Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about 

joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and 

recommendations of national security professionals and the Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the 

SOF community and defense leadership. 

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The 

JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate 

leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, 

and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU 

provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who 

enable the SOF mission in a joint environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department 

where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s 

priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend 

the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the 

staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by

its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military 

communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., Education, President

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, Strategic Studies Department Director

Colonel (USA, Ret.) William W. Mendel, Colonel (USA, Ret.) Jeffrey W. Nelson, 

Colonel (USAF, Ret.) Kenneth H. Poole, Captain (USN, Ret.) William S. Wildrick, 

resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire 

Group and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, 

Ret., Professor of Strategy, Joint 

Advanced Warfighting School and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU 

Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAFSOS Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced 

Air and Space Studies and JSOU 

Associate Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher 

School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate 

Fellow

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, 

Inc. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War 

College and JSOU Associate Fellow
On the cover. 4 August 2006: Marines of G Company, 2nd 

Marine Special Operations Battalion, Marine Corps Forces, 

Special Operations Command, in the water off the coast of North 

Carolina as part of a training mission. Photo: PFC Rebekka 

Kramp, Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina. 

USSOCOM Headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. U.S. 

Air Force photo. 

JSOU Report 08-2

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2008

Retaining a Precarious

Value as Special

Operations Go Mainstream

Jessica Glicken Turnley
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-4732. Electronic versions of this and all 

JSOU Press publications can be found at https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/

publications/index.php. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-23-7
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen
vii

Foreword

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are growing to meet 

the increasing irregular warfare challenges posed by violent 

extremist organizations. Although a tradition of tension exists between 

conventional military forces and SOF, there is little disagreement 

within USSOCOM and the broader defense community that the 

current threats facing the United States require an increased SOF 

capability. The challenge is how best to implement and manage the 

growth while retaining the unique capabilities resident in our special 

operations community. 

Jessica Turnley wades into the discussion with a short monograph 

on the concept of organizational identity or organizational culture and 

the difficulty of developing and, more importantly, retaining these in

the face of changing organizational structures and institutional growth. 

Her discussion cuts to the heart of what it means to be SOF vice what 

it means to be a member of USSOCOM. In the current organization, 

they are not synonymous. A significant percentage of the command

is made up of non-SOF members assigned from the various services. 

As the command grows, these “SOF enablers” will remain a critical 

element within the command and the SOF community at large. 

Underlying much of Dr. Turnley’s discussion is the unique position 

USSOCOM and SOF have within the Department of Defense. It is the 

only combatant command with Title 10 “Service-like” responsibilities 

and authorities as well as operational command authority. Jessica’s 

research highlights how this tension in responsibilities and authorities 

drove USSOCOM to create what she describes as a “blended” organization. As the tensions of growth and the current global struggle 

continues over the years, this dichotomy of missions will need to be 

addressed to ensure the formal requirements of the “Service-like” 

requirements do not undermine the inherent flexibility and creativity

associated with traditional SOF activities.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

ix

About the Author

Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley

is president of Galisteo 

Consulting Group, Inc., 

Albuquerque, New Mexico and a 

senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. She provides services in the national security 

arena, in strategic business planning, organizational development, 

corporate culture change, policy 

analysis, and economic development to a wide variety of clients 

in the public and private sector. 

Dr. Turnley works directly with the intelligence community, including service on the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Advisory Board and 

with other agencies in both programmatic/analytic and organizational development capacities. She has worked with various offices

in the Department of Defense as well as with United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM). She also works on a consulting 

basis with Sandia National Laboratories. Her technical work includes 

projects focusing on computational social simulations; technologies 

for smart, secure international borders; explorations of techniques to 

detect deception; and explorations of the ways in which organizational 

structures and management approaches affect the practice of warfare, 

national security, and science. 

Dr. Turnley has helped the Environmental Protection Agency 

develop approaches to assess social, cultural, and economic impacts 

at Superfund sites; participated in regional economic development 

efforts; and engaged in organizational audits and development projects 

for local corporations and organizations. She has also organized and 

conducted focus groups and workshops on a variety of topics. Prior 

to Galisteo, Dr. Turnley worked for ecological planning & toxicology, 

inc., focusing on risk communication and stakeholder involvement in 

public decision-making. In this capacity, she has given workshops in 

China and Poland on citizen involvement and participated in efforts 
x

to formalize public participation in environmental management in 

the United States. 

Dr. Turnley served as a technical manager at Sandia National 

Laboratories for programs ranging from the development of a Geographic Information System based information-management tool on 

the safety of nuclear reactors around the world to methods for evaluating the success of government-funded research programs. Prior to 

Sandia, she started and ran a nonprofit business assistance center

for women in New Mexico called WESST Corp; as one of its funders, 

the Small Business Administration praised the center as giving the 

best value for the dollar. Dr. Turnley also has provided marketing and 

public relations services for the high technology industry, working in 

Silicon Valley in its high growth days of the early 1980s and on the 

East Coast. Dr. Turnley has a B.A. in Anthropology and English Literature from University of California, Santa Cruz; an M.A. in Social 

Anthropology from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and a Ph.D. 

in Cultural Anthropology and Southeast Asian Studies from Cornell 

University. She was a Fulbright Scholar in Indonesia and has published 

as both Jessica Glicken and Jessica Turnley. JSOU has published two 

of her monographs, Implications for Network-Centric Warfare (March 

2006) and with Dr. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Theoretical Perspectives of 

Terrorist Enemies as Networks (October 2005).
1

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special 

Operations Go Mainstream

Background and Introduction

I

n 1987 it appeared as if the special operations community was 

going to change from a collection of specialized organizations 

(such as the Special Forces Groups and Naval Special Warfare 

units)—reporting independently up through the U.S. military service 

components—into a joint, independent, and formal part of the U.S. 

military and defense structures. This shift was catalyzed by the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the fiscal year (FY) 1987

National Defense Authorization Act, which established the United 

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

(ASD SO/LIC). The Nunn-Cohen Amendment was designed to provide 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) a formal institutional role and voice 

in the defense complex, largely by converting a capability (embodied in 

SOF) into an organization that could be tasked and manage resources 

(USSOCOM). The “capability” was given a voice in the policy arena 

through ASD SO/LIC. The legislation was a deliberate and explicit 

effort by special operations supporters in the military and in Congress 

to ensure the continuity and strength of what had historically been a 

marginalized and continuously threatened capability. 

The passage of the legislation and the organizational changes 

that followed raises interesting questions. These questions focus 

on the retention of “specialness” as special operations are brought 

into the military mainstream 

through their management 

by an organization defined

in the same terms as those 

serving the general-purpose 

military. The urgency of the questions is underscored by the leading 

role USSOCOM and, by implication, special operations have acquired 

in confronting today’s primary national security threat. 

The establishment of USSOCOM fundamentally changed (and is 

still changing) SOF. Prior to 1986/7, SOF were perceived as a loosely 

coupled group defined by a capability, held together by a core quality

...questions focus on the retention of 

“specialness” as special operations are 

brought into the military mainstream...
2

JSOU Report 08-2

that enabled its defining capability, and located by design outside 

of mainstream activity. After 1986/7 the presence and activities of 

USSOCOM set up a tension in which this group of special operations 

personnel (SOF) was pulled toward mainstream activity through an 

institutional replica of other unified commands and of the services.

This tension raises a question about the impact of organizational 

structure on organizational definition and operation. If USSOCOM

reduced the marginal nature of SOF, it may also have changed the 

nature of SOF in both desirable and undesirable ways. 

Strong textual and theoretical evidence exists that locates the 

distinctiveness of SOF in the quality of their people. However, the 

long and ongoing debate over the question, as well as interviews and 

participant-observation work, suggests a key point: Both SOF and 

non-SOF personnel do not clearly, quickly, and explicitly recognize 

that it is the quality of SOF personnel that makes SOF special. This 

unclear expression of the SOF core quality, combined with ongoing 

resentment of SOF from members of the general-purpose forces, 

argues that SOF, as a group of specially qualified personnel, can be

characterized by a “precarious value” 2—that the group functions as 

a precarious organization: 

a. It occupies an unstable social position within a larger community. 

b. It has what it claims to be its own distinctive qualities, but does 

not clearly articulate them. The persons representing that organization (its functionaries) are not perceived as fully legitimate 

when interacting with members of the larger community. 

c. The organization itself is not fully acceptable to its host population.3

Since the value of quality personnel is not strongly behaviorally or 

operationally recognized either within or outside the special operations 

community, and because USSOCOM headquarters (the management 

function) is under strong pressure to organizationally “look like” other 

commands and the services in order to maintain legitimacy, the core 

value of SOF—the importance of the quality of the people—is at great 

risk of being lost. It will be translated into tasks or acquired behaviors 

and will thus become solutions to problems of a specific time and place

rather than potential or capability that can be operationalized anywhere in the world to address a range of different types of problems. 
3

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

In this case, the value (defined as a capability) is at risk of becoming 

redefined into behavioral achievements.

If SOF (considered as a group) comprise a precarious organization and these types of organizations are unstable and subject to 

assimilation by the mainstream community, has the establishment of 

USSOCOM had the effect its supporters desired? It did address one of 

the hallmarks of precariousness—that is, the lack of representatives 

of the organizations—and thereby helping to ensure stable funding 

for SOF and more effective inclusion of special operations in war 

planning and operations. However, if USSOCOM did fully integrate 

special operations into the defense community through its status as a 

fully legitimate actor, will this also eliminate the special nature of the 

contribution of the special operations community? Will it put pressure 

on SOF to mainstream their core value (the quality of their people)? If 

so, how well positioned are SOF to resist this pressure? 

This monograph will explore the relationship between the group of 

special operations-qualified personnel embodied in the loosely defined

group called “SOF” and USSOCOM, then focus specifically on SOF.

It will also address the nature of organizations and the impact organizational structure can have on operational decisions and behavior. 

It will take the position that SOF is a loosely coupled, precarious 

organization. Legitimation, as 

was attempted with the establishment of USSOCOM, comes 

with benefits and costs for that

organization. The histories of 

USSOCOM generally focus on the benefits to SOF brought through

the development of the more formal institution of USSOCOM and its 

more complete integration into the defense community. The costs of 

legitimacy, particularly as they relate to SOF, are not discussed. The 

cost may be the diminishment of the distinctiveness and strength of 

SOF’s core quality: the specialness of SOF personnel. As Philip Selznick 

writes, “the more readily subject to outside pressure a given value is, 

the more necessary is [its]...isolation.” 4 The thesis of this discussion 

is that while it may be determined that the benefits may outweigh

the costs, both must be considered in the decision process to avoid 

or mitigate significant unintended consequences.

Legitimation, as was attempted with 

the establishment of USSOCOM, 

comes with benefits and costs...
4

JSOU Report 08-2

The Relationship Between the Special Operations Community and USSOCOM 

Prior to 1986 USSOCOM did not exist. Each service component had 

its cadre of special operations-qualified personnel. Each service

set up its own selection, training, and equipment standards, all driven 

by similar philosophies but calibrated to different scales. However, 

although they did “recruit, train, and equip” SOF personnel, military 

leadership in the service components historically regarded special 

operations—and SOF—with ambivalence. “Military decisionmakers 

are well aware of the value of a tank, strategic bomber, or aircraft 

carrier but find it more difficult to measure the value of a Special

Forces military training team working with military forces in Peru.” 5

This ambivalence toward and lack of knowledge of SOF led to a crisisdriven budget-allocation process for special operations that often left 

the various SOF components understaffed and under-resourced. It 

also, many argued, contributed to issues of joint interoperability that 

led to such poorly coordinated operations as Grenada and certain 

high-profile “failures” such as Desert One. These factors stimulated

supporters of special operations to develop and pass the Nunn-Cohen 

Amendment. 

What is USSOCOM? 

USSOCOM was designed to achieve three major goals: provide SOF 

with control over their own resources, foster interservice cooperation 

and interoperability, and give SOF a voice in the Pentagon.6 Details of 

the battle behind the legislation and the process by which the command was stood-up are covered elsewhere.7

It is important to note one specific aspect of the legislation establishing USSOCOM. This command is different from other unified commands, as it has both mission authority and its own budget authority. 

It differs from the services for the same reason.8 The passage of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 gave all other unified commands mission authority, but their personnel and equipment are still provided 

by the services.9 Although USSOCOM—like the services—recruits, 

trains, and equips SOF personnel through its Major Force Program 

(MFP)-11 responsibilities, it also has mission authority (deriving from 

its role as a unified combatant command), which the service components do not. 
5

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

Every SOF operator is at the nexus of multiple and sometimes 

conflicting professional identities. Each operator came into the military

through a service component. He then volunteered for special operations qualification and went through some “rite of passage” in order

to belong. His rank is a service grade, and his pay comes through 

his service. USSOCOM pays for his SOF training and SOF-specific

equipment. While in theater, he is under operational command of the 

regional commander, although he works through a Theater Special 

Operations Command (TSOC) funded and staffed by USSOCOM. 

This set of multiple identities establishes an interesting tension 

among USSOCOM, the services, SOF, and the other unified commands.

All SOF stationed in the United States are assigned to USSOCOM.10

However, as USSOCOM is a unified combatant command,11 the 

headquarters site at MacDill Air Force Base and the Pentagon office

include SOF personnel, nonspecial operations military personnel, and 

nonmilitary (civilian) personnel. 

Note that no formal SOF “organization” exists—only the collection 

of the special operations personnel from four services. Responses from 

interviews conducted for this research12 clearly demonstrated that 

primary institutional loyalty for SOF was to their services. The primary 

marker of institutional membership for SOF, as for all military personnel, is still the uniform that is service-specific. The uniform is modified by flashes and tabs, which identify the wearer as a member of a

service-specific SOF group. Twenty years 

after the passage of Nunn-Cohen, and 

despite the establishment of USSOCOM, 

the SOF identity is far from primary. 

The USSOCOM Capstone Concept, its 

forward look beyond the Future Years Defense Plan, contains a section 

on the Joint Special Operations Warrior—but does not directly address 

the development of a SOF-specific identity.13 This monograph explores 

this tension in more detail in the discussion on legitimacy. 

What is the relationship of USSOCOM to the collection of individuals who make up SOF? What are the consequences of this relationship? Does USSOCOM define institutional identity in a way that

SOF do not? As this discussion progresses it is important to keep in 

mind that, from a statutory and budget standpoint, USSOCOM is a 

unified command and exhibits service-like qualities in ways that no 

other command does. 

...despite the establishment 

of USSOCOM, the SOF 

identity is far from primary.
6

JSOU Report 08-2

USSOCOM and SOF are both groups, but of qualitatively different 

types. USSOCOM is a formally defined organization with a recognized

place in the organization chart of the Department of Defense. SOF 

are the collection of special operations-qualified personnel from all

the services, each of whom may report up through USSOCOM or a 

theater command (as well as their service component) as the circumstances of the individual change. Furthermore, as USSOCOM 

is a unified command, military personnel looking for joint postings

under Goldwater-Nichols can fulfill the requirement through service

at headquarters (HQ) USSOCOM. As a result, a significant number

of the personnel participating in the HQ USSOCOM organization are 

not SOF but come from the general-purpose military or are civilians. 

Does this matter? One important way in which it matters is that they

feel the distinction. All SOF interviewed at HQ USSOCOM clearly 

felt and expressed that they belong to a subgroup within USSOCOM 

and—perhaps most importantly—belonged to the group USSOCOM 

was designed to serve. Non-SOF did not see the distinction so clearly. 

One SOF respondent commented that, “those guys [i.e., non-SOF] 

don’t even know the difference between 

SOF and USSOCOM. I had to explain it 

to him (sic).” Another said it does matter, 

but only in certain areas like capabilities assessments and certain types of 

procurements. SOF felt they were different. Others may or may not 

recognize that difference. 

The formal mission statements of USSOCOM reinforce the separateness of the special operations community and USSOCOM. 

From inception, the mission statements have included SOF in the 

third person, as a community towards which USSOCOM has certain responsibilities. USSOCOM’s initial role was to “prepare SOF” 

to do certain tasks (1987). A decade later, it was to “Provide Special 

Operations Forces to...” (1996). Today’s mission reflects the dual hats

USSOCOM wears:

a. The first part is clearly devoted to USSOCOM’s unified command responsibilities and goes far beyond a SOF-only focus. 

It posits a role for USSOCOM in which it “leads, plans, synchronizes, and, as directed, executes global operations [related 

to the global war on terrorism, or GWOT]...” 

SOF felt they were different. Others may or may not 

recognize that difference.
7

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

b. The second part is similar to earlier versions and emphasizes 

USSOCOM’s service-like responsibilities: USSOCOM “trains, 

organizes, equips and deploys combat ready Special Operations Forces....” 

As we will see later, under General Brown, USSOCOM developed a 

bifurcated structure to separately play these two roles. 

Interestingly, the command’s vision statements over the years give 

a different message. The vision statements under the first seven commanders14 reflect a collapse of SOF and USSOCOM, where USSOCOM

will “Be the most capable and relevant Special Operations Forces in 

existence...” 15 The current USSOCOM vision, 10 years later than the 

previous quote, remains much the same: “To be the premier team of 

special warriors....” 16 This language suggests strongly that USSOCOM 

is the community of special operations-qualified personnel. However,

as mentioned earlier, USSOCOM has a role that goes beyond special 

operations (a leadership role for global operations related to the war 

on terrorism). Furthermore, SOF themselves feel that this vision of a 

collapse between USSOCOM and the special operations community 

is not realized. If, as the mission statements suggest, USSOCOM’s 

role is to manage a distinctive capability that is embodied in SOF, is 

it reasonable for the vision to push toward a future in which the two 

organizations are collapsed? 

Operationally, then, HQ USSOCOM (as the most visible operational arm of USSOCOM) is separate from the community of special 

operations-qualified personnel. Respondents suggested that one could

work for USSOCOM—but one would be SOF, be a member of SOF. 

These are very different types of organizational loyalties and stem from 

the differing nature of the two types of organizations. In USSOCOM, 

loyalty is to the rules and procedures that define and operationalize

USSOCOM. This cognitively oriented loyalty is common in a bureaucratic organization where ties are to offices, not people. In SOF, loyalty

is rooted in a sense of commonality and is more affectively based. 

Ties are to individuals and are expressed through relationships.17 It 

is important for our purposes that members of SOF recognized, commented on, and felt strongly this distinction, and that others did not. 

The recognition of this distinction leads to the next question.
8

JSOU Report 08-2

What are SOF and what makes them special?

If USSOCOM is not the same thing as SOF, what is the cross-service 

“organization” called SOF? Precisely because special operations historically has been an informal cross-service community within the U.S. 

military (its historic formal organizations have always been servicespecific), its defining characteristics have been matters of long debate.

Robert Spulak’s exploration of the specialness of SOF makes a strong 

argument that the “smaller and tighter distribution of personnel with 

greater average ‘attributes’ is the source of the nature and capabilities 

of SOF.” 18 Individuals within this distribution are identified through

the rigorous selection processes, which are hallmarks of SOF (the “Q 

course” for Army Special Forces and BUD/S training for Navy SEALs). 

Selznick points out that “self-insulation” devices or high barriers to 

entry, including selective recruiting, specialized training, and withdrawal in some way from “everyday pursuits” (activities of the general 

population)19 are necessary to maintain what he calls the “autonomy of 

elites,” where elites are those professionals responsible for maintaining group identity. He argues that this autonomy or separateness is 

critical for the maintenance of social values, particularly for weakly 

articulated values.20

General Brown, the USSOCOM commander from 2003 to 2007, 

said, “Innovation, initiative and judgment are hallmarks of Special 

Operators.” 21 The official history of SOF emphasizes the quality of

special operators.22 In short, it is the people who make SOF special, 

not their missions, equipment, or training. Although the absence of 

special missions would eliminate the need for special men, the hallmark of SOF are the operators, not their tasks. It is these operator 

qualities—the specialness of the people—that allow SOF to do things 

that other military components could not do, were not allowed to do, 

or would not do. The quality and caliber of its personnel thus are a 

core value of SOF. This value is captured in the SOF truth: “People 

are more important than hardware.” 

Textual and theoretical evidence make a strong case for locating 

the specialness of SOF in the quality of their people. However, the 

long and ongoing debate over the question, as well as interviews and 

participant-observation work, suggest that the recognition of this 

core value is less clear and not well articulated in a behavioral and 

operational context. This challenge is for SOF because, as Burton 
9

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

Clark writes, “A value conception stands to be ‘lost’ as its behavioral 

meaning becomes diffuse.” 23 If USSOCOM did fully eliminate the 

precariousness nature of the SOF community, would this loss also 

eliminate the special nature of SOF’s contribution? 

Organizations Matter

Organizations and their structure matter. They matter because 

organizations provide formal answers to some of the most universal human questions: who are “we” and who are “they”? Who gets 

resources—and resources of what type—and who does not? Who 

has power and what are legitimate ways for them to exercise it—and 

what are the consequences for stepping outside the bounds of that 

legitimacy? 

What are organizations and why do we care?

Organizations are groups of people connected by a common purpose. 

That purpose (Allen Batteau’s “strategic end” 24) shapes and is in turn 

shaped by the organization’s structure. An organization’s purpose 

and structure also are constrained by environmental factors such as 

available resources (including people and money). In turn, an organization acts on its environment to make more resources available 

and to modify its purpose. Thus constant interaction exists between 

organizational purpose, structure, and its environment. Therefore, 

organizational structures are appropriate for certain purposes and 

certain environmental circumstances, rather than right or wrong.25

They will change as purpose and circumstance change. Changes in 

structure also can force changes in purpose and will make different 

portions of the environment relevant. 

This iterative interaction of organizational structure, organizational 

purpose, and environment puts constraints on the types allowable in 

each of the following categories: 

a. Problems that are reasonable for the organization (and the 

individuals who populate it) to consider

b. Actions the organization can take

c. Resources that are legitimate for it to pursue. 

Formal organization focuses the decision-makers’ attention by 

allowing certain problems and certain solutions to come to his attention 
10

JSOU Report 08-2

and precluding others.26 Morton Egeberg writes, “Formal organization 

provides an administrative milieu that focuses a decision-maker’s 

attention on certain problems and solutions, while others are excluded 

from consideration. The structure thus constrains choices, but at the 

same time it creates and increases action capacity in certain directions” 27 (emphasis in original). In short—organization matters. 

Organizations can be formal or informal. Formal organizations tend 

to have explicit and strong rules for behavior, and detail clearly the 

consequences for breaking the rules. Membership in these organizations is clearly marked. (Employment contracts, passports, and, in the 

military, uniforms with all their identifying insignia are examples of 

these markers.) In order to become a member of the organization, one 

must recognize and accept both the rules and the consequences for 

breaking them. The rules are usually captured in documents or other 

formal statements. The loci of power are clear, and the mechanisms for 

the transference of resources and power are spelled out in the rules. 

These organizations tend to change slowly and persist over time, with 

the processes of change clearly and explicitly spelled out in documents 

or other codified materials. Weber’s bureaucratic form is the model

for this type of organization:28 it is operationally manifest in many of 

our government and corporate entities, including the military. 

Informal organizations, or what Karl Weick calls “loosely coupled 

organizations” 29 are harder to identify, control and manage, change 

quickly, and are much more ephemeral than formal organizations. 

Social networks or relationship-based organizations are examples 

of loosely coupled organizations. Membership is generally marked 

implicitly, not overtly. The organization exists only as relationships are 

exercised. (No “identity card” exists for belonging to a particular group 

of friends or the group of “go to” individuals on your contact list.) Power 

and authority also only exist as they are exercised. Informal organizations thus are less stable than formal organizations as behavioral 

rules and the organizational values that underpin those rules tend to 

be uncodified. The values are visible only in shared behavior. If not

exercised, the values first become diffuse and then disappear. However,

precisely for this reason values increase in importance as mechanisms 

of control. They thus tend to become more universal within the group 

than they are in formal organizations. Group cohesion often is based 

in the acts maintaining the value (adherence to and manifestation of 
11

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

the value through behavior being the factor marking membership) 

rather than in the loyalty to the rules, which define the organization

as an entity separate from the individuals that compose it. 

Organizations with strong and clearly recognized shared values 

have less need for formal control mechanisms than those without 

them. Control is exercised through appeal to those values rather than 

by externally enforced adherence to explicit rules. As Batteau put it, 

“the greater the degree of homogeneity and shared sentiments among 

members of the organization, the more subtle will be the mechanisms 

of command.” 30

Organizational structure and organization performance

Given that organizational structure affects decision-making, it is 

interesting that little historic research exists on the military as an 

institution and the influence of institutional factors on decisionmaking and performance. A brief review of literature on comparative 

administration (which studies the formal organizations of the public 

and private sectors)31 and the specific field of military sociology will

contextualize and supplement this research. 

Most approaches in comparative administration, which look at the 

implications of various formal structural configurations on organizational performance, take one of two paths. They either focus on what 

March and Olsen have called “environmental determinism” (i.e., the 

influence of contextual factors such as resource availability, culture

or general geo-social pressures on organizational performance) or use 

“reductionist (individualistic)” explanations, which draw upon the literature of psychology and social psychology to explain the behavior of 

the group through an understanding of individuals.32 Although a few 

notable exceptions exist, such as Wilson’s Bureaucracy33 and work in 

contingency theory,34 these are not the rule. 

Compounding the absence of work in this area in general public 

administration is the lack of work in military sociology on this subject. Military sociology has historically dealt with three areas. Perhaps the most studied is that of the relationship of the individual 

to the institution. It is represented by such works as Huntington’s 

The Soldier and the State35 and includes the large body of work that 

addresses both the occupational and professional dimensions of the 

military. The second area is that of the relationship of small subgroups 
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JSOU Report 08-2

such as racial minorities, women, veterans, and others to the larger 

institution. The journal Armed Forces and Society, for example, is filled

with articles addressing these types of questions. The final area is one

that has received much more attention of late as the U.S. has focused 

on coalition-building and relationships with nonmilitary organizations. 

It includes work that explores the relationship of the institution of the 

military to other institutions. The classic approach to this area has 

been “civil-military relationships.” Conspicuously absent is a significant

body of research and analysis that deals directly with the institutions 

of the military itself as is found in this discussion. 

What is suggested here 

is that the establishment of 

USSOCOM fundamentally 

changed the nature of the 

organization in which SOF 

participate. Prior to 1986/7, the special operations community (as a 

cross-service collection of service-specific special operations units and

groups) was a loosely coupled group defined by a common capability,

held together by a core value (belief in the quality of its people) that 

underpinned this capability. After 1986/7, HQ USSOCOM set up a 

tension in which the special operations community was pulled more 

toward an institutional replica of other unified commands and of

other services. The premise that organizational structure constrains 

the types of problems the organization will address leads to questions about the implications of this change in structure for SOF. The 

change induced by the establishment of USSOCOM begs the question 

of the precarious nature of the SOF community, which USSOCOM 

was designed to stabilize. 

Precarious Organizations 

Clark writes that precarious organizations (which he calls “organizations with precarious values”) usually have three characteristics: 

1.	 Core values are undefined.

2. The position of functionaries or those responsible for operationalizing the institution is not fully legitimated.

3. The organization is unacceptable to a host population.36

...the establishment of USSOCOM 

fundamentally changed the nature of the 

organization in which SOF participate.
13

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

The value of these organizations thus is precarious or unstable in 

the context of the larger or host organization. Susan Marquis, in her 

characterization of SOF as an organization defined by a precarious

value, says that “Precarious values are those goals or missions within 

an organization that are in conflict with, or in danger of being overwhelmed by, the primary goals or missions of the organization.” 37

The primary goals or missions of the organization in this case are 

those of the general-purpose forces that characterize the U.S. military. 

To avoid confusion over terminology, we recognize that the special 

operations approach is a precarious value for the U.S. military. When 

speaking of the organization that embodies this value (the special 

operations community, which is populated by SOF), the reference is 

to a precarious organization. This posits that the organization itself 

(the special operations community) reflects the precariousness of its

value position within the host population (the military as a whole). The 

next sections address each of the three characteristics Clark identifies

to support the argument that the special operations community is, 

indeed, a precarious organization. 

Characteristic 1: Values are undefined

Strong, well-understood, and homogeneous values are particularly 

important in loosely coupled or informal communities such as the 

special operations community. As described earlier, an informal organization is one in which the rules for behavior, including those defining

power, resource allocation, and relationships within the organization 

and to other organizations are largely implicit. Community control 

is exercised not by recourse to rules but by the invocation of these 

values. As a consequence, if the values are tenuous, poorly defined,

or unevenly distributed, the integrity of the community is at risk.38

The theoretical arguments are strong for the importance of the 

focus on the quality of people as a core SOF value. This value is clearly 

expressed by USSOCOM leaders and official documents. It is captured

in one of the four SOF “truths.” However, it did not exhibit one of 

the primary characteristics of a core value in interviews with special 

operations and nonspecial operations personnel in ASD SO/LIC at the 

Pentagon and with SOF at HQ USSOCOM. (Keep in mind that both of 

these locations are populated by special operations and nonspecial 

operations personnel.) Strong core values are quickly recognized and 

expressed in the same terms by all respondents who are members of 
14

JSOU Report 08-2

the group defined by that value. In the interviews, even SOF respondents generally were not able to respond directly and clearly to the 

question, “What makes SOF ‘special’?” Although most respondents 

eventually converged on the intrinsic qualities of people, they arrived 

at that conclusion almost by walking themselves through the things 

it was not (e.g., technology, training, and tasks). While the value was 

recognized, it was not clearly, quickly, and strongly articulated in 

informal settings by either SOF or nonspecial operations personnel. 

The diffuseness of the value is reinforced by the perspective of 

many nonspecial operations personnel assigned to special operations units. When viewed from outside, the specialness of SOF often 

gets characterized as behavioral, rather than character, traits. This 

tendency is an important distinction. Character traits are indicators 

of the potential for certain types of behavior. Behavior can be learned 

through training and other mechanisms. 

Recent efforts to formalize the Army Special Forces Assessment 

and Selection process illustrate both the value and the difficulty of

this investment in “character.” Under a new “whole man” concept, six 

core Special Forces attributes have been defined as key: intelligence,

trainability, judgment, influence, physical fitness, and motivation.

Three metrics are used to judge candidates: “his intelligence quotient 

(IQ)...[which] measures a soldier’s cognitive potential and his ability to 

learn...The physical quotient (PQ)..[which] defines a soldier’s physical

strength, endurance and level of motivation...[and] the unconventional 

warfare interpersonal quotient (UWIQ) [which] is hard to define but

includes a soldier’s judgment and his ability to influence others.” 39

Note that these are all measures of potential. The authors go on to say 

that, once selected, “The most powerful argument for non-selecting a 

soldier in subsequent phases of the Q-course is that the cadre gave 

the candidate the tools to better his performance and he failed to 

use them.” 40 Although one can be deselected for failing to exercise 

the potential, the absence of the potential will not allow a candidate 

into the course at all. Note that non-selection does not focus on poor 

performance with a tool, but on the inability to recognize when a tool 

should be used. 

As an example of the behavioral definition of SOF, Vice Admiral

Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation in the U.S. 

Department of Defense from 2001 through 2005, said: 
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Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

We want forces to be more SOF-like. Not necessarily that we 

want more special operations forces, but certain characteristics 

of our Special Operations Forces are enormously valuable, 

and we’d like to see them spread more into the other forces 

overall. Ease of insertion, a depth of local knowledge, small 

unit agility are all very, very powerful attributes that the entire 

force should possess.41

None of the characteristics of SOF that he delineates are character 

traits:

a. “Ease of insertion” is a problem that can be solved by transportation or technology platforms of various types.

b. Depth of local knowledge can be achieved through training 

and education.

c. Small unit agility could be interpreted to be a function of 

the size of the unit rather than of the thinking of the men or 

women involved. 

As another example, several participants at the U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Training Summit in 2007 

commented that SOF “already does the culture stuff,” and “has people 

who do that...” Many other conversations throughout the Department 

of Defense about the importance of culture and the teaching of cultural 

skills referenced the cultural knowledge SOF had as a benchmark, 

not the ability or potential to operate cross-culturally. On the other 

side, a SOF perspective on the utilization of cultural knowledge in a 

military context does describe this as a capability: SOF operate as 

“forward-deployed warrior-diplomats.” 42 An analogy pointing up this 

distinction would be the dissimilarity between attainment of a certain 

level of language proficiency (which can be behaviorally measured

through different types of tests) and the innate ability to easily learn 

a foreign language, which one possesses independent of knowledge 

of a particular language. 

While this distinction between definitions based on behavior and

character traits may seem subtle, it is about lack of clarity regarding 

the specialness of SOF. If SOF’s specialness lie in character traits as 

Spulak argues from a theoretical perspective, the formal literature 

states, and as most who are engaged with the special operations 

community agree at some point, then selection processes such as 
16

JSOU Report 08-2

the Special Forces’ Robin Sage and the Navy SEALs BUD/S training are necessary to sort out those who “have it” from those who do 

not.43 If the defining characteristics are behavioral, in theory different 

training, equipment, or organization could allow the general-purpose 

military to become more SOF-like. The lack of clarity as to whether 

the distinction lies in the raw material (the people) or the molding of 

that raw material contributes to the precariousness of the special 

operations community. 

Characteristic 2: Position of functionaries is not fully legitimated

Clark’s second characteristic of an organization, which embodies a 

precarious value, is that the position of functionaries or those responsible for operationalizing the institution is not fully legitimated. This 

lack of legitimation means that other players do not recognize the right 

of a particular player to act. Recall that this function is a feature of 

any organization—to define who is in and who is out (i.e., to identify

those who have a voice in a given discussion). 

Prior to 1986/7, no recognized voice existed for the cross-service 

special operations community. SOF participated in national defense as 

a capability (“special operations”), not as an actor (SOF). As SOF are 

a very small part of each service component, it was to SOF’s general 

disadvantage. This disadvantage was particularly apparent in SOF’s 

lack of visibility and advocacy in the Washington budget battles and in 

the special operations community’s struggle for appropriate inclusion 

in battle and operational plans by the theater commander-in-chiefs 

(CINCs). Prior to the establishment of USSOCOM, special operations 

personnel and equipment were resourced entirely through the services. The services tended to focus political energy and attention on 

the types of procurements necessary to support the general-purpose 

military, which comprised by far the greatest portion of their force 

structure. Prior to 1987, support for SOF came and went with each 

political-military crisis in which they were employed, with budgets 

fluctuating in accordance with immediate needs for their services.

This absence of visibility also meant that SOF had no enduring public 

identity separate from their activities during a crisis (i.e., no identity 

for the special operations community). Theater CINCs often were 

unfamiliar with SOF capabilities and, therefore, used them inappropriately or not at all. 
17

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

Further complicating the question of SOF legitimation is the 

way in which SOF operate in the field. The general-purpose soldier,

sailor, airman, or marine is under fairly tight operational control on a 

battlefield. The reasons for this control are compelling but are generally outside the purview of this discussion. Suffice it to note that the

military is the primary institution that our society has authorized to 

deal with the application of lethal violence. Its social threat is compounded by the fact that general-purpose troops are generally men 

of an age at which they are socially and culturally taught to question 

authority, are dealing with high levels of testosterone, and are generally socially immature and inexperienced. To manage this threat, 

we have put into place a strong set of institutional controls. “Thus 

the military profession is very hierarchical (as a means of control), 

formal (to reinforce control), heavily socialized (for internal control) 

and full of explicit rules, regulations, checks, and counter-checks (for 

external control).” 44

A SOF team turns this control on its head. In a special operation, decision-making and planning are usually located at the lowest 

possible level, although field commanders still have final approval.

SOF generally are older than those in the general-purpose military, 

and more socially experienced. A deployed SOF unit (an A team or a 

SEAL platoon) will be given the objective: the team devises the plan. 

Some significant portion of operational control of the battlefield thus

is taken away from both the formal military structure and from the 

individuals who occupy certain command and control positions in 

that structure and given to members of a low-level small group. The 

very presence of SOF on the battlefield challenges the legitimacy of 

the conventional military organization. The commander turns to SOF 

because they fill a need the general-purpose military cannot—and fill

it by negating many of the control structures that characterize the 

general-purpose force. 

Characteristic 3: Unacceptable to a host population

The general-purpose military and the Department of Defense have 

historically been hostile to SOF. The reasons are legion. The delineation of them here is drawn from many conversations, interviews, as 

well as formal documents. 
18

JSOU Report 08-2

The primary resentment of SOF by the general-purpose military 

centers around what SOF believe is their core value. If, in fact, SOF 

are men (people) of the highest quality, by definition that means that

general-purpose military personnel are not. This understanding is 

clearly damnation by exclusion. Resentment surfaces in comments 

about the egos of SOF, questions about the utility of the skills, and—

most importantly here—challenges to the very nature of the difference. 

“They’re not really that much better than us. They just think they are.” 

Such statements are a direct attack on the SOF core value. 

Other concerns are not surprising. Any funds that go to support 

SOF are monies that are not available to the general-purpose military. 

Since SOF do not contribute directly to the services’ missions, any 

funds that go to SOF are monies that are not available for mission 

achievement—although, as one SOF interviewee pointed out, “I don’t 

know why they are getting their knickers in a twist. All of USSOCOM 

is such a small part of the defense budget, never mind that designated 

for SOF activities.” (USSOCOM represented only about 1.5 percent of 

the total Department of Defense budget in FY 2006,45 for example...and 

that was one of USSOCOM’s richer years.) However, the perception 

that SOF take away what is “rightfully theirs” is a powerful source of 

resentment of USSOCOM among the general-purpose forces. 

Funding channels can be in conflict with reporting lines and

authorities. For example, USSOCOM provides funding and personnel for the TSOCs, but each TSOC reports directly to the geographic 

combatant commander. 46 Recall also that each SOF operator is a 

member of a service component to which he also feels loyalty. The 

regional combatant commander thus has combatant command over 

the TSOCs in his theater,47 but does not control the personnel or their 

equipment. 

SOF as a precarious organization

The special operations community, as embodied in SOF, is a loosely 

coupled, precarious organization. The special operations community 

does exhibit the three characteristics of such an organization. The 

lack of clarity as to whether the specialness of SOF lies in the raw 

material (the capabilities or the potential of people) or achievements 

that can be gained by the molding of that raw material illustrates the 
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Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

poor definition of what should be one of the special operations community’s core, distinctive values. 

The intermittent recognition of the existence of SOF as exemplified by its pre-1987 general absence from budget discussions and

subsequent resource allocation exercises established an environment in which SOF (and an informal cross-service special operations 

community) only existed at the time of immediate need. The community virtually disappeared when it was not operationalized (and 

so, therefore, did SOF), in stark contrast to the service components. 

Hence SOF were not equal and therefore legitimate players in that 

environment. This de-legitimation was underscored by the very nature 

of SOF operational units. Their command and control structure and 

consequent mode of operation directly challenged the legitimacy of 

the conventional military organization, particularly when SOF were 

successful on the battlefield.

The “host population” of SOF, the general-purpose military, highly 

resents SOF. The SOF core value of special people by definition classes

those who are not SOF as nonspecial people. And resources (both 

men and materiel) that go to SOF are resources the services (and so 

the Department of Defense) do not have available for general-purpose 

warfare. 

It is useful to correlate these three characteristics, which define

the special operations community as a precarious organization, with 

the three qualities Spulak identifies that distinguish SOF from other

military personnel: they are creative, flexible elite warriors.48 SOF’s 

core value—the potential of their people—allows SOF to exercise that 

potentiality in a wide range of behaviors. This lack of behavioral prescription in fact allows the greatest behavioral flexibility. That they

are elite warriors generates resentment in the host population. And 

the absence of legitimacy allowed the special operations community 

organizational and behavioral creativity, permitting the development of responses tailored to any situation in which SOF might find

themselves. If this correlation holds, reducing the precarious nature 

of the special operations community will impact the very qualities 

that distinguish SOF and the special operations community from the 

general-purpose forces. Consequently, this question is addressed in 

the next section. 
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JSOU Report 08-2

Precariousness: the Benefits and the Costs

Marquis writes in her chapter entitled “Survival of a Precarious 

Value,” 

SOF organizational culture and, to some extent, support from 

the broader SOF community have enabled at least a skeleton 

special operations capability to exist since World War II.49

This premise is consistent with the nature of informal organizations. 

However, she argues, the survival of the special operations capability 

was put in severe jeopardy in the late 1970s post-Vietnam era. Said 

another way, the following factors threatened to overcome any kind 

of special operations organizational integrity:

a. Inherent organizational instability engendered by the loose 

nature of the organization

b. Lack of clarity as to its defining value

c. Absence of legitimacy for its functionaries and operators

d. Resentment of SOF by other service components. 

Supporters of the special operations capability believed that formally recognizing SOF and giving them a designated place at the table 

was necessary for the survival of the capability. This recognition was 

the genesis for development of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and the 

establishment of USSOCOM and ASD SO/LIC. 

Legitimizing SOF

The Nunn-Cohen Amendment aimed to reduce the precariousness 

of SOF by making their functionaries more legitimate. USSOCOM 

recognized the success of the effort in a 2007 document published 

for its 20-year anniversary. “The establishment of a four-star Commander in Chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice

in the highest councils of the Defense Department.” 50 The designation by President Bush in 2005 of USSOCOM as the “lead combatant 

commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing 

global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other 

combatant commanders” 51 was a very strong stamp of legitimacy. 

It clearly and publicly recognized USSOCOM as first among equals

(the other combatant commands) in the warfighting environment of
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Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

the greatest interest to the nation today. This explicit recognition of 

legitimacy was a step in reducing the precarious nature of SOF and 

the special operations community. 

Almost all histories of the establishment of USSOCOM recognize 

this benefit.52 What none of these stories discuss is the possible cost to 

SOF and to special operations of increased organizational legitimacy. 

The next subsections will address this question. 

What is legitimacy? Legitimacy is a characteristic of an organization 

whose means and ends appear to conform to social norms, values, 

and resources. Legitimacy is a function of the perception of others of 

an organization. Desire for legitimacy thus impacts the way in which 

an organization manipulates symbols and structures to convince 

others that its actions meet or adhere to the expectations of the social 

systems’ norms, values, and rules.53 Another way to put this premise 

is that the more an organization is like other organizations (or is isomorphic with them), the greater its legitimacy. As Deephouse wrote, 

“A fundamental proposition of institutional theory is that isomorphism 

leads to legitimacy.” 54

Legitimacy is important because it justifies the organization in the

eyes of others in the same social system (in the military and defense 

community, in SOF’s case). It thus garners support for and can attract 

resources to an organization. In fact, some have gone so far as to say 

that “legitimacy is itself a resource.” 55

Organizations seek legitimacy in two ways.56 The first is through

changes in substantive management, and the second is through management of symbolic structures. Changes in substantive management 

involve real changes in goals, structure, or socially institutionalized 

practices. It could be argued that many of the changes within the 

Department of Defense proposed under “defense transformation” fall 

into this area. Changes in symbolic management focus on making the 

organization appear as if it is conforming to socially acceptable goals. 

These changes in symbolic structures may involve statements and pronouncements (think of the liquor companies and their statements about 

drinking responsibly) or actual redefinition or reinterpretation of means

and ends so they appear to be in conformance with such goals. 

Any change in legitimacy involves change through both means, 

and we find this to be the case with the special operations community. The establishment of USSOCOM is a clear example of how the 
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JSOU Report 08-2

structure was altered to bestow additional legitimacy on SOF. The 

establishment of USSOCOM was an effort to help the cross-service 

special operations community define for itself a place in the broader

military/defense community by making it look more like other parts 

of the community (i.e., establish structural isomorphism). 

Interestingly, the legislation that established USSOCOM was able to 

give it legitimacy in two communities. As explained earlier, USSOCOM 

simultaneously exhibits command- and service-like qualities. The crafters of the legislation used the mission authority inherent in USSOCOM 

as a unified combatant command to ensure temporal continuity for

SOF. The MFP-11 budget authority USSOCOM was given allowed it 

control over resources for SOF similar to the services and unlike other 

unified commands. Later discussion will illustrate how this dual-hatted

legitimacy also fostered resentment against USSOCOM and, by extension, the special operations community in other unified commands.

Through its MFP-11 budget authority USSOCOM controlled funding 

in ways in which the other unified commands did not and which had

the potential to challenge their operational authorities. Resentment 

also existed in the service components as USSOCOM could exercise 

mission authority for its personnel in a way the services could not. 

The structural or substantive legitimacy the cross-service special operations community obtained through the establishment of 

USSOCOM was enhanced by changes in social conditions, which 

made the type of war SOF were particularly positioned to fight (low

intensity conflict) front and center. This environmental change allowed

USSOCOM to achieve legitimacy in the symbolic dimension. SOF, 

through USSOCOM, thus became the embodiment of the social norm 

(as in the earlier quote by Admiral Cebrowski in which he commented 

that conventional forces needed to become “more SOF-like”). SOF 

warfighting techniques (their means) conformed strongly with social

goals (winning the war on terrorism). Interestingly and importantly 

for this argument, it was the social goal that changed to come into 

conformity with SOF’s means, rather than vice versa, as usually happens when organizations seek legitimacy. Because of the change in 

social goals, the special operations community was able to gain strong 

additional symbolic legitimacy through USSOCOM’s elevation to the 

supported or lead command for the war on terrorism. This explicit, 

formal recognition was a statement that the conflict in which we are
23

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

engaged is one for which USSOCOM—and, by implication, the capabilities exemplified by SOF—is best suited through its combination

of global reach and unique warfighting techniques.

What does legitimacy bring? The benefits of increased legitimacy for an

organization in general and for the special operations community in 

particular are clear. Temporal continuity is certainly critical for SOF 

with their long personnel selection and development pipeline. A formal 

place on an organization chart—parity with other joint commands—

helps ensure such continuity. Access to resources has been another 

historic major SOF problem. The establishment of USSOCOM and ASD 

SO/LIC has given SOF a voice in the resource acquisition process.

The costs of legitimacy, particularly as they relate to SOF, have 

not been discussed historically. The thesis of this discussion is that 

both benefits and costs must be considered in the decision process

to avoid or mitigate significant unintended consequences.

The costs of isomorphism. Increased legitimacy means increased isomorphism (i.e., to be legitimate, you need to look like your neighbors). 

As the new kid on the block (to continue the neighborhood analogy), 

USSOCOM found itself forced to look organizationally more like everyone else. Some of these changes in organizational structure will be 

described later in this section to illustrate this point. Secondly, one of 

the demands on players in our governmental system—particularly those 

who access resources—is accountability for use of those resources. 

This accountability leads to an increase in formalism for an organization as it becomes required to trace the movement of money, materiel, 

and personnel because it is now a legitimate player. 

The U.S. military as a whole is organized according to the J-staff 

structure. “The J-Structure is an organizational approach that focuses 

upon functionality of each of the ‘J or Joint Elements’.” 57 The J elements are functional staff elements such as J-2 (Intelligence) or J-1 

(Personnel). USSOCOM was itself initially set up with the J-staff structure. However, in the late 1990s, General Schoomaker eliminated the 

J-staff structure to try to set up something more compatible with the 

unique nature of SOF requirements. He established five “centers of

excellence,” each of which included like elements from the J structure. 

This streamlining of operations underscored the different approach of 
24

JSOU Report 08-2

USSOCOM, freed up billets that were transferred to the TSOCs, and 

provided core staff for the establishment of the Joint Special Operations University.58

An unintended consequence of this reorganization was that USSOCOM’s lack of structural compatibility with the rest of the military 

led to operational confusion. “Guys from other places just don’t know 

who to talk to in USSOCOM because we don’t have a J-designation,” 

said an individual interviewed during this period. When USSOCOM 

assumed the role as the lead command in the GWOT in 2005, General 

Brown (then commander of USSOCOM) restructured the command in 

a way that accomplished three goals. First, he regained isomorphism 

with the other commands by reviving the J-staff structure. Second, 

he retained the statement of the “uniqueness” of special operations 

and SOF by locating the directorates within a new version of the functional centers, which has been called a “blended organization.” 59 And 

third, he structurally addressed the dual-hat nature of USSOCOM 

(a service and a command) by placing responsibility for intelligence, 

operations, and planning (the traditional J2, J3, and J5 functions) 

into the Center for Special Operations (CSO). The CSO functions as 

a GWOT warfighting element, a force provider; and the commander

of the CSO can also serve as the commander of a Joint Task Force 

related to the war on terrorism. All other J-functions—communications 

(J6), requirements and resources (J8), acquisition (J4), knowledge and 

futures (J7/9), and a recently established (2007) function addressing 

irregular warfare (J10)—have been left distinct but are organizationally identified as “centers.” 60

The structural separation of the operational portion of USSOCOM’s 

charter from its more general administrative and leadership responsibilities toward the war on terrorism was meant to help maintain the 

distinctiveness of the special operations approach in an environment 

such as that found at HQ USSOCOM and at the Pentagon where many 

of the players are not SOF. It would accomplish this distinction by 

clearly delineating that which requires special operations capabilities. 

This distinctiveness is reinforced by the rigorous selection process 

SOF personnel must endure. 

The SOF selection process takes on increased importance if the 

core characteristic of a SOF warrior truly is character-based, and if the 

maintenance of the autonomy or distinctiveness of this group is critical 

for maintenance of group values. The fieldwork for this monograph,
25

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

including formal interviews and conversations in participant-observation environments, supported this argument with statements by 

informants challenging the legitimacy of certain Air Force members 

of the special operations community. Although those in the Air Force 

SOF Special Tactics Group—particularly combat controllers and 

pararescue jumpers (PJs)—go through extremely strenuous physical 

testing and a cognitively demanding training regime similar to the 

Special Forces Q course and the Navy SEALs BUD/S training, others 

are simply assigned to Air Force SOF positions outside the Special 

Tactics Group through the normal Air Force assignment process. 

Even Air Force SOF personnel often question the legitimacy of the 

SOF designation for these positions. In the same vein, much of the 

push-back from the special operations community against the elevated SOF levels requested in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 

revolve around precisely this point. A high level of attrition in the SOF 

training pipeline exists because, as Spulak pointed out, the range of 

the distribution of those with appropriate capabilities is narrow.61 In 

order to ensure appropriate screening, the pipeline to produce a SOF 

warrior is long and narrow. A significant time delay exists from when

a recruit enters and a fully competent SOF warrior emerges, and far 

fewer emerge than enter. Quick increases in troop levels thus would 

violate a core SOF value. 

The belief in the quality of special operations-qualified personnel

and the associated ability to push decision-making down to low levels 

within SOF led to other issues around parity or isomorphism in various 

cross-service environments. In 2003, prior to USSOCOM’s designation 

as the lead command in the war on terrorism, but concurrent with its 

increasing participation in planning for the fight, SOF personnel in the

Pentagon’s USSOCOM office commented that although they might be

deemed qualified through character by HQ USSOCOM to participate

in certain cross-service 

meetings or decision processes, the lack of rank 

parity with members of 

other services meant that 

they were either not invited 

or their opinion/decision was not considered as legitimate as those of 

others in the meeting or decision chain. The USSOCOM personnel thus 

found themselves putting inordinate demands for their presence on the 

...the lack of rank parity with members of 

other services meant that they were either 

not invited or their opinion/decision was 

not considered as legitimate...
26

JSOU Report 08-2

relatively few numbers of flag and general officers at HQ USSOCOM

in order to establish command and SOF “service” legitimacy in the 

cross-service environment. This demand led to an increase in the 

number of flag officers within USSOCOM and a redefinition upwards

of the rank required to command certain elements. Again, in its quest 

for legitimacy USSOCOM was forced into isomorphism with the other 

players, leading it to challenge or downplay SOF’s core value. 

We now return to the disjunction outlined earlier between 

USSOCOM’s mission (to manage a capability that is embodied in SOF) 

and its vision (to be the special operations community). As Marquis 

points out, the very qualities that make SOF distinctive and successful 

in an operational context do not translate easily into the administrative or bureaucratic structure within which USSOCOM must work.62

Efforts to conflate the special operations community with USSOCOM

may lead to an erasure of that which makes SOF unique. 

Increased accountability means increased formalism. One of the prizes 

the special operations community was seeking with the establishment of USSOCOM was a resource stream that was free from the 

short-term, wild, fluctuations it had experienced previously. However,

formal access to resources in the U.S. governmental structure as a 

legitimate actor means increased accountability for expenditure of 

those resources. This increased accountability means formalism in 

planning and in the tracking of how funds are used. 

In key ways, this formalism is antithetical to the special operations 

approach. If the organization’s greatest value is the capabilities of its 

people—capabilities that specifically focus on innovation, creativity,

and improvisation—the formalism that is required in order to get 

increased and reliable funding will change the nature of the environment within which the organization’s members operate, and thus will 

select for different successful skills. As one interviewee who had been 

a special operator for decades said, “We didn’t used to have a lot, so 

we were innovative and creative because you had to be—we had to 

beg, borrow, and steal. Now we have USSOCOM to get stuff for us 

the regular ways.” He added, “The leaner you are the more creative 

you are.” Another SOF interviewee asked, “Is it harder to manage 

abundance or to manage scarcity? I think managing abundance is 

harder.” He felt that his skill set did not suit him well for the formalism required. 
27

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

The formalism required by increased resource levels could change 

the nature of SOF themselves. If special operators have “the intellectual 

agility to conceptualize creative, useful solutions to ambiguous problems,” 63 successful special operations depend upon the SOF capability 

to use resources in previously un-thought-of ways. One interviewee 

said that, “these are guys who, when everything goes wrong, they can 

make it right.” When this creative and innovative attitude is combined 

with the mandate to “work by, with, and through the local population” 

and a history of scarce resources, a culture emerges that is capable of 

and values exploiting the environment in which it finds itself. These

individuals are looking for and likely will use assets and resources 

that are locally recognized as appropriate to the task. 

These types of “found” resources often are outside the formal 

legitimate resource pool. “This ‘hidden in plain sight’ nature of some 

elements...places them outside the normal channels of accountability. It places them outside the normal funding channels as well...” 64

Control over action thus is handed back to the individual operator, 

which removes the actor from the level of institutional control found 

in the general-purpose military. The reliance on found resources in 

special operations thus sets up a strong tension between the SOF 

value of the quality individual and the USSOCOM requirement for 

organizational accountability. As the special operations community 

through USSOCOM becomes more concerned about the maintenance 

of legitimacy, this tension is at risk of shifting in the direction of 

increased isomorphism with the other services and unified commands

to the detriment (again) of the SOF core value. 

Summary and Conclusions

The establishment of USSOCOM and ASD SO/LIC is achieving what 

its initiators and supporters had hoped. Changes in social values 

(i.e., our national investment in the war on terrorism) have brought 

USSOCOM significant symbolic legitimacy. After some experiments

with organizational and management structure, HQ USSOCOM is 

achieving substantive legitimacy through a blended organization that 

still recognizes the cross-service J-staff structure while promulgating 

centers of excellence that recognize SOF’s unique approaches. And the 

establishment of the CSO directly addressed the dual-hat nature of 

USSOCOM, allowing it to look like both a service and a command by 
28

JSOU Report 08-2

organizationally separating certain operational responsibilities from 

other command functions. 

Achievement of these points is coming at a price. If Spulak’s arguments hold, SOF are, by definition, a cadre of creative, flexible, elite

warriors. The SOF core value of the quality of personnel argues for a 

pool of personnel with the potential to creatively exercise behaviors 

appropriate to a wide range of situations. The historic absence of 

legitimacy in the military community allowed for flexible organizational

structures and operational behaviors that did not conform to standard 

military regimes. This framework engendered hostility toward SOF 

among the general-purpose military who resented the cadre of personnel self-styled and regarded by others as “elite warriors.” Addressing 

elements of the precarious nature of the special operations community 

has the potential to undermine the very qualities that distinguish it 

and give it value. 

HQ USSOCOM has been 

forced to look like the other services perhaps more than its commanders and personnel would 

like. Recognizing that organization does matter, HQ USSOCOM 

tried—and was institutionally “not allowed”—to be organized in a way 

it felt better fit the types of problems it was best designed to address.

The current blended organizational structure is an effort to simultaneously address issues of structural conformity while retaining the 

structural uniqueness that will allow SOF-appropriate problems and 

solutions to surface. However, this blend does set up a strong tension that needs to be explicitly managed, as the pull to conformity is 

strong. The prize for such conformity is funding and recognition. The 

cost is loss of flexibility.

Increased funding comes with increased accountability, which 

in turn takes responsibility for resource acquisition and utilization 

away from the operator and places it in the system. This situation 

challenges the strong SOF value placed on individual character and 

quality, particularly on the ability to improvise and innovate. The need 

to conform to requirements for rank parity also is a clear and direct 

challenge to the strong SOF value placed on individual character and 

quality. The pull to conformity will be felt as a challenge to the SOF 

HQ USSOCOM has been forced to 

look like the other services perhaps 

more than its commanders and 

personnel would like.
29

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

core value. SOF’s distinctiveness lies in the quality of its people, in 

the “raw material,” in a potential. 

If SOF’s ability to achieve certain ends through a particular type 

of means relies on what Selznick calls an “autonomous elite” or what 

Spulak describes as a “smaller and tighter distribution of personnel,” by definition SOF’s means cannot become the preferred means 

of warfighting for the military in general. However, this core value

is not well articulated in a behavioral or operational environment. 

While it is captured as a formal core truth, it is not a ready answer to 

what makes SOF special. This behavioral diffuseness puts the value 

in jeopardy. As Marquis says, “Precarious values are those goals or 

missions within an organization that are in conflict with, or in danger 

of being overwhelmed by, the primary goals or missions of the organization” 65 (emphasis added). Since the value of quality personnel is 

not clearly behaviorally or operationally recognized either within 

or outside of SOF, and because 

USSOCOM is under strong pressure to organizationally look like 

other commands and services in order to maintain legitimacy, the 

core value of SOF—the importance of the quality of their people—is 

at great risk of being lost. It will be translated into tasks or acquired 

behaviors and will thus become solutions to problems of a specific

time and place rather than potential or capability that can be operationalized anywhere in the world to address a range of different types 

of problems. In this case, the value defined as a capability is at risk

of becoming redefined into behavioral achievements. The potential

cost here is loss of creativity. 

Finally, the move towards isomorphism and the loss of creativity, 

combined with the hostility from the host population towards SOF, 

are an ongoing challenge to the position of the elite warrior. If SOF 

organizationally look like the general-purpose forces and are held to 

similar standards of behavioral accountability, they will become more 

like them. As noted earlier, organizational structures constrain the 

types of problems that organizations can address, the resources they 

can access, and the types of solutions they devise. “Elite” by definition

is different. And difference generates organizational precariousness. 

...the core value of SOF—the 

importance of the quality of their 

people—is at great risk of being lost.
30

JSOU Report 08-2

Loss of difference for SOF and the special operations community 

is not an inevitable outcome. Some of the mechanisms necessary to 

sustain SOF distinctiveness include continued push-back on rapid 

personnel increase requirements justified by a strong focus on selection and maintenance of a pool of personnel with certain qualities. 

Clear expression of and focus on the role of the core SOF value of the 

quality of personnel in the selection processes also will be helpful. 

Focus on the development of a cross-service SOF identity might force 

more explicit recognition and (more importantly) enable clear expression by both SOF and nonspecial operations personnel of what make 

SOF different. Since HQ USSOCOM and the high visibility activities in 

the Pentagon involve a lot of non-SOF personnel, it will be important 

to keep operational SOF distinct from general-purpose/conventional 

personnel assigned to HQ USSOCOM and to explicitly recognize that 

difference (as the mission statements do but the vision statements 

do not). Finally, if Spulak is correct and it is the particular distribution of character traits or attributes within a group (not simply their 

presence in a particular individual) that characterizes SOF, leveraging 

that distribution through a different organizational form that allows 

the full expression of those traits is critical. 

The challenge for leadership will be to devise a way to promote and 

maintain SOF distinctive capabilities without appearing to simultaneously denigrate general-purpose forces. Leadership will need to be able 

to simultaneously balance the requirements of legitimacy and SOF’s 

creativity and ingenuity in working with “found” resources. 

This discussion was intended to highlight some of the costs associated with reducing the precariousness of the cross-service special 

operations community as an organization within the U.S. defense community so that these costs can be recognized, managed, and mitigated. 

It is not an argument for reducing legitimacy or for eliminating other 

benefits associated with the establishment of USSOCOM. Rather, it

is a plea to consider both sides of the balance sheet so organizational 

mechanisms and leadership strategies can be developed to prevent 

the diminishment of what we are trying to save and strengthen. 
31

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

Endnotes

1. Allen W. Batteau, “Negations and Ambiguities in the Cultures of Organization,” American Anthropologist vol. 102 no. 4 (2001): 726-740: p. 

728. 

2. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 

1997). 

3. Burton R. Clark, “Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values: A 

Case Study” American Sociological Review vol. 21 no. 3 (June 1956): 

327-336.

4. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation

(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 

1957), 127.

5. Marquis, op. cit., 4.

6. United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 www.

socom.mil/Docs/Command_History_26Feb07webversion.pdf (accessed 

July 2007).

7. See, for example, Marquis, op. cit. 

8. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap (USAF), “Organizational Change and the New 

Technologies of War” (paper presented at JSCOPE 98 (XX): Ethics and 

Leadership During Organizational Change, Washington D.C., January 

1998) Note 50. 

9. James R. Locher III, “Has it worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act,” Naval War College Review (Autumn 2001).

	 10.	 U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 6, section 167, Unified

combatant command for special operations forces. See paragraph (b).

11. SOF Resource Relationships https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/db23edd177d0433e85256cff00097fe2/fba07f7f6d2890e285256cf30060aa36/

Body/M2/SOF%20Resource%20Relationships.ppt?OpenElement#393 

(accessed July 2007).

12. All interviewees for this project were given assertions of anonymity so no 

names or affiliations are given in the text. Text in quotes is the actual

language used by interviewees. When quotes or observations are given 

from a participant-observation situation, the same caveats apply.

13. USSOCOM: Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006) www.socom.

mil/Docs/USSOCOM_CCSO_2006web.pdf (accessed April 2007).

14. As of this writing, Admiral Olson, the current commander of USSOCOM, 

has held that office for only a few months and has published no official

revisions to the vision statement.

15. United States Special Operations Command History, op. cit. p. 13 quote 

from vision statement promulgated by General Schoomaker, CINCSOC 

1997-2000.
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JSOU Report 08-2

16. Ibid., 17.

17. See Jessica Glicken Turnley, Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, 

JSOU Report 06-3 (Hurlburt Field, FL::Joint Special Operations University Press, March 2006) for a discussion of rule- and relationship-based 

organizations.

18. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: the Origin, Qualities, 

and Use of SOF, JSOU Report 07-7 (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 

October 2007), 12.

19. Selznick, op. cit., 123.

20. Selznick, op. cit., 121.

21. Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, “U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting 

the Challenges of the 21st Century” Joint Force Quarterly issue 40, p. 

43.

22. United States Special Operations Command History, op. cit., 25-26.

23. Clark, op. cit, 128.

24. Batteau, op. cit.

25. Jay R. Galbraith, Organization Design (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1977). 

26. H. A. Simon, V. A. Thompson, and D. W. Smithburg, Public Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); Morten Egeberg, “The Impact of 

Bureaucratic Structure on Policy Making,” Public Administration vol. 

77, no. 1 (1999): 155-170).; and James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What 

Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 

1989, New Edition 2000).

27. Egeberg, op.cit., 159.

28. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans., From Max Weber: Essays in 

Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196.

29. Karl E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), see especially pp. 32-56.

30. Batteau, op. cit., 729.

31. Egeberg, op. cit., 155-170.

32. J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, “Institutional perspectives on political 

institutions,” Governance 9 (1996): 247-264.

33. Wilson, op. cit.

34. Galbraith, op. cit.

35. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics 

of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1957).

36. Clark, op. cit., 327-336.

37. Marquis, op. cit., 7.

38. Selznick, op. cit., 120.

39. Major Will Cotty, Captain (P) Brendon Bluestein, Ph.D. and Jat Thompson, Ph.D., “The Whole-Man Concept: Assessing the SF Soldier of the 

Future,” Special Operations Technology vol. 3, issue 4 (2005): 68-72.
33

Turnley: Retaining a Precarious Value

40. Cotty, et al., op. cit., 72.

41 Arthur Cebrowski, “Planning a Revolution: Mapping the Pentagon’s 

Transformation,” The Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 292 (2003), 

www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm292.cfm. 

42. USSOCOM: Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006), op. cit.

43. Cotty, et al., op. cit. 

44. Guy Siebold, “Core issues and theories in military sociology,” Journal 

of Political and Military Sociology vol. 29 (summer 2001), 140-159 

www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3719/is_200107/ai_n8977420

(accessed January 2008).

45. USSOCOM: Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006), op. cit., 

21.

46. USSOCOM Fact Sheet 2007, produced by USSOCOM Public Affairs, 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

47. U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 6, section 167, op. cit., 

paragraph (d). 

48. Spulak, op. cit., 18.

49. Marquis, op. cit., 58.

50. USSOCOM: Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006), op. cit., 

7.

	 51.	 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP) 1 March 2005.

52. See, for example, Marquis, op. cit. and United States Special Operations 

Command History, op. cit.

53. Blake E. Ashforth and Barrie W. Gibbs, “The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation,” Organization Science vol. 1 no. 2 (1990): 177-194; 

David L. Deephouse and Suzanne M. Carter, “An Examination of 

Differences Between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational 

Reputation,” Journal of Management Studies 42(2) (2005): 329-360; 

and M.C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 

Approaches,” Academy of Management Review 20 (1995): 571-610.

54. Deephouse, op. cit., 333.

55. Ashforth, op. cit., 177.

56. Ashforth, op. cit.

57. NATO/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, www.nato.int/

shape/issues/ncs/faq.htm, describes the structure of military organizations.

58. United States Special Operations Command History, op. cit., 14.

59. USSOCOM Fact Sheet 2007, op.cit.

60. Ibid.

61. Spulak, op. cit. 

62. Marquis, op. cit., 166.

63. USSOCOM Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006), op. cit., 

13. 
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JSOU Report 08-2

64. Kerry B. Fosher, Just Thinking Out Loud: How Practitioners Make Homeland Security (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2008, in press). 

65. Marquis, op. cit., 7.