Opinion filed August 20, 2020

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-18-00210-CR

__________

RUDY CARRION A/K/A RUDY LOZA CARRION, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 42nd District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 26533A

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Rudy Carrion a/k/a Rudy Loza Carrion was charged by indictment with 

assault on a public servant by kicking Abilene Police Officer Bradley Hambright

about the arm and leg. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (West Supp. 

2019). Appellant pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial before a jury, which 

found him guilty of the charged offense. After Appellant entered pleas of not true 

to two punishment enhancement paragraphs, the jury found that the enhancement 
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allegations were true and assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement for a term

of twenty-five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. In his sole issue 

on appeal, Appellant complains that the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he 

acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly when he kicked Officer Hambright. 

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background Facts

Officer Hambright is a patrol officer with the Abilene Police Department. On 

September 20, 2015, Officer Hambright was on duty when he responded to a report 

of a disturbance in progress and found Appellant hugging or grabbing Dianna Perez

in the street. Perez’s shirt was torn, and Appellant appeared to be intoxicated. 

Officer Hambright addressed Appellant and, for officer safety, ordered him to 

remove his hands from his pockets. Appellant initially complied with 

Officer Hambright’s directive, but after Appellant placed his hands back in his 

pockets and failed to comply with Officer Hambright’s order to show his hands, 

Officer Hambright detained and handcuffed Appellant. During this encounter, 

another officer, Jessica Watkins, arrived and assisted Officer Hambright. Appellant 

was irate, used profanities when speaking, and yelled. Officer Hambright eventually 

arrested Appellant, and before Officer Hambright placed Appellant in the patrol 

vehicle, Appellant told him, “I’m going to remember you today, tomorrow, and the 

next day.”

The camera mounted on the dash of Officer Hambright’s patrol vehicle

recorded video and audio during the encounter. The recording was admitted into

evidence and published to the jury. Visually, the recording shows that 

Officer Hambright was wearing his uniform and shows his encounter with Appellant

until the moment that Officer Hambright escorted Appellant to the side of the patrol 

vehicle to place him in the backseat, which was out of the camera’s view. As 
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Officer Hambright listened to the portion of the recording being played at trial, he

identified the sound of a scuffle as the moment when Appellant had kicked him on 

two occasions in the left arm and leg and caused him pain. He agreed that he could 

be heard warning Appellant, “You’re gonna get sprayed.” Officer Hambright

explained that he gave Appellant this warning about pepper spray as a means to stop 

Appellant’s assault on him. Officer Hambright felt that Appellant’s kicks were 

intended to harm him. 

Officer Watkins testified that she was on patrol duty on September 20, 2015,

and responded to a disturbance with an injured subject. When Officer Watkins 

arrived, she saw Officer Hambright, Appellant, and Perez. Officer Watkins testified 

that she heard Officer Hambright instruct Appellant twice to keep his hands out of 

his pockets. After Appellant returned his hands to his pockets, Officer Watkins 

assisted Officer Hambright cuff Appellant’s hands for officer safety. While 

Officer Watkins spoke with Perez, she observed that Perez’s shirt was ripped and 

that her arms bore scrape marks. Officer Watkins determined that Appellant had 

committed assault family violence against Perez and signaled to Officer Hambright 

that it was proper to arrest Appellant. Officer Watkins accompanied

Officer Hambright as he escorted Appellant to the backseat of the patrol vehicle, 

where she observed Appellant kick Officer Hambright. Officer Watkins went to the 

passenger side to assist Officer Hambright in securing Appellant with a seat belt and 

observed Appellant kick Officer Hambright again.

At trial, Officer Watkins identified a sound on the recording that occurred 

when Appellant first kicked Officer Hambright in the arm. She said to Appellant, 

“Knock it off.” She heard Appellant say, “You already sprayed me,” followed by

Officer Hambright’s warning, “You’re gonna get sprayed.” She clarified that 

Officer Hambright did not use the pepper spray on Appellant until after Appellant 

kicked Officer Hambright. Officer Watkins observed Appellant kick 
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Officer Hambright no less than twice, once to Officer Hambright’s arm and the other 

to his leg “in the front area.” Officer Watkins testified that Appellant was not having 

trouble getting into the vehicle and that she saw Appellant lean back, pull up his 

legs, and intentionally kick Officer Hambright with both feet as Officer Hambright

was attempting to buckle Appellant’s seat belt.

Analysis

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant complains that the evidence is 

insufficient to prove that he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly when he 

kicked Officer Hambright. Appellant suggests that his “kicking of the officer was 

[merely] . . . a reaction to being pepper-sprayed.” He argues that there was 

conflicting testimony regarding the number of times that Officer Hambright sprayed 

Appellant with pepper spray and also suggests that Officer Hambright’s remark that 

he was going to spray Appellant, along with Appellant’s statement, “You already 

sprayed me,” indicates that Appellant was sprayed before he kicked 

Officer Hambright. Appellant also suggests—but does not argue—that the evidence 

fails to prove that Appellant did not act in self-defense. We note that self-defense 

was not raised at trial or submitted to the jury. 

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, “viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cuevas v. State, 

576 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979)); Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012). We consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence 

that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the trier 

of fact resolved the conflicts in favor of the State and defer to that determination. 
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Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Clayton,

235 S.W.3d at 778). 

Assault of a public servant requires proof of misdemeanor assault and proof

that (1) the complainant was a public servant, (2) the actor knew that the complainant 

was a public servant, (3) the complainant was discharging an official duty when he 

was assaulted, and (4) the official duty was being discharged lawfully. PENAL

§ 22.01(b)(1); Cuevas, 576 S.W.3d at 399; Hall v. State, 158 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005). The term “public servant” includes a police officer. See

Carriere v. State, 84 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. 

ref’d); McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. 

ref’d). The indictment alleged that Appellant “intentionally, knowingly, and 

recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to BRADLEY HAMBRIGHT by kicking him on 

or about the leg and arm”; that Appellant knew that Officer Hambright was a public 

servant, to-wit: a police officer with the Abilene Police Department; and that 

Officer Hambright was lawfully discharging an official duty, to-wit: attempting to 

detain Appellant.

Appellant argues on appeal that the State failed to prove the culpable mental 

state necessary to establish that Appellant committed the assault element of the 

charged offense. See PENAL § 6.03(a)–(c) (West 2011). A person commits the

offense of assault if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily 

injury to another. Id. § 22.01(a)(1). “A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with 

respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Id.

§ 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature 

of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 

nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.” Id. § 6.03(b). And “[a] person 

acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
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or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 

occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 

constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 

exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Id. 

“‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 

condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8).

The jury may infer intent or knowledge from any facts tending to prove its 

existence, including the defendant’s acts, words, and conduct at the time of the 

offense. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). 

The record shows that Officer Hambright arrived in a police patrol vehicle and was 

wearing his uniform when he encountered Appellant. Except for Appellant’s initial 

compliance, the dashcam recording shows that Appellant was noncompliant with

Officer Hambright’s orders to keep his hands out of his pockets, was belligerent, and 

warned Officer Hambright that he would remember him. Officer Hambright 

identified a scuffling sound on the recording that occurred at the time Appellant 

kicked him. He also testified that Appellant had kicked him twice—on the arm and 

leg—as he attempted to place Appellant in the rear of the patrol vehicle and that, in 

accordance with department policy, he sprayed Appellant with pepper spray to 

reduce Appellant’s violence. Officer Hambright believed that Appellant had kicked 

him with the intent to cause harm. Officer Watkins had observed Appellant lean 

back, pull up his legs, and kick Officer Hambright—intentionally and no less than 

twice—with both feet while the officers attempted to buckle Appellant’s seat belt. 

In addition to the testimony, the jury saw and heard the dashcam recording. 

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational

jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Officer Hambright, a public servant
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who was discharging an official duty. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

KEITH STRETCHER

JUSTICE

August 20, 2020

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating.

1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.