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BRIEFING ON OPERATION MOSHTARAK IN 

HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 22, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

BRIEFING ON OPERATION MOSHTARAK IN HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN

FEBRUARY 22, 2010

Page 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ..................... 4 

Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director for Operations, J–3, The 

Joint Staff ............................................................................................................. 6 

(III) 

(1) 

BRIEFING ON OPERATION MOSHTARAK IN 

HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN 

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, E. 

Benjamin Nelson, Hagan, McCain, and LeMieux. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. 

Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and David M. Morriss, 

minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard, and 

Jennifer R. Knowles. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator 

Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick 

Hayes and Mike Pevzner, assistants to Senator Bayh; Tyler Smith, 

assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Perrin Cooke, assistant to Senator Hagan; Roger Pena, 

assistant to Senator Hagan; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator 

Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Chip 

Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. First let us welcome our briefers this afternoon, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Miche`le Flournoy, and Lieutenant General John Paxton, Director for Operations, J–3, the Joint Staff. They will be providing 

the committee with an update on Operation Moshtarak in Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan, which is named for the Dari word that 

means ‘‘together.’’ This operation is being conducted by combined 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces 

totaling around 15,000, deployed side-by-side to the central 

Helmand River Valley, including the former Taliban stronghold of 

2 

Marjah, to support extending the authority of the Government of 

Afghanistan to the Afghan population there. 

It represents the most significant campaign since President 

Obama concluded his strategy review in December and it is a critical test of the counterinsurgency strategy announced by the President and implemented by General Stanley McChrystal. 

While much of America is watching the Olympics and the daring 

of our athletes, we must keep a constant eye on the extraordinary 

bravery and skill of our troops and their allies. An important component of General McChrystal’s campaign plan is the emphasis on 

putting the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) in charge of their country’s security. Afghan Government officials, including President Karzai, Defense 

Minister Wardak, and Interior Minister Atmar, have played active 

roles, apparently, in planning and approving operations. 

According to Marine Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, Afghan 

forces are partnered at every level with the marines. He says these 

Afghan forces are not ‘‘cosmetic,’’ but are in the fight. News reports 

have also said that the ratio of Afghan to U.S. troops in Marjah 

is almost 1 to 2, one Afghan soldier to two coalition troops. Now, 

that’s considerable progress from the 1 to 5 ratio which was the 

case when I visited the marines in Helmand Province last September. 

I’m particularly interested in hearing this afternoon about the 

performance of ANSFs, including the extent to which they are in 

the lead in operations. 

It appears that ISAF and Afghan forces have made steady 

progress in removing the Taliban and restoring security to Marjah 

and central Helmand. But this has come at a very heavy price. 

Twelve North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers, including at least eight Americans and three British, have died in 

the offensive so far. Many more have been wounded. 

The cause they fight for is a vital one to our security. It is also 

far more complex than many military operations, because a key aspect of the counterinsurgency plan is to provide governance. It has 

been reported that the Afghans have prepared a ‘‘government in a 

box’’ to quickly begin providing services to the Afghan people once 

security has been reestablished. General David Petraeus, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has called this operation the ‘‘initial salvo of a 12- to 18-month military campaign.’’ 

Ultimately, as General McChrystal has said, this is a war of perceptions, which will be measured by whether the Afghan Government, with our support, succeeds in gaining the trust of local Afghan people. 

Finally, I hope our briefers will address the plans for providing 

incentives to low-level Taliban fighters to renounce violence and reintegrate with Afghan society. Also of interest would be any developments in the reconciliation process between the Afghan Government and senior-level Taliban leaders. As General Petraeus has 

noted, reconciliation is not done with one’s friends, but with one’s 

enemies. 

I want to again thank our briefers for coming this afternoon. We 

look forward to hearing from them, and our thoughts and our prayers are with the men and women who, again while putting on the 

3 

uniform of this great Nation, are in harm’s way as we meet here 

this afternoon. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our 

distinguished witnesses for briefing us today on Operation 

Moshtarak in Afghanistan. I join you in honoring the brave Americans, along with our NATO and Afghan allies, who are now serving 

and sacrificing in this consequential operation. 

The most important thing I think we should remember today is 

that the campaign in and around Marjah remains a work in 

progress, just like the broader strategy of which it is a part. There’s 

much work yet to be done. So we should refrain from drawing firm 

conclusions at this time, either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic ones. 

First, I would like to address the effectiveness of ANSF. There 

have already been press release reports about how much the 

Marjah operation has been NATO-led rather than Afghan-led, and 

this raises concerns about the ability of the Afghan forces to operate effectively and professionally on their own one day. We should 

remember, I think, that the early operations of the surge in Iraq 

were nearly all U.S.-planned, U.S.-led, and U.S.-fought. It was only 

by living and fighting and sacrificing together with American 

troops over time that Iraqi security forces (ISF) grew more effective. We should work urgently to foster a similar development with 

the Afghan forces, but I don’t think we should expect to see the results that we need overnight. 

The same goes for the Afghan Government. Key pillars of the 

Marjah campaign plan are to ‘‘hold’’ and to ‘‘build,’’ the civilian effort to help Afghans deliver better governance and economic opportunity once the Taliban is cleared out. Indeed, this effort will largely determine the overall success of the operation itself. We should 

expect this process of the Afghan Government reform and capacitybuilding to be one step forward and two steps back, and two steps 

forward and one step back. I’m eager to hear how our civilian agencies plan over the coming months to support the Afghan authorities 

and the success of Operation Moshtarak. 

Finally, Pakistan. The recent capture of Mullah Baradar and 

other high-value Afghan Taliban leaders is obviously a good news 

story. The question is what does this imply about Pakistan’s strategic orientation. Are the Pakistani Army and Interservices Intelligence (ISI) taking a more aggressive stance towards the Afghan 

Taliban? I’d be cautious about reading too much into these positive 

recent developments, but we certainly are pleased to hear it. 

I’m eager to hear how our distinguished witnesses assess Pakistan’s recent success, as well as many others surrounding our campaign in Afghanistan. I thank the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

After we conclude our hearing here, we will move to a closed session, which will be in the Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC–217. 

Again, with thanks, we will call first on you, Secretary Flournoy. 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator Levin, distinguished members of the 

committee: Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to 

give you an update on our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. You all 

understand the importance of the challenges that we face there, 

and the depth of our commitment to meeting those challenges. 

When President Obama first took office just over a year ago, we 

confronted a pretty bleak situation in Afghanistan. Many of our 

early gains had eroded, the Taliban was re-ascendant in many 

parts of the country, and Afghan confidence in the coalition was in 

decline. President Obama ordered an immediate strategy review 

and in the course of that preliminary review we made a number 

of changes. The United States added about 30,000 troops last 

spring and NATO appointed General McChrystal as the commander of ISAF. 

General McChrystal immediately began to emphasize the importance of counterinsurgency as a strategy and prioritized protecting 

the Afghan people over killing the enemy. He issued a series of 

new tactical directives for ISAF, everything from partnering with 

the Afghans to convoy driving behavior. 

So far, the evidence suggests that this fundamental shift in approach has been extremely successful. The percentage of Afghan civilian casualties caused by coalition actions has dropped substantially. This has produced significant shifts in the Afghan people in 

terms of their attitudes towards ISAF. Compared to a year ago, Afghans today report that they are far more optimistic about the future and have far more confidence in our ability to prevail over the 

Taliban and other violent extremists. 

We’ve seen other positive indications in the last year as well. Although the Afghan elections in August were certainly marred by 

electoral fraud, the new government was ultimately formed and, 

despite serious issues such as corruption that remain, most Afghans have a degree of confidence in their new government. 

In his December speech at West Point, the President announced 

a number of refinements to our strategy, which you’re familiar 

with: the addition of 30,000 additional troops in places where 

they’re needed most by the summer of 2010, supplemented by several thousand additional NATO and non-NATO troops. This strategy refinement focuses on reversing the insurgency’s momentum 

and accelerating ANSF growth, while also improving their quality. 

We are also surging civilian assistance to develop both national 

and sub-national governance capacity, using economic development 

to enhance government legitimacy. We’ve also assured our Afghan 

partners that this kind of assistance will be enduring. 

Our refined strategy has received very strong support from our 

allies and partners. Our NATO allies and non-NATO partners have 

already pledged more than 9,000 additional troops to our efforts 

and we have another force generation conference at the end of this 

month. 

We’ve also seen some positive steps taken by the Karzai Government. At the January 28th London conference, President Karzai reaffirmed his government’s commitment to peace, reconciliation, reVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
5 

integration, developing its security forces, good governance, fighting corruption, and so forth. He has said all the right things. 

The London conference also produced a renewed international 

commitment to strengthen civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan. This was reflected in part by the announcement of a new 

NATO senior civilian representative, who will be General 

McChrystal’s civilian counterpart to coordinate things on the civilian side, as well as a new United Nations special representative, 

Stefan de Mistura, representing the Secretary General in Afghanistan. 

Now, of course, none of these steps by themselves guarantees 

success. As Senator McCain said, this is a work in progress. But 

we are seeing conditions begin to develop that we believe will ultimately be necessary for success, and for the first time we believe 

we have the right mission, the right strategy, the right leadership, 

and the right level of resources in support of the mission. 

Our efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF are again a work 

in progress, but showing some progress. We believe we’re on track 

to meet our end strength goals for fiscal year 2010 and that would 

be 134,000 for the army and about 109,000 for the police. We recognize, however, serious challenges related to recruiting, retention, 

and attrition. But we do see our Afghan partners beginning to take 

steps to address issues of pay and benefits to raise both the retention of the force and the quality of the force. We have set targets 

for fiscal year 2011 that we believe are both achievable and sustainable and we will continue working towards those. 

We’re also seeing some positive signs, in terms of using or 

leveraging our development assistance in support of building governance capacity. Last week I had the chance to visit the 

Arghandab Valley in Regional Command-South (RC-South), which 

many used to call the heart of darkness. This is a place with a storied history, a place where the Soviets never managed to achieve 

their goals. It is a place where now, after very serious fighting in 

the summer and fall, we have U.S. infantry soldiers working with 

a Canadian civil-military detachment, an operational mentor and 

liaison team, along with civilians from State Department, U.S. 

Agency for International Development, and Department of Agriculture, partnering very closely with a Afghan district governor, 

local tribal leadership, an Afghan National Army (ANA) kandak, 

and local Afghan police, to really begin to develop programs that 

will provide the foundation for governance and economic development. 

What’s there are the seeds of transforming a very tough environment into what we’re trying to achieve in Afghanistan more broadly. By using development to support Afghan governance, we see a 

district governor that’s now become an energetic ally and who’s 

working overtime to resolve disputes and jump-start projects with 

the local community. 

I don’t want to suggest that achieving success will be simple or 

easy. Far from it. We have many challenges as we move forward. 

We’re still struggling to improve retention and decrease attrition 

with the ANSF. We have a lot to do to improve the quality of the 

training that we offer our Afghan partners, but we are engaged in 

very aggressive diplomatic efforts to get our partners to provide adVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
6 

ditional trainers and mentoring teams for the ANSF and we believe 

we will be successful there. 

Inevitably, we will face some setbacks as we make progress. We 

need to prepare for the possibility that things may get harder before they get better. As additional U.S. and coalition forces flow 

into key geographic areas where we have not had an ISAF presence 

before, we may well see increases in violence, and increases in attacks on our forces. Our adversaries are cunning, they are adaptable, they are tenacious, and we will need to continually reaffirm 

our commitment and refine our tactics in response. 

As all of you know, the operations in Helmand are going well so 

far. I will leave the specifics to Lieutenant General Paxton, but I 

do want to emphasize that this really is the first large-scale effort 

to fundamentally change how we are doing business, to protect the 

population as the top priority, to work very closely with our Afghan 

partners, and to ensure that the ‘‘clear’’ operations that we’re conducting actually pave the way for the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ with regard to governance and economic development. 

I think you’ve seen an extraordinary level of civil-military planning and engagement with Afghan partners in the preparing of this 

operation, not only the government, but also local tribes and populations. But again, these are the early days, and it is too soon to 

draw any firm conclusions. 

Let me just say, however, in conclusion that at this point in time 

I am cautiously optimistic. I do believe that we have the right mission, the right strategy, the right leadership, and the right resources. As we move forward, there will be challenges, but we will 

continue to adjust and ultimately I believe we will make progress 

towards our objectives. 

Let me conclude there and turn it over to General Paxton to provide you more detail on the operations themselves. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy. 

General Paxton. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, 

DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J–3, THE JOINT STAFF 

General PAXTON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 

for your time today. As Secretary Flournoy noted, my remarks will 

focus on the current operations in the Central Helmand River Valley and I’d like to explain how these operations will fit into General 

McChrystal’s overall context. From there I’d like to move to how 

the operations were planned. The third point will be how we work 

with our Afghan partners, and from there I’ll take a look at where 

the operations are in their current phase of execution and then explain where we expect them to go. 

In June 2009, after assuming command of ISAF, General 

McChrystal embarked on an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. He developed the campaign plan to provide a secure environment that would enable improved governance and development in 

all of Afghanistan. At the heart of the campaign plan were the requirements to: (a) protect the Afghan people; (b) enable the ANSF; 

(c) neutralize the malign influences; and then, (d) support the extension of governance. Our operations today in the Central 

7 

Helmand River Valley are directly tied to all four of those objectives. 

In his assessment, General McChrystal identified southern Afghanistan as the main effort for the campaign. In southern Afghanistan, we intend to clear high population areas like the Central 

Helmand River Valley that are threatened by the insurgency. Right 

now our two largest points are to separate the insurgents from the 

population and then to demonstrate our resolve and our commitment to stay, as Senator McCain talked about earlier, so that we 

can gain credibility with the people of Afghanistan. 

More importantly, our efforts are trying to build on the capabilities of the ANSF and the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. 

General McChrystal views these operations as essential to enable 

ISAF to seize the overall initiative in the campaign nationwide, to 

reverse the momentum of the insurgency, and to demonstrate resolve to the international community and, most importantly, to the 

people of Afghanistan. 

The operation being executed, as noted by Senator Levin, 

Moshtarak, which means ‘‘together,’’ is an accurate description of 

how the operation was planned and, most importantly, how it’s 

being conducted today. Operation Moshtarak is the first operation 

in Afghanistan where coalition planning has been fully integrated 

with our Afghan partners from the very start. This planning has 

been integrated at all levels, from the provincial government, led 

by Governor Mangal, all the way up to the national level in Kabul. 

It should be noted that the planning was not confined to just 

ANSF. Planning for Operation Moshtarak was integrated with 

other efforts throughout the Afghan Government. President Karzai 

was briefed on these operations and now has cabinet-level ownership of the operation itself. 

Moshtarak is being executed in the four traditional phases of the 

counterinsurgency operation: the ‘‘shape,’’ the ‘‘clear,’’ the ‘‘hold,’’ 

and the ‘‘build.’’ Extensive shaping operations over the last several 

months were executed prior to the start of the ‘‘clear’’ operation. As 

noted before, these were done at not only the army level, but at the 

police level and the special operations forces level. So we were 

partnered in all three of those evolutions. 

Shaping efforts involved Afghan and coalition forces. Most importantly, these shaping operations involved extensive interaction with 

local tribal leaders to ensure that their concerns were addressed 

before the start of the clearing operations as well as the current 

phase in the operation. 

The ‘‘clear’’ phase was embarked upon last Saturday, February 

13. The clearing operations are being conducted with five ANA 

kandaks, roughly battalion-sized units, and three Afghan commando companies. In addition to the Afghan Army units, the operation will make use of about 1,000 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan special police that is nationally recruited. 

We are also in the process of training approximately a thousand 

new Afghan National Policemen who will reinforce Nad’Ali and 

Marjah later in the operation. 

If I can at this time, I’d just like to draw your attention to the 

map here to my left and to your right, which shows you the geographic boundaries of the upper Central Helmand River Valley. It’s 

8 

a triangular area. It’s roughly bordered by Garmser on the south, 

Lashkar Gah on the northeast, Marjah on the west, and Nad’Ali in 

the north. So that’s the area where the operations are currently 

being confined to. 

In order to meet the coalition force requirements for Operation 

Moshtarak, we accelerated the deployment of two Marine battalions from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, which were made available by President Obama’s decision to increase the force levels in 

Afghanistan. British forces have also been brought in, to bring the 

total size of the force to between 8,000 and 10,000 ISAF and ANSF 

combined troops. 

Prior media announcements of the operation likely persuaded 

some of the Taliban leaders to flee the area, which has decreased 

the morale of those fighters who have remained. Within the first 

days of the clearing operations, the insurgents appeared to be in 

disarray. ISAF and ANSF encountered only sporadic insurgent contact or organized resistance. The insurgents appear to be focused 

on self-preservation rather than on an organized defense of the 

Central Helmand River Valley. 

Pockets of resistance, however, still remain in Nad’Ali district. In 

Marjah there is stiff resistance from the remaining insurgents. The 

U.S. Marines, in partnership with the ANSF, are still fighting a series of intense actions in that area. Understanding how effective 

our forces are, the insurgents will continue to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as their primary weapon system. As many of 

you know, between 65 and 70 percent of our casualties continue to 

come from the IEDs. 

There are encouraging signs that parts of Marjah are now starting to clear, that the ANCOP forces have been introduced into the 

area, and that it’s now secure enough, as we noted last weekend, 

to even bring Governor Mangal back into Marjah for a series of 

successful meetings with the tribal elders. Ground commanders assess that the population is broadly on our side and is likely to remain so, as long as they can be persuaded that we’re making a 

genuine commitment to ensure their long-term security. 

We are satisfied with the pace of operations so far and have decided to take a very deliberate approach to the continued clearing 

operations in order to protect the population. There have been isolated incidents of regrettable civilian casualties. We have seen the 

Taliban use the civilians as human shields in some cases. 

In the weeks ahead, when conditions are appropriate—and I 

stress here again the conditions-based aspect of the operation—we 

will transition to the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ phases of Operation 

Moshtarak. Our efforts during these two phases will focus on 

quickly rebuilding damaged infrastructure, on offering support to 

local communities, and supporting the reconstitution of the Afghan 

Government and all institutions in Helmand. During the ‘‘hold’’ 

and ‘‘build’’ phases of the operations, the ANSF on the ground will 

demonstrate the presence and resolve of the central Afghan Government. 

As I conclude my remarks, I would like to reiterate what both 

Senator McCain and Secretary Flournoy said, that, in spite of recent successes, we know that this is going to be a hard fight. We 

know that there are going to be pockets of intense resistance and 

9 

there will be, as you said, Senator, perhaps one step forward, two 

steps back, for a while. But we’re committed to the process and the 

work that lies ahead in partnership with our Afghan partners and 

coalition partners. 

Thank you for your time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Why don’t we try an 8-minute first round. 

We’ve read various reports as to how the Afghan forces are 

doing. Some reports indicate that they’re doing very well, they are 

in the fight, they are brave, they are doing everything which we 

would hope that they would do. Other reports are less positive. A 

report in the New York Times yesterday was fairly negative, saying 

that it’s mixed at best, that they’re rarely in the lead, that they 

wait to be led, that they have not yet led one effort. 

General, can you give us your assessment as to how the Afghan 

forces are doing? I’m going to ask you about the planning of the 

operation in a moment and whether they’re adequately equipped. 

But most important is their willingness to engage. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. All indications are that they 

have been every bit as present as U.S. and coalition forces and 

every bit as engaged as U.S. and coalition forces. Their standards 

of operation and their training, of course, are much different than 

ours and I’m sure that leads to the wealth of discussions about how 

effective they have been. But if you go by the metric, sir, of whether they have been with us lockstep from the beginning, the answer 

is yes in terms of not only the planning, but also the execution. I 

think the visibility of the Afghan national forces in the operation 

is what’s going to lend credence and credibility to a partnered operation and start to build the confidence of the local population that 

there are not just coalition forces in there, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are we predominant in terms of numbers and 

in terms of taking the lead? 

General PAXTON. We are certainly not predominant in terms of 

numbers, sir. The number of Afghan kandaks and commandos is 

larger than the number of U.S. and coalition forces by perhaps 

1,500 to 2,000. So their physical presence on the ground is more 

than ours. Having not been there myself, sir, the indications are 

that it has been partnered every step of the way, sometimes with 

them in the lead, sometimes with us in the lead. Obviously, the 

face that we would like to put forward during the clear operations 

is the Afghans in the lead, because they have the cultural awareness and the ability to work with the population. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s good to hear. I think when we visited 

Afghanistan, as we have on a number of occasions, our leaders and 

our troops told us that they have a lot of confidence in the Afghan 

forces. There have been some exceptions to that, but for the most 

part we were reassured that they have the willpower, the bravery, 

and the willingness to engage. So your report is a good one and it 

is reassuring. It’s important that that be the case, and that the 

American people hear that that’s the case, and equally important 

that the Afghan people hear that that’s the case. 

One of the issues which I have focused on is the question of the 

Afghan units, how many, what is their capability, the shortfalls 

that we have in their numbers, and what the goals are in terms 

10 

of numbers. But on our last visit we were given some pretty startling news, that the number of trainers of Afghan forces was only 

at about 37 percent of what was necessary. That came as a very 

disturbing bit of news to us, because there’s so little excuse for 

there not being adequate trainers. 

On February 19, our supreme allied commander, Admiral 

Stavridis, said that NATO remains 2,000 trainers short of the 

number needed and he was hopeful that NATO would meet those 

levels when defense ministers meet in Belgium this week for a 

force generation conference. 

I believe, Madam Secretary, you indicated that there were 9,000 

troops that had been forthcoming altogether from NATO allies and 

others. Where are we on the trainers issue? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are still trying to fill a shortfall of about 

2,000 trainers. That is the target going into the force generation 

conference on February 23. We are working very actively with our 

allies. I was on the phone myself with two ministers of defense this 

morning and we are making calls, really trying to put as much emphasis on contributions of institutional trainers as well as Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational 

Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) as possible. 

Training and developing the ANSF is the long pole in the tent 

in Afghanistan, and we have to support that effort with a fully 

resourced force. So we are pulling out all the stops to work towards 

that. We are also reexamining our own contributions to make sure 

that we’re doing everything we can to fill that gap. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think we’ve added 1,000 trainers already, 

have we not? The first of the 30,000 have arrived and were put 

right into the training issue. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. The training, as I use the term, really includes 

three pieces, right? One is the first kind of 8-week basic training. 

Then we have the mentors who are OMLTs, as you call them, who 

are with their units. This would be just a handful of our people 

with each of the Afghan units. Then, perhaps the most important 

part of the training is that partnering, that in-the-fight togetherness which you have described. We’re 1,000 short of trainers that 

are not in combat; they are separated from combat. The idea that 

NATO has not carried out their commitments and they’ve only fulfilled 10 percent of their commitment as of the time we were there 

is, frankly, startling, shocking, and unacceptable to me. 

I just hope that when you talk to our NATO allies and when we 

have these discussions that you can report two things, at least. One 

is we’re grateful for those NATO allies who are there in the fight 

and who have given so much. We have a number of NATO allies 

who have done even more than their share. But many of our NATO 

allies have not stepped up as they have committed to, and it is that 

group of NATO allies that I’m particularly unhappy about. 

My next question has to do with the reintegration and reconciliation piece and as to whether or not we are involved already in a 

reintegration program in Central Helmand as part of Operation 

Moshtarak. Have we seen any effort there to provide some incentives to the low-level Taliban fighters there, including amnesty and 

11 

a job, to try to get them to renounce violence and switch their support from the Taliban to the Afghan Government? 

Has that begun? Is it too early because we’re right in the middle 

of a fight? Where are we on that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. First of all, let me say thank you to this committee for demonstrating leadership in getting us the authorities to 

actually use some of our Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding for reintegration. We are putting the mechanisms in place to enable that. It’s very much anticipated to be part 

of the operations in Helmand and other parts of Afghanistan as the 

momentum shifts and as reintegration becomes more attractive to 

some of the low-level fighters who are willing to put down their 

weapons. 

I think these are the early days. I think there have been some 

small indications of interest, but that part of the program is definitely expected. It has yet to take off, I would say. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just to wind that up, there’s a loya jirga in 

March as I understand it. Do we expect that there will be a jointly 

approved reintegration plan between the Afghan Government and 

us and our allies by that March loya jirga? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would certainly hope so. That’s something that 

we set for ourselves as a goal coming out of the London conference, 

certainly for reintegration. We hope to have a full plan in place 

very soon. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses again for being here. 

Secretary Flournoy, General McChrystal’s initial request for the 

troop increase was about 40,000. The number of 30,000, I believe, 

was arrived at by counting on significant makeup of those shortfalls by additional contributions from our allies. Is that correct? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Now, over the weekend the Dutch Government 

collapsed and they announced that they will be withdrawing in August. That’s 2,000 troops. The Canadians will be withdrawing. 

What are the prospects of getting sufficient number of troops to 

make up that difference between the 40,000 that General 

McChrystal recommended and the 30,000 that are actually being 

deployed? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think that we are seeing NATO allies step up. 

The initial estimate was 7,000. It’s now up to 9,000. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you taking into consideration the Dutch decision to pull out? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, that is something that we will have to see 

once they form a new government. 

Senator MCCAIN. They’ve announced that they are withdrawing, 

Madam Secretary. That’s a matter of record. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. That is the government’s plan that just fell, but 

there will be a new government. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any prospect that they will remain 

in Afghanistan? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think there are prospects that there will be 

some significant form of some contribution from the Dutch. 

12 

Senator MCCAIN. Anywhere near the 2,000 troops they have 

there now? I think we all know what’s reported in the media, 

Madam Secretary, and I think we ought to plan for it. 

Now, the Canadians are leaving as well, is that correct? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Not until 2011. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. What we have done is endeavor for 

those nations that we have a reasonable expectation are leaving to 

see if they would pony up folks for trainers and then we would take 

the United States or the other coalition and allied nations that are 

still there and we would do the differential by moving some of the 

existing forces into combat forces, but we would ask them to maintain on the training side, sir. Some have indicated that they would 

do that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I say with great respect you are getting different information than I am, including conversations that I had in 

Munich with our NATO allies. I believe that Senator Lieberman 

got the same impression. 

Look, we might as well face up to the fact that the Dutch are 

leaving. That’s why their government collapsed. I’m grateful for 

their participation and I have great sympathy for the losses they 

sustained. But we have to deal with realities of what the actual allied contribution is going to be and, very frankly, Madam Secretary, to somehow believe they’re going to make up that difference 

is very different from the realities of their domestic political situation. 

Steven Coll wrote an article on February 15 in The New Yorker 

where he says that the key area in Afghanistan is Kandahar. Obviously, it’s a historical seat of power, it’s the birthplace of the 

Taliban. I think obviously you know all those reasons. He questions 

whether Kandahar shouldn’t have been the focus of our offensive 

as opposed to the present one. General, maybe you can respond to 

that. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. When General McChrystal started his 

assessment last July, he had broken the country down into five potential areas for operations, sir. Some of this we can get to in the 

subsequent discussions in the closed session afterwards. He divided 

those five areas into three groups: one where there was a focus of 

operations that we needed to initially go after a main effort; then 

there would be a supporting effort; and then the third group would 

be the economy-of-force effort. 

Kandahar area was in that first large group of a main effort and 

a place we would go. But the General’s assessment, and based on 

briefs through the Joint Chiefs and Chairman Levin, was that the 

Central Helmand River Valley was where the insurgency had the 

most safe havens, the most succor, the area that we really needed 

to go after first if we were to open up the freedom of movement 

throughout RC-South. So I think you’ll see, sir, that Kandahar will 

closely follow, but it just was not the preference for the initial attack, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. I keep hearing reports, General, that the Rules 

of Engagement are overly restrictive. Can you clear that up a little 

bit for us? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

13 

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, we’re hearing reports that even 

if they see an armed enemy, they can’t fire unless they are fired 

upon. I don’t know if that’s true or not, but maybe you could clear 

that up. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. Thanks. There has been much discussion on this in open sources here. There have been no changes to 

the Rules of Engagement, starting at the baseline for self-defense 

and the rules for actually engaging an armed combatant. What 

General McChrystal has done through a series of at least three 

major tactical directives is give all his subordinate commanders litmus tests to look at to make sure that in the execution of the mission, they are not taking undue risk by putting civilian casualties 

in the equation or aggravating the mind set of the population by 

killing innocents that don’t need to be engaged at that time. 

Senator MCCAIN. So it’s a careful balance between trying to reduce or eliminate civilian casualties and at the same time allowing 

the military to defend themselves. 

General PAXTON. That’s correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think they have the right balance? 

General PAXTON. I think they do, sir. I think, given the education 

of the force and the experience through many years now in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq, that our subordinate commanders can exercise that judgment call and use that litmus test properly, given the 

situation that they face, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, there are press reports 

that the Taliban have been able to build up their strength by about 

35 percent over the past 2 years in the Afghan-Pakistan border, up 

by 7,000 more than in 2008 to about 27,000. Are those reports accurate and what do you attribute it to if they are? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I’d rather answer that in closed session if we 

could. 

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. But it is an area of concern. 

General, are we capturing significant numbers of Taliban fighters? 

General PAXTON. Senator, we have captured some. I wouldn’t 

classify it right now as significant. There have been some killed 

and some captured, and some have fled the area, if you will, sir. 

But we’re waiting to assess how many and of what intelligence 

value they are, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. But the NATO forces are operating under the 

so-called 96-hour rule. They can only be detained for 96 hours and 

then they have to be released. Is that a problem? 

General PAXTON. Sir, I’d have to get out to talk to the commanders on the ground and go back through General McChrystal 

to see if in the last 10 days that has posed a problem over there. 

None that I have heard of, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Has this operation gone pretty much as you 

had thought that it would? Have there been any surprises? 

General PAXTON. No, sir. I would characterize the operation as 

according to plan. 

Senator MCCAIN. As you expected? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. The expectation that there would be 

a large amount of IEDs, that there would be bands to try and restrict our movement, that there would be focused complex attacks, 

14 

all of that was exactly as we anticipated, sir. The fact that local 

nationals and the civilian populace have started to identify to us 

where those IEDs are, the fact that some Taliban have departed 

the area, and the fact that we have already seen some markets and 

bazaars start to open as people entrust their livelihood and their 

security and safety to the Afghan forces and the coalition, that’s 

heartening to us, but we just don’t want to put too much stock in 

it right away. But we have seen some of that, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is there a significant presence of foreign fighters? 

General PAXTON. I can’t answer that right off the top of my head, 

sir. I’ll go back and get that answer to find out, of those that we 

have killed or captured, what the percentage would be of foreign 

fighters as opposed to Taliban or Pashtu or Dari, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, General Paxton, thanks very much for being 

here. Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask if you could explain how 

our operations in Marjah fit into the broader offensive to retake 

southern Afghanistan from the Taliban that I know will unfold as 

this year goes on. 

I begin by asking if I’m correct in thinking that our operations 

in Marjah are just a first step in a broader campaign to break the 

Taliban’s momentum, and that the next step after Marjah is likely 

to be to focus on Kandahar? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. General McChrystal has talked about this being 

a war of perceptions, and I think Marjah is an opening salvo. It is 

a first step. It is designed to begin to create that shift in momentum. Once we have that in Helmand, the focus will very much shift 

to Kandahar Province. 

Just having come from the Arghandab, there are pockets where 

that shift is already taking place in Kandahar Province. So I think 

there is some positive momentum in areas there already. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My understanding is at this point the lion’s 

share of the surge forces that have arrived in Afghanistan are in 

Helmand, where the population is smaller than in Kandahar, and 

Kandahar, as you well know, has a historic significance to the 

Taliban as a center of their operations. 

So I want to ask you if you feel that we have enough forces, basically, to handle both? Can we fulfill General McChrystal’s role or 

purpose of not just taking a town and then leaving it, in other 

words keeping some general presence in Marjah and Helmand, and 

also have enough forces to move into the larger area of Kandahar? 

General, do you want to start? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Senator. I think your assessment is 

correct, sir. We do believe, General McChrystal and then the assessment thereafter, that Marjah, Nad’Ali, and the Helmand River 

Valley were the places to start, again because of sanctuary and safe 

haven and the fact that we needed to crack the insurgent stronghold there, to open the freedom of movement, with a reasonable exVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
15 

pectation that Kandahar was still going to be one of those cities 

that was part of the main effort, that we would have to go there. 

To your second point, sir, you’re absolutely right. There is a commitment on both the Afghan National Security and the coalition 

forces that we have to already lean into the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ 

phase while we’re doing the ‘‘clear’’ phase. So, consequently, we 

can’t outrun either our capacity or the limited numeric capability 

of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

So we are partnered with them with the expectation that they 

will stay in the Marjah-Nad’Ali area. Then some operations will 

have an overlap, but I wouldn’t say they will be simultaneously. 

Some of them are going to be more sequential, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So do you think we have enough troops 

there to both ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ in Helmand and move on to take 

Kandahar City? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir, that is the plan. I’m sure again, because General McChrystal’s assessment was that it would be conditions-based, I think we will be very careful and deliberate not to 

overstretch ourselves by moving on to another area before we’ve 

completely cleared or we have enough resident capacity to hold 

that area before we step off and go somewhere else, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Flournoy, in this regard I remember when President Obama announced his decision to surge our 

forces, which I appreciated greatly. There was indication that beyond the 30,000 American troops that were committed and the 

hope for 10,000 more, which we hope is realized, that Secretary 

Gates would be given the latitude to increase the American presence beyond the 30,000 troops. 

Just remind me if I have that correct, and if so is there any contemplation at this point, because of the resource-intensive nature 

of these drives, particularly if, as seems to be, and we’re all thrilled 

to see it, we seem to be breaking the Taliban momentum in Marjah 

and perhaps have an opportunity to move on to Kandahar? Does 

Secretary Gates have that authority, and if so, is he prepared to 

use it to seize the moment as we regain the momentum against the 

Taliban in Afghanistan to make sure we have enough troops on the 

ground? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. When the President approved the additional 

forces for Afghanistan, he did give the Secretary of Defense the 

flexibility of about 10 percent to request additional troops should 

they be required. I think in the Secretary’s mind, given his experience of the last couple of years, he anticipates that will most likely 

come in the form of critical enablers that have to do with force protection, lifesaving, and mobility. I think that he’s very much interested in seeing the force flow continue through the summer and 

then have that bit of flexibility to adjust, should urgent needs 

emerge at that time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. That’s reassuring to hear. 

Let me go to the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, top 

Taliban military commander in the Quetta shura Taliban, who was 

seized in the Pakistani city of Karachi. I wonder if either or both 

of you could assess for us what you think the operational impact 

of the capture of Mullah Baradar will be on the ability of the 

Taliban to wage its insurgency in Afghanistan? 

16 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would be more comfortable answering 

this in closed session if that’s all right with you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, that’s okay with me. Perhaps with 

the next question I was going to ask, you’ll feel the same way. It’s 

rare that we hear anything positive said in this country about the 

ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence Service, but it is true, I gather, that 

they participated, and were perhaps in the lead, in the capture of 

Mullah Baradar. Is that correct? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, I would refer any details to the closed session. But what I would say is that the ISI has, in many cases of 

counterterrorism operations, been a very important partner for our 

intelligence agencies and actually contributed substantially to the 

capture of a number of high-level people from terrorist organizations. But I will reserve comment on any specifics. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your answer. I think we’ve learned as we’ve gone to Pakistan a lot and 

talked to our people there, that this is a mixed picture with the 

ISI, and that’s saying something positive. In other words, it’s not 

all negative. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It’s not all negative. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, the negative obviously is our concern 

that there continue to be contacts between some elements of the 

ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorist groups. But on the 

other hand, it is reassuring to note that they have contributed significantly to counterterrorist actions by our own intelligence or 

military forces. 

My time is up. Thank you very much. Thanks to General 

McChrystal and the troops. My own sense from here, and it’s validated by what you’ve said, is that it’s early, but we’ve begun a 

turnaround, and that’s very significant. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary and General, for being here to answer our 

questions today. General Paxton, the news reports indicate that 

this effort could take a month or more. Do you have a time frame 

when you think that our troops will have achieved the mission in 

Marjah? 

General PAXTON. I do not, Senator. Again, based on my earlier 

comments, it will largely be conditions-based and we’ll have to see 

how these initial operations, particularly in Marjah and Nad’Ali 

and Garmser, turn out. But we’re going to continue to press forward in partnership with the Afghans and with a high degree of 

energy. 

Again, the critical phase here of the four is actually the ‘‘hold’’ 

phase. So the clearing is what gets all the attention because of the 

casualties, because of the destruction, because of the kinetics involved. But it’s going to be the transition from the ‘‘clear’’ to the 

‘‘hold’’ that will be the most important, and that will be the condition that will allow us to know when it’s time, as Senator 

Lieberman said, to perhaps look at another objective. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I think you said earlier that we have sufficient troops for the ‘‘hold’’ phase? 

17 

General PAXTON. We believe at this time that we do, both U.S., 

coalition, and Afghan. 

Senator LEMIEUX. One concern that has been expressed in the 

past is that when we fight the Taliban, they sometimes just throw 

down their weapons and recede back into the local civilization and 

then come out and fight us later. Afghanistan has traditionally had 

a fighting season. I think we’re earlier than that. This is still before the fighting season. Is there any concern that these folks are 

melting back into the civilization and are going to come back later? 

General PAXTON. There is always, sir, a concern that they’ll come 

back. For right now, though, the ability to reclaim key terrain, reclaim areas of population, and have them throw down their arms 

and leave is perhaps a good thing. If we can demonstrate a commitment to stay, if the population can demonstrate a resilience and an 

agreement to work with the ANSF, then those who have thrown 

down their arms and left may be faced with two opportunities: of 

either retreating further or starting to think about reconciliation, 

which is where we want to go. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Based on the ratio of the number of folks that 

we’re capturing or killing, is there anything that would lead you to 

think that it’s out of the normal based upon our experience? In 

other words, are we not capturing enough or killing enough? Could 

there be more melting back into civilization or lack of civilization? 

General PAXTON. I think, based on 9 or 10 days, it’s probably a 

little bit premature to make any of those judgments, although 

there are some things we can talk about in closed session that 

would give us an indication that this may be a good opportunity 

that presents itself. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Senator McCain spoke about the Rules of Engagement. I have in front of me an L.A. Times article from February 19 that talks about the Marines being warned of rough treatment or even harsh language aimed at a detainee, that when making an arrest they are instructed to ask the subject if they will go 

voluntarily with them. 

Having met with General McChrystal, I understand the need to 

handle this in the right way. But do you think that these Rules of 

Engagement are appropriate? Are we giving our men and women 

the appropriate tools to do the job? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir, not only the Rules of Engagement 

kinetically about direct fire and indirect fire, but certainly the rules 

in terms of handling detainees. There’s a clear line and distinction 

between what’s appropriate for sensitive site exploitation and handling detainees, and what is not. Again, it’s based on the concept 

that you want to gain a potential source of information or a potential ally, as opposed to alienate some of the population that you 

may not have sufficient intelligence or indication right now is truly 

an enemy. So discretion is the better part here. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Secretary Flournoy, in the discussions about 

forces who are aiding us in the coalition, I wonder if there are 

other countries outside of NATO that would be willing to help. I 

was in Columbia last week and saw the special forces, I think there 

were about 38 of them, who are deploying to go over to fight with 

us in Afghanistan. Are you looking at countries outside of NATO 

to lend support to our warfighting effort? 

18 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely. We have allies like Australia, and 

others from Asia. The Koreans are putting in a Provincial Reconstruction Team. Countries from South America, as well as some 

from the Middle East, are also offering their training facilities as 

potential training sites over time for the ANSF. So I think we have 

many non-NATO partners who are also contributing importantly. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Can that help us make up the difference if we 

lose some of these NATO folks? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are certainly moving in that direction, yes. 

Senator LEMIEUX. The last thing I want to touch on, and Chairman Levin briefly referenced it, is this notion of ‘‘government in a 

box.’’ Part of that strategy and part of this whole counterinsurgency strategy is the communications efforts that we do to 

win the war of the hearts and minds of the people who have been 

under Taliban rule and may wonder whether or not we’re staying 

and whether or not the information they’re receiving from us is accurate or the information from Taliban is accurate. 

When I was in Afghanistan at the end of October, there was 

some concern that we weren’t doing as good of a job as we could 

be in the information department. We had met with a Colonel 

Kraft who was working in Special Forces, who had done a good job 

of radio stations and other types of communication to make sure 

that the people know what’s true and not true. 

Are you implementing those efforts in this offensive? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. There’s a very conscious messaging 

piece to it, and some folks would say we’re almost telegraphing our 

punch. But it was to try and force people to make a conscious decision to either cooperate or to leave the area. 

Part of it is the messaging, but the other part is the actual delivery of goods and services, so that the populace doesn’t feel that 

they owe allegiance to a shadow government who provides something that the local government cannot. With the help of this committee and the help of the forces over there, we’re able to provide 

the rudimentary assistance for the start to clinics, to schools, to 

local governance, which is what the people seek. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just add, part of the civilian surge 

going into Afghanistan is building up the civilian side of our ability 

not only to do our own strategic communications, but also to help 

build Afghan capacity, Afghan radio stations, Afghan media, Afghan press, and so forth. We have some new leadership going into 

that effort, some new resources, and I think that will begin paying 

off over the coming year as well. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I had a chance to go to CENTCOM not too 

long ago in my home State. I think there was some concern that 

in the current budget request there’s not enough funding for these 

efforts going forward. I don’t know if you have an opportunity to 

review that or have an opinion about it. If not today, it’s something 

we could talk about in the future. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are actually writing a very detailed report to 

Congress, as requested, on the whole of information operations, including in Afghanistan, and we’d be happy to discuss details for 

ways we could augment that effort. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you. 

19 

General, these folks that we see retreating when we’re fighting 

them, are they heading south into Pakistan or are they heading to 

Kandahar? Is there one central focus of their migration or are they 

fleeing everywhere? 

General PAXTON. Because there are many areas of combat, 

they’re moving in a lot of different areas. I would tell you that 

some of the trend seems that they may be moving north and east. 

But we can discuss more of that in the closed session, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary and General, for your service and 

for being here today. Beyond the clearing of, let’s say, Marjah, is 

there any expectation or have we anticipated how long the ‘‘hold’’ 

and ‘‘build’’ phases might last in terms of Marjah? 

General PAXTON. I don’t believe we have, sir, simply because 

again the ‘‘hold’’ phase is the critical one and until we can see the 

efficacy of the Afghan security and the Afghan local government, 

I’m not sure we can be able to safely predict that on a timeline, 

sir. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. One of the unique qualities of this was bringing 

in Afghan ministries from the ground up, if you will, in the planning of this operation. What we’re doing is dovetailing this with 

their own district development program. The Afghan ministries 

that will be coming in to Marjah to set up district offices are actually going to stay indefinitely. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is that the ‘‘government in a box’’? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. That is the reference. It’s sort of the beginning 

of the Government of Afghanistan’s enduring presence in these 

areas, that we hope will endure indefinitely. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Part of the plan then apparently is to use 

as much or as many of the ANSF for the holding, as much as the 

ISAF troops; is that accurate? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. Initially it will be the Afghan National Police and the ANCOP, and then it will become the local police over 

time. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is there anything in particular that makes 

us believe that the Afghans are ready for this role of their own selfgovernance within some reasonable period of time? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Certainly at the subnational level, I think there’s 

a real eagerness on the part of many populations to see development, and to see responsive governance. What we’re seeing now is 

many of the ministries in Kabul stepping up to build their capacity 

to be present at the provincial level and now the district level. 

They need our help with that. They need resources for that. But 

there is certainly an interest and a willingness, and I think they 

see this as an opportunity to move down the road towards achieving that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is there a sense of decentralization going 

on here in this process? I don’t mean that in a pejorative sense as 

20 

much as I do recognizing that the local control and local interests 

have to prevail for this to be successful. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think there’s a sense that most Afghans experience governance at the local and district levels, and that’s where 

you have to really create momentum. It’s where the Afghan Government interfaces with more traditional social structures, tribes 

and clan elders and so forth. So I do think that’s where the emphasis is, or much of the emphasis is right now. 

General PAXTON. Sir, if I could, I believe there’s a sweet spot in 

there, because obviously you want the local governance to flourish, 

you want the trust and confidence in the local governance. That’s 

what General McChrystal and his staff have tried to do by bringing 

Governor Mangal in for some local shuras and jirgas. 

Part of the reason to go back and brief the entire operation to 

President Karzai and to get the ministries to buy in was to force 

that connective tissue between the local government and the national government, so that the local governance would not be on 

their own and die on the vine. So we’re trying to force not only the 

security issue with the ANSF, but the governance between local 

and national as well. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are we running into similar problems as 

we experienced in Iraq, sectarian differences creating a challenge 

to have local governance? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I guess I would say there are tribal dynamics at 

work. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But those are different than religious sectarian. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think that part of the challenge in Afghanistan is to seek governance processes that will enable balance at 

the local level with competing groups that have sometimes competing interests or histories of grievance. So that’s where having 

Afghan partners really helps us to work through those issues at 

the local level and make sure that there’s a process for adjudicating 

those. Part of what has given the Taliban traction is the absence 

of any kind of adjudication mechanism, any kind of justice. I think 

the more we restore that in terms of local governance, the less 

room for the Taliban. 

Senator BEN NELSON. We might learn a great deal about the 

Helmand Province area. An experience or an education that we receive there, will that help us in the other provinces? Because this 

isn’t going to be limited to that central part of Afghanistan. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think many of the players will change, but I 

think a lot of the lessons learned will translate. 

General PAXTON. I was just going to say, sir, we’re always looking to capture success stories, best of breed, and to see what is 

transferable. We have to be very cautious. Just as we didn’t want 

to make sure everything was literally transferable from Iraq to Afghanistan, in the same way it may not be transferable between 

Helmand and Kunar or Kunduz or any of the other provinces. 

We are looking for things that are transferable and, as Secretary 

Flournoy indicated, some of the indications in Afghanistan are that 

it’s more about intimidation, tribal dynamics, corruption, and neglect than it is about sectarian issues, as it may have been in Iraq. 

But we’re watching that, sir. 

21 

Senator BEN NELSON. We’re hopeful that the ‘‘government in a 

box’’ concept will be acceptable to those local tribal leaders. Will 

there be a general resistance to the central nature of that ‘‘government in a box’’? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. One of the things we’re doing is using development to enhance the reach and legitimacy of the local government. 

I can draw on the example of what I saw in Arghandab. What you 

have is the development piece creating momentum that brings people to the district government to be able to participate. It is really 

enabling the local government in a way that it hasn’t been enabled 

before. 

Senator BEN NELSON. One final question as it relates to 

counterinsurgency. Is the training that’s under way for our troops 

in Afghanistan, as well as for the Afghan forces, sufficient for 

counterinsurgency? Are we closing the knowledge gap in Afghanistan, as we apparently were doing in Iraq, on counterinsurgency? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. I think I can assure you that the training is adequate to the task. That doesn’t mean it’s perfect because 

we’re always looking to improve the tactics, techniques, and procedures we use based on best of breed, lessons learned, changes to 

the equipment, and defining things that work better in certain conditions or environments. We are capturing that, and all indications 

from our National Training Center, our Joint Readiness Training 

Center, and what we’re doing here in the States, as well as what 

we do in Europe, are that it’s adequate to the task, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As one of the Senators from North Carolina, I want to definitely 

give kudos to our marines from Camp Lejeune that are leading 

these efforts in Afghanistan. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of approximately 10,900 marines, under the command 

of Brigadier General Nicholson, is doing an excellent job in 

Helmand Province and the current Marjah offensive. There are 

four Marine task forces under the 2nd MEB’s operational structure 

and I’m proud to say that the 1st Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment was the first unit deployed to Afghanistan as part of President Obama’s decision to deploy the additional 30,000 troops. I’m 

also proud of the Marine Special Operations Command of approximately 300 marines that’s heading the Special Operations Task 

Force in Afghanistan. 

One of the concerns that I continue to have is the maiming and 

killing of a number of our soldiers due to the IEDs. I know that 

in Afghanistan they are difficult to detect because of the small 

amount of metallic content. But I want to be sure that our 

servicemembers have the best defense available to protect them 

against what I believe is the greatest source of combat casualties. 

Several weeks ago, when I met with Lieutenant General Oates 

and we were talking about this, I was concerned when he stated 

that we were only able to detect and mitigate about 50 percent of 

the IEDs. 

22 

Lieutenant General Paxton, I know that Secretary Gates mentioned that you are chairing a counter-IED task force with Under 

Secretary Carter. What are some of your observations regarding 

the types of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and human 

intelligence assets that we need to increase the IED detection and 

mitigation above this current 50 percent rate? How can we better 

assist at the brigade and battalion levels? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Senator. I am indeed one of the cochairs on the Secretary’s counter-IED task force. We are looking at 

this through a technology aspect, a training aspect, and then an 

equipping aspect. There are at least three component pieces to the 

way you defeat. 

As I’m sure General Oates passed on to you, ma’am, there are 

three things that we look at: actually defeating the device, developing the network, and then building the intelligence that goes behind that. We are looking at best of breed from technology across 

the United States, whether it’s soil conditions and infrared (IR) and 

electro-optical (EO) and different types of photographs that we can 

take, and taking a look at how we can work with local nationals 

to tell us where they have been. 

I think the operations in Marjah so far will tell us that about 65 

or 70 percent of the IEDs that we do detect are being passed on 

to us by word of mouth from local nationals. That’s a good sign because they watch and they know where they are, and they will tell 

us things that we cannot necessarily pick up from technology. That 

goes to the heart of the very reason that population-centric 

counterinsurgency and the deliberate piece of the shaping and clear 

is so important here. It cuts down on the number of IEDs present, 

or at least, improves the opportunity to find IEDs. 

We’ll have the opportunity here over the next 3 or 4 months, 

ma’am, to come back with the IED task force and to further elaborate both technologically and in training about where we’re going, 

and the good things that are resident in our capabilities that we 

want to capitalize on, either get more of or get into the fight or 

pass off to the Afghan National Security. That’s one of our components, is to see what kind of things the U.S. forces have that we 

may be able to share with coalition partners and allies, ma’am. 

Senator HAGAN. So the human intelligence asset is a great contributor in this endeavor right now? 

General PAXTON. Yes, Senator. The human aspect is probably the 

most important right now. You always think that you can rely on 

technology and there will be a better type of photograph or a better 

type of sensor. But eyes on target or somebody who watched it get 

emplaced is still the most positive and most reliable indicator. 

Senator HAGAN. You mentioned EO. I’m not familiar with that. 

General PAXTON. Electro-optical or infrared, all the different 

types of photographs and scanning capability we may have, either 

from an elevated line of sight platform or something in the air. 

Senator HAGAN. Also, I know that in Afghanistan the ammonium 

nitrate is part of the component parts. I was curious, has the Pakistan military taken an active role in countering the smuggling of 

this ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan, and if not, how can we 

engage them to address this important factor? 

23 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We did succeed in working with the Afghan Government to ban ammonium nitrate on their side of the border, and 

we have raised this issue with the Pakistan Government in hopes 

that they will also assist. This has just come about, so we have yet 

to hear back from them about their position on this issue. 

General PAXTON. If I may, Senator, obviously there are legitimate uses for it for agriculture and legitimate uses for it for 

cratering and quarrying and road construction and things that they 

need for infrastructure and development. So we are now in the 

process of trying to work with the two governments, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, as well as with our intelligence detection sources, to 

figure out where it’s produced, how much is necessary, and then 

how much of it is above and beyond that. A lot of that may go to 

the heart of import-export controls and how those local governments track how much they bring in, how much they make, and 

how much they export. There’s where I know Secretary Flournoy, 

Secretary Carter, and I will continue to work on that, ma’am. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Reportedly, elements of the Afghan Taliban high command are 

beginning to relocate from the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province to the city of Karachi, due in large part to drone 

attacks. Obviously, this makes it more difficult to locate and apprehend the senior Taliban leadership because Karachi is a major 

metropolitan city with over 3 million Pashtuns. 

How will the Afghan Taliban high command’s relocation to Karachi impact the U.S.-Pakistani intelligence efforts to apprehend 

them? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I’m not sure I’m the right person to answer that, 

because it may be more for some of our intelligence agency brethren. But we could certainly talk about it more in a closed session. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Let’s just try a fairly brief second round. We’ll start with 5 minutes. 

You indicated, General, there were five kandaks, five battalions, 

of the Afghans. Do you know offhand and could you tell us in open 

session if you do, whether or not those units are at the highest 

level of capability, CM–1, or whether they’re CM–2, or whether 

these are new troops that are coming in straight from basic training? 

General PAXTON. Sir, I cannot right now. I think I can get that 

answer for you and perhaps in closed session I could pass that, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Chairman LEVIN. There is an integrated decisionmaking process 

between us and the Afghans, I understand, within that operational 

command. Does the Afghan commander approve all aspects of the 

operations? Is that a joint decision? 

General PAXTON. Sir, I know there is an Afghan corps who developed the concept of operations in parallel with the MEB commander, with the force commander there, and then briefed it and 

did what we call the rehearsal of combat drill with RC-South. So 

24 

I know they have been intimately involved in the collaborative 

planning. 

I do not know, in terms of the command and control relationships, who has the final say and whether it is single or collaborative. My estimate is, based on military experiences, that you can 

only have one commander at one time. So they will partner in 

terms of who controls which piece of the battle space and who is 

making a decision on a ‘‘clear’’ piece and who on a ‘‘hold’’ or who 

on a ‘‘maneuver’’ and who on a ‘‘fire.’’ So they’re probably doing 

that collaboratively, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you let us know the answer to that 

question for the record? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

We confirmed that the answer given in the open session was accurate. International Security Assistance Force commanders sought recommendations and insights from their Afghan National Security Force counterparts as full partners 

throughout this combined operation. The ultimate C2 for the operation fell to Commander IJC and the RC(S) commander. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was a very strong surge in recruiting in 

the Afghan Army that came right after the President made it clear 

in his West Point speech that he was serious in terms of not being 

an open-ended commitment, not being an occupation army, by the 

way in which he framed the beginning of the drawdown. Our general there who’s in charge of training of the Afghans was very specific about the surge that came at the end of 2009 in the Afghan 

recruits. Do we know whether or not that recruitment has continued to be strong through January? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir, it has. The recruitment, retention, and 

reenlistment have continued, sir. Although we are still behind our 

fiscal year 2010 goal, we are still continuing to see increases in recruiting. I think we’re up between 57 and 60 percent on retention, 

which is below the 65 percent goal, but it’s going well, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s great news. Thank you. 

Secretary Flournoy, can you give us an idea as to the role of 

President Karzai and his cabinet in the run-up to this operation? 

How involved were they, including the minister of defense, Minister Atmar, other ministers, as well as the president? 

How much consultation was there with the villages and village 

elders in Helmand Province prior to this operation? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Consultation with both was extensive. I think on 

the Afghan Government side in Kabul, in addition to the national 

security ministries, defense, interior, National Directorate for Security, you also had the ministries that would really have lead responsibility in the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ phase also brought into the 

planning from the start. So you have a very high level of ownership 

and involvement at the cabinet level. 

General McChrystal briefed President Karzai several times. The 

final time it was really engaging him to approve the operation and 

the start time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that approval forthcoming? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

25 

Chairman LEVIN. Was President Karzai accurately quoted when 

he said that that was the first time that he had been asked to 

make that kind of decision? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think it was the first time he had ever been 

asked, yes. 

At the local level, there were multiple shuras with the local community, really talking to them about the situation on the ground, 

whether they wanted their area to be cleared, whether they wanted 

to be rid of the Taliban, whether they wanted Afghan and coalition 

forces to come in, and working through what it would look like and 

whether they are prepared for the risk that would be involved. 

So I think that also set the conditions for the local population to 

have real buy-in into the operation. This wasn’t just something 

happening to them. This is something that they actually asked for. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you characterize the response of the village elders at those shuras, as to whether they generally were supportive, whether they were neutral, or whether they were critical? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think initially there was probably some skepticism, but I think in conversation the vast majority of them became very supportive. But they were also very clear that they 

wanted not just a clearing, they wanted the ‘‘hold’’ and the ‘‘build,’’ 

and they wanted legitimate and responsive governance at the end 

of the day when it was all over. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you say ‘‘shape, clear, hold, build,’’ I’ve 

had some conversations where I’ve suggested we add the word 

‘‘transfer.’’ 

Ms. FLOURNOY. ‘‘Transfer’’ or ‘‘transition,’’ I think that is very 

much part of the plan. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ve forgotten who it was that said that they 

were going to add that fifth stage of transition or transfer. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It may take our doctrine a while to catch up, but 

that is the idea. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it’s really important to everybody. It’s 

important to us, it’s important to our people, it’s important to the 

Afghans, that that be seen as a goal of this mission, not just to 

‘‘shape, clear, hold, build,’’ but to ‘‘transition.’’ So I hope, General, 

you will add that to your sequence there. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s best I save my 

questions for the closed session, though I’m trying to play Scrabble 

in my mind with what word I can come up with with ‘‘shape, clear, 

hold, build, and transition.’’ I don’t have one yet, but there’s an acronym there somewhere. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

My final question here for the open session is the question of 

metrics or milestones. Senator Nelson, among others, has been one 

of the members of the committee who’s put a lot of focus on this. 

I misspoke the other day when I said we were not given milestones, because apparently we had been given milestones, but they 

were classified milestones. 

26 

If we haven’t already made the request for unclassified milestones, we would make that request now. That would include the 

metrics. I don’t know if metrics and milestones are synonymous. 

But if you could give us some metrics, not today, as to how we 

would judge the Afghan people’s trust. It may be impossible. It’s 

not just public opinion polls. Is there any other way that you can 

gauge that? If there is it would be welcome along with those unclassified milestones. 

Finally, for both of you, we’ve worked on a chart which I think 

both of you have, which is a matter of milestones. It’s a chart 

which shows the end strength currently of the Afghan Army, the 

objective in October 2010 and July 2011, the capability status of 

the Afghan battalions starting with the baseline of December 2009 

for this progress chart. Battalions are partnered, this is something 

which is extremely important in RC-South and RC-East. How 

many of those partnered battalions are fully integrated? Lieutenant 

General Rodriguez gave us some numbers or is giving us numbers 

in terms of full integration, not just the partnering but ‘‘fully integrated’’ I believe were his words. The trainers, which we call ‘‘initial trainers,’’ which is the first 8 weeks of training, so he would 

give us what is the requirement, how many are assigned, what the 

shortfall is. 

This is a work in progress, as you would say. We’re adding recruiters and retention. What was the number of recruiters we already got with the initial trainers column, and what is the retention? 

I’m pretty sure in your offices you will have that chart, but we 

will give you an up-to-date one. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I have not yet seen it, sir, but I will be happy 

to help you fill it out. 

General PAXTON. I just saw the most recent version just this 

morning, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

27 


222ful2.eps
28 

Chairman LEVIN. I know you’ve probably been working on it, and 

you’ve been helpful in getting us those numbers. 

We thank you again and we will see you over at the Capitol Visitor Center. 

We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

OPERATION MOSHTARAK

1. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, the traditional epicenter of Taliban influence 

within Afghanistan has been based in Kandahar. Why did we decide to devote our 

manpower and resources to Marja, rather than controlling Kandahar and bringing 

the same sort of commitment to restoring the authority of the Afghan Government 

and providing good governance and adequate services and security there? 

General PAXTON. The first phase of operations targeting Kandahar was to take 

away the insurgents’ base of operations in Central Helmand that directly affects the 

security of Kandahar City. While ongoing operations in southern Afghanistan are 

currently focused on Central Helmand, they serve primarily as shaping efforts for 

upcoming operations in Kandahar. 

The area of the Central Helmand River Valley has been a historical stronghold 

and safe haven for insurgents where they profit from the narcotics trade and 

unimpeded freedom of movement. A body of reporting from the last 12 months suggests the Taliban were using Marja as a staging area to launch attacks, and smuggle drugs and weapons to outlying areas. The Taliban had also mined key lines of 

communication, fortified fighting positions, stockpiled weapons caches, and intimidated the local population throughout Nad Ali District. Marja was a specific area 

in Central Helmand from which Taliban insurgents were exploiting the local population and launching attacks against coalition forces and Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) as well as influencing the insurgency within Kandahar City. 

Helmand also benefits from stronger provincial leadership than Kandahar. Ghulam 

Mangal, the Helmand governor, and much of his staff are supportive of Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), capable of implementing development programs, and actively compete against malign powerbrokers. 

Operations have been ongoing since the beginning of this year to improve the security in Kandahar and its surrounding areas. Now that the insurgent base of support in Central Helmand River Valley has been degraded, our operational focus will 

increasingly shift to Kandahar City itself. Operations to secure Kandahar City will 

commence when the right force is in place, and the proper shaping efforts have had 

their effect. 

IMPACT OF PAKISTANI CAPTURES OF AFGHAN TALIBAN LEADERS

2. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, since the offensive in Marja began, the 

media has reported a significant and apparently successful effort to capture or kill 

Afghan Taliban leaders within Pakistan. What can you tell me about these recent 

efforts? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We applaud recent operations by the Pakistan military 

(PAKMIL). Operations such as these disrupt enemy leadership and do a great deal 

to deny militants safe haven. This particular operation has also highlighted the 

PAKMIL’s ability to successfully target key militant leaders. We encourage more operations against militant groups and stand ready to support the Government of 

Pakistan if it so requests. 

3. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what led to the decision from Pakistani 

authorities to make the move now? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Government of Pakistan, as well as the PAKMIL, has 

become aware that violent extremist organizations are a threat to its national security. These operations demonstrate the PAKMIL’s ability to successfully target key 

militant leaders. We hope Pakistani authorities continue to engage insurgent leadership, though it is unclear what effect such operations will have over the long-term. 

4. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what long-term effect do you think this 

will have on the Afghan Taliban and their ability to hide in Pakistan? 

29 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Afghan Taliban continues to maintain safe-havens 

within Pakistan. We continue to work with the Government of Pakistan and the 

PAKMIL to advise them and assist with their counterinsurgency operations. As the 

operational tempo of PAKMIL forces continues to increase, U.S. security assistance 

programs will be of the utmost importance to Pakistan’s stability, security, and ability to engage all militant groups within its borders effectively. 

5. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, will Taliban troops fighting in Afghanistan be significantly impacted? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. While operations such as these are positive steps for Pakistan both operationally and politically, the Afghan Taliban still maintain safe-havens within Pakistan. The long-term effects of this particular operation are unclear 

but demonstrate the PAKMIL’s ability to reach the militants it targets. Nevertheless, the Taliban remain a capable and effective force. 

6. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what do these successful operations 

against Afghan Taliban leaders mean to the Pakistani Taliban? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are interconnected. They 

share support networks and resources to such a degree that successful action 

against one may degrade the ability of the other. Yet until both organizations are 

defeated, the Pakistani Taliban will continue to be a significant threat to both the 

Government of Pakistan and international security. 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND CIVILIAN DEATHS

7. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, despite all efforts to reduce civilian casualties, there have been reports that civilians have been killed and President Karzai 

asked publicly for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to do even 

more to hold down civilian casualties. On Sunday, there were reports of a NATO 

airstrike on a convoy in a province adjacent to Helmand in which as many as 33 

civilians were killed. How many civilians have been killed in the fighting? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

8. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, what has been the major cause of civilian 

deaths? 

General PAXTON. The vast majority of civilian casualties are caused by insurgent 

attacks. They show a total disregard for civilians caught in the cross-fire, or in the 

callous emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IED) that have a disproportionate affect on the local populace. Frequently, insurgents will conduct their attacks deliberately using civilians as shields, in order to protect themselves from coalition force counter-fires. 

Regarding coalition-caused civilian casualties, the majority have resulted from the 

employment of indirect fires and close air support (CAS). In Central Helmand there 

have been 21 civilian casualties since the beginning of Operation Moshtarak. A majority of these (12) occurred from one incident on 15 February when marines and 

Afghan National Army (ANA) were taking casualties in an engagement and requested fire support. Three High Mobility Artillery Rocket System rockets were 

launched in response to the marines’ request for fire support. One of the rockets impacted the purported insurgent fighting position, where it was later alleged that civilians were present. There is an ongoing investigation into this incident. 

9. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, describe the efforts to avoid air strikes and 

other measures taken to reduce civilian deaths. Have new restrictions been applied 

to other kinds of firepower, such as multiple launch rocket systems, artillery, or 

mortars? 

General PAXTON. Shortly after assuming command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General McChrystal, recognizing the need to take greater 

measures in order to protect the population, issued a new Tactical Directive, dated 

6 July 2009. This directive requires all commanders to carefully consider whether 

or not to use force in any situation, and to use the most appropriate level and type 

of force in close proximity to civilian residential compounds. Understanding that the 

population is the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, General McChrystal wants commanders to protect the population from the effects of our 

fires, while at the same time providing for appropriate protection of our own forces. 

This directive does not preclude the use of CAS or indirect fires (IDF) if necessary 

for self-defense. In addition, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) clearly provide no reVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
30 

strictions on the use of fires to protect our forces under current or imminent threat, 

but tempered judgment must be applied. 

There are frequently situations where alternatives to the use of kinetic fires are 

more appropriate. Small-arms fire and maneuver, withdrawal, or deescalation often 

make more sense than using CAS or IDF, which may cause extensive collateral 

damage and risk alienating the local population. In other situations, doing nothing 

may be the best reaction to the enemy, particularly if the enemy is in amongst noncombatants and civilians—the center of gravity whose hearts and minds we are trying to win. General McChrystal will continue to emphasize adherence to tactical directives designed to reduce the potential of civilian casualties and reinforce his intent at all levels of command. It is imperative that tactical operations not undermine the overall strategic effort. 

10. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, have commanders in the field asked for any 

changes to the rules? 

General PAXTON. There have been no requests from field commanders in Afghanistan asking for changes to the tactical directive, and no changes have been made 

to the ROE, which provide for the inherent right of self-defense. 

TALIBAN RESISTANCE

11. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, prior to the battle starting, Taliban 

leaders were quoted as being willing to stand and fight to the death and the media 

reported new combat forces flowing into Marja to increase Taliban numbers. Since 

the battle began, however, it appears that many of the Taliban may have slipped 

out of Marja or may have tried to blend in with the civilian population. Did the 

Taliban flee or did they stand and fight? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

12. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, if resistance is less than expected, will 

the operation be as decisive as we had hoped in routing the Taliban so that they 

don’t return? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

13. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, are the citizens of Marja helping NATO 

and Afghan forces identify Taliban insurgents and their IEDs, booby-traps, and 

weapons caches? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

14. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what is the sense of where the Taliban 

might have gone if they fled? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

15. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, will we have to seek another decisive battle 

on other ground? 

General PAXTON. We are at a critical juncture. Our forces are in the process of 

trying to reverse the insurgent momentum. The aim is to separate the population 

from the insurgents and convince both the Afghan people and the Taliban that 

change is inevitable. In order to accomplish our goals, there may indeed be additional decisive battles in other places of Afghanistan. In the near-term, the main 

ISAF effort will shift from Central Helmand to Kandahar when the right force is 

in place, and our shaping efforts have had the proper effect. 

PERFORMANCE OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

16. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, reports on the performance of the ANA 

in support of Operation Moshtarak have been varied thus far. While there are scattered examples of the ANA performing ably and courageously, there seem to be just 

as many, if not more, examples of the Marine Corps leading and the ANA following 

in almost every aspect. On whole, it seems the day when the ANA is capable of taking any significant role in the command, control, or execution of missions without 

robust American assistance is many years away. How would you assess the performance of the ANA in current operations in Helmand? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The ISAF continues to conduct operations and planning 

with Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to increase their capabilities so 

they can eventually conduct independent operations. The intent over the past year 

has been to field infantry-centric forces quickly to get more ANSF into the fight and 

31 

to delay the growth of enablers (such as airlift, logistics, intelligence, et cetera) to 

future years of development. The ISAF Commander’s strategy involves intense coalition partnership with ANSF in order to make up for the lack of enablers and other 

gaps in the force due to the need to create infantry forces quickly. As we move into 

fiscal year 2011 and beyond, ISAF will focus on increasing the capacity of the ANSF 

and establishing enabler units to allow them to take a greater leadership role in 

conducting independent operations and planning. 

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, what role has the ANA played in the conduct of operations in Helmand? 

General PAXTON. We formed an embedded partnership with the ANA for operations in Central Helmand River Valley. They stood shoulder to shoulder with coalition forces at all levels through the planning and execution phases of operations for 

Central Helmand. This was the first major operation in Afghanistan in which the 

ANSF took the lead for planning and execution. The final operations plan was 

briefed to President Karzai, following which he provided his guidance and approval. 

On 13 Mar 10, approximately 750 ANSF conducted an airborne insertion with coalition forces into Marjah and Nad-e-Ali. As of 06 Mar 10, the 1/215th ANA Brigade 

(BDE) and the 3/215th ANA BDE, partnered with Task Force (TF) Leatherneck and 

TF Helmand respectively, had successfully cleared the towns of Marjeh and Nade-Ali. The ANSF were a critical component of this operation, and represented 

GIRoA’s committed involvement and support. The ANSF and coalition forces continue to provide a secure environment, enabling improved security, governance, and 

development in Central Helmand. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, is it accurate to say that the U.S./NATO 

force is still taking the lead both in the planning and execution of all missions? 

General PAXTON. U.S. and NATO forces are partnering with the ANSF as never 

before. We are working very closely at all levels of planning and execution. As the 

ANSF capabilities improve, they are increasingly taking a lead role in the planning 

and execution of operations. The ANSF do not retain all of the organic capabilities 

inherent to U.S. and NATO forces and are limited in their capacity to support certain specialty functions like route clearance, tactical airlift, and various other logistic functions. We will continue to provide crucial support in these areas until ANSF 

capacity is increased. 

19. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, is it realistic to believe that the ANA 

will be capable of taking the lead in the planning and execution of missions by the 

July 2011 deadline on which U.S. forces are scheduled to begin withdrawing from 

the Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. By July 2011, we anticipate that some elements of the ANA 

will be capable of taking the lead to plan and execute missions in some parts of the 

country. I want to ensure that what has been said about July 2011 is well understood. As President Obama has previously indicated, July 2011 will mark the beginning of a transition of our forces out of Afghanistan and a period in which the Afghan Government will take on more responsibility. He did not say that after July 

2011 there would be no forces from the United States or allied countries in Afghanistan. He did not say that we will switch off the lights and close the door behind 

us. The pace at which the transition occurs will depend on conditions on the ground. 

GOVERNANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

20. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, we’ve been told that the combat offensive in Marja will be followed by a substantial effort by U.S. and Afghan civilian 

agencies to reestablish effective civilian control over Marja and demonstrate the 

ability of the Afghan Government to bring good governance and basic services to its 

people. Which U.S. and Afghan civilian agencies are involved in this effort? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Department of State is the U.S. Government lead agency for the integration of civilian agencies in the effort to build governance and development capacity throughout Afghanistan. The civilian effort in Helmand is largely 

led by the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and includes contributions from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Treasury, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. The lead 

Afghan agency is the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. It is responsible 

for implementing the District Delivery Program, with the local lead being Provincial 

Governor Gulab Mangal. Governor Mangal coordinates with the PRT, district governors, and provincial and district-level line directors from the Ministry of AgriVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
32 

culture, Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 

21. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, who is coordinating this civilian surge? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. A key civilian official in the ISAF leadership is Ambassador 

Mark Sedwill, who was recently appointed as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative. One of his primary responsibilities is to improve coordination in the delivery 

of civil effects to the ISAF campaign. His Afghan counterpart, tasked with improving local governance, is Mr. Jelani Popal of the Independent Directorate of Local 

Governance. This partnered structure is mirrored at lower echelons: PRTs provide 

civilian expertise and coordination to ISAF brigade-level commanders and Afghan 

provincial governors, and District Support Teams partner with battalion-level task 

force commanders and Afghan district governors. 

22. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what are the specific goals that are 

going to be accomplished and what is the timeline for achieving them? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Marja operation anticipated a 30-day timeline to ‘‘clear’’ 

the main objective area of significant Taliban influence, followed by ‘‘holding’’ and 

‘‘building’’ phases where the focus would shift to governance and development initiatives. Key tasks to be accomplished in the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ phases include appointing qualified, capable district governors and line directors; filling local Afghan National Police tashkiels (manning documents) with trained officers and policemen; 

initiating key infrastructure projects that lead to job creation and provide economic 

alternatives to poppy cultivation; and establishing district-level justice systems to 

provide legitimate rule of law. The ISAF and the Senior Civilian Representative are 

developing metrics that assess progress achieving these goals, and the decision to 

transition security lead in Helmand to the ANSFs will be conditions-based. 

23. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what are the major obstacles to achieving these goals? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The long-term presence of the Taliban in Marja has made 

governance progress difficult. Despite the presence of the ISAF and ANSFs, the 

local population remains fearful of the Taliban and concerned that they will be subject to retribution if ISAF and ANSF forces are withdrawn at the end of the operation. The Marja area includes more than 100 square kilometers of farmland, irrigation systems, and sub-villages; the large area involved is difficult to secure and vulnerable to Taliban re-infiltration efforts. 

Despite significant advance planning and coordination between ISAF and the 

Government of Afghanistan, governance progress has been slower than expected. 

Several ministries’ progress has been impeded by limited manpower and resources, 

and lack of personnel with local ties and the trust of the population. 

24. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how long will U.S. and NATO forces remain in Marja to ensure a secure environment? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Operations in Marja are driven by conditions. The role and 

strength of the ISAF and civilian presence are linked to progress in establishing security and the requisite local governance capacity to maintain it. In accordance with 

the NATO Operational Plan, ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative 

are establishing clear metrics to measure progress toward the goal of transitioning 

the security and governance lead to Afghan forces in order to ensure this is not an 

open-ended commitment. Decisions over U.S. and NATO force presence and roles 

will be informed by this process. Although the goal is to begin transitioning some 

districts and provinces by the summer of 2011, Marja and Helmand are among the 

most highly contested regions in Afghanistan and are unlikely to be early candidates for transition. 

POPPY PRODUCTION AND ITS IMPACTS

25. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, Marja is a major center of poppy production in Helmand and the trade in poppy and opium products have become the basis 

of the economy for farmers and others living there. The U.S. military does not see 

the poppy trade per se as their target, yet without replacing the poppy with a legitimate form of agriculture products, the politics and economy of Marja will remain 

something that can be used by the Taliban to support the insurgency. What is the 

plan to address the poppy issue in Marja? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Poppy cultivation and narco-trafficking are major threats to 

stability and security in Marja, Helmand province. Addressing the poppy issue in 

33 

Marja requires first establishing security and then the delivery of alternative livelihoods and development. A whole-of-government approach needs to be taken. Unity 

of effort is critical for success in Marja and other key locations in Afghanistan. To 

address the connection between the Afghan insurgency, terrorism, corruption, threat 

finance, and narcotics production and trafficking, law enforcement and alternative 

development efforts must be effectively integrated into U.S. COIN plans. The military will continue to work with representatives from the United States and the 

international community to ensure the proper integration of counternarcotics efforts 

into the COIN campaign. 

26. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how do we break the link between the 

poppy trade and the Taliban? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Breaking the link between the poppy trade and the Taliban 

requires a unity of effort to provide security and the development of licit livelihoods. 

To address the nexus between the Afghan insurgency and terrorism, corruption, 

threat finance, and narcotics production and trafficking, law enforcement and alternative livelihood efforts must be effectively integrated into U.S. COIN plans. Our 

efforts to increase security and stability are designed to help create an environment 

where farmers are no longer coerced into poppy cultivation by the insurgents and 

where they have access to licit economic opportunities. 

Meanwhile, coordinated interdiction efforts need to continue in order to increase 

the pressure and risk on narcotics networks that support the Taliban. The Department of Defense (DOD), in partnership with other U.S. departments and agencies, 

provides training, equipment, and infrastructure support to the Counternarcotics 

Police of Afghanistan in order to develop a more capable, effective, and self reliant 

force that can affect the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus. 

JULY 2011 TIMELINE FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL

27. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, on Sunday, General Petraeus described 

our operations in Marja as the ‘‘initial salvo’’ in a military campaign that could last 

12 to 18 months. President Obama has said, however, that he intends to start withdrawing our troops by July 2011, which is less than 18 months from now. Given 

the uncertainty we face regarding how long it may take to achieve our military objectives, and the even more difficult task of estimating how long it will take to restore and build government legitimacy and basic services in the areas we are clearing and holding, do we run the risk of running out of time for our military and civilian campaign plans if we adhere to plan to start drawing down troops by July 2011 

regardless of where we stand on the ground? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The July 2011 timeline is not an end date for U.S. and 

NATO involvement in Afghanistan. It represents the beginning of a process to transition the security lead to the ANSFs. This process will begin in districts and provinces that enjoy a high degree of security and adequate governance to preserve 

those conditions. As more secure provinces move through the transition process, the 

ISAF and the Afghan Government will have the opportunity to refocus resources to 

more contested regions such as Helmand province. 

28. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, where do you think the next phase of the 

longer campaign will be focused? 

General PAXTON. Following operations in Central Helmand, the next main effort 

for ISAF will be concentrated in Kandahar. Key districts and population centers in 

Kandahar will be the focus in executing the COIN campaign for the next 12–18 

months. 

29. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, how many more U.S. troops will be needed 

from the 30,000 increase to support this next phase? 

General PAXTON. Detailed planning is being conducted between ISAF and the 

ANSF with respect to the numbers and types of units needed for the next phase 

of the COIN campaign in Kandahar. However, current plans have an additional Brigade Combat Team (∼3.5K) deploying to Regional Command-South in support of 

these upcoming operations. 

30. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, when do you think this next phase will 

start? 

General PAXTON. It would be premature to give a specific timeline as plans are 

still being developed. With that said, future operations in Kandahar are projected 

34 

to begin when proper conditions have been set. We anticipate this will be the case 

in the summer of 2010 timeframe. 

TALIBAN RECRUITING GAINS

31. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, recent press reporting cites U.S. military 

intelligence forces as estimating that the Taliban have been able to build their 

strength by 35 percent over the past 2 years in the Afghan-Pakistan theater, up by 

7,000 more than in 2008 to about 27,000. The number of al Qaeda fighters is estimated to be about 600, moving between the two countries. What is your estimate 

of the Taliban troop strength in the Afghan-Pakistan theater? 

General PAXTON. While DIA acknowledges those numbers, our current policy is 

to not provide estimates of insurgent manpower in Afghanistan and we have low 

confidence in any such estimates given the fluid, dynamic, and multi-faceted nature 

of the threat. The number of active insurgent fighters fluctuates based on the time 

of the year, funds available, the operational activities of ISAF/Afghan forces, and 

a variety of local or regional factors. 

32. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, has the Taliban been as successful in recruiting as this article says? 

General PAXTON. The success of the Taliban’s recruiting efforts is largely dependent on the region in question. The Taliban is moderately successful in garnering 

local support in areas which are geographically excluded from the Afghan Government’s sphere of influence and contain higher concentrations of young, impoverished, Pashtun males. Taliban recruiters also deliberately target madrassas, or religious schools, inside Afghanistan. The Taliban separate the younger, more indoctrinated, male students at these schools and send them to Pakistan for specialized 

training, usually for the purpose of building a pool of available suicide bombers. 

33. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, according to the military intelligence official, the Taliban have taken advantage of the lack of security and government presence in the south and the lack of basic government services and has offered food 

and money. They have also made the point that, ‘‘We will still be here after the 

infidels have gone.’’ What is the plan to break the force of these recruiting tools? 

General PAXTON. We will continue to pursue our COIN-centric strategy throughout Afghanistan, but particularly in the south and where the Taliban have exploited 

a lack of security to intimidate local populations into complying with their demands. 

We will attempt to sever the Taliban’s hold in areas where they currently have influence, and facilitate GIRoA capacity in these areas. We must be vigilant in identifying and eliminating Taliban influence and prevent their return to these areas. 

DEFECTION OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL

34. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, late last week, the New York Times ran 

a story about 25 Afghan national police officers in Wardak province who are believed to have defected to the Taliban along with their equipment, which included 

trucks, machine guns, and other heavy weapons. Have you received any additional 

information about this incident? Was this a result of a dispute over pay as some 

have asserted, or rather an expression of sympathy/loyalty to the Taliban? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We were not aware of this incident. 

35. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe such incidents to be isolated events or part of a larger, systemic pattern of defection by ANSF as the U.S/ 

NATO offensive efforts increase? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. In a COIN fight such as in Afghanistan, incidents of security forces defecting would not be unusual—particularly among police and in insurgent strongholds with high levels of intimidation—as the goal of both sides is to win 

the support of the population. However, DOD does not see a systemic pattern of defections emerging within the ANSFs. 

DETENTION OF CAPTURED TALIBAN FIGHTERS

36. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, are we capturing significant numbers of 

Taliban fighters? If so, how many? 

General PAXTON. Presently we have 355 known Taliban (TB) in detention at the 

Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), and another 300 possible TB affiliates comprised of detainees identified by capturing units as Anti-Afghan Forces or Anti-CoaVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:18 Feb 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\64644.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
35 

lition Militia. We are constantly assessing these detainees to determine in which 

category they actually belong—Taliban or other. We currently have 655 in detention, of which we have confirmed 355 as Taliban. 153 of the 655 have been detained 

since December 2009, of which 37 were detained within the last month. 

37. Senator MCCAIN. General Paxton, NATO forces have been operating under the 

96-hour rule that requires an Afghan court to review the grounds for detaining a 

person and issue authority for detention beyond 96 hours. Have there been any 

problems complying with the 96-hour rule? 

General PAXTON. There has never been a requirement for Afghan courts to review 

a detention within 96 hours. The ISAF rule (from JFC-Brunssum) required that detainees be released or turned over to Afghan authorities within 96 hours of capture. 

COMISAF has the authority to grant an extension beyond 96 hours for exceptional 

circumstances (e.g., medical treatment or logistical/transportation issues preventing 

release). 

Recently, the Secretary of Defense authorized an exception to U.S. forces that fall 

under NATO operation control of ISAF. The first U.S. general/flag officer in the capturing unit’s chain-of-command may now approve detention for up to 14 days, if the 

detention might yield vital intelligence. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, where are Taliban being captured during the Marja operation being held? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The majority of individuals detained during the Marja operation have been either captured directly by ANSFs or transferred to ANSF by the 

ISAF in accordance with ISAF procedures within a few days of capture. Such individuals are typically held in the National Directorate for Security (NDS) facility in 

Lashkar Gah or are transferred to other NDS facilities because of capacity limitations at Lashkar Gah. Individuals captured by U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom 

forces who meet the criteria for detention are transferred to the U.S. Detention Facility in Parwan for detention consistent with the law of war. 

39. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, where is the court overseeing detention 

of captured Taliban during this operation? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The primary-level court in the Marja region is located in 

Lashkar Gah. Most detainees held at the NDS facility in Lashkar Gah would be 

tried in this court. It is my understanding that, in some cases, NDS transfers highlevel individuals to Kabul for detention and trial. 

U.S. AND AFGHAN TROOPS AND CASUALTIES

40. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many U.S. combat forces are involved in the offensive? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

41. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many are Afghans? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

42. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many troops are from NATO partners? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

43. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many U.S. casualties have there 

been? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

44. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many Afghan casualties have there 

been? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

45. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, how many NATO casualties have there 

been? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

46. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what is causing most of the casualties? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

36 

MEDICAL ISSUES

47. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, in March 2009, Secretary Gates directed 

that medical care and evacuation capabilities in Afghanistan achieve parity with 

those available in Iraq. Have we achieved that goal? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Medical care and evacuation capabilities in Afghanistan 

have achieved parity with those in Iraq. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have rigorously 

applied the Secretary of Defense’s 1-hour evacuation standard, from the time of incident to arrival at a resuscitative surgical care facility. Standardized data collection 

and reporting have been implemented with weekly reviews briefed at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Joint Staff level. Accordingly, medical facilities and 

evacuation assets were deployed as close as possible to the population at risk. The 

result was a substantial decline in the average evacuation times—which has been 

maintained at well under one hour since April 2009—and greatly improved access 

to definitive care by deployed U.S. forces. 

48. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what have we done to increase 

MEDEVAC and combat medical care in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [Deleted.] 

49. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, mild traumatic brain injury (TBI), or 

concussion, is a common occurrence in the field as a result of exposure to blast and 

vehicle accidents. Multiple concussions appear to greatly increase the risk of longterm injury and psychological problems. The committee has learned that new protocols are being developed by the Joint Staff to provide for continuous screening and 

evaluation TBI in the field. What guidance have the commanders in Afghanistan 

received concerning screening for brain injury in our fighting servicemembers? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. CENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual/Unit Deployment Policy dated September 10, 2008 (§ 15.K.4. B.1) delineates theater policy 

regarding blast injury protocols in which patients with possible exposure to a blast 

injury require an evaluation by a medical provider and annotation of the event in 

their medical records. In the near future, DOD-wide guidance will expand on these 

protocols. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will release a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) on ‘‘Policy Guidance for Management of Concussion/Mild Traumatic 

Brain Injury in the Deployed Setting.’’ The DTM will establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures on the medical management of mild TBI in the 

deployed setting for all leaders within DOD, servicemembers, and medical personnel 

engaged in ongoing DOD missions. It will standardize terminology, procedures, leadership actions, and medical management to provide maximum protection of those 

servicemembers. This document outlines mandatory evaluation and reporting requirements. CENTCOM will release a fragmentary order to implement this policy, 

directing unit-level leaders to screen servicemembers exposed to potentially concussive events and track/document the exposure. Additionally, CENTCOM will develop 

a potentially concussive event exposure module in its existing database of record 

used for reporting significant activities. 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Flournoy, what are the operational implications 

for servicemembers who continue to fight after having sustained a mild TBI, as well 

as those who may have sustained multiple injuries? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Current research demonstrates that there is an increased 

risk for persistent symptoms with multiple concussions. Per the draft DTM, ‘‘Policy 

Guidance for Management of Concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in the Deployed Setting,’’ and the latest in concussive injury research, servicemembers who 

may have been exposed to a concussive event undergo a Military Acute Concussion 

Evaluation. If the servicemember presents no symptoms, he or she is reevaluated 

and returned to duty. If a servicemember suffers repeated concussions within a certain timeframe, he or she undergoes a neurological evaluation by a qualified provider, neuro-imaging (if appropriate), a neuropsychological assessment by a psychologist, and a function assessment by an occupational or physical therapist. Once 

these assessments are completed, a neurologist determines the servicemember’s 

duty status, with one of the following dispositions: (1) Return the member to the 

United States; (2) Send the member outside the area of responsibility (AOR), but 

within the theater; (3) Maintain the member in the AOR, but restrict to a base; or 

(4) Return to full duty. 

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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