HILL FIGHTS

THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 

1967

COLONEL ROD ANDREW JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

MARINES IN THE VIETNAM WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War, is published for the education and training 

of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the U.S. Department of Defense 

observance of the fiftieth anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of 

the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Director of Marine Corps History

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Commemorative Series Historian

Paul Westermeyer

Senior Editor

Angela J. Anderson

Visual Information Specialist

Robert A. Kocher

2017

PCN 2017946890

F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn S.U ,s G . evo r emn tn P Office

I tn er en t: tskoob ro e P vog.opg. enoh : lot l f ree ( )668 -215 ;0081 D C a re ( a )202 -215 0081

Fa :x ( )202 -215 aM 4012 il: I potS DCC W , ihsa tgn no D , C -20402 1000

ublishing

ISBN 978-0-16-093961-7

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39617

90000
Hill Fights | 1

I

n the spring of 1967, some of the most vicious and 

bloody fighting of the Vietnam War occurred in the 

remote northwestern corner of the Republic of Vietnam 

(RVN), or South Vietnam. Khe Sanh lies in the mountainous northwest corner of Quang Tri Province. As an otherwise insignificant village that few people from the outside 

world had ever heard of, Khe Sanh’s location astride Route 

9 near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating North and 

South Vietnam and just 10 kilometers east of the Laotian 

border made it strategically significant to American military 

planners and their North Vietnamese foes. Later, in 1968, 

the legendary siege of Khe Sanh, partly coinciding with the 

larger Communist Tet Offensive, would make this small village a household name among Americans and a well-known 

heroic chapter in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps.

This narrative does not tell the story of the 1968 siege, 

but rather describes the equally heroic, brutal, and bloody 

fighting that took place around Khe Sanh during the preceding year. In the spring of 1967, various units from 3d Marine 

Division (3d MarDiv) fought a number of ferocious battles 

with elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), some 

of the best-trained and most motivated troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.*

 These fierce clashes, erupting 

suddenly in steep mountainous terrain at close range and 

resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, included some of 

the most desperate fighting of the Vietnam War. In Marine 

Corps lore, they were known as the “Hill Fights” or the “First 

Battle of Khe Sanh.”

The relative obscurity of the Hill Fights in comparison 

to the 1968 siege of Khe Sanh is unfortunate for several reasons. First, individual Marines and small-unit leaders acquitted themselves valiantly in the Hill Fights and their efforts 

should not be overlooked. The valor of Marine infantrymen 

at Khe Sanh was matched only by that of the aircraft crews 

who supported them. Also, the Hill Fights illustrated several 

trends that characterized the experience of the U.S. Marine 

Corps in Vietnam. Effective close air support and other fire 

support coordination were hallmarks of the Hill Fights and 

undoubtedly saved countless American lives. The fighting 

around Khe Sanh also highlighted the tenacity of the North 

Vietnamese soldier and his skills in concealment and in 

building fortifications.

Additionally, the operational decisions made by senior 

Marine officers in relation to Khe Sanh illustrated the strategic difficulties and dilemmas they faced along the DMZ. 

The growing presence and aggressiveness of the NVA in the 

northwestern corner of South Vietnam threatened to undo 

the growing success the Marines were having in pacification 

and counterinsurgency efforts in the lowland villages, which 

*The more proper term for the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was the 

People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). However, in daily parlance, members of 

the U.S. military commonly used NVA.
2 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

is where most senior Marines thought the primary American focus should be. Senior Marine officers, decorated veterans of battles with the Japanese, North Koreans, and Chinese 

earlier in their careers, were not averse to slugging it out 

with their Vietnamese foes in conventional fights. Younger Marines also were willing to fight a conventional enemy 

they could see rather than chase the ephemeral Viet Cong 

guerrillas who often avoided battle. Marine commanders 

believed, though, that Vietnam represented a different kind 

of war. They would give battle to the enemy’s regular forces, 

the NVA, when the opportunity arose, but victory would 

ultimately come through winning the trust of the population 

and defeating the insurgency in the countryside.

Profound tension existed between the Marines’ counterinsurgency strategy and the conventional war of attrition against enemy main-force units favored by U.S. Army 

General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. 

forces in Vietnam. This played out initially in Marine leaders downplaying the size and importance of NVA units near 

Khe Sanh, while Westmoreland and his staff at U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), in Saigon 

remained heavily focused on that threat. Additionally, Khe 

Sanh illustrated how thinly stretched Marine forces were in 

the I Corps sector, the five northernmost provinces of South 

Vietnam that Westmoreland had assigned to the Marines. 

The remote location of Khe Sanh, the difficulty of keeping it 

supplied, the need to protect more populated areas, and the 

emphasis on counterinsurgency efforts in those areas initially resulted in minimal Marine combat power being assigned 

to the area. Marines who did serve there in late 1966 and 

the first four months of 1967 often found themselves fighting enemy forces of surprising strength and tenacity, and felt 

hard pressed to accomplish their mission with the forces at 

hand. Over time, senior Marine leaders would realize that 

large NVA forces were indeed in the Khe Sanh area and were 

determined to overrun it.

By the last week of April 1967, 3d MarDiv was able to 

deploy more than two full infantry battalions to the Khe 

Sanh area and disrupt Communist plans for a major NVA 

offensive against Khe Sanh. In late April and early May, the 

Marines won a convincing tactical victory and dissuaded 

the North Vietnamese from further attempts to capture the 

base there for another nine months. The Marines proved, as 

they did so often in Vietnam, that it was difficult to prevent 

American infantrymen with supporting arms from taking 

and holding ground when they were determined to do so. 

Their efforts secured a strategically important area and set 

the stage for the famous siege that would occur the following year. In the process, 168 Marines were killed in the Hill 

Fights between 24 April and 13 May 1967. If the previous 

fighting between 1 February and 23 April is included, the 

number of Marines who gave their lives at Khe Sanh rises 

to 198. They and their comrades wrote a valiant, if less wellknown, chapter in Marine Corps history.* 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A800223 

Aerial view of the mountainous terrain surrounding the Khe 

Sanh combat base. Low, thick clouds often covered the landscape, particularly during the monsoon season from October 

to February.

*Casualty figures in secondary sources on the Hill Fights contradict those 

found in the situation reports sent from Khe Sanh to 3d MarDiv headquarters every six hours between 24 April and 13 May 1967. The most trusted 

secondary source states that “reported enemy casualties in the action from 

24 April through 11 May stood at 940 confirmed killed . . . 155 Marines 

died and another 425 suffered wounds.” However, the Khe Sanh situation 

reports, as well as the 3d MarDiv Command Chronology for May 1967, 

record U.S. casualties from 24 April to 13 May as 168 killed in action (KIA), 

436 wounded, and 2 missing; additionally, it reports enemy losses at 807 KIA 

(confirmed), 611 KIA (probable), and 6 captured. Between 1 February and 

23 April, the Americans lost 30 killed and 144 wounded at Khe Sanh, with a 

reported 58 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 63 KIA (probable). Thus, between 

1 February and 13 May, 198 Americans were killed at Khe Sanh, and the 

Marines believed they could confirm the death of 865 NVA soldiers during 

that same period.
Hill Fights | 3

SOUTH VIETNAM

Provincial Capital

Population Center

Kilometers

0 25 7 50 5

I CORPS Tactical Zone (CTZ)

Reference Map

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63

N

South

 China

 Sea

I C

O R P S

DMZ

LAOS

II C ORPS

NORTH 

 VIETNAM

Quang Tri

Thua 

 Thien

Quang Nam

Quang Tin 

Quang Ngai

Quang Tri

Dong Ha

Hue

Phu Bai

Da

Nang

Hoi An

Tam Ky

Chu Lai

Quang

 Ngai

Thailand

Cambodia

North Vietnam

South

 China

 Sea

Laos

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 
4 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Background and Strategic Debate

For much of the Vietnam War, U.S. Marine forces were 

responsible for the five northernmost provinces in South 

Vietnam: Quang Tri, Thu Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, 

and Quang Ngai.* This northern sector of the country made 

up the I Corps Tactical Zone, a region generally referred to 

as “I Corps.” Khe Sanh was the most northwesterly settlement of any size in Quang Tri Province. When U.S. Marines 

established bases and outposts in the northern portion of 

South Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, they initially paid little 

attention to Khe Sanh due to its remote location far from 

the population centers closer to the coast. Khe Sanh was near 

the western end of Route 9, the only east-west road traversing the northern part of the country. This road, which would 

not have qualified as such to most Americans, began at the 

village of Dong Ha. The French, the former colonial power 

in Vietnam, had paved the 12-kilometer section of the road 

between Dong Ha and Cam Lo. West of Cam Lo, Route 

9 was little more than a cart path until it reached a jagged 

peak the Marines called the “Rockpile.” Someone travelling 

west on the road would find that it jogged south after reaching the Rockpile, then resumed a westerly course. For the last 

18 kilometers, the traveler on Route 9 would have to navigate steep descents, sharp turns, cliffs, and unsafe bridges as 

the route deteriorated into a jungle path and climbed into 

mountainous terrain. Khe Sanh sits 10 kilometers (6 miles) 

from the western border, though the winding road makes the 

journey 15 kilometers, and less than 25 kilometers (15 miles) 

south of the DMZ.

A team of U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers had been at 

Khe Sanh since 1962 and had recruited small militia units 

of Bru tribesmen to help patrol the mountains around the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail.** This amalgamation of Special Forces 

soldiers and Bru tribesmen was called a Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group (CIDG). In 1964, the Special Forces team 

had moved to a long, narrow plateau about three kilometers 

north of the village, on top of which was an airstrip running 

east and west. When Marines arrived in 1966, they expanded 

and fortified the base. After that point, this base, not the village itself, was what Marines were usually referring to when 

they used the term Khe Sanh. To the north and west of the 

base, several hills only a few kilometers away provided excellent observation of the Khe Sanh plateau for whoever occupied them, whether they were enemy or friendly troops. Most 

of the heavy fighting around Khe Sanh would occur on three 

of those hills—Hill 861, Hill 881 South (881S), and Hill 881 

North (881N). The terrain throughout the area was rugged, 

often steep, and covered with jungle vegetation including tree 

canopy, bamboo thickets, and dense elephant grass.

During 1965 and 1966, the Marines in I Corps had fought 

a number of battles at the battalion and regimental level with 

Viet Cong and NVA forces, resulting in tactical victories 

for the Marines. Additionally, smaller Marine units regularly conducted sweeps, patrols, and ambushes to gain control over rural areas. Senior Marine officers, however, believed 

that permanent, meaningful success in Vietnam would result 

primarily from efforts at “pacification.”These Marine leaders included Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, commander 

of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, commander of Fleet Marine 

Force, Pacific (FMFPac). Prior Marine Corps experiences combatting insurgencies in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua earlier in the century and the influence of 

the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual influenced officers to 

believe that the real war lay within the villages.

Several American and South Vietnamese programs aimed 

to carry out the pacification strategy. Since August 1965, III 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A191691 

Aerial view of the Rockpile, east of Khe Sanh.

*Responsibility for Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces would later be 

transferred away from the Marines. 

**The Bru were one of 40 such aboriginal tribes inhabiting the central highlands of Vietnam and making up the Montagnard population. Hundreds of 

these tribesmen fought and died alongside U.S. forces during this conflict.
| 5

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Kilometers

See Reference Map Sections 1,2,3,5,6,7,8

Marine Bases in

Northern I CTZ

January 1967

0 5 10 15

LAOS

Ca Lu

Rockpile

Camp Carroll

Cam Lo Dong Ha

Gio Linh

Quang Tri

Khe

Sanh

Cam Lo River

Thach Hai River

Ben Hai River

Cua Viet River

Con 

Thien

N

South

 China

 Sea

D E M I L I T A R I Z E

D

Z O N E

Mieu Giang River

Cua 

Viet

9

1

608

x x

500 500

700

800

950 900

1015

800

700

500

600

800

700

600

600

689

500

559600

500

x

x

x 881N

881S

861

N

meters

See Reference Map Section 10

Khe Sanh Combat Base

and Vicinity 1967

0 1000 2000 3000

Rao Quan River

Khe Sanh

To Ca Lu

Lang Vei

Special Forces Camp

9

Khe Sanh

Combat Base

x x

x

x

9

Hill Fights
6 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

MAF had been committed to the Combined Action Program (CAP), in which one squad of Marine infantrymen 

and two squads of men from a Vietnamese village formed 

a “combined action platoon.” These units were responsible for the security of their respective villages; additionally, 

they facilitated the training of the villagers for their own selfdefense, denying resources and manpower from the villages to the Viet Cong, establishing civic action programs that 

improved the quality of life, and weakening the Communist 

guerrillas’ hold over the population. The growth of CAP in I 

Corps paralleled that of the new Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, carried 

out principally by the South Vietnamese government and 

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In CORDS, 

South Vietnamese troops established physical security in 

hamlets and villages and then worked with the village chiefs 

to improve the quality of life. By late 1966 and early 1967, 

General Krulak and other III MAF leaders saw much of 

the Marines’ role in I Corps as providing a tactical screen 

behind which counterinsurgency and civic action operations 

could proceed. Finally, Marine forces in I Corps continued to 

carry out their own civic action programs, providing advice 

and assistance for construction projects, schools, medical 

care, and resettlement of refugees, and to secure local support 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A416479 

LtGen Victor H. Krulak (left), commanding general of FMFPac, visits with Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, on 10 May 1968. Gen Krulak believed that success in Vietnam would ultimately result from a “spreading inkblot” 

strategy of pacification rather than primarily through conventional warfare and attrition.
| 7

for the government’s cause. Pacification efforts in I Corps 

were beginning to show positive results and likely influenced 

the Communist government of North Vietnam to send the 

NVA’s 324B Division across the DMZ in mid-1966.*

The Marines’ approach to fighting the war, however, 

consistently clashed with General Westmoreland’s, whose 

thinking was perhaps influenced by his own Service’s experiences fighting large-scale conventional forces in the world 

wars and in Korea. In 1965 and 1966, for example, Marine 

leaders had favored an “enclave” strategy, by which Marine 

units would secure and pacify an area, gradually extending 

the expanse of U.S. and government control like a “spreading ink blot.” Westmoreland did not completely discount the 

importance of the Marines’ pacification efforts but, in comparison to the Corps, he placed more emphasis on a searchand-destroy approach in which U.S. units would leave their 

bases and enclaves to locate and defeat large Viet Cong and 

NVA units in a war of firepower and attrition. Marine leaders, especially in the case of Khe Sanh, originally chafed 

under Westmoreland’s pressure to put more emphasis on 

these types of operations than on CAP.

As early as May 1966, evidence showed that the enemy’s 324B Division had entered the northeastern portion 

of Quang Tri Province. American reconnaissance aircraft 

reported a large enemy presence there, after several attacks on 

ARVN forces, as well as information from a North Vietnamese prisoner. Since the Marines in that area had little contact 

with the enemy, General Walt and 3d MarDiv commander Major General Wood B. Kyle were skeptical of a large 

NVA presence. That changed on 28 June 1966, when a heavy 

mortar attack on the base at Cam Lo caused seven friendly casualties.** Several clashes occurred between Marines and 

the NVA in eastern Quang Tri as the 3d MarDiv launched 

multibattalion operations dubbed Operation Hastings in July 

and Operation Prairie in August, followed by heavy fighting 

northwest of Cam Lo in February 1967.***

While it eventually was undeniable that NVA forces had 

crossed the DMZ in significant force in 1966, Westmoreland and the Marines interpreted that information differently because of their conflicting approaches to fighting the 

war. It is clear that General Krulak, General Walt, and General Kyle regarded the NVA incursion as a bothersome distraction to the primary mission of pacification. The North 

Vietnamese, they assumed, had taken that step to induce III 

MAF to commit significant combat power to neutralize the 

NVA threat, thereby interfering with the CORDS program. 

And while Marine leaders were alert to the enemy’s presence 

in the eastern part of the province, they were at first relatively 

unconcerned about it in the west around Khe Sanh.

Westmoreland, in contrast, believed that in addition to 

the 324B Division, there were two more NVA divisions—

the 304th and 341st Divisions—just across the DMZ ready 

to advance into Quang Tri Province by September. He feared 

they would slip around the western flank of Marine defenses at the Rockpile and Dong Ha and “open a corridor” in 

the mountainous northwest corner of the province bordering Laos and North Vietnam. If the NVA captured Khe 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190185 

A Bru village located about 1,500 meters south of the Khe 

Sanh airstrip. Ethnically and linguistically distinct from the 

Vietnamese, the Bru were generally supportive of U.S. efforts 

in Vietnam.

*The fact that senior Marine officers saw their role by late 1966 as largely that 

of providing a screen behind which pacification efforts could flourish is clear 

from a recorded briefing for LtGen Krulak provided by the 3d MarDiv staff 

on 8 March 1967. The same language is used in the 3d MarDiv Command 

Chronology for April 1967.

**The term friendly refers to incidents involving Americans or allies mistakenly targeted as a result of misidentification or error.

***Operation Hastings began as a search-and-destroy mission to counter 

NVA actions across the DMZ. Operation Prairie was a continuation of that 

mission.

Hill Fights
8 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Sanh, they would have use of Route 9 as an avenue to outflank allied positions farther east. Conversely, Westmoreland 

thought there would be several advantages to the Marines 

sending a battalion to Khe Sanh. Such a presence would prevent the enemy’s use of Route 9, provide a base for reconnaissance teams monitoring enemy movement along the Laotian 

border, facilitate an operation to launch an attack into Laos 

to “cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail” once approved by Washington, and allow the Marines to “get to know the area and to 

gain confidence fighting there if required.” Finally, Westmoreland felt that holding Khe Sanh could provide an opportunity for American forces “to fight large North Vietnamese 

Army units without delivery of our fires (artillery and tactical 

air) being complicated by the proximity of civilian population.” In other words, Westmoreland saw Khe Sanh as a place 

where the Americans could apply all their firepower and win 

a decisive conventional battle against the NVA. In his mind, 

the NVA forces in Quang Tri Province were not a distraction to the “real war” in the villages; instead, their destruction 

actually represented the quickest way to win the war.

Senior Marine leaders questioned not only Westmoreland’s focus on a conventional strategy, but also his premise that the North Vietnamese would give the Americans an 

opportunity to destroy them in open battle along the DMZ 

and the Laotian border. Brigadier General Lowell E. English, assistant division commander of 3d MarDiv, expressed 

this feeling as late as January 1967. By that time, there had 

been several fights in northern Quang Tri Province in which 

the Marines had inflicted serious losses on NVA forces. English noted that, every time the enemy had appeared in large 

units, he had been “clobbered” by Marine artillery and aircraft. “I don’t believe he’s that stupid,” said English, “that 

he’s going to come down in regimental strength or divisional strength, and give you the opportunity to annihilate him.”

General Krulak tried to dissuade Westmoreland from 

ordering more troops to Khe Sanh. In a conversation after 

an official briefing in mid-September, he argued that because 

of the mountainous terrain, at least two battalions would 

be required if Khe Sanh were to be held and that an infantry presence also would require helicopter assets because of 

the difficulty of resupplying the base overland. Finally, and 

most importantly, sending Marines to Khe Sanh would leave 

insufficient manpower to carry out the pacification program 

in the coastal areas of the province where most of the population lived—the mission Krulak felt was by far the most 

critical. Other Marine officers continued to agree that Khe 

Sanh was simply not that important. It was so remote that 

its loss would not enable the enemy to disrupt the Marines’ 

larger mission in the I Corps area. In the words of General English, “when you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not any place 

really. . . . You could lose it and you wouldn’t have lost a damn 

thing.”

Arrival of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

Over the course of the next year, the attitude of senior Marine 

officers about the insignificance of Khe Sanh would change. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Official U.S. Marine Corps portrait of BGen Lowell E. English.
| 9

For the time being, General Walt decided to appease Westmoreland’s desire to send a Marine infantry battalion there. 

If the enemy really was going to try to take Khe Sanh, and 

General Westmoreland really wanted it to be held, its remote 

location would require more than a company to defend it. As 

even General English later noted, once a decision was made 

to hold Khe Sanh, “you better not put less than a battalion 

there, with artillery.” The final catalyst for this decision was 

an intelligence report on 26 September 1966 that located 

an NVA troop concentration and base camp just 14 kilometers northeast of Khe Sanh. Soon after, orders went out that 

would transport Major Peter A. Wickwire’s 1st Battalion, 

3d Marines, to Khe Sanh on 30 September via Lockheed 

KC-130 Hercules aircraft.* Even then, the decision was a 

reluctant one. As III MAF G-3 Operations Officer Colonel 

John R. Chaisson explained: “had we not [put a battalion at 

Khe Sanh], we would have been directed to put it out there

. . . we put it out just to retain that little prestige . . . of doing 

it on your own volition rather than doing it with a shoe in 

your tail.”

When Wickwire’s battalion arrived on 30 September, his 

Marines immediately got to work liaising with U.S. Special 

Forces and ARVN forces, strengthening the defenses of the 

base and patrolling the area around it. Their mission was to 

determine the strength of the enemy presence in the area 

and to prevent any interdiction of the airstrip. Thus, for the 

first several weeks, the Marines of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 

patrolled the area outside the Khe Sanh base up to a distance 

of six kilometers, slightly more than the range of the enemy’s 

120mm mortars. Later, they would send squad-, platoon-, 

and occasionally company-size patrols as far out as 15 kilometers, the farthest distance at which they could still receive 

artillery support from 155mm howitzers. This support was 

provided by Battery B, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, which 

began arriving in Khe Sanh on 2 October.

Wickwire’s mission of providing protection for all friendly forces in the Khe Sanh area was complicated by a lack 

of unity of command, a situation that persisted through 

the end of the hill fights. The Khe Sanh garrison consisted 

of the Army Special Forces soldiers and Bru tribesmen of 

the CIDG; a detachment of the Studies and Observations 

Group (SOG) that reported to USMACV headquarters in 

Saigon; a U.S. Air Force air reconnaissance detachment; elements of the Marines’ 3d Reconnaissance Battalion; a team 

of U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees) sailors; and 

intelligence personnel from another U.S. government agency 

whose exact mission remained a mystery to the Marines.**

By early February 1967, there was also a Marine-led CAP 

company working alongside villagers within Khe Sanh itself, 

though these Marines would not directly take part in the 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Official U.S. Marine Corps portrait of Col Peter A. Wickwire. 

As a major, he commanded 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and 

was promoted to lieutenant colonel shortly after the battalion’s arrival at Khe Sanh in late 1966.

*Throughout most of this work, the longer, formal style of designating Marine Corps units will be used, such as Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. 

Note that “9th Marines” or “3d Marines” in Marine Corps parlance refers to 

the 9th Marine Regiment or the 3d Marine Regiment.

**Initially named the USMACV-Special Operations Group, SOG later became the Studies and Observations Group, an elite military unit that carried 

out some of the most dangerous and covert operations of the Vietnam War.

Hill Fights
10 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Hill Fights north of the combat base. The senior officer at 

Khe Sanh was a Marine throughout most of this period, but 

he had no authority over personnel from other Services or 

agencies, and often their patrols and activities interfered with 

each other. Because of the lack of communication, Wickwire’s Marines occasionally fired on Bru patrols, believing 

them to be the enemy. On another occasion, they refrained 

from firing because they believed the men they spotted might 

be allies. They later learned that no friendly patrols had been 

in the area. After that incident, Marine officers announced 

that their men would fire on any troops whose presence they 

could not account for.

The 1st Battalion’s contact with the enemy was sporadic, relatively rare, and never significant in terms of duration 

or the size of the enemy force. There was plenty of evidence, 

however, of NVA presence. Marines on patrols received and 

returned fire and often found newly constructed base camps 

and trails, discarded enemy gear, and even an abandoned field 

hospital. They took a handful of prisoners and followed the 

blood trails of wounded enemy soldiers. Still, it was impossible to determine whether there were large enemy forces lurking in the mountain valleys and dense foliage or whether 

they were small isolated patrols. Unable to provide definitive 

information on that question, 1st Battalion found its original 

30-day stay at Khe Sanh extended into early February 1967. 

Meanwhile, the Special Forces team relocated to Lang Vei, 

about five kilometers west of the village of Khe Sanh. 

Throughout October, November, and December 1966 

and January 1967, the Marines lost 1 man KIA and 27 

wounded, while claiming 15 confirmed kills of NVA soldiers. At times though, it seemed that their most implacable 

foe was not the NVA but the weather. The monsoon season 

struck in mid-October and did not fully abandon its assault 

on either the Marines or the NVA around Khe Sanh until at 

least February. Though the temperature never dropped below 

40 degrees Fahrenheit, the cold was made much worse by 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193282 

Marines from Combined Action Platoon Oscar-3 enter Tum Plang, a Bru village in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh combat base in 

September 1967.
| 11

constant rain and strong northerly winds of 20 –25 miles per 

hour with occasional gusts up to 45 miles per hour. Arriving in Khe Sanh without winter clothing, the Marines were 

caught physically and mentally unprepared for the onslaught. 

The men were literally never dry and rarely warm, especially while on patrols that lasted for days. Their clothing and 

web gear could not be cleaned or dried, and it disintegrated quickly.*

 As one Marine wrote to his parents, “We take 

showers in the rain everyday and rinse our clothes out. Our 

clothes never seem to dry and one set is already rotted off 

me.” This particular Marine wrote home repeatedly, asking 

his parents to send him fresh socks and a raincoat. After only 

minimal use, roads within and outside the base became “bottomless,” in Lieutenant Colonel Wickwire’s words, throwing 

mud into fan belts, engines, and brakes. Streams and rivers 

became impassable. Because the men found it impossible to 

stay dry and clean, cuts from elephant grass and leech bites 

became infected and developed into cellulitis, a serious bacterial skin infection. Constant cold, wet weather led to upper 

respiratory infections. Because of Khe Sanh’s remote location, the Marines essentially lived in the field for more than 

four months. There was no secure base area, no movies, no 

beer rations, and, at the most, one hot meal a day. For the first 

six or eight weeks, all the meals were C-rations. Still, Wickwire noted in January that his men had become acclimated 

to the conditions and withstood them well. Morale remained 

high, and indeed one of the most serious threats to it was the 

lack of hostile contact in proportion to all the “hard work” 

the Marines were putting into finding the enemy.

The experience of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, differed 

from that of other units that would participate in the hill 

fights in the following spring and summer due to the presence of the monsoons. In some ways, though, the seasonal 

weather accentuated aspects of the Khe Sanh fight that were 

true year round. For example, the bad weather actually highlighted the extent to which it was vital to keep the airstrip 

open. The monsoons transformed the Route 9 ground supply 

route from unreliable to utterly impassable, meaning that 

Khe Sanh was even more indefensible without fixed-wing 

air support for resupply. However, the rain, fog, and mist 

led to long periods in which flights to Khe Sanh were also 

impossible. As a result, a 15-day store of supplies, which was 

considered the accepted minimum, was never maintained, 

and at times the battalion’s supply of some items dwindled 

to one day at most. Also, the ruggedness of the terrain and 

the frequent difficulty of supplying advanced patrol bases 

by vehicle meant that the infantrymen in the hills around 

Khe Sanh were mostly dependent on helicopters for resupply and medevacs. Helicopters also became the preferred way 

of taking one squad or platoon out of the field and replacing it with another. The Sikorsky UH-34 Seahorse helicopter 

was often used, but its inability to hover made it incapable 

of evacuating casualties in several cases. The Boeing Vertol 

CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, Wickwire noted, was much 

more capable in that role.

On 26–27 January 1967, another contact with NVA forces 

illustrated both the Marines’ reliance on helicopters and the 

growing presence of the enemy. On the morning of 26 January, a patrol from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion consisting 

of six men and one dog was inserted by helicopter at a position on the western side of the Laotian border, 20 kilometers 

northwest of the Khe Sanh base. Around 1630 that day, the 

patrol, led by Gunnery Sergeant Gordon B. Hopkins, was 

atop a 2,300-foot hill and surrounded by a force of approximately 150 NVA soldiers. During the next 16 hours, Marine 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189915 

A key road on the Khe Sanh combat base in November 1967. 

Though this picture was taken approximately one year after 

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, occupied Khe Sanh, it illustrates 

road conditions at the combat base during monsoon season.

*Marines used the term web gear to refer to their cartridge belt and suspenders that were attached to it and draped over the back and shoulders, as well as 

the individual equipment items that could be attached to the belt or suspenders, such as canteen and ammunition pouches.

Hill Fights
12 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

aircrews made repeated attempts to evacuate the beleaguered 

patrol and, failing that, to land a reaction force of infantrymen to reinforce the reconnaissance Marines. At around 

1800 on the twenty-sixth, two UH-34 Seahorses tried to 

land to extract the patrol. Despite supporting fire from Bell 

UH-1E Huey gunships circling overhead, both helicopters 

were damaged so badly by enemy fire that they had to abandon the attempt and return to Khe Sanh. Shortly thereafter, a 

CH-46 piloted by Captain Joseph G. Roman landed just 25 

meters from the Marine patrol’s perimeter. However, NVA 

soldiers poured so much machine-gun fire into the helicopter that it was unable to lift off. Captain Roman and his 

crew abandoned the aircraft and joined Gunnery Sergeant 

Hopkins and his patrol. A second CH-46 piloted by Captain 

Harold J. Campbell Jr. crash-landed nearby about 25 minutes 

later. The Sea Knight carried a reaction force of 17 infantrymen. The helicopter caught fire, but all the Marines were 

able to escape, as well as salvage the aircraft’s two .50-caliber 

machine guns. Eventually the crew and the infantry Marines 

also made their way into the perimeter, which now held a 

total of 31 Marines and two .50-caliber machine guns.

Throughout the night, the hard-pressed collection of 

reconnaissance Marines, infantry Marines, pilots, and air 

crewmen battled NVA troops at hand-grenade range and 

called in air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft. At least two dozen 

sorties by McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II aircraft 

helped keep the enemy at bay, and a U.S. Air Force Douglas AC-47 Spooky airship (a.k.a. “Puff, the Magic Dragon”) 

also circled overhead, providing flares and 7.62mm fire from 

its miniguns. Meanwhile, the two Army M107 175mm 

long-range, self-propelled guns located at Camp Carroll 

near Cam Lo moved west to the Rockpile to support the 

besieged Marines in Laos. At 0200, two UH-34s attempted 

a medevac. Only one pilot was able to land. Due to the high 

elevation, his aircraft could carry only two of the most seriously wounded Marines. Casualties continued to mount. At 

around 0615, the NVA made another determined attack on 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189649 

A KC-130 makes an airdrop over the Khe Sanh combat base 

on 23 October 1967. Resupply by fixed-wing aircraft was 

vital to the survival of the base, particularly during monsoon 

season when the only road into Khe Sanh was impassable.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A800186 

The view looking out from Hill 86 north of the Khe Sanh 

combat base toward the Co Roc mountain range in Laos to 

the west. In these mountains to the west, GySgt Gordon B. 

Hopkins’s patrol from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion was 

attacked by enemy forces.
| 13

The President of the United States of America takes 

pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Captain Joseph 

Gerald Roman, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving 

as a Pilot with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE (HMM-265), 

Marine Aircraft Group Sixteen, FIRST Marine Aircraft 

Wing, in connection with combat operations against the 

enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on 26 and 27 January 1967. When a six man Marine reconnaissance team 

was surrounded by a force of approximately 150 North 

Vietnamese Army Regulars near Khe Sanh, Captain 

Roman launched as Flight leader of a section 

of two CH-46A transport helicopters with the 

mission of inserting a thirty man reaction force 

to relieve the beleaguered unit. Upon arriving 

over the area, it was decided to return the reaction force to Khe Sanh and prepare for immediate extraction of the reconnaissance team 

because of rapidly deteriorating weather conditions, approaching darkness and increased fire in 

the zone. Returning to the pickup zone, Captain Roman approached the landing area under intense 

enemy fire and upon landing, his helicopter sustained 

several hits, causing the flight control hydraulic systems 

to fail and igniting a fire in the cabin section. Observing 

the enemy approaching his aircraft, he ordered his crew 

to abandon the flaming wreckage and guided the dazed 

and injured men to the reconnaissance team’s position. 

There, with a force of only ten men, three of whom were 

wounded, he established a hasty defense to withstand 

the inevitable enemy assault. As the enemy charged up 

the ridge toward his position, the fire in his downed helicopter ignited the ammunition still on board, inflicting numerous casualties on the North Vietnamese and 

causing them to retreat in confusion. Reacting instantly, Captain Roman quickly expanded his defensive 

perimeter and relayed his tactical situation to the UH-1E 

gunships and his wingman, orbiting overhead. It was 

decided to attempt an insertion as extraction of the reconnaissance team appeared impossible. While his wingman 

returned to Khe Sanh to embark the reaction force, Captain Roman called for air support, including flare ships, 

and artillery cover. As his wingman returned with a seventeen man reaction force and attempted a landing, his aircraft sustained hits which caused it to crash land near the 

reconnaissance team’s position. The crew and reinforcements quickly abandoned the helicopter and moved to the 

besieged Marines’ position where they assisted in manning the defensive perimeter. During the night, 

he skillfully directed the air attacks, pinpointing 

enemy targets by sound when fog and clouds 

obscured the explosions. When two of his men 

required immediate medical evacuation, he 

guided an evacuation helicopter into the darkened zone by radio. Subsequently, the enemy 

launched a grenade attack on the Marines’ position and Captain Roman was wounded by fragments from grenades which exploded within 

the perimeter. Disregarding his painful wounds, he continued to direct the air strikes on them. The enemy then 

launched a second fanatical assault and he courageously 

adjusted the air strikes to within fifty meters of his own 

men, successfully repulsing the North Vietnamese force. 

With the arrival of daylight, Captain Roman requested 

immediate retractions of the Marines, which was subsequently completed without further incident. His daring 

and heroic actions in leading the small Marine force in the 

face of seemingly insurmountable odds undoubtedly saved 

the lives of his men and inspired them to withstand the 

determined enemy. By his exceptional leadership, resolute 

determination, uncommon courage and inspiring devotion 

to duty, Captain Roman upheld the highest traditions of 

the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

Captain Joseph G. Roman

Silver Star Citation

Hill Fights
14 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

the southern side of the perimeter, charging and tossing grenades. Private First Class Steve A. Srsen stood up and shouted “Grenades!” so that other Marines would take cover. The 

grenades wounded four Marines, including Srsen, who was 

treated for his wounds and then asked to be sent back into 

the fight. When another grenade landed near him half an 

hour later, Srsen pushed another Marine away from it. This 

action saved the other Marine but resulted in Srsen being 

wounded again, taking the full force of the grenade’s blast. 

He would soon die of his wounds and posthumously receive 

the Navy Cross. Finally, shortly after 0900 on 27 January, 

helicopters were able to extract all the remaining Marines.

A similar, though slightly smaller, action occurred on 17 

January when a seven-man patrol from 3d Reconnaissance 

Battalion collided with 50–70 NVA troops. A platoonsize reaction force from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, arrived 

to assist the reconnaissance Marines. The action resulted in 

the death of several NVA soldiers, the wounding of several 

Marines, and the heroic death of Corporal Michael J. Scanlon of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Soon after spotting the 

enemy formation, Scanlon gave the rest of the team time to 

deploy by moving to a defensive position, warning the rest of 

his patrol of an imminent attack, and killing four soldiers in 

the enemy column. Though soon wounded, he continued to 

fight aggressively. When a grenade landed within the patrol’s 

perimeter, he attempted to cover it with his body to protect 

his fellow Marines and was mortally wounded.

A Reduced Garrison and More Contacts

Despite the numerous enemy contacts made by 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and elements of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, there was still no conclusive proof that the NVA 

occupied the hilly jungle terrain north of Khe Sanh in regimental or division strength. Wickwire felt that more troops 

were needed in Khe Sanh to accomplish the mission he had 

been given, but his superiors instead decided to reduce the 

Marine presence there. The fighting in the eastern part of 

Quang Tri Province was heavier, and there was the continued desire to apply as many troops as possible to the pacification mission. In January 1967, General English noted 

that the tactical areas of responsibility (TAORs) for Marine 

units in the northernmost areas of Vietnam were expanding, 

and there simply were not enough troops to cover them adequately. This came out at the same briefing in which the general had commented that, if the Americans decided to hold 

Khe Sanh, it would be foolish to do so with “less than a battalion” of infantry along with supporting artillery. Less than 

a month later, Marine commanders were forced to violate 

Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pride in 

presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Private First 

Class Steve Albert Srsen, United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism as a Rifleman while serving with Company A, First Battalion, Third 

Marines, THIRD Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in the Republic 

of Vietnam on 27 January 1967. Private First 

Class Srsen was with the First Platoon, Company A, when it was engaged in action as a 

reaction force assigned to link up with a reconnaissance patrol. Early the next morning following the linkup, Private First Class Srsen’s squad came under 

heavy small-arms fire and grenade attack. When an enemy 

grenade landed in his squad’s position, Private First Class 

Srsen warned three other members of the squad, allowing 

them to take cover and escape injury. Wounded in his right 

side and leg from the grenade, Private First Class Srsen, after 

being treated by a Corpsman requested permission to return to his position in the perimeter. Approximately thirty minutes later another 

enemy grenade landed close to another Marine 

and Private First Class Srsen gallantly pushed 

him to the ground, thereby saving his life. Mortally wounded by the exploding grenade, Private 

First Class Srsen, by his dauntless courage and 

grave concern for another had risked his life to 

save that of a fellow Marine, thereby upholding the highest 

traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval 

Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Private First Class Steve A. Srsen
| 15

The President of the United States of America takes 

pride in presenting the Silver Star (Posthumously) to 

Corporal Michael J. Scanlon, United States Marine 

Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in 

action while serving as a Rifleman with Detachment, 

Third Force Reconnaissance Battalion, THIRD 

Marine Division, during operations against the 

enemy in Vietnam. On the night of 17 January 1967, Corporal Scanlon, as a member of a 

seven-man reconnaissance patrol, was flown by 

helicopter deep into enemy-controlled territory, with the mission of locating enemy infiltration routes. Throughout the night, the Marines 

heard sounds of enemy activity. At dawn on 18 

January, the patrol moved to an observation point where 

a numerically superior North Vietnamese Army patrol 

of approximately forty men was sighted moving toward 

their position. Assigned the responsibility of providing 

security for the patrol’s flank, Corporal Scanlon quickly 

moved to his defensive position where he was observed 

by the approaching enemy. Demonstrating exceptional 

presence of mind, he warned his companions and immediately opened fire at the lead man of the North Vietnamese unit. His continued to bring effective fire to bear on the 

advancing enemy although wounded twice as the North 

Vietnamese moved to within fifteen meters of his position. 

Exhibiting exemplary courage and aggressive 

fighting spirit despite his painful wounds and 

the intense enemy fire directed at him, Corporal Scanlon maintained his position and halted 

the enemy’s attempts to dislodge the patrol’s 

flank security. When an enemy hand grenade 

landed within the patrol’s defensive perimeter 

Corporal Scanlon, with complete disregard for 

his own safety, valiantly attempted to recover 

the grenade but was mortally wounded. By his extraordinary courage, bold initiative, and selfless devotion to duty, 

Corporal Scanlon undoubtedly saved the lives of several 

Marines, inspired all those who observed him and upheld 

the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the 

United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for 

his country.

Corporal Michael J. Scanlon

Silver Star Citation

this logic. When 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, was withdrawn 

from Khe Sanh on 1–2 February 1967, it was replaced not by 

another battalion but by a single rifle company.

Captain Michael W. Sayers’s Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, replaced 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Marine 

forces also included a 45-man platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. In terms of artillery, Battery I, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, replaced Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th 

Marines, on 26 January. The senior officer present (SOP), 

Colonel Thomas A. Horne, coordinated all Marine Corps 

activities at Khe Sanh and relayed reports to higher headquarters. Essentially though, Captain Sayers had a reinforced company to accomplish the same mission Lieutenant 

Colonel Wickwire had pursued with an entire battalion: protecting the airstrip by patrolling out to a distance of 15 kilometers. Initially, damp weather and fog inhibited patrolling 

and reconnaissance operations, but there were enough contacts to indicate increased enemy activity. More reconnaissance patrols were attacked by NVA units and extracted by 

helicopters while under fire.

Then, on 25 February, a hard fight erupted no more than 

three kilometers from the airstrip. Second Lieutenant John 

M. Kramer’s 2d Platoon was patrolling west of the airstrip 

when its 1st Squad, led by Sergeant Donald E. Harper Jr., 

collided with the enemy. As they patrolled, Harper’s squad 

members had spotted several enemy soldiers, who later 

Hill Fights
16 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

fled. When Harper’s first fireteam, led by Corporal Steven 

Wright, reached the top of a low hill, they suddenly found 

themselves within point-blank range of three enemy soldiers sitting on the ground. Both sides were surprised by the 

encounter, but the Marines fired first with a shotgun and an 

M60 7.62mm machine gun, killing one man and severely 

wounding the other two. The leader of the second fireteam 

wounded another enemy soldier several yards to the right. 

The squad then began receiving heavy fire from 50 yards 

away on the reverse slope of the hill. The incoming fire was so 

intense that Harper quickly concluded he was facing a superior force. He withdrew to the bottom of the hill, reported to 

Captain Sayers, and requested artillery fire on the top of the 

hill. After the fire mission, Sayers ordered Harper to reoccupy the top of the hill and retrieve the enemy soldier’s body. 

Upon reaching the crest with five men, Harper searched 

the body before his men began to drag it back, when they 

received fire from their front and flank. Harper withdrew 

again and requested more artillery, then advanced a third 

time. By this time, the enemy had emplaced a machine gun 

and the fire was even more intense. Captain Sayers ordered 

two squads from 1st Platoon, led by First Lieutenant David 

L. Mellon, to join Harper and take the hill. As the three 

squads advanced, they were hit not only by machine-gun fire 

but also mortars, which killed one Marine, Staff Sergeant 

Kendell D. Cutbirth, and wounded 8–10 others, including 

Lieutenant Mellon. 

Despite his painful wounds, Mellon was able to contact 

an airborne air controller and request air support.* Moments 

later, two F-4 Phantom’s with 500-pound bombs came 

screaming in overhead and dropped their load on the enemy 

on the reverse slope. After two more passes, the enemy force 

was devastated and its survivors scattered. Meanwhile, Captain Sayers had ordered Lieutenant Kramer to take his other 

two squads to Harper’s support. By the time these Marines 

could advance through the thick elephant grass 8–10 feet 

high, the action was over and medevac operations were in 

progress. Lieutenant Mellon delayed his own medevac until 

Kramer arrived so he could explain the situation. Late that 

afternoon and the next day, searches of the area turned up 

10 dead NVA soldiers, an 82mm mortar, several mortar base 

plates, hundreds of mortar rounds, binoculars, rifles, a pistol, 

and more than 20 enemy packs, indicating that the NVA 

had taken such serious casualties during the encounter that 

they were required to flee so rapidly that they had left a large 

amount of gear and ordnance. Company B had lost 1 man 

killed and 11 wounded.**

There would be no firefights this serious for another 

three weeks. However, the action of 25 February foreshadowed the intensity of the battles that would follow in the 

spring. Moreover, there were other signs of increased enemy 

activity in the Khe Sanh area. On the night of 2 March, the 

NVA fired more than 90 82mm mortar rounds at the Khe 

Sanh base, killing 2 Marines, wounding 17, and destroying 

three helicopters. This was an opportunistic strike, taking 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193264 

Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, patrolling through elephant grass near Hill 861. This photo was 

taken several months after the Hill Fights.

*Common military terminology would refer to this individual as a forward 

air controller (airborne) or FAC(A).

**Accounts of this action differ in some details. Those presented here are 

based heavily on the interviews 2dLt Kramer and Sgt Harper completed just 

three days after the fight.
| 17

advantage of the confusion from perhaps an even more serious tragedy that had occurred earlier the same evening. Two 

U.S. Air Force aircraft had mistakenly bombed the village of 

Lang Vei, killing 112 villagers, wounding 213, and destroying 140 buildings. The Marines immediately sent helicopters, trucks, and a Lockheed Martin KC-130 aircraft from 

the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) to help evacuate 

the casualties, while Marines and Special Forces soldiers did 

what they could to alleviate the suffering. On 4 –5 March, 

small groups of NVA soldiers probed the perimeter around 

the Khe Sanh airfield but were driven off.

 Besides these high-profile incidents, smaller contacts 

occurred almost daily, and Captain Sayers felt he needed far 

more men to accomplish his mission. He was able to express 

this desire in person to Brigadier General Michael P. Ryan, 

the new assistant division commander of 3d MarDiv, when 

Ryan visited Khe Sanh. On 7 March, 3d MarDiv responded 

by strengthening the Khe Sanh garrison with another company, Captain William B. Terrill’s Company E, 2d Battalion, 

9th Marines.

Captain Terrill’s men immediately took over half of the 

TAOR from Company B and began patrols, making contact 

on several occasions. On 16 March, Company E’s 1st Platoon found itself in a vicious engagement with the enemy. 

The platoon, led by Staff Sergeant Spencer F. Olsen, had set 

out the previous evening on a patrol toward Hill 861. Hearing sounds in the brush just before reaching the crest of the 

hill, the platoon had halted and established a perimeter for 

the night. The next morning, 1st Squad secured the top of 

the hill and 3d and 2d Squads continued slowly down the 

reverse slope, with 3d Squad taking the point.

At about 1000, Sergeant Donald P. Lord’s 3d Squad suddenly received heavy fire from two directions at close range. 

The fusillade immediately killed the leader of the point 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188623 

MajGen Michael P. Ryan (center) in 1967. Earlier in the year, Ryan, as a brigadier general, served as assistant division commander of 3d MarDiv.

Hill Fights
18 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

fireteam, Lance Corporal Julian A. McKee, and wounded three others. The Marines of 3d Squad returned fire, and 

Corporal John K. Middleton’s 2d Squad rushed down the 

hill to reinforce them. First Squad, led by Sergeant Stephen 

P. Bodie, was ordered to leave its position on the hill and 

assist as well. The NVA ceased firing and the Marines began 

carrying their casualties back to the top of Hill 861, hoping 

to reach the opposite slope. The landing zone on the opposite 

slope was the only suitable location nearby for a helicopter 

medevac. As the Marines carried their wounded comrades, 

however, they received fire again, this time from the rear and 

right flank. Even worse, the NVA had gained the summit of 

the hill just evacuated by 1st Squad and began lobbing grenades and firing AK47 assault rifles at the Marines below. 

Realizing that he was nearly surrounded and rapidly taking 

more casualties, Staff Sergeant Olsen called for artillery and 

a napalm strike on top of the hill. Impacting no more than 

50 meters away, the napalm attack was far closer to friendly 

forces than normal.*

The napalm strike was right on target, however, and 

eliminated the NVA threat from the top of the hill. It also 

destroyed enough vegetation to make the summit of the hill 

a more suitable place to land helicopters. The flames, however, travelled down the hill toward the Marines, and Sergeant Bodie and other Marines rushed forward to extinguish 

the fires before wounded Marines lying in the brush could 

be burned. Meanwhile, Captain Sayers ordered Second Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell to rush toward Hill 861 with two 

squads from his 2d Platoon, Company B, to assist 1st Platoon, Company E. The Company B Marines had been 

patrolling somewhere between 1,500 and 3,500 meters east 

of Hill 861.** To make better time, they dropped their packs 

and pushed up the east side of the hill. A third squad boarded a CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter so that it could be inserted on the southeastern slope of the hill.

By 1600, the landing zone had been cleared and three 

CH-46’s were on station to evacuate the wounded and dead 

Marines. The first helicopter landed, was loaded with casualties, and managed to get away safely. As the second touched 

down, enemy mortar shells impacted on the side of the hill, 

causing more casualties.

The dilemma now faced by the two platoon commanders was how to get their wounded evacuated when the enemy 

obviously had their mortars zeroed in on the hilltop. The situation was made worse when the CH-46 transporting the last 

squad of 2d Platoon, Company B, crashed near its intended landing zone, injuring every man aboard and leaving more 

casualties to be treated and flown out. The platoon commanders, Staff Sergeant Olsen and Lieutenant Gatlin, knew 

they needed to carry the wounded men to the safer landing 

zone below the crest of the hill; by this point, however, there 

were not enough able-bodied Marines remaining to accomplish the task. With few options remaining and determined 

to evacuate their wounded comrades, the Marines called 

artillery fire on suspected enemy mortar sites and requested the third helicopter to come in. As it approached, more 

enemy mortar rounds landed, forcing the CH-46 to break 

off and causing yet more casualties. One of them was Hospitalman Third Class Francis A. Benoit, USN, who had multiple shrapnel wounds that he had not taken time to treat 

so he could tend to his Marines first. Though he had been 

slated to be evacuated on the previous flight, Benoit refused, 

giving his place to a wounded Marine. As he helped a casualty into the third helicopter, he was killed by shrapnel from an 

incoming round. Both Sergeant Bodie and Corporal Middleton remembered the carnage at the scene. “There was a 

big mess,” Middleton recalled, “wounded and dead bodies 

strewn all over the hill.”

Around 1900, Captain Terrill and his 2d Platoon flew 

into a landing zone south of Hill 861 and began working 

their way up to the remnants of the other two platoons. By 

2100, all the wounded Marines had been evacuated and the 

able-bodied ones spent the entire night carrying weapons, 

gear, and the bodies of their fallen comrades down the hill 

to the landing zone. Terrill had to provide security for the 

wrecked helicopter until it could be extracted at 1100 on the 

eighteenth, and then, with the reinforcement of a platoon 

from Company B, he spent two days sweeping the area north 

*Modern military terminology would refer to this situation as danger close.

**Some sources claim that 2d Platoon, Company B, had been operating 1,500 

meters east of Hill 861. Capt Terrill claimed in an interview that the distance 

was actually 3,500 meters, a very long distance for the platoon to traverse 

in time to help 1st Platoon, Company E, clear the landing zone. Also, additional documents identify 2dLt Gatlin J. Howell as the commander of 2d 

Platoon, Company B, while another claims it was actually 2dLt Kramer, the 

officer who had led that platoon in the action the preceding month, and 

states that Kramer was wounded while leading the platoon up Hill 861.
| 19

and west of Hill 861. He found little sign of the NVA and 

believed that, “had there been more troops available on the 

evening of the 16th,” he and the Marines with him would 

have been more successful in finding and defeating NVA 

forces attempting to break contact. As it was, the enemy had 

plenty of time to get away and take their gear and weapons 

with them.

The results of the fight on 16 March were sobering, 

illustrating how dependent the Marines were on helicopter support for quick reinforcements and medevacs. They 

also highlighted the NVA’s ability to keep large units well 

concealed in the dense terrain around Khe Sanh until the 

moment they chose to attack, as well as the enemy’s skill in 

taking advantage of American techniques of casualty evacuation to inflict even more casualties. Perhaps due in part to the 

enemy’s ability to withdraw unmolested, the Marines could 

confirm the death of only 11 NVA soldiers, while they had 

lost 19 KIA and 59 wounded.

Though 3d MarDiv had sent a second rifle company to 

Khe Sanh on 7 March and was fully aware of the bloody 

fight on 16 March, Lieutenant General Walt still believed 

that the enemy’s primary goal was to disrupt the CORDS 

Defense Department, courtesy of GySgt B. L. Owens 

Helicopters were vital for resupply and casualty evacuation in Vietnam, particularly at Khe Sanh. They also were the primary 

means by which Marines in I Corps could be quickly reinforced. Here, just weeks after the conclusion of the Hill Fights, Marines 

from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, dash to a waiting Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter at Dong Ha to reinforce Marines 

from 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, battling NVA forces at Con Thien.

Hill Fights
20 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

program in the villages. On the morning of 19 March, Walt 

met with General Westmoreland and several other senior 

officers at the USMACV headquarters in Saigon. Walt 

argued his point in separate private meetings with General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and Westmoreland. Walt pointed to recent attacks on 

South Vietnamese Popular Force troops, CORDS teams, 

and South Vietnamese district headquarters. The employment of NVA main forces, he claimed, was the enemy’s “secondary effort.” Wheeler privately told Walt that he agreed 

with him, while Westmoreland appeared not to contradict 

him directly. Later, however, members of Westmoreland’s 

staff told Walt that Westmoreland had commented the day 

prior that U.S. forces “might have to sacrifice their support 

of the RD [CORDS] effort in order to have troops enough 

to clear out base areas and fight the NVA and main forces.”

Walt left the 19 March meeting knowing he had not 

convinced Westmoreland. As he wrote Lieutenant General Krulak and Marine Corps Commandant General Wallace 

M. Greene Jr., “I am still convinced he does not understand the importance of the RD [CORDS] effort in winning this war.” Less than a month later, another high-level 

exchange illustrated that Westmoreland was still seeking a 

big-battle showdown with the NVA near Khe Sanh. Krulak 

forwarded to Walt a copy of an exchange between Westmoreland and the U.S. ambassador to Laos, William H. Sullivan. The ambassador knew that the North Vietnamese had 

been moving supplies and equipment down the Ho Chi 

Minh Trail and storing it just inside the Laotian border west 

of Khe Sanh or moving it into the northwest portions of 

South Vietnam. He believed that that the enemy was planning to “emulate Dien Bien Phu,” the decisive defeat Communist forces had inflicted on a surrounded and besieged 

French force in 1954. Sullivan believed that the most logical 

place for the NVA to attempt this would be Khe Sanh. He 

reminded Westmoreland that the NVA 

may be already tunneling in against potential air 

attack. They can make their preparations quite undisturbed because they control the hills and the countryside. . . . They will assume that the Marines at Da Nang 

will attempt to relieve Khe Sanh and that the Marines 

will therefore move in reinforcements as fast as they 

can. But these . . . will be susceptible to ambush and 

destruction piecemeal. In short, I would assume that 

they will use the bait of a besieged Khe Sanh to draw 

more and more of your Marines into the totally inhospitable territory of western Quang Tri [Province.]

Sullivan suggested that Westmoreland consider “pull[ing] 

your Marines and ARVN temporarily out of Khe Sanh in 

order to deprive them of the bait for their trap.” Then Westmoreland could evacuate “friendly villagers” and begin a massive campaign of spraying the hills around Khe Sanh with 

defoliant and conducting raids by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers.

Westmoreland’s response indicated that he shared the 

ambassador’s conviction that the Communists were planning 

a major attack in western Quang Tri. At times, both before 

and after the fighting at Khe Sanh, Westmoreland would 

opine that the North Vietnamese were planning or had 

attempted “another Dien Bien Phu.” However, he believed 

that existing contingency plans and a decisive response would 

enable American forces to hold Khe Sanh. The area was too 

important to give up, he explained, as “the CIDG base at 

Lang Vei and the USMC base at Khe Sanh serve as integral 

patrol bases for our surveillance activities in the northwest.” 

Besides, an attack on Khe Sanh would provide a welcome 

opportunity to inflict heavy losses on the enemy: “Experience 

has shown that the enemy has suffered his greatest losses 

when he has chosen to mass for attack against our defensive 

positions, or when we have managed to engage his forces in 

open combat.” This desire to inflict massive casualties on the 

enemy’s conventional forces coincided with Westmoreland’s 

larger strategy for winning the war. Only a few days after 

this exchange with Ambassador Sullivan, Westmoreland told 

a group of reporters, “We’ll just go on bleeding them until 

Hanoi wakes up to the fact that they have bled their country 

to the point of national disaster for generations. Then they 

will have to reassess their position.”

If there was “bait” at Khe Sanh, the largest chunk consisted of the two Marine rifle companies there: Captain Sayers’s Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and, for a time, 

Captain Terrill’s Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. If 

Sayers hoped the battle on 16 March would convince his 

superiors to send him more firepower, he was only partially satisfied. On 27 March, he received more support from 
| 21

Brigadier General Ryan, now designated as commander of 

3d MarDiv (Forward) at Dong Ha. Engineers had finally 

opened the road from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh, and a huge 

convoy of 68 vehicles arrived that day. The opening of Route 

9 to Khe Sanh and the 3d MarDiv’s use of it to bolster Khe 

Sanh’s defenses was an important event signifying growing Marine control over Quang Tri Province; additionally, it 

suggested that in the future the Khe Sanh base might not 

be totally dependent on air support. Sayers received a section of tanks and two light sections of truck-mounted heavy 

weapons, including dual 40mm automatic cannons and quad 

.50-caliber machine guns. There was also a section of M50 

Ontos vehicles. The Ontos was a self-propelled, partially armored vehicle that carried six 106mm recoilless rifles. 

Though originally designed as an antitank gun, Marines in 

Vietnam had found the Ontos to be a very effective antipersonnel weapon. This Ontos section was part of Company A, 

3d Antitank Battalion, and was commanded by First Lieutenant Philip H. Sauer. On the very day that Sayers received 

these welcome additions in firepower, however, he lost the 

support of Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines—Captain 

Terrill’s unit returned to Dong Ha to rebuild after its losses 

from the fighting on the sixteenth.

It was doubtful, though, that Khe Sanh could hold out 

against the force that the enemy conceivably could have 

brought against it. Intelligence reports in early April indicated that two NVA regiments were moving in the area 

northwest of Khe Sanh, potentially some 3,000 men. Several reconnaissance patrols reported large enemy units northwest of Khe Sanh moving toward the base. By the last week 

of April, the 18th Regiment of the 325C Division and perhaps other elements of that division were dug into the hills 

northwest of Khe Sanh and planning a major attack on the 

base. There were still less than 1,000 allied personnel in the 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A801029 

Gens Westmoreland, Walt, Hochmuth, and Ryan talking to different ARVNs at CoBi-Thanh Tan after Operation Swanee on 3 

May 1967.

Hill Fights
22 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Khe Sanh area, including Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines; Battery I, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (soon to 

be replaced by Captain Glen Golden’s Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines); the Marine reconnaissance company; the reinforcements that arrived previously on 27 March; 

the Special Forces at Lang Vei; the Marines’ CAP Company Oscar, located between the village of Khe Sanh and the 

combat base; and a U.S. Air Force contingent responsible for directing reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and Laos. Moreover, the fighting strength of the allied 

Khe Sanh area forces was weakened by the lack of unity of 

command. The newly arrived Marine SOP, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Reeder, had no jurisdiction whatsoever over 

the various Army and Air Force elements at Khe Sanh and 

Lang Vei. This virtually ensured a lack of coordination that 

would become a serious problem during the upcoming battle 

of April and May. Finally, the withdrawal of Company E, 

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, suggests that the 3d MarDiv staff 

were still not fully convinced of the enemy’s strength around 

Khe Sanh.

In the relative lull following the fight of 16 March, 

Marines at Khe Sanh, and indeed throughout the division, 

had trained with the new M16 rifle, the replacement for the 

M14. The new weapon was lighter and had a more rapid rate 

of fire than the M14. Its 5.56mm round was lighter than the 

M14’s 7.62mm ammunition, allowing Marines to carry more 

rounds. In the upcoming battles, however, Marine infantrymen would find serious problems with their new rifles.

For now, the enemy still seemed to avoid large engagements with the Marines. The next major contact did not 

occur until 30 March, and it was the result of another Marine 

patrol northwest of Hill 861. Staff Sergeant Alfredo V. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189652 

An M50 Ontos with its six 106mm recoilless rifles at Khe Sanh in October 1967.
| 23

Reyes’s 3d Platoon of Company B was patrolling in the area 

when it discovered a recently abandoned NVA base camp, 

which appeared capable of accommodating a companysize force. There was a covered sleeping area large enough to 

shelter 50 men, as well as approximately two dozen bunkers. 

Third Platoon’s point man, Private First Class Thomas F. 

Ryan, found several large pots of rice boiling over campfires, 

indicating that the enemy had quickly melted into the jungle 

upon the Marine patrol’s approach. Staff Sergeant Reyes was 

gathering documents from the bunkers when enemy mortar 

rounds began slamming into the camp. Over a period of 15 

minutes, the enemy “walked” some 85 rounds back and forth 

across their position. Reyes and his men took cover in the 

bunkers and contacted a FAC(A), who was able to locate 

the enemy mortars and attack them with two F-4 Phantoms armed with 500-pound bombs. Nevertheless, another 

40 rounds fired from two other mortars landed in the position. When the airborne controller informed Reyes that he 

could see an entire company of NVA soldiers headed toward 

him, Reyes wisely withdrew his platoon and fortunately suffered no casualties.

On 20 April, the Marine forces at Khe Sanh ceased to 

come under the direct operational control of 3d MarDiv; 

instead, the division passed control of Khe Sanh down to 

3d Marines. This occurred on the same day that the division 

launched a two-regiment search-and-destroy operation in 

Quang Tri Province known as Operation Prairie IV. In the 

east, two battalions from 9th Marines would operate in the 

piedmont area around Quang Tri City. In the northwest portion of the area of operations, north of Camp Carroll and 

the Rockpile, 3d Marines would operate with two battalions. The area of operations for Prairie IV did not include 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A369882 

On 21 February 1967, MajGen Herman Nickerson Jr. talks with one of the few Marines of 1st MarDiv to have been issued one 

of the new M16 rifles. Marines of 3d MarDiv serving near Khe Sanh would begin receiving M16s at about the same time.

Hill Fights
24 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Khe Sanh. As a Marine Corps historian explains, Khe Sanh 

“was a territorial appendage, attached for control purposes to 

the 3d Marines because that regiment was in the best position to oversee the base and reinforce it if the need arose.” 

At the same time these arrangements were made, it was also 

decided that Captain Sayers’s Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th 

Marines, would be replaced by Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, led by Captain Bayliss L. Spivey Jr. The relief was 

supposed to take place on 29 April, just days after Company 

K’s planned arrival on 25 April.

The Beginning of the Hill Fights

The heaviest combat around Khe Sanh occurred between 

24 April and 11 May 1967, and this fighting is usually 

referred to as the Hill Fights. The magnitude of the fighting 

in terms of friendly troops engaged and casualties on both 

sides dwarfed the smaller-scale but sometimes equally fierce 

engagements of 1966 and the first three months of 1967. As 

the fighting developed, General Walt and his staff reconstructed what the enemy had hoped to accomplish. 

The enemy had indeed hoped to overrun Khe Sanh near 

the end of April or early May and planned to accomplish this 

in the same way Communist forces had overrun the French 

base at Dien Bieh Phu in 1954, much as Westmoreland suspected. There would be a buildup of men and supplies and 

occupation of key terrain near the base, followed by coordinated attacks against supporting facilities, such as airfields, 

and lines of communication to the base. The enemy had in 

fact been infiltrating the hills north of Khe Sanh with large 

elements of the 325C Division, and there were other NVA 

troops in northern Quang Tri Province. The NVA hoped to 

destroy transport helicopters based near the coast on which 

the Khe Sanh garrison depended so heavily for supplies. In a 

further attempt to isolate the base and cut it off from friendly 

support, the enemy would attack key bases along Route 9—

Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh. These 

attacks would be diversions and also would reduce those garrisons’ ability to provide fire and logistical support to Khe 

Sanh. There also would be a diversionary attack on the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Finally, regimental-size elements based in the Hills 881 and 861 complex would launch 

the main attack and overrun Khe Sanh itself. 

Walt and his staff believed that the fighting of 24 April 

occurred only days before the 325C Division planned to execute its main attack on Khe Sanh. The NVA, however, apparently launched most of its diversionary attacks on schedule. 

The Marine bases along Route 9 received heavy rocket, 

mortar, and artillery attacks on 27–28 April and the route 

itself was cut at several places. The Lang Vei Special Forces 

Camp, as will be seen, suffered a massive enemy attack on 

4 May. But any regimental- or division-size attack on Khe 

Sanh was thwarted as the Marines patrolled in the hills 

north of it on the twenty-fourth. 

The battle of 24 April opened much as the earlier ones 

had—with a platoon-size Marine patrol running into unexpectedly heavy resistance just north or west of the base. It did 

not result from III MAF deliberately seeking a large-scale 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188590 

From left: LtGen Henry W. Buse Jr., deputy chief of staff for 

Plans and Programs Office, Headquarters Marine Corps; 

BGen Michael P. Ryan; and MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth 

confer during a meeting at Camp Carroll on 31 March 1967. 

Though there was much to consider on the progress of the 

war in I Corps, it is likely that Khe Sanh was discussed. In 

1968, LtGen Buse would succeed LtGen Krulak as commanding general of FMFPac.
| 25

battle at Khe Sanh; in fact, senior Marine officers near the 

DMZ were primarily focused on Operation Prairie IV to 

the east of Khe Sanh, which was in its fifth day. Likewise, 

senior officers in the NVA’s 325C Division would have probably preferred to postpone any serious engagement near Khe 

Sanh. As Marines patrolled northwest of the base on the 

twenty-fourth, however, they ran into a surprisingly large 

enemy force. The NVA soldiers chose to give battle, and the 

Marines reacted forcefully.

The action commenced in the morning, as the 1st and 3d 

Platoons of Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, swept 

a complex of caves northwest of Hill 861. These platoons 

were already outside the base, located north and east of the 

hill, when they set out that morning. To support this sweep, 

Sayers ordered the bulk of his 2d Platoon, led by Second 

Lieutenant Thomas G. King, to depart the base and advance 

to Hill 700 as a covering force for the other two platoons. 

King led two of his rifle squads and 10 men from the company’s 81mm mortar section up Hill 700 that morning. His 

column also included a forward observer for the mortars and 

First Lieutenant Sauer, the Ontos section leader, who wanted 

to accompany the platoon and assist with establishing an 

observation post for the mortars forward observer.

King arrived at his predesignated position on Hill 700, 

had the mortar tube emplaced, and dispatched a five-man 

team led by Lieutenant Sauer to establish an observation 

post on the crest of Hill 861 from which fire missions could 

be directed in support of the 1st and 3d Platoons. At a point 

about 300 meters below the summit of Hill 861, the observation post team was ambushed and the point man was killed. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Action at Khe Sanh on 24 April.

Hill Fights
26 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Receiving a radio message that the team was under heavy 

fire, King instructed the team to withdraw so that he could 

direct mortar fire onto the ambush site. As the team attempted to withdraw, Lieutenant Sauer bravely stood and tried to 

cover it with fire from his .45-caliber pistol. Sauer was killed 

as the remaining three Marines ran through heavy fire. The 

bullets flew so thickly that only the forward observer, Private 

First Class William Marks, returned to Lieutenant King’s 

position alive. As Marks stumbled into his fellow Marines, 

he breathlessly reported, “They’re all dead. The other four. All 

dead.” This tragic event signified the onset of the First Battle 

of Khe Sanh.

Before Marks returned to his position, Lieutenant King 

had lost radio contact with the observation post team and had 

sent a rifle squad to investigate. These men found the bodies 

of two Marines, but were forced back due to heavy automatic 

weapons fire. Shortly afterward, Captain Sayers and a radio 

operator flew to King’s position. King now ordered a third 

ascent, this time leading the squad of nine Marines himself. King’s contingent retrieved two of the bodies; according to an official Marine Corps history, the other two bodies 

had been decapitated by the enemy and burned. King’s squad 

received no enemy fire, but he felt certain it was still a dangerous place due to the unnatural quiet—there were “no bugs 

making noise,” he recalled. Receiving permission to return 

downhill, King reached an area where a helicopter could land 

and requested a pickup for the two bodies and the gear that 

had been retrieved. As soon as the wheel of the UH-34 Seahorse helicopter touched the ground, he reported, the “whole 

treeline on top of Hill 861, which extends for about . . . 300 

meters, opened up” with heavy automatic weapons fire. The 

helicopter received 35 bullet holes, but escaped with its load 

intact. King later reported that the reason for its safe departure was that the two UH-1E Huey helicopters accompanying the transport craft poured heavy fire into the treeline, and 

they “just tore the daylights out of that place.”

As the day progressed, the mortar crew with King on Hill 

700 continued to fire missions in support of the two platoons on the opposite side of Hill 861. At least some of the 

mortar fire was accurate and deadly. Late in the day, Captain 

Sayers led the 2d Platoon back to the Khe Sanh base. With 

the NVA apparently occupying Hill 861 just a few hundred meters away in company strength, and having received 

enemy 12.7mm rounds from the rear earlier in the day, neither Sayers nor King felt it was wise to leave the understrength 2d Platoon on Hill 700 overnight.

While Lieutenant King and his men coped with their situation on the south side of Hill 861, the other two platoons 

of Company B on the northern side of the hill had an even 

more trying ordeal. First Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant 

James D. Carter Jr., and 3d Platoon, led by Staff Sergeant 

Reyes, began their sweep at around 0530, moving uphill in 

the direction of Hill 861. It was not long before the nature 

of the terrain separated the two units by a distance of a few 

hundred meters. Soon, a Marine near the rear of the 1st Platoon column, in 3d Squad, passed word up the column that 

he had spotted five enemy soldiers, one of them being carried on a stretcher. Lieutenant Carter ordered the platoon to 

halt, as the NVA soldiers had not yet noticed the Marines 

and were approaching. At a range of about 50 meters, one of 

the enemy soldiers spotted a Marine and began firing. First 

Platoon returned fire, and then eight or nine men moved 

forward to investigate. They found two dead NVA soldiers; 

however, another enemy soldier who was not yet dead threw 

a grenade, killing Corporal James G. Pomerleau, the leader 

of 1st Squad.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193244 

A patrol of Marines returning to their “hooches” on Hill 861 

near the Khe Sanh combat base in September 1967. At the 

time of the Hill Fights five months earlier, this Marine base 

camp on Hill 861 did not yet exist.
| 27

About this time in the morning, Captain Sayers contacted Lieutenant Carter and Staff Sergeant Reyes and ordered 

a change of mission. Because of the NVA contact made by 

Lieutenant King’s 2d Platoon on Hill 861, Sayers thought 

he had an opportunity to strike the enemy from two opposite directions. He ordered 1st and 3d Platoons to abandon 

their sweep of the cave complex and instead advance southeast directly toward the summit of Hill 861. 

After advancing some 300 meters from the site of its last 

contact, 1st Platoon was crossing an open area, when they 

received intense machine-gun and small-arms fire from the 

right flank. As Marines dove for cover and attempted to 

return fire, the heroism of one man, Lance Corporal Dana 

C. Darnell, stood out. Darnell was an ammunition carrier for 

the 60mm mortar section. The gunner for Darnell’s section 

was knocked unconscious before he could set up the mortar. 

Without time to set it up properly, Darnell placed the base of 

the tube in a helmet between his legs and steadied it with his 

bare hands. As the rounds quickly heated the tube, another Marine urinated on it so that Darnell would not burn his 

hands. Darnell expended all his ammunition, but the other 

mortarmen in the column could not bring their rounds to 

him due to the heavy fire and lack of cover. Darnell, therefore, went to them. At least three times, Darnell ran across 

open terrain under intense enemy fire to gather mortar 

rounds and bring them back to his tube so that he could fire 

them. More men were wounded or killed when Lieutenant 

Carter ordered the Marines to move, two at a time, out of the 

open area to cover. Darnell dragged two wounded comrades 

to safety until an enemy mortar round blew dirt and gravel 

into his eyes, temporarily blinding him. Instead of allowing himself to be evacuated, he used precious drinking water 

from his canteen to cleanse his eyes, and within an hour was 

back assisting the wounded. For these actions, Darnell was 

posthumously awarded the Navy Cross, as he would be killed 

in action two days later.

At the same time that 1st Platoon was caught in the open 

and Lance Corporal Darnell was responding with mortar 

fire, 3d Platoon, about 400 meters behind 1st Platoon, was 

also hit and six of its Marines were wounded. Later, the 

Navy Cross Citation

The Navy Cross is awarded to Lance Corporal Dana C. Darnell, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism 

as a 60mm Mortar Ammunition Carrier attached to Company B, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third 

Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam 

on 24 April 1967. Company B was engaged in 

a search and destroy operation against the Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese forces in Quang 

Tri Province. Lance Corporal Darnell’s platoon 

was entering a clearing, when it was ambushed 

by North Vietnamese Army Forces, using heavy 

small arms and automatic weapons fire. As the 

ambush was sprung, the mortar gunner was knocked unconscious while seeking cover. Exhibiting sound judgment and 

extraordinary calmness in the face of intense enemy fire, 

Lance Corporal Darnell retrieved the mortar. Due to the 

urgency of the situation, he was unable to set the mortar 

up properly. Holding it between his legs and steadying it 

with his hands, he began firing the mortar from a position 

exposed to the enemy fire and delivered accurate fire into the 

enemy positions. When he had exhausted all of his ammunition, he moved from man to man, collecting mortar ammunition to keep his mortar in 

action. He repeated this selfless performance 

many times, until the enemy fire was silenced. 

At this time, the platoon was ordered to withdraw from the clearing. Lance Corporal Darnell 

was dragging two wounded Marines from the 

clearing when he was temporarily blinded by 

enemy fire, which knocked dirt and rock fragments into his eyes. He refused to be evacuated and within 

an hour was again assisting in the care of the wounded. By 

his outstanding courage, exceptional fortitude and valiant 

fighting spirit he served to inspire all who observed him and 

upheld the highest traditions of the United States Marine 

Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Lance Corporal Dana C. Darnell

Hill Fights
28 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

platoon would suffer more casualties when an F-4 mistook 

it for an NVA unit and dropped a pair of 250-pound bombs, 

killing six Marines and wounding a dozen more. Both Carter’s and Reyes’s platoons were now burdened, indeed almost 

immobilized, by the duty to care for their own wounded and 

dead. There were so many bodies to carry that the men were 

exhausted as they tried to reach suitable landing zones for 

helicopters to pick them up. The helicopters received such 

heavy mortar attacks as they landed that only three men 

could be evacuated before Carter had to “wave them off.” 

He moved the platoon to another site that he thought would 

be safer, but the results were nearly identical. Third Platoon’s experience was very similar, particularly as Staff Sergeant Reyes tried to evacuate his casualties. That night, both 

platoons dug in with most of their wounded and dead still 

with them. In a single day of fighting, Company B had lost 

12 Marines killed, 17 wounded, and 2 missing. Confirmed 

enemy losses were five NVA dead; also one NVA soldier was 

captured when he wandered too close to the lines of 3d Platoon. A large proportion of the American casualties had been 

suffered as the Marines tried to load their wounded comrades 

onto helicopters. The NVA had perfected their tactic of targeting likely landing zones with mortar fire, timing it so that 

the rounds impacted just as the helicopters touched down. 

For the Marines, it was a cultural impossibility to leave their 

wounded behind or to delay their evacuation and they felt 

nearly as strongly about their dead. The NVA took advantage 

of this Marine tradition and of the fact that helicopters were 

virtually the only way to evacuate casualties from the rugged 

terrain around Khe Sanh.

On a tactical level, then, one could conclude that the 

Marines had received the worst of the fight on 24 April. 

General Walt concluded, however, that the actions of Company B had forced the NVA to reveal their hand. The enemy, 

he thought, was staging men and supplies for a major attack 

on Khe Sanh in the coming days. The second step in their 

plan was to isolate Khe Sanh by destroying transport helicopters near the base and cutting Route 9 at key places. Then, 

as the actual attack on Khe Sanh commenced, the enemy 

would also create diversions and inhibit American ability 

to reinforce the base by striking other Marine strongholds, 

such as Camp Carroll and Dong Ha, with supporting arms. 

Actual subsequent attacks on Route 9 and the other Marine 

bases in Quang Tri Province on 27–28 April suggested that 

Walt’s assessment was generally correct, and this interpretation of enemy plans has appeared in official Marine accounts 

of the battle ever since.

What is certainly clear is that Walt and his staff recognized the real fight was now at Khe Sanh. No one questioned 

the significance of the threat there any longer, and Operation 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

The NVA plan of attack for 24 April.
| 29

Prairie IV, taking place farther east, was about to be overshadowed by the determination to strike the NVA in the 

hills north of Khe Sanh.*

This determination was reflected from Captain Sayers’s 

level all the way up to the regimental and division level on 

the night of the twenty-fourth. At the company level, Sayers 

decided the next morning that he would take the bulk of 2d 

Platoon (about 22 men), along with more ammunition and 

medical supplies, to the northern side of Hill 861 to reinforce his other two rifle platoons. With him would be the 2d 

Platoon sergeant, Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns. At higher 

levels, it was decided that Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, would deploy to Khe Sanh as originally scheduled 

on the twenty-fifth and move directly into the fight rather 

than spend four days getting oriented to their new location. 

Fortunately, liaison personnel from Company K were already 

at the base making arrangements for a smooth arrival and 

transition. Moreover, the entire 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

not just Company K, would now be making the move to Khe 

Sanh.

Well before the arrival of Company K and the command group of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Captain Sayers and 

his 2d Platoon departed the base in two helicopters to join 

the rest his company. The helicopters were able to evacuate 

a few of the more critically wounded from the 1st Platoon 

and then the 3d Platoon positions before heavy incoming 

fire drove them off. At least some of this burden was lifted, 

but Company B Marines still had a number of wounded and 

dead bodies to carry with them. Much of that day, 25 April, 

was spent trying to get helicopters in to evacuate the casualties. Around late afternoon, the three platoons of Company B started moving up Hill 861 in hopes of eventually 

linking up with Company K the next day. They had moved 

about 800 meters before the thick fog and darkness forced 

Sayers’s men to halt at around 2130. The fog was so thick, 

remembered Staff Sergeant Burns, that “I couldn’t have seen 

Ho Chi Minh himself if he had been walking right behind 

me.” Company B, therefore, set up defensive perimeters and 

ambush locations for the night. At around 0500 the next 

morning, the enemy began a heavy bombardment of the Khe 

Sanh base with recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars, and rockets. These weapons were located on the eastern slope of Hill 

881S, perhaps only 400 meters away from Company B. They 

were close enough that the Company B Marines could see 

the muzzle blast of the recoilless rifles through the fog and 

could hear the mortars. Captain Sayers called in an artillery 

fire mission, and adjusted the rounds by sound. Thanks to 

holes in the fog and the use of 105mm illumination rounds 

from the howitzers, the Marines were able to verify the 

destruction of the recoilless rifles, and the fire ceased. Fortunately, the fog seemed to have decreased the accuracy of the 

enemy fire on the Khe Sanh base, as most of the 100 rounds 

landed just outside the perimeter. Staff Sergeant Burns, for 

one, concluded that Captain Sayers’s fire mission “probably 

saved a few lives.” It certainly reassured the Marines of Company B.

While Company B had been regrouping on the twentyfifth and evacuating casualties on the north side of Hill 861, 

Company K had arrived by helicopter at the Khe Sanh airstrip to join the fight. Heavy fog had delayed their departure until just after 1100. Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder, 

the battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, also 

arrived that morning with his command group. Wilder was 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189136 

Crew members of Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 

fire an M101 105mm howitzer round at Viet Cong troops 

in South Vietnam. These howitzers made up the majority of 

artillery pieces firing in support of Marine infantry during the 

Khe Sanh Hill Fights.

*Operation Prairie IV began on 20 April as a search-and-destroy operation 

involving four Marine battalions.

Hill Fights
30 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

given operational control over Captain Sayers’s Company B. Another new arrival to Khe Sanh that day was the 3d 

Marines regimental commander, Colonel John P. Lanigan. 

On 20 April, 3d MarDiv had transferred operational control 

of Marine units at Khe Sanh to 3d Marines, and now Colonel Lanigan was on site and ready to oversee a major operation to root out the NVA from the hills around the base. The 

assistant division commander, Brigadier General Ryan, also 

visited on the twenty-fifth.

Shortly after landing, Company K, as well as Lieutenant 

Colonel Wilder and his battalion command group, started 

moving northwest to assist Company B. Unfortunately, their 

communications with Captain Sayers were poor since Company B did not have the codes or radio frequencies for 3d 

Battalion, 3d Marines. Sayers was convinced that the enemy 

could monitor his transmissions and would only send coded 

messages to his rear command post at Khe Sanh, which in 

turn would have to decode them and somehow transmit 

them to 3d Battalion, who in turn attempted to forward 

them to Company K. These communications difficulties were 

never satisfactorily solved during the next several days of 

fighting, and throughout the day and night of the twentyfifth, Wilder did not have a good fix on Sayers’s position 

north of the hill. Despite all these complications, Company 

K was able to move out from the Khe Sanh base toward Hill 

861 by 1200, with the howitzers of Battery F providing preparatory fires on the objective.

By 1600, Company K had advanced to within 500 meters 

of the crest of Hill 861. Artillery and air-delivered preparatory fires now were sporadic due to frequent check fires. Spivey, 

however, as well as Wilder, felt that the NVA had now 

absorbed enough pounding that the Marines would meet 

little resistance as they made the last push up the hill. Captain Spivey deployed his platoons for the final assault. The 

hilly, broken terrain dictated an attack along two separate 

axes. First Platoon would advance along a ridgeline directly south of the summit, and Spivey and his command group 

would colocate with those Marines. Third Platoon advanced 

along another ridgeline that approached the summit from 

the east. Second Platoon, numerically the weakest because 

one of its squads was detached to another unit, would be the 

reserve. It was in a central position to support the attack, but 

the three platoons did not have physical contact because of 

the terrain. Around 1615 or 1630, the final assault kicked off, 

with both 1st and 3d Platoons advancing cautiously.

At 1705, the leading squad of 1st Platoon ran into a withering, constant hail of machine-gun bullets about 300 meters 

from the crest. The NVA gunners had good fields of fire and 

raked the platoon with grazing fire from bunkers. Several experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) remembered that it was the heaviest fire they had ever encountered 

in Vietnam, and the platoon immediately began taking casualties. The platoon commander, Staff Sergeant Charles R. 

Shoemaker, attempted to move his squads out of the kill 

zone. Using folds in the terrain, he assigned one squad as 

a base of fire and attempted to advance with the other one. 

The Marines were able to deliver effective fire on the bunkers 

with M79 40mm grenade launchers, rifles, and M72 light 

antitank weapons (LAWs). They advanced for another 200 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Col John P. Lanigan, commanding officer of 3d Marines 

during the Hill Fights.
| 31

meters, but by 1730, 1st Platoon was left with only 10 men 

still able to fight, having lost 15 killed and approximately 15 

wounded. Clearly, the platoon could not continue the assault. 

Only 100 meters away from the enemy bunkers, it could not 

even be safely extracted from its exposed position before 

dark, though the able-bodied Marines were able to drag 

their wounded comrades to safer locations. Captain Spivey, 

therefore, brought up 2d Platoon, his reserve, which arrived 

at about 1830 and, under cover of darkness, retrieved all but 

four of 1st Platoon’s dead. Casualties had been sustained in 

this evacuation effort, and the remaining four bodies were so 

close to the enemy bunkers that Captain Spivey decided to 

make no further effort to retrieve them.

Thus, Company K’s 1st Platoon had been decimated in 

a frontal assault on a well-fortified and well-armed enemy 

force that was skilled in the use of automatic weapons. The 

preparatory fires had not weakened the position nearly as 

much as Spivey and Wilder had believed, and the terrain had 

limited Captain Spivey’s options. Third Platoon, advancing 

by a more roundabout approach on the eastern ridge, had 

never been able to find a position from which it could effectively support 1st Platoon’s assault.

That night, all three platoons of Company K dug in and 

maintained their positions, with 1st and 2d Platoons receiving sporadic fire. Like the Company B Marines, Company K 

observed the enemy mortars and recoilless rifles on the eastern slope of Hill 881S, and also called in fire missions that 

they believed were very effective. At one point, Lieutenant 

Colonel Wilder took control of the missions.

Besides directing fire missions, Wilder had plenty of time 

that night to consider the tactical situation. Company K had 

one of its platoons decimated, and most of the company 

was in an exposed position just under the muzzles of NVA 

machine guns. Company K as a whole, however, still had 

plenty of fight left in it, especially the relatively unscathed 

3d Platoon. The situation of Company B on the other side 

of the hill concerned Wilder even more. He knew that company was in a difficult predicament, but he still did not know 

exactly where it was. That meant that he had to be very cautious in his use of supporting arms on Hill 861 lest he direct 

fire onto those Marines north of the summit. On the positive 

side, Wilder knew that he was about to receive another rifle 

company—Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Moreover, Wilder’s previous experience with the enemy persuaded him that the NVA company on the hill would be gone by 

the next morning. In every previous fight he had seen, the 

enemy might offer serious resistance for a time, but would 

then withdraw before the Americans could bring all their 

firepower to bear. He, therefore, had Company K maintain 

its position on the hill—help was on the way.

Captain Spivey, likewise, had not given up his determination to take the hill. Spivey and the members of 3d Platoon 

believed that, so far, the platoon remained undetected. Spivey 

thought that, by advancing on the summit from the east and 

northeast, 3d Platoon could gain the summit before encountering heavy resistance. Third Platoon moved out at first light, 

and was eventually able to spread out into a 150-meter-long 

front as it advanced through tall elephant grass. About 0800, 

elements of the platoon reported that they could see some of 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Col Gary Wilder pictured in 1971. As a lieutenant colonel, 

Wilder served as battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, during the Hill Fights.

Hill Fights
32 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

the enemy positions and could hear voices—they were close 

to an enemy listening post. Shortly thereafter, they received 

heavy fire and began taking casualties. One Marine, even as 

he fell, fired his weapon and killed the two NVA soldiers in 

the listening post. The platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Curtis L. Frisbee, was wounded in the right arm and 

face, but continued to lead the attack. Despite his leadership, 

the attack faltered as so many Marines went down that the 

platoon could not continue. Frisbee reported the situation 

to Captain Spivey, who concluded that he “didn’t have the 

horsepower to take that hill without sustaining more casualties than I thought it was worth.”

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder agreed, and the two officers 

turned their attention to getting Company K and its casualties off the hill. Third Platoon withdrew to a landing zone 

where helicopters quickly evacuated its wounded. Meanwhile, UH-1 Huey gunships arrived at about 1030, and their 

fire was very effective at suppressing the enemy machine 

guns. By leapfrogging about 25 meters at a time under covering fire from the Hueys, 1st and 2d Platoons were able to get 

their equipment, all of their wounded, and most of their dead 

to another secure landing zone. The able-bodied remnants 

of the company made it back to the 3d Battalion command 

post near the base of the hill later in the day. Along the way, 

they made contact with elements of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, that had been sent to their support.

Captain Spivey’s Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

had lost 19 men killed, 42 wounded, and 4 missing and presumed dead. One of the wounded later died of his wounds. 

With all those losses—48 percent of the company’s strength 

before the battle—he and his stunned Marines were frustrated at their inability to take the hill. The leadership of the 

company, however, refused to let their Marines dwell on the 

losses. At the base of the hill, Spivey got to work with his 

officers and staff NCOs, accounting for each man, evacuating casualties, and organizing for the final march back to 

the base. Observing the sullen demeanor of the survivors in 

his decimated platoon, Staff Sergeant Shoemaker stood up 

and barked orders: “Let’s go. Stand tall. Square yourself away. 

You’re still Marines. Get your gear together. I want everyone 

ready to move out in five minutes. Five minutes. Let’s go.”

As Captain Spivey’s Company K was making its way 

down the hill on 26 April, Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th 

Marines, was working its way up. Led by the experienced and 

hard-charging Captain Jerrald E. Giles, the reinforcing company had been serving as 3d MarDiv’s company-size reaction 

force for several months. Giles’s Marines had been manning 

the perimeter at Camp Carroll when he received word on 

the afternoon of the twenty-fifth that the company would 

be flying immediately to Khe Sanh. By 1800 that same day, 

Giles and his Company K were disembarking from CH-46 

Sea Knights at Khe Sanh, and immediately moved outside the perimeter to set up a night bivouac site. It was now 

under the operational control of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Wilder planned for its Marines to 

help extricate the other two companies from Hill 861 the 

next day.

The difficult saga continued for Company B on 26 April, 

the same day that Spivey’s Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, withdrew from Hill 861. Captain Sayers was now 

attempting to skirt around to the west and southwest of Hill 

861 and return to Khe Sanh. Meanwhile, one of the platoons 

of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was dispatched 

to the west side of the hill to reinforce and assist Company B. At one point, the platoon advised Company B that 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189256 

Aerial view of Hill 881S in 1967, roughly around the time of 

the Hill Fights.
| 33

they would throw a yellow smoke grenade to help Company B find them and link up. Staff Sergeant Donny W. Richie, 

platoon sergeant for 1st Platoon, Company B, reported that 

soon afterward, Company B Marines observed yellow smoke. 

The Company K platoon, however, had not yet thrown a grenade. This incident reinforced the suspicion among Company 

B leaders that the enemy was monitoring their transmissions. 

Later in the day, Company B ran into yet another enemy 

ambush and received more casualties. On two occasions, 

the company tried to evacuate those casualties by helicopter with the same results—enemy mortar rounds in the landing zone were so accurate that more Marines were wounded 

and few casualties could be taken out. It seemed that Company B was losing more Marines than it was saving with 

its attempts to evacuate the wounded. Lieutenant Colonel 

Wilder told Sayers that he would simply have to carry his 

wounded out and leave the dead behind. Sayers responded 

that, by this point, he did not have enough able-bodied men 

to carry the wounded. He was virtually immobilized, resupply was impossible, and the batteries in his radios were dying. 

The beleaguered captain contemplated his last stand. Sayers 

determined that he would move into the fog, settle into a 

defensive position, and “fight until it was over.” Fortunately, it did not come to that, thanks in part to Marine artillery. Sayers later gratefully recalled the artillery support he 

received from Captain Golden’s Battery F: 

Captain Glen Golden found me in the fog by walking artillery rounds to me. (Once in the fog I could 

only make an educated guess as to my exact position.) 

Artillery put a “ring of steel” around my defensive 

position that was so tight we were taking dirt from 

the impact. It was the most professional and accurate 

piece of artillery work that I have ever seen. No doubt 

it saved our lives.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Action at Khe Sanh on 25–27 April.

Hill Fights
34 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Around 1900, Captain Giles’s Company K Marines finally found Company B, to the great relief of the latter. The 

combined force now had sufficient manpower to carry the 

wounded and dead off Hill 861, but it was a grueling and 

grisly ordeal. Under the cover of fog, darkness, and artillery 

rounds from Battery F, the Marines were able to avoid any 

more enemy ambushes as they made slow progress in their 

journey off the hill. Four men carried each litter, which were 

makeshift stretchers made from sticks and ponchos. The rain, 

mud, and the darkness caused the litter bearers to slip and 

fall, and several times the column halted as a bloated body 

rolled out of its poncho and down the hill. Marines recovered the bodies but, Sayers recalled, “identification was difficult and KIA tags were lost.” Throughout the ordeal, Sayers 

could not be positive that he had everyone. The Marines 

trudged wearily through the night until they reached the 3d 

Battalion’s command post near the base of Hill 861 at 0500 

on the twenty-seventh. Helicopters arrived to take the salvaged equipment and casualties back to the base, and then 

trucks were available to transport the able-bodied men. The 

battered remnants of Company B refused this offer, proudly 

insisting that they would march back. Once in Khe Sanh, the 

company leaders were finally able to reconcile the company 

roster with the evacuation lists—Captain Sayers could finally 

say with certainty that they had not left one of their Marine 

comrades in the hills.

Reinforcements

The intense fighting and heavy losses sustained around Khe 

Sanh convinced the leadership of 3d Marines and 3d MarDiv 

to commit even more combat power to the remote outpost in 

the hills. The presence of large enemy forces with machine 

guns and mortars indicated that they indeed intended to make 

a major effort to take Khe Sanh. Major General Bruno A. 

Hochmuth, commanding general of 3d MarDiv, and Colonel 

Lanigan, commander of 3d Marines, withdrew the two most 

bloodied companies and replaced them with several more. On 

27 April, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, depleted by heavy casualties, 

were pulled out of the fight for much-needed rest and rebuilding. Colonel Lanigan replaced them the same day by giving 

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder and his 3d Battalion command 

group operational control over Company M, 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, and Company M, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Thus, 

3d Battalion now consisted of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th 

Marines, and the two new Company Ms from 3d and 9th 

Marines. 

The day before, even as Company B had been fighting for 

its life west of Hill 861, General Hochmuth had decided to 

reinforce the 3d Marines garrison at Khe Sanh with another battalion. Second Battalion, 3d Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. DeLong, had previously 

been designated as the Special Landing Force battalion, thus 

acting as a floating reserve at sea for the division.* On 22 

April, the battalion had been committed to Operation Beacon 

Star, a search-and-destroy operation 28 kilometers north of 

the coastal city of Hue. On the twenty-sixth, however, even as 

Beacon Star was still in progress, Hochmuth had 2d Battalion 

withdrawn by helicopter to Phu Bai and then transported by 

fixed-wing aircraft to Khe Sanh. The battalion arrived at the 

hilltop base the same day, and by 1600, it was moving toward 

Hill 861, taking up positions east of 3d Battalion. The newly 

arrived battalion consisted of Companies E, G, and H, with 

Company F temporarily designated as a regimental reserve and 

assigned to perimeter security at the Khe Sanh combat base. 

Third Marines now had seven rifle companies—two reinforced 

battalions—at Khe Sanh. 

Additionally, the artillery battery that had been attached 

to 2d Battalion—Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines—

came along as well. Now there were two batteries—Battery 

F and Battery B—armed with a total of six 105mm howitzers, two towed 155mm howitzers, and two 4.2-inch mortars. 

Four U.S. Army 175mm guns at nearby Camp Carroll also 

were prepared to provide long-range support. Moreover, aircraft from 1st MAW were about to deliver massive air support to the fight at Khe Sanh.

Attack on the Hills

While all this firepower was being assembled, the Marines 

made plans for a new attack against the formidable NVA 

forces in the hills. Colonel Lanigan passed down broad outlines for a two-battalion operation and allowed the two 

*The Special Landing Force in the Vietnam War typically consisted of a 

Marine infantry battalion, with attachments and helicopter support, afloat 

with the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet. It was used as a readily deployable tactical reserve.
| 35

battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonels Wilder and 

DeLong, and their staffs to work out the details. Planners 

designated Hill 861 as objective one, while Hill 881S would 

be objective two and Hill 881N identified as objective three. 

Late on the afternoon of 28 April, the newly arrived 2d Battalion would seize objective one with 3d Battalion following behind. Then 3d Battalion was to turn west and seize the 

terrain between Hill 861 and Hill 881S, and later assault the 

latter hill, for objective two. Meanwhile, 2d Battalion would 

consolidate objective one and then move toward objective 

three, while screening the right flank of 3d Battalion. Finally, 

3d Battalion would seize objective three.

None of these attacks would take place until American artillery and air had spent the better part of two days 

pounding Hill 861 and the surrounding area. During 27–28 

April, the two Marine batteries and the U.S. Army 175mm 

guns farther east fired more than 2,000 rounds of preparatory fire on the area north of Khe Sanh. Even more impressive was the 518,700 pounds of ordnance dropped on the 

target area by 1st MAW aircraft. As aircraft arrived on station, FACs had them orbit over the area in a large holding pattern, beginning at the higher altitudes and gradually 

working their way down as preceding flights attacked the 

target and then returned to base. FACs took great care to 

maximize the damage done to the enemy’s extremely wellconstructed bunkers. Even 500-pound bombs could not 

destroy these durable structures; napalm also was ineffective 

because of the thick tree canopy, which caused the chemical to burn out in the treetops. Instead, aircraft made low 

runs armed with 250- and 500-pound “snakeye” bombs to 

strip the trees and heavy foliage from the hill.* With the foliage reduced and the bunkers more exposed, other aircraft 

attacked with 750-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs.

On 28 April, just after noon, 2d Battalion stepped off in 

its attack on Hill 861 with two companies abreast. The only 

resistance came from sporadic mortar fire, and the Marines 

consolidated their position on the hill by 1600 without 

taking any casualties. In the process, they found yet more evidence of a tough, disciplined, and numerous foe. The odor 

of dead bodies indicated that the bombardment of the hill 

by American artillery and air had been deadly. Nevertheless, 

the enemy’s abandonment of the hill had been an orderly 

one, not a rout. The NVA soldiers had left behind no equipment or anything else with intelligence value. The Marines 

also got a closer look at what their brethren from other units 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A370041 

A CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter airlifts a 12,000-pound 

155mm howitzer from Duc Pho on the southern coast of Vietnam, where it was supporting the 7th Marines to Quang Ngai 

on 30 March 1967.

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A189526 

An M107 175mm self-propelled gun from the U.S. Army’s 

Battery B, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery, in position on Hill 65 in 

support of Marine units in the vicinity.

*Snakeye bombs were general-purpose aircraft bombs with fin retardation 

to allow them to fall behind the aircraft rather than just beneath it at low 

altitude, thus giving the aircraft time to avoid damage from the explosion.

Hill Fights
36 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

had been up against during the previous days—25 wellcamouflaged bunkers and more than 400 fighting holes, 

strongly fortified and mutually supporting.

With U.S. Marines finally in control of Hill 861, 3d 

Marines continued its offensive against the NVA on the 

other hills the next day, 29 April. Third Battalion began 

the assault on Hill 881S, with 9th Marines’ Company M at 

the head of the column followed by 3d Marines’ Company M. Lieutenant Colonel Wilder’s plan was first to secure 

an intermediate objective, a hill mass about 700 meters east 

of Hill 881S. At 1120, 9th Marines’ Company M deployed 

to engage an enemy platoon in a small draw, dispersing it 

with its own fire and that of artillery and air. Meanwhile, 

3d Marines’ Company M bypassed the firefight by moving 

around it to the south; at 1915, they secured the intermediate objective.

Around nightfall, 3d Marines’ Company M made at least 

two sightings of enemy soldiers. Some were attempting to 

emplace mortars on Hill 881S, while others were hidden in 

bunkers on a smaller hill about 300 meters away between the 

Marines and Hill 881S. The artillery forward observer, First 

Lieutenant David G. Rogers, called in artillery with one battery firing on Hill 881S and another firing on the smaller, 

closer hill. Shortly after 2000 that night, Marines at a listening post observed an enemy unit, perhaps as large as a company, advancing toward 3d Marines’ Company M’s perimeter. 

3/3

88IS

2/3

2/3

To

Khe Sanh

Combat Base

86I

88IN

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Plan of attack by 2d and 3d Battalions on 28 –29 April.
| 37

More artillery was called in; as the rounds struck the location where the enemy troops had been observed, the Marines 

could hear the screams of wounded enemy soldiers. Marine 

artillery continued to bombard the two hills through most 

of the night. The next morning, Marines searched the area 

and found five dead NVA soldiers, a wounded man who was 

killed as he tried to escape, and another wounded man who 

was captured. 

The third day of the operation, 30 April, began with 2d 

Battalion advancing northwest from Hill 861 to Hill 881N 

and screening the right flank of 3d Battalion as the latter 

unit assaulted Hill 881S. In preparation for the attack, the 

Marines continued to pound Hill 881S with supporting 

arms. Thirty-three sorties of aircraft added 250 2,000-pound 

bombs to the 1,300 rounds of artillery that the enemy positions had received the night before. The aircraft dropped their 

bombs directly on the target, but observers estimated that 

the trees and heavy foliage over the bunkers decreased the 

effectiveness of the attacks by about 50 percent. The restricted terrain and lack of easy approaches to the summit made 

it impossible for Lieutenant Colonel Wilder to employ the 

favored technique of assaulting with two companies abreast 

and one in reserve. Instead, 3d Marines’ Company M had 

to make the final assault on the hill alone with 9th Marines’ 

Companies K and M in reserve.

The commander of 3d Marines’ Company M, Captain 

Raymond H. Bennett, devised his plan for attacking and 

securing Hill 881S. The highest parts of the hill stretched in 

an east-west direction. First Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant Billy D. Crews, would lead the way and secure a position 

near the summit of the hill. Second Platoon, led by Second 

Lieutenant Joseph R. Mitchell Jr., would advance behind and 

to the left of Crews’ platoon and come up on his left flank. 

Then 3d Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant Norman D. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Action at Khe Sanh on 30 April –3 May.

Hill Fights
38 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Houser, would secure the right flank and the western end of 

the hill. Lieutenant Crews’ 1st Platoon reported only moderate resistance as it worked its way south and southwest 

toward the top of Hill 881S. At around 1025, Crews reached 

the summit of the hill, formed his platoon into a defensive 

perimeter, and initially reported only light contact. Lieutenant Mitchell’s 2d Platoon was not far behind and would join 

1st Platoon shortly afterward.

The initial success of Lieutenant Crews’ and Mitchell’s 

platoons had been deceptive. By means of strict fire discipline 

and excellent camouflage, the enemy had led 3d Marines’ 

Company M into a trap. Though they did not yet know it, 

its Marines were now in the midst of an entire battalion of 

the NVA’s 18th Regiment, 325C Division. Lieutenant Rogers 

recalled that no more than five enemy bunkers were visible on the hillside. Due to recent clashes with the enemy 

in the area and on Hill 881S, in particular the day before, 

the Marines were certainly aware of an enemy presence on 

the hill. They soon were stunned, however, at the strength of 

that presence. The Marines would find that there were actually dozens of bunkers, so well constructed that they were 

impervious to any bombs or artillery shells that were not 

direct hits. The bunkers were so well concealed that even the 

most careful observer could not possibly spot them until he 

was less than 30 –40 yards away. There were also hundreds 

of fighting holes concealed in the brush, and the enemy had 

expertly cleared lanes of fire for machine guns and zeroed 

mortars on the most likely avenues of approach. Thus, while 

9

608

x

x

500 500

700

800

950 900

1015

800

700

500

600

800

700

600

600

689

500

559

600

500

x

x

x

x

881N

881S

861

N

meters

See Reference Map Section 10

Khe Sanh Combat Base

and Vicinity 1967

0 1000 2000 3000

Rao Quan River

Khe Sanh

To Ca Lu

Lang Vei

Special Forces Camp

9

x

Khe Sanh

Combat Base

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 
| 39

the Marines had advanced up the hill, they had unknowingly bypassed enemy bunkers and fighting holes and were now 

in a kill zone.

Suddenly, the NVA struck with heavy machine gun, 

sniper, and mortar fire. The Marines returned fire but took 

casualties immediately. Determined to assist, Lieutenant 

Mitchell brought his platoon up on 1st Platoon’s left flank, 

but both platoons were soon in the same predicament. With 

no cover other than tall grass, shrubs, and a few isolated trees 

and shellholes, both platoons were taking fire from all directions, often from ranges of less than 100 meters. They were 

unable to move forward or backward. The Marines fought 

back fiercely. One Marine, for instance, fired round after 

round from his M79 grenade launcher into enemy bunkers, 

neutralizing at least four of them. Another man stood up in 

the tall grass with his M60 machine gun and discharged an 

entire belt of ammunition, only to be gravely wounded by 

an enemy round as soon as the belt was empty. One of his 

fellow Marines crawled through a hail of bullets to aid the 

wounded Marine and retrieve the weapon. Lance Corporal 

James H. Whisenant advanced on his own initiative into an 

exposed position from which he could destroy a bunker with 

his M72 LAW rocket launcher. After destroying the bunker, 

he advanced farther into open ground and killed the NVA 

soldiers inside. While doing so, Whisenant was killed by a 

burst from a NVA machine gun. Throughout the platoons’ 

positions, Marines bravely moved through heavy enemy fire 

to return fire, to call in supporting arms, and to assist wounded comrades. Eventually, Lieutenant Houser’s 3d Platoon 

also arrived, taking up a position to the right of 1st Platoon.

The situation of all three platoons, however, was desperate. Casualties were mounting quickly, including among the 

lieutenants. Lieutenant Mitchell, wounded once by shrapnel, continued to fight until he was struck again and killed. 

After the battle had raged for at least an hour, Lieutenant 

Crews was blown into the air by a mortar round and, after 

slamming into a tree trunk, landed 10 feet from his original position. With broken ribs and shrapnel in his forearms, 

face, and neck, the lieutenant gradually regained consciousness and returned to the fight. To make matters worse, the 

Marines’ new M16 5.56mm rifles often jammed as they tried 

to engage attacking NVA soldiers at close range. Moreover, 

Marines found it nearly impossible to carry wounded and 

dead Marines back down the hill, as deadly enemy fire from 

bypassed bunkers and fighting holes blocked the way.

The volume of fire and reports from the hill convinced 

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder that 3d Marines’ Company M 

needed help and that it must be withdrawn. Huey gunships, 

fixed-wing aircraft, and artillery attacked enemy troops on 

the hill, sometimes within 50 meters of the Marines. Wilder 

also ordered 9th Marines’ Company K up the hill to provide support and to help 3d Marines’ Company M disengage. 

While successful in this mission, Company K suffered heavy 

casualties as well. To help the two companies withdraw from 

the hill and carry out their wounded, Marine air and artillery blanketed it with high-explosive and smoke rounds. By 

the end of the day, both companies were consolidating in the 

vicinity of the “intermediate objective” that had been secured 

the day before.

The 30 April fight on Hill 881S cost the Marines 44 

men killed and 109 wounded in a period of about eight 

hours. Twenty-seven of those killed and 51 of the wounded belonged to 3d Marines’ Company M; with such heavy 

losses, that company was rendered temporarily ineffective. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A800216 

An NVA bunker on a finger of Hill 881S. Ten to 15 feet away 

from the bunker is a large crater made during the battles of 

April 1967, but the bunker remains intact. Taken in October 

1967 by LCdr Ray W. Stubbe, a Navy chaplain attached to 

26th Marines, who notes that the bunker is “constructed low, 

and with bamboo in the overhead.”

Hill Fights
40 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

The decimated company returned to Khe Sanh and was 

flown to Dong Ha to be rebuilt; Company F, 2d Battalion, 

3d Marines, the regimental reserve, moved forward to take 

its place. While Marine losses were significant, approximately 163 NVA soldiers were killed that day on Hill 881S.

Hill 881 North

As 3d Battalion fought for Hill 881S on 30 April, 2d Battalion moved west and northwest from its positions on Hill 861 

in its mission to screen 3d Battalion’s right flank and secure 

positions from which a final assault could be made on Hill 

881N. Company E, 2d Battalion, moved west into the low 

ground between Hills 881S and 881N and on the right flank 

of 3d Battalion. The plan was for Company E to occupy a 

small knoll about 800 meters southeast of Hill 881N. On 

Company E’s right, Company H would advance in a westerly 

direction to attack and hold the position where 9th Marines’ 

Company M had enemy contact the previous evening. Company G was held in reserve on Hill 861.

Company E encountered resistance and sustained casualties in its advance. There were intense firefights in this sector, 

and at least six men were wounded. These included two of 

the platoon commanders and the company commander, 

Captain Alfred E. Lyon, who, like many Marines in the Hill 

Fights, refused evacuation. Two Marines were killed. By the 

end of the day, however, the company had killed or driven off 

the enemy and secured the knoll that was its objective, finding a large number of empty bunkers and fighting holes that 

indicated the enemy had been there in strength.

While Company E had not had an easy day, the resistance 

that Company H met was far more severe. At around 0800, 

the company was descending a deep draw near the location 

of 9th Marines’ Company M’s earlier firefight. Third Platoon 

was advancing in column on the right, with 2d Platoon to 

its left and 1st Platoon taking up positions at the top of the 

draw to provide supporting fire for the other two platoons. 

Suddenly, the lead platoons came under extremely heavy fire 

from very close range. Just as 3d Battalion was about to discover on Hill 881S later that day, the enemy bunkers were 

so well camouflaged that they were nearly possible to identify until it was too late. The 3d Platoon’s point fireteam was 

no more than 15 meters away from the closest bunker when 

the firing began. Rifle and machine-gun fire from two NVA 

platoons, including that of a .50-caliber machine gun, ripped 

into the two Marine platoons. The Marines returned fire as 

best they could and maneuvered to destroy the .50-caliber 

gun, but dozens of Marines were killed or wounded within 

minutes. 

Company H’s experienced commander, Captain Raymond C. Madonna, quickly concluded that his men, relatively exposed and without cover, had no chance in this unequal 

fight. He informed battalion headquarters that his company had run into “a real buzz saw” and was withdrawing so 

that air and artillery could attack the enemy bunkers. Under 

cover of these attacks, Company H was able to disengage; 

though its losses had been severe with 9 dead and 43 wounded, almost half of the company’s strength. Third Platoon had 

lost 30 of the 33 men with whom it had entered the fight, 

suffering 4 dead and 26 wounded. The 2d Platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Bruce E. Griesmer, had been 

seriously wounded and evacuated. The company executive 

officer, First Lieutenant David S. Hackett, was killed as he 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 195152 

The opening to an NVA bunker on Hill 881S.
| 41

charged forward to direct the fire of a nearby M60 machine 

gun on an enemy bunker and to assist Lieutenant Griesmer. 

Only 1st Platoon was still relatively intact.

Marine aircraft and artillery fired on the area where 

Company H had been engaged for several more hours before 

Captain James P. Sheehan’s Company G moved out to 

assault it. Company G began its advance at around 1700 and 

the platoons were in their assault positions by 1800, ready to 

advance with two squads in each platoon on line and a third 

in reserve. Because of Company H’s experience, the Marines 

of Company G were under no illusions as to what they were 

about to face. Still, one young squad leader thought it was 

“somewhat surprising” to see the enemy bunkers still intact 

after the heavy bombing the area had received. All the vegetation had been “blown away,” leaving only stubble and debris 

from trees, yet the bunkers remained relatively undamaged.

Staff Sergeant Ruben Santos, platoon sergeant of 1st Platoon, remembered that the enemy started firing once his 

Marines came within a range of 25 meters. Marines fell, 

but Company G responded fiercely. Corporal John P. Hayes 

recalled that only the pure aggressiveness of the assault 

squads made it possible to take the position. As the Marines 

were within range, Santos found that the best way to assault 

the bunkers was with a liberal use of hand grenades. Once 

enough had been thrown, one squad would charge in line 

formation and overrun the position, shooting into the bunkers and throwing grenades inside.

The Marines could not suppress a grudging respect for 

the enemy’s tenacity. In assaulting one bunker, the Marines 

tossed in three grenades to kill the two suspected NVA soldiers inside. One of the enemy soldiers was killed, but the 

Marines discovered later that the other had sat on one of the 

grenades, which “blew his rear end off,” but did not kill him. 

As a Marine began to enter the bunker to clear it, the surviving NVA soldier grabbed his leg, pulled him in the bunker 

and shot him, with the bullets going through the Marine’s 

body, killing him, and wounding two other men behind 

him. Staff Sergeant Santos threw tear gas grenades into the 

bunker in an unsuccessful attempt to drive the man out or 

make him surrender. Finally, the Marines threw more fragmentation grenades and killed him. As Santos said, there was 

no way of getting an NVA soldier out of his bunker “unless 

you drug him out and he was dead.”

Besides the stubborn defense of the enemy, another factor 

that had to be overcome was the unreliability of the M16 

rifle. Corporal Hayes reported that one of his men, Lance 

Corporal William J. Roldan, was crouched in front of an 

enemy bunker for a time and “appeared to be having trouble with his weapon.” Roldan was “in a kneeling position 

working on his weapon and was in one position long enough 

[that] a sniper” could get a bead on him. As soon as the 

Marine stood up, he was killed.

Still, by pure determination, and with the earlier help of 

supporting arms, the Marines prevailed. By the end of the 

day, Company E was less than 1,000 meters southeast from 

objective three, the summit of Hill 881N. On its right, Company G had overrun the enemy bunker complex and continued its advance until it was located east of Company E and 

about 1,500 meters southeast of objective three.

Renewed Attacks on Hills 881 North and South 

The two battalions and regimental headquarters at Khe Sanh 

spent the day and night of 1 May preparing to resume the 

offensive the next day. Third Battalion remained in place 

with its companies located in the vicinity of the intermediate objective northeast of Hill 881S. Third Marines’ Company M had now flown out of Khe Sanh and its place in 

the 3d Battalion lines was filled by Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. The other two companies still assigned to 

3d Battalion were 3d Battalion, 9th Marines’ Companies K 

and M. Slightly to the north, 2d Battalion remained south 

and east of Hill 881N and patrolled areas where there had 

been previous contact. Colonel Lanigan was determined 

that they would not do so, however, until “after a heavy air 

and arty prep.” Companies E and G did most of this patrol 

work and remained closer to Hill 881N; Company H, still 

recovering from the “buzz saw” it had collided with the previous day, stayed near the battalion command post and reorganized. Additionally, both battalions prepared for the next 

day’s assault by bringing up their M40 106mm recoilless 

rifles. These were mounted on “Mules,” the nickname for the 

Willys-Overland M274 truck, a small, rough-terrain vehicle primarily used for resupply. The 106mm recoilless rifles 

mounted on the Mules were primarily antitank weapons, but 

were also useful for destroying bunkers. Higher headquarters 

also acted to reconstitute the regimental reserve at Khe Sanh 

Hill Fights
42 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

since 9th Marines’ Company F had been taken out of that 

role and put directly under the control of 3d Battalion near 

Hill 881S. Major General Hochmuth, the new division commander of 3d MarDiv, assigned the new regimental reserve 

duty to Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, which 

arrived at the Khe Sanh base at around 1900. Thus, Captain 

Terrill’s Company E, veterans of the earlier Khe Sanh fighting in March, were back again.

Colonel Lanigan and the two battalion commanders were 

determined that the Marines would ultimately secure Hills 

881S and 881N, but they would not send their troops against 

the enemy-controlled hillsides again without a massive preparation of the objectives by Marine artillery and aircraft. 

While the rifle companies and battalions reorganized and 

were resupplied, artillery and aircraft continued to bombard 

enemy positions in and around Hills 881S and 881N, as well 

as likely routes of resupply and reinforcement leading to the 

hills from the north and west. More than 166 aircraft sorties from 1st MAW attacked the hills; these attacks included 130 2,000-pound bombs and a total of more than 650,000 

pounds of ordnance. This massive air assault was augmented 

by 1,445 artillery rounds. The Marine infantrymen were not 

passive bystanders during this shelling. Forward and aerial 

observers directed these missions and reported confirmed 

and probable kills of enemy soldiers, and the infantry’s own 

organic mortars added to the fire, which was so intense that 

one NVA platoon, driven to desperation, abandoned its bunkers and ran down Hill 881S. As they fled, they came under 

withering fire from aircraft and from 3d Battalion’s mortars 

and small arms. Pilots from 3d MAW reported that their 

air attacks alone killed 140 enemy soldiers on 1 May. The 

Marine infantry, however, was not left unscathed. In each 

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| 43

battalion, two Marines were wounded by flying debris caused 

by the air strikes. Early in the morning, 3d Marines’ Company E was struck by 18–20 enemy mortar rounds, which 

killed 3 Marines and wounded 16. The Marines responded 

with countermortar fire until the incoming ceased.*

On 2 May, 3d Battalion was ready to proceed with the 

final conquest of Hill 881S. After four more hours of preparation of the objective by artillery, 9th Marines’ Companies K and M began the assault. This time, it seemed that 

the NVA had finally been convinced by the day’s previous 

bombardment to concede Hill 881S to the Marines, who 

received only sniper fire. By 1420, the hill was secured, and 

the two assault companies and Lieutenant Colonel Wilder’s command post occupied it and dug in. There also was an 

opportunity for the Marines to see what they had been up 

against just two days prior. While the recent bombing and 

artillery shells had left the top of the hill almost completely denuded of vegetation and virtually unrecognizable to the 

Marines who had been there, many of the enemy’s fortifications remained intact. There had been approximately 250 

enemy bunkers on the hill. They had been well camouflaged, 

but also extremely well constructed. The smaller ones were 

covered by two layers of logs and up to five feet of dirt, while 

the largest ones had roofs covered by four to eight layers of 

logs and four feet of dirt. Many had small storage shelves, 

bamboo mat floors, and simple drainage systems.

The fortifications were strong enough that as many as 75 

of them were still intact even after a day and a half of constant, heavy bombing. Lieutenant Rogers, the artillery forward observer for 3d Marines’ Company M (subsequently 

transferred to 9th Marines’ Company M), asserted that 

105mm and 155mm artillery rounds could do little to no 

damage to the structures. He believed that 8-inch artillery 

rounds would have been effective, but there were no howitzers of that caliber at Khe Sanh; only the larger bombs that 

could be dropped by fixed-wing aircraft had been able to 

seriously weaken the enemy’s fortifications. Amazingly, the 

NVA had been able to build and man these elaborate defenses while Marine infantry and reconnaissance units had been 

patrolling the area for months before the battles of April and 

May 1967. Just as surprising, the NVA had left virtually none 

of their equipment or dead bodies on the hill. Only much 

later would Marines discover an elaborate tunnel system 

that allowed the enemy to withdraw from the hill in relative 

safety. What the enemy had left was the bodies of Marines 

who had not been removed amidst the chaos and carnage of 

30 April. The NVA had taken care to prominently display 

three of the corpses in a humiliating fashion.

As 3d Battalion completed the conquest of Hill 881S, 2d 

Battalion resumed its attack on objective three—Hill 881N. 

Unknown to the Marines, the 325C Division had withdrawn the battered remnants of its 18th Regiment from the 

hill to base camps in Laos, replacing them with elements 

of its 95C Regiment. Companies E and G of 2d Battalion 

began their assault at 1015, with Company E approaching 

the objective from the south and Company G from the east. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 194155 

A well-concealed NVA bunker on Hill 881S.

*The intense shellings of Hill 881S on 1 May have been called “nearly unprecedented in their intensity and duration” at that point in the Vietnam 

War. Nine months after the battle, Marines would return to the hill to build 

their own bunker complex, and combat engineers would try to cut down the 

few remaining trees. Their efforts were thwarted because the trees were so 

full of metal shrapnel from the previous bombardment that chain saws were 

useless. Marines digging into the red clay often struck masses of putrefied 

flesh, the remains of enemy soldiers who had been buried by the devastating 

air and artillery assault of 1 May 1967.

Hill Fights
44 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Company H was in a central position from which it could 

support either unit. The area of objective three also had sustained heavy prep fires that morning, including about 1,400 

artillery rounds. Nevertheless, Company G ran into heavy 

resistance sometime after 1400 that afternoon. About 600 

meters east-northeast of the summit, the squads from 3d 

Platoon deployed into line formation and descended a draw. 

On the far side of the draw, there was a knob with a clearing, and behind that, a wooded area, and 3d Platoon was 

ordered to secure the knob. Corporal Robert E. Torter’s 1st 

Squad was on the left, 2d Squad was on the right, and 3d 

Squad followed behind. As Torter’s squad entered the woods, 

two NVA soldiers stood and began to run, but Torter’s men 

killed them with rifle fire. Torter ordered his men to reload 

their magazines, and shortly afterward, both his squad and 

2d Squad were hit by heavy automatic-weapons and smallarms fire. The initial burst killed a radioman and one of the 

squad’s team leaders. Torter had his men assault, but reported 

that out of the nine riflemen making the assault, six of their 

rifles jammed almost immediately. This, he reported matterof-factly, “slowed down our assault quite a bit, as the enemy 

was able to pick off quite a few of my men.”

Within minutes, 10 of Torter’s 13 men lay dead or wounded, 

as Captain Sheehan attempted to bring 60mm mortar rounds 

onto the enemy positions. Second Squad provided some supporting fire, but it had sustained casualties as well. The Marines 

of both squads risked their lives attempting to reach their 

wounded comrades and evacuate them, as the fire was extremely intense. Some of the injured were carried out, but Torter did 

not have enough able-bodied men to carry off all of them, and 

some Marines in the company sustained wounds even as they 

tried to rescue the others. Captain Sheehan ordered the company to withdraw so that he could blast the area with artillery, 

then return to the position and rescue the wounded. Under 

cover of artillery fire, the company returned to the position. 

Still receiving machine-gun and mortar fire, Marines from 3d 

Platoon and 2d Platoon were able to get within 10–15 meters 

of the wounded men, but they appeared to be dead. An artillery fire mission called in by Company G silenced the enemy 

mortars, but 2d Platoon sustained at least two additional casualties in the rescue attempt, including a squad leader killed and 

a fireteam leader wounded. Unwilling to lose any more men in 

an attempt to retrieve the dead, Captain Sheehan again ordered 

his men to withdraw to a clearing about 600 meters to the rear. 

Company H, which had moved forward to support Company 

G, had also received an enemy mortar attack.

While Company G was in the midst of this fight, Company E had pushed up the steep terrain to the top of Hill 881N. 

Captain Lyon felt sure there was a very strong NVA presence 

beyond the summit, however, and was reluctant to remain in 

place without additional support.* Shortly after Lyon’s Marines 

reached the hilltop and took in the fantastic views, the entire 

area was struck was by a sudden, violent thunderstorm. Winds 

gusted up to 40 miles per hour. The rain was so heavy that visibility was reduced to a few feet, making coordination and 

communication both impossible and dangerous to communicate on radios with antennas. Unable to coordinate with 

the other two companies or even observe artillery missions, 

Captain Lyon believed it would be prudent to withdraw, continue to pound the objective with artillery, and then to participate in a final assault along with the rest of the battalion the 

next morning in more manageable weather that allowed for 

the employment of all supporting arms. Lieutenant Colonel 

DeLong agreed and pulled his companies back to more defensible positions. As Company E withdrew from the summit, 

the storm pelted Company G, which was then withdrawing 

after its failed attempt to retrieve the bodies from the wooded 

knoll. The heavy rain, in fact, provided cover and concealment 

for Company G’s withdrawal. For both companies, however, the heavy rain resulted in a miserable night for the soaked 

and shivering Marines.

Enemy Night Attack, 3 May

The regiment’s plans for 3 May were for 3d Battalion to 

continue patrolling in the vicinity of Hill 881S and for 2d 

Battalion to resume its assault on objective three. Second 

Battalion’s plans were disrupted, however, by a major enemy 

counterattack that night. Company E had established its 

night perimeter on a small hill about 500 meters south of 

Hill 881N. Perhaps reasoning that Company G had been 

repulsed the previous day, at least two NVA companies made 

Company E their target. 

*Subsequent events would prove the captain right about the strong enemy 

presence.
| 45

Company E’s Marines, soaked and exhausted, were on 50 

percent alert in their fighting holes and abandoned enemy 

bunkers, with half of the company sleeping and the other 

half on watch. At 0415, at least two Marines—Captain Lyon 

and Sergeant Billy Joe Like—issued challenges to forms they 

saw in the dark. Those challenges were met by enemy smallarms and machine-gun fire, followed immediately by mortars. Scores of NVA soldiers, approaching mainly from the 

northeast, swarmed over Company E’s position, and a bitter 

hand-to-hand fight ensued. Marines and NVA soldiers killed 

each other at point-blank range with rifles, grenades, and 

bayonets.

The brunt of the assault fell initially on 2d Platoon in 

the northeastern sector of the company’s position. The platoon commander, Second Lieutenant James R. Cannon, 

maneuvered through the chaos, attempting to direct the 

defense. He radioed Captain Lyon that he would need support if he were to hold the position. Cannon gave one of his 

squad leaders permission to detonate M18 claymore antipersonnel mines along the platoon’s front, which resulted in screams from wounded NVA soldiers. Captain Lyon 

had already called for mortar fire, and within 10 minutes of 

the first attack, he ordered 1st Platoon to send one squad 

from the southwestern side of the perimeter to the 2d Platoon sector to help seal the penetration. First Lieutenant 

Frank M. Izenour Jr. responded by leading one of his squads 

in that direction, but immediately took heavy losses from 

two enemy machine guns. Izenour reported that more support was needed, but Captain Lyon did not want to further 

weaken the rest of the perimeter by sending other squads. 

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Hill Fights

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Plan of attack for 3 May.
46 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

He, therefore, sent 11 combat engineers who were attached 

to the company. The engineers and the men from Lieutenant Izenour’s squad who had not been wounded found positions on the left side of the enemy’s penetration and fired 

into the enemy’s right flank. These actions helped stall the 

enemy’s attack, but 2d Platoon still needed assistance. Most 

of its Marines were either dead or wounded.

Lieutenant Cannon had also asked Captain Lyon to 

request artillery and a flare ship to help him defend his position. An Air Force AC-47 Spooky could discharge parachute 

flares with a candlepower of two million, virtually turning 

“night into day.” It also could fire an extremely heavy and 

dense pattern of 7.62mm rounds from its miniguns, making 

it a formidable close air support weapon. Captain Lyon had 

already requested the flare ship, which also meant that he 

had to deny his lieutenant’s request for artillery, as the latter 

would be dangerous to “Puff ” flying directly over the target 

area.

“Puff ’s” flares lit up the night, and the illumination provided an incredible sight to the 3d Battalion Marines farther 

south on Hill 881S. Approximately 200 enemy soldiers were 

approaching Company E’s position from the west. Quickly, 

3d Battalion reoriented its 106mm recoilless rifles and fired 

more than 100 rounds into the flank of the NVA unit. This 

broke up the enemy attack, and then artillery decimated the 

NVA formation as it withdrew.

By the time daylight came to Hill 881N, the tide of battle 

had turned in the Marines’ favor. Supporting arms, flare ships, 

and determined fighting had blunted the enemy’s penetration of Company E’s position, although the fight was ongoing and there were still many NVA soldiers to be rooted out. 

Before dawn, Colonel Lanigan returned 3d Marines’ Company F, which had been under the temporary control of 3d 

Battalion, to its own 2d Battalion so that it could send reinforcements to the beleaguered Company E. A platoon from 

Company F flew via helicopters, landed at 0745 in a landing zone just outside Company E’s perimeter, and quickly 

attacked the southern side of the enemy penetration. Lieutenant Colonel DeLong also ordered Company H to assist. 

Company H moved west and northwest along a ridgeline and 

then struck the enemy force from the northeast at its rear. As 

Company H’s Marines closed on the enemy, they found a 

large number of NVA soldiers in spider holes and bunkers in 

a deep gully located between themselves and Company E.* 

Here, they were able to exact a measure of revenge for the 

heavy losses they had suffered the day prior. The NVA soldiers were surprised by the appearance of a Marine company 

from the rear, and the Company H Marines moved into the 

gully, attacking with deadly efficiency. Advancing from hole 

to hole, they killed the NVA soldiers with rifles, grenades, 

and pistols. Soon, the platoons from Company F and Company H finally closed the gap in Company E’s lines.

Company H and survivors of 2d Platoon, Company E, continued to advance to reclaim the area penetrated 

by the enemy attackers. The Marines discovered that every 

single man in 1st and 2d Squads of 2d Platoon, Company E, 

was dead. The number of enemy dead in those squads’ sectors approached 80. The positions in which several Marines 

were found testified to the gallantry of their fight. Some 

were found in a death grip with a dead NVA soldier. One 

bunker contained the body of the radioman, Private First 

Class John R. Meuse, who had been wounded early in the 

fight and refused evacuation. This allowed him to hold his 

position for several more hours and continue to radio information to his platoon commander, Lieutenant Cannon. The 

lieutenant found Meuse the next day, still clutching his radio 

handset and with five dead NVA soldiers piled at the bunker’s entrance.

As the laborious and dangerous task of clearing continued, Marines engaged in more bitter, close-quarter fighting 

as the remaining NVA soldiers fought virtually to the last 

man. By 1500 that afternoon, higher headquarters received 

a report that the last bunker was cleared. The battle resulted 

in 27 Marines KIA and 84 wounded. The NVA left behind 

137 of their dead but likely dragged away many more, as was 

their custom. The Marines captured three enemy soldiers and 

a large cache of equipment and weapons.

The bitter fight of 3 May highlighted the peculiar 

strengths of the opposing forces, and had great impact on 

the ultimate outcome of the Khe Sanh Hill Fights. Capitalizing on their skills in infiltration and night movement, 

the determined NVA force had initially achieved some measure of surprise. The aggressiveness and determination of the 

*A spider hole is a rough, shallow indentation typically just deep enough to 

conceal a person for ambush or protection.
| 47

North Vietnamese, however, was matched by that of Marines 

who refused to concede defeat. Additionally, superior American firepower and tactical mobility provided by helicopters 

also helped turn the tide against what was initially a superior enemy force. During the course of the battle, the Marines 

skillfully coordinated the use of artillery, a flare ship, mortars, 

fixed-wing air strikes, and transport helicopters. In the end, 

the North Vietnamese had managed to delay, but not prevent, the Marines’ ultimate seizure of Hill 881N. Moreover, 

the enemy’s losses seriously weakened his ability to continue 

the fight for Khe Sanh. Not only had his attempt to take the 

Marine base failed, but this counterattack was the last serious 

resistance the Marines would face in the area of Hills 861, 

881S, and 881N.

Both 2d and 3d Battalions spent the day conducting air 

strikes on bunkers and tunnel complexes in the areas around 

Hills 881S and 881N. Third Battalion collected abandoned 

enemy ammunition, weapons, and documents around Hill 

881S and even found an “underground mess hall.” Instead 

of resuming the assault on Hill 881N, 2d Battalion prepared 

for another night fight. Prisoners taken that morning and the 

night before reported that the enemy was planning another attack that night. Lieutenant Colonel DeLong drew his 

battalion into a tight perimeter on the south slope of the hill 

and prepared to meet it. During the night, helicopters delivered concertina wire, trip flares, and claymore mines. With 

their defensive capabilities strengthened by this equipment 

and by the return of Company F to 2d Battalion’s control, 

the Marines organized for another determined assault. They 

were far more prepared than the relatively isolated Company E had been the night before. Wisely, the enemy did not 

test them again.*

Attack on Lang Vei

Instead, the enemy struck the Special Forces camp at Lang 

Vei that night and inflicted a grievous blow on the soldiers 

and their Bru allies. At around 0345 on the morning of 4 

May, enemy mortar rounds and heavy small-arms fire ripped 

into the area. After a bombardment that lasted 10–15 minutes and included some 250 mortar rounds, a company-size 

force assaulted the position. Armed with satchel charges, they 

penetrated the position and inflicted massive casualties. Both 

the commanding officer and executive officer of the Special 

Forces detachment were killed, and two more U.S. Army soldiers were wounded. Casualties among the Bru in the CIDG 

were devastating: 20 were killed, 34 wounded, and 39 went 

missing. The allied force could claim no more than seven confirmed kills among their attackers. Perhaps the only thing that 

prevented complete annihilation of the garrison was timely 

air support as well as assistance from the Marine base seven 

kilometers away at Khe Sanh. Situation reports indicated that 

an AC-47 Spooky flare ship and two helicopters (probably 

UH-1 Hueys) were launched shortly after 0400. The Marines 

at Khe Sanh’s main base fired preplanned artillery concentrations around Lang Vei, and sent medevac helicopters and a 

ground reaction force to secure a landing zone for them. The 

fight at Lang Vei had no immediate impact on the Marines’ 

battle in the hills farther north, though it was certainly a tactical victory for the Communist forces. It was initially planned 

to be a diversion for the main NVA assault on Khe Sanh, the 

initiative that the Marines had preempted on 24 April.

As daylight returned to the Lang Vei and Khe Sanh areas, 

2d Battalion continued to sweep the area around Hill 881S. 

Third Battalion prepared for its final assault on Hill 881N, 

reorganizing during the first part of the day and then moving 

into assault positions in the afternoon. Marine aircraft and 

artillery blasted the hill with 105mm rounds, napalm, and 

250- and 500-pound bombs. Meanwhile, 3d MarDiv took 

several other steps to strengthen forces around Khe Sanh 

and prepare for further action. In light of the defeat suffered 

by the Special Forces detachment at Lang Vei, the division 

sent Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, to Khe Sanh 

to shore up the southwestern flank of the allied forces in the 

area. Company C also would be prepared to provide security 

for artillery moving forward from the main base at Khe Sanh. 

After the capture of Hill 881N, Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th 

Marines, would be expected to move its 105mm howitzers to 

a location two kilometers west to better support the infantry. 

Its two 4.2-inch mortars would displace to Hill 881S. Finally, 

plans were made to helolift two 106mm recoilless rifles from 

Khe Sanh to Hill 861.

*Second Battalion suffered several casualties from friendly fire on 4 May. 

One Marine from Company H was wounded by American mortar fire, and 

two from Company E were wounded by shrapnel from a close air support 

mission. Misdirected artillery fire killed one Marine from Company G and 

wounded nine others, resulting in an investigation.

Hill Fights
48 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Final Conquest of Hill 881 North

On 5 May, 2d Battalion finally completed its conquest of 

Hill 881N. Companies E, F, and G jumped off in the attack 

at 0850, meeting resistance that began as “sporadic,” but was 

later reported as increasing to “moderate.” Determined to 

rely on fire support and minimize casualties, the rifle companies paused in their assault so that aircraft and artillery 

could work over the hill once more. Then, with Company E 

acting as a base of fire, Companies F and G advanced on the 

summit from different directions, securing it at 1445. Two 

Marines were wounded and none killed during 2d Battalion’s 

assault. All three of the major hills around Khe Sanh were 

now in Marine hands.

One of the stranger incidents of the Hill Fights also 

occurred on 5 May. At around 0720, an aerial observer in a 

UH-1 Huey spotted a lone NVA soldier about a kilometer 

east of the summit of Hill 881N waving a white flag. In the 

first known surrender of a Communist soldier to an aircraft 

in Vietnam, the helicopter landed so that the prisoner could 

be taken on board. He was taken to the base at Khe Sanh 

and interrogated. Later that afternoon, just after 2d Battalion secured Hill 881N, American psychological operations, 

or psy ops, personnel tried to make use of this prisoner. A 

Helio U-10 Super Courier, a small utility aircraft, flew over 

the 881N area broadcasting messages designed to persuade 

enemy soldiers to give up the fight. One of the messages was 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188642 

Marines of Weapons Platoon, Headquarters, and Service Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, fire an M40 106mm recoilless rifle 

near Hill 881N on 1 May 1967.
| 49

a recorded appeal from the prisoner, asking his former comrades to surrender to the Americans.

Mopping Up

During the next several days, the Marines of 2d and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, strengthened their hold on the hills of 

Khe Sanh, patrolling out to a radius of 1,000 meters from the 

summits of Hills 881S and 881N, then to a radius of 1,500 

meters and beyond. There were occasional fleeting contacts 

with the enemy, mostly fleeing stragglers or pockets of NVA 

soldiers still holding out in bunkers. Two Marines belonging 

to Company H, 2d Battalion, were wounded by a booby trap 

when patrolling Hill 881N. The Marines fired on the enemy 

force’s remnants with infantry weapons, artillery, and aircraft, 

resulting in several dozen more enemy deaths. The patrols 

found abundant evidence of the enemy’s former strength and 

eventual defeat in the area. The Marines discovered hundreds 

of abandoned fighting holes and bunkers and large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. They also 

found dozens, perhaps scores, of bodies—unfortunate victims of American firepower left behind by their comrades. 

Officers forwarded the numbers of enemy corpses found up 

the chain of command, and generally the Marines became 

accustomed to these macabre discoveries. One finding, however, was an interesting enough demonstration of American firepower that it received special mention in reports all 

the way up to III MAF headquarters. On 7 May, Company M, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, uncovered a dead NVA soldier who had been killed by a “bomb blast [and] burned to 

death in bunker.” Company M Marines found documents 

on the charred corpse and forwarded them to headquarters. 

Though plenty of remains of dead NVA soldiers had been 

located, this corpse apparently made a deep impression on 

the Marines who found it. The discovery of former enemy 

positions and dead soldiers illustrated two things. First, there 

could no longer be any doubt that the NVA had occupied the 

hills around Khe Sanh in at least regimental, perhaps division strength, and that they had been preparing for a major 

assault in the area. Second, American firepower and the hard 

fighting of Marine infantry had devastated this enemy force. 

Yet, these patrols of the former battlefield also revealed 

the price that the Marines had paid for this victory. Occasionally, Marines found the bodies of their own comrades 

from the fight on 30 April in which 3d Battalion had briefly 

seized and then been driven from the summit of Hill 881S, 

and those from the night fight of Company E, 2d Battalion, 

3d Marines, on 3 May. These discoveries were more sobering, 

and resulted in a number of names being moved from the 

missing list to the KIA column. Another particularly chilling 

discovery was made by personnel aboard the aircraft carrier USS Princeton (LPH 5). On 3 May, 3d Battalion Marines 

had found one of their dead comrades and put him in a body 

bag to be evacuated to the Princeton. The Marine had an 

open head wound into which enemy soldiers had inserted a 

grenade with a string attached. The booby trapping of this 

body was done so cleverly that the dead Marine’s comrades 

did not notice it. Personnel aboard ship fortunately discovered the grenade before it did any damage and performed the 

grim task of disarming it.

The Khe Sanh Hill Fights were not quite over though. 

Colonel Lanigan, commander of 3d Marines, was intent on 

consolidating control over the Khe Sanh area with infantry 

foot patrols and with reconnaissance teams inserted by helicopter. Lanigan and 3d MarDiv headquarters also wanted to 

confirm the extent to which the enemy’s 325C Division had 

withdrawn. On 8 May, both 2d and 3d Battalions were given 

orders to extend their “search and clear operations with primary emphasis to the west.” The infantrymen were to patrol 

west to the 74 grid line on the north/south coordinates of the 

grid, about 3,500 meters west of the summits of Hills 881N 

and 881S, but also within the supporting range of Battery F’s 

105mm howitzers. The purpose was “to determine the extent 

of enemy withdrawal from the area.” Meanwhile, two reconnaissance teams were to be inserted three to five kilometers 

north and west beyond the extent of the infantry battalion’s 

foot patrols. The mission of these reconnaissance Marines 

was “to determine the extent, if any, of enemy activity buildup, and movement in the area.” Reconnaissance teams also 

were patrolling to the southeast to interdict enemy approaches to the base from that direction.

In obedience to these orders, Captain Merle G. Sorenson’s Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, sent two platoons to the northwest in the direction of Hill 778 on 9 May 

and then to Hill 803. Captain Sorenson, whose custom it was 

to accompany the largest element of his company on patrols, 

went with these two platoons. For Sorenson, this meant that 

Hill Fights
50 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

it was his third consecutive day going out on patrol. Advancing parallel and about a kilometer south of Company F were 

two platoons from Company E, now commanded by First 

Lieutenant John P. Adinolfi after Captain Lyon had been 

wounded days earlier.

Company F’s 1st and 3d Platoons struggled through the 

rugged, hilly terrain and had difficulty reaching their checkpoints on schedule. While negotiating ravines and ridges, 3d 

Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant Patrick G. Carroll, soon 

found itself in a battle for survival. About midday, the platoon was advancing down the steep southwestern side of 

Hill 778. To its left loomed the final objective—Hill 803. 

At around 1300, Lieutenant Carroll spotted NVA soldiers circling around the flank and rear of his platoon and 

attempting to gain control of a ridge above and behind him. 

Recognizing the danger, Carroll immediately ordered his 

squads to assault to prevent this maneuver, but the platoon 

took heavy casualties over the next several minutes. Once 

again, enraged Marines found themselves at a disadvantage 

as their M16s jammed and could not be cleared. Fighting 

among the ridges, ravines, and steep slopes, the Marines and 

NVA soldiers exchanged small-arms and automatic weapons 

fire and grenades at point-blank range; at times, the fighting was hand-to-hand. Second Lieutenant Jack Schworm’s 

1st Platoon heard the firing and soon joined the fight as well.

Poor communications, probably due to the rugged terrain, hindered the Marines’ efforts. The platoons had limited communications with each other or with their company 

commander. Company F’s artillery forward observer, Second 

Lieutenant Terry M. Weber, was unable to contact the fire 

support coordination center to get support; eventually, he 

was able to relay his fire mission request through Company E. The FAC with Company F also had difficulty, although 

Company F did receive two “dry runs” by Vought F-8 Crusaders that had expended their bombs elsewhere.

Hampered by malfunctioning rifles and poor communications, Company F fought fiercely, but casualties mounted. Lieutenant Carroll was wounded twice and continued 

to fight until a third wound left his leg so badly damaged 

that he could no longer walk and could barely crawl; Captain Sorenson was badly wounded as well. Several Marines 

observed NVA soldiers overrunning positions where wounded Marines lay, and saw the enemy methodically shooting 

and stabbing their wounded comrades.

Fortunately, help was on the way. Soon after the fight 

began, Lieutenant Colonel DeLong diverted the two Company E platoons from their patrol route and sent them north 

to Company F’s aid. DeLong and his command group moved 

forward by helicopter to a position just a kilometer south of 

Company F. With them were several mortar crews, a 106mm 

recoilless rifle crew, and a platoon from Company H to provide fire support for their beleaguered comrades. This rapid, 

forceful response by other elements of 2d Battalion turned 

the tide of battle less than half an hour after it began. For the 

next hour thereafter, the NVA executed a fighting withdrawal, which turned into a rout once the Marines were finally 

able to direct fire from mortars, artillery, and UH-1E Huey 

gunships onto the enemy. 

Marine Corps Art Collection 

The Gates of Hell by Ned Conlon. An F-8E Crusader of Marine 

All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 in close air support of 

Marines during the Hill Fights northeast of Khe Sanh in 1967.
| 51

Thanks to these supporting arms and the aggressive 

response of DeLong and other officers and enlisted Marines 

in Companies F and E, the Marines could claim victory in 

this fight. The cost, however, was high. Twenty-four Marines 

were killed and 19 wounded, mostly in the opening minutes 

of the battle. The Marines claimed 25 confirmed kills among 

the NVA and 35 probable kills. Helicopters soon arrived to 

extract the four platoons that had borne the brunt of the 

battle. Meanwhile, Marines from Company E made a discovery that possibly explained why the enemy decided to 

fight for this location. Near the spot where the battle began, 

the Marines found piles of bloody NVA web gear, or individual equipment, and 203 freshly filled graves. Lieutenant 

Cannon of Company E, the second American to see these 

graves, guessed that the enemy did not want the Marines to 

find their burial site. The discovery did not help 2d Battalion win the engagement, but officers at higher headquarters 

added 203 to the number of confirmed enemy kills at Khe 

Sanh and subtracted the same number from probable kills. 

Even after this, the fight of 9 May was not completely 

over. At around 1620, the 2d Battalion command group and 

crew-served weapons teams at Lieutenant Colonel DeLong’s 

position received small-arms fire from the direction of the 

previous battle site. In response, a rifle squad from Company E advanced uphill toward it, killing six enemy soldiers as 

it went. The infantrymen then withdrew, and the 106mm 

recoilless rifles and mortars blasted the position from which 

the fire had come.

Surrounded Reconnaissance Patrol, 9–10 May

While Marine infantrymen were slugging it out with NVA 

forces in the hills immediately outside Khe Sanh, reconnaissance units continued their work closer to the Laotian border 

and the DMZ to determine enemy strength and intentions 

in the area. On the evening of 9 May, a seven-man reconnaissance patrol from 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, was inserted 13 kilometers northwest 

of Khe Sanh (about six kilometers north of Hill 881N) to 

observe suspected enemy infiltration routes and report on 

enemy buildups. The patrol had not been on the ground long 

before it found a total of 16 well-constructed enemy bunkers and assorted equipment—clearly it had landed near to 

or in the midst of a much larger enemy unit. After reporting 

this information, the patrol received orders to leave its current location, find some high ground, and establish a defensive position. 

By midnight, the seven reconnaissance Marines were 

in a fight for their lives. The Marines were dug in and concealed on a small hill when 30–50 NVA soldiers walked up 

to and through their position. Hoping to avoid detection, the 

Marines held their fire. However, when two enemy soldiers 

finally spotted the Marines and unslung their rifles, they 

were killed by Private First Class Steven D. Lopez. A vicious 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193268 and A800211 

Top: Hill 950 to the left and Hill 1016 to its right. Bottom: Hill 

881S from the air, showing both parts of the hill outpost with 

Hills 950 and 1015 in the background.

Hill Fights
52 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

firefight ensued and several other Marines became casualties 

almost immediately. Sergeant James N. Tycz moved about 

the position, directing fire, shouting directions, and calling 

in artillery fire. Later, Sergeant Tycz picked up an enemy 

grenade that had just landed next to a seriously wounded Marine. Tycz threw the grenade back at the enemy, but 

it exploded as it left his hand, leaving him mortally wounded. Soon, only three men were left alive—Lopez (wounded), 

Lance Corporal Clarence R. Carlson (wounded), and Private 

First Class Carl Friery, who was wounded and unconscious 

throughout the rest of the battle. Private First Class Lopez, 

only 18 years old and on his third patrol, took over the job of 

directing artillery and air strikes. He and Carlson each killed 

several enemy soldiers with their own weapons, and at one 

point had to move about the position under enemy fire to 

retrieve ammunition from their dead comrades when their 

own supply ran out.

At 0245, there was an attempt to extract the patrol’s survivors with two CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. This endeavor failed due to the extremely heavy volume of enemy ground 

fire, and one of the pilots, Captain Paul T. Looney, was killed 

as a result. As the night wore on, the situation became even 

more desperate. Lopez continued to call in air strikes and 

artillery rounds to the edge of, and on top of, his own position. At one point, while lying in the grass, he found himself 

face to face with a very young looking NVA soldier. Lopez 

fired and the man fell dead where he lay; Lopez would continue to fight the rest of the night with his enemy’s corpse 

next to him.

A second attempt to rescue the three survivors was made 

just after first light. Fixed-wing aircraft and UH-1 Hueys 

made multiple strikes in an effort to “box” the area around 

the patrol, or deliver so much firepower on it that it would 

be impossible for the enemy to prevent the pickup by the 

two CH-46s. This attempt also failed. Just as discouraging to Lopez was the fact that Lance Corporal Carlson, the 

only other conscious Marine, was hit by a 12.7mm heavy 

machine gun round. Lopez believed it was a stray round 

from the UH-1 Huey that had provided fire support during 

the extraction attempt. Regardless of the source of the round, 

Lopez thought for some time that Carlson was dead and 

that he was the only Marine left alive. Still, he continued to 

call in fire missions. Shortly after 0900, there was an attempt 

to insert another reconnaissance team as a reaction force to 

aid Lopez. This effort also failed.

As another extraction was organized, Lopez asked that 

a Huey, not a Sea Knight, be sent this time. Lopez thought 

that the UH-1 could come in faster and provide enough 

of its own deadly fire that the enemy would be suppressed 

long enough to get him and his comrades out. As it turned 

out, the third rescue effort was quite a display of airmanship. The pilot of the Huey assigned to pick up the survivors 

was Major Charles A. Reynolds. Reynolds’ helicopter was 

unarmed, but he carried two full crews on it, so that even if 

one member was killed or wounded, the mission could continue. As he flew toward the pickup point, he was accompanied by two other Hueys providing covering fire, and 

fixed-wing aircraft dropped bombs and napalm around the 

landing zone as close as they dared to the Marines on the 

ground. Swooping in low and fast, as if he were simply providing fire along with the other Hueys, Reynolds changed his 

approach at the last minute and tried to land. With enemy 

rounds and fire from the napalm all around him, he aborted 

this first attempt, and then the second. Finally, Reynolds was 

able to land, embark the three wounded Marines, and escape 

through smoke, nearby napalm flames, and a hail of enemy 

fire. Upon inspection during their return to base, Lopez 

and Carlson had only 20 rounds of ammunition remaining 

between them. At the end of the fight, three reconnaissance 

Marines were wounded and four were dead, in addition to 

the deceased pilot, Captain Looney. Seven helicopter crewmen also were wounded. At least 15 NVA soldiers were certainly killed, and the Marines estimated another 20 probable 

enemy deaths.* Sergeant Tycz and Private First Class Lopez 

received the Navy Cross for this action. Silver Stars were 

awarded to Lance Corporal Carlson; Captain Looney, the 

*Official reports by officers at Khe Sanh concluded that there were 7 confirmed NVA kills in this action and 20 probable ones. However, in an interview conducted the very day he was rescued, a clearly exhausted but alert 

PFC Lopez testified that he had killed at least six NVA and Carlson at 

least another six. He also stated that he counted 15 dead enemy bodies at 

one point in the fight. Sources also contradict each other on the number of 

failed extraction attempts that were made and the times at which they were 

made. A message from Khe Sanh to 3d MarDiv headquarters sent on the 

afternoon of 10 May states that three unsuccessful attempts were made and 

that the successful attempt was made at 1145. However, interviews of Lopez 

and his company commander, Capt Alfred T. Crosby, state that there were 

two unsuccessful attempts and that the successful attempt occurred earlier.
| 53

Sea Knight pilot who was killed; and Major Reynolds, the 

Huey pilot who made the successful pickup.

Aftermath

In the days following the Marines’ seizure of Hill 881N, 

NVA troop sightings indicated that the 325C Division was 

withdrawing north and west toward the DMZ and the Laotian border. More than 150 Marines had been killed and 

another 400 wounded in the vicious fighting around Khe 

Sanh since 24 April. Body counts were still being verified, 

but the Americans believed more than 800 NVA soldiers 

had been killed and estimated another 600 probable enemy 

deaths. The Marines and their brethren from the other 

Services had badly mauled the 18thRegiment and, temporarily at least, halted the infiltration of its parent unit, the 325C 

Division, into the western reaches of Quang Tri Province. It 

seemed clear that the NVA north and west of Khe Sanh had 

suffered a serious tactical defeat.

Enemy activity around Khe Sanh did not end, however, 

after the Hill Fights, and neither did the American determination to hold the base. The 2d and 3d Battalions of 3d 

Marines were withdrawn from Khe Sanh between 11 and 

13 May and replaced by 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. On 13 

May, Colonel John J. Padley, commander of 26th Marines, 

formally assumed command at Khe Sanh from Colonel Lanigan and his 3d Marines. Temporarily, the Marine presence 

Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Corporal [then Private First Class] Steven D. Lopez, United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving as a Radio Operator with the First Platoon, 

Company A, Third Reconnaissance Battalion, 

THIRD Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet 

Marine Force, near Khe Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, on 9 and 10 May 1967. Corporal Lopez 

was a member of a seven man reconnaissance 

patrol deep in enemy controlled territory. The 

patrol discovered numerous enemy bunkers and 

equipment and radioed the valuable intelligence information back. Towards evening they withdrew to high ground 

and established a night defense. Shortly after midnight, 

a North Vietnamese unit of approximately 50 men was 

heard moving toward their position. Several enemy troops 

walked into their position and started to unsling their weapons and Corporal Lopez quickly killed them with an accurate burst of automatic weapons fire. The enemy immediately 

began delivering a heavy volume of small arms fire into their 

perimeter. As the fire fight continued, numerous casualties 

were inflicted until only Corporal Lopez, who was wounded in the side, and another Marine were able to deliver fire 

on the enemy. Although wounded, he assumed the task of 

directing artillery on enemy positions around the patrol. 

Armed helicopters and flare ships arrived to add support to 

the besieged patrol. Wounded a second time, he still courageously directed supporting arms in dangerously close to his 

position as, on several occasions, the enemy was 

within 15 feet of his position. Two attempts to 

extract the patrol by helicopter failed, due to the 

intense enemy fire. Running low on ammunition, he moved among the bodies of his fallen 

comrades to retrieve ammunition and discovered one Marine seriously wounded. He moved 

him to a covered position and distributed the 

ammunition between himself and the other 

survivor. He once again called in air support so close that 

dirt from the exploding rockets and bombs showered them 

and was once again wounded when an enemy round grazed 

his head. A last desperate attempt was made for extraction 

by helicopter. Napalm, bombs, and rockets rocked the enemy’s position as the three remaining members of the patrol 

were extracted. His steadfast determination and indomitable fighting spirit throughout the twelve hour ordeal were 

instrumental in inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy 

and saving the lives of several Marines. By his outstanding courage, bold initiative and selfless devotion to duty in 

the face of grave personal danger, Corporal Lopez upheld 

the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United 

States Naval Service.

Private First Class Steven D. Lopez

Hill Fights
54 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

at Khe Sanh decreased from two infantry battalions to one. 

Enemy sightings and contacts picked up again in early June, 

however, and intelligence indicated that all three regiments 

of the 325C Division were still in the triborder area—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The 26th Marines now maintained company outposts on Hills 861 and 881S as well as 

the Khe Sanh base itself, as well as smaller detachments on 

Hill 950. The requirement, or the decision, to hold and patrol 

a larger area only magnified the defensive problem. On 13 

June, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, reinforced its sister battalion at Khe Sanh. The 26th Marines would continue to battle 

its NVA foes around Khe Sanh, off and on, until the massive 

Communist siege of the hilltop base the following year.

Problems with the M16

One particularly distressing trend in the Khe Sanh fighting of 1967 was the performance of the recently issued M16 

rifle. The Marines who fought around Khe Sanh at that time 

were not able to train and familiarize themselves with the 

new weapon. The M16 had obvious advantages over the M14 

rifle that it replaced, including its lighter weight, much faster 

rate of fire, and lighter ammunition that allowed troops to 

carry more rounds into combat. Infantrymen, however, complained often that the rifle jammed. The fighting around Khe 

Sanh brought the dissatisfaction with the M16 to a head. 

One Marine after another came forward to report that his 

rifle had jammed in the midst of a firefight or, worse, that 

he personally saw buddies killed while they struggled to 

clear blockages in the chamber of their rifle. Some of these 

bitter complaints were made in verbal comments to congressmen visiting the front lines or in a letter to a congressman, and were clearly exaggerated. Other accounts, however, 

were matter-of-fact statements made to field historians only 

days after the event and were corroborated by other eyewitnesses. Though the magnitude of the problem was difficult to 

quantify, it undoubtedly had a negative impact on Marines’ 

morale, not to mention their confidence in the most important tool of their trade. The Marines’ bitterness was probably 

exacerbated when senior officers and staff NCOs responded that there was nothing wrong with the rifle; in reality, 

Marines either had not been cleaning their rifles properly or 

had not received adequate training on them. Even General 

Walt and the Commandant, General Greene, publicly made 

these assertions, as did General Westmoreland in his memoirs nearly a decade later.

The problem led to a public outcry and intense congressional scrutiny. It turned out that the troops were right, 

but that the generals were partially right as well. The M16 

required more careful, frequent, and thorough cleaning than 

the M14 to function properly. The requirement for cleanliness was so stringent, however, that it was often impossible to 

meet in field or combat conditions. Additionally, even when 

the rifle was cleaned perfectly, it often failed to properly eject 

spent cartridges, causing a jam when the next round was 

chambered. Part of the problem lay in the fact that microscopic “pits” formed in the chamber of the M16 after firing. 

This had not occurred in the M14, which had a chromeplated chamber that minimized corrosion. More fundamentally, the powder in the 5.56mm round then in use caused 

a more rapid rate of fire than that for which the rifle was 

designed.* This resulted in the powder in each round failing 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193261 

A CH-53 helicopter delivers M101 105mm howitzers belonging to Battery I, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, to a landing 

zone on Hill 881S in 1967 shortly after the Hill Fights. As 

26th Marines consolidated outposts on the hills seized by 3d 

Marines during the Hill Fights, helicopter support continued 

to be vital to the defense of the area.

*The original weapon design was intended to fire 700 –800 rounds per minute. The change in powder increased that rate to 1,000 rounds per minute.
| 55

to burn fully, leaving behind a dirty residue that made the 

weapon more likely to malfunction.

Within a few months of the Hill Fights, the U.S. Army 

and Marine Corps took action to fix the problems with the 

M16. The rifle was fitted with a new buffer group that slowed 

down the rate of fire and with chrome-plated chambers to 

reduce corrosion. These vital and urgent modifications and 

the replacement of the rifles that had already been issued 

placed a tremendous logistical strain on the III MAF, and 

were still not quite complete by the end of 1967. By 1968, 

however, the M16 had become a much more reliable weapon.

Tactical and Strategic Implications

The Khe Sanh Hill Fights highlighted several tactical trends 

that generally held true whenever American troops faced 

Communist troops in Vietnam, particularly the NVA. The 

enemy showed himself to be extremely skilled in infiltration, concealment, and fortification. These strengths of the 

NVA soldier were pitted against the Americans’ infantry fireand-maneuver tactics and the strength of their supporting 

arms, particularly air and artillery. U.S. Marine infantry were 

skilled at using a base of fire, or firing element, while sending a maneuver element to close with the enemy. However, because of the numerical strength of the enemy at Khe 

Sanh, as well as his skill at concealing his positions and automatic weapons, those tactics would not have succeeded without the massive firepower provided by American supporting 

arms. The 1st MAW flew more than 1,100 sorties at Khe 

Sanh during the Hill Fights, expending more than 1,000 

tons of munitions. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force directed 23 strikes by B-52 aircraft, and Marine and Army artillery pounded enemy positions in the area with more than 

25,000 rounds. Even with all this firepower, NVA bunkers were so well constructed that, at first, air and artillery 

attacks on them did not achieve the desired results. Eventually, though, American firepower and the dogged determination of Marine infantrymen carried the day.

The First Battle of Khe Sanh also highlighted the importance of rotary-wing aircraft in the Vietnam War. Helicopters were even more vital for the Americans at Khe Sanh, 

where the rugged terrain made vehicle transport generally 

impracticable and even foot transportation difficult. Helicopters were indispensable for rapid resupply, tactical insertion 

of reconnaissance patrols and reinforcements to units in contact, and medevacs. The Marines were so dependent on helicopters in this battle, in fact, that NVA troops were able to 

turn this dependence to their advantage. Using cover and 

concealment to strike first against patrolling Marine units, 

they could inflict initial casualties, perhaps without fully 

giving away their positions. Then, rather than close with 

the well-armed and aggressive Marines, they would wait 

until helicopters arrived to take out the wounded, seeking 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A190131 and A190136 

Top: Sgt P. Richardson of 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, demonstrates firing the M16 rifle from the hip at the Khe Sanh 

rifle range on the northern perimeter of the combat base in 

1967. Bottom: PFC Krenzer of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion 

fires an M16 rifle from the standing “offhand” position at the 

Khe Sanh rifle range in1967.

Hill Fights
56 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

the opportunity to inflict more casualties. When they had 

pinpointed the location of landing zones, the NVA could 

direct accurate and deadly fire from mortars and automatic 

weapons as the Marines attempted to evacuate their stricken comrades and receive supplies. The frequent inability of 

the Marines to actually see the enemy made this tactic even 

more effective. The Americans soon countered by blanketing 

the area around the landing zone with supporting arms as 

the medevac helicopters arrived. This action was somewhat 

effective and inflicted NVA casualties, but helicopter operations supporting Marine infantry in contact with the enemy 

remained a dangerous and sometimes fatal endeavor. The 

courage and skill of pilots and helicopter crewmen in a “hot” 

landing zone, and the desperate courage of Marines on the 

ground determined to get their wounded comrades onto the 

medevac helicopters, became signature features of the American experience in Vietnam.

At the operational level, there is little reason to doubt 

the interpretation of senior Marine leaders on how the Hill 

Fights fit into a larger enemy plan. During and immediately after the battle, senior officers at the regimental, division, 

and Marine amphibious force level concluded that the NVA 

had planned a determined attempt to overwhelm American 

forces at Khe Sanh, as Westmoreland originally suspected. 

This determination manifested in the enemy’s patient efforts 

over weeks and months to infiltrate troops into the area in 

at least regimental strength. While assembling large numbers of troops in the area, the enemy temporarily deployed 

them in base camps and strongly fortified bunkers built to 

last, and built field hospitals as well. Rather than avoid battle 

as they had in the past when the Americans brought airpower and artillery to bear, by 24 April, the NVA soldiers 

held fast against incredible firepower and dared the Marines 

to push them off the hills. Senior Marine officers believed 

that other enemy actions at the time were meant to support 

the attack on Khe Sanh. The enemy, they concluded, was 

attempting to cut off Route 9 east of Khe Sanh to isolate the 

garrison. Meanwhile, a diversionary attack was planned on 

the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. About the 

same time, mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks struck Dong 

Ha, Gio Linh, Con Thien, and Camp Carroll designed, 

the Marines thought, as additional diversions and to freeze 

Marine units in place so that they would not be sent to Khe 

Sanh’s relief. Marine leaders determined that these endeavors were meant to support the main effort—a large attack on 

Khe Sanh to take place on or about 1 May. However, aggressive Marine patrolling resulted in the battle of 24 April, the 

subsequent arrival of two Marine battalions, and the determined Marine attack on the hills northwest of the base, 

which preempted the planned NVA assault on Khe Sanh. 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) 

Military actions in Vietnam between 28 April and 12 May.
| 57

Communist Vietnamese sources on the war are still relatively inaccessible and often propagandistic, but they give little 

reason to doubt this interpretation. Even the most regarded 

official Vietnamese history of the war translated into English 

does not mention the fighting at Khe Sanh in 1967.

In the strategic debate between General Westmoreland 

and such Marine officers as Krulak, Walt, and others, the 

USMACV commander certainly had been right about one 

thing: the NVA was in northern Quang Tri Province, and the 

Khe Sanh area in particular, in significant strength. Eventually, the Marine generals agreed with that assessment, and 

would have also agreed that Westmoreland’s concern that the 

enemy might make a determined attempt to overwhelm the 

remote base in the mountains had been prescient. On 7 May, 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188991 

Gen Westmoreland (right) visits the Marines’ I Corps headquarters on 10 –11 August 1967 and is shown here speaking with Gen 

Wallace M. Greene Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps (left). In the background is LtGen Robert E. Cushman Jr., who replaced 

LtGen Walt as commander of III MAF on 1 June 1967. By mid-1967, senior Marine leaders agreed with Westmoreland that Khe 

Sanh was important, but many still differed with him on why it was important in the overall strategic approach to fighting the 

war.

Hill Fights
58 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Lieutenant General Krulak stated in a situation report that 

“the destruction of the base and forces at Khe Sanh probably 

has been an enemy objective of long standing.”

Assuming, however, that the North Vietnamese had 

indeed planned a determined and coordinated effort to capture Khe Sanh, what was the larger strategic significance of 

that effort? It seems that Marine leaders came to agree with 

Westmoreland that Khe Sanh was important after all. Lieutenant General Krulak referred to the “critical nature” of the 

Khe Sanh base in his 7 May situation report. Similar terminology was used in 1969 by Lieutenant General Robert 

E. Cushman Jr., who replaced Lieutenant General Walt as 

commander of III MAF only weeks after the conclusion of 

the Hill Fights. Cushman referred to Khe Sanh as a “vital 

link in the northern defenses.” Thus, it seems that the Hill 

Fights resulted in a new American consensus on Khe Sanh’s 

importance and a determination to hold it. No longer would 

senior Marine officers leave a single rifle company to defend 

it or claim that, if one lost Khe Sanh, “you wouldn’t have lost 

a damn thing.” This new attitude toward the hilltop base set 

the stage for the massive and legendary siege of Khe Sanh in 

1968.

What General Westmoreland and Marine leaders never 

fully agreed on was why Khe Sanh was important. By 1969, 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193248 

A Marine attached to Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, cleans his weapon in a 81mm mortar position on Hill 861 less 

than three months after the conclusion of the Hill Fights.
| 59

Westmoreland would comment on the importance of holding 

Khe Sanh so that NVA forces could not sweep into the populated areas farther east and threaten the civilian population 

and the pacification program. In his memoirs published in 

1976, however, Westmoreland revealed that his basic view on 

the importance of Khe Sanh had not fundamentally changed. 

Though Westmoreland was more flexible in his approach to 

fighting the war than is often realized, he was relatively more 

inclined than the Marines to view the Vietnam War as a conventional struggle. To him, Khe Sanh was a key outpost that 

anchored the left flank of the American line in the north; 

provided a base for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering near the DMZ and Laotian border, a base from which he 

hoped someday to launch a major drive into Laos to cut the 

Ho Chi Minh Trail; and the opportunity to destroy enemy 

conventional forces with American firepower should they ever 

attempt to overwhelm the base.

Marine leaders, however, did not allow the Khe Sanh 

fighting to distract their focus away from pacification and 

counterinsurgency efforts. In FMFPac’s monthly report to 

USMACV for April 1967, Krulak’s headquarters reported 

that the heavy conventional fighting in I Corps that month, 

including Khe Sanh, had caused the CORDS program to 

suffer, but that the “Combined Action program continued to 

develop satisfactorily.” Even after the larger and even bloodier conventional fight at Khe Sanh in 1968, Lieutenant General Cushman thought the significance of the battle lay in 

protecting pacification efforts in the villages. When Cushman noted in 1969 that Khe Sanh was a “vital link in the 

northern defenses,” he claimed its importance lay in the fact 

that those defenses “screened the Allied counterinsurgency 

efforts in the densely populated coastal plain.” By preventing 

an enemy invasion of the coastal plain, “American and South 

Vietnamese forces at Khe Sanh provided a shield for their 

contemporaries who were waging a war for the hearts and 

minds of the people in the cities, villages, and hamlets farther 

to the south.” To many senior Marine officers, this focus on 

counterinsurgency remained the key to victory in Vietnam.

Discussions on strategy can become abstract and conjectural, but what was demonstrable and undeniable was the raw 

courage displayed, and the suffering endured, by the fighters on both sides at Khe Sanh. The Marines saw that NVA 

soldiers, like themselves, could withstand great hardship and 

continue to fight. When well dug in and determined to stand 

their ground, NVA units could endure massive air and artillery bombardments and continue to function. 

Great credit also belongs to the Marines who refused to 

quit until they routed, blasted, or drove those same NVA soldiers out of their bunkers and off the hills around Khe Sanh. 

Battling harsh terrain and weather and withering enemy fire, 

Marine infantrymen and the U.S. Navy medical corpsmen 

with them refused to give up and often sacrificed their lives 

for their comrades. Marine cannoneers provided timely and 

reliable 24-hour support, while pilots and aircrews risked their 

lives to evacuate the wounded and help the infantry to stay 

in the fight.

The pace of operations did not slacken after the Hill 

Fights, of course, and there was only limited time for Marine 

officers to reflect on the courage and character their men had 

displayed. Just after the fight for Hill 881S, Captain Raymond H. Bennett, commander of Company M, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, spoke to reporters from Stars and Stripes. The 

paper quoted Captain Bennett as saying, “the most impressive thing I saw is the actions of the American youngster. The 

same long-haired kid that loves rock and roll music . . . comes 

through with flying colors when the chips are down.”

Perhaps, however, the conduct and character of the 

Marines in the Khe Sanh Hill Fights was best summed up 

more than six months later by another young officer who had 

witnessed the carnage first hand. Captain David G. Rogers 

had been a lieutenant and a forward observer attached to Captain Bennett’s Company M during its assault on Hill 881S on 

30 April. Now back in the United States and reflecting on the 

experience to a Marine interviewer, Rogers swore he would 

never forget the sight of Marines carrying their wounded 

comrades down the hill at the end of the day. Rogers said, 

I learned to respect the individual Marine, the 18, 19, 

20-year old, more in this particular battle than at any 

other time that I’ve been in the Marine Corps. He was 

given his job, he went up in the face of danger, in the 

face of just being blown away more or less, and he went 

up and he did his job. To see the faces of Marines dragging back their dead buddies or wounded buddies, you 

could see how close the Marines really were with each 

other. It was true brotherhood, and I was really proud 

at the conduct of the Marines.

Hill Fights
60 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Though several unit after action reports on the Hill Fights 

are no longer extant, enough surviving sources exist to reconstruct the fighting with reasonable accuracy. Regrettably, the 

command chronologies for 3d Marine Regiment and the 

battalions that fought at Khe Sanh or contributed infantry 

companies to the battle contain almost no relevant information. One minor exception can be found in those from the 

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (BLT 

2/3), from 13 April to 12 May 1967. The regimental and battalion command chronologies sometimes reference separate, special after action reports for the Khe Sanh fighting 

that were apparently prepared but no longer exist. Likewise, 

the command chronologies for 3d MarDiv and III MAF 

for April 1967 offer limited usefulness. These sources can be 

found in the National Archives in Washington, DC, or at 

the Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center (GRC), Marine 

Corps University (MCU), Quantico, VA.

The most useful surviving primary sources are the situation reports prepared by the SOP, or senior officer present, 

at Khe Sanh, and the personal interviews conducted with 

the participants by Marine Corps field historians during or 

shortly after the battle. The situation reports, along with “plan 

summaries,” were sent every six hours from Khe Sanh to the 

3d Marines’ regimental headquarters, which then forwarded them to 3d MarDiv. Spanning the period from 30 April 

to 13 May 1967, the documents cover the fighting in great 

detail, including grid locations for individual units down to 

the company level. These situation reports can be accessed 

online in the Virtual Vietnam Archive, Vietnam Center and 

Archive at Texas Tech University.

As for personal interviews, Marine Corps University holds the audio recordings of dozens of men who served 

at Khe Sanh from late 1966 to mid-1967. The most useful 

include those of BGen Lowell E. English, BGen John R. 

Chaisson, Col T. M. Horne, LtCol Peter A. Wickwire, Maj 

Glenn Golden, Maj Richard C. Ossenfort, Capt Alfred 

T. Crosby, Capt David G. Rogers, Capt Joseph G. Roman, 

Capt Bayliss L. Spivey Jr., Capt William B. Terrill, U.S. 

Navy Lt T. L. Folkerth, 2dLt Thomas G. King, 2dLt John 

M. Kramer, 2dLt Terry M. Weber, SSgt Leon R. Burns, 

SSgt Donny W. Richey, SSgt Ruben Santos, Sgt Stephen P. 

Bodie, Sgt Donald E. Harper Jr., Sgt Milton D. Norwood, 

Sgt Harry W. Stier Jr., Cpl Michael A. Brown, Cpl John P. 

Hayes, Cpl John K. Middleton, Cpl Robert E. Torter, LCpl 

Donald A. Clark, LCpl Larry W. Umstead, and PFC Steven 

D. Lopez. Particularly revealing as to the strategic views of 

senior Marine Corps officers is the interview of BGen English conducted on 9 January 1967 and the extended briefing 

provided to LtGen Victor H. Krulak, commanding general of III MAF, by the staff of 3d MarDiv on 8 March 1967.

Sources
| 61

Other useful primary sources include FMFPac, “Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, April 1967,” Record 

Group 127, National Archives; LtGen Walt to Gen Greene 

and LtGen Krulak, 19 March 1967, Personnel/Exclusive—

Outgoing, 26 August 1965–8 May 1967, Virtual Vietnam 

Archive, Texas Tech University; Gen William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1976); 

and Gen William C. Westmoreland, comments on draft 

manuscript, 27 May 1978, Vietnam Comment File, GRC, 

MCU. For the experiences of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 

from September 1966 to January 1967, see 1st Battalion, 3d 

Marines, Command Chronologies, September 1966, October 1966, November 1966, December 1966, and January 

1967, Record Group 127, National Archives. The trials of the 

individual Marine infantryman during this period are vividly portrayed in the memoir of Rodger Jacobs, Stained with 

the Mud of Khe Sanh: A Marine’s Letters from Vietnam, 1966–

1967 ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2013). Jacobs was 

an infantryman in Company A, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, 

and spent the months of October and November 1966 at 

Khe Sanh. This work also made use of official citations for 

Marines and sailors who received the Navy Cross, Silver Star, 

and other medals.

A large number of contemporary periodical articles covered the controversy over the M16 rifle. See, for example, 

New York Times articles for 27 May 1967, 1 June 1967, 8 June 

1967, 27 August 1967, 28 August 1967, 20 October 1967, 

25 October 1967, 4 May 1968, 2 November 1971, 5 February 1972; Time articles for 9 June 1967, 8 September 1967; 

the Wall Street Journal article for 19 October 1967; and Washington Post articles for 27 May 1967, 5 September 1967, 19 

October 1967, 25 October 1967, 25 November 1971.

The two most useful secondary sources on the Hill 

Fights are Maj Gary L. Telfer (USMC), LtCol Lane Rogers 

(USMC), and V. Keith Fleming Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, 

DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1984); and Edward F. Murphy, The Hill Fights: The 

First Battle of Khe Sanh (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003). 

Besides the above titles, other official Marine Corps secondary sources include LtCol Shawn P. Callahan, Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe Sanh, Occasional Paper (Quantico, 

VA: History Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2009); 

Capt Moyers S. Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 1969); Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington, DC: History 

and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1982); 

and BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations 

in Vietnam, 1967,” in The Marines in Vietnam, 1957–1973: 

An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 1985), 69 –98.

Other popular histories besides Murphy’s The Hill Fights 

focus more on the siege of 1968 rather than the fighting 

that preceded it in 1966 and 1967. However, John Prados’ 

and Ray W. Stubbe’s Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991) is very useful. See also 

Ronald J. Drez and Douglas Brinkley, Voices of Courage: The 

Battle for Khe Sanh, Vietnam (New York: Bullfinch Press, 

2005); and Ray W. Stubbe, Battalion of Kings: A Tribute to 

Our Fallen Brothers Who Died because of the Battlefield at Khe 

Sanh, Vietnam, 2d ed. (Wauwatosa, WI: Khe Sanh Veterans, 

Inc., 2008). Allan R. Millett’s Semper Fidelis: The History of 

the United States Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 1991) 

remains the standard scholarly overview of Marine Corps 

history and provides background and context for Marine 

Corps operations at Khe Sanh.

Original Communist sources virtually have nothing to 

say about Khe Sanh in the context of the 1967 fights. See, for 

example, Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., Victory in Vietnam: The 

Official History of the People’s Army in Vietnam, 1954 –1975

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); and Khac Vien 

Nguyen, American Failure (Hanoi: Xunhasaba, 1968).

Recently, Gregory A. Daddis has challenged the orthodox criticism of Gen William C. Westmoreland as a strategist in Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in 

Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Daddis 

provides a healthy corrective note to the common assumption that Westmoreland blindly pursued a narrowly conceived, conventional strategy of attrition in Vietnam. As 

the primary sources that inform the current study illustrate, 

however, Westmoreland eagerly sought a conventional victory against the NVA around Khe Sanh in late 1966 and 1967 

while, comparatively speaking, senior Marine officers were 

far more focused on their pacification program.

Hill Fights
62 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARVN....................................................................................................................................Army of the Republic of Vietnam

CAP ...............................................................................................................................Combined Action Platoon or Program

CIDG..................................................................................................................................... Civilian Irregular Defense Group

CORDS ......................................................................................... Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

DMZ..............................................................................................................................................................demilitarized zone

FAC(A) .....................................................................................................................................forward air controller (airborne)

FMFPac ............................................................................................................................................Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

KIA ......................................................................................................................................................................killed in action

LAW ....................................................................................................................................................... light antitank weapons

MAW.......................................................................................................................................................Marine Aircraft Wing

NCO ....................................................................................................................................................noncommissioned officer

NVA .....................................................................................................................................................North Vietnamese Army

RVN...........................................................................................................................................................Republic of Vietnam

SOG......................................................................................... Special Operations Group or Studies and Observations Group

SOP............................................................................................................................................................ senior officer present

TAOR ............................................................................................................................................ tactical area of responsibility

USMACV ............................................................................................................U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
| 63

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank numerous individuals who contributed to the completion of this project. Charles D. Melson, 

formerly chief historian at Marine Corps History Division, 

provided expert advice on possible sources of information and 

offered a helpful critique of the initial manuscript draft, as 

did Dr. Nicholas Schlosser. Intern Igor Neves worked with 

the photographs and maps. Professor Edwin E. Moise of 

Clemson University also read an earlier draft and provided 

helpful comments. Paul Westermeyer assisted with the final 

stages of this project in locating illustrations. The editorial 

expertise of Ms. Angela Anderson of Marine Corps History 

Division was much appreciated, as well as Mr. Rob Kocher’s 

skill as the project’s chief illustrator and designer. 

Hill Fights
64 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Col Rod Andrew Jr. is a 29-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps 

and Marine Corps Reserve. He formerly served as officer-incharge, Field History Branch, Marine Corps History Division, 

and currently is a professor of history at Clemson University.

Rod Andrew Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Photo courtesy of the author