Filed 2/4/19 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRET STEPHEN LANDEN,

Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B 286062 (S uper. Ct. No. 15F

- 11592) (San Luis Obispo County)

The victim of this crime is a local school district. The defendant is ordered to pay restitution to the school district. Some of the loss the school district suffered was reimbursed by
the state.
Be cause of the state’s inextricable relationship to the school district, the state is also a direct victim of the defendant’s crime
and is entitled to restitution. ( Butt v. State of California (1992) 4
Cal.4th 668 , 680 .) The amount of restitution the defen dant must pay d oes not change. O nly the party to whom some of that
restitution must b e paid changes . However reprehensible a defendant’s conduct, restitution due the victim should not exceed
the loss suffered.2 Bret Stephen Landen appeals a judgment foll owing his no contest plea to making threats to use a weapon of mass destruction ( Pen. Code , § 11418.5, subd. (a) ) 1 and making
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a) )

. The trial court placed him on
fi ve years of supervised probation. After a restitution heari ng, it ordered him to pay the Atascadero Unified School District (District) $235,341.17 as restitu tion. We conclude, among other things, that the court should reduce the amount of restitution to the District by the amount of reimbursement the D istrict

rec eived from the S tate of California (State) ($68,722.56) for average daily a ttendance (ADA) funds

. We reverse. O n remand

, the trial court shall order Landen to pay restitut ion to the S tate in the amount of $68,722.56. I n all other respects

, w e affirm.
FA CTS During June or July 2015, Landen stole the keys to the San Gabriel Elementary School, a school which is part of the District. On September 11, 2015 , Landen locked the entrances to
that school and placed a jar containing a liquid mixture of
“sodium a nd cyanide” three feet off the ground , near a play area
where it was “e asy for children to reach it.” He left black envelopes for the teachers of the school with the following note
inside : “I want to play a game. Inside the package before you hold [ sic ] a key to the classroom. However, there is a catch. Three of your colleagues have the unfortunate situation where their keys
are switched. Furthermore, an additional four teachers will have to retrieve four keys that will unlock the corresponding pad l ocks that currently deny the children’s entrance to the school. In order to further the safety of your children, four of you need to

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.3

obtain the keys that are located in a jar, connected to the fence, adjacent to the play structure. If these tasks are not completed by 8:00 am, there will be consequences to follow, possibly affecting the children. Make your choice.”
A “digital recorder” was near the glass jar containing the cyanide and sodium liquid. Landen left a note close to the jar

, which read, “Co ngratulations, you have found the jar that contains the keys. As you can see, there is a liquid that surrounds the keys. Be aware that the solution is a combination of liquids that release a very poisonous cyanide gas. Also, the liquid happens to be a r elatively strong acid.” Landen left a note on the digital recorder stating

, “Play
me.” In a digital recording in a “disguised voice

, ” Landen said,
“Hello there. Most of you are probably wondering about the invitation at you r doors. This is a game to t est your ability of how far each and every one of you is willing to go in order to secure the safety of your children. As you can see, there are not four keys, but five. There is an additional lock that must be unlatched before your time is up. Get to i t. The clock is running

out. ” The police in vestigated and discovered that the items used
in the cr ime were not purchased locally. Law enforcement was eventually able to trace these items to purch ases made by
Landen on Amazon.
Landen admitted he commi tted the offense. He said that “he felt good carrying out his plot and that he experienced an

over whelming sense of excitement.” He said that “ [ h ] e w an ted
the teachers to feel fear.”4 The probation d epartment recommended that as a result of
Landen’s act ions he should pay restitution to the District in the amount of $456,163.09. The trial court held a restitution hearing. Tom Butler, the District’s superintendent, Jackie Martin, a District assistant superintendent, and Curt Eichberger, the District’s as sistant superintendent for human resources, testified about the District’s financial expenses and losses incurred as a result of Landen’s
actions. Butler said Landen’s acts caused a “direct impact on the
financial sol vency” of the District. The San Gabri el school had to
be closed for two weeks. Students and staff were transpor ted to
other District schools. There was a “ [ l ] oss of revenue for reduced [scho ol] attendance district wide.” There were increased labor

, overtime, construction and security costs because of the September 11, 2015

, incident.
The tria l court found the District was a direct victim and
Landen’s threats were directed at District staff and caused “a significant sense of terror” for “p arents and community
members.” It said restitutio n serves the “probationary goal of rehabilitating the defendant” and making him “confront .

. . the
harm his actions have caused.” As a result of his crime

, the San
Gabriel school had to be closed and “taken over” by law

e nforcement “as a crime scene.” T he District incurred substantial costs for chemical testing and security costs. Students had to be
“relocated to othe r elementary school campuses.”
The trial court ordered Landen to pay restitution to the
District in the total amount of $235,341.17. In reaching this

amount , it found nine restitution categories were reasonable

, which included : 1) $ 2,778.88 to rekey classrooms at San Gabriel; 2) $21,728.22 for security costs to supervise or monitor the school ;5

3) $11 ,933.87 for relocation expenses; 4) $ 23,810.23 for additional costs for ongoing constr uction due to security concerns; 5) $19, 044.14 for administrative costs “to stabilize the work force over the weekend and engage in relocating a school within 48
hours with out having access to the school ” ; 6 ) $94,669 for losses
in ADA revenue for San Gabriel and other District schools due to school children being relocated and pa rents fears about school safety; 7) $32,585.75 for chemical testing; 8) $8,245.16 for
“classroom lockdown kits” distribu ted “across the school District ” ; and 9) $20,545.92 for a “visitor software system.”
The trial court also found that the District had received “partial reimbursement” for the loss of ADA funding from the
State in the amount of $68,722.56.
DISCUSSION
The Amount Orde red as Restitution to t he District
Landen contends the trial court should not have order ed
restitution to the District for expenses not directly related to the
incident at the San Gabriel school as a condition of probation.
We review the tr ial court’s co nditions of probation for abuse
of discretion. ( People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.) “[A] reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is ar bitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.” ( Ibid. ) “In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” ( People v. Carbajal (1995 ) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “Restitution has long been considered a valid condition of probation.” ( Id . at p. 1121.) “[A]n order for restitution, which attempts to make a victim6

whole, ‘has generally been deemed a deterrent to future criminality’.

. . .” ( Id. at p. 1123.) “There is no requirement the
restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might
be recoverable in a civil action.” ( Ibid. )
The trial court’s discretion in ordering restitution is broad,
but not unlimited. ( People v. Carbajal

, supra , 10 Cal.4th at

p. 1121 .) It may not order excessive restitution amounting to an
unreasonable windfall for a victi m. ( In re Anthony M. (2007 ) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017 .) It should compensate a victim for actual losses, but never overcompensate a victim. ( People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.)
Landen claims he did not cause “physical harm” to an y “school property ” or any “ person present” and the District is not a
“direct victim. ” H e target ed the San Gabriel school , not the
District. He contends the District sought restitution for security
and other costs unrelated to the San Gabriel school

. But the San Gabriel school is part of the District and
Landen minimizes the impact of his actions on the District

. He
made criminal threat s and used a deadly substance

– cyanide.
Law enforcement was not able to immediately identify a suspect. A school h ad to be closed. Landen targeted District teachers and

t he District believe d t his was not an isolated incident. K eys and cyanide reflected careful planning. This was not a harmless prank.
Landen terrorize d District educators on September 11 , the
anni versary of the World Trade Center attack

. District administrators believed the District had been targeted by a n unknown terrorist

. T hey incurred substantial costs by tak ing7

steps consistent with their duty to protect the District’s students and faculty

. ( Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist

. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747.) Butler said Landen’s actions caused a “ direct ” impact on the Di strict’s “financial solvency.” Lockdown Kits and the Visitor Software Program
Landen contends restitution for “lockdow n kits for all [District] schools” and the “visitor software program” is not
authorized. He claims restitution is only proper for the loss of
ADA revenue at the San Gabriel school, not other District
schools. He ar g u es the order to pay $23,810.23 for inc reased
construction costs at the San Gabriel school was improper

. Eichberger testified the District’s “Safety Committee” determined lockdown kits for students and a software system to identify and screen all school visitors w ere necessa ry for the
Distric t’s schools. Those measures had not been instituted before the September 11, 2015

, incident. Butler said various security

measures and costs “would not have been necessary if it were not for the horrific event at S an Gabriel Elementary School.”
Teache rs whom La n den targeted at the San Gabriel s chool
had to be transferred to other District schools when the S an Gabriel school was closed for chemical testing and a police investigation. Butler said law enforcement had obtained evidence showing a threat “t o other students in the District .”
Landen had shown his ability and intent to enter a District school to target teachers

. He had place d a dangerous substance
within the reach of children

. The District had a duty to protect
its teachers and students. ( D ailey v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist

. , supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 747.) The trial court reasonably
infer red these safety measures were the result of

, and reasonably
related to

, Landen’s crimes. The restitution order was well8

within the trial court’s discr etion

. ( People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 624

- 626.)

Increased Construction Costs The trial court found $23,810.23 in increased construction costs at the San Gabriel school was “reasonably related to Mr.
Landen’s crimes.” It did not err. But ler testified there was an ongoing construction project at the school when it had to be closed because of Landen’s threats. The suspect had not been apprehended and there was a belief that a “trades person working on [that project]” may have been responsi ble for the September 11, 2015, incident. The District decided to have construction proceed at night “when students were not there.” It was concerned for the safety of its students. ( Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist

. , supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 747. ) It incurred “swing shift employment” costs for this reason. The court found that given “the trauma” Landen caused, the decision to incur this special labor expense was appropriate.
The trial court also found this “would aid in the
rehabilitation of Mr. Landen under the total circumstances of
this case.” Landen has not shown error. The court’s concern that Landen needed to understand the consequences of his actions was well justified. After his arrest, Landen said that “he felt good carrying out hi s plot.” A defendant must “ ‘ “confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.” ’ ” ( People v.
Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27.) This is a proper goal of probation restitution. ( People v. Carbajal

, supra , 10 Cal.4th at

p. 1123.)
Loss o f Revenue for District ADA Funds The closing of the San Gabriel school and the transfer of its students and faculty to other District schools produced a climate9

of fear throughout the District. M any parents decided to keep
their children out of District schools. Martin testified the District
receives State money based on the ADA

. Butler said there was “a
dramatic dec rease in attendance across [their] school d istrict

, ” causing a loss of ADA rev enue in the amount of $94,669

. He said
this was a “direct co st associated with the in cident on September 11, 2015.” The District’s ADA loss of revenue was reasonably
related to Landen’s crimes. But as Landen correctly notes, the trial court also found the
District received “partial reimbursement” from the State f or the
loss of ADA funding in the amount of $68,722.56. The court did
not subtract this amount from its restitution order.
Martin testi fied t he District applied for a n ADA “waiver,”
the State granted it and recalculated ADA funding

. The State
then sent $68,722.56 in ADA funds to the District. Landen notes the trial court incorrectly calculated the District’s ADA loss

. Th at loss was not $94,669 ; i t was only $25,946.44 ( the difference between $94,669 and the $68,722.56 ADA funds the District actually re ceived )

. The court has broad discretion to determine restitution as a probation condition. ( People v. Carbaja l

, supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121

. ) In the ordinary case, the court abuses its
discretion if it orders restitution at an amount several times high er than the victim’s actual loss

. ( People v. Whisenand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391 ; People v. Baumann (1985 ) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 76.) But such an abuse will not occur here.

Restitution to t he S tate The trial court ordered restitution to the District in the
amount of $68,722.56 it received from the State to reimburse it for its loss of ADA funding. W e asked for additional briefing on
whether the trial court h as authority to now order Landen to pay10

restitution to the State for that $68,722.56 amount

. Counsel for the parties cited inapplicable authority, mostly involving victim restitution relating to insurance policies.
We conclude the trial court has authority to order
restitution to the State

. Why? Because the State is a direct
victim of defendan t’s crime

. “ Public education is an obligation which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. ( San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 951

- 952 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]; Piper v. Big Pine
School Dist. (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 669 [226 P. 926].) The system of public schools, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is ‘ one system .

. . applicable to all the

common sc hools .

. . . ’ ( Kennedy v. Miller (1893) 97 Cal. 429, 432 [32 P. 558] , italics in original.) " ( Butt v. State of California

, supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 680.) Under the broad provisions of section 1203.1, the court may order the defendant to pay victim
restitution.
The restitution statutes authorize trial courts to “ retai n jurisdiction ” for the purpose of “imposing or modifying
restitution” so that eligible victi ms will receive the restitution to
which they are entitled. ( People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966.) “ The government may be the beneficiary of

. . . reimb ursement if it has incurred actual loss due to the crime.” ( People v. Tarris

, supra , 180 Cal. App.4th at p. 622.) Landen’s interruption of school attendance was a crime affecting the District and the State . The State is responsible for maintaining adequ ate educational funding based on student ADA figures. ( Butt v. State of California

, supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 704; Fullerton Union High School District v. Riles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 369, 373.)11 Where there is a drop in attendance due to a wrongdoer’s
crim inal act which create s a funding crisis

, the State is a victim

. The State is responsible for obtaining the funds necessary to address the crisis and support the educational process. It has the “plenary constitutional responsibility for operation of the c ommon school system.” ( Butt v. State of California

, supra , 4 Cal.4th at

p. 704.) Because the District was unable to financially meet its responsibility

, the State paid these funds which reduced its State ADA funding reserve. An order requiring Landen to pay restitution to the State falls within the trial court’s discretion to order restitution as a probation condition to require the defendant to face the consequences of his criminal act s

. DISPOSITION
T he portion of the restitution order that ordered La nden to
reimburse the District for $68,722.56 for partial ADA
reimbursement it received from the State is reversed. On
remand

, the trial court shall order Landen to pay restitution to
the State for that $68,722.56 amount

. In all other respects

, the
order is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J. We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.12 Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Cour t of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann, Viet H.
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaint iff and Respondent.