NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0441n.06 

 No. 16-4141 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

WEI FANG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney 

General, 

 Respondent. 

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 

FROM THE UNITED STATES 

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 

APPEALS 

 BEFORE: NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Wei Fang petitions this court for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. As set forth 

below, we deny the petition for review. 

 Fang, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection in 2007. 

Fang filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT), asserting that he and his wife violated the family planning 

policy in China and that she was forced to have an abortion. The Department of Homeland 

Security served Fang with a notice to appear in removal proceedings, charging him with 

removability as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. See

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Appearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Fang admitted the 

factual allegations contained in the notice to appear and conceded removability as charged. Fang 
No. 16-4141, Fang v. Sessions 

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subsequently supplemented his applications to assert his involvement with the Chinese 

Democracy Party (CDP) in the United States. 

 At the conclusion of the merits hearing, the IJ denied Fang’s applications for relief and 

ordered his removal to China. The IJ found that Fang was not credible and that he had failed to 

demonstrate eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. On appeal, the 

BIA, assuming Fang’s credibility, affirmed the denial of his applications on the merits. This 

court denied Fang’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. Fang v. Holder, 529 F. App’x 641 

(6th Cir. 2013). 

 Two years later, in July 2015, Fang filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings 

along with a new application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Fang 

asserted that, after his removal proceedings ended, he began to attend a Christian church and was 

baptized in April 2014. According to Fang, if he “is sent back to China and continues to practice 

Christianity[,] he will be arrested, detained, and beaten just like other members of the 

underground Christian Church.” To avoid the 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen, see 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(ii), Fang claimed a material worsening of conditions for Christians 

in China. 

 The BIA denied Fang’s motion to reopen. The BIA first determined that Fang’s motion 

was untimely and that he had failed to establish a material change in conditions for Christians in 

China since his January 2010 hearing as required to fall within the exception to the filing 

deadline. The BIA further noted that Fang had failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for 

relief. 

 This timely petition for review followed. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to 

reopen for an abuse of discretion. Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2009). We “will 

find an abuse of discretion if the denial of the motion to reopen ‘was made without a rational 
No. 16-4141, Fang v. Sessions 

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explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis 

such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.’” Id. at 490 (quoting 

Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005)). 

 A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day deadline does not apply if the motion 

to reopen is based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not 

available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 

 The BIA noted that Fang’s recent conversion to Christianity constituted a change in his 

personal circumstances, which, standing alone, was insufficient to fall within the exception for 

changed country conditions. See Liu, 560 F.3d at 492. The BIA went on to conclude that Fang 

had failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions for Christians in China since his 

January 2010 hearing before the IJ. In reaching that conclusion, the BIA compared the country 

reports submitted at the hearing with those submitted in support of Fang’s motion to reopen. 

Those reports showed continued tensions between the Chinese government and members of 

unregistered churches rather than a material change in country conditions. 

 Fang argues that the BIA “completely ignored” the 2013 annual report from the China 

Aid Association. Contrary to Fang’s argument, the BIA cited China Aid’s report on the basis 

that the report failed to show how Christians have been treated in Fang’s home province of 

Fujian. 

 Fang also contends that the BIA erred in narrowly interpreting the evidence necessary to 

show a change in country conditions, citing Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2011). In 

Vahora, the Ninth Circuit addressed the changed circumstances exception to the one-year 

deadline for filing an asylum application, which excuses the filing deadline if the applicant 
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demonstrates “the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s 

eligibility for asylum,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), stating that the exception was “intended to be 

broad.” 641 F.3d at 1045. Fang fails to explain why or how the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 

a different statutory exception would apply to his motion to reopen, especially when such 

motions are disfavored. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 

94, 107 (1988). 

 The BIA further determined that Fang had failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for 

any of the relief that he sought. A prima facie showing requires “evidence that reveals a 

reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied.” Alizoti v. 

Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To 

be eligible for asylum, Fang must establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his 

religion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B). As the BIA noted, Fang failed to 

explain how the Chinese authorities would become aware of his religious beliefs and activities. 

The BIA also pointed out that Fang’s background evidence showed mistreatment occurring 

outside his native province and involving church leaders, political activists, and other individuals 

not similarly situated to him. Moreover, Fang’s motion to reopen reflects an “attempt to 

manufacture a more perfect asylum application while living illegally in the United States,” 

changing the basis for relief from his wife’s forced abortion to his CDP activities and now to his 

religious conversion. Liu, 560 F.3d at 493. 

 Fang contends that the BIA ignored a report from the Australian Refugee Rights 

Alliance, which purportedly demonstrates that he will be persecuted if he returns to China. This 

report focuses on the adequacy of Australia’s refugee status determination process rather than the 

mistreatment of Christians in China. While the report states that “[t]here are now many cases of 

deportees being tortured upon their return to China,” the report does not provide the basis for 
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their refugee claims, where in China they returned to, or other information indicating that Fang is 

in “the exact same situation.” 

 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Fang’s motion to reopen. Accordingly, 

we DENY Fang’s petition for review.