IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-40719

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HAYDEN RICKS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-197-1

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Hayden Ricks was convicted of one count of possession of child 

pornography and sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and ten years of 

supervised release. Now on appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress statements and evidence. We review the district court’s legal

conclusions de novo and its factual determinations for clear error, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government as the prevailing party

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 11, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-40719

2

on the motion to suppress. See United State v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 773 (5th 

Cir. 2015).1 

In April 2013, Ricks was placed on community supervision pursuant to 

a state conviction for possession of child pornography; both sides agree that the 

supervision requirements were still in effect at the relevant time. As a 

condition of that supervision, Ricks was required to allow any law enforcement 

agent to inspect his cell phone. On the day in question, Ricks met with his 

probation officer who inspected Ricks’s cell phone and returned it to him before 

Ricks left for a hearing at the Collin County courthouse. After Ricks left, the 

probation officer called a detective at the Collin County Sheriff’s Office to 

report that Ricks had child pornography on his phone and was on his way to 

the courthouse. A group of law enforcement officials met Ricks at the 

courthouse and asked if he would visit with them; it is undisputed that he was 

not under arrest at that point. He agreed to the interview and also agreed to 

let them inspect his phone. They found the child pornography and questioned 

him about it; the interview was recorded by body camera. The results of the 

interview, including the material from his phone, are the subject of the 

suppression motion and this appeal.

After assessing all the facts presented at a hearing, the district court 

concluded that Ricks was not in custody for the purpose of Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Wright, 777 F.3d at 773-75. We find no clear error in 

that conclusion. We are likewise unpersuaded that the district court erred in 

determining that Ricks voluntarily consented to the search of his cell phone. 

1 Ricks argues that his consents were involuntary because of his probation status 

and probation conditions. The Government contends that these arguments should be 

reviewed only for plain error, a contention Ricks contests. See United States v. Vasquez, 899 

F.3d 363, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1543 (2019); FED. R. CRIM. P.

12(b)(3)(C); accord United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 2005). We 

conclude that the standard of review is not dispositive in this case, so we need not resolve 

this disagreement.

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See United States v. Rounds, 749 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2014). Further, as 

noted by the Government and left unaddressed by Ricks, because of the 

probation requirements, the officers did not need Ricks’s consent; they needed 

only reasonable suspicion to review Ricks’s phone. United States v. Knights, 

534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (“When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a

probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there 

is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the 

probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable”); see

also United States v. Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (law enforcement 

can conduct a search of a parolee who is under supervised release if reasonable 

suspicion existed that said person was engaged in criminal activity). They 

clearly had reasonable suspicion as a result of the probation officer’s 

information. Ricks has failed to demonstrate reversible error in the denial of 

his motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

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