58822 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 190 / Friday, October 1, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number.

Regulatory Analysis 

A regulatory analysis has not been 

prepared for this rulemaking. This final 

rule makes an administrative change in 

the method of calculating the NRC’s 

application fee for criminal history 

checks requested by licensees. The 

amendment is required to ensure that 

the NRC recovers the full cost of the 

criminal history program from licensees 

using the service. Because this rule 

implements the Section 149 

requirement that the cost of the criminal 

history check be paid by the licensee or 

applicant, a regulatory analysis is 

unnecessary. 

Backfit Analysis 

The NRC has determined that the 

backfit rule does not apply to this final 

rule and a backfit analysis is not 

required because this amendment does 

not involve any provisions that would 

impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 

Chapter I. 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act 

In accordance with the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has 

determined that this action is not a 

major rule and has verified this 

determination with the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs of 

OMB.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous 

materials transportation, Import, 

Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants 

and reactors, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures.

■ For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, 

the NRC is adopting the following 

amendments to 10 CFR part 73.

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

PLANTS AND MATERIALS

■ 1. The authority citation for part 73 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, 

as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 

2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 

106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 

5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 

U.S.C. 3504 note).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 

141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 

U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also 

issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96–295, 94 

Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 

is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99–399, 100 

Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

■ 2. In § 73.57, paragraph (d)(3) is 

revised to read as follows:

§ 73.57 Requirements for criminal history 

checks of individuals granted unescorted 

access to a nuclear power facility or access 

to Safeguards Information by power reactor 

licensees.

* * * * *

(d) * * * 

(3) (i) Fees for the processing of 

fingerprint checks are due upon 

application. Licensees shall submit 

payment with the application for the 

processing of fingerprints through 

corporate check, certified check, 

cashier’s check, money order, or 

electronic payment, made payable to 

‘‘U.S. NRC.’’ (For guidance on making 

electronic payments, contact the 

Security Branch, Division of Facilities 

and Security, at (301) 415–7404). 

Combined payment for multiple 

applications is acceptable. 

(ii) The application fee is the sum of 

the user fee charged by the FBI for each 

fingerprint card or other fingerprint 

record submitted by the NRC on behalf 

of a nuclear power plant licensee, and 

an administrative processing fee 

assessed by the NRC. The NRC 

processing fee covers administrative 

costs associated with NRC handling of 

licensee fingerprint submissions. The 

Commission publishes the amount of 

the fingerprint check application fee on 

the NRC public Web site. (To find the 

current fee amount, go to the Electronic 

Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/

site-help/eie.html and select the link for 

the Criminal History Program.) The 

Commission will directly notify 

licensees who are subject to this 

regulation of any fee changes.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day 

of September, 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Martin J. Virgilio, 

Acting Executive Director for Operations.

[FR Doc. 04–21766 Filed 9–30–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. CE212, Special Condition 23–

151–SC] 

Special Conditions; ARINC, Inc.; 

Raytheon Models 200, 300, and B300; 

Protection of Systems for High 

Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued to ARINC, Inc.; 1632 S. Murray 

Boulevard; Colorado Springs, CO 80916 

for a Supplemental Type Certificate for 

the Raytheon Model King Air 200, 300 

and B300 airplanes. These airplanes 

will have novel and unusual design 

features when compared to the state of 

technology envisaged in the applicable 

airworthiness standards. The novel and 

unusual design features include the 

installation of a Digital Air Data 

Computer on the copilot side. The 

Digital Air Data Computer will be either 

an IS&S ADDU (Air Data Display Unit) 

or a Thommen AD32 Air Data Display 

for which the applicable regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

airworthiness standards for the 

protection of these systems from the 

effects of high intensity radiated fields 

(HIRF). These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to the airworthiness 

standards applicable to these airplanes.

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is September 20, 

2004. Comments must be received on or 

before November 1, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed 

in duplicate to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Regional Counsel, 

ACE–7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, 

Docket No. CE212, Room 506, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All 

comments must be marked: Docket No. 

CE212. Comments may be inspected in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes 

Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards 

Office (ACE–110), Small Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, 

Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone 

(816) 329–4127.

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 190 / Friday, October 1, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 58823

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable because these 

procedures would significantly delay 

issuance of the approval and thus 

delivery of the affected aircraft. In 

addition, the substance of these special 

conditions has been subject to the 

public comment process in several prior 

instances with no substantive comments 

received. The FAA, therefore, finds that 

good cause exists for making these 

special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit such written data, views, or 

arguments as they may desire. 

Communications should identify the 

regulatory docket or notice number and 

be submitted in duplicate to the address 

specified above. All communications 

received on or before the closing date 

for comments will be considered by the 

Administrator. The special conditions 

may be changed in light of the 

comments received. All comments 

received will be available in the Rules 

Docket for examination by interested 

persons, both before and after the 

closing date for comments. A report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this rulemaking will be filed in the 

docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to 

acknowledge receipt of their comments 

submitted in response to this notice 

must include a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard on which the following 

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to 

Docket No. CE212.’’ The postcard will 

be date stamped and returned to the 

commenter. 

Background 

On February 9, 2004, ARINC, Inc.; 

1632 S. Murray Boulevard, Colorado 

Springs, CO 80916, made application to 

the FAA for a new Supplemental Type 

Certificate for the Raytheon Model 200, 

300, and B300 airplanes. The Raytheon 

Models of concern are approved under 

TC No. A24CE. The proposed 

modification incorporates a novel or 

unusual design feature, a digital air data 

computer, which may be vulnerable to 

HIRF external to the airplane. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 

21, § 21.101, ARINC, Inc. must show 

that the Raytheon Model 200, 300, and 

B300 aircraft meet the following 

provisions, or the applicable regulations 

in effect on the date of application for 

the change to the Raytheon Model 200, 

300, and B300: For those areas modified 

or impacted by the installation of the 

IS&S ADDU (Air Data Display Unit) or 

a Thommen AD32 Air Data Display 

system, the following paragraphs as 

amended by Amendments 23–1 through 

23–54 must be complied with: §§23.305, 

23.307, 23.365, 23.603, 23.609, 23.611, 

23.613, 23.625, 23.627, 23.771, 23.773, 

23.777, 23.1301, 23.1303, 23.1309, 

23.1311, 23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1325, 

23.1331, 23.1335, 23.1351, 23.1357, 

23.1359, 23.1361, 23.1365, 23.1367, 

23.1381, 23.1431, 23.1529, 23.1541, 

23.1543, 23.1581 and the special 

conditions adopted by this rulemaking 

action. For systems that are not 

modified or impacted by the 

installation, the original certification 

basis listed on TC No. A24CE are still 

applicable. 

Discussion 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards because of novel or 

unusual design features of an airplane, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

the provisions of §21.16. 

Special conditions, as appropriate, as 

defined in §11.19, are issued in 

accordance with §11.38 after public 

notice and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the models for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model already 

included on the same type certificate to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under the provisions of §21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

ARINC, Inc. plans to incorporate 

certain novel and unusual design 

features into an airplane for which the 

airworthiness standards do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for protection from the effects of HIRF. 

These features include the addition of a 

digital Air Data computer, which may 

be susceptible to the HIRF environment, 

that were not envisaged by the existing 

regulations for this type of airplane. 

Protection of Systems From High 

Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) 

Recent advances in technology have 

given rise to the application in aircraft 

designs of advanced electrical and 

electronic systems that perform 

functions required for continued safe 

flight and landing. Due to the use of 

sensitive solid-state advanced 

components in analog and digital 

electronics circuits, these advanced 

systems are readily responsive to the 

transient effects of induced electrical 

current and voltage caused by the HIRF. 

The HIRF can degrade electronic 

systems performance by damaging 

components or upsetting system 

functions. 

Furthermore, the HIRF environment 

has undergone a transformation that was 

not foreseen when the current 

requirements were developed. Higher 

energy levels are radiated from 

transmitters that are used for radar, 

radio, and television. Also, the number 

of transmitters has increased 

significantly. There is also uncertainty 

concerning the effectiveness of airframe 

shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, 

coupling to cockpit-installed equipment 

through the cockpit window apertures is 

undefined. 

The combined effect of the 

technological advances in airplane 

design and the changing environment 

has resulted in an increased level of 

vulnerability of electrical and electronic 

systems required for the continued safe 

flight and landing of the airplane. 

Effective measures against the effects of 

exposure to HIRF must be provided by 

the design and installation of these 

systems. The accepted maximum energy 

levels in which civilian airplane system 

installations must be capable of 

operating safely are based on surveys 

and analysis of existing radio frequency 

emitters. These special conditions 

require that the airplane be evaluated 

under these energy levels for the 

protection of the electronic system and 

its associated wiring harness. These 

external threat levels, which are lower 

than previous required values, are 

believed to represent the worst case to 

which an airplane would be exposed in 

the operating environment. 

These special conditions require 

qualification of systems that perform 

critical functions, as installed in aircraft, 

to the defined HIRF environment in 

paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed 

value using laboratory tests, in 

paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate 

that the operation and operational 

capability of the installed electrical and 

electronic systems that perform critical 

functions are not adversely affected 

when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF 

environment defined below:

Frequency 

Field strength

(volts per meter) 

Peak Average 

10 kHz–100 kHz ... 50 50 

100 kHz–500 kHz 50 50 

500 kHz–2 MHz .... 50 50 

58824 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 190 / Friday, October 1, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 

Frequency 

Field strength

(volts per meter) 

Peak Average 

2 MHz–30 MHz ..... 100 100 

30 MHz–70 MHz ... 50 50 

70 MHz–100 MHz 50 50 

100 MHz–200 MHz 100 100 

200 MHz–400 MHz 100 100 

400 MHz–700 MHz 700 50 

700 MHz–1 GHz ... 700 100 

1 GHz–2 GHz ....... 2000 200 

2 GHz–4 GHz ....... 3000 200 

4 GHz–6 GHz ....... 3000 200 

6 GHz–8 GHz ....... 1000 200 

8 GHz–12 GHz ..... 3000 300 

12 GHz–18 GHz ... 2000 200 

18 GHz–40 GHz ... 600 200 

The field strengths are expressed in terms 

of peak root-mean-square (rms) values. 

or, 

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by 

a system test and analysis that the 

electrical and electronic systems that 

perform critical functions can withstand 

a minimum threat of 100 volts per 

meter, electrical field strength, from 10 

kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to 

show compliance with the HIRF 

requirements, no credit is given for 

signal attenuation due to installation. 

A preliminary hazard analysis must 

be performed by the applicant, for 

approval by the FAA, to identify either 

electrical or electronic systems that 

perform critical functions. The term 

‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose 

failure would contribute to, or cause, a 

failure condition that would prevent the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

airplane. The systems identified by the 

hazard analysis that perform critical 

functions are candidates for the 

application of HIRF requirements. A 

system may perform both critical and 

non-critical functions. Primary 

electronic flight display systems, and 

their associated components, perform 

critical functions such as attitude, 

altitude, and airspeed indication. The 

HIRF requirements apply only to critical 

functions. 

Compliance with HIRF requirements 

may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, 

models, similarity with existing 

systems, or any combination of these. 

Service experience alone is not 

acceptable since normal flight 

operations may not include an exposure 

to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a 

system with similar design features for 

redundancy as a means of protection 

against the effects of external HIRF is 

generally insufficient since all elements 

of a redundant system are likely to be 

exposed to the fields concurrently. 

Applicability: As discussed above, 

these special conditions are applicable 

to Raytheon Model 200, 300, and B300 

airplanes. Should ARINC, Inc. apply at 

a later date for a supplemental type 

certificate to modify any other model on 

the same type certificate to incorporate 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model as well under the 

provisions of § 21.101. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on the 

models listed. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

The substance of these special 

conditions has been subjected to the 

notice and comment period in several 

prior instances and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. It is unlikely that 

prior public comment would result in a 

significant change from the substance 

contained herein. For this reason, and 

because a delay would significantly 

affect the certification of the airplane, 

which is imminent, the FAA has 

determined that prior public notice and 

comment are unnecessary and 

impracticable, and good cause exists for 

adopting these special conditions upon 

issuance. The FAA is requesting 

comments to allow interested persons to 

submit views that may not have been 

submitted in response to the prior 

opportunities for comment described 

above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols.

Citation

■ The authority citation for these special 

conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 

44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 

11.38 and 11.19. 

The Special Conditions

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the type certification 

basis for Raytheon Model 200, 300, and 

B300 airplanes modified by ARINC, Inc. 

to add a digital Air Data computer. 

1. Protection of Electrical and 

Electronic Systems From High Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system 

that performs critical functions must be 

designed and installed to ensure that the 

operations, and operational capabilities 

of these systems to perform critical 

functions, are not adversely affected 

when the airplane is exposed to high 

intensity radiated electromagnetic fields 

external to the airplane. 

2. For the purpose of these special 

conditions, the following definition 

applies: Critical Functions: Functions 

whose failure would contribute to, or 

cause, a failure condition that would 

prevent the continued safe flight and 

landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on 

September 20, 2004. 

David R. Showers, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–22019 Filed 9–30–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19170; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NE–18–AD; Amendment 39–

13809; AD 2004–20–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & 

Whitney Canada PT6B–36A and PT6B–

36B Turboshaft Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & 

Whitney Canada (PWC) PT6B–36A and 

PT6B–36B turboshaft engines with 

compressor rear hubs, part number (P/

N) 3018111 installed. This AD requires 

reviewing, and correcting if necessary 

the critical part record for compressor 

rear hubs, P/N 3018111. This AD also 

requires removing compressor rear hubs 

from service that exceed the published 

part life limit, before further flight. This 

AD results from the discovery of a 

compressor rear hub, P/N 3018111, that 

exceeded the published life limit. This 

occurred because the operator used an 

incorrect life limit calculation contained 

in a PWC Service Bulletin. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent uncontained 

failure of the compressor rear hub and 

damage to the airplane.

DATES: Effective October 18, 2004. The 

Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the 

regulations as of October 18, 2004. 

We must receive any comments on 

this AD by November 30, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD.