undertaken 

by the team, including quantitative analysis (detailed 

below in “Economic Analysis”), and an in-depth review 

of the literature and pre-existing reports, have allowed 

the team to build a broad overview of the situation in 

the KRI, as it pertains to religious freedom and minority 

rights. When possible, the researchers have attempted 

to convey some of the many disputes within specific 

communities, by including details from interviews with 

individuals from a range of areas or organizations. The 

report also focuses in depth on specific issues identified 

during the interviews. This report should be used in 

conjunction with other valuable reports published in 

recent months on Iraq and Kurdistan. Further, it should 

be weighed against other available country of origin 

information on the situation in the KRI and other Kurdish controlled areas. Where especially valuable reports 

exist, we highlight them in the body of this report for 

further review.

Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

General Overview

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (see map on p. 7) is home 

to considerable religious diversity and has provided a 

comparatively safe haven for minorities fleeing violence 

in the rest of the region. Compared with the situation in 

many of its regional neighbors, the Kurdistan Region of 

Iraq possesses a robust state of religious freedom. Even 

so, minority religious and ethnic groups face specific 

challenges, such as systemic discrimination by elements 

within the authorities or wider society. In addition, the 

deteriorating political and economic situation in the 

region, combined with poorly enforced protections and 

relatively weak rule of law, could put minorities increasingly at risk in the future.

Background

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is located in the 

north of Iraq and consists of three of Iraq’s 22 governorates: Erbil governorate, Sulaimaniya governorate, and 

Dohuk governorate. It is bordered by the rest of Iraq to 

the south and has border crossings with Syria in the 

west, Turkey to the north, and Iran to the west.

Within the KRI, a fourth governorate, Halabja, is 

recognized; it is formed of territory considered part of 

Sulaimaniya governorate. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also lays claim to considerable territory 

situated between its three governorates and the rest of 

Iraq. This includes the city of Kirkuk and all of Kirkuk 

(formerly Ta’amim) governorate; the Sinjar (Shengal) 

district, in addition to the Nineveh plains, in Nineveh 

governorate as well as in the Tuz Khurmatu district of 

Salahuddin governorate and parts of Diyala governorate. Kirkuk in particular has been a flashpoint between 

Erbil and Baghdad, with large populations of Kurds, 

Arabs, and Turkmen contesting control of the governorate and city. Article 140 of the Iraq constitution (which 

called for a referendum on the governorate’s status 

before 2008) was intended to settle the issue, but was not 

put into force.

Since the rise of the Islamic State (referred to as ISIS 

in this report), the KRG has taken de facto control of large 

parts of these disputed territories. The Kurdish Peshmerga (militias loyal to either the Kurdistan Democratic 

Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 

rival Kurdish political parties) have moved into territory 

abandoned by Iraqi security forces in 2014, or have taken 

control of towns after driving ISIS out. As a result, over 

the last three years the land and populations controlled 

directly by the KRG in Erbil has grown dramatically, with 

up to a 50 percent increase in held territory.

The majority of the KRI’s population are Kurds who 

adhere to Sunni Islam. The three main governorates of 

the region are overwhelmingly Sunni Kurdish. Yet, the 

KRI is also home to considerable religious and ethno-religious diversity. This is partially a result of Iraq’s ancient 

cultural heritage. Diversity is especially intense in the 

disputed territories. The Nineveh plains are home to 

large numbers of Christians, Shabak, and Yezidis. The 

Sinjar area is a Yezidi heartland. Kirkuk and its governorate are home to large numbers of Sunni and Shi’a 

Turkmen, as well as Christians and Sunni Arabs. 

The KRI is governed by the Kurdish Regional 

Government, which has its seat at Erbil and is officially 

subordinate to the Iraq federal government in Baghdad. 

In reality, the KRG exercises considerable autonomy, 
4 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

and Baghdad’s rule has little effect within the KRI. The 

KRG makes its own laws, runs its own security services 

and judicial system, and is administratively responsible 

for all affairs within the region.

KRI diversity has become more pronounced since 

2003, as many minority groups fled the instability 

and violence in Iraq’s south. Some of these populations fled abroad, but others relocated to the relatively 

stable Kurdish north, further concentrating minority 

populations there. This trend has been accelerating in 

response to ISIS’s campaigns and genocides against 

minority communities, and the KRI has been the 

destination of choice for many Iraqi civilians fleeing 

extremism and conflict. 

Today, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the areas 

also controlled by the KRG are home to the majority of 

Iraq’s Christian populations (largely of Assyrian, Chaldean, and Syriac ethnicities), almost all of the Yezidi 

community, Shi’a and 

Sunni Turkmen, Shabak, 

Kaka’i, in addition to 

adherents to Zoroastrianism, and very small 

populations of Sabean 

Mandeans and Baha’i.

Independence 

Movement

Between 1991 and 2003, 

the KRI was effectively 

independent from the 

rest of Iraq. Operation 

Provide Comfort was launched in 1991 by the United 

Kingdom, the United States, and allies, and provided 

a no-fly zone to protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein. 

Up to 2003, the KRG passed laws and administered the 

region without input from Baghdad. In the mid-1990s 

the major Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, fought 

one another in a civil war.

After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Kurdistan 

region ratified the Iraq federal constitution, which 

recognized the KRI as a semi-autonomous region, and 

recognized the KRG and its post-1992 laws.

In recent years, the relationship between the KRG 

and the federal government in Baghdad has deteriorated, following disputes over the status of Kirkuk, the 

supply of oil from the KRI to Baghdad, and the apportionment and release of the part of the federal budget 

set aside for Kurdistan. These disputes, along with 

internal Kurdish politics and political gridlock, have led 

to renewed calls for independence. In March 2016, KRG 

President Massoud Barzani made calls for an independence referendum before the end of the year.

Though it is likely that economic and political 

pressures will ultimately delay any independence bid in 

the immediate future, should a referendum be held it is 

highly probable that the result would favor an independent Kurdish state. As such, it is vital that the Kurdistan 

Region and its government are scrutinized independently 

of Iraq and Baghdad. The societal, ethnic, and political 

distinctions between the two regions are considerable, 

and the Iraq federal government has little, if any, effect 

on the laws, politics, and popular freedoms of the KRI. 

Kurdish support for independence could enable the 

emergence of a new state 

in the Middle East in the 

relatively near future.

KRG commitments 

to rights and freedoms 

of minorities should be 

closely scrutinized in 

anticipation of any possible 

independence bid. While 

many residents of the KRI 

currently enjoy comparatively robust religious 

freedoms, it will be important for local authorities to 

ensure these freedoms are safeguarded by laws and institutions. It will also be important for the KRG to guarantee 

support for all minority ethnicities and religious groups.

Overview of Religious Freedom in the KRI

As the Baghdad-based Iraqi federal government has 

almost no real power within the KRI, responsibility for 

religious freedom within the region falls entirely on the 

Kurdistan Regional Government. Either the KRG, or one 

of the major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK)2 also serves 

as the de facto authority in much of Kirkuk governorate, 

Sinjar, and the Nineveh plains. 

Compared with full-fledged states in the region, 

and with the rest of Iraq, the KRI is a haven of religious 

. . . the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 

and the areas also controlled by the 

KRG are home to the majority of 

Iraq’s Christian population . . . almost 

all of the Yezidi community, Shi’a and 

Sunni Turkmen, Shabak, Kaka’i, in 

addition to adherents to Zoroastrianism, 

and very small populations of 

Sabean Mandeans and Baha’i. 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 5

tolerance. Over the last decade, religious groups have 

been targeted less frequently in the KRI and have been 

relatively free to worship as they choose. However, 

integration between different religious communities is 

limited, and adherents of a given religion tend to live in 

villages or city quarters separate from members of other 

faiths and ethnicities.

KRG policy is outwardly favorable to religious 

freedom in the region. Senior religious leaders are 

frequently consulted by ministers and government 

officials. Clauses in the draft constitution and passages 

in laws written by the Kurdistan parliament explicitly 

defend freedom of worship and other minority rights. 

Some minority ethnic and religious groups also have 

legislative seats or representation in the regional government, with set quotas mandated by Kurdistan law. 

Implementation of expressed policy is sometimes 

less positive. Many religious groups complained to 

researchers that they remain second-class citizens 

compared with Sunni Kurds. Some groups suggested 

that while legal protections do exist, these rights are 

not always respected by the wider community. In 

addition to systemic biases, particular problems exist, 

including the appropriation of Christian lands and 

properties in the north of the region; the placement 

of strong political and coercive pressure on Yezidis to 

support KRG and KDP designs on Sinjar; and the mistreatment (often for political gain) of minority groups 

living in the disputed territories. 

Wider Regional Context

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is surrounded by countries which have been monitored by the United States 

Commission on International Religious Freedom 

(USCIRF) and the U.S. State Department Office of 

Religious Freedom. In 2016, Iran was re-designated 

a “country of particular concern” (CPC) under the 

International Religious Freedom Act, a designation 

reserved for any country whose government engages 

in or tolerates particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom that are systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious. Since 2014, USCIRF has recommended that 

the State Department add Syria to the list of CPCs. 

Turkey, which also borders the Kurdistan Region of 

Iraq, was designated a “Tier 2” country, where the 

violations engaged in or tolerated by its government 

are serious and characterized by at least one of the 

elements of the CPC standard. Until 2017, it was also 

recommended that Iraq be included in the list of 

CPCs, but improvements in the country have led to 

USCIRF revising its assessment.

Within this regional context, this report’s research 

team considers the KRI to be notable for having provided a safe haven for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) of many faiths from Iraq, including individuals fleeing broad religious persecutions 

across the wider region. The KRG estimates that it plays 

host to 1.5 million Iraqi IDPs and around a quarter of 

a million Syrians. This number is likely to increase in 

the immediate future because of ongoing campaigns 

against ISIS. 

KURDISH AUTHORITIES & LOCAL POWERS

The KRG is a semi-presidential system, with an elected 

president, and a parliament. Historically, real power 

has been concentrated in the hands of the two largest 

parties: the KDP, which controls Dohuk and much of Erbil 

governorates, and the PUK which dominates Sulaimaniya 

and Kirkuk. The Peshmerga units are loyal to, and controlled by one of the two parties. 

In recent years, a third party, Gorran (Change) 

has become a force on the political stage, and in 2013 

joined the KDP in coalition government. This relationship 

has now broken down, and the Kurdish parliament has 

become gridlocked and nonfunctional, with the parties 

hostile to one another (physical violence is not unknown). 

To date, the KRG President, Massoud Barzani of the 

KDP, has refused to step down, despite his term limit 

expiring. This has caused further tension and gridlock in 

the KRG and between parties.

In much of the KRI, and in all of the disputed territories, the KDP or PUK are the de facto authorities, and for 

many minorities, loyalty to the local dominant party is the 

best (or only) way to succeed in gaining office, resources, 

or government support.

. . . this report’s research team 

considers the KRI to be notable for 

having provided a safe haven for 

refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDP) of many faiths. . . .
6 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Areas of Concern

Although the KRI has a better track record for upholding religious freedom than its neighbors, a number of 

concerning trends exist or have begun to emerge in 

recent years. This is of particular relevance at a time 

when some political elements in the region are making 

movements toward full independence from Baghdad. 

The KRI faces economic uncertainty, mass migration, 

and ongoing conflict with its regional neighbors. At the 

same time, the rights and freedoms of minorities are 

only loosely enshrined in law and in the popular social 

contract. Those laws and protections that do exist are 

enforced unevenly, and sometimes ineffectually. 

Moreover, the KRG has made moves to take control of the territories disputed by Baghdad and Erbil. De 

facto KRG control now extends to much of Sinjar district, 

Kirkuk, and the Nineveh plains. These are exceptionally 

diverse areas, with many faiths and ethnicities. However, 

some communities protest that loyalty to the KRG, or 

even to specific political parties, is a prerequisite for aid 

and protection in these areas. More worryingly, accusations of “Kurdification” of areas and populations are 

linked to the suppression of those groups and minorities 

unwilling to declare themselves to be Kurds, or unwilling 

to support being subsumed into a future Kurdish state.

As a result, the United States and international 

partners should monitor the KRI as it becomes even 

more autonomous. Partners should help the KRG 

• A Kurdistan Region independent from Iraq is a likely reality 

in coming decades. The KRG is already highly independent 

from Baghdad.

• The KRI and territories controlled by the KRG are exceedingly diverse in terms of religious and ethno-religious 

groups. Ongoing turmoil in the south has created a flow 

of displaced persons into the KRI; this is likely going to 

increase diversity in the KRI.

• It is not yet clear whether the KRI will quickly recover from 

its economic slowdown and political dysfunction. It is 

unclear what opportunities will exist for the region’s young 

population, regardless of independence. 

• While many minorities are currently relatively secure not 

all have guaranteed rights and freedoms. Some violations 

of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethno-religious 

groups occur. Some minority groups believe that they 

remain at risk from elements among the Sunni Kurdish 

majority population.

• Measures, including laws and institutions, should be put 

in place now to safeguard minority rights and religious 

freedoms. Independent and empowered bodies should 

be created to ensure policies are effectively implemented. Positive developments, such as 2015’s Minority 

Rights Law should be built upon and effectively upheld.

• Improvements and reform should be encouraged as a 

matter of urgency, in light of the increasingly large nonSunni Kurdish minority populations. Reform should also 

be prioritized to ensure the region has a robust culture 

of religious freedom and ethnic tolerance in advance of 

any moves toward independent statehood.

• All groups and individuals should be actively afforded 

rights and freedoms. Identification as Kurdish, or as any 

other group, should not be a prerequisite for receiving 

rights in the KRI. All individuals should be treated as persons before the law.

SUMMARY | IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

and other local actors to strengthen the institutions 

and safeguards that protect minorities and religious 

groups, and should work with those groups to ensure 

their voices are heard and respected. Problems should 

be identified early, and policies introduced to correct 

and reverse negative trends. If done effectively, religious freedoms and rights can be enshrined firmly in 

the law, in institutions, and in popular understanding, 

allowing these values to be an integral part of Kurdistan’s future. 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq Law and 

Religious Freedom

Role of the Iraq Constitution and Federal Laws

Officially, the Iraqi constitution is the ruling governing 

document for the KRI, with the region’s autonomy established in law under Article 117. However, the constitution states that in the event of contradictions between 

central and local laws of any regional administration, 

authority is conferred on the local administration.3

Increased autonomy in recent years has further reduced 

the limited power of federal law and the constitution 

over Kurdish affairs. As such these sources of law have 

only a limited effect on religious freedom in the KRI.

THE IRAQ CONSTITUTION 

The Iraq Constitution itself contains various provisions aimed at guaranteeing protections for religious 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 7

and ethnic minorities. These rights include freedom 

of religious worship, education, and promulgation of 

cultural languages. Since its adoption, the Iraq Constitution has come under various criticisms.4

 It has not 

always been observed or respected by the federal and 

regional governments or courts.

Article 2 makes Islam the official religion of the 

state and establishes it as a foundation source of legislation. Under the Article, “no law may be enacted that 

contradicts the established provisions of Islam.” However, Article 2 also “guarantees the full religious rights to 

freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals 

such as Christians, Yezidis, and Mandaean Sabeans.” 

The centrality of Islamic principles in Iraq’s legal system 

is reinforced by Article 92(2), which requires the Federal 

Supreme Court to be made up of experts of both secular 

and Islamic law.

USCIRF has previously expressed concern that a 

constitutional arrangement establishing a role for Islam 

as a source of legislation nevertheless “could be used by 

judges to abridge the internationally recognized human 

rights of political and social reformers, those voicing 

criticism of prevailing policies, religious minorities, 

women, or others.”5

The Constitution has other provisions that could 

protect the religious freedoms of the population, including peoples in the KRI. Article 37, for example, provides 

that “the State shall guarantee protection of the individual from intellectual, political and religious coercion.” 

While Articles 42 and 43 explicitly provide for freedom 

of belief and worship. USCIRF has previously produced 

detailed analysis and recommendations for each article 

of Iraq’s permanent constitution. 

RELEVANT FEDERAL LAWS

Throughout the in-region research, multiple religious 

leaders and politicians expressed their concerns about 

the recently passed federal National Identity Card Law.6

Article 26 of the law includes two provisions that 

Iraqi minorities argue discriminate against non-Muslims. 

According to the first provision, only non-Muslims can 

convert to Islam; Muslims, by contrast, cannot change 

their religious affiliation. The second provides that a child 

born to one Muslim and one non-Muslim parent is listed 
8 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

on its National ID card as Muslim. As a result, if a spouse 

decides to convert to Islam, any child born to that parent 

is automatically registered Muslim – and may be unable 

to alter the child’s ID card at a later date.

Christian leaders in the KRI in particular are worried about this law, and some priests told researchers 

that Muslims wanting to convert to Christianity have 

faced difficulties from police and security services.7

Under the United States International Religious 

Freedom Act (1998), IRFA, arbitrary prohibitions on, 

restrictions of, or punishment for changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation is considered a violation 

of religious freedom.8 The ID card law is a product 

of the federal Iraq parliament, and not the Kurdistan parliament or KRG. Nevertheless, it effects the 

religious freedom of individuals within the KRI, and 

pressure should be put on the federal government to 

remove the law.

Kurdistan’s Draft Constitution

Due to the legislative, judicial, and political autonomy 

afforded to the KRI, it is important to consider its laws, 

practices, and sources of law. This is especially important in light of growing calls for independence, as current 

practice within the region may indicate future practice 

should a new state emerge. 

The Kurdistan Constitution has not been formally 

adopted, and remains in draft form. In its current form, 

the draft constitution contains several provisions aimed 

at promoting freedom of religion (for a more detailed 

overview, see Appendix A). The constitution has gone 

through various revisions. Most recently, the Kurdistan 

Parliament formed a Constitution Drafting Committee 

in 2015. However, to date no updated document has been 

released, and political gridlock in the KRI and its parliament cast doubt on when the new draft will be ready.9

 The 

following analysis is based on the 2009 draft.10

As with the Iraq Constitution, Shari’ah law is a 

source of legislation in Article 7. Yet, the language is 

very different from Article 2 of the Iraq Constitution; 

specifically, it contains no prohibition on legislation 

violating the established principles of Islam. There is 

no article requiring courts to include religious legal 

experts. Several KRG officials and lawyers have stressed 

in interviews that Shari’ah is only one of many sources 

of law in the KRI.11 However, the prominence of Shari’ah 

within the document leaves many non-Muslims nervous. Various Christian religious leaders and politicians 

expressed fears that this inclusion might open the way to 

judicial interpretations curtailing their rights.12 Yezidis 

also expressed concern, with even pro-KRG leaning 

Yezidi leaders observing that the provision risks a longterm erosion of non-Muslim freedoms while potentially 

encouraging non-pluralistic Islamism.13

Elsewhere in the draft constitution, Article 7 

would secure all the rights of Christians and Yezidis 

and members of other religious groups regarding the 

freedom of belief and practice of religion, and Article 

18 would establish equality before the law, regardless 

of faith. Article 65 holds that religious affiliation is 

not compulsory and would give citizens freedom of 

religion, belief, and thought, and Article 124 states 

that no one religion may be imposed on other religious 

groups. For a fuller analysis of the draft constitution, 

see Appendix A.

The Kurdish draft constitution contains multiple 

provisions that would enshrine religious freedom as 

fundamental to the KRI and a future Kurdish state. In 

future drafts, it will be important to ensure these articles 

are preserved. It will also be necessary to ensure these 

rights are upheld.

Kurdistan Election Law and 

Minority Quotas

Under the Iraq Constitution, the Kurdistan Parliament 

has full legislative control over the region, except for 

those enumerated powers reserved for the Iraqi parliament. With this level of power, healthy minority involvement in the parliament must be maintained to ensure 

that statutes are passed assuring minority protections. 

The 111-member parliament has a number of seats 

reserved for minorities under the Kurdistan National 

Assembly Elections Law (1992, amended 2009). Five 

OTHER INSTITUTIONS

The Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs hosts 

two Directorates for Minority Affairs, one for Yezidi 

Affairs, and the other for Christians.

The Ministry also is home to the “Seven Religious 

Representatives,” including individuals who represent 

Muslim, Christian, Yezidi, Kaka’i, Alevi, Baha’i, Jewish 

faiths. These representatives meet monthly at a specially 

created directorate for religious co-existence.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 9

seats are reserved for Turkmen parties; five for Assyrian, Chaldean, or Syriac parties; and one for Armenian 

parties.14 This ensures that the various Christian ethnic groups of the KRI, along with the sizable Turkmen 

population, are guaranteed some representation in 

the Kurdistan Parliament. However, other religious 

groups and ethnicities remain unrepresented, or 

underrepresented. Notably, there is no seat reserved 

for Yezidis or Shabak populations. In the case of the 

former, this may be justified by Kurdish policy makers 

on the grounds that Yezidis are frequently considered 

to be ethnic Kurds. However, this categorization is 

fiercely disputed by many Yezidis. Several Yezidi leaders suggested that a lack of political representation 

contributed to poorer outcomes for Yezidis in the KRI. 

While some Yezidis are in elected positions, almost 

all are members of the KDP. By contrast, Christians 

effectively have six seats dedicated to parties devoted 

to representing the Christian community. 

2015 Kurdistan Minority Rights Law

In 2015, the Kurdistan Parliament passed the Law of 

Protecting the Rights of Components in Kurdistan 

(The Minority Rights Law).15 This law lists national 

groups (Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs, and 

Armenians) and religious groups (Christians, Yezidis, 

Sabian Mandaeans, Kaka’is, Shabak, Faylies, Zoroastrians, and others) as components of the citizenry 

of the KRI.16 The law enumerates a series of rights, 

including freedom of thought, religion, speech, and 

culture.17 The law also mandates the government to 

guarantee equality and equality of opportunity to 

all component groups of the region, while requiring 

religious discrimination to be punished.18 This law is 

notable for its comprehensive listing of the various 

religious groups and minorities, and its unambiguous 

granting of rights and religious freedoms to all. The 

law formalizes many of the not yet ratified provisions 

of the draft constitution and is a stronger legal protection, as it formally acknowledges all of region’s specific 

groups, and grants them rights equally. 

The Minority Rights Law reflects a push on a policylevel to ward off the types of systemic and arbitrary 

actions that are the primary focus of IRFA.

However, although the Minority Rights Law is 

undoubtedly a positive step for religious freedom in the 

KRI, and in Iraq, it is unclear how effective it will be. 

Implementation of the law will require a strong commitment to the rule of law, for prosecutors and local 

authorities to uphold the rights outlined, and for the 

courts to administer the law fairly. It is too soon to know 

how effectively this nascent law will be implemented.

Effectiveness of Law Enforcement and 

Rule of Law

Compared with much of the rest of Iraq, rule of law is 

strong in the KRI. Nevertheless, access to justice varies 

depending on location, connections, ethnicity, and 

religion. An April 2016 report produced by the Danish 

Refugee Council (DRC) and the Danish Immigration 

Service (DIS) cited interviews with various experts on 

KRI in collecting updated information relevant to cases 

of Iraqi asylum seekers and their access to the KRI.19

In that report, Human Rights Watch characterized the 

Kurdish court system as under political influence and 

used to stifle dissent. Further, according to the Office 

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), the local population in KRI makes little use of 

the police or the courts. UNHCR said that the courts are 

not seen as responsive, even though, in principle, they 

have a number of sound laws that meet international 

standards. In addition, UNHCR explained that access to 

rule of law is dependent on ethnic and religious affiliation, tribe, connections, family and relatives, and it is 

very difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to stand 

up for his rights by himself.20

This analysis is consistent with the observations 

gleaned by this report’s research team from interviews 

with many Christians, Turkmen, and Yezidi leaders. 

Some Assyrian Christians expressed skepticism about 

gaining a fair hearing in the courts, especially if making 

a claim against a Sunni Kurd.21 Many Yezidis are reluctant to use the court system at all.22 The DIS/DRC report 

from April 2016 also included interviews referring to a 

Compared with much of 

the rest of Iraq, rule of law

is strong in the KRI.
10 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

“lack of protection of minority groups by authorities,” 

which manifests itself in IDPs creating ghettos based on 

ethnic affiliations inside camps and other areas.23

These findings may indicate some degree of 

arbitrariness with regard to the treatment of religious 

minorities in the region – which is relevant when considering whether a state is a “Country of Particular Concern.” It would also be necessary to ascertain whether 

repression faced by specific communities is of a systemic nature, which is beyond the scope of this report.

KRG Attempts to Improve

The KRG has been keen to show the international community that it protects minorities, especially Christians. 

According to one scholar interviewed by the DRC, Kurdish authorities have taken steps to prevent incidents of 

disputes based on ethnic affiliation.24

The KRG has attempted to include religious groups 

in the political process, with multiple religious representatives affiliated with the government, and regular 

consultations with religious leaders.25 Further, the KRG 

stressed to researchers that it does not differentiate 

between IDPs from different ethnic backgrounds.26

Nevertheless, protections from the KRG frequently 

appear to rely on links to the authorities or to the major 

Kurdish political parties. Some activists and local leaders accuse those individuals who represent their respective communities within the KRG, or who succeed in 

climbing to positions of political authority, of being 

paid or otherwise coerced by the KRG or KDP.27 These 

dissenters hold that rights and protections under the 

law are only granted to minorities and religious groups 

if they do not object to mainstream Kurdish political 

objectives. This is somewhat borne out in the respective 

treatment of different religious groups, discussed in 

depth later in this report.

Economic Analysis of Religious Minority 

Welfare in Kurdistan

Issues of religious freedom are strongly related to economic freedom and development.28 In communities 

and countries where diverse groups thrive in parallel 

and without substantial disparities, political tensions 

and infringements of religious freedom, whether from 

the government or wider society, are less likely to 

arise. On the other hand, underdevelopment can fuel 

tensions in areas with high ethnic or religious diversity, and economic inequalities that persist across a 

country can be both the cause and effect of grievances 

that spillover into the political sphere and can threaten 

religious freedom.29 Evidence of a systemic bias against 

the economic development of minority areas in the KRI 

may reflect an institutional setup that is less likely to 

ensure that minority religious groups are safeguarded 

and their religious freedoms protected.30

Complete and accurate statistical data on Kurdistan’s economy is scarce, and even less exists to link economic welfare with particular ethnic or religious groups. 

This paucity of reliable data can obscure potential 

disparities and issues and make it difficult to generalize 

• The Iraq Constitution’s reliance on Shari’ah law as a foundational source of law creates a legal system in which equal 

protection under the law for religious minorities is tenuous. 

However, the autonomous nature of the KRI and its government means that the Iraq Constitution is largely ineffectual 

in areas controlled by the KRG.

• If enacted the Kurdistan’s Draft Constitution would temper 

the role of Shari’ah, and enforce religious minorities’ rights 

to freedom of worship. It is recommended that future constitution drafts contain enhanced rights allowing self-identification for certain minority groups, including the Yezidi.

• The Iraqi National Identity Card law impinges religious 

freedoms by preventing parents from raising children in a 

faith other than Islam when at least one parent is a Muslim. 

The statute should be repealed by the parliament in 

Baghdad, and the Kurdish parliament should take steps to 

counteract this law in the KRI.

• The Kurdish parliament reserves seats for Turkmen and 

Christian groups, preserving their voice in the legislature, 

but additional seats should be reserved for groups who 

do not have guaranteed representation, such as Yezidis 

and Shabaks.

• The 2015 Minority Rights law further enhances protections 

for religious minorities in Kurdistan, but the results of the 

law should be monitored to ensure that the protections are 

respected and enforced locally.

• Kurdish courts do not seem to be an effective avenue for 

enforcing religious minority rights. Although it is unclear 

that this deficiency is primarily motivated by religious differences, the effects clearly occur along religious divides 

and must be addressed to assure an adequate, independent judiciary, and equality before the law for all faiths 

and ethnicities.

SUMMARY AND RECOMENDATIONS
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 11

from particular observations. The evidence presented 

in the rest of the report contributes substantially to an 

understanding of the general state of different minorities in Kurdistan. Further, the following analysis of the 

official Kurdistan region (the governorates of Dohuk, 

Erbil, Sulaimaniya (and Halabja)) provides additional 

evidence, both in terms of macro level analysis, and in 

building a body of statistically based evidence.

Minority vs. Majority Status

The results outlined in brief here involve analysis that 

uses nighttime satellite imagery of Kurdistan to proxy 

for economic activity. This analysis is then combined 

with precise mappings of ethno-religious groups to find 

statistical patterns in the levels of growth and activity 

for different groups. The study tests the hypothesis 

that being Sunni Kurdish offers a significant economic 

advantage, in terms of growth. The analysis examines 

data from 1992 to 2015 but focusing specifically on the 

high growth peacetime period from 2004 to 2013.

The findings indicate that Sunni Kurds have experienced significantly higher levels of growth than other 

groups, as is shown by Appendix B, Figure A4. This result 

is not explained by accounting for differences in geography, urbanization, existing development, weather, and 

other factors. Moreover, this effect became more pronounced in the final years before ISIS occupied territory 

in Iraq (2014), and less pronounced since.31 This effect 

may be due to poor growth overall after ISIS became a 

significant factor in Iraq, and oil prices crashed. 

Because other factors and explanations cannot 

account for the difference, the findings are strong evidence that Kurdish authorities or significant elements 

in society favor Sunni Kurds over other groups. This 

is probably due at least in part to government institutions that have favored the Kurds. The analysis mostly 

identifies disparities that remain consistent across geographic regions; such ethno-religious inequality across 

regions, rather than at the micro level of interactions 

between individuals, suggests a more centralized 

source of the disparity. An institutional theory also 

accords well with findings in other parts of this report 

pointing to some behavior on the part of Kurdish 

parties, including the KDP and PUK, governmental elements, and the wider society that does ultimately favor 

the Sunni Kurdish majority.

The findings remain highly significant when different methods of measurement are applied as illustrated in 

Figures A13, A15 and A18 in Appendix B. For a full analysis 

and discussion of why possible objections and alternative 

explanations are rejected, see Appendix B of this report.

Fragmentation

The study additionally tests hypotheses positing that the 

level of fragmentation in a community has an effect on 

the growth rate of that community. The fragmentation 

metric is a measure of how diverse a region is; specifically, the metric measures the probability that two 

randomly selected individuals in a region will be from 

different groups. This measure is standard and well-documented in the literature. 

The analysis reveals another highly significant 

finding; the very strong negative effect of fragmentation 

in a given community on growth, as demonstrated in 

Appendix B, Figure A6. That is, more fragmented areas 

of Kurdistan experience significantly lower levels of 

luminosity growth over the studied time period. This is 

true whether similar groups, such as the various Christian ethnicities, are considered together, or separately 

when calculating fragmentation.

This study on the effect of fragmentation also survives potential critiques. As before, the results are statistically significant and robust to different specifications. 

More pertinently, accounting for a number of potential 

confounding variables leaves the conclusion unaltered: 

differences in geography, urbanization, existing development, or weather cannot explain away the significant 

negative effect of fragmentation on growth.

Many possible explanations support this effect, 

but academic literature suggests that fragmented 

communities are unlikely to cohere enough to bargain 

with and lobby politicians for greater levels of investment in their community.32 This has been borne out to 

some degree by the various interviews conducted with 

minority leaders in the regions during the in-region 

research period for this report.

Implications for Religious Freedom

The results carry important consequences for a general 

study of the current and future status of religious freedom, and should inform any policy approach aimed at 

ameliorating issues of religious freedom.
12 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

First, the research provides reinforcement of interview-based evidence compiled elsewhere in this report of 

potential issues in Kurdistan’s institutional structure that 

in some cases may work to disadvantage minority religious groups. Institutions that prevent individuals from 

attaining the same level of economic success on the basis 

of minority or religious status (even if this is not a deliberate policy) are probably insufficient to safeguard groups 

from other, more clear-cut infringements of religious freedom. This is in-line with the concerns stated elsewhere 

in the report of minorities claiming they face systemic 

biases that prevent them from realizing their rights. The 

analysis here outlines that, at least in terms of economic 

development, evidence exists to support this claim.

Second, regardless of the accepted explanation 

for the relationship between fragmentation, minorities, and economic growth, it is nonetheless salient 

that fragmented areas, 

which are home to large 

numbers of religious and 

ethnic minorities, are 

stagnating. This is cause 

for concern, given that 

economically disadvantaged areas are more 

likely to experience radicalization, conflict, and 

polarization, which in 

turn can lead to infringements of religious freedom.33

If adherents of a minority religion in Kurdistan are left 

behind economically, it bodes poorly for their rights 

and freedoms, religious or otherwise. That these areas 

are diverse to begin with only adds to this argument: 

given the potential in such areas for strife and intergroup tensions to become problematic, any economic 

stagnation in these areas should be seen as potentially 

threatening to religious freedom.

Religious Groups and Ethno-Religious 

Minorities in the KRI

The KRI, along with the disputed areas, plays host to a 

diversity of religions, ethno-religious groups, and other 

minorities. The vast majority of the KRI population is 

Muslim. Sunni Islam is the dominant sect, with a very 

small Shi’ite minority. Fayli Kurds and Iraqi Turkmen 

account for the majority of the Shi’ite population. 

The second largest religion in the Iraqi Kurdistan 

region is Christianity, adherents of which are primarily 

divided among three main denominations: the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, 

and the Syriac Orthodox 

Church. While Iraq’s 

overall Christian population has precipitously 

declined since the 2003 

invasion, in recent years 

large numbers of Christians have fled from Iraqi 

governorates into the 

three official KRG-controlled governorates. This 

is primarily due to the actions of ISIS. Christians have 

fled (or been forcibly deported) from Syria, Mosul, and 

the wider Nineveh governorate. 

Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion with 

small numbers of followers residing in Kurdistan. 

• Assessing the socioeconomic wellbeing of various minority 

religions is an important factor in making a determination 

on issues of religious freedom. Economically disadvantaged areas are more likely to experience radicalization, 

conflict, and polarization which in turn can lead to infringements of religious freedom.

• Combining data on the location of ethno-religious groups 

with satellite data on luminosity is a useful way of breaking 

down economic activity by religious group where better 

subnational data does not exist.

• Sunni Kurdish communities perform significantly 

better with regards to growth than minority groups, 

suggesting a systemic bias against economic achievement 

by minority groups.

• More diverse communities experience significantly lower 

levels of economic growth and constitute potential 

‘problem areas’ for religious freedom. These communities 

should constitute a focal point of further investigation 

and policy.

• Policy designed to improve rights and religious freedoms 

should take into account that religious freedom and 

substantive equality in economic development between 

groups go hand-in-hand.

SUMMARY

If adherents of a minority religion 

in Kurdistan are left behind 

economically, it bodes poorly for 

their rights and freedoms, 

religious or otherwise.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 13

There are reports of growing numbers of converts into 

the religion, possibly fueled by its perceived links with 

Kurdish nationalism.

Beyond these religions, Iraqi Kurdistan is home to a 

host of ethno-religious groups. This includes the Yezidi, 

the Kaka’i (Ahl-e-Haqq/Yarsani), the Shabak, and the 

Mandaean peoples. For these groups it is almost impossible to disentangle adherents’ religious affiliation from 

their ethnic identity. Where Muslims and Christians frequently are identified (or self identify) as ethnic Kurds, 

Arabs, or Assyrians, ethno-religious groups tend to resist 

being subsumed into Kurdish or Arab culture. In recent 

years this has occasionally led to tensions between some 

groups and the KRG, which has at times been accused of 

attempting to “Kurdify” minority groups.

Ethno-religious groups frequently display close 

social cohesion and can be secretive in their practices. They tend to number only a few hundreds of 

thousands. For these reasons and others, they have 

historically been discriminated against. This discrimination continues today. In addition to the genocides 

perpetrated by ISIS against the Yezidis, Shabak, and 

others, ethno-religious groups can face difficulties 

from local communities, and systemic injustices 

stemming from local government policy.

Other minorities also reside in the Iraqi Kurdistan region who, though not defined by their religious 

affiliation, are nevertheless directly affected by issues 

of religious freedom. These minorities include the 

Iraqi Turkmen, who are divided between adherents 

to Sunni Islam and Shi’a Islam; and the small Armenian population (a majority of whom worship at the 

Armenian Apostolic Church, with the balance being 

Armenian Catholics).

The remainder of this section serves as a brief 

overview of the religions and minorities present in 

the KRI, and highlights issues facing these groups for 

later discussion.

Fig 1. Majority Religious and Ethno-Religious groups in the KRI and disputed territories. 

Note: on this map, a block color denotes the majority population, but does not show the level of diversity in each area. See maps below for more. 
14 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Religious Groups and Minorities

Islam

SUNNI ISLAM

The overwhelming majority of Kurds in the KRI are 

adherents to Sunni Islam, although in Iraq there has 

never been a clear split between between Sunni and 

Shiite Kurds.34 The KRG Ministry of Endowment and 

Religious Affairs estimates there are 5,340 mosques in 

the region, with around 3,000 in Erbil governorate.35 For 

most of the last century Kurdish nationalism was distinct 

from Islam, although nationalist sentiment was stronger 

among Sunni Kurds than among other religious groups.36

Kurdish cultural associations and political parties 

that have emerged in Iraqi Kurdistan have been almost 

entirely secular.37 During the Iran-Iraq war era, both 

Iran and Saudi Arabia attempted to encourage Islamic 

movements among Iraqi Kurds, with only limited success. The largest of these movements continues to exist 

as the Bizûtnewey Îslamî Kurdistan (Kurdistan Islamic 

Movement), with its support centered around Halabja. 

Other Islamist parties in the Kurdish parliament include 

the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komelî Îslamî Kurdistan), 

and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgirtûy islâmî Kurdistân). Collectively these parties hold seventeen of 111 

seats in parliament.

Sunni Muslims are very well represented in government, civil society, and the legal profession and judiciary. Sunni Kurds experience no significant restrictions 

on their freedom of religion in the KRI, nor do they face 

any legal or social barriers on the basis of their religion.

IDPs and the Disputed Regions

Over the last five years, a large influx of Sunni Muslim 

IDPs has flowed into the KRI. Most of these groups are 

composed largely of Iraqi Arabs, but also consist of Iraqi 

Turkmen along with Syrian refugees. According to some 

estimates, displaced Sunni Arabs now constitute about 

20 percent of the Kurdistan region’s population.38 Most 

of these IDPs have been displaced by the actions of 

ISIS. Although the rights of these individuals may have 

been curtailed to varying degrees by local authorities, 

their freedom of religion has not. Nevertheless, Kurdish 

authorities view the incoming population with great 

suspicion. This is partly due to a fear of being infiltrated 

by terrorists.39 However, there is also a deep-seated 

worry that immigrants risk diluting the “Kurdishness” 

of the autonomous region. The memory of Saddam Hussein’s “Arabization” policies makes Kurdish authorities 

especially nervous of major demographic changes.

A significant percentage of the IDPs (including Sunni 

Muslims) come from the disputed territories. During the 

conflict against ISIS, the KRG gained de facto control of 

many of these territories. The newly controlled regions 

are more ethnically and religiously diverse than the rest 

of the KRI. It will be necessary to monitor the KRG to 

ensure it upholds the rights and protections of members 

of all religions and ethno-religions equally. 

There is also a risk of reprisals against Sunnis 

(specifically Sunni Arabs) from communities affected 

by ISIS. As ISIS has been driven back in the disputed 

regions, Sunni Arabs have been targeted in revenge 

• Sunni Muslims are a majority in the KRI, are well represented throughout society, and are free to practice their 

religion. However, attention should be paid to the rights 

of Sunni Muslims (especially Arabs) who have fled to 

KRG-controlled areas.

• Some Sunni Arabs have not been allowed to return to their 

homes now under the control of the Peshmerga and KRG, 

and in some cases, homes may have been destroyed or 

looted by Kurdish elements. Some IDPs and organizations 

believe this is part of a Kurdification policy by the KRG, 

KDP or PUK (discussed later in this report, under “General 

Issues of Concern”). Both the KRG and the parties strongly 

deny this allegation. 

• Sunni Arabs returning to disputed areas currently under 

KRG control are at risk of reprisals from communities previously targeted by ISIS.

• Declining standards of living and youth unemployment 

risks a rise in radicalization. This is a threat to regional 

stability and could ultimately fuel a backlash from Kurdish 

nationalists and secularists against the religious freedoms 

of the Sunni majority. Sunni Arabs are already treated 

with a degree of mistrust. In addition, a rise in extremism 

and radicalization may threaten the security and freedoms 

of non-Muslims in the KRI. 

• The United States and the international community 

should monitor the risk factors for unrest and increased 

extremism. The KRG and local actors should be empowered to tackle causes of extremism, without unreasonably 

restricting the freedoms of population. 

ISSUES OF CONCERN
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 15

Fig 2. Distribution & Density of Sunni Kurdish population, KRI & disputed territories

attacks.40 Having de facto control of these regions, 

the KRG must take measures to protect Sunnis from 

reprisals. The need for such measures will only 

increase in urgency as greater numbers of IDPs are 

able to return home as ISIS is defeated. Reconciliation 

between the groups targeted by ISIS and Sunnis is 

likely to be extremely difficult.41

Some IDPs and activists have accused KRG officials 

of not allowing members of certain groups (including 

Sunni Arabs) to return to their homes, even after their 

villages and towns have been liberated from ISIS. Some 

individuals suggested this is an attempt to undo Saddam 

Hussein’s “Arabization” policies and to make the disputed regions more ethnically Kurdish. KRG officials 

confirm that they have occasionally prevented civilians 

returning home, but fiercely deny that this is ethnically 

or religiously motivated. Officials claim villages are not 

safe for return, and that IDPs can harbor terrorists and 

terrorist sympathizers among them42 (see the following 

discussion on Sunni extremism).

Sunni Extremism

Some Sunni extremism exists in the Kurdish autonomous region. In the early 2000s Ansar al-Islam, a 

terrorist insurgent group, was based in the KRI. In May 

2015, Kurdish security forces prevented a bombing plot 

in Erbil by local members of ISIS, revealing the group’s 

societal reach beyond the front lines of Iraq’s disputed 

territories.43 Fears of terrorist infiltration have alarmed 

Kurdish authorities, leading to the imposition of strict 

travel limitations on Sunni Arab populations – though 

critics suggest this policy is also motivated by a desire 

to make life difficult for Sunni Arabs and to discourage 

them from remaining in the region.

In addition, the economic downturn after the 

war on ISIS, declining global oil prices, increasing 

unemployment rates, and widespread corruption and 

nepotism all add to the risk of radicalization, especially 

among the region’s youth. In the KRI, 36 percent of the 

population is under the age of 14; the median age is 

slightly over 20.44 According to the Ministry of Social 
16 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Affairs, unemployment skyrocketed from 7 percent in 

2013 to 21 percent in 2015. Since June 2014, more than 

500 young Sunnis have joined ISIS from Kurdistan.45

To counter the threat of radicalization, the KRG 

plans to offer “courses to retrain and attempt to ‘moderate’ the nearly 3,000 imams in the Kurdistan Region and 

to change the Islamic program in public schools, which 

is under the authority of the Ministry of Education.”46

Imams and mosques are now monitored for signs of radicalism.47 Anecdotally, this has led to radical preachers 

and recruiters meeting in secret.

SHI’A ISLAM

Shi’a Muslims are much less common in the KRI. 

Those that are present tend to live in the disputed 

territories, and are Turkmen or Faily Kurds. These 

groups are discussed in more detail later. Unlike 

much of the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan has largely avoided 

sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a groups. 

However, developments in Kirkuk province, and in 

Tuz Khurmatu, have sparked clashes between Kurdish forces and Shi’a militias, including the al-Hashd 

al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Units). Should these 

clashes become more frequent or widespread, Kurds 

may find themselves drawn into sectarian conflict in 

some of the disputed territories. 

CHRISTIANITY

Christianity is the second largest religion in Iraq after 

Islam, although the percentage of population identifying as Christian has continuously fallen since a high of 

about 10–12 percent in the middle of the 20th century. 

Some sources estimate that the number of Christians in 

Iraq has been reduced by half since the 2003 invasion. 

Others have the pre-war population of 1,500,000 dropping by two thirds.48 Inconsistent census gathering has 

obscured the true population size of Christians in both 

Iraq and the KRI.

Christians are generally not ethnic Kurds, and variously identify as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs. They 

Fig 3. Distribution & Density of Arab population, KRI & disputed territories
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 17

speak Arabic and dialects of Syriac (a form of Aramaic). 

There is also a small Armenian community (see the full 

profile in “Other Ethnic Groups and Minorities Affected by 

Issues of Religious Freedom in the KRI”). 

Even prior to the decline in Christian population, the 

community was heavily centered either in the KRI (especially in Dohuk governorate) or in nearby portions of Iraq 

(Nineveh governorate.) Since the rise of ISIS and the fall of 

Mosul, the relative security of the KRI has led to a further 

concentration of Christians in the area. Consequently, 

Christians in the KRI remain a relatively prominent religious and political force, even as the overall Iraqi Christian population decreases.

Christians in the region generally fall into one of 

three main denominations: the Chaldean Catholic Church (which makes 

up the largest portion of 

the Region’s Christian 

population); the Assyrian Church of the East; 

and the Syriac Orthodox 

Church. Small pockets of other Christian groups all exist 

throughout the area. 

Adherents to Christianity in the KRI tend to ethnically identify with their respective sects. Followers 

of the different denominations tend to be geographically concentrated together, and tend to share political 

affiliations. Followers of various strands of Christianity 

sometimes accuse other denominations of preferential 

treatment by local authorities, or claim to have been 

specifically targeted or discriminated against. 

Treatment by the Authorities

The KRG makes special efforts to provide for Christians. 

Several leaders interviewed stressed that the efforts of the 

KRG directly benefited and protected their communities. 

Three archbishops from different denominations detailed 

money provided by the government for the building of 

churches. Ainkawa, the Christian quarter outside of Erbil, 

has seen considerable development in recent years.

IDPs have also been well provided for, with Christians receiving better care than many others thanks to the 

support networks organized by local and international 

churches. A bishop who had fled Mosul praised the KRG 

and the region for its role in protecting Christians from 

the genocide against them perpetrated by ISIS.

However, away from population centers Assyrian 

Christians have complained of land appropriations by 

ethnic Kurds. This is especially true in the countryside 

in Dohuk governorate 

and around Zakho, and 

in the Nahla Valley area. 

In some cases the appropriations emerge from 

long-standing disputes 

complicated by population displacements 

and resettlements. In other cases, the origins of the 

disputes are more recent, and appropriations may have 

occurred with the blessing, or tacit consent, of Kurdish 

officials. When Christians have attempted to protest, 

they have been prevented from traveling through 

checkpoints, where Asayish (KRG security services) 

have turned back individuals with ID cards marked 

“Christian” — regardless of purpose of travel (see “Specific Issues of Concern,” later in this report). 

Identify card laws cause further concern for 

Christian priests and politicians. The 2015 National 

ID Card Law passed in Baghdad has infuriated Christians because it makes changing religions extremely 

difficult for Muslims, and compels children from 

• Accusations of land appropriations against Christians by 

Kurds are commonplace in some parts of the KRI. Such 

appropriations targeted against Christians are examples 

of religious discrimination. Where true, they also represent 

violations of Kurdistan’s 2015 Minority Rights Law.

• Some Christian groups call for a Christian Zone in the Nineveh 

plains area. Although the vulnerabilities of the Christian community in Northern Iraq are clear, the creation of a Christian 

canton as a remedy is not without issue.

• Some Christian leaders expressed concern about the 

threat against them from growing extremism. Institutions, 

protections, and rule of law must be strengthened to 

ensure Christians remain safe from extremist elements of 

the wider population.

• In April, Kurdish Forces prevented Assyrian Christians from 

passing roadblocks, stopping them from traveling to Erbil to 

peacefully protest land appropriations by Kurds.

ISSUES OF CONCERN

Accusations of land appropriations 

against Christians by Kurds are 

commonplace in some parts of the KRI.
18 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Christian politicians from the Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Popular Council also expressed concern 

about the lack of economic opportunity for the population. These politicians fear that regional persecution, 

combined with opportunities abroad, will lead to the 

complete disappearance of Assyrian Christians from 

their historic homeland. A senior bishop echoed this 

sentiment, noting that bureaucracy and officials can be 

linked to religious cronyism. He called for more transparency in the region to prevent hidden discrimination 

or favoritism based on religion.

Christian Governorate

Several political figures told the researcher that the 

Christian community hopes to be permitted to create a 

Christian governorate in the Nineveh plains (between 

the Tigris and Greater Zab rivers, and the Dohuk governorate border). One leader, former finance minister 

Sarkiz Aghajan, claimed that Christians are plurality in 

the plains (according to him, about 150,000 out of a total 

mixed-religion marriages to be registered as “Muslim.” One priest related incidents where a Muslim 

who had converted to Christianity was unable to 

change his ID card and subsequently faced difficulty 

from security services when trying to attend churches 

in a Christian quarter. 

Relationship with the Wider Community

Some Christian leaders expressed concern to the 

researcher about underlying hostility from some more 

extreme elements of the Sunni Kurdish majority. 

Priests unanimously warned of growing extremism 

emanating from the mosques and sections of society. 

Christians acknowledge that the authorities have safeguarded them to date, but fear that these protections 

could be eroded if Kurdish leaders choose to appease 

extremists in future governments. One priest claimed 

that Kurdish contractors had refused to carry out a 

contract upon learning that the work was on behalf of a 

Christian church. 

Fig 4. Distribution and Density of the Christian population in KRI and Dispute Territories
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 19

population of nearly 400,000), and that the Assyrian 

diaspora would also return to increase that number if 

given autonomy. Several Christian leaders confirmed 

that if given an Assyrian Christian governorate, the governorate would be a part of the KRI subordinate to Erbil.

Creating political units solely based on religion 

or ethnicity can fuel discontent. In this case, there is a 

risk (if such a plan was permitted) of creating tensions 

with other minorities in the area, including Shabak and 

Yezidis. In the long run, groups in the minority might 

find themselves at a disadvantage, or compelled to leave.

What Christians Want from the 

International Community

Representatives of the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian 

Popular Council told the researcher that the Christian 

leadership wants five things from the international 

community. These are: 1) the swift liberation and 

rebuilding of the Nineveh plains, 2) recognition of 

the ISIS orchestrated genocide against Christians, 3) 

the creation of a protected zone with 4) the eventual 

establishment of a governorate in the Nineveh plains, 

and 5) an effort to end the ongoing dispute over the 

sovereignty of the Nineveh plains region of Nineveh 

Governorate.

ZOROASTRIANISM

Zoroastrianism was founded in ancient Iran approximately 3500 years ago. From 600 BCE to 650 CE it was 

the official religion of Persia. In 2006 the number of 

Zoroastrians worldwide was estimated to be fewer 

than 190,000.49

Zoroastrianism is monotheistic: the Zoroastrian 

God is referred to by followers as Ahura Mazda, and the 

religion is the world’s oldest based on divine revelation.50

Zoroastrians believe Ahura Mazda revealed the truth 

through the Prophet Zoroaster, and revere a book of 

Holy Scriptures called The Avesta.

Today, Zoroastrians are present in several areas of 

the KRI and other areas of Iraq. According to a leader of 

the Iraqi Zoroastrians, Zoroastrians are mainly found 

in Duhok (specifically in Zakho) and in Sulaimaniya 

(in the Darbandikhan, Ranya, Qalaat Daza and Chamchamal districts). 

Nevertheless, there are no accurate estimates of their 

numbers; they are still referred to as “Muslims” on identity 

documents despite engaging in Zoroastrian religious rituals. The spokesperson for the Ministry of Endowment and 

Religious Affairs told researchers that Zoroastrian leaders 

have reported up to 100,000 members, although the official stressed that this number may be exaggerated.51

Zoroastrians enjoy more recognition in Kurdistan 

than other regions. Sulaimaniya is home to not only the 

Zoroastrian Cultural and Heritage Center, but also a 

small temple where Zoroastrian rituals are being held 

for the first time in modern Iraqi history.52 Luqman 

Karim, the leader of the Zoroastrians in Iraq, currently 

lives in Sulaimaniya.

Zoroastrianism is recognized as one of Kurdistan’s 

religions in 2015’s Minority Rights Law. In addition, the 

presence of NGOs such as the Zoroastrian Cultural and 

Heritage Center represent the community’s interests. 

However, as of February 2016, the Center has yet to be 

recognized by the KRG as a place of worship despite 

repeated attempts by Zoroastrians to lobby the KRG 

Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs to do so. 

Yet, the Ministry appears to have outwardly expressed 

goodwill and the intention to help Zoroastrians prosper.53 The Ministry told researchers that the reason for 

the lack of recognition was due to a rental disagreement. 

A potential issue for Zoroastrians arises out of the 

recent trend in conversions from Islam to Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrians claim increasing numbers of Kurdish 

Muslims are converting to Zoroastrianism.54 There is 

little agreement about the numbers of converts; local 

media reports estimate the number of converts in the 

year of 2015 as ranging from 10,00055 to 100,000.56

There are two possible reasons for the upward 

trend in conversions. The first is the perception on the 

part of Kurds that their roots are closer to Zoroastrianism than Islam, with Kurdish adherents often talking 

about the inherent “Kurdishness” of Zoroastrianism.57

The second, more speculative reason is that conversion 

• Zoroastrianism’s success in converting Muslim Kurds 

has led to hostility from extreme Sunni clerics and from 

some sections of the wider population.

• Hate crimes towards Zoroastrians, and towards Zoroastrian converts, should be investigated.

• Clerics inciting violence towards Zoroastrians or other 

minorities should be held accountable.

ISSUES OF CONCERN
20 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

to Zoroastrianism is a reaction to the rise of ISIS and 

extreme sects of Islam in the region.58

For some of these extreme sects, apostasy is often 

seen as a crime and an act of treason. According to 

some reports, a result of these conversions has been the 

incitement of hatred and defamation by some Sunni 

clerics. Recent examples of this backlash include Mullah 

Abdul-Latif Ahmad of Sulaimaniya defaming Zoroastrians publicly in front of an audience in January 2016,59

and prominent followers of Zoroastrianism reporting 

threats and harassment from Islamic groups.60

Zoroastrians converts also risk falling afoul of the 

Iraqi ID card laws, which do not permit Muslims to 

change their religion. 

Ethno-Religious Groups

YEZIDI

The Yezidi (also Ezidi, or Yazidi) are a secretive ethnoreligious group found in Iraq, Syria, Georgia, Armenia, 

and parts of Iran.61 The Yezidi believe in reincarnation, 

sacrifice bulls, and revere an angel known as Melek 

Taoos who takes the form of a peacock.62 Yezidis pray in 

distinctive conical roofed shrines,63 and around 150 of 

these are present in Dohuk and Nineveh plains.64 The 

group has a caste-based social structure, including a 

priestly caste. Religious figures include the sheikhs, the 

faqirs (self-deniers), the kawwals (song reciters), the 

kockeks (who guard the shrine at Lalish), and the pirs (a 

junior priestly caste to the sheikhs). 65

Yezidism is closely linked with Kurdish culture and 

heritage. A distinct Kurdish dialect, known as the Yezidi 

language, is the language of the religion’s texts and invocations. Even in areas where Yezidis speak Arabic (due to 

systematic Arabization policies under Saddam Hussein), 

the Yezidi language is often also used. Meanwhile, 

Yezidis are geographically attached to Kurdistan, with 

their main temple located at Lalish, 45 kilometers to the 

east of Dohuk.66 Yezidis are found at and around Lalish 

and are also scattered throughout the KRI. Until 2014 

they were also heavily concentrated in the Sinjar district 

of the Nineveh governorate in Iraq, although many of 

those are now IDPs.

Geographical location is central to the Yezidi faith. 

Unlike mosques or churches, shrines and temples 

cannot be built anywhere, and require the religious 

leaders to preside over any building or rebuilding 

project. Lalish, Mount Sinjar, and surrounding areas 

are locations with deep meaning to Yezidis, which 

cannot be replicated in other places. Although a large 

and established community has settled in Germany 

after fleeing past persecutions, for example, no Yezidi 

shrines have been built there.

The guarantee of religious freedom for Yezidi in 

the KRI does not necessarily translate to acceptance. 

• Yezidi activists accuse the KDP (and the wider KRG) of 

actions targeting Yezidi leaders who oppose KDP and KRG 

actions. Activist also accuse Kurdish authorities of targeting 

the wider Yezidi population. Accusations include detention 

for political activities, looting of villages, and murder (see 

“Specific Issues of Concern,” below).

• There is anger in the Yezidi community at the Iraqi-Kurdish 

Peshmerga’s slow and allegedly lackluster attempts to 

defend Yezidis from ISIS.

• Kurdish officials frequently put pressure on Yezidis to 

identify as Kurds. For some Yezidis this is an affront that 

they believe threatens the existence of the Yezidi people. 

Regardless, rights should not be attached to ethnic identity 

or religious affiliation.

• Yezidis who do not identify as Kurds, or who challenge the 

authorities and KDP’s control over Sinjar and Yezidi affairs, 

risk harassment and being barred from entering the KRI. 

As the holiest Yezidi shrine is at Lalish and is under KRG 

control, this presents a problem for Yezidis hoping to make 

the pilgrimages required by the religion.

• Conditions in refugee camps are reportedly poor. Large 

numbers of Yezidis are IDPs located in camps and private 

accommodation in Northern Iraqi Kurdistan. Some 

Yezidis claim there is a systemic bias against them in the 

receipt and distribution of aid and food supplies. It has 

been alleged that aid is withheld for political reasons by 

Kurdish officials.

• Yezidis in Sinjar are calling for help in forming and 

strengthening locally run protection units. They do not 

believe Kurdish forces or Iraqi forces prioritize Yezidi 

security. The United States and the international community should continue to support attempts to provide 

reliable security for minorities including the Yezidi.

• Yezidi religion is tied to land and places, such as Mount 

Sinjar and Lalish. Policies that restrict Yezidi access to 

these places, deliberately encourage their depopulation, 

or Kurdify these areas risk damaging the religion. The 

KRG and other local authorities should avoid implementing such practices.

ISSUES OF CONCERN
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 21

In fact, their reverence for the angel Melek Taoos has 

contributed to their ostracism and worse. Melek Taoos 

is often identified with Iblis and Azazael, which are 

names in the Islamic tradition for the greatest angel of 

God, who rebelled and was cast down. This association 

has led the Yezidi to be erroneously labeled devil-worshippers by followers of Abrahamic faiths in the region. 

It has become common for young Muslims to refuse to 

eat with Yezidis.67

From 2014 onwards, ISIS directly targeted Yezidis 

in areas it successfully overran, massacring men and 

enslaving women. Notably, Yezidis in Sinjar became 

stranded and besieged on Mount Sinjar until a combination of Syrian-Kurdish forces and U.S.-led airstrikes 

broke the siege and removed civilians to safety. It is 

estimated that nearly 600,000 Yezidis reside in the KRI 

following the influx of IDPs from Sinjar and surrounding areas.68

Within KRG-controlled areas, Yezidis frequently 

come under pressure to identify as Kurds. Like several 

other small ethno-religious groups, they are not identified as a unique ethnicity in the draft constitution, 

their status likely being derived from their presumed 

“Kurdishness.” Many Yezidi leaders told researchers 

in interviews that they feel Yezidis have few legal 

rights, and even fewer in practice. Even those leaders 

and religious figures with close ties to the KRG and 

KDP were skeptical about whether Yezidi rights are 

respected by Kurds. 

Some Yezidi activists go further, accusing the KRG 

of various discriminatory policies that have led to the 

deaths of Yezidi. These groups accuse the Peshmerga of 

looting Yezidi villages in the Sinjar region, of detaining 

Yezidi activists and political leaders, and of preventing 

food and supplies reaching IDPs. A particular point of 

contention (detailed later) is the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga’s role in the 2014 assault and subsequent massacres. 

The Peshmerga is accused of confiscating Yezidi arms, 

telling Yezidis not to flee, and then suddenly withdrawing before ISIS arrived.

Fig 5. Distribution and Density of the Yezidi population in KRI & Dispute Territories
22 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Yezidis who dissent, or refuse to identify as Kurds, 

risk harassment, detention, or deportation. Several 

Yezidi leaders researchers spoke to are not allowed to 

enter the Kurdistan Region, and this includes members of the Yezidi Movement for Reform and Progress 

(which is the only Yezidi party with seats in Iraq’s 

parliament – although other Yezidi members sit with 

parties including the KDP). This means these Yezidis 

are unable to visit the shrine at Lalish, to which Yezidis 

are expected to make pilgrimages. The shrine at Lalish 

hosts many of the religion’s most important festivals.

Political Representation

Yezidis are poorly represented politically, and their rights 

are derived from the status of “Kurd” applied to them 

by the KRG. In one internal report produced by a Western-run humanitarian organization, it was stressed that 

loyalty to the KDP is valuable (if not essential) for Yezidis 

to reach office; the report claimed that many Yezidi elites 

are part of the KDP, while the majority of the population 

resent the party. Speech critical of the party and the KRG 

is cracked down on harshly. A senior establishment Yezidi 

figure, along with other Sheikhs, told researchers that the 

lack of political representation, especially as compared 

with other minorities, is a significant challenge for the 

community. Where some minorities have reserved seats 

in the Kurdistan parliament reserved by quota, no seats 

exist for the Yezidis. This means Yezidi interests are less 

likely to be heard by the KRG. Some rights have been 

established under Law No. 5 of 2015, which was passed in 

the Kurdistan Region’s parliament to protect the rights of 

groups in the region.69

Fear of the Wider Community

Hostility from the wider population is also a problem. 

Several religious and political leaders drew attention 

to the unwillingness of Sunni Kurds and Arabs to eat 

or interact with Yezidis.70 A Yezidi leader noted that 

systemic biases exist that make it difficult for Yezidis to 

gain prominence in the affairs of the region.71 A senior 

religious figure said that while he had seen no problems 

from the government, considerable Yezidi discrimination continues to emanate from the population at large.72

Some leaders from Sinjar were particularly vocal 

about the need for greater efforts from the international 

community and local governments to provide Yezidis 

with arms and training to form protection units. These 

leaders do not believe that Yezidis can trust the KRG or 

central government to prioritize Yezidi interests and 

security concerns. Given the Peshmerga withdrawal 

from Sinjar (detailed later) this fear is understandable. 

In addition, continued hostility from some Kurds and 

Arabs make Yezidis worry that another massacre could 

happen in the future.

NGO workers interviewed pointed to various incidents from the IDP camps where clashes or other unrest 

broke out between the Sunni and Yezidi residents. One 

aid worker recalled an incident when Sunnis were augmented by armed Sunni Kurds from the local population living outside of the camps.

Economic Blockade of Sinjar

A de facto economic blockade has been put in place by 

KDP forces controlling entry and exit from Sinjar. Ostensibly this is to prevent PKK forces from Turkey and Syria 

(or affiliated Yezidi units) from establishing themselves. 

However, the overall effect is that thousands of Yezidis 

are cut off from their homelands around Mount Sinjar. 

One aid worker suggested that this was linked to a policy 

of Kurdification in Sinjar. The same individual expressed 

fears that the KRG might be tempted to never allow 

Yezidi IDPs to return, instead resettling this population 

in Dohuk province. 

Regardless of the underlying policy considerations, 

restricting the movement of people and goods into and 

from Sinjar will make it difficult for Yezidis to remain 

in the area. As the religion is so closely tied to land and 

places, this could harm the faith’s long term survival. 

The economic blockade is discussed further in subsequent sections of this report.

KAKA’I / AHL-I-HAQQ

The Kaka’i, also known as the Ahl-i-Haqq or Yarsani, 

are a religious minority located throughout Northern Iraq, in the provinces of Sulaimaniya area, the 

Nineveh plains, and Kirkuk governorate. The largest 

population resides in the Halabja area.73 74 There may 

be about 200,000 Kaka’i living in Iraq. The Ministry 

of Endowment and Religious Affairs estimated only 

30,000 Kaka’i live in the KRI.

This religious affiliation is hereditary. Kaka’i do not 

accept converts, and are secretive in nature. It is claimed 

that the faith is syncretic, incorporating Zoroastrianism 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 23

and Shi’a Islam. Followers believe in the transmigration 

of the soul. Kaka’i also believe Ali is one of many manifestations of God on earth.

Kaka’i have been targets of violence and oppression, due to their small numbers and lack of political 

protections. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, 

religious tensions against the group increased, forcing 

some members of the community to declare themselves 

Muslim. In September of 2015, 30 leading Kaka’i figures 

met at a conference at the Union of Religious Scholars 

in Kirkuk and declared themselves Muslims.7576 Other 

Kaka’i have reacted by reaffirming independence from 

Islam. It is possible that Kaka’i living in more diverse 

regions (including Kirkuk and Nineveh) are more likely 

to feel the need to align with Islam for safety, whereas 

Kaka’i living in areas such as Halabja feel less at risk. In 

September 2016, ISIS targeted a Kaka’i community near 

Tuz Khurmatu with a car bomb.77

The Kaka’i have faced discriminatory practices from 

the wider community in some areas. In 2010, the Minority 

Rights Group reported that Muslim religious leaders in 

Kirkuk told people not to purchase goods from Kaka’i 

owned shops.78 Nevertheless, the Kaka’i community has 

made some gains in recent years, obtaining a “quota-mandated” seat in the Halabja provincial council—the 

first Kaka’i to hold office in the KRG.79

• Parts of the Kaka’i community clearly consider their safety 

at risk from wider society.

• KRG legislative efforts to protect Kaka’i should include 

actual protections on the ground in the disputed areas 

such as Kirkuk. Greater efforts to include Kaka’i in 

ministries like the Ministry of Endowment and Religious 

Affairs should be made.

• Though policy appears to be moving in favor of the Kaka’i’s 

religious freedoms, it is unclear the extent to which these policy 

changes are implemented and reflect reality on the ground. 

ISSUES OF CONCERN

Fig 6. Distribution and Density of the Kaka’i population in KRI & Dispute Territories
24 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Despite this recent gain, official recognition remains 

limited for the Kaka’i —neither the 2005 Iraq Constitution 

nor the Kurdistan Draft Constitution “make any reference 

to the Kaka’i as a religious community.”80 Article 6 of the 

Kurdistan Draft Constitution refers by name to many 

religions in the region, but does not mention the Kaka’i.

Further, the Kaka’i are not represented in the 

Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs in 

the Kurdistan Region, and therefore are afforded 

no official state support.81 A Ministry spokesperson 

explained to the researcher that this was due to confusion over whether the Kaka’i constitute a distinct 

religion or whether they are a sect of Islam. The 

first mention of the Kaka’i in any official capacity in 

modern history was in the Law No. 5 of 2015 passed in 

Kurdistan Region’s parliament to protect the rights of 

groups in the region.82

SHABAK

The Shabak are an ethno-religious group consisting of 

three tribes: the Hariri, the Gergeri, and the Mawsili. 

Most identify as Muslim, with the majority Shi’ite, and a 

small minority Sunni. However, the Shabak faith actually diverges (often significantly) from Islam. Among 

other beliefs, Shabak believe that Allah, Muhammad, 

and Ali constitute a trinity, in which Ali appears as the 

dominant manifestation of the divine.

Shabak population estimates range from 100,000 

up to 500,000. Until the rise of ISIS, the population was 

largely concentrated in the Sinjar area, around the 

Nineveh plains, and in the Mosul area. The actions of 

ISIS have forced much of the population to relocate, 

often to the KRI. A KDP 2015 report held that 90 percent 

of Iraq’s Shabak population had relocated into Iraqi 

Kurdistan in recent years,83 although the KRG claims it 

will be facilitating their return. However, the 90 percent 

figure may be exaggerated, as a sizable portion of the 

Shabak population has in fact relocated to the region 

around Karbala (in southern Iraq).

Located in an area that has been increasingly 

disputed between Erbil and Baghdad, the Shabak have 

been detrimentally affected by power struggles between 

the two governments.84 The Shabak have faced enormous pressure (and even harassment) from the KRG to 

assimilate and declare themselves to be “Kurds.”85 This 

is contrary to the wishes of many of the Shabak and their 

representatives. In addition, Shabak villages have lacked 

basic services.86 KDP documents and press releases 

frequently refer to Shabak as “Shabak Kurds”87

Shabak are also systematically prevented from 

serving in essential roles in the Kurdish society; for 

example, in 2006 the Shabak were banned from being 

part of police forces.88 It has been suggested that the 

KDP’s behavior in this vein is designed to continue its 

dominance over local minorities. Further, Shabak have 

been unable to access employment in the civil service.89

The KRG has tried to assert power over the Shabak 

by attempting to add Shabak inhabited areas to their 

jurisdiction; Shabak leaders rejected this ploy and some 

claimed that Kurdish authorities tried to force them 

into signing the incorporation petition.90 In addition, 

in 2008 Shabak accused the Peshmerga of the murder 

of a member of the Democratic Shabak Assembly.91 The 

community remains divided on whether to join the KRG 

or remain with Iraq. On August 4, 2016, Shabak leader 

Salem Juma’a called for a public referendum on the 

issue, favoring joining the KRG.92

According to the Kurdish press, in recent months a 

Shabak division of the Peshmerga has been established 

to defend Shabak communities from ISIS.93 The creation 

• The Shabak community is at risk from ISIS and many members of the community have fled to KRG controlled areas. 

IDPs should be protected, provided for without discrimination, and should be allowed freedom of movement to 

return to their homes.

• Comparatively recent reports document systematic abuses 

against the Shabak by the KRG. Some reports specifically 

blame KDP actions, while others more generally blame 

discriminatory practices by Kurds against non-Kurds. These 

abuses include forced or coerced “Kurdification,” blocks 

to holding certain roles in society, in addition to violence, 

detention, and murders.

• Kurdish authorities have traditionally been afraid of the 

“Kurdish-ness” of Kurdistan being diluted. This may be a 

throwback to Saddam Hussein’s policies of “Arabization.” 

With so many Shabak having fled to the Kurdish region, 

KRG policy should be watched for signs of forced assimilations or other discriminatory practices.

• Shabak are offered few legal protections as “Shabak.” Some 

Shabak feel the KRG forces a “Kurdish” identity upon them.

ISSUES OF CONCERN
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 25

of this division was confirmed to researchers by officers 

in the Peshmerga, and could represent a step forward 

for the Shabak. However, the Shabak right to identify 

as Shabak, and to participate fully in society or avail 

themselves of protections against ISIS, without having 

to represent themselves as Kurds, should be respected 

and defended.

Other Ethnic Groups and Minorities Affected 

by Issues of Religious Freedom in the KRI

TURKMEN

The Turkmen population of Iraq descends from Turkic 

tribes that began settling in Iraq around the year 500. 

Turkmen are overwhelmingly adherents of Sunni or 

Shi’a Islam. Although no reliable estimates exist for the 

proportions, it is likely that around half of the Turkmen 

population is Shi’ite, the other half Sunni. 

The overall Turkmen population of Iraq (and of Iraqi 

Kurdistan) is disputed. Sources agree that the Turkmen 

represent Iraq’s third largest ethnic group (after Arabs 

and Kurds), with the estimated percentage Turkmen 

within the total Iraqi population ranging from 5 percent 

to 13 percent. Some Turkmen activists have claimed that 

the Turkmen represent the second largest ethnic group 

in the KRI.94 The percentage of Turkmen in specific areas 

of Kurdistan varies even more than the previously cited 

range. For example, a former Kurdish official cites the 

number of Turkmen in Kirkuk at more than 20 percent.95

Representation

Turkmen are represented politically by a number of relatively small political parties. Many of these parties seek 

to counter attempts by the major Kurdish parties (KDP 

and PUK) to marginalize the Turkmen and “Kurdify” 

historically Turkmen areas. Some parties, such as the Iraqi 

Turkmen Front (ITF) go further, and call for an independent or autonomous area in Northern Iraq reserved for the 

Turkmen, which they call “Turkmeneli.” Turkmen regard 

Kirkuk to be their historic capital, which puts the minority 

at odds with KRG policy as it moves to implement Article 

140 of Iraq’s constitution, and incorporate Kirkuk province 

Fig 7. Distribution & Density of the Shabak Population, KRI & Disputed Territories.
26 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

into the KRI. Some groups seek to make Kirkuk a special 

territory with a joint administration (32 percent for each 

of the Turkmens, Arabs and Kurds, and 4 percent for the 

Chaldo-Assyrians).96 These groups also demand Tal Afar in 

Nineveh and Tuz Khurmatu in Salahuddin (both districts 

are majority Turkmen) be given governorate status.97

Relationships between Turkmen groups and the 

Kurdish political parties are frequently fraught, and have 

at times resulted in violence. Nevertheless, Turkmen 

have been included in the political process. In 2002 the 

KDP created the Turkmen National Association from five 

Turkmen parties in the Erbil area. While the ITF regards 

the party as a KDP puppet, it nevertheless expands 

Turkmen inclusion in the political process. Further, 5 out 

of 111 seats in the Kurdish parliament are reserved for 

Turkmen candidates (though religion is not accounted 

for). Researchers also heard concerns that Turkmen were 

being frozen out of power in Kirkuk because of long-term 

favoritism toward Kurds by the governor and the Kurdish-dominated provincial council.

Fig 8. Distribution & Density of the Turkmen Population, KRI & Disputed Territories.

• If unrest between Turkmen Shi’a and Kurdish forces 

continues or increases, it will be necessary to monitor KRG 

policy and actions for signs of infringing on the rights and 

freedoms of Shi’a Turkmen. 

• Similarly, if tensions do rise in areas such as Kirkuk province, attempts by militias and political groups to infringe on 

the religious freedoms of others should be monitored.

• Kurds have avoided the worst of the sectarian tensions 

seen in the wider region between Sunnis and Shi’ites. The 

KRG should be encouraged to take steps to strengthen 

Sunni-Shi’a tolerance in areas under its control.

• Alleged “Kurdification” of areas with large populations 

of Turkmen should be monitored. Failure to respect the 

rights of minority groups to exist risks leading to conflict. 

In the case of the Turkmen, such a conflict could take on 

sectarian aspects.

• Turkmen calls for a separate autonomous region put Turkmen politics directly at odds with Erbil. 

ISSUES OF CONCERN
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 27

Sectarian Violence

There is a possibility that future sectarian conflict could 

arise between KRG forces and Shi’a Turkmen. In 2016, 

violence erupted between Shi’a Turkmen paramilitaries 

and the Kurdish Peshmerga in Tuz Khurmatu in the 

Salahuddin governorate, 55 kilometers south of Kirkuk. 

The Turkmen Shi’ite militias may have been linked 

either directly or indirectly with Iran.98 The fighting 

left 69 dead and millions of dollars in uncompensated 

damage. Some reports have communities in the town 

putting up dividing walls to prevent conflict among the 

Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Turkmen, and Kurds. One source told 

the research team that if “Kirkuk is a microcosm of Iraq, 

then Tuz Kurmatu is a microcosm of Kirkuk.” 

Implication for Religious Freedom

Overall, issues concerning the Turkmen in the KRI are 

less focused on religion than on ethnic identity. Nevertheless, recent conflict has clearly had a sectarian element. It 

will be necessary to consider whether the KRG could be 

drawn into Iraq’s wider sectarian conflicts, and whether 

its leaders, institutions, and population are able to avoid 

infringing on the rights of Shi’a Muslims (Turkmen or 

otherwise) while addressing violence against its forces 

and other groups. The possibility of Iranian involvement 

must also be considered.

ARMENIANS

Armenians settled in Iraqi Kurdistan following the 

Armenian Genocide in 1915. However, the number of 

Armenians living in the KRI today is relatively small 

as compared with neighboring regions, with estimates 

suggesting a population total of less than 3,000. 

The Armenian presence is particularly strong in 

the northern city of Zakho, Dohuk governorate, which 

lies on the border with Turkey. In Dohuk governorate 

there is an estimated total Armenian population of 

2,690. The only sizable community outside of Dohuk 

governorate is a community of about 440 in the Ainkawa district of the city of Erbil.

A senior Armenian Christian religious figure told 

researchers that the KRG has funded the building of 

four churches for Armenians in the KRG and helped 

source the necessary land. This source also stressed that 

Armenians, as Christians, have the freedom to worship 

as they choose in the KRI.99

Outside of the KRI, large populations of Armenians have resided in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. 

The Mosul population has largely been displaced by 

ISIS, which has attacked Armenian churches, and in 

2015 burned down the city’s St. Etchmiadzin Church. 

Implications for Religious Freedom

Almost all Armenians are Christians, with the majority 

belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church, while 

a small percentage belongs to the Armenian Catholic 

Church. The Armenians appear to be able to practice their 

religion without obvious restraints. A number of churches 

exist in the region, particularly near Dohuk. In addition, 

there are Armenian Schools in Dohuk and in Erbil.100

FAYLI

Fayli Kurds are Shi’a Muslims who live near the Iran-Iraq 

border in the Zagros Mountains. Population estimates 

have the number of Fayli Kurds at 2.5 million in Iraq, and 

3 million in Iran. The majority of Iraqi Faylis live outside of 

the three KRG-controlled governorates, with only about 

10,000 living in areas officially controlled by the KRG. 

Historically, the Fayli Kurds have faced significant 

persecution in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein their faith 

and perceived ties with Iran led to waves of forced 

deportations. Faylis were stripped of their citizenship 

and their property seized. Seized Fayli property has 

subsequently been occupied by both Kurds and Arabs 

at various times. 

Fayli Kurds do not appear to have established their 

own political organizations, and have instead integrated 

into Iraqi-Kurdish institutions. The Fayli are represented 

up to the ministerial level in the KRG and may be found 

as commanders in the Peshmerga. Faylis are considered 

to be – and consider themselves – ethnically Kurdish, 

• ISIS has had a notable effect on the Armenian communities, as it has had with many Christian groups. Armenians 

have been displaced from Mosul and the Nineveh plains 

to the KRI.

• The KRI has done much to provide for the welfare and 

religious freedoms of Armenian Christians and other 

Christians. This work has been supplemented by churches 

and charitable donations. The KRG should continue to 

support these efforts to rebuild Armenian communities.

ISSUES OF CONCERN
28 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

which allows them to be unambiguously protected by 

the laws of the KRI. 

The restoration of property rights lost during the 

Saddam Hussein era remains an issue of contention for 

Faylis. The KRG leadership has expressed sympathy and 

has vowed to help compensate Fayli losses. The extent 

and practicality of this compensation is unclear, as is 

any evidence that it has yet been implemented.

BAHÁ’Í

The Bahá’í Faith is a monotheistic faith that has historically faced considerable persecution in the Middle East, 

especially in Iran. Unlike in Iran, the Bahá’í faith was 

recognized by the KRG in 2015, and Bahá’í are to receive a 

representative at the Ministry of Endowment and Religious 

Affairs. This is a positive development for the tiny number 

of adherents in the region (fewer than 100 families). Kurdistan is the location of Sar-Galu cave, a holy site for Bahá’ís, 

situated to the northwest of the city of Sulaimaniya. 

JEWS

In 2015 the KRG announced a new Jewish religious representative in government. Several officials mentioned the 

representative (Mr. Sherzad Mamsani) and his role ensuring Jews are represented in government. However, it is not 

clear that any practicing Jews live in the KRI. Historically, 

a Jewish community was present in the region, especially 

in the North in the Dohuk governorate. Most (if not all) 

of this community, though, emigrated in the second half 

of the 20th century. In notes passed to the researcher 

by the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs, it 

appeared that KRG officials are unsure if any practicing 

Jews live in the region. The notes acknowledged that the 

population may amount to a handful of families who 

are descended from the original Jewish community, but 

have long ceased to actively consider themselves Jews. 

Nevertheless, the appointment of a representative for 

Jews is a positive sign of tolerance in a region often beset 

by anti-Semitism.

SABEAN MANDAEANS 

The KRI plays host to a small community of Mandaeans. 

Many Mandaeans fled their homes in the south of Iraq 

after the 2003 invasion in response to sectarian violence. Some of these refugees settled in the KRI. Sabean 

Mandaeans are frequently referred to by KRG documents 

and laws aimed at safeguarding religious communities. 

Water and baptism are important to adherents, and the 

community has built a Mandi (place of worship) in the 

west of Erbil. 

Mandaeans have faced some difficulties settling 

in the KRI. In 2006, the European Centre for Kurdish 

Studies claimed that “it is not possible for Mandaeans 

to establish presence in northern Iraq due to lack of 

job opportunities, language difficulties and continued religious harassment by Kurdish extremists.” This 

concern was reaffirmed in a 2009 report.101 Nevertheless, 

Mandaeans are represented in laws and to the KRG. The 

difficulties the tiny community faces stem from being a 

small minority among a Kurdish population with potentially hostile elements. 

General Issues of Concern

Systemic Biases 

Minority religious groups and ethno-religious groups 

face systemic biases against them. The Kurdish state 

and society frequently favors ethnic Kurds over other 

groups. Throughout the research period, interview 

subjects from the Christian, Yezidi, Turkmen, and 

other communities complained that opportunities 

and freedoms afforded to Sunni Kurds were not available to other religious and ethnic groups.

• The KRG has taken positive steps to ensure very small 

minority communities are represented.

• These efforts will only be successful if these tiny groups 

can feel safe and protected from potentially hostile 

elements of the Kurdish population.

SUMMARY

• The practical extent of Iraqi government – or KRG– 

compensation for formerly displaced Faylis should be 

ascertained. The successes and failures experienced by 

Faylis seeking compensation for displacement will be 

a useful indicator of some of the challenges that may 

be experienced settling claims from groups displaced 

during recent Iraqi conflicts.

• As with other Shi’a groups living in disputed territories, 

signs of discrimination or hostility from other local populations should be monitored.

ISSUES OF CONCERN
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 29

For some groups the biases against them stem 

not from specific government policy, but from antipathy from the wider community. Christians cited 

incidents where Kurdish contractors would not work 

for Christians or on Christian projects. Other groups 

complained that advancement in specific industries, 

and particularly in government service, requires the 

patronage of high ranking officials. Nepotistic practices effectively freeze increasingly large numbers of 

non-Sunni Kurds out of decision making roles. According to local religious and political leaders, this has the 

effect of further concentrating power and resources 

away from minority groups. 

The KRG has made efforts to consult with religious 

groups, and the Ministry of Endowment and Religious 

Affairs holds meetings with leaders once each month. 

However, meaningful inclusion remains elusive. 

Although not directly an issue of religious freedom, as 

long as non-Sunnis struggle to occupy senior and midlevel positions throughout the KRI’s society, they are less 

likely to have their religious rights and freedoms respected 

in the future. This will be particularly important should 

independence occur, as minority religious and ethnic 

groups could find themselves shut out of positions influencing the formation of new institutions and practices. 

FEAR OF THE SUNNI MAJORITY

Christians and Yezidis both expressed a deep fear of the 

Sunni Kurdish majority. This is undoubtedly influenced by experiences of these minorities at the hands 

of ISIS. Nevertheless, members of both communities 

told the researcher that extremist Islamism is rising in 

the KRI, and that if the government did not keep this 

growing movement in check, their respective communities would be in danger. Christian leaders praised the 

current government for its efforts in this respect, which 

they credit with allowing them to live in safety in recent 

decades. Still, minority groups fear that their safety 

would be in jeopardy should the authorities begin to 

appease the growing extremism in some mosques.

It is difficult to ascertain how accurately these views 

reflect reality, and how much they are a product of the 

trauma inflicted on minorities by extremist groups in 

recent years. However, it is clear that extreme interpretations of Islam have been encouraged, with funders in 

countries such as Saudi Arabia working to spread doctrines 

previously unpopular in the Kurdistan region. ISIS has also 

worked in the past to recruit Kurdish youths.102

SECURITY FORCES

Individuals from the Yezidi, Shabak, Turkmen, and 

Christian communities independently told the 

researcher that they do not believe the Peshmerga forces 

prioritize protecting non-Kurds to the same degree 

as they do Kurds, or the political interests of Kurdish 

parties. The withdrawal from Sinjar in 2014 (discussed 

later) as compared with the rapid occupation of Kirkuk 

may be an example of this. Although the policy may not 

be deliberate, it does appear that Peshmerga have been 

slower to act to protect non-Kurds. 

For its part, the Peshmerga does have units and 

fighters drawn from among the KRI’s minority populations. Officers from the Peshmerga confirmed that 

there are Christian, Yezidi, Kaka’i, Shabak, and Turkmen fighters. The inclusive composition of Peshmerga 

forces is not disputed by religious and ethnic minorities; rather, they criticize the Peshmerga’s leadership 

for failing to prioritize the protection of minorities and 

their villages. Various Yezidis, Christians, and Turkmen 

told the researcher that they hope for funding, training, and arms for their own protective units, to be run 

independently of Erbil. Some such units exist already, 

often funded by the central government in Baghdad, or 

by international sources. The Nineveh Plains Protection 

Units (NPU) is one of several militias raised from the 

Assyrian Christian community in the north of the KRI. 

Several Yezidi militias now also exist. The HPE (Hêza 

Parastina Ezidkhane) is a PUK affiliated militia, and the 

YBS ̨: (Yekîneyên Berxwedana S ̨engalê) is a PKK affiliate. 

The Peshmerga are effectively, if not officially, 

Northern Iraq’s security forces. However, their lack (or 

Individuals from the Yezidi, 

Shabak, Turkmen, and Christian 

communities . . . do not believe the 

Peshmerga forces prioritize protecting 

non-Kurds to the same degree 

as they do Kurds. . . .
30 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

perceived lack) of neutrality and previous failures to 

protect, have driven minorities to form their own militias, further militarizing Iraq.

CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES, AND 

ALLEGATIONS OF “KURDIFICATION”

The official governorates of the Kurdistan region 

are relatively homogenous, being overwhelmingly 

Sunni-Kurdish, with comparatively small enclaves 

of other groups scattered throughout. The territories 

disputed between Erbil and Baghdad – which have 

largely been controlled by the KRG since 2014 – are 

much more diverse (see Figure 9). The KRG and local 

authorities must therefore adapt to administering 

a considerably more diverse population than it has 

previously. At the same time, Kurdish authorities 

may worry about the loyalties of newly controlled 

populations – and how they might vote in the event of 

referenda to determine whether each territory joins 

the Kurdistan region or remains administered by the 

federal government in Baghdad. 

“Kurdification” is the alleged policy by which lands 

and populations, particularly within the disputed territories, are being converted to majority Kurdish. Different minorities claim to have experienced this policy in 

different ways. Elements of the Yezidi community fiercely 

oppose the Kurdish practice of listing Yezidis as ethnic 

Kurds, arguing this is a policy that amounts to the destruction of their religious and national identity. Turkmen 

groups object to Kurdish families moving to the Kirkuk 

area, shifting the demographic ever closer to a Kurdish 

majority. Some Christian leaders believe that the appropriation of Christian land by Kurdish officials and the 

repopulation of formerly Christian towns and villages are 

part of a systemic policy to Kurdify their ancestral lands.103

For some Kurds, Kurdification is a chance to undo 

the Saddam Hussein era policy of Arabization (ta’arib). 

From the 1970s until 1991, successive Iraqi administrations forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of ethnic 

Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians from northern Iraq, and 

repopulated the area with Arabs moved from central 

and southern Iraq.104 Many of the disputed areas now 

Fig 9. Ethnoreligious Fractionalism in IKR. The darker the shaded area, the less homogenous the population.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 31

occupied by Peshmerga forces are considered to have 

been Kurdish lands historically.

The ongoing campaigns against ISIS may be creating 

an environment that accelerates Kurdification (whether 

at the hands of local commanders, or in response to a centrally organized policy). Over the course of researching 

this report, several individuals claimed that Peshmerga 

loyal to the KDP have been known to enter non-Kurdish 

villages and destroy property.105 In January 2016, Amnesty 

International published a report that identified several 

villages where civilian homes were destroyed or looted by 

Kurdish forces. 

Reports exist of displaced populations – particularly, but not exclusively, Sunni Arabs – not being 

allowed to return to their homes. When put to ministers and KRG officials in interviews, the justifications 

given for this policy amounted to various “security 

concerns.” One official told researchers that the continued presence of fighters and ordnance risks civilian 

casualties should IDPs be allowed to return home too 

soon. The official speculated that returnees so injured 

might then lay the blame with the KRG. Former Kurdistan Parliament speaker Kemal Kirkuki (now a Peshmerga commander) stressed that incidents of destruction of property have been isolated, and at no point 

were condoned. He told the researcher that on several 

occasions individual local commanders have been 

disciplined for allowing abuses to occur. In addition, 

he stressed that the [KDP Peshmerga] “has not settled 

one Kurd in an Arab village.”106

However, the January Amnesty report noted that “in 

two majority Kurdish towns [Makhmour and Zummar], 

which were recaptured by Peshmerga forces after brief IS 

[ISIS] incursions in August and September 2014, Kurdish 

residents have long returned to their homes whereas Arab 

residents continue to be denied permission to return.”107

Peshmerga told Amnesty International the same 

argument repeated to this report’s researchers, but 

Amnesty also met a group of young men in civilian 

clothes who told the organization’s researchers that they 

“would blow up the houses of Arab residents so that none 

would return.”108 A second report by the Danish Refugee 

Council published in April cited regional experts who 

further supported these findings.109

These reports are supported by many of the interviews researchers held in the KRI while compiling 

this report. Taken collectively, there is extensive 

evidence that points toward a policy (implicit or 

otherwise) aimed at permanently displacing certain non-Kurdish populations from some parts of 

the disputed territories in the Nineveh plains area, 

Kirkuk governorate, and Sinjar.110 Various minority 

leaders confirmed to researchers the existence of 

such a policy. Several Sunni Kurdish former officials 

from the opposition parties also claimed a policy of 

displacement aimed at Kurdifying the disputed territories existed, going as far as claiming the policy was 

ordered by officials in Erbil.

Forced displacement and the destruction of 

civilian property may be war crimes and should 

be investigated as such. A policy of “Kurdification” 

would threaten the religious and ethnic diversity of 

Northern Iraq. Such a policy may also risk Balkanizing Iraq further, encouraging Sunni Arabs to relocate 

to majority Sunni Arab regions. In the long run, the 

homogenization of regions based on religious or ethnic background will accelerate the breakup of Iraq, 

and will threaten the security of those minorities too 

small to create their own regions.

KRG moves to hold territories occupied during the 

fight against ISIS will also invite long-term conflict with 

Baghdad. Unlike the rest of the KRI, some of the disputed territories play host to Shi’a militias and al-Hashd 

al-Sha’abi affiliates, who may be hostile to Kurdish 

incursions on lands perceived to belong to Shi’as. In 

parts of Sinjar, KDP Peshmerga are only one of several 

groups vying for control, including the PKK (generally 

composed of Turkish Kurds), the PYD/YPG (Syrian 

Kurds), and local Yezidi militias. 

A conflict between any of these parties will undoubtedly disadvantage minority ethnic and religious groups 

living in the disputed regions. Recent statements from 

KRG ministers have implied that the Peshmerga will not 

withdraw from territory they have occupied, including 

territory formally part of non-KRI governorates. 

The IDP Crisis and Treatment of IDPs

The KRI and territories under Kurdish control now 

plays host to about 1.5 million IDPs, including Sunni 

Arabs, Kurds, Yezidis, Christians, Turkmen, and others. This number represents approximately a quarter of 

the KRI’s total population. 
32 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

IDPs choose to come to the KRI because it is 

comparatively tolerant and considerably more stable 

than much of the rest of Iraq. Economic pressure and 

the strain of three years fighting ISIS has led the KRG to 

raise concerns that it may struggle to adequately provide 

for all the IDPs in its territory.111

IDPs are variously housed in camps or in private 

accommodations (often run by KRI natives of the same 

religious or ethnic affiliation). Typically, IDPs cannot 

move freely within the KRI and are unable to cross 

between governorates without specific approval from 

Asayish officers.

Treatment of IDPs varies by religion, ethnicity, 

and location. Overall, Kurds have the best prospects, 

especially if they are 

connected with authorities in the region. April’s 

DIS/DRC report quoted 

sources that mentioned 

Sunni Arabs, Arabs in 

general, Turkmen, and 

to some extent Shabaks 

as ethnicities that face 

denial of entry or varying 

degrees of difficulty in 

entering the KRI.112 While all Sunni Arabs must have a 

sponsor to enter KRI, this is not the case for Christians, 

Yezidis, Kurds, and Turkmen.

Christian leaders interviewed by the researcher 

confirmed that their respective churches were providing 

food, supplies, and accommodation to Christian IDPs 

and refugees. The researcher interviewed senior priests 

who fled ISIS controlled areas. These individuals confirmed that Kurdish authorities provided a safe haven, as 

well as funding and supplies. They confirmed that — as 

far as Christians were concerned — the KRG had provided for them and ensured that their freedom to worship 

was unimpeded.113

This is less true for other minorities, especially 

those who belong to communities without the resources 

or numerical strength to care for large numbers of new 

residents. Around 20 percent of IDPs are located in 

camps, where conditions are frequently poor (in part 

because of the strain on local authorities resulting from 

the economic situation and scale of the crisis). The KRG 

itself has a policy of not differentiating between IDPs 

from different ethnic groups, and it does not register the 

ethnicity and religion of new IDPs. 

When it comes to Arabs, however, a general sense of 

suspicion prevails among many Kurds. This suspicion was 

alluded to by some officials interviewed for this report, who 

asserted that Sunni Arabs generally approve of or support 

ISIS. Officials interviewed were keen to emphasize the risk 

of jihadists infiltrating the KRI among Arab IDPs.

Long Term Risks

The local population has thus far been relatively tolerant 

toward the growing numbers of (non-Kurdish) IDPs. In a 

report from April 2016, DRC cited interview subjects who 

claimed that self-sufficient IDPs face little discrimination, whereas discrimination against IDPs is more 

noticeable in areas where 

IDPs are poorer and more 

dependent on the KRG for 

basic needs. One interview subject in that report 

stated that because of all 

the IDPs living in informal settlements, “there is 

a sneaking xenophobia.”114

Economic pressures in the KRI are already felt 

keenly by the Kurdish population. If the IDP population 

increases significantly, or fails to leave the KRI after the 

defeat of ISIS in Iraq in coming months, it is plausible 

that xenophobic attitudes will boil over. This could lead 

to the targeting of already at-risk religious and ethnic 

groups, and exacerbate tensions between Kurds, Arabs, 

and other populations. 

Specific Issues of Concern

In addition to the general issues such as Kurdification of 

territories, the treatment of IDPs, and threats and hostility 

from the majority population toward minorities, a number of more specific issues have been identified. These 

issues affect some the various minority groups of the KRI.

The Treatment of Yezidis in the KRI

BACKGROUND

The Yezidi community suffered a genocide at the hands 

of ISIS in the fall of 2014, after their homeland in Sinjar 

(also known as Shengal), Nineveh governorate, was 

The KRI and territories under 

Kurdish control now plays host to about 

1.5 million IDPs . . . This number 

represents approximately a quarter of 

the KRI’s total population.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 33

rapidly overrun by militants. Large segments of Iraq’s 

Yezidi population were subsequently displaced to the 

KRI, and continue to reside there, in camps and private 

accommodations in the north of the region. 

Even pro-Kurd publications note that reaction to 

increased Yezidi presence has been mixed. While a great 

many locals have accepted Yezidi IDPs openly, others 

have not.115 For instance, in 2015, according to EKurd, a 

pro-KRG publication, many Kurds in Dohuk feel a sense 

of resentment and distrust towards the Yezidi.116 Kurdish 

Muslims’ historic distrust of Yezidi partially stems 

from the misconception of their faith (which includes 

the exaltation of a fallen angel) as amounting to “devil 

worship.”117 Hatred has been fueled by a number of 

Kurdish Sunni clerics and academics, who have in some 

instances called for violence against them. 

Other overt signs of this resentment can be seen 

in demonstrations held by Kurds denouncing the 

presence of Yezidis in the city of Dohuk, and in the 

frequent exclusion of Yezidi traders (whose goods are 

considered “unclean” by conservative Muslims) from 

the city’s markets.118

Among the challenges Yezidis face is a most basic 

one: gaining recognition and acceptance of their ethnic 

identity by the Kurdish authorities and the wider population. Kurdish authorities claim Yezidis are Kurds, 

or “original Kurds.” While some Yezidi leaders accept 

this categorization,119 other elements in the community 

fiercely contest it. Those that do are frequently targeted 

by the authorities.120

Additional tensions between Kurds and Yezidis 

arise from grievances going back to the 2014 massacres. Some Yezidis and activists believe that Peshmerga loyal to the KRG and KDP failed to effectively 

protect villages in Sinjar, contributing to the rapid and 

unexpected ISIS advance. 

More recently, Kurdish authorities may have 

attempted to incite conflict among the Yezidi population residing within the KRI. A speech by KRG president 

Massoud Barzani at Feshkhabour in May 2016, which 

was considered by some to be inflammatory, coupled 

with the extrajudicial killing of an unarmed Yezidi man 

by a KRG-affiliated Peshmerga unit and a rise in political violence and harassment against Yezidi IDPs left the 

Yezidi community in a state that “bordered on panic.”121

Underpinning all of these tensions is a five-way 

political conflict being played out in the Sinjar region by 

the KDP, PUK, PKK, the Iraq central government, and local 

Yezidi actors. This dispute centers on which government 

and political groups will control the district in the long run. 

In particular, Syrian Kurdish groups and the PKK have 

established a presence, backed up by local support as a 

result of their actions to liberate the area in 2014. This is at 

odds with KRG and KDP designs for the future of Sinjar.122

• While the KRI is comparatively successful at safeguarding 

religious and ethnic minorities, researchers have identified 

general issues of concern in the region. These include systemic biases against non-Kurds; security forces’ failure to 

prioritize non-Kurdish defense; ongoing attempts to seize 

control of the disputed territories, and attempts to “Kurdify” these regions; and issues concerning the pressures 

and strain of caring for disproportionately large numbers 

of IDPs now living in the KRI.

• Abuses and failings by the Peshmerga militias should be 

investigated fully. Where possible war crimes or violations 

of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(to which Iraq is a party) have occurred, they should be 

investigated as such. Pressure should be placed on commanders to continue to uphold high standards as they take 

control of territory.

• An effort should be made to move Kurdish security forces 

away from being political militias, heavily influenced by 

political parties. A unified, politically independent force, 

representative of all KRI residents should be encouraged. 

• IDPs should be allowed to return to their homes, regardless 

of their ethnicity.

• Kurdish authorities are dealing with an enormous population of IDPs. Authorities and NGOs working with IDPs 

should be supported by the United States.

• A plan to ensure IDPs are shielded from discrimination 

or hostility should be implemented. A breakdown in the 

relationship between IDPs and local Kurdish populations 

would have repercussions for the safety of religious 

minorities.

• Allegations of a policy of “Kurdification” of disputed areas 

must be investigated fully. 

• A peaceful solution to the control of the disputed territories must be worked out before the defeat of ISIS. Any 

solution will likely vary by territory, but it must take the 

desires of the local populations (frequently vulnerable 

minorities) into account. Coercion, threats, the destruction of property, forced relocations, and any other such 

method cannot be tolerated for securing the future of the 

disputed territories.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
34 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

KRG and Yezidi Relations since August 2014

The trust of the Yezidi community with the KRG is 

irreparably shattered because of KRG actions during the 

Sinjar massacres on August 3, 2014. This delegitimizes 

the KRG as a partner for reconstruction in or as administrator over Sinjar, which remains a disputed territory 

claimed by the KRG. 

The issue of August 3rd, 2014 is not frequently discussed publicly in the KRI, and the KRG generally avoids 

the topic. When pressed government officials respond 

with these three claims: 1) the ISIS campaign against 

Sinjar was a surprise attack for which there was not adequate time to prepare; 2) the KRG had not been provided 

with sufficient weapons to enable its forces to protect the 

area; 3) the frontline collapsed after being overwhelmed 

by ISIS jihadists, and the Peshmerga were forced to flee.

Yezidis and NGOs123 respond to these claims by 

noting the advance on Sinjar following Mosul’s fall 

was gradual (two months), and ISIS intentions toward 

Yezidi “pagans” were already clear. They note that 

the Syrian Kurdish YPG forces, which fought through 

ISIS lines days after the Peshmerga withdrawal, were 

armed with inferior weaponry and possessed less 

regional knowledge. Finally, the Peshmerga pullout is 

alleged to have begun in the early hours of August 3rd, 

before the jihadists’ advance, without engaging the 

enemy or attempting to defend the local population.

Further souring the relationship, Yezidi activists 

and NGOs have claimed that KRG Peshmerga disarmed 

the Yezidi population in advance, prevented families 

from evacuating on August 2 and in one incident killed 

two Yezidis in Zorava who attempted to seize weaponry 

to defend themselves.

These incidents fueled grievances towards the 

KRG and the wider Kurdish community, felt by some 

Yezidis. The incidents also raised questions as to why 

Iraqi-Kurdish forces withdrew from a majority Yezidi 

area, while in other regions the Peshmerga advanced 

and held territories abandoned by Iraqi security forces 

and threatened by ISIS. In August 2016, these questions 

Fig 10. Distribution & Density of IDPs in the KRI & Disputed Territories.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 35

surfaced when the Kurdish KDP and Gorran parties 

engaged in a public spat over who was to blame for the 

withdrawal from Sinjar.124

Yezidis or Kurds?

One Yezidi sheikh in Sinjar told researchers that “Yezidis 

have no rights in Kurdistan.” Yezidis are listed as a 

religious group in the Law of Protecting the Rights of 

Components in Kurdistan-Iraq (Law No. 5, 2015), but 

not as an ethnicity. By contrast, Christians are listed 

as a religious group to be protected, and also as ethnic 

groups, afforded protections and rights to protect their 

ethnic identity.125

Some Yezidis claim that being able to identify as 

ethnically Yezidi is vital to their spiritual well-being. 

Ethnic identity, these Yezidis claim, is as much a part of 

the Yezidi religion (known as Sharfeddin) as the ability 

to celebrate traditional festivals. One sheikh told the 

researcher that “[Yezidi] ethnicity is the base of our 

religion.” Kurdish insistence that Yezidis are a Kurdish 

sect is met with hostility from many Yezidi sheikhs and 

activists. Some of these community leaders claim that 

they have been intimidated and even detained for their 

opposition to being classified as Kurds.

Not all Yezidi share this view on ethnic identity, 

which can vary in intensity by location. Some leaders, 

particularly in the Shexan area, are receptive to the KRG 

narrative of Yezidis as Kurds. A representative of the 

office of Baba Sheikh, the Yezidi spiritual leader, said 

Yezidis are indeed Kurds.

There may be a political element to Kurdish efforts 

to define Yezidis as Kurds. Some interview subjects suggested that elements within the KRG, and particularly 

in the KDP, see Sinjar district as an area that should 

naturally be under the administrative control of Erbil, 

rather than Baghdad. Ongoing overtures to the Yezidi 

community are part of a strategy to bring the region 

under Kurdish control.

However, restricting the Yezidi right to identify as 

Yezidi, especially through forcible and coercive means, 

would be a violation of the community’s religious 

freedom. Specifically, this KRG policy risks placing an 

arbitrary prohibition or restrictions on the Yezidis’ right 

to speak freely about their religious beliefs.126

Government Abuses Directed at the 

Yezidi Community

NGOs and activists report economic blockades of 

Sinjar, along with restrictions on freedom of movement 

and return, and the prevention of goods and supplies 

being distributed. NGO workers and medical supplies 

have also been blocked. According to one internal 

report from an NGO worker the interference does not 

stem from a specific or organized central policy. “The 

blockade is ad hoc, being implemented outside of any 

official legal framework, and in violation of the human 

rights of civilians who are being prevented from receiving essential resources in their areas.”

This same NGO worker observed, “There is no 

consistency in how it is implemented. Neither NGOs, 

nor local civilian families, nor local merchants know 

what to expect when they reach the checkpoint, 

or whether or not they will be allowed to bring in 

their goods.” This makes life in Sinjar intolerable 

for Yezidis. The community is tied closely to places, 

and these blockades may cause Yezidis to leave their 

ancestral lands which risks harming the religion’s 

long-term chances of survival. 

Yezidis who disagree with or criticize the KRG or 

KDP, or who work with groups such as the YBS or the 

. . . restricting the Yezidi right to 

identify as Yezidi, especially through 

forcible and coercive means, 

would be a violation of the 

community’s religious freedom.

THE KDP AND THE PKK

The KDP is particularly concerned by the strength of the 

PKK and affiliates in Sinjar. The role of Turkish and Syrian 

Kurdish forces in protecting Yezidis has built these groups a 

base of support in the region. President Barzani’s meeting 

with Yezidis in May 2016 was reportedly part of an attempt 

to dissuade Yezidis from working with PKK forces.

The KDP led economic blockade of Sinjar is also part 

of an attempt to weaken non-KDP forces, such as the YBS, 

PKK, and YPG.

In August 2016, a Kurdish journalist with links to the 

PKK was abducted and murdered, allegedly by Asayish 

officers. The journalist had worked to publish stories about 

KDP treatment of Yezidis in Sinjar.122
36 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

YPG are frequently barred entering KRG-controlled 

territory, and so are prevented access to the shrine 

at Lalish. Since August 3, 2014, Asayish have cracked 

down on peaceful demonstrations of Yezidis who are 

frustrated with the KRG’s role in the crisis or tactics of 

intimidation against the community. Activists allege 

that this has involved: 1) the arrests and jailing of activists; 2) the torture of young Yazidi activists by Kurdish 

Asayish; 3) the conviction in a court of law of one Yazidi 

activist who posted messages critical of the KRG/KDP 

on Facebook; 4) threats against the lives and health of 

the family members of Yezidi activists and journalists by 

Kurdish security forces; 5) the shutting down of humanitarian organizations when members of these organizations are found to have participated in demonstrations 

or have expressed sympathetic sentiments for the KDP’s 

political opposition on social media.

Attempts to Incite Violence within the 

Yezidi Community 

In May 2016, KRG President Massoud Barzani held meetings with KDP-loyal figures from Sinjar. The meeting content was leaked within the Yezidi community. It became 

widely reported that President Barzani told the Yezidi 

community to join with and support the Peshmerga in 

taking up arms against the PKK affiliated Yekîneyên 

Berxwedana S ̨engalê (Sinjar Resistance Units), in order to 

drive them out of Sinjar.127 Attached to this demand was 

some kind of threat about another Peshmerga withdrawal 

to create another security vacuum, if the Yezidi community did not side with the KDP against the YBS ̨.128

These comments resulted in panic among the Yezidi 

community, with families fearing conflict between 

different Yezidi groups. A conflict between the YBS ̨, a 

defense force which enjoys widespread support in Sinjar 

and poses no threat to Kurdistan, and the Peshmerga 

(which also has Yezidis within its ranks) would be a 

disaster for the wider community.

On Saturday May 14, 2016, a KRG-controlled 

Peshmerga unit (Peshmerga Rojava) shot and killed 

an unarmed Yezidi civilian near Khanasor. This act 

seemed to coincide with the Barzani meeting, and 

Yezidis felt that it was an attempt to spark armed conflict between the groups. Peshmerga Rojava’s treatment of Yezidis in the Sinjar area has been described as 

“highly abusive” by local NGOs.

Sectarian Violence

On a number of occasions, tensions between Kurds 

and Yezidis have boiled over, taking the form of acts of 

violence perpetrated by citizens or soldiers. 

In one instance in 2012, prior to the ISIS massacres, 

riots in the northern city of Zakho culminated in the 

destruction and ransacking of businesses selling alcohol.129 Given that alcohol can be consumed by Christians 

and Yezidis but is forbidden by Islam, its sale was a point 

• Yezidis face ongoing discrimination from authorities, and 

from the population at large.

• Restrictions on Yezidis’ right to identify as ethnic Yezidis is 

concerning, as is harassment directed at Yezidis who raise 

grievances against the KRG and KDP. 

• Harassment against Yezidi activists must stop. 

Yezidis should be permitted to identify as Yezidi, or as 

Kurdish, depending on their personal preferences 

and beliefs.

• Restricting Yezidi freedom of movement, or exiling Yezidis 

resident in the KRI should be discouraged except where 

legitimate security concerns exist. Yezidi freedom of 

movement must be protected to allow them access to 

their holiest shrine, which is located in Kurdish-controlled 

territory.

• Withdrawal of protection (or the threat to withdraw protection) in retaliation for not supporting KRG or KDP policy 

should never be permitted.

• Economic blockades and arbitrary restriction on 

freedom of movement must end. Blockades and restrictions on Sinjar place considerable pressure on local and 

displaced Yezidi populations. The KRG must ensure 

humanitarian aid and supplies are allowed to reach 

civilians in need. 

• Violence or discrimination against Yezidis by clerics or 

citizens of the KRI should be met with zero tolerance.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On a number of occasions, 

tensions between Kurds and Yezidis 

have boiled over, taking the 

form of acts of violence perpetrated 

by citizens or soldiers.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 37

of contention for conservative Muslim Kurds who came 

to see its presence as corrupting and offensive. Zakho’s Christian and Yezidi populations perceived these 

attacks as being directed at their freedom and safety as 

communities within the KRI.130

Another example of violence occurred in November 2015, when Kurdish Peshmerga encountered 

Yezidi Peshmerga while attempting to bring sheep that 

had been liberated from ISIS into Duhok. The Yezidis 

identified the sheep as having been owned by members 

of their community prior to their capture by ISIS, and 

demanded that they be returned.131 The confrontation 

then erupted into violence, with two Yezidi and one 

Kurd being killed. The incident fueled conflicting eyewitness accounts as to who initiated the conflict.132

Another incident occurred as Yezidis fled Sinjar in 2014. According to multiple Yezidi eyewitness 

accounts,133 134 an unspecified number of Sunni Muslims 

in Sinjar turned on their Yezidi neighbors and aided in 

their massacre by ISIS. It is worth noting that after the 

resettling of Sinjar, these acts of violence were reciprocated by the Yezidi, who killed 21 Arab civilians.135

These issues relate mainly to the actions of private 

citizens in KRI, rather than the actions of the state. Nevertheless, these tensions are significant. The long-term 

stability of the KRI is contingent on the ability of groups 

like the Yezidis, Kurds, and Arabs to coexist. 

Disputes with Turkmen Groups

The Turkmen are not a religious group, but an ethnic 

group, consisting of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims (see 

above, “Other Ethnic Groups and Minorities”). By some 

accounts, Turkmen comprise the third largest ethnic 

group in Iraq. Despite its size, this group has been 

targeted by other groups in the country. From 2014, 

ISIS targeted Shi’a Turkmen during their campaigns 

in Sinjar, the Nineveh plains, Kirkuk governorate, and 

elsewhere. According to a Turkmen activist, around 

600 women abducted by the group remain missing. 

With respect to the KRI and Kurdistan, Turkmen have 

clashed with Kurds politically and at times militarily over 

control of Kirkuk city and governorate, and over Peshmerga control of areas such as Tuz Khurmato.

Kirkuk, in particular, is considered of particular 

importance to Turkmen, and many Turkmen are 

concerned that they are being frozen out of the politics 

of the governorate, even as Kurds move into the city and 

its environs in greater numbers.

REPRESENTATION

Turkmen are mentioned as a component ethnicity of 

Kurdistan in the 2015 Minority Rights Law, and they 

are guaranteed seats in regional legislative bodies 

within the KRI by quota systems outlined in election law. Turkmen have reached high office, with the 

KRG’s current justice minister coming from Kirkuk’s 

Turkmen community. 

Nevertheless, Turkmen activists complained that 

they are underrepresented on the Kirkuk provincial 

council.136 According to these activists, Turkmen are 

discriminated against and struggle to make it to high 

office in the province. Rights “derive from party politics” 

and affiliation.

CONFLICT IN TUZ KHURMATU

Conflict between the Peshmerga and Turkmen Shi’a 

militias has broken out in Tuz Khurmatu (Salahuddin 

governorate) in the last year. In November 2015, and 

April 2016 fighting erupted, and when the fighting has 

not been live, walls have been erected between the Shi’a 

Turkmen community, the Kurdish population, and 

Sunni Arabs living in the town.137

Each side blames the other for starting the fighting, 

which killed dozens and caused millions of dollars of 

damage. Among the Turkmen militias are members of 

the al-Hashd al-Sha’abi, Iraqi Shi’a militias fighting for 

Baghdad and having links to Iran.

Conflict between Kurdish Peshmerga and Shi’a 

militias risks harming communities caught between 

the two sides. More worrying for the status of religious 

• Turkmen voices must be respected and represented 

within the KRG. 

• Clashes between Turkmen Shi’a militias and Peshmerga 

in Tuz Khurmatu must be monitored. Should fighting 

break out again, there is a risk it could spill over on a 

widespread basis. To date Kurdistan has largely been 

immune from Sunni-Shi’a violence common in Iraq.

• Efforts should be made to avoid further clashes. Authorities and States able to exert pressure on regional militias 

should be encouraged to work to avoid further clashes in 

Tuz Khurmatu or Kirkuk.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
38 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

freedom in the region, clashes between Shi’a militias 

and Sunni Kurds could lead to sectarian violence and 

targeting from both sides. Sectarian violence between 

Sunni and Shi’a communities has been commonplace in 

Iraq since 2003, but the Kurds and Kurdish forces have 

largely been unaffected to date. 

Further, a Sunni-Shi’a conflict, or a Kurdish-Turkmen conflict, might break out on a more widespread 

basis. Kirkuk, in particular would be at risk of suffering 

an increase in violence and instability. 

Appropriation of Christian Land

Christian citizens of the KRI have issued complaints and 

held protests against Kurdish residents for attacking and 

seizing their land and villages in the provinces of Dohuk 

and Erbil.138 139 Some Assyrian Christians accuse Kurdish government and party officials of taking lands for 

personal use or financial gain. These Christians believe 

they are specifically targeted as part of a policy to Kurdify 

historically Christian areas.140 Other Christian leaders do 

not believe a policy exists, but do concede that individual 

Kurds and Kurdish businesses have been known to build 

on or take Christian land.141 In April 2016, Human Rights 

Watch published a report after Kurdish security forces 

prevented Christians from traveling to Erbil to demonstrate against land appropriations in the Nahla Valley, 

and other areas of Dohuk and Erbil governorates.142

Background

Many individuals interviewed, both within the Christian community and outside it, noted that issues 

surrounding Christian land go back decades.143 Officials 

interviewed for this report at Zowaa, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, said at least 54 villages have been 

subject to partial or complete appropriation by Kurds 

since the 1960s.

Effectively, two types of land appropriation exist. 

Significant portions of the claims are long standing 

land ownership issues. Through the 1960s, and 1970s, 

Assyrians were caught up in various regional uprisings 

and suppressions. In the 1980s and 1990s, Assyrians 

were among groups targeted by Saddam Hussein’s campaigns. As a result of these events, large portions of the 

population fled their homes and land, while continuing 

to hold the deeds to the land. Over time, Kurds moved 

in to the fallow land and took them over. Now Christians are returning with their deeds and attempting to 

reclaim or be compensated for their apparently abandoned property. 

In addition to these long standing claims are 

alleged incidents where powerful local officials or 

businesses seize land on which to build new properties. Assyrian leaders alluded to various cases where 

Kurdish officials, or individuals or developers with 

links to officials, have built on land owned by Christians. Assyrian Christians from Zowaa pointed to 

incidents throughout Dohuk governorate, the Nineveh 

plains, and in Erbil. Seizures in the Nahla Valley have 

received particular attention; here, Christians allege 

42 encroachments in the villages in recent years. Most 

recently, a Kurd building on communal agricultural 

land sparked protests, after requests to cease and desist 

were ignored. 

A case involving Erbil International Airport was 

raised independently by various Christian leaders interviewed (both religious and political). In that case, land 

owned by the Chaldean Catholic Church (and others) 

was built on by developers without permission.

Over recent decades, the KRG has made various statements and issued orders calling for appropriations against 

Christians to end, while denying any central involvement. 

Christians, however, are frustrated by a perceived lack 

of action by the authorities and a lack of recourse in the 

courts. They believe that encroachments are increasing.

Taken together, the various types of land appropriation are a source of deep concern for Christians in 

Iraq. Yonadam Kanna, an Assyrian MP from Zowaa 

in the federal parliament, recently told the Al-Monitor

publication, that “The seizure of Christian lands is part 

of the process of demographic change.”144 These sentiments were echoed by several of the Christian leaders 

interviewed by researchers for this report. There is a 

worry that even if this effect is not intentional, failures 

to protect the rights and property of Christians will 

contribute to the continued decline of the Christian 

population of Iraq, and the disappearance of Assyrians 

from their historic homeland.

Demonstrations Blocked

In April 2016, Kurdish security forces blocked Christians 

from traveling through checkpoints to attend a demonstration against land appropriation. The demonstration 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 39

was to be held in Erbil. The Asayish set up roadblocks 

at the exit of Nahla Valley, and checkpoints throughout 

the region prevented Christians, including those not 

intending to protest, from reaching Erbil, as reported by 

Human Rights Watch.145

As detailed elsewhere in this report, Iraqi ID documents list an individual’s religious affiliation. Identity 

documentation is generally required to pass Asayish

checkpoints.

The decision by Kurdish authorities to deny Christians their right to assemble and peacefully demonstrate 

is concerning. Equally concerning was the decision to 

restrict freedom of movement for all Christians. Prohibition of travel based on religious affiliation amounts 

to religious discrimination. It should be noted that this 

action was a violation of the Kurdistan Parliament’s 

Minority Rights Law (2015) and the principles of the 

region’s draft constitution.146

KRG Response

Various counter narratives emerged from individuals 

aligned with the KRG and the ruling KDP. Mariwan 

Naqshbandi, representative of the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs, has stressed that in many 

cases, Christians abandoned the land, only returning 

recently. According to Naqshbandi after Kurdish citizens 

refused to leave, the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs issued a fatwa prohibiting such practices.

On the other hand, a KDP advisor interviewed by 

the researchers identified recent appropriations as the 

work of “corrupt local officials,” who have subsequently 

been investigated and punished. A lawyer at the KRGfunded Independent Human Rights Commission told 

researchers that in some cases the lands were already 

government owned and that Christians were tenants 

rather than owners.

It is also worth noting that not all Christian groups 

have prioritized fighting this issue. A senior religious figure in Ainkawa told the researcher that although in time 

his church would bring their case in court, now is not the 

right moment. He argued that his church is overextended 

caring for Christian IDPs, and he felt that the government 

should deal with the security and economic crisis first, 

before turning to settling land disputes. He plans to go 

to court once stability returns.147 Another priest noted 

that in the in the older cases being disputed, there is the 

difficulty of displacing long-settled Kurdish families. 

Without offering details he said that a “strong resolution” 

is needed that takes into account the needs of all parties.

Possible Relevance to Religious Freedom

The restriction of Christians’ movements based on 

their religion is clearly a violation of religious freedom. However, it is unclear whether the underlying 

issue of land appropriation also amounts to an issue 

of religious freedom. 

The International Religious Freedom Act (1998) 

requires countries that commit systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious freedom to be 

designated “countries of particular concern.” USCIRF 

has also established a second tier of countries in which 

religious freedom conditions do not rise to the statutory level that would mandate a CPC designation but 

require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of 

• Christian lands have been appropriated by Kurds in Dohuk 

and Erbil governorates, and the Nineveh plains. Incidents 

in Nahla Valley are a high profile example, but only one 

part of a broader issue.

• Christians have been prevented from protesting and traveling freely in response to this issue because of their religion.

• It is unclear whether Christians are targeted for their faith or 

ethnicity. It is clear that land appropriation is a long standing, unresolved problem. While some examples go back 

decades and are a result of the apparent abandonment of 

the lands, other cases are more recent.

• Christians doubt the effectiveness of the courts in resolving the issue.

• The loss of lands, livelihoods, and faith in the Kurdish population and authorities risks further emigration of Christians 

from Kurdistan. 

• A closer investigation of this issue should be made, focusing on the motivations for the land appropriation, and the 

response of the authorities, as well as their commitment to 

a resolution. Countries including the U.S. should monitor 

the issue closely to help local authorities resolve the issue 

through a process which respects the rights of all parties, 

and the rule of law.

• Fully independent and neutral tribunals to hear cases should 

be encouraged and support arranged for setting up such 

hearings. The international community should put pressure 

on local authorities to ensure this issue is resolved.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
40 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated 

by governments. 

Under IRFA (1998) the imposition of onerous 

financial penalties, along with forced mass resettlement, can be sufficient to constitute a violation 

of religious freedom, if committed on account of 

an individual’s religious belief or practice.148 Many 

Christians in Northern Kurdistan believe that they 

are being targeted because of their religion, with 

the intent of replacing their population with a Sunni 

Kurdish population. 

If land is being systematically taken from Assyrian 

Christian communities, it would be a clear breach of the 

rights of this population. However, it is unclear whether 

Christians are targeted because of their religion, or 

their non-Kurdish ethnicity, or simply because of the 

minority’s relative political weakness as compared with 

some of the KRI’s Sunni Kurdish residents. Christians 

interviewed frequently 

claimed that appropriation and abuses against 

their community are 

religiously motivated, 

and that these abuses are 

linked to a rise in more 

extreme Islamic thought 

in the region, which influences government policy and manifests in the increasing influence of various Islamist parties.149

Regardless of the reasons for the appropriations, 

Christian leaders were clear about the effect. The Assyrian Chaldean Syriac Christian communities of Northern 

Iraq, already reduced after 2003, are being pushed out of 

their ancestral homeland. Many Christians in Iraq fear 

that Christians are emigrating from the country in ever 

greater numbers, risking an even weaker community, 

and loss of culture. As ancestral lands and property 

are taken from Christians, and this action is condoned 

(whether explicitly or tacitly) by local authorities, fewer 

incentives will remain for one of the world’s oldest 

Christian communities to stay in Kurdistan and Iraq.

Abuses Against the Shabak Community

Kurdification in the Nineveh Plains

Alleged Kurdification can also affect the Shabak, due 

to the historic concentration of their population on 

the Nineveh plains. One of the most powerful ways in 

which the KRG has suppressed the Shabak in Nineveh is 

through the imposition of unrepresentative leadership 

and law enforcement. In recent years, the police force 

of predominantly Shabak villages in Nineveh has been 

composed primarily by Kurds from outside the local 

community. Feeling as though these officers do not 

practice justice impartially, local Assyrian and Shabak 

communities filed complaints, resulting in the appointment of 800 new policemen from the local communities 

in March of 2006.150 However, the implementation of 

Nineveh’s new police force was repeatedly delayed by 

the KDP-controlled Provincial Court of Nineveh until 

June 2006. When it was finally implemented, the 800 

Assyrian and Shabak officers were assigned to the city of 

Mosul, rather than the local communities.151 This denied 

Shabak communities their representative police force.

This is part of a larger trend in which local Kurdish 

authorities have applied 

coercive pressure to 

Shabak communities 

in Nineveh Province 

to incorporate within 

the Kurdistan Regional 

Government. Documents 

published on Wikileaks 

by the Nineveh Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT, teams established by the 

U.S. government intended to promote stable and representative democratic development in unstable regions) 

shed light on the extent to which some Kurds (and 

possibly KRG officials) have coerced community leaders 

into supporting the integration of their communities 

into the KRG. For instance, the aldermen and community leaders of three Shabak villages all confirmed to the 

PRT that they have been threatened for refusing to sign 

a KDP-circulated petition that expresses support for 

incorporating Shabak areas into the KRG.152 One of these 

aldermen also asserted that a deceptive petition form 

had been circulated and that he had been tricked into 

signing it.153

Although information that would paint a clearer 

picture of the percentage of Shabaks who support 

incorporation into the KRG is not available, the information that is available suggests that a majority opposes 

it. When the PRT arranged a meeting with ten Shabak 

The restriction of Christians’ movements 

based on their religion is 

clearly a violation of religious freedom.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 41

community leaders, they unanimously asserted that 

Shabak areas in the Nineveh plains near Mosul should 

not be considered in support of KRG incorporation.154

The PRT has claimed that further coercive power 

is applied through Nineveh government and the 

Provincial Council, which are both controlled by the 

Kurdish Alliance. Kurdish dominance of Nineveh 

plains governance can be seen in the Provincial 

Council, in which 31 out of 41 members ran on the 

Kurdish Alliance List (though only 8 profess to be 

KDP); the Deputy Governor also happens to be the 

KDP Chief for the Nineveh region; and the majority of 

judges and police officers (as previously mentioned) 

are Kurdish.155 One Shabak Hamdaniya District Council member reported that provincial reconstruction 

projects planned for Shabak areas and submitted by 

his district were blocked at the Provincial Council, 

which is KDP controlled.

The ambitions of the KRG in the Shabak dominated 

Nineveh plains were laid bare in June of 2006, when PM 

Barzani referred to them as “Kurdish towns.”156 Rather, 

leaders such as Democratic Shabak Assembly Chair 

Qusay Abbas Muhammad have suggested that the 

Shabak would vote for an autonomous region of their 

own if given an opportunity, while Shabak Council of 

Representatives member Dr. Hunain Qaddo assessed 

that Shabaks “just want to be left alone.”157

Violence against Shabaks

The fact that about 70 percent of Shabaks are Shi’a 

Muslims has made them a target in the eyes of ISIS, 

who see their faith as heretical.158 But others have also 

targeted Shabaks for reasons other than theology. 

Groups like Human Rights Watch have noted that since 

2008, Shabaks have increasingly fallen victim to violent 

attacks in their communities. Violence has fallen disproportionately on those who vocally oppose KRG political 

control of Shabak communities.159 Attacks have ranged 

from suicide bombings by terrorist groups that targeted 

large Shabak communities to political violence by Kurds 

directly targeting Shabak community leaders.

Shabak communities in Nineveh are disproportionately the target of violence from other political groups. 

For instance, in October of 2013, a truck drove into the 

Shabak village of Mwafaqiya, and then detonated, killing 

about a dozen and injuring 55 more.160 The previous 

month, suicide bombers targeted the funeral of a Shabak 

man, killing 23 and injuring many more in a Shabak 

village near Mosul.161 Even EKurd, a pro-KRG publication, 

acknowledges that the “amount of violence directed at the 

Shabaks in Northern Iraq is rising.”162 Yet another attack 

occurred in June of 2014, when two car bombings killed at 

least 27 people in the Shabak village of Tahrawa.163

Although the KRG cannot be expected to stop 

these attacks in their entirety, many within the Shabak 

community feel that little is being done to keep them 

safe. These attacks have driven multiple protests calling 

for greater KRG action, and Shabak former MP Hunain 

al-Qaddo remarked, “Security forces keep repeating 

that they can control the terrorists and that they have 

arrested hundreds, but nothing has really changed. 

There’s no clear plan for security and the security forces 

don’t have any idea of where the terrorists hide out or 

their targets or how they achieve their work.” 

Similar sentiments have been expressed by protestors in the aftermath of many mass killings. It seems 

probable that the KRG places less value on the protection of Shabaks, but regardless, the KRG should consider 

following the advice of al-Qaddo and other leaders by 

empowering Shabak communities to address their own 

security (contrary to past actions, such as the refusal to 

assign Shabak police officers locally, as discussed previously in this report). 

At other times, violence against Shabaks has targeted 

individuals of political significance within the Shabak 

community. For instance, in January of 2009, al-Qaddo 

reported to Human Rights Watch that he had been targeted for assassination when his convoy was fired upon 

by assailants wearing Kurdish security uniforms while he 

was on his way to celebrate the Shia festival of Ashura.164

Another instance of deeply politicized violence 

between Kurds and Shabaks occurred in July of 2008, 

when Shabak Assembly member Abbas Kadhim was 

The fact that about 70 percent of 

Shabaks are Shi’a Muslims has made 

them a target in the eyes of ISIS, 

who see their faith as heretical.
42 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

returning home after a conference on the upcoming 

election. In spite of Kurdish Peshmerga checkpoints 

all over the road, Kadhim was gunned down by a 

group of armed men.165 Although his killers were not 

apprehended, Hunain al-Qaddo claimed that Kadhim 

had previously been threatened over the phone and 

in person by members of the Kurdish Militant Peshmergas and members of the Kurdistan Democratic 

Party.166 Allegedly, these threats centered on demands 

that Kadhim stop campaigning against Kurdish parties 

and interests. Al-Qaddo (now the head of the Shabak 

Democratic Assembly) survived another assassination 

attempt in May of 2014.167

At worst, these attacks were the result of a coordinated attempt by Kurdish officials to violently suppress 

the Shabak people. Even in the best case scenario - 

where these attacks were conducted by lone wolves 

against the wishes of all Kurds - they still reflect a fundamental failure of the KRG to give sufficient protection to the rights of those Shabaks who oppose the KRG 

(within Shabak regions where Kurds still overwhelmingly control the government institutions). 

Conclusively, it is clear that the KRG has an 

incentive to expand its control to Shabak territory in 

the Nineveh plains. This 

incentive is amplified 

not only by their desire to 

project notions of ethnic 

and cultural homogeneity, but by the oil-rich 

nature of Shabak territory. Political exclusion 

and violence raise troubling questions concerning the future of Shabak 

treatment by Kurds and the KRG.

Concluding Remarks

The International Religious Freedom Act (1998) 

requires countries that commit systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom be 

designated “countries of particular concern” (CPCs). 

USCIRF also established a second tier of countries in 

which religious freedom conditions do not rise to the 

statutory level that would mandate a CPC designation 

but require close monitoring due to the nature and 

extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or 

tolerated by governments. 

Until 2017, it was recommended that Iraq as a whole 

should be included in the list of CPCs. In its most recent 

annual report, USCIRF revised its assessment. It is the 

opinion of the research team compiling this report that if 

the Kurdistan Region of Iraq were considered separately 

from the rest of Iraq, it also would not meet the necessary standard for designation as a “country of particular 

concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act. 

Though violations of religious freedom do exist in the KRI, 

they are not systematic, ongoing and egregious. 

Nevertheless, Kurdistan still requires close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations of 

religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by its authorities. In general, the region, its government, its political 

parties and their Peshmerga militias should all be 

monitored closely for signs of ongoing violations of religious freedom. Private attitudes toward non-Kurds and 

non-Muslims should also be considered, and potential 

threats from elements of the local population addressed. 

Conscious of its public image, the Kurdistan 

Regional Government is likely to respond positively to 

scrutiny, but economic and security pressures cannot 

be accepted as a carte 

blanche for local authorities to violate rights and 

freedoms. Kurds should 

be assisted in improving and strengthening 

their institutions. Where 

appropriate, funds should 

be allocated to support 

institutions and programs 

aimed at preserving 

minority rights and the rule of law. Minorities in the 

region should be engaged with and further empowered 

with the help of Kurdish authorities. 

Though violations of 

religious freedom do exist in KRI, 

they are not systematic, ongoing and 

egregious . . . Nevertheless, Kurdistan 

still requires close monitoring. . . .
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 43

Appendices

Appendix A - Kurdistan’s Draft Constitution 

and Minority Rights (Selected articles)

Article 2: Specifies a number of regions that are 

considered part of Iraqi Kurdistan and designates that 

all people in those regions gain citizenship if those 

regions join Iraqi Kurdistan.

Article 7: Establishes that Shari’ah principles and 

the majoritarian Muslim identity of Kurdish citizens 

are sources of legislation. However, religious minorities 

have rights to freedom of belief and practicing religion. 

Article 13: The Kurdish Peshmerga have a monopoly on force: No other militias may exist. This poses 

potential problems for minority rights given the Peshmerga’s track record on the protection of minority rights.

Article 14: Kurdish and Arabic are the official languages, but citizens have the right to teach their children 

in their native tongue, and children have the right to 

learn their native languages in educational institutions. 

In administrative units where Turkmen and Syriac are 

the majority, theirs will be the official languages.

Article 18: All citizens are equal under the law; discrimination under essentially any metric is banned.

Article 21, 23 subsection 2: Establishes equal treatment for women and a quota for the number of seats for 

women in parliament. 

Articles 37-38: Prohibits discrimination against 

prisoners based on the characteristics under Article 

18 and specifies that prisoners’ religious beliefs, moral 

principles, and ethics are to be respected.

Article 42: No groups may participate in or encourage a number of harmful things; racism and ethnic 

cleansing are specifically mentioned and are pertinent 

to minority rights.

Article 46: Employees are only promoted due to 

seniority and competence. 

Article 49, subsection 5: All forms of discrimination in society, family, and school are banned.

Article 55, subsection 3: The state has a duty 

to educate children about Kurdistan’s cultural and 

national heritage. 

Article 63: Every legal resident has the right to free 

movement within Iraqi Kurdistan. Mobility rights are 

useful in protecting the safety of minorities. 

Article 65: Religion is not compulsory, and everyone has freedom of religion, belief, and thought. 

Furthermore, citizens have the right to practice their 

worship and create sites of worship.

Article 66, subsection 4: Dismissal of employees 

based on ethnicity or religion is banned.

Article 67, subsection 6: Political parties and associations may not use any aspect of religion or religious 

ceremonies to degrade the political or social standing of 

others. This can mitigate the likelihood of conflict

Article 71: Guarantees the rights and freedoms 

under the Constitution unless any infringements on 

those rights or freedoms are not substantial as determined by a metric of the underlying principles of a “just, 

free and democratic [society].” This allows for a potential 

override on minority rights.

Article 80: The structure of the Kurdish Parliament 

will reflect a fair representation of nationalities and 

religious organizations in Kurdistan, regardless of the 

member’s constituency. 

Article 111: A fair representation of the “Minorities” 

should be reflected in the Kurdish Council of Ministers.

Article 116: Provides for an independent judiciary. 

This helps in ensuring minority rights.

Article 123: Courts will be organized to address 

crimes committed by the Peshmerga or Internal Security Forces. 

Article 124: Religion may not be imposed on other 

religious groups. Allows for non-Muslim religious 

groups to establish their own spiritual communities and 

practice their beliefs.

Articles 133-139: Establishes a Supreme Court. This 

is useful for creating precedents about minority rights. 

However, the Court is decided by the Judicial Assembly 

in consultation with the President, so demographics 

within Parliament may determine the legitimacy of the 

Court.

Article 146: In forming the Local and Municipality 

Council, a fair representation of the ethnic groups in an 

administrative unit will be taken into consideration. 

Article 147: Establishes a commission concerned 

with Fayli Kurds’ rights

USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 45

Appendix B - Technical Appendix: 

Economic Analysis

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ETHNORELIGIOUS 

GROUPS USING LUMINOSITY: TECHNICAL APPENDIX

03/11/2016

1 DATA

1.1 Location of ethnic groups

The project drew upon a great number of sources to plot 

on a map the locations of ethnic groups. Researchers 

tried to determine the location and mix of ethnoreligious 

groups in as granular a fashion as possible. The result is a 

map that splits Kurdistan into a number of polygons (see 

pictured), where each polygon represents the greatest 

level of granularity that the researcher was able to achieve 

for an area. Each polygon contains information on the 

estimated relative make-up of each group, expressed as 

a fraction. At times, this fraction was an expression of 

the best judgment of the researcher based on the sources 

used. That is to say, sources which did not identify a 

specific percentage but gave some qualitative sense of the 

composition were used by the researcher to comprise an 

estimate of the fraction. Of course this approach admits 

of the possibility of error, but the belief of the team is that 

at worse this will increase unbiased measurement error, 

which can be accounted for statistically and will cancel 

out over the region at large. For the sake of robustness, 

however, we also run our analysis under the stylized 

assumption that, in any polygon, the majority group is 

the only group in that area, which removes the possibility 

of measurement error entering our specification via the 

estimates of relative composition.

Another issue that was salient to the construction 

of a reliable mapping of ethnoreligious is the dating of 

sources. The team used a variety of sources spanning 

a timeframe 1972-2016, with all but two sources from 

1992 or later. The concern of researchers is that, due to 

the movement of ethnoreligious groups, particularly 

due to Ba’athist Arabization policies, past sources 

about demographics may be inaccurate. In considering 

this problem the team took several measures. First, 

recent sources are prioritized, particularly in areas 

where the team has prior reason to believe that the old 

data may be inadequate. As such our approach was 

more or less successful in avoiding some of the older 

sources that are likely to be inaccurate. For example, 

the 1957 census contains precise data on the composition of groups in Kirkuk, but these values are unlikely 

to be a realistic assessment of the current composition 

of Kirkuk, and so we did not use this or similar data. We 

also note, for the sake of posterity, the date of the oldest 

source used for each polygon.

The below diagram is a representation of the 

polygons that comprise the final mapping. Note, 

however, that for statistical analysis we use only a 

subset of this map, specifically the subset covering 

the official KRG area.

1.2 Luminosity data

To proxy for economic output we use satellite image 

data, available at approximately the square kilometer 

level, on light density at night as a proxy for economic 

output. There are two repositories for such information. 

The first is the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP) dataset, 

which provides at least yearly data168 from 1992 to 2013, 

but was discontinued afterwards in favour of the Visible 

Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) dataset. The 

DMSP data reports a six-bit number that ranges from 

0 to 63. The second, consequently, is the VIIRS dataset, 

which uses different satellites and an improved methodology to provide luminosity images for every month 

from January 2014 onwards, and instead reports values 

of radiance, in nanoWatts/cm2/sr.

The use of satellite data as a proxy for economic output is well documented. While we outline some of the 

more prominent papers, the use of luminosity data goes 
46 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

well beyond these papers. Henderson et al. (2012) find it 

to be a useful measure of economic growth for countries 

with poor statistical data. Chen and Nordhaus (2010) 

also argue that where there is a shortcoming of standard 

data sources, luminosity data provides a highly valuable 

proxy for economic growth. Alesina et al. (2012) presents a methodology for combining luminosity data with 

data on ethnicity groups to compile measures of ethnic 

inequality, which sets an important precedent for our 

work. I-Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010) use luminosity 

data to analyze economic development and poverty in 

Africa. Hodler and Raschky (2014) use luminosity to find 

evidence of economic favoritism for the birth region of a 

leader by analyzing luminosity data from 126 countries. 

This is a similar concept to our own work, which seeks to 

test for evidence of economic favoritism for the majority 

Sunni Kurdish group.

There are several reasons why we believe the 

use of luminosity is particularly well-suited to the 

analysis of Kurdistan. First, our research approach 

requires the use of subnational data. While there are 

extant measures of GDP for Kurdistan, they are only 

of reliable quality at the national level. Further to this, 

the existing measures are all time invariant, using a 

variety of surveys dating from 2011-2013, and thus are 

insufficient to do the kind of growth analysis that we do 

in our work. There is, to the best of our knowledge, no 

substitute for the use of luminosity data to analyze the 

economic relationships between ethnoreligious groups 

in Kurdistan over time.

While the new satellite data is superior to the old 

for various reasons169, the not insubstantial differences 

make it difficult to compare across DMSP and VIIRS and 

in particular creates variation in our metrics that cannot 

easily be explained by trends. Therefore for most of our 

work we utilize the DMSP data as it provides the dataset 

with a greater length of continuity. However, we also 

report our work including luminosity growth from 2014-

2015 which are both VIIRS years. We do not calculate 

growth from 2013-14 as, because 2013 and 2014 are from 

different datasets, the measure will be meaningless. 

We argue that it is most productive to focus on the 

2004-2013 subset of the DMSP data. This marks the 

greatest period of peacetime (from post Iraq war to 

the rise of ISIS)170 and saw the greatest level of growth, 

stemming from international investment into Iraq, 

and which we believe would highlight any disparities 

between groups in Kurdistan. Figure B1 highlights 

our argument here, with the greatest levels of growth 

coming in the years after the Iraq war. Moreover, the 

rise of ISIS led to the KRG siphoning funding away from 

domestic investment and into the military, resulting in 

reduced growth in the country overall, and therefore 

we the differential between Kurdish and non-Kurdish growth will be less noticeable. Lastly, while this is 

partially offset by taking differences in logs, the ultimate problem is that we are using two different satellite 

datasets with radically different recording policies, 

which increases uncertainty in our results, and reduces 

the possibility for significant results when such results 

would be possible with complete continuity in the type 

of dataset.

1.3 Other variables

The team used population density information from 

Worldpop which provides density values at a geographically precise level for Iraq for 2010 and 2015. In the current 

layer of work we used the UN-adjusted 2010 values, working under the assumption that the relative populations of 

different areas have not changed enough to significantly 

affect our work. This density data was used to calculate 

the population of each polygon to assist in calculating per 

capita luminosity values. It was also used to calculate a 

population density variable as a control.

We employ a number of controls to evaluate in 

greater detail the effect of ethnoreligious status on growth 

and output as proxied by luminosity data. Climate data 

for temperature and precipitation was downloaded for 

2005 from the Consortium for Spatial Information. We 

employ the mean value from 2005 for all years, as a way 

of coding for differences in climate across Kurdistan that 

may affect suitability for agriculture. 

We encode a variable for distance to border, calculated for each polygon, which is the distance from the 

center of a polygon to the nearest point on the official 

KRG border. This allows us to control for the possibility 

that more conflict prone and less secure areas to the 

south of Kurdistan are less likely to face positive economic outcomes.

Our work adds controls for urban extents. These were 

taken from the GRUMP database provided by the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center. The variable is 
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 47

coded as a 1 if a polygon partially overlaps with an urban 

extent, a 2 if a polygon is fully within an urban extent, and 

a 0 otherwise. We code two such variables - one for urban 

areas greater than 100,000 habitants, and one for urban 

areas with greater than 500,000 habitants.

Road density information was also included by 

accessing the OpenStreetMap database. Road density 

was calculated by taking the total length of road per 

polygon and dividing by the area of the polygon.

2 ESTIMATES OF GROUP AND POLYGON OUTPUT

For a set of polygons set of ethnoreligious groups 

proportion of polygon i that is group j given by αij, population of polygon i given by Popi

, the average luminosity 

per square meter is given by lumi, and the area of the 

polygon by Ai. The population of group j is given by:

Then the per capita luminosity of group j is given by:

Additionally, we are interested in estimates of the 

luminosity per capita individuals. We assume that each 

individual in a polygon has the same level of luminosity, 

equal to the luminosity per capita of that individual. 

That is, we assume that where we lack the information 

to further delineate geographically between ethnicity or 

religion in an area, the level of output of every individual in that area is identical. The luminosity per capita of 

each polygon is given by:

3 ETHNORELIGIOUS FRAGMENTATION

The mapping data also allows researchers to construct 

a measure of fragmentation for each region. Let denote 

the share of group j in a region. Then the ethnoreligious 

fragmentation measure is given by:

Since we have estimates of the share of each group 

in each polygon, we can construct a measure both for 

each polygon and for each district. Note, however, that 

in order to calculate the shares sj for a district using the 

polygon level data, we need to combine it with the density information in order to determine the population in 

each polygon.

The intuitive interpretation of this metric is that it 

measures, for a specified area, the probability that two 

individuals picked at random will be from different 

ethnoreligious groups. Therefore, it can be said to be a 

measure of fragmentation or diversity. An area comprised of many small groups will score high, whereas an 

area with a large majority will score low.

We calculate two different fragmentation measures 

which vary in what they consider to be the salient group 

divisions. The first, which we refer to as ’ERF’, treats all 

groups as separate. The second, ’sumERF’, fuses groups 

that we consider to be similar, such as the different 

Christian denominations, the Turkmen and the Arabs. 

We report regression results for both measures.

We represent visually each measure. Figure B2 

demonstrates the map visualizing the ERF measure, 

whereas Figure B2 reports the map visualizing the sumERF measure.

4 ECONOMETRIC DESIGN

The assumptions outlined in Section 2 allow estimation 

of a particular individual’s luminosity. With such estimates we can specify models regressing the luminosity 

of an individual on the level of fractionalization of the 

community they live in. We outline each model and the 

formal results below.

4.1 Effect of ethnoreligious status on economic output 

proxied by luminosity

There are several alternatives we can test. We examine the 

model with each individual-year as a unit of observation:

Where yit is the luminosity value of a given individual, X1i

 is a dummy that is coded as 1 if the individual 

,
48 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

is Sunni Kurdish, and 0 otherwise. X2it is a vector of 

relevant controls, which we outline in greater specificity below. 

Figure B20 highlights our results here, showing in 

some places a negative effect of being Sunni Kurdish 

status on luminosity per capita levels. This may be a 

residual of pre-autonomous Iraq where Kurds were not a 

favoured group under the Ba’athist regime.

4.2 The effect of group status on growth

We further outline a model examining the effects of 

membership of the Sunni Kurdish majority group on 

growth in luminosity. We look at the log changes, which 

for small values will be approximately equal to the 

percentage change, and examine different time periods (including looking at a aggregate specification that 

bunches all years). The model is as below.

Where , and T0 T1 and are 

the desired times over which growth is measured.

When examining the model with each individual-year as a unit of observation, the model becomes

Where

We give results for both specifications, but focus on 

the second as it allows us to exploit more of the data that 

is available to us, and take advantage of the yearly data 

that is provided to us by the DMSP satellite data.

4.3 Controlling for per capita luminosity

We run the regressions in the table above but with the 

base value of luminosity as a control. That is, we run the 

regression:

This allows us to test for the alternate hypothesis 

that the above correlations were a result of growth in 

less developed areas rather than specifically growth for 

the Sunni Kurdish majority.

4.4 The effect of fragmentation on growth

We can additionally test a model that posits fragmentation as a significant determinant of output and growth. 

The models are identical to the above, but instead of 

regressing on a dummy variable for membership of the 

majority Sunni Kurdish group, the relevant variable is 

the ethnic fragmentation value earlier mentioned.

Of course, the measure of the fragmentation is very 

sensitive to the level at which the analysis is carried out. 

If the individual unit is the household, then very few 

units will show any level of fragmentation, since any 

particular household will most likely be homogeneous. 

Polygons yield a greater degree of fragmentation than 

taking households overall, and districts higher still.

We choose polygons as our level of observation. 

The argument for this is that, where the researcher has 

enough information to parse groups into distinct polygons, the groups live distinctly enough to be allocated 

separate regions. If on the other hand, the researcher 

cannot geographically distinguish groups within an 

area and chooses to include them in a single polygon, 

they are genuinely interspersed (and therefore fragmented) and not geographically distinct. Of course 

this does not hold true in all cases; there will be regions 

where groups might be geographically distinct in terms 

of the particular area of the city etc, but there is not 

enough information available to the researcher to divide 

the region accordingly. Nonetheless we feel that this 

approach works well enough generally in identifying 

genuine fragmentation in a given area and identifying 

its economic effects.

4.5 Frequency weighting

The models as specified above assume that the observation for each individual in Kurdistan is i.i.d. However, 

for the estimates that we calculate, this is clearly not 

the case; we observe one set of luminosity values for all 

individuals in a given polygon. To get around this issue 

we select a polygon-group-year as our unit observation. 

That is to say, our database includes a single observation 

for every group in a select polygon, for every year. We 

then use analytic weights with the population of the 

group in that polygon as the value to weight by. Finally, 

we cluster standard errors by polygon, allowing us to 

account for the likely fact that the errors for two groups 

in a polygon are correlated. 

.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 49

5 RESULTS

Figures B4, B5, and B6 highlight our basic results, showing a significant advantage of Sunni Kurdish status for 

growth, even when we control for luminosity per capita 

as we do in B5. This suggests that investment in underdeveloped areas cannot explain the Sunni Kurdish 

advantage. 

We outline some of the additional controls that were 

used in the regressions. Urban extents, road density and 

population density controls try to account for the discrepancy by using data on existing development and population demographics. Using the distance from the southern 

border allows us to account for the hypothesis that being 

closer to potential disputed regions and conflict zones 

negatively affected growth. Mean precipitation and mean 

temperature allow the researcher to control for variations 

in weather across Kurdistan which may potentially affect 

agricultural suitability. We introduce these controls in 

sequence for all regressions and find that in almost all 

cases the effect of both being Sunni Kurdish and fragmentation remains highly significant.

Figure B13 gives additional results using just a 

difference in logs between an initial and final data: 

’lumgrowth’ giving the difference where the initial 

date was 1992, and ’lumgrowth04’ giving the difference 

where the initial data was 2004.

The negative effects of fragmentation are also very 

strong, when given with the ERF measure as in B6, and 

persist even when we use the sumERF measure, as in 

Figure B14.

As stated beforehand, we also report the regressions 

for the full timeline for DMSP data, as in Figures B7, B8, 

B9, and with the VIIRS data included, Figures B10, B11, 

B12. The results are generally robust, although less so 

with the VIIRS data, as is argued would be the case. 

6 ROBUSTNESS

6.1 Regression on share

We consider an alternative specification of the model, 

with a polygon-year as the unit of observation, and the 

relevant regressor being the share of Sunni Kurds in 

that polygon. Figures B15, B16, and B17 show the results 

of this analysis, finding significance just as with the 

original analysis and providing a confirmation of the 

robustness of our results.

6.2 Majority-only polygon specification

We run the same analysis but with a specification that 

posits that only the largest group within a given polygon 

is assumed to exist within a polygon. This addresses 

potential criticism that our estimation of relative shares 

within a given region admit to any kind of bias or uncertainty. Figures B18 and B19 show the results under such 

a specification, providing additional support for the 

Sunni Kurdish advantage, and increasing the robustness of our results.

6.3 Discussion

This section deals with some of the further critiques of 

the work that might arise; this study seriously alternative explanations for the observed results, and finds 

them unconvincing. First, we consider that there is no 

underlying discrepancy and that the analysis we conduct misinterprets imperfect data as a result. Such an 

explanation is not credible. The effects were statistically 

significant: the statistical tests show that the probability 

of observing a pattern as strong as strong as is present, 

given no underlying disparity exists, is extremely small. 

Moreover, the findings remain highly significant when 

trying different methods of measurement and model 

specification, such as considered in Figures B18, B15, 

and B13. Were the objection to be feasible, the chances 

of observing an effect at least as large as that which is 

observed is very small.

It might be argued that the disparity between Kurdish and non-Kurdish growth rates can be explained by 

investment flowing into underdeveloped regions and, 

in general, faster development in less well off regions. 

While this is possible - historically, Kurds were not a 

favoured group in Iraq – Figure B20 specifically highlights that Kurds on average live in slightly less developed areas. Nonetheless, this does not account for the 

disparity in growth rates. The study controls for disparities in development in our analysis, and find that even 

for a given level of current development, the average 

Sunni Kurd can expect to have an advantage, in terms of 

output growth, over his peers. This cannot be explained 

purely by investment in underdeveloped areas.

The following counter is also unconvincing: Kurds 

are more urbanized than their minority counterparts, 

and have therefore experienced the brunt of better 

growth. The study finds little evidence for such an 
50 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

effect. On the contrary, the largest cities have experienced lower rates of growth overall than other areas, as 

demonstrated in Figure B4 - a mildly surprising result, 

but in accord with economic literature which emphasizes the economic potential of less developed areas 

to experience high levels of percentage growth as they 

’catch up’ to more developed areas. Moreover, any such 

effect cannot account for the increased growth rate of 

Sunni Kurds: the study includes urban extents in our 

models and find that there remains a substantial systemic disparity unexplained by urbanization.

There may be concerns that luminosity is not a plausible indicator of economic activity. The first response 

to this is that there is no substitute for the method used. 

Kurdistan’s statistical agencies are still in a nascent 

stage and do not have the capacity to construct good 

measures of GDP over time. What good measures do 

exist are not available over different time periods, and 

are for the national level - not nearly the precision we 

need to compare different regions with each other and 

have some idea of the performance of different groups 

in Kurdistan. This criticism of the inaccuracy of such 

methods is well founded. The quality of satellite luminosity data as a proxy for GDP is very strongly supported 

and articles using the method have found their way 

to the top journals in remote sensing, economics and 

political science. The data is not a perfect measure of 

GDP, and of course there will be uncertainty in using 

luminosity to proxy for activity, but this is not an argument against the presented method, since the statistical results specifically rule out random fluctuation or 

uncertainty as an explanation for the observed data. 

Finally, even in the sense that luminosity detects something distinct from economic activity, it still constitutes 

evidence for economic favoritism of the Kurds that they 

have experienced statistically higher levels of luminosity growth than their minority counterparts.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 51

Fig B1. The evolution of output for the Kurdish majority vs minority groups in general in Kurdistan, 1992-2013
52 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Fig B2. ERF mapping
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 53

Fig B3. ERF mapping
54 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B4: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status: 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.020**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.022** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.026***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.004 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -8.641*** -2.205 -2.309 -4.501**

(0.85) (1.42) (1.58) (1.91)

Population Density -58.028*** -57.247*** -41.123**

(12.12) (13.08) (15.73)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation -0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.197*

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2150.0 1844.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 55

Figure B5: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, controlling for starting luminosity: 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.032** 0.034*** 0.026** 0.017** 0.017** 0.020**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Luminosity P/C -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.027***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.004 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037***

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.538*** -1.269 -1.319 -3.447

(1.18) (1.64) (1.80) (2.13)

Population Density -57.107*** -56.516*** -40.545**

(12.91) (13.81) (16.78)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation -0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.118*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.187*

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2150.0 1844.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
56 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B6: Regression of luminosity growth on fragmentation: 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Fragmentation -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.072*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.074***

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.025***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.000 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.033**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -8.110*** -3.929*** -3.862*** -3.830**

(0.71) (1.30) (1.37) (1.73)

Population Density -38.956*** -38.541*** -25.928*

(12.17) (12.39) (13.97)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature 0.000

(0.00)

Luminosity P/C -0.000**

(0.00)

Constant 0.154*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.145

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2150.0 1844.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 57

Figure B7: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status: 1992-2013

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.027** 0.019** 0.014 0.018**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.047***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.010 0.027** 0.027** 0.030** 0.031**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.188*** -2.302 -3.260 -6.429***

(1.01) (2.55) (3.06) (2.25)

Population Density -44.159** -40.022* -13.885

(19.82) (24.10) (16.29)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000* 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.090*** 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.148*** 0.135*** 0.158

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4479.0 3809.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
58 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B8: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, controlling for starting luminosity: 1992-2013

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.027** 0.031*** 0.025** 0.018** 0.013 0.017**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Luminosity P/C -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.048***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.001 0.023* 0.024* 0.026** 0.027*

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -5.488*** -0.687 -1.724 -4.846*

(1.45) (2.87) (3.28) (2.65)

Population Density -43.577** -39.809* -14.538

(20.11) (23.83) (16.72)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.102*** 0.135*** 0.141*** 0.151*** 0.139*** 0.144

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4479.0 3809.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 59

Figure B9: Regression of luminosity growth on fragmentation: 1992-2013

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Fragmentation -0.075*** -0.078*** -0.058** -0.044** -0.036 -0.054**

(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.046***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.006 0.028** 0.028** 0.029** 0.024*

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -6.865*** -3.577 -4.174 -5.099*

(0.98) (2.59) (2.96) (2.59)

Population Density -30.730 -29.301 -4.630

(20.45) (23.12) (18.32)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature 0.000

(0.00)

Luminosity P/C -0.000**

(0.00)

Constant 0.132*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.153*** 0.119

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4542.0 4479.0 3809.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
60 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B10: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status: 1992-2013, 2014-15

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.024** 0.016** 0.009 0.014*

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.042***

(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.013 0.024** 0.024** 0.027** 0.029**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.134*** -1.834 -2.832 -5.620***

(0.98) (2.47) (3.02) (1.98)

Population Density -47.889** -43.952* -20.689

(19.43) (23.95) (14.61)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000** 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.086*** 0.117*** 0.132*** 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.147

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)

R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4756.0 4052.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 61

Figure B11: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, controlling for starting luminosity: 1992-2013, 2014-15

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.024** 0.028*** 0.022** 0.014* 0.008 0.013*

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Luminosity P/C -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.043***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.004 0.020 0.020 0.023* 0.024*

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -5.282*** -0.079 -1.174 -3.919

(1.43) (2.79) (3.22) (2.42)

Population Density -47.233** -43.694* -21.316

(19.79) (23.71) (15.45)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000* 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.098*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.132*** 0.133

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4756.0 4052.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
62 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B12: Regression of luminosity growth on fragmentation: 1992-2013, 2014-15

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Fragmentation -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.054** -0.038* -0.028 -0.052**

(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.041***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.009 0.024** 0.025** 0.026** 0.021

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -6.809*** -2.937 -3.605 -4.135*

(0.96) (2.52) (2.90) (2.39)

Population Density -36.175* -34.662 -11.380

(20.05) (22.63) (17.28)

Distance, Southern Border 0.000* 0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Luminosity P/C -0.000**

(0.00)

Constant 0.125*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.141*** 0.102

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)

R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

Obs 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4823.0 4756.0 4052.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 63

Figure B13: Regression of long-distanced luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, for: 1992-2013, 1992-2013, 2004-

13, 2004-13 respectively

(1) lumDelt b/se (2) lumDelt b/se (3) lumDelt04 b/se (4) lumDelt04 b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.746*** 0.363** 0.399*** 0.195**

(0.23) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.693*** -0.763*** -0.203** -0.257***

(0.15) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.047 0.727*** -0.041 0.381***

(0.34) (0.26) (0.15) (0.13)

Road Density -128.757*** -45.904***

(42.88) (17.51)

Population Density -169.411 -315.980**

(309.89) (136.89)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation -0.002 -0.002

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000 -0.003

(0.01) (0.00)

Constant 2.285*** 3.608* 1.103*** 2.754***

(0.23) (2.07) (0.10) (0.95)

R2 0.35 0.60 0.12 0.29

Obs 173.0 146.0 243.0 206.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
64 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B14: Regression of luminosity growth on fragmentation (group sums measure), 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Fragmentation -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.082*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.079***

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.026***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.002 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.033**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.876*** -3.065** -2.981** -3.417*

(0.78) (1.34) (1.44) (1.78)

Population Density -45.128*** -44.805*** -28.612*

(12.53) (12.71) (14.62)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature 0.000

(0.00)

Luminosity P/C -0.000**

(0.00)

Constant 0.156*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.171

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2177.0 2150.0 1844.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 65

Figure B15: Regression of luminosity growth on share of Sunni Kurds in region, 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.038** 0.044**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.022** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.026***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.004 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.038***

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -8.127*** -2.646** -2.911** -4.324**

(0.90) (1.25) (1.40) (1.83)

Population Density -50.818*** -47.446*** -36.871**

(11.19) (12.46) (14.52)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.084*** 0.101*** 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.144

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1123.0 979.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
66 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B16: Regression of luminosity growth on share of Sunni Kurds in region, controlling for base luminosity, 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.031** 0.036** 0.043**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)

Luminosity P/C -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.027***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.003 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.035**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.151*** -1.729 -1.934 -3.300

(1.21) (1.48) (1.63) (2.04)

Population Density -50.469*** -47.260*** -36.470**

(11.85) (12.99) (15.24)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature 0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.099*** 0.115*** 0.127*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.135

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12)

R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1123.0 979.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 67

Figure B17: Regression of luminosity growth on fragmentation of region, 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Fragmentation -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.072*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.073***

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.025***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.000 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.033**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -8.088*** -3.906*** -3.839*** -3.790**

(0.71) (1.30) (1.37) (1.74)

Population Density -39.012*** -38.599*** -26.102*

(12.18) (12.40) (13.99)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature 0.000

(0.00)

Luminosity P/C -0.000**

(0.00)

Constant 0.154*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.145

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1123.0 979.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
68 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B18: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, majority-only mapping, 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.021** 0.022* 0.026*

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.021** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.026***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) -0.005 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -8.604*** -2.673* -2.761* -4.831**

(0.91) (1.39) (1.56) (1.91)

Population Density -53.861*** -52.760*** -37.393**

(12.12) (13.33) (15.18)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation -0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.101*** 0.118*** 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.183

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1123.0 979.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 69

Figure B19: Regression of luminosity growth on Sunni Kurd status, majority-only mapping, controlling for base 

luminosity, 2004-13

(1) lumgrowth 

b/se

(2) lumgrowth 

b/se

(3) lumgrowth 

b/se

(4) lumgrowth 

b/se

(5) lumgrowth 

b/se

(6) lumgrowth 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish 0.036** 0.037*** 0.031** 0.019** 0.021* 0.025*

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Luminosity P/C -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Urban Extent (>500k) -0.025** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.027***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Urban Extent (>100k) 0.003 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037**

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Road Density -7.606*** -1.711 -1.748 -3.780*

(1.24) (1.63) (1.79) (2.14)

Population Density -53.658*** -52.648*** -37.066**

(12.80) (13.87) (15.95)

Distance, Southern Border -0.000 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation -0.000

(0.00)

Mean Temperature -0.000

(0.00)

Constant 0.114*** 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.174

(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11)

R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Obs 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1141.0 1123.0 979.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
70 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Figure B20: Regression of luminosity per capita on Sunni Kurd status, 2004-13

(1) lumcap 

b/se

(2) lumcap 

b/se

(3) lumcap 

b/se

(4) lumcap 

b/se

(5) lumcap 

b/se

(6) lumcap 

b/se

Sunni Kurdish -35.825*** -35.839*** -14.178* -13.312 -8.966 -4.790

(12.49) (12.82) (8.16) (9.92) (10.44) (11.46)

Urban Extent (>500k) -14.836* -10.295 -10.806 -7.360 -5.082

(7.65) (9.51) (8.83) (8.04) (9.41)

Urban Extent (>100k) 39.266** -30.067* -30.126* -32.102* -40.295**

(18.36) (17.86) (18.01) (17.70) (17.77)

Road Density 13583.320*** 12989.452** 13677.666** 14764.866**

(3253.03) (5214.66) (5377.73) (7290.86)

Population Density 5349.392 2763.520 -4984.906

(30750.68) (33053.38) (49671.99)

Distance, Southern Border -0.001 -0.000

(0.00) (0.00)

Mean Precipitation 0.103

(0.09)

Mean Temperature 0.538**

(0.23)

Constant 53.211*** 48.788*** 22.817*** 21.675* 30.844** -104.567

(12.83) (10.93) (8.57) (11.42) (14.85) (64.48)

R2 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27

Obs 5901.0 5901.0 5901.0 5901.0 5817.0 5103.0

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 71

Endnotes 

1 Crispin Smith traveled to Iraq to perform the in-field research 

and interviews.

2 While other large and influential parties – notably the Gorran 

Party – exist, they exercise less direct influence in disputed areas 

due to their lack of significant Peshmerga militias. 

3 See, Saad N. Jawad, The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and 

Political Implications, Middle East Centre, Nov. 2015, at 16, 

http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/SaadJawad.pdf. “The constitution states that in the event of 

contradictions between central and local laws of any regional 

administration, authority is conferred on the local administration . . . . Article 115 of the Iraqi Constitution states: ‘The priority 

goes to the regional law in case of conflict between other powers 

shared between the federal government and regional governments’. Article 121, 2 states: ‘In case of a contradiction between 

regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the 

exclusive powers of the federal government, the regional authority 

shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region’ . . . . Article 126 states that ‘articles of the 

Constitution may not be amended if such amendment takes away 

from the powers of the regions that are not within the exclusive 

powers of the federal authorities, except by the approval of the 

legislative authority of the concerned region and the approval of 

the majority of its citizens in a general referendum’. In other words 

the drafters awarded the Kurdish region an iron clad veto.” 

4 See, e.g., id.

5 See, USCIRF, Iraq’s Permanent Constitution: Analysis and Recommendations, Mar. 2006, http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/

special-reports/iraqs-permanent-constitution-march-2006.

6 Interview with Representatives of the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian 

Popular Council, in Ainkawa, Iraq (July 19, 2016); Interview with 

Bashar Warda, Archbishop, Mar Youssef Cathedral, in Ainkawa, 

Iraq (July 15, 2016). 

7 Various interviews. 

8 International Religious Freedom Act § 3(13)(A)(iii) (1998).

9 A Kurdish lawyer told researchers political gridlock in KRI 

means no progress has been made by the committee.

10 Interview with Kemal Kirkuki, former speaker, Kurdistan Parliament, in Kirkuk, Iraq (July 26, 2016). Dr. Kirkuki confirmed no 

material changes have occurred. 

11 E.g., Interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi, Religious Affairs 

Spokesperson, KRG Ministry of Endowment, in Erbil, Iraq (July 

17, 2016); Interview with a Representative of the Independent 

Commission of Human Rights-Kurdistan Region, in Erbil, Iraq 

(July 18, 2016).

12 Interviews with senior Christian religious figures, Ainkawa, 

Iraq, (July 15, 2016; July 19, 2016).

13 Interviews with Yezidi leaders, Shexan, Iraq, (July 26, 2016). In 

light of the 2014 genocide, Yezidis are particularly afraid of Islamic 

extremism.

14 Kurdistan National Assembly Elections Law No. 1 of 1998, Art. 

36(2)(1) - (3) (amended 2009, 2014).

15 The Rights of National and Religious Minorities Protection Law 

in Kurdistan – Iraq Law No. 5 of 2015.

16 Id. at Art. (1)(2); Art. (2).

17 Id. at Art. 4.

18 Id. at Art. 3.

19 See, Danish Refugee Council, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 

Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian 

Situation, Apr. 2016, https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/

4B4E8C12-84B7-4ACB-8553-5E0218C5689A/0/FactfindingreportKurdistanRegionofIraq11042016.pdf.

20 Id. at 45.

21 E.g., Interviews with senior Christian religious figures, Ainkawa, Iraq, (July 15, 2016; July 19, 2016); Telephone interview with 

a representative of Zowaa, living in Dohuk governorate, July 31, 

2016. Telephone interview with a Turkmen activist (Aug. 2016). 

22 Interview with Yezidi Sheikh, in Sinjar, Iraq (July 28, 2016); 

Interview with Yezidi activist, Khanke, Iraq (July 30, 2016); Telephone Interview with Yezidi political figure (Aug. 6; Aug. 14, 2016).

23 See, Danish Refugee Council, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq at 50.

24 Id.

25 E.g., interview with Hoshang Mohammed, Director of the Joint 

Crisis Coordination Center, Ministry of the Interior, in Erbil, Iraq, 

(July 16, 2016); interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi, Religious 

Affairs spokesperson, KRG Ministry of Endowment, in Erbil, Iraq 

(July 17, 2016); interview with a representative of the Independent 

Commission of Human Rights-Kurdistan Region, in Erbil, Iraq 

(July 18, 2016).

26 Id.

27 One local leader told the researcher that [minorities] “cannot 

be in any government position in Dohuk governorate, if they are 

not [also] in the KDP.” This sentiment was echoed by leaders from 

other minorities in the area.

28 See, Ilan Alon & Gregory Chase, Religious Freedom and Economic Prosperity, 25 CATO J. 399 (2005); See also, Brian Grim, 

God’s Economy: Religious Freedom & Socio-Economic Wellbeing, 

in Religious Freedom In The World, 42-47 (Paul Marshall, ed., 

2007); Theodore Malloch, Free to Choose: Economics and Religion, 

in Religious Freedom In The World, 48-53 (Paul Marshall, 

ed., 2007); See also, Brian Grim & Roger Finke, The Price Of 

Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution And Conflict In 

The 21St Century (2011); See also, Brian Grim, The Link Between 

Economic and Religious Freedoms, World Economic Forum, Dec. 

18, 2014, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/the-link-between-economic-and-religious-freedoms/.

29 Abbas P. Grammy & Isabella Kasselstrand, Factors Hindering 

Religious Freedom: International Evidence, 4 Int’l J. Bus. & Soc. 

Sci. 44, (2013) http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_13_October_2013/7.pdf.

30 John D. Huber, Ethnic inequality and the ethnification of political parties: Evidence from India, (2013) http://polisci.columbia.

edu/files/polisci/u86/huber%20suryanarayan.pdf.

31 For a full discussion, see appendix.

32 Alberto Alessina et. al., Public Goods and Ethnic Diversity: 

Evidence from Deforestation in Indonesia, National Bureau of Economic Research (2014) http://www.nber.org/papers/w20504.

33 Oeindrila Dube, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: 

Evidence from Colombia, 83 Rev. Econ. Stud. (2013) http://restud.

oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/15/restud.rdt009.

34 See e.g., Martin Van Bruinessen, Religion In Mullas, Sufis 

And Heretics: The Role Of Religion In Kurdish Society (2000).

35 Interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi, Religious Affairs Spokesperson, KRG Ministry of Endowment, in Erbil, Iraq (July 17, 2016).

36 See, Martin van Bruinessen, The Kurds and Islam, Islamic Area 

Studies Project, 1999 at 19.

37 Id.

38 Official numbers indicate that the population rose from 5.2 million people to 7 million after the recent migration. See, The People 

of the Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Government (Aug. 

30, 2016), http://www.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=214.
72 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

39 This attitude was confirmed in interviews with various KRG 

officials, who warned of the risk of ISIS militants hiding among the 

refugees. 

40 See, Amnesty International, Iraq: Yezidis Carried Out Village 

Massacre of Sunnis as Anti-Islamic State Backlash Continues, 

Jun. 10, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/

iraq-yezidis-carried-out-village-massacre-sunnis-anti-islamic-statebacklash; see also, Isabel Coles, Trapped Between Iraq 

Frontlines, Refugees Illustrate Sunni Arab Predicament, Reuters, 

Feb. 25, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-refugees-idUSKCN0VY0LP; Isabel Coles, Iraqi Yazidis 

Take Revenge on Islamic State Atrocities Unearthed, Reuters, 

Feb. 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-yazidis-idUSKBN0LE1YQ20150210; Yazidis Accused of 

Reprisal Attacks on Sunnis in Iraq, Al-Jazeera, Jun. 10, 2015, 

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/yazidis-accused-reprisal-attacks-sunnis-iraq-150610132156089.html.

41 When asked during interviews about the potential for reconciliation, many Yezidi leaders stated it would be impossible. A senior 

Christian cleric from Mosul echoed the sentiment. Shi’a Turkmen 

have also suffered greatly at the hands of Da’esh. 

42 Interview with Hoshang Mohammed, Director of Joint Crisis 

Coordination Center, KRG Ministry for the Interior, in Erbil, Iraq 

(July 16, 2016).

43 See, Denis Natali, Islamic State Infiltrates Iraqi Kurdistan, 

Al-Monitor, June 4, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

originals/2015/06/is-infiltration-iraqi-kurdistan.html. 

44 See, The People of the Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan 

Regional Government (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.gov.

krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=214.

45 Erbil Hub, Youth Between Two Options: Migration and Joining 

Extremist Groups, Global Shapers Community Erbil, (Aug. 30, 

2016), https://www.globalshapers.org/news/youth-between-twooptions-migration-and-joining-extremist-groups.

46 See, Denis Natali, Islamic State Infiltrates Iraqi Kurdistan. 

47 Interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi; Interview with a Representative of the Independent Commission of Human Rights-Kurdistan Region, in Erbil, Iraq (July 18, 2016).

48 See, Minorities In Iraq, Masarat Institution, 60, http://

masaratiraq.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minorities-inIraq.pdf. See also. Saad Salloum, At Crossroads: Human Rights 

Violations After ISIS, Masarat Institution, http://masaratiraq.

org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AT-CROSSROADS.pdf.

49 See e.g., Zoroastrianism at a Glance, The BBC, Oct. 2, 2009, 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/zoroastrian/ataglance/

glance.shtml; Laurie Goodstein, Zoroastrians Keep the Faith, and 

Keep Dwindling, The New York Times, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.

nytimes.com/2006/09/06/us/06faith.html?_r=1. See also, Alaa 

Latif, The One, True Kurdish Prophet? Thanks to Extremism, Iraqis 

Revive Ancient Religion, Niqash, May 28, 2015, http://www.niqash.

org/en/articles/society/5014/Thanks-To-Extremism-Iraqis-Revive-Ancient-Religion.htm. 

ّة بل ثورةّة لعقيدة ألفيّة يف العراق بيري لقامن حاجي: ما نقوم به ليس دعوة ديني

ّ املرشد الروحي للديانة الزرادشتي

ّةّة إصالحي

ثقافي, Sa’ad Salum, Al-Monitor, (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2016/02/iraq-kurdistan-religious-minorities-zoroastrianism.html.

51 Interview with Mariwan Naqshbandi, Religious Affairs Spokesperson, KRG Ministry of Endowment, in Erbil, Iraq (July 17, 2016).

52 Alaa Latif, The One, True Kurdish Prophet? Thanks to Extremism, 

Iraqis Revive Ancient Religion, Niqash, May 28, 2015, http://www.

niqash.org/en/articles/society/5014/Thanks-To-Extremism-Iraqis-Revive-Ancient-Religion.htm. 

53 Id. 

54 See, Thanks to Islamic Extremism, Kurds Revive Ancient 

Kurdish Zoroastrianism, EKurd, (May 29, 2016) http://

ekurd.net/iraqi-kurds-revive-ancient-kurdish-zoroastrianism-religion-2015-05-29; Lata Fatah, The Curious Rebirth of 

Zoroastrianism in Iraqi-Kurdistan, (Nov. 26, 2016), https://

projects21.org/2015/11/26/the-curious-rebirth-of-zoroastrianism-in-iraqi-kurdistan/; Head of Zoroastrian Temple says People 

are Returning to their Roots, Rudaw, (Jan. 2, 2016), http://rudaw.net/

english/kurdistan/310120162. See also, Iraqi Kurds abandon their 

religion to Zoroastrianism to escape Islamic extremism, EKurd, (May 

3, 2016), http://ekurd.net/kurds-abandon-their-religion-to-zoroastrianism-to-escape-islamic-extremism-2015-05-03.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Id.

وهاڵمی دكتۆر عهبدول لهتیف بۆ ئهو كهسانهی بانگهشه بۆ دینێكی ,video See 59

 .Dr of Response(دروستكراوی وهك و زهردهشت ئهكهن كۆمێنتی نارشین بان ئهكرێت

Abdel Letif to adherents of the contrived Zoroastrian religion), at https://www.facebook.com/Zankoline/videos/

vb.193934557343067/950917384978110/?type=2&theater.

60 Supra note 54.

61 Gerard Russell, Heirs To Forgotten Kingdoms, 39, (2014).

62 Id. at 40.

63 Id. at 41.

64 According to documents passed to researchers by the Ministry 

of Awqaf and Religious Affairs. This figure does not include Sinjar/

65 Id. at 42.

66 Minorities In Iraq, Masarat Institution, 70, http://

masaratiraq.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minorities-inIraq.pdf. See also. Saad Salloum, At Crossroads: Human Rights 

Violations After ISIS, Masarat Institution, http://masaratiraq.

org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AT-CROSSROADS.pdf.

67 Supra note 62. This was confirmed by many of the Yezidis interviewed, and anecdotally by Kurds and Yezidis not interviewed.

68 See, 7,000 Yazidi Kurds migrate from Iraqi Kurdistan: ministry, Ekurd Daily, (Dec. 15, 2015), http://ekurd.net/yazidis-migrate-from-kurdistan-2015-12-15. See also, What you did not know 

about Iraq’s Yazidi minority, Al-Aribiya Institute for Studies, (Aug. 

11, 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2014/08/11/What-you-did-not-know-about-Iraq-sYazidi-minority-.html.

69 Id. See also, Law No. 5 (2015) of the Kurdish Parliament.

70 Various interviews, between July 1 and August 13, 2016. Subjects 

in various locations, including Shexan, Lalish, Sinjar, and Baghdad. 

71 Interview with a senior Yezidi political leader and other local 

leaders, July 28, 2016, at Shexan, Nineveh Governorate, Iraq.

72 Interview with a religious leader, July 28, 2016, at Shexan, 

Nineveh Governorate, Iraq.

73 See, Saad Salloum, Who are Iraq’s Kakai?, Al-Monitor (Feb. 

10, 2016), http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/

iraq-kakai-religious-minority-kurdistan-quota.html.

74 See, Martin van Bruinessen, Religion in Kurdistan Kurdish 

Times 4, 5-27 (1991), http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Bruinessen_Religion_in_Kurdistan.pdf.

ّ ّ هم مسلمون ويشك ّ لون قوات مسلّحة ملواجهة داعش ,See 75

ّون يعلنون أن

الكاكائي, Sa’ad Sallum, 

Al-Monitor, (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

ar/originals/2015/09/iraq-kakai-religious-beliefs-armed-forceisis.html

50
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 73

76 See, “The Kaka’i announce that they are Muslims in Kirkuk” 

Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3Mbm7FMDMc&feature=youtu.be, accessed June 13, 2016.

77 Islamic State extremists attack Kaka’i religious minority in Iraq, 

ARA News, (Sept. 3, 2016), http://aranews.net/2016/09/islamic-state-extremists-attack-kakai-religious-minority-iraq/.

78 See, Preta Taneja, Religious Minorities in Iraq: Participation in 

Public Life, Minority Rights Group International, 9, (2011).

 ,Sallum ad’Sa ,حوار مع السيد اكو شاويس ممثل كوتا الكاكائيني يف مجلس محافظة حلبجة ,See 79

Al-Monitor, (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/

originals/2016/02/iraq-kakai-religious-minority-kurdistan-quota.

html.

80 Id.

81 Id.

82 Id. See also, Law No. 5 (2015) of the Kurdish Parliament.

83 See, Ji sedî 90 ê Kurdên S ̧ebek vegeriyane Herêma Kurdistanê, 

Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê, (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.kdp.

info/a/d.aspx?l=16&a=84213

84 See, Minorities In Iraq, Masarat Institute. http://masaratiraq.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minorities-in-Iraq.pdf. See 

also. Saad Salloum, At Crossroads: Human Rights Violations After 

ISIS, Masarat Institution, http://masaratiraq.org/wp-content/

uploads/2015/09/AT-CROSSROADS.pdf.

85 See, SHABAK IN IRAQ: A TARGETED ETHNIC MINORITY? 

(leaked memorandum from US Embassy in Baghdad to White 

House and Secretary of State), (Nov. 27, 2006), https://wikileaks.

org/plusd/cables/06BAGHDAD4365_a.html.

86 Id.

 ê 90 Jisedî ,also see الداودي: الكورد الشبك يطالبون بالعودة إىل كوردستان .,g.e See 87

Kurdên S ̧ebek vegeriyane Herêma Kurdistanê, Partiya Demokrat 

a Kurdistanê, (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.kdp.info/a/d.aspx-

?l=16&a=84213

88 Kurds Block Assyrians, Shabaks From Police Force in North 

Iraq, AINA Editorial, (Jun. 24, 2016), http://www.aina.org/

releases/20060624123753.htm.

89 See, IRAQ - Shabak official: Nineveh province is arabizing our 

areas, (leaked emails between employees of private intelligence 

company, Stratfor) (Jun. 30, 2011) https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/

docs/31/3127798_-os-iraq-shabak-official-nineveh-province-isarabizing-our.html

90 See, NINEWA: SHABAK REJECT INCORPORATION INTO 

KRG, (Jan. 27, 2007), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAGHDAD276_a.html.

91 Iraq’s Shabak Accuse Kurds of Killing Their Leader, AINA, (July 

16, 2008), http://www.aina.org/news/20080716101640.htm.

/175834/news/tv.alsumaria.www://http ,)2016 4, .Aug (,Sumariaal ,نائب: الشبك قرروا اجراء استفتاء شعبي لالنضامم إىل كردستان بعد تحرير مناطقهم .,g.e ,See 92

/نائب-الشبك-قرروا-اجراء-استفتاء-شعبي-لالن

93 Kurdên S ̧ebek daxwaza avakirina 2 tabûrên din ên pês ̧mergeyên 

S ̧ebek dikin, Rudaw, (Nov, 16, 2015),

http://rudaw.net/NewsDetails.aspx?pageid=172069.

94 E.g. Telephone interview with Turkmen activists from Kirkuk 

governorate, Aug. 6, 2016.

95 Interview with a former aide to Najmuddin Karim, governor of 

Kirkuk, Apr. 14, 2016.

96 See Minorities In Iraq, Masarat Institute, 154, http://

masaratiraq.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minorities-inIraq.pdf. See also. Saad Salloum, At Crossroads: Human Rights 

Violations After ISIS, Masarat Institution, http://masaratiraq.

org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AT-CROSSROADS.pdf.

97 Id.

98 See, Tuzhurmatu: S ̧ii-Sünni savas ̧ının yeni sahnesi mi?, Mahmut 

Bozarslan, (May 5, 2016), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/

originals/2016/05/turkey-iraq-tuz-khurmatu-new-sunni-shiitefront.html

99 Interview with a senior Armenian religious figure, and his staff, 

July 14, 2016.

100 See, Armenians in Iraqi Kurdistan – Taking up arms against the 

ongoing IS threat, Hrant Gadarigian, Ekurd Daily, (Oct. 18, 2014), 

http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/10/state8596.htm

101 See, Mandaean Human Rights Annual Report, Mandaean 

Human Rights Group, (Nov. 2009), http://www.genocidewatch.

org/images/Syria_09_11_xx_Mandaean_human_rights_annual_

report.pdf.

102 See e.g., Abigail Hauslohner, ISIS recruits Kurdish youths, 

creating a potential new risk in a peaceful part of Iraq, Washington 

Post, (June 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

isis-recruits-kurdish-youth-creating-a-potential-new-risk-ina-peaceful-part-of-iraq/2014/06/23/2961ea2e-defd-4123-8e31-

c908f583c5de_story.html.

103 E.g., Interview with an Assyrian Christian leader from the 

Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) living in Dohuk governorate, July 31, 2016.

104 Claims In Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing In 

Northern Iraq, Human Rights Watch, (Aug. 2004) https://www.

hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/4.htm.

105 E.g., interview with an Assyrian Christian leader from the Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) living in Dohuk governorate, 

July 31, 2016; Telephone interview with a former Kurdish PUK politician, June 10, 2016; interviews with Yezidi and Turkmen activists.

106 Interview with Kemal Kirkuki, former speaker, Kurdistan 

Parliament, in Kirkuk, Iraq (July 26, 2016).

107 Banished And Disposessed - Forced Displacement And 

Deliberate Destruction In Northern Iraq, Amnesty International (Jan. 2016), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/

banished_and_disposessed_-_forced_displacement_and_deliberate_destruction_in_northern_iraq.pdf.

108 Id. at 35.

109 The Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri): Access, Possibility Of 

Protection, Security And Humanitarian Situation, Danish 

Immigration Service, 30 (Apr. 2016), https://www.nyidanmark.

dk/NR/rdonlyres/4B4E8C12-84B7-4ACB-8553-5E0218C5689A/0/

FactfindingreportKurdistanRegionofIraq11042016.pdf.

110 Banished And Disposessed - Forced Displacement And 

Deliberate Destruction In Northern Iraq, Amnesty International (Jan. 2016), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/

banished_and_disposessed_-_forced_displacement_and_deliberate_destruction_in_northern_iraq.pdf.

111 Internal Briefing Documents passed to the researcher by 

officials in the Joint Crisis Coordination Center, part of the KRG 

Interior Ministry. 

112 The Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri): Access, Possibility 

Of Protection, Security And Humanitarian Situation, 

Danish Immigration Service, 26 (Apr. 2016), https://www.

nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/4B4E8C12-84B7-4ACB-8553-

5E0218C5689A/0/FactfindingreportKurdistanRegionofIraq11042016.pdf.

113 Interviews with senior Christian religious leaders of different 

denominations, Ainwaka and Aishty, July 2016.

114 The Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri): Access, Possibility Of 

Protection, Security And Humanitarian Situation, Danish 
74 USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Immigration Service, 28 (Apr. 2016), https://www.nyidanmark.

dk/NR/rdonlyres/4B4E8C12-84B7-4ACB-8553-5E0218C5689A/0/

FactfindingreportKurdistanRegionofIraq11042016.pdf

115 Interviews with various officials, activists, and aid workers. 

116 See, Ekurd. Muslim Kurds demonstrate against Yazidis in Iraqi 

Kurdistan. EKurd Editorial Staff. (Nov. 25, 2015). 

117 See, e.g., Jalabi, Raya. Who are the Yazidis and why is ISIS hunting them? The Guardian. (Aug. 11, 2014).

118 See e.g., Ekurd. Muslim Kurds demonstrate against Yazidis in 

Iraqi Kurdistan. EKurd Editorial Staff. (Nov. 25, 2015). Confirmed by NGO workers interviewed.

119 Interview with a representative of the office of Babasheikh, 

Shexan, Iraq, July 26, 2016.

120 Interviews with leaders and activists between July 5 and August 

14, 2016. Telephone interview with an aid worker, Sept. 6, 2016.

121 Interview with aid workers. See also. Yazidi women respond 

to Massoud Barzani over PKK, Sinjar comments, EKurd *May 15, 

2016), http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/yazidi-women-respond-tomassoud-barzani-over-pkk-sinjar-comments/.

122 See, Iraqi Kurdistan: Kurdish Journalist Abducted, Killed: 

Threatened by Security Forces Over His Reporting, Human Rights 

Watch, (Aug. 25, 2016) https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/25/

iraqi-kurdistan-kurdish-journalist-abducted-killed. Confirmed 

in a telephone interview with an aid worker, Sept. 6, 2016.

123 According to private briefing documents passed to the 

researchers by a private individual.

124 See e.g., KDP and Gorran exchange accusations over the fall of 

Iraq’s Sinjar, EKurd, (Aug. 6, 2016). http://ekurd.net/kdp-gorranfall-sinjar-2016-08-08.

125 See, Law No. 5, 2015 of the Kurdistan Parliament Article Four.

126 International Religious Freedom Act § 13(A)(ii) 1998.

127 Interview with aid workers. See also. Yazidi women respond 

to Massoud Barzani over PKK, Sinjar comments, EKurd *May 15, 

2016), http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/yazidi-women-respond-tomassoud-barzani-over-pkk-sinjar-comments/.

128 E.g., http://www.yazda.org/a-statement-about-recent-political-developments-in-shingal-sinjar-and-other-yazidi-areas/

129 See, Ahmad Barvan, Christian exodus from Iraqi Kurdistan: 

North no longer safe. Ekurd, (Mar. 22, 2012). 

130 Id. 

131 See, Amy Beam, Three Killed in Shingal Clash Between Yezidis 

and Kurds over ‘Stolen’ Sheep, Kurdistan Tribune, (Nov. 27, 2016).

132 Id. 

133 See, Alexander Whitcomb, Yezidis say they are ready to quit 

Iraq. Rudaw. (Aug. 18, 2014). 

134 See, Ivan Watson, Sara Sidner, Ted Rowlands, Neighbors Joined 

ISIS Slaughter, Yazidi says, CNN. (Aug. 17, 2014).

135 See, Lara Whye, Yezidi Militias Killed 21 Arab Civilians in Iraq 

Revenge Attack: Rights Group, Vice, (June 11, 2015). 

136 Telephone interview with a Turkman Activist, Kirkuk, Iraq, 

Aug. 6, 2016.

137 Interview with Tuz Khurmatu resident, Erbil, Iraq, July 6, 2016.

ّون يف كردستان العراق يشتكون من االستيالء عىل ,Jafal-al Omar .,g.e See 138

مسيحي

أراضيهم, al-Monitor, (June 6, 2016), monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2016/07/christians-kurdistan-iraq.html.

 ,بعلم السلطات‘.. مسيحيو كردستان يشكون من انتهاكات’ ,Mandy Ali Hashem ,See 139

al-Hurra, (June 15, 2016), http://www.alhurra.com/a/iraq-kurdistan-christian/310749.html.

140 Interview with an Assyrian Christian leader from the Assyrian 

Democratic Movement (Zowaa), Dohuk governorate, Iraq, July 31, 2016. 

141 Interview with a Senior Christian priest, Ainkawa, July 15, 2016. 

The individual noted cases exist even in and around Ainkawa; 

Interview with a senior Christian priest, Ainkawa, July 19, 2016. 

142 See, Iraqi Kurdistan: Christian Demonstration Blocked, 

Sought to Protest Kurdish Land “Encroachment”, Human Rights 

Watch, (May 22, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/22/

iraqi-kurdistan-christian-demonstration-blocked.

143 E.g., interviews with Assyrian Christian and Chaldean Catholic 

religious and political leaders; researchers at Human Rights Watch; 

Mariwan Naqshbandi, KRG spokesperson for the Ministry of 

Endowment and Religious Affairs; and local human rights lawyers.

144 Supra note 134.

145 Supra note 138.

146 Id. For a full discussion of the relevant provisions, see above.

147 Interview with a Senior Christian Priest, Iraq (July, 2016).

148 International Religious Freedom Act § 3(13)(B)1998).

149 Various interviews with Christian leaders conducted around 

the region, (July, 2016)

150 Kurds Block Assyrians, Shabaks from Police Force in 

North Iraq, AINA, June 24, 2006, http://www.aina.org/

releases/20060624123753.htm. 

151 Id.

152 “Ninewa: Shabak Reject Incorporation into KRG.” Ninewa PRT 

Team.

153 Id.

154 Id.

155 Id.

156 Id.

157 Id.

158 Joe Stork, At a Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years 

After the US-Led Invasion, Human Rights Watch, Feb. 21, 2011, 

https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/02/21/crossroads/humanrights-iraq-eight-years-after-us-led-invasion. 

159 Id.

160 EKurd. “Iraq: Shabak murders part of extremists’ divide and 

conquer campaign.” EKurd. October 25, 2013. 

161 Suicide Bombing Hits Funeral in Northern Iraq, Al-Jazeera, 

Sept. 14, 2013.

162 Abdullah Salem, Iraq: Shabak Murders Part of Extremists’ 

Divide and Conquer Campaign, Niqash, Oct. 24, 2013, http://

www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/3311/. 

163 Iraq: Attack Kills At Least 27 People, The Associated Press, 

June 6, 2014.

164 Joe Stork, At a Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years 

After the US-Led Invasion, Human Rights Watch, Feb. 21, 2011, 

https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/02/21/crossroads/humanrights-iraq-eight-years-after-us-led-invasion. 

165 Iraq’s Shabak Accuse Kurds of Killing Their Leaders, Assyrian 

International News Agency, July 16, 2008.

166 Id.

167 Id.

168 Some years have two sets of readings. For these years we use 

the average of the two satellite images to improve accuracy and 

reduce random fluctuations in the data.

169 For a fuller discussion of the comparison, please see Elvidge et 

al. (2013)

170 While most of Iraq had to deal with continued conflict throughout this period, Kurdistan found relative stability and prosperity 

in that time.
USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 75

Data Sources

DMSP:

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 

“Global DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series 1992 - 

2013 (Version 4).” NOAA Earth Observation Group. 1992-

2013. Accessed online 1 August 2016 at http://ngdc.noaa.

gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html

VIIRS:

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) 

DNB Cloud Free Composites.” NOAA Earth Observation 

Group. 2014-2015. Accessed online 20 August 2015 at 

http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/viirs/download_monthly.html

Climate:

University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit; 

Jones, P.D.; Harris, I. (2008): Climatic Research Unit 

(CRU) time-series datasets of variations in climate with 

variations in other phenomena. NCAS British Atmospheric Data Centre, 2016. 

http://catalogue.ceda.ac.uk/uuid/3f8944800cc48e1cbc29a5ee12d8542d

Urban Extents:

Center for International Earth Science Information 

Network - CIESIN - Columbia University, International 

Food Policy Research Institute - IFPRI, The World 

Bank, and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical - CIAT. 2011. Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project, 

Version 1 (GRUMPv1): Urban Extents Grid. Palisades, 

NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 

Center (SEDAC). http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4GH9FVG. 

Accessed 1 August 2016

Balk, D.L., U. Deichmann, G. Yetman, F. Pozzi, S. I. 

Hay, and A. Nelson. 2006. Determining Global Population Distribution: Methods, Applications and Data. 

Advances in Parasitology 62:119-156. http://dx.doi.

org/10.1016/S0065-308X(05)62004-0.

Roads:

Open StreetMap contributors. “Iraq.” Geofabrik/ 

Open StreetMap. Accessed online 15 August 2016 at 

http://download.geofabrik.de/asia/iraq.html

Population density:

Worldpop. “Iraq Population Dataset.” University of 

Southampton GeoData Institute. March 2015. Accessed 

online August 1 2016 at 

http://www.worldpop.org.uk/data/summary/?contselect=Asia&countselect=Iraq&typeselect=Population

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18512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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F.-C. (2013). Why viirs data are superior to dmsp for 

mapping nighttime lights. Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network, 35:62–69.

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(2012). Measuring economic growth from outer space. 

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USCIRF | WILTING IN THE KURDISH SUN | THE HOPES AND FEARS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 77

About the Authors

The study was conducted by

Crispin M. I. Smith

Crispin M. I. Smith is a British researcher specializing in 

foreign policy and international law. Crispin has worked 

on a range of projects and policy reports relating to the 

conflicts ongoing in Syria and Iraq, and to the wider 

MENA region. He has researched and consulted for 

NGOs, INGOs, and businesses working in Syria and Iraq, 

and advises party working groups in the U.K. House of 

Lords on foreign and defense policy. Crispin has also 

briefed representatives of multiple governments and 

government agencies on a range of foreign policy issues, 

including matters related to the ongoing conflict in Iraq 

against ISIS, adherence to international humanitarian 

law in Northern Iraq, and ongoing human rights abuses 

in the Middle East.

Crispin holds a BA in Assyriology and Arabic from 

the University of Oxford, and is a candidate for Juris 

Doctor at the Harvard Law School.

Vartan Shadarevian

Vartan Shadarevian is a political economist with an 

interest in the study of conflict, stability and minority 

analysis. His focus is in adapting novel and innovative 

ideas from academic research, and using a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques to provide clear policy-making insight. Vartan is founder of 

the Aleph Policy Initiative, a non-profit research group 

that aims to bridge the gap between academic research 

and policy-making, and works with policy makers in 

the US, UK and Canada. Vartan is also a research associate with the UBC Department of Economics and the 

Sauder School of Business, and has previously worked 

at the Liu Institute.

Vartan holds an MA in Economics from UBC and 

a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the 

University of Oxford.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Nicholas Gersh and Lloyd 

Lyall, researchers on this project, as well as the research 

assistants: Mustafa Gorbuz, Isaac Hordiyuk, Charlotte 

Kamin, Peter Koczanski, Katy Minshall, Ahsan Sayed, 

and Jason Xiao. In addition, thanks go out to Farzand, 

Mahmud, Sardar, Sufian, and many others in the Kurdistan Region, and Iraq.

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