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[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13397-13398]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-5608]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DOE Response to Recommendation 2010-2 of the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and 
Immobilization Plant

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 
2010-2, concerning Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and 
Immobilization Plant was published in the Federal Register on December 
27, 2010 (72 FR 24279). In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(b), the Secretary of 
Energy transmitted the following response to the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board on February 10, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 
Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Steven Petras, Nuclear Engineer, 
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on February 28, 2011.
Mari-Jo Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004-2901
    Dear Mr. Chairman:
    This is in response to your December 17, 2010 letter, which 
provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) 
Recommendation 2010-2, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and 
Immobilization Plant. Mr. Dale E. Knutson will be the responsible 
Manager for this Recommendation.
    The Department of Energy (DOE) agrees with the Board that more 
testing and analysis should be completed to provide additional 
confidence that pulse jet mixing (PJM) and transfer systems for the 
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will achieve their 
design and operating requirements. DOE has previously made 
commitments to address the concerns raised by the Board in its 
Recommendation 2010-2. These commitments were made by the Federal 
Project Director in August 2010 during an internal project 
management meeting; in the October 7-8, 2010 public hearing on WTP; 
and in our supplement to the public hearing record submitted to the 
Board in January 2011. At each point, full disclosure of DOE plans, 
with identified timelines for further details and schedules for 
testing and analysis, was included. The implementation of these 
commitments is on-going as part of WTP project plans that supports 
scheduled testing to begin in 2012.
    The Board acknowledged in its letter that DOE has taken and 
continues to take steps to increase the confidence that the PJM 
mixed vessels will comply with their designed operating 
requirements. As outlined in your letter:

     DOE contracted an independent technical review team, 
Consortium for Risk Evaluation and Stakeholder Participation 
(CRESP), that presented DOE with 13 recommendations. DOE is 
continuing to take actions addressing the CRESP recommendations.
     On October 7-8, 2010, DOE publicly committed to large-
scale testing and to complete relevant portions of the testing 
before installing remaining process vessels in the WTP Pretreatment 
Facility. As part of that commitment, the testing objectives and 
summary schedule for the large-scale testing was included in the WTP 
Project's January 2011 update to the public record.

    We believe the Board's concerns regarding PJM at the WTP will be 
addressed by DOE's current direction related to resolving PJM and 
transfer system uncertainty. Accordingly, DOE accepts Recommendation 
2010-2.
    The Board's Recommendation includes specific sub-recommendations 
that it believes need to be addressed as part of the DOE's pulse jet 
mixed vessel testing program. There are certain specific details of 
the Board's Recommendation that require clarification and are 
summarized below. We believe our intended actions should satisfy the 
Board's concerns.

     Sub-recommendations 1 and 2: Wording in both sub-
recommendations calls for ``testing that envelope the complete range 
of

[[Page 13398]]

physical properties for the high-level waste stored in the Hanford 
Tank Farms.''
    DOE intends to conduct large-scale testing with simulants 
selected to represent the vast majority of the waste in the tank 
farms, consistent with the approach used in WTP's pulse jet mixing 
test program conducted to date. The WTP design and planned 
operations approach is intended to address residual uncertainty with 
other actions and design features. These include (1) waste feed pre-
qualification activities; and (2) specific design features, 
including the ability to inspect vessels and equipment for vessel 
heel dilution and cleanout, that would enable waste particles that 
may not be mixing with the bulk of the waste to be moved forward to 
the melters.
     Sub-recommendation 3: This sub-recommendation calls for 
``* * * verification and validation of any computational models used 
by the WTP project team (e.g., Low Order Accumulation Model and 
FLUENT) based on the results from the `large-scale testing.' ''
    The verification and validation effort is expected to be 
completed prior to the ``large scale testing.'' The WTP project 
intends to compare the results from the ``large scale testing'' with 
the computational models.
     Sub-recommendation 4: This sub-recommendation calls for 
``* * * including demonstrating that representative samples can be 
obtained even if the assumed WTP design particle size or density is 
exceeded. This will ensure that the sampling system does not exclude 
large, dense particles and artificially bias the measured particle 
size and density distribution.''
    The vessel testing activities will include determining the 
acceptability of vessel sampling in conditions where sampling may be 
challenged by mixing performance, i.e., solids-containing vessels. 
There may be cases where the sample system operation during normal 
vessel operations does not retrieve some large dense particles for 
analysis. As noted above, this is planned to be accommodated by the 
feed-prequalification process and by the ability to pull a sample 
during the heel dilution and cleanout process, when larger, denser 
particles would be retrieved into the sample system. Consequently, 
the large-scale testing program is not intending to demonstrate that 
normal sampling activities can retrieve all waste particles.

    DOE is committed to the safe design and operation of its nuclear 
facilities, consistent with the principles of Integrated Safety 
Management, and values input on how DOE can improve its activities. 
We look forward to working further with the Board and its staff on 
preparation of the DOE's Implementation Plan for Recommendation 
2010-2 so that the WTP project can complete its design and 
construction activities while promoting nuclear safety for the life 
of WTP operations.
    If you have any further questions, please contact me or 
In[eacute]s R. Triay, Assistant Secretary for Environmental 
Management, at (202) 586-7709.

    Sincerely,

    Steven Chu.

[FR Doc. 2011-5608 Filed 3-10-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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