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i 

25–046 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–14] 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—THE DEFENSE 

SCIENCE BOARD’S PERSPECTIVE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 9, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

RO KHANNA, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Larsen, Hon. Rick, a Representative from Washington, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ........................................................................................................... 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

John, Dr. Miriam, Dr. Michael Anastasio, and Dr. William LaPlante, Members, Defense Science Board ................................................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

John, Dr. Miriam, joint with Dr. Michael Anastasio and Dr. William 

LaPlante ........................................................................................................ 28 

Larsen, Hon. Rick ............................................................................................. 25 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Richard L. Garwin letter, January 11, 2016 .................................................. 45 

Roy Schwitters statement, January 11, 2016 ................................................ 41 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 56 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 57 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 51 

(1) 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE—THE DEFENSE SCIENCE 

BOARD’S PERSPECTIVE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:36 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 

order. I want welcome to our hearing on ‘‘Nuclear Deterrence—The 

Defense Science Board’s Perspective.’’ 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, and for 

your service to the public. Our witnesses are all experts who have 

spent their careers in fields related to nuclear deterrence. They are 

appearing today in their capacities as members of the Defense 

Science Board [DSB], but all have long and distinguished histories 

in the topic of our hearing today. 

We thank you for the hard work it takes to prepare for this hearing. 

And our witnesses are Dr. Michael Anastasio, Dr. Miriam John, 

and Dr. William LaPlante. 

Without objection, I will introduce my full statement for the 

record, but I would briefly summarize. 

In December 2016, in the waning days of the Obama administration, the Defense Science Board completed a report titled, ‘‘Seven 

Defense Priorities for the New Administration.’’ It made recommendations to the new Trump administration on key issues in 

the world of defense. Chapter 2 of this report summarized years of 

work by the Board on nuclear deterrence, which is exactly what we 

will explore today. 

The Board has published 12 studies over the 14 years on this 

topic. So it is clear the Board has spent a lot of time thinking about 

this, as well it should. A defense mission of this importance seems 

worthy of sustained and focused attention. 

As the new administration and Congress goes forward with the 

nuclear modernization program initiated by President Obama, the 

Board’s experts help us take stock. They help us understand how 

nuclear threats are evolving and how we should compensate. They 

help us understand where we have been and where we should go. 
2 

Our witnesses today will be able to provide the collective views 

and recommendations of the Board as well as their own views as 

Board members. 

Ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for the long-term future 

will continue to be a major priority for this Nation and the Congress and this committee. 

With that, let me turn to my friend and colleague, the acting 

ranking member from Washington State today, Mr. Larsen, for any 

opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM WASHINGTON, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Doctors, I join Chairman Rogers in welcoming you to the subcommittee. Thanks for helping us out. 

Ranking Member Cooper is unable to participate in today’s hearing. He is pretty ill right now, just sort of kind of a head cold and 

can barely speak. So I am sitting in for him, and I know he would 

be here if he could. 

So as independent advisers, though, the DSB has an important 

role to play in making recommendations to the scientific and technical matters to the DOD [Department of Defense] leadership. And 

in its ‘‘Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration’’ report, 

the DSB correctly noted that our nuclear forces remain a cornerstone of U.S. national security. I agree that this is one of the most 

important areas for the Department and for our community to 

focus on. 

Given how critical these nuclear systems are and with costly 

modernization programs occurring concurrently, we can’t afford to 

get this wrong. While I appreciate the vision represented in the report, I would be remiss if I did not mention that DOD still has 

been unable to provide us with a 30-year estimate on the full costs 

of nuclear modernization. 

It is not a matter of partisan politics. Members of this committee 

have been asking for this accounting across multiple administrations. 

In your report, you write that the budget for modernization, 

quote, ‘‘will significantly compromise investments in conventional 

capabilities,’’ unquote. This commonsense observation should alarm 

those who seek to downplay the impact on the defense budget of 

nuclear modernization and provoke all of us to understand the inherent tradeoffs that are looming. 

There are other elements of this report that I find concerning. 

You recommend prototyping and fielding low-yield nuclear weapons. I found the justification to be unclear. Are these intended to 

address new threats? To enable us to reduce our stockpile of other 

types of nuclear weapons? To deter a Russian escalate-to-deescalate 

scenario? Are they to keep nuclear weapon scientists sharp and interested in their mission? 

These are all very different objectives. I have not seen a sufficiently detailed analysis of what the proposals are, whether they 

are necessary, what alternatives are being considered, what the 
3 

tradeoffs are, what the costs would be, and, of course, what the policy implications are. 

I also find this recommendation to run contrary to General 

Hyten’s testimony yesterday. During the full committee hearing, 

General Hyten stated that the deployment of nuclear weapons is 

always an attempt to achieve strategic effects and disagreed with 

the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. 

Smaller nuclear weapons would require prototyping. However, 

Dr. Richard Garwin and Dr. Roy Schwitters, both of the eminent 

JASON scientific group, strongly criticized the need and value of 

manufacturing prototypes of new nuclear weapons in written comments to this subcommittee last year. 

I am particularly concerned that new types of nuclear weapons 

would have significant policy and proliferation implications. Adding 

new military capability and building new nuclear weapons would 

be a radical shift, one that Congress, rightly so, has not been willing to approve for nearly 25 years. This approach could lead to a 

requirement for renewed nuclear testing, a policy shift that would 

be unwise, unnecessary, and have potentially disastrous consequences in re-legitimizing nuclear testing and helping to advance 

our adversaries’ nuclear forces. 

The DSB report more explicitly opens the door to the potential 

need to resume testing. Until now and for the foreseeable future, 

our top scientists have confirmed that there is no need to resume 

nuclear testing to certify the current stockpile. 

Still, there is much to commend in your report. It highlights correctly, I believe—and we get ice cream sometimes with our Brussels sprouts—it highlights correctly, I believe, the need for investments in detection and monitoring technologies, which can reduce 

the threat posed by nuclear proliferation. With new technologies 

such as 3D printing emerging, these investments can support current and future nonproliferation and arms control agreements with 

a robust technological foundation. 

The report also correctly identifies some of the geopolitical complexities that have challenged our nuclear deterrent. These include 

proliferation of nuclear weapons, and our allies’ concerns that the 

U.S. may be weakening its security guarantees. 

As a candidate, the President expressed support for proliferation 

and seemed to threaten the sanctity of the American security guarantee to our allies. It is my hope that as Commander in Chief, he 

understands the destabilizing effects of these statements. 

A 2014 DSB report warned that, quote, ‘‘For the first time since 

the early decades of the nuclear era, the Nation needs to be equally 

concerned about both vertical proliferation, the increasing capabilities of existing nuclear states, and horizontal proliferation, an increase in the number of states and nonstate actors possessing or 

attempting to possess nuclear weapons. Monitoring for proliferation 

should be a top national security objective, but one for which the 

Nation is not yet organized or fully equipped to address,’’ unquote. 

Your comments and insights on this issue are most welcome. I 

would be interested in more specific recommendations in support of 

this mission, particularly with regard to what gaps remain and 

how we can use advancing technology and analytical approaches, 

including big data analytics, to improve our capabilities. 
4 

I want to thank you for joining us today. And I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larsen can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I want to let the witnesses know that their entire opening statements will be accepted for the record. If you would like to just 

spend your 5 minutes summarizing, that is fine—or less. 

But I will take the first witness, Dr. Anastasio, for your opening 

statement—oh, okay. I understand that you have a joint opening 

statement? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. And Dr. John is going to present that to us. 

And then the other two, if you have an opening statement you 

want to submit individually, we will take that for the record. 

With that, you are recognized, Dr. John. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MIRIAM JOHN, DR. MICHAEL ANASTASIO, 

AND DR. WILLIAM LAPLANTE, MEMBERS, DEFENSE SCIENCE 

BOARD 

Dr. JOHN. Thank you. I lost the coin toss. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the 

subcommittee, we thank you for the opportunity to testify today 

concerning ‘‘Nuclear Deterrence—The Defense Science Board’s Perspective.’’ And we are here representing the Defense Science Board. 

We are going to discuss our principal findings and recommendations over the past 15 years’ worth of work, and as you noted, they 

are summarized in chapter 2 of the report that we issued in December. 

For those that are not fully familiar with the Defense Science 

Board, we are indeed a Federal advisory committee to the Secretary of Defense and a source of independent scientific and technical 

advice. 

Our tasking, we do not invent our tasking. Our tasking comes 

from Department leadership and occasionally comes from you all, 

from Congress. And, typically, it is to address tough problems that 

may not have a lot of structure, like cyber and nuclear in the early 

days of its emergence, and/or problems it may present on the positive side, game-changing opportunities. We have done a lot of work 

in things like directed energy over time, autonomy, and electronic 

warfare. 

There are currently 46 members of the Board, and we come from 

a wide variety of walks of life in the national security arena. The 

three of us represent, all right, over 100 years of experience in the 

nuclear area. And when we wrote that down, my God, I felt old. 

All right. For the topic of this hearing, namely, the DSB’s perspective on nuclear deterrence, we have summarized over a decade’s worth of work in chapter 2 of our recently released ‘‘Seven 

Defense Priorities for the New Administration.’’ Based on what you 

have already heard this week, and especially yesterday from our 

military leaders, you are probably not going to learn much new 

from us, because there is a lot of harmonization of views. It is just 

that we have been saying it a lot longer, I think, than they have. 
5 

Our working assumptions have always been that there is no 

more important defense objective than preventing a nuclear attack 

on the United States or its allies, and the foundation for prevention 

is deterrence. 

Three key points that we would make around that, and you can 

find them in the report, although they are not stated quite this succinctly. 

The first, the threat environment has been evolving in very troubling ways. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 

sought to raise the threshold for nuclear use, at least for ourselves, 

by emphasizing dramatically improved nonnuclear or conventional 

force capabilities. 

Unfortunately, others have gone the wrong way—let’s just say 

different directions—in part, because they can’t afford to overmatch 

us conventionally. Russia has modernized and expanded the capabilities of its nuclear force. China has expanded both its nuclear 

and nonnuclear forces. And we face a new and unpredictable nuclear proliferator in North Korea. 

We have also seen attempts at commerce in nuclear know-how 

and materials and acquisition—attempts at acquisition elsewhere, 

name them. North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Iran are on the list. 

The second point, modernization of the triad and the infrastructure to support it is long overdue. The triad remains a key component of the Nation’s deterrence posture. The platforms and warheads have aged well beyond their original design intent. In addition, critical elements of the DOE [Department of Energy] production infrastructure are very old and inefficient. We simply can’t 

wait any longer to renew all three legs of the triad and to assure 

their operational viability and readiness. 

Our third point, and this is the one that may engender the most 

discussion, we must hedge against an uncertain future. We should 

expect—we already are, but we should expect that it won’t change, 

that the future holds a very dynamic geopolitical environment for 

us, that the advances in science and technology are happening at 

a breathtaking pace and are happening on a global scale, and continued attempts by adversaries will be paramount in thwarting 

U.S. advantages. 

To ensure a robust deterrence posture besides the triad, there is 

much more to the story, and we believe there also need to be 

healthy efforts to, one, deepen our insight into the developing capabilities, doctrine, and threats of current and potential adversaries. 

So we have got to keep an eye on what they are doing. 

We need to ensure a very robust nuclear command and control 

and communication system. We need to ensure the survivability of 

U.S. forces, both nuclear and nonnuclear forces, in the face of their 

use of nuclear weapons. And we need to ensure a demonstrated, 

flexible, and adaptive capability to respond to changing threats 

through a strong research and development program. 

And finally, and equally important, we need to prevent further 

proliferation through both cooperative and unilateral measures, 

through the tools of diplomacy, and through renewed and strengthened efforts at assurance of extended deterrence to our allies. 
6 

The linchpin of all this, of course, is the demonstrated skills of 

the talented, knowledgeable, committed, and valued people who are 

part of this enterprise. 

With that brief background, we would be happy to take your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. John, Dr. Anastasio, and 

Dr. LaPlante can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. And I will recognize myself for the first 

set of questions. 

The DSB report from December says that we should focus our 

nuclear weapons R&D [research and development] on concept and 

advanced development. Prototyping, placing options on the shelf 

should be needed rapidly. It goes on to say: Already, the DOD can 

anticipate the need for capabilities such as hardening or maneuvering for defensive penetration. 

In this open forum and in more detail later, when we are in our 

classified session, would you please explain why the DSB and DOD 

anticipate needing to pursue capabilities like maneuverable warheads or lower yield, primary-only missile warheads? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to be careful. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, what you can’t say here we will say in the 

classified. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. No, I understand. I am just getting my thoughts 

right. 

I think the issue is the developing capabilities in our adversaries 

like the Russians and the Chinese with more and more capable denial capabilities, denial our access for our systems. They have to 

believe that if we were ever—if a President ever made a decision 

to use it, that it would get to its target. And if they develop capabilities to try to deny us that, then we need to assure that we have 

alternate ways to do that. 

And I think that is the origin of the thinking about how do you 

anticipate what might be coming from an adversary and have our 

deterrent be in a place where we can counter their capabilities. 

And so we should be thinking about the kinds of options that we 

in the military might have to do that. So how do you anticipate 

what a future threat might be and how are we going to be prepared 

to deal with that? 

Mr. ROGERS. Based on the threats we see developing with our adversaries, when do you think we are going to need to be able to 

field these capabilities that you referenced? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Well, I think they are developing capabilities 

now, and we can talk more about that later. And I think it is it 

up to the military and the Defense Department and all the leadership of the country to decide what actually needs to get done when. 

But I think those capabilities are developing, and we can talk 

about that later. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I would just add, Chairman Rogers, to my colleague that one of the things that the science and technology community must do is always understand the limits of what physics 

and engineering can be done. That is separate from what the 

threat is assessed to be. 
7 

So we have a duty to understand things like the maneuvering, 

what is capable technologically, and what could be done to counter 

it, both ways, offensive, defensive. We have to understand that and 

be ahead of a potential adversary. 

So just from a technical edge and an engineering edge, we have 

to understand that, and then watch, as you say, as the threat 

evolves or if operationally there is a change, we can provide to the 

policy makers, to the leadership, what the technology can do or 

what it can’t do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do warhead life extension programs truly utilize all 

the design, engineering, science, and manufacturing capabilities 

that would be needed to produce a new nuclear weapon? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Not completely, Mr. Chairman. What we are 

doing with the life extension programs is largely renewing the capabilities, the systems that we had during the Cold War. And in 

some cases, we are having to make some accommodation to the fact 

that certain materials and so forth are not available anymore. But, 

largely, we are replicating something that we had. 

What we are not doing is exercising that full end-to-end partnership with the Department of Defense and DOE to think about what 

a requirement might be, how would you go implement that requirement with the constraints that get imposed, and then carry that all 

the way through to developing a weapon system out the door that 

could potentially go in the stockpile. 

And we have not exercised that full system process since the end 

of the Cold War, for over 25 years. So there is a skill set that is 

involved in doing that process and that collaborative work between 

DOE and the DOD that we haven’t fully exercised. Certainly, doing 

the LEPs [life extension programs] exercise is part of that, but not 

that full sweep. 

Mr. ROGERS. What should Congress do to improve the stockpile 

responsiveness program to get after the problems you have described here in your report? 

Dr. JOHN. We saw your authorization for the stockpile responsiveness program as a huge step forward, but it is authorized and 

it is not appropriated. So there needs to be some continued encouragement that DOE put money behind it, but it is also important 

that it is a partnership with DOD. And it is not on the radar 

screen at DOD to think about the future at this point, because 

there are trades to be made between what you put on the weapon, 

what you put on the delivery platform. 

And across the board, they have got to be concerned about the 

new threats to new systems that we are putting forward. And I 

would throw out cyber as something that this community is just 

waking up to thinking about. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the ranking 

member for any questions he has. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So the 2014 report warned of this vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation. It led to a provision in the NDAA [National 

Defense Authorization Act] at the time calling for a national roadmap, identifying costs, gaps, opportunities to partner with industry 

and academia that would improve nuclear verification. We are still 

waiting to get that report 3 years after the provision in the bill. 
8 

Do you think that report should be a priority for the administration to answer those questions? 

Dr. JOHN. Well, since I was the prime mover behind that report, 

you would see me say, yea, verily. Because for one thing, technology has moved forward in ways that would allow us to do a 

much stronger job at what I would call early, early detection of proliferation where you have many more options to either cooperatively or unilaterally thwart the acquisition by a new proliferant. 

I will say that my somewhat limited insight into things that have 

happened around a Presidential directive in the last administration 

created some working groups across the interagency. And I had the 

opportunity to spend the day with them about a year ago, and I 

have never seen so many different intelligence community representatives who knew each other and were sharing information. 

Now, that is the good news. And you say, why is that happening? 

Well, it is a very small community still, so it has been easy to 

make the connections. 

We on the Defense Science Board are about to publish another 

report that really hammers home this early, early warning piece 

and the potential for the tools of big data management and acquisition and data analytics and the promise that that holds, particularly when you tap into open source, for the sort of cueing that you 

would need on where to look and all. So continued emphasis on 

that, because it is a new paradigm for the intelligence community 

to step up to this. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Could I add one more thought to that? Which is 

that as technology evolves and as we do more R&D, you can imagine that the paths to proliferation can change. When we get in another room, we can talk more about opportunities like that that 

could be out there that would be nontraditional paths, and, hence, 

the R&D community needs to help the intelligence community understand what are the potential threats of the future that might 

come about and how would you look for those, too. So it is not just 

monitoring what you are used to monitoring, but, perhaps, there 

are other things you have to look for. 

Mr. LARSEN. Would you argue, then, this could help us with detection and verification as well? 

Dr. JOHN. We really didn’t touch the verification problem in what 

we looked at. We started out to, because we had anticipated a more 

robust arms control agenda when we started the study in the 2010 

timeframe, and that quickly fell apart. But at the same time, arguing among ourselves, we actually were taken with the fact that we 

have a problem with proliferation that seems to be cropping up in 

many different ways. And so let’s take a step back and figure out 

if we have got the tool set to be able to deal with what we see coming. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Would you suggest that that be on our plate, 

the subcommittee, to look at that? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Verification? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, the verification, the use of these new tools and 

how it applies to verification. 

Dr. JOHN. I am not sure, because it depends on what treaties are 

going to be honored by our partners who have signed up and the 

like as to how much to put in a verification piece of it at this point. 
9 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I think there has been work done in the past to 

think about how you do verification on what potential agreements 

might look like, and if you get to the point where you are starting 

to count warheads themselves, the individual objects, how would 

you do verification of that and how could you agree on protocols for 

how to do that, et cetera. And there has been work done on things 

like that. And so that might be something that is worth the committee getting updates on. But it does depend on what you might 

think an agreement of the future might look like. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield 

back to other members. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And thank you for all the work that 

you have done on these important issues. 

You talk about the lack of funding, and you talk about the modernization that Russia and China have done in recent years but we 

have not done because of lack of commitment and funding. And I 

think after meeting with some of the uniformed people that we 

have listened to this week, and previously also, we know the way 

forward. We just have to have the financial commitment to do the 

modernization and upgrading and enhancing reliability and safety 

and security. 

If we don’t do that, what is the risk that our nuclear umbrella 

has if it begins to develop leaks, if the 30 or so allies that rely on 

our nuclear umbrella have doubts as to whether we can actually 

carry through on our commitments? Will they begin to contemplate 

developing their own nuclear programs, for instance? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As you note, Congressman, the fact that we have 

put off modernization for lots of reasons until where we are today, 

where we basically have no more life extension that can be done, 

that is one of the reasons why we are in this situation today where 

you have in the 2020s all this stuff that has to happen at the same 

time. We can’t push it anymore. 

It is remarkable that we are flying the B–52s today in the nuclear mission. Grandfathers, sons, and grandsons, literally have the 

same airplane. It is absolutely remarkable. As a former chief of 

staff for the Air Force used to say, it would qualify for an antique 

license plate in the State of Virginia. 

So I think, getting to your question about how does that deal 

with our allies, giving them confidence, well, no matter what you 

say in terms of your commitment, if you don’t do it, and if you don’t 

keep your systems current, people are watching. They are watching 

not just what you are saying, they are watching, are you really 

going to extend and go into the next version of Ohio replacement? 

Are you really going to build this bomber? Are you really going to 

do it and not just talk about it, not just study it? And we are sort 

of at that point where we are either going to do it or we are not, 

because, really, you can’t life extend. So I would imagine everybody 

is watching what we do for all the reasons that you imply. 

Dr. JOHN. Just to add a little color here, I guess. There are discussions that have been ongoing, I am sure you are all aware, in 

South Korea and Japan. They are not the majority yet, but the 

noise is there. And, my God, the last week, the Poles, the Germans 
10 

said, maybe we better start thinking about a NATO Europeanowned deterrent. So we have got some fraying around the edges 

here. And so it is part what we do. It is also part what we back 

up with our words and actions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Let me ask about one other possible erosion of our 

nuclear umbrella, and that is the lack of testing. It has been 25 

years since any tests have been done. I think we can be confident 

today that our weapons would still perform as needed, as advertised. But as each year goes by, we are going to lose, I believe, 

some of that certainty and the day will arrive when we need to negotiate with near peers about maybe a one-time round of testing 

and negotiate it. 

What threat do we have—and I will disagree with my colleague 

to my left—what risk do we have if our credibility becomes eroded 

because people don’t have confidence that the weapons will actually—or at least all of them will perform? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Let me try to take that one on, since I had the 

honor to write nine of the letters, annual assessment letters that 

go to the President and Congress about the need for testing. And 

I would reiterate that I believe and that I think the Defense 

Science Board believes that there is no need for testing right now. 

And the way I think about it is that nuclear testing is a tool. It 

is a technical tool to help us do a job. And our view is that the job 

we have today, we don’t need that tool right now. 

The question becomes, would I need it in the future? Well, the 

answer to the question depends on what my job is in the future. 

There are potential versions of the job, like the job we had in the 

Cold War, for which we would say we do need nuclear testing. But 

if the job looks like the one we have today, I think the view is that 

we don’t believe that is an essential element, a tool, for us to get 

our job done with confidence. So it is a tool to be used, and it depends on what you are trying to accomplish when you do it. 

The other piece is, as our chairman of the Defense Science Board 

reminds us, we should be humble about the future. We don’t know 

what the future is going to look like in 10 or 20 years. And so to 

make a blanket statement about what it is we need or don’t need 

then is probably a fool’s game. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A lot of things to discuss here. I think we are spending several 

billion dollars on a testing machine in Lawrence Livermore, aren’t 

we, Dr. Anastasio? How is it working? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I believe you are talking about the National Ignition Facility, the NIF? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Oh, yes, that is what I am talking about. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I don’t work at Lawrence Livermore anymore. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I know you are familiar with it. You spent 

a lot of time teaching me about it, so—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yes, sir. And it is good to see you, again, sir. 

I think the Defense Science Board has looked at NIF and has felt 

it was a valuable tool and asset for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
11 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We will let it go at that. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I will say that much. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we need an update on that. It is an important element in what Mr. Lamborn just talked about. 

I want to go to a recommendation here about tactical nuclear 

weapons. And under what circumstances does the Board assume 

that we would be using them? 

Dr. JOHN. We were puzzled by the reference to us recommending 

tactical nuclear weapons, because we never wrote that. We just 

didn’t say that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Then how did I come to believe that you did? 

Maybe somebody is interpreting your work? 

Dr. JOHN. Yes. I think somebody decided what we meant to say 

was. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What did you mean to say? Where are you with 

tactical nuclear weapons? 

Dr. JOHN. If there is a military need, if the military stands up 

and says, we need it, then the enterprise will respond. But there 

is no military requirement right now. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let me be sure that I understood. As far as the 

Board is concerned, you know of no military requirements for tactical nuclear weapons? 

Dr. JOHN. Today. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, there is tomorrow. 

Well, how about low-yield weapons, what is the purpose of a lowyield weapon? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Well, currently, without going into any detail 

here, we have weapon systems that have low yields. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, we do. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. As you know. And so they have a purpose. We 

have a requirement. The enterprise has a requirement to produce 

those, and that is fine. 

I think the discussion that you have seen in this document was 

intended to be along the lines: We don’t know what the future 

brings. We do see what adversaries are off doing. And I think the 

Board felt it was prudent for us to spend time thinking about how 

might we respond to a different requirement than we have today 

sometime in the future, would we be ready to respond to that? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In other words, do you have a low-yield tactical 

nuclear weapon? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Well, there are many, many different kinds of options that could be possible in the future and are we ready to be 

able to respond to that. So it is a capability question. It is not a 

recommendation that this is something that the country should be 

doing now. It is a desire to be capable of thinking about such a 

thing in the future. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, help me think about it for a while. We do 

have a nuclear weapon that has a quite low yield—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. And a quite high yield. Does that 

meet the anticipated—potential anticipated needs that you are 

thinking about? If not, why not? 
12 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Let’s see, I am trying to think of how to answer 

that. We don’t have a requirement for something other than that. 

So what might happen in the future is speculation. 

I think what we are trying to—our intent was to distinguish between the technical capability of this enterprise versus the policy 

questions. We were not trying to address the policy questions of 

whether that is a good thing to do or an appropriate thing to do 

sometime in the future. It was more, are we as an enterprise collectively in the DOD and the DOE capable of responding to a different 

requirement than the ones we have today? And that is a technical 

capability question versus a statement about what the policy 

should be. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am out of time. I will come back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Abraham, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses 

for being here. 

The DSB report from December emphasizes, and I am going to 

quote, ‘‘that the nuclear weapons are a steadily evolving threat,’’ 

end of quote. 

Would you please describe how the nuclear weapon threat has 

evolved, particularly since the last NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], 

I think what was written in 2010, the new threats, the new vulnerability, opportunities that have emerged are changed since that 

2010 report? 

Dr. JOHN. Let’s see, we will be a little bit careful until we go into 

classified session, but certainly there is plenty of awareness in the 

public domain that Russia is fielding their modernized systems. 

They have been at it since the late 1990s to retool their capabilities. And that includes a number of advances in their air defense 

systems that present very thorny opportunity—I mean challenges 

for us to be able to penetrate Russian airspace. 

In addition, the Chinese have gone from order a dozen strategic 

weapons, as in long-reach weapons, to something like 100 or so. 

And look at North Korea. We have underestimated them every step 

of the way. I will stop it at that. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Okay. And we will pick this up in a different briefing. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Hanabusa for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being 

here. 

I think the problem that I am having with this is that when we 

talk about nuclear deterrence, you seem to imply in your report 

that there is both nuclear weapons, but also nonnuclear weapons 

that can also act as deterrents. And you talk about the triad, and 

we had a session yesterday where I was telling the military members who were sitting where you are that I think the assumption 

of the triad was something that I questioned right off the bat. In 

other words, how can you say something that has been in the 

shape that it has been for all these years, you talk about modernizations, which you also talk about, and then somehow the modernization includes the structure that has been there for all of 

these years. 
13 

So what I would like to ask you is, when you talk about the deterrence of nuclear weapons and you also mention the nonnuclear 

weapons, what are you talking about? And when you talk about 

modernizing the triad, it seems to assume that somehow the inherent structure of the triad is what we need. And I just can’t understand how when you sit here before us that that would be something that you would begin this whole discussion with. So if anyone 

can take a stab at that. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I can start by saying the Board believes and enforces the fact that the triad needs to be strong, robust, and modernized. One would argue that we have used the—we use the triad 

every day, and we use the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], we use the SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] every day, 

we use the bombers every day, okay? We talked earlier about the 

fact that they are all running to the end of their life. And so what 

the Board has pointed out, as has others, is it is time to modernize. 

Now, the triad itself is the ultimate part of deterrence. It is the 

ultimate. It is to deter the country against, God forbid, a nuclear 

attack. And the fact of the matter is there are other kinds of deterrence, lower on the escalation ladder, as you imply, conventional. 

But, God forbid, if all of those failed, all we have is the triad, and 

that is our point. 

The other point about the triad is each leg of the triad has 

unique characteristics, and they are actually complementary with 

each other. The ICBMs, in order for an adversary to take out the 

ICBMs in a first strike, would have to be a massive first strike 

against the continental United States, something that would be a 

very high bar for any country, God forbid, to even think about, and 

that is what we want them, not to think about it. 

The bombers have an inherent flexibility. We can signal with the 

bombers. We can move them. We can show them. We can recall 

them. They have a flexibility that is unique of themselves. The 

SSBNs are an ace in the hole. No matter what happens, they will 

always survive and be there as a credible second strike. 

Now, there is always talk and there will be talk and there should 

be talk about is there a better way to do business. And we would 

encourage that. We think the NPR that is being started should be 

informed by the best experts. But the triad as I just described it 

and having it be modern and having been it be proficient and credible is the state that we are in, and that is what the Board emphasized in its report. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So when the Board says it should be modern, I 

guess that is the problem I am having. I understand the SSBN. I 

understand the move from Ohio to Columbia class. That I understand. But when you talk about bombers or ICBMs, how do you 

modernize ICBMs? 

And your other statement that I find curious, you say, we use it 

every day. How are we using ICBMs every day? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Right now there are people in the missile fields, 

in the LCCs [launch control centers], airmen in the LCCs, that are 

airmen doing that mission. So they are doing that mission right 

now as we speak. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So are you saying we are deploying ICBMs every 

day? 
14 

Dr. LAPLANTE. No, the deterrence posture—we have right now 

SSBNs in the ocean, we have ICBMs in CONUS [continental 

United States], in the United States, and we have bombers. Those 

are all part of an active deterrent that operates 24/7. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So when you say we are using it every day, you 

are not meaning we are actually using it in the conventional sense. 

You mean just their presence is sufficient to be the deterrent? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Absolutely. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. In fact, that is the point. The point is, you know, 

there are the three C’s of deterrence: credibility, capability, and 

clarity. And this is part of the capability. We have to show that we 

have this capability. 

Ms. HANABUSA. My time is almost up, so we will continue this 

in the next session. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Sure. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When we talk about the triad, I am awfully concerned about the 

next-generation bomber. And given our capability in terms of cruise 

missiles, of precision guidance, guided munitions, those things, how 

important is it to have—I mean, is that part of the triad in terms 

of having a next-generation manned bomber? Is that dated or is 

that still as critical as it has always been? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Board has not, as far as I know, actually— 

the Defense Science Board has not addressed that specific question. 

I have personal experience in this in my previous job as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, but the Board has not answered 

that. 

But I would say that it is a policy of the United States and the 

plan that the next bomber, the B–21, is replacing and is that part 

of the triad. And as the Air Force has stated publicly, initially it 

is going to be manned, but they are building in the hooks and the 

capabilities, so if there is a potential future that it needs to be unmanned they don’t have to start from scratch. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

‘‘Redundancy’’ is a term we hear repeatedly when discussing the 

nuclear triad and our ability to retaliate in the event of a hostile 

nuclear attack. How vulnerable are our satellite detection systems 

to Chinese and Russian kinetic kill or directed energy antisatellite 

weapons? Are these systems redundant in any way? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I will try to answer it, because the Board has 

looked at space, and there is a limited amount we can say in this 

open session. But are you saying is the triad redundant given antispace capabilities? 

Mr. COFFMAN. That is right, ASAT [antisatellite] capability. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. By an adversary? 

Mr. COFFMAN. Right. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. No. No, it is not. In fact, quite the contrary. The 

idea being that these—like, I used the example of the SSBNs and 

others. We have to have ways that the triad can be a credible deterrent even in the most extreme warfighting scenario, and includ-
15 

ing in a space situation. So while we can’t go into the details here, 

a nuclear command and control has to be robust enough to deal 

with the fact that space is going to also be contested, so communications that use space have to be considered redundancies, resiliencies to deal with that to make sure the triad works. 

But, no, no. In fact, the triad is supposed to be able to be robust 

against the full spectrum of space threats, cyber threats, and, God 

forbid, a nuclear threat. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Khanna, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Do you agree with President Ronald Reagan’s statement that a 

nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I think it is the hope of all of us that we never 

have a nuclear war. 

Mr. KHANNA. That wasn’t his statement. He said it must never 

be fought. I mean, it can’t be won. Do you believe that he was correct, or do you believe that we need to reconsider President Reagan’s approach to deal with nuclear weapons because the times 

have changed? And do you think that—are you here saying that his 

thinking is outdated, or do you believe that his thinking still applies? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I don’t know if I could speak for the Board in 

that regard. 

Dr. JOHN. Let’s see, let me help Mike out a little bit. That is a 

policy statement which we, representing the Defense Science 

Board, really would act upon or not. 

We will say that we start with prevent nuclear war, and the 

foundation for that is deterrence. And as I believe one of your 

briefers said yesterday, and I can’t remember who it was, or General Kehler might have said in different testimony, that the paradox of deterrence is that they have to be convinced that you actually would use it. We have devoted our lives to putting substance 

behind that proposition, and if you think there is a better way to 

do deterrence, I think we would love to hear it. 

Mr. KHANNA. I guess I want to get your views in terms of—I 

mean, I think President Reagan—and I disagreed with him on so 

many things, but I think that many people would say that he had 

an aspiration for peace. He, if you read his biographies, said that 

he never wanted to see nuclear war. That is why he came up with 

Star Wars, whatever you may think of it. 

And my question is just he clearly would disagree with what you 

are proposing, at least from his public statement. So are you rejecting President Reagan’s legacy on this issue? Which would be fine, 

I mean, you can say we are in different times and President 

Reagan didn’t know what he was talking about when it came to nuclear deterrence and you have a different approach. I just want to 

see if that is your view. 

Dr. JOHN. I don’t know how different it is today, because the 

most significant modernization program, last modernization program, was in his administration, modernization of our nuclear 

weapons. 
16 

Dr. LAPLANTE. We are living off the modernization, many of 

which was done during the Reagan administration, the Ohio class, 

the Minuteman. And so, again, the Defense Science Board is not 

a policy board. 

Now, clearly, the objective of having a triad as a deterrent is stability. And stability is, as I my colleague here said, is what you are 

after. You are after stability. You are after stability. And the paradox is to get stability in deterrence theory, you have to have a 

credible capability. That is the paradox. 

Mr. KHANNA. I guess I still want to just get to the point. I agree 

with your point on modernization having been done there, but your 

quote, which is in the Defense Science Board’s report, that you believe in a more flexible nuclear enterprise for limited use, that basically what you are saying is that we should have a first strike option if it is in our strategic interest. Is that not correct? I mean, 

because that is how Senator Feinstein characterized it in her oped this morning. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I would suggest that that is not what we—what 

the Board believes. What we believe is—as my colleague said, we 

are not making policy recommendations. What we are trying to 

say, is in an uncertain future, are we capable and prepared to respond in whatever way the policy makers in this country decide we 

should? Are we prepared, are we capable, can we go execute that 

if that were something that was required of the community? 

And that is one of the things that we believe has been ignored 

in recent decades, which is, how do you think about what potential 

things you might have to do in the future and how do you assure 

the country and our adversaries that if this country has to go a different place, that we are ready to go there and capable of doing 

that? 

And so it is not making a policy recommendation that we should 

do this or should do that, and I think that is a misreading of our 

report. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. 

Cheney, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to take issue with my colleague from California’s interpretation of Ronald Reagan’s policy. You know, President Reagan believed and said that war comes not when the forces of freedom are 

strong, it is actually when we are weak that we are threatened. 

So wouldn’t you say that fundamental to the notion that nuclear 

war should never be fought is the idea that our forces must, in fact, 

be so strong, so able to overwhelm any adversary that they understand they will not survive such a conflict? That, in fact, deterrence 

requires both a characterization and calculation about the threats 

we face, but also ensuring the lethality, the modernization, the effectiveness of our force across a broad array of circumstances so 

that our adversaries never mistake any action that we take for 

some sort of indication that they could actually prevail in a nuclear 

conflict? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Yeah, it is a risk-benefit. It is, does an adversary 

believe that if they take an action that they would gain more benefit than they would have to pay a cost in our response? 
17 

And I think my comment, back to the previous question, was 

along that line, is how do we make sure an adversary believes that 

whatever avenue they try to follow to negate the military capability 

of this country, whatever avenue they pursue, that we are ready 

and capable of responding in whatever way we have to, to convince 

them that whatever benefit they think they might accrue, that is 

not going to work, and that we can impose a cost that is much 

more significant than the benefit they think they can gain. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I would just add that the classic deterrence theory is, this is the hardest part, is you are really trying to get—all 

that matters is inside the head of the adversary or peer that you 

are trying to deter. And so, as my colleague said, the idea behind 

deterrence, the theory of deterrence is fundamental, is that, as you 

said, whatever action that this adversary, potential adversary, is 

going to take to their advantage, that they must be convinced that 

the downside of taking that action will way overrule any upside 

they will get. That is the theory. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. And I think it is important also just for 

the record to point out that it was the policy of President Reagan 

to ensure that we had superiority across the Board, including in 

our nuclear forces, so that, in fact, we could guarantee that nuclear 

war would never be fought. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. The Chair now recognizes the ranking 

member. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just ask consent 

to enter into the record the January 11 statement from Roy Schwitters and the January 11 letter from Richard Garwin, both with regards to Peer Review and Design Competition in the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] National Security Laboratories. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 41.] 

Mr. ROGERS. We are now going to stand in recess as we move 

to—what room are we moving to? To another room. We are in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 9, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 9, 2017 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 9, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 9, 2017 

(51) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. What are your recommendations regarding how the Stockpile Responsiveness Program authorized by Congress in the FY16 NDAA, and the foreign 

design prototyping requirement in the FY15 NDAA, could be improved to better 

tackle the concerns expressed by the DSB? What actions should the administration 

take here? What actions should Congress take here? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. As stated in the ‘‘Seven Defense 

Priorities. . .’’ report, the DSB believes that a hedge against uncertainty is as important a part of the nation’s nuclear weapons program as both the certification of the 

current systems and the life extension or replacement of systems that have aged 

out. The foreign design prototyping requirement, known as the Foreign Nuclear 

Weapons Initiative (FNWI) in the FY15 NDAA and the Stockpile Responsiveness 

Program in the FY16 NDAA were positive steps to support such hedging, but their 

focus is on DOE. Two ways the Stockpile Responsiveness Program could be more 

effective would be through the participation of the DOD and with Congressional 

funding of the Program, to include options for prototyping promising concepts. The 

FNWI would also benefit from a DOD partnership to posit a set of signatures not 

just of threat warheads, but also system and operational capabilities for which the 

intelligence community could monitor as early as possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe why the DSB thinks it is important to truly flex all 

of the muscles needed to build nuclear weapons from scratch? Why don’t life extension programs flex all of these muscles? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The DSB has confidence in the current U.S. stockpile but believes that the nuclear weapons have aged well beyond 

their expected lifetimes with no margin to further extend their life. Life extension 

programs (LEPs) for existing delivery platforms and warheads are essential to sustain the safety, security, and reliability of our currently fielded systems, but only 

go so far and do not produce a fully modernized system with a long life, nor do they 

address the growing concerns about our ability to be flexible in the face of unpredictable threats. However, LEPs are replacement programs that rebuild fashion, legacy system which originated during the last decades of the Cold War. They do not 

exercise the full scope of activities across the spectrum of concept development, design, engineering, production, and certification. To be sure, LEPs often involve some 

level of component or subsystem redesign and certification as duplicate replacement 

parts may no longer be available. But they do not start from a ‘‘clean sheet’’ for the 

entire system in which the options that would optimize the system for the purposes 

the nation might need can be explored—whether that optimization be fore performance, improved margin, employment of new manufacturing techniques, etc. The 

DSB recognized this shortcoming in an LEP approach as early as 2004 and again 

in 2006, as limiting flexibility against an uncertain future, and calling for research 

to meet emerging needs for east of manufacture, higher margins, lower collateral 

damage, and special effects. If the nation ever decided it needed something different, 

the DOD–DOE partnership would need to recreate skills that have atrophied over 

the last 25 years in the context of different requirements and constraints (such as 

modern delivery platforms or no nuclear testing). 

Mr. ROGERS. The DSB report indicates that U.S. nuclear force planning must do 

a better job anticipating threats and be ready to respond to them. What are some 

of those threats? How should our nuclear forces programs and enterprise be postured to respond to them? Do DOD, NNSA, and the IC have an active and ongoing 

effort to anticipate threats in the nuclear weapons realm? What is it? What can 

Congress do to help ensure DOD and NNSA are effectively and actively working to 

anticipate threats? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The DSB’s report from December emphasizes that ‘‘nuclear weapons 

are a steadily evolving threat.’’ Would you please describe how the nuclear weapons 

threat has evolved, particularly since the last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was 

written in 2010? What new threats, vulnerability, or opportunities have emerged or 

changed since 2010 that the new NPR must take a clear-eyed look at? 
52 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. Since the late 1990s, Russia has 

been on a path to emphasize nuclear weapons as an integral part of its security 

strategy by modernizing its strategic forces, expanding its tactical capabilities, and 

promulgating and exercising new doctrine for regional and strategic use. Since the 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the breakdown of any further U.S.-Russia arms control discussions, Russian violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty, 

and its aggressive actions along its borders have occurred. Russia’s threatening actions on the borders with U.S. NATO partners raised concerns about the alliance’s 

commitment to mutual defense. In addition, China made nuclear modernization and 

expansion of its strategic arsenal a key part of its massive military expansion and 

continued to surprise the U.S. with the speed at which it has fielded new systems. 

North Korea has continued to develop and operationalize its own nuclear force 

seemingly without more price to pay than it already has. In both technical and operational aspects, Russia and China are introducing asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and concepts of operation that incorporates nuclear warfighting options in a 

more integrated—or ‘‘cross-domain’’—approach with non-nuclear forces. North Korea’s opacity creates numerous questions as to what capabilities would best deter 

it from further proliferation or use, and as a result, raises serious concerns in the 

minds of U.S. regional allies as to whether their interests are better served by having their own nuclear capabilities instead of relying on our extended deterrence 

guarantees. Depending on how these three situations unfold and how the U.S. addresses them, the potential for further proliferation is serious. Iran has demonstrated the difficult and tenuous nature of stemming a state actor who sees nuclear weapons as a deterrent or hedge against regional threats and as an equalizer 

against superior non-nuclear military forces. A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear physicist, demonstrated the ability, even before the advent of such enablers as the dark 

web, to create an undetected network of nuclear commerce. To complicate matters 

further, technology is advancing in directions with the potential to make acquisition 

of a weapon more accessible to those with limited resources. 

Mr. ROGERS. What action could the administration or Congress take to improve 

the readiness and responsiveness of the NNSA enterprise to produce nuclear weapons? Right now, it takes over 15 years to even life extend an existing nuclear weapon—this is far too long. What can we do to drive down timelines while maintaining 

safety and security (and minimizing costs)? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The sluggishness of the NNSA enterprise has been recognized as a serious problem through numerous studies, commissions and reviews over two decades, including the 2014 Augustine-Mies Congressional Advisory Panel ‘‘A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise.’’ The DSB 

contribution to this topic came in a 2006 study ‘‘Nuclear Capabilities.’’ The DSB observations and recommendations differed little from the other studies both before 

and after its publication, except that it included both DOE and DOD in its review 

with the conclusion at that time that ‘‘the production complex was not configured, 

managed, or funded to meet minimum immediate stockpile sustainment needs and 

that the organization, management, and programs at both DOD and DOE did not 

provide for a nuclear weapons enterprise capable of meeting the nation’s future 

needs.’’ Leveraging the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to explore design approaches that emphasize readiness and responsiveness provides another avenue to 

drive down timelines while maintaining safety and security. The governance structure and practices that have burdened the enterprise with excessive oversight, inefficiencies, and mistrust are consistently cited in almost all the dozens of studies as 

the root problems with NNSA. It remains to be seen whether the Panel to Track 

and Assess Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise, jointly established by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 

Medicine and the National Academy of Public Administration at Congressional direction to carry out a 4.5 year assessment of the NNSA’s responses to longstanding 

problems, will provide the forcing function needed to affect the cultural change required to address the inherent problems. 

Mr. ROGERS. The DSB report says ‘‘The recent uptick in priority for nuclear force 

modernization in both departments sends a strong message of U.S. commitment to 

the deterrent, but it comes after 25 years of downplaying (and poorly resourcing) 

the mission.’’ Would you please describe how this message has resonated within the 

DOD and NNSA enterprises? Has it improved morale, recruitment, or retention? 

When the DSB says the mission was poorly resourced, do you believe the nuclear 

modernization and budget plans laid out now are sufficient? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The DSB took a detailed look at 

nuclear skills across both DOD and Doe in 2008 (an expanded version of the 1999 

Chiles Commission, also led by ADM Chiles) and identified some serious skills 

shortfalls fueled by strategy and leadership shortcomings in defining the nature and 
53 

scope of the nation’s nuclear deterrent. In addition, the DSB Permanent Task Force 

on Nuclear Weapons Surety undertook a series of studies from 2008–2013 focuses 

on the Air Force in the wake of the accidental transport of a live round from Minot 

to Barksdale in 2007. Continuing missteps by the Air Force and more recent ones 

by the Navy led then-Secretary Hagel to request the ‘‘Independent Review of the 

Nuclear Enterprise.’’ The persistent message through these reviews were that the 

root cause for the operational mishaps linked to airmen and sailor perceptions that 

the mission was not valued by leadership, as evidenced through their actions that 

placed greater emphasis on compliance and inspections, and their lack of commitment to address long standing operational support shortfalls. Individual DSB members and a recent study on WMD deterrence are observing that the uptick in priority for nuclear force modernization has definitely improved morale, although there 

is concern whether this priority will be sustained. The last three Chiefs of Naval 

Operations have made clear that its nuclear mission is its highest priority. As a result, the Navy has been able to sustain a capable acquisition community and operational force. The Air Force has been slower to change. It is recovering its skill base 

through a combination of leadership and organizational changes, and is closing 

funding gaps, but it will require years of sustained support to recreate the spectrum 

of nuclear skilled military and civilians required. The NNSA laboratories have been 

growing to meet the demands of the Lifetime Extension Program schedule, with excellent success in attracting highly talented new staff, but they are inexperienced 

and reliant on a dwindling cadre of experienced (and retirement eligible) scientists 

and engineers. Sustainment of the current priority placed on the mission, through 

both words and actions, is the best bet for ensuring retention. The DSB does not 

comment on specific levels of funding. However, we note that there no funds for 

DOE/NNSA for plutonium pit production beyond 30 pits/year or for a Stockpile 

Sustainment Program. For delivery systems, we note that all three legs of the Triad 

(SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers) are at the end of their already extended life and will 

need to be replaced over the next decade and a half. The significant resourcing required will be competing against other priorities in the Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do we guard against ‘‘technology surprise’’ or ‘‘strategic surprise’’ in the nuclear deterrence realm? Are we putting enough effort into cuttingedge R&D in nuclear capabilities to understand what is possible, what other nations 

may achieve? Are we putting enough resources into collecting and understanding 

technical intelligence on other nuclear powers and what capabilities they are researching? What role does prototyping and basic, fundamental nuclear science play 

here? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The December DSB report says that ‘‘Despite the ‘peace dividend’ at 

the end of the Cold War, the DSB remains unconvinced that downplaying the nation’s nuclear deterrent would lead other nations to do the same.’’ Would you please 

elaborate on how the DSB believes the U.S. has been downplaying its nuclear deterrent? What actions or policies would you point towards? Have the steps the U.S. 

has taken to de-emphasize its nuclear deterrent had any effects on the nuclear programs of Russia? China? Any other nuclear power or aspiring nuclear power? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. Successive administrations since 

the end of the Cold War sought to place more reliance on advanced non-nuclear 

force capabilities for deterrence while downsizing the nuclear component and focusing investments in that community on life extensions of systems fielded in the 

1980s. That strategy, however, had the unintended consequence that nuclear became even more prominent for other nations because they could not afford to meet 

or overmatch the U.S. with conventional capabilities. Russia began undertaking and 

extensive modernization and expansion program over a decade earlier than the U.S., 

China embarked on a steady march to expand both its nuclear and non-nuclear 

forces, and North Korea became fully committed to developing its own systems irrespective of external pressures. At the same time, the end-of-life of all U.S. systems 

was known but not addressed until left with no choice, and therefore few options 

except replacement could be supported in the time remaining. The relatively recent 

consensus reached by both Congress and the last administration to support the full 

suite of modernization efforts at both DOD and DOE is a welcome reversal, but any 

faltering in that commitment going forward will lead to gaps in the viability of the 

deterrent. 

Mr. ROGERS. The DSB’s December report makes a pointed summary statement, 

saying: ‘‘In short, ‘nuclear’ still matters, nuclear is in a class of its own, and nuclear 

cannot be wished away.’’ What recent actions would you describe as ‘‘wishing away’’ 

the nuclear aspects of defense? What actions do you think we could take that would 

again be wishing it away? Or to put it another way—what actions could we take 
54 

that would be putting our heads in the sand? Would cancelling key nuclear modernization programs fall in that list? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Our O&I Subcommittee had a hearing focused on the huge backlog 

of deferred maintenance at NNSA’s facilities. Has the DSB looked at this issue? 

What are the impacts of all of this very old, very decrepit infrastructure? How does 

it influence NNSA’s readiness and responsiveness to react to new taskings and 

changes in programs? 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. In its ‘‘Nuclear Capabilities’’ report of 2006, the 

DSB reported that the production complex was not configured, managed, or funded 

to meet minimum immediate stockpile sustainment needs. Many of the problems 

that prompted that observation remain, but the DSB has not taken a look at the 

issue recently. A glimpse of the advantages that a modern facility employing advanced manufacturing capabilities can provide can be found at the new Kansas City 

plant, where non-nuclear components for the weapons are produced. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the key drivers of the U.S. nuclear modernization program? How is it affected by foreign threats and capabilities? How is it affected by 

vulnerabilities or aging in current U.S. nuclear forces? Is there margin to further 

slip or delay the schedules for our nuclear modernization programs? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What could be done by DOD—and more broadly DOE and the nation—to ‘‘reestablish the knowledge base in nuclear matters and the art of deterrence among both civilian and military leadership,’’ which the DSB notes ‘‘has largely atrophied’’? What role can Congress play in this? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The DSB has been consistent 

through most of its work on nuclear matters to point out that the most important 

part of the nation’s deterrent posture is the professional workforce, be they in the 

policy, technical, programmatic or operational roles. In no other area of national security do these several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise decisions and 

take appropriate actions simply takes time. That said, there are some practical 

things to be done such as re-introducing the fundamentals of nuclear weapons and 

warfighting in the education, training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating 

and promoting promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating highpotential professionals through a range of assignments that would expose them to 

the policy, technical, and operational considerations associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should be encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, 

the U.S. deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the country 

tested and implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex 21st century multi-polar environment, the U.S. is at the beginning of developing new strategies for deterrence and 

should expect those strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the DSB’s concerns on whether DOD’s conventional 

forces are adequately prepared to ‘‘fight through’’ a nuclear environment. What 

should DOD be doing to ensure nuclear survivability requirements are included in 

key DOD acquisition programs? How should DOD examine tactics, redundancy, and 

recovery plans to ensure it can ‘‘fight through’’? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Please talk us through the following recommendation the DSB made: 

‘‘The DSB strongly recommends that all major acquisitions be born with a nuclear 

survivability requirement derived from projected threat scenarios relevant to the 

range of missions expected for the system.’’ DOD doesn’t already do this? Which 

major DOD acquisition programs are subject to nuclear hardening requirements— 

or requirements to be able to ‘‘fight through’’—and which are not? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. [A classified response was provided 

and is retained in committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the state of knowledge and expertise in DOD and the defense industry regarding nuclear weapons effects and survivability? What could be 

done to improve this knowledge level? What steps should Congress take here? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. Through its work in the area of nuclear weapons effects and survivability over the decade from 2005–2015, the DSB 

observed that expertise was initially continuing to decline as it had since the end 

of the Cold War. The area started to draw attention, however, because of a number 

of activities, such as the EMP Commission and the follow-on DSB Work through the 
55 

standing committee, the B61–12 program, and leadership at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). While those coincident efforts did not result in restoration 

of Cold War levels of investment or expertise, they did stem the decline and produced a more stable programmatic situation at DTRA and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) laboratories. That stabilization and even modest growth has 

persisted as a result of the triad related modernization programs. In the past ∼three 

years, there have also been investments in applying the computational and aboveground simulator tools of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program to advancing the 

science of weapons effects. The DSB has observed, however, that this area has been 

a relatively poor sibling to the weapons physics community. We recommended a 

more effective ‘‘national’’ enterprise in which DTRA and the NNSA laboratories 

were seamlessly partnered. Such a partnership could create a more viable capability 

to better serve the needs of both Departments and the defense industry which has 

largely lost its in-house design, development, and testing expertise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the history of the DSB’s work on nuclear deterrence 

issues. How long has DSB been working in this topic? What are the backgrounds 

and expertise of the DSB members who contribute to its work on nuclear deterrence? 

Dr. JOHN. The DSB has worked on nuclear issues since its inception 60 years ago. 

The list below covers work since 2004. 

– Nuclear in the Context of Broader Themes—Defense Imperatives for a New 

Administration, 2008 

– Capability Surprise (2008 Summer Study), 2009 

– Strategic Surprise (2014 Summer Study), 2015 

– Deterring, Preventing, and Responding to the Threat or Use of WMD, 2017 

(in review) 

– Nuclear Technologies and Systems—Future Strategic Strike Forces (2003 

Summer Study), 2004 

– Employment of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), 2004 

– Future Strategic Strike Skills, 2006 

– Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030 (2012 Summer 

Study), 2013 

– Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, 2014 

– Operations (Reports of the Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety) Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons, 2008 

– Nuclear Weapons Inspections for the Strategic Nuclear Force, 2008 

– Independent Assessment of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, 2011 

– Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Follow-On Review, 2013 

– Nuclear Survivability and Weapons Effects Nuclear Weapons Effects Test, 

Evaluation, and Simulation, 2005 

– Nuclear Weapons Effects National Enterprise, 2010 

– Reports of the Standing Task Force on Survivability of DOD Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and other Nuclear Weapon Effects, #1– 

5, 2011–2015 

– Unconventional Nuclear Strike Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine 

Nuclear Attack, 2004 

– Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Desctruction (2005 Summer 

Study), 2007 

– Skills and the Health of the Enterprise Nuclear Capabilities, 2006 

– Nuclear Deterrence Skills, 2008 

Each report lists the members of the task force. While not replicating that here, 

the participants have included retired senior civilians and general/flag officers who 

made their careers in DOD’s nuclear weapons community, with backgrounds that 

span the policy, technical, acquisition, and operational areas. Positions held include 

former STRATCOM commanders, Air Force Chiefs, Navy submarine force and nuclear weapons systems program leaders, Assistant Secretaries of Defense from OSD 

(Policy) and OSD (AT&L), and technical leadership from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Intelligence Community. Participants were also drawn from 

senior leadership of DOD’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 

(FFRDCs) and the Energy Department’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and form industries involved in both the platform and technical services aspects related to nuclear weapons. To keep entrenched perspectives in check, most studies also include 

task force members whose expertise is in related fields (e.g., cyber ISR, missile defense) but not mainstream nuclear matters. 
56 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. The report suggests the potential need to return to nuclear testing, 

noting that: ‘‘Underground nuclear testing provided both stockpile confidence and a 

powerful tool in advancing scientific understanding, but nuclear testing has not 

been permitted . . . In its place, the nation supported the Stockpile Stewardship Program that significantly improved the fundamental understanding of material aging 

and nuclear explosive physics through above ground simulators, and state-of-the-art 

computational modeling. An open question remains as to how long one can have 

confidence in the weapons through these approaches alone.’’ (emphasis added). 

While recognizing that the Board did not consider policy implications or cost considerations, please explain whether and how the report recommends reconsidering 

the need for nuclear testing? [Question #46, for cross-reference.] 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. Nuclear testing was one of several tools used to develop the U.S. stockpile and advance scientific understanding during the Cold War. 

With the end of the Cold War the nation put in place the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program that has been remarkably successful in providing the technical basis for 

continued sufficient confidence in the current stockpile. As part of the DSB’s highlighting the need for a hedge to an uncertain future, we have raised the question 

of how long this approach alone will provide the needed confidence. The DSB has 

not made a recommendation of how and/or when the need for nuclear testing should 

be reconsidered, but note that there is an existing process of annual assessment by 

the Commander U.S. Strategic Command and each of the national security laboratory directors regarding the need to return to nuclear testing. 

Mr. COOPER. Is nuclear deterrence just about U.S. nuclear forces? What else contributes to deterrence? [Question #47, for cross-reference.] 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. While the Triad represents the most visible manifestation of deterrence and is overdue for modernization, there are many other factors that contribute to deterrence and also require attention. Together with the 

Triad, these factors present to any adversary the credibility that the U.S. is fully 

capable of executing against our strategy under any circumstance; namely that the 

U.S. can impose unacceptable costs and/or negate any perceived benefits of an adversary’s actions. They include: The operational readiness of the force as demonstrated through training and exercises; The ability and capacity of the technical 

enterprise to anticipate and respond to changes in the threat; The ability to operate 

in an adversary generated nuclear environment (referred to as nuclear survivability); A robust command and control system; Preventing further proliferation— 

both ‘‘vertically’’ by current nuclear weapons actors, and ‘‘horizontally’’ by new 

proliferators—through the tools of diplomacy (treaties and agreements), cooperative 

and unilateral monitoring, and assurance/extended deterrence to our allies. The 

lynchpin: the demonstrated skills of talented, knowledgeable, committed, and valued 

people. The DSB has addressed each of these areas (with the exception of command 

and control, a topic covered by special commissions and the subject of a new DSB 

study just getting underway) in some depth throughout its history, and especially 

over the past 15 years as we began to see worrisome trends in the threat. A relatively recent proposition to add to the above list is that integration of U.S. advanced non-nuclear capabilities with its nuclear forces—so-called cross-domain, or 

integrated, deterrence—holds promise as a more fulsome approach. Over the last 

three decades the U.S. has developed highly effective non-nuclear capabilities to 

hold targets at risk that only nuclear weapons could previously. Several of these capabilities—kinetic and non-kinetic—seem likely to be able to enhance the credibility 

of both the nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrent if effectively employed as 

part of a broader integrated deterrence strategy. Each of the capabilities have the 

potential to affect the confidence the adversary can hold in his offensive nuclear capability to achieve a military or diplomatic purpose. These non-nuclear capabilities 

include the application of the technologies of autonomy, precision conventional 

strike, and space and cyber operations. Successful integration will require a seamless command and control system across nuclear and non-nuclear warfighting domains. 

Mr. COOPER. The DSB report recommends developing weapons with lower yields. 

What is the need or benefit when we already have non-strategic nuclear weapons 

that have low yields? 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. The DSB did not recommend the development of 

nuclear weapons with lower yields. We did state that the U.S. should have a robust 

hedge against an uncertain future and that one consideration for such a hedge could 

be low yield options for existing weapons beside the B61. 
57 

Mr. COOPER. How have advances in technologies made it easier for aspiring nuclear weapons states or even terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons? What investments should we make to keep ahead of this threat? 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. [A classified response was provided and is retained 

in committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. What could be done by DOD—and more broadly DOE—to ‘‘reestablish the knowledge base in nuclear matters and the art of deterrence among both 

civilian and military leadership,’’ which the DSB notes ‘‘has largely atrophied’’? 

What role can Congress play in supporting this effort? 

Dr. JOHN and Dr. ANASTASIO. The DSB has been consistent through most of its 

work on nuclear matters to point out that the most important part of the nation’s 

deterrent posture is the professional workforce, be they in the policy, technical, programmatic or operational roles. In no other area of national security do these several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise decisions and take appropriate 

actions simply takes time. That said, there are some practical things to be done 

such as re-introducing the fundamentals of nuclear weapons and warfighting in the 

education, training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating and promoting 

promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating high-potential professionals through a range of assignments that would expose them to the policy, technical, and operational considerations associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should 

be encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, the U.S. deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the country tested and 

implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex 21st century multi-polar environment, the 

U.S. is at the beginning of developing new strategies for deterrence and should expect those strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. The DSB reports that ‘‘nuclear testing has not been permitted for 

25 years’’ and ‘‘an open question remains as to how long one can have confidence 

in the weapons’’ by pursuing the Stockpile Stewardship Program but no full-scale 

nuclear testing. 

Does it believe our science-based tools will be enough to certify the reliability of 

the stockpile for the long term or may we need to return to nuclear testing at some 

point? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. As part the DSB’s highlighting the 

need for a hedge to an uncertain future we have raised the question of how long 

this approach alone will provide the needed confidence. (See also the answer to 

question 46.) [Question #46 can be found on page 56.] 

Mr. FRANKS. What could be done by DOD, DOE, and Congress to ‘‘reestablish the 

knowledge base in nuclear matters and the art of deterrence among both civilian 

and military leadership,’’ which the DSB notes ‘‘has largely atrophied’’? What are 

we doing to ensure our nuclear scientists and engineers are able to design and build 

new nuclear warheads if they were called upon to do so? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The DSB has been consistent 

through most of its work on nuclear matters to point out that the most important 

part of the nation’s deterrent posture is the professional workforce, be they in the 

policy, technical, programmatic or operational roles. In no other area of national security do these several dimensions interact as intimately as they do for nuclear matters, such that developing the knowledge and experience to made wise decisions and 

take appropriate actions simply takes time. That said, there are some practical 

things to be done such as re-introducing the fundamentals of nuclear weapons and 

warfighting in the education, training, and exercising activities of the DOD; creating 

and promoting promising career paths for military and civilians; and rotating highpotential professionals through a range of assignments that would expose them to 

the policy, technical, and operational considerations associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition, respectful debate about the merits of various contributors to deterrence should be encouraged. Contrary to the current perception held by many, 

the U.S. deterrence posture of the Cold War was constantly evolving as the country 

tested and implemented ideas, keeping some and discarding others, and as non-nuclear capabilities advanced. In the more complex 21st century multi-polar environment, the U.S. is at the beginning of developing new strategies for deterrence and 

should expect those strategies to evolve as we get smarter about the threats it faces. 
58 

Regarding the second question, to be prepared to design and build new warheads, 

NNSA scientists and engineers must actually do it. Respecting the restructions of 

current legislation, the DSB is a strong supporter of exploratory and advanced development activities, which is the focus of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program at 

NNSA, with the provision that concepts can be carried through to prototyping and 

flight testing. 

Mr. FRANKS. The December DSB report says: ‘‘The lead time for obtaining a modernized force is long and the U.S. is starting well behind Russia and China’s efforts.’’ We heard this same message yesterday at our hearing with General Selva 

and General Hyten. 

Would you please explain why the U.S. is lagging behind Russia and China’s modernization efforts and what could be done to shorten this timeline for the U.S. to 

catch up? 

Dr. JOHN, Dr. ANASTASIO, and Dr. LAPLANTE. The U.S. is lagging because the 

Russian and Chinese started their modernization programs 20 years ago. There is 

little we can do to catch up, and delays in support for modernization will only increase the gap. Care should be taken in the current modernization efforts to ensure 

flexibility in the new systems (e.g., open software architectures) that would allow 

their rapid adaptation to changes in the threat once they are deployed. In the meantime, there must be investment in sustaining the force that is currently deployed 

for as long as possible and for engaging in a more comprehensive approach to deterrence as discussed in the answer to question #47. [Question #47 can be found on 

page 56.] 

Æ