* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. SALVADOR PACHECO-GARCIA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-50047 D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00918-JLS-2
MEMORANDUM *

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. MAURO BARRERA-MORENO, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-50048 D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00918-JLS-1

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding 

# FILED
FEB 15 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS** The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 2 Argued and Submitted December 5, 2011 Pasadena, California Before: PREGERSON and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and CONLON, District Judge. ** Defendants-Appellants Salvador Pacheco-Garcia and Mauro BarreraMoreno (“Defendants”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence in connection with their convictions for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction over th is matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The facts are known to the parties and we do not recite them here. I. Factual Findings and Credibility Determination This Court reviews findings of fact regarding motions to suppress for clear
error . See F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a)(6); United States v. Prieto-Villa , 910 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1990). Review under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a “definite and fi rm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie , 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Credibility determinations are given particular deference. See3 F ED . R. C IV . P. 52(a)(6); Rozay’s Transfer v. Local Freight Drivers, 850 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1988). We accept the district court’s factual findings and credibility determination of the Agents as not clearly erroneous. Bu t that is not the end of the matter. We must also determine, on de novo review, whether the Agents had reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop of the Defendants. We find that the Agents had the required reasonable suspicion. II. Reasonable Suspicion Whether reasonable suspicion existed under given facts is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review. See United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002). Each of the reasonable suspicion factor s considered by the district court were proper, and those factors, considered toge ther, rise to the level of individualized reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (holding “officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts”). As Arvizu teaches, the possibility that the Defendant s’ admitted abrupt lane changes might have an innocent explanation does not pr eclude consideration of this suspicious conduct in light of all the other factors known to the Agents and considered by the district court. 534 U.S. at 277-78.4 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Barrera-Moreno’s and Pacheco-Garcia’s motions to suppress.