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HORROCKS v. KEEPERS, INC.—CONCURRENCE

FLYNN, J., concurring. I agree that the trial court’s

judgment should be affirmed. I write separately for the

following reasons. It has been usual for this court either

to address each claim raised by an appellant on appeal

or, in the alternative, to explain why review is not undertaken. In the present case, the first claim of the defendants/appellants, Keepers, Inc., and Joseph Regensburger, is ‘‘[w]hether the standard of review for the trial

court should have been de novo review rather than the

more deferential review afforded arbitration decisions

when the arbitrator found the entertainment lease

agreement violated public policy and determined it to

be illegal.’’ This claim is listed as Roman numeral one in

the defendants’ statement of issues, and the defendants

devote more than one half of their appellate brief to

detailing their supporting arguments. I write separately

to explain why I think this claim, ultimately, is unreviewable. In support of their argument, the defendants cite

to Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 425, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000)

(‘‘we conclude that because the arbitrator’s decision

regarding the postemployment payments implicated a

legitimate public policy, that is, facilitating clients’

access to an attorney of their choice, the trial court

should have exercised de novo review’’). In response,

the plaintiffs, Crystal Horrocks, Yaritza Reyes, Dina

Danielle Caviello, Jacqueline Green, Sugeily Ortiz and

Zuleyma Bella Lopez, contend: ‘‘Although the first issue

raised by the defendants in this appeal is disguised

as a legal question concerning the standard of review

utilized by the trial court, they are actually asking this

court to hold that the trial court applied an improper

standard of review to a claim it was never asked to

consider. Despite never challenging the arbitrator’s

determination that the . . . agreement was void as a

matter of public policy, in [their] motion to vacate [the

arbitration awards], the defendants now ask this court

to reverse the trial court on an issue [they] never raised.’’

The defendants raise for the first time on appeal the

issue of whether the arbitrator properly had determined

that the agreement was void as a matter of the public

policy of the freedom to contract and challenge the

standard of review purportedly used by the trial court

in addressing that issue. However, there is an obstacle

in the path of reviewability. The defendants never raised

in connection with their motion to vacate a challenge

to the arbitrator’s decision that the agreement was void

as a matter of the public policy of the freedom to contract, and, as a result, the trial court did not address

that issue, much less apply a standard of review to it.

The defendants’ mere citation in their motion to vacate

to Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 416, for the proposition that
the arbitrator in the present case exceeded his authority

under General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4), is not sufficient.

Although Schoonmaker concerns the necessity to

review an arbitrator’s decision de novo where it affects

the public policy of a client’s right to be represented

by an attorney of his or her choice, reference to Schoonmaker, without more, would not alert a trial court to the

distinct freedom to contract ground that the defendants

now assert for the first time on appeal. This court cannot

review a claim on appeal that the trial court applied

the wrong standard of review to a claim that it had not

been asked to review. Issues must be distinctly raised

before the trial court to be reviewable on appeal. See E.

Prescott, Connecticut Appellate Practice & Procedure

(7th Ed. 2021) § 8-2:1.1, p. 466; see also Practice Book

§ 60-5 (reviewing court not bound to consider claim not

distinctly raised at trial).