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26–398 PDF 2017

A DANGEROUS AND SOPHISTICATED ADVERSARY: 

THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND POSED BY 

CARTEL OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 16, 2017 

Serial No. 115–4 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

MARTHA MCSALLY, ARIZONA, Chairwoman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Vice Admiral Charles W. Ray, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. 

Coast Guard: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Chief Paul A. Beeson, Commander, Joint Task Force—West, Arizona, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Matthew C. Allen, Assistant Director for HSI Investigative Programs, 

Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30 

Mr. Luis E. Arreaga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York: 

Article, The Daily Beast ....................................................................................... 54 

Article, Daily Caller ............................................................................................. 56 

(1) 

A DANGEROUS AND SOPHISTICATED ADVERSARY: THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

POSED BY CARTEL OPERATIONS 

Thursday, February 16, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Duncan, Hurd, Rutherford, Vela, Correa, Demings, and Barraga ́n. 

Also present: Representatives Katko and Jackson Lee. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. Let 

me first apologize for being a little bit late. We need to clone ourselves around here. I was in an Armed Services Committee hearing, very important on the F–35 and the way ahead for our troops, 

so appreciate your patience. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threat posed 

by drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations. I will recognize myself for an opening statement. 

First, I would like to welcome the newest Member of our subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford. Welcome. 

I look forward to working with you and other new Members of the 

committee. 

As we begin the 115th Congress, let me be clear from the outset. 

I hope, over the course of this Congress, we can engage in thoughtful and productive conversations that lead to legislation and partnerships that will help secure our homeland. 

One of my goals this year as Chair of the subcommittee is to drill 

down on the threat that an unsecured border poses to our fellow 

Americans, which will be the focus of our conversation today. At 

our next hearing, we will hear from leaders of the Border Security 

Joint Task Forces, authorized by this committee last Congress, to 

examine the Nation’s counter-network approach to combatting this 

threat. 

Protecting our borders is a multi-faceted effort. The job of securing the land border falls primarily to U.S. Border Patrol, while the 

job of the U.S. Coast Guard is to secure our maritime border. 

We do have Office of Field Operations, an important role of securing more than 300 ports of entry, and Air and Marine OperVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
2 

ations carries out air and marine maritime environment activities 

and admissions to detect and interdict unlawful people and cargo 

approaching our borders. 

Finally, HSI, Homeland Security Investigations, supports National security through its investigatory authorities and responsibilities. 

These are not simple or easy tasks. The Southwest Border is a 

dynamic place with sometimes unforgiving terrain: Rugged mountains, scorching desert, high cliffs, canyons, and more than 1,000 

miles of river. 

The maritime border is more than 4.5 million square miles of 

vast ocean patrolled by a limited number of assets, providing cartels with enormous expanses of territory to which to conduct their 

illicit activities. 

Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to shore up our border defenses. Today, we have an impressive array of technology, infrastructure, and personnel deployed to keep the Nation safe. Despite our best efforts, we have seemingly made little progress, 

though, over the last few years to secure the border. 

Most recent reports and testimony suggest that between our 

ports of entry we are a little more than 50 percent effective at stopping people from crossing the border illegally, and narcotics continue to pour into our communities unabated. 

But on the other side of the border, the adversary, Mexican drug 

cartels, operate a wide-reaching network. Nothing moves in or out 

unless the cartel plaza boss says so. 

Cartel presence, influence, and power throughout Mexico is ubiquitous. Corruption is endemic. Local law enforcement in Mexico 

often find themselves ill-equipped to handle the vast amount of cartel activity. 

Smuggling drugs and people is a billion-dollar business, and the 

individuals in charge have one goal in mind: Make as much money 

as possible delivering illicit narcotics, people, and other assets 

across the border and into the United States. 

Obscene profits incentivize the cartels to be entrepreneurial and 

innovative in the tactics they use to successfully smuggle their illicit cargo. For instance, we know they conduct extensive countersurveillance activities against our agents. They place spotters or 

scouts on hilltops and use the high ground to guide the drug loads 

away from agents and other detection assets. 

Sophisticated and deep tunnels that include the use of ventilation systems and railcars to expedite the movement of drugs have 

also been used. We have seen a proliferation of unorthodox methods of smuggling, such as the use of propane-powered double-barrel 

cannons in my district and around in other areas to shoot hundreds 

of pounds of drugs over the fences and barriers. 

Ultralight aircraft, difficult to detect on radar, have been used 

under the cover of darkness to fly drugs over the border, dropping 

it very quickly and then returning undetected to Mexico. 

In my district, authorities broke up a complicated smuggling ring 

recently in Cochise County. The criminal network specialized in 

drive-through operations that used vehicle convoys laden with 

thousands of pounds of drugs to cross remote parts of the border. 

3 

They used scouts, encrypted communications, specialized codes to 

avoid detection. 

It was not an amateur operation by any means. To the contrary, 

it was a sophisticated criminal enterprise with advanced tactics designed to thwart law enforcement at every turn. This is the nature 

of the adversary that we are facing along the border. 

San Diego was once one of the busiest sectors for illicit traffic in 

the Nation, but concerted efforts in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, included additional barriers and manpower, brought the situation 

under control. 

But nonetheless, because the cartels are nimble, they responded 

by using small open-hold vessels called panga boats to push the 

drug loads farther and farther off the coast of California—I am 

sure we will hear about that from you today, Admiral—and making 

them more difficult to detect, track, and ultimately interdict. 

Semisubmersibles, painted blue to blend in with the ocean, barely visible above the waterline, have been used to deliver multi-ton 

cocaine loads to Mexico. Their ultimate destination is cities and 

towns across our Nation. 

As we increase our focus this Congress on securing the border, 

which I welcome, we have to be clear-eyed about the dangerous and 

sophisticated threat that we face from these adversaries on the 

other side. Rest assured, the cartels will not sit idly by while we 

increase manpower, technology, infrastructure, or adjust our strategy, and that will threaten their business model. 

They will adapt. They will innovate like they always do, and just 

plain sometimes outsmart us if we do not leverage the full power 

of all of us together to focus on countering the cartel network. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today this morning. 

I really look forward to your testimony and the discussion ahead. 

Before I recognize the Ranking Member, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, be permitted 

to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

FEBRUARY 16, 2017

First, I would like to welcome the newest Member of our subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford. I look forward to working with you and the 

other new Members of the committee. As we begin the 115th Congress, let me be 

clear from the outset, I hope that over the course of this Congress we can engage 

in thoughtful and productive conversations that lead to legislation that will help secure our homeland. 

One of my goals this year as Chair of this subcommittee is to drill down on the 

threat that an unsecure border poses to our fellow Americans, which will be the 

focus of our conversation today. At our next hearing, we will hear from the leaders 

of the border security joint task forces, authorized by this committee last Congress, 

to examine the Nation’s counter-network approach to combating the threat. 

Protecting our borders is a multi-faceted effort. The job of securing the land border falls primarily to the U.S. Border Patrol, while it is the job of the U.S. Coast 

Guard to secure our maritime border. The Office of Field Operations has the important role of securing more than 300 ports of entry while Air and Marine Operations 

carries out air and maritime environment missions to detect and interdict unlawful 

people and cargo approaching our borders. 

Finally, Homeland Security Investigations supports National security through its 

investigatory authorities and responsibilities. 

These are not simple or easy tasks. 

4 

The Southwest Border is a dynamic place with unforgiving terrain—rugged mountains, scorching desert, high cliffs, canyons, and more than a thousand miles of 

river. The maritime border is more than 4.5 million square miles of vast ocean, patrolled by a limited number of assets, providing cartels with enormous expanses of 

territory in which to conduct illicit activities. 

Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to shore up our border defenses. 

Today we have an impressive array of technology, infrastructure, and personnel deployed to keep the Nation safe. Despite our best efforts, we have seemingly made 

little progress over the last few years to secure the border. Most recently reports 

and testimony suggest that, between our ports of entry, we are little more than 50% 

effective at stopping people from crossing the border illegally, and narcotics continue 

to pour into our communities unabated. 

But on the other side of the border, our adversary, the Mexican drug cartels, operate a wide-reaching network. Nothing moves in or out unless the cartel plaza boss 

says so. Cartel presence, influence, and power throughout Mexico is ubiquitous. Corruption is endemic, and local law enforcement in Mexico often find themselves illequipped to handle the vast amounts of cartel activity. Smuggling drugs and people 

is a billion dollar business and the individuals in charge have one goal in mind: 

Make as much money as possible delivering illicit narcotics and people across the 

border and into the United States. 

Obscene profits incentivize the cartels to be entrepreneurial and innovative in the 

tactics they use to successfully smuggle their illicit cargo. For instance, we know 

that they conduct extensive counter-surveillance against our agents. They place 

spotters, or scouts, on mountains, and use the high ground to guide the drug loads 

away from agents and other detection assets. 

Sophisticated and deep tunnels that include the use of ventilation systems and 

rail cars to expedite the movement of drugs have also been used. And we have seen 

a proliferation of unorthodox methods of smuggling, such as the use of propane-powered double barrel cannons to shoot hundreds of pounds of drugs over the fence. 

Ultralight aircraft, difficult to detect on radar, have been used under the cover 

of darkness to fly marijuana over the border—dropping it very quickly and then returning undetected to Mexico. 

In my district in Arizona, authorities broke up a complicated smuggling ring in 

Cochise County. The criminal network specialized in drive-through operations that 

used vehicle convoys laden with thousands of pounds of drugs to cross remote parts 

of the border. They used scouts, encrypted communication, and specialized codes to 

avoid detection. It was not an amateur operation by any means. To the contrary, 

it was a sophisticated criminal enterprise with advanced tactics designed to thwart 

law enforcement at every turn. 

That is the nature of the adversary we face along the border. 

San Diego was once one of the busiest sectors for illicit traffic in the Nation, but 

concerted efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s that included additional fence and 

manpower brought the situation under control. 

Nonetheless, because the cartels are nimble, they responded by using small openhulled vessels called ‘‘panga boats’’ to push drug loads farther and farther off the 

coast of California, making them more difficult to detect, track, and ultimately interdict. Semi-submersibles, painted blue to blend in with the ocean, and barely visible 

above the water line, have been used to deliver multi-ton cocaine loads to Mexico. 

Their ultimate destination is cities and towns across our country. 

As we increase our focus this Congress on securing the border, we have to be 

clear-eyed about the dangerous and sophisticated threat that we face from our adversaries on the other side. 

Rest assured, the cartels will not sit idly by while we increase manpower, technology, and infrastructure that threaten their business model. They will adapt, innovate, and just plain out-smart us if we do not leverage the full power of the Government to focus on countering the cartel network. I thank the witnesses for being 

here this morning and look forward to their testimony. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a statement he may have. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you, Chairwoman, for calling this very important hearing. 

As we have discussed, I think this is one area where many of us 

can agree that we are going to be able to work together to achieve 

our ultimate goal, which is to do as much as we can to impact the 

5 

negative work that the cartels do in South America, Mexico, and 

all throughout the United States and, at the same time, do what 

we can to take drugs off our streets. 

I would first like to welcome and introduce our newest Members 

to the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. Congressman Lou Correa represents California’s 46th Congressional District 

and most recently served in the California State Senate. 

Congresswoman Val Demings represents Florida’s 10th Congressional District and previously served as the chief of the Orlando 

Police Department, the first woman to hold that position. 

Congresswoman Nanette Barraga ́n, an experienced attorney, represents the 44th Congressional District, which includes the Port of 

Los Angeles. 

I would also like to recognize my colleague, Mr. Richmond, who 

is a senior Member in the committee and has joined us on this subcommittee for the first time. I look forward to working with all of 

you in the coming months, because each of you bring a unique perspective and expertise regarding border and maritime security to 

this subcommittee. 

The subject of our hearing today is one of particular interest to 

me given that, like Congresswoman McSally, I represent a border 

district, and mine is in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas. For years 

now, Tamaulipas, Mexico, the state across from my Congressional 

district, has been coping with serious security issues due to cartel 

violence. 

In fact, this coming Thursday, my Mexican colleagues at the Federal level in the state of Tamaulipas and I will be launching a social media effort to help promote the idea of bringing peace to the 

state of Tamaulipas. 

As Mexican cartels have fought for control of smuggling corridors 

within Mexico and along our Southern Border, communities on the 

Mexican side have seen record levels of drug-related homicides and 

violence. 

The threat is not confined to our Southern Border. Cartels use 

criminal networks within the United States to traffic illicit drugs, 

weapons, and other contraband. The security and prosperity of all 

of our districts and so many communities across the Nation depend 

in part on security and prosperity across the border. 

I want to continue to be supportive of United States’ efforts to 

that end. I am also appreciative of Secretary Kelly’s recent comments with respect to what he would like to do to address the issue 

of demand in this country. 

I hope to hear from you today about how the various components 

within DHS are coordinating with our counterparts in Central 

America and Mexico to combat transnational criminal organizations and enhance border security. 

I would ask all of our witnesses to speak to the subcommittee 

about how the threat has evolved and changed over time, what you 

need to address this threat, and what we as Members of Congress 

can do to support all of your efforts. Border communities, like the 

ones that many of us represent, and our neighbors in Mexico are 

counting on us to get this right. 

Madame Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and I appreciate our witnesses joining us today. I look forward to a producVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
6 

tive Congress with you and all the Members of the subcommittee. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, thanks. Other Members of the committee are 

reminded opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

FEBRUARY 16, 2017

Today, the matter before the subcommittee is one where I expect there to be a 

great deal of bipartisan agreement. Drug cartels seek to exploit our borders to 

smuggle narcotics into the United States and bulk cash and weapons out of this 

country. 

The Department of Homeland Security and its Federal partners are charged with 

combatting the cartels and securing America’s borders, ports, and waterways from 

their contraband. 

This is no easy task, to be sure. The cartels are sophisticated operations with 

thousands of members, the best technology, and almost limitless resources to spend 

on their illicit activities. 

That is why we need to use our border security resources wisely. Why waste billions on walls that we know cartels are already defeating by sending their drugs 

over, under, or through, or by concealing in conveyances at ports of entry? 

Instead, we need to dedicate funding to the personnel, technology, and assets that 

will help DHS interdict illicit drugs and identify, disrupt, and dismantle the organizations responsible for bringing drugs into our country. 

For example, Customs and Border Protection is thousands of officers and agents 

short of what the agency’s own staffing models say is necessary to carry out its operations. Simply saying you are going to hire more agents pays lip service to the problem, but does nothing to address the underlying issues that have prevented CBP 

from recruiting, hiring, and retaining personnel. 

Also, Coast Guard’s air and maritime assets are woefully outdated and in dire 

need of recapitalization. Even so, through the dedication and hard work of its men 

and women, the Coast Guard is credited with seizing tons of cocaine in the source 

and transit zones each year. 

Imagine what they could do with the right kind of modern assets and the proper 

number of personnel to carry out the drug interdiction mission that Congress has 

charged them with. 

These are the kinds of things we, as a country, need to invest in if we want to 

be serious about combatting the cartels and achieving meaningful border security. 

Real border security does not come from vaguely worded, politically charged Executive Orders or fancy signing ceremonies, but rather by providing the right personnel and tools to get the job done. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

today about how we can do just that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to be joined today by four distinguished witnesses to discuss this important topic. 

Vice Admiral Charles Ray assumed duties as the Coast Guard 

deputy commandant for operations in August 2016. In this role, 

Admiral Ray is responsible for the development of operational 

strategy, policy, guidance, and resources that address the Coast 

Guard’s National priorities. 

Admiral Ray has previously served as a Pacific area commander 

and in the Middle East as the director of Iraq training and advisory mission for the Ministry of Interior. 

Commander Paul Beeson is the commander of the Joint Task 

Force—West, Arizona and chief of the U.S. Border Patrol’s Tucson 

sector. As commander of JTF–West, Arizona, he is responsible for 

implementing strategic guidance from Joint Task Force—West, and 

commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, 

through command, control, and coordination of CBP operational 

functions within the State of Arizona. 

7 

In addition to those roles and responsibilities, Commander 

Beeson has oversight of the Tucson sector, encompassing the tactical and strategic operation of eight stations and approximately 

420 personnel, many of which are in my district. 

Mr. Matthew Allen is the assistant director for investigative programs for Homeland Security Investigations within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Mr. Allen is responsible for programmatic oversight of HSI’s strategic planning, National policy 

implementation, and the development and execution of operational 

initiatives. 

Mr. Allen previously served as a special agent-in-charge of 

Homeland Security Investigations in Arizona, where he had oversight of the full spectrum of ICE investigative activities and led 

more than 500 personnel assigned to offices throughout the State. 

Ambassador Luis Arreaga—did I pronounce that correctly?—was 

appointed deputy assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in November 

2013. 

In this role, he is responsible for State Department programs 

combating illicit drugs and organized crime, as well as support for 

law enforcement and rule of law in the Western Hemisphere. Prior 

to this appointment, Ambassador Arreaga served as United States 

Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland from 2010 to 2013. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Admiral Ray for 5 minutes to testify. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CHARLES W. RAY, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral RAY. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Coast Guard’s role in combating 

transnational criminal organizations and the continued threat it 

poses to the homeland. 

I am particularly pleased to testify alongside three of our most 

important partners in the fight against transnational crime: CBP, 

ICE, and the Department of State. I would like to thank Chief 

Beeson, Assistant Director Allen, and Ambassador Arreaga for 

their leadership in this effort. 

Before I continue, I will just draw your attention to the exhibit 

over there of the North America, Central America, and South 

America. When I talk about the transit zone, I am generally speaking to that and when we speak of the maritime transit zone, it is 

that area between South America, Central America, and Southern 

Mexico. 

We continue to face a significant threat from transnational criminal networks whose drug transit routes lead to the southern approach of the United States. The Coast Guard protects the maritime border not just here at home, but also off the coast of South 

and Central America as part of our layered security strategy. 

As Secretary Kelly stated just a few days ago, the defense of the 

Southwest Border really starts about 1,500 miles south of there, 

when transnational violent transnational criminal organizations 

harm economies and threaten governments and citizens throughout 

the hemisphere. 

8 

They are agnostic to borders, engage in all manners of illicit activity, and they actually destabilize Latin America. The widespread violence they employ has reached epidemic levels, is spreading, and drives the continued flow of migrants from Central America and Mexico who attempt to illegally enter the United States. 

As one of the Nation’s five Armed Forces and the only one with 

broad law enforcement authority, the Coast Guard is uniquely positioned to attack these criminal networks where they are most vulnerable—at sea. 

In the offshore transit zones, the Coast Guard employs an interdiction package consisting of a cutter, an airborne use of force-capable helicopter, high-speed pursuit boats and, of course, highly 

trained boarding teams. 

We seize multi-ton loads of drugs at sea before they are broken 

into small quantities, which are extremely difficult to detect and 

cause devastation at each step of their journey as they make their 

way to North America. 

Beyond our own capabilities, we leverage over 42 maritime law 

enforcement bilateral agreements, 29 of which are in the Western 

Hemisphere, to enable partner nation interdiction and prosecutions. In many affected areas, we are the only maritime presence 

to enforce universal criminal statutes with our maritime neighbors. 

Our Coast Guard personnel assets are effective. Coast Guard and 

partner agencies interdicted more cocaine at sea in 2016 than was 

interdicted in all the land and across our country by all Federal, 

State, and locals combined, because we did it in bulk quantities offshore, sometimes in the thousands of kilos. By doing so, we pushed 

the border south, protect the Nation, and significantly impact the 

transnational criminal organizations. 

Beyond demonstrating our effectiveness, these statistics indicate 

that cocaine and illicit trafficking of all kinds are, unfortunately, 

on the rise. However, resource constraints and the lack of capable 

surface assets allow the U.S. Coast Guard to only attack or target 

30 percent of the known cases. 

We have good intelligence, really high-confidence intelligence. As 

a result of a lack of resources last year, we were prevented from 

getting after 580 known smuggling events, and those shipments 

made their way on north. 

Unfortunately, the other significant National security demands 

on our great Navy now preclude their participation in this area of 

operations. In his testimony before the committee, Secretary Kelly 

noted there hasn’t been a significant sustained Navy presence in 

the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific for almost 4 years. 

In that time, our Coast Guard has doubled down our presence in 

the region, and we are your armed force in the maritime approaches to the United States. We continue to look for ways to increase our offshore cutter presence. As I have said, we just don’t 

have the assets to address all the intelligence that we have. 

For that reason, recapitalizing our medium-endurance cutter 

fleet with our off-shore cutter patrol program is a must to enable 

the Coast Guard to meet mission demand. We appreciate the support thus far, and continued support from this Congress will be essential as we move on to commission our first off-shore patrol cutter in 2021. These new assets will make us more effective. 

9 

Just like the other Armed Forces, we are also facing significant 

readiness challenges with our aging assets and infrastructure and 

a strained work force. Like our fellow service chiefs, the commandant has said he believes it will stay this way as long as the 

Budget Control Act is in effect. 

We will continue to use risk-based approach to allocate our resources. We have an outstanding and dedicated group of professional women and men, as evidenced by the 201 metric tons of cocaine we seized in 2016. It is a Coast Guard record. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for 

all you do for the women and men of the Coast Guard. I look forward to addressing your questions and concerns. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Ray follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. RAY

FEBRUARY 16, 2017 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in 

combating transnational organized crime and specifically how we address the drug 

smuggling methods of these networks. 

Drug trafficking has destabilized regional States, undermined the rule of law, terrorized citizens, and driven both families and unaccompanied children to migrate to 

the United States. To be clear, the flow of illicit drugs funds Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) networks, which pose a significant and growing threat to National and international security. 

Today’s Coast Guard is a direct descendant of the Revenue Cutter Service, created 

by Alexander Hamilton in 1790, to stem the flow of maritime contraband into our 

newly-formed Republic. It is one of the Nation’s five Armed Services, and the only 

branch of the military within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While 

our missions and responsibilities have grown significantly since then—addressing a 

full range of security, safety, and stewardship concerns—our anti-smuggling roots 

continue to be an essential part of our service to the Nation. The Coast Guard is 

the lead Federal maritime law enforcement agency, the lead Federal agency for drug 

interdiction on the high seas, and the only agency with both the authority and capability to enforce National and international law on the high seas, outer continental 

shelf, and shoreward from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to our inland 

waters. 

For over two centuries, the Coast Guard has built a reputation as one of the most 

agile and adaptive agencies within the Federal Government; these qualities have 

served the Coast Guard well in its efforts to combat smugglers’ ever-evolving conveyances and tactics. The modern role of the Coast Guard in this fight can be traced 

to the demand for a variety of illegal drugs. From 1973 through 1991, the Coast 

Guard removed over 26 million pounds of marijuana, targeting and interdicting a 

variety of smuggling conveyances including commercial fishing vessels, ocean-going 

cargo freighters, and pleasure craft. Beginning in the late 1990’s, through the 

present day, cocaine has been the predominant drug being trafficked via maritime 

routes, bringing with it shifts in smuggling tactics. Cartels initially began using 

some of the very same conveyances used by marijuana smugglers, which included 

multi-ton loads of cocaine vulnerable to interdiction by Coast Guard forces. Cartels 

quickly adapted to Coast Guard efforts and began expanding tactics to include the 

ubiquitous ‘‘go-fast vessel,’’ as well as more modern conveyances including the purpose-built self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS), to disperse loads onto more numerous and harder-to-detect conveyances. 

Today we face a sophisticated and well-funded adversary that leverages high-tech 

conveyances such as low-profile vessels and semi-submersibles, employs multiple gofast vessels to outnumber interdicting forces, and deploys GPS beacons if forced to 

jettison bales of contraband to allow later relocation; all are advanced and coordinated means to avoid detection and evade apprehension. 

The change in flow of cocaine toward the United States from South America from 

2015 to 2016 was the largest increase the service has observed to date. The rise of 

cocaine production is attributed to the largest single-year increase of coca cultivation 

10 

1The maritime portion of the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone is a 6 million-square-mile 

area, roughly twice the size of the continental United States. The Transit Zone includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. 2 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013 United States Illicit 

Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA–DCW–DIR–012–15, January 2015. 3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC Research and Trend Analysis 

Branch, Global Study on Homicide 2013. 4 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013 United States Illicit 

Drug Prices, DEA Intelligence Report, DEA–DCW–DIR–012–15, January 2015. 

in Colombia ever recorded (immediately following the second-largest single-year increase in more than a decade). To meet this growing threat, the Coast Guard has 

dedicated additional focus and assets to the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone1, and 

is investing in the people and platforms necessary to carry out an agressive interdiction effort, in addition to helping build regional partner capabilities. 

CURRENT THREAT: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND INSTABILITY

One of the goals of the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction program is to interdict 

illicit traffic as close to the source zone as possible. This helps to stem the flow of 

drugs from reaching Central America, Mexico, and the United States. Over the past 

5 years, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft have removed more than 630 metric tons 

of high-purity cocaine from the high seas, with a wholesale value of nearly 18 billion 

dollars.2 Our annual seizures at sea amount to more than three times the quantity 

of cocaine seized at our borders and within the United States, combined. Despite 

these successes, TOC networks operate throughout Central America, vying for 

power through drug-fueled violence and corruption of Government officials; in fact, 

eight out of the world’s ten countries with the highest per capita rates of homicide 

are along the cocaine trafficking routes in the Western Hemisphere.3

In response, the Coast Guard released its Western Hemisphere Strategy that 

indentifies three priorities for the maritime domain in the Western Hemisphere: 

Combating Networks, Securing Borders, and Safeguarding Commerce. To meet 

these priorities, the strategy emphasizes the importance of a robust off-shore airborne use-of-force (AUF)-enabled cutter capability, which is supported by fixed-wing 

maritime patrol aircraft and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. 

COMBATING TOC NETWORKS—A LAYERED APPROACH TO DRUG INTERDICTION

The Coast Guard uses a ‘‘maritime trident’’ of cutters, boats, and aircraft in a layered approach to combat TOC networks as they transport illicit goods from the 

source zone, through Central America and Caribbean islands, into the United 

States. This approach maintains operational control by confronting the threat beyond our land borders, beyond Mexico, and beyond Central America on the high 

seas where traffickers are most exposed and vulnerable to interdiction by the United 

States. This layered approach begins overseas, spans the off-shore regions, and continues into our territorial seas and our ports of entry. 

The Coast Guard is the major maritime interdiction asset provider to Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S), which executes the Department of Defense 

statutory responsibility for the detection and monitoring of illicit drug trafficking in 

the air and maritime domains bound for the United States in support of law enforcement agencies such as the Coast Guard. Our most capable force package is 

flight deck-equipped major cutters with embarked Airborne Use of Force (AUF)-capable helicopters and deployable pursuit-capable boats, supported by fixed-wing 

maritime patrol aircraft, along with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments embarked on U.S. and allied ships. When they are able to target cases, they have been 

80–90 percent effective in disrupting drug shipments. 

As an example of their effectiveness, Coast Guard Cutter HAMILTON, the fourth 

and newest of nine National Security Cutters (NSC) to be built for the Coast Guard, 

returned to her homeport of Charleston, South Carolina from her inaugural patrol 

on December 16, 2016. On deck, she carried more than 24 metric tons of high-purity 

cocaine from 27 different interdictions by U.S. forces with a street value of nearly 

$700 million.4 These interdictions also netted 111 suspects bound for U.S. prosecution. 

Our interdicting capabilities continue to prove their value against TOC networks’ 

conveyance of choice—the go-fast vessel. In 2016, our Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) of AUF-capable helicopters—along with partner aircraft 

from the U.S. Navy, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom operating under our law 

enforcement authority with Coast Guard precision marksmen—set a record 63 atsea interdictions, netting over 44 metric tons of cocaine. 

11 

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Review of U.S. Coast 

Guard’s Fiscal Year 2016 Drug Control Performance Summary, OIG Report, OIG–17–33, February 1, 2017. 

In addition, the Coast Guard began providing high-speed pursuit boats and crews 

to U.S. Navy Patrol Coastal class ships operating in the transit zone in 2016 to increase interdiction opportunities. Coupled with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments, this innovative force package capability netted 11 interdictions and removed 6.5 metric tons of cocaine in just a few months. In total for fiscal year 2016, 

the Coast Guard removed 201 metric tons of cocaine (7.1 percent of estimated flow)5

and 52,600 pounds of marijuana from the transit zone, worth an estimated wholesale value of $5.7 billion. 

The importance of interdictions transcends the direct removal of drugs taken off 

the high seas; when the Coast Guard apprehends suspects from drug smuggling 

cases, they disclose information during prosecution and sentencing that is used to 

help indict, extradite, and convict drug kingpins in the effort to disrupt and dismantle TOC networks. Interdictions also take profits out of the pockets of criminal 

networks by denying them financial resources. Additionally, they contribute to actionable intelligence on future events, producing follow-on seizures and intelligence. 

TOC networks cause much of the corruption and violence that spurs the increased 

migrant flow seen in recent years. 

While more than 90 percent of our 2016 interdictions were cued by intelligence, 

the Coast Guard’s aging major cutters limit our ability to respond to all intelligencecued events. Critical acquisitions like the National Security Cutter (NSC) and Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) are essential to our long-term success in our fight against 

TOC networks. 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In coordination with JIATF–S, the Coast Guard is engaging with partner nations 

in Central and South America, and Mexico, leveraging their capabilities and local 

knowledge to improve maritime governance in the littoral regions being exploited 

by TOC networks. Among the efforts to foster international cooperation and build 

partner capacity, Coast Guard personnel are posted as attache ́s, liaisons, and drug 

interdiction specialists at several of our embassies in the Western Hemisphere. 

These personnel develop strategic relationships with partner nations that facilitate 

real-time operations coordination, confirmation of vessel registry, waivers of jurisdiction, and disposition of seized vessels, contraband, and detained crews. The Coast 

Guard’s law enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in high demand from 

Central American partners, whose Navies more closely resemble the U.S. Coast 

Guard than the U.S. Navy. Coast Guard International Training teams, as well as 

Coast Guard units deployed in the region increase professional interaction, shiprider 

activities, and training in conjunction with operations, and also execute maritime 

exercises coincident with port visits and patrols. 

Working in conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice, the Coast 

Guard has negotiated, concluded, and maintains over 40 counterdrug bilateral 

agreements and operational procedures with partner nations throughout the world, 

the majority of which are in the Western Hemisphere. These agreements enable the 

Coast Guard to rapidly gain authority to board suspect vessels, prevent suspect vessels from using under-patrolled territorial waters of partner nations as safe havens, 

and coordinate interdiction and apprehension operations in the transit zone. Highlighting their importance to Coast Guard counterdrug efforts, 59 percent of all Coast 

Guard interdictions in fiscal year 2016 involved the use of a bilateral agreement or 

operational procedures agreement. 

THE ARRIVAL ZONE

Closer to United States shores, Coast Guard operational commanders work with 

the other operational components within DHS and across the interagency to provide 

a robust presence in the U.S. maritime approaches by deploying Fast Response Cutters, high-speed pursuit boats, medium-range fixed-wing aircraft, and land-based 

AUF-capable helicopters. To achieve Unity of Effort, the Coast Guard is a major 

contributor to DHS’s Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan. The Coast 

Guard Atlantic Area Commander, Vice Admiral Karl Schultz, serves as the director 

of Joint Task Force—East overseeing coordination efforts for DHS components operating in the maritime approaches in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern 

Pacific Ocean. 

12 

CONCLUSION

The Coast Guard endeavors to secure our vast maritime border by identifying 

emergent threats, countering them in a layered approach, utilizing strong international relationships, and maximizing domestic and regional partnerships; this approach has been key to combatting TOC networks. The Coast Guard stands ready 

to meet off-shore, coastal, and inland drug trafficking threats in the maritime domain posed by TOC networks. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for your continued 

support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Admiral Ray. 

The Chair now recognizes Commander Beeson to testify for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL A. BEESON, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK 

FORCE—WEST, ARIZONA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Chief BEESON. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, and the distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection to discuss the evolving drug smuggling tactics and techniques used by transnational criminal organizations and how CBP is working to address this threat and secure 

our Nation’s borders. 

I began my career as a Border Patrol agent in 1985, and in my 

32 years of service I have seen the border change from a barbed 

wire fence and a Nation-wide work force of just a few thousand 

Border Patrol agents, to today, with over 600 miles of fencing and 

almost 20,000 Border Patrol agents on duty. 

The border has changed and become more complex. Over the 

course of my career, I have seen the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security, funding increases and decreases, and the committed evolution of criminals who seek to exploit our borders. 

I have also seen CBP and the legacy offices that make up CBP 

work with Congress to improve the border environment. Personnel, 

resources, technology, and tactical infrastructure have shaped the 

border that we see today. 

We have realized greater situational awareness and significant 

reductions in activity from a high of over 1.6 million arrests in fiscal year 2000 to just over 400,000 arrests last fiscal year. Throughout my career, I have seen TCOs demonstrate unending resolve in 

their intent to exploit the border for their own gain. 

They have used nimble and innovative tactics to illegally cross 

our borders and smuggle both people and contraband. TCOs operate throughout the border environment, including at and between 

the ports of entry in the various domains such as land, air, and 

sea. 

CBP has met and combated these illegal activities, but TCOs 

continue in their intent to circumvent border security measures. 

Drug smuggling is a part of many TCO enterprises, and today 

these groups smuggle drugs by foot, vehicle, air, tunneling, and 

even through the use of projectile-type systems. 

TCOs also rely on scouting and counter-surveillance, concealment 

and logistical support to further their illegal drug smuggling operations. While illegal drug smuggling still occurs, CBP continues to 

take steps in combatting their efforts. 

13 

In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers seized or disrupted more than 

3.3 million pounds of narcotics. In addition to interdictions and seizures, CBP has also disrupted the manner in which TCOs attempt 

to smuggle drugs. 

As an example, prior to fencing and technology deployments in 

the Tucson sector area of operations, over 1,000 vehicle drivethroughs were recorded in 2006, and last year, only 18 such events 

recorded. While ramping and drive-throughs still occur, the efforts 

of CBP have diminished their probability of success and shaped 

these illicit operations. 

What I have seen in over 30 years of law enforcement is that 

TCOs remain persistent in their intent to engage in illegal crossborder activity. I have also seen CBP, through collaboration and coordination with law enforcement partners, make progress in improving the security of our borders. 

This is the result of investments over the years in our border security, and in the blood, sweat, and tears of the men and woman 

who are engaged in the daily battle to secure our borders. With 

continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our 

partners, we will continue to further refine and enhance the effectiveness of our detection and interdiction capabilities. 

While TCOs may be intent in their smuggling operations, CBP 

is no less determined to safeguard the borders of this great country 

with vigilance, service, and integrity. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished 

Members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Beeson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL A. BEESON

FEBRUARY 16, 2017 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss the evolving drug smuggling tactics 

and techniques used by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) and how CBP 

is working to address this threat and secure our Nation’s borders. 

CBP is responsible for America’s front-line border security and has a significant 

role in the Nation’s efforts to combat the cross-border criminal activity of cartels and 

other TCOs. Thanks to the support of Congress, in the past decade, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) has deployed more personnel, resources, technology, 

and tactical infrastructure for securing our borders than at any other time in history. As America’s front-line border agency, CBP protects the United States against 

terrorist threats and prevents the illegal entry of inadmissible persons and contraband, while facilitating lawful travel and trade. CBP’s mission demands we examine 

all border security threats, from human smuggling to drug smuggling. TCOs continue to exploit the border environment for their own gains, employing various capabilities to carry out illegal operations. We continue to meet and combat these capabilities. 

CBP plays a critical role in the effort to keep dangerous drugs from illegally entering the country. Specifically, by leveraging a comprehensive, multi-layered, intelligence driven, and threat-based approach to enhance the security of our borders, 

we can diminish the effectiveness of TCO drug operations, as well as other border 

security threats. This dynamic approach to security both reduces the vulnerability 

of any single operational approach and extends our zone of security to include the 

avenues of approach, allowing threats to be addressed before they reach our borders. 

By leveraging international partnerships, we can ensure that our physical borders 

are not the first or last lines of defense. 

14 

1Fiscal Year 2016 Border Security Report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, https:// 

www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016-Dec/CBP-fy2016-border-security-report.pdf. 2Drug Enforcement Administration,2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, ‘‘Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations’’, page 1, DEA–DCT–DIR–001–17, November 2016. 

https://www.dea.gov/resource-center/2016%20NDTA%20Summary.pdf. 

THE CURRENT BORDER ENVIRONMENT

The border environment today is both challenging and complex. TCOs continually 

adjust their operations to circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement, 

and are quick to take advantage of technology advances, cheaper transportation and 

improvements to distribution methods, and improving fabrication and concealment 

techniques. Also, while the threats of illegal immigration and drug smuggling continue to be the principal criminal concerns in the border environment, TCOs continue to maintain a diverse portfolio of crimes to include fraud, weapons smuggling, 

kidnapping, and extortion. DHS, with the support of Congress, has made significant 

improvements to the physical security infrastructure along the Southwestern Border 

and has invested in personnel, training, and information sharing. These investments have been valuable in combating the TCOs and have helped shape the current border environment. 

In fiscal year 2016, CBP officers and agents seized and/or disrupted more than 

3.3 million pounds of narcotics across the country 1 including approximately 46,000 

pounds of methamphetamine, 4,800 pounds of heroin, and 440 pounds of fentanyl. 

The vast majority of CBP drug interdictions occur along the Southwest land border 

from all environments and transportation modes. 

Much of the illegal drug trafficking encountered by CBP officers and agents is facilitated by TCOs operating in Mexico. The reach and influence of Mexican cartels, 

notably Los Zetas, and the Gulf, Juarez, Jalisco New Generation, and Sinaloa Cartels, stretches across and beyond the Southwest Border, operating through networks 

and loose affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across the United States. 

According to a 2016 Drug Enforcement Administration report, Mexican TCOs pose 

the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States. These criminal organizations 

traffic heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana throughout the United 

States, using established transportation routes and distribution networks.2 TCOs 

also maintain influence over U.S.-based gangs as a way to expand their domestic 

distribution process. Gang members are heavily involved in the domestic distribution of narcotics and, to a lesser extent, the actual movement of contraband across 

the Southwest Border. 

TCO OPERATIONS

In examining TCOs, it is apparent that they continue to seek ways to exploit the 

border environment. These TCOs pose a significant threat to both U.S. and international security. The illegal operations of TCOs affect both public safety and economic stability. Not only are these criminal networks resilient, but they maintain 

illicit pathways through foreign countries and toward the U.S. border, which could 

be exploitable by terror organizations to move personnel and assets into the United 

States. Furthermore, their operations are often diversified with separate operational 

cells, and with TCO participants often having the capability to participate in multiple roles. These TCOs are highly mobile and maintain sophisticated cross-border 

networks and are involved in a wide range of organized criminal activities including 

firearms trafficking, drug smuggling, and alien smuggling (See Exhibit 14). Additionally, TCOs operate throughout the spectrum of the border environment including at and between the ports of entry (POE), and in the various domains such as 

land, air, and sea. 

The vast expanses of remote and rugged terrain between our POEs, and the large 

volume of trade and traffic at our POEs, continue to be targeted for exploitation by 

TCOs. These groups use a wide range of ever-evolving methods to move illicit goods 

into the United States. Some of these techniques include the movement of drugs by 

foot, conveyance, tunneling, and even through the use of projectile-type systems. 

These groups also rely on supporting tactics such as countersurveillance, concealment, and logistical support to further their illegal drug smuggling operations. 

The Southwest land border POEs are the major points of entry for illegal drugs, 

where smugglers use a wide variety of tactics and techniques for concealing drugs. 

CBP officers regularly find drugs ingested, concealed in body cavities, taped to bodies (body carriers), hidden inside vehicle seat cushions, gas tanks, dash boards, tires, 

packaged food, household and hygiene products, in checked luggage, and concealed 

in construction materials on commercial trucks. While many smuggling attempts 

15 

occur at POEs, the mail and express consignment environment, as well as maritime 

cargo also remain attractive options for smugglers. 

TCOs have increased both the number and the sophistication of smuggling tunnels (See Exhibits 11–13). The tunnel threat consists of four categories of tunnels: 

Conduit, rudimentary, interconnecting, and sophisticated. In the Arizona border regions specifically, TCOs also continue to attempt ‘‘drive-throughs’’—incursions into 

U.S. territory by driving vehicles on ramps over the fence, or by attempting to cut 

the fence to drive vehicles containing illegal drugs across the border. Drive-through 

incursions generally involve large loads of illegal drugs, an expansive network of individuals (to include scouts), strategic logistics, and sophisticated communications 

equipment. TCOs have also improved their capabilities in passing drugs over existing fencing. Whereas TCOs previously threw, by hand, small loads of drugs over the 

border fence, they now utilize compressed air cannons to launch bundles of illicit 

narcotics in excess of 100 pounds over the border fence. These illegal operations are 

indicative of the ever-evolving and persistent intent of TCOs to exploit the border 

environment. 

As interdiction and enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border have become 

more effective, TCOs continue to use maritime and air smuggling routes to transport contraband into the United States. TCOs use a variety of methods to enter the 

United States via maritime routes, including the use of small open vessels known 

as ‘‘pangas.’’ These small, wood or fiberglass, home-made fishing vessels cross the 

border at night, attempting to use their relatively high-speed and small radar signature to evade detection by CBP and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) patrol vessels and 

aircraft. TCOs also use pleasure boats or small commercial fishing vessels—Sometimes equipped with hidden compartments—and attempt to blend in with legitimate 

boaters and transport contraband during broad daylight. Smuggling operations 

using this technique rely on the sheer number of similar boats on U.S. waters on 

any given day to elude detection. TCOs have also turned to new methods of smuggling by air with the emergence in recent years of the use of ultralight aircraft (See 

Exhibit 1). Under the cover of darkness, ultralights fly across the Southwest Border 

and air-drop drugs to waiting ground crews. 

TCOs regularly use countersurveillance tactics. This type of activity ranges from 

the use of scouts, individuals performing surveillance activity against law enforcement agencies, to more complicated activity such as interception of law enforcement 

communication. Scouts embed deep in the remote, rugged, terrain as well as urban 

communities, watching and reporting on border law enforcement activities. TCOs 

who deploy these scouts utilize a robust, highly technical, communication method— 

with the deliberate intent of concealing their communication from law enforcement 

(See Exhibits 2–5). While some of these operations are illegal in their execution 

(such as attempts to illegally obtain Law Enforcement Sensitive information) others 

simply exploit the public venues from which, and within which, law enforcement operates (such as monitoring the coming and going of patrol vehicles from a Border 

Patrol station). 

As TCOs involved in smuggling continue to explore new tactics and techniques 

to attempt to evade detection and interdiction, CBP, our Federal partners, and other 

law enforcement entities continue to adapt and increase our enforcement resources, 

enhancing our capabilities, and refine our strategies to anticipate and disrupt TCO 

activity. 

CBP EFFORTS, RESOURCES, AND CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER TCO S

Addressing the TCO threat necessitates a united, comprehensive strategy and an 

aggressive approach by multiple entities across all levels of government. In close coordination with local, State, Tribal, international, and Federal law enforcement 

partners—specifically U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the 

USCG—CBP’s continued efforts to interdict illegal aliens, drugs, cash, and weapons 

at the border are a key aspect of U.S. border security efforts. We must also concentrate on increasing our understanding and identification of transnational criminal networks in order to identify, interdict, investigate, and prosecute TCOs and 

their criminal activity. 

Along U.S. Borders 

Since 2004, the number of Border Patrol agents has nearly doubled, from approximately 10,800 in 2004 to over 19,500 agents today. Along the Southwest border, 

DHS has increased the number of law enforcement on the ground from approximately 9,100 Border Patrol agents in 2001 to more than 16,000 today. At our NorthVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
16 

3 As of January 7, 2017. 

ern Border, the force of 500 agents that we sustained 15 years ago has grown to 

over 2,000.3

To combat the threat of TCO drug smuggling activities along the Southwest Border between the POEs, CBP relies on a network of systems comprising of information, integration, personnel, technology, and infrastructure. CBP has deployed sophisticated detection technology, including fixed towers, mobile surveillance units, 

ground sensors, and thermal imaging systems to increase the ability to detect illegal 

cross-border activity and contraband and maintains 654 miles of border fencing and 

other tactical infrastructure in key trafficking areas. The CBP ReUse effort utilizes 

Department of Defense (DOD) technologies, including aerostat technology, spectrometers, land, air, and maritime radar, and night-vision equipment that are not needed by DOD but can be used to satisfy critical border security missions with minimal 

up-front costs for DHS. These resources are matched with personnel of various skill 

sets who work with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to 

interdict TCO drug smuggling operations. 

As part of its efforts to prevent the illicit smuggling of drugs and other contraband, CBP maintains a high level of vigilance on avenues of egress from our Nation’s borders. TCOs deploy a sophisticated network of scouts into rough and remote 

terrain as well as highly-populated urban areas along the Southwest Border, making the identification and disruption of scout activity highly challenging. CBP utilizes predictive analysis, available technology, targeted enforcement, and the ability 

to rapidly readjust counter surveillance activities to affect and degrade the ability 

of scouts to operate in a given environment. When the location of a scout is discovered, we work quickly to counter the scout’s ability to take advantage of major vantage points and force spotter displacement or relocation; thus forcing them into more 

costly, vulnerable, and continuous reorganization. 

When tunnels are detected and investigated, each U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) sector follows established protocols for coordination, confirmation, assessment, investigation, exploitation, and remediation. The USBP is an active participant in ICE 

Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) tunnel task forces. Since 2010, CBP has operated a Tunnel Detection and Technology Program, to integrate the efforts of CBP, 

ICE, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), to address tunnel-related activities and technology. 

As an example of further CBP counter tunnel efforts, in March of 2016, collaboration through the cross-border coordination initiative and bi-national tunnel teams 

led Mexican officials to alert USBP agents in Nogales, Arizona, that a tunnel entrance in Nogales, Sonora had been located. During their investigation, USBP discovered that the incomplete cross-border tunnel extended approximately 30 feet into 

the United States. Since agents discovered the first illicit tunnel in 1990 in Douglas, 

Arizona, there have been 195 illicit cross-border tunnels discovered—194 along the 

Southwest Border and one discovered along the Northern Border near Lynden, 

Washington. Investigating a cross-border tunnel is a particularly dangerous task 

that requires an agent to crawl into what is usually a dark and confined space of 

unknown structural integrity and the potential to encounter a variety of threats. In 

some of the most narrow, dangerous tunnels, the Nogales tunnel team deploys a 

wireless, camera-equipped robot to investigate the passages. After a tunnel is investigated, the passage must be thoroughly remediated, or blocked to prevent further 

use. 

At U.S. Ports of Entry 

To support CBP’s evolving, more complex mission since September 11, 2001, the 

number of CBP officers ensuring the secure flow of people and goods into the Nation 

through POEs has increased from 17,279 customs and immigration inspectors in 

2003, to over 21,000 CBP officers and 2,400 agriculture specialists today. At POEs, 

the Office of Field Operations (OFO) utilizes CBP officer expertise and experience, 

technology, such as non-intrusive inspection (NII) X-ray and gamma ray imaging 

systems, and canine teams to detect the illegal transit of drugs hidden on people, 

in cargo containers, and concealed in conveyances (See Exhibit 6 and 8–10). 

As of February 1, 2017, 313 Large-Scale (LS)–NII systems are deployed to, and 

in between, our POEs. In fiscal year 2016, LS–NII systems were used to conduct 

more than 6.5 million examinations resulting in more than 2,600 seizures and over 

359,636 pounds of seized narcotics. NII systems are particularly valuable in detecting concealed contraband in vehicles. Two months ago, CBP officers working at the 

World Trade Bridge in Laredo, Texas, referred a driver and vehicle for secondary 

inspection. Using both non-intrusive inspection equipment and a narcotics-detection 

canine, CBP officers discovered and seized 201 pounds of alleged crystal methVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
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4https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-seize-more-4-million-crystalmeth-world-trade-bridge. 5https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-seize-approximately-121- 

pounds-heroin-and-8-pounds-cocaine. 6https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cincinnati-cbp-seizes-stone-statue-filledmeth. 7Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013 United States Illicit Drug Prices, page 7, DEA– 

DCW–DIR–012–15, January 2015. 2013 National Price Range, Cocaine, Approximately $28,700 

per kilogram. 

amphetamine concealed in fiberglass pottery, with a street value of more than $4 

million.4

Personal vehicles are not the only means by which TCOs attempt to smuggle illegal drugs. In April 2016, CBP officers used non-intrusive inspection equipment to 

discover approximately 121 pounds of heroin and 8 pounds of cocaine in a shipping 

container of vegetables transiting from Ecuador to Miami, Florida, through the Red 

Hook Container Terminal in Brooklyn, New York.5 TCOs also move drugs—especially hard drugs such as heroin and methamphetamine—in smaller quantities to 

try to evade detection. This past December, CBP officers working express consignment operations in Cincinnati intercepted a shipment containing 53.46 pounds of 

methamphetamines concealed in decorative concrete sculptures shipped from Mexico.6

The OFO National Canine Program (NCP) deploys specialized detection canine 

teams throughout the Nation. OFO’s 489 canine teams are trained to detect narcotics, currency, firearms, and concealed humans. The majority of the canine teams 

are concentrated in four field offices along the Southwest Border. Of those 489 canine teams, 49 of these teams also trained to detect firearms and currency. During 

fiscal year 2016, OFO canine teams were responsible for the seizure of 533,783 

pounds of narcotics, $38,629,557 in seized property, and $21,530,795 in currency 

seized. The currency/firearms detection canine program was also responsible for 154 

firearms and 14,000 rounds of ammunitions seized. 

Because TCOs are also known to use legitimate commercial modes of travel and 

transport to smuggle drugs and other illicit goods, CBP partners with the private 

sector to provide anti-drug smuggling training to air, sea, and land commercial 

transport companies (carriers). The overall goals of these programs and their training component are to encourage commercial carriers to share the burden of stopping 

the flow of illicit drugs; to deter smugglers from using commercial carriers to smuggle drugs; and to provide carriers with the incentive to improve their security and 

their drug smuggling awareness. The Carrier Initiative Program is a voluntary 

training program directed at employees of carriers with route systems that are highrisk for drug smuggling. The Super Carrier Initiative Program is for those carriers 

that face an extraordinarily high-risk from drug traffickers. Participating carriers 

sign agreements stating that the carrier will exercise the highest degree of care and 

diligence in securing their facilities and conveyances, while CBP agrees to conduct 

site surveys, make recommendations, and provide training. CBP and various carriers have signed over 3,800 Carrier Initiative Agreements and 27 Super Carrier 

Agreements. 

In the Air and the Sea 

To advance counternarcotic efforts in the air and at sea, CBP deploys capable and 

effective aerial and marine assets, including manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft 

systems and strategic and tactical aerostats, providing critical surveillance coverage 

and domain awareness (See Exhibit 7). CBP’s Air and Marine Operations (AMO) 

employs high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels specifically designed and engineered 

with the speed, maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and engage 

a variety of suspect non-compliant vessels in offshore waters, including the Great 

Lakes on the Northern Border. 

CBP AMO P–3 Orion Aircraft (P–3s) have also been an integral part of the successful counternarcotic missions operating in coordination with Joint Interagency 

Task Force–South (JIATF–S). The P–3s patrol in a 42 million-square-mile area 

known as the Source and Transit Zone, which includes more than 41 nations, the 

Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the 

United States. In fiscal year 2016, CBP’s P–3s operating out of Corpus Christi, 

Texas, and Jacksonville, Florida, flew more than 6,100 hours in support of counternarcotic missions resulting in 129 interdiction events of suspected smuggling vessels 

and aircraft. These events led to the total seizure of 87,657 kg of cocaine with an 

estimated wholesale value of $2.5 billion.7

In the air domain, AMO detects, identifies, investigates, and interdicts potential 

air threats to the United States including general aviation (GA) aircraft involved in 

18 

the transit of contraband. The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), a stateof-the-art law enforcement surveillance center, monitors complex airway traffic to 

identify illicit use of aircraft and those attempting to blend in with legitimate traffic. CBP’s eight Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems (TARS) form a network of longrange radars deployed along the border, which can identify and monitor low-altitude 

aircraft and vessels. TARS and hundreds of other domestic and international radar 

data are integrated through AMOC, located in Riverside, California, to identify and 

track suspect aircraft incursions. Also, AMO actively participates in Operation 

Martillo, an international counter illicit trafficking initiative whereby U.S. and regional partner nations’ military and law enforcement agencies patrol the air and sea 

environments in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific on a 

year-round basis. 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

Substantive and timely information sharing is critical in targeting and interdicting TCOs involved with drug-trafficking along the Southwest and Northern borders. CBP contributes to several initiatives to improve and integrate the combined 

intelligence capabilities of multiple Federal entities—including DHS, the intelligence community, and DOD—as well as our State, local, Tribal, and international 

partners. For example, CBP participates in the Office of National Drug Control Policy-led Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy implementation effort, which 

includes a focus on the improvement of intelligence and information sharing among 

law enforcement agencies on the Federal, State, local, and Tribal levels. From the 

use of labs to improved relationships with partners, we are committed to the creation of an intelligence and information enterprise for the benefit of all those combating drug smuggling. Improved technology and enhanced capabilities have expanded the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information among law enforcement partners working to dismantle TCO networks. 

For example, the CBP Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate uses advanced techniques to provide qualitative identification and quantitative determination as well as analysis of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine to assist with identifying potential drug smuggling routes. In addition, S&T is working 

to develop, test, and pilot new technology for securing and scanning cargo, improving surveillance of the Southern border, and enhancing detection capabilities for 

radar-evading aircraft. S&T is also pursuing and fielding new technology to monitor 

storm drains, detect tunnels, track low-flying aircraft, monitor ports, and enhance 

current mobile/fixed radar and camera surveillance systems to increase border security. S&T-developed technology recently put into operational use at the U.S.-Mexico 

border includes a new general aviation aircraft scanner in Laredo, Texas, and a new 

Brownsville-Matamoros Rail Non-Intrusive Inspection Microwave Data Transmission System. 

CBP also hosts monthly briefing/teleconferences with Federal, State, and local 

partners regarding the current State of the border—the Northern Border and Southwest Border—in order to monitor emerging trends and threats and provide a crosscomponent, multi-agency venue for discussing trends and threats. The monthly 

briefings focus on narcotics, weapons, and currency interdictions and alien apprehensions both at and between the POEs. These briefings/teleconferences currently 

include participants from the government of Canada, the government of Mexico; 

ICE; USCG; DEA; FBI; U.S. Northern Command; Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; Naval Investigative Command; State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers; 

and other international, Federal, State, and local law enforcement as appropriate. 

CBP also contributes to the whole-of-Government effort to combat narcotics-related threats by sharing critical information on travelers and cargo with investigative and intelligence partner agencies to identify and disrupt sophisticated routes 

and networks. Recognizing the need for open and sustainable channels to share information with our law enforcement and intelligence partners, personnel are co-located at the National Targeting Center to support efforts to combat narcotics and 

contraband smuggling by integrating real-time intelligence and all-source information into CBP targeting efforts and enforcement actions. 

Information exchange with our partners within the Government of Mexico, facilitated by the CBP Attach ́ e office in Mexico, has allowed for an unprecedented exchange of real-time information through deployments of personnel between our 

countries. Representatives from Mexican Customs (Servicio de Administracion 

Tributaria) are deployed at the CBP National Targeting Center in Sterling, Virginia, to share information and assist in targeting narcotics and other contraband. 

Likewise, CBP personnel are assigned to Mexico City and Panama under the Joint 

19 

Security Program where we exchange alerts on suspicious TCO movements through 

the monitoring of our Advance Passenger Information System. 

Enhancing counternarcotic information sharing in the air and maritime environments, the AMOC integrates data from multiple sensor sources to provide real-time 

information on suspect targets to responders at the Federal, State, and local levels. 

AMOC’s capabilities are enhanced by the continued integration of DHS and other 

Federal and Mexican personnel to increase efforts to identify, interdict, and investigate suspected drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains. 

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

A whole-of-Government approach that leverages interagency and international 

partnerships as a force multiplier has been and will continue to be the most effective way to keep our border secure. Providing critical capabilities toward the wholeof-Government approach, CBP works extensively with our Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, and international partners to address drug trafficking and other 

transnational threats along the Southwest Border, Northern Border, and coastal approaches. Our security efforts are enhanced through special joint operations and 

task forces conducted under the auspices of multi-agency enforcement teams, composed of representatives from international and U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies who work together with State, local, and Tribal agencies to target drug and 

transnational criminal activity, including investigations involving National security 

and organized crime. 

Under the Department’s Unity of Effort initiative, and with the establishment of 

three new DHS Joint Task Forces (JTFs), CBP is enhancing our collaboration with 

other DHS components—specifically ICE and USCG—to leverage the unique resources, authorities, and capabilities of each agency to more effectively and efficiently execute our border security missions against transnational criminal organizations, drug-trafficking, and other threats and challenges. The operation of the 

JTFs increases information sharing with Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

agencies and improves border-wide criminal intelligence-led interdiction operations 

to disrupt and dismantle TCO operations. CBP, together with our international, 

Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, is committed to reducing the risk associated with TCOs by addressing threats within the Southern Border and Approaches 

Joint Operating Area. 

Joint Task Force—West (JTF–W), with CBP as executive agent, developed specific 

security objectives to frame and focus operations against prioritized TCOs, including 

integrating and aligning our intelligence capabilities; institutionalizing integrated 

counter-network operations to identify and target TCOs and illicit networks; 

prioritizing investigative efforts to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle TCOs and illicit 

networks; and strengthening international, prosecutorial, and deterrent efforts 

against TCO enterprises and significant activity impacting the JTF–W Joint Operating Area. Additionally, JTF–W continues to plant the seed for the next evolution 

of border security by targeting priority TCOs and their supporting illicit networks 

in ways never done before. As a result of the joint infrastructure that has been established during this past year, JTF–W is now able to plan, coordinate, and execute 

integrated counter network operations beyond traditional DHS component operational capabilities and the immediate border. The ability to leverage the full spectrum of DHS intelligence, interdiction, and investigative efforts has maximized consequence application to illicit network members exploiting our operational seams, 

prosecutorial thresholds, and those abusing current immigration benefits. 

TCO activity is a global problem and CBP continues to work with our international partners, especially the government of Mexico to share information and leverage resources to combat this threat. Through the 21st Century Border Management Initiative, the U.S. Government, and the government of Mexico are working 

to strengthen our collaborative relationship and efforts to secure and facilitate the 

cross-border flows of people and cargo. International Liaison Units (ILU) facilitate 

cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement authorities as part of a 

multi-layered effort to target, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations. 

The Cross Border Coordination Initiative (CBCI) provides an operational framework to enhance public safety and degrade and disrupt the ability of TCOs to engage in the smuggling of illegal drugs, currency, weapons, ammunition, and people. 

CBP works with the government of Mexico to deliver targeted consequence strategy 

through patrols, interdictions, prosecution, investigations, and intelligence. In fiscal 

year 2016, USBP and the Mexican Federal Police conducted 1,584 coordinated patrols. Additionally, bi-national operations, such as Operation Double Threat/Blue 

Thunder, are innovative and mutually beneficial mirrored patrols that are key to 

border security and safety for both countries. Operation Double Threat/Blue ThunVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
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der took place between USBP and Mexican Federal Police on April 17–30, 2016, in 

Sonora and Nogales, Arizona. During the time of the operation, entries and arrests 

dropped by almost 50 percent in the targeted zone, and 3,504 kg of marijuana, 727g 

of cocaine and 55g of methamphetamine were seized. 

On Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean waters, CBP partners with the USCG 

and the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to conduct maritime operations on both sides of 

the border and maintain a dynamic presence. For example, AMO along with DOD’s 

Air Forces North (AFNORTH) have partnered to deploy International Air and Marine Operations Surveillance Systems (I–AMOSS) to SEMAR locations. This system 

has proven to be an invaluable part of their anti-cartel mission and contributes to 

CBP/USCG/SEMAR joint planning. As such, efforts to expand this capability to 

other SEMAR locations are under way. Moreover, AMO supports SEMAR with Operation Albatros, providing maritime patrol aircraft over the Eastern Pacific with 

a SEMAR host-nation-rider on-board acting as a mission commander. Albatros patrols target cocaine-laden vessels transiting from the source and transit zone to the 

shores of Mexico. 

CBP is committed to working with the government of Mexico to identify and prosecute TCOs, and is working with Mexico Attorney General (PGR) to explore additional areas where CBP and the government of Mexico can target and degrade 

TCOs. For example, the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS) is a bi-national prosecutorial program with the PGR that is focused 

on combating human smuggling across the Southwest Border, by identifying and 

prosecuting Mexican nationals arrested for alien smuggling in the United States. 

Since the implementation of OASISS in August 2005 to October 2016, a total of 

2,556 cases have been generated in the United States. From these cases, a total of 

3,009 principals have been presented to the government of Mexico for prosecution, 

and 2,196 of those principals were accepted for prosecution. In fiscal year alone, 99 

criminal cases were generated in the United States with a total of 111 principals 

and 70 of those principals were accepted by the government of Mexico for prosecution. 

AMOC’s coordinating efforts with the government of Mexico and the deployment 

of shared surveillance technology continue to enable the government of Mexico to 

focus aviation and maritime enforcement efforts to better combat TCO operations 

in Northern Mexico and the contiguous U.S.-Mexico border. AMOC’s joint collaboration with the government of Mexico leverages intelligence and operational capabilities to further both air and maritime domain awareness. During fiscal year 2016, 

this improved collaboration resulted in 15 Mexico-based seizures, six of which were 

mixed loads of narcotics. Smuggling events involved aircraft, semi-submersibles, 

pleasure craft, and panga-type conveyances. The most recent example of these efforts was in October 2016, when AMOC detected and tracked an aircraft to a landing in Baja California, Mexico and alerted Mexican authorities. Mexican air and 

ground forces responded and reported the seizure of a Cessna 206, one vehicle, and 

504 lbs. of methamphetamine. 

In January 2016, AMO’s Tucson Air Branch participated in Operation ‘‘El Diablo 

Express,’’ a HSI-led investigation, resulting in a multi-agency operation that utilized 

HSI, DEA, FBI, Arizona DPS, Scottsdale PD, other CBP components, and Mexican 

government agents. The operation was designed to combat Mexican drug cartels operating in Sonora, Mexico, south of Arizona. AMO air crews were instrumental in 

escorting Mexican Government aircraft and personnel through Arizona airspace on 

the day of mission, and provided real-time information to them as they covertly 

crossed the border back into Mexico to conduct an early morning raid on a suspected 

drug cartel location, leading to multiple arrests and seizures. 

It is important to acknowledge the significant strides that Mexico has taken in 

recent years to address transnational organized crime generally and narcotics smuggling specifically. Our relationship with Mexican counterparts is stronger today than 

it has ever been and their officers face the same challenges and threats that CBP 

experiences. We receive information from Mexican authorities on a daily basis that 

helps us better target narcotics smugglers at the border. In 2016, CBP’s commissioner participated in a high-level bilateral and interagency security cooperation 

meeting in Mexico City, where senior Mexican officials committed to working with 

the U.S. Government even more closely—including expanding efforts to combat heroin cultivation, production, and trafficking, and sharing more information on smuggling routes and networks. CBP will continue to work in close cooperation with our 

counterparts in Mexico as we seek to identify, interdict, investigate, and prosecute 

TCOs. 

21 

CONCLUSION

CBP, through collaboration and coordination with our many Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, international government, and other partners, has made great strides in protecting the integrity and security of our borders. The investments over the years in 

our border security have been valuable and have helped shape the current border 

environment. Vulnerabilities have been addressed and this has led to the reduction 

of illicit activity in many areas along the border. CBP continues to maintain a vigilant watch on the changing dynamics of border security threats. 

With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our partners, 

will continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and 

interdiction capabilities to combat transnational threats and the entry of illegal 

drugs into the United States. Furthermore, through the JTFs, we will continue to 

work with the intelligence community and our law enforcement partners to improve 

the efficiency of information sharing with relevant partners, to guide strategies, 

identify trafficking patterns and trends, develop tactics, and execute operations to 

address the challenges and threats posed by TCOs to the safety and security of the 

American public. The establishment of JTFs marks a renewed commitment to seek 

out and coordinate optimal, multi-component authorities, capabilities, competencies, 

and partnership expertise to combat all threats to the homeland. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your 

questions. 


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Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Commander Beeson. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Allen for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW C. ALLEN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

FOR HSI INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS, HOMELAND SECURITY 

INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALLEN. Good morning, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the threats posed by 

transnational criminal organizations, and the efforts of the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle these criminal elements. 

Today I will provide ICE’s perspective on the sophisticated smuggling threats that we face on our Southwest Border, the approaches 

that lead up to our border, and what we do to address TCOs and 

their smuggling activities before contraband arrives at our borders 

and even once it makes it to the interior of the United States. 

I have brought with me today a troubling graphic that represents 

the interagency assessment of the areas of influence of the major 

Mexican transnational criminal organizations in the United States. 

I want to thank the Drug Enforcement Administration for sharing 

that and its use today. 

The Mexican cartels, notably Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation, 

Los Zetas, and the Gulf Cartels, stretch across and beyond the 

Southwest Border, operating through networks and loose affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across the United States. 

As many of you know first-hand, the Southwest Border is a very 

diverse environment with vast maritime and land border areas 

where the cartels have adapted their methods and the cargo to the 

local environment. 

From an operational point of view, this means that there is not 

a single strategy, tactic, or technology that will succeed in eliminating the smuggling threat on every part of the Southwest Border. 


h:\seals\115414.eps
29 

To give you a sense of the variety of smuggling challenges that 

we collectively face, it is important to start by talking about the 

specific drug threats such as heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. 

Mexican-produced heroin has become the most significant drug 

consumed in the United States. The purity of Mexican-produced 

heroin makes it marketable because it can be smoked or snorted, 

as well as injected intravenously. 

The Mexican cartels have also quickly added fentanyl to their inventory in response to the explosion of opioid abuse in the United 

States. The smugglers include fentanyl in contraband loads also 

containing heroin and our methamphetamine, reinforcing the poly 

drug nature of the cartels. 

Mexico is a transit country for South American-sourced cocaine, 

which is most exclusively seized at the ports of entry in modified 

compartments of privately-owned vehicles, or deeply concealed 

within commercial conveyance and cargo shipments. 

The majority of methamphetamine consumed in the United 

States is now produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals that 

come from Asia. Methamphetamine is almost exclusively seized in 

modified compartments of personally-owned vehicles. The secondmost common method of smuggling methamphetamine is by pedestrians. 

Last, marijuana which is cultivated by Mexican cartels, makes 

Mexico the largest foreign supplier of marijuana to the U.S. drug 

market. The majority of the marijuana seized by the DHS agencies 

is seized as it is being smuggled between the ports of entry. 

When marijuana is seized at U.S. ports of entry it is most often 

found concealed among commercial cargo. Recognizing that the border in Southern California is different than the border in Arizona, 

New Mexico, and Texas, the cartels adapt their smuggling methods 

to suit a specific area, blending into normal traffic in a given area 

in order to avoid law enforcement attention. 

The cartels conduct surveillance on law enforcement operations 

along the border, principally focusing on U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection operations at and between the POEs. 

As the Department changes its tactics and techniques or introduces new technology and infrastructure, the cartels adapt their 

operations to undermine our border security efforts. 

One of the major factors allowing the cartels to sustain their existence and proliferate is public corruption in both Mexico and the 

United States. The cartels rely on corrupt Mexican and U.S. law 

enforcement officials to operate and avoid seizures and arrest. 

In response to the smuggling threats along the Southwest Border, ICE has assigned more than 1,500 special agents and 150 intelligence research specialists to our Southwest Border offices. Additionally, ICE leads and participates in a number of task forces focusing on investigating this criminal element. 

Our relationship with Mexico has also proven to be an important 

partnership in the fight against TCOs. For example, taking down 

the cartels’ top leadership as evidenced by the recent extradition of 

Joaquin Guzma ́n Loera, aka El Chapo, demonstrates how binational cooperation can affect cartel leadership. 

30 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today 

and for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement 

mission. ICE is committed to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through the various efforts I have discussed today, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW C. ALLEN

FEBRUARY 16, 2017 

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members: Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss threats posed by 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and the efforts of U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, dismantle, 

and bring to justice these criminal elements. 

ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) leverages its broad authority, unique 

investigative tools, and global footprint to secure our borders. We work in close coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG) and many other domestic and international law enforcement and customs 

partners to target TCOs. Today, I will provide ICE’s perspective on the sophisticated 

smuggling threats that we face on our Southwest Border, the approaches that lead 

up to our border and some of what we do to address TCOs and their smuggling activities before contraband arrives at our borders, and even in the interior of the 

United States. 

THE CARTELS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

The primary TCOs that threaten the Southwest Border of the United States are 

Mexican Drug cartels (the cartels). Over the last decade the United States, working 

with our Mexican law enforcement and military counterparts, has had sustained 

success in attacking cartel leaders, as evidenced by the recent extradition of Joaquin 

Guzma ́n Loera, aka ‘‘El Chapo’’, to face prosecution in the United States. However, 

every law enforcement success against the cartels is challenged by the fact that the 

cartels are highly networked organizations with built-in redundancies that adapt on 

a daily basis based on their intelligence about U.S. border security and law enforcement. 

I have brought with me today a troubling graphic that represents the interagency 

assessment of where the various cartels in Mexico operate and the ‘‘approaches’’ or 

‘‘corridors’’ that each controls along the U.S. Southwest Border. Mexican cartels, notably Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation, Los Zetas, and the Gulf cartels, stretch 

across and beyond the Southwest Border, operating through networks and loose affiliations with smaller organizations in cities across the United States. The areas 

controlled by each cartel have evolved over time, often as a result of U.S. or Mexican 

law enforcement successes that have weakened cartel influence in certain areas, and 

as alliances between cartel leadership shifts over time. 

In addition to drug smuggling, another criminal threat that we face along our 

Southwest Border is human smuggling. One of the questions we are often asked is 

whether human smuggling organizations are part of the cartels or operate as distinct criminal enterprises. Based on HSI investigations and intelligence, it is our 

opinion that, although alien smuggling organizations pay taxes and fees to the cartels to smuggle in a specific geographic area, they are generally run as distinct 

criminal enterprises in both Mexico and the United States. Certain members of 

these criminal enterprises control the major drug markets and others control a portion of the border on behalf of their cartel. We believe that these drug cartel leaders 

and associates play a coordinating role in the immediate border areas, dictating 

when and where human smugglers will be allowed to cross the border. This coordination ensures human smugglers and their human cargo do not bring unwanted law 

enforcement attention, particularly in the United States, to their smuggling efforts. 

Our investigations have shown that when human smugglers do not heed warnings 

from drug smuggling organizations about where and when they smuggle, they can 

be targeted for physical violence, including murder, by cartel members. 

SMUGGLING TRENDS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

As many of the Members of this subcommittee know first-hand, the Southwest 

Border is a very diverse environment, starting with a maritime border in the Gulf 

of Mexico and on the Pacific Ocean that transitions to vast land border areas that 

31 

include rivers, rural agricultural lands and densely populated urban areas along the 

nearly 2,000 miles of our border. In response to these vastly different areas, the cartels adapt their methods and cargo to the smuggling environment. From an operational point of view, this means that there is not a single strategy, tactic, or technology that will succeed in eliminating the smuggling threat on every part of the 

Southwest Border. 

Mexico is a major source and transit country for illicit drugs destined for the 

United States, including marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and, more 

recently, fentanyl. Intelligence reports indicate that Mexico is not only a source 

country for the production of fentanyl, it is also a transit country for fentanyl originating from Asia. Finally, in the last two decades, Mexico has also become the largest transit country for South American-sourced cocaine destined for the United 

States. 

As a result of Mexico’s dominant role as either a source or transit point for illicit 

drugs destined for the United States, it has also become a primary destination for 

the illicit proceeds that the cartels earn from the distribution networks in the 

United States. Mexican cartels use a variety of techniques to repatriate illicit proceeds, from bulk cash smuggling to sophisticated trade-based money laundering 

schemes. Many of the more complex techniques rely on third-party money 

launderers and corrupt financial institutions. 

To give you a sense of the variety of smuggling challenges that we collectively 

face, it is important to start by talking about the specific drug threats, smuggling 

methods, and modes used across the spectrum of the Southwest Border. 

Heroin 

Mexico has become the most significant source of heroin consumed in the United 

States, and according to the 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, the 

U.S. Government estimated that Mexican cartels’ potential production of heroin was 

70 metric tons in 2015, a 66 percent increase from 2014. The purity of Mexicanproduced heroin has also increased over time, making it more marketable because 

it can be smoked or snorted as well as injected intravenously. 

Fentanyl 

The Mexican cartels have quickly added fentanyl to their smuggled drugs in response to the explosion of opiate abuse in the United States. Based on recent seizures it has been learned that smugglers are mixing fentanyl in contraband loads 

also containing heroin and/or methamphetamine, reinforcing the poly drug nature 

of the cartels. While U.S. law enforcement continues to assess how much of the 

fentanyl market in the United States is supported by Mexican-sourced fentanyl, the 

size of individual seizures and the proximity of Mexico to the U.S. drug market is 

a troubling sign. 

Cocaine 

Mexico is a transit country for South American-sourced cocaine. Cocaine is almost 

exclusively seized at Ports of Entry (POEs) in non-factory compartments of privately-owned vehicles (POVs). Alternatively, the cocaine may be deeply concealed 

within commercial conveyances and cargo shipments. 

Methamphetamine 

The majority of methamphetamine consumed in the United States is now produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals from Asia. Methamphetamine is almost 

exclusively seized in non-factory compartments of POVs. The second most common 

method of smuggling methamphetamine is by pedestrians who secrete it on their 

bodies or within body cavities. Methamphetamine is seized in both crystalline and 

liquid forms. 

Marijuana 

As I mentioned earlier, the Mexican cartels cultivate marijuana, with Mexico 

being the largest foreign supplier of marijuana to the U.S. drug market. The majority of the marijuana seized by DHS agencies is seized as it is being smuggled between the POEs. When marijuana is seized at U.S. POEs it is most often found concealed among commercial cargo shipments. 

Southwest Border Smuggling Methods and Related Challenges 

Recognizing that the border in Southern California is different than the border 

in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the cartels adapt their smuggling methods to 

suit a specific area. The unifying goal of all smugglers is to try to blend into normal 

traffic in a given area in order to avoid law enforcement attention. On a daily basis 

the cartels conduct surveillance of law enforcement operations along the border, 

32 

principally focusing on CBP operations at and between the POEs. As the Department changes its tactics and techniques, or introduces new technology and infrastructure, the cartels adapt their operations and probe our border security to determine the best way to accomplish their goals. 

Land Ports of Entry 

At POEs along the Southwest land border, smugglers use a wide variety of tactics 

and techniques for concealing drugs. Our special agents work every day with CBP 

officers from the Office of Field Operations to identify, seize, and investigate drug 

smuggling organizations that attempt to exploit POEs to introduce drugs into the 

United States. Within the POE environment there are three distinct threat areas 

exploited by the cartels: Pedestrians; POVs; and Commercial Cargo. Pedestrians are 

primarily used to smuggle cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine on or within their 

bodies. POVs are used to smuggle cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and 

marijuana, often using deep concealment methods like non-factory compartments, 

gas tanks, and other voids. At Commercial POEs, the cartels utilize commercial 

tractor trailers to commingle narcotics with legitimate commercial goods or to conceal the narcotics within the tractor trailers themselves. 

The cartels also attempt to exploit CBP programs that facilitate the expedited 

entry of travelers and cargo into the United States. CBP seizures and ICE investigations have documented smuggling organizations’ attempts to exploit the Secure 

Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) and Free and Secure 

Trade (FAST) Programs. 

The cartels also use spotters/scouts and counter-surveillance techniques both at 

and between the POEs in order to increase their chances of success in smuggling 

ventures. Spotters/scouts watch and report on border law enforcement activities. 

Between the Ports of Entry 

The cartels use the areas between the POEs primarily to smuggle marijuana in 

bulk. In these areas, the cartels use a variety of techniques that are tailored to the 

terrain and other environmental factors. In Texas, the Rio Grande River creates a 

natural barrier that poses unique challenges for the U.S. Border Patrol. 

Outside of urban areas along the land border, one tactic used by the cartels is 

vehicle incursions, or ‘‘drive-throughs,’’ whereby smugglers breach the border by either going over or through border fences. Smugglers move vehicles over the fence 

using ramps or, on more rare occasions, lift vehicles over the fence using cranes. 

Going through the fence involves cutting fence panels and lifting them up or creating a gate in the fence allowing a vehicle to pass through. Vehicle incursions often 

rely on networks of scouts that are staged on the area’s highest points to warn them 

of U.S. Border Patrol or other law enforcement presence. 

In areas where the cartels cannot conduct vehicle incursions, they have experimented with ways to throw or launch marijuana bundles over the fence to co-conspirators waiting in the United States. Recently, we have seen cartel attempts to 

use air or propane cannons to launch bundles of marijuana weighing more than a 

hundred pounds over the border fence. 

Another tactic cartels use in remote areas between the POEs is to have backpackers carry bundles of marijuana on their backs using improvised backpacks 

made of burlap or other materials. Backpackers often travel in groups and have 

been known to travel for days before getting to pre-designated locations where they 

are picked up by other members of the organization in the United States. 

Smuggling by general aviation aircraft from Mexico has not been a significant 

threat since the late 1990’s. However, in the last decade we have seen the cartels 

experiment with the use of ultralight aircraft to smuggle marijuana in Arizona and 

eastern California. More recently we have also seen the cartels experiment with the 

use of small recreational drones to smuggle very small quantities of drugs, often just 

a couple of pounds. 

In 1990 the first cross-border tunnel was discovered in Douglas, Arizona. Since 

that time a total of 194 tunnels (both completed and in progress) have been located 

along the Southwest Border, primarily in Arizona and Southern California. The discovery of illicit subterranean tunnels is evidence that smugglers are moving away 

from traditional smuggling techniques due to enhanced law enforcement efforts. In 

recognition of the significant smuggling threat present in Arizona and San Diego, 

ICE leads two Tunnel Task Forces in San Diego and Nogales under the auspices 

of the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Program, described in more 

detail below. 

Maritime Smuggling 

As infrastructure, technology, and staffing have been added to the border in the 

San Diego area, we have seen an increase in maritime smuggling of marijuana from 

33 

Mexico to California coastal areas north of San Diego. The cartels use pleasure 

boats or small commercial fishing vessels known as ‘‘pangas’’ that are able to 

achieve relatively high speeds under the cover of darkness to attempt to evade detection by CBP and USCG surface patrol vessels and patrol aircraft. Bulk quantities 

of cocaine are seized along the maritime approaches to our border during the transportation phase through either the Eastern Pacific Ocean or the Caribbean Sea 

prior to being broken down into much smaller loads for transport along land routes 

through Central America and Mexico. 

Corruption 

One of the major factors allowing the cartels to sustain their existence and proliferate is public corruption in both Mexico and the United States. In Mexico, the 

cartels rely on corrupt Mexican law enforcement and other public officials at every 

level of government to operate. U.S. law enforcement is not immune to corruption 

by the cartels, who have used corrupt law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE, and 

other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to avoid seizures and arrests. 

ATTACKING TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS (TCO S)

In response to the smuggling threat along the Southwest Border, we have assigned more than 1,500 special agents and almost 150 intelligence research specialists to our Southwest Border offices. 

In fiscal year 2016, HSI drug smuggling investigations conducted by the five HSI 

Special Agent in Charge Southwest Border offices resulted in 5,659 criminal arrests, 

3,941 indictments, 3,383 convictions, and 330 administrative immigration arrests. 

We have continued to collaborate with our partners in Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement agencies to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the cartels. The following is a list of the various initiatives we use to combat TCOs: 

DHS Joint Task Forces 

In 2015 the Secretary of DHS created three Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to address 

the smuggling threats identified in the Southern Border and Approaches Campaign 

Plan. Two of the JTFs, JTF–East (JTF–E) and JTF–West (JTF–W), are geographically-focused task forces that concentrate on the southern land and maritime border 

of the United States and the approaches to our border all the way to Central and 

South America. HSI has provided Senior Executives to serve as the Deputy Directors of JTF–E and JTF–W, as well as staff-level support in the JTF–E and 

JTF–W Joint Staffs. 

ICE has been designated as the executive agent for the third Joint Task Force, 

Joint Task Force Investigations (JTF–I), with other DHS components supporting. 

JTF–I is a joint, integrated, ‘‘functional’’ task force that has the responsibility of targeting top-tier criminal investigations and supporting JTF–E and JTF–W. The success of JTF–I in these diverse environments depends upon a high level of cooperation among HSI and our Federal, State, local, and foreign partners in consolidating 

resources and leveraging unique international maritime authorities in combating 

TCOs. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) 

Our BEST units employ a threat-based/risk mitigation investigative task force 

model that recognizes the unique resources and capabilities of all participating law 

enforcement partners. This model enables each unit to apply a comprehensive approach to combating TCOs, while recognizing the distinctive circumstances and 

threats facing the various border environments, be it land borders, seaports, or airports. Additionally, BEST units are designed to incorporate other DHS-partner 

agencies, including CBP and the Transportation Security Administration, and are 

vehicles for establishing unity of effort, the cornerstone of a successful DHS mission. 

BEST units further solidify HSI’s role as the primary investigative entity for DHS. 

We continue to expand the BEST program, which currently operates in 44 locations throughout the United States. BEST leverages more than 1,000 Federal, State, 

local, and foreign law enforcement agents and officers representing over 100 law enforcement agencies. BEST also provides a co-located space that allows for collaboration in conducting intelligence-driven investigations aimed at identifying, disrupting, and dismantling TCOs that operate in the air, land, and sea environments. 

In fiscal year 2016, the BEST program accounted for 3,710 criminal arrests, 991 administrative arrests, and prosecutors obtained 2,248 indictments and 1,923 convictions. 

34 

Money-Laundering Efforts 

The cartels move illicit proceeds, hide assets, and conduct transactions globally. 

Among the various methods cartels use to transfer and launder their illicit proceeds 

are bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, funnel accounts and professional money launderers, and misuse of money service businesses (MSB) and emerging payment systems. The cartels exploit vulnerabilities in the financial system and 

conduct layered financial transactions to circumvent regulatory scrutiny, which presents difficulties for authorities attempting to distinguish between licit and illicit 

use of the financial system. HSI has refined our ability to target money-laundering 

and financial violations through various techniques, to include interagency investigations, training and capacity-building, targeted financial sanctions, and direct engagement with at-risk financial institutions and jurisdictions. 

U.S. Anti-Money Laundering laws and regulations impose customer identification, 

recordkeeping, and reporting obligations on covered financial institutions that help 

deter criminals from moving illicit proceeds through the financial system. These preventive measures also create valuable evidentiary trails for law enforcement to employ during an investigation. As such, HSI has an abundance of investigative tools 

in our arsenal to disrupt and dismantle cartel money laundering operations as well 

as to discourage new actors from engaging in illicit activity. 

Our National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC), located in Burlington, 

Vermont, generates long-term, multi-jurisdictional bulk cash investigations by analyzing incident reports and conducting intelligence-driven operational support to 

field offices. When contacted by Federal, State, and local law enforcement for support, the BCSC assists that jurisdiction as much as possible by engaging the full 

scope of its law enforcement intelligence data sources and referring requests for assistance to local HSI field offices for immediate response. Since its inception in August 2009, the BCSC has initiated or substantially contributed to over 1,428 investigative leads, which have yielded 1,182 criminal arrests, 747 indictments, 546 State 

or Federal convictions, and seizures of bulk cash totaling over $326.5 million. 

HIDTA—High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces 

The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program was initiated in 1990 

by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in order to designate certain 

geographical areas as having especially high concentrations of drug trafficking activities such as distribution, transportation, and smuggling. The HIDTA Program 

provides these areas with Federal funding, which supports coordinated law enforcement counter drug efforts. 

The ONDCP designates geographic areas as HIDTAs and allocates Federal resources to establish formal cooperative law enforcement efforts between local, State, 

and Federal drug enforcement agencies. HSI, using its combined immigration and 

customs authorities, leads several HIDTA initiatives along the Southwest Border. 

The OCDETF Program allows our Special Agents to partner and collaborate in 

investigations using our unique and far-reaching authorities to enforce and regulate 

the movement of carriers, persons, and commodities between the United States and 

other nations. We have dedicated personnel on all 11 OCDETF co-located Strike 

Forces. These Strike Forces logically extend the OCDETF program beyond the creation of prosecutor-led task forces that join together on case-specific efforts and then 

disband at the end of the investigation. Now, permanent task force teams work together to conduct intelligence-driven, multi-jurisdictional operations against the continuum of priority targets. We also participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center, 

which support investigations of TCOs through interagency coordination. 

International Partners and Cooperation 

ICE HSI works closely with our Federal law enforcement and international partners to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. We have 63 offices in 47 countries and are 

uniquely positioned to utilize established relationships with host country law enforcement, to include the engagement of Transnational Criminal Investigative Units 

(TCIUs). These TCIUs are composed of DHS-trained host country counterparts who 

have the authority to investigate and enforce violations of law in their respective 

countries. Since our law enforcement officers working overseas do not possess general law enforcement or investigative authority in most host countries, the use of 

these TCIUs enables ICE to promote direct action in its investigative leads while 

respecting the sovereignty of the host country and cultivating international partnerships. These efforts, often thousands of miles from the U.S.-Mexico border in countries like Colombia and Panama, essentially act as an outer layer of security for our 

Southwest Border. 

35 

Working with Mexican Authorities 

Mexico has proven to be an outstanding partner in the fight against TCOs, taking 

down the cartels’ top leadership and helping in efforts to dismantle these organizations. ICE’s attache ́ Office in Mexico City is the largest ICE presence outside of the 

United States. ICE has coordinated the establishment of TCIUs in Mexico comprised 

of Mexican law enforcement officers. Through our attache ́ in Mexico City and associated sub-offices, HSI assists in efforts to combat transnational drug trafficking, 

weapons smuggling, human smuggling, and money-laundering syndicates in Mexico. 

ICE attache ́ personnel work daily with Mexican authorities to combat these 

transnational threats. Additionally, ICE—along with other DHS components—actively works through the Department of State to provide training and technical assistance to our Mexican counterparts. The spirit of collaboration and joint effort between DHS components and our counterparts in Mexico is unprecedented. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission. ICE is committed to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through the various efforts I have discussed today. I appreciate your interest in these important issues. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you Mr. Allen. 

The Chair now recognizes Ambassador Arreaga for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LUIS E. ARREAGA, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ARREAGA. Thank you very much. Chairwoman McSally, 

Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to 

discuss the Department of State’s efforts to combat transnational 

organized crime in the Western Hemisphere. 

With your permission, I have a formal statement which I would 

like to submit for the record. 

As this committee knows well, transnational crime undermines 

our border security, inflicts harms in our communities and threatVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH

h:\seals\115415.eps
36 

ens the rule of law. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, which I 

have the honor to represent, leads our country’s efforts to combat 

crime overseas. 

We do this by supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies’ efforts 

to strengthen the capacity of partner governments’ criminal justice 

system. The fact is that we need strong and effective partners overseas to combat narcotics and production and trafficking. 

We advance our efforts through four partnerships, the Me ́rida 

Initiative, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, the 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and our long-standing partnership with Colombia. 

Under the Me ́rida Initiative, we are working to strengthen the 

capacity of Mexican institutions to identify, investigate, and dismantle criminal networks to uphold the rule of law and to protect 

our shared border. 

Since 2007, the United States has delivered nearly $1.6 billion 

in assistance. This includes inspection and detection equipment, 

which is now deployed along Mexico’s border, as well as training 

and equipping to enhance the capacity of Mexican officials to identify and dismantle clandestine drug laboratories and to carry out 

complex investigations of organized crime. 

Our investments, and I emphasize this, have fostered unprecedented collaboration between American and Mexican law enforcement authorities. In Central America, violence from gangs and 

other drug trafficking criminal networks are driving citizens to 

leave their home in search of safety, opportunity, and family living 

abroad. 

Many travel through Mexico in an attempt to reach the United 

States. Our programs in Central America help governments 

strengthen border security and fight narcotraffickers, transnational 

gangs, and human smugglers. 

In 2016, Central American security units, many of which are 

supported by U.S. law enforcement agencies, reported seizing over 

116 metric tons of cocaine. On the corruption front, Honduras fired 

nearly 2,000 corrupt police officers, while in Guatemala the attorney general is bringing corruption charges against former and current high-level government officials. 

In the Caribbean, approximately 10 percent of cocaine movement 

is destined for the United States transit region. Our program supports maritime interdiction by training and equipping law enforcement agencies in partner countries. In 2015, reported cocaine seizures in partner countries reached 24 metric tons, a 152 percent 

increase over the previous years. 

Let me conclude with Colombia. Colombia remains the world’s 

largest producer of cocaine and is the origin of approximately 90 

percent of the amount seized in the United States. 

In light of the troubling increase in coca cultivation since 2013, 

we know that we need to deepen our collaboration with our Colombian partners. The good news is that Colombia, with our support, 

has intensified their interdiction efforts. In fact, cocaine seizures 

increased 42 percent in 2016. 

37 

The Colombian government has been our steadfast partner in the 

fight against crime and narcotics since before the start of Plan Colombia in 1999. We are confident that this partnership will endure. 

Let me close by reiterating our commitment to continue working 

with our partner governments to protect our homeland. But it must 

be said that achieving lasting change will be neither easy nor 

quick. We are encouraged however by results to date and remain 

confident that a sustained investment will benefit the security of 

the United States. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, again, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Arreaga follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LUIS E. ARREAGA

FEBRUARY 16, 2017 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

work of the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to combat transnational organized crime and drug cartels 

in the Western Hemisphere. As this subcommittee knows well, the United States 

is deeply affected by crime and violence perpetuated by transnational criminal organizations, including drug cartels, whose smuggling networks undermine our border 

security, inflict harm in our communities, and threatens the stability of our allies 

in the region. Today, the trafficking by drug cartels of illicit fentanyl, heroin, and 

other opioids into this country is fueling a National epidemic with fatal consequences. The CDC reports between 2000 and 2015, the rate of heroin-related overdose deaths in the United States more than quadrupled. The impact of 

transnational crime is felt, too, by American businesses and financial institutions 

who suffer when crime disrupts legitimate commercial sectors, depriving workers of 

a level playing field to compete globally. The cartels that operate today are more 

fluid, more nimble, more diverse than ever before and effectively combatting them 

requires a comprehensive, committed, and well-coordinated approach. 

INL leads the Department’s efforts to combat transnational organized crime by 

strengthening the capacity of foreign governments’ law enforcement and criminal 

justice systems, combatting narcotics production and trafficking, and fighting corruption. Our efforts abroad complement those of, and are closely coordinated with, 

the efforts of our U.S. interagency colleagues, including those represented here 

today from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

INL does not approach today’s challenges at point zero. Decades of experience and 

lessons learned teach us that eradicating drug crops in Latin America, in and of 

itself, is not sufficient; it must be coupled with robust alternative development efforts in order to take hold over the long term. In addition, the growing threat of 

synthetic drugs like fentanyl—which are not produced from illicit crops—limits the 

effectiveness of eradication on today’s drug threat. Interdiction is critical to reducing 

the flow of drugs to our communities, but traffickers adapt quickly and shift their 

routes and methods. Taking down the leadership of cartels and other criminal organizations disrupts drug flows in the short-term, but also often exacerbates violence 

and leaves room for criminals to vie for power. To address these challenges, INL 

executes two mutually supportive lines of effort-building cross-border law enforcement cooperation and building stronger, more transparent criminal justice systems. 

To deny safe havens to criminal networks, INL assistance strengthens governments’ 

ability to enforce their laws and to serve as reliable, trusted partners to U.S. law 

enforcement. INL programming throughout the hemisphere, including in Mexico, 

Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean, is guided by this two-pronged approach, coupling law enforcement efforts to deny transnational criminal organizations the ability to operate, with building stronger, more accountable institutions 

that reduce corruption and bring criminals to justice. Building strong, effective institutions capable of confronting and stopping transnational organized crime before it 

reaches U.S. borders is a long-term endeavor that requires a sustained commitment. 

Cartel operations today present a complex set of national security challenges that 

38 

do not lend themselves to simple solutions but the strategic approach we have put 

in place provides a solid foundation for strengthening security over time. 

MEXICO

The flow of illicit narcotics across our shared border with Mexico threatens citizen 

security in both countries. Mexico is the primary source country for heroin and 

methamphetamine consumed in the United States and a key transit country for cocaine from South America. Since 2008, under the Me ́rida Initiative, the $1.9 billion 

appropriated for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 

funding has provided training, equipment, and technical assistance to complement 

Mexico’s much larger investment in building the capacity of Mexican institutions to 

counter organized crime, uphold the rule of law, and protect our shared border from 

the movement of illicit drugs, money, and goods. This includes more than $130 million in fixed and mobile non-intrusive inspection equipment and related detection 

devices provided at Mexico’s border crossings, checkpoints, and ports of entry, and 

for which CBP, USCG, and ICE provided training and technical assistance. INL provided over 500 canines to Mexican law enforcement and military units—many of 

which CBP helped to train—to ensure they have a vital, sustainable capability to 

detect, interdict, and deter the illicit movement of illegal drugs, cash, and other contraband headed for the United States. Under Me ́rida, INL works closely with ICE, 

CBP, the USCG, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to train and 

equip Mexican law enforcement officials to identify and safely dismantle clandestine 

drug laboratories used to produce methamphetamine, heroin, and synthetic drugs 

and to better track and prevent the shipping of precursor chemicals used to manufacture these drugs. From April 2014 to September 2015, Mexico seized over 1,346 

metric tons (MT) of marijuana (a 45 percent increase from this period 2013 to 2014), 

two MT of opium gum (a 43 percent increase), 26.5 MT of methamphetamine (a 74 

percent increase), 10.2 MT of cocaine (a 183 percent increase) and 653 kg of heroin 

and closed 272 clandestine laboratories (a 90 percent increase). Included in these 

statistics is 238.9 MT of illicit drugs Mexico seized using equipment and resources 

provided through the Me ́rida Initiative. Mexican security forces have also carried 

out a series of successful raids of methamphetamine laboratories in recent months 

and made significant arrests in confrontations with drug trafficking organizations. 

Our programs also strengthen the intelligence analysis and investigative capabilities of Mexican law enforcement agencies to carry out complex investigations 

against organized crime. Me ́rida provides equipment and training to Mexico’s specialized law enforcement units that combat kidnapping, money laundering, human 

trafficking, and narcotics trafficking. Strengthening these units diminishes drug 

trafficking organizations’ funding sources. Over $300 million of targeted assistance 

via Me ́rida supported Mexico’s reforms to its justice system across every facet of the 

criminal justice system, including police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections. When 

fully implemented, Mexico’s reformed accusatory justice system will more effectively 

reduce corruption and impunity and bring transnational criminals to justice. In coordination with Mexican authorities, Me ́rida programming continues to expand to 

address shared challenges. Our U.S. investment has fostered unprecedented collaboration with Mexico’s national security actors to address irregular migration and 

stem the flow of illegal drugs. In partnership with DHS, we are currently contributing $78 million to the development of a communications network and $75 million 

to a national biometric system to enhance the ability of Mexican officials to apprehend criminals and share critical information with U.S. law enforcement before a 

threat reaches the United States. We also partner with ICE and CBP to train and 

mentor Mexican migration and customs officials. Under Me ́rida, the United States 

is an essential partner in Mexico’s reform efforts to address criminal organizations 

and insecurity that affect Mexico and the United States. 

CENTRAL AMERICA

In Central America, gangs perpetuate violence and foster conditions that drive 

people to leave their homes in search of safety, opportunity, and family abroad, 

often traveling through Mexico in an attempt to reach the United States. Under the 

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) as part of our overall Central 

America Strategy, INL programs assist governments in their fight against narcotraffickers, transnational gangs, and human smugglers by assisting Central American nations in improving investigative and border security capacity. The result is 

a more stable and prosperous Central America. We are helping Central American 

governments seize record levels of narcotics and build justice institutions throughout the region which are strong enough to prosecute, convict, and imprison criminals. An estimated 90 percent of documented northbound cocaine movements transit 

39 

the Central America and Mexico corridor before reaching the United States. To target this threat, INL works with U.S. interagency and international partners to 

train, advise, and equip police task forces, vetted units, and maritime law enforcement. In 2016, Central American governments seized over 116 metric tons of cocaine. Many of the seizures were conducted by police units and security forces vetted or supported by INL, working in coordination with CBP, ICE, the DEA, and 

FBI. INL is also increasing its partnership with the USCG to more effectively interdict maritime routes often used to transport illicit goods. Corruption and limited 

partner government resources and capacity continue to pose challenges in the fight 

against narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, but we are seeing positive developments. In Honduras, an INL-supported police vetting program 

dismissed 1,946 corrupt officers, and is continuing to conduct investigations. In Guatemala, the Attorney General is bringing corruption charges against former and current high-level government officials. 

This is a unique moment in our relationship with these countries. Goverments in 

Central America are increasingly willing to work with the United States to arrest 

and extradite drug traffickers. INL will continue to leverage this strong political will 

to effectively target the most at-risk people and places, and to help the governments 

extend their presence and services. Drug trafficking is a major source of revenue 

for organized crime groups in Central America and irregular migration is again on 

the rise. INL is addressing the underlying conditions driving irregular migration 

through crime prevention and community policing programs, while strengthening 

border security, and disrupting human smuggling and trafficking networks to minimize the impact on the U.S. Government and Americans. 

CARIBBEAN

Approximately 10 percent of documented cocaine movements from the source zone 

to the United States transit the Caribbean. Through the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative (CBSI), INL supports countries with the training and equipping of vetted 

maritime law enforcement interdiction units. These efforts contribute to increased 

drug interdictions, particularly in the waters surrounding the Dominican Republic, 

helping to stop the flow of drugs before they reach the United States. Cocaine seizures in all CBSI countries increased 152 percent, from 9.6 metric tons in 2014 to 

24.3 metric tons in 2015. 

COLOMBIA

Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and is the origin of approximately 90 percent of the cocaine seized in the United States. As cocaine makes the 

long journey from Colombia to the United States, it fuels violence and instability 

as is passes through the transit zones of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Between 2013 and 2015, we witnessed a troubling increase in the amount of 

coca cultivated in Colombia—an increase of nearly 100 percent. Unfortunately, we 

expect this updward trend to continue. Working hand-in-hand with our Colombian 

partners, INL assistance supports the government of Colombia in its robust interdiction efforts against trafficking organizations and criminal networks on land and at 

sea; last year alone, the Colombian government reported seizing 421 metric tons of 

cocaine and cocaine base, a 42 percent increase over 2015, and the destruction of 

more than 4,800 drug labs. 

However, we must do more to combat the tremendous growth of coca cultivation 

in Colombia. Together with our Colombian partners, we must increase forced eradication and provide for crop substitution and robust rural development. Now, at a 

time the Colombian government is implementing a peace accord with the FARC, we 

have an important opportunity to work with the Colombian government on focused 

counternarcotics support. We understand they are reassigning police and military 

units to increase eradication of coca. To restrict the ability of transnational criminal 

organizations, narcotics producers and traffickers from continuing to operate in the 

rural regions of the country, we must also continue our long-term efforts to support 

the expansion of Colombia’s rule of law. The Colombian government has been our 

steadfast partner in the fight against crime and narcotics since before the start of 

Plan Colombia in 1999. We are confident that we will continue to effectively work 

together to tackle the considerable challenges before us. 

CONCLUSION

Achieving lasting change is not easy, nor quick, but INL has programs and partnerships that, over time and with concerted effort, work to keep us safer by 

strengthening the capacity of our foreign partners to combat transnational organized crime before it reaches U.S. borders. 

40 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you Ambassador Arreaga. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions and since we 

started late I am going to start off by yielding to my vice chair, Mr. 

Hurd from Texas, and I will go at the end of our colleagues. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Chairwoman. And to our esteemed panelists, appreciate you all being here today and for all the work that 

you and the men and women in your organizations do. I recognize 

the difficulty of the task. 

Admiral Ray, my first question is to you. In your opening remarks, you talked about how 30 percent of the intelligence is action 

on this high confidence intelligence. What would you need to get 

that number to 100? 

Admiral RAY. Sir, thank you for the question. I don’t know if we 

will ever get it to 100, but to raise it to the levels that we would 

like to see it, it is pretty straightforward. You need more Coast 

Guard cutters on the water and the package that goes with them, 

the airborne use of force helicopter, the overhead maritime patrol 

aircraft. 

When you raise that number—right now, our current numbers 

down in that transition region are about 6.0 cutter presence and 

usually we have four airborne use-of-force helicopters. So that is 

why we are able to action the 30 percent to raise it up. 

You double that and you would make a pretty good dent. That 

is why our off-shore patrol cutter program which is a recapitalization is so important for that. 

Mr. HURD. Can you give us some context of how it would—you 

know, let us say, you were able to double your resources. How long 

would it take to actually make that operational? 

Admiral RAY. Well, once we put the resources in theater, sir, the 

long pole in the tent is building the ships out. The first off-shore 

patrol cutters we have—with the support of the Congress, we have 

got it on our budget—or excuse me—on contract, and she will be 

commissioned in 2021. That is a fleet of 25. 

Now, there are more bills to pay on that, and that is why we appreciate your support in advance. Soon as they are commissioned 

we put them down range. That is our highest priority mission area 

or one of our highest. 

Mr. HURD. We have the folks? We have the people? 

Admiral RAY. Well, they would come with the ships, sir. We 

would be recruiting those and building the forces as the ships came 

on-line. 

Mr. HURD. Good. Copy. My next question is to Chief Beeson and 

Mr. Allen. My sense is that when it comes to, let us call it the 

ground war, we are having the opposite issue that we have on the 

seas, where the level of intelligence that is coming out of the TCOs 

and the groups operating from in Mexico and the rest of Central 

America can be increased. 

I have always said that when you look at the 19 criminal organizations that are operating in Mexico alone, that we are not making 

them a National intelligence priority. Do you disagree with that assessment? Would you like to see more NSA collection, more CIA 

collection on the threat in order to drive your operations? 

Chief Beeson, I will let you go first. 

41 

Chief BEESON. Thank you, Congressman. We do work with the 

intelligence community to get information. So my experience most 

recently has been as the chief of the Tucson sector and as the commander of that task force there in Tucson. 

We have been able to synthesize, if you will, if that is the right 

word, the intelligence that we received from the intelligence community and then take action against it. 

We work very closely with Homeland Security Investigations. 

They have personnel assigned to our facility where we handle that 

type of information. 

When there is an interdiction based on that type of information 

that we have been able to do parallel construction on and such, we 

will hand that off to them and they will, of course, take it to fruition with regard to the investigation. 

We are always looking for ways to improve on our intelligence capabilities and that is something that we continue to work at is to 

get better and better at the intelligence. 

Mr. HURD. Mr. Allen, what would be helpful to improve the intelligence collection? 

Mr. ALLEN. I would, you know, echo Chief Beeson’s comments. 

You know, we work on a daily basis with the intelligence community. No one is going to turn down any more assistance or more information. 

I think our biggest challenge, and I think what we, you know, 

what we are seeing in our investigations that we have that I think 

the ICE could really help us with is what I would call network 

identification and identifying the networks that are out there. 

More and more, I think the challenges that we face is the ability 

to kind-of illuminate the network and figure out and connect people 

and events in ways that we could use, you know, prosecution. 

I think, you know, there has always been a challenge in turning 

intelligence into evidence because in the end, you know, our primary focus is criminal investigations and our goal is to present 

cases for prosecution. 

While it is great to know and there is a not-so-fine-line difference 

between intelligence and evidence, in our world we need to be able 

to turn intelligence into evidence. 

Mr. HURD. Good copy. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking 

Member Vela for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you. 

Admiral Ray, just want to point out that your personnel have 

been tremendous over the last 4 years, as I have been on this committee. There is nothing like seeing it for yourself, and they have 

consistently worked with our office and reached out to show us 

what they do. 

I would just, you know, let you know that with respect to our 

newer Members, to the extent that you can do the same thing in 

the regions that they represent, that it is a very helpful experience. 

Thanks for everything you do. 

I think my first question is for Chief Beeson and Mr. Arreaga, 

and if you could comment, you referred to the eradication efforts 

in Colombia. 

42 

If you could maybe go first Chief Beeson, just generally summarize where we are with respect to eradication efforts in Colombia 

and the other two South American countries where we see cocaine 

production? Then maybe briefly comment on that as it pertains to 

poppy production in Mexico. 

Chief BEESON. So the Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, we are really working on the capability. So what we are doing 

is working to interdict the narcotics, the contraband, things like 

that, that are being smuggled across the border. 

We are not heavily involved in eradication and so—— 

Mr. VELA. So maybe this is a better question—— 

Chief BEESON [continuing]. I am going to punt to the State Department. 

Mr. VELA. Yes, I was going to suggest that. 

Mr. ARREAGA. Yes. On the issue of coca plantings in Colombia, 

indeed there has been a doubling of the area cultivated since 2013. 

This is the result of a number of factors. No. 1, there was a WHO 

report which the Colombian courts used to ask for the end of aerial 

eradication. That is one reason. 

Another very important reason is as our aerial eradication continues quite successfully, the coca planters took countermeasures to 

cultivate in areas where aerial eradication was made difficult, to 

plant it in areas where aerial eradication was not allowed. But for 

instance, some of the indigenous areas, some of the border areas, 

some of the mountain areas. 

Then the third factor is that we believe the FARC actually encourage farmers to plant, anticipating that perhaps there was 

going to be a peace process where coca farmers would be compensated for eradicating their crops. So those are the main reasons 

as to why there was an increase. 

Nonetheless, the Colombian authorities are very much committed 

to eradicate manually, to eradicate voluntarily. We are in very intense conversations with them to figure out how we can support 

those efforts. 

There is also the interdiction part, but that refers mostly to the 

actual action to produce cocaine. 

Mr. VELA. Well, and in the future, I think what I would like to 

do is explore that issue and compare eradication efforts in the 

other countries and, for example, pocket production in Mexico. 

But I will go ahead and move to my next question for Mr. Allen, 

but I think this is something perhaps probably deserving of a hearing in and of itself. 

But Mr. Allen, my question for you is how would you, with respect to our cooperative efforts in Mexico and with law enforcement 

in Mexico and the United States, how would you describe the State 

of that cooperative effort today? What would you like to see in the 

future? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think the one word answer is ‘‘good,’’ and I would 

expand on it by saying ‘‘growing.’’ You know, I talked earlier about, 

you know, our goal being criminal investigations and criminal prosecutions. 

The largest HSI presence outside the United States is actually 

in Mexico. That is where we have the largest number of agents deployed internationally. 

43 

I think if we are going to become more effective and impact the 

TCOs and the cartels in particular, we need to grow that presence 

and the relationships that we have with the Mexican Federal police, with Mexican customs, with the Mexican military, and 

ANOME in Mexico that focuses on migration through Mexico to the 

United States. 

So, you know, we have a good relationship, but we need to continue to work to grow it. 

Mr. VELA. Real quickly Chief Beeson, on the trends on the TCO 

chart of the influence of Mexican TCOs across the United States, 

I know it looks like the Sinaloa Cartel has quite a presence along 

the East Coast. Can you tell us about that? How do they extend 

that deeply? 

Chief BEESON. I have got to remember the button. It is through 

the use of networks. They are leveraging their networks, the transportation infrastructure. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

The Chair will now recognize other Members of the subcommittee for questions they have for the witnesses. In accordance 

with the committee rules and practice, I plan to recognize a Member present at the start of the hearing by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be recognized in order of arrival. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 

panel for being here today. Thank you for all the service that you 

have provided in the past and will in the future to keep our country safe. 

I want to shift the focus just a little bit though if I could? Admiral Ray, you know, we have talked a lot about the drugs and the 

harm that that brings to our country. But also, the United States 

Coast Guard interdicted several migrants from former Eastern Bloc 

countries in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. 

Could you please discuss how it is not just South and Central 

Americans that these cartels are smuggling into the United States, 

but also people from other countries? 

In addition to that, could you address the potential of foreign terrorists utilizing these cartels to utilize the maritime domain to gain 

entry to the United States and do us harm? 

Admiral RAY. Thank you, Congressman Rutherford. Thank you 

for your years in law enforcement service, sir. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you. 

Admiral RAY. It is an honor to take a question from you. The 

Coast Guard last year, we interdicted over 6,000 primarily Cubans 

at sea and they were in the straits of Florida and certainly in the 

eastern approaches to Florida. A few, a handful over on the West 

Coast, which was a big year. The biggest year since 1994. 

Like I say, it is primarily Cubans. With regards to what we call 

special interest aliens, those from countries associated with terrorism, small numbers in the maritime approaches right now. You 

know, less than 20 over the course, each year of the last couple of 

years. So not a great threat vector there at present. 

44 

However, to address your, kind-of, the real question is, are these 

transnational criminal organizations capable and would they? 

There is no doubt in my mind. 

They are sophisticated smuggling organizations, which start in 

the southern reaches of our hemisphere, and as the chief addressed 

and the graphics addressed, go all the way to New York City. They 

work for profit, and I don’t think they check passports before they 

pick people up. So I think they will do anything for a profit. 

We have not seen evidence of terrorist connections right now, 

Congressman. But I don’t think anybody is—we must maintain vigilance on that. So with that. 

With regards to people from other nations that are not special interest, sir, we get them. Just last week, we had a boat seized off 

of the Bahamas en route to the United States that had a dozen 

Chinese people on-board. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Well. 

Admiral RAY. So the tales of these migrants that come from all 

over the world trying to get to America, there are plenty of them. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. See, and I think the potential, Admiral, highlights the fact that Mr. Hurd brought up earlier about the gap that 

is created between our abilities now and the recapitalization of the 

fleet and your capabilities down the road. We certainly have a gap 

there. 

That is one reason I want to salute, Madam Chairman, the 

United States Navy who made the decision just yesterday to locate 

the MQ4C Triton Program in Jacksonville at the Mayport Naval 

Station, which will give us that unmanned aerial vehicle capability 

that I hope will certainly be used to fill some of that gap that was 

created when the Navy did away with their frigate program which, 

you know, certainly increased the gap. 

So, I bring that up to also ask, kind-of following up on Mr. 

Hurd’s question, I know that the President has made it clear that 

one of his top priorities will be rebuilding the Navy to 350-plus 

ships but I believe this effort also should include the U.S. Coast 

Guard. That is why I think you are here today. 

As Secretary Kelly told us during the full committee hearing, 

many of your ships are very, very old. In fact the Valiant in Jacksonville, I think, is 50 years old. But one of those ships—can you 

give us your—I know you talked about this a little earlier but, how 

long will it be before we get those 25? Is that wasn’t the 2019 you 

were talking about, correct? 

Admiral RAY. Yes, sir. Well, thanks for the question. The offshore patrol cutter, we have got them under contract now, and it 

is a multi-year contract. The first one is supposed to be commissioned in 2021. 

So we are maintaining our medium-endurance cutters. As you 

said, some of them, in fact, almost all of them are older than the 

parents of the young men and women that are serving on them. 

That is just kind-of a data point. 

So we have got other medium-endurance cutters that are averaging in the 35-year length. We will be able to stretch those out 

for another 15 years until we get on-board. That is why our offshore patrol cutter is so important to get back in service, or to get 

in service. 

45 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you. I certainly hope that the Triton 

program will be of great assistance to you as well. 

Thank you Madam Chair, and I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. This Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, gentleman, 

I appreciate your being here today. I represent Southern California. 

I am a father of four children. So to me, drugs and keeping that 

poison away from our children is top priority. I have been blessed. 

My children have avoided those scourges, but a lot of my neighbors 

have not. 

You know, drugs are something we can all agree on stopping 

from getting to our communities. Yet as I look at our Mexican border, when I was State senator I chaired the California Mexico Select Committee. You begin to realize the tremendous, huge trading 

partnership that we have with Mexico, our biggest or second-biggest trading partner that we have in the world. 

That border is the most traveled cross-border in the world. I have 

always advocated for smart borders, meaning you can check folks, 

you can check merchandise before it gets to the border so we can 

make sure things flow smoothly, effectively, and we stop the negativity. 

Vice Admiral Ray, you said something that really bothered me, 

and that is that you had intelligence on 500 events—500 events— 

and you did not have the assets to stop them from possibly reaching our shores. So I am going to repeat the same question that has 

been asked of you is, what do you need and where? 

As I look at that chart on the side, I look at those red lines. 

Given that Colombia is now at peace with FARC, I think those red 

lines are going to get thicker in the very near future. So where do 

you need those assets? Do you need them in the United States or 

do you need them somewhere in Latin America to stop all of that 

cocaine production from coming in to our shores? 

Admiral RAY. Thank you, sir. Those assets would be based in the 

United States, hopefully in one of your districts, and they would 

sail from there and go anywhere we need them. But primarily right 

now where we need them and where they could be most effective 

is in that area between South America and Central America. 

You know, that is a huge area. It is as big as the continental 

United States. So covering that is difficult. However, with the intelligence we have now that is what let us know who is out there. 

We know on a given morning, and we do this on a 24-hour cycle 

and we create these packages, and we know who is there, who we 

can get after. Of those, we literally had to let 580 of them—we 

couldn’t take a pass at them because we didn’t have sufficient assets. 

So as I have mentioned to Congressman Rutherford earlier, or 

Congressman Hurd about doubling down on the amount of assets 

we have in that transit zone, that is how you get after them. That 

is how you affect them. 

Mr. CORREA. So that would be your priority, sir, in terms of investment. 

46 

Mr. Allen, you also mentioned that you have a tremendous working relationship or a better working relationship with the Mexican 

government. 

A number of years ago I had the opportunity to go down to Mexico City and look at one of their central intelligence monitoring stations where they were looking at almost every vehicle coming 

across their Southern Border. That information would be digitalized, sent to Mexico City, and I presume that was sent eventually to Langley, Virginia. 

My question is what else do you need? What is it that we need 

to do to increase, enhance our partnership with Mexico to make 

sure that these drugs don’t reach our shores and our borders? 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, as I said, and I think, you know, building the 

capacity of Mexican agencies and, you know, increasing the rule of 

law in Mexico is a key part of that. Our role is a liaison role and 

increasing our footprint in Mexico and making sure that we can 

have good, productive relationships with our Mexican—— 

Mr. CORREA. So what do you need from us to do that? 

Mr. ALLEN. More people. You know, one of the things we haven’t 

talked about today is the, you know, the President’s Executive Orders which calls for 10,000 more ICE employees. Some of those, I 

think, if the Secretary gets his way, will be special agents. Our 

plan would be to deploy some of those outside the United States. 

So coming up—— 

Mr. CORREA. Outside the United States and within Mexico and 

other countries as well? 

Mr. ALLEN. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. CORREA. Final question to Chief Beeson. In terms of folks, 

people of interest, do you have a number of how many of those 

have been apprehended crossing the Southern Border versus the 

Northern Border? 

Chief BEESON. So when we talk about—we would use the term 

‘‘special interest alien.’’ We are looking at folks and their travel 

patterns, where they have been, that would lead us to have some 

concern about those individuals. 

So that is information that we do keep. I do not have it with me 

here today, so I would have to take that back for the record. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you. 

Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. The Chair now recognizes myself for questions. 

Chief BEESON. Director Allen, I mentioned in my opening statement a sophisticated drive-through operation that was recently broken up in Cochise County, Arizona. 

According to press accounts anyway, looks like they successfully 

smuggled large quantities of drugs through Arizona for years, not 

days or weeks or months, but for years before they were actually 

caught. 

These drive-through operations are something that I hear from 

my constituents and border residents often about. We have seen 

encrypted communication, you know, special code words, other tactics to avoid detection. 

The last breach that I personally saw on the border was where 

they used pretty sophisticated blowtorch and, you know, welding 

47 

equipment to be able to cut through, basically, a gate in the barrier 

with hinges. 

So they were able to prep that in advance through their spotters 

and scouts. They knew when they weren’t going to be detected or 

where they weren’t going to be detected. 

If you actually went by it, you wouldn’t be able to see the breach. 

But then at the time and place of their choosing, they open it up, 

put the ramp, drive through, shut it, and go through essentially 

undetected. 

So just giving that case study of them being able to conduct these 

operations for years in Cochise County, do you think this is the 

level of sophistication is like the new, you know par, this is the 

new normal for cartel operations? 

Are there additional tools or authorities that we need to give you 

in order to detect and interdict these types of operations so they 

don’t go on for years before they are detected? 

I congratulate them being rolled up and a number are being 

prosecuted right now, but, you know, what could we learn from it 

and do you need any additional tools or authorities? 

Chief. 

Chief BEESON. So we do have this phenomenon, if you will, of the 

drug trafficking organizations and their smuggling. They certainly 

are very sophisticated in their approaches. 

They have the benefit of time. So they have got plenty of time 

to wait and seek the right opportunity to engage in their illegal activity. 

They use scouting networks, as you have mentioned. They utilize 

encrypted communications. They are utilizing, of course, these vehicles, sometimes very rudimentary vehicles. It looks like a car carrier, and then they just use it to ramp over the fence. 

For us to combat that, we are continuing to work on situational 

awareness, making sure that we are improving our detection capabilities along the Southwest Border. 

Very critical for us to continue to engage with our law enforcement partners, certainly with Homeland Security Investigations to 

make sure that we are all sharing the same information, know 

about who the networks are, who is operating in the area. 

Then, of course, getting information from the intelligence community that is going to provide us with the pre-event intel so that we 

can take action against these folks as they are—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Are there any, and I know we have been out there 

visiting. Are there any additional tools specifically related to or authorities related to intercepting or cracking the encrypted comms? 

Or you know, we introduced a bill last Congress related to the 

scouts, that oftentimes, when you roll them up, you can’t prosecute 

them for anything unless you can tie them to a specific drug load. 

So we made that a Federal crime. It didn’t make it into law, but 

we are going to keep pushing that issue. But are there any additional tools or authorities you would need in order to get out in 

front of their decision loop and their techniques? 

Chief BEESON. So we have had some success against scouts. As 

you mentioned, we have been able to prosecute some of them. It 

does require some effort, right? I mean, good solid police work to 

48 

sit there and investigate and do that. We are certainly happy to do 

that and do that very well, I think. 

We have been having what I think is a really good relationship 

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in terms of being able to present 

these cases and for them to take a prosecution on individuals that 

really don’t have any narcotics with them but they are still able to 

prove conspiracy and take those cases. 

We are going to continue to plug away on technology, certainly 

on the tactical infrastructure, the barriers, and we need to keep applying those things to really improve the situational awareness 

that we need along the border. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. You know, the one thing I would add to Chief 

Beeson’s picture there is the foreign piece. There was a very good 

example last year, just south of your district, or in your district but 

on the Mexican side where by having a good relationship with our 

Mexican counterparts we were able to make sure that the border 

was not actually a barrier. 

When we had information about a failed drive-through or a 

drive-through that had been thwarted, we were able to cue Mexican law enforcement to go and take law enforcement action on the 

Mexican side. 

I think that is another piece that we need to continue to work 

on to make sure that, you know, when we do develop intelligence 

about a drive-through, you know, if we can’t action that on the U.S. 

side of the border we can action it on the Mexican side. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Can I follow up on that? In all of your testimony, most of your testimonies, you talked about better coordination with authorities in Mexico, yet endemic corruption, you know, 

through their government and law enforcement. 

How do you balance those two and cooperating but not tipping 

them off related to the elements of corruption that would be involved in your partner agencies? 

Mr. ALLEN. I will start on that. Some of it, you know, first of all, 

you have to go in with your eyes wide open. You have to, you know, 

acknowledge right up front that corruption is a challenge. But 

some of it comes down to who you talk to and where and at what 

level of government. 

Our best relationships are often in Mexico City away from the 

border. As an example, to kind-of demonstrate how important that 

can be, last year HSI and CBP and State and local law enforcement authorities in Arizona did a somewhat unprecedented operation in which we identified targets in northern Sonora that we 

had—or indictments on, in the United States and we wanted to go 

get. 

We enlisted the support of the Mexican Federal Police and got 

them to send more than a hundred law enforcement officers and 

stage on the U.S. side of the boarder, in Arizona and conduct, 

frankly, an air mobile assault into Mexico from the United States, 

fully armed, coordinated amongst all the U.S. agencies from the 

State Department through all law enforcement very successfully. 

It was not compromised because we worked with, you know, 

U.S.-trained, U.S.-vetted law enforcement units that made that 

possible. I think that is the way we want to continue to move. 

49 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. I will have another round of questions, but my time has expired. 

So the Chair now recognizes Ms. Barraga ́n from California for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and thank you for being 

here today. 

I want to start with you, Vice Admiral Ray. There has been a lot of talk of building a wall on the Southern Border and investing $25 

billion or so in it. If that is done, do you think that is going to increase and shift more focus onto the seas and our maritime ports 

of entry? 

Admiral RAY. I think there is a highly likelihood of that, ma’am. 

You know, we found that when determined, illegal traffickers meet 

a hard barrier on the land then there is a percentage of them that 

will go to sea and try their hand there. 

We see it on both sides of the country when it comes to illegal 

smuggling and when it comes to human trafficking. So I think 

there is a reasonable potential for that. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. You also testified about if you had resources it 

may be a good place to put it in the seas between, I guess, the 

United States and Central and South America. 

What about, do you foresee any increased threats coming into the 

west side of the U.S. coast? Or is there a greater need down in that 

area—— 

Chief BEESON. Well—— 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N [continuing]. That you mentioned? 

Chief BEESON. We would do both, ma’am, in answer to your 

question. We have an on-going operation just south of Los Angeles 

between, well, from San Diego north, called Baja Tempestad, where 

we work with our partner agencies. 

We have had a big effect and quite a few seizures of marijuana 

trafficking going along there and illegal smuggling. We have been 

doing that on-going for the last 4 years. 

So that is an on-going right at our border, operation. When I talk 

about the down-range, further down closer to Central America, that 

is where we have the effect because that cocaine is bound for Central America where it causes all the unrest and criminal activity. 

It is just fuel for the fire there in those violent countries. That 

is what drives the young people out of there. That is why they 

show up on our border. So it is both of those. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Great. The last question I have is for everybody. 

We have been hearing a lot from—all the panelists talk about the 

importance of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, the importance of the 

role they play in helping us address and deal with the drug cartels 

and the criminal organizations. 

Yet we have been hearing from this administration lots of talk 

about building a wall, about having Mexico pay for the wall, even 

about talks of a possible tariff of 20 percent on Mexico. One of my 

concerns is all this talk is going to weaken the cooperation between 

the United States and Mexico, having us become more of a—less 

of a partner, I should say, between the two. 

Can you comment on what would be the impact if we had that? 

If we had the United States and Mexico weaken the cooperation, 

50 

what that will do on the impact to the drug cartels and us having 

the ability to fight that threat? 

Chief BEESON. So I will just say that, you know, I have been 

doing this job for a long time now, you know, over 30 years. It is 

certainly we have enjoyed throughout the course of that time what 

I think is a good relationship with the government of Mexico. That 

relationship has gotten better and better and better throughout the 

years. 

We have a number of operations, as the ones that Director Allen 

mentioned, we engage with local authorities on a regular basis to 

address border violence, to address cross-border communication so 

that we both understand what the threat is that is operating in 

that area because we both want a secure border. 

We look forward to continued relationship with the government 

of Mexico. It is important for us. What we are doing from a law 

enforcement perspective is paying dividends on the border security 

front. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Chief, so just so I want to make sure you answer 

my question, and that is, what will the impact be if there is less 

cooperation with the United States and Mexico? Because I understand what you are saying. I completely agree with you. 

My concern is that a lot of the rhetoric we are hearing from this 

administration only leads to less cooperation. I want to know what 

the harm will be on less cooperation to this fight, this very important fight, against the drug cartels and the criminal organization. 

Can you address what that impact might be? 

Mr. ALLEN. You know, I think the short answer is that it would 

hurt it. But I think, as Chief Beeson has mentioned, and I think 

our experience would illustrate as well, you know, we have weathered similar storms before in our relationships. Fortunately we 

deal very well, law enforcement to law enforcement, with our Mexican counterparts. 

So we have not seen any degradation in our relationship. I think 

we will be able to soldier on and make our way through it. 

Mr. ARREAGA. I agree with my fellow panelists. We have not detected any deterioration, but naturally we work on the basis that 

partner governments want to work with us. Without it, we couldn’t 

accomplish much. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Demings from Florida. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you very much, Chairwoman. 

To all of you, thank you so much for your service, but not just 

to you, but to the men and women who also serve with you. 

Mr. Allen, we have heard quite a bit of talk, and I do believe we 

have a very strong relationship with Mexico. I am thankful for 

that. But what about our working relationship with your counterparts in Central America? Could you talk a little bit about that? 

Mr. ALLEN. Absolutely. While we definitely have focused a lot on 

our relationship with Mexico, you know, HSI has attache ́ offices 

throughout Central America and into South America. A lot of the 

same relationships that we enjoy with our Mexican law enforcement counterparts we also share with our Central American and 

South American counterparts. 

51 

In my written testimony one of the things we talk about are our 

transnational criminal investigative units where we work cooperatively with U.S.-trained investigators from host countries that 

allow us to project our priorities and our authorities into the areas 

that provide that land bridge to the United States, whether it is 

drug trafficking or illegal migration. 

And we see those relationships as just as important as our relationships with our Mexican counterparts because, in the end, the 

further we can push out that border and identify bad things or bad 

people that are coming to the United States, the better off that we 

are by pushing out that border. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. What do you think can be done to better improve 

or enhance that relationship? You talked about the number of 

agents that you have on the ground in Mexico. What could be done 

to enhance that relationship in Central and South America? 

Mr. ALLEN. I would say continuing to help them build their capacity, you know, working with the Department of State, in particular INL, who often funds a lot of our relationships and that the 

U.S. training that we provide to our foreign counterparts is often 

funded through INL. 

So increasing that, the ability to help them improve their capabilities which, in turn, helps us protect our border is a key part of 

that relationship. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. OK. 

Chief Beeson, in previous years, many agents have complained or 

requested communication systems that would allow them to better 

communicate and share information with their law enforcement 

partners. Is this still a challenge for you? If so, what can be done 

to improve communications, intercommunications between those 

partners? 

Chief BEESON. We work, I think, very hard at improving relationships with our law enforcement partners. I mean, this is really, 

for us, we look at it as a whole-of-Government approach. We want 

to make sure that law enforcement agencies that are able to work 

with us on these border security issues, that we have got good communication. 

We will engage in task force operations with them. Oftentimes, 

those task forces are led by Homeland Security Investigations. We 

will—of course we do have car-to-car communications, you know, 

assuming that our radios are compatible. There are still from time 

to time, some challenges with compatibility on radios. 

Oftentimes we are able to overcome that now, especially nowadays with the advent of cell phones and things like that. Always 

working on ways to improve communication. 

We enjoy what I think is a very good relationship with the law 

enforcement community and something that we look forward to 

continuing in the years to come. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Have you had any challenges with the security of 

the communications? 

Chief BEESON. So our communications are encrypted and so we 

are continually assessing the viability of the encryption and looking 

forward to, you know, we want to make sure that they remain that 

way. 

52 

We do lose radios from time to time or they get stolen. Generally 

when that happens we are able to inhibit the radios and as long 

as we are aware that that has happened, but that is something 

that we are always looking at. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. OK. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentlelady yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Katko from New York for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KATKO. I appreciate the Chair for allowing me to come in 

and ask a few questions here. 

I want to thank the panel for being here. I started out my career 

as a Federal organized crime prosecutor in El Paso, Texas. I saw 

first-hand on the border the profound problems that we confront. 

I finished my 20-year career on the Northern Border. 

My concern, at times, is that, well, there is not enough attention 

being paid to the Northern Border. There have been some recent 

articles to that effect, that everyone is focusing on the Southern 

Border and no one is really paying attention to the Northern Border, at least from our standpoint. I am not saying law enforcement—from our standpoint. 

I can tell you, the Northern Border is largely a sieve. We have 

an Indian reservation in the northern district of New York that 

straddles both sides of the border and is involved in hundreds of 

millions of dollars a year, at a minimum, in cocaine and marijuana 

trafficking and smuggling of aliens. 

Many people view the Northern Border as far more vulnerable 

to a terrorist infiltration than the Southern Border. 

With that being said, I would just ask that at some point that 

the Chairman maybe schedule a hearing so we can dedicate an entire hearing to the Northern Border issues, because they are profoundly different than the Southern Border. But they do merit 

more attention. 

I am a Chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee for Transportation Security. As we saw this week, there are still gaping 

holes in the drug trafficking components at our airports. 

We saw a case in Puerto Rico that has spanned now more than 

a decade, and they smuggled more than 20 tons of cocaine onto aircraft from Colombia through Puerto Rico into the United States. 

That, to me, is a profound problem, and that is another border-type 

issue. 

So for Director Allen, as you are well aware of this instance, I 

would like to hear from HSI as to whether you have enough resources to fund these types of investigations at our Nation’s airports. That is not the first time we have had this at the airports 

with HSI, and I am concerned about that. 

Second, how can TSA or the FBI or other State and local partners better support your efforts? I don’t want FBI to be at odds 

with you, running separate investigations at airports. I want you 

to coordinate better with Homeland Security. So if you could answer that, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. ALLEN. Sure. Well, I will probably not talk about the Puerto 

Rico investigation since it is a pending prosecution. I am happy to 

53 

talk about what we often refer to as internal conspiracies, whether 

they be at airports or seaports and looking at that insider threat. 

You are correct. They present a tremendous challenge for law enforcement and everything from a counterterrorism point of view, 

the ability to get a firearm or other explosive device onto an aircraft by using an insider threat certainly falls well within the scope 

of our counterterrorism responsibilities at the Department. 

But from a drug trafficking point of view as well, we are well 

aware that drug trafficking organizations want to use that interState ability to move commercially to get their products from point 

A to point B. 

In terms to your question about resources and our ability to work 

on that challenge, the vehicle that we use for that is the Border 

Enforcement Security Task Forces. We have been expanding the 

BESTs, as we refer to them. We have now—— 

Mr. KATKO. Yes, I helped stand one up on Massena, New York 

before I left. 

Mr. ALLEN. Exactly, yes. So we now have four airport-focused 

BESTs, one of them in Puerto Rico, that are chartered to focus on 

that internal conspiracy threat. 

Our goal would be to expand them and increase the number of 

BESTs we have around the United States that can focus both on 

the physical land border, but also on other chokepoints, in this case 

in airports and seaports. 

Mr. KATKO. What about, I know FBI, for example, the FBI has 

headed up some major operations Nation-wide. The example was 

the Dallas-Fort Worth case where—that was a multi-airport case 

there. How would you, kind-of, make FBI’s efforts jibe with yours 

better, if you could? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think, for us, that all comes down to, you know, coordination and deconfliction. I think one of the things that I have 

seen change in my career, certainly accelerated after 9/11 and a 

huge transformation in Federal law enforcement, is the willingness 

and openness of agencies to coordinate and deconflict investigations. 

I think as long as all of us are doing that and we know that 

someone is working an issue and that if resources are needed from 

the Bureau or the Bureau needs resources from any of the DHS 

components, that we are standing by to do that. As long as we are 

talking and coordinating and deconflicting our investigations, we 

are on the right track. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. Very quickly, I have 20 seconds so I can’t 

help it, but I am going to have to ask a Northern Border question 

of the Vice Admiral, and that is the Shiprider Program which you 

use up on the Northern Border has been, I think, a very good success. 

You marry the Canadian law enforcement with American law enforcement. I think it is a good way to patrol the Great Lakes and 

the St. Lawrence as best you can. How is that program doing? Is 

there any discussion about possibly expanding it? 

Admiral RAY. As you stated, sir, that program is doing great. 

They have done about 900 boardings since that has been stood up, 

several arrests. It closes seams on the border with the Royal CanaVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:52 Sep 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0216\FINAL\26398.TXT HEATH
54 

dian Mounted Police who are real proud of it: St. Lawrence, Great 

Lakes, and also out in Puget Sound. 

What it needs is more people and that is really what it—you 

know, operations and maintenance money. There is not a—it is 

boarding team members, carrying a gun, being trained, and operating with the Canadians, and that is what we are short of. 

Mr. KATKO. I appreciate that, and hopefully we can have another 

hearing on this if the Chairman is so inclined. 

I just wanted to note two things for the record here. These are 

reports on FBI, two articles, one recently, titled ‘‘FBI Reports Show 

Terror Suspects Coming from Canada While Trump Stares at Mexico.’’ 

The other one is from The Daily Caller, another article about illegal refugees are now streaming across the Quebec/New York border. That was recently done this week. I ask both of them be entered into the record. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. JOHN KATKO

FBI REPORTS SHOW TERROR SUSPECTS COMING FROM CANADA WHILE TRUMP STARES

AT MEXICO

Jana Winter 02.07.17 1:13 AM ET 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/fbi-reports-show-terror-suspects-coming-from-canadawhile-trump-stares-at-mexico 

Documents reviewed by The Daily Beast show way more suspected terrorists encountered at the northern border than at the southern one. Why is Trump so eager 

to build a wall down there? 

Donald Trump keeps talking about the threat from the U.S.-Mexico border. But 

he may be looking in the wrong direction. FBI reports reviewed by The Daily Beast 

reveal that far more suspected terrorists try to enter the country from the northern 

border with Canada than from the south. 

Seven FBI Terrorist Screening Center ‘‘monthly domestic encounter reports’’ dating from April 2014 to August 2016 detail the number, type, and location of encounters with known or suspected terrorists across the United States. The encounters 

are based on information in various watchlist databases. In all seven reports, the 

numbers of encounters at land border crossings were higher in northern states than 

southern. 

‘‘We are looking the wrong direction,’’ said a senior DHS official familiar with the 

data. ‘‘Not to say that Mexico isn’t a problem, but the real bad guys aren’t coming 

from there—at least not yet.’’ 

On Monday, press secretary Sean Spicer told reporters he would not disclose evidence behind the President’s claims that jihadis are ‘‘pouring’’ into the country. ‘‘I’m 

not going to get into specific information that the President has,’’ he said. 

The FBI reports obtained by The Daily Beast provide data on known or suspected 

terrorists attempting to enter the country, or who are already in the United States. 

These reports show hundreds of watchlisted passengers encountered on domestic 

flights—meaning they are already in the country—and a smaller percentage crossing the border over land. 

Those encounters are reported back to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center and 

used to compile the monthly domestic encounter overview reports, which are classified ‘‘Law Enforcement Sensitive.’’ 

Newly installed Department of Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly traveled 

to Texas last week to survey the border in the Rio Grande Valley with local law 

enforcement. He is scheduled to testify Tuesday morning at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on threats to the southern border. 

But the FBI data shows concerns about terrorists crossing into the U.S. from Canada may be a more immediate concern, or is at least worthy of considerable attention, according to border and Congressional officials. 

55 

‘‘We often hear about security concerns on the southern border, but bad actors intent on entering our country will always seek the path of least resistance, so we 

must have the necessary tools and resources to secure both the northern and southern borders,’’ Sen. Gary Peters (D–MI) said in a statement to The Daily Beast. 

In August 2016, for example, more than twice as many watchlisted individuals 

were encountered at land border crossings in northern U.S. border states than in 

all states on the Mexican border combined. 

The reports do not say whether the land border crossings were attempts or successful entries into the United States. (Being watchlisted does not necessarily prevent you from entering the country.) The people documented in these encounters 

can include people holding valid visas, applying for asylum, or caught between ports 

of entry by U.S. law enforcement. 

From Aug. 1 to Aug. 31, 2016, the Terrorist Screening Center recorded 538 encounters with known or suspected terrorists in the U.S. or at its borders. That includes incidents on domestic and incoming international flights, at land and maritime border crossings, during law-enforcement investigations, at Customs and Border Protection inland checkpoints, and in the process of administrative work including vetting for visa and refugee applicants. 

Of those, only 68 happened at land borders. Michigan alone had 26 such encounters; New York had 17. Arizona and Texas had none at all—even Vermont and 

Washington state had more—and California had 19. 

FBI Terrorist Screening Center monthly reports from 2014 and 2015 tell a similar 

tale. New York, Michigan, and Washington have the most encounters with suspected terrorists at land border crossings. North Dakota and Vermont encounter one 

or two per month on average. The numbers at the southern border were comparatively small. In April 2014, for example, there were 12 border encounters in California and Texas combined and 17 in Washington, New York, Michigan, and 

Vermont. In the same month the following year, southern states reported two encounters; northern states: 18. 

In some months, some southern states had higher encounter numbers overall, but 

fewer at land border crossings. 

In April 2014, for example, there 141 encounters overall in California, but just 

five at the land borders. (New York, by contrast, had 154 overall and seven at the 

land border.) 

‘‘So often there’s just talk about the southern border, but we can’t ignore the 

northern border,’’ Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, a North Dakota Democrat, said in a statement to The Daily Beast. ‘‘When I brought then-Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas to Pembina, North Dakota, we heard about issues ranging from recruiting and retaining quality border patrol workers to inefficient or out-of-date 

technologies.’’ 

(The Department of Homeland Security referred requests for comment to Customs 

and Border Protection headquarters, which did not respond to The Daily Beast.) 

Canada Embassy spokesperson Christine Constantin told The Daily Beast in a 

statement ‘‘it is relevant to note that no terrorists have ever been successful in attacking the United States coming through America’s northern border.’’ Constantin 

also highlighted ‘‘robust security measures’’ on the border including integrated U.S.- 

Canada law enforcement teams. 

A new threat assessment report by the Texas Department of Public Safety, released just days before Trump signed his refugee and immigration executive order, 

describes terrorists’ potential use of existing Latin American human-smuggling 

routes that ‘‘have long transported Syrians, Iraqis, and other immigrants from countries where terrorist groups operate to our land border with Mexico, where they 

often seek asylum too,’’ sometimes fraudulently. It does not say this network is currently being utilized in this fashion. (In fact, this report and others say that the 

more pressing issue may be terrorist sympathizers crossing the U.S. border into 

Mexico—a dozen of whom have been arrested over the last four years—to evade the 

U.S. no-fly list as they make their way to joining ISIS overseas.) 

This DPS report is being widely circulated among White House and Congressional 

policy makers close to the administration, Congressional, White House, and border 

security officials said. And it is being relied heavily upon for immigration-related 

policy decisions. DHS Secretary Kelly met privately with the Texas DPS last week 

to discuss aspects of the report. 

But Aaron Heitke—U.S. Border Patrol Grand Forks sector chief patrol agent, who 

oversees all Customs and Border Protection activities in North Dakota, Minnesota, 

Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, South Dakota, and Nebraska—thinks all the attention to the southern border may be a bit myopic. 

56 

After all, the northern border is the longest land border in the world, stretching 

5,525 miles and 120 border crossings. The U.S. shares 1,933 miles with Mexico, according to information on CBP’s website. 

In an interview with The Daily Beast, Heitke said the numbers of watchlist encounters have been consistently higher in northern states, though he said he’s seen 

more steady numbers than the sharp uptick suggested by the nationwide FBI reporting. 

‘‘It’s been reasonably steady,’’ he said. 

He and other border sources noted that the northern U.S. hosts more large immigrant populations that often come under scrutiny by federal authorities. For example, Minneapolis has a large Somali community; it can sometimes be more convenient for a passenger traveling from Somalia to Michigan to travel to Canada first, 

and then cross into the United States. 

He also stressed that the northern border doesn’t get as much overall traffic as 

the southern one, and border patrol efforts in the northern are aided by portions 

of near impossible to traverse terrain and a ‘‘fantastic’’ relationship with Canada. 

In contrast, a senior border official based in Texas said the increasingly hostile 

relationship with Mexico will only make securing that border more difficult. The official would not speak on the record, citing concerns over incurring the wrath of 

President Trump and the new administration from whom CBP is requesting vast 

increases in resources. The official was unaware of data contained in the FBI terrorist encounter reports. When asked if surprised that the number of encounters 

was higher on the northern border, the official said ‘‘yes, a bit,’’ before adding that 

this did not mean the danger of terrorists entering the U.S. from the south was any 

less. 

This official and Heitke both suggested that the attention from the President and 

in the press on the Mexican border could inspire an increase in future attempts to 

enter the country undetected through Canada. 

‘‘While all eyes are on Mexico the bad actors will take another look at Canada,’’ 

said the DHS official. ‘‘Unless you’re incredibly stupid you’re not going to try to 

sneak into the country where everyone is looking. You’d put on a coat and head to 

Canada.’’ 

Editor’s Note: This story was updated with a response from the government of 

Canada. 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. JOHN KATKO

ILLEGAL REFUGEES NOW STREAMING ACROSS QUEBEC-NEW YORK BORDER

Posted by David Krayden Contributor 12:23 PM 02/14/2017 

http://dailycaller.com/2017/02/14/illegal-refugees-now-streaming-across-quebecnew-york-border/ 

Despite all the media reports of refugees illegally entering Canada from the U.S. 

at remote Manitoba crossings, more are actually getting through along the QuebecNew York border—and it can be just as cold as the temperatures reported along the 

prairies that have sometimes induced frostbite. 

The Canadian Border Security Agency says Quebec is now the flashpoint for ‘‘asylum seekers’’ or double refugees who first entered the U.S. as refugees and are now 

fleeing there and trying to sneak into Canada over fears that President Donald 

Trump will have them deported. 

The numbers speak for themselves, with 42 asylum claimants showing up at the 

Quebec border last weekend alone and 452 for January—a 230 percent increase 

from the year before. 

RCMP spokesman Cpl Camille Habel told CBC News that he attributes the popularity of the Quebec border to its relative closeness to major U.S. cities like New 

York and Washington, D.C. and the fact that international airports are nearby. 

‘‘Bigger cities on each side can mean more people trying to cross here.’’ 

The ‘‘refugees’’ are deliberately crossing illegally so they can bypass the Safe 

Third Country Agreement, which is supposed to prevent people seeking asylum from 

choosing more than one ‘‘safe’’ destination when the flee their country of origin. The 

U.S. and Canada are both considered safe under this international legislation. But, 

paradoxically, the act only applies at legal border crossings; so double refugees are 

crossing illegally in order avoid their official refugee status from being questioned. 

Should refugees be stopped from crossing into Canada? 

57 

But the agreement only holds at official border crossings, so people crossing illegally into Canada are able to apply for asylum here, even if they arrived in the U.S. 

first. 

Julie Lessard, who specializes in business immigration law, told the CBC that the 

current illegal flow of refugee claimants that is spreading across the longest 

undefended border int the world is fast becoming the status quo. 

‘‘People are just trying to get better lives, so if the ban comes back in another 

form—and because of the insecurity that it all created—well definitely, there was 

an increase in the last couple of weeks of the number of people trying to cross the 

border,’’ Lessard said. 

‘‘I don’t see it ending at this point in time.’’ 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I look forward to working with you and the potential for future discussions on the Northern Border. 

OK. We are going into round two here. Vice Admiral Ray, as 

much as you can in an open setting, can you share some perspectives on increased sophistication of cartel activities in the maritime 

domain? 

We have heard about them armoring their engines to avoid being 

shot out, or using infrared technology, night vision devices, subsubmersibles, those types of things. Can you share some other examples of what you have seen of their evolving tactics and sophisticated technology? 

Admiral RAY. Yes, ma’am. I will have to think my way through 

what I can talk about in this setting, but they are, without a doubt, 

as all the panel members have said, they are an innovative, adaptive, agile organization. As you said in your opening statement, it 

is sophisticated operations. 

If you can buy it in the open market, they have got the funds 

to buy it. If it is anything that has to do with locating illicit goods, 

communicating via satellite, they are doing it and they get that. 

When it comes to their ingenuity on the maritime, it is really impressive that they can build in a ditch in the jungle in Ecuador a 

craft capable of sailing about the distances going from Florida to 

Washington State and carrying about 7,000 or 8,000 pounds of cocaine. I mean, that is pretty impressive. 

So incredibly innovative, incredibly resourceful, and so, that is 

what makes the problem so tough, they are adaptable. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. 

Chief Beeson, we talk a lot about situational awareness and 

operational control. So on the land border, there has been much 

discussion today about pushing the border south and disrupting the 

networks, and that is all an important part of the strategy. 

But as any sort of breaches come to the border, whether it is 

going to go over, through or under or around, you know, we have 

got to make sure we have got the situational awareness that those 

breaches are happening and then the ability to have operational 

control to intercept those breaches as close to the border as possible. We have had many discussions about this. 

In a previous hearing last Congress, Acting Chief Vitiello said 

that the situational awareness on the 2,000-mile Southern Border, 

if something breaches, if it moves, being able to see it real time is 

a little over 50 percent, 56 percent. 

Do you agree with that number? Has any of that changed? What 

do we need to do in order to increase situational awareness so that 

if something moves, you see it? 

58 

Chief BEESON. So Chief Vitiello, I think, was referring to deployment density, and that encompasses situational awareness among 

other things, how you are, you know, putting down your resources 

and things like that. 

From my perspective, that has gotten better. We have implemented integrated fixed towers in Nogales. As you know, we have 

got a system coming on-line in your district any day now, should 

becoming operational in Douglas. 

We have another system that will be going operational in 

Sonoyta in the very near future. Then let’s not forget the value of 

men and women in the Border Patrol, and certainly within Customs and Border Protection of the field office as well, being on the 

line and being able to observe and report what they are seeing. 

You know, the barriers that we have deployed and that we will 

continue to deploy, the technology that we have deployed. All of 

that has to have a response element built into it, and that is the 

men and women. 

So we need to make sure that we are continuing to deploy personnel, and certainly our objective is to get them down as close to 

the border as possible. 

Obviously, we want to push it south. We would like to get the 

traffic before it ever gets to us. Absent our ability to do that, we 

want to get it at the border. 

But then we do not want the border to become a single point of 

failure, and so we do need to be able to respond appropriately 

should something get past us on the line. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, Chief. Additionally, we have talked a lot 

about the strategy of defense-in-depth in the rural areas, like my 

community, where we have fixed checkpoints which still—no real 

measurements of effectiveness there, but just really allowing the 

cartels to traffic through communities for hours, days, miles, you 

know, before they are potentially intercepted, which is a public 

safety threat. 

As we are coming with a, you know, new leadership, is there 

going to be a fresh look at that strategy and trying to, you know, 

push closer to the border as opposed to where we have had, you 

know, almost 50 percent of the interceptions in the Tucson sector, 

as you know, are north of 5 miles from the border. There are a lot 

of people who live in that area. That is a continuous public safety 

concern. 

Chief BEESON. So we are constantly assessing our strategy and 

looking for ways to improve upon it. As I mentioned, our objective, 

really, we want to work and push the border south as far as we 

can. 

I think we have had some pretty good success stories, a couple 

of which Director Allen mentioned here today. Working with the 

government of Mexico to really get some of these bad things before 

they are even crossed into the United States. 

We are continuing to deploy the men and women down to the 

border with the objective that we are going to make the arrests as 

close to the border as possible. On the whole, when you look at it, 

that is occurring in a wide number of areas. 

There are some areas where we still have challenges with access 

to the border. You know, there are some environmentally-sensitive 

59 

areas. There are areas where there are no roads. So those are 

areas where that is a challenge for us, and so we are continuing 

to work. 

Really, we want it as close to the border. We want to prevent it 

in the first place. Then, of course, absent our ability to do that, 

which does happen, then we want to make sure that we do not 

allow the border to become that single point of failure. We want to 

make sure that we have got the capability to interdict anything 

that does make it across. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks, Chief. So let’s talk barriers for a minute. 

There is the 2,000-mile Southern Border. Seven hundred miles is 

land and about 1,300 is water. We have got some level of barriers 

in 654 miles. 

Secretary Kelly testified last week that he would be listening to 

you and the troops on the ground to hear in different sectors where 

barriers need to be replaced or added. In your assessment, where 

do we need additional barriers or different types of barriers? 

I will tell you, even some of the replacements going on in my district are causing some responses from local residents who are living 

on the border and their concerns. 

So could you just comment on your perspective, which Secretary 

Kelly said he would be listening to on what we actually need? 

Chief BEESON. Secretary Kelly did come down to the border. He 

has been to my sector. He has also been to the San Diego sector. 

Subsequent to the visit with us, he went to San Diego and did receive briefings from us on what our current laydown is, and some 

of the areas where we would look to enhance that when given the 

opportunity. 

Customs and Border Protection and the Border Patrol, we have 

a process. The acronym for it is, because we love acronyms, the 

CGAP analysis. 

So what we are doing with that is looking at what our critical 

needs are, where there are gaps, and then making sure that we 

have the plans moving forward on where we want to put these 

things. So we can, I think, provide you with another briefing—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

Chief BEESON [continuing]. To, kind-of, give you a better idea of 

where exactly we would like to put up barriers. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I appreciate that. 

All right, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Madam Chair. Very quickly, gentlemen, 

wanted to say that, you know, during the Obama administration, 

we had a record number of deportations, I believe, under Obama. 

Deportations were more than the last few Presidents combined. 

So my question to all of you is it is my understanding that the 

folks migrating north from Mexico has really slowed down tremendously. Assuming that is the case, how much of that is due to a 

growing Mexican economy, growing middle class, growing number 

of jobs in Mexico that provide for folks to stay and essentially find 

a living in Mexico? 

Mr. ALLEN. For me, that is more of an economics question. A little outside my area of expertise. So I pass on that one. 

Mr. CORREA. Everybody pass on that one? 

Admiral RAY. Well, I—— 

60 

Mr. CORREA. It is an economics question, but I think it is a relevant one when we are looking at possibly putting tariffs on imports. That is really a monetary policy that could reduce economic 

growth south of the border. 

But the other question I have, one is a sensitive one which is on 

the issue of corruption on our side. Do we have any reports? I know 

we have had some newspaper articles in the past about some of our 

border agents, unfortunately, you know, looking the other way. Any 

update on that? Any status on the corruption on our side of the 

border? 

Mr. ALLEN. I don’t have any numbers, and I refer to it both in 

my written and my oral statement. You know, the reality is that 

U.S. law enforcement is not immune to corruption. 

While I think anecdotally it is certainly at a much lower level in 

the United States than it is in Mexico, you know, back to the question about internal conspiracies in the air environment, that we 

face that same challenge, that insider threat challenge, on our borders as well. 

It is ICE is not immune. CBP is not immune. State and local law 

enforcement in the United States is not immune. It is something 

that we have to focus on and acknowledge. 

Mr. CORREA. I say that because there is so much money involved 

in this business of drugs that nobody is immune. At the same time, 

let me take the opportunity to thank all of the men and women in 

uniform who do protect our borders, who do protect our citizens, because you do a darn good job. 

My final question is really kind-of a comment. Got a chance to 

go into Mexico about 4 or 5 months ago. I went through some of 

the small villages, and the issue of public safety is a big one. Folks 

won’t go out of their homes after the sun goes down because they 

fear for their lives. 

It was very interesting. A few days before I got there, the Mexican marines came in and swept up the whole area. It is my understanding, unofficially, about 40 casualties. Forty of the bad guys 

were actually taken out. 

But I want to encourage you to continue to cooperate with the 

Mexican authorities because you notice when Mexican marines go 

in with U.S. leadership they do make a difference when it comes 

to folks living in those small villages throughout Mexico. So please 

continue to do a good job. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from Florida for a second round. No? OK. Great. Just a few more questions. 

Admiral Ray, have you seen—can you share any changes in 

trends from the change to the wet foot, dry foot policy as far as Cubans trying to head north? 

Admiral RAY. Yes, ma’am. As I said, last year was a record year 

in terms of growth of Cuban immigration, illegal immigration, 

since 1994, the biggest year we have had. After the wet foot, dry 

foot was repealed last month, we saw a dramatic downturn. 

Now some of this is not really the season, right, this time of year 

when the weather and other things. So we are certainly not letting 

our guard down now because there is always the threat. 

61 

Certainly the conditions in Cuba and the conditions in America 

haven’t changed. So we see the threat is still out there, but the 

facts on the water as of right now since that was repealed, there 

is a lot less attempts that we have seen thus far. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. Can any of you comment on we 

have had a number of States in the country that are now legalizing 

marijuana, and whether that is impacting the business model of 

the cartels and changing from marijuana to other drugs or human 

trafficking related to the supply-and-demand issue? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think that might fall into, you know, what we could 

call the intelligence gap. But, you know—and we talked earlier 

about heroin. In my mind, there is no mistaking the explosive, you 

know, growth in the cultivation of poppies in Mexico and the transition to, you know, heroin as one of their primary drugs that they 

are exporting to the United States. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So, I mean, correlation doesn’t mean causality, so 

there is—— 

Mr. ALLEN. Correct. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. Probably a couple of different elements in that to include the increased demand and the opioid addictions—— 

Mr. ALLEN. Absolutely. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. In the country. I do want to talk 

about that. Despite all the amazing efforts that you gentlemen represented today and all the individuals that are doing the job every 

single day in order to defeat these networks and intercept the activity, we still have a drug epidemic going on in our country. 

The price of drugs is still, unfortunately, affordable for people to 

be ruining their lives. So that has not changed. The hard drugs 

coming through the ports of entry, primarily, most of you have testified to. 

Mr. Allen, what else do we need to do at the ports of entry related to these hard drugs that are making their way through? 

There are pretty innovative techniques, as you have testified to and 

many of you have testified to. 

Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think, you know, CBP has done a tremendous 

job in refining and improving how they target, you know, at the 

ports of entry. 

I think focusing more, you know, resources on that problem set. 

You know, the reality is that CBPOs who are on the border have 

a very, very short time to make a decision about whether they 

should admit somebody or refer a vehicle or a person to secondary 

for further inspection. 

So I think, you know, giving them the resources and the capabilities to target as effectively as they can, both in the, you know, 

kind-of the personally-owned vehicle and pedestrian environment, 

and then in commercial cargo, is key to that. That is certainly an 

interagency problem. 

You know, ICE and HSI contribute, you know, information that 

helps refine targeting. But, you know, giving them as much good 

information to use to target is where we want to go. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is there additional technologies that are needed or 

technologies that have been proven that are not deployed to each 

of the ports of entry? 

62 

Mr. ALLEN. I would defer to Chief Beeson on that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Chief. 

Chief BEESON. I will have to take that back, for the record. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Chief BEESON. I will have to ask my—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Chief BEESON [continuing]. Field ops, Congresswoman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. I will say I agree with many of the 

comments made by my colleagues here today that, you know, we 

have got to make sure that the legitimate economic activity that 

comes north and south continues to be able to flow while we are 

intercepting the illegitimate activity and the drugs and the human 

smuggling and what has been talked about today that happens 

both between the ports of entry and at the ports of entry. 

If we are talking about border security, we have got to look at 

that in its completeness: The maritime domain, the air domain, the 

land domain, but then at the ports of entry. So we have seen in 

my community, the Douglas port of entry, just as an example, is 

one that is old, is not capable for addressing the commerce. 

But also it is a security issue, right? Because they need upgrades 

to be able to address the illegitimate activity that is coming 

through the ports of entry. My hope would be—we had a hearing 

on this last time but, you know, upgrades to the ports of entry have 

been somehow—they are involved in other Federal buildings and 

priorities related to GSA. 

I think we need to look at this more holistically as a security 

issue. When we are talking about infrastructure in this Congress 

and with the administration, I think we need to be focused at our 

ports of entry both for economic drivers and for security drivers, 

and I don’t think that should be lost. 

So that is more of a statement. I don’t know if anybody has a 

comment on that, but I think somehow we, you know, often just 

talk about between the ports of entry, but the security at the ports 

of entry is just as critical. All right. 

The Chair now recognizes my colleague for any last statements. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you very much. Again, I want to thank everybody for being here today, and I also concur with our chair 

that—very good discussion. Learned a lot today. 

I just wanted to leave, again, focusing what our Madam Chair 

has said, ports of entry, inland ports. This is a concept I picked up 

from my colleagues in Texas, that checking our cargo, checking 

those things that are about to cross the border a few miles before 

they get to the border be sealed. 

So that once you get to the border, your jobs is a whole lot easier 

than they are now. Has there been any further thought about 

working on those inland ports of entry? 

Chief BEESON. So CBP has engaged in several different pilot programs. The one that I think you are referring to was in California. 

Most recently in Arizona they have a program, a joint customs program, with Mexican customs that has been working quite well for 

them. They speak very highly of it. So it is something that, you 

know, we continue to assess. 

63 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the dialog and the questions and answers 

today. I thank the Members for their questions as well. 

The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses. I would ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be 

open for 10 days. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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