U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

79–010 

" ! SENATE 115TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2017

115–169 

Calendar No. 239 

REGULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN 

NEED OF SCRUTINY ACT OF 2017 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

WITH MINORITY VIEWS 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 21 

TO AMEND CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, TO 

PROVIDE THAT MAJOR RULES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

SHALL HAVE NO FORCE OR EFFECT UNLESS A JOINT 

RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL IS ENACTED INTO LAW 

OCTOBER 16, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 


congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

JON TESTER, Montana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

SATYA P. THALLAM, Chief Economist 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

STACIA M. CARDILLE, Minority Chief Counsel 

CHARLES A. MOSKOWITZ, Minority Senior Legislative Counsel 

KATHERINE C. SYBENGA, Minority Counsel 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

Calendar No. 239 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 115–169 

REGULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN NEED OF 

SCRUTINY ACT OF 2017 

OCTOBER 16, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 21] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 21) to amend chapter 8 of title 

5, United States Code, to provide that major rules of the executive 

branch shall have no force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted into law, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill, 

as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and the Need for Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 4 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 5 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 7 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 7 

VII. Minority Views ............................................................................................... 10 

VIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 13 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 

2017 (REINS Act) revises the Congressional Review Act of 1996 

2 

1See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–121, 110 Stat. 847 

(1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808); see also Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017) (CRA was included as part of the Contract with 

America Advancement Act of 1996). 2 H.R. Rep. No. 114–214, pt. 1, at 7 (2015). 

3S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017). 

4See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). 5 Id. 

6See 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2012). 7See Jonathan H. Adler, Placing ‘‘Reins’’ On Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act, 

16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 2–36 (2013). 8 Aggregate measurement of federal regulatory scope and cost is difficult, though there have 

been attempts at using a structural model to estimate costs, as well as machine-learning methods to ‘‘read’’ the extensive Code of Federal Regulations to count the number of regulations. See 

Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regulations (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, April 

2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf (‘‘Had regulation been held constant at levels observed in 1980, our model predicts that the economy would 

have been 25 percent larger by 2012 . . . or about $13,000 per capita); see also Omar Al-Ubaydli 

& Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-specific Regulations for 

All United States Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997–2012, 11 Reg. & Governance 1, 109– 

123 (2017). 9 Adler, supra note 7. 10 Id. 

(CRA) to increase accountability and transparency in the Federal 

regulatory process.1 The CRA, which originated from a desire to instill more active congressional control over a rapidly growing body 

of Federal regulation, created an expedited process for Congress to 

review and disapprove any rule after it is issued by a Federal agency.2 The REINS Act would amend the CRA by adding a mandatory 

congressional approval procedure for major agency rules before 

they can go into effect.3 By requiring prior congressional approval 

for major rules, regulations will be more carefully crafted and the 

regulatory process will be more accountable to the American people. 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Under the CRA, a major rule cannot take effect for at least 60 

days after a report on the rule is submitted to both Houses of Congress and the rule itself is published in the Federal Register 

(whichever occurs later).4 However, unless Congress acts to formally disapprove the rule, it automatically goes into effect.5 The 

REINS Act would reverse this process for major rules, preventing 

implementation of major rules that do not receive explicit approval 

by Congress. A major rule is one that the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) determines will have a likely annual effect of $100 million or more on the economy, cause a major increase 

in costs or prices, or have significant international anti-competitive 

effects.6

The costs and burdens associated with Federal regulatory activity have increased significantly over the last 40 years.7 However, 

despite an increasing regulatory burden,8 the legislative structure 

has not meaningfully changed to commensurately increase accountability. Over the course of the twentieth century, there has been an 

escalation of congressional delegation of regulatory authority to 

Federal agencies.9 By delegating broad regulatory authority to Federal agencies, Congress has lost legislative control and political accountability over the exercise of that delegated regulatory authority.10

3 

11 142 Cong. Rec. 96, 6922, 6926 (1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement of House and Senate 

sponsors for CRA). 12 Id. 13See H.R. Rep. No. 114–214 at 8. 14See Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72–212, ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (repealed 

1966); see also James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive 

Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. J. 323, 324 n.5 (1977) (cited in I.N.S. v. 

Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting)); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 3–4, 28 (1984). 15 142 Cong. Rec. 96, 6922, 6926 (1996); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 16See H.R. Rep. No. 114–214 at 8; see also Adler, supra note 7, at 21. 17See U.S. Fed. Reg., https://www.federalregister.gov/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (search Mar. 

30, 1996 through Sept. 13, 2017). 18See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act/overview (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (search Mar. 30, 1996 through Sept. 13, 2017). 19See generally S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015–2016); S.J. Res. 22, 114th Cong. (2015–2016); 

S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015–2016); S.J. Res. 24 114th Cong. (2015–2016); H.J. Res. 88, 114th 

Cong. (2015–2016) (the five vetoed resolutions); see also S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted 

as Pub. L. No. 107–5); H.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 155–4); H.J. 

Res. 38, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 155–5); H.J. Res. 40, 115th Cong. (2017) 

(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–8); H.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 155– 

11); H.J. Res. 44, 155th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 155–12); H.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. 

(2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–13); H.J. Res. 58, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. 

No. 115–14); H.J. Res. 42, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–17); H.J. Res. 69, 

115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–20); H.J. Res. 83, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted 

as Pub. L. No. 115–21); S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–22); H.J. 

Res. 43, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–23); H.J. Res. 67, 115th Cong. (2017) 

(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115–24); H.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 115– 

35) (the fifteen resolutions overturning rules and signed into law). 20 Adler, supra note 7, at 19. 21 Id. 

The purpose of the CRA was to ‘‘redress the balance [of power], 

reclaiming for Congress some of its policymaking authority.’’ 11 The 

sponsors observed that Congress was increasingly delegating its 

legislative functions, effectively ‘‘abdicat[ing] its constitutional 

role.’’ 12 Previous Congresses have contemplated other means of disapproving of Executive actions vis-a ́-vis delegated powers, employing various means to assert authority over Federal agencies and restore legislative control.13 These means have included everything 

from ordinary congressional oversight activities to the use of the 

unicameral legislative veto, which goes back to 1932.14 On the latter tool, ‘‘the Supreme Court struck down any procedure where executive action could be overturned by less than the full process required under the Constitution to make laws.’’ 15 The CRA outlines 

a process similar to a legislative veto, but which requires participation of both Houses of Congress and the President. 

Despite its conceptual intentions, the CRA has not had much 

success reigning in the pace of regulations promulgated by Federal 

agencies.16 Since the enactment of the CRA, agencies have issued 

more than 85,000 new final Federal regulations,17 over 1,500 of 

which are major rules.18 However only a small fraction have received some form of Congressional action via a Congressional resolution—to date only 20 have been passed by both chambers and 

sent to the President; of those, only 15 have been signed into law.19

One limitation of the CRA is that it forces Congress to take its 

own initiative to overturn any regulations of which it disapproves.20 Additionally, the CRA essentially requires a super-majority in Congress to overturn any regulations because a sitting 

President is likely to veto any joint congressional resolutions meant 

to disapprove of regulations promulgated by his own administration.21

There is a need for further reform of the regulatory process. 

Under the CRA, unless Congress disapproves of a rule, the rule 

4 

22See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). 23Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo. L.J. 785, 793–96 (1984). 24Tribe, supra note 14, at 9. 25 Breyer, supra note 23, at 28; see also H.R. Rep. No. 114–214 at 11. 26S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017). 

goes into effect without any congressional action.22 Therefore, as a 

matter of course, even rules to which many in Congress (perhaps 

even a majority) may object go unchallenged, and individual members can hold at arm’s length any undesirable outcomes—avoiding 

‘‘a degree of visible responsibility.’’ 23 Legal scholar Laurence Tribe 

described that ‘‘through rulemaking . . . exercises of delegated authority change legal rights and privileges no less than do fullfledged laws.’’ 24 This means that changes to and creation of new 

Federal regulations carry the full force and effect of law, and can 

proceed without the active participation of the Congress, which 

may have only vaguely authorized regulation in a particular area 

months, years, or decades prior. 

The REINS Act revises the CRA by inverting this process for 

major rules by preventing them from going into effect without Congress’ explicit approval. Under the REINS Act, any new major rule 

would require Congress to pass within 70 session or legislative 

days of the rule being submitted to Congress, and the President to 

sign, a joint resolution approving the new major rule before it could 

take effect. Accordingly, the REINS Act, like the CRA, would require approval by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the 

President. Then-Judge Stephen Breyer and constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe have opined that a congressional approval 

mechanism for regulations—similar to that outlined in the REINS 

Act—would be constitutional.25

The REINS Act provides for a few exceptions to its process. First, 

a major rule may take effect for a 90-day period without congressional approval if the President determines it is necessary under 

certain circumstances. Second, any rules affecting budget authority, outlays, or receipts are ‘‘assumed to be effective unless [they 

are] not approved in accordance’’ with this bill. 

Finally, the REINS Act ensures Congress has the ability to efficiently review major rules before they take effect by providing an 

expedited process. This process includes a prohibition on amendments to congressional joint resolutions of approval, a limited period of up to 15 session days for committees to discharge such resolutions, limited time allowed for floor debate, and a deadline by 

which both chambers of Congress must take a vote on final passage 

of the resolution in question.26

These processes are designed to increase Congress’ accountability 

for the content of major rules and foster more deliberation before 

major rules take effect. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Senator Rand Paul (R–KY) introduced S. 21 on January 4, 2017, 

with Senators Roy Blunt (R–MO), Todd Young (R–IN), Mike 

Rounds (R–SD), Chuck Grassley (R–IA), Cory Gardner (R–CO), 

Joni Ernst (R–IA), Tom Cotton (R–AR), Shelly Moore Capito (R– 

WV), Steve Daines (R–MT), John McCain (R–AZ), Tim Scott (R– 

SC), Ted Cruz (R–TX), John Barrasso (R–WY), Mike Crapo (R–ID), 

John Thune (R–SD), James M. Inhofe (R–OK), Deb Fischer (R– 

5 

NE), Ron Johnson (R–WI), John Boozman (R–AR), Dean Heller (R– 

NV), Dan Sullivan (R–AK), Michael B. Enzi (R–WY), Mike Lee (R– 

UT), Pat Roberts (R–KS), Ben Sasse (R–NE), Jerry Moran (R–KS), 

and Bill Cassidy (R–LA). Senators Roger Wicker (R–MS), John Cornyn (R–TX), James E. Risch (ID), David Perdue (R–GA), Rob 

Portman (R–OH), Jeff Flake (R–AZ), John Kennedy (R–LA), and 

Johnny Isakson (R–GA) later joined as cosponsors. 

The bill was referred to the Committee. The Committee considered S. 21 at a May 17, 2017 business meeting. 

The Committee ordered S. 21 reported favorably on May 17, 

2017, by a roll call vote of 8 yeas to 6 nays. Senators voting in the 

affirmative were Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Enzi, 

Hoeven, and Daines. Senators voting in the negative were McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris. For the record 

only, Senator Carper voted nay by proxy. Consistent with Committee Rule 11, the Committee reports the bill with a technical 

amendment by mutual agreement of the Chairman and Ranking 

Member. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the bill’s short title, the ‘‘Regulations from 

the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017.’’ 

Section 2. Purpose 

This section describes the bill’s purpose as increasing Congressional responsibility in the regulatory process. It states that despite 

the ‘‘Constitution grant[ing] all legislative powers to Congress,’’ 

such power have been increasingly delegated to non-legislative authorities. By requiring Congress to explicitly vote to approve major 

regulations, the bill will result in more accountability to the public 

for the regulations with which they must comply. 

Section 3. Congressional review of agency rulemaking 

This section amends sections 801 to 807 of the CRA to reflect 

new requirements for promulgating a Federal regulation as well as 

new review and approval mechanisms for Congress to consider 

rules. 

The bill amends Section 801 subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of the CRA 

to require the agency submitting a rule for review to include, in the 

Federal Register and in a report to Congress and the Comptroller 

General, additional information and analysis pertaining to the rule. 

Subparagraph (a)(2)(A) adds a requirement that the Comptroller 

General provide a report to Congress on any major rules which includes ‘‘an assessment of whether the major rule imposes any new 

limits or mandates on private-sector activity.’’ Subparagraph 

(a)(2)(B) requires Federal agencies to information to the Comptroller General relevant to the major rule report l. 

Subparagraph (a)(3) stipulates that a major rule’s effective date 

is when a joint resolution on the rule is enacted, or the date included in the rule, whichever is later. 

Subparagraph (a)(4) stipulates that nonmajor rules take effect 

only if they are submitted to Congress and Congress does not disapprove of the rule. 

6 

Subparagraph (a)(5) prohibits Congress from approving a major 

rule beyond the period specified in this bill. 

Subsection (b) states that Congress must enact a joint resolution 

of approval within 70 session days from receipt of a major rule for 

it to take effect. 

Subsection (c) allows the President to temporarily put into effect 

(for up to 90 days) a major rule if he or she makes a determination 

that the rule is needed due to: an imminent threat to health and 

safety; enforcement of criminal laws; national security; or implementation of international trade agreement. This determination 

does not affect the resolution procedures in Section 802. 

Subsection (d) provides a new review period for rules submitted 

during the last 60 session days (in the Senate) or legislative days 

(in the House) before a Congress adjourns, all the way through to 

the convening of the next session. The new review window begins 

as if the rule is first published or submitted on the 15th session 

day (Senate) or legislative day (House) of the new session and otherwise treated the same as any other rule. 

Subsections 802(a) through (h) describe the specific requirements 

for the content of the joint resolution and expedited procedures related to a resolution of approval for a major rule. They require the 

majority leader in each chamber to introduce a joint resolution 

(after receipt of a major rule’s report) within three session or legislative days, whichever is applicable, with no amendments allowed 

at any point. It is then referred to the committee(s) of jurisdiction 

which has 15 (session/legislative) days to consider the resolution. 

The subsections further prescribe specific floor procedures in each 

chamber which limit debate, prevent moving on to other business 

without disposal of the resolution, or postponing a vote on final 

passage beyond the allowed review period described in section 801. 

Section 803 describes the disapproval procedure for nonmajor 

rules. This section is largely based on the existing authorities in 5 

U.S.C. § 802. Under this section, Congress is given a limited period 

of time in which to enact a joint resolution of disapproval for a 

nonmajor rule, otherwise the rule goes into effect by default. The 

amount of time committees are given to consider and report the 

rule is changed from 20 calendar days (in current law) to 15 session days which may be the same, longer, or shorter depending on 

scheduling. This section also describes procedures for floor consideration, including what motions are privileged and allowable time 

for debate. 

Section 804 amends the existing section to provide for new definitions for ‘‘nonmajor rule’’ and ‘‘submission or publication date,’’ 

while retaining definitions for ‘‘Federal agency,’’ ‘‘major rule,’’ and 

‘‘rule.’’ 

Section 805 adds to the existing section to clarify the scope of allowable judicial review. It states that courts may review whether 

an agency complied with the requirements under this chapter for 

a rule to take effect. It also clarifies that should Congress enact a 

resolution of approval of a rule, that resolution should not be interpreted as changing or expanding the regulatory authority of an 

agency nor will it enter the judicial record except on the question 

of whether a rule is in effect. 

Section 806 exempts rules and policies concerning monetary policy and the Federal Reserve from this chapter. 

7 

Section 807 is the same as existing Section 808 and allows for 

certain rules (dealing with hunting, fishing, or camping) to take effect when the agency determines they should. The same applies to 

rules where the agency finds good cause that notice and comment 

are ‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest’’ 

and explains its reasoning for doing so in the rule itself. 

Section 4. Budgetary effects of rules subject to section 802 of title 5, 

United States Code 

This section amends the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 

Control Act of 1985 to state that major rules, which otherwise require approval in this bill, that are budgetary in nature are treated 

as in effect unless not approved under the major rules procedures. 

Section 5. Government Accountability Office study of rules 

This section requires the Comptroller General to submit a study 

within one year of enactment that identifies the number of rules 

in effect, how many of those rules are major, and an estimate of 

their aggregate economic cost. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill and determined that the bill will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 

would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

JULY 14, 2017. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 21, the Regulations from the 

Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kathleen Gramp. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

S. 21—Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 

2017 

Summary: Under current law, a final federal rule can take effect 

unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. In contrast, S. 21 would require the Congress to enact a joint resolution 

of approval before any major rule could take effect. Thus under S. 

21 new major regulations would depend on future legislation. 

CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) cannot determine the budgetary effect of making all future major rules 

subject to Congressional approval, but we expect that, in the abVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:57 Oct 19, 2017 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR169.XXX SR169
8 

1See 5 USC § 804(2). 

2GAO Federal Rules Database, www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-review-act. 

sence of subsequent legislative action affecting those rules, enacting S. 21 would have significant effects on both direct spending and 

revenues. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply because enacting S. 21 

would affect direct spending and revenues. 

CBO cannot determine whether enacting S. 21 would increase 

net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 billion 

in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028. 

CBO expects that implementing S. 21 also could have a significant impact on spending subject to appropriation, although we cannot determine the magnitude of that effect. 

CBO expects that S. 21 would impose no intergovernmental or 

private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: 

Background 

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) of 1996 requires federal 

agencies to submit final rules to the Congress and the Comptroller 

General before they may take effect. Final rules may be annulled 

by the Congress if a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into 

law. S. 21 would amend current law to require instead that the 

Congress enact a joint resolution of approval before any major rule 

may take effect, thereby making implementation of major rules 

contingent on future Congressional action. 

The CRA defines a major rule as one that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) finds has resulted in or is likely to result 

in: 

• An annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; 

• A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, federal, state, or local government agencies, 

or geographic regions; or 

• Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of U.S.-based 

enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.1

S. 21 would establish special Congressional procedures and explicit timelines for enacting a joint resolution of approval for major 

rules. Under the bill, if a joint resolution of approval is not enacted 

within 70 legislative (or session) days of the Congress receiving the 

major rule and an accompanying report from a federal agency, the 

rule would not take effect. Further, the Congress could not reconsider a joint resolution of approval relating to that rule in the same 

Congress. However, a major rule could take effect for one 90-calendar-day period without Congressional approval if the President 

determines, via an executive order, that it was necessary for one 

of four reasons: (1) to respond to an imminent threat to health or 

safety, (2) to enforce criminal laws, (3) to protect national security, 

or (4) to implement an international trade agreement. 

Historical data show that federal agencies published 117 major 

rules in 2016, and 84 major rules, on average, over the past five 

calendar years.2 Major rules published in recent years include ones 

that established standards for the reliability of critical infrastrucVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:57 Oct 19, 2017 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR169.XXX SR169
9 

ture, set Medicare payment rates for inpatient psychiatric facilities, 

and established national ambient air quality standards for ozone 

pollution. However, looking to recent major rules as a way to estimate the number or scope of future major rules that would be affected by S. 21 may not be a good guide to what would happen 

under the bill because agencies might change course if the bill was 

enacted. 

Because major rules are issued to implement current law, the 

budgetary effects of anticipated rules are reflected in CBO’s baseline projections. For example, annual rules establish new payment 

rates for a variety of Medicare services that reflect changes in the 

price indices used for those services under current law. Those rules 

often result in an increase in payment rates and thus an increase 

in spending, which are incorporated in the baseline. 

Under the Deficit Control Act, which governs the contents of the 

baseline, actions that are contingent on future Congressional action 

are generally not included in CBO’s projections. S. 21 would amend 

that Act to require that CBO continue to assume that any planned 

major rule will go into effect, unless the rule has already been promulgated and the Congress has not enacted a resolution of approval within the specified 70-day period. (Without that provision 

amending the Deficit Control Act, S. 21 would result in baseline 

projections that did not reflect the budgetary impact of major 

rules.) 

Under S. 21, CBO’s baseline projections would continue to include the budgetary impact of major rules even though future Congressional action would be necessary to approve them. For example, if S. 21 is enacted, baseline projections would continue to reflect the assumption that payment rates and related federal spending for Medicare providers would rise over time, even though raising those rates would require future Congressional action. Accordingly, a Congressional resolution of approval for a major rule raising such rates would be estimated as having no cost relative to 

CBO’s baseline projections. (CBO’s subsequent baseline projections 

would be updated to exclude the budgetary impact of the proposed 

rule if it is not approved.) 

Impact on direct spending 

To assess the budgetary effects of S. 21, CBO considered the 

costs and savings that would be realized if anticipated major rules 

do not take effect. The consequences would vary tremendously because the budgetary impact of different rules varies considerably. 

Preventing some major rules from taking effect would result in 

costs to the federal government, while preventing others would result in savings. On net, CBO estimates that enacting S. 21 would 

probably have a significant effect on direct spending (more than 

$500,000), but we cannot determine the magnitude or sign of those 

changes for any year or over time. 

Many major rules that occur routinely under current law are related to the government’s health care programs, in particular Medicare. For example, some rules establish annual updates to payment 

rates for services provided by hospitals, physicians, and other 

Medicare providers. Enacting S. 21 would freeze payment structures for those providers at current levels pending future Congressional actions. Similarly, payment rates (such as the annual benefit 

10 

amount for each individual) under some other federal programs 

might also be frozen under the bill in the absence of future Congressional actions. CBO cannot estimate the net impact of all such 

changes. 

Impact on revenues 

Enacting S. 21 would also affect tax revenues, and JCT expects 

that preventing regulations from going into effect could reduce collections of revenues in some cases and increase collections in other 

cases. JCT cannot determine the sign or magnitude of the possible 

effects on revenues. 

Impact on spending subject to appropriation 

S. 21 also would affect programs funded through the annual appropriation process. However, CBO cannot determine the magnitude of such effects. For example, if the major rules issued by the 

Environmental Protection Agency could not take effect, spending by 

the agency would decline, assuming future appropriations were reduced accordingly. 

The legislation also would require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to prepare a study on the rules and their economic cost. Based on information from agencies and on similar 

GAO reports, CBO estimates that completing the study would cost 

less than $500,000 over the next few years. 

Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. Pay-as-you-go 

procedures apply to S. 21 because enacting the legislation would affect direct spending and revenues. CBO and JCT cannot determine 

the sign or magnitude of those effects. 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: CBO expects that 

S. 21 would impose no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. By requiring major rules to be approved 

by a joint resolution of Congress and potentially delaying or halting 

the implementation of those rules, the bill could affect public or 

private entities in a number of ways, including slowing reimbursements and eliminating or changing regulatory requirements. Although the costs and savings tied to those individual effects could 

be significant, CBO has no basis for estimating either the overall 

direction or magnitude of those effects on public or private entities 

because of uncertainty about the nature and number of regulations 

affected. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Kathleen Gramp; Impact on 

state, local, and tribal governments: Zachery Byrum; Impact on the 

private sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for 

Budget Analysis. 

VII. MINORITY VIEWS

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS CLAIRE MCCASKILL, THOMAS R. 

CARPER, HEIDI HEITKAMP AND MAGGIE HASSAN

While it is important for Congress to conduct regular oversight 

of the federal rulemaking process, S. 21, the Regulations in Need 

of Scrutiny Act of 2017 (REINS) is a significant departure from the 

11 

1 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808. 

2 4 ACUS 63 (1977). 

3 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 4Statement of Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, H.R. 367 the REINS Act of 2013: Promoting Jobs, Growth, and 

American Competitiveness, Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 

Judiciary, Subcommittee on Regulatory, Commercial and Antitrust Law (March, 5, 2013). 

longstanding separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches that would abolish the regulatory process for 

major rules and undermine much-needed protections for the American people. 

Critics of the federal rulemaking process raise a variety of concerns. Most observers agree, for example, that the process needs to 

be more open, transparent and accessible. Some argue that the 

process is stacked to favor inaction, denying Americans the protections they need and deserve. Others argue that agencies are given 

too much authority to regulate and do not do enough to take competing interests into account when promulgating regulations. However, rather than thoughtfully seeking to resolve these, or any 

other issue raised by stakeholders, the REINS Act would create additional bureaucracy and political considerations into a process intended to be based on sound and thorough analysis. 

The REINS Act would require both houses of Congress to approve any major rule within a 70 day window. Absent Congressional action within 70 days, the rule would not take effect. This 

is a reversal from current law—the existing Congressional Review 

Act process allows a regulation takes effect unless Congress acts to 

affirmatively block the proposal.1

Nonpartisan observers have long opposed this idea, and the concept may be unconstitutional. As early as 1977 the nonpartisan Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recommended 

that, ‘‘Congress should not, in general legislation or as a routine 

practice, provide for prior submission of agency rules for Congressional review and possible veto.’’ 2 This recommendation later became moot following INS vs. Chadha where the Supreme Court 

ruled that a one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional.3 Indeed the REINS Act itself may violate this prohibition of a onehouse legislative veto. 

Pursuant to the REINS Act, if just one chamber votes against a 

resolution to approve a major rule, the rule will not take effect. 

Even more concerning, either chamber could simply refuse to bring 

a resolution to the floor to approve of the rule within the 70-day 

window, killing the regulation without even allowing a vote on it, 

giving either chamber a one-house legislative veto through inaction. While the committee report cites instances where legal scholars have said a process such as the one in this bill could be constitutional, significant uncertainty remains around that question. 

As Ronald M. Levin, Professor of Law at the Washington University Law School in St. Louis testified before the House Judiciary 

Committee, ‘‘there is reason to think that the Act might not survive 

constitutional scrutiny’’ since ‘‘the Act is intended to enable a single 

House of Congress to control the implementation of laws through 

the rulemaking process.’’ 4

One practical effect of the REINS Act would be to discourage 

agencies from taking on major rulemakings in the first place and 

could grind the entire rulemaking process to a halt if they choose 

12 

5P.L. 114–182 

6 5 U.S.C. § 801(b). 

7https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/can-congress-deliver-appropriations-bills-on-time/ 

to pursue rulemaking. The REINS Act would replace the current 

system’s reliance on science, expertise and public process in developing rules with Congress’ partisan considerations and the potential influence of industry lobbyists. Today the Federal rulemaking 

process relies on technical expertise, data gathering and analysis 

and input from stakeholders. These are areas of core competency 

and expertise for Federal agencies. Members of Congress simply do 

not have the technical and scientific expertise that agencies possess, especially since Congress defunded its own Office of Technology Assessment. As a result, agencies will be disinclined to put 

the multi-year effort into the development of major rules that 

would become mere recommendations that could be discarded 

through Congressional inaction in just 70 days. 

The process for regulating toxic chemicals established by bipartisan and recently passed Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for 

the 21st Century Act is a perfect example of the deleterious effect 

the REINS Act would have on the regulatory process and the potential impact it could have on the health of Americans. Passage 

of that law was predicated on the notion that the Environmental 

Protection Agency needed more resources and clearer processes to 

accelerate its pace of rulemaking because the previous regulatory 

regime for identifying and regulating toxic chemicals was widely 

regarded as a failure.5 However, if the REINS Act were to be enacted, it would allow Congress’s political considerations to supersede the best scientific information available to determine the safety of new chemicals, determinations that nearly every Member of 

Congress is ill-equipped to make. 

Supporters argue that the REINS Act is simply reinserting Congressional involvement in the rulemaking process. However, this 

argument willfully ignores Congress’ critical role in the current 

process: the rules issued by a federal agency are based on underlying authority given the agency by Congress in legislation that directs such rulemaking in the first place. Should Congress wish to 

limit rulemaking, it can already do so by either enacting self-enforcing laws or being more prescriptive in legislation to limit agencies’ flexibility rather than creating a potentially unconstitutional 

single-house veto for every major rule. 

Additionally, Congress already has other tools to ensure effective 

oversight of agency regulatory actions, including the ability to control appropriations and conduct agency oversight. Should Congress 

wish to overturn a regulation, it does not need additional tools to 

do so; it can pass a law overturning the regulation or restrict funding to carry out the rule. Congress can also hold hearings to publicize its concerns with the rule. As we have seen this year, it can 

also disapprove final rules before they are implemented under the 

current Congressional Review Act process.6

Not only would S. 21 throw sand in the gears of rulemaking it 

would also throw sand in the gears of legislating. Congress currently struggles to fulfill its basic functions of passing budgets and 

thirteen appropriation bills annually. In fact it has been over 20 

years sign the legislative branch was able to pass all of the appropriations bills on time.7 In addition, Members of Congress introVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:57 Oct 19, 2017 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR169.XXX SR169
13 

duced 10,078 bills in the 114th Congress, and sent 329 of those to 

President Obama. In the 113th Congress, Members introduced 

8,911 bills and sent 282 to President Obama. It seems unlikely, 

then, that both chambers of Congress would act on the majority of 

the major rules presented for consideration. 

Whatever we do here in Congress and on this Committee to reform the regulatory process should encourage reducing burdens 

and increasing transparency while achieving the greatest public 

benefit. It should be our goal to have the most efficient, effective, 

and transparent regulatory process possible, and to ensure that 

process results in common-sense regulations. We do not believe this 

bill would improve the regulatory process, and in fact would make 

the process far less efficient and insert additional political considerations into the process. For these reasons we strongly oppose S. 21 

and urge our colleagues to join us in opposition. 

VIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 21 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 2—THE CONGRESS 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 20—EMERGENCY POWERS TO ELIMINATE 

BUDGET DEFICITS 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter I—Elimination of Deficits in Excess of Maximum 

Deficit Amount 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 907. THE BASELINE. 

(a) * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(D) * * * 

(E) BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF RULES SUBJECT TO SECTION

802 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE.—Any rules subject to 

the congressional approval procedure set forth in section 

802 of chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, affecting 

budget authority, outlays, or receipts shall be assumed to 

14 

be effective unless it is not approved in accordance with 

such section. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND 

EMPLOYEES 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—THE AGENCIES GENERALLY 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 8—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 

RULEMAKING 

Sec. 

801. Congressional review. 

802. Congressional ødisapproval¿ approval procedure for major rules. 

803. øSpecial rule on statutory, regulatory, and judicial deadlines¿ Congressional 

disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules. 

804. Definitions. 

805. Judicial review. 

806. øApplicability; severability¿ Exemption for monetary policy. 

807. øExemption for monetary policy¿ Effective date of certain rules. 

ø808. Effective date of certain rules.¿ 

SEC. 801. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 

(a)(1)(A) Before a rule øcan¿ may take effect, the Federal agency 

promulgating such rule shall publish in the Federal Register a list 

of information on which the rule is based, including data, scientific 

and economic studies, and cost-benefit analyses, and identify how 

the public can access such information online, and shall submit to 

each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing— 

(i) a copy of the rule; 

(ii) a concise general statement relating to the ruleø, including whether it is a major rule; and¿; 

(iii) øthe proposed effective date of the rule.¿ a classification 

of the rule as a major or nonmajor rule, including an explanation of the classification specifically addressing each criteria 

for a major rule contained within subparagraphs (A) through 

(C) of section 804(2); 

(iv) a list of any other related regulatory actions intended to 

implement the same statutory provision or regulatory objective 

as well as the individual and aggregate economic effects of 

those actions; and 

(v) the proposed effective date of the rule. 

(B) On the date of the submission of the report under subparagraph (A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule shall submit 

to the Comptroller General and make available to each House of 

Congress— 

(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the rule, if 

anyø;¿, including an analysis of any jobs added or lost, differentiating between public and private sector jobs; 

(ii) the agency’s actions ørelevant¿ pursuant to sections 603, 

604, 605, 607, and 609ø;¿ of this title; 

15 

(iii) the agency’s actions ørelevant¿ pursuant to sections 202, 

203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 

1995; and 

(iv) any other relevant information or requirements under 

any other Act and any relevant Executive orders. 

(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph (A), 

each House shall provide copies of the report to the chairman and 

ranking member of each standing committee with jurisdiction 

under the rules of the House of Representatives or the Senate to 

report a bill to amend the provision of law under which the rule 

is issued. 

(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on each 

major rule to the committees of jurisdiction øin each House of the 

Congress¿ by the end of 15 calendar days after the submission or 

publication date øas provided in section 802(b)(2)¿. The report of 

the Comptroller General shall include an assessment of the agency’s compliance with procedural steps required by paragraph (1)(B) 

and an assessment of whether the major rule imposes any new limits or mandates on private-sector activity. 

(B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller General by providing information relevant to the Comptroller General’s 

report under subparagraph (A). 

(3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under paragraph 

(1) shall take effect øon the latest of— 

ø(A) the later of the date occurring 60 days after the date on 

which— 

ø(i) the Congress receives the report submitted under paragraph (1); or 

ø(ii) the rule is published in the Federal Register, if so published; 

ø(B) if the Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval described in section 802 relating to the rule, and the President signs 

a veto of such resolution, the earlier date— 

ø(i) on which either House of Congress votes and fails to 

override the veto of the President; or 

ø(ii) occurring 30 session days after the date on which the 

Congress received the veto and objections of the President; or 

ø(C) the date the rule would have otherwise taken effect, if not 

for this section (unless a joint resolution of disapproval under section 802 is enacted).¿ upon enactment of a joint resolution of approval described in section 802 or as provided for in the rule following enactment of a joint resolution of approval described in section 802, whichever is later. 

(4) øExcept for a¿ A nonmajor ruleø, a¿ rule shall take effect as 

øotherwise¿ provided by section 803ølaw¿ after submission to Congress under paragraph (1). 

(5) øNotwithstanding paragraph (3), the effective date of a rule 

shall not be delayed by operation of this chapter beyond the date 

on which either House of Congress votes to reject a joint resolution 

of disapproval under section 802.¿ If a joint resolution of approval 

relating to a major rule is not enacted within the period provided 

in subsection (b)(2), then a joint resolution of approval relating to 

the same rule may not be considered under this chapter in the same 

Congress by either House of Representatives or the Senate. 

16 

(b)(1) A major rule shall not take effect ø(or continue), if¿ unless 

the Congress enacts a joint resolution of ødis¿approvalø,¿ described 

under section 802ø, of the rule¿. 

(2) øA rule that does not take effect (or does not continue) under 

paragraph (1) may not be reissued in substantially the same form, 

and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may 

not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.¿ If a joint resolution described in subsection (a) is not enacted into law by the end of 70 session days or 

legislative days, as applicable, beginning on the date on which the 

report referred to in subsection (a)(1)(A) is received by Congress (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 

3 days during a session of Congress), then the rule described in that 

resolution shall be deemed not to be approved and such rule shall 

not take effect. 

(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (except 

subject to paragraph (3)), a major rule øthat would not take effect 

by reason of subsection (a)(3)¿ may take effectø,¿ for one 90-calendar-day period if the President makes a determination under 

paragraph (2) and submits written notice of such determination to 

the Congress. 

(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the President by Executive order that the major rule should take effect because such rule is— 

(A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or 

safety or other emergency; 

(B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws; 

(C) necessary for national security; or 

(D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an international trade agreement. 

(3) An exercise by the President of the authority under this subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under section 802 øor 

the effect of a joint resolution of disapproval under this section¿. 

(d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise provided under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which a report 

was submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) during the 

period beginning on the date occurring— 

(A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days, or 

(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60 legislative 

days, before the date the Congress is scheduled to adjournøs¿ 

a session of Congress through the date on which the same or 

succeeding Congress first convenes its next session, sections 

802 and 803 shall apply to such rule in the succeeding session 

of Congress. 

(2)(A) In applying sections 802 and 803 for purposes of such additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) shall be treated as though— 

(i) such rule were published in the Federal Register ø(as a 

rule that shall take effect)¿ on— 

(I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th session dayø,¿; or 

(II) in the case of the House of Representatives, the 15th 

legislative day, after the succeeding session of Congress 

first convenes; and 

17 

(ii) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress under 

subsection (a)(1) on such date. 

(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect the requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be submitted 

to Congress before a rule can take effect. 

(3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect as otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of this section). 

ø(f) Any rule that takes effect and later is made of no force or 

effect by enactment of a joint resolution under section 802 shall be 

treated as though such rule had never taken effect.¿ 

ø(g) If the Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval under section 802 respecting a rule, no court or agency 

may infer any intent of the Congress from any action or inaction 

of the Congress with regard to such rule, related statute, or joint 

resolution of disapproval.¿ 

SEC. 802. CONGRESSIONAL øREVIEW¿ APPROVAL PROCEDURE FOR 

MAJOR RULES 

(a)(1) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘joint resolution’’ 

means only a joint resolution øintroduced in the period beginning 

on the date on which the report referred to in¿ addressing a report 

classifying a rule as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii) 

that—øis received by Congress and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 

3 days during a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving 

clause of which is as follows: ‘‘That Congress disapproves the rule 

submitted by the lll relating to lll, and such rule shall 

have no force or effect.’’ (The blank spaces being appropriately 

filled in).¿ 

(A) bears no preamble; 

(B) bears the following title (with blanks filled as appropriate): ‘‘Approving the rule submitted by lll relating to lll.’’; 

(C) includes after its resolving clause only the following (with 

blanks filled as appropriate): ‘‘That Congress approves the rule 

submitted by lll relating to lll.’’; and 

(D) is introduced pursuant to paragraph (2). 

(2) After a House of Congress received a report classifying a rule 

as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii), the majority leader of 

that House (or his or her respective designee) shall introduce (by request, if appropriate) a joint resolution described in paragraph (1)— 

(A) in the case of the House of Representatives, within 3 legislative days; and 

(B) in the case of the Senate, within 3 session days. 

(3) A joint resolution described in paragraph (1) shall not be subject to amendment at any stage of proceeding. 

(b)ø(1)¿ A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be referred øto the committees¿in each House of Congress to the committees havingøwith¿ jurisdictionø.¿ over the provision of law under 

which the rule is issued. 

ø(2) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘submission or publication date’’ means the later of the date on which— 

ø(A) the Congress receives the report submitted under section 801(a)(1); or 

ø(B) the rule is published in the Federal Register, if so published.¿ 

18 

(c) In the Senate, if the committee or committees to which øis referred¿a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred have not reported øsuch joint resolution (or an identical joint 

resolution)¿ it at the end of ø20 calendar¿15 session days after øthe 

submission or publication date defined under subsection (b)(2)¿ its 

introduction, such committee or committees ømay¿ shall be automatically discharged from further consideration of øsuch joint¿ the 

resolution øupon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of 

the Senate, and such joint resolution¿ and it shall be placed on the 

calendar. A vote on final passage of the resolution shall be taken on 

or before the close of the 15th session day after the resolution is reported by the committee or committees to which is was referred, or 

after such committee or committees have been discharged from further consideration of the resolution. 

(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee or committees to which 

a joint resolution is referred øhas¿ have reported, or when a committee or committees øis¿ are discharged (under subsection (c)) 

from further consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion 

to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all 

points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject 

to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider 

the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not 

be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint 

resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of. 

(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ø10¿ 2 hours, which shall be divided equally 

between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A 

motion to further øto¿ limit debate is in order and not debatable. 

An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed 

to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the 

joint resolution is not in order. 

(3) * * * 

(4) * * * 

(e) øIn the Senate the procedure specified in subsection (c) or (d) 

shall not apply to the consideration of a joint resolution respecting 

a rule— 

ø(1) after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning 

with the applicable submission or publication date, or 

ø(2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was submitted 

during the period referred to in section 801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning on the 15th session 

day after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes.¿ In 

the House of Representatives, if any committee to which a joint 

resolution described in subsection (a) has been referred has not 

reported it to the House at the end of 15 legislative days after 

its introduction, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, and it shall be placed 

on the appropriate calendar. On the second and fourth Thursdays of each month it shall be in order at any time for the 

19 

Speaker to recognize a Member who favors passage of a joint 

resolution that has appeared on the calendar for at least 5 legislative days to call up that joint resolution for immediate consideration in the House without intervention of any point of 

order. When so called up a joint resolution shall be considered 

as read and shall be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and 

controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and the previous 

question shall be considered as ordered to its passage without 

intervening motion. It shall not be in order to reconsider the 

vote on passage. If a vote on final passage of the joint resolution 

has not been taken by the third Thursday on which the Speaker 

may recognize a Member under this subsection, such vote shall 

be taken on that day. 

(f)(1) If, before øthe passage by one House of¿ passing a joint resolution øof that House¿ described in subsection (a), øthat¿ one 

House receives from the other øHouse¿ a joint resolution ødescribed in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall 

apply:¿ having the same text, then— 

ø(1)¿(A) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committeeø.¿ ; and 

ø(2) With respect to a joint resolution described in subsection (a) 

of the House receiving the joint resolution—¿ 

ø(A)¿(B) the procedure in øthat¿ the receiving House shall be 

the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the 

other Houseø; but¿ 

ø(B)¿ until the vote on øfinal¿ passage, øshall be on¿ when 

the joint resolution øof¿ received from the other Houseø.¿ shall 

supplant the joint resolution of the receiving House. 

(2) This subsection shall not apply to the House of Representatives 

if the joint resolution received from the Senate is a revenue measure. 

(g) If either House has not taken a vote on final passage of the 

joint resolution by the last day of the period described in section 

801(b)(2), then such vote shall be taken on the dat. 

øg¿(h) This section and section 803 øis¿ are enacted by Congress— 

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and 

House of Representatives, respectively, and as such øit is¿ are 

deemed øa¿to be part of the rules of each House, respectively, 

but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed 

in that House in the case of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and it øsupersedes¿ superseding other rules only 

øto the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules¿ where explicitly so; and 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either 

House to change the rules (so far as they ørelating¿ relate to 

the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same 

mannerø,¿ and to the same extent as in the case of any other 

rule of that House. 

SEC. 803. øSPECIAL RULE ON STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND JUDICIAL DEADLINES¿ CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL FOR 

NONMAJOR RULES 

ø(a) In the case of any deadline for, relating to, or involving any 

rule which does not take effect (or the effectiveness of which is terminated) because of enactment of a joint resolution under section 

802, that deadline is extended until the date 1 year after the date 

20 

of enactment of the joint resolution. Nothing in this subsection 

shall be construed to affect a deadline merely by reason of the postponement of a rule’s effective date under section 801(a).¿ 

(a) For purposes of this section, the term ‘joint resolution’ means 

only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the 

date on which the report referred to in section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days 

either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during 

a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which 

is as follows: ‘That Congress disapproves the nonmajor rule submitted by the ll relating to ll, and such rule shall have no 

force or effect.’ (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in). 

ø(b) The term ‘‘deadline’’ means any date certain for fulfilling 

any obligation or exercising any authority established by or under 

any Federal statute or regulation, or by or under any court order 

implementing any Federal statute or regulation.¿ 

(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be referred 

to the committees in each House of Congress with jurisdiction. 

(c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported such joint resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the end of 15 session days 

after the date of introduction of the joint resolution, such committee 

may be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution upon a petition supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar. 

(d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is discharged 

(under subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time thereafter in order 

(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint 

resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and 

against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion 

is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 

reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed 

to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration 

of the joint resolution is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain 

the unfinished business of the Senate until disposed of. 

(2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited 

to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between 

those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. A motion to 

further limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment 

to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution 

is not in order. 

(3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a), and a single 

quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote on final passage of the 

joint resolution shall occur. 

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure relating to a joint 

21 

resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. 

(e) In the Senate, the procedure specified in subsection (c) or (d) 

shall not apply to the consideration of a joint resolution respecting 

a nonmajor rule— 

(1) after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning with 

the applicable submission or publication date; or 

(2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was submitted during the period referred to in section 801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days beginning on the 15th session day 

after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes. 

(f) If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of that 

House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the 

other House a joint resolution described in subsection (a), then the 

following procedures shall apply: 

(1) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee. 

(2) With respect to a joint resolution described in subsection 

(a) of the House receiving the joint resolution— 

(A) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if 

no joint resolution had been received from the other House; 

but 

(B) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House. 

SEC. 804. DEFINITIONS 

For purposes of this chapterø—¿: 

(1) * * * 

(2) The term ‘‘major rule’’ means any rule, including an interim final rule, that the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management 

and Budget finds has resulted in or is likely to result in— (A) an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or 

more; 

(B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government 

agencies, or geographic regions; or 

(C) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets. 

øThe term does not include any rule promulgated under the 

Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the amendments made by 

that Act.¿ 

(3) The term ‘‘nonmajor rule’’ means any rule that is not a 

major rule. 

ø(3)¿ (4) The term ‘‘rule’’ has the meaning given such term 

in section 551, except that such term does not include— 

(A) any rule of particular applicability, including a rule 

that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, 

prices, services, or allowances therefore, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions 

thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on 

any of the foregoing; 

(B) any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or 

22 

(C) any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. 

(5) The term ‘‘submission or publication date’’, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, means— 

(A) in the case of a major rule, the date on which the 

Congress receives the report submitted under section 

801(a)(1); and 

(B) in the case of a nonmajor rule, the later of— 

(i) the date on which the Congress receives the report 

submitted under section 801(a)(1); and 

(ii) the date on which the nonmajor rule is published 

in the Federal Register, if so published. 

SEC. 805. JUDICIAL REVIEW 

(a) No determination, finding, action, or omission under this 

chapter shall be subject to judicial review. 

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a court may determine whether a Federal agency has completed the necessary requirements under 

this chapter for a rule to take effect. 

(c) The enactment of a joint resolution of approval under section 

802 shall not be interpreted to serve as a grant or modification of 

statutory authority by Congress for the promulgation of a rule, shall 

not extinguish or affect any claim, whether substantive or procedural, against any alleged defect in a rule, and shall not form part 

of the record before the court in any judicial proceeding concerning 

a rule except for purposes of determining whether or not the rule is 

in effect. 

øSEC. 806. APPLICABILITY; SEVERABILITY 

ø(a) This chapter shall apply notwithstanding any other provision of law. 

ø(b) If any provision of this chapter or the application of any provision of this chapter to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, 

the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, 

and the remainder of this chapter, shall not be affected thereby.¿ 

øSEC. 807.¿ SEC. 806. EXEMPTION FOR MONETARY POLICY 

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to rules that concern monetary policy proposed or implemented by the Board of Governors of 

the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee. 

øSEC. 808.¿ SEC. 807. EFFECTIVE DATE OF CERTAIN RULES 

Notwithstanding section 801— 

(1) any rule that establishes, modifies, opens, closes, or conducts a regulatory program for a commercial, recreational, or 

subsistence activity related to hunting, fishing, or campingø,¿; 

or 

(2) any rule other than a major rule which an agency for 

good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief 

statement of reasons therefore in the rule issued) that notice 

and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, 

or contrary to the public interest, 

shall take effect at such time as the Federal agency promulgating 

the rule determines. 

Æ