Art of War Papers

Stabilizing the Debate between Population 

and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Success Demands a Balanced Approach

 Nathan Ray Springer, Major, US Army

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Stabilizing the Debate Between Population and Enemy-Centric 

Counterinsurgency

Success Demands a Balanced Approach

Nathan Ray Springer, Major, US Army

M.A., Naval Postgraduate School

B.A., Oklahoma State University

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stabilizing the Debate Between Population And Enemy-Centric 

Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach / by Nathan 

Ray Springer, Major, US Army.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index

 1. Counterinsurgency--Case studies. I. Title

 U241.S77 2013

 355.02’18--dc23

 2012050366

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover 

a wide variety of military history topics. The 

views expressed in this CSI Press publication are 

those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of 

the Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications 

available for downloading can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as 

an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official 

seal on any republication without the express written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Editor

C. Fischer

2012
iii

Abstract

This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a populationcentric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan 

detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the 

human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate 

should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial 

portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different 

from one AO to the next. Each extreme, whether focusing all effort on 

killing and capturing the enemy (enemy-centric) or partnering with and 

protecting the population from the enemy (population-centric) is unique 

to local conditions on the ground. “Centric” means to focus efforts only 

in one direction or the other. The “centric” banners must be dropped and 

the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both strategies 

and freeing commanders to use every available resource across the lines 

of effort in the concentrations he deems appropriate and conducive to 

his specific AO. The US is fighting a counterinsurgency that necessitates 

both the destruction of the enemy and the nurturing of the population. 

Counterinsurgency, as another form of warfare, must utilize all elements 

of national power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from 

a comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates 

that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced approach and 

providing the autonomy our commanders require to achieve success in 

their AOs is the most effective way to deal with counterinsurgencies now 

and in the future.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the 

student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army 

Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. 

(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as those 

in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining earlier 

military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected to show 

the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns throughout 

the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of understanding 

previous engagements in order to formulate policy and doctrinal response 

to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 
v

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, 

military or civil... is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make 

them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr.

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Commanding General

 CAC LD&E

Daniel Marston

DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

 in the Art of War

US Army Command & General 

 Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

The author is honored to have been a member of the class 11-01 

Art of War Scholars Program. Thank you to Dr. Marston and Dr. Hull, 

fellow scholar students, and the faculty and staff at the college for their 

assistance on this project. The author would also like to thank the military 

commanders, policy theorists, and government officials in both the US and 

UK for facilitating this process and contributing greatly to this author’s 

education and understanding of the difficult decisions our governments and 

militaries face when planning and executing counterinsurgency campaigns. 

The author would also like to thank the editor, Andrea Courtright, for her 

tireless effort reviewing and correcting grammatical errors while quickly 

returning each chapter, facilitating the completion timeline.

Finally, thank you to my wife and family for understanding why this 

project was so important to me. Without their support and understanding, 

I would not have completed this project in time. I undoubtedly recognize 

the sacrifice they made during a year that was supposed to be a leisurely 

one for all of us.
vii

Table of Contents

Objectives ................................................................................................ iv

Acknowledgments.................................................................................... vi

Table of Contents.................................................................................... vii

Acronyms...............................................................................................viii

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................ 1

Chapter 2. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, and the Classification

of ‘Centric’ Operations.............................................................................. 7

Chapter 3. Malaya: 1948 to 1960............................................................ 37

Chapter 4. Dhofar, Oman: 1965 To 1975................................................ 63

Chapter 5. Afghanistan: 2001 to Present................................................. 89

Chapter 6. Conclusion............................................................................117

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 123

Tables

Table 1. Conditions under which a general uprising

 can be effective ..................................................................................... 12

Table 2. How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed ............................ 14

Table 3. Strategy for Countering an Insurgency

 in a Selected Area.................................................................................. 27

Table 4. Strategic Principles of revolutionary and

 counter-revolutionary warfare............................................................... 28

Table 5. The Four Main Aims of the Briggs Plan ................................... 43

Table 6. Secretary of State for Colonies Oliver Lyttelton’s

 6 Point Malaya Strategy........................................................................ 48

Table 7. Lieutenant Colonel Watts “Five Front”

 Strategy for Operations in Dhofar, Oman............................................. 69

Table 8. Winning the War in Dhofar, Oman: The important features..... 78
viii

Acronyms

ANA Afghanistan National Army

ANP Afghanistan National Police

ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces

AO Area of Operation

ASP Afghanistan Solidarity Program

BATT British Army Training Team

CAS Close Air Support

CAT Civil Action Team

CENTCOM Central Command

CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program

COE Contemporary Operating Environment

COIN Counterinsurgency

COP Combat Outpost

DEV Development

DLF Dhofar Liberation Front

DOD Department of Defense

DSO Distinguished Service Order

DWEC District War Executive Committee

FOB Forward Operating Base

FWC Federal War Council

GOV Governance

GWOT Global War On Terrorism

IO Information Operations

ISAF International Security and Assistance Force

MC Military Cross

MCP Malayan Communist Party

MID Mentioned in Dispatches

MM Military Medal

MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army

MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

PDRY People’s Democratic Republic Yemen
ix

PFLOAG Popular Front Liberation Occupied Arab Gulf

PFLO Popular Front Liberation Oman

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

ROE Rules of Engagement

SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces

SAS Special Air Service

SEC Security

SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel

SWEC State War Executive Committee

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

USAID United States Agency International Development

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

All successful counterinsurgents have been willing and able to 

kill the enemy, often with great ruthlessness but all have clearly 

distinguished that enemy from the population in which it hides, 

have applied violence as precisely and carefully as possible, have 

acted scrupulously within the law, and have emphasized measures 

to protect and win over the population.

— David Kilcullen,

Counterinsurgency

Over the past 10 years of war in Afghanistan, a philosophical debate has 

emerged as to which counterinsurgency approach most readily produces 

favorable outcomes: population-centric or enemy-centric. Populationcentric counterinsurgency (COIN) touts partnering with and protecting the 

population from the enemy, whereas enemy-centric COIN emphasizes the 

importance of focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy.1

A third school of thought deems neither approach appropriate when 

executed in isolation, but advocates a balanced strategy customized for 

each area of operation’s dynamics. The debate over adopting a populationcentric versus an enemy-centric strategy is multidimensional, and not 

remotely black and white. It is grey. Each approach contains critical 

elements necessary to success. As David Kilcullen’s quotation indicates, 

successful counterinsurgents both aggressively pursue the enemy and 

protect the population, integrating both strategies.

This thesis examines the views of both the traditional and 

counterinsurgency war theorists and investigates three complex 

counterinsurgency campaigns in order to get to the heart of this debate 

and uncover the truths that will carry us forward in the years ahead. 

The war experience of the theorists coupled with the detailed analysis 

of counterinsurgency strategy in the Malaya, Oman, and Afghanistan 

campaigns provides evidence that integrating the enemy-centric and 

population-centric strategies into a balanced, hybrid approach affords 

counterinsurgents a real opportunity to succeed in the contemporary 

operating environment (COE).

Research Goal

The debate between an enemy-centric and population-centric 

counterinsurgency approach in the contemporary operating environment 
2

is a polarizing and ineffective one.2 The COE in Afghanistan is complex. 

Solutions necessarily get tailored to local areas, requiring vastly different 

approaches at the tactical level to achieve success. A strategy which 

yields a resounding victory in one enclave of Afghanistan may precipitate 

devastating defeat twenty miles over the next rise because, in this conflict, 

political landscape and context reign supreme. These approaches must 

constantly morph to outpace the enemy and account for the shifting 

attitudes within the population.

Commanders must have the clearance to tactically pivot to address 

counterinsurgent activities in each area of operation (AO) without fear of 

their actions being cherry picked to support the counterinsurgency theory 

of the day back home. Although there is constant thirst for a common 

solution to defeat the insurgency, there is no fail-safe solution to quench 

it.3

 Whether a commander focuses on the enemy, the population, or both is 

largely decided by local conditions at the time. Each area represents diverse 

challenges with respect to the local people, the enemy, governance, culture, 

and socio-economic conditions that require commanders to formulate 

specialized approaches to best address the situation in their areas. We 

must drop the “centric” banners from our lexicon and embrace a balanced 

campaign methodology. Integrate elements of national power, deliver 

assets from across the lines of effort (security, economy, development, 

governance, psychological) in the measured doses conducive to defeating 

the enemy while supporting the local population and each commander, at 

his respective echelon, and the counterinsurgency effort overall just might 

prevail. Finally, interventionist powers such as the US in Afghanistan must 

ensure its counterinsurgency strategy is aligned and nested with the host 

nation’s to facilitate its political end state.

Importance

This study’s findings illuminate a number of important issues. First, 

close examination of the war theorists’ work suggests the focus on the 

population and the enemy have never been mutually exclusive in war. 

The counterinsurgency campaigns in both Malaya and Dhofar, Oman 

demonstrate that if a strategy leans too heavily toward killing and capturing 

the enemy or favors the population to the exclusion of enemy pursuit, 

progress is hobbled.4

 The Malaya and Oman campaigns were specifically 

selected for this study because they are British campaigns conducted on 

vastly different scales. Malaya was highly organized and resourced while 

Oman was more decentralized with scarce resources. The juxtaposition 

of these conflicts offers a unique view of British application of national 
3

power. More importantly, Malaya was selected because U.S military circles 

often refer to it as an example of a population-centric, “Hearts and Minds,” 

campaign.5

 Once analyzed in greater depth the evidence is much greyer, 

suggesting success against the insurgency emerged only once a balanced 

strategy that leveraged intelligence-driven offensive operations against the 

enemy while simultaneously integrating other resources across the lines of 

effort in the appropriate weighted way conducive to the local area and time 

was attained. Oman was selected because, within the US, it is not a well 

known COIN campaign. It was small scale but offered lessons similar to 

Malaya’s, particularly in terms of the formulating strategy, even though 

these counterinsurgencies took place within vastly different contexts 

and political landscapes. A balanced strategy integrating all resources 

across the lines of effort, both in support of the population and against the 

insurgency, appears to have been effective in these historical case studies.

In Afghanistan, it took nearly nine years of war to attain some 

semblance of a balanced approach after initially adopting an enemycentric approach, changing course to a population-centric strategy, and 

finally rebalancing tactical efforts to include a hybrid approach. While the 

war is not over and it does not seem that victory is over the horizon, the 

current balanced approach offers the most flexibility for success there. 

The crucial point in this study is that there is no panacea for success in 

countering an insurgency.

The strategies that facilitated the quickest path to defeating the 

respective insurgencies or forced a political solution were balanced; 

however, each case study was different due to the context of the forces 

arrayed on both sides of the campaign. The counterinsurgents mobilized 

elements of national power and both utilized resources against the 

insurgency and in support of the population, based on local conditions. 

When the approach is combined, balanced, and synchronized to address 

sociological dynamics on the ground, a counterinsurgency strategy is 

created that offers the most promising way ahead. A commander cannot say 

what his winning strategy will look like when he first arrives to his post and 

he should not promote his unique approach as a fix-all upon his successful 

mission completion. These issues are complicated and their resolution 

depends heavily upon intuitive and responsive strategy development. The 

need for adaptive officers capable of applying unique balanced approaches 

weighted appropriately to fit their respective AOs is critical to success. We 

are only as effective as our commanders’ assessments of their AOs. The 

U.S military, policy makers and strategists should rethink their narratives 

and possibly abandon the “centric” narrative because it complicates 
4

forging ahead with a balanced strategy that gives commanders at every 

level the necessary autonomy to accomplish their missions and expedite a 

political solution.

Thesis Overview:

This thesis consists of six major sections. Chapter 1 contains the 

research goal, importance and thesis overview. Chapter 2 reviews both 

traditional and counterinsurgency war theorists. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 consist 

of the case studies of Malaya, Oman, and the contemporary operating 

environment (COE) in Afghanistan, respectively. Chapter 6 synthesizes 

and analyzes the case studies in order to recommend a way ahead and 

highlight the best counterinsurgency approach for use in the COE. Finally, 

the bibliography section contains the research methodology and an 

alphabetical listing of sources by last name in each respective periodical 

type.
5

Notes

1. There is no published definition for either population-centric or enemycentric counterinsurgency in US doctrine. In the absence of these definitions, the 

following definition is offered: Population-centric COIN focuses on partnering 

with and protecting the population from the enemy. While enemy destruction is 

still important, it is secondary to population protection. Enemy-centric COIN focuses effort on the killing and capturing of the enemy while population protection 

is of secondary importance. 

2. To better understand the debate between population and enemy-centric 

COIN, read the ISAF tactical directives describing the implementation of population-centric COIN including, “Tactical Directive,” Kabul, AF: International Security and Assistance Force, July 6, 2009 and the “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” International Security Assistance Force, August 26, 2009. 

Also read Binard Finel’s “A substitute for Victory,” in Foreign Affairs, April 8, 

2010; that supports population-centric COIN as the strategy in Afghanistan. To 

understand both arguments against population-centric COIN and for an enemycentric approach, read Colonel Gian Gentile’s “A Strategy of Tactics: Populationcentric COIN and the Army,” in Parameters, Autumn 2009 and Colonel Craig 

Collier’s “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn,” Military Review, 

September-October 2010.

3. The case studies will clearly prove that there is no silver-bullet approach 

that produces immediate success in counterinsurgency. 

4. Review chapter 3 and 4, Malaya and Oman respectively, for a more nuanced understanding of how the strategies evolved from an approach heavily focused on killing the enemy to a more balanced approach integrating all resources 

available, effectively isolating and destroying the insurgency while partnering 

with and protecting the civilian population. 

5. Read Colonel Gian Gentile’s “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric 

COIN and the Army,” in Parameters, Autumn 2009, 6 or look at the US Army’s 

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Manual, which discusses “true” definition of hearts 

and minds on page A-5. 

7

Chapter 2

Insurgency And Counterinsurgency, and the Classification of 

‘Centric’ Operations

Revolutionaries will have to start from nothing. Starting from 

nothing initially requires organization. Secretly, the revolutionaries 

have to organize, first, cells and then, extensive networks of 

conspiracy. Around the cells they must build political propaganda 

groups to win popular support and teams of terrorists to intimidate 

where propaganda fails. They will organize fronts, parties, and 

pressure groups to mobilize the popular support. Agents will be 

infiltrated into the administration, armed forces, police, labour 

unions and other power centres. Intelligence networks will 

be established. . . . All cracks in the social and administrative 

structures will be magnified and exploited. 

— John McCuen,

The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

This chapter analyzes the theory of warfare, insurgency, and 

counterinsurgency as described by both the classical and contemporary 

theorists. The definition of both insurgency and counterinsurgency will 

establish a common understanding prior to the review and analysis of the 

theorists’ methodologies. The theorists assert that in every war, regardless 

of whether the conflict is a conventional war or a counterinsurgency, all 

elements of national strategy (political, economic, social, governmental, 

and psychological) are utilized. The theorists’ volumes of research prove 

there is no ‘centric’ side of war; thus the debate between the populationcentric and the enemy-centric camps is neither valid nor black and white. 

War is war. It requires the application of different elements of national 

power to suit the local situation. The current debate will be presented 

on counterinsurgency strategy executed in Afghanistan between the 

population and enemy centric camps through the lens of the theorists.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Definitions

Insurgency and subversion are not a new phenomenon. The last 

decade of conflict has forced the United States and other countries to reexamine the capability of modern groups, how to deal with insurgents, and 

to re-evaluate its own capacity to counter these movements. A thorough 

examination of the historical counterinsurgency theorists’ assertions, 

below, has led me to Sir General Frank Kitson’s widely agreed upon 

definition of insurgency and subversion.1
8

Defining both insurgency and subversion separately provides the most 

comprehensive definition available.

Subversion, then, will be held to mean all measures short of the use of 

armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow 

those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which 

they do not want to do. It can involve the use of political and economic 

pressure, strikes, protest marches, propaganda, and can also include the use 

of small-scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members 

of the population into giving support. Insurgency will be held to cover the 

use of armed force by a section of the people against the government for 

the purposes mentioned above.2

Where an insurgency brews there is often a counterinsurgency effort, 

waged by the ruling government party, group in charge, an interventionist 

power, or a combination of players. Although many conflicts between 

insurgents and counterinsurgents begin because of deep asymmetries 

between the two, there is often great commonality in the strategies each must 

pursue to win or reach a settlement.3 The insurgents and counterinsurgents 

find themselves competing for many of the same goals such as the right to 

govern, the support of the population, and control of resources and economic 

opportunities. Some insurgencies are regionally based and simply desire 

the central government or ruling power to stay out of their areas and not 

exert state control over their people.4 Counterinsurgency is best defined by 

David Kilcullen5

 as “an umbrella term that describes the complete range 

of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies. These measures 

may be political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or 

informational, and are almost always used in combination.”6

Foundations of Warfare Theory

The foundation of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory share the 

same roots that all types of warfare share. Sun-Tzu, a Chinese Military 

General who wrote The Art of War twenty five centuries ago, described the 

principles of warfare then as eloquently as anyone could today. Sun-Tzu 

understood the political process was the most important aspect of warfare 

and that armed conflict only came after all other avenues had been explored 

and exhausted. National political cohesion could only be achieved “under 

a government which was devoted to the people’s welfare and did not 

oppress them....war [was inextricably linked] to the immediate political 

process.”7

 He believed in the power of negotiation and reaching consensus 

to reach the political and military objective prior to war. He stated “[if] 

the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, 
9

and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain 

success.”8 After a concerted effort to avoid armed conflict using all other 

means available, be it political, economic, psychological, or deceptive, 

armed aggression became necessary to achieve the will of the state or 

ruler. “Armed force . . . was applied so that victory was gained: (1) in the 

shortest time possible; (2) at the least possible cost in lives and effort; (3) 

with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties.”9

Sun-Tzu highlights popular support as an essential foundation for a 

nation’s success in war. Although he discusses popular support in context 

as related to the ruling party or nation, this truth is obviously essential 

to both the insurgent or counterinsurgent camps. He understood the 

importance of intelligence as he launched agents to infiltrate his foes; 

speed and surprise exploited his enemies’ vulnerability. Sun-Tzu knew 

the commanders’ capacity to adapt quickly to changing situations and 

operating environments was crucial. He determined whether to wage war 

by carefully considering foes’ relative strengths and capabilities and he 

scrutinized the following five areas: “human (morale and generalship), 

physical (terrain and weather), and doctrinal.”10 Unless his Army was 

clearly superior in all five arenas, Sun-Tzu avoided war.

Antoine-Henri Jomini, a French General who served in both the 

French and Russian militaries from 1798 until his retirement in 1829, 

was a celebrated military strategist who analyzed the Napoleonic way 

of war which many credit as establishing the framework for western war 

structure. Unlike Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz, who closely analyzed the 

theory of war, Jomini focused on the science of war, the synchronization 

of the battlefield, and the tactical and operational mechanical maneuvers 

and coordination of military forces against the enemy. This is reinforced as 

Jomini discussed the nature of the art of war. “The art of war, independently 

of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: 

Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the 

Art of the Engineer.”11

Many of the basic tactical and operational maneuver lessons and 

mechanisms Jomini branded, especially in the “first half of the 19th

Century,”12 such as operating from interior lines, protecting lines of 

communication, combined arms synchronization, offensive order of battle 

and defensive engagement area development, heavily influence Western 

and US doctrine today. Jomini understood the critical interplay of political 

strategy and warfare. He states there is an “intimate connection between 

statesmanship and war in its preliminaries, [and] in most campaigns 

some military enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, 
10

sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. They frequently lead 

to the commission of great errors in strategy.”13 If political objectives and 

military strategy are not harmonious, the campaign effort is doomed from 

the start.

We may place the passions of the nation to be fought, their military 

system, their immediate means and their reserves, their financial resources, 

the attachment they bear to their government or their institutions, the 

character of the executive, the characters and military abilities of the 

commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet councils or councils 

of war at the capital upon their operations, the system of war in favor with 

their staff, the established force of the state and its armament, the military 

geography and statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, 

the resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of 

which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.14

Although Jomini’s description points to another state in his analysis of 

determining whether or not to go to war, the principles regarding political 

objectives and military calculations are the same today whether we are 

planning a conventional war or a counterinsurgency effort.15

Jomini does discuss insurgency in his book The Art of War; however, 

he describes it through the lens of his time as an internal uprising of the 

population because of “political or religious sectarianism.”16 He states, 

“Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally 

the result of a conflict of opinions. . . . Governments may in good faith 

intervene to prevent the spreading of a political disease whose principles 

threaten social order.”17 The important point here is that nowhere in 

Jomini’s book Art of War does he attempt to classify internal conflict or 

intervention on behalf of another state as anything but war. All flavors 

and levels of war require a political strategy and support and the means to 

accomplish the political and military objectives.

Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian General who served in both the 

Prussian and Russian military from 1792 until his death in 1831, is credited 

with writing On War, originally published in 1874, which stands as the 

Western world’s foremost illustration of the philosophy of war. Clausewitz 

famously states “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, 

with the addition of other means.”18 His description and application of the 

principles and theories of war have served as a guidepost for some Western 

militaries since On War was published and have been aptly applied in 
11

all types of warfare whether total or against a “general uprising.”19. As 

Sun-Tzu believed, Clausewitz understood the importance of mass, speed, 

surprise, cunning, and the flexibility and mental acuity of leaders in war. 

He warns against blind compliance with doctrine, noting that each war, 

each area of operation, is different with unique circumstances to consider. 

He accurately asserts that the study of theory, rather than a reliance on 

doctrine, is critically important to the development and education of a 

leader and can be better applied to the changing nature of warfare in the 

future.

We must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct 

a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the 

commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back 

on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict 

with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to 

the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate 

outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice.20

Clausewitz, in the 19th Century, understood the emerging phenomenon 

of modern insurgency in Europe. He believed “a general insurrection 

[was] simply another means of war.”21 He understood that if an insurgency 

was to be successful, it needed time, space, sanctuary, and dispersion to 

cultivate popular support, to arm and train its members, and to increase in 

strength. He realized that an insurgency was best put down at its inception 

and, if overlooked, a popular uprising could become a real threat to the 

state.

No matter how brave a people is, how warlike its traditions, how great 

its hatred for the enemy, how favorable the ground on which it fights: 

the fact remains that a national uprising cannot maintain itself where the 

atmosphere is too full of danger . . . if its fuel is to be fanned into a major 

conflagration, it must be at some distance, where there is enough air, and 

the uprising cannot be smothered by a single smoke.22

Clausewitz describes the most effective route to success for an 

insurgency facing a more powerful enemy is to attack supply lines in the 

rear while disallowing itself to be decisively engaged, only concentrating 

force on vulnerable formations, remaining both transitory and illusory 

all the while. “The element of resistance will exist everywhere and 

nowhere.”23 He describes the conditions that must exist to enable an 

insurgency’s success.
12

Table 1. Conditions under which a general uprising can be effective

1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.

2. It must not be decided by a single stroke.

3. The theater of operations must be fairly large.

4. The national character must be suited to that type of war.

5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, of 

forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.

Source: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 

480.

Just as Clausewitz prescribed enduring principles of war that hold 

true today, he also clearly established that war is war; a popular uprising 

or insurgency is no different. Each conflict is unique, forcing a state to 

apply different means in each to regain control and defeat the threat. One 

must “act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself 

no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of 

his political purpose.”24 Whether the state finds itself engaged in total 

or limited war against another state, or against a general uprising of the 

population, it must apply means to counter the threat to win the conflict or 

force a settlement. Every war in history has proven that.

Sun-Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz each approach the concept of warfare 

differently. Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz focus on the theory of war while 

Jomini describes the more rigid doctrine and science of war. Even though 

these theorists’ perspectives were shaped through varied experiences, 

cultures, and in the case of Sun-Tzu, vastly disparate timeframes, each 

acknowledges that the conduct of war is connected to political objectives. 

They all discuss the potential for insurrection, popular uprising, or 

insurgency to develop. More importantly, they do not classify these 

conditions as anything other than war. Sun-Tzu states “As water has no 

constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.”25 He understood 

the support of the population was necessary in any conflict and a general 

uprising of the people could be disastrous. He grasped that each conflict 

was different, possessing its own unique context that describes war. Jomini 

also describes war and politics as inseparable and links “Diplomacy in its 

relation to War. . . . It enters into all the combinations which may lead to a 

war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken.”26

He points to the threat of internal uprising, or intestine wars, and simply 

warns it is another type of war. Finally, Clausewitz discusses the potential 

for insurgency, directly addressing the debate on whether or not to commit 
13

the state’s forces to quell an insurgency. “The resources expended in an 

insurrection might be put to better use in other kinds of warfare.”27 To 

these classical theorists, war, no matter how big or small, is simply war.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theorists

The Insurgency Camp

Insurgencies, popular uprisings, and revolutions have increased 

dramatically since the end of the Second World War. There are a number 

of mutually supporting theories that explain why. The first theory suggests 

the “crumbling of European empires under colonial and even domestic 

assault, and the rapid appearance amidst the imperial ruins of new successor 

states,”28 have fueled the conditions for insurgency and revolution. 

Internal and external conflict naturally occur as a result of independent 

states emerging from colonial rule and struggling to establish their own 

identities and governments. This, coupled with globalization and rapid 

advancements in technology including nuclear weapons, has essentially 

shrunk the world. Today traditional powers going to war with one another 

must weigh the benefit against the inherently dear costs of such action. 

“Globalisation changed the nature of the conflict area, strengthening some 

actors, weakening others and altering the conditions of the conflict between 

government forces and insurgents to favour the latter.”29 There is not one 

theory that is wholly responsible for the rise in subversion and insurgency 

throughout the world as each conflict area has its own unique history.

It is hard to think of a greater revolutionary leader than Mao Tse-Tung. 

Mao, a military leader and member of China’s communist party, used the 

principles of Sun-Tzu to create the foundation for his concept of guerrilla 

warfare, described in his book On Guerrilla Warfare, mobilizing the 

local Chinese population to achieve victory over the Chinese Nationalist 

Party in 1949. Mao’s real genius was displayed “in Indochina, where the 

Vietnamese waged a revolutionary struggle against the French from 1941 

to 1954.”30 It is from this conflict, and the refinements later made by Giap, 

who is discussed in detail in the coming pages, from which the concept 

of “Maoism” is best understood. 31 Mao appreciated the importance of 

mobilizing the local population and garnering their political support around 

a rallying political objective. His concept of guerrilla warfare, which we 

would now refer to as insurgency, was not a purely military affair. His 

strategy involved a wide range of social, psychological, political, and 

military components working in unity with each other. Mao understood 

that once he had the popular and political support of the people, he could 

then begin to organize them into active guerrilla units to carry out the 

military phase of his strategy.
14

Table 2. How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed

The unit may originate in any one of the following ways:

a) From the masses of the people.

b) From regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose.

c) From regular army units permanently detailed.

d) From the combination of the regular army unit and a unit 

recruited from the local people.

e) From the local militia.

f) From deserters from the ranks of the enemy.

g) From former bandits and bandit groups.

Source: Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Publishers, 

1961), 71-72.

Mao’s military strategy is most recognized for his unique three-phased 

approach. It is important to understand that Mao’s three phases did not 

progress sequentially in time and space. The progression, or regression, of 

the phases were a direct reflection of enemy strength, activity, and strategy 

and would be adjusted to best counter it.

The first phase ought to consist of isolated hit-and-run attacks against 

enemy forces, with the aim of weakening and demoralizing them. The 

second phase would witness the consolidation of guerrilla power in 

some remote, outlying and difficult area to access; from there they would 

continue their work of propaganda, harassment and sabotage . . . the third 

phase of their campaign, would resort to open warfare.32

Mao considered the support of the local population throughout each 

of the phases. He directed his fighters to work under a strict and honorable 

code when dealing with civilians. They had to be perceived by the locals 

as the better future alternative to the existing government structure. Mao 

also released strict guidelines on the treatment of enemy personnel. He 

believed they had to be treated with dignity and respect; they were a 

potential asset to use against the enemy still in the field.33

Mao’s three-phased military strategy was one of the most effective 

guerrilla strategies ever implemented. As important as it was, the military 

strategy could not have been successful without first mobilizing the 

population and garnering local political support. “The political goal 

must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones 
15

and their national consciousness awakened.”34 Mao clearly surmised 

that the strategy was not purely military. It was critical to maintain the 

people’s support, using all means available to him, whether enacting local 

government, social, economic, political or military means.35

General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese People’s Army leader, 

credited with assisting in the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 the French 

in Vietnam in 1954, was heavily influenced by Sun Tzu and Mao in his 

approach to guerrilla warfare.36 After expelling the Japanese from China 

in 1945, General Giap, together with Ho Chi Mihn, turned his attention 

to the defeat of the French.37 Giap led a protracted insurgent campaign 

that culminated with the massive defeat of French forces at Dien Bien 

Phu in May of 1954. Giap stated “ the Dien Bien victory is the most 

prestigious which our Army has ever achieved . . . we have expanded our 

zone of resistance and further contributed to the success of land reform . 

. . In the name of the Army I warmly thank all the porters and the whole 

population.”38

General Giap’s view, comparable to Mao, recognized the importance 

of the local population’s political and social support. He understood 

the victory against the French was not the result of a purely military 

strategy. He had orchestrated total war that required all of the elements 

at his disposal to work in conjunction for victory. He leveraged local 

governance and social reform, psychological operations, and convinced 

the local population they were better off without French interference to 

achieve active popular support. As the French gave up their aspirations in 

Indochina, fueled by the loss at Dien Bien Phu, Giap’s reputation among 

the people grew exponentially.39

When the US combat formations entered Vietnam in 1965, Giap 

already had over a decade of experience leading guerrilla movements. 

Armed with his vast experience, he devised a strategy based on Mao’s 

three-phased approach to defeat the US Phase one of the strategy included 

“a general offensive against South Vietnamese cities.”40 The idea was 

that the South Vietnamese military would be forced to protect the cities, 

leaving the rural areas open for the Viet Cong to easily influence. In the 

second phase, if “the general offensive failed, Viet Cong troops would 

retreat, surrounding the cities and villages to create a chaotic situation, 

to exhaust the economy.”41 Simultaneously, Viet Cong forces would 

concentrate their efforts on specific areas, forcing the US to reinforce those 

areas leaving other areas more vulnerable to attack. In the final phase, the 

North Vietnamese would initiate a large scale attack that would catch the 

US off balance. Giap believed the first two phases of the campaign would 
16

cause such turmoil that a successful large scale attack, timed appropriately, 

would force political settlement. The important aspect of the strategy was 

that the phases were not sequential and were wedded to the action of the 

enemy.42

General Giap launched the Tet Offensive in January 1968. The 

offensive had a psychological effect in the United States although his 

Army had an unsustainable casualty rate against the Americans. The scale 

of the attack was “spectacular enough to dominate television attention 

long enough to make an impact of strength on the American public. . . . By 

overrunning the towns. . . . Giap shattered what confidence many people 

had left in American power to win a military victory in Vietnam.”43 The 

political situation on both sides was complicated after the Tet offensive. 

Giap would face harsh criticism for the large casualty toll inflicted on his 

forces as a result of Tet and subsequently lose political power in Hanoi.

Although the The Tet offensive ultimately proved to be a political 

victory for the Communists, militarily it was a disaster. Heavy losses led 

the Communists to withdraw some of their major units to remote base 

camps and cross-border sanctuaries far from South Vietnam’s population 

centers. . . .Ironically, the Communist offensive had achieved what MACV 

had only imperfectly accomplished after three years of effort-it had driven 

the main force units back and weakened the remaining guerrillas to the 

extent that pacification could finally move forward.44

It would take years for the psychological effect that the offensive 

had on the American psyche to be realized; however, Giap’s objective to 

decrease US public opinion would prove to have been successful over 

time.45 The US had won the battle but the violent images of Tet back in 

the US strengthened the veracity of the anti-war debate and resulted in 

a wholesale change of leadership in the US Army. Giap’s three-phased 

strategy framework would be carried on by subsequent commanders. 

Although the war would rage on for seven more years, the framework, 

coupled with the support of the population and an effective propaganda 

campaign, would ultimately drive the US to leave in 1975.

Mao Tse-Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap executed more than just military 

strategies. They both showed great expertise by utilizing all elements 

at their disposal to achieve their political and military objectives. They 

garnered support from the local populations in the rural areas, inserted 

local governance, and employed propaganda to strengthen their positions. 

They understood the necessity to maintain popular support, only using 

coercive tactics against the locals when absolutely necessary. They realized 
17

the limits of their guerrilla forces and avoided large-scale conflict with the 

enemy. Their military forces chose when and where they fought. They 

maintained the initiative in the field against a larger and more powerful 

foe. Most importantly, they did not lose sight of their political objectives 

and utilized all elements of their national power to achieve victory.

The British Counterinsurgency Camp

The British have a wealth of experience fighting protracted 

counterinsurgency campaigns, especially since the end of World War 

II. In an analysis of British counterinsurgency campaigns between 1945 

and 2011, the British have been actively involved in counterinsurgency 

efforts each of those years, many times executing multiple campaigns 

simultaneously. These campaigns include Greece, Palestine, Aden, 

Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Oman, Malaya, Northern Ireland, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan.46 The British experience has highlighted the degree of 

government involvement necessary for integration with the military in 

counterinsurgency campaigns. It provided numerous case-studies of both 

successful and non-successful campaigns that contribute important lessons 

for governments that face insurgencies in the future. Close examination 

of the British experience can prevent future counterinsurgency programs 

from repeating the same mistakes and, at the same time, provide instructive 

lessons. “There is no easy or quick answer as to how to defeat insurgents, 

but much can be learned from a study of the many campaigns that have 

occurred in the past.”47 To wit, a number of British counterinsurgency 

theorists have emerged throughout these conflicts contributing a wealth of 

applicable theory.

It is difficult to find a theorist with as much experience as Sir General 

Frank Kitson. Kitson, a professional Army soldier and counterinsurgent 

theorist who served in the British Army for 40 years serving “in four 

separate operational theaters: Kenya, Malaya, Oman, and Cyprus,”48

has greatly influenced western counterinsurgency theory and practice. 

Among his numerous publications, he contributed two books dedicated to 

counterinsurgency, Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five. Kitson’s 

book, Bunch of Five, adds important counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTPs), describing in detail the four counterinsurgency 

campaigns he navigated that illuminate the context necessary to understand 

the lessons he learned, which he had explained in his earlier book, Low 

Intensity Operations.

Kitson has the innate ability to analyze theory and transform it into 

a palatable framework practitioners can evaluate for future application. 
18

Kitson believes one must address four critical areas when planning to 

counter an insurgency. He equates these four areas with the four sides of 

a picture frame, describing how each side must work in conjunction with 

the others to stay bound together. ”The first requirement for a workable 

campaign is good coordinating machinery.”49 At all levels of command 

a functioning, cohesive team understands it takes all of the government’s 

resources, political, economic, developmental, or psychological, working 

in unison to achieve the desired end state. He describes insurgency as 

another form of warfare. “The main characteristic which distinguishes 

campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily 

concerned with the struggle for men’s minds.”50 In each campaign Kitson 

fought, the local situation and context dictated how the lethal and nonlethal resources at his disposal were applied.

The second part of the framework is “establishing the sort of political 

atmosphere within which the government measures can be introduced with 

the maximum likelihood of success.”51 The one advantage the government 

has over the insurgency is its resources. In most cases the insurgency 

simply cannot compete with the government’s ability to spend. This 

advantage makes it critically important for the government to analyze the 

second and third order effects of each measure it introduces and creates an 

environment in which each measure has the highest potential for success. 

These measures include everything from security initiatives, economy, 

development, or psychological operations. Kitson clearly recognized 

the difficulty in understanding local area contexts and how each mix of 

government measures would work differently in each area. For this to be 

successful, Kitson called upon reform in training the Officer Corps. He 

called for “generally increasing the time allocated to teaching countersubversion and counter-insurgency in schools and colleges throughout the 

army.”52

The third piece of the frame was intelligence. “It is absolutely 

necessary to understand the fact that the main responsibility for developing 

background information rests with operational commanders and not with 

the intelligence organization.”53 Kitson devotes a significant proportion 

of his writings to how units at all levels must reform their intelligence 

organizations to suit local conditions and provide the appropriate 

intelligence support at the most important and relevant levels. Traditionally, 

intelligence organizations are constructed to provide the weight of 

the intelligence from the top down. Kitson agrees that information and 

intelligence at the top is important but he also recognizes the critical need 

for intelligence at the lower levels to support every echelon of command. 
19

In a number counterinsurgency and counter-subversion environments, 

intelligence at the local level is critical to the success of the campaign. “The 

intelligence organization must enlarge itself rapidly, must decentralize in 

order to give security force commanders at every level access to it, and 

must change its methods of working so as to produce the different sort of 

information that operational forces need.”54

The last aspect of Kitson’s framework involves the law, which is 

critical to enabling all of the government efforts to function as intended. 

Western countries follow strict laws and guidelines, such as the Geneva 

Convention, that govern how they will conduct themselves and operate in 

a campaign. Breaking the law is out of the question; however, changing 

the law to support the counterinsurgency effort and minimize insurgent 

advantage is encouraged. “It is therefore perfectly normal for governments 

not only to introduce Emergency Regulations as an insurgency progresses, 

but also to counter advantages which the insurgents may derive from.”55

Operate inside the confines of the law but change it to give the strategy 

you are implementing the best chance of success.

Kitson’s understanding of the unique requirements at each level of 

command within a counterinsurgency environment makes his work timeless. 

Few theorists can provide both the conceptual lessons and the pragmatic, 

tactical and operational application, or ways, for practitioners to approach 

campaigns. Kitson stresses that the business of counterinsurgency is not 

easy and requires considerable study by those involved. Commanders 

must understand that different sets of skills are required for both them 

and their subordinates in a counterinsurgency environment. Even so, 

most commanders train their units for the conventional war and convince 

themselves it is enough.

Traditionally a soldier is trained and conditioned to be strong, 

courageous, direct, and aggressive, but when men endowed with these 

qualities become involved in fighting subversion they often find that their 

good points are exploited by the enemy...Gradually the more intelligent 

officers find themselves developing a new set of characteristics such as 

deviousness, patience, and a determination to outwit their opponents by 

all means compatible with the achievement of the aim.56

Kitson understood that war primarily involving subversion and 

insurgency was a different kind of war, but it was war. It required the 

counterinsurgents to conceptualize and approach it differently.

Sir Robert Thompson served both as a district administrator in the 

Malaya Emergency in the 1950’s and as an advisor to the US military 
20

and South Vietnamese government in the early 1960’s. Thompson’s 

primary contribution to counterinsurgency theory is his book, Defeating 

Communist Insurgency, which he published in 1966 after completing his 

assignment in Vietnam. Thompson’s views on insurgency are heavily 

influenced by his experiences witnessing communist backed insurgencies 

in Malaya and Vietnam. He cites the root causes of the insurgencies in 

Malaya and Vietnam as a result of “anti-colonialism”57 in Malaya and 

“anti-imperialism”58 in Vietnam. He spends a considerable amount of time 

explaining how insurgencies take root among populations and how they 

spread. Similar to Kitson, he warns that insurgent intimidation, directed 

violence, and propaganda heavily influence the actions of the masses 

and that the government or intervening authority must do all within its 

power to separate the people and the insurgency before it generates a large 

popular support base and gains strength.

Thompson offers five principles for governments that must organize 

to face insurgencies. The first is that the “government must have a clear 

political aim; to establish and maintain a free, independent and united 

country which is politically and economically stable and viable.”59 The 

government’s political objective and the associated unity of effort required 

to achieve it are critically important for success. Equally important is the 

government’s willingness to address the grievances of the insurgency and 

be open to political compromise. As we will see in our case studies, political 

compromise is a critical component in successful counterinsurgency 

campaigns such as Malaya and Dhofar, Oman, discussed at length in the 

coming chapters. Thompson names three factors that influence the citizens 

of a nation, “nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, 

material well-being and progress.”60 The population wants to be associated 

with the side they believe will be prosperous, victorious, and offer the best 

social and economic alternative for the future.

The second principle is that the “government must function in 

accordance with the law.”61 As with Kitson, Thompson places great emphasis 

on the criticality of the government operating within the confines of the 

law. He re-emphasizes the point that the law should not inhibit operations 

but, rather, facilitate them. If the laws in place impede the government’s 

ability to succeed, those laws must be changed. In the British tradition, 

this was dealt with by enacting emergency laws and regulations for the 

duration of the conflict. New laws in the form of emergency regulations 

could range from draconian to empowering. The most important lesson 

Thompson learned when applying emergency regulations was “each new 

law must be effective and fairly applied.”62
21

The third principle states “The government must have an overall 

plan. This plan must cover not just the security measures and military 

operations. It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, 

police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency.”63

The integration of the civilian authorities executing many of the political, 

social, and administrative activities with the military executing security 

and aspects of all the other measures is, at the least, difficult. If unity of 

effort is not achieved, a cohesive plan that avoids “duplication of effort” 

between civilian and military authorities is not possible.64

The fourth principle dictates “the government must give priority to 

defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas.”65 It is obviously 

important to destroy guerilla forces whenever making contact with them. 

The hard part is actually finding them as the guerillas avoid pitched battles 

with better armed government forces. What the government can do, and 

do very successfully, is to regain the lost influence they had within the 

population and win back the villages, towns, and cities by placing great 

weight on the establishment of responsive local and regional governance. 

A responsive government, backed by a hefty purse, can bring tangible 

services to areas in a way insurgents simply cannot. This is significant. As 

the government directs its efforts to bolster local governance and services, 

the insurgency will begin to lose its hold on the local population. Lose the 

local political support of the population and the insurgents’ power wanes.66

The fifth principle states “In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, 

a government must secure its base areas first.”67 The military forces 

must guard against getting spread too thin. A viable security force must 

be established to repel insurgent attacks against each installation the 

government possesses. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, 

whether through the training of local indigenous forces to serve as a 

home guard, host nation security forces, or police. Thompson goes on to 

describe that securing these base areas is important enough to execute even 

if it means allowing the insurgency to retain freedom of maneuver in the 

remote areas. If the government forces are not large or powerful enough to 

control the entire area, it is vital military forces stake their ground where 

the most concentrated population of people is located in order to have 

the greatest impact on the political, social, and economic direction of the 

country.68

Dr. John Mackinlay, a 20-year British Army officer and contemporary 

counterinsurgency theorist, made a significant contribution to 

counterinsurgency theory with the publication of his book, The Insurgent 

Archipelago, in 2009. Mackinlay believes the world has entered a new 
22

era of insurgency, a post-Maoist world. Globalization and technology 

have mingled to form a breeding ground for subversion and insurgent 

mobilization. MacKinlay describes four factors that have changed over the 

past three decades and contributed to a new global environment. “Transport 

technology; the proliferation of information and communications 

technology; the deregulation of the international economy; and the 

consequences of exposure to foreign cultures.”69 These factors set the 

conditions for a whole new breed of insurgent revolution in the world.

Al Qaeda is a good example of the post-Maoist insurgency that Dr. 

Mackinlay describes. The changing world environment facilitated Al 

Qaeda to recruit on a globalized scale. As the global economy and media 

increased in scale, access and capacity, citizens of the poorest countries 

began to see images and feel the influence of the rich Western countries 

as never before. For many, it was the first time they had been exposed to 

the vast economic and cultural divide that exists between the west and 

their own countries. The situation afforded insurgent groups such as Al 

Qaeda a new platform from which to spread their ideology providing “a 

universally relevant message or a narrative of their circumstances that 

had trans-national resonance.”70 Finally, the global media facilitated the 

effectiveness of another recruiting technique, the propaganda of the Deed. 

Mackinlay defines it as “the incitement of an animated or potentially 

violent audience through dramatic actions, rather than words.”71 There is 

no better example than the image of the World Trade Center collapsing on 

September 11th, 2001.

The global insurgency of which Mackinlay warns shares traits with 

the traditional Maoist insurgency he purports we have surpassed. The 

primary difference is the global scale and potential difficulty for the 

counterinsurgent force to respond, especially if the insurgency exists in 

many different regions. Nevertheless, the insurgency still has an overall 

political objective and set of grievances that the counterinsurgent force 

has no choice but to address. Mackinlay believes the US and UK will be 

forced to approach insurgency much differently in the future as technology 

continues to evolve and societal globalization proliferates.

It [the US and UK] will have to address insurgency as political 

violence and not as a form of warfare in which the military have primacy; 

the principles and procedures it suggests therefore have to include an 

array of government departments and non-government agencies which are 

also involved...future operations will have to engage disaffection on the 

ground at a very local level. The emerging theme would be that local beats 

global.72
23

Mackinlay conceptualizes a radically different operating environment 

in the future when combating insurgencies with this statement. Ironically, 

it is the same course of action the contemporary theorists purport, only 

on a widely distributed scale. A nation state that wants to counter an 

insurgency, in this case a global one, must utilize all elements of its national 

power in unison - political, diplomatic, economic, developmental, social, 

psychological, and military - to achieve the unity of purpose necessary 

to make progress, reach a settlement, or win. “The insurgent’s art is to 

take advantage of an environment to exploit a society’s aspirations and the 

way it exists. The counter operation organized by the state needs to be as 

socially astute as the insurgent’s.”73

Mackinlay does not believe Western states have reacted to the 

global insurgency appropriately. He suggests that the West is wedded to 

past solutions in countering insurgencies and as a result, has responded 

inappropriately to the contemporary global insurgency because the 

characteristics and nature has changed. Mackinlay purports the future and 

response to insurgency will be vastly different than it is today. “It might 

be possible to anticipate a future era beset by rapidly evolving forms of 

globalized insurgency but nevertheless contained by governments and 

their security forces that have successfully transitioned into the twentyfirst century and are now able to exploit its information dimension and are 

able to engage its social characteristics.”74

The French Counterinsurgency Camp

The French, as with the British, have had a wealth of experience with 

counterinsurgency operations since the end of World War II. The two 

most notable campaigns concerning counterinsurgency within the French 

experience were in Vietnam and Algeria as France jockeyed to maintain its 

declining empire.75 The two campaigns lasted sixteen years sequentially, 

from 1946-1962, and have provided extremely valuable lessons for 

counterinsurgents since. Professor Douglas Porch, a military historian 

and professor at the Naval Postgraduate School states that the French lost 

the two campaigns because “its strategy was overly militarized, and its 

insurgent enemies produced a more compelling political scenario.”76 Most 

recently the French have participated in counterinsurgency operations in 

Afghanistan as a coalition member under the International Security and 

Assistance Force (ISAF).

Roger Trinquier, a French Army Officer who served in both Algeria 

and Vietnam, is a counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner most 

recognized for his book, Modern Warfare, originally published in 1964. 
24

Through Trinquier’s experience in Algeria, he asserts a new type of 

warfare, modern warfare, has emerged since World War II. He believes 

the future of warfare will not include two armies meeting each other on the 

field of battle with one emerging the victor. He states that “Warfare is now 

an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, 

and military – that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a 

country and its replacement by another regime.77 This new environment has 

changed the role of the military and urgently necessitated the intervening 

state to apply all the elements of national power against the insurgency. 

“Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed 

forces, are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict.”78

A sound counterinsurgency strategy requires unity of effort within each 

governmental department at all levels, National, Provincial, District, and 

local to adequately address the insurgency.

Trinquier recommends concentrating counterinsurgent forces in the 

most dense population areas that have the greatest impact on economic, 

development, and social progress of the country or area involved. He, 

consistent with every other theorist reviewed in this chapter, understood 

that the local population’s support, voluntary or forced, is the foundation 

for success in a counterinsurgency. Trinquier describes how to organize 

forces at the local level focusing on policing, intelligence, and the local 

political environment. He asserts the “most desirable objective is the 

destruction of the politico-military organization in the intermediate areas.79

The government and its military forces cannot allow the insurgency to 

control the local governmental and political situations in the cities. It must 

break this cycle to have a chance at gaining control and support of the 

population.

Trinquier’s theory on modern warfare is controversial in the United 

States, and most other western countries, including France, because he 

makes a case for the necessity of torture in war. Trinquier experienced 

some tactical success in the Algerian campaign following the application 

of torture to gain intelligence from captured insurgents. He believes the 

ends justify the means when it comes to torture.

No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives 

the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; in not, 

specialists must force his secret from him. Then as a soldier, he must face 

the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid...

Once the interrogation is finished, however, the terrorist can take his place 

among soldiers. From then on, he is a prisoner of war like any other.80
25

Though most disagree with Trinquier on the torture issue, 

counterinsurgent practitioners should study his efforts and theory 

in all other aspects. Trinquier recognizes a critical problem with the 

French government and military as he believed it had not adapted itself 

organizationally to face the modern battlefield, and in the author’s 

opinion, cannot approach a counterinsurgency fight as business as usual. 

This type of war necessitates a different strategy, a different organization 

and approach. Trinquier states “Will we in modern warfare make use of all 

necessary resources to win, as we have always done in the traditional wars 

of the past?”81 Counterinsurgency strategy demands change and cannot be 

left solely to the military; it requires a concerted, combined approach from 

the intervening government and civilian agencies down to the lowestranking soldier on the ground.

David Galula, also a French Army officer and counterinsurgency 

theorist served as a tactical level commander in Algeria and an observer 

in Greece. Galula is best known for his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 

published in 1964.

82 Galula is another of the theorists who believes the 

population’s support and the political process are inextricably bound to 

the counterinsurgent force’s success or failure. Galula states “so intricate 

is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they 

cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be 

weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.”83 Galula also 

shares the common belief that countering an insurgency requires far more 

than purely military action. It must include psychological operations, civic 

and social programs, and local governance initiatives.

Galula offers four laws applicable to the counterinsurgency campaigns 

in which he has participated. The first law states “The support of the 

population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”84

It has been a common theme thus far that when a counterinsurgent force 

enters a local area after an insurgency has begun, it is immediately 

disadvantaged because the insurgency has established popular support in 

the area and created grass roots governance. Even so, it is not possible to 

clear an area of insurgent forces and their associated political constructs 

with military force alone. The government must expend a considerable 

amount of effort to regain local support, even if it is only passive support, 

because usually there are not enough counterinsurgent forces to hold all 

of the cleared areas. All elements of the government’s national power 

including economic, social, psychological, security, developmental, 

and governance, have to be applied to protect the population, gain their 

support, and facilitate the continued expansion of the military as it clears 

additional areas.
26

The second law states that “support is gained through an active 

minority.”85 Here, Galula describes the same conventional wisdom that 

exists in today’s US Army. The basic idea is that there is a slice of the 

population at the local level supportive of government intervention, the 

loyalists. The majority of the population qualifies as fence sitters, falling 

somewhere in the middle, carefully weighing options to determine which 

side has the most to offer. The fence sitters make decisions on where to lend 

support based upon individual and family circumstances. The final slice 

of the population actively supports the insurgency, the rebels. The goal 

of the counterinsurgency force in this case is to leverage the loyalists to 

influence the active majority of fence sitters. This effort is completed while 

actively seeking out the rebels. Galula describes victory as “the permanent 

isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon 

the population but maintained by and with the population.”86

The third law Galula applies is that “support from the population 

is conditional.”87 It would be impossible to identify the slice of the 

population that supports the government, i.e., the counterinsurgent force, 

if the insurgency actively threatens that population. The counterinsurgent 

force must convince the local people that the insurgency can no longer 

harm them. This may require the counterinsurgent force to destroy a large 

element, or all of the insurgency, or it may mean the counterinsurgent 

force lives among the local people. Galula states “when a man’s life is 

at stake, it takes more than propaganda to budge him...Political, social, 

economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and 

popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the 

population.”88

The fourth law states the “intensity of efforts and vastness of means 

are essential.”89 The counterinsurgency force must portray itself as the 

preferable choice. Since most locals sit the fence, swaying under the 

dilemma of who to support, the counterinsurgent forces have to make an 

immediate positive impact on the local area. This is where Galula, and all 

of the other counterinsurgent theorists reviewed agree. The government 

must inject the local area with economic, governmental, political, civic, 

and social programs so that the average citizen witnesses tangible positive 

change. The government must step up here to convince the local population 

that life is better under government control. The insurgents do not have the 

capability or resources to even fathom introducing programs into the local 

community on the scale governments can. The government and military 

must work in unison to win the day.
27

Galula offers a framework for countering an insurgency based upon his 

four rules. He clearly states there is no way the framework could be used as 

a cookie cutter solution or applied anywhere in the same sequential manner. 

Finally, Galula leaves us with the following advice on counterinsurgency. 

“Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward.”90

This has to occur with the full support of the government and under the 

security of the counterinsurgent force and interventionist power.

Table 3. Strategy for Countering an Insurgency In a Selected Area

1) Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main 

body of armed insurgents.

2) Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s 

comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and 

towns where the population lives.

3) Establish contact with the population, control its movements in 

order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.

4) Destroy the local insurgent political organization.

5) Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

6) Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. 

Replace the softs and the incompetents; give full support to the active 

leaders. Organize self-defense units.

7) Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

8) Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. 

Source: David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: 

Praegar Security International, 2006), 55-56.

The US and Australian Counterinsurgency Camp

A large volume of counterinsurgency lessons and history has been 

written detailing the United States Army’s recent COIN campaigns 

including the Philippines, 1899-1902, Vietnam,1965-1975, and both 

Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 and 2003 to present, respectively.91 As 

the US nears the completion of a decade of conflict in Afghanistan, the 

war takes its place as the longest in American history. The Australians 

have experience in a number of counterinsurgency campaigns including 

Vietnam and East Timor while fighting the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 

alongside the United States.
28

John McCuen is an American counterinsurgency theorist and the author 

of The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. He wrote the book in 1966 as 

the US was increasing its commitment and presence in Vietnam. McCuen 

aimed “to stress the political, psychological, and military fundamentals 

and develop a set of guiding principles which can be used to understand 

and conduct this new type of warfare.”92 When discussing the principles 

of counter-revolutionary war, McCuen contends they are the mirror image 

of revolutionary principles. In short the principles are the same, aimed at 

destroying the enemy while securing the support of the local population. 

The problem for the counterinsurgent force is that it usually comes into 

this process late and has to first determine where the insurgency stands in 

the process before it can create a strategy to interdict the insurgency.

Table 4. Strategic Principles of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare.

1) Preserving Oneself and Annihilating the Enemy.

2) Establishing Strategic Bases.

3) Mobilizing the Masses.

4) Seeking Outside Support.

5) Unifying the Effort.

Source: John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books, 1966), 73.

McCuen points to the organization of governance at all levels 

while focusing government resources on the local area to counter the 

existing insurgent organization. He cites this as “the vital first step in the 

governing power’s strategy to thwart revolutionary attempts to control 

the population.”93 McCuen also points to the importance of raising local 

police or security forces to protect local areas. The counterinsurgent 

force will never be large enough to protect these areas from recurring 

insurgent influence. Once the local areas are secure and the people trust the 

counterinsurgency is there to stay, the government introduces measures 

and begins to change the environment for the better.94

McCuen warns that western governments have the tools to win 

the counter-revolutionary fight but they have a difficult time adapting 

their rigid structures and selecting the right tools for the fight. McCuen 

states “Inherent in this process is early recognition of the nature of the 

revolutionary threat and application of a maximum psycho-politicomilitary effort in time to seize the initiative.”95 The process involves the 
29

military and the government working in concert to bring all assets to bear 

either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the situation. The 

government must commit to the cause from the beginning and understand 

there is no quick victory when fighting an insurgency. If the government is 

not committed to a possible protracted campaign, it should not go to war. 

McCuen warns of this as clearly and concisely as possible when he states 

“half-measures lead only to protracted, costly defeats.”96

David Kilcullen, an Australian Army Officer and contemporary 

counterinsurgency theorist conducted counterinsurgency operations with 

the Australian Army in East Timor in 1999 and participated in peace 

enforcement operations in both Cyprus and Bougainville in the 1990s. 

Most recently, Kilcullen served as an advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq 

and is best known for his two books, The Accidental Guerrilla, published 

in 2009, and Counterinsurgency, published in 2010. Kilcullen has the 

innate ability to turn theory into a workable, practical framework that is 

equally palatable and accessible to all ranks.

In Kilcullen’s book, The Accidental Guerrilla, he offers a framework 

that describes how locals are recruited, in many cases this happens purely 

by accident, as a direct result of the conflict between the insurgent and 

counter-insurgent forces. Kilcullen describes the process in four phases: 

“Infection, Contagion, Intervention, and Rejection.”97 Kilcullen uses Al 

Qaeda in his example of the process; however, it applies to a general 

insurgency regardless of its affiliation as well. In the infection stage the 

insurgency inserts itself into a local region and establishes a base area 

from which it will begin its operations. The insurgency begins to influence 

the local population using both soft and hard tactics, infiltrates local 

governance, and uses psychological operations to establish its political or 

ideological beliefs.98

In the contagion phase, the insurgency begins to expand its influence 

from its base area to the surrounding villages, districts, regions or 

provinces. The insurgency leverages propaganda to spread its political 

beliefs and ideology to influence surrounding communities and uses 

violence if necessary to eliminate local authority figures unwilling to 

cooperate. The insurgency expands its influence within local governance 

and establishes new systems to facilitate its political and ideological 

beliefs. Kilcullen cites the contagion phase as the “critical stage in the 

process, since without it the terrorist presence in a given area would be 

unlikely to attract international attention or to present a threat to the world 

community at large, hence the next state (intervention) would not occur.”99

It is at this stage that the government realizes it has a problem and must 
30

act. As many of the previous theorists have identified, the government 

reacts after the insurgency has implanted its political or ideological beliefs 

into local society.

The intervention stage occurs when the government or counterinsurgent 

force responds to the insurgent contagion of society. The government, 

usually armed with a powerful military, moves in to destroy the insurgency 

and restore society to its pre-insurgent ways. The counterinsurgent force 

fights the insurgency fiercely and may capture or eliminate a large number 

of them. In the process, the counterinsurgent force has probably made a 

number of mistakes in its pursuit of the insurgency, incurring a number 

of civilian casualties, destroying property, houses, crops, vehicles, or 

equipment. The locals in the area, who likely never considered fighting 

before, are placed in a position to take a side. Each individual must make 

a rational decision based on his or her personal situation. “The terrorists 

may have been seen as outsiders until this point, their identity as such has 

been not fixed but ‘contingent’: as soon as the foreigners or infidels appear 

in the area, by comparison the terrorists are able to paint themselves as 

relative locals and opportunistically draw on local loyalties for support.”100

The rejection phase occurs as the local people decide who to support. 

These decisions feature a number of components. Who will win the 

conflict? Who will be here when the conflict is over? What does each side 

offer me individually or for my family? Kilcullen states “this is the phase 

in which the local people begin to become accidental guerrillas.”101 The 

locals who choose the insurgency do not fight with them because they 

necessarily share the same rigid ideology or political aspirations; they do 

it because it was the most logical choice for them personally. Regardless, 

the cycle shows that for the locals trapped inside this stressful process of 

conflict between the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces, good people 

who never envisioned themselves as guerrillas can become insurgents 

overnight. All it takes is the loss of property, family, or friend amid the 

stress and chaos and suddenly the cause has become personal.102

Kilcullen, such as Galula before him, recognizes the potential assets 

that government or counterinsurgent forces have at their disposal. In 

Kilcullen’s view, if a counterinsurgent force can break through this 

aforementioned process, protect the population, and implement immediate 

government measures, political, economic, social, and psychological, that 

produce tangible benefits to the local population, the counterinsurgent 

force has a solid chance at success. Kilcullen states “victory does not 

demand that we reduce violence to zero or establish peace and prosperity 

in absolute terms. It only demands that we return the system to what is 

normal – for that society, in that region.”103
31

How theorists would react to the Population versus Enemy Centric 

Debate

The theorists would dismiss the current debate between population 

and enemy-centric counterinsurgency immediately, calling it irrelevant. 

Each theorist, regardless of background or pedigree, agrees that war 

serves a political purpose. Not one of the theorists identified a silver bullet 

approach to counterinsurgency methods or war. Each asserts we must 

implement all elements of power available and be savvy enough to apply 

those elements when the situation warrants it. Popular and political support 

of the people is critical to success. The theorists would never dismiss a 

resource that could help them win or achieve a political compromise. Nor 

would they try only to eliminate the enemy, which is the thrust of the 

enemy-centric camp. Limiting focus to a singular strategy is unwise and 

counterproductive. War is war to these theorists, no matter how big or 

small. A balanced approach, utilizing all elements of national power and 

considering the application of every available resource within the strategy 

is critical to success. 
32

Notes

1. Sir General Frank Kitson was a British Officer, and commonly referred 

to as a classical Counterinsurgency theorist, that conducted Counterinsurgency 

operations in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. He is the author 

of numerous books to include Bunch of Five, detailing his experience in 

Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus, and Low Intensity Operations, which establishes 

a framework for Counterinsurgents and details in general, the best practices 

of Counterinsurgency at the local level as he experienced them throughout his 

distinguished career.

2. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and 

Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2009), 3

3. It is important to note that all wars have irregular and asymmetric 

characteristics and components, not just counterinsurgency campaigns. In this 

context, the author is showing that while vast divisions between groups can easily 

fuel subversion and insurgency, there is often 5 degrees of separation between the 

strategies each, the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, must adopt to attain their 

objectives or force political settlement or compromise. A couple common factors 

are almost always the active and passive support of the population and the right to 

govern nationally or in specific territories in the case of regional insurgencies.

4. Two examples of regional insurgencies include the Dhofar Province of 

Oman discussed in detail in chapter 4 and Eastern Nuristan, Afghanistan today. 

The districts of Eastern Nuristan Province including Kamdesh and Barge Matal 

had no desire to topple the government of Afghanistan, they simply wanted 

the government to stay out of their area and business. Coexistence within the 

boundaries of Afghanistan coupled with an unwritten but understood autonomy 

separate of the government was perfectly acceptable to the traditional leaders in 

Eastern Nuristan and still is today.

5. David Kilcullen served 20 years in the Australian Army with experience 

conducting counterinsurgency operations in both Cyprus and Bougainville. He 

is considered a modern Counterinsurgency theorist who had played a significant 

role in advising US and Australian Forces over the last decade during the conflicts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan.

6. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (United Kingdom: Oxford 

University Press, 2010), 1.

7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 39.

8. Sun Tzu.

9. Sun Tzu.

10. Sun Tzu., 40.

11. Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte Press, 

2005), 66.
33

12. Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought 

(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2005), 220.

13. Jomini, The Art of War, 91.

14. Jomini, 38-39.

15. The critical point here is that counterinsurgency is war and the process to 

go to war is similar regardless of scale. The same process that goes into planning 

a conventional war against another state occurs when planning to combat an 

insurgency. Jomini describes the importance of analyzing every aspect of the 

enemy state from their people to their capabilities to their political objectives. He 

also describes the importance of establishing your own clear political objectives 

that are nested with the military strategy before proceeding going to war against 

another state. Although an insurgency is not a state, the same calculus is applied 

when making the decision to go to war against one. 

16. Jomini, 35.

17. Jomini, 35-36.

18. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1976), 605.

19. Von Clausewitz, 480.

20. Von Clausewitz, 140.

21. Von Clausewitz, 479.

22. Von Clausewitz, 482.

23. Von Clausewitz, 480.

24. Von Clausewitz, 585.

25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 101.

26. Jomini, The Art of War, 13.

27. Clausewitz, On War, 479.

28. John Shy and Thomas Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Makers of 

Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1986), 816.

29. John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago (London: Hurst and 

Company Publishers, 2009), 27.

30. Shy and Collier, “Revolutionary War,” 846.

31. The Oxford dictionary of philosophy, 2008, defines Maoism as “the 

transposition of the theory and practice of Marxism to apply to the conditions 

not of the urban proletariat, but of the Chinese peasantry. In some quarters in the 

West, especially during the late 1960s, it became optimistically regarded as the 

ultimate egalitarian and communitarian political ideal.
34

32. Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War, 209.

33. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praegar Publishers, 

1961), 92.

34. Tse-Tung, 89.

35. Tse-Tung, 43.

36. Robert O’Neill, General Giap: Politician and Strategist (New York: 

Praegar Publishers, 1969), 23. 

37. Ho Chi Mihn was Vietnamese leader who served as prime minister 

between 1946 and 1955 and as president from1945 to 1969 of the Democratic 

Republic of North Vietnam. He was critical in starting the political party of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam and was an influential leader of the Viet Cong 

during Vietnam. 

38. John Colvin, Giap: Volcano Under Snow (New York: Soho Press, Inc. 

1996), 142.

39. O’Neill, General Giap: Politician and Strategist, 203-204. 

40. Colvin, Giap: Volcano Under Snow, 231.

41. Colvin.

42. O’Neill, General Giap: Politician and Strategist, 204-206.

43. O’Neill, 198. 

44. Andrew Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 

Doctrine 1942-1976 (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History United States 

Army, 2007), 366-367. 

45. O’Neill, General Giap: Politician and Strategist, 198..

46. Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2011. Scholars 

Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2011. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency, 2010), 4 February, 2011.

47. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations (New York: Walker and 

Company, 1967), 17.

48. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 

xi.

49. Kitson, 284.

50. Kitson, 282.

51. Kitson, 286.

52. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 180.

53. Kitson, 96.

54. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 287-288.
35

55. Kitson, 289.

56. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 200.

57. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, 

FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 21.

58. Kitson, 21.

59. Kitson, 50-51.

60. Kitson, 63.

61. Kitson, 52.

62. Kitson, 53.

63. Kitson, 55.

64. Kitson

65. Kitson, 55.

66. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 168-170.

67. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 57.

68. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 170-171.

69. Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, 29.

70. Mackinlay, 41.

71. Mackinlay, 124.

72. Mackinlay, 231.

73. Mackinlay, 6. 

74. Mackinlay., 232. 

75. The French fought in Vietnam from 1946 to 1954 when the French 

ended their colonial administration and dissolved their Indo-China holdings. 

Algeria fought a bloody insurgency against the French from 1954 to 1962 when it 

attained its independence. 

76. Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare,” in Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston et al. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 

91. 

77. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency 

(Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 5.

78. Trinquier.

79. Trinquier, 60.

80. Trinquier, 19.

81. Trinquier, 90.
36

82. Galula also published an insightful book on the Algerian War titled, 

Pacification of Algeria: 1956-1958.

83. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 

(Westport, CT: Praegar Security International, 2006), 5.

84. Galula, 52.

85. Galula, 53.

86. Galula, 54

87. Galula.

88. Galula, 55

89. Galula.

90. Galula, 95.

91. The conflict in the Philippines would begin in 1898 and conclude in 

1954. The American counterinsurgency campaign referenced in the text was a 

phase of the total conflict from 1899-1902. 

92. John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (Harrisburg, 

PA: Stackpole Books, 1972), 19.

93. McCuen, 25.

94. McCuen, 182-183.

95. McCuen, 324.

96. McCuen, 330.

97. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2009), 35.

98. Kilcullen, 113.

99. Kilcullen, 36.

100. Kilcullen, 38.

101. Kilcullen

102. Kilcullen, 36-37.

103. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 216.
37

Chapter 3

Malaya: 1948 to 1960

There should be a proper balance between the military and the 

civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields. Otherwise a 

situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting 

results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action. 

Similarly, civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed with the 

insurgents, are a waste of time and money if they are unsupported 

by military operations to provide the necessary protection.

— Sir Robert Thompson,

Defeating Communist Insurgencies

This chapter will analyze and review strategy application within the 

Malayan counterinsurgency campaign. The chapter will focus on how the 

government and associated counterinsurgent forces administered political, 

military, social, economic, and psychological aspects of strategy against 

the insurgency. This chapter provides further evidence that there is no 

such thing as a purely ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ strategy, or what many US military 

leaders describe today as either a population-centric or an enemy-centric 

strategy. Even though US military circles consider the Malayan campaign 

a population-centric one, the evidence suggests the government applied all

elements of national power: both an offensive kill and capture effort and 

a non-lethal effort, to achieving a positive outcome. In some cases, soft 

power elements were engaged too late, in others the mix of soft and hard 

power was skewed detrimentally in one direction or the other. For certain, 

this is a delicate dance in which governments must execute a carefully 

nuanced approach to achieve an acceptable outcome. 

The Malaya Emergency

The most important single lesson that can be learned from the Malayan 

Emergency is that at the level of governmental decision making a very 

fine balance must be struck between policies directed at destroying the 

organizational strength of the Communists and policies aimed at creating a 

stable political process in the society. . . The government must be prepared 

to apply all its powers of coercion against the organizational basis of 

Communist power; but it must also seek to create the conditions which will 

expand the area of open political participation on the part of the public.1

The Malaya Emergency (1948-1960) serves as a prime example 

of the flexibility required by a government mired in a protracted 

counterinsurgency campaign. The British declared a state of emergency, 
38

including the introduction of emergency regulations, after continued 

escalation with the Malayan Communist Party reached a boiling point 

with the murder of three prominent British citizens working as farmers 

on June 16, 1948.2

 The emergency regulations enacted by the British 

government adapted the existing criminal law to facilitate swift action 

and justice against the insurgency. The regulations were tough and gave 

the British and Malay government the authority to execute preventative 

detention of suspected insurgents without having a trial.3

 This served as 

a powerful deterrent measure against the already powerful communist 

insurgency. “The Malayan Communist’s Party’s (MCP) armed wing, the 

Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), and its support organization, 

the Min Yuen, sought to overthrow the British colonial administration and 

later, after independence in 1957, the Malayan government.”4

 The goal of 

the Malayan Communist Party was to establish a “communist-controlled 

peoples’ republic”5

 in Malaya.

The Malayan Communist Party originates from the Malayan People’s 

Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which had fought fiercely as a resistance 

movement against the Japanese during Japanese occupation.6

 Interestingly 

enough, the British mentored this force to fight the Japanese. The British 

did not guess they would face the very group they armed in a protracted 

counterinsurgency campaign three short years later.7 Once the MPAJA and 

British defeated the Japanese in 1945, the British returned to the region 

to reclaim their colonial holding. This did not sit well with the MPAJA as 

they found the British undeserving to regain control over the land that they 

had just fought for.8

The Malayan Communist Party had every intension of taking over 

the country in the wake of the Japanese withdrawal, but the end of the 

War came suddenly before their plans were complete and the British were 

able to re-establish their position, disbanding the Mayalan Peoples Anti 

Japanese Army with expressions of goodwill, supplemented by gratuities 

and an appropriate issue of honors and awards.9

Once the MPAJA was officially disbanded by the British, the MCP 

quickly took their place as a legal entity to represent the Communist 

Chinese in Malaya.

Over the next three years the Malayan Communist Party grew 

increasingly effective organizing violence against the British run 

government. Their aim was to damage the economy fueled by tin mines 

and the numerous rubber plantations and saturate trade and labor union 

membership.10 The MCP organized significant attacks that disrupted 
39

industrial capacity. “In 1947 there were 291 strikes [against mines and 

rubber plantations], involving 69,000 men and the loss of nearly 700,000 

man-days.”11 The MCP did not stop there. They also targeted prominent 

local leaders working with the British, killing a couple hundred between 

1945 and 1948.12

The British counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya evolved significantly 

to counter the threat of the Malayan Communist Party. The British strategy 

initially deployed battalion and brigade sized units to conduct search and 

destroy techniques against the insurgency. This was initiated by Major 

General C.H. Boucher between 1948 and 1950.13 Although the conduct 

of large scale unit sized operations was conventional wisdom at the time, 

executing operations within a jungle setting in which the British military 

had little experience made the technique less than effective. In order to 

address the lack of jungle experience, the British gathered leaders with 

jungle expertise and formed a training center. British leaders deployed 

from England were required to receive 167 hours of training in jungle 

warfare techniques. Large scale search and destroy operations were reevaluated and some smaller scale units were formed, such as the Ferret 

force, with success.14

The counterinsurgency strategy began to shift between1950-1952 

as the collective experience and ability of soldiers at the tactical level to 

operate in the jungle increased. Lieutenant General Harold Briggs arrived 

as Director of Operations in 1950 fueling a more balanced strategy. The 

Briggs Plan increased the focus on population protection and control while 

maintaining an offensive, aggressive disposition against the insurgency.15

Large scale offensive operations were replaced with smaller, lethal, 

intelligence driven operations against the insurgency. After an assessment 

of the situation in 1952, Lieutenant General Harold Templer took control 

between 1952 and 1954. Unlike Briggs, Templer took control as both the 

Director of Operation and the High Commissioner. This authority allowed 

him to further unify the effort.16 Templer maintained Briggs balanced 

framework while adapting and improving it to increase the pressure on the 

insurgency forcing them into significant decline by the time he left in 1954. 

From 1954 to 1957, the British worked to transfer power to the Malayan 

government and finally, from 1957 to the conclusion of the insurgency 

in 1960, the Malay government worked to reach a settlement with their 

indigenous Chinese population by further including them in the political, 

social, economic, and security aspects of Malay society.17

Throughout counterinsurgency campaigns in history, one of the most 

common government miscalculations is failing to recognize the threat 
40

and rising power of a subversive element within its ranks before it has 

developed into a powerful foe, capable of challenging the government’s 

authority politically, socially, and militarily.18 Sir Robert Thompson 

warns of this stating “any sensible government should attempt to defeat 

an insurgency movement during the subversive build-up phase. . . 

prevention is better than cure, and the government must be positive in its 

approach.”19 In the case of Malaya, the British government had supported 

the MCP during their struggle against the Japanese from 1941-1945, 

but failed to recognize how quickly it was growing disenfranchised. By 

1948 negotiations with the British had broken down, union regulations 

were in place working against the MCP, and deportation sharply rose.20

The British understood the MCP was an emerging threat; however, they 

underestimated the military scale of the MRLA and the social and political 

potential and momentum they would generate in Malay society.21 By the 

time the British declared the situation in Malaya an emergency in 1948, 

the insurgency had around 2000 members.22 “The British problem was not 

one of a lack of information [on the MRLA] rather, the difficulty was one 

of interpretation and of choice of policies to meet the possible threat.”23

At the emergency’s outset, the British chose to counter the MRLA 

threat largely through a legalistic approach “construing the Emergency 

to be essentially a problem of re-establishing law and order...Once 

the government had established its objective to be the elimination of 

lawlessness, it could neither compromise with itself nor permit the general 

public to expect a compromise with the MCP.”24 The civil administration’s 

inability to efficiently organize and coordinate efforts within the individual 

government departments countering the MCP complicated matters. There 

was confusion as to which department was responsible for which function 

in relation to the insurgency and support for the counterinsurgency effort. 

The Government struggled to establish clear guidelines and priorities when 

appropriating resources to its departments and overall counterinsurgency 

effort.25 The government response to the emergency moved forward; 

however, it was often disjointed as individual departments did their best to 

contribute to the effort but often overlapped resources and wasted energy 

because they were making decisions in isolation.

The government utilized the Malayan police force in its effort to 

restore law and order by amplifying its size by 30,000 between 1948 and 

1951.26 “The 30,000 additional police, known as special constables, were 

not regular police, trained in routine law enforcement and apprehension 

of criminals, but paramilitary forces whose sole purpose was to carry 

out counterinsurgency and infantry operations.”27 The military’s role 
41

was subordinate to police efforts and was largely used to support police 

operations.28 The military’s strategy to defeat the insurgency between 1948 

and 1951 was heavy-handed and often counter-productive as it frequently 

inflicted a heavy civilian casualty rate as an effect of operations.29 The 

army was organized to conduct large offensive operations intended to kill 

or capture Communist insurgents in droves.30 The conventional approach 

was commonplace to the British as they had used it to destroy German 

formations in Europe just years before.31

One Malay veteran described this approach as “bait bashing.”32 Bait 

bashing is a short-term strike operations, usually lasting 24-48 hours, 

originating from one’s combat outpost with the goal of killing or capturing 

insurgents. Once the unit reaches the location where the insurgents are 

expected, they conduct intrusive searches of the area. 

The soldiers would kick everything out, including woman and 

children, [and] mine detectors around to see if they could find any arms. If 

we didn’t find anything, then we’d say let’s be nice. “We’ve got a doctor 

here; he can give you some medical help.” You think that is going to turn 

them onto your side? You’ve alienated their people. They will hate you. 

And then you go back down the hill again [back to your combat outpost], 

what I call mowing the grass. You’ve achieved nothing.33

The massive, short-term British strike operations usually failed to 

ferret out insurgency pockets. The strategy against the MRLA was one of 

counter-terror and had mixed results. While some short term success was 

present in dismantling larger MRLA groups and increasing intelligence as a 

result of detention, the death toll on civilians fueled MRLA recruiting. The 

MRLA quickly broke up into smaller groups to preserve their forces and 

increase the effectiveness of their attacks. The British Army continued its 

large-scale operations to hunt down the insurgency but the insurgents were 

successful in avoiding extensive contact with the government forces.34

Although the insurgents suffered significant casualties upon 

confronting government forces, they managed to expand their active 

base to “nearly 8,000 by the end of 1951, with 10,000 – 15,000 regular 

workers in the Min Yuen.”35 As the MRLA and Min Yuen gained traction 

and popular support within the local communities, it was clear only a 

significant change in strategy could reverse the MCP’s momentum. The 

Malayan veteran said he came to accept one undeniable truth about bait 

bashing operations, drawn from all the counterinsurgency campaigns of 

his career. If your operation against the insurgency achieves “a short term 

success, but doesn’t affect long term aim, it’s a failure.”36
42

The British experienced plenty of short term success against the 

MRLA from 1948-1950 as they learned pivotal lessons on how to deal 

with the insurgency and operate in the jungle at the company level.37

The strategy focused effort on killing or capturing the enemy via large 

formations and crushing firepower, an enemy-centric approach, while 

failing to appropriately deploy other essential resources both against 

the insurgency and in support of the population. This strategy was also 

referred to as a counter-terror approach using large scale sweep operations 

to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.38 Slowly the British realized they could 

not kill their way to victory in Malaya. The offensive mindset was good; 

however, the collateral damage inflicted on the local population as a result 

of the enemy-centric approach made recruiting for the MRLA easy and 

the insurgency proliferated.39 The strategy would have to change. General 

Frank Kitson served in the campaign and later remarked, “it took about 

two years of trial and error for the Government to develop a reasonable 

strategy.”40

In reaction to the worsening Malayan situation in 1950, retired 

Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was chosen to reverse the momentum 

of the MRLA and restore law and order. He arrived in April, 1950 and 

immediately implemented changes which directly impacted unity of effort 

with which the Malay government had struggled with during the first two 

years of the emergency.41 Still, Briggs lacked the command authority and 

the autonomy to run the counterinsurgency effort completely. Briggs acted 

not as a commander but as an “operational controller”. He was tasked 

to organize both the counterinsurgency operations of the police and of 

the military.42 Briggs immediately addressed the unity of effort between 

the police, military, and civil government efforts by enacting an executive 

committee system at all levels, the Brigg’s Plan.

Police, military, and associated civil departments participated in 

Briggs’ formalized system in which power brokers at all levels met, 

shared information, and discussed daily decisions as well as long-range 

plans. The committee system reached all the way to the top with Briggs 

forming and actively participating in the Federal War Council (FWC) 

and the Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee43. The Federal 

War Council, chaired by Briggs, established policy and appropriated 

resources for the counterinsurgency effort against the MRLA.44 The 

Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee enabled the fusion of intelligence 

from the army, police, and local government collecting, coordinating and 

analyzing information across the joint and interagency spectrum.45 Prior 

to this fusion effort, each entity had its own intelligence stovepipe and 
43

had struggled to share information and intelligence across organizations. 

The state and district levels had similar committees called the State War 

Executive Committee (SWEC) and the District War Executive Committee 

(DWEC), respectively.46 Although these positive changes facilitated 

a holistic government approach, the system was imperfect. For most 

decisions, each committee’s consensus sufficed; however, reaching that 

consensus presented a challenge in the face of certain volatile issues. It 

was clear to Briggs that he needed command authority over all operations 

in Malaya. He never got it. 

Briggs quickly deemed the large-scale military operations to kill or 

capture insurgents to be ineffective. While the MRLA suffered heavy 

casualties in the wake of targeted sweep operations, the process of actually 

locating insurgent bands was relatively unsuccessful. The MRLA was 

making significant progress infiltrating isolated local villages in the jungle 

and gaining popular support.47 The Malayan police experienced some 

success at keeping MRLA and Min Yuen influence out of the accessible 

villages but the remote jungle settlements were much more difficult to 

interdict. Chinese squatters posed the most significant challenge to the 

security forces in the jungle. There were thousands of squatters dispersed 

in the jungle. Their dispersion made them easy targets for the insurgents to 

influence and target. 48 The MRLA had freedom of maneuver in the jungle 

and access to food, shelter, and support from the indigenous Chinese 

population who did not have the means to defend themselves.

Briggs envisioned a strategy to defeat the MRLA insurgency. One 

counterinsurgency theorist stated the Briggs plan “was nothing less than 

the Master Plan for the winning of the campaign.”49

Table 5. The Four Main Aims of the Briggs Plan.

a) To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of 

complete security, which would in time result in a steady and increasing 

flow of information coming from all sources.

b) To break up the Communist organizations within the populated 

areas.

c) To isolate the bandits from their food supply organizations in the 

populated areas.

d) To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the Security Forces 

on their own ground.

Source: Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations (New York: Walker and Company, 

1967), 56-57.
44

While Briggs understood the importance of attriting the military 

capacity and strength of the insurgency, his plan set the stage for the 

British and Malay security forces to regain the initiative. No longer would 

the security forces conduct large-scale offensive operations and expect the 

insurgency to face their strength on the battlefield. “Briggs issued a tactical 

directive which stressed the importance of maintaining the ‘framework’ 

and of operating in small controlled units.”50 It was clear the chances of 

closing with and destroying the enemy favored a government force small 

enough to not give off a signature with each movement. The insurgency 

had already proven they would not disadvantage their forces by exposing 

them to the more powerful Malay security forces. The intricate workings of 

Briggs’ strategy offered a more balanced approach to tackling the MRLA. 

The weekly meetings to fuse the civilian-military strategy better focused 

the government resources to work in concert and attack the insurgency 

from all angles.

One of the most important elements of the Briggs strategy, and one 

that created major problems in the beginning, was the resettlement effort 

to separate the insurgency from the local population and prevent them 

from interdicting the government-backed rubber and mining industry. 

Resettlement came in the following two forms: relocation and regroupment.

Relocation, which involved the removal of dispersed rural dwellers 

whether squatters or legitimate settlers, to prepare fortified sites often 

remote from their existing homes. In some cases existing village: in others 

it involved the establishment of a completely new settlement; and regroupment or regrouping, which involved the concentration and protection 

of estate and mine labor either within the property or close to it, with 

emphasis on providing security within easy access of the community’s 

place of work.51

Resettlement was a highly effective method of separating the local 

population, especially the jungle dwelling ethnic Chinese most at risk to 

insurgent influence and support, from the insurgency. Locations chosen to 

establish resettlement camps were as easily accessible and defendable by 

government forces as they were difficult to attack by the insurgency.52 As 

the number of ‘Squatters’ and jungle dwellings decreased, the insurgency’s 

ability to sustain their forces with food and support faltered. This facilitated 

one the Briggs plan’s main goals of attacking MCP’s logistical systems 

and lines of communication.53
45

Resettlement was not executed without a long list of issues. Horrendous 

living conditions typified many of the camp experiences, despite the best 

British and Malay government intentions. These circumstances would 

be handled and improved over the years but, there was no doubt about 

it, population resettlement was toxic to the insurgency’s vitality. By 

1957, when the Malaya government was granted its independence from 

Britain, around “500,000 of Mayala’s 1950s population of approximately 

5,000,000”54 had been resettled. The resettlement program was a top 

priority; it was executed very quickly with the bulk of resettlement 

complete by 1952. The resettlement effort proved sustainable in Malaya, 

considering that “of the more than 500 resettlement areas established 

between 1950 and 1960, only six were abandoned and resettled elsewhere, 

mainly on security grounds.”55

Briggs implemented effective population controls within the resettled 

villages by executing curfews, establishing a food control program, 

strictly registering locals, and providing security to protect the population 

all legally under enacted “Emergency Regulations.”56 The food control 

program and curfews were aimed at both denying the insurgency the 

ability to buy food in the villages and preventing village sympathizers 

from supplying the insurgency. The program was marginally effective 

prior to resettlement as insurgents could still lean on the ethnic Chinese 

squatters in the jungle; however, it became an extremely powerful weapon 

once resettlement was completed.57

The system was administered by the SWECs and DWECs, which 

were allowed considerable local option...it involved strict rationing of 

certain foods at state discretion, village gate checks and curfew hours 

(also on roads), spot checks, careful inspection of road and rail traffic at 

checkpoints, mobile food-check teams, and strict accounting for all stocks 

and sales of specified foods and supplies. Food cans were even punctured 

when sold to prevent their being stored. Sales could be made only to 

people with ID cards, and records had to be kept for inspection in foodrestricted areas.58

The resettlement program crippled the insurgency’s ability to sustain 

operations. The insurgency literally had no one left to co-opt, threaten 

or intimidate by the time the main thrust of the resettlement effort had 

occurred. Life as an insurgent in the jungles of Malaya was growing 

increasingly difficult. Most importantly the British and Malayan security 

forces regained the initiative through these measures. “The Communist 

guerrillas had to converge on the [resettled] villages in order to obtain 

their necessary supplies... Instead of the Communists being able to exploit 
46

the advantages of surprise in ambush operations, it was [now] the British 

who were able to lay the ambushes.”59 The British and Malayan security 

forces could identify insurgent groups attempting to infiltrate the resettled 

villages and take action. It was not a perfect system as it was difficult 

to secure nearly 500 resettled villages. The insurgency did successfully 

infiltrate a number of the villages; however, the resettlement strategy still 

greatly favored the government.

The insurgency faced a real problem. Their sole refuge was the jungle 

but their logical supporters there had been removed. Only one other jungle 

population remained: the aborigines. Initially, many aborigine people had 

been resettled with the Chinese as part of the anti-insurgency campaign. 

The British government realized moving them meant the military had lost 

the valuable MRLA intelligence the aborigines had always provided, so 

the British returned them to their areas.60 Jungle forts were established 

in an effort to deny the insurgency access to the aborigines. “Each was 

little more than an area hacked out of the jungle at which a police post of 

platoon strength [thirty men] was established, and a light aircraft strip was 

built.”61 The jungle forts effectively denied the insurgency access to the 

population while also garnering that population’s support for the British 

military. The forts offered the aborigines basic services previously unheard 

of. As a Mayala veteran recalls, “What could you get at a jungle fort? You 

could go in and buy your axes and your sarongs, you could get medical 

support, it’s all of those little things.”62 The jungle forts further denied the 

insurgency access to sanctuary areas. In the end, the only sanctuary area 

available to the MRLA was Thailand, and that is exactly where they went. 

General Briggs launched an initiative to create an irregular security 

force, the Home Guard, to protect populations in both the resettled and 

existing villages.63 The Home Guard enabled villagers to take responsibility 

for security by appointing individuals to serve on the force and protect their 

local population from insurgency influence. Home Guard would also free 

up the government’s police and military for other operations.64 The Home 

Guard was created for the purpose of protecting villages and establishing 

local security, reaching a strength of 200,000 by 1954.65 The Home Guard 

concept further organized the resettled and government controlled villages 

making it more difficult for the insurgency to penetrate. “A headman for 

each village and Home Guard was to be nominated under the supervision 

of the District Officer. Each house in the village was to have a tenant-inchief who would be responsible to the headman for reporting the names 

and movements of people in his area of the village.”66
47

It is important to understand here that the Briggs strategy and 

framework to improve security and regain control was not immediately 

lauded as a success or even appreciated as a potentially effective plan. In 

1951, the Briggs plan was in full swing and the resettlement initiative was 

moving at lightning speed but the insurgency was potent and desperate.67

The extreme level of violence in 1951 was the highest it had been since the 

emergency began, accounting for “1,000 insurgents and 500 security forces 

killed.”68 The situation looked grim for the government security forces and 

to make matters worse, Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner 

to Malaya, was killed on 7 October 1951. Gurney’s death was an absolute 

outrage to the British and resulted in the government calling for a renewed 

and tougher effort against the insurgents. They demanded increasingly 

robust policies and resources be applied to the counterinsurgency effort.69

Briggs made clear that his lack of authority and decision-making power 

decreased his ability to prosecute the emergency. In one of his final acts as 

the director of operations, Briggs wrote in report how not having complete 

control in Malaya hobbled his efforts and made it particularly difficult to 

get the police in line.70

Briggs four part plan and efforts to reform the strategy would prove 

decisive in turning around the war effort in favor of the British and Malay 

government but it was not immediately apparent. He distanced the police 

and military away from the enemy-centric strategy, focusing them on a 

more balanced approach. While he still did not have the political autonomy 

he desired to run the war at maximum efficiency, he improved civilianmilitary unity of effort and reapportioned resources to boost government 

efforts and degrade the insurgency.71 Briggs integrated intelligence 

collection departments and agencies within the government and military, 

streamlining the system. He utilized resources to implement population 

control measures to protect the population while denying the insurgency 

critical logistic support.72 He boosted psychological operations against 

the insurgency by disseminating leaflets to communicate directly with the 

insurgents.73 Briggs bolstered funding and training for the police, expanded 

the Malay military, and launched lethal kill and capture operations 

against the insurgency utilizing smaller, more focused, operations. Briggs 

established the foundation for a balanced strategy that employed available 

resources across the lines of effort in support of the counterinsurgency 

campaign. 

The British Government was quick to re-examine the situation after 

Gurney’s death, sending Oliver Lyttelton, the British Secretary of State, 

to make recommendations for future efforts.74 Lyttelton devised a way 
48

ahead and plan for the Emergency after having examined the situation and 

extensively discussing the issues with the exiting General Briggs. General 

Briggs departed Malaya in November 1951, feeling he had failed to turn 

the tide of the war. He died in 1952, unaware that his efforts predicated a 

dramatic turn-around, which greatly impacted the successful conclusion of 

the Emergency eight years later.75

Table 6. Secretary of State for Colonies Oliver Lyttelton’s 6 Point Malaya 

Strategy.

1) Need for a unified, overall direction of the civil administration and 

the military forces.

2) The police should be reorganized and retrained.

3) Government-run compulsory primary education was necessary to 

counter Communist propaganda in Communist-infiltrated schools.

4) Resettlement areas should be given a high level of protection.

5) The home guard had to be reorganized and large numbers of 

Malayan-Chinese enlisted.

6) The strain on an undermanned civil service had to be alleviated.

Source: Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” In 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston et al. (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing LTD, 2008), 108-109.

General Sir Gerald Templer was selected to take over operations 

in Malaya in the early months of 1952. Based on Secretary Lyttelton’s 

assessment, coupled with General Briggs’ assertion that he lacked the 

necessary power required to direct operations in Malaya and unify the effort 

across the government, General Templer was given complete control. Not 

only would he take over for General Briggs as the Director of Operations 

but he would concurrently serve as the High Commissioner. This gave 

General Templer total control over the military and civilian efforts in 

Malaya and would allow him to better organize counterinsurgency efforts 

against the communists.76 Templer’s near dictator like power gave him 

the ability to force unity of command across the government and make 

timely decisions that led to rapid execution. It is important to understand 

here that while Templer commanded the Federal government and its 

associated foreign policy, he only controlled one of the nine Malayan 

states that including the capital city. The other eight states were governed 

by Malayan princes who had control of the internal workings of their 

respective states. Templer still had to negotiate with these governors on 

a range of political issues.77 Political discussion and pressure was also 
49

mounting back in Britain to grant the Malayan government independence. 

General Templer was directed to make that goal a key component in his 

strategy as he moved forward.78

General Templer was highly successful in Malaya but it is important to 

note that the critical framework for his success was established by General 

Briggs.79 Templer did institute some immediate changes, refinements, and 

new initiatives using his authority and power that enabled the government 

to apply a level of unity of effort that had previously eluded them. Templer 

immediately merged the civilian and military decision-making bodies. He 

created two deputies, one for the military operations and one for civilian 

government operations; both answered directly to him.80 He stated “Any 

idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the 

Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and for all. 

The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.”81

The bolstered emphasis to support the Emergency by the British 

government gave Templer the power to request, recruit, and employ 

absolutely the best minds Britain had to offer. Templer understood that both 

the expansion and retraining of the current police force was critical so he 

brought in one of the best policemen Britain had to offer, Sir Arthur Young, 

the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police to fuel the effort.82

Young executed his duties and responsibilities as advertised. He opened 

police training facilities across Malaya, focused the Malayanization of the 

leadership the number one concern, and made the most promising police 

instructors in police school s across the country.83He also understood the 

importance of integrating ethnic Chinese into the police force and made 

a major effort to do so, resulting in the addition of over 1,000 between 

1952 and 1953.84 Young also realized that the harried effort to recruit 

police and get them on the street in the previous years had made for a very 

ineffective and inefficient police force. While creating and executing the 

critical police training the Malayan security forces so desperately needed, 

Young also “reduced the force by 10,000 personnel, cutting mostly special 

constables who had been recruited early in the emergency and who had 

proven incompetent or corrupt.”85

General Templer coined the oft-used term “Hearts and Minds” that 

has frequently described aspects of our military’s counterinsurgency 

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. When asked how he intended to bring 

the Emergency in Malaya under control he stated, “The answer lies not 

in pouring more troops into the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds 

of the Malayan people.”86 Templer demonstrated great leadership to the 

British and Malayan government agencies, the security forces, and the 
50

Malayan people in reinforcing this point. He seemed to care deeply about 

the Malayan people and they recognized it. He listened to their grievances 

and created policies to support solutions when possible. 

Templer strongly believed “he could win the Emergency if he could 

get two-thirds of the people on his side.”87 To do that, Templer had to 

carefully think through how to give the population, especially the 

Chinese population, enough confidence in themselves and their security 

situation to insure they would choose the government over the communist 

insurgents.88 Civilian policies and directives coupled with military action 

were refocused with that aim in mind. Whether Templer accomplished his 

goal of winning Chinese hearts and minds or if the Chinese sided with the 

government because of the rigid population control measures may never 

be known.89 Most likely, both efforts together contributed to the end result. 

One of the most important things Templer was to optimize the strategy 

that Briggs had already laid out for him. Briggs had already created the 

framework that would be credited for progress, it just wasn’t visible yet.90

Templer optimized a number of already established programs. He nurtured 

the feeling of security and safety throughout the Malayan population by 

expanding the Home Guard program that had been slow to start under 

Briggs. “Goals were set to expand the home guard to 240,000 men and to 

ensure that there was proper supervision of the force by trained officers.”91

The same principles that had been applied to the regular security forces 

were also in effect for the Home Guard. Templer knew it was critical 

to include ethnic Chinese in the program. Arming the ethnic Malayan 

Chinese, many of whom came from the same communities as those who 

had joined the insurgency, was perilous business.92

Templer knew it was a risk to arm the indigenous Chinese but it was 

one worth taking and it paid off in the end. It turned out that allowing 

the indigenous Chinese to be both part of the Malayan government and 

solution trumpeted the call to communist ideology that the Min Yuen or 

MCP were spouting. “50,000 Chinese willingly joined the Home Guards, 

and by 1954, 150 Chinese villages were protected by their own security 

forces.”93 The well-organized training and careful expansion of Home 

Guard was critical to establishing sufficient force in the villages to provide 

locals a sense of security. In the end, the Home Guard “formed a valuable 

link between the Security Forces and the populace, and they provided 

much useful information...and freed trained troops from static duties.”94

Templer also perceived a critical need to expand governance capacity 

at all levels. As the Home Guard expanded and rapidly upgraded village 
51

security situations, it was just as crucial to ensure responsive governance 

was in place to meet people’s needs. This included immediately addressing 

the second and third order effects created by the resettlement effort. In 

the rush to accomplish the resettlement mission, many of the hastily 

established villages lacked the infrastructure to support appropriate living 

conditions. Templer recognized that the resettlement areas to which over 

half a million ethnic Chinese had been forcibly moved required dramatic 

improvement. How could one expect to gain a population’s passive or 

active support if the resettled areas were significantly inferior to the ones 

left behind?

Templer ordered the resettlement centers to be called “new villages...

The provision of services and amenities for the new villages was no 

longer to be referred to as ‘after care’ but as ‘development.”95 The aim 

was to win the Chinese villagers’ support by improving and enhancing 

their quality of life to the extent that the Min Yuen and MCP could no 

longer compete. Templer vastly expanded local governance and made a 

concerted effort to include ethnic Chinese in all aspects of the process, 

including elected positions. As local government was established in the 

villages, things began to get better for the local people and services that 

had never been available before, like water and electricity, were coming 

available.96 Templer offered a huge incentive to villages and areas that 

successfully governed and defended themselves while shunning the 

insurgency and openly supporting the government. One of Templer’s most 

influential incentives debuted “in 1953 by instituting a policy of declaring 

‘white areas,’ from which the Emergency Regulations were lifted once 

insurgency in them had died down.”97 This essentially allowed villages 

achieving white area status to return to normalcy, or, at least, to take a 

huge step toward it. The incentive of village white area status proved 

overwhelmingly successful. The village of “Malacca was declared the 

first ‘white area’ in September 1953...By mid-1955, a third of Malaya’s 

population lived in cleared ‘white’ areas.”98

While Templer clearly understood the importance of inclusion, 

population empowerment, increased governance at all levels and 

meticulous security force training and expansion, he also pursued the 

insurgency tenaciously. Templer advocated a balanced approach to 

combating the insurgency. A critical strategy component was the use of 

intelligence-driven, targeted kill and capture operations to render the 

insurgency ineffective. Army units conducted intensive in-country jungle 

warfare training.99 Commanders decreased the number of soldiers in their 

patrols and increased the amount of time they spent in the jungle searching 
52

for insurgents.100 Security force and Home Guard expansions had a positive 

second order effect on intelligence. 

The focused, intelligence driven, small unit jungle operations proved 

highly effective for the British. The totality of the sanctions, emergency 

regulations, and increasingly effective counterinsurgency focused kill and 

capture operations proved too much for the insurgents. The framework 

established by Briggs in 1950 re-focusing the counterinsurgency effort 

across the lines of effort and initiating effective population control 

measures against the insurgency between 1950 and 1952 coupled by 

Templer’s optimization of the framework between 1952 and 1954, broke 

the back of the insurgency.101 Although the effectiveness of Briggs plan 

would not be realized until Templer’s tenure in 1952, Two-thirds of the 

insurgents were destroyed between 1952 and 1954.102

Templer maximized the effectiveness of a number of significant 

initiatives that directly impacted the counterinsurgency effort. His keen 

use of information, psychological warfare, and propaganda both, against 

the insurgency and to enhance public opinion, is worth mentioning. Sir 

Robert Thompson, a British counterinsurgency theorist who is summarized 

in chapter 2, explains the importance of psychological warfare.

A successful psychological warfare campaign will depend on a clear 

and precise government surrender policy towards the insurgents. Such a 

policy has three main aims: (1) to encourage insurgents to surrender; (2) 

to sow dissension between insurgent rank and file and their leaders; and 

(3) to create an image of government both to the insurgents and to the 

population which is both firm and efficient but at the same time just and 

generous.103

The British proved experts in their use of psychological warfare, 

attracting a considerable number of Surrendered Enemy Personnel 

(SEPs). In many cases, the SEPs could be reintegrated into Malay society, 

serving in the Home Guard or, in some cases, the security forces. SEPs 

became a crucial component of both the intelligence effort and devising 

the psychological warfare strategy. In a combat assessment of Operation 

Sword which began in September 1953, Captain D.J Wilford of the 22 

Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) explains his use of propaganda in 

the fight. “Millions of surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes were 

dropped into the trees, voice aircraft broadcast daily and teams visited the 

surrounding areas speaking of the operation and all it meant to them.”104

Captain’s Wilford’s description of how propaganda was employed in 

Operation Sword typifies its use against the MRLA nationwide.
53

By the time Templer’s command ended in 1954, significant progress 

had been made by the British and Malay government against the 

insurgency. General Templer had been the right man for the job, poring 

over General Briggs’ framework and command confines, advocating for 

change, and then implementing and refining the framework successfully. 

More political power enabled Templer to achieve greater unity of effort 

than Briggs had that, in turn, created an even more balanced strategy. He 

had fueled the Malayanization of the government and security forces as 

he multiplied the number of Malays in every institution, making a point to 

include the indigenous Chinese. He understood, as Briggs had, the security 

forces were key. He redoubled efforts to train and re-train as necessary.105

Templer revamped struggling resettlement camps into modern new villages, 

complete with essential services. He rewarded government controlled 

areas and supporters with development and economic assistance. 

Templer stepped up efforts to communicate to the local people and 

insurgency through psychological operations. He continued intelligencedriven tactical operations against the insurgency and improved upon the 

body of knowledge for his soldiers, creating a jungle manual detailing best 

practices.106 In short, he took the balanced framework that Briggs passed 

him and improved it. The approach applied every available resource and 

asset at the government’s disposal to the campaign. Once the insurgency 

was brought under control, General Templer’s dictator-like power was 

readily and necessarily abandoned.107

Templer’s successor, General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, controlled the 

military side of the counterinsurgency effort while Sir Donald McGillivray 

served as the High Commissioner.108 Between 1954 and 1957 a great effort 

to prepare the Malay government for independence was underway. General 

Bourne was successful in further destroying the remaining insurgency. As 

the insurgent ranks continued to thin, the number of surrendered enemy 

personnel increased. British military assistance was slowly decreased 

security leadership positions, roles, and responsibilities were transitioning 

to the Malayans.109 The thorough British training of the security forces 

was apparent. The effectiveness, efficiency, and lethality of the security 

forces did not ebb as the Malays took the reins.110 The same thing was 

happening across the country in every government institution. The 

Malayan government was granted its independence in 1957 and did not 

have great difficulty defeating the remaining pockets of MCP insurgency 

that existed in the country.

The twelve-year counterinsurgency struggle in Malaya affords a prime 

example of the complexity, trial and error, flexibility, and self-evaluation 
54

required by a government in order to survive. It took the British the 

better part of five years, with herculean efforts from Generals Briggs and 

Templer, to settle on the appropriately balanced strategic and operational 

approach against the MCP, which ultimately turned the tide of the war to 

favor the government. During the first two years of the Emergency the 

focus on heavily weighted, large scale, military kinetic sweep operations 

were conducted at the detriment of the local people and the integration 

of civilian agencies. Unity of effort was not achieved and the large scale 

military operations were decreasingly successful in even gaining contact 

with the enemy.

General Briggs delivered the first major course correction away from 

an enemy-centric approach, downgrading the use of large-scale offensive 

operations in favor of smaller ones and forced military and civilian agencies 

to work together in the SWECs and DWECs. The security framework that 

Briggs created, even though he did not get to see it through, would prove 

to be the foundation of success in Malaya. General Briggs did a great deal 

to balance the counterinsurgency approach implementing the resettlement 

program and got a better handle on effective smaller scale kill and capture 

operations. He fueled an expansion of the security forces and understood 

the potential of the Home Guard. He implemented both new and improved 

existing population control programs such as food control, curfews, and 

registration of the population. Although General Briggs improved unity 

of effort, his authority to implement his framework and force compliance 

and focus across the government would prove inadequate. The structure 

of the decision making process, facilitating decisions by consensus and 

agreement between the government, police, and military authorities was 

undesirable and did not result in timely and accurate decisions and their 

associated implementation.

General Templer was the final ingredient the British and Malayan 

government needed to achieve an appropriately balanced militarycivilian strategy. He was immediately given a huge advantage by 

being made both the High Commissioner and director of operations in 

Malaya. He immediately forced the integration of military and civilian 

counterinsurgency efforts by merging the decision making committees and 

assigning deputies to answer directly to him. His dictator-esque power was 

appropriate for the situation. He was able to attain complete unity of effort 

and expedite the implementation of his decisions. He took General Briggs’ 

sound security framework and both adjusted and added a few additional 

key components. He understood the counterinsurgency strategy could not 
55

be successful without either the passive or active support of the population. 

He recognized the critical need to retrain the security forces, aggressively 

grow the Home Guard, and increase the equality and inclusion within the 

government and security forces of the indigenous ethnic Chinese.

The key intelligence side of the counterinsurgency campaign steadily 

improved, thanks to the increased presence of Chinese in the army, police, 

and home guards. As the security forces became more representative of the 

population, the attitudes of the Chinese population towards the government 

became more positive. As the reforms in the Malayan security forces took 

effect, the insurgents had to operate among an increasingly unfriendly 

population.111

Templer relooked the resettled villages and injected money and 

influence in them to create ‘new villages,’ drastically improving quality 

of life, worthy of the Chinese who had been moved there. He expertly 

utilized psychological operations and set the conditions for surrendered 

enemy personnel to safely reintegrate into Malayan society. Templer 

focused his offensive operations against the insurgency to be highly 

effective, intelligence driven, and precise. He improved his jungle training 

center and mandated his Officers attend in order to attain the most current 

operational tactics, techniques, and procedures on jungle warfare against 

the insurgency. Finally, he set the conditions for transfer of authority to the 

Malayan government and began to effectively ‘Malayanize’ the national 

government and security forces.

After Templer completed the turn-around of the counterinsurgency 

effort and left Malaya in 1954, the government would not lose the 

initiative to the insurgency again. One British Army Malayan veteran said 

one critical political concession predicated success in Malaya.

One word: independence. That’s what won it. Suddenly, Chin Peng 

[leader of the MCP] and all his merry men had the carpet pulled from 

under them because there they were saying, ‘We’re going to fight you Brits 

and drive you out!’ And we’re saying, ‘Yea we’re going and we’re going 

to hand it over to Malayans!’ There were too many people that had turned 

against them. All the Malays were against them. Many of the Chinese 

knew this was going to be a nice and defendable country and wanted a 

good life. ‘[We’d] much rather have this lot in charge, than your lot.’112

The Malayan Emergency is a good case study to discuss the importance 

of implementing a balanced Civilian-Military strategy simultaneously 

utilizing all elements of national power at the government’s disposal. 

In Malaya, the government could not simply focus efforts on the enemy 
56

or the population in isolation. They had to construct a hybrid approach 

that balanced their efforts. A strategy too heavily weighted toward either 

side, as the Malayan example clearly shows, can prove detrimental to the 

counterinsurgency effort. “Altogether the Communists’ initial success, 

such as it was, owed as much to the weakness of the Government resources 

as it did to the strength of its own campaign.”113 The careful application of 

power, striving for a unified approach across the joint, inter-governmental 

spectrum offers the best chance for success. A government must analyze 

each asset it has to apply to the counterinsurgency effort and carefully 

study the potential second and third order affects the asset can bring to bear 

against the insurgency. Sometimes the wisest strategic decision involves 

handing off power to the people who will value it and defend it the most 

passionately. 
57

Notes

1. Lucian Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism 

(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, 1957), 60.

2. Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” In 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston et al. (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing LTD, 2008), 113.

3. R.W. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 

Successful Counterinsurgency Effort” (Research Project, RAND, 1972), 17.

4. Komer, 17.

5. J. M. Forster, “A Comparative Study of the Emergencies in Malaya and 

Kenya,” Operational Research Unit Far East (1957): Report Number 1/57.

6. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 8.

7. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 

Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,” 2-3.

8. The British government had a difficult time coming to an agreement on 

how to deal with Malaya at this time. Many within the administration respected 

and supported the MPAJA after witnessing their success against the Japanese. 

To several leaders in the administration in the beginning, the Malay Rajas 

posed a potentially greater threat than the MPAJA to continued British colonial 

administration in the area. 

9. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 

71.

10. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 9.

11. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 

Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,” 5.

12. Komer.

13. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 115-121.

14. Daniel Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle,” In Big Wars and Small 

Wars, ed. Hew Strachan (London: Routledge Publishing, 2006), 97-98. The Ferret 

force were small units that integrated British and Malay soldiers with police. The 

Ferret force represents British willingness to reform their strategy to better fit the 

local conditions. Large scale offensive operations were not proving successful. 

The Ferret force could conduct longer operations in the jungle and better gain 

contact with insurgents as their signature was small and hard to detect. 

15. The four part Briggs Plan, discussed in detail later in the chapter, would 

prove effective over time and better balance the strategy. The framework of the 

Briggs plan would not be changed by General Templer when he took over in 

1952, only adapted as necessary to fit the changing conditions. 
58

16. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 118-121.

17. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a 

Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,” 31-33.

18. As part of the Art of War Scholars program, we studied 10 different 

Counterinsurgency campaigns throughout history including the Philippines, 

Ireland, Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, Dhofar, Oman, Rhodesia, Northern Ireland, 

Iraq, and Afghanistan.

19. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgencies, 50.

20. Karl Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 385.

21. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 7-10.

22. Stubbs “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 113 – 115.

23. Stubbs, 8.

24. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 15-16.

25. Pye, 18.

26. James Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A 

Tale of Two Insurgencies,” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, National War 

College, 2006), 5.

27. Corum.

28. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 25.

29. Stubbs “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 115-118.

30. Stubbs, 115.

31. Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle,” 97.

32. BI070, Retired General Officer, Interview by Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, March 30, 2011, United Kingdom. 

33. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011.

34. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

386.

35. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 114.

36. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011

37. Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle,” 99-100. 

38. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

404. 

39. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 116. 

40. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 75. 
59

41. John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, An Analysis of the Malayan 

Emergency 1948-1954 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 81-83.

42. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 27.

43. Komer, 27-28.

44. Komer, 27.

45. James Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency 

Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 149.

46. Arnold, 28.

47. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations (New York: Walker and 

Company, 1967), 55-58.

48. Paget, 58-59.

49. Paget, 56.

50. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 95.

51. Coates, 89.

52. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

388.

53. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 51.

54. Wade Markel, “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population 

Control,” Parameters, Spring: (2006), 37.

55. K.S. Sandu, “Emergency Resettlement in Malaya,” Journal of Tropical 

Geography 18 (1964): 167.

56. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 118-119. 

57. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 58-59.

58. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 58.

59. Pye, Lessons From The Malayan Struggle Against Communism, 51-52.

60. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 92-93.

61. Coates, 93.

62. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011

63. Irregular Security Forces are groups that are not members of the 

traditional government security force systems of Police, Army, etc. The Home 

Guard in Malaya was specifically created to bolster local security in safe areas in 

order to allow the government security forces the flexibility and strength to deal 

with the insurgency. 

64. The Home Guard was part of the tiered police system in Malaya. They 

were the third tier of the system, and lowest level, charged with protecting local 

villages and key areas denying the insurgency access to their people, food, and 
60

supplies. The Home Guard was an absolutely critical part of the Malay police 

force as it could secure static areas, in many cases government controlled areas, 

which allowed additional security forces the flexibility to do other critical tasks to 

counter the insurgency. 

65. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 75.

66. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 95.

67. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 101-103.

68. Stubbs, 102.

69. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 61.

70. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 27.

71. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 85. 

72. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

388. 

73. Hack, 406.

74. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 61.

75. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 60-61.

76. Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of Special 

Branch in the Malayan Emergency (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of 

Southeast Asian Studies 2008),177.

77. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 3rd at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Marston’s 

Malaya background lecture made a very clear distinction between what the 

conventional wisdom concerning General Templer’s range of power in Malaya 

vs. reality. Templer did possess near dictator like power when it came to National 

Policy and the prosecution of the National government’s response and efforts 

against the insurgency; however, he did not control the inter-workings of 8 out of 

9 of the Malayan states. 

78. COIN Scholars Seminar.

79. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 4-7 at Fort Leavenworth. The history 

books credit General Templer as a critical component to turning the tide of 

the Emergency back to favor the government. It became conventional wisdom 

because of the gains made in Malaya on Templer’s watch. Although Templer was 

a brilliant leader and does deserve the credit he gets, one must remember that 

Templer implemented, refined, and improved Briggs framework. 

80. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 30.

81. Komer, 31.

82. Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of 

Two Insurgencies,” 15.

83. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

395. 
61

84. Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of 

Two Insurgencies,” 22.

85. Corum, 18.

86. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 65.

87. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 109.

88. Simon Smith, “General Templer and counter-insurgency in Malaya: 

hearts and minds, intelligence, and propaganda,” Intelligence and National 

Security 16, no. 3 (2001): 65.

89. Smith, 68.

90. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

403. 

91. Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of 

Two Insurgencies,” 22.

92. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 4-7 at Fort Leavenworth. We debated 

the importance of the decision to arm the ethnic Chinese in Malaya at length in 

the seminar class. It was not out of the realm of possible that the arming of the 

local Chinese could have backfired in a serious way. There was no way to be sure 

that the armed Chinese the British would empower would not turn on government 

security forces. It turned out to be the right decision as the issue of the inclusion 

of the indigenous Malayan Chinese in the government was more important than 

communist ideology. 

93. Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of 

Two Insurgencies,” 23.

94. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations, 67.

95. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 110.

96. Stubbs, 110-111.

97. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 20-21.

98. Komer.

99. Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle,” 98.

100. Marston.

101. Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” 

386.

102. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 20.

103. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgencies, 90.

104. D.J. Wilfurt, “Some Aspects of Anti-Terrorist Operations: Malaya” 

(22d Special Air Services Regiment, 7th Special Forces Group, Operational 

Assessment, 1963), 8.
62

105. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 122. 

106. Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle,” 103. 

107. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 31-32.

108. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 126.

109. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 21.

110. James Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A 

Tale of Two Insurgencies,” 23.

111. Corum.

112. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011

113. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 74.
63

Chapter 4

Dhofar, Oman

1965 To 1975

An Army can defeat an Army but an Army cannot defeat a people. 

If the terrorists come from the people you are not going to defeat 

the people and therefore you’ve got to influence the terrorists in 

such a way that they will stop fighting. That is partly by force, 

partly by persuasion, and partly by offering them concessions. By 

and large of course, the more successful you are militarily, the 

more generous you can afford to be in concessions. That is why it 

is important that the military side is jolly good. 

— BI070, United Kingdom

This chapter will analyze the application of the balanced enemy and 

population focused strategy during the Dhofar, Oman counterinsurgency 

campaign from 1965 to 1975. While the campaign’s scale was smaller 

and the socio-political landscape was vastly different than that of 

Malaya, many of the same lessons emerged. The analysis will highlight 

the Oman government’s reform and transfer of authority, which was 

critical to achieving a balanced strategy at the national level across the 

political, military, social, economic, and psychological lines of effort. 

The cooperative execution of counterinsurgency operations in the Dhofar 

province by the British Special Air Service (SAS), and the Sultan’s Armed 

Forces (SAF) and the unity of effort achieved among the SAS, SAF, and 

the Sultan produced a highly effective collective strategy against the 

insurgency once the British provided more reinforcements to the conflict 

in 1970. In Oman, it took regime change from Sultan Said bin Taimur 

to his son Sultan Qaboos bin Said on July 23rd, 1970 to set conditions 

necessary for creating a sound, balanced, counterinsurgency strategy 

capable of defeating the communist insurgency in Dhofar.1

The story of the counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar, Oman is an 

important one. Once the conditions were set with the open-minded Sultan 

Qaboos in power in 1970, the British, through the Sultan, were able to 

create a balanced strategy that simultaneously smashed the communist 

insurgency in Dhofar province and produced enough incentive and 

opportunity across the lines of effort to convince the majority of locals to 

support the government.2

 This campaign further supports the notion that 

when fighting an insurgency, a government must take care to foster the right 

political climate, open to reform and negotiation. The government must 

ferociously target insurgents on the one hand but be willing to reintegrate 
64

insurgents into society the moment they decide to stop fighting. All of 

this is done while simultaneously partnering with and protecting the local 

population and providing them tangible standard of living improvements 

across the security, governance, and development lines of effort.3

Oman was never a British colony; however, historically, the British 

government has had a keen interest in Oman because of its position near 

waterways critical to transport of key resources and trade commodities. The 

British government has kept the ruling party of Oman close, establishing 

lucrative financial arrangements and intermittent military support to 

maintain the relationship. Prior to the outbreak of the Dhofar insurgency, 

Great Britain had proved its willingness to come to the Sultan’s aid to 

maintain influence in the country. Between 1955 and 1958, a dispute rose 

between the Sultan of Oman and a number of Imamates in the country 

over oil, government policies, and wealth sharing.4

The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) repelled the uprisings but they 

did not defeat the groups. They took refuge around the city of Nizwa 

in northern Oman. The British agreed, in November of 1958, to assist 

in defeating the insurgency and to help train and equip the SAF to be 

better prepared for low intensity conflicts in the future. British Special 

Air Service (SAS) soldiers joined with Sultan’s Armed Forces and a 

British conventional brigade from Kenya to conduct this mission between 

1958 and 1959.5

 The British repelled the insurgency and the remaining 

leadership, the Imamates, fled to the Jebel Akhdar.6

 “It had been victory 

at the first attempt by a numerically inferior force against an able enemy 

with geography on his side.”7 Once the British had successfully shifted 

the momentum of the uprising back to the government and SAF, the SAS 

withdrew in the same year while detached British officers stayed behind to 

assist in both training and commanding in the SAF soldiers.8

Before delving deeper into this Oman vignette, it is important to draw 

a distinction between the poor Omani province of Dhofar in the south and 

the rich Muscat region of Oman in the northeast. Dhofar borders Yemen, 

referred to at that time as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 

(PDRY) in the West, and Saudi Arabia to the North. The Dhofar province 

encompasses mostly vast desert, featuring few life-sustaining resources. 

The largest provincial city is Salalah, bordered by the Arabian Sea to the 

South and the Jebel Akhdar to the North. The Jebel is a commanding terrain 

feature that seemingly rises out of the desert north of Salalah, reaching 

elevations of 10,000 feet in some locations, replete with abundant wadis, 

rocky terrain, and foliage.9
65

The tribes inhabiting Dhofar and the Jebel differ drastically from the 

northern Omanis. They speak an unwritten language most northern Omanis 

do not understand, their tribal customs contrast starkly with those of the 

Omanis, and even their pigmentation is much darker than that of their 

countrymen.10 All in all, these regions read as two separate nations. The 

Dhofaris had been largely left out of the few economic and social programs 

that existed under Sultan Said. The Dhofaris were a remote tribal people 

without much reason to support the Sultan and the Oman government. 

The Dhofar Province with its rugged Jebel Akhdar and Spartan lifestyle is 

a logical place to base an insurgency.11 They were the ideal population to 

sway and co-opt to join an anti-government movement.

After the British SAS left in 1959, the Dhofar province began to 

experience significant issues in the early 1960s with the rise of the 

Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) led by Musselim bin Nuffl.12 The DLF 

aimed to separate the province from greater Oman and seize control from 

Sultan Said bin Taimur, pointing to the enormous disparity between the 

government’s economic and social policies for the wealthy capital city 

region of Muscat in the North and the much poorer Dhofar region in the 

south. Because of the lack of opportunity in the Dhofar province, many 

of the people left the region to work and serve in other countries and 

were exposed to the outside world. Those that remained behind were 

easy targets to influence. As the DLF looked to gain outside support, a 

number of Marxist ideologues offered their assistance. For Musselim bin 

Nuffl, accepting this assistance would prove a fatal mistake as Ahmad al 

Ghassani, a Marxist leader supported by both China and Russia, would 

eventually align himself with enough tribes on the Jebel to take control of 

the insurgency.13

By 1967, the uprising in Dhofar evolved from one aimed at achieving 

separation from the Sultan’s control to a communist-backed, ideological 

fight for the people of Dhofar by both the insurgency and the Oman 

government and Sultan.14 In 1968, the situation took a sharp turn as al 

Ghassani further radicalized the DLF and clearly articulated the DLFs aim 

as establishing “scientific socialism”15 throughout the region. The DLF 

renamed their group the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 

Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The aim of PFLOAG was to unify all of the Arabian 

emirate states into one socialist conglomerate. 16 Fighters in PFLOAG had 

virtual freedom of movement and maneuver on the Jebel in the Dhofar 

province. The local fighters that made up PFLOAG were referred to as the 

Adoo, the local word for enemy, by the government forces.17
66

Sultan Said understood the potential danger of PFLOAG and called 

upon the British to again assist him in quelling a rebellion in his country. 

The British, who by this time had supported Sultan Said and his exploits 

for over three decades, understood that this situation was unique and they 

were not willing to run toward the sound of the guns until a clear political 

path was illuminated. In many ways, the insurgency had risen because of 

the Sultan’s autocratic policies, rigid beliefs, and unwillingness to reform. 

Sultan Said followed a strict Islamic interpretation and despised what he 

was witnessing across the Arab states with the rise of oil revenue.18 He saw 

the second order effects of the new founded oil wealth of Westernization 

and modernization and believed it was severely tarnishing the Islamic way. 

The Sultan’s response to the “devilish secular influence” was to isolate 

the people in Oman from the outside world. The Sultan banned “trousers, 

sunglasses, transistor radios, dancing, music, cameras, cigarettes, dolls, 

and gas cookers”19 in an attempt to avoid westernization and unwanted 

influence. To further keep his country devout, the Sultan made life horrible 

for his people denying them modern medical facilities, schools, and 

development which led to a massive exodus of intellectuals.20

The British knew that if the Sultan was not willing to budge when 

it came to his beliefs and policies, there would be no way to defeat the 

insurgency and achieve positive change for the people of Oman.21 In an 

interview with a British commander who served in the 22 SAS during the 

Oman war, he described the British government’s recognition that Sultan 

Said did not possess the political flexibility necessary to achieve success 

against the insurgency. He stated quite simply that “every war is different 

but only politics will win and war is about people.”22 He emphasized this 

point numerous times during our interview stating later that “the military 

is not going to provide the solution; they are going to provide the pathway 

down which you’ve got to go in order to get to the solution. The politicians 

have got to sort it out. If you are particularly reliant on a military resolution, 

it ain’t going to work.”23 Sultan Said was not willing to even consider a 

political solution or create programs for the support of the Oman people. 

Winning a counterinsurgency campaign with Sultan Said was not going 

to happen. If the British were to intervene and assist against PFLOAG 

insurgency, the right political conditions had to exist first.

The British government decided it needed to act before it was too late 

and set political conditions in Oman that could successfully counter the 

insurgency. PFLOAG was only getting stronger while estimates at the time 

indicated they were capable of fielding 2,000 fighters with an additional 

3,000 militia on the Jebel.24 Recent conflicts in Malaya and Aden were 
67

influential for the British, who were keenly aware that a common strategic 

mistake was to delay until the counterinsurgency is well organized and 

established before sufficiently reacting.25 By 1970, PFLOAG announced 

that they had complete control over the Dhofar Province and were 

conducting increased attacks across the country. The final straw came in 

June of 1970 when the insurgency launched a failed attack on the Sultan 

of Oman’s Armed Forces at their garrison in Iski, in Central Oman.26 The 

British knew they had to come to the aid of Oman if they did not want to 

watch it fall to a communist system. The political situation in Oman would 

have to be made conducive to both win British political support at home 

and create a strategy to counter PFLOAG at the national level in Oman.27

Sultan Said’s son, Qaboos Bin Said was exactly the right leader who 

the British believed could turn the tide in the war and reform Oman. Said 

had been allowed Qaboos to leave Oman in pursuit of a Western education 

in the early 1960s. He graduated from the Royal Military Academy, 

Sandhurst, and had the opportunity to observe Britain’s government 

structure while in that country. He served a year in Germany alongside 

his British counterparts and gained an educated Western perspective.28

Upon return to Oman in 1964, the father quickly surmised that his son had 

become dangerously westernized and had relaxed his belief system. The 

Sultan placed Qaboos under house arrest, where he would remain for the 

next six years.29

On July 23rd, 1970 the British assisted Qaboos Bin Said to overthrow 

his father in a near bloodless coup.30 The popular impact of Sultan Qaboos 

taking power in Oman was immediate. For the British, this was the step 

necessary for the government to further commit to the counterinsurgency 

effort against PFLOAG in support of the Sultan. Qaboos’s rise to power 

also had an impact on the PFLOAG as well. The new Sultan released his 

father’s chokehold on his citizens by immediately implementing social 

and economic reforms, retracting racist policies that divided the north and 

south, and eliminating isolationist policies. Many non-socialist PFLOAG 

members who had joined the insurgency because of their opposition to 

the old Sultan found solid reason to stop fighting.31 Additionally, Qaboos 

called for a nationwide amnesty and ceasefire to give low to mid-level 

insurgents a chance to stop fighting.32 For many of the low level fighters 

and former DLF members, it was enough to throw down their arms 

immediately. Hard core socialists in PFLOAG were a tougher sell in that 

they needed to witness tangible results before making a decision.33

Once Sultan Qaboos was in power, the British furthered their 

commitment to counter the insurgency. They redoubled their support 
68

of the SAF, sending more detached and contracted officers to bolster 

the capability of the current units and raise additional SAF battalions. 

Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Watts, the commanding officer of 22 Special 

Air Service (SAS) at the time, had been sent to Salalah, Dhofar Province, 

in the months preceding Qaboos’s rise to power to conduct an assessment 

of the situation in Oman. His task was to determine how best to increase 

the SAF’s efficiency and which strategy would most effectively counter 

PFLOAG while bolstering SAS involvement. If this was not daunting 

enough, he also was to monitor conditions and recommend exactly when 

to make the move.34 In an interview between Lieutenant Colonel John 

McKeown and Colonel Watts, Watts had this to say about the conditions 

around the city of Salalah and the Dhofar Province in early 1970.

I was horrified. The road was cut and the only resupply was by air or 

sometimes by sea. . . . There were no Dhofaris in SAF, which was virtually 

an army of occupation. Everybody on the Jebel was with the enemy, some 

convinced, some out of boredom, some intimidated: SAF had only a few 

Jebali guides. . . . There were signs of counter-revolution, with MuslimCommunist arguments. The latter were better armed and organized and 

ruthless, absorbing some Dhofaris and shooting others. A clash was coming 

and therefore the Government had a chance of getting some Dhofaris on 

their side. The idea must be to pick up the Muslim rebellion, but to do this 

a national aim was needed.35

Colonel Watts’ assessment of the problems that faced the Sultan’s 

Armed Forces and the way ahead were well received. First, it was very 

clear to him that the SAF had to get up on top of the Jebel and stay there.36

The SAF had not had a good experience on the Jebel to date. Every time 

they went up on the Jebel they had to fight their way out. Colonel Watts 

envisioned a balanced strategy in which government forces would focus 

on both partnering, protecting, and controlling the local population, 

bringing them development, governance, and economy, while smashing 

the insurgents through intelligence-driven kill or capture operations. 

None of that could happen until government forces had a secure hold 

on the Jebel. The current model that was being executed included only 

offensive operations against the insurgency and was often times void of 

intelligence. Colonel Watts recommended the SAS be integrated into the 

Dhofar province as a major player in the campaign. He called it ‘Operation 

Storm’ and designed a framework that, in his mind, had the best chance of 

turning the tide of the war.37 His campaign plan that would adhere to five 

basic fronts.
69

Table 7. Lieutenant Colonel Watts “Five Front” Strategy for Operations in 

Dhofar, Oman.

1) An Intelligence Cell

2) An Information Cell

3) A medical Officer supported by SAS medics

4) A veterinary Officer

5) The Raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan

Source: Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East (London: 

Greenhill Books, 2005), 32-33.

Many Dhofar veterans interviewed had served in both the SAS and 

the SAF and pointed to Colonel Watts’ simple strategy as key and noted 

the basic concept stuck throughout the war and nested well with the efforts 

of Sultan Qaboos.38 It produced the framework for a balanced military 

approach which advocated both the killing and capturing of the enemy 

while, at the same time, setting the right conditions to convince the local 

people to stop fighting and support the government, which now had more 

to offer.39 They would use information cell to communicate to both the 

insurgency and to the locals detailing the good deeds of the government. 

The medical and veterinarian officer would be used to bring services to 

the tribal inhabitants on the Jebel for the first time ever. As the primary 

currency on the jebel was livestock, namely cattle, camels, and goats, 

veterinarian services were sought after.40 The raising and mentorship of 

Dhofari soldiers would bolster combat power and facilitate the necessary 

intelligence required to defeat the insurgency.

This conflict is a prime case study example when evaluating an 

enemy-centric vs. population-centric strategy. Rather than weighing the 

strategy to one particular side, Colonel Watts’ strategy, and the execution 

by the SAS and eventually the SAF, created the appropriate equilibrium 

between two approaches. Even with vastly scarce resources, the scale of 

which would be unheard of and not even considered for the Contemporary 

Operating Environment (COE)41, the men of the SAS utilized every asset or 

line of effort they possessed, whether bullets, leaflets, medical assistance, 

or small-scale development and agricultural expertise and applied them 

evenly to the campaign to win.

One of the first things the SAS did when they got into Dhofar in 1970 

was formulate a plan to deny the Adoo freedom of movement on the Jebel. 

As mentioned earlier, the SAF had a bad experience on the Jebel the 
70

months prior, sustaining high casualty rates, and they were mired in a cycle 

of effectively clearing terrain, but ineffectively holding it. As described in 

the Malaya chapter, veterans described this as “bait bashing.”42 The SAF 

would conduct two day missions up onto the Jebel. They would clear 

villages, search homes, fight, and then head back to their secure base in 

Salalah, leaving the area vulnerable to re-infilitration.

One SAS veteran commented on the revolving process of bait bashing 

and the logic behind it. He mentioned that when planning a mission against 

the insurgency you must understand the second and third order effects and 

goals of that mission. “If it’s [the mission] a short term success that doesn’t 

affect long term aim, it’s a failure.”43 Finally, a genuine sense of “jebelitis” 

pervaded the SAF units.44 Jebelitis was a dangerous, almost mystical, fear 

among the soldiers of the SAF regarding the powerful enemy occupying 

Jebel. This fear had to be conquered. The only way to do that was to both 

clear and hold portions of the Jebel.

The SAS did return to Jebel and establish a presence, allowing the 

SAF to do the same. According to one SAS veteran who played a role in 

establishing bases on the Jebel between late 1970 and 1972, bases and a 

permanent presence on the Jebel were early signs that the government was 

winning and turning the tide of the war.45 Critical to this effort was the 

amnesty program internal to SAS and SAF that was in harmony with the 

Sultan’s country-wide amnesty effort. The British were quick to recognize 

the Adoo vacillated between faithfulness to their religion and loyalty to 

the hard line communist PFLOAG ideology and belief system that had 

swept them into the insurgency. The British focused their Psychological 

Operations (PSYOPS) effort on this fissure with success.46

The British and SAF made the insurgency a very simple, black and 

white amnesty offer that was closely tied to their PSYOPS strategy. The 

banner phrase for the PSYOPS effort to co-opt and recruit Adoo and other 

neutral Jebali tribesmen under the PFLOAG banner was “Islam is our 

Way, Freedom is our Aim.”47 There was no fear of prosecution for Adoo 

fighters who decided to “cross-over” to the side of the government, even 

if they had been involved in deadly attacks on government forces in the 

past.48 This, coupled with the fact the Adoo could openly practice their 

religion and gain immediate employment as members of the Firqat, was an 

attractive offer. The acceptance and implementation of Surrendered Enemy 

Personnel (SEPs) into the Firqat was hugely significant. In fact, the vast 

majority of the Firqat were former SEPs. A group of SAF commanders 

estimated that by the counterinsurgency’s conclusion in 1975, 38 tribally 

affiliated Firqat groups ranging in size from 30–160 members had been 
71

formed.49 The Firqat’s end strength numbered well over 1000 fighters 

when added together and the war would not have been won without them.50

The raising of the Firqat required considerable of trial and error. 

The initial attempt to organize a Firqat group, the 1970 multi-tribal 

conglomerate “Firqat Salahadin”, proved not to be the way ahead.51 One 

veteran, who assisted with the formation of a multi-tribal Firqat, indicated 

the British misunderstood tribal dynamics at the time. Eventually they 

discovered successful Firqats operated within their own tribal areas and 

were comprised of singular tribes.52 Subsequent efforts to raise Firqat 

groups in singular tribal areas were more successful than previous efforts; 

however, problems persisted.

Once Firqat groups were raised, British and SAF leaders struggled to 

control them. Veterans from the SAF commented that, during operation 

planning, they could count on about a fourth of the Firqat to show up for 

the mission execution.53 While the Firqat were a frustrating group to work 

with, they were critical to counterinsurgency effort. They understood the 

tribal areas and dynamics, languages, customs, and geography of the Jebel. 

The British appreciated their unique importance and found ways to work 

with them. One of the best ways was through the British Army Training 

Teams (BATT) attached to Firqat groups providing mentorship and 

enablers including air support and artillery.54 “The only proven method of 

enjoying a modicum of control over the Firqat is to have a British Officer 

or NCO permanently attached. The BATT teams have varied from four 

men to a dozen or more.”55

The importance of the amnesty effort resulting in the Firqat program 

cannot be understated and should raise questions regarding the United 

States’ current amnesty effort in Afghanistan. The amnesty program in 

Dhofar worked because there was little grey area for a fighter to navigate 

and consider prior to ‘crossing-over’ to the government’s side. The critical 

point here is the government forces in Oman recognized there could not 

be a grey area. If the government wanted to win, they had to allow for 

reconciliation and integrate the Jebalis into the political process.56 The 

government could not allow the process to seem threatening in any way. 

They had to ensure the Adoo believed without question, through both 

word and action, that when they crossed over there would be no retribution 

applied against them for past deeds. This required some counterinsurgents 

to shelve their personal feelings on the matter for the greater good. One 

SAS veteran described this process as simple math stating, “It is far better 

to turn one of them [an Adoo] than to kill him. You turn one of them, you’ve 

deprived the Adoo of one man and you’ve gained one. Mathematically that 

is two. Kill him and so what; he will be replaced by someone else.”57
72

At the same time that military operations, coupled with the raising 

of the Firqat, by SAS and SAF were gaining traction against PLFOAG 

on the Jebel, Sultan Qaboos launched major economic and development 

initiatives. Unlike his father, the Sultan had opened the country up to 

oil export and quickly accelerated the national revenues to 300,000,000 

pounds a year. The Sultan took his increased wealth and appropriated over 

half of it to defense and a large portion to major economic and development 

projects in Dhofar.58 Additionally, an economic and development program 

was an integral part of the strategy at the tactical and operational level 

within the SAS and SAF aimed at gaining local buy-in within the local 

communities and the tribes. The SAS and SAF spent considerable periods 

of time appeasing their Firqat counterparts. Small scale projects were often 

targeted in loyal tribal areas where Firqats were raised. The Firqat had a 

voracious appetite for what the SAS and government could bring them.

They [the Firqat] were victims of the cargo-cult. The twentieth century 

had burst on Dhofar in a matter of months and the Firqat just could not 

come to terms with all the material possibilities this might bring them; or 

rather, the SAS teams working with them were hard pushed to meet their 

demands for blankets, tents, utensils, boots etc. . . . It was common for a 

young Firqat member to be absent looking after his father’s camels for 6 

months and to return expecting his back pay.59

 Once government forces were securely on the Jebel interdicting Adoo 

freedom of movement, the campaign focus turned to cutting off insurgent 

supply routes in 1972. In fact, that year would prove a decisive year for the 

government forces. A couple miles from the border of Yemen, the outpost 

at Sarfait was established (initially called Simba) to interdict insurgent 

camel trains coming in to resupply the insurgency.60 The operation kicked 

off in April 1972 when the SAF conducted an air assault into Sarfait and 

immediately began establishing a permanent battalion outpost just a few 

miles from the border.61 The bold move to establish Sarfait in such an 

austere location was the subject of much debate at the time and now.62 The 

debate comes because the battalion that occupied Sarfait could do little 

but sit in their static position and interdict only the convoys that came 

within visual range. “Sarfait overlooked the routes from Hauf into Dhofar, 

but the distance from the feature itself to the coast was considerable. 

Commanding as the position was, there was nothing to prevent enemy 

camel caravans passing at night through the broken country between the 

Jebel and the sea.”63

Many leaders believed Sarfait was a very narrow mission set for 

an entire battalion and some even wondered if it were a waste of talent. 
73

Others thought that it was an important position for the Sultan to have 

staked so far to the west. If anything, the position sent a strong signal 

from the Sultan to PFLOAG and the enemy resupply effort that the Sultan 

was not willing to cede even the farthest western land he possessed. The 

audacious move to establish such a position and prove it sustainable, 

mostly through helicopter resupply, sent an important message to the 

insurgency. The Sultan and his Army were more powerful than previously 

imagined and they had the fortitude to win.64 Sarfait was wildly unpopular 

with the enemy as the location was close to traditional supply lines. The 

outpost attracted an enormous amount of enemy activity from the region, 

including across the border. The soldiers stationed at Sarfait faced heavy 

enemy contact, including indirect fire from across the border in Yemen. 

The position at Sarfait took a significant amount of pressure off more 

strategic areas such as Salalah by giving the insurgency a huge problem to 

deal with in the west. It forced PFLOAG to refocus many of its assets to 

deal with the new position.65

An additional effort to interdict the insurgents’ supply line was 

executed with Operation Hornbeam that would establish a blocking 

obstacle between the towns of Manston and Adonib in southwest Dhofar.66

Although this was a small operation executed by a company, it was 

important because it laid the groundwork for the larger blocking obstacle 

effort in the years to come. It was recognized immediately that the position 

at Sarfait was just the beginning, the anchor point, of a significant effort to 

cut the enemy off from its supplies coming from Yemen.67

In the years to follow, the Hornbeam Line was reinforced with mines 

and wire while additional lines would be added in the west to interdict the 

insurgency’s ability to resupply.68 The Hornbeam line was expertly sighted 

in and was overwatched by a battalion. The strength of this battalion was 

greatest to the southwest part of Dhofar where the vegetation offered the 

enemy the best chance to get through under concealment. The SAF forces 

occupying the line would conduct numerous patrols, nightly ambushes, 

and complicate enemy resupply efforts. The Hornbeam line would force 

insurgent camel trains north where they would have to travel further and 

be forced into more open country where they were easier to identify and 

engage.69

Between 1972 and 1975 the effort to block resupply from Yemen had 

become a high priority. Added to the defensive position at Sarfait and the 

obstacle effort was the Diane ring, a series of overwatch positions that 

interdicted key resupply routes while naturally turning resupply convoys 

into the Hornbeam line and further north.70 The Simba and Damavand 
74

lines were placed west of the Hornbeam line to provide depth in the 

obstacle plan and make it increasingly difficult for the Adoo to cross. The 

Hammer line, named after one of the SAS soldiers serving in Dhofar, was 

placed just east of the Hornbeam Line.71 This defensive depth increased 

the chances of interdicting enemy camel trains significantly. By 1975, the 

final touches were placed on the obstacle system by connecting the outpost 

at Sarfait with a mine and wire mixed line all the way to the sea in the 

south. This ushered the war to a conclusion due to the fact the Adoo could 

no longer sufficiently supply themselves in their fight against the Sultan 

and his forces.72

On July 19th, 1972 the insurgency, writhing under pressure from the 

ever-strengthening government forces, planned a bold operation against a 

small garrison in the town of Mirbat.73 The Mirbat garrison housed 9 SAS 

soldiers with an estimated 22 man Firqat in defense.74 The enemy attacked 

the garrison with 100 to 200 fighters. The small force of 30 defenders 

successfully held their position against the overwhelmingly larger force 

long enough for reinforcements to arrive. A senior Dhofar veteran noted: 

“One of the 9 was killed, two wounded, but they shared a DSO, a DCM, an 

MC, 1 MM, and 2 MIDs between them for a remarkable action resulting 

in 30 enemy dead and over 60 captured. They [the Adoo] never tried a 

frontal attack this way again.”75 The Adoo’s failed attack on the garrison 

at Mirbat set the Adoo back as they lost a significant percentage of their 

assembled force. Approximately a fourth of the insurgents had been killed 

or captured during the attack. The defeat at Mirbat would prove a turning 

point as fighting in the eastern part of the Jebel waned. The insurgency 

would not attempt another attack in open terrain against a garrison again.76

The Sultan continued his diplomatic efforts as these successful events 

unfolded. He had joined the Arab League to both continue his efforts to rid 

the country of his father’s isolationist policies and gain outside support. 

The success of the Sultan against PFLOAG did not go un-noticed by 

regional partners. The Iranians and the Jordanians, both anti-communist 

governments, answered the call for help from the Sultan in a measurable 

way.77 The Iranians sent their first soldiers, a Special Forces unit, into Oman 

and began assisting the Sultan with weapons and ammunition in 1972.78

In December of 1973, the Iranians sent an entire well-equipped brigade 

to Oman. Most importantly, the Iranians came in with well resourced air 

and helicopter support that was critical to increasing the effectiveness of 

the SAF and overall effort against the insurgency.79 The brigade made 

a difference by manning static positions both on the Hornbeam line, 

the midway road and airfield, and closer to Salalah.80 The Jordanians 
75

contributed support as well. They sent intelligence officers and a hefty 

dose of engineer support that the Sultan desperately needed to bolster his 

civil support to the Dhofari’s.81

In 1974, as PFLOAG struggled to sustain its forces and keep pace with 

the Sultan’s efforts, they were compelled to take stock of their efforts. The 

Sultan’s information campaign, amnesty program, development effort in 

Dhofar, and governance reform was damaging the insurgency as many 

Adoo decided the fight was no longer worth the cost.

PFLOAG convened its fourth congress in January 1974. A number 

of problems, including logistical shortages, communications breakdowns, 

and a high defection rate, were acknowledged. In response to these 

difficulties, the gradual success of the regime, and the emergence of 

dissention within its own ranks, the PFLOAG undertook a reappraisal 

of its strategy. This examination eventually produced a shift of emphasis 

from the military to the political struggle. . . . The insurgents began to 

focus almost exclusively on the situation in Oman; therefore the name of 

the movement was changed . . . to the Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Oman [PFLO].82

The establishment of the first permanent positions on the Jebel 

in 1973, coupled with the emplaced defensive belt in the west, mostly 

completed by the end of 1974, tipped the insurgency into defensive mode.

83 The sanctuary area for PFLO had been greatly reduced as SAF and SAS 

forces. The Sultan’s momentum was irreversible. The insurgency failed.

The Sultan took great pains to win over the people of Dhofar and on 

the Jebel Akhdar using economic and developmental initiatives. As the 

Sultan opened up his country and pulled his economy out of isolationism. 

The revenue he had available to bring progress and infrastructure to his 

people was vastly richer than what the insurgency could bring. PFLO 

simply could not compete. The Sultan was well aware of the conditions 

on the Jebel. The tribal people lived an austere life desperately lacking 

amenities and life support infrastructure. It was easy for the Sultan to bring 

progress into an area that had nothing. For the people on the Jebel, the 

most life-altering single resource was water.84 The water was important to 

both sustain themselves and to sustain their livestock, which was critical 

to their nomadic way of life.

Many of the development and economic projects funded by the Sultan 

on the Jebel targeted Firqat tribal areas to strengthen their support. Areas 

that begin with nothing laud efforts such as those of the Sultan. One veteran 

described this process as critically important to the war effort. The Firqat 
76

would choose an area for development most central to its tribal lands and 

the SAF would secure it during the whole process. A Civil Action Team 

(CAT) would come in and assist in digging a well to make a centralized 

water point for the tribe.85 Once the well was built, the CAT would erect a 

simple infrastructure consisting of a “shop, school, clinic, and a mosque”86

for the tribal area. The CAT standardized this process across the Jebel to 

great success. It was a tangible action readily visible to both sides. The 

action persuaded the Firqat to remain loyal and fueled many other Adoo to 

stop fighting and join the progress. PFLO could not bring as much to the 

local people as that government of Oman could. The Sultan also stepped 

up an already decent effort to develop Salalah and the coastal region of 

Dhofar. The areas he chose to sink his resources into were areas that were 

both under the control of and supported by the government.87

This is worth considering in light of our own undertaking on the 

development line of effort in Afghanistan.88 The Sultan and his forces did 

want to help the people of Dhofar and bring progress to the area; however, 

they ensured each developmental initiative was tied to a second and third 

order effect and the long term aim of the government. In short, nothing 

was free to the Dhofaris. The Firqat fought with the SAS and in support of 

the government of Oman. They made the decision not to support PFLO, 

switched sides, and were doing what they felt was right for their tribesmen. 

The CATs strategically thought through where they would place their 

resources on the Jebel. The individual tribes the Firqat represented were 

the logical choice to gain the most long-term impact for the government. 

It rewarded the tribes supporting the government and gave them incentives 

to maintain loyalty to the government. The concept resembled the new 

village strategy executed in Malaya. 89 The tribes that did not support the 

government, remained on the fence, or supplied large portions of the Adoo 

got nothing.

A SAF operation in strength supported by a Firqat secures a position 

of the Firqat’s choice which dominated its tribal area. Military engineers 

build a track to the position giving road access, followed by an airstrip 

if possible. A drill is brought down the track followed by a Civil Action 

Team with shop, school, clinic, and mosque. SAF thins out to a minimum 

to provide security. Water is pumped to the surface and into distribution 

systems prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans 

and troughs for animals. Civilians come in from miles around to talk to 

the Firqat, SAF and Government representatives. They are told that enemy 

activity in this area will result in the water being cut off. Civilians move 

out in surrounding areas and tell the enemy not to interfere with what 
77

is obviously a good thing [they also provide intelligence]. Enemy, very 

dependent on the civilians, stops all aggressive action and either goes 

elsewhere or hides. Tribal area is secure. All SAF are withdrawn.90

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) were repeatedly called critical by 

nearly every veteran interviewed for this thesis.91 One veteran interviewed 

had been involved in PSYOPS for practically the entire war. He made 

it clear that the PSYOPS effort in Oman was conducted concurrently 

with every operation they conducted. There was a large leaflet campaign 

reinforcing the slogans of the government. As mentioned earlier, “Freedom 

is our Aim. Islam is our Way” was the overall slogan used throughout the 

conflict. It was chosen to drive home the point that “Islam is prosperous 

with the Sultan; life is barren with the Communists.”92

The government had a leaflet campaign and created a radio station in 

Salalah to provide a counterpoint to a pro-communist station broadcasting 

from Aden. It even created a mobile movie station, in the days before 

Salalah had television that could be used in austere locations to broadcast 

to locals.93 The PSYOPS director obtained wind up radios to make 

available to the local population. A lot of thought went into how to help 

the locals value their radios. After studying the way the Americans had 

proceeded with a similar radio disseminating effort in Vietnam, the 

director of PSYOPS in Oman decided to sell them cheaply to increase 

the sense of ownership by the locals. This was done with the second order 

effect in mind. If the insurgents destroyed a local’s radio, he would be 

destroying an item for which that local had paid. The idea was that this 

would anger the local more than if he had been given the item.94 The most 

important lesson conveyed by the PSYOPS veteran interviewed dealt with 

both continuity and aim. He stated “As with any other type of military 

effort it is vital to keep a clear vision of the strategic and tactical aims at 

all times. If this is forgotten or neglected it is very easy to expend valuable 

resources on non-supportive ventures.”95

The PSYOPS effort in Oman is also worth considering in light of 

our efforts in the Contemporary Operating environment of Afghanistan. 

What bound to the fore immediately was that the British were not afraid to 

confront the thorny issue of religion. They recognized the potential fissure 

between the communist PFLO ideology and the local customs, religion, 

and beliefs of the people of Dhofar. They tackled the religious issue head 

on even though, as with the communists, the British were also a nonIslamic military force. The difference was the British were in support of an 

Islamic government and recognized the power of the religious differences 

that existed between the locals and the communists. In Afghanistan, the 

US has steered as far away from the religious issue as we can.96
78

By late 1975, the insurgency had suffered heavy casualties coupled 

with an enormous number of defections and they could no longer put up 

a significant military threat. By December of 1975, government forces 

controlled all vital areas of Dhofar and reported to the Sultan that is was 

ready for expanded development.97 Government forces had increased 

dramatically in effectiveness and size, the Firqat were supportive and 

strong in their tribal areas, and economic, development, and governance 

initiatives were in full swing across the Dhofar province and the country.98

The counterinsurgency campaign in the Dhofar province of Oman is 

informative when compared to the US led war in Afghanistan today. Above 

all else, it was a struggle for control of the people. Major General (R) Tony 

Jeapes, who commanded 22 SAS at the beginning of the war makes this 

point very clear stating “it was first and last a war about people, a war in 

which both sides concentrated upon winning the support of the civilians 

of the Jebel Dhofar and which was won in the end by civil development. 

Military action was merely a means to that end.”99 There were many 

components to the balanced counterinsurgency strategy in Oman. One 

veteran described the key components to the victory in his opinion.

Table 8. Winning the War in Dhofar, Oman: The important features.

1) The Sultan’s accession and immediate liberal reforms.

2) Sufficient money to expand and equip the forces.

3) Join civil/military control throughout.

4) Airpower.

5) The Iranian contribution.

6) The Government could offer so much more than the enemy.

7) Communism and Islam are incompatible.

8) British Officers.

Source: The Dhofar War (From COIN PRIMARY SOURCES), 19.

The British government was not keen to not further commit themselves 

until the right political atmosphere was in place to make the reforms 

necessary to combat PFLO. The British got that reform in Sultan Qaboos, 

who immediately eased the strict, isolationist policies of his father within 

weeks of taking power. Sultan Qaboos scrubbed out racist policies across 

the country, drastically increased economic and development initiatives, 

increased the funding of the military, and enacted a liberal nationwide 
79

amnesty program that gave his enemies a way to re-integrate into Omani 

society. Most importantly, in spite of the Sultan’s drastic reforms in Oman, 

the tribal system on the jebel was reinforced, religion and customs were 

respected, and they were not expected to change their system. The Sultan 

had formulated the appropriate strategic level policy that applied the right 

local solution in Dhofar.

The next step was to form the logical military strategy at the Operational 

level that was complimentary to the Sultan’s efforts and attacked the 

insurgency from all possible angles. The British military advisory effort, 

led by the SAS, established a framework created by Lieutenant Colonel 

Johnny Watts which proved enduring. The framework focused on the local 

population on the Jebel, injected an economic system in Dhofar, invited 

insurgents to change sides and immediately employed them in the Firqat, 

expertly utilized psychological operations, and executed intelligence 

driven kill / capture operations against the Adoo that significantly reduced 

the insurgency and made low to mid-level fighters seriously consider 

‘crossing-over’ to the government’s side.

Every asset the government forces had at their disposal was utilized 

with the campaign’s long-term aim and goals in mind. It was recognized 

from the beginning that the military intervention by the British or the 

expansion of the Sultan’s Armed Forces would not achieve victory; rather, 

they would illuminate the path to a political solution. In the end, with the 

arrival of Sultan Qaboos, a balanced campaign was established to defeat 

the insurgency. The military was increasingly effective, the economy 

fueled a targeted development effort in Dhofar, policies that benefitted 

northern Oman while ignoring southern Oman were retracted, and the 

government proved to the local people that their best interests would be 

served by the government and not by the communists.

While all of these factors were necessary to achieve success against the 

insurgency in Dhofar, the execution of the government’s strategy and the 

events that unfolded to result in victory were not black and white. Victory 

against PFLOAG in Dhofar was much closer to the shade of gray. In the 

military we hesitate mightily to use the word luck; however, there was 

plenty of it at play for the government forces in this counterinsurgency. 

As described throughout this paper there was a contentious issue of 

religion the government exploited to its advantage. Sultan Qaboos himself 

turned out to be a brilliant, caring leader that his people respected. Had 

Sultan Qaboos not been able to deliver as the British thought he would, 

the campaign could have gone the other way. If the Arab League had not 

accepted Oman into its ranks, the crucial Iranian and Jordanian assistance 
80

may have never come. These are just three obvious examples to support 

the important point that while the victory was sweet for the Sultan and his 

supporters, the struggle was a close contest to the end.

Nevertheless, the counterinsurgency in Dhofar, Oman will stand as an 

important and illuminating case study for the governments and militaries 

that find themselves facing an insurgency. It illustrates a tale in which 

victory was achieved in an austere environment with few resources and 

diminutive odds. The Oman veterans did not characterize this campaign 

as either population-centric or enemy-centric; it was far more complicated 

than that. One senior veteran stated “the military operations were of 

secondary importance [to civil action] but of first rate necessity in the 

first instance.”100 The government achieved a well balanced strategy 

that aggressively pursued the enemy, partnered with and protected the 

population, and effectively utilized their resources across the lines of 

operation to achieve success. 
81

Notes

1. For the reader that wants to learn more about the counterinsurgency 

campaign in Dhofar province, Oman, the following literature is recommend. 

For a great overview of the campaign start Ian Becket’s chapter “The British 

Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-75,” In Daniel Marston and Carter 

Malkasian’s book, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. For in depth analysis 

of the war read General Sir Tony Jeapes book, SAS Secret War: Operation Storm 

in the Middle East and General Sir John Akehurst’s book, We won the War: The 

Campaign in Oman 1965-1975.

2. This campaign represents a rare case-study, along with the campaigns in 

Greece and Malaya, where a communist insurgency is defeated. The defeat of the 

Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, PFLOAG came at an 

important time for the west as the US was struggling in Vietnam.

3. BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel, Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, March 28, 2011, United Kingdom.

4. Ian Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar

1965-1975,” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare ed. Daniel Marston et al. 

(Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2008), 175-176.

5. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 161-162.

6. The Jebel Akhdar in the Dhofar Province of Oman is situated in the 

southern part of the country and would prove to be the perfect insurgent sanctuary 

area throughout the counterinsurgency. The Jebel, as it is called in short, has peaks 

that reach as high as 10,000 feet and is surrounded by desert, the city of Salalah, 

and flat land to the south and rocky no man’s land type plains to the north. The 

Jebel has dense vegetation, steep canyons, and the only way to get to it is to 

climb or hike up. The force that commands the top of the Jebel holds a distinct 

advantage over anyone else attempting to gain access.

7. A. J. Deane-Drummond, “Brilliant but little known British Desert 

Action: Operations in Oman,” The Times, April 9, 1959, 14.

8. Deane-Drummond, 177. For clarity and US understanding the term 

“detached” when describing British officers who were paid by the British 

government to serve as commanders in the Sultan’s Armed Forces. The British 

term for this is “seconded” officers. Finally, “contract” officers were those that left 

the British Army for a period of time and were contracted and paid by the Sultan 

for service in his Army.

9. BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel, March 28, 2011, United Kingdom.

10. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers: Campaigning in Somaliland and 

Oman (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2008), 60.
82

11. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations (New York: Walker and 

Company,1967), 24-25.

12. Bard O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” In Insurgency in the 

Modern World ed. Bard O’Neill et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 216-

217.

13. O’Neill.

14. D. L. Price, “Oman: Insurgency and Development,” Institute of Conflict 

Analysis 53 (1975):2.

15. Bard O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” 217.

16. O’Neill.

17. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 209.

18. John Akehurst, We Won A War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975 

(Southhampton, England: Camelot Press Ltd, 1982), 12.

19. Akehurst.

20. Interview with BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel, March 28, 2011. The 

Dhofar veterans made it very clear that Sultan Said was falling out of favor 

with the British government. Because of the Sultan, many of the Oman’s top 

intellectuals left the country if they could. The situation that Sultan Said put 

country in is analogous to the situation that has faced Afghanistan over the last 30 

years. The men with potential and bright futures leave the country if there is no 

opportunity to be successful. Intelligent, type A leaders are drawn to areas they 

can achieve success for themselves and their families. In the case of Oman, many 

left the country and when they wanted to come back in, Sultan Said wouldn’t 

allow it claiming they had most definitely been too westernized and would poison 

the people’s minds with foreign ideas.

21. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 21st at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Marston’s 

Dhofar Oman background lecture made it very clear that the British were not 

willing to get involved in the counterinsurgency against PFLOAG because they 

recognized that in the end, a political solution would have to be reached with the 

local tribal population in Dhofar to overcome the influence of PFLOAG and their 

communist ideology on the people. Sultan Said was not willing to budge on his 

strict Islamic beliefs and was therefore, not willing to negotiate a settlement with 

the insurgency. The British government recognized that defeating the communist 

insurgency and gaining and maintaining the support of the local people was not 

feasible under Sultan Said.

22. BI080, Retired General Officer, Interview by Benjamin Boardman, 

Robert Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, April 3, 2011, United 

Kingdom.

23. Interview with BI080, April 3, 2011, United Kingdom.
83

24. Walter Ludwig, “Supporting allies in counterinsurgency: Britain and the 

Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (2008): 67.

25. John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1972), 34-35.

26. Paul Sibley, A Monk In The SAS: Second Edition (London: Spiderwize 

Publishing, 2011), 298.

27. Interview with BI080, April 3, 2011, United Kingdom.

28. BI080, 299.

29. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 21st at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Marston 

explained while Qaboos was under house arrest, it was more like virtual house 

arrest as he was privy to all the perks that the son of the Sultan of Oman would 

have. Sultan Said honestly thought he was doing the best thing for his son by 

attempting to isolate him in hopes he would his poisonous western ideas would 

fade.

30. Ian Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-

1975,” 179.

31. Bard O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” 217.

32. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “Oman Operations:1970-1975,” 1975, 5.

33. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 29-30.

34. Ian Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-

1975,” 180.

35. John McKeown, “Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its 

Significance,” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1981), 46.

36. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 30-31.

37. Jeapes, 32.

38. In total, 8 SAS veterans and 5 SAF veterans were interviewed who 

served in the counterinsurgency campaign in Oman between 1965 and 1975.

39. The important point here is that Sultan Qaboos did not try to change 

the traditional tribal society on the Jebel. He worked to find ways to garner their 

support without forcing change to their customs and beliefs. PFLOAG did force 

locals to change their behavior and beliefs when they joined the insurgency on the 

Jebel. Religion was a one of the main issues. Join the government and continue 

to pray and remain a devout Muslim. Join the insurgency and give it up. Finally, 

Qaboos did not take away any of the autonomy of the tribes on the Jebel. He 

simply wanted them to support the government rather than the communists and 

searched for ways to prove it was in their interest to do so. 

40. Interview with BI050, March 28, 2011, United Kingdom.
84

 41. To say the British government executed this counterinsurgency 

campaign on the cheap would be a vast understatement. The small teams of SAS 

that conducted operations in Dhofar and on the Jebel lacked resources that in the 

modern era of warfare would not be tolerated or considered. These teams went in 

with a little bit of money, their weapons and basic supplies to sustain themselves 

but that is all. For a large portion of the conflict, really until the Iranians entered 

the war at the end of 1973, the SAS had such scarce rotary wing support that 

casualties had to be carried off the Jebel by donkey. This increased casualty rates 

significantly. These small SAS teams were successful executing their impossible 

mission because they were elite soldier leaders that relied on their training and 

ingenuity to rule the day. They didn’t have the luxury, as many of us have the good 

fortune of utilizing today, of having vast resources to use as leverage within the 

counterinsurgency campaign.

42. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011, United Kingdom.

43. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011, United Kingdom. The lesson 

on bait bashing is informative for US forces conducting operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. US forces repeated this mistake for years in both countries, planning 

operations in our forward operating bases (FOBs), executing short-term missions 

against the insurgency, and then heading back to bases in time for dinner. History 

shows us this is no way to fight a counterinsurgency and surely does not invite 

popular support.

44. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 30.

45. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011, United Kingdom.

46. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “Oman Operations:1970-1975,” 18.

47. BI060, Dhofar Veterans Panel, Interview by Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 2 April 2011, United Kingdom.

48. When Interviewing the Oman Veterans who had served in both the 

Sultan’s Armed Forces and the Special Air Service, they all referred to the process 

of Amnesty as ‘Crossing Over.’ The term ‘Crossing Over’ was a slang word used 

during the war to describe the process of Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs) 

joining the side of the Sultan and government.

49. Interview with BI060, 2 April 2011, United Kingdom.

50. John McKeown, “Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its 

Significance,” 56.

51. Middle East Center, “Origins and Formations of the Firqats,” Oxford: St. 

Anthony’s College, 1972, Annex A to Section 10, 2. 

52. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011, United Kingdom.

53. Interview with BI060, 2 April 2011, United Kingdom.
85

54. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-

1975,” 180.

55. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “SAF Take-Over of Firqat – Dhofar,” 

OPS/D/12 December 28, 1971, 2.

56. COIN Scholars Seminar: January 21st at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Marston 

explained this during the seminar as a critical point. To get the insurgents to 

cross over on the jebel there had to be a clearly defined, black and white process 

to do so. The policy was that no matter what previous operations an individual 

insurgent had conducted with PFLO, the message was clear (and broadcast) that 

100 percent forgiveness and integration would be offered. There was no gray, if an 

insurgent crossed over his sins were forgiven no matter how many he had killed. 

Once an insurgent did cross over, he was expected to pass all intelligence he had 

on the insurgency to the government forces. These crossed over men would be 

offered employment under the government and would ultimately create the Firqat 

formations.

57. Interview with BI070, March 30, 2011. The US sticks to its old adage 

of “We do not negotiate with terrorists,” yet near every counterinsurgency 

campaign that the government “won” did so by reaching political compromise 

with the insurgency. The US has an amnesty program in Afghanistan; however, 

it is complicated, biased, and marginally effective. The US amnesty process in 

Afghanistan is too grey. A fighter who crosses over will be treated differently 

based on his history. The insurgent who has western blood on his hands or who 

can be tied to an attack on Western forces will surely consider whether or not 

he will be prosecuted if he attempted to cross-over to the side of the Afghan 

government. It is far from the black and white program executed in Oman.

58. John Akehurst, We Won A War, 19.

59. W02 Lane, “Oman Operations: 1970-1975,” 27.

60. John Akehurst, We Won A War, 300.

61. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “The Dhofar War,” 1975, 7.

62. It was interesting to see the wide variance of opinion on the merits of the 

Sarfeit outpost during the interviews with the Oman veterans in both the SAS and 

SAF. Opinions on Sarfeit ranged from one extreme to the other. Some veterans 

believed Sarfeit accomplished its mission of interdicting camel resupply lines 

coming from Yemen. Others believed it was a massive waste of a Battalion as it 

limited a large number of soldiers to a very narrow mission while critically taxing 

the sustainment system. Others believed it was an extremely important statement 

by the Sultan in claiming his territory and sending the message that he was strong 

enough to sustain such a bold position.

63. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 75.

64. BI090, Retired General Officer, Interview by Benjamin Boardman, 

Robert Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, April 4, 2011, United 

Kingdom.
86

65. John McKeown, “Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its 

Significance,” 67.

66. Sibley, A Monk In The SAS, 301.

67. Sibley.

68. John Akehurst, We Won A War, 60-61.

69. D.L. Price, “Oman: Insurgency and Development,” 8.

70. Jeapes, SAS Secret War,189-190.

71. Jeapes, 16.

72. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 190-191.

73. John McKeown, “Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its 

Significance,” 72.

74. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “The Dhofar War,” 1975, 8 (SAS 

composition at Marbat) and Ian Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency 

Campaign in Dhofar 1965-1975,188. (Firqat strength at Marbat).

75. Headquarters Dhofar Salalah, “The Dhofar War,” 8.

76. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-

1975,” 188.

77. Ludwig, “Supporting allies in counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar 

Rebellion,” 76.

78. Sibley, A Monk In The SAS, 301.

79. John Akehurst, We Won A War, 36. The Iranian Brigade was critical in the 

grand scheme of the campaign as they provided increased air mobility and large 

formation of soldiers to guard cleared areas and static positions but the British 

did not respect them as an effective fighting force. The Dhofar veterans described 

them as dangerously inexperienced and in Akehurst’s book, page 84, he details 

the account of a British company commander coming across the aftermath of an 

Iranian engagement with the Adoo in which the Iranians had lost 10 soldiers and 

refers to them as amateurs. 

80. John McKeown, “Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War and Its 

Significance,” 81-82.

81. Ludwig, “Supporting allies in counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar 

Rebellion,” 76.

82. O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” 217-218.

83. Sibley, A Monk In The SAS, 301-302.

84. Reid, “Oman Operations:1970-1975,” 48.

85. Reid, 49.

86. Reid.
87

87. O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” 222.

88. The issue of development in Afghanistan will be covered in the next 

chapter. In Afghanistan, units have been well resourced with development dollars 

but, in many cases, have failed to focus their resources to achieve the desired 

second and third order effects associated with the long term aims of the campaign. 

Instead, many leaders have utilized development dollars in areas where the local 

people have made few, if any, sacrifices. Make no mistake, the US military has 

improved over the years in its focus of development dollars; however, a large 

portion of what’s been spent has failed to achieve much of anything at all. Part 

of the problem with our effort in Afghanistan is that US leaders may have been 

resourced too well, which naturally amplified the pressure to spend the resources 

and make quick progress. The CATs in Oman did not have financial backing 

anywhere near the levels that the US can access for Afghanistan. The focused 

development effort during the conflict in Oman may be informative to us today. 

In the famous words of the late economist Milton Friedman, “There is no such 

thing as a free lunch.” The US military may need to take those words to heart as 

we continue efforts in Afghanistan utilizing our economic and development might 

as a key component of our military strategy. 

89. Ludwig, “Supporting allies in counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar 

Rebellion,” 92. 

90. Akehurst, We Won A War, 63-64.

91. The Dhofar veterans pointed to psychological operations as vital to 

exploiting the narrative of the insurgency and communicating with the local 

people on the Jebel. It was through the PSYOPS and information campaign that 

both the government amnesty program and the religious freedom policies were 

communicated.

92. Dhofar Veteran Manuscript, “Dhofar 1970-1980 a Briefing: A ten year 

progress from PSYOPS to a Ministry of Information,” March 28, 2011, 7.

93. Dhofar Veteran Manuscript, 8-9.

94. Dhofar Veteran Manuscript, 8.

95. Dhofar Veteran Manuscript, 13.

96. For the US military in Afghanistan, religion it is a taboo subject and we 

feel more harm than good will result from taking it on. This is almost certainly 

a mistake as the US is allowing millions of uneducated, illiterate Afghans to be 

persuaded by radical Islamists who preach a version of the Koran that cannot be 

refuted. Religion in Afghanistan will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

97. There were still artillery attacks fired from Yemen in the early months of 

1976; however, they were largely ineffective.

98. Akehurst, We Won A War, 175-176.

99. Jeapes, SAS Secret War, 13.

100. Interview with BI080, April 3, 2011, United Kingdom.

89

Chapter 5

Afghanistan: 2001 to Present

The conditions that really inform your strategy? There is a huge 

variation at the local level. The challenge is that you are going to 

have a carrot and a stick and you’re going to get variation in the 

right combination of the two from village to village and within the 

same village over time. It is a challenge and you have to understand 

that it’s a carrot and a stick and it is not one or the other. It is not an 

extreme . . . it is the right combination; it is the dynamic application 

of those incentives and disincentives that will lead to success. One 

thing General Petraeus would correct you [someone] on in midsentence was if they ever made a distinction between kinetics and 

COIN. He would stop you right there and say, ‘Hey, kinetics are 

part of counterinsurgency, let’s not forget that.’ But at the end of 

the day, the strategy has to change to reflect local conditions.

— BA080, Fort Leavenworth, KS

The US war in Afghanistan approaches the completion of year ten at 

the time of this writing. The conflict has produced, in concert with the 

counterinsurgency in Iraq, one of our nation’s most experienced fighting 

forces and its longest war, bar none. This chapter analyzes the U.S journey, 

dating from the first combat operations in October 2001 to the present. The 

chapter will specifically focus on the “so-called” sequential and differing 

strategies, Enemy-centric vs. Population-centric approaches, the US has 

executed over the last ten years and what it took to achieve a balanced 

strategy that harnesses the best of both in Afghanistan. The chapter will 

discuss the evolution of the political, military (or security line), social, 

economic, developmental, and psychological lines of effort, exploring how 

the U.S has applied them to achieve this critical balance in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan presents the US a difficult challenge in the coming years. Here 

we are, actively pursuing our mission on the cusp of finally hitting the right 

balanced approach, while, at the same time, popular support for the war 

declines worldwide.

Afghanistan’s history lends context to the current conflict. Afghanistan 

was born in the eighteenth century when a series of tribes came together 

to form a dynastic state.1

Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, a number of tribes ruled the 

country in succession that belonged to the Durrani dynasty including the 

Popolzay, Saddozay, and Barakzay tribes through 1978.2

 It is important 
90

to understand that, for the most part, those ruling dynasties controlled 

Afghanistan’s foreign policy; however, governance only extended outside 

the capital city when it was forced, leaving many tribes, sub-tribes, and 

clans to govern their own regions. Between the country’s founding in the 

18th century and the Soviet invasion, over 200 years of history, the hearty 

fabric of Afghan society was formed, which the author witnessed in a 

fragile state in rural Northeastern Afghanistan in 2008.

The confederation (Ulus) was held together by the common aim of 

conquering neighboring areas with a view to pillage or exacting tribute. 

The political and military forms of this period were characteristic of tribal 

warfare. War was a short-lived affair and decided upon by the council of 

clan chiefs (a limited jirga); the troops that went into battle were selected 

from the total number of warriors under arms (lashkar). The framework 

was that of traditional society. . . One’s allegiance belonged to the restricted 

group and the tribal code (pashtunwali), not to the Pashtun community 

or to the state . . . ‘To exercise Pashtu’ (to identify oneself with values) was 

more important in the context of the tribe than ‘to be a Pashtun’ (to be 

identified with an ethnic community or a nation).”3

The Soviets entered Afghanistan on December 27th, 1979 and, in the 

subsequent thirty years; the people of Afghanistan have been at war in one 

way or the other.4 The sustained conflict in this country is nothing short 

of tragic. Afghanistan has endured a failed monarchy, the Soviet invasion, 

a communist government, the warlord era, the Taliban (jihadism), and 

the Global War on Terror is not over.5 Its citizens have suffered greatly. 

For example, by the time the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, 

1.3 million citizens had been killed while another third lived as refugees.6

These figures account for only 10 of the 30 years of conflict!

After the Soviets withdrew in 1989,7

 the Afghan Communist 

government remained in power for just over two additional years until it 

was toppled by a conglomerate of ethnically diverse former mujahedeen

fighters.8 The years to follow would bring to power a number of tribally 

aligned warlords in different parts of the country. The Pashtun-backed 

Taliban came to power in 1996, spreading their strict interpretation of 

Islam, which barred females from educational opportunities and limited 

social mobilization. The Taliban set in motion a number of rigid and 

oppressive laws restricting any concepts perceived as “Western.” Osama 

Bin Laden and Al Qaeda entered the country with permission in 1996. 

Al Qaeda and the Taliban were mutually supporting as Al Qaeda offered 

foot soldiers and expertise to support Taliban efforts against the Northern 

Alliance and in return received sanctuary to train in Afghanistan.9

 They 
91

spent the next five years overseeing the training of Al Qaeda members and 

orchestrating the World Trade Center bombing of September 11th, 2001.10

Less than one month later, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) in Afghanistan in order to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, destroy 

Al Qaeda, and topple the Taliban if they refused to comply with demands 

to turn over Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders within her borders.11

There are a number of theories to characterize the effect of the last 

30 years of warfare in Afghanistan. Which theory proves the accurate 

description depends largely on the area in Afghanistan as each has navigated 

a different path over time. One theory asserts that new influences began 

to erode the norms of traditional society. Traditional leaders lost power 

and influence over some of their men and tribes as new sources of money 

offered alternatives to customary ways.12 New economic opportunities, 

such as receiving money for fighting, opened new social mobility platforms 

outside of the traditional tribal structure.13

After 30 years of conflict, an economy has developed in which money is 

exchanged for fighting. Violence has created the most viable path to social 

and economic mobility and political influence. Those who prove skilled 

and demonstrate leadership qualities can advance in the ranks, increase 

their local power, and grow wealthy. Many insurgent leaders are from 

traditionally poor families who would otherwise have remained outside 

the local governing structures.14

Another theory asserts the relevance of the traditional leaders’ loss 

of power over the last 30 years is overblown and religion lies as the true 

motivation of the insurgency. “Westerners have not come to the realization 

that this insurgency is an Islamic jihad. The insurgency’s root cause is 

not lack of economic opportunity, but the desire to establish an Islamic 

Emirate of Afghanistan under Sharia law.”15 The author goes on to assert 

that the influence of the mullah, not the traditional khans and elders, is 

at the heart of the insurgency.16 The reality is that all of these theories are 

partially correct, depending on the local area, and add to the complexity of 

the geo-political landscape of Afghanistan. As David Galula would say, to 

be successful in this type of conflict, “build (or rebuild) a political machine 

from the population upward.”17

A couple months after the US entered Afghanistan in 2001, the Bonn 

conference was conducted to reestablish an interim government authority 

and constitution, create baseline laws and procedures, garner international 

support for the new government, and secure the financial assistance 

necessary from the international community to move forward.18 The Bonn 
92

conference was well received by the international community and gave 

Afghanistan a starting point from which to expand. The international 

community, led by the US in late 2001, worked tirelessly to establish the 

government in Kabul and assist in creating the institutions necessary for it 

to run efficiently as quickly as possible. 

From the beginning, the central government has been fraught with 

issues ranging from illegitimacy to corruption. Its success is seen today 

as critical to US policy.19 Initial focus and mentorship at the central 

government level came at the expense of appropriate focus at the provincial 

and district government levels. The key issue was connecting those midlevel governance systems with the well-established tribal governance 

at the local village level. Efforts are now being made to improve subcentral governance. “There has been a US shift, predating the Obama 

Administration, toward promoting local governance. Some argue that, in 

addition to offering the advantage of bypassing an often corrupt central 

government, doing so is more compatible with Afghan traditions of local 

autonomy.”20

The changes in the strategy and focus of military operations in 

Afghanistan over the last 10 years can be illustrated by a pendulum. From 

the start of the war until General McChrystal’s 2009 strategy reassessment, 

the operational strategy weighted heavily on the security line of effort that 

highlighted kill or capture operations against the enemy while the other 

lines of effort, political, social, economic, developmental, and psychological, 

were deployed in support. The singular focus on kill or capture operations 

was in no way the only strategy being implemented by coalition units across 

Afghanistan. There were plenty of success stories utilizing a wide variety 

of different approaches to achieve success and momentum in individual 

AOs.21

As Afghanistan became a secondary priority due to the Iraqi war from 

2003 to 2009, both troop levels and total funding were insufficient to do 

much else effectively. Troop levels have slowly increased in Afghanistan 

since the war’s early days, beginning at 10,000 in 2002 and ending up right 

at 69,000 by December of 2009.22 By now, May 2011, well over 90,000 US 

troops serve in Afghanistan. This raises another complicating issue that 

has hindered the States’ ability to achieve a unified strategy. With such 

small numbers of soldiers in Afghanistan, the level of autonomy individual 

commanders had on the ground, from the company to the brigade level, 

was as vast as the Areas of Operation (AO) they controlled. For example, 

there was only one brigade combat team in RC-East in 2005. That number 

doubled by 2008 and as of May 2011, there are four maneuver brigades in 

the AO.23
93

While each unit certainly learned lessons at the local level, some 

commanders failed to adequately adapt to their environments. Some areas 

achieved significant progress while others slipped deeper into conflict. 

Commanders who understood their environments experienced this 

autonomy as a great asset; however, it was a dangerous concession to those 

who did not or would not deviate from their original strategic plans and 

assumptions. General Sir Frank Kitson makes it clear that good officers 

develop characteristics that allow them to adapt to their unique areas of 

operation.24

Those [officers] who are not capable of developing these characteristics 

are inclined to retreat into their military shells and try not to notice what 

is going on. They adopt the ‘fit soldier with a rifle’ theory, and long for 

the day when they can get back to ‘proper soldiering’ by which they mean 

preparing for the next-or last- war, as opposed to fighting in the current 

one. . .Considerable progress in subversion and insurgency could be 

achieved by careful briefing of those commanding units.25

 Many commanders rigidly oriented their units to killing and 

capturing the enemy each day even though their AOs were conducive to 

partnering with and protecting the population while utilizing political, 

economic, development, and psychological initiatives to enhance their 

efforts. In order to combat this, ISAF issued a series of tactical directives 

to assist commanders to better understand the operating environment 

and the potential skills necessary to be successful.26 The problem grows 

exponentially when you add the unique national caveats of each ISAF 

contributing country.27 It is similar to bait bashing, as referred to in both 

the Malaya and Oman chapters and experienced by the author in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom II. Highly skilled units would coordinate complex mission 

after mission to disembark from their compounds, kill or capture the 

enemy and clear the terrain but they relinquished all ground gained at 

the day’s end, returning to the Forward Operating Base (FOB) in time for 

dinner. The cycle caused units to constantly clear the same areas.28

The opposite was also true. Other commanders bought into the 

population-centric strategy wholesale and misdiagnosed the root causes 

for conflict in their areas. It was easy to be blinded as senior leaders and 

practitioners. Some were fresh off successful surge experience in Iraq while 

others learning the same lessons in Afghanistan began largely saying the 

same thing, the silver-bullet in Afghanistan lies with winning the support 

of the population.

The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by 

armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict 
94

will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, 

the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars 

of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of the populations will be 

the final arbiters of success.29

 They believed so fervently in the new doctrine, partnering with 

and protecting the people while leveraging the political, economic, 

development, and psychological lines of effort, that they were blinded to 

the objective truth. The insurgency had grown too powerful in their areas 

of operation and required clearing before any hope of progress could be 

achieved. A brigade commander made clear that the enemy has to be dealt 

with effectively before the other lines of operation can have the impact 

desired. “Find the enemy, fix the enemy, kill the enemy, and then expand 

out and protect the people.”30 There is no silver-bullet approach. An ISAF 

advisor stated, “Doctrine is great but it is not dogmatic and must be 

interpreted based on local conditions.”31 Both the population-centric and 

enemy-centric approaches can prompt a leader, sometimes unwittingly, to 

reveal his affinity for one over the other. It follows that he would prefer 

to prove his approach superior. The debate over the superior tactical 

approach has impeded some units’ abilities to effectively analyze situations 

on the ground in real time. It has created a mythical ideal scenario that 

could hinder creative thinking and bias the people whose lives depend 

upon objectivity. There is no substitute for objective, flexible leadership 

and strategy planning and openness to all lines of effort.32

To further complicate matters, each AO exists within a fundamentally 

unique and nuanced environment at the local level, which complicates a 

senior commander’s ability to evaluate whether a subordinate commander 

is pursuing an appropriate local strategy. “Operations in Afghanistan from 

2001 to 2009 have been marked by a series of disjointed efforts to learn 

how to conduct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.”33 Counterinsurgency 

guidance continued to evolve. General McKiernan, commander of ISAF 

from 2008 to 2009, published COIN directives on March 18, 2009 that 

looks similar to the guidance today. “Our operational imperative is to 

protect the population while extending the legitimacy and effectiveness 

of the GIRoA and decreasing the effectiveness of insurgent elements.”34

One commander interviewed was tasked to implement McKiernan’s 

guidelines across the country in 2008. “I traveled around the country to 

help implement his guidance; I was his COIN team. I found that units were 

just not implementing the guidance, they were doing counter-terror.” 35 The 

charge to shift the strategy was in place under McKiernan but executing 

the protocol was a different story. It is vital to convey that many leaders 
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from that period accepted the COIN guidance, understood their AOs 

intimately and pursued intuitive, highly successful strategies that positively 

contributed to the war effort.36

Shortly after General Stanley McChrystal took over as the commander 

for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) he assembled a 

strategic assessment team to review the war in Afghanistan.37 On August 

30, 2009, General McChrystal released his Afghanistan strategy assessment. 

It advanced COIN concepts created under McKiernan, challenged 

conventional wisdom, and set a new tone for our military strategy.

ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, 

inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges 

inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated 

by our current operational culture and how we operate. Preoccupied with 

protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances 

us–physically and psychologically–from the people we seek to protect. In 

addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that 

cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents 

cannot defeat us militarily, but we can defeat ourselves.38

General McChrystal’s 2009 strategy reassessment determined the 

operational strategy focused too heavily on kill or capture operations 

and needed more balance to harness the potential benefit from all 

available assets and lines of effort. The mission statement of ISAF became 

population-centric in 2009.39 “ISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts

population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded 

and effective ANSF and supports improved governance and development 

in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment 

for sustainable stability.”40 Over the next year, General McChrystal and his 

ISAF team produced tactical directives encouraging commanders to focus 

on the Afghan population and communities rather than just the enemy.41

Progress and reform occurred on General McChrystal’s watch, in 

part, because the ISAF mission statement directed soldiers to conduct 

population-centric counterinsurgency operations but in some areas the 

pendulum swung too far from the balanced approach that was envisioned.42

Some units interpreted the ISAF tactical directive guidance in stark black 

and white. Junior commanders often took statements such as “the use of 

air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds 

is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions”43 out of 

context. In the name of complying with the commander’s intent, some 

units centralized their indirect fire and close air support (CAS) procedures 
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and, in turn, constrained their junior formations in contact. Although 

ISAF intended to limit civilian casualties by decreasing the use of indirect 

fire and CAS, the new mission statement was never intended to constrain 

commanders or endanger soldiers in contact.44 Clarifying remarks on 

the same page of the directive make this evident. “I cannot prescribe the 

appropriate use of force for every condition that a complex battlefield will 

produce. . . This directive does not prevent commanders from protecting 

the lives of their men as a matter of self defense when it is determined 

that no other options are available to effectively counter the threat.”45

Nevertheless, the rules of engagement would be reviewed regarding the 

employment of CAS and indirect fire when General Petraeus assumed 

command of ISAF months later.46

One vital area that became a higher priority was Afghanistan’s National 

Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF’s effort to develop and expand them. By 

October 2011, the goal is to have a 305,000 man ANSF.47 In short, General 

McChrystal and his team expanded the ANSF effort while redefining 

the procedure for partnering our forces with Afghanistan’s local military 

forces. “The requirement to expand the ANSF (both ANA and ANP) 

rapidly to address the challenges of the insurgency will require ISAF to 

provide enhanced partnering, mentoring, and enabling capabilities until 

parallel capabilities are developed within the ANSF.”48 The rapid expansion 

of the ANSF has caused problems. Partnering and mentorship of the ANA 

was more natural for the military and as a result, their progression has 

been faster than the ANP.49 “The United States and its partners still have 

not centered on a clearly effective police training strategy.”50 ISAF has 

amplified efforts with the police in 2010 asserting that a well trained and 

capable police force is at least as critical as an ANA force.51

President Obama followed General McChrystal’s strategy assessment by 

delivering a speech in December of 2009 that officially cast the Afghanistan 

war as the primary focus of the United States. He committed an additional 

30,000 soldiers to shift the war’s momentum and he invested resources to 

further solidify our partnership and cooperation with Pakistan. President 

Obama clearly accompanied his calls for victory with ample resources to 

deliver one. Afghanistan was now the priority.

I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from 

here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks 

are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. 

In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our 

borders that were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if 

the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We 

must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the 

stability and capacity of our partners in the region.52

When General Petraeus took over as the commander of ISAF in July of 

2010, the counterinsurgency strategy did not change but it was refined. The 

tactical guidance and rules of engagement were reviewed regarding CAS 

and indirect fires procedures and General Petraeus opted not to change 

the standing directive the General McChrystal had ordered. He did clarify 

the ROE and ensured subordinate commanders understood when it was 

appropriate to use fires and that they did not have the authority to apply 

additional procedures to the fires process. “Subordinate commanders are 

not authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.”53

Additionally, the term population-centric was removed from the mission 

statement and replaced with a less black and white term to direct soldiers’ 

actions in Afghanistan: conducts operations.

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 

ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will 

of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in 

governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure 

environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.54

The new mission statement swung the pendulum back toward the 

center, resulting in the most balanced approach in Afghanistan to date.

The US has struggled to get a handle on the political and governance 

lines of effort since the genesis of our efforts in Afghanistan. As mentioned 

at this chapter’s beginning, federal governance has never really extended 

beyond the confines of the capital city, Kabul. Historically, the King or Amir 

controlled foreign policy and dealt with the ethnic tribes surrounding Kabul 

when necessary.55 Autonomous, self-reliant tribal groupings comprise 

over 80 percent of rural Afghanistan and always have.56 While the Afghan 

government historically has avoided conflict and even contact with the 

tribes, the same phenomenon exists in reverse. In short, there are many 

self-contained, independent tribal and local groupings within the confines 

of Afghanistan’s border, all with their own identities, traditions, goals and 

values. These tribes and local groups are only tangentially associated with 

the central government and their politics are purely local. 57

To complicate matters, the US led coalition attempted to install a 

Western style Jeffersonian democracy at Afghanistan’s central governance 
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level in 2001, which has been an ordeal to integrate. While this western 

governance construct was welcomed as the way ahead by interventionist 

powers such as the US and other members of the Western international 

community, it was foreign to Afghans. “Our failure to reinstate King 

Zahir Shah to his throne is an example of our lack of understanding of the 

Afghan condition. A true parliamentary democracy with the king as the 

head of state [as had been the tradition in the past] could have provided 

solutions for problems coalition forces faced [with Afghan governance].”58

The US has doggedly pursued this endeavor at the central level, committing 

extraordinary resources and time in an attempt to make it work. “Most of 

the coalition’s efforts have centered on initiatives such as the creation of 

the heavily centralized Afghan government ministries.”59 This misguided 

effort belies the fact that, for much of the conflict, the US and its allies have 

lacked a fundamental understanding of how traditional Afghan society 

functions and the relationship, or lack of one, between the rural tribes and 

the government.60

As a troop commander in Northeast Afghanistan for 15 months in 

2007 and 2008, the author was stunned to discover traditional governance 

at the tribal and village level not only functioning, but thriving. It did not 

take long to conclude that local tribal politics afforded Afghan young men a 

significantly more democratic system than the Afghan top-down, ministryheavy, central, provincial, and district government forms did. In the rural 

Pashtun and Nuristani areas the author commanded, local Jirgas occurred 

weekly or bi-weekly, depending upon the area, with the expectation that 

every male attend. 61 Attending a Jirga was a revered right and inextricably 

bound to each tribe’s heritage. The striking similarities between Jirgas

and Greek-style democracy were surprising. Each man in the Jirga had 

the right to voice his opinion and the author found it fascinating, and 

sometimes frustrating, that decisions weren’t made unless there was 100 

percent, or very close to 100 percent, consensus within the group. As a 

young Captain charged with accomplishing tasks quickly and efficiently, 

the author struggled to adjust to this more methodical governance style. 

The author learned to accept the Jirgas would not take one step forward 

unless overwhelming evidence compelled them all to agree it was in their 

best interests to do so. Tribal governance did not need fixing in the area.62

Herein lay the real challenge associated with Afghan governance. 

This highly competent traditional tribal democratic system had operated 

adequately for centuries when along came the Bonn conference and its 

newly minted, western-influenced central government. This new central 

government model featured district, provincial and central governance 
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levels, reminiscent of the US local, state and national government levels.63

The monolithic new government system needed credibility but how could 

it assert authoritative power within this enduring political landscape of 

tribal governance? To further complicate matters, the central government 

offered (and continues to offer) very limited assistance to tribal and local 

governments and, throughout history, whether king or Amir, this pattern 

has persisted. The city dwellers in and around Kabul have far more access 

to services and hard evidence that a central government can benefit them.64

The tribal populations of Afghanistan have little incentive to cooperate 

with the central government because it is absent from their lives and, as 

we’ve learned, the Jirgas do not ratify change without justification and 

consensus. ISAF unintentionally fueled the perception of an incapable 

central government by delivering services in any way they could to the 

local areas, with little central government involvement. “The degree to 

which Afghans feel a part of what is at stake in their country and to what 

has been achieved so far is unclear. . . Finding ways to empower Afghans 

in Afghanistan emphasizes the importance of an integrated approach and 

one that builds needed capacity on multiple levels.”65 The tribal populations 

need to witness the central government delivering goods and services, not 

the ISAF, if they are ever to believe in it.

Since 2001, presented with an Afghan central government whose 

presence at the local level has often been either absent, incompetent, or 

corrupt, the international community has turned increasingly toward 

nongovernmental organizations for the delivery of services. Yet this 

approach rarely strengthens the perceived legitimacy of the government in 

the very communities whose loyalty to the government is being contested.66

As part of General McChrystal’s Afghan strategy assessment, he 

articulated what so many of us had come to believe on the ground: the 

central government must find a way to respectfully link up with the wellestablished tribal and local governance systems to become relevant. “We 

must facilitate the development of governance capacity that serves the 

interests of the people. Until the government is seen as less hostile to 

those interests, it will never gain trust and respect.”67 McChrystal’s report 

highlights the governance leaders’ vastly varying degrees of competency at 

the provincial and district levels. He asserts the ISAF must prioritize efforts 

to remediate and fortify governance efforts at these levels.68 Although the 

US and ISAF have expanded efforts to increase government transparency, 

efficiency, and effectiveness at the district and provincial stations, a number 

of concerns remain. Nevertheless, the important first step of connecting the 

central, provincial and district government system with the local people of 

Afghanistan has been acknowledged.69
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Tremendous issues still beg resolution. For instance, under the 

central/provincial/district system, President Karsai currently appoints 

all provincial governors, even if they do not hail from the provinces they 

govern. Karsai grants the provincial governor’s authority to appoint district 

governors and many of these appointees also have no connection to the 

districts they are tasked to oversee. The system is patrimonial. Financial 

and business considerations often factor more heavily into these governor 

decisions than questions relating to leadership or honest governance for 

the people.70

The Afghan people are very well aware of the graft and corruption. 

None of them [the provincial and district governors elected] live where 

they are elected and they do not spend any time there. Why is that? Because 

now that they have been elected, they can make some money by going to 

Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, or wherever there is money to be had. The 

people know that so they don’t put a lot of stock into government.71

These governors were neither respected nor recognized by the local 

men, villages, and Jirgas. The locals viewed their governors as mere 

obstacles who had to be dealt with daily.

One senior commander who has completed multiple Afghan tours of 

duty offered his view on an important step we must take immediately if we 

hope to gain the buy-in of local people.

We need to reinforce existing customs and existing mores that they 

have like the tribal shura. The purple finger thing is just not going to work 

in Afghanistan, it just isn’t. It’s nice, it’s symbolic, just like that picture of 

Karsai, but it means nothing. What means something is if the shura elders 

are the ones who elect their District governor. You do that and all the sudden 

they have invested in that District governor. He is beholden to them, the 

people of that district that he represents, and especially the elders. Then 

he argues with the Provincial governor for what they need. Wouldn’t it be 

great if you had all the elders in a Province elect the Provincial governor 

they want or the District governors elect the Provincial governor they 

think will be most effective?72

As a battalion commander explained, leaders at the tactical level 

must ensure the traditional governance construct at the local and village 

levels functions well and then find a way to connect it with the district 

government.73 There is a difference between governance and government 

and tactical level leaders are largely concerned that governance functions 

fluidly before concerning ourselves with government.74 Connecting the two 

is the important next step and one ISAF and the international community 

must achieve.
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Harnessing the development line of effort in Afghanistan has also been 

a challenge during the conflict. At every level, focusing our development 

and economic targets to achieve positive second and third order affect has 

been hit or miss. As the counterinsurgency effort has progressed over the 

years, significantly greater monetary assets are available to commanders.

US government funding for assistance has come through three 

main agencies – The Department of Defense (DOD), the US Agency for 

International Development (USAID), and the State Department. Military 

and security assistance since 2001 represents more than half of US funding 

for Afghanistan and has been provided through DOD, mainly through 

the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP), and other funds appropriated for counternarcotics and 

other programs.75

As the availability of development dollars multiplied for commanders 

in Afghanistan, so did the pressure to use them. Success and failure in the 

application of development assets is unique to the local area and the way 

each commander individually utilizes and applies his development dollars.

US government funding for development and aid has been the subject 

of much debate during the course of the war. The success stories highlighting 

how development dollars facilitate troop-population relationships and 

further a unit’s strategy. The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173rd Airborne 

Brigade lived a few of those stories. Development dollars enabled the 

unit to oversee the successful construction of hydro-electric plants, pipe 

schemes, bridges and factories, putting locals to work and truly improving 

their living conditions. The use of Development as a catalyst for the start of 

a relationship with one remote village community was most telling.76

In the town of Saw, Naray District, Konar Province in Afghanistan, just 

13 kilometers from the FOB, villagers had wanted nothing to do with the 

unit when it first arrived in summer 2007. The village had been a coalition 

ally up until the previous year, when an unsuccessful nighttime search 

operation brought soldiers in pursuit of a high-value target straight into 

villagers’ homes, where many women were mortified to be seen uncovered. 

The village men considered themselves disgraced. The village elected to 

terminate relations with the coalition over the incident.77 The newly arrived 

1-91 Cavalry began the delicate process of mending the rift. 1-91 leaned 

heavily on the partnered Afghan Army battalion and engaged in hours 

of earnest informal meetings with community leaders who had heard the 

new unit was operating differently. Slowly, the 1-91 began to make progress 

re-establishing the trust and respect lost. First, 1-91 Cavalry tasked the 
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Afghan Army with delivering some very basic Humanitarian Assistance 

(HA) including school supplies to the village. Next, the unit empowered 

village leaders to start small projects using development dollars. The village 

began to believe the unit and, by extension, the central government was 

trustworthy and had something to offer. Over the next many months 

with the Afghan Army in the lead, the trust was re-earned and the village 

became a close ally.78

There are just as many stories of development dollar failure and those 

truly happened as well. As with most experiences, the leaders who dismiss 

development dollars as a waste of money and time are the same ones who 

have negative experiences applying the assets in their areas. The issue 

becomes black and white, as if there is a solid answer one way or the other 

as to whether development efforts are worthwhile. This is one issue in 

which the debate sounds the same whether the topic is Afghanistan or Iraq. 

The conversation begins with statements such as: “Nonlethal enthusiasts of 

COIN orthodoxy claim that combat operations, even if successful, bring 

only a temporary dip in violence. They contend that projects and services 

provide more long-term benefits.”79 The application and use of development 

dollars does not equal the panacea for success in Afghanistan. There is no 

single component that does. If there were one, the war in Afghanistan 

would have ended long ago. Development efforts do represent a key critical 

enabler that is germane to a balanced strategy as proven in the case studies 

of Mayala and Dhofar in the two previous chapters.

The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, mentioned above, experienced 

both successes and failures following development dollar projects in 

Afghanistan. The critically important lesson learned was that a unit does 

not have to spend money just because it can. Each project must have a 

long term aim and the second and third order affects must be fleshed out 

and scrutinized to ensure the effort is worthwhile and does not feature 

tangentially associated consequences that the unit failed to anticipate. 

There were plenty of development initiatives the unit got burned on in the 

beginning of the last tour to Afghanistan; however, once leaders began to 

understand the potential of each development dollar, they learned to apply 

the funds more effectively.80

In the end, the application of development resources using initiatives 

such as CERP, ASP, or work for food programs are important components 

and enablers to the strategy in Afghanistan. The US cannot allow itself 

to enter circular debates that have no logical right or wrong answers. 

Development dollars, assets, and initiatives represent enablers our enemies 

do not possess. The US must wisely employ these assets to potentially fuel 
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its efforts while hobbling theirs. Whether a commander can effectively use 

development in his AO is often dictated by the local situation and enemy 

threat, but sometimes it is limited only by his capacity to comprehend the 

local dynamics of his AO. Regardless, the last thing the US can afford to do 

is remove this asset from the table.

The information or psychological line of effort has improved 

considerably since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan; however, 

outstanding issues remain. One of the most resounding improvements since 

the beginning of the war has been the military’s simple acknowledgment 

of the significance of information operations. Resourcing these efforts has 

been dramatically improved across the country. Even though a shortage 

of Psychological Operations Officers (PSYOPS) is still a problem, the 

US military has procured a number of items to facilitate information 

operations at the unit level.81

Recognizing the desperate need to counter insurgent propaganda at the 

tribal level, the United States military started the radio in a box program in 

2006.82 This program brought an asset normally utilized at higher echelons 

down to the battalion and even company levels. The program provides the 

equipment and funding necessary to hire Afghan personnel to run a radio 

station that broadcasts command information, interlaced with traditional 

Afghan music and news. Wind-up radios are provided to locals through 

Humanitarian Assistance channels. The technique of handing out radios to 

the local population was debated by one Oman veteran. He stated “radios 

were sold at cost in Dhofar province to increase the sense of ownership 

by the locals that purchased them. That way, when the insurgents came 

through and destroyed a local’s property, it increased their outrage as they 

had not been given the radio, rather, they had bought it themselves.”83

This is an important consideration the US missed in the application of 

its information operations campaign in Afghanistan.84 Nevertheless, the 

radio in a box program enables commanders at the tactical level to quickly 

broadcast important information to locals in the area, confirm or deny 

rumors, and quickly counter insurgent propaganda.85

Important lessons regarding Information Operations (IO) and PSYOPS 

can be drawn from the previous case studies in this thesis to further improve 

our efforts in Afghanistan. The US has severely limited itself with regard 

to IO when it comes to issue of religion. “With overwhelming firepower, 

Western armies rarely lose in combat to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan but 

in the communications battle, the militants appear to hold the edge.”86 They 

hold the edge because we have treated religion in Afghanistan as a subject 

we must avoid. This gives the insurgency a huge advantage. As there is a 
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very low literacy rate in Afghanistan, the Koran is taught and interpreted to 

most by religious leaders in their community. If those religious leaders are 

sympathetic to or coerced by the insurgency, then the religious education 

of the local people skews against the coalition or Afghan government.87

In Oman, the British did not avoid religious differences they perceived 

between themselves, SAF, and the Firqat. They used religion to drive 

a wedge between the communist backed insurgency and the Islamic 

government of Oman with a lot of Omani support. In Afghanistan, the 

potential to clear the same hurdle exists. The insurgency in Afghanistan is 

obviously not communist; however, it purports a strict and rigid Islamic 

interpretation not shared by Afghanistan’s government or the majority 

of its people.88 ISAF, in close consultation with the Afghan government, 

does not have to cede the religion issue to the insurgency. The increase in 

IO funding in ISAF for resources such as Afghan run radio stations and 

newspapers have huge potential to be leveraged further.89

ISAF can tackle the religion issue by empowering the Afghan 

government and our Afghan partners to better utilize resources to launch a 

religious education program across the country. The Afghan government, 

with the support of ISAF resources, has the opportunity to turn the corner 

on this critical issue and combat radical religious interpretation and 

teachings. ISAF can help supply the resources and assets to do so; however, 

it must be an Afghan run program to solve a critical Afghan issue.

As leaders gained experience in Afghanistan, each came back with 

vastly different ideas of what worked and what did not, based on their 

individual AOs. One of the debates that emerged is whether the military 

should focus on killing or capturing the enemy or partnering with and 

protecting the population from the enemy. This is commonly referred to as 

enemy-centric or population-centric COIN. Open debate within a military 

is constructive; however, the debate can quickly turn inflexible when that 

debate is based on personal, emotional experiences and, sometimes, troop 

losses. Value diminishes quickly once the conversation becomes black and 

white. In some circles, the debate between an Enemy-centric or Populationcentric COIN strategy has become just that.90

Some leaders have taken extreme views supporting an enemyfocused strategy on the right or a population-focused strategy on the 

left. The debate is fueled by rigid views on either side. “COIN principles 

include changing our focus from killing and capturing insurgents to 

protecting the population and liberally funding economic development 

projects plus essential services.”91 Another one that captures attention 
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is, “the American Army’s new way of war, otherwise called Populationcentric counterinsurgency, has become the only operational tool in the 

Army’s repertoire to deal with the problems of insurgency and instability 

throughout the world.”92 The problem with statements such as these is they 

attempt to simplify and dumb down a very complex counterinsurgency 

effort. We have changed our focus from killing and capturing insurgents 

to relying on development and economic initiatives as the panacea for 

success? We only have the intellectual capacity to have one operational tool 

to deal with conflict?

These statements obviously represent the enemy-centric camp’s 

portrayal of Population-centric strategies. They are far from the truth. The 

focus and importance of kill and capture operations in Afghanistan are 

not thrown into question just because there is more than one legitimate 

strategy available. Eliminating irreconcilable insurgents from the battlefield 

is a constant factor in any AO, no matter what the local commander wants 

to do.93

Enemy-focused strategy which seeks to attack the guerrilla forces 

directly risks dissipating effort in chasing insurgent groups all over the 

countryside, an activity that can be extremely demanding and requires 

enormous numbers of troops and other resources. Counterinsurgents who 

adopt this approach risk chasing their tails and so exhausting themselves, 

while doing enormous damage to the noncombatant civilian population, 

alienating the people and thus further strengthening their support for 

insurgency.94

The real trick for the commander is to evaluate whether kill or capture 

operations are the only option in his AO. If the insurgency is so fierce that 

kill or capture operations are the most viable course, then the commander 

must eliminate the insurgency. Next, he must accurately call the point at 

which his AO reaches a transition point so he can integrate other resources 

and assets as part of his strategy. Each area is different but there are always 

indicators to help commanders understand the complexity of their specific 

AOs.95

Once his AO achieves a transition point, the commander considers 

the assets at his disposal and which should be applied from across the 

lines of effort.96 The same is true in reverse. If a commander’s AO initially 

affords him the opportunity to apply multiple resources from across the 

lines of effort but the situation changes, he must detect it and be nimble 

enough to change course. If 200 insurgents enter the AO from across the 

border and enemy contact increases 200 percent, a precipitous change 
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in strategy should follow. The key for the commander is not to indulge 

in rigid thinking. A balanced strategy is attained by the leader who 

understands which resources and assets are available, what the second and 

third order affect will be if he applies each one to his strategy, and to what 

percentage, if any at all, each asset can be applied in the first place. One 

senior commander stated, “A commander has to be able to do both [focus 

on the enemy and protect the population] and must have his hand on the 

thermostat and be able to dial it up and down based in the situation.”97

No cookie cutter solution or succinct combination of actions guarantees 

success. Afghanistan offers a mosaic of vastly different local environments 

and communities, each with its own unique history, traditions, and 

challenges.98 Leaders who objectively reassess their local situations and 

adapt strategy to jive with their complex, ever-changing environments 

have the most likely shot at success.

The population-centric side of the argument contributed to fueling the 

debate in Afghanistan. In General McChrystal’s initial counterinsurgency 

guidance issued on August 26th, 2009, it opened by stating, “The 

conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the 

enemy.”99 The ISAF mission statement itself directed its forces to conduct 

‘population-centric counterinsurgency’ during this time. The concept 

was described through tactical directives but there was never a published 

definition of population-centric COIN. This oversight left some details 

open to interpretation by commanders on the ground; however, the author 

would argue the logic, intent, and desired end state were very clear from 

the start.100

Over the last couple years, the author has written a number of articles on 

how his squadron formulated and executed a balanced counterinsurgency 

strategy. The squadron referred to its strategy as population-centric. The 

infusion of development dollars, time with the locals and the trust and 

assistance earned from them over the course of deployment dovetailed 

with a sharp drop in violent attacks, enabling the Squadron feel to it had 

succeeded. Leaders chalked it up to the inclusion of population-centric 

strategy, rather than enemy-centric strategy in isolation. This, coupled 

with the fact that at the time of publishing these articles the ISAF mission 

statement directed a Population-centric approach, the author naturally 

titled the articles along the same lines. One of the articles was titled, 

“Implementing a Population Centric Strategy in Northeast Afghanistan, 

May 07-July 08.”101 The intent was to demonstrate how the squadron achieved 

balance across the lines of effort in its AO by customizing those lines within 

each Troop AO based on the best route to defeat the insurgency. The use of 
107

the title term ‘population-centric’ to describe this complicated balancing 

act unfortunately cast this author as a “far left” thinker in some circles.102

These circles contend subscribers to a population-centric strategy believe 

kill and capture operations are ineffective while development, essential 

services, and economy are the end-all, be-all utopia of counterinsurgency. 

That could not be further from the truth. Regardless, the author is guilty of 

contributing to this polarizing debate.

The author advocates for a balanced approach in which a commander 

is well resourced and bestowed the appropriate autonomy to apply assets 

across the lines of effort, tailored to his AO.103 This balance and the 

application and weight of assets he applies, will fluctuate in each individual 

AO over time and will be intensely different across unit boundaries. The 

guiding strategy in Afghanistan from ISAF must allow for that autonomy 

and flexibility while clearly articulating the goals, glide path, and end state. 

The current ISAF guidance and mission statement do exactly that.104

The author has described the guiding strategy in Afghanistan using 

the analogy of a pendulum. For the first many years in Afghanistan, the 

strategy was heavily focused on enemy-centric, kill or capture operations. 

The coalition destroyed a huge number of insurgents and won every tactical 

engagement but created an equally astonishing number of converted 

insurgents because of civilian casualties and intrusive search, detainment, 

and interrogation practices. Then the pendulum swung the other way as 

ISAF led commanders to a population-centric strategy, which promoted 

partnering with and protecting the population against the insurgency, 

boosting their confidence, gaining their passive or active support, and 

utilizing all assets across the lines of effort to do so.

General Petraeus has made the final adjustment necessary to the 

guiding strategy at ISAF to give the coalition its best chance for success. 

He removed the term ‘population-centric’ from the mission statement, 

crystallized the ROE, and promoted the importance of a balanced 

strategy and each asset’s potential impact on AOs. The mission statement 

reflects the balanced strategy necessary to attain a positive outcome in 

counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.105 Neither an enemy, nor 

a population, nor an economic or development focused strategy will 

guarantee success in Afghanistan. A balanced approach in which we 

wisely deploy every asset in our arsenal as we listen to and protect the local 

population, support the government, build a competent and capable ANSF 

and aggressively pursue, capture or kill the enemy will.
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Notes

1. Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, England: 

Cambridge University Press, 1990), 13

2. Roy.

3. Roy. 

4. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the 

Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

5. Christopher Kolenda, “Command Brief,” 1-91 CAV, 173rd Airborne,” 

August 1, 2008, 9.

6. Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: 

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, Virginia: USMC Studies 

and Analysis Division, 1995), xi.

7. It is important to note that the Soviets did not leave Afghanistan because 

of some military defeat as it is perceived sometimes in the West. There is no doubt 

that US-supplied weapons, especially surface to air systems, was an important 

factor in the Soviet decision to withdraw, but they were not beaten. In fact, 

According to Les Grau’s book The Other Side of the Mountain, the Soviets lost 

13,833 soldiers compared to the 1.3 million Afghan casualties. For as much as 

the Soviets did wrong, like the obvious slaughter of innocent civilians, they did 

a number of other things very well. They expertly trained the Afghan Security 

forces, discussed later in the chapter, and assisted the government to create a 

well functioning Communist system. As a result of these successes, the Afghan 

Communist government remained in power for two years after the Soviets 

withdrew.

8. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the 

Road Ahead,” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare Second Edition, ed. 

Daniel Marston et al. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Company, 2010), 254-255.

9. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present, 

304-305. 

10. Dorronsoro.

11. Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 89.

12. Christopher Kolenda, “Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (2010): 26-27. 

13. The author subscribes to this theory as it best describes the effects of 30 

years of war in N.E. Afghanistan where the author served as a commander. In 

Eastern Afghanistan, wealth was not assessed based upon how much money one 

possessed; rather, it was the size and breadth of possessions that mattered. Wealth 

was calculated in terms of volume. How much property did you have, compared 

to your neighbor, and how many heads of livestock? Was yours a large family? 
109

These factors figured in heavily. The tribal system was not hierarchical, as the US 

military witnessed in Iraq. It was flat. Authority was localized and often didn’t 

extend beyond the confines of the village or valley. The rich local level khans and 

elders established a dynasty of ruling power and wealth for generations of their 

families. In short, an individual’s place in traditional society had more to do with 

who his father was than his potential or drive to succeed in life. For the lucky 

minority born into the rich families, this was great. For the rest, a life of hard labor 

and subsistence farming was about all one could expect. As mentioned above, each 

village or valley had a leader, a Khan, to lead a tribal style participatory democracy 

of elders and men in the area. Their regular meetings were called jirgas. They 

collectively hired a religious leader, a mullah, to serve their small populations. The 

mullah was usually paid by the community and under the authority of the Khan 

and elders. Thirty years of outside influence fragmented the traditional structure 

of Afghanistan’s society. A new social order and opportunity presented itself. 

Money began to percolate into the country at unprecedented rates and created 

a new social mobility platform. New options abounded outside the traditional 

tribal structure for young men. History, family name, and social status did not 

dictate a man’s future anymore and he no longer faced the once inevitable path of 

backbreaking subsistence farming. Now he had the option to join the resistance. 

The financial incentives were difficult to ignore, as was the sense of adventure. 

Each man had the opportunity to climb a new social mobility ladder that could 

potentially propel him to fame and fortune, especially if armed, while elevating his 

position, insuring a much better life for him and all who shared his table. For a 

generation of men, fighting has become a respected part of life in Afghanistan. It 

has illuminated a route out of extreme poverty and many previously hopeless men 

have hastened to take up arms as a means to a more successful life. 

14. Kolenda, “Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level,” 27.

15. John Malevich and Daryl Youngman, “The Afghan Balance of Power and 

the Culture of Jihad,” Military Review (May-June 2011): 35.

16. Malevich and Youngman, 38. 

17. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 95.

18. United Nations Security Council, “Agreement on Provincial 

Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent 

Government Institutions,” Security Council Resolution (S/2001/1154): 2-8.

19. Kenneth Katzman, RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, 

Security, and US Policy, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11.

20. Katzman., 12. 

21. There were plenty of units that adopted a unique approach that was 

adapted to their individual AOs integrating all lines of effort. The approach was 

anything but conventional wisdom at the time. It would be ridiculous to say 

commanders across Afghanistan weren’t creating vastly different approaches 

to accommodate their local conditions. The execution of the ISAF strategy was 
110

anything but black and white and did have an important component attached 

to it and that was autonomy. Individual commanders did have the autonomy to 

deviate from conventional wisdom. Still, the focus at the top in ISAF was heavily 

focused on the enemy. As the surge of soldiers is complete in Afghanistan today, 

the numbers have drastically increased. According to the ISAF website, the total 

troop numbers in Afghanistan as of May 16, 2011 are approximately 90,000 US 

soldiers and an additional 42,400 ISAF soldiers from 47 contributing countries. 

The total number of ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan is 132,400. 

22. Amy Belasco, RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global 

War On Terror Operations Since 9/11 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, March 29, 2011), 44-45.

23. International Security and Assistance Force Command., “Mission 

Statement.,” Website. http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (accessed May 18, 

2011). The increase in combat maneuver Brigades in Afghanistan between 2002 

and now is dramatic. In 2002, there were 2 US maneuver brigades in country. 

According to the ISAF website as of 18 May, 2011, there are 13 US maneuver 

brigades in country and that is not counting Provincial Reconstruction Teams and 

detached battalions. 

24. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London, Faber and Faber 

Publishing, 1971), 200.

25. Kitson, 200-201.

26. Stanley McChrystal, “ISAF Counterinsurgency Training Guidance.” 

Kabul, AF: International Security and Assistance Force, November 10, 2009.

27. There are 48 ISAF contributing countries including the United States 

as of May 2011. Each nation has different national laws dictating what military 

roles and responsibilities they can and cannot contribute to the war effort in 

Afghanistan. Formulating a strategic theater level strategy that maximizes each 

nation’s potential contribution taking into account the caveats is difficult. 

28. John Nagl, “A Better War in Afghanistan: Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations,” Center for New American Security (September 16, 2009): 4. 

29. William Caldwell and Steven Leonard, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability 

Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change,” Military Review 88 (July/August 

2008), 6. 

30. BA090, Brigade Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Benjamin 

Boardman, 24 February 2011, Fort Riley, KS.

31. BA080, Counterinsurgency Advisor, Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Nathan Springer, 9 March 2011, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

32. BE090, Battalion Commander, Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 7 March 2011, Fort Irwin, CA.

33. Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road 

Ahead,” 261.
111

34. David McKiernan, “Counterinsurgency guidance paper,” (Kabul, AF: 

International Security and Assistance Force, March 18, 2009), 2. 

35. BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 24 March 2011, Quantico, 

VA.

36. Much of the COIN guidance that was created under General McKiernan 

was adopted, adapted, and implemented by General Mchrystal when he took 

command in 2009.

37. Laura Rozen, “Winning hearts and minds: all of McChrystal’s 

advisors,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2009. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2009/07/31/ winning_hearts_and_minds_all_of_mcchrystals_advisors. 

(accessed May 8, 2011).

38. Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” (Kabul, AF: 

International Security and Assistance Force, August 30, 2009), 1-2.

39. McChrystal, 1-9.The population-centric COIN directive intended to 

focus ISAF units on the population and not just the enemy was successful in most 

areas but had a negative effect on the force in some units. Other units adapted 

their operations to meet the ISAF commander’s intent in a way that remained 

appropriate to their unique local conditions and the strength of the insurgency. 

This is discussed in detail later in the chapter. 

40. Information briefing conducted at the ISAF T3C counterinsurgency 

academy in Kabul, AF on March 18, 2010 witnessed by the author. 

41. Stanley McChrystal, “Tactical Directive,” (Kabul, AF: International 

Security and Assistance Force, July 6, 2009) 1-2.

42. When General Petraeus took over in July 2010 he changed very little that 

General McChrystal had set in motion as the new strategy in Afghanistan. He 

agreed with almost everything. The one thing that the Petraeus team did change 

was the ISAF mission statement and the use of the term population-centric COIN 

and cleared up the ROE regarding indirect fire and CAS. As described, the term 

was used by General McChrystal to signal a transition at the time and convey 

the importance of partnering with and protecting the population and not simply 

focusing on the enemy. Over time, some leaders at levels below ISAF began to 

see the directive as black and white, creating additional measures to enforce and 

comply with it, which made the rules of engagement in some units more rigid. The 

Petraeus team recognized this, removed the term population-centric, and changed 

the mission statement to simply read ‘conduct operations in Afghanistan.’

43. McChrystal, “Tactical Directive,” 2. 

44. ROE regarding the use of Indirect Fire and CAS would be reviewed by 

General Petraeus in July 2010. Although he would not change the directive issued 

by General McChrystal, he would issue guidance to ensure leaders at all levels 

understood the appropriate use. This is discussed in the following pages at length.
112

45. McChrystal, “Tactical Directive,” 2. 

46. Sean Naylor and Michael Hoffman, “Petraeus Reviews, clarifies strike 

directive,” Air Force Times, August 9, 2010. http://www.airforcetimes.com/

news/2010/08/ airforce_rules_of_engagement_080910/. (accessed 18 May 2011).

47. This information was obtained at the unclassified level while attending 

the Afghan Counterinsurgency Academy at Camp Julien, Afghanistan in March 

2010. General McChrystal laid out the goals for the ANSF calling it a critical 

component to the strategy and overall success in Afghanistan.

48. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” G-1.

49. Coupled with the desperate need to immediately amplify the recruiting, 

vetting, and training of the ANSF is the importance of effective partnership. One key 

obstacle to our training efforts in Afghanistan is patience. No one has uncovered a 

shortcut to building an elite force. It takes time to grow and develop leaders, which 

is integral to establishing a viable Security Force. In the US Army, the average 

battalion commander logs between 16 and 18 years of experience before assuming 

command. In Afghanistan today, Commands are purchased rather than earned. 

As the ANSF ranks swell, the risk of a leadership crisis looms on the horizon, 

threatening to unseat the delicate balance of order. One-to-one partnership with 

ANSF forces is more critical today than ever before and, since 2009, it has become 

a high priority at every level. One US Commander acknowledged the importance 

of one-to-one partnering in his AO stating “ANSF capacity-building is our main 

effort, and we accept some risk in our operational capabilities to focus on this.” 

(Steven Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 

Operations, and Issues for Congress, 47) Make no mistake, an efficient and well 

functioning Afghan National Security Force will predicate a successful ISAF 

withdrawal in the coming years.

50. Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US 

Policy,” 26.

51. Katzman, 26.

52. The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation 

on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The White House, Office of the 

Press Secretary, December 1, 2009.

53. Naylor and Hoffman, “Petraeus Reviews, clarifies strike directive,” 

accessed May 18, 2011. 

54. ISAF, “Mission Statement,” International Security and Assistance Force 

Command Website, 2011. http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (accessed May 2, 

2011).

55. Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 16.

56. BB020, Battalion Commander, Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, March 2, 2011, Fort Bliss, TX. 
113

57. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 10. 

58. Malevich and Youngman, “The Afghan Balance of Power and the Culture 

of Jihad,” 35. 

59. Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road 

Ahead,” 252.

60. Kolenda, “Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level,” 29. 

61. A tribal jirga was defined as a meeting among the men and elders within 

a village or valley in order to decide on local governance matters and decisions 

that affected the community. This is opposed to a shura, which would have the 

religious Mullahs of the area in attendance. Shuras had a religious component or 

a decision was involved that was associated with religion. The unit was corrected 

many times by elders in the local communities in the AO when asked to hold a 

shura. Leaders would share a laugh and they would correct the terminology each 

time and say, ‘you mean you want to have a jirga’!

62. Nathan Springer, “Implementing a Population-centric Strategy in 

Northeast Afghanistan, May 07-July 08.” Small Wars Journal, March 1st, 2010. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/ implementing-a-populationcentr/. 

(accessed May 2, 2011).

63. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present, 

329-334. 

64. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 20-21. 

65. Rhoda Margesson, R40747, “United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service. 

December 27, 2010,18.

66. Nagl, “A Better War in Afghanistan: Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations,” 8.

67. Kolenda, “Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level,” 30.

68. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 2-9.

69. Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US 

Policy,” 12. 

70. Interview with BB020, March 2, 2011, Fort Bliss, TX.

71. Interview with BB020, March 2, 2011, Fort Bliss, TX. 

72. Interview with BB020, March 2, 2011, Fort Bliss, TX.

73. Kolenda, “Command Brief,” August 1, 2008. 

74. Much of the literature alludes to ungoverned space. There is no such 

thing. Governance is the traditional system in place or power broker in a village, 

valley, or area that administers the rules and regulations while enforcing the 

traditional customs and way of life. Government is more formal. The first hint of 

government comes at the district level in Afghanistan and extends to the provincial 
114

and central levels. Formal government is often mistrusted by the locals because of 

a history of corruption and falsehood. Governance has functioned for centuries in 

Afghanistan while government has not. We must connect the government with the 

functioning governance to set the conditions for peace, self-reliance, and progress 

in the future.

75. Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: 

Background and Policy Issues,” 9.

76. Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis, CRM D0022894.A2, 

“Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How different units adapted 

to local conditions,” Center of Navy Analysis, July 1, 2010, 51-64. 

77. Kolenda, “Command Brief,” August 1, 2008. 

78. Meyerle, Katt, and Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in 

Afghanistan: How different units adapted to local conditions,” 53-54.

79. Craig Collier, “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn,” 

Military Review (September-October 2010): 91.

80. Meyerle, Katt, and Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in 

Afghanistan: How different units adapted to local conditions,” 55-57.

81. Joseph Cox, “Information Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong” (Monograph, School of 

Advanced Military Studies: Fort Leavenworth, 2006), 39.

82. Information briefing conducted at the ISAF T3C counterinsurgency 

academy in Kabul, AF on March 18, 2010 witnessed by the author. Although the 

RIB program officially began in 2006, radio stations were being procured prior 

to that year by individual commands. Once the program became standardized 

in 2006, it functioned better nationally as radio station components were 

standardized.

83. Interview with BI050, March 28, 2011, United Kingdom. 

84. In Northeast Konar and Eastern Nuristan Province in 2007 and 2008, 

the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry stretched this concept as far as it could to extract 

as much benefit as possible. At Forward Operating Base Naray, 1-91 purchased an 

FM radio station that had an increased range due to repeaters. Thousands of windup radios were distributed to the local population and the radio station broadcast 

in Pashtun and Nuristani 18 hours a day by an all Afghan staff. Additionally, an all 

Afghan run newspaper was published weekly at Naray. It reported positive news 

and human interest stories, as well as local tribal news. The paper was distributed 

to every major village in the area of operation and provided an excellent avenue 

for informing locals of our efforts in their area. The other important function 

the Afghan newspaper staff performed was the creation of flyers for use prior 

to and during tactical operations. The funding to maintain the radio station and 

newspaper was made available through a combination of funding mechanisms 

including CERP, local area contract, and battalion funds. The information 
115

operations effort was a critical component to the overall strategy.

85. Spencer Ackerman, “Military Embraces Counterinsurgency in 

Afghanistan,” The Washington Independent, September 29, 2008. http://

washingtonindependent.com/8821/ counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan. (accessed 

May 19, 2011).

86. Greg Bruno, “Winning the Information War in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 11, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/

pakistan/winning-information-war-afghanistan-pakistan/p19330 (accessed April 

30, 2011).

87. Malevich and Youngman, “The Afghan Balance of Power and the Culture 

of Jihad,” 38. 

88. Malevich and Youngman, 39.

89. For more information regarding the debate on religion in Afghanistan 

read Oliver Roy’s book Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan and Sana Haroon’s 

book, Frontier of Faith.

90. To see how this debate has gripped our military, read Binard Finel’s “A 

substitute for Victory,” in Foreign Affairs April 8, 2010 that supports populationcentric COIN as the strategy in Afghanistan and Colonel Gian Gentile’s “A Strategy 

of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” in Parameters, Autumn 2009

that disapproves of the strategy.

91. Collier, “Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn,” 88.

92. Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the 

Army,” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 6.

93. Interview with BH040, 24 March 2011, Quantico, VA.

94. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 9.

95. Andrew Knight, “Influence as a Measure of Success,” Military Review

(January-February 2011): 71.

96. Lines of effort include but are not limited to: Security (which includes 

Kill / Capture Operations and ANSF, Economy, Development, Governance, and 

Information Operations / Psychological Operations.

97. BB030, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 3 March 2011, Fort Bliss, TX.

98. Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road 

Ahead,” 285.

99. Stanley McChrystal, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 

International Security Assistance Force, August 26, 2009.

100. From May 2007 to July 2008 in Afghanistan, 1-91 Cavalry Squadron 

focused on partnering with and protecting the population from the insurgency 

in the AO. The Squadron was in the AO for two summer fighting periods, which 
116

is rare, and it makes for a good case study. The precipitous drop in violence the 

Squadron experienced between the first and second summer was dramatic. 

101. Nathan Springer, “Implementing a Population-centric Strategy in 

Northeast Afghanistan, May 07-July 08.” Small Wars Journal, March 1st, 2010, 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/implementing-a-populationcentr/, 

(accessed May 2, 2011).

102. The author has written a number of articles on this experience using 

the term population-centric to describe the strategy. They are: “Taking the Next 

Step: Operationalizing a Population-Centric Strategy at the Battalion-Squadron 

Level,” US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, January 11, 2010; 

“Isolating the Critical Element Necessary to Achieve Success in a Population 

Centric Environment: Close Personal Relationships,” US Army and Marine Corps 

Counterinsurgency Center, March 1, 2010, and “Many Paths Up the Mountain: 

Population Centric COIN in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, May 25, 2010. 

103. Balanced approach: This does not mean that a commander utilized 

all assets equally. The commander must understand which assets are available, 

consider each one across every line of effort, and apply them in proportions that 

best address local conditions.

104. ISAF, “Mission Statement,” International Security and Assistance Force 

Command Website, 2011. http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (accessed May 2, 

2011).

105. ISAF, “Mission Statement”.
117

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The debate over population-centric versus enemy-centric 

compartmentalizes our thinking and it’s not an either or 

proposition. . . . Those are not mutually exclusive but I think the 

emotion gets up and people wind up justifying their position at the 

expense of relevance and reality. I honestly think it stifles some of 

the things that we are really trying to do. . . . I think we have to 

be cautious of that because there are assumptions built in to labels 

like that when quite frankly they have to be applied differently 

every single place we go.

— BA060, Counterinsurgency Advisor, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS

The case studies suggest that commanders who craft a balanced 

strategy integrating all resources while simultaneously shielding civilians 

and conducting aggressive, intelligence-driven offensive operations, 

most frequently encounter success in their AOs. The polarizing debate 

over whether to employ a population-centric or enemy-centric strategy 

to achieve superior victory in a counterinsurgency campaign became 

complicated because each side is partially correct. AOs benefit from 

enemy elimination, absolutely. AOs benefit from civilians who feel safe 

and protected from the insurgency but a purely population-centric or 

enemy-centric counterinsurgency approach exists mostly in theory and, in 

practice, it can leave gaping deficits in strategy. The key is to accept there 

are no black or white solutions when countering an insurgency. Appropriate 

solutions depend on unique factors, inherent to local areas. These AOs 

require creative applications of available resources from across the lines of 

effort to best combat the insurgency and improve local conditions.

Commanders at the operational and strategic levels must acknowledge 

this and issue guidance that delivers clearly articulated goals and 

milestones. It must point the desired way ahead, such as General Briggs 

did when he took over as director of operations in Malaya in 1950.1

 It must illuminate the path to a political solution while allowing junior 

commanders at the tactical level the necessary autonomy to formulate and 

execute the unique day-to-day strategy necessary to move AOs to agreed 

upon end states. Every asset available to leaders across the lines of effort 

must be considered when formulating their individual plans for their AOs. 

The case studies which the essay has examined show the complexity of the 

debate and the need for nuanced understanding.
118

The physical act of war begins with, is connected to, and ends with 

a political solution. The theorists in chapter 2, whether conventional war 

theorists or more contemporary counterinsurgency theorists, agree that to 

achieve an acceptable solution in war, every applicable element of national 

power must be applied in the conflict to integrate and synchronize the 

effort that enables the quickest political resolution or settlement.2 How the 

available elements of national power are weighted when applied to the war, 

whether offensive operations or governance, diplomacy, development, or 

economic initiatives, are contingent upon dynamics on the ground. The 

theorists would never dismiss a potential resource, asset, or opportunity 

available to them that could be applied to the war effort and potentially 

contribute to reaching a political solution. It was apparent to them that the 

solutions in war that prompt political negotiation or compromise are often 

gray and require constant evaluation and manipulation; no one cookiecutter paradigm fits all.3

The counterinsurgency campaigns in both Malaya and Oman 

demonstrate that if a strategy is too focused on killing and capturing the 

enemy or favors the population to the exclusion of enemy, progress is slow. 

Contrary to current US military conventional wisdom, Malaya was not a 

population-centric campaign. In fact, it was not centric at all. While the 

scale of the British government’s national power application was vastly 

different in both campaigns, similar lessons emerged. Malaya was highly 

organized and well resourced while Oman was decentralized and under 

resourced. In both campaigns, it took flexibility, time, and adaptation by 

leaders at all levels to achieve a balanced strategy. Offensive operations 

started out enemy-centric, heavily focused on killing or capturing 

insurgents. While the approach brought limited success, it did so with a 

high number of associated civilian casualties pushing popular support 

toward the insurgents. As leaders developed a more nuanced understanding 

of their respective insurgencies, the strategy became more balanced.

Offensive operations better utilized intelligence to target the enemy. 

Resources were leveraged from across the lines of effort both in support 

of the population and against the insurgency. Economic and development 

initiatives were utilized in government-controlled areas to reinforce gains 

and incentivize further cooperation and support from the population. 

Life began to look better under government control rather than insurgent 

control. Population control measures were utilized against the insurgency. 

In Malaya, even with a long list of associated issues, resettlement and food 

control denied the insurgency access to the local Chinese population in the 

jungle.4

 In Dhofar, Oman, villages were secured by physical barriers that 
119

controlled access, necessarily isolating the insurgency from the population. 

Construction of a series of blocking obstacles greatly degraded the Adoo’s 

ability to resupply its forces from PDRY.5

 Offensive operations continued 

in both campaigns. The balanced approach, utilizing every available 

resource in support of government forces and against the insurgency, 

illuminated the brightest path to political reconciliation.

The case studies on Malaya and Oman are informative to our current 

conflict in Afghanistan. For a large portion of the conflict the coalition 

was heavily focused on enemy-centric, large scale offensive operations. 

Although there were units at the tactical level pursuing unique balanced 

approaches conducive to the local situations they faced, the strategy at 

the operational level remained focused on killing and capturing insurgents 

until 2009.6

 To complicate matters, by 2003, American war attention and 

resources were diverted to Iraq and the war effort in Afghanistan was 

secondary to the war effort in Iraq until 2009. Everything, from resources 

to the total number of soldiers committed to the conflict, was done on the 

cheap. All elements of national power were hardly committed against the 

insurgency in Afghanistan.

In 2009, President Obama officially shifted the focus of the US war 

effort from Iraq to Afghanistan. General McChrystal adjusted the ISAF 

approach from an enemy-centric to a population-centric one. He guided 

the force to partner with and protect the population, he doubled efforts 

to train, mentor, and partner with the ANSF, and he better focused the 

effort to kill and capture the enemy. Between 2009 and 2010, ISAF 

directed an effort to utilize all resources and elements of national power 

against the insurgency, with particular emphasis on avoiding civilian 

casualties. Although the intent was to balance the strategy, the populationcentric directive swung the pendulum too far the other way. In the spirit 

of complying with the directive, some commanders added additional 

restrictions to protect the population that made the rules of engagement 

(ROE) more rigid, which constrained some units when trying to integrate 

critical assets such as close air support or fires while engaged with the 

enemy. As a retired general officer concluded, “There has to be a degree 

of caution [to prevent civilian casualties and increase popular support] but 

you must ensure you [your directives] don’t have unnecessary caution as 

you can quickly border, frankly, on pacifism.”7

General David Petraeus took command of ISAF in July of 2010 and 

continued General McChrystal’s strategy but removed the populationcentric directive from the ISAF mission statement. Petraeus issued a 

directive preventing commanders from adding additional restrictions to 
120

the ROE. Petraeus made small adjustments to the strategy; however, in 

doing so he created a more balanced approach. ISAF now promotes a 

strategy that recognizes the importance of every available resource and 

the complexity of each local area. Commanders at the tactical level have 

the autonomy to create and execute strategies they feel will work best in 

their AOs while staying true to their senior commanders’ intent. ISAF has 

placed itself in a promising position to induce a political solution in the 

future as all resources are applied at varying but seemingly appropriate 

levels across Afghanistan.

In closing, counterinsurgency strategy should not be categorized in 

mutually exclusive terms such as population-centric or enemy-centric 

because countering insurgents requires a far more dynamic, hybrid 

approach. The US military, strategists, and policy makers must retire 

the “centric” narrative and work together to integrate and utilize every 

available resource as part of a balanced approach. Counterinsurgency 

strategy planning requires a nimble and expansive mindset. We must 

understand that counterinsurgency is simply one more type of warfare and 

one that we are sure to experience again. The careful analysis of current 

and future counterinsurgency campaigns must first start with history. The 

best practices, hard lessons, and recommended solutions history provides 

us both highlight the starting point and illuminate the way ahead from 

which to navigate uncharted waters. Military commanders, strategists, 

and policy makers must analyze historical campaigns in depth and avoid 

cherry picking history for the sake of their arguments. The critical lesson 

that bound to the fore from the case studies in this thesis was that success 

demands a balanced approach in counterinsurgency that aggressively 

pursues the enemy while at the same time partners with and protects the 

population.
121

Notes

1. For more information on General Briggs four main aims to improve the 

counterinsurgency effort in Mayala, read page 52 in chapter 3 on Malaya.

2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 39.

3. For further examination of the war theorists and the potential approaches 

in war to win, achieve political compromise, or negotiated settlement, please 

read chapter two of this thesis. Theorists analyzed in the chapter include classic 

theorists such as Suz-Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz; insurgent theorists Mao TseTung and Giap; and counterinsurgency theorists Julian Paget, Frank Kitson, Robert 

Thompson, Roger Trinquier, David Galula, John McCuen, David Kilcullen, John 

Mackinlay.

4. As shown in the Malaya chapter, resettlement of the local Chinese 

population in the jungle was anything but smooth in the beginning. Resettlement 

villages lacked basic services and were unhealthy and dangerous to live in. It 

took a concerted effort on behalf of the British and Malay government to 

improve resettlement centers, add essential services, and create acceptable living 

conditions.

5. For more information on the population control measures employed 

against the insurgency in Malaya and Dhofar province, Oman, see chapter 3 and 

4.

6. This issue becomes much more nebulous at the tactical level. Afghanistan 

was the war of secondary importance to Iraq from 2003 to 2009 and a small 

number of units were operating in Afghanistan as compared to Iraq. This made 

areas of operation at the company, battalion, and brigade level in Afghanistan 

very large, which afforded commanders great autonomy to apply solutions they 

deemed most appropriate to their individual AOs. There were commanders and 

units applying balanced approaches conducive to their local AOs between 2002 

and 2009. The issue is that the lack of guidance at the strategic and operational 

levels afforded other commanders the opportunity to pursue an enemy-centric 

strategy in their AOs even if a balanced strategy was more appropriate. The lack 

of higher guidance makes autonomy your best friend and worst enemy at the same 

time.

7. Interview with BI070, 30 March 2011, United Kingdom.

123

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Interviews

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Scholars Program 2011. 

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Boston, Massachusetts

BF010, Former Army Officer. Interview by Richard Johnson and Aaron 

Kaufman, 11 March 2011.

BF020, Civilian Advisor to MNF-I. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Aaron Kaufman, 11 March 2011.

BF030, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and Aaron 

Kaufman, 12 March 2011.

BF040, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and Aaron 

Kaufman, 14 March 2011.

Fort Bliss, Texas

BB010, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 2 March 2011.

BB020, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 2 March 2011.

BB030, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 3 March 2011.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

BC010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 1 March 2011.

BC020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 2 March 2011.

BC030, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 1 March 2011.
124

BC040, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 2 March 2011.

BC050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 2 March 2011.

BC060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 3 March 2011.

Fort Irwin, California

BE010, Transition Team Leader. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 7 March 2011.

BE020, Transition Team Member. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 7 March 2011.

BE030, Company Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 8 March 2011.

BE040, Transition Team Leader. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 9 March 2011.

BE050, Battery Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 8 March 2011.

BE060, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 9 March 2011.

BE070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 9 March 2011.

BE080, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 7 March 2011.

BE090, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 7 March 2011.

Fort Knox, Kentucky

BD010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD020, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD030, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 14 March 2011.

BD040, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 15 March 2011.
125

BD050, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 15 March 2011.

BD060, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 16 March 2011.

BD070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 16 March 2011.

BD080, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 17 March 2011.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BA010, Brigade Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and Thomas 

Walton, 22 February 2011.

BA020, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Benjamin 

Boardman, 23 February 2011.

BA030, Vietnam Veteran. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 24 February 2011.

BA040, Brigade Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 23 February, 2011.

BA050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Nathan 

Springer, 23 February, 2011.

BA060, Counterinsurgency Advisor. Interview by Robert Green and 

Nathan Springer, 23 February, 2011.

BA070, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and Thomas 

Walton, 24 February 2011.

BA080, Counterinsurgency Advisor. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Nathan Springer, 9 March 2011.

BA090, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Benjamin 

Boardman, 24 February 2011.

Fort Stewart, Georgia

BG020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 14 March 2011.

BG030, Troop Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, Nathan Springer, 

and Thomas Walton, 14 March 2011.

BG040, Brigade Commander. Interview by Nathan Springer and Thomas 

Walton, 15 March 2011.
126

BG050, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 15 March 2011.

BG060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, 15 March 2011.

BG070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Nathan Springer and Thomas 

Walton, 15 March 2011.

BG080, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 16 March 2011.

BG090, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 16 March 2011.

BG100, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 16 March 2011.

United Kingdom

BI010, Senior British Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, and Nathan Springer, 29 March 2011.

BI020, Battle Group Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Thomas Walton, 31 March 2011.

BI030, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Thomas 

Walton, 29 March 2011.

BI040, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and Dustin Mitchell, 

1 April 2011.

BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 28 March 2011.

BI060, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, 

Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 2 April 2011.

BI070, Retired General Officer. Interview by Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, 

Dustin Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 30 March 2011.

BI080, Retired General Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman, Robert 

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 3 April 2011.

BI090, Retired General Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman, Robert 

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 4 April 2011.

BI100, Senior Army Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 4 April 2011.
127

BI110, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, Richard 

Johnson, and Dustin Mitchell, 8 April 2011.

BI120, Retired Army Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman, Robert 

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 8 April 2011.

BI130, Platoon Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 5 April 2011.

BI140, Afghan Army Advisor. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 5 April 2011.

BI150, Company Sergeant Major. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI160, Company Second In Command. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and 

Dustin Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI170, Afghan Army Advisor. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI190, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 5 April 2011.

BI200, Platoon Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 7 April 2011.

BI210, Company 2nd In Command. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 7 April 2011.

BI220, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 7 April 2011.

BI230, Company Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Nathan 

Springer, 7 April 2011.

BI240, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI250, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Richard Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI260, Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Robert Green and 

Nathan Springer, 7 April 2011.

BI270, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 7 April 2011.

BI280, Commander’s Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 April 2011.

BI290, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 April 2011.
128

BI300, Company Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 2 April 

2011.

BI310, Company Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and 

Nathan Springer, 31 March 2011.

BI320, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 29 March 2011.

BI330, Dhofar Veteran. Interview by Robert Green, 28 March 2011.

Washington, DC

BH010, Senior Policy Official. Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011.

BH020, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Benjamin 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011.

BH030, Iraq Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert Green, 

Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.

BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 24 March 2011.

BH050, Historian. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert Green, Richard 

Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.

BH060, Vietnam Political and Military Analyst. Interview by Mark Battjes, 

Benjamin Boardman, Robert Green, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.

BH070, Iraqi Mayor. Interview by Mark Battjes and Robert Green, 25 

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